

THE OPERATION OF FREEDOM IN THE INDIVIDUAL -
A STUDY IN STUART HAMPSHIRE'S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

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By

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PREFACE

This study in Stuart Hampshire's philosophy of mind was prompted by an interest in gathering from his various essays and symposiums the more detailed expositions of the concepts which constitute the freedom of the individual as it is reflected in Thought and Action, and making a specific and detailed examination of the basis and nature of the freedom which Hampshire posits for individuals.

DECLARATION

Unless specifically indicated to the contrary in the text, the whole thesis is my own original work.

This thesis has not been submitted for a degree in any other university.

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INTRODUCTION

Individuals refer to themselves and to others as being free or as lacking freedom in certain areas of their interests and capacities. The chief concern of this study of freedom is therefore not with the question of whether individuals can properly be said to have freedom, but rather with the nature and extent of the freedom which manifests itself in an individual's capacities as an agent, observer and language user.

Stuart Hampshire posits a relative lack of intellectual freedom centering on the connection between freedom and knowledge; the impetus for this study is thus provided by the question

"Why should that which I do
with full knowledge of what
I am doing alone constitute
that which I do with full
freedom?" (i)

The aim of this thesis is to examine the connection between freedom and knowledge as it is reflected in Hampshire's philosophy of mind through the concepts of Language, Intention, Knowledge, Action, Moral Questions and Responsibility.

What emerges from examining this connection in terms of the concepts employed by individuals which make it possible are the grounds and justification for Hampshire's view that the greater the degree of an individual's self-consciousness in action, and the more clear and

explicit /

ⁱ Hampshire, S. Thought and Action, 4th edition. London: Chatto and Windus, 1970, p.133.

explicit his knowledge of what he is doing, the greater the degree of his freedom will be.

The abovementioned concepts are outlined and examined in independent sections to establish the importance of each as it pertains to the question of freedom. A problem that arises out of this procedure is that these concepts cannot effectively be separated. They are essentially interrelated, each depending on the others for its intelligibility. Thus, although the emphasis in each section will be on the particular concept being examined, implicit and explicit references to the other concepts are unavoidable; these references are elucidated more fully in the sections dealing with such concepts referred to. Because of this, no single section of this thesis can, on its own, provide an adequate reflection of the nature of freedom which Hampshire posits for the individual.

Hampshire's style presents difficulties, particularly in Thought and Action which is the central reference for this study. He writes loosely, albeit eloquently, often adding to an idea in a piecemeal fashion. The comments of some of his critics reflect this view. O'Connor is the most militant in decrying Hampshire's style, and says

"Thought and Action is hard to describe, impossible to summarize and very difficult to read It lacks any clear thread of argument or any ordered conclusions from evidence and lacks at the same time the concrete examples that might have helped the reader to hold on to the subtle connections that Professor Hampshire traces between the concepts that he deals with." (ii)

Strawson /

ii O'Connor, D.J. Philosophy. The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy vol XXXVI, 1961, p.231.

Strawson simply offers that

"It is not easy to read: it has indeed to be read as a whole more than once for the general movement of thought to be discerned." (iii)

Scriven comments on the complexity of the work in a more humorous vein :

"Behind the scenes of the philosophical argument in this book, there is a director cum critic who utters a prologue, takes an occasional hand in the prompt box, gives a short speech at the end, and wrote the programme notes. This director is also the author." (iv)

Although Hampshire's critics use epithets such as "diffuse", "unclear", "infuriating", "baffling" and "verbose" in outlining their objections, nearly all recognise it as a valuable contribution to the philosophy of mind. Wheatley, however, believes that almost any type of enquiry needs justification if it is to be understood and sees a statement of Strawson's as providing this. He quotes

"Up to a point the reliance upon a close examination of the actual use of words is the best, indeed the only sure way in philosophy. But the discriminations we can make, and the connexions we can establish, in this way, are not general enough and not far-reaching enough to meet the full, metaphysical

demand /

iii Strawson, P.F. Philosophical Quarterly Review,
vol 1, no.1, 1960, p.7.

iv Scriven, M. Mind vol LXXI, no.281. January, 1962.

demand for understanding. For when we ask how we use this or that expression, our answers, however revealing at a certain level, are apt to assume, and not to expose, those general elements of structure which the metaphysician wants revealed. The structure he seeks does not readily display itself on the surface of language, but lies submerged. He must abandon his only sure guide when the guide cannot take him as far as he wishes to go."

(v)

Besides providing a justification it would, in some measure, account for the difficulties encountered in reading Hampshire's work and establishing a consistent pattern in his thought because it reflects the complex nature of the material with which he is dealing, viz. the powers, interests and limitations of individuals.

^v Wheatley, J. Hampshire on Human Freedom. Philosophical Quarterly, vol 12, 1962, p.249, as quoted from Strawson, P.F. Individuals. An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London: Methuen, 1961, p.9-10.

CHAPTER 1

LANGUAGE

1. Introduction

An examination of Hampshire's views on language in an independent section immediately presents problems. To give a complete analysis of language in this section would be drastically to impoverish the other sections of this thesis. To separate a discussion of language from a discussion of concepts such as intention, knowledge, action and moral argument would be to distort Hampshire's philosophy of mind.

To try and avoid such distortion, or alternatively, repetition, the examination of Hampshire's views on language will be chiefly confined to a specific aspect which is significant for the consideration of the freedom of the individual; Hampshire's further views on language, equally important for the question of freedom, will be included in the relevant contexts.

Hampshire attributes to individuals a relative lack of intellectual freedom rather than an absolute freedom or lack of freedom.⁽¹⁾ A basis for the type of freedom he posits can be found in his views on the structure of the individual's thought about the world.

The focus of this section will therefore be on an outline of what Hampshire sees as being two necessary features of language, i.e. the rule of identity and the rule of resemblance, and the organising notions which the individual employs in the application of these two necessary features of language; from this it emerges that in

organising /

¹ Hampshire, S. Thought and Action. 4th edition. London; Chatto & Windus 1970, p.209.
(Hereafter referred to as T & A.)

organising his world,⁽²⁾ the individual unavoidably compares, criticises and reflects even if only to a limited degree. These capacities are for Hampshire intrinsic to the concept of a self-determining and free individual, and the degree to which an individual employs them determines the degree to which he is acting freely and responsibly.

Scriven asks, *inter alia*, why these rules are necessary and is of the opinion that Hampshire does not provide an answer.⁽³⁾

Hampshire is using the term "necessary" in the sense of "ultimate", "most general", "not to be further explained",⁽⁴⁾ so the explanation or description of any particular system of thought or language, or part of a language, will involve and include these general features.

He is not claiming absolute finality for this because it is not within his power to predict the forms which language may take with the development of human powers and interests. He is simply talking about language as we know it.

It is necessary that the individual employs an organising principle, constituted for Hampshire by the two above-mentioned rules, because

"Reality and experience cannot be thought about unless we have rules that correlate particular groups of signs with particular recurrent elements in reality and experience, in such a way that any familiar use of a particular group of signs will be taken as a reference to some particular element in experience." (5)

Scriven /

2 The term "world" indicates more than simply the objects in the environment towards which an individual directs his practical interests; it includes these practical interests and the individual's capacity for realising them.

3 Scriven, M. Vlll - Critical Notices. Mind, vol LXXI, no.281. Jan. 1962, p.101.

4 (Hereafter referred to as Mind, vol LXXI, 1962.)

5 T & A, p.14.

5 Ibid. p.11-12.

Scriven objects to the notion of recurrent elements in reality and experience and asks

"Can 'recurrent element' be given a meaning without circularity, i.e. without appeal to the recurrence of a certain sign-group in linguistic activity 'about' the element ?" (6)

It is not clear why Scriven should see a problem of circularity in Hampshire's idea that the individual refers to recurrent elements in reality and experience and identifies and classifies them as being the same or similar in all or some respects when they appear again.

"Recurrent element" may be seen to be applicable in different senses, viz :

- the same chair (numerically the same) may be perceived after a period of non-continuous observation and, by means of distinguishing marks and characteristics, be identified and classified as the same chair recurring in an individual's experience.
- a chair (qualitatively similar in all respects, but numerically different from the first) may be perceived and identified and classified as a chair.
- a chair (qualitatively different and numerically different from the first two chairs, but serving the same function) may be perceived and identified and classified as a chair.

"Recurrent element" is applicable in all three of these senses (these not necessarily being the only ones) because in each case the chair represents an element in the individual's experience of which he has some knowledge based upon previous experience and which he can therefore identify and classify in terms of a particular context, i.e. function, and to which he applies the term "chair".

Before /

⁶ Scriven, Mind, vol LXXI, 1962, p.101.

Before outlining and discussing the two rules it is necessary to point out that Hampshire is not concerned with defining the word "language", nor with the systematic classification of different forms of language as this gives rise to too simple an opposition of thought/action, and speech/action.

In the consideration of the freedom of the individual it is important that there should not be this opposition because it is the intention which enters into and guides the action that distinguishes the action from mere natural movement or unintentional behaviour; and it is the possibility that an individual has of declaring or expressing his intentions that gives sense to the notion of intention itself.

For Hampshire, the using of language must therefore be viewed as a particular kind of human behaviour, so that individuals may be simultaneously considered as observers, agents and language users. This simultaneity, as will be seen in the examination of intention, knowledge, action, moral questions and responsibility in subsequent chapters, is reflected throughout Hampshire's philosophy of mind.

2. The Principle of Individuation or Rule of Identity

Hampshire sees the necessary features of language as being two kinds of rules which are essentially related in the sense of implying each other. The first of these to be outlined, the rule of identity, is derived from the individual's identification of objects and experiencing them as being the same when they appear again.

Hampshire does not, in Thought and Action, indicate very clearly what is involved in the identification of something as being a thing of a certain kind. He, however, does so in his paper, Perception and Identification. He says

"To /

"To identify something perceived as a physical object of a certain kind is to be committed to some implication either about the history, or the causal properties, of the thing perceived." (7)

And

"Finding some answer, however incomplete, to the question: 'What was their history before they were perceived on that occasion?' is a necessary part of finding an answer to the question 'What are they?' An historical, or quasi-causal, judgement is always implied in the identification of something as an object of a certain kind." (8)

Hampshire contrasts identification of objects with what he calls non-committal descriptions, and says of these

"These are pure, non-committal descriptions of something perceived or felt, but not identified." (9)

This contrast is important for accounting for the inter-dependence of the rule of identity and the rule of resemblance. This will be discussed immediately after an outline of the rule of identity has been given.

Hampshire introduces a qualification for the rule of identity because he does not want to imply anything metaphysical about the way in which the world is structured. The qualification is that the rule of identity does not give us absolute things because the description of reality is inexhaustible. He illustrates this by saying that one cannot give any sense to the claim that one has identified all the things that there are; nor even to the more limited claims that one has exhaustively /

⁷ Hampshire, S. and Strawson, P.F. Perception and Identification. Aristotelian Society Supp. vol XXXV July, 1961. p.96.
(Hereafter referred to as Aristotelian Society Supp. vol XXV, 1961)

⁸ Hampshire and Strawson, Aristotelian Society Supp. vol XXXV, 1961, p.89.

⁹ Ibid p.96.

exhaustively identified all the things in a particular room.

To give an outline of the application of this rule - Hampshire sees every individual who can state his intentions as having an ontology, i.e. a range of entities to which he can make identifying references and which sometimes enter into his practical intentions.

It is, however, important that the individual should have the means of speaking about particular entities or elements in reality because reality is constantly changing. He needs points of attachment so that he can know whether the same thing is still being referred to or whether the topic has changed. If the individual was not able to make this distinction, he would have no means of contradicting a statement and therefore no means of distinguishing between truth and falsity; so, without points of attachment, all statements would be unrestricted general statements. Furthermore, it is only by means of having points of attachment that the individual can give sense to every other type of description, i.e. in terms of states and relations and processes.

Language is a means which the individual has for differentiating elements and for singling out and directing attention to particular elements of reality and experience.

According to Hampshire, in singling out and directing attention to particular elements, the rule of identity is applied in the form of a statement which has the force of "this is a so-and-so". In making such statements, the individual uses his eyes, ears and sense of touch in conjunction with an established language. Hampshire emphasises that any application of language and thought to reality involves the fundamental form of a statement "this is a so-and-so", and explains this by saying

"One /

"One must be in a position to use an expression which has the force or plays the part of 'That is a so-and-so'. This is only the truism that, if I am to speak about anything, I must have the means of referring to something in particular. To give a sense to any expression which replaces 'so-and-so', is to give instructions for distinguishing 'so-and-so's' from anything else: not only to give the means of recognising 'so-and-so's' in general, but also to state what makes any 'so-and-so' the same 'so-and-so.'" (10)

Wheatley criticises this statement on the grounds that it implies that any language necessarily contains common nouns.⁽¹¹⁾ To disprove this he constructs a language, similar to our own, but which has no common nouns; objects are referred to, not by means of the fundamental form of the statement "this is a so-and-so", but by means of spatio-temporal co-ordinates.

Kirk⁽¹²⁾ replies to this by asserting that Hampshire has not said that a language must have common nouns which are referred to by means of some form of the statement "this is a so-and-so", but rather that a language must have terms for naming or referring to elements in reality and experience, these terms having the fundamental form of "this is a so-and-so." Besides this there must also be terms which, although they do not take the form of the statement "this is a so-and-so", fulfil the function or have the force of a statement of this kind. As an

illustration /

¹⁰ T & A, p.15.

¹¹ Wheatley, J. The Necessary Presuppositions of Language. The Philosophical Quarterly, vol 11, no.44, July 1961.

¹² Kirk, R. Language and Necessity. Philosophical Quarterly, vol 12, January 1962, p.77.

illustration of this second type of term Kirk says

"Thus 'This is blue' singles out this object from other objects by reference to its colouring; 'blue' does the work of 'a so-and-so' (or of 'a blue object')." (13)

Kirk contends that all that is implied in this is that there must be types of term which an individual can employ to identify and single out elements in reality and experience as being of a certain kind, and that there is no implication that all languages must contain specific parts of speech, viz. common nouns.

Individuals single out and direct their attention to elements of reality and experience both in the sense of their own observations and manipulation of them, and in the sense of referring to them on occasions of discourse with others. An individual explains this reference to things on such occasions by handling or pointing to the thing to which he is referring.

In Hampshire's view, pointing is a natural, pre-social gesture performed with intention, and is the link on which all communication about physical things ultimately depends. He maintains that pointing has "a natural sense and direction, and therefore a natural indeterminate meaning - 'From me to this'". (14)

If the individual wants to make an identifying reference to something which cannot be pointed to because it is not within the range of objects sensibly present, he can identify it by means of a description, and relate it to something which can be pointed out. The structure of language is built on the fact that each speaker speaks to an actual or potential hearer, and communication depends on the identifiability and identification of objects.

Hampshire /

¹³ Ibid. p.78.
¹⁴ T & A, p.55.

Hampshire sees the constant objects of reference to which individuals may refer by means of a statement which has the form "this is a so-and-so" as being constituted by persisting things. He does not clearly demarcate a class or category of persisting things and indicates that the question as to whether something is a persisting thing or a process can only be answered in the context of a particular grammar.

Scriven⁽¹⁵⁾ questions the contrast between persisting things and processes and events made in the statement

"I am in effect arguing that we must unavoidably think of reality as consisting of persisting things of different types and kinds ... rather than of events and processes of different types and kinds." (16)

Scriven finds the contrast vacuous because the term "thing" is used so generally, viz.

"There are no criteria that anything must satisfy in order to be called a thing in the widest sense of the word." (17)

He also objects to the notion that the contrast depends on the way in which particular grammars distinguish nouns and verbs, as this could not adequately fix the contrast since it does not take into account the fact that thing-terms can or could be taken to stand for processes in most languages.

It must be seen, however, that the important point in making the contrast is not whether an event or process can be called a thing or whether thing-terms stand for processes, but rather that in the interests of consistent identification of objects around him the individual requires fairly constant points of attachment for his

identifying /

¹⁵ Scriven, Mind, vol LXXI, 1962, p.102.

¹⁶ Ibid, as quoted from T & A, p.17.

¹⁷ T & A, p.25.

identifying references; these constant points of attachment will be constituted by the relatively persisting elements in his experience.

Hampshire indicates an important feature of persisting things as being that they do, to some degree, retain their identity through change and therefore have a history.

This having a history means that the individual can discover how they came to be in a particular place, and therefore how they came to stand in a particular relation to a speaker as an object of reference. Another important feature which arises out of this is that they can be re-identified as being one and the same when they appear again.

For Hampshire, ordinary physical or concrete objects and persons are the most obvious cases of things that retain their identity through change. He maintains

"Of physical objects of any kind, there is always the requirement that, as physical objects, they should have a characteristic history, however short, or certain causal properties, which are characteristic of their kind. They cannot simply appear, from anywhere or nowhere, before an observer, exhibit a characteristic appearance, and then disappear anywhere or nowhere." (18)

Ordinary physical objects qualify as persisting things because, to use Strawson's terms, ⁽¹⁹⁾ they are relatively enduring and maintain relatively fixed or regularly changing relations with other physical objects and with persons.

Hampshire maintains that individuals necessarily make a

distinction /

¹⁸ Hampshire and Strawson, Aristotelian Society Supp. vol XXXV, July 1961, p.89.

¹⁹ Strawson, P.F. Individuals. 2nd edition. London, Lowe and Brydone, 1961, p.53.

distinction between a thing and its changing properties. He is not, in this, positing an unknowable thing-in-itself in the Kantian sense; what he is positing is that the individual makes a contrast between the momentary appearance of the object as he perceives the sound, look or feel of it at a particular moment and from a particular point of view, and its real or enduring properties. There is no principle of individuation for sense data, so that to identify the object perceived, the individual must move from the marks of recognition to the nature of the continuing thing itself.

Objects of other types which can be singled out but which do not persist for any length of time to form constant points of attachment depend for their reference on persisting things, e.g. flashes of lightning, rainbows, etc. can be identified and re-identified through their spatial relations to concrete persisting objects or to the observer. The implication which emerges is that persons and persisting things are the constant or basic objects of reference in the individual's conceptual scheme and that reference to other elements of experience, in some sense either explicitly or implicitly, depend on reference to these persisting objects. This may be seen as the essential and important contrast which Hampshire is making.

Hampshire also takes into account the types of non-physical objects which persist and form points of attachment in the individual's identifying references. With the development of human interests, knowledge and vocabulary, more and more objects are singled out as having a traceable history; some of these may be abstract and not have the sort of spatio-temporal continuity of physical things. By way of illustration, Hampshire says that individuals can single out types, patterns or models of artefacts and enquire into their history in

much /

much the same way that they can enquire into the history of the artefact.

They may, he admits, simply be regarded as characteristics of the artefact and not as persisting things; but the important point is that they have a traceable history and can be constant objects of reference. A further example Hampshire provides is of the sort of "physical things" which scientists refer to. These do not offer perceptible resistance to the human body, but they have the status of physical bodies because of their power of affecting other bodies. Hampshire does not specify but acceptable examples would be photons, neutrons and electrons.

Persons or individuals are regarded by Hampshire as the most important persisting things in experience. This is because each individual always carries with him the idea of at least one persisting thing, which is himself. This idea that the individual has of himself is the idea of one active body amongst other bodies, moving and changing his viewpoint at will.

In talking about the self, Hampshire makes a distinction between the self as agent and the self as observer. This is a secondary, theoretical distinction because they are in fact inseparable. This is borne out by the terms in which Hampshire describes the individual in his situation; he talks about the pronoun "I" as being the nucleus on which all other referential devices depend, e.g. I can identify; I point from me to it; but I do not just point, I interact with objects in the world by moving or manipulating them, or finding that they resist me; I situate myself in relation to other objects; I move in relation to other objects. In this Hampshire is tying up pointing, thinking or states of consciousness and being active.

The individual always traces spatial and temporal

relations /

relations from his own particular standpoint as the central point of reference; this means that the individual has a permanent point of attachment for even his most subjective impressions.

Just as there is no principle of individuation for sense data, there is also no principle of individuation attached to such concepts as states of mind, attitudes, emotions, passions and moods. This is the case for Hampshire because, although a form of the statement "this is a so-and-so" is used to refer to them, there is no sense in which an individual could distinguish the same emotion, attitude etc., from an emotion or attitude which is similar in all respects.

Hampshire calls them organic sensations; they are not identifiable objects which can be surveyed by different observers from different points of view because they are not perceived, they just occur. He is, in this, making an absolute distinction between sensations and perceptions.

His contention is that the individual cannot simply pick them out as separate entities and label them, and in this way give an inventory of his feelings. To be able to refer to them at all, the individual has to fit them into the narrative of his life; he therefore has to exteriorize them. Hampshire denies that this need to exteriorize sensations is simply a necessity of language and description. He claims that the individual's feelings occur in conjunction with his doing or perceiving something and being conscious of his situation. Sensations imply some sort of reason for acting, i.e. either the deliberate extending of pleasure or avoiding of pain. He does not say whether one's action is directed to that which caused the pain, to the perceived object, he just makes pleasure and pain reasons for acting. An action is the natural expression of the individual's

feelings /

feelings and even if he tries not to show pain, this is still an act.

In speaking of his sensations the individual is therefore compelled to speak of them as sensations caused by something or as occurring at the same time as something else. This means that the individual could not describe his sensations unless he has the means of identifying and describing external objects. Once the individual has the means of describing or labelling his mental states he can think and speak of them as if they were objects to be manipulated in relation to his intentions.

In speaking of the distinction between objects and their properties and persons and sensations, Hampshire emphasises that there are not

"just two kinds of description of reality and experience, always neatly divided from each other, one being the description of subjective impressions and the other being the identification of objects in the external world. Descriptions of the look of things, of sounds, colours, tastes, smells, sensations and subjective impressions, may take many forms for many different purposes, some of them involving simultaneously an identification of the thing and a description of its momentary appearance." (20)

The necessity of the principle of individuation or rule of identity is expressed by Hampshire as the necessity in the use of language that individuals should refer to persisting objects employing some criteria of identity through change. This notion of employing criteria of identity indicates the importance of the second rule, viz. the rule of resemblance as the complement of the

rule /

rule of identity in the sense that, in order to be able to identify something as being a thing of a certain kind, the individual must include something about the history or the normal uses or the causal properties of the thing perceived.

In order to be able to say something about the history, normal uses and causal properties of the thing perceived and identify it as being a thing of a certain kind, the individual would have to use his background knowledge of the history, normal uses and causal properties of other things of a similar kind. In doing this he relates the thing perceived to a class of things which are similar enough, for his purposes, to warrant its inclusion in such a class, and distinguishes the thing perceived from those classes of things which are dissimilar enough, for his purposes, not to warrant its inclusion.

It is only in giving non-committal descriptions that an individual can avoid saying or implying anything about the history or origin or the causal properties and normal uses of the thing perceived. In such non-committal descriptions the individual is not committed to any criterion of identity through change. Hampshire raises the question as to whether non-committal descriptions in fact have a natural place in the individual's conceptual scheme. His contention is that they do not, because

"There seems to be no single and generally applicable way of answering the question: 'Suppose that you did not have the knowledge that you do have of your present situation, and of the nature of objects around you; what descriptions would you offer, based on the evidence of your senses alone, in referring to this object in your range of vision ?'" (21)

For Hampshire this sort of description does not seem to be possible because in giving descriptions individuals

always /

21 Hampshire and Strawson, Aristotelian Society Supp. vol XXXV, 1961, p.91-2.

always use their senses against a background of knowledge that they have in terms of the properties of the objects they identify. It appears therefore that in making a reference to some object as being a thing of a certain kind, the individual necessarily makes an identifying reference involving the application of both the rule of identity and the rule of resemblance.

The rule of resemblance has thus far simply been assumed. It is now necessary to give an outline of this rule, in the course of which much of what has been discussed above will become clearer.

3. The Principle of Classification or the Rule of Resemblance

This rule is derived from the singling out of elements in reality as being of the same kind. Their resemblance to each other determines the grounds for classifying them as being the same.

The qualification Hampshire introduces for the rule of resemblance is that individuals can go on picking out resemblances inexhaustibly. He maintains that to some extent they do as they perpetually extend the vocabulary of their language or as they learn to move from one language to another each recording resemblances in vocabularies that do not always translate each other.

To enlarge on the application of the rule of resemblance - Hampshire claims that reality by itself sets no limits to classification, because, when the individual surveys the external world he may look at as many things as he wishes or has the means to distinguish, and elements in reality may be classified in an indefinite number of alternative ways.

Scriven⁽²²⁾ objects to Hampshire's statement that "It is

also /

²² Scriven, Mind, vol LXXI, 1962, p.101.

also necessarily true that everything resembles everything in some respect." (23) To illustrate his objection he says

"The number ten and the last lamprey eaten by a king do not resemble each other in any respect. They are both things, but having an applicable common predicate is apparently not the same - in normal usage - as bearing a resemblance. The latter seems to require that the common property should be one in terms of which contrasts are normally or could usefully be made." (24)

The question as to whether the "number ten" could be termed "a thing" is difficult to ascertain from Hampshire's philosophy of mind because the term "thing" is used so generally; as regards the validity of the comparison it seems the objection must stand.

The objection can, however, be answered in part, on the basis of Scriven's own suggestion, viz. that Hampshire's claim should be amended to the effect that "almost anything can properly be said, in some context, to resemble any other given thing." (25) Since Scriven italicizes both "almost" and "in some context", it may be assumed that he assigns equal weight to each.

It is on the question of context that the objection can, in part, be answered because Hampshire states quite specifically that

"there is no constant sense attached to phrases 'same thing' and 'same event' or even 'same action', when these phrases are taken in isolation from any context that suggests the respect of identity. Reality is not divided into units that are identifiable apart from some particular system of classification." (26)

Admittedly /

23 T & A, p.31.

24 Scriven, Mind, vol LXXI, 1962, p.101.

25 Ibid, p.102.

26 T & A, p.223.

Admittedly the point is made nearly two hundred pages after the claim that everything must resemble everything else in some respect; but it is nevertheless made and in a chapter, i.e. Criticism and Regret, which is, according to Strawson,⁽²⁷⁾ the complement to the chapter in which the initial claim is made, i.e. Persons and their Situation.

A further reply to the objection may be found in Hampshire's contention that there cannot be a class of all things that exist, nor a class of all properties since there can be no rule for forming such classes; to instruct an individual to put all things that resemble each other together into groups is unintelligible. Because there are no criteria that anything must satisfy in order to be called a thing in the wide sense of the word, the individual cannot differentiate things simply as different or similar things; he must have criteria for seeing them as things of a certain kind, i.e. he must assume some single principle of similarity or resemblance.

As regards the question of "almost" anything resembling any other thing, a tentative suggestion is that if the terms "same" or "similar" which are employed in the application of the rule of resemblance only have a constant sense within a particular context that suggests the respect of identity, and if the individual must assume some single principle of similarity, does the question as to whether it is all or only almost all things that can be said to resemble each other in some respect, actually arise? This suggestion, if valid, would in effect be a criticism of both Hampshire and Scriven.

Hampshire's /

²⁷ Strawson, P.F. Philosophical Quarterly Review, vol 1, no.1, January 1960, p.7.

Hampshire's use of the term "resemblance" can be misleading because he is not referring primarily to resemblance in appearance; in fact, he says that individuals could not differentiate elements in reality by simply using colour, shape, smell and taste as criteria, as was apparent in his rejection of the idea of purely non-committal descriptions. He is not, however, entirely rejecting the differentiation of elements in terms of colour, shape, smell and taste as he allows that they may be used as criteria for specific types of classification. Of this he says,

"Given that we have already identified an object as an object of a certain kind, we can say how it looked on a particular occasion, or how in general this particular specimen differs in appearance from others of its kind. We can say of an object of one kind that it resembles in appearance, either in general or on a particular occasion, an object of a totally different kind." (28)

The criteria which individuals do employ Hampshire sees as being so complex and various that one cannot make an entirely valid generalisation. The criteria will, however, in some sense depend on the permanent and common interests of individuals and on the forms of their social life of which language is a part.

Because the criteria depend on human interests and the forms of social life, Hampshire says that individuals generally but not inevitably classify things as being the same if they can be used to serve the same human need or if they play the same or a sufficiently similar part in the individual's life, irrespective of appearance.

To /

28 Hampshire and Strawson, Aristotelian Society Supp. vol XXV, 1961, p.93.

To provide an example of this, different kinds of chairs, e.g. Regency chairs, folding chairs, plastic space-age chairs etc. are all placed in the same class because they have a similar function.

Hampshire's own, admittedly fantastic, example is of creatures from another planet who are anatomically unlike men. He says that if they communicated thoughts and intentions in a language we could understand we would classify them as men because they would play the same or a sufficiently similar part in our lives as human beings now play.

For Hampshire the forms of language are therefore largely determined by the practical interests of the individuals as social beings; their practical interests, i.e. their goals of action are in turn limited by their powers of communication and description.

What emerges from this is a contrast which is important for indicating the kind of freedom which the individual has, i.e.

"the contrast between the unlimited multiplicity of things and activities, and of features of things and activities, and our limited power to identify and distinguish them in a language." (29)

The individual's language and knowledge develop and extend their range together, not as an intellectual exercise but with regard to the individual's practical interests.

This, in part, gives Hampshire the basis for positing a relative lack of intellectual freedom and obviates the question of an absolute freedom or absolute lack of freedom.

Another /

Another important sense in which the individual is limited, which is important for freedom, is the limit set by existing classifications which an individual learns when he learns a language. The familiarity of such existing systems of classification can make it difficult for the individual to envisage alternatives.

4. Organising Notions employed in the application of the Rule of Identity and the Rule of Resemblance

As may be seen from the outline of the rules of identity and resemblance, the individual necessarily employs organising notions such as "same", "similar", "exist", "true" and "certain", in his application of these rules.

According to Hampshire, these organising notions enter into every kind of discourse in which statements are made. They are general and unrestricted in their application because there is no constant sense attached to them when taken out of a context which suggests the respect of identity, e.g. "'Same church' and 'same building' have a sense that is specified by the sense of the concept of a church and of the concept of a building." (30)

The important point is that in employing these organising notions the individual is unavoidably involved in comparison. Comparison would not be possible without some critical reflection and judgement.

There is another organising notion which is perhaps of greater interest for the present study, i.e. the notion of goodness. Hampshire maintains that it is less general in application because it would appear that it is not impossible for an individual to refuse to employ it. But, Hampshire immediately adds that it is in fact impossible except perhaps in a theoretical and limited sense.

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³⁰ T & A, p.223.

By way of illustration Hampshire says that an individual could possibly refuse to justify, criticise or express regret about his actions. The individual would therefore simply state that he had been influenced by certain considerations, and when he deliberates it would simply be uncertainty about what he wanted or the necessary means to attain it. He could not reflect systematically on reasons for his own activities or the activities of others without raising the question of "good" or "bad".

But for Hampshire this hypothesis of the amputation of critical thinking cannot be pushed to its conclusion because individuals could not apply concepts to experience without making a comparison. To quote Hampshire's own example by way of illustration :

"A man who asks himself or another whether a particular action is a means to the attainment of a certain end must understand and accept a qualified answer of the form, 'It is a means but not the best means.' If he asks whether the present time is the time to perform a certain action, he necessarily understands the idea of a better time and the best time." (31)

For Hampshire the sense of a classificatory concept is fixed by the contrast between the standard or perfect instance of something falling under a concept and an imperfect case.

This same comparison and ordering therefore applies to the classification of specimens as being more or less imperfect, as it does to statements as being true or uncertain.

But /

³¹ T & A, p.225.

But Hampshire raises the question as to whether the comparison and ordering of things as specimens is the same as comparing them as good or bad things, e.g. does the classification of a tiger as a tiger imply that it is a good tiger? Apparently not, because it would seem that the grounds of the classification of things as tigers do not by themselves supply a constant and obvious sense to "good as a tiger".

So the objection, as Hampshire sees it, is that the phrase "a good so-and-so" will only have a determinate sense in a particular context of use; and that when the grounds of classification do not in any way involve the more or less constant part that the things classified play in human life, (fairly explicitly, it seems), the phrase "a good so-and-so" will not have a clear and constant sense.

Hampshire answers the objection by saying that the vocabulary of common sense is largely anthropocentric; as was indicated in the outline of the rule of resemblance, the grounds of most classifications of things outside the exact sciences are the permanent and common interests of individuals and the forms of their social life. As Hampshire puts it, the individual

"sees reality around him and his present situation as a pattern of usable or obstructive things with which he has to cope and he distinguishes and classifies things by their relation both to his permanent practical interests and to his immediate intentions." (32)

So, when an individual identifies objects of use around him, he unavoidably makes a comparison between things as more or less good or inferior specimens of their kind,

and /

³² T & A, p.101.

and therefore as serving their typical part in human life, more or less well.

Hampshire maintains that one can impose a constant sense on the phrase "a good so-and-so" e.g. by choosing criteria by which to judge different specimens. But these criteria will not be arbitrary; they will directly or indirectly be based on the distinguishing characteristics of the species, and the part that it plays in human life.

In Hampshire's view therefore, some reflection, comparison and critical thinking, however elementary, is unavoidable because individuals necessarily have the idea of a "more or less so-and-so", as part of the procedure of identification and classification, and therefore as intrinsic to any use of language in thought and speech. The unavoidability of reflection, comparison and criticism is significant for the kind of freedom which Hampshire posits, i.e. a relative lack of intellectual freedom, because it provides a means of accounting for this type of freedom since it places the individual in the situation where he does not simply become the kind of person he is, holding the views that he does and acting on them by virtue of some pre-determined plan.

It places him in a situation where he is constantly comparing, reflecting and criticising even if only to a limited degree; and choosing, whether explicitly or implicitly. It is the degree to which such comparisons and choices and their grounds are constantly extended beyond their narrow or familiar confines and are made explicit to the individual himself that he can be said to be more, or less, free in what he does.

It must be pointed out that this attempt to account for the kind of freedom which Hampshire posits is not an attempt to introduce a deterministic element in the sense that the individual is automatically compelled to

become /

become more and more free because he cannot do otherwise since he unavoidably compares, criticises and reflects in ordering his world.

If this were the case, the whole point of Hampshire's argument about freedom would be lost. In examining Hampshire's views one may say that he sees the individual as having a limited sort of freedom because his critical thinking is necessarily employed in his use of language and in his ordering of the world. But this limited freedom may persist. It is only by his own efforts of self-consciously employing his capacities for reflection, comparison and criticism that the individual can acquire more and more knowledge about his situation, become aware of alternative classifications of human powers and interests, and come to recognise the limitations of his freedom. He is then free to acquiesce in these limitations or to attempt to overcome them.

It is also not being suggested that the whole question of the individual's freedom lies in the ordering of his world in the sense of the identification and classification of objects he can use. This is certainly not all there is to his freedom because, besides the ordering of objects of use around him, he acts on the world and interacts with individuals around him, and identifies and classifies human interests and powers. His classifications include a reference to the beliefs he has and the values he holds.

The aspects of the individual's freedom as reflected by the concepts involved in the abovementioned are outlined and discussed in the subsequent chapters on intention, knowledge, actions, moral questions and responsibility.

This chapter has therefore been confined to indicating the basis of, and accounting for, the type of freedom which Hampshire posits, something which he does not

specifically /

specifically do himself, although the material is provided for it. Furthermore, and of great importance for this study, the outline of the principle of ordering demonstrates that the individual is essentially situated in a world of objects as an observer, agent and language user, and it is only in these terms that the freedom of the individual can in any sense be discussed.

CHAPTER 11

INTENTION.

1. Introduction

In Hampshire's view, that which an individual does with full knowledge of what he is doing constitutes that which he does with full freedom, and it is the function of intention to mark the kind of knowledge of what one is doing or inclined to do that is fully conscious.

The focus of this section will therefore be on the connection between intention and consciousness and intention and the unconscious, and the extent to which the individual can know what he is doing since "full knowledge" in an absolute sense is an impossible ideal.

As a background to this, Hampshire's views on the development of intentional states will be outlined and what will emerge in this outline, of particular importance to this study, are the conditions for attributing intentions to an individual and therefore the conditions for being able to say that he is acting with fully conscious and explicit knowledge of what he is doing.

2. The Development of Intentional States

By "development" Hampshire does not mean the evolution of the human species from other animals, nor the development of man in history. He is interested in the development of any individual from infancy onwards and claims that individuals in their early life make a transition from a state of nature without memory or rule, to a self-conscious existence as a social being. The individual thus passes in his mental development from a phase which is characterised by simple inclinations to

behave /

behave in certain ways, to a phase which is characterised by the imputation and acknowledgement of beliefs and intentions. This clearly indicates that the development is divided into two distinct phases. A sense of continuity is indicated by Hampshire in his characterisation of the word "development".

"The word 'development' when we speak of the development of a mind or person, implies an order that is held together by manifold links of conscious, half-conscious and unconscious memory." (33)

But Hampshire does not indicate specifically whether the memories extend back further than the stage at which the individual acquires language.

Hampshire summarises the development of intentional states as the double development of simultaneously learning the use of mental concepts and acquiring the corresponding powers of mind. In this sense the development depends on language; it is for Hampshire in the learning of a language that the individual acquires inclinations which he may on occasions choose to inhibit or realise.

It is important to note that in "the development of intentional states" the operative term is "intentional". At the earliest stage of his life the individual presumably already has states of consciousness, but which he cannot identify as states of a particular kind because he has no language in which to describe them; so, what is of primary interest for Hampshire is that the individual becomes conscious of his feelings, sentiments, desires etc. as being inclinations of a certain kind, i.e. as satisfying a particular description, and which he may then anticipate, inhibit or realise, as he chooses.

Hampshire /

33 Hampshire, S. Disposition and Memory. Freedom of Mind and Other Essays. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972, p.170.
(Hereafter referred to as D & Mem. F of M & Other Essays.)

Hampshire does recognise that individuals are from the beginning potential language users and potential observers of social conventions which they will later learn to formulate; but the conclusive attribution of intentions to an individual depends on that individual's ability to state his intentions. He maintains that one cannot ascribe intentions to infants whose actions follow a more or less simple pattern of stimulus and response. They do exhibit patterns of behaviour but not easily discriminable mental powers behind these patterns. He finds it impossible to draw a hard and fast line at which one could speak of a child as now having formed intentions. Consequently, there remains a large blurred area within which it would not be absurd to ascribe intentions to a child, nor would it be absurd to refuse to ascribe intentions as distinguishable from observable behaviour. This presumably would be the stage at which a child is making some sort of recognisable communication in terms of demand, protest or rejection, but without statement, or perhaps indicating a preference for specific objects but without identifying them in words.

To elucidate the ideas put forward here in summary form, it is necessary to give a more detailed outline of Hampshire's views on the development of intentional states.⁽³⁴⁾

According to Hampshire it is in a social context and in primitive dealings within a family that a child responds to, and imitates, the meaningful gestures of adults. He sees imitation as being an original disposition of man,

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³⁴ A debt must be acknowledged to Albino, R.C., Professor of Psychology at the University of Natal, Durban, whose unpublished paper, Suggestions for the Study of Language Development, 1974, and whose discussions of language development have given rise to the criticisms which are made of Hampshire's views on the development of intentional states.

and as being one primitive and natural way of learning the use of language and the routines and customs which constitute social life, because it involves the use of natural signs in childhood and throughout life. It is thus by imitation that the individual's first entry into social life is effected. This responding to, and imitation of, the meaningful gestures of adults, Hampshire sees as being the earliest phase of a continuous history which ends with the use of language and with the sort of intentions and memories which depend on the use of concepts. In this, Hampshire gives no priority to any particular adult, e.g. the mother, who in normal circumstances may be assumed to have the closest relationship with the child and who does not only make meaningful gestures but uses words, thereby teaching the child a language.

A problem arises in connection with the idea that a child learns by imitation involving the use of natural signs.

Before outlining the problem it must be noted that the concern in giving Hampshire's outline of the development of intentional states is not primarily with details of how the child learns but rather with the dependence of intentions on language. It may be, however, that the lack of comprehensive and consistent detail of the actual learning process is what limits Hampshire to saying that intentions depend on the acquisition of language, and consigning anything prior to this to "stimulus and response" and a dubious "blurred" area". It is therefore worth noting the discrepancies.

According to Hampshire, the child initially learns by natural signs, not by conventional signs, but Hampshire experiences some difficulty in distinguishing them clearly. He says that if this distinction could be stated clearly, many problems in the philosophy of mind would be open to clarification. The distinction he

does /

does make turns on the notion that the rule of the use of a conventional sign has to be learnt independently, whereas no general rule of correlation between "sign" and "thing signified" has to be learnt in the case of a natural sign. This is made clearer by Hampshire's indication of the sort of thing which can be expressed by each kind of sign.

Thoughts or processes of thought, to be understood by an observer, must be expressed by conventional signs, the significance of which is determined by learnt rules of use and syntax, e.g. an individual cannot express his thought that he will go to town instead of staying at home tomorrow, unless he converts his gestures into separate signals which have rules of interpretation and of syntax. Feelings and sentiments can be expressed by natural signs, e.g. the individual's excitement or anger can be expressed by his facial expressions and gestures, without any statement on his part to inform an observer that he is excited or angry. In Hampshire's words,

"No one who has been angry has, in addition, to learn the rules for expressing anger, as he has to learn how to say that he is angry in the course of learning a language." (35)

On the basis of this distinction, if the first things a child is capable of expressing are his feelings and sentiments and these can be expressed by natural signs, e.g. crying may indicate distress, reaching out for something may indicate wanting it, it is reasonable to assume that an adult could interpret and respond to such signs. It is, however, difficult to understand how,

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35 Hampshire, S. Feeling and Expression. Freedom of Mind and Other Essays. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972, p.147. (Hereafter referred to as F & Exp. F of M & Other Essays.)

within Hampshire's theory, the child responds to and imitates the gestures of adults, particularly in the light of the information he gives as to the nature of signs. He says

"When a disposition to behave in a certain way is controlled, the last vestige of the behaviour is apt to survive in facial expression, and particularly in the eyes, as being the ineffective part of the behaviour, the most subtle and insubstantial, and therefore the most immediately expressive of the inner movement of the mind. If the angry man had shaken his clenched fist at his adversary, he would have gone through motions that show only too coarsely his inclination to attack. This gesture is the full action that flows from the inclination without its proper climax, and rendered ineffective; and therefore it is an unmistakable natural sign. If a movement is seen effectively to serve some evident and familiar human need or purpose, its significance as gesture is lost. The behaviour generally needs to be uneconomic and useless, as action, in order to be taken as a sign." (36)

and

"Generally speaking, we effectively do things, and make changes in the world, in the primary sense that is associated with physical change with our hands and other limbs rather than with our face." (36)

Obviously these are signs used and recognised by convention observing individuals. The question is, how do such signs fit into the child's scheme of learning by the imitation of meaningful gestures? Hampshire does not make the correlation, nor does he expand on the nature /

³⁶ Hampshire, S. F & Exp. F of M & Other Essays, p.153-4.

nature of these meaningful gestures. Hampshire is also not taking into account that an adult's communication with a child would be largely determined and influenced by his own background of knowledge of convention and routines of the society in which he lives, so that the child is not merely confronted with natural signs but (for him) an indistinguishable mixture of natural and conventional signs which would have to serve some function in the child's dealings with adults for them to be in any way significant.

A related discrepancy centres on the concept of imitation. Hampshire distinguishes two types: the first type is the imitation which an individual engages in at an age when the idea of true statement and the use of conventional signs to convey information has not yet occurred to him. He goes through the motions of doing things without believing that the conditions for effectively doing them are present and therefore without the intention of actually doing them. He may engage in this sort of imitative play simply for the pleasure of creating a likeness.

The second type of imitation is that which an individual may engage in as an autonomous activity, deliberately, knowing what he is doing. He can engage in this kind of imitation once he has learnt the use of conventional signs according to rules and learns how to convey information and make statements.

It would appear that the child would initially engage in the first type of imitation; but Hampshire does not indicate the nature of the transition from the first type to the second, or what mixture of the two there may be in an intermediate phase. The information he does provide on this is at best sketchy and questionable. He raises the question

"How /

"How much is included in the child's response to, and imitation of, the meaningful gestures of adults ?" (37)

To this he replies that the child's earliest behaviour foreshadows the added depth of disposition and inner emotion, and is revealing of inhibited dispositions and therefore of a depth of feeling unrecognised by the child; because these signs of inner feeling are not recognised by the child but have to be read by someone else, they are not intentional signs.

He conjectures that a possible support for this is the idea that an individual may find, in his memory, a continuity between inclinations originally expressed in his play and later inclinations, either expressed in intentional conduct or recognised as an inclination to behave in a certain way. In this there is the suggestion that the order that is held together by manifold links of conscious, half-conscious and unconscious memory, does indeed extend back further than the stage at which the individual acquires language; Hampshire is, however, not very clear on this. (38)

It is, however, difficult to see how inclinations originally expressed in play can later be recognised as inclinations of a certain kind if the initial inclination or feeling could not be recognised by the child but only by an adult observer. The child would surely have to recognise these initial inclinations in order to retain some memory, however vague, of them. In this suggestion that he would have to recognise the initial inclinations there is the implication that these inclinations are in some sense describable as intentional. This implication indicates the point in noting the discrepancies centering on signs and imitation in

Hampshire's /

37 Hampshire, S. D & Mem. F of M & Other Essays, p.169.
38 See above, p.28.

Hampshire's philosophy of mind. The point is that there is the possibility that individuals who are not language users in the sense that they do not yet utter statements, requests, commands etc. do have intentions in that they know what they are doing, but are not able to state it in words. This suggestion is not altogether unfeasible in terms of Hampshire's analysis since, according to him, having an intention means to know what one is doing; and, if a child is to learn by imitation of signs he would in some sense have to know what he is doing. This "having to know what he is doing" indicates a need for greater clarification with regard to the signs from which the child learns, the transition from the first type of imitation to the second, and an investigation as to whether this is indeed the way in which a child learns social routines and conventions of expression. These ideas raised here will be discussed after the outline of the development of intentional states, and will be discussed in terms of research currently being conducted in the field of psychology. ⁽³⁹⁾

To continue with Hampshire's outline of the development of intentional states - he says that in responding to and imitating the meaningful gestures of adults, the child learns conventions of communication. He also learns to observe conventions and rules that conflict with his own instinctual needs and learns to control his behaviour at will.

This control or inhibition, Hampshire distinguishes from that of an animal which may have been trained to inhibit its natural inclinations. The child has the possibility of knowing what it is that he wants to do, in the sense that it satisfies a certain description, and may thus decide to restrain his inclinations in a sense which is not applicable to animals. It is not applicable to animals because they are not language users, nor even

potential /

³⁹ See below, p. 42 ff.

potential language users. The use of language, in Hampshire's view, implies the power to observe rules and conventions, to criticise infringement of the rules and the capacity for self-conscious adaptation to such rules. It furthermore implies the means of reflecting upon and announcing future behaviour.

Hampshire maintains that it would be senseless to attribute to an animal a memory that distinguishes the order of events in the past or an expectation of events in the future, because without language it does not have the concept of order or any concepts at all.

He allows that one can speak of animals as having wants and purposes because these are not thought-dependent concepts as is intention; so, when one asks what an animal is doing, this is simply taken as a request for a description of its overt activities as they appear to an observer. The equivalent question asked of a language-user is a question which includes both the observable activity and the intention which enters into and guides it.

O'Connor criticises Hampshire's statements about animals and directs it chiefly at the fact that he does not provide evidence for his claims, rather than at the validity of the claims. His criticism of the lack of evidence does, however, imply that the validity of the claims is questionable. He says

"It is not good enough to make glib generalizations about animal psychology, ... without familiarizing oneself with something of the vast corpus of experimental and observational findings. What is the evidence, for example, that animals cannot observe conventions, cannot entertain thoughts about their future, or that it is impossible to ascribe intentions to them? These may

conceivably /

conceivably be true statements, but we would like to be shown the evidence for them. For Hampshire, they seem to follow from the simple fact that animals have no language. But if this is the evidence for these remarkable generalizations, they become trivial and uninteresting at once." (40)

It is accepted that O'Connor is correct in criticising Hampshire for making generalisations without providing evidence. But the idea that these generalisations follow from the fact that animals do not have language may not be so trivial, particularly if it is taken from the point of view of an individual, in terms of his application of the principle of ordering, viz. an individual does not attribute intentions to animals in the sense that he attributes them to individuals because animals do not play a similar role in his life. Whether or not experimental and observational findings have proved that animals observe conventions, entertain thoughts about their future and have intentions, would make very little difference to the identification and classification of animals as animals, until they play a sufficiently similar role to that which other individuals play in the life of any individual.

Whether an animal can inhibit its behaviour in the same way that individuals do is, however, of lesser importance than the fact that with regard to an individual, this power of intentional inhibition constitutes and marks the beginning of his full inner life. Concurrently with, or a little later than, learning to control behaviour, the child also learns to express inclinations in words and to

identify /

⁴⁰ O'Connor, D.J. Philosophy. The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, vol XXXVI, 1961, p.232. (Hereafter referred to as The Journal of R.I. of Phil. vol XXXVI, 1961.)

identify persons, things and actions as having certain names or as satisfying certain descriptions. Once the child can name and describe he is no longer confined to an undiscriminated present in the direction of his inclinations and the objects of his desires. He can now direct his desires, intentions and fears towards future events because he has the means of describing, identifying and placing in an identified future objects remote from his present situation, which he might desire, fear or hope. When an individual is able to reflect on what he wants to do, and communicate it, he also has the power to review his inclinations and criticise them.

For Hampshire, it is the two abovementioned capacities, i.e. to control or inhibit inclinations and to identify inclinations and circumstances in words, which determine the application of a vocabulary of feelings to human beings. A vocabulary of feelings is important for the attribution of intentions because in Hampshire's analysis an individual's use of mental concepts is essential to the development of intentional states.

The necessity of the individual's having both the capacity to inhibit and to identify, in order for him to have a vocabulary of feelings, may be expressed briefly as follows - To identify a feeling or inner sentiment as being of a certain kind, the individual must abstract it from the natural expression which constitutes the feeling. To abstract the feeling, he must inhibit the natural expression, which leaves him with the controlled inclination. He can distinguish the inner sentiment or feeling as a controlled inclination to behave in a particular way in standard circumstances; but, to inhibit the natural expression he must be able to identify and distinguish the natural expression as a particular pattern of behaviour associated with particular circumstances. That this is not mere circularity but rather a complex

interdependence /

interdependence of the two capacities emerges if one considers at greater length how, according to Hampshire, the individual acquires a vocabulary of feelings.

In order to acquire a vocabulary of feelings by means of which to identify and communicate his feelings and sentiments as being of a certain kind, the individual must first learn to distinguish certain patterns of behaviour in certain standard circumstances. These patterns of behaviour are the natural expression of various feelings and sentiments, and are not added to the feelings and sentiments, but constitute them. Of "natural expressions" Hampshire says

"Whenever there is a necessary connection between an identifiable feeling or emotion, and the inclination to behave in an identifiable way, the pattern of behaviour may be called the natural expression of the feeling. A certain pattern of behaviour is a natural expression of a certain feeling if, in distinguishing this feeling from other feelings with which it might be confused, we would specify an inclination towards the particular pattern of behaviour, together with some standard circumstances actually existing or believed to exist, which provokes the inclination. So in explaining what anger is, I would refer to a disposition to attack when the subject has been or believes that he has been in some way hurt or harmed." (41)

The individual's distinction and identification of the patterns of behaviour in conjunction with the distinction between what he is naturally inclined to do and

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⁴¹ Hampshire, S. F & Exp. F of M & Other Essays, p.143.

what convention requires him to do, enables him to abstract the feeling from the manifesting behaviour by inhibiting its natural expression. He is then left with the inclination as a shadow or residue of the manifesting behaviour; he can identify the feeling or sentiment, not as a mere quality of feeling, but as an inclination to behave in a certain way taken together with those features of the situation with which he associates his inclination, e.g. he knows that he is angry because he knows what he is inclined to do, which is to attack. Once the individual can identify his inclinations as being of a certain kind, he can have fully conscious and explicit knowledge of what he will do rather than just a simple inclination to behave in a particular way in certain circumstances. This fully conscious and explicit knowledge of what he will do, i.e. his intention, depends not only on his ability to identify in words the object towards which his intention is directed and the circumstances in which it is to be carried out, but also the inclination itself as being of a certain kind which he may choose to inhibit or realise. So, for Hampshire, the individual, in his classifications, moves from the expressive behaviour, inwards to the feeling; he maintains that the vocabulary of feeling and sentiment with which individuals identify and communicate, could never be established if the primary identification of an inclination to behave in a certain way could not be made prior to the classification of inner and contained feeling.

He says that he is not denying that an individual may experience confused and conflicting inclinations, which he may be unable to describe and distinguish clearly; nor is he denying that by some methods of analysis, e.g. anger and fear, may be shown to be similar and related reactions to a particular type of situation, such as defence against a threat of some sort. He sees it as

sufficient /

sufficient that simple cases of identification of states of consciousness do occur; it is on these simple cases that the whole psychological vocabulary is ultimately founded.

Hampshire himself raises the question as to the justification of a simplified philosophical theory of the emotions in relation to behaviour, and asks

"... is this a priori psychology? What is a philosopher's authority for distinguishing phases of human development beginning with primitive behavioural reactions and ending with inner concealed emotion? What is the purpose and criterion of success in such an enquiry as this? It may seem that any such theory must be tested by the observation of children and by careful experiment; and yet this is not the work of philosophers." (42)

He replies to the effect that

"... these considerations about the emotions are part of a more general, and of course disputable, theory of language, a theory of how concepts must be properly introduced and applied in their normal contexts. I am, or take myself to be, specifying the implications, and the method of confirmation, attached to uncriticised, ordinary statements about human emotions of the most rudimentary kind. And surely this must be the starting-point in prescribing the use of the vastly complex and derivative concepts of psycho-analysis. They also have been developed, through many stages of complication and theory, from a rudimentary base in commonplace usage. We have to retrace the path back to this base if we are to understand how they are made up. We have first to see the rudimentary base clearly before us in some simple form, and then we can make the connections to the commonplace conceptual scheme which the discoveries of psycho-analysis require." (42)

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42 Hampshire, S. D & Mem. F of M & Other Essays, p.42.

The uncertainty as to whether a child does or does not have intentions before the acquisition of language in which to state them is a problem currently being examined in the field of psychology.⁽⁴³⁾ These studies raise the possibility that intentions may be conclusively attributed to individuals at an earlier stage than that at which they acquire language. This is neatly summed up by Albino as the idea that

"pre-speech actions may have a structure analogous to spoken language, and that the latter is a development of the former." (44)

This is particularly relevant to this thesis in the light of Hampshire's emphasis on the idea that the conclusive attribution of intentions to individuals depends on that individual's ability to state his intentions. Albino's paper, being the briefer of the two and the more recent, is included as a whole to indicate the sort of research currently being conducted in this field.⁽⁴⁵⁾

The inclusion of Albino's paper and the reference to Bruner's is not for the purpose of criticising Hampshire for not engaging in the sort of observation and experiment in which a psychologist engages. This is certainly not, as Hampshire says, the work of philosophers. It is accepted that Hampshire as a philosopher is perfectly justified in engaging in a study which may seem to be the preserve of a discipline which proceeds by more empirical methods, provided he knows the rules. Searle is a proponent of this view.⁽⁴⁶⁾

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- ⁴³ Albino, R.C. Suggestions for the Study of Language Development. Unpublished paper, 1974, University of Natal.
Bruner, J. The Ontogenesis of Speech Acts. Unpublished paper, 1973. Oxford University.
⁴⁴ Albino, R.C. Suggestions for Lang. Devl. p.3.
⁴⁵ See below, Appendix 2.
⁴⁶ Searle, J.R. Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge University Press, 1969, p.16.

The purpose of including the manuscript is rather to indicate that in much the same way that the philosopher may contribute to studies in the field of psychology, the psychologist's discoveries may make a contribution to existing philosophical theories by expanding on them with the addition of empirical data and perhaps focussing on their limitations. The caution in stating that these studies may make a contribution to philosophy is due to the fact that Albino's unpublished paper is only the preliminary to further research in the form of observation, experiment and analysis; and Bruner, in his paper, states that he will

"consider briefly the beginnings of a study of the transition from the pre-linguistic to linguistic communication in infants, now in progress in Oxford - more in the interest of illustrating a concrete approach to speech acts and their ontogenesis, than drawing conclusions." (47)

The question, however, of whether intentions are language dependent or not remains an interesting and important one for a philosophy of mind in which the conclusive attribution of intentions to any individual depends on that individual's ability to state his intentions. It is important because if an individual is acting with intention, he is acting freely and is responsible for what he does.

3. Intention and Consciousness

The examination of the connection between intention and consciousness (and intention and the unconscious) as it pertains to the question of the individual's freedom, will be with regard to individuals as language users.

According /

⁴⁷ Bruner, J. The Ontogenesis of Speech Acts, 1973, p.3.

According to Hampshire, intention is inseparable from consciousness, and he makes this a symmetrical relation. On the one hand, while an individual is conscious and in possession of all his faculties, he has active intentions all the time. This puts the individual in the position of always being able to answer the question as to what he is doing. On the other hand, there is for Hampshire no sense in which an individual can have unconscious intentions, since consciousness consists in knowing what one is doing. If an individual needed to be told what he was doing, and if someone else knew better than he did, it would follow that he was not an intentional agent in the full sense postulated.

In spite of this assertion that intentions must be conscious, Hampshire does use the term "unconscious intentions."⁽⁴⁸⁾ Of this, Wheatley says

"This really would introduce a complication if he meant it. However, he did not mean it, it is a slip. In an earlier draft of this paper I went to some trouble to show that it is inconsistent with his main position but as this has since been confirmed by Hampshire himself, it is not necessary to reproduce it here." (49)

To have an intention means to have a settled belief about one's future actions. Hampshire illustrates his notion of intention with the analogy of a beam of light which has a periphery of darkness. The beam of light represents something that an individual particularly has in mind to do: his central intention. Along the periphery, which is not altogether clearly demarcated,

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⁴⁸ T & A, p.133.

⁴⁹ Wheatley, J. Hampshire in Human Freedom. Philosophical Quarterly vol 12, January 1962, p.256-7.
(Hereafter referred to as Phil. Quarterly vol 12, 1962.)

are the by-products and accompaniments of the central intention. Two types of unintentionality mentioned by Hampshire provide an example of such by-products which would be important for the individual's freedom; for example, an individual may make a statement without realising the true nature and immediate effects of making it. An example of this, Hampshire says, would be the inadvertent disclosure of a secret. In the second type of unintentionality an individual may, in making a statement commit himself to an opinion which he does not hold. An example of this would be a case in which he uses words in a different sense from the sense dictated by the rules governing their use. Although in both cases the individual's central intention was to make a particular statement, he did not, in the former, intend to bring about the effect which resulted, and in the latter to convey the meaning which he did.

The individual's central intention does not pose a problem for freedom, because if he knows what he is doing, he is doing it freely.⁽⁵⁰⁾ It is the degree to which the individual is unaware of the by-products of his central intention which indicates the degree of his lack of freedom if he has not reflected carefully enough on his intended action and its consequences.

As to the accompaniments of an intention, it is not enough just to have an intention to do something; an individual must know of some way in which it might be accomplished. This means that the background and accompaniment of any intention is both a belief about one's present situation and environment, and a belief about or expectation of, the future course of events

and /

⁵⁰ This of course excludes cases of coercion in which the question arises as to whether an individual is acting freely because he could resist the coercion; or whether he is not acting freely, even though he knows what he is doing, because he cannot, in the light of other considerations, resist the coercion.

and circumstances.⁽⁵¹⁾ The complex formed by intention, together with such beliefs, in Hampshire's analysis, constitutes thought.

In outlining the conditions of thought, Hampshire indicates that intention is not synonymous with decision, an act of the will. Of this distinction he says

"the word 'decision', as opposed to the word 'intention' is more naturally associated with the question - 'Shall I do it or shall I not ?' - thereby showing his uncertainty about what he is going to do, an uncertainty of the kind which constitutes indecision." (52)

A decision or act of the will is the preliminary which starts the process of thought. After this, thought follows its own path without the intervention of the will. In following its own path, it is governed by the rules and conventions of language because the content of thought is determined and limited by the range of language at an individual's disposal. Once the individual has formed his intention, he can thereafter be said to have that intention. Unless he changes his mind, he does not have to reflect on it again because intentions are not momentary occurrences but constitute the permanent background of an individual's waking life. Hampshire adds, however, that intentions are not always and necessarily the outcome of a process of thought or
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51 This is examined in some detail in Chapter III of this thesis, viz. "Knowledge" p.62ff., where knowledge of mental states and processes is also discussed as one of the factors which goes to make up the background and accompaniment of intentions.

52 Hampshire, S. and Hart, H.L.A. Decision, Intention and Certainty. Mind. A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy; vol LXVll, no. 265, January, 1958, p.3.
(Hereafter referred to as D, I & C. Mind vol LXVll, 1958)

of a datable act of decision. They may form themselves in the mind without conscious and controlled deliberation, e.g. if an individual is asked what he is going to do, he may give his reply without hesitating and without having reviewed the question before. He simply recognises that this had been his intention all along.

This explanation of the way in which intentions form themselves is too vague to be satisfactory. Hampshire could have made it more explicit by saying that intentions which form themselves are instances of a wider trajectory of more or less consistent and connected beliefs and policies of action to which the individual has already committed himself. If the individual changes or modifies his existing beliefs and policies of action, a whole range of intentions would be affected. This suggestion for making the explanation of the formation of the abovementioned intentions more explicit is consistent with Hampshire's views on the connectedness of beliefs and on policies of action, which are outlined and discussed in some detail in this thesis.⁽⁵³⁾

It must be noted that although Hampshire uses the terms "act of the will" he is in some doubt about the implication that making a decision constitutes an act. He says of this

"But what is the force of saying that to decide to do something is to perform an act? This category word, in this as in other contexts, is entirely unclear."
(54)

He /

⁵³ In Chapter III "Knowledge" p.62ff. and Chapter IV, p.113 ff. respectively.

⁵⁴ Hampshire, S. and Hart, J.L.A. D, I & C. Mind vol LXVII, 1958, p.3.

He explains this by saying that when an individual is told that he ought to make up his mind, or to decide, it appears that the imperative or quasi-imperative form of the verb indicates that the verb represents an act. But he contends that this is misleading since an order of this kind frequently refers to the action to be performed or the announcement of the decision, and not to the decision itself. He allows, however, that there are cases in which the imperative or quasi-imperative cannot be attached to the actions to be performed or to the announcement of the decision, such as in the phrases "'Never hesitate' or 'Always decide what you are going to do in advance'". (55) Of this he says

"... it is still an imperative which has a parallel use with cognitive verbs. One may intelligibly be told not to believe information of a certain kind, or one may be told that one ought not to believe it. One may even be told that one ought not to doubt some matter of fact, and that one ought to accept it as something which is certainly true. Doubt and certainty about an action are not in this respect essentially different from doubt and certainty about a statement; the one is as little, or as much, an act as the other." (56)

In distinguishing intention from an act of the will, Hampshire goes so far as to say that thought cannot retain its status as a continuous process if it is constantly punctuated by acts of the will. It is most pure when it is self-directing as in the exercise of the intellect in deduction and in the following of an argument.

This /

55 Hampshire, S. and Hart, H.L.A. D, I & C. Mind
56 vol LXVII, 1958, p.4.
Ibid.

This use of the term "pure" may be somewhat misleading since Hampshire actually rejects the idea of pure thought as such; he rejects it both, firstly, in the sense that it pertains to a deliberate human action, and, second, in the sense that it pertains to a mathematician solving a theoretical problem or a scientist weighing evidence.

He admits that we do make a contrast between intentions and beliefs together constituting thought and the actions and judgements that flow from them, since thought is the background and source of both action and statement. But, in the first sense mentioned above, i.e. of deliberate action, even if one spoke of an individual as having thoughts running in his head parallel with his actions, one would not be speaking of separate events, but of two aspects of the same thing. They are not separate events because the intention enters into and governs the action, thereby differentiating it from mere physical movement. Even if the individual was only reviewing reasons for and against two courses of action, this would still not be pure thought, because the thinking is directed at a problem and the object arrived at is an action or a set of actions. In the second sense mentioned above, a mathematician or scientist while engaged in their problems may well be doing nothing else but thinking. But this is not a case of pure thought, it is rather the case that their whole activity is thinking, unmixed with anything else. It does not stop here, however, because the solving of a problem or the weighing of evidence imply an interest in arriving at the truth, which involves the formulation of statements. The making of statements is for Hampshire a particular kind of action. This would be an example of what he refers to as "directed thought", and refers to it as an "activity".⁽⁵⁷⁾

Thus /

⁵⁷ T & A, p.88; enlarged upon in Chapter IV, "Action", p.113 ff.

Thus, for Hampshire, thought cannot be thought, as opposed to daydreaming or musing, unless it is directed towards a conclusion in action or judgement. It is an individual's consciousness which gives him the sense of himself as an essentially active thing among other things. He sees himself in a particular situation in the world, viewing the world from a particular standpoint, and classifying the objects around him as instruments which he may use or which may obstruct his purposes. This sense that he has of himself as an active thing among other things is only interrupted by periods of sleep or unconsciousness. To contrast consciousness and unconsciousness, he places the distinction between the necessity of intended action, on the one hand, and mere natural movement without intention on the other. Examples of natural movement would be the utterances and actions of a sleeping individual, even if these are intelligible. The sleeping individual has no knowledge of what he is doing, so no intention could be attributed to him.

Hampshire sees his distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness as a departure from the empirical philosopher's stand, and criticises Berkeley and Hume for representing human consciousness as a state of passive awareness and contrasting this with the unconsciousness of sleep. For Hampshire the individual cannot simply have a passive awareness of his environment, he is at the same time both an observer and an agent, envisaging possibilities of action and finding means towards ends. In finding means towards ends the individual has to take into consideration his proposed conduct, the situation and circumstances in which he finds himself and his expectation of the future course of events. The degree to which he does this will determine the degree to which he knows what he is doing.

The individual certainly knows what his central intention
is /

is, because if he did not, he could not be said to have the intention; he does not, however, always know what the effects and consequences of his actions will be, either because he has not reflected carefully enough, or because of the limitations of his habits of thought.⁽⁵⁸⁾ These limitations, both of reflection and of his habits of thought are limitations to his freedom and he is responsible for both in the sense that he could have reflected more carefully, and in the sense that he is not imprisoned in the narrow circle of his habits of thought, but has the possibility of extending them by critical reflection and comparisons with other systems of thought.⁽⁵⁹⁾

4. Intention and the Unconscious

For Hampshire it would be a contradiction to say that individuals have unconscious intentions, but he sees no contradiction or conceptual confusion in speaking of unconscious purposes. The discovery of unconscious purposes does not mean that mental concepts have to be re-defined, it rather means the discovery of a new range of facts with an important bearing on the individual's freedom. The discovery of such facts does, however, as will be seen, raise problems; the solution of these problems would be no simple matter, so the most that can be done here is to indicate some of the more important ones. The essential question to be considered in connection with this is whether the problems endanger Hampshire's theory about the unconscious as it pertains to freedom.

Hampshire maintains that an individual may have motives
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58, 59 Discussed at greater length in Chapter V, "Moral Questions", p.143 ff.

and purposes which guide and influence his intention and of which he is unaware. He bases this idea on Sigmund Freud's discovery of the nature of neurosis which he sees as providing "powerful and almost irresistible reasons for speaking of unconscious policies and purposes as commonplace facts of human life."⁽⁶⁰⁾ Freud's neurotic, as interpreted by Hampshire, is an individual who does not lose contact with reality entirely, as compared with a psychotic who does not recognise the features of reality around him and therefore cannot know the effect of his actions or even what he is trying to do. The neurotic does not know what he is really trying to do because unconsciously he is trying to achieve something quite different from what he may say that he is. Freud, it appears, attributes to a psychoanalyst the ability to grasp clearly the meaning and direction of which the neurotic himself is not aware. The analyst's task is to bring the neurotic to acknowledge his unconscious purposes and policies. Once he has acknowledged them, he has new possibilities of fully self-conscious action and the possibility of escaping his obsession and achieving his sincerely professed intentions.

In Hampshire's view, Freud's idea that the neurotic may be brought to recognise and acknowledge his unconscious purposes and motives can be extended to ordinary individuals who sometimes pursue purposes and policies of which they are unaware. He maintains that there is no difference in principle but rather a difference in degree and so suggests that although we can speak of the ordinary individual as having unconscious purposes and policies, the application of such criteria should be modified. The difference as regards the ordinary individual is that it is only on occasion that he, to a greater or lesser extent, misrepresents to himself what he is trying to do, rather than constantly defeating his sincerely expressed intentions as the neurotic does.

To /

⁶⁰ T & A, p.132.

To explain unconscious motives and purposes, Hampshire resorts to the notion that an individual has countless unconscious memories of past satisfactions and frustrations which may determine his future dispositions. Before giving the forms that memory may take, it is necessary to indicate what Hampshire means by "dispositions". To attribute a disposition to someone is not to make a hypothetical statement about him, to the effect that he would behave in a certain way if certain conditions were satisfied. He states this dogmatically to dissociate himself from philosophers who claim that statements about feeling and sentiment are all in principle reducible to complicated statements about overt behaviour. He divides dispositions into two classes, firstly

"There is no primary sense of disposition, disposition in the sense of inclination, typically applied to persons rather than to physical objects: the sense in which I may report that I was at a certain moment disposed to laugh or to cry. A disposition in this sense is something that may occur at a particular moment, may be felt, may be disclosed, and may be inhibited or indulged." (61)

and second

"I speak of 'secondary dispositions' here to distinguish dispositions, in the sense of character traits, from dispositions already mentioned - namely, inclinations to behave in a certain way on a specific occasion. The original formation of secondary dispositions can be traced back to unconscious memories of primitive satisfactions and frustrations of instinctual needs, modified by complicated and continuing processes of repression, projection, displacement, transference and so on These dispositions, resting on the weight of my earliest memories, constitute my character as an individual." (61)

Hampshire /

⁶¹ Hampshire, S. D & M. F of M & Other Essays, p.161.

Hampshire maintains that in the simplest case of past memory influencing future dispositions, the individual may be aware of the memory as the ground or reason for his present attitude and behaviour. But, in a different case, if the memory which is influencing his conduct is below the level of consciousness, the individual may think that his present intention is directed towards the future, whereas the case is rather that his real motive is a desire to alter the past. When the memory is evoked the individual must decide whether it is, or is not, relevant to his present behaviour. Once an individual recognises a secondary disposition as influencing his conduct he is thereafter and for the first time an intentional agent in this domain of his conduct and is left with an unavoidable choice of policies, i.e. either to acquiesce or to try to overcome the particular character trait. This choice of policies, however, according to Hampshire, still remains within the limits of other secondary dispositions that constitute his character.

The question now arises as to how an individual discovers his unconscious purposes and motives. Hampshire mentions two possibilities. On the one hand - following Freud, he believes that in the process of psycho-analysis, an individual can be brought to recognise his unconscious purposes and motives, the psycho-analyst of course knowing what they are; or, the individual can discover them for himself in the process of psycho-analysis through experiencing a resistance to reviving certain memories. The important point is that the psycho-analyst does not simply tell the individual what his motives and purposes are. The individual must recognise and acknowledge them as being his motives, for them to be in any way valid.

A problem that arises here, however, is the accuracy of the psycho-analyst's inferences and conclusions. Presumably the individual tells the psycho-analyst about his

past /

past experiences and on the basis of this the psychoanalyst judges which experience (or set of experiences), is relevant to the individual's problem. But, could this not simply amount to a subjective interpretation of the facts presented to the psychologist, followed by persuasion of the individual that a particular incident and its effects is at the root of his problem? Admittedly, whether a particular incident is actually the cause of the problem, or whether the psychoanalyst persuades the individual that it is, the individual may be helped to overcome his problem in this way. But this is not the important issue for the present study; the important issue is rather the question as to whether the unconscious influences an individual's conduct in the form of motives and purposes of which he is not immediately conscious, thereby limiting his freedom.

On the other hand, it seems that the individual can discover his motives and purposes by investigating his intentions without the intervention of a psychoanalyst. The individual does not investigate his intentions to discover what they are, because in order to have an intention, he must be fully aware of it. But he may, in some circumstances, investigate them to see if they have been consistently related. If he finds that they have not, he will need to look for underlying motives and memories to explain the inconsistency.

The link between past states and future dispositions is for Hampshire not a causal one. He says that if one investigates the development of a man's body, it is taken for granted that the earlier states, taken in conjunction with external factors, determine the later states and causal properties in accordance with a variety of exact and confirmable natural laws. But this causal connection cannot by analogy be extended to the notion of past states determining future dispositions, because, if the determination were causal, it should allow

prediction. /

prediction. In Hampshire's view, prediction of any accuracy is not possible since memory involves too many independent variables for a general law of cause and effect to be formulated and tested. So, the determination that Hampshire is claiming, based on Freud's findings is not a causal one but only that of experiences in the past supplying unconscious motives for present or future conduct and inclination.

Hampshire maintains that Freud, in correlating early alleged experiences and later fantasies of such experiences with subsequent hysterical disorders, interposed a doctrine of remembered fantasies which have an explanatory function, as a middle term. He sees this introduction of this middle term as precluding the correlation from being a causal connection of two events because - the elicited memory as a reason for conduct may be accepted or repudiated by the individual, unlike a cause; it must make his conduct intelligible to him by explaining his present inclination in the same way that an observed feature of his present situation might; the individual must also recognise a continuity of the hitherto repressed memory in a consistent misreading of situations.

Hampshire raises the point that Freud's findings may appear to separate the unconscious mind from the conscious mind or seat of personality with which the individual identifies himself. But he maintains that this is not the case and that the process of repression, inhibition and resistance to analysis actually shows the unity of the mind in its two dimensions. This is so because the individual does not feel disconnected from the unconscious processes of his mind when he is brought to realise them; he rather recognises his real character in them and this sets him free to try to control or modify them.

Barret /

Barret questions Hampshire's idea that once the individual is aware of past experiences affecting his conduct, he is thereafter an intentional agent in that domain. He says

"Hampshire believes (as I think did Freud, Socrates, Plato and Spinoza, each in his own way) that knowledge of tendencies and inclinations from our past brings them under conscious control. It is not clear, however, whether this control is necessary or contingent. If the first, it seems wrong; knowledge that I behave in a certain way because of past experiences does not necessarily ensure that I can prevent such behaviour occurring in the future. If the connection is only contingent - i.e. I may be able to control tendencies which, when they were unconscious, I could not - the case for the liberating power of reflective knowledge, on which the Spinozan theory of freedom rests, is greatly weakened." (62)

In questioning the necessity or contingency of the control which an individual has over his unconscious inclinations and tendencies once he has knowledge of them, Barret raises an issue which is of some importance in Hampshire's philosophy of mind because of the connection he wishes to draw between freedom and knowledge, viz. the more fully and explicitly an individual knows what he is doing, the more he can be a self-determining and free agent. Thus far in this Chapter, all that has specifically been said on this issue of control over tendencies and inclinations is that the individual is free to control or acquiesce in them once he has become aware of them as influencing his conduct; this is important as regards Barret's question.

Hampshire /

⁶² Barret, C. Philosophical Books vol XIV, no.2, May 1973, p.8.
(Hereafter referred to as Phil. Bks. vol XIV, 1973.)

Hampshire does not claim that the individual's knowledge of his hitherto unconscious tendencies and inclinations necessarily means that he can control them; but, the connection as being contingent, viz. that the individual may be able to control the tendencies and inclinations once he is aware of them, does not adequately reflect Hampshire's position. Hampshire does maintain that the individual may be able to control the tendencies and inclinations once he is aware of them; at the very least he is free to try to control them. It goes further than this, however; if the individual finds that he cannot control them, his knowledge provides him with the means of self-consciously acquiescing in them. This self-conscious acquiescence is important in that the individual no longer finds himself blindly acting in a way which is inconsistent with his sincerely professed intentions but accepts these tendencies and inclinations as limitations to his freedom of choice in action. The individual furthermore has an explanation for this inconsistency and can take its determining features into account in order to avoid the more disastrous consequences of his tendencies and inclinations.

A more serious problem that arises out of Hampshire's discussion of the connection between intention and the unconscious is that the actual connection, and therefore the motives and purposes (expressed as tendencies and inclinations to act in a particular way), while they are below the level of consciousness, remain unexplained. Once the individual is aware of such motives and purposes he becomes, in Hampshire's view, an intentional agent in that domain. The problem is not cleared up by the sort of distinction Kenny makes, viz.

"if a man breaks into a house
to steal money to buy medicine
for his wife, he has an intent
to steal, but to buy medicine
is his motive." (63)

⁶³ Kenny, A. The Anatomy of the Soul. Bristol: Western Printing Services, 1973, p.131.

In Hampshire's analysis, such an individual would have the intention both to steal and to buy medicine. So the actual status and existence (if one can speak of them as "existing") of unconscious motives and purposes amongst an individual's other powers of mind, e.g. beliefs, decisions, intentions, remains something of a mystery. Walsh comments on this to the effect that

"The possibility of unconscious intention is denied; but rather than renounce the entire conception of the unconscious or reconstruct it along the lines of 'bad faith', Hampshire offers a difficult distinction between intention and purpose. The difference lies in control; I can at least try to control that of which I am conscious. This simply begs the question or at least ignores the difficulties of the problem of unconscious agency." (64)

Hampshire does reply to this, stating emphatically that the problem of unconscious agency is not ignored.⁽⁶⁵⁾ But his reply does not add much more to the solution of the problem than do his views already outlined in this chapter so it will not be repeated here.

Without this problem being cleared up, Hampshire simply indicates the importance of the unconscious for the question of the individual's freedom. He maintains that in taking the modified application of Freud's discoveries in the field of neurosis, in conjunction

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- ⁶⁴ Walsh, J.J. Remarks on Thought and Action. The Journal of Philosophy vol LX, no.3. January 31, 1963, p.60
⁶⁵ (Hereafter referred to as The J of Phil. vol LX. 1963)
Hampshire, S. Reply to Walsh on Thought and Action The Journal of Philosophy. vol LX, no.14, July 4, 1963, p.414.
(Hereafter referred to as The J of Phil. vol LX 1963)

with the accepted criticism of freedom, i.e. that which an individual does with full knowledge of what he is doing, alone constitutes that which he does with full freedom, we can see ourselves to be less free in discovering that we are less fully self-conscious than we had hitherto believed.

The positive aspect of this, according to Hampshire, is that with the awareness of the unconscious dimension, the possibility of another and deeper self-consciousness is opened to the individual. In taking account of the unconscious as regards the individual's freedom, Hampshire says that

"The whole weight of explaining and understanding of human behaviour is placed on the individual subject, as potentially an active, remembering being. Because of this, he can to some extent become rather more free and self-determining, through making an active use of memory in disinterring his own unconscious motives and in acquiring a clearer view of present reality." (66)

At the beginning of this section⁽⁶⁷⁾ the question was raised as to whether the problems that arise seriously undermine Hampshire's theory of the connection between intention and the unconscious as it pertains to freedom. The problems centre on Hampshire's acceptance from Freud that there are unconscious purposes and motives which influence an individual's conduct.

O'Connor criticises Hampshire for his contempt for exemplified fact. He says that this is illustrated by

" ... generalizations /

⁶⁶ Hampshire, S. D & Mem. F of M & Other Essays, p.182.
⁶⁷ "Intention and the Unconscious".

" ... generalizations on matters of psychology, a field where there is abundant factual evidence, continually relevant and continually ignored. (It is significant to note that the only psychological citations are to Freud (four times) and to psycho-analysis (four times). It is time that philosophers realized that psychoanalysis is not the whole of psychology or even a reputable part of it.) (68)

The fact that the unconscious remains unexplained does call Hampshire's theory of the unconscious as it pertains to the individual's freedom, into question. Unless, or until the unconscious dimension has adequately been accounted for, it does seem that its effect on an individual's conduct as a limiting factor remains only an interesting theoretical possibility.

⁶⁸ O'Connor, D.J. The Journal of R.I of Phil. vol XXXVI, 1961, p.232.

CHAPTER 111

KNOWLEDGE

1. Introduction

It is necessary to examine the kind of knowledge which individuals have and its significance for their freedom, because it is Hampshire's view that it is through having more and more explicit knowledge of what he is doing that the individual becomes comparatively more free.

According to Hampshire the individual's present state of consciousness is constituted by beliefs about his present situation and environment and two kinds of knowledge of the future, viz. Inductive knowledge, which is knowledge of the future course of events, and non-inductive knowledge, which is the individual's knowledge of what he will do.

In this section these three broadly distinguishable kinds of knowledge, as well as the knowledge which an individual has of his states of consciousness, i.e. his mental states and processes, will in as far as it is possible, be examined separately as they pertain to the question of the freedom of the individual.

It must, however, not be thought that these types of knowledge are separate, because they are related at least in the sense that an individual's knowledge of what he will do, i.e. his intentions, arise out of and are influenced by his beliefs about his present situation and environment, his expectations about the future course of events and his knowledge of his own mental states and processes, which have to be taken into account as features of the situation in which he finds himself and in which he acts.

2. Belief /

2. Belief

With regard to an individual's beliefs it is important to point out that the phrase "beliefs about his present situation and environment" implies distinguishable kinds of belief.

Beliefs about his environment - In Hampshire's view the individual sees reality around him and forms beliefs about it as a pattern of usable or obstructive things. His identification and classification of things around him is in accordance with the way in which they are related to his present practical interests and to his immediate intentions.

Present situation - Hampshire defines as where the individual is and what he is trying to do. Where the individual is, is fixed as the place from which he observes and manipulates things around him. As he moves, his point of view changes and it is in this way that he explains and organises the world with himself as the central point of reference. When an individual is trying to do something, his knowledge of what he is trying to do depends partly on his beliefs about reality around him and his position in the environment; but, very importantly, what he is trying to do involves beliefs which may be categorised as moral or ethical beliefs and may be expressed fairly simply at this stage of this thesis as the individual's beliefs about what would be the best action or actions in the circumstances. What will specifically be examined here are Hampshire's views on the general nature of beliefs as they pertain to the question of freedom, rather than a discussion of the distinction between moral and non-moral beliefs. The question of the individual's beliefs about the best ends of human life is discussed later in this thesis.⁽⁶⁹⁾

Hampshire /

⁶⁹ Chapter V, "Moral Questions" p. 143 ff.

Hampshire says of an individual's beliefs

"Any one man inevitably carries with him an enormous load of settled beliefs about the world, which he never has had occasion to question and many of which he never has had occasion to state. They constitute the generally unchanging background of his active thought and observation, and they constitute also his knowledge of his own position in the world in relation to other things. The culture of which he is part is formed partly by beliefs in which he grew up, almost without noting them, and partly by the habits of action and social behaviour that are unthinking, unquestioned, but not unintentional." (70)

In speaking of the nature of beliefs, Hampshire outlines certain conditions which are essential to the concept of belief. The possibility of having a belief depends on the possibility of expressing it in a statement. This dependence of beliefs on language he sees as being intrinsic to the concept of belief because, in the first place, unless an individual has a language in which to express his beliefs, no sense could be given to the notion of attributing any specific opinions to him; and, secondly, the expression of a belief is what makes it definite.

Hampshire does not deny that an individual can make mistakes in stating his beliefs. In fact he says that a believer may make several different kinds of mistake; an example would be using incorrect words to express his belief. But, even though an individual may make such a mistake, he must at least be able to recognise a correct formulation of his opinion when it is offered to him.

One /

One may object and say that it is perfectly possible for an individual to form definite beliefs and reflect on them without making any statement to the effect that he believes such-and-such. Hampshire agrees with this, but maintains that individuals can only formulate and reflect on their beliefs solitarily because they have learnt to do it in communication with others. The point is not that a belief must immediately and necessarily issue in a public statement, but rather that the believer must be prepared to express it, even though he may for various reasons be unwilling to do so, or be prevented from doing so. In order to be prepared to express it, his belief must have been made quite definite to himself by having been formulated. For this, the individual requires, and depends on, language.

If an individual finds that he cannot express his belief in language, Hampshire maintains that the so-called belief amounts to a mere confusion or muddle; this is because the content of beliefs is determined by the rules of language that determine how particular expressions of the language can be intelligibly combined. The individual must therefore be able to express his belief within these rules if it is to have any substance.

It must not only be possible for an individual to express his beliefs, they must also guide his actions in order to count as beliefs. The individual does not simply hold beliefs in isolation from his interests and activities, he also envisages possible consequences of having a particular belief or set of beliefs. In this way the individual attaches sense to the alternatives of belief and disbelief.

Although beliefs guide action, they are not themselves actions. Hampshire indicates various idioms that assimilate belief to action :

" ... e.g./

"... e.g. 'I cannot believe',
or even 'I cannot bring my-
self to believe', or 'You
ought not to believe', or
'He refused to believe.'" (71)

Individuals can, and do, intelligibly speak of beliefs as if they were actions; but Hampshire rejects the notion that the formation of a belief is an action on the basis of what he sees to be a necessary feature of action, viz. that an individual can decide to perform an action and either succeed or fail in the attempt, depending on the circumstances. As regards beliefs, Hampshire maintains that there is no sense in which an individual is free to decide or to try to believe something and perhaps achieve belief, or fail in the attempt. If, for example, an individual says that he wants to believe something, or that he is determined to believe what someone says, or that he made himself believe a statement, he is not in fact expressing his belief but rather his scepticism. Even if someone advised him to turn his attention away from contrary evidence so that he could achieve belief, his ensuing state, says Hampshire, would not be belief.

Another aspect of this is that if, in expressing his belief, an individual prefaces his statement with the words "I believe", he introduces a qualification into the statement and indicates that he is not altogether sure of the accuracy of his statement. This also applies to a statement about what an individual will do if he prefaces it with the words "I intend"; it indicates that he is making a statement about his intention (or belief) only, and that he does not purport to know whether the future will turn out as he expects it to.

Thus, when an individual says that he believes a statement, he has not decided to believe it; he has not

attempted /

⁷¹ T & A, p.155.

attempted or achieved anything; he has simply decided that the statement in question is true.

This raises an interesting problem for the question of faith, e.g. if an individual questions religious doctrine because he finds inconsistencies or contradictions which he cannot accept or reconcile, and is told that he must simply have faith and believe - can any sense be attached to such an instruction? Scriven thinks so and says

"Religious people, perturbed by the problem of evil, are often told to 'fix their eyes firmly on the Cross', i.e. to concentrate on the moral virtues of God rather than on the difficulties. And there is every evidence that this procedure is often effective. We do have this rather furtive kind of control over what we and others believe, and in this respect the contrast with action fails." (72)

Scriven does not, however, provide the evidence for this, nor does he explain what he means by "furtive control". In Hampshire's analysis, no sense could be attached to such an instruction because the whole point and purpose of a belief is that it must be true.

The use of the term "true" immediately raises questions such as

- "true for whom?"
- "true in the sense that there is common agreement amongst individuals?"
- "true in the sense of being empirically verifiable?"

The sense in which Hampshire uses the term "true" with regard to an individual's belief is that it must be true for that individual; this means that the object of his belief must, for that individual, be an appropriate

one. /

⁷² Scriven, M. Mind. vol LXXI 1962, p.105.

one. Hampshire says of this that if an individual makes a statement to the effect that he believes something, but at the same time admits that the object of his belief is inappropriate, his admission cancels the validity of his statement of belief. Other people may think that an individual's belief is misguided and perhaps try to show him that it is, but the individual himself cannot claim to have a belief and at the same time believe that it is misguided or groundless. He cannot, as Hampshire puts it,

"... find himself saddled
with a belief in the incredible,
as he may find himself saddled
with an appetite for the un-
attainable or with a fear of
the harmless." (73)

Hampshire adds to this that

"If he does find himself still
haunted by a thought, which he
now knows to be unfounded and
absurd, he still cannot say
'I believe that someone is
following me', if he knows
that this haunting thought is
a symptom of paranoia and has
no foundation in fact. He
can only say - 'I cannot help
thinking (imagining) that some-
one is following me.'" (74)

The individual could only, on reflection, discover afterwards that he had been too gullible and had believed something which he now regards as being unfounded or incredible.

If an individual cannot decide to believe something and if his beliefs must be true in the sense indicated by Hampshire, the question arises as to whether there is a deterministic element in the formation of beliefs.

In /

73 Hampshire, S. Freedom of the Individual, 2nd edition.
London: Chatto and Windus, 1975, p.76.
74 (Hereafter referred to as F of I.)
Hampshire, S. F of I. p.76-7.

In a sense yes, because he cannot decide or choose what he will believe or disbelieve; but, in a very important sense, no, because the individual is not, for example, presented with a proposition "X" which entails his belief that "X" is true. He still has to assess it according to his own criteria of validity.

An individual's beliefs are therefore, according to Hampshire, formed in response to free enquiry. This free enquiry is not, however, totally without limits; each belief is formed against a background of existing beliefs which an individual has, and which provide him with some criteria of judgement when faced with situations or propositions which he has to examine in terms of their validity.

When an individual forms a belief, it is conditioned upon other beliefs and upon a reasoning process. The reasoning process necessarily involves a belief at each step. It is for Hampshire an absurdity to say that an individual believed something on impulse. He sees it as a necessary truth that part of the point and purpose of any belief is that it is to be calculated in the sense that reasons for a belief constitute a train of thought or calculation leading to a conclusion. It is particularly when an individual experiences uncertainty in forming a belief that some of the conditions attached to it are most apparent to him.

An individual can either represent his beliefs in conditional form as a chain of beliefs connected by reasoning, or he can simply represent a belief without its conditions attached. If he is asked to justify such a detached belief, he does not need to appeal to some general covering law, nor employ inductive experimental argument. All he has to do is to reconstruct some of the chain of conditions on which it depends to find a necessary condition of his detailed belief. It

is /

is therefore, in Hampshire's view, incorrect to speak of causes of a belief if "causes" mean "sufficient conditions of belief." He maintains that

"Sufficient conditions of belief are immediately converted into sufficient conditions for an inclination to believe, when the conditions become known to the subject and are believed by him not to be reliable indices of truth; or the sufficient conditions of belief, hitherto, become reasons for belief when the conditions become known to the subject and are taken by him to be reliable indices of truth." (75)

The reasons which an individual could give in justification of his belief are limited by the content of the statement believed. The content of the belief is fixed by the conventions of language, and if the reasons which an individual gives for his belief are inadequate or inappropriate, this inadequacy or inappropriateness can be shown by reference to the content of the belief alone; the occasion on which the belief was formed or stated would, for this particular purpose, be irrelevant.

Although the reasons which could be given for a belief are limited by the conventions of language, and therefore to the content of the statement of the belief, the statement of the belief does not necessarily show the grounds, or provide the reasons for the belief. Hampshire makes a distinction between holding a belief and stating the belief, and therefore sees an unavoidable distinction between reasons for stating the belief and the grounds on which, or reasons for which, the belief is held.

As regards, firstly, the statement of a belief, the

differences /

75 Hampshire, S. Freedom of Mind. F of M & Other Essays, p.14. (Hereafter referred to as F of M. F of M & Other Essays.)

differences in the syntax and vocabulary in stating it on various occasions, only reflect differences in the individual's motives or intent in stating it, or differences in his circumstances and the social act of stating the belief. Hampshire gives an illustration of this, i.e. an individual might say to someone that a particular action is wrong. His intention might be to persuade the person not to perform the action in question. It is not, however, apparent from his statement why he believes or how he knows that the action is wrong. Alternatively, he might say of a particular poem that it is beautiful, but in expressing his appreciation he has not given his reasons for thinking that it is a beautiful poem. This is not confined to questions of ethics and aesthetics but but applies equally to utterances in which the individual gives information, issues commands and makes requests. This is not, of course, to say that Hampshire would deny that there are cases in which the statement of the belief makes the grounds of such a belief quite explicit; the more general type seems to be beliefs in the statement of which the grounds for holding the belief are not made explicit.

As regards, secondly, the holding of a belief or beliefs, Hampshire maintains that the grounds of the individual's opinions are only made clear if he asks himself, "What other changes in my opinion would lead to my changing my opinion on this matter ?" ⁽⁷⁶⁾ In this way he can establish what it is that he believes and why he believes it.

In examining his beliefs in this way the individual may find that he was mistaken in the reasons he had for a belief, i.e. he may find that what he thought were

reasons /

⁷⁶ T & A, p.143.

reasons are in fact simply rationalisations and do not explain his beliefs. Alternatively, an individual may find that his beliefs are to some extent confused. Hampshire allows for confusion in beliefs because in his view

"There may be shades and degrees of conscious irrationality and of confusion; and of half-belief and half-imagination." (77)

The degree of such confusion in an individual's beliefs indicates the degree to which he lacks consistency, and therefore freedom, in his actions. The increase in his knowledge which may result from the examination of his beliefs and their reasons will change the account he will give of why he believes something. Since an individual always has the possibility of increasing his knowledge, his beliefs may be supported by different arguments at different periods of his life. When he finds, in this way, that some of his beliefs are false or misguided he will review other beliefs which are conditional upon, or related to, the false ones if he recognises them as being inconsistent with his changed beliefs.

An individual's examination and revision of his beliefs amounts to establishing a pattern of rationality in the beliefs to which he commits himself. Hampshire sees rationality in the domain of opinion as simply the opposite of disconnectedness, i.e. as the opposite of holding his beliefs apart without ranging them in a decided order of dependence. If an individual's beliefs remain disconnected to any great extent, he will find himself acting irrationally and frequently undoing what he has previously achieved. Although the individual

may /

may change or modify his beliefs, they must, in Hampshire's view generally be stable to count as beliefs. Beliefs cannot simply be changed or modified at will without affecting other beliefs; this is because the reasons for his beliefs must, over some period of time, fit into a recognisable policy of belief to count as genuine reasons. Hampshire does say that there are exceptions to this, in that some beliefs may be episodic, but he does not illustrate or provide examples.

An important question with regard to the question of the individual's freedom is the sense in which an individual is responsible for his beliefs. In Hampshire's view it seems exaggerated to speak of someone as responsible for his beliefs. This is borne out by his view that the individual cannot decide to believe something; he simply believes it if, to the best of his knowledge, for example, a statement appears to him to be true, or a state of affairs appears to him to be the case.

An individual may be held responsible for being too gullible, for believing something too readily; so an important sense in which an individual has responsibility with regard to his beliefs, is the responsibility for examining the grounds of existing beliefs, or beliefs he is forming, and establishing that they are adequate. The onus is on the individual himself to sort out inconsistencies in the policy of beliefs to which he commits himself and to establish a pattern of rationality in so far as it is possible for him to do so.

The widening of his freedom may either lie in the fact that he will act differently from the way in which he may have acted before examining the grounds of, and the inconsistencies in, his beliefs; or it may be the case that once he has established adequate grounds for his beliefs and ranged them in some order of dependence, he may not necessarily act differently, but will be more

free /

free to the extent that he knows more explicitly why he acts in a particular way.

3. Inductive and non-Inductive Knowledge

Hampshire outlines two sharply distinguishable kinds of knowledge of the future: ⁽⁷⁸⁾

(1) knowledge of the future which the individual has by virtue of observation of the natural course of events, and which is normally to be justified by inductive reasoning;

(2) knowledge of the future which the individual has by virtue of having formed an intention or intentions to act in certain ways in the immediate future and sometimes in the relatively remote future.

He maintains that these two kinds of knowledge are mutually dependent, which has the implication that there is an inductive component in all non-inductive knowledge. This mutual dependence and its implications for the question of freedom will be discussed immediately after the two kinds of knowledge have been outlined and discussed.

(i) Inductive knowledge

This is knowledge of the future which may be justified by inductive reasoning and is not directly connected with the will of the individual who makes the claim to knowledge. It is constituted by the individual's anticipation of situations that will confront him and the environment in which he may find himself.

In Hampshire's view the whole point of such an expectation is that it must be in accordance with what in fact
does /

⁷⁸ F of I. p.53.

does happen. An individual's expectation will be found to be incorrect if it does not correspond with the reality. If he is questioned as to the correctness of his expectations he will need to formulate them with reasons, and then wait and see whether the formulated expectations match the actual events. Of this Hampshire says

"My expectations may not be expressed in communication with others, and therefore no statement may be made. My reasons for expecting what I expect may also not be disclosed to others. In the normal case a man is able, when there is occasion for it, to express in words his expectations about future happenings." (79)

But to this he adds

"It is not an accidental feature of one's expectations and beliefs that they should be expressed. If I have made up my mind what will happen, I have eo ipso made up my mind what to say about the future, if I am asked; at least I have some representation of the future to offer." (80)

This is a fairly good indication of the form which this kind of knowledge takes. The individual may, and often does, make claims to more specific knowledge of this nature, e.g. about a particular impending event. If he states a confident belief about what will happen, he may be asked firstly how he knows what will happen; this would be a demand for the source of his knowledge, and he would have to provide evidence to support his prediction; secondly, he may be asked how he could possibly know what will happen. This would be a challenge to his claim to knowledge and would also

require /

79 F of I. p.67.
80 Ibid. p.67-8.

require evidence to support his reply to the challenge. In both of these examples the individual is predicting something and can be called upon to justify his predictions with evidence and the source of his knowledge. The question arises as to an individual's prediction of what he himself will do; the logical impossibility of such predictions is discussed in the context of non-inductive knowledge immediately following this outline of inductive knowledge. Hampshire maintains that an individual can, however, predict or attempt to predict, with regard to his own activities, what the outcome of such activities will be. The individual might, for example, be asked whether he will succeed in what he is doing. He can, without absurdity, make a prediction because the success or failure of what he attempts is not decided by him. He can only decide to try to achieve something; if he fails in his attempt, this is something that happens to him, his intentions notwithstanding. The prediction as to whether he will succeed or fail can be made on the basis of evidence of his past success and failure and in terms of his competence at what he is doing.

Although an individual cannot predict his own future voluntary actions, he can, in Hampshire's view, form expectations about and predict the future voluntary conduct of other individuals. If he claims to know what someone will do he implies, by his claim to know, that he has access to a reliable source of information. If asked, he would have to state the information and perhaps the source, by way of justification. Alternatively, he may say that on the basis of what he knows of that person it is reasonable to predict what he will do in particular circumstances.

If an individual professes himself unable to predict

in /

in some circumstances either what will happen, what situations will arise, or what someone else will do, his inability arises from a lack of information and can perhaps be remedied by further enquiry and observations.

It is therefore, in Hampshire's view, possible for an individual to make predictions on the basis of knowledge which he has, which does not directly depend on his will. It has been indicated that the same is not true of knowledge which is dependent on the individual's will, i.e. non-inductive knowledge.⁽⁸¹⁾ An individual can only decide what he will do and cannot predict it. Hampshire justifies this claim in his discussion of non-inductive knowledge.

(ii) Non-inductive knowledge

Hampshire indicates that intention and memory are sources of non-inductive knowledge. Memory as a source of non-inductive knowledge is limited in the sense that the individual can only claim to know directly what happened on a specific occasion if he was actually present and observed it. Similarly, an individual can only claim to know what he will do or try to do as a result of his own decision or intention. Hampshire indicates that there is another source of non-inductive knowledge, and says

"One may properly claim to know various propositions about the objects visible in one's environment to be true, and such knowledge is not inductive knowledge; a man can properly claim he knows because he sees the objects before him."(82)

Other /

81 Also referred to by Hampshire as intentional-knowledge, non-inferential knowledge and non-propositional knowledge.
82 F of I. p.66.

Other claims to knowledge of the past, and other claims to knowledge of the future must, in Hampshire's view,

"... be justified as an inductive inference, based upon some general proposition which has been thoroughly tested and found to be true in all examined cases." (83)

The kind of knowledge which an individual has by virtue of having an intention is never inferred. Any attempt on the individual's part to justify a claim to certain knowledge of what he will do, on a specific occasion, by inductive argument, simply becomes unintelligible. It becomes unintelligible because, if he knows what he will do, he knows it simply by virtue of having made a decision, or having an intention. This knowledge is direct and the individual therefore does not need any sort of double or reflexive knowing, expressed by Hampshire as "... knowing what one intends." (84) This is, in his view, a redundant way of saying "... I know what I shall do." (85) It expresses no more than the latter statement.

Hampshire illustrates the directness of intentional knowledge with an example of movements an individual may make and his knowledge of it, e.g. the individual knows directly whether he moved his arm or whether it was simply a reflex movement, a twitch. He knows directly because he does not have to perceive it moving. He may of course also observe it moving because he is looking at it, but his knowledge of whether he moved it or not is not derived from this observation. Walsh raises an objection to this idea and asks whether individuals can really know exactly where their limbs are /

83 T & A. p.128.

84 T & A. p.102.

85 Ibid.

are without observation. If they could know, it is his contention that there would be no point in filming sporting events so that athletes can watch themselves to discover exactly how they performed. To this he adds

"The diligent athlete observing himself in action should remind us that in some sense of 'know' and in some sense of 'do' it is not necessarily true that a person knows with certainty what he is doing. The obvious temptation here is to distinguish between two senses of the term 'do' - one the overt movement of the body and the other the action that is meant by the agent." (86)

Although it is Walsh's opinion that to resolve the paradox by distinguishing between two senses of the term "do" in this way, would be to trivialise it, Hampshire's reply to Walsh is in terms of this sort of distinction, because in his view there is necessarily a double face of human action, i.e. in terms of the attempt and the actual performance. That this distinction does not trivialise the problem may be seen from the fact that it reflects the whole basis of Hampshire's philosophy of mind, viz. the connection he establishes between thought and action. In terms of this connection action is a combination of intention and physical movement; the intention enters into and guides the physical movement, thereby distinguishing it from mere natural movement without intention. (87)

The individual intends to make the attempt, but it does not necessarily follow that his actual performance will coincide with his intention. Hampshire therefore replies to Walsh in terms of the double face of action,

and /

⁸⁶ Walsh, J.J. The J of Phil. vol LX, 1963, p.59.
⁸⁷ Dealt with more fully in Chapter IV, "Action", p.113ff.

and says

"About my own performance there are two distinct kinds of discovery I may make: first, that what I have observably achieved does or does not correspond with what I intended.... This seems to be the case of Walsh's athlete who observes his own performance and tries to improve it. In general we learn by observation what we have actually achieved or are achieving But neither the athlete nor anyone else learns by observation what he is trying to do (e.g. with his limbs). (88)

Hampshire adds to this the comment that if an individual simply knows the position and movements of his body, this would not be enough to enable him to answer the question as to what he is doing. He illustrates this by saying that an individual could look at his hands and see that he holding a knife, and not know what he intended to do with it because he has forgotten.

According to Hampshire

"This illustrates the irrelevance of prior observation by the agent of his bodily movements to his declarations of what he is currently engaged in doing." (89)

The emphasis in this is on "prior observation" because Hampshire would not deny that when an individual stops to think what he was doing because he has forgotten, he may be reminded of what he was doing by seeing the knife in his hand.

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88 Hampshire, S. The J of Phil. vol LX, 1963, p.414-5.
89 Hampshire S. and Hart, H.L.A. D.I & C. Mind
vol LXXVll, 1959, p.9.

In a similar way that an individual knows what he is doing and where his limbs are without observation, when he is certain about what he will do on a specific occasion in the future, his knowledge is direct. It is direct because his certainty is about the action and not about a proposition about the action derived or inferred from some general law or evidence of past behaviour, e.g. if an individual makes a statement to the effect that he knows what he is going to do, he cannot properly be asked for the source of his knowledge, nor the means by which he acquired it. He cannot therefore be asked to justify his claim to know what he will do. He may quite intelligibly be asked if he is sure that he will do it, in which case he is not being asked to supply evidence in support of his claim, but is being asked whether he really intends to do as he says he will.

Because the knowledge of what an individual will do is direct and not inferred, the individual himself is normally accepted as the final authority in declaring his central intention or main intentions. Other individuals do not have direct knowledge of what he is trying to do. They can only perceive what he is doing and from this infer his intentions. If the individual states his intention and it does not correspond with what he subsequently does, he cannot be accused of not knowing what he is doing. He can only be accused of dishonesty or of making a mistake in stating his intention. Even if someone points out to him that he said he would do "X" and is in fact doing "Y", and he acknowledges that the person is right, this does not mean that he does not know what he is doing; it is his statement which was incorrect and not his intention. An example Hampshire gives of this is that if an individual says that he is going to pick an azalea and then picks a lily instead, his intention was not incorrect; his statement of his intention was wrong because he had incorrectly

identified /

identified the object towards which his intention was directed.

Intentional knowledge is thus in Hampshire's view direct. It is not inferred and nor is it justified by inductive argument. The individual knows what he is doing, or going to do, because he has decided, or has an intention to do it. With regard to the individual's knowing what he is going to do, Hare⁽⁹⁰⁾ raises a problem similar to the one raised by Walsh.⁽⁹¹⁾ He maintains that if an individual has decided exactly what he is going to do, it does not necessarily follow that he knows he will do it, in the sense of knowing that he is actually doing what he has decided upon. Hare says

"... for all I know I may try
but fail to do it (even when
I think I am succeeding). I
may know what to say in the
next sentence; but do I know
that I shall actually say it
- or even that I am now say-
ing what I think I am saying ?
Does the hymn-singer know
without observation that he is
not singing 'From death's dead
string thy servant's free'?" (92)

To this it can be replied in Hampshirian terms that an individual would have to observe the action, i.e. the utterance of the words, for him to know whether he has done, or is doing, what he intended to do. This does not, however, mean that he has to observe the action in order to know what his intention is; his mistake is discovered by observation, not his intention. This, once again, raises the point that an individual must be an agent and observer, simultaneously; and the more perceptive an individual is with regard to his

actions /

⁹⁰ Hare, R.M. Phil. Review. vol 76, 1967, p.232-3.

⁹¹ See above p.109.

⁹² Hare, R.M. Phil. Review, vol 76, 1967, p.232-3.

actions, the more possibility he has of avoiding or correcting mistakes and achieving what he intended.

From the idea that an individual's knowledge of his own intentions is direct and is not inferred, it follows for Hampshire that an individual cannot predict his own intentions. If an individual is asked what he will do next, he is called upon to state his intentions. If he has not thought about it, and a reply is required, he is called upon to decide. Hampshire sees prediction with regard to the individual's own intentions on a specific occasion as a logical impossibility based on the distinction between that which happens to an individual and that which he does of his own free will; the individual employs inductive methods to predict what will happen in the normal course of events; such inductive knowledge serves the individual's intentions because it is on the basis of inductive knowledge that he can decide on his own conduct. If the individual attempts to replace his intentions with inductive anticipation, he cannot, in Hampshire's view, act deliberately or rationally.

If an individual attempts to predict what he will do next, his announcement of "prediction" will amount to a statement of action. He would be stating what he is going to do and not what will happen to him. His attempt is by definition what he himself does; the success or failure of his attempt is what happens to him, either in accordance with or contrary to his intentions.

According to Hampshire it would be senseless for an individual to predict what he will do next. In attempting to make such a prediction, he would be in the position of trying to predict something that is already beginning and would do just as well to make a decision.

If /

If an individual does predict what he himself will do on a specific occasion in the future, it is Hampshire's contention that he is implying that the action to be performed will not be entirely voluntary. If the action were entirely voluntary, the individual could not avoid deciding what he will do. When an individual is faced with having to make a decision, Hampshire maintains that

"While he is making the decision, and while he is reviewing reasons for acting in one way rather than another, he must be in a state of uncertainty about what he is going to do. The certainty comes at the moment of decision, and indeed constitutes the decision, when the certainty is arrived at in this way, as a result of considering reasons, and not as a result of considering evidence." (93)

In this idea that the individual can predict actions of his own which will not be performed entirely voluntarily, Hampshire is raising the question of coercion. He does not, however, in the context of this essay, "Decision, Intention and Certainty", give examples or illustrate the nature of such non-voluntary actions. The question therefore arises as to how an individual can predict and perform an action (knowing what he is doing since action is a combination of intention and physical movement), and yet not be performing it entirely voluntarily.

The actions which Hampshire has in mind would obviously not be of the following type, viz. when a doctor taps a patient's knee, his leg jumps; because this would not, in Hampshire's analysis, constitute an action, but rather a natural movement caused by the tapping of the
knee./

⁹³ Hampshire, S. and Hart, H.L.A. D, I & C. Mind
vol LXXVI, 1958, p.2-3.

It could equally not be of the type in which an individual predicts that he will be working late next week because he has been told to. He can still be said to be performing the action voluntarily because he has to decide whether to acquiesce or to refuse; in that case he would not be predicting his own action. The type of action Hampshire has in mind would, it seems, be of the type outlined in the symposium "Freedom and the Will"⁽⁹⁴⁾ viz. that a drug addict firstly knows that he will ask for a drug within twenty-four hours whether or not he decides beforehand that he will not ask, and secondly, when the time comes he asks for it even though he does not want to, since he wants to be cured. His need for the drug is so overwhelming that, at the time, he cannot exercise his will to overcome the compulsion to ask.

In the outline of non-inductive knowledge it has been indicated that an individual cannot predict what he himself will do on a specific occasion, because in Hampshire's opinion it does seem possible that an individual can adopt a spectator's view of himself and predict what he would decide to do in a hypothetical situation or if the situation envisaged is fairly remote and no relevant practical decision is open to him. In such cases, Hampshire thinks that a quasi-prediction may just be possible. But he goes on to say that if an individual is asked to make a prediction of this nature he could simply be taken to be expressing his opinion of what would be the right or best thing to do in the circumstances envisaged. Furthermore, if one considers that if the expression of his opinion is sincere, he would be taken to be expressing

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⁹⁴ Pears, D.F. editor Freedom and Knowledge. Freedom and the Will London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1963. (Hereafter referred to as Fr. & the Will.)

a determination to act in just that particular way should the circumstances arise, unless he changes his mind; he would not be taken to be making a prediction in the same sense that he predicts the future course of events or the actions of some other individual.

Alternatively, Hampshire suggests that an individual might be asked to predict his own future conduct on the basis of his knowledge of himself and his tendencies. But Hampshire maintains that by taking his tendencies into consideration, the individual would still have to decide whether he would acquiesce in these tendencies or try to change or overcome them. He would therefore be making a hypothetical decision and not an observer's guess as to what he would do.

Even if the individual simply says he expects that he will try to do "A" because he has always done it in the past, this is not equivalent to predicting someone else's conduct. His past actions do not cause him to act in a similar way in the future, so he cannot infer his future intentions from his past conduct. His past actions or attempts constitute his reason for trying the same thing in the future; or alternatively his reasons for doing something in the past could be reasons for trying the same thing in the future; furthermore, in Hampshire's view, the individual does not helplessly encounter reasons for action, he unavoidably has to decide for himself what he considers to be a sufficient reason for action. So, even if an individual does say that he will do something because he has done it in the past, Hampshire maintains that the individual cannot in this way disguise his freedom of action since the term "because" cannot be taken as a sign of inductive inference equivalent to saying of someone else that one expects he will do something because he has always done it in the past. Of this Hampshire says

"That /

"That which he quotes as the basis or ground of his certainty that he will try to do so-and-so will be taken as his reason for doing it, if the doing is to be genuinely an action of his." (83)

If the individual takes his reasons into consideration he is already forming a plan of action. If he tries to ignore such reasons in order to simply make a prediction, he could not possibly have any confidence in such a prediction and could not act rationally and deliberately on the basis of it. Hampshire states that

"The principle here is that no one can, logically can, regard his past intentions as a basis for predicting his future intentions." (84)

Pears, however, is not entirely satisfied with the account Hampshire gives of the impossibility of an individual's prediction of his own intentions and raises the question of psychological self-prediction. He illustrates by saying

"For example, a person sometimes knows that a particular consideration will seem to be much stronger when the moment for action arrives than it now seems to be. And doesn't this show that he can predict that it will eventually lead him to make a decision, although he hasn't yet made the decision?" (85)

To this Hampshire replies that the individual in Pears'

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T & A. p.130.

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T & A. p.129.

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Pears, D.F. ed. Fr. & the Will, p.84.

example knows ⁽⁸⁶⁾ that a particular consideration will seem stronger to him when the time comes to act; but in knowing this, the individual has only predicted something about the circumstances in which he will have to make the decision. He has not predicted the decision since he is still considering what he will do on that particular occasion, and is therefore still undecided. To this it may be added that if the individual has predicted what decision he will make, he knows what he will do when the moment for action arrives and has therefore decided to acquiesce in the considerations which seem so strong to him; he would in effect have an intention to do that which Pears claims he is predicting. Hampshire illustrates as follows :

"Suppose he used the following form of words: 'I know that this consideration will outweigh all others, when the moment for action comes, because I shall be so tired and disillusioned; therefore I predict that I shall try to do so-and-so.' Should we not say: 'Have you then decided to let the events - in this case, psychological events - take their course ?' This is also a decision." (87)

(iii) The mutual dependence of inductive and non-inductive knowledge

In Hampshire's view the two kinds of knowledge of the future, i.e. inductive knowledge which is constituted by the individual's expectation of the future course of events, and non-inductive knowledge constituted by

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⁸⁷ Pears, D.F. ed. Fr. & the Will, p.85.

his intentions, are mutually dependent because it is impossible for an individual to have the one without also having the other.

Expectations and intentions are similar in that both satisfy the following conditions outlined by Hampshire, viz.

"... that they are states, or attitudes, which any conscious rational agent must sometimes have; that they are states, or attitudes, which cannot be identified as such independently of identifying a real or notional object of the state or attitude: thirdly, that the subject of the state or attitude must believe that the object he identifies as the object is an appropriate one." (88)

The individual always forms his intentions in the light of his expectation of the natural course of events because in order to have an intention to do something he must know of some way in which it is possible for him to do it. He must therefore have some knowledge of, or beliefs about, features of the situation in which he will make his attempt. If his expectations are changed or modified because he has acquired additional knowledge, he will correspondingly change or modify his intentions.

The individual does not only take into consideration his expectations of the future course of events in forming his intentions, he also takes account of events in the past and his own past actions in terms of their consequences and effectiveness. The beliefs which guided his past actions would also play an important part in guiding the future actions which he is determined upon. If these beliefs have changed, his future actions would correspondingly be different.

Hampshire /

Hampshire thus expresses the view that inductive knowledge is the unavoidable background of the individual's actions and plans of action, and it is in this way that the individual learns what he can or cannot do. The more accurately he has inferred what will happen in the future, the more likely he is to succeed in his attempts, and the less likely he is to attempt something in which he cannot, unbeknown to himself, under any circumstances succeed.

Hampshire indicates another aspect of the mutual dependence of the two kinds of knowledge of the future, viz. the mere fact that the individual knows or believes that something will happen in the future, places upon him the responsibility of allowing it to happen if he could prevent it. He does not at this point go into detail as to the kind of events for which the individual would have responsibility. What he does indicate is that an individual does not have any responsibility for events which cannot be changed or prevented by his intervention if he lacks the means, opportunity, or authority to intervene effectively; furthermore, since the range of the individual's thoughts and interests determines his possibilities of action, he could not be held responsible for allowing something to happen if there is no possibility of his foreseeing it. But when an individual has knowledge of what will happen in the future, particularly of events and circumstances which touch his interests, certain questions immediately arise because the individual is forced, by the knowledge, into stepping back and reviewing the new possibilities. The sort of questions which arise are

"Am I in a position to intervene
in the course of events ?" "Can
I get myself into a position to
intervene ?" "If I am, what state
of affairs should I bring about ?" (89)

In /

In Hampshire's view, it is the knowledge by itself which confers the responsibility upon the individual to alter what will happen in the natural course of events; if he does not act he is responsible in the sense that he allowed it to happen. Another aspect of this which Hampshire does not discuss is the individual's knowledge of what will occur in the future as a result of the activities of other individuals; but he may be subsuming this under the heading of "knowledge of the natural course of events", because it is also knowledge of events which do not depend on the will of the individual in question.

It may be seen that it is on the basis of his view of the mutual dependence of the two kinds of knowledge that Hampshire maintains that the terms "non-inductive" and "non-inferential" knowledge are in a sense misleading because there is an inductive component in all non-inductive knowledge.

One implication of the mutual dependence of the two kinds of knowledge of the future is that by virtue of knowing or having beliefs about the natural course of events, the individual also knows that he will find himself doing various things in the near and more distant future. But, it may be objected, the individual would in this sense be predicting his own future conduct and Hampshire emphatically denies such a possibility.

Hampshire is not contradicting himself because what he sees as a logical impossibility is the individual's justification of a claim to certain knowledge of what he will do on a specific occasion, by inductive argument. It is a logical impossibility because if the individual really knows what he will do on a specific occasion, he knows this by virtue of having an intention.

However, whether this is an acceptable example of the indicative component in non-inductive knowledge may

still /

still be called into question. If one takes examples of the sort of thing an individual knows he will find himself doing because he knows the future course of events pertaining to these things, it does seem dubious, e.g. the individual may know from experience that he will at some time in the future go to bed, eat, make a purchase and so on. If he gives it some thought he could even specify the occasion on which he will do these things.

If one considers what Hampshire says of the nature of intention, this kind of knowledge does not seem to amount to a prediction. Hampshire says of intentions that they are not necessarily the outcome of a decision, they may form themselves in the individual's mind and they constitute the permanent background of his working life. If the individual therefore knows that he will find himself doing these things, he must intend to do them, as and when the occasion arises. The question of predicting his future conduct, or having knowledge of it on the basis of inductive inference, even in terms of unspecified occasions, does not therefore seem to arise.

The other example Hampshire gives which illustrates the inductive component in non-inductive knowledge is somewhat different and more acceptable. In this example Hampshire says that if an individual claims to know what he will do by virtue of having an intention to do it, this knowledge contains an inductive element in the sense that the individual's record of reliability is relevant in judging his claim.

If the individual makes a mistake in judging the natural course of events, this may lead to a mistaken statement about his future voluntary actions. Hampshire allows that mistakes are always possible because, for example, no matter how carefully an individual assesses the evidence he has, he may still make mistakes in his

assumption /

assumption or deduction of what the situation will be. Even if he does not make this kind of mistake, and in fact assesses the evidence correctly, it is possible that he may not realise that the circumstances will have changed when the time comes for him to act. So, if an individual claims to know what he will do, even though he cannot properly be asked how he knows, his claim may in Hampshire's view be rebutted by inductive argument. He gives an example of this, viz. if an individual says that he is going to London by train tomorrow, his claim may be rebutted by the statement that he is not, because there are no trains tomorrow.

In another example Hampshire shows that this is equally applicable to other types of non-inductive knowledge, viz. if an individual tells someone the time and has often made a mistake in the past, the reasons for doubting the truth of his statement would be of the inductive kind because the doubt would be founded on the individual's record of reliability.

Similarly, an individual's claim to knowledge of a past event at which he was present has an inductive element. He may be quite sure that he knows exactly what happened because he saw it happening; but he may have made a mistake in his assessment of the situation because he had not noticed certain important features or had misconstrued others. His claim to knowledge could then be rebutted by inductive argument.

Hampshire therefore sees a close parallel between the criticisms that can be made of claims to both types of knowledge of the future. He says of this

"Both predictions and announcements of intention can be criticised for being ungrounded or careless, and they can be criticised because the speaker does not have all the credentials that he implicitly claims to have

in /

in making his statement; and they may both turn out to be unfortunate, although well-grounded in (in the one case) evidence and (in the other case) in a serious determination to act in the stated way." (90)

The significance of the mutual dependence of the two kinds of knowledge for the individual's freedom which emerges hinges on the fact that the individual must not only know what he is going to do, he must also know of some way in which it is possible for him to realise his intentions. Furthermore, his choices of action can only be made within the limits of the possibilities open to him, and it is his knowledge of the circumstances in which his actions will be performed which determines the range of possibilities open to him.

So, the more accurate an individual's knowledge of his situation and environment and of the future course of events is, the more effective he will be in achieving what he sets out to do, and the more consistent his actions can be in the sense of fitting into a wider policy of action to which he commits himself for varying lengths of time; furthermore, the wider his range of knowledge, the wider the range of possible actions open to him, will be.

4. Knowledge of Mental States and Processes

This outline of the individual's knowledge which is significant for the question of his freedom has thus far been confined to certain aspects of his beliefs about his situation and environment, his knowledge of what he will /

⁹⁰ F of I. p.58.

will do and his knowledge of what will happen in the future course of events. There is another aspect of the individual's knowledge which is important for the question of his freedom. This is the knowledge that an individual has of his own mental states and processes, dealt with specifically in an essay, "Sincerity and Singlemindedness",⁽⁹¹⁾ and a chapter entitled "Two Kinds of Knowledge."⁽⁹²⁾

Hampshire distinguishes an individual's mental states and processes broadly into two categories, viz.

"desires and attitudes which are formed as the outcome of considering the appropriateness of their objects, and which remain dependent on a conviction of appropriateness," (93)

and

"desires and moods that are not in this sense thought-dependent." (93)

This distinction he sees as being built into the vocabulary of emotions and attitudes and marks the difference between

"activity and passivity of mind, which is applied to one's thoughts no less than to desires, emotions and attitudes which are differentiated by the thoughts that enter into them." (94)

(i) Thought-dependent mental states and processes

Hampshire indicates examples of these as being "hope that p, anger that p, fear that p, belief that p, shame that /

91 F of M & Other Essays, p.232-256.
92 F of I. p.53-103.
93 F of I. p.93.
94 F of I. p.102.

that p, horror that p -" (95) In his discussions he characterises them as intentional states and uses various terms such as "sentiments", "passions", "attitudes", "desires", "propositional attitudes", "emotions", "feelings", fairly loosely to refer to them; the important common feature is their thought-dependence.

The knowledge that an individual has of his own contemporary intentional states is reflexive knowledge, and a way in which he comes to know them is by "watching." (96) This is not to imply that an individual needs to use inductive argument or consider the evidence of his behaviour in order to know; he cannot be asked how he knows, but he can be asked if he is sure with regard to their characterisation. In this sense there is an inductive component in the knowledge an individual has of his own intentional states.

According to Hampshire, watching is necessary for the individual to be able to characterise his own contemporary intentional states correctly, and also because of the confusions an individual may experience or the mistakes he may make in their characterisation. This is important because of the effects of such mistakes on his actions which will constitute a limitation to his freedom.

In this Hampshire says he is opposing the French moralists Stendahl and La Rochefoucauld (97) who are against self-watching. He attributes to them the view that if an individual watches his own states of mind, the change that this makes to the states of mind gives rise to sentimentality and then the individual's feelings will no longer be sincere. Their ideal, it appears, is spontaneity. Hampshire sums up their

views /

95 F of M & Other Essays, p.236.

96 Ibid.

97 For whom Hampshire provides no reference.

views as being

"Do not watch yourself feeling or you will no longer know what you really feel; and finally you will scarcely feel anything at all. If you watch your feelings and wonder what they are, they will become a cerebral invention, a kind of posturing to yourself. You will no longer be sincere; your impulses will cease to be impulses, and you will confuse what you think you ought to feel with what you actually do feel." (98)

Hampshire does not deny that this may happen in some instances of self-watching but sees this only as

"A special sub-class of the total range of cases in which a man's coming to know, or changing his opinion about, what his state of mind is constitutes a change in his state of mind." (99)

It must be noted that Hampshire's aim in outlining his ideas on reflexive knowledge in the essay "Sincerity and Singlemindedness"⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ is to show that the ideal of sincerity is difficult to attain. For the purpose of this study, however, the outline is directed towards showing that the more an individual knows about his intentional states, their causes and the appropriateness of their objects, the less liable he is to perform and repeat actions which could have been avoided if he had reflected on his intentional states. This confers upon the individual a responsibility for watching his own intentional states if he is to be a self-determining and free agent.

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⁹⁸ F of M & Other Essays, p.234.

⁹⁹ Ibid, p.236.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. p.232-256.

It will be useful to commence the discussion of intentional states by comparing the knowledge that an individual can claim to have of these states with the knowledge he can claim to have of his physical states and processes.

The knowledge that an individual may have of his physical states and processes does not by itself alter the physical state. Hampshire uses the example of an infection in the bloodstream and maintains that the individual's changing beliefs about the presence or absence of an infection in his bloodstream makes no difference to the chemical composition of his blood.

The individual's knowledge of his mental states and processes differs from this in that the individual's changing beliefs about the nature and origin of his intentional states will in some sense alter the state of mind. Hampshire explains this by saying that intentional states such as belief that *p*, hope that *p* etc. are not independent objects because the process of forming an intentional state of mind and the formation of beliefs about that state of mind overlap. These beliefs are constitutive elements in his state of mind and are one of the factors which determine what his state of mind is. A change in the individual's beliefs about the cause of his state of mind will change the state of mind; and a change in his beliefs about the object of his state of mind will change the state of mind. Hampshire gives an illustration:

"A man may be listening to music and at the same time, unknown to him, receiving a physical stimulation which produces a state of exaltation and pleasure; if the stimulation stops, the exaltation and pleasure would stop also. The man may think that he is enjoying the music intensely and, although this is certainly not the whole relevant truth about his state

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of mind, it is not entirely false either; it is not entirely false, just because he believes it to be true. He listens to the music as the source of his pleasure, and, because of this, we can say that the stimulation, which ordinarily causes just pleasure, on this occasion causes him to enjoy the music. But as soon as he ceases to believe that the music has any connection with his pleasurable state, we shall have less inclination to say that he is enjoying the music, because in his thought there is now no association between the music and the enjoyment. The difference in the specification of the object of the enjoyment depends on the subject's belief about the cause of the enjoyment." (101)

An implication of this in Hampshire's view is that if the individual was asked to report on the effects of the stimulus and he knows what the experiment involves, he cannot report on the effects without this knowledge affecting his state of mind on which he makes the report. A further implication is that the individual cannot use his knowledge of the causes of his intentional state to plan his sentiments and desires, as he could use his knowledge of the causes of his physical states to bring about a particular sensation. If he did try to plan his sentiments and desires they could not be sincere.

The other example Hampshire gives is as follows :

"Suppose that I truthfully say that I am frightened of German Nationalism as a political force; I would in this case normally be taken to have revealed that I believe that German nation-

alism /

101 F of M & Other Essays, p.253-4.

alism is in some way dangerous, unless I add that my fear is altogether irrational. The belief is the main constitutive element in the fear, which would disappear or at least be modified, with the disappearance of the belief. If in this case the belief were abandoned, nothing would remain that would constitute fear. The subject has his reasons for believing that German nationalism is dangerous, and just these are his reasons for fearing it. His reasons are the precautions against error that he would cite to show that his fear is not misguided, or unfortunate, and that it has an appropriate or normal object." (102)

It may be seen that it is both the fact that an individual could give reasons for his fear, and the appropriateness of the object of his fear, or at least his belief about its appropriateness, which distinguishes these mental states as intentional states from the mental states which Hampshire calls "facts of consciousness". If the individual's beliefs about the object of his intentional state changes, his state will correspondingly change; as will be seen from the outline of mental states which are not thought-dependent, this is not true of these mental states.

Because the individual's thought about his state of mind is a factor which determines the state of mind, Hampshire expresses the view that the individual himself is the final authority as regards his claim to know what his state of mind is. If others want to determine what his state of mind is, they have to take into account the individual's own belief about it. This does not mean, however, that an individual cannot be

confused /

confused or uncertain or mistaken about his state of mind.

An individual may be said to have a confused state of mind if he inclines to incompatible states of mind as regards the same object.⁽¹⁰³⁾ An example Hampshire gives is of an individual who believes that fatalism is true and at the same time feels remorse about his conduct. A truthful account of his state of mind would reflect the confusion and, if the individual is aware of the confusion, he would have to admit that he does not yet know how he feels about the matter in question.

It may be, however, that the individual is not confused in the above sense, but is simply uncertain as to what his state of mind is. In considering a past action of his, he may feel unhappy or uneasy about it. He may put the following sort of questions to himself: "What is this feeling I have ?", "What is my attitude ?",⁽¹⁰⁴⁾ in order to make up his mind whether he feels embarrassment, guilt, shame or regret. He would have to reflect on the cause or causes of his state of mind because, in Hampshire's view, this is a condition of distinguishing the more complex intentional states from simple occurrences of pleasure or uneasiness.

This making up of his mind on the part of the individual, after deliberation, is in many cases like a kind of decision, in that he adopts a specific attitude towards his action in order to explain and justify his feeling of uneasiness. Sometimes, however, the individual's diagnosis of his unhappiness may be more like a

discovery /

103 Hampshire does not indicate precisely what the "object" of the state of mind is, but it may, it appears, be taken to indicate the individual's own action, someone else's action or a situation, state of affairs, circumstances or concepts, all of which in some way affect his interests.

104 F of I. p.242.

discovery than a decision. The individual may, on the basis of someone else's suggestion, says Hampshire

"... for the first time find in himself some thought with its accompanying desire which had been causing his unease and thereby influencing his behaviour." (105)

But this notion of the individual "finding in himself some thought" raises a problem because it is only acceptable on the basis of Hampshire's assumption that

"there are less than conscious thoughts and consequently less than conscious dispositions, which may be in conflict with the thoughts, accompanied by pleasure or displeasure, which are fully conscious." (106)

The question is, however, can such an assumption be accepted in Hampshire's own terms? And can the individual therefore be said to discover what his state of mind is? Hampshire's characterisation of thought is that it is a complex constituted by intentions together with beliefs. His indication of the nature of both intention and beliefs would exclude the notion of "less than conscious thoughts."

A more acceptable account of the individual's so-called discovery of what his state of mind is may be that on the basis of someone else's suggestion the individual focusses on some hitherto neglected aspect of his action and its consequences, and in this way discovers that it is the kind of action that is embarrassing or shameful or to be regretted because it conforms to a particular description. He has not, however, discovered his state of mind but is, on the basis of a discovery concerning the circumstances of the action, able to adopt a specific attitude to it because he now sees it as a state of a

particular /

105 F of I. p.242.
106 Ibid. p.246.

particular kind rather than as a simple feeling of uneasiness.

Hampshire expresses the view that the very fact that an individual may be uncertain about his state of mind, apart from just feeling unhappy or uneasy, indicates that he may make mistakes in the characterisation of his own contemporary intentional states. There are various ways in which an individual may be mistaken; for instance, he may be mistaken in his conception of the object of his intentional state. He may think that he feels angry about something, and may be mistaken because he conceives of it as having properties which it does not in fact have. Hampshire says

"If I have overlooked, or misconceived, the circumstances, I shall be in part deceived in the account that I render to myself and to others of what my state of mind is; but this false thought is an element in the state of mind as finally formed." (107)

Because the individual's conception of his own state of mind is an element in that state of mind he cannot be "merely wrong" or "wholly wrong", and so an observer's account of the individual's state of mind would have to include both the notional and the real explanation of the individual's attitude to the object of his intentional state. This, for Hampshire, constitutes a fairly complex kind of mistake.

Two questions arise, however; the possibility of an individual's being mistaken about the actual intentional state and the question of the observer's knowledge of the real explanation of the individual's intentional state. The object or cause of the intentional state

must /

107 F of M & Other Essays, p.244.

must, according to Hampshire, be an appropriate one so that, if the individual believes for instance that he has been insulted and believes himself to be angry, can it be said that the characterisation of his intentional state is incorrect? If he discovers afterwards that the other person did not mean to insult him he would be mollified and would have to admit that his reaction was misguided; but at the time he was undoubtedly angry and would describe that intentional state as anger. It would appear therefore that it is his assessment of the cause of his intentional state which was incorrect and not his characterisation of his intentional state. If this is the kind of mistake Hampshire is indicating, then it would appear that it only works retrospectively and that the individual cannot be mistaken about his contemporary intentional states in the sense of what he believes it to be.

As regards an observer's knowledge of the real explanation of the intentional state, it would appear that an observer could only know with any real authority the individual's real state of mind in the sort of example Hampshire gives of an experiment outlined earlier in this section;⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ this, however, covers a very limited range of situations in which an observer could have knowledge of the real explanation of the intentional state.

Besides this kind of mistake, Hampshire maintains that there are fairly simple mistakes which an individual may make in the characterisation of his intentional states, e.g. an error in the description of the object or an incorrect use of names. He does add, however, that it is not always a question of a simple correction of the description or names used by the individual. If the individual makes a radical mistake in his description

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¹⁰⁸ See above, p. 98-9.

of an action which he says he regrets, there will be no simple answer to the question as to whether he really regrets it. Unfortunately Hampshire does not provide an illustration of this type of complication, but it can be added that once the individual discovers his mistake, the regret would disappear.

The intentional states outlined so far are not simply internal states and processes. Hampshire links them to what may be regarded as their natural expression in behaviour, or a disposition to behave in a particular way. Of this Hampshire says

"The concepts that we ordinarily employ to classify and to distinguish our sentiments, passions, propositional attitudes are explanatory concepts, explanatory in relation to behaviour. They serve, among other things, to correlate standard recurring types of situation with standard recurring patterns of behaviour." (109)

The linking of intentional states with a disposition to act may be seen as a factor which characterises the states as intentional because, by analogy, it may be seen that if an intention, to be an intention, must issue in action, similarly, for a mental state to be an intentional state, it must be correlated with the appropriate dispositions to act. The link, furthermore, has important implications for both the discrimination of intentional states and for the individual's freedom if he makes mistakes in his discrimination.

As regards the discrimination of intentional states, Hampshire maintains that the cause or occasion of the occurrence of the individual's state of mind and his beliefs about the cause or occasion are not the only means of discriminating them, but that there is this

third /

109 F of M & Other Essays, p.232.

third factor, viz.

"... the expected behavioural expression of the intentional state, with its specified object, which supplies evidence that the subject's thought is or is not of the kind that is imputed to him, or that he imputes to himself." (110)

If, therefore, an individual claims to have a particular intentional state such as regret, the evidence of his behaviour must be in accordance with his claim. So if the individual regrets an action he must at least have a disposition to avoid doing it again. If he is not disposed to avoid a repetition of the action he cannot be said to regret it, because, for Hampshire, the individual's thought would be without its natural expression to act; or alternatively to avoid acting in a similar way.

There appear to be at least two important aspects to the inclusion of a disposition to act in a particular way, as one of the features for discriminating intentional states, i.e. for identifying and classifying them correctly.

The one aspect is that the individual himself does not need to examine his disposition to act in a particular way in order to know what his intentional state is. All he needs to do is correctly identify the object and cause of his intentional state to be able to characterise it correctly. If he has succeeded in doing this he will have a disposition to act in a way which is appropriate to the intentional state, e.g. he regrets doing x and therefore has the disposition to avoid doing x again. If he does not have the disposition to avoid doing x again he either cannot be said to

regret /

¹¹⁰ F of M & Other Essays, p.251.

regret it or would have to explain that he would regret not doing it, even more. This disposition to avoid doing x again would provide an observer (and not the individual himself) with a means of judging the sincerity of the individual's claim that he regrets doing x.

The second and related aspect is that an individual may think that he regrets doing x and therefore he will have a disposition to avoid repeating it. But he may find that when faced with a similar set of circumstances he does repeat the action and does not regret it. He would then, on the basis of his realisation that he has the disposition to repeat the action, find that he did not really regret doing it the first time and that his characterisation of his intentional state was incorrect. His revised characterisation of his intentional state is made on the basis of his reflection on his disposition to act in a similar way and he would have to change his mind about the object and cause of his previous intentional state which was incorrectly characterised as regret.

What has become apparent as regards the importance of the link between intentional states and an appropriate disposition to act, for the question of the individual's freedom, is that if an individual characterises his state of mind incorrectly, his disposition to act will be appropriate to the mistaken characterisation of the intentional state, and he will act in a way in which he would not have acted had his characterisation been correct. He would find that such an action is inconsistent with what he would normally wish to achieve according to his beliefs about the best ends of human conduct. The mistakes that he makes in the characterisation of his intentional states constitutes a limitation to his freedom in that his freedom is limited

to /

to the degree that he does not know what he really wants to do. His awareness of the possibility of such mistakes and the consequent effects on his conduct allows him to avoid making them in the future in as far as this is possible; it furthermore places a responsibility upon him to try to avoid such mistakes.

If on the other hand an individual makes no attempt to watch and characterise his intentional states correctly in terms of their accompanying features, i.e. the object, cause and disposition to act in a particular way, and simply acts on impulse as prescribed by the French moralists, he cannot act rationally or consistently and therefore cannot be described as a self-determining and free agent.

(ii) Knowledge of mental states and processes which are not thought dependent

Hampshire calls these mental states and processes "facts of consciousness",⁽¹¹¹⁾ and they differ from intentional states in that they are not thought-dependent in the sense of being dependent on the individual's beliefs about the appropriateness of their object. He refers to them as being the more passive states of mind constituted by desires, feelings, attitudes, emotions, impulses, passions and inclinations.

An example Hampshire gives is that of an individual who may be afraid of something, e.g. a chameleon, even though he knows that it is harmless and therefore knows that his fear is misplaced. The individual is a victim of his emotions as of a symptom of a disease because he thinks of the thing as frightening even though he knows that it cannot harm him.

But, /

¹¹¹ F of I. p.83.

But, it may be objected, is it not impermissible to say that the individual "thinks" of the thing as frightening since these states of mind are not thought-dependent? The term "thinks", according to Hampshire, does not here indicate a thought which can properly be called a belief, but indicates the kind of thought constituted by fantasy or imagination. The individual has the thought that there is danger without believing that the object of his fear is dangerous.

This kind of thought that there is danger is a constitutive element of the individual's fear and is something that happens in the natural course of events rather than as the outcome of his decision or beliefs about the object. If this thought that there is danger is removed, then the individual could no longer be said to feel fear even if some unpleasant associations remained when he is presented with the object with which his fear is associated, or he finds himself in the situation which gave rise to the idea that there was danger.

If the individual wanted to rid himself of his fear which he knows to be absurd, he would have to rid himself of this thought or idea that there is danger. Because the thought that there is danger occurs in the natural course of events rather than as the outcome of a decision or formation of a belief about its object, it is in Hampshire's view not absurd for an individual to rid himself of his fear by using his knowledge of the conditions on which his fear depends. The conditions either cause the thought or are positively correlated with it and by using his knowledge of the conditions, the individual may vary them and thereby bring about a change in the sequence of ideas which occur in the natural course of events.

The individual would not, in such a case, have changed his mind about the existence of the danger, because he never actually believed that there was any danger.

What /

What he has, in Hampshire's view done, is to bring about an effect in his own mind exactly as he could in the mind of some other person. Hampshire illustrates this by saying

"Suppose that I learn that an excess of fear, together with a desire to conceal myself from other people, which I suffer from time to time, is caused by a recurrent bodily condition, which, by new scientific methods, can be detected; perhaps the bodily condition is found to be regularly conjoined with moods of exactly this kind in a great variety of people. Then I know what I need to do in order to avoid such a mood descending upon me." (112)

Hampshire maintains that this self-controlling activity is applicable only to the more passive states of mind or facts of consciousness. It would be absurd for an individual to try to change an intentional state of mind by this method, precisely because his intentional state is in part determined by his beliefs about the appropriateness of its object.

An important feature of these states of mind which Hampshire calls facts of consciousness for the question of the individual's freedom is that an individual can have inductive knowledge of them. He can anticipate his own states of mind in much the same way as he can anticipate the occurrence of natural phenomena. The individual arrives at this knowledge

"Either by induction from his own experience, or from knowledge of some well-attested propositions of psychology, or by some combination of these two." (113)

Hampshire /

112 F of I, p.88.
113 F of I, p.81-2.

Hampshire does not give an explanation of these "propositions of psychology" and therefore the notion of inferences from the individual's own experience seems more acceptable. From his own experience, Hampshire maintains, the individual may learn to recognise the conditions which precede some of these mental states and on which their occurrence, in his view, depends. This is, for Hampshire, ordinary inductive knowledge, albeit self-knowledge, as it is knowledge of the natural course of events. The individual's knowledge of the causal sequences will be constitutive elements of the situation with which he expects to be confronted and he will therefore have to take them into account, along with the other features of the situation.

He has to take account of these elements of the situation in two ways:

"First, as possibly constituting reasons for acting in one way rather than another; secondly, as possibly constituting obstructions to acting in some way in which he is disposed to act, that is, as limiting to his powers." (114)

Hampshire states it as a necessary truth that, in general, the more an individual knows of the conditions on which his states of mind depend, the more his achievements can be in accordance with his intentions. Furthermore, this anticipation of states of mind confers on the individual the responsibility for allowing them, and their effects and consequences, to occur if he could have prevented it.

Hampshire does allow that there may be states of mind which the individual cannot prevent because he has no control over the conditions of their occurrence. He may

find /

114 F of I, p.82.

find, for example, that he becomes weak-willed and vacillating under certain conditions, with disastrous consequences. He may try, and yet fail, to control it. Once he has knowledge of the conditions on which such a state depends, he will at least have some explanation as to why he fails to control it. The positive aspect of this is that he will no longer struggle uselessly because he will know the limits of his powers and what powers he would have to acquire in order to overcome his limitations. If he cannot overcome his limitations, at least he could make sure that he is not placed in a situation in which the worst of the consequences would ensue.

In Hampshire's view, self-knowledge is important to the individual's freedom because

"... an individual who acquires more systematic knowledge of the causes of his states of mind, emotions and desires, insofar as these are not the outcome of his decision, thereby becomes more free than he previously was to control and direct his own life: more free to control and direct his own life in the sense that there will in general be a closer correlation between that which he sets himself to do and that which he actually achieves in his life," (115)

and conversely

"A man is less free, in proportion as his interests and activities are adequately explained as the effects of external causes and of conditions which he has little or no power to change, even if these causes and conditions do not include the will of others. Insofar as there are genuine possibilities open to him, and he can be said to have decided to live as he does, he can be said to be self-directed and free." (116)

CHAPTER IV

ACTION

1. Introduction

The various features of and conditions attached to the concept of an action have been referred to in the preceding sections.⁽¹¹⁷⁾ The focus of this section will be on drawing these together and providing an outline of what, for Hampshire, constitutes an action. A simple definition of action cannot be given because of the complexity of the concept.

What is stressed in outlining the different aspects of the concept of action is a consistency and continuity through change, constituting a connectedness which is essential to human conduct. What emerges finally is that a certain minimal degree of connectedness is unavoidable in human actions and the greater the degree to which there is this connectedness, the greater the degree to which an individual acts rationally and therefore freely.

2. Characteristics of Ordinary Human Action

The connection between what Hampshire terms the internal/mental and the external/physical processes of individuals has constantly been stressed so far because in order to discuss language, intention and knowledge in Hampshire's philosophy of mind, the notion of action must unavoidably be included. This rests largely on Hampshire's insistence that individuals must be regarded simultaneously as observers, agents and language users.

This /

¹¹⁷ See above, p.43-50; 65-7; 73-81; 83-6; 90-96; 104; 111.

This simultaneity has important implications for the question of freedom because if the internal/mental and external/physical are separated any discussion of deliberate human action and, therefore, of moral questions and responsibility will be distorted.

Hampshire allows that a distinction can be made between the internal/mental and external/physical in the sense that there is a contrast between thought as the source of an action and the actual physical manifestation of its expression which can be perceived by observers; but to separate the source of the action from the physical movement as if they were two independent events makes it impossible to give an account of the concept of action.

To show the necessary connection between the internal/mental process as the source of the action, and the action, Hampshire provides an independent criterion of intentional action. The criterion is stated at some length because of certain complications involved. The complications stem largely from the distinction between knowing something and being able to state it correctly in words, and the sort of errors an individual may make in the statement of his intention or the description of his action.⁽¹¹⁸⁾ To do justice to the criterion and the problems taken into consideration, it will be given in full. In Hampshire's view,

"A criterion may be sought in the way in which the question 'What are you doing ?' is normally interpreted and answered. It seems to be characteristic of an intentional action that a man who accuses the agent of answering the question 'What are you doing ?' wrongly accuses him either of deliberately lying, or of misdescribing his own activity in some more or less trivial way. It seems that he

can /

¹¹⁸ See below, appendix 2, "Verbalised and Unverbalised Knowledge."

can never accuse him of simply not knowing what he is doing, of sheer ignorance in this respect, without implying that his action is not intentional. But the criterion is still not correctly stated. It is possible that a man might not in fact be doing what he honestly says that he is doing, without it being true that he is not doing what he intended to do. He might make a mistake in describing the achievement at which he was aiming, because he has false opinions about the proper and conventional description of the achievement intended. That which he honestly said that he was doing, when asked the question 'What are you doing?' might not be a correct account of what he actually intended to achieve. But still there is a logical connection between what a man knows or thinks that he is doing and what he intends to do. If a man is doing something without knowing that he is doing it, then it must be true that he is not doing it intentionally. Yet a man may be doing something intentionally in circumstances in which he may be said to have a false opinion about the nature of his intended action, in virtue of the fact that he honestly misdescribes it, or that he would misdescribe it, if the question were raised. What I actually intend to do is not necessarily the same as I would honestly say that I intend to do, if I were asked. I may very easily make a mistake in the description or identification of my activity as an activity of one kind rather than another without being confused in my practical intentions. That my intentions were clear in my own mind, even though I had expressed them wrongly in words, would be shown when I recognised something as happening contrary to my intentions, or recognised it as happening in accordance with them. I

might /

might say truthfully 'This is not what I intended', even though I point to something that accords precisely with my own declaration of my intentions. My intention was not what I had declared it to be. But it does not follow from this that I did not know what I was doing, in one familiar sense of this treacherous phrase. 'Knowing what one is doing' may be used to mean the same as 'doing something with a clear intention to bring about a certain result' and not as equivalent to 'being able to give a correct account in words of what one is doing'." (119)

On the basis of this criterion Hampshire can claim that

"An ordinary human action is a combination of intention and physical movement. But the combination of the two is not a simple additive one." (120)

On the one hand the intention, as it were, enters into and guides the physical movement, thereby distinguishing it as action from mere physical movement. Physical movements can only be called actions if they are performed with intention and the individual can therefore be said to know, at least in part, what he is doing. On the other hand, if an individual simply intends or wills a change with regard to objects in the environment which he wants to manipulate, he could not bring about a change without executing some physical movement as well.

The conditions attached to an action are that it must be done at will, at some particular time, and it must constitute some recognisable change in the world. A further necessary feature is that although an individual

decides /

119
120 T & A, p.94-6.
Ibid. p.74.

decides or intends to do something, he may fail in the attempt. Hampshire calls this the double face of human action, the one face being the project and the other the result, and sees it as essential to the concept of action because the individual intends or decides on the project but not the result. He may, in expressing his determination, say that he intends to succeed, but this is no guarantee that he will not fail. He can only be certain that he will make the attempt and, within reason, predict that he will succeed. The individual may fail in his attempt because he does not know enough about, or has incorrectly assessed, the circumstances in which he makes his attempt, or because of unforeseen circumstances which alter the situation in which he envisages his action being performed. In order to make an attempt at all the individual must see some possibility of success. If he sees no possibility of success, but makes the attempt anyway, he could really only be said to be demonstrating the impossibility of the feat.

On the basis of these conditions Hampshire distinguishes between what may be regarded as an action and what may not. To make this distinction he raises the question as to whether a process of thought is an action.

To this the reply is that an individual's thought, i.e. his speculation and the conclusion he draws, does not constitute an action but can only be regarded as an introduction to action. If, for instance, an individual were asked what he was doing and his reply is that he was thinking, this thinking does not constitute an action because it does not make a recognisable change in the world; but, if an individual were to state his thought aloud, and in the hearing of others, this would be an action because it makes some change in the external world.

The external world towards which the individual's intentions are directed is constituted by everything that occurs among the objects of the individual's active intentions; but Hampshire includes in the metaphor "external world" not only objects in the environment, but also the individual's own body and its limits, and his states of mind, moods and inclinations. He includes them because they are factors in the order of nature which happen to, or impinge upon, the individual, and in acting he has to take them into account as instruments for, or obstructions to, his proposed achievements.

An objection must be raised. Hampshire's contention that the individual's body and its limits may be seen as instruments and obstructions to his purposes and are therefore factors in the order of nature⁽¹²¹⁾ is inconsistent with a view expressed earlier on,⁽¹²²⁾ because it implies that the body as a whole may be used as an external instrument.

This earlier view was that when an individual acts,

The mind animates and enters
into the movements and
reactions of a body that is
in a sense one of the 'external'
objects and in a sense is not
'external'.(123)

He indicates the sense in which the body is "external" and "not external" by his view that an individual's limbs may be seen as instruments to his purposes, or they may be obstructions such as when he finds that he cannot use his hands as effectively as he wishes; but there is no sense in which the individual can use his body taken as a whole to perform an action. To speak of using the body as a whole creates, for Hampshire, an
opposition /

121 Stated at T & A, p.124.

122 Stated at T & A, p.79-80.

123 T & A, p.79.

opposition between using the body and using the mind, and therefore a separation of thought and action.

Hampshire admits that there are circumstances in which a contrast can be made between the mind and the body; for example, the individual may be said to be training his mind or his body, but in both cases it is the individual who is being trained; or, as an alternative example, when an individual meets a physical obstruction, it is not simply an obstruction to his body but an obstruction to his action and therefore to the individual as a whole person.

In this Hampshire is expressing a view similar to that of Strawson⁽¹²⁴⁾ whose primitive concept of a person is the concept of an entity such that both

M - predicates i.e. ascribing physical characteristics,
and

P - predicates i.e. ascribing states of consciousness
are equally ascribable to a single entity of that type; and, that an individual consciousness exists (if it can exist at all) as a secondary concept, and is analysable only in terms of the primitive concept of a person. The idea of the concept of a person as being primitive may be seen to be reflected in ordinary language in that, when a reference is made to a mind or a body, it is always implied that it is my (or someone else's) body or some former persons's (deceased) body; the pronoun employed indicates the concept of a person as being primary.

According to Hampshire, even if an individual were totally paralysed and had lost the use of all his limbs and principle organs, while he is conscious it would still be wrong to say that he has only the use of his mind. If the individual is alive and conscious, there

must /

¹²⁴ Strawson, P.F. Individuals.

must be some action he can perform even if only to hold his breath or avert his gaze and change his attention from one thing to another. A problem arises in that, if an individual is totally paralysed, he could certainly be said to have the concept of action if he can observe (in a very limited sense) what is happening in his environment, but would it be within his power to employ the concept in holding his breath or averting his gaze ?

The objection and suggestion put forward by Barker do nothing to clear up this matter. He says

"... after having stressed the connection between consciousness and action, Hampshire then infers that it would be logically impossible for a person to be conscious yet completely paralysed. Surely the point is rather that a person who is conscious cannot be always totally paralysed; though paralysis might be total during part of the time that he is conscious."

(125)

Barker's suggestion does not throw light on the matter because Hampshire is in fact using the example of a conscious and totally paralysed individual. Hampshire's example is unacceptable because the term "totally" (126) is being used inappropriately. The implication in the example is that although the individual is totally paralysed, he is not totally paralysed because there are still certain actions that he can perform. To use the example of a partially paralysed individual, as Barker suggests, would simply beg the question.

According to Hampshire, the individual is always and essentially an agent while he is conscious; (paralysed individuals here being included in view of the objections) and from this it follows that an individual

cannot /

125 Barker, S.F. The Philosophical Review, vol LXXI, 1962, p.394.
126 T & A, p.80.

cannot suspend judgement when he is faced with an immediate practical matter. Hampshire experiences difficulty in distinguishing practical and theoretical questions with regard to action and therefore has difficulty in defining a practical matter. He maintains that it is not a distinction already marked within ordinary language and objects to a linguistic solution in that, if one concentrates on the purpose of using a particular form of words only, a clear distinction cannot be made.

Hampshire initially defines a practical problem as one with regard to which an individual reviews alternatives, calculates the advantages and disadvantages and acts on his conclusions. He defines a theoretical problem as one with regard to which the individual considers what he would do in some remote or hypothetical situation with which he may in fact never be faced.

Hampshire asks, however, what the point would be of solving a problem which has no connection at all with an intention to act in a particular way. He calls this kind of solution a shadow solution.

He then proceeds to subsume both the abovementioned practical and theoretical definitions under the heading of a practical question and makes the distinction in terms of a wider and narrow practical question, i.e.

"A practical question might be defined, widely, as a question about what action is, was, or would be the right action in certain specified circumstances, actual or imaginary, and, more narrowly, as a call to someone to decide when his decision is his certainty about his own future action." (127)

Hampshire /

Hampshire admits that this is not a conclusive definition and there is nothing in language or in the human situation which ultimately imposes it; but what this distinction does reflect is Hampshire's attempt to avoid an opposition between thought and action, and the connection he wants to draw between them.

An individual can, as regards a belief, refrain from coming to a conclusion because he has insufficient information. But as regards an immediate practical situation in which he must act, even if he cannot decide which of two courses is the right one, or the more expedient, he must inevitably decide to do one or the other. Hampshire does not illustrate this, but a possible example would be of an individual who arrives at the scene of an accident, and does not know whether he should stop or not; he does not know because, although he knows that he will be of no use at all since he faints at the sight of blood, he feels it is his duty to stop anyway. Inevitably he will have to decide between the two courses of action, i.e. either to stop or to continue on his way. If he is the sort of person who never stops when he sees an accident, that would be the conclusion he has reached for every practical situation of that type until he changes his mind. The individual's conclusion need not be as clear-cut as this; he could attach various conditions to his decision so that, depending on the actual circumstances which he will assess at the time, he either would or would not stop and offer his help.

It appears that the unavoidability of coming to a conclusion and acting in a practical situation is applicable only to a practical question as narrowly defined, since, although an individual may decide in advance what he would do in some hypothetical situation, he could equally say that he does not know what he would do, and therefore make no decision until he is

faced /

faced with an actual situation of that type.

Although individuals are essentially and always agents, according to Hampshire there are situations in which an individual may partly suspend the possibility of action even though it is an immediate practical situation and not a hypothetical one. The example Hampshire gives is of aesthetic experiences in which an individual can contemplate a work of art without moving towards the solution of a problem or choosing between alternative courses of action. He describes individuals as being capable of deliberately enjoying moments of pure aesthetic experience without having the shadow of a practical interest as regards the work of art he is contemplating; this could by analogy be extended to other similar experiences which an individual may have, e.g. spectator events, daydreaming, musing and so on. Hampshire says

"When we are not deliberately inhibiting action, as in aesthetic experience, and are fully conscious, our intentions are always focussed on some objects to the exclusion of others, with a view to doing something with them, or with a view to learning something about them." (119)

3. Shadow Action

For Hampshire the foregoing outline is inadequate to reflect the concept of action because he maintains that it would be

"a crude metaphysics that implied that an action is necessarily a physical movement." (120)

This /

119
120 T & A, p.217.
T & A, p.91.

This raises the problem as to whether thought or a process of thought is to be regarded as an action; according to the conditions of action outlined above, ⁽¹²¹⁾ thought or a process of thought cannot be regarded as an action.

To deal with this Hampshire introduces the concept of shadow action and by means of an analogy, shows how thought may, in a certain sense, constitute an action. He furthermore shows that the concept of a shadow action is not inconsistent with the concept of action. It complements the concept of action and is dependent upon it, thereby avoiding both the naive standpoint that all action must involve physical movement, and the contentious standpoint that all thought and processes of thought are in themselves actions.

To draw the distinction between actions and shadow actions, Hampshire maintains that if an individual assents to a statement by saying "yes", this is a genuine act, and the manner in which it was performed could be described.

If the individual assents to the statement but makes no public affirmation, his assent amounts to a shadow act, and there is no manner of performance to be described. The individual has, however, in both cases assented.

Hampshire uses an analogy to indicate the dependent relationship of shadow actions to actions, viz. if an individual is insulted and instead of striking his enemy he "looks daggers" ⁽¹²²⁾ at him, the real action has been arrested or inhibited and only the shadow remains. This shadow that remains Hampshire describes as being the mental content, the attitude or state of mind; it constitutes the reaction to the insult.

Before /

¹²¹ See above, p. 117.

¹²² T & A, p.64.

Before outlining the analogy it is necessary to deal with the question as to whether actions are always accompanied by a shadow process. For Hampshire such a notion is absurd because while an individual is acting he cannot easily extract the mental component from the whole activity. He can only do this if he deliberately inhibits the physical movements and utterances. What remains is the shadow act; but it is no longer simply the mental component of the whole activity, but is autonomous and self-contained, albeit as Hampshire says, in its own indefinite way.

For Hampshire the metaphor of a "shadow process" is appropriate because if an individual had no knowledge of the movement of material bodies he could not explain the play of shadows. The individual's reference to the play of shadows includes an implicit reference to the corresponding bodies which cast the shadows. The shadows are consequently less substantial than the bodies and are more dependent for their existence on an individual's perception and recognition of them than are the corresponding bodies.

By analogy, if an individual had no knowledge of making statements or asking questions in communication with others, he could not formulate a statement or ask a question silently and in his own thought; furthermore, if the individual had no concept of action, he would have no power of inhibiting his actions; so, although the shadow act becomes autonomous, it remains dependent upon action in this sense.

The inhibited or shadow action is less substantial than the genuine act of making a statement or asking a question in communication with others because it is more dependent for its existence on the individual's own recognition of it.

Hampshire raises the question as to why the public

statement /

statement should make the thought more definite. He replies that

"the definiteness depends on the possibility of the process of thought being recognised and identified by observers from different points of view because this possibility is essential to any definite reality." (123)

If an individual does not state his thought aloud in the presence of others, or write it down or record it in some way, there is no way of knowing whether it has been accurately recalled later on and therefore no way of knowing what he really thought. It would remain to this degree shadowy and uncertain.

For Hampshire the individual has to go into action of some kind to make his thought definite, and adds that it becomes definite even if the individual only mutters it to himself. But this may be objected to on the grounds that, in the interests of accurately recalling what an individual really thought about something, there is no significant difference between carefully formulating his statement in his own mind and muttering it aloud to himself.

The concept of shadow action would explain why Hampshire, although denying that thought or a process of thought can be an action, because it does not conform to the criteria of action, can make a statement such as

"When I refer to myself as doing something and as active, even if the activity is only that of directed thought" (124)

and /

123 T & A, p.162.
124 T & A, p.88.

and

"It is a necessary condition of any human activity being regarded as a process of thought that it should involve the use of words, or of other symbols." (125)

4. The Indeterminacy of the Concept of Action

An important feature of the concept of action in Hampshire's analysis is that it is an indeterminate concept in the sense that actions do not generally have a conventional meaning. Hampshire outlines this in terms of a comparison between the expression of an intention in action and the expression of a belief in words. A possible objection to this procedure is that the expression of a belief in a statement also constitutes an action and that the grounds for comparison are therefore dubious. As will be seen, however, the point of the comparison is the relation holding between an intention and its expression in action and a belief and its expression in a statement.

According to Hampshire an action does not have a conventional meaning because the physical movement which may be observed is not related to the intention that enters into and guides it by rules and conventions in the way that, for example, words are related to their meanings by rules and conventions. An action does not, therefore, have a content as a belief does; in the case of a belief, the content is fixed by the conventions of language.

When an individual acts he does not have to find the conventionally correct expression amongst alternative systems of expression. This means that an observer

cannot /

125 T & A, p.92.

cannot distinguish an individual's intention from the meaning of the action in the way that he can distinguish the meaning that an individual conveys in the statement of his belief from the conventional meaning of the words according to the rules of language.

The meaning of the action is, according to Hampshire, in the thought of the individual and is not expressed in the same way that a belief can be expressed in words. The expression of a belief in words, if it is a sincere statement, leaves nothing to be elicited whereas the expression of intention in action does not make the intention entirely transparent; something always remains to be elicited even if it is only for an observer to check whether he has inferred the individual's intention correctly from the observation of the behaviour.

In case there is still doubt as to the validity of comparing intentions and their expression in action with beliefs and their expression in statements, it may be added that although the belief can be made transparent by the conventions of language and can be criticised by reference to the context, the individual's intention in stating the belief, i.e. the effect he intends to bring about by performing the action of stating the belief, is in the thought of the individual and is not entirely transparent.

An implication of the indeterminacy of action is that when two actions are described as being the same, the sense of the word "same" would, for Hampshire, vary with the context of use. An individual could, for example, classify two similar actions differently, even though they might be regarded as being the same by an observer, because the intention was different, e.g. an individual might on two occasions be described as comforting a friend. In this minimal sense his two

actions /

actions could be said to be "the same". His intentions, however, could be so different in each case that he would classify the one as an expression of genuine concern for his friend and the other as a means to some selfish end. Alternatively, two actions may be classified as being the same because they are performed with similar intentions even though the manner of performance is different.

Hampshire admits that he is placing an artificial restriction on the concept of action in his explanation of its indeterminacy, but this restriction may be regarded as necessary for elucidating his point.

He does not, however, leave it at that. He allows that there are actions which are given a conventional meaning, e.g. if they are symbolic or ritual performances as in religious rites or the action of raising a hand or nodding as a sign of agreement. A problem arises, however, when Hampshire extends this fairly generally to gestures an individual makes when he speaks, writes or communicates in some way. Does this not allow a conventional meaning to most if not all actions, even to such actions as comforting a friend ?

In Walsh's opinion it is necessary that actions have a conventional meaning, and he says

"... to be an agent is a status requiring society for its background. However much the agent may have knowledge without observation of what he is doing, what he is doing must make some social sense to be counted as action at all. This picture is not unlike that widely accepted for language: a speaker may be in some way the authority for what he means, but the determinants of meaning are public conventions, not private whims." (126)

To /

To this Hampshire replies

"... a man's intentions are not formed and expressed in some private language peculiar to himself. That which he intends to do has its proper, socially accepted name or description, and his practical thoughts about his future are at once furnished and limited by the distinctions established in the vocabulary that he has learned. He could not lend his action an altogether private significance, as having a character that no one else would recognise in it, any more than he could endow his words with a private significance independent of their normal meaning." (127)

This is not, however, to imply that actions have a conventional meaning because the description of any and every action as having a conventional meaning amounts to a minimal description of what the action may be observed to mean, and does not take into account the variations there may be in the intention "behind" an action when its meaning is not entirely determined by a convention. If an individual were asked what he is trying to do, he would not describe his observable bodily movements, he would explain his action in terms of what he intends to achieve.

A problem arises in that Hampshire maintains that actions do not have a standard meaning unless they are symbolic or ritual performances, ⁽¹²⁸⁾ but also says that an action does not have a content even if it is the act of performing a ritual. ⁽¹²⁹⁾ It is difficult to see what distinction is being drawn between "meaning" and "content" which allows a ritual action to have a meaning but no content.

Hampshire's /

127 Hampshire, S. The J. of Phil. vol LX, 1963, p.418.
128 T & A, p.152.
129 T & A, p.151.

Hampshire's point may be that a ritual action is given a meaning in a description of both the observable action and the intention with which the action is performed. Once the meaning has been established, there is no longer any question as to what the intention is, it is accepted and understood by an initiated group. In this sense the ritual would not simply have a content, but is given a content by establishing its meaning within a particular context. An uninitiated observer could not immediately grasp the content just by observing the performance of the ritual - it would have to be explained to him, the explanation being a standard one.

This may provide an explanation for the discrepancy if the distinction between having a content and being given a content is accepted; but this is not satisfactory because it may be argued that once an action is connected with an intention by rules and conventions, and is in this way given a content, it then has that content and is determinate. There would therefore be no significant difference between the relation of a ritual action to its intention, and the relation of a statement of a belief to the belief, the analogy being drawn between the words as being rule governed in the statement of a belief, and the gestures and movements being rule governed in the performance of a ritual.

5. Reasons for Action

The indeterminacy of the concept of action (ritual and symbolic actions being here excluded) has important implications for the sort of reasons which can be given for an action. Reasons which can be given for actions are in Hampshire's view correspondingly indeterminate in the sense that an individual could at different times give different reasons for a particular type of action. He would in each case be following different policies of belief or action, i.e. what might constitute a good

reason /

reason for doing "A" on one occasion, would not necessarily constitute a good reason for doing it on some other occasion. According to Hampshire

"... there is no means of establishing a universal connection between a specified action and the reason for and against performing it, in virtue of which certain reasons must be accepted as good reasons independently of everything else." (130)

Because of this, if the rightness or wrongness of the action is to be judged, the occasion of its performance has to be considered, unlike the judgement of the rightness or wrongness of a belief.

It might appear that the reasons which can be given for an action are only limited by the interests and desires of the individual in question. Although an individual may, when asked for reasons for his action, reply without absurdity that he simply did it on impulse, in Hampshire's view not just any impulse or sentiment would provide an adequate or acceptable reason for the performance of an action. The intention with which an individual performs an action limits the range of reasons that could intelligibly be given for that action. The range is limited because in stating his intention, the individual also indicates what he will try to achieve, and he cannot be trying to achieve something which is entirely inconsistent with his intentions. In Hampshire's words

"I cannot be said genuinely to want anything (x) unless I take the fact that something (y) is a means toward x as a reason for doing y." (131)

So, if the reasons given for an action are entirely inconsistent with the intention they would not count as reasons. In this sense the range of reasons which

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130 T & A, p.151.
131 T & A, p.147.

can be given for an action is determined by the intention with which it is performed.

The reasons which an individual gives for his action must not only be consistent with his intention, they must also, in a wider sense, fit into some recognisable policy of action.

Hampshire sees this as essential to rational as opposed to impulsive or unreflective action because if an individual's conduct does not have a certain minimum consistency and direction which relates his actions to each other, he would constantly find himself undoing what he has previously achieved. If, for example, an individual were asked why he did something and he replied that he had no real reason but simply did it on impulse, his action could not be regarded as part of some wider policy of action. He might find that he regrets it precisely because it is not consistent with his other actions and is therefore at variance with what he would normally, after reflection, try to achieve. If, however, he supplies reasons for the action he fits it into the policy of which it is part, thereby establishing its consistency with his other actions during the same period of time. Alternatively in formulating his reason, he may find that it does not fit in with any policy of action he has decided upon, and he may have to take remedial steps.

By establishing some continuity in his behaviour in this way the individual necessarily compares and classifies his various actions and their effects, placing them, as Hampshire puts it, "within the penumbra of a larger intention."⁽¹³²⁾ Hampshire does not illustrate this penumbra with an example, but it can be related to his

illustration /

¹³² T & A, p.149.

illustration of intention, i.e. the analogy of a beam of light surrounded by a periphery of darkness,⁽¹³³⁾ in the sense that, for any period of time, an individual may have a central intention issuing not only in the main action or actions he wants to perform, but also in a number of related actions, all of which contribute to his final achievement.

This expresses the relatedness of an individual's various actions in a limited sense only. Hampshire goes even further to relate an individual's actions in a wider sense and in his view

"Every action, and even the most inconspicuous voluntary gesture, can be seen as part of a manner of life, and a set of attitudes to experience, which can be intentionally changed and controlled, when the person acting is made aware of them as finally forming a certain pattern, and as gradually constituting his character."

(134)

6. Continuity Through Change in Action

Hampshire compares the relatedness of actions with creative activity and maintains that the artist's creative activity is essentially discontinuous in the sense that he can finally finish one work and then turn to another which presents different problems. Each work of art has a distinctness and individuality which actions do not have because there is a relatedness in the sense of "a trajectory of intention that fits a sequence of behaviour into an intelligible whole."⁽¹³⁵⁾

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134 T & A, p.222.

135 T & A, p.146.

The relatedness of actions can be explained or accounted for in terms of a continuity through change which Hampshire maintains is already within the trajectory of an action with its guiding intention. This continuity is important in that without it the individual could not become aware of patterns of behaviour, and could not have a policy of action or policies of action in terms of which to act rationally and consistently rather than impulsively.

There are various aspects of this continuity through change, the most significant centering on intentional action, the individual himself as the agent and the individual's observation, i.e. continuity is provided by the relation between consciousness and action, the individual's awareness of himself as the source of action, and his continuing awareness, in action, of his environment.

(i) Consciousness and action

Hampshire makes several emphatic statements about the relation between consciousness and action, examples of which are

"A conscious mind is always and necessarily envisaging possibilities of action, of finding means towards ends." (136)

"But while we are awake and fully conscious, we are all the time acting and moving with intent..." (137)

"At any moment of my waking life, there are always things that I intend to do in the future and there are always things that I am doing with intent at the moment." (138)

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136 T & A, p.119
137 Ibid. p.78
138 Ibid. p.134.

These statements can be misleading because Hampshire does say that he is not suggesting that an individual is always doing something active and purposeful. The point he rather wants to make is that if an individual has been fully conscious for some time, there must be verbs of action to describe what he has been doing. He does not specify as to the length of time; to add to the difficulty Hampshire maintains that the individual may be described as doing something inactive and desultory. Walsh says of this

"Presumably, then, one can be doing something purposeless and inactive, and thus have no special intention; yet one constantly has 'certain intentions'. While this notion of intentionally having no intentions might seem to characterize some of the more advanced stages of satori, it is not a very lucid formula for the more normal states of mind."

(139)

The notion of "inactive action" is less dubious in terms of an example, e.g. the individual may be sitting in a chair and, if he were asked what he was doing, the reply could quite naturally be that he is not doing anything, he is simply sitting there.⁽¹⁴⁰⁾ The implication of the reply is that the individual is not doing anything purposeful, that he is inactive; but this does not mean that he is not doing anything at all, in the sense that there is no verb of action applicable to him during that time. In describing him as sitting, the assumption is that he knows that he is sitting there, holding himself upright or slouching, and he may decide

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Walsh, J.J. The J. of Phil. vol LX, 1963, p.61.

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Leaving aside for the moment the question of what he was thinking and whether his thinking may be described as an action.

to get up and walk away.

But if this is acceptable as an example of an "inactive action" could the same not be applicable to the unconscious or sleeping individual? It could certainly be said of him that he is lying on the bed if the question were raised as to what he is doing. The difference in posture does not indicate any significant difference between the two situations. The second description is, however, incomplete, because it does not include that the individual is asleep. Once this is added there is a distinct difference between saying that he is sitting in the chair and that he is lying on the bed.

If he is asleep, he is unconscious and cannot be said to know that he is lying there although it may be said that he got there of his own volition and knew it before he fell asleep. It could not be said of him that he could get up at any moment and go, without adding or implicitly including the condition "when he wakes up". It would be senseless to ask him what he is doing while he is lying there asleep. He may of course, once he has woken up, say that he was sleeping.

The distinction therefore turns on the idea that the individual knows what he is doing or inactively doing at the time, on the one hand, and does not know what he is "doing", on the other.

Since, in Hampshire's analysis, to have an intention means to know what one is doing, it can be accepted that while an individual is fully conscious, he has intentions even if he is not actively manipulating objects in his environment, making a statement or moving from one place to another.

This continuity of intention is interrupted only by sleep and other forms of unconsciousness, but this does not imply a total discontinuity because the periods of sleep or unconsciousness are part of the individual's

history /

history and can be accounted for in a narrative of his experience.

The individual has intentions which refer not only to his present situation but which extend forward in time. Hampshire bases this continuity on the idea that if any individual has active intentions, it necessarily entails some certainty in his own mind about the future, i.e. the individual knows what he will do next because he knows what he is doing at the present moment and knows what he has just done. Hampshire sees this continuity as being reflected in the certainty with which an individual can reply, if he is interrupted in what he is doing, that he knows what he has just done and what he will do next. To account for this Hampshire can be quoted to the effect that

"A human being's action is essentially constituted by means towards an end; it is a bringing about of some (result) (141) with a view to some result. 'With a view to' or 'in order to', are unavoidable idioms in giving the sense of the notion of an action, the arrow of agency passing through the present and pointing forward in time. We are always looking at the present situation as arising from the immediate past by some agency and as passing in- to some other situation by some force or agency that is operative now." (142)

If an individual cannot reply to the question of what he is doing, and does not know in any sense what he was doing, he could not have been conscious and could therefore have had no intentions.

Hampshire does allow that an individual may forget, not
only /

141
142 Corrected to "change" would make better sense.
T & A, p.73.

only what he has been doing, but what he is at the present moment trying to do; but even in such a case, when he has forgotten the single unifying intention, the sense of continuity is maintained because the individual still knows that his present actions are "continuous with the actions that preceded them in such a way as to constitute a single continuous action." (143) It constitutes a continuous action because when the individual moves or initiates a change, he perceives a relation of a before and after in an immediate sense, i.e. the individual cannot easily separate the early stages of the movement from the later stages; the whole movement is embraced by the intention. In this way, Hampshire maintains, the individual is prevented from thinking of the present as a razor edge or as a point-instant. The term "now" which is commonly used in descriptions of individuals' contemporaneous actions could, according to Hampshire, more accurately be termed "the continuous present." (144)

(ii) The individual as agent

The second aspect of continuity through change in action arises out of the first because it is through the continuity of intentional action that an individual has the assurance of his own existence as a continuing object of reference. Continuity of self-consciousness is provided not only by the fact that the individual carries his intentions with him, but also by the fact that when his intentions are translated into action he sees himself as the central and constant point of reference as opposed to the objects in the environment on which he acts. As he acts and moves, changing his point of view, he distinguishes himself as the source

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143 T & A, p.72.
144 T & A, p.73.

of action from all his passing states. In Hampshire's view, this sense that the individual has of himself as the source of action and as that which is producing changes in the world provides him with a sense of continuity from the present into the future.

(iii) The individual's observation

The third important aspect of continuity within the trajectory of action arises, in Hampshire's view, out of the necessity that when an individual is acting there must be a continuity in space between his situation at the beginning of the action and at the end, i.e. he must either be at the same place for the duration of his action, or he must have moved through a series of adjacent positions. This continuity also holds for various actions performed at different times.

This sense of continuity, however, involves more than a simple movement from one place to another. When an individual acts he must know something about his situation in the world, otherwise his actions could not be directed towards objects in his environment and he could have no intentions. According to Hampshire, it is only in dreams that an individual seems to move discontinuously from one place to another. In his dream, the individual is not surrounded by a consistent world of objects, so the conditions of human observation and action break down. He may in his dreams have the experience of being disembodied and of receiving impressions of objects which move and change at random and do not consistently conform to any spatial or temporal laws. To Descartes' question of how an individual can be sure that he is not dreaming, Hampshire suggests as a possible answer that the consistent flow of intention into action in waking life makes it intrinsically unlike dream experiences.

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From these three aspects of the continuity through change in action, it emerges that because an individual has intentions all the time that he is conscious, and because it is a condition of the sense of intentions that they must be expressed in action or in statements, and because an individual can act only if he knows something about his situation in the world, there is an unavoidable continuity in an individual's conduct.

On the basis of this continuity the individual can become aware of a pattern or patterns of action. Once the individual is aware of his actions as forming a pattern, it is Hampshire's view that

"He must unavoidably reflect upon these patterns as he guides his actions and makes his individual choices." (145)

Because an individual's conduct cannot be detached from the thought that guides it, his interests and therefore his habits of thinking limit not only his possibilities of action, but also his reflection on his actions. The individual is limited even further because in reflecting on the patterns of action of which he becomes aware, he cannot direct his attention to all aspects of his conduct simultaneously. His attention within these limits will furthermore be directed towards that which he considers to be most important in terms of the beliefs which he has. He may neglect facets of human expression and activity which other individuals consider to be important. By criticism and comparison in communication with others, he can become aware of these limitations and extend his reflective powers to other, hitherto neglected, aspects of his conduct and become to that extent more free. It is Hampshire's view of an individual that

"If he has once left the most primitive level of self-consciousness and

therefore /

therefore has the freedom
of reflection, he cannot
easily see himself as guided
by any established morality
that is already complete." (145)

Hampshire does not provide an outline of a primitive level of self-consciousness. It may be seen as a simple choosing of courses of action by an individual according to his interests and needs within an established system of morality, the consequences being calculated according to these established norms, or in terms of expediency and achievement, rather than in terms of the moral rightness or wrongness of the action according to any wider policy of beliefs arrived at by reflection and comparison. The basis of Hampshire's view quoted above emerges in the following section which deals with moral questions.

145 T & A, p.222.

CHAPTER V

MORAL QUESTIONS

1. Introduction

In the consideration of moral questions, Hampshire indicates certain approaches to moral philosophy which, in his view, are incorrect because they tend to be "vacuous and uninformative".⁽¹⁴⁶⁾

For example, if a philosopher simply provides a list of essential human virtues such as friendship, justice, knowledge and so on, or concentrates on the analysis of moral terms such as "right", "good" and "ought" as they are used in sentences which express moral praise or blame, the emphasis will be on moral appraisal for its own sake; moral criticism and reflection insofar as they are used in the solving of practical problems such as deciding what to do will be neglected.

In Hampshire's view the solution of practical problems, and therefore the consideration of details of conduct and expression in which ideals such as justice, friendship and knowledge have been incorporated, is important since there can be no general moral theory which completely controls an individual's conduct and absolves him from responsibility. An individual's choices have to be made between specific forms of human achievement in practical situations and not simply in terms of an abstract theory of conduct. Even if an individual regarded moral issues as matters of casuistry, i.e. if he believes that the whole of morality is contained in a particular binding code of explicit and exhaustive

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¹⁴⁶ Feeling and Expression. F of M & Other Essays, p.269.

instructions, it is Hampshire's view that what the individual intends to do is not completely stated in the instructions.

The individual would still have to test his decisions and intentions by discovering whether they can be described in certain ways in order to know if his actions fulfil or conform to the instructions. Because of this, there is for Hampshire only a difference in degree between the individual who regards all moral issues as matters of casuistry and an individual who constantly or frequently reflects on his actions to discover whether they could be described differently according to varying classificatory principles. They can both only consider the nature and quality of an action by comparing it with other actions and by taking into account the widest possible range of features of the situation in which the action is, or is to be, performed.

The second of the approaches indicated by Hampshire is that which arises out of the area of Kant's moral philosophy⁽¹⁴⁷⁾ in which he represents all practical thought as ending in an imperative addressed to the will. He sees contemporary moralists,⁽¹⁴⁸⁾ following Kant, as tending to represent all moral judgements as injunctions such as "You ought not to do or to have done so and so"⁽¹⁴⁹⁾ and to see this as implying that an individual could have or can do it. Rather than directing his criticism specifically at Kant, Hampshire is directing it at those philosophers who have adopted Kant's assumption either that "there is one type of moral judgement" or "that all types of moral judgement are

impure /

147 Kant, I. Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics. Longmans, 1969.

148 He does not specify.

149 T & A, p.208.

impure variants of one pure type", without adopting the system of thought which makes it intelligible. He says

"... without the support of Kant's transcendental argument and his distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal realms, the assumption is altogether unfounded and in conflict with the evidences of ordinary speech." (150)

This view that all moral injunctions are addressed to the will and not to the critical intelligence implies, according to Hampshire, that an individual is confronted with a set of clearly distinguished and labelled actions from which he simply has to make his choice. In such a case, moral problems are seen as moral conflict and all that is required of a moralist is that he prescribe the right course of action and provide reasons as to why it is the right course. Furthermore Hampshire contends that

"'There is no point in making a moral judgement unless the subject of the judgement is or was free to act in the manner prescribed' it would be pointless and self-defeating behaviour to say 'He ought to have done X, but he could not have done X' ... to say 'He ought to do this' is to imply 'It is in his power to do this' or 'It is not impossible for him to do this'; for (as we should naturally say) it is no use saying that he ought to do it if in fact he cannot do it." (151)

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- 151 Hampshire, S. The J of Phil. vol LX, 1963, p.419.
Hampshire, S. Maclagan, W.G. and Hare, R.M. Symposium: Freedom of the Will. Aristotelian Society Supplementary vol XXV, July 1951, p.162-3.
(Hereafter referred to as Arist.Soc.Supp. vol XXV, 1951.)

The idea of clearly distinguished and labelled actions and moral prescription on the part of the moralist is, for Hampshire, unsatisfactory because it leaves no room for exploratory thinking which guides actions or for moral enquiry in which an individual explores new possibilities of action and makes new discriminations within and beyond the limits of a system of beliefs or moral precepts which he may have.

The individual is not, according to Hampshire, faced with a plainly arranged world of facts from which he can choose.⁽¹⁵²⁾ The situation with which an individual is confronted when he has to act is one in which subjects for evaluation and for the exercise of his will or intentions is not marked out by an ordinary undisputed concept of action. The concept of action is, according to Hampshire, indeterminate since an action is not correlated with its guiding intention by rules and conventions. There is therefore no single correct description of any particular action, e.g. two individuals could give widely differing accounts of the action of some third person even though they are talking about the same person and the same phase of activity. Their accounts may differ because according to each one's system of belief the action and the features of the situation will have a different significance.

Because different descriptions may be given of the same action and an individual may be in doubt about the nature of the action he will perform, it is Hampshire's view that

"moral /

¹⁵² Hampshire says in a footnote, *F of M & Other Essays*, p.55: "The word 'fact' here as always is treacherous, involving the old confusion between the actual situation and the description of it. The situation is given but not 'the facts of the situation'; to state the facts is to analyse and interpret the situation."

"moral reflection is often a preliminary, not to a choice between clearly identified alternatives, but the discovery that a possible course of action, which was originally identified under one description, could be described no less truthfully in quite different terms." (153)

In trying to find alternative descriptions of his action and comparing such descriptions and reflecting on them, the individual can assess his action in terms of its rightness or wrongness and has the possibility of acting with greater freedom than if he had simply decided on a course of action and carried it out.

Hampshire's criticism of the sort of moral philosophies which concentrate on moral injunctions addressed to the will, or the listing of essential virtues and the analysis of moral terms, reflects his view that the approach to moral philosophy should emphasise the critical intelligence of the individual as it is employed in situations in which he acts. On this particular point Hampshire states that

"Often it is the point of a moral comment addressed to a man, not that it should be censure, but that it should inform him of a way of viewing his situation, past or present, and of a possibility of action, that would never otherwise have occurred to him." (154)

So in Hampshire's view if an individual is accused of doing something and replies that he did not realise

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153 T & A, p.211-2.
154 T & A, p.207.

realise what he was doing, his reply may be met with the injunction that he should have reflected more carefully, and not with the injunction that he ought to have done (and by implication could have done) so-and-so instead.

The basis of these views emerges in an outline of Hampshire's own approach to moral philosophy. What will be given are the principles which, in his view, are to be employed in any discussion of moral questions rather than a detailed outline of a specific moral theory. These principles are broadly :

- The notion of the good man as the starting point of ethical discussion.
- The necessity of a framework within which human excellences and defects can be discussed.
- The question as to whether judgements of moral excellences and judgements that form practical intentions are separate and distinct kinds of judgement.
- The idea that any particular moral theory cannot be final and indisputable but only provisional.

These form the background for a discussion of Hampshire's more specific views on moral questions, i.e. morality becoming hardened and why it cannot survive, as this pertains to the question of the freedom of the individual.

2. The Good Man

For Hampshire the notion of the good man is the starting point of a discussion of that which is supremely valuable and of the priority of human virtues. In this he is following Aristotle who takes the notion of the good man as the starting point in ethics and sees the supreme virtue of man as constituted by the habit of

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using his intelligence to assess each situation in which he finds himself or with which he is confronted.

Hampshire disagrees with Aristotle that the nature of man can finally be ascertained because, unlike Aristotle, he does not accept that there is a single system of correct definitions and classifications corresponding to an eternal scheme of reality. This was seen in the outline of Hampshire's principle of ordering.⁽¹⁵⁵⁾ Hampshire says of Aristotle's theory

"No critical philosopher can now believe that an inquiry into the concept of man, and therefore into that which constitutes a good man, is the search for an immutable essence. He will rather think of any definition or elucidation of the concept as a reasoned proposal that different types of appraisal should be distinguished from each other in accordance with disputable principles derived from a disputable philosophy of mind."

(156)

Although Hampshire rejects the idea of a fixed human nature, he accepts that Aristotle is correct in his illustration of his idea of the nature of man with examples of ordinary human activity drawn from social life because it is, according to Hampshire, the concrete details of virtues and vices which gives sense to any abstract concept of man and any division of human powers and interests.

Hampshire's arguments for starting ethical discussions with the concept of man will be outlined first; his arguments for the necessity of starting with the concept of the good man, either explicitly or implicitly, will

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See above Chapter I, "Language", p.4 ff.

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T & A, p.233.

then be dealt with.

He sees the concept of man as the starting point of ethical discussion because it is the most general concept, unlike, for example, the concept of an engineer, doctor or mathematician. The concept of engineering is specific enough for there to be little difficulty in outlining the powers that make a man an engineer or a good engineer. Furthermore, when an individual is criticised and assessed as an engineer he is seen in a fairly clearly defined role. Hampshire maintains that individuals do, either by choice or by force of circumstances, appear in various roles and one can speculate about their conduct and capacities in these roles or in alternative roles.

But when an individual is assessed and criticised as a good or bad man, and not as an engineer or doctor, the assessment is as general as possible because the concept of man is more general than any other concept. Hampshire sees it as being more general in two senses. Firstly, criticisms of an individual as an engineer or doctor could be quoted in support or rebuttal of criticisms and assessments of him as a good man. Secondly, although it would be perfectly natural to say of a man that he is a good engineer, it would be absurd to refer to an individual as an animal who is also a good man. It would be absurd because an individual is primarily identified as a man and one could not speculate about his conduct or capacities as a man in any other role than that of a man.

But even though the criticism and assessment of an individual as a good man is as general as possible, a discussion of his virtues or defects as a man has certain limits; statements about him which have no relation to statements about his virtues or vices as a man would be excluded, e.g. the size of his feet. Hampshire adds that

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"The sense of the qualification 'as a man' if the phrase 'a good man' is interpreted 'good as a man', is to mark the confinement of the discussion to a range of distinctively human virtues and defects. Anyone who enters into the discussion by quoting certain facts as relevant, shows the range of excellences and defects that he takes to be distinctively human excellences and defects." (157)

Hampshire sees it as a logical necessity that the notion of the good man should be the starting point in any discussion of ethics because "judgements of ultimate value inevitably allot a sense to the phrase 'a good man'". (158) The most obvious sense in Hampshire's view in which they allot a sense to the phrase is if the notion of the good man or the exercise of some human capacity is seen as supremely valuable and is taken as the starting point of the discussion. But if some entity other than the good man or human capacities is seen as being of supreme value, how would judgements of ultimate value derived from it allot a sense to the phrase 'a good man' ?

The examples Hampshire provides of this are Plato's theory that the goodness of man is derived from his relation to suprasensible and timeless truths; the belief that a good state is the primary subject of ultimate judgements of value; and the belief that anything that may be regarded as being of supreme value is made so by the will of God.

On the basis of examples such as these Hampshire sees it as perfectly reasonable and logical to argue that the excellence of man as man is derived from some

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157 T & A, p.236.
158 T & A, p.259.

absolute value. This idea can, however, be defeated by what Hampshire calls a purely philosophical objection, viz.

"The distinctions that are marked in the vocabulary of any language are the distinctions recognised by men. 'A good so-and-so' is a form of phrase that derives its sense from some grounds of classification chosen by men for their own purposes, and from the criterion of value that is more or less directly derived from these grounds of classification. However resolutely we may try as philosophers to separate judgements of value from any limiting human interests, we can never altogether succeed."

(159)

In the case of the Platonic Forms, their characteristics and features would have to be derived from excellences which are, for individuals, characteristic of human life, even if they are not exemplified in any absolute sense in ordinary human conduct. Similarly, in the case of attaching supreme value to natural or supernatural entities, the excellences which either constitute a good state or are believed to be prescribed by the will of God, will be derived from an assessment of human excellences and defects as they are exemplified by individuals in their ordinary conduct and capacities.

In an essay, *Ethics: A Defence of Aristotle*,⁽¹⁶⁰⁾ Hampshire outlines in detail that there are roughly two distinguishable uses of "good", i.e. the predicative and /

159 T & A, p.258.

160 F of M & Other Essays, p.64-86.

and the attributive, the former being used in propositions such as "It is a good play"⁽¹⁶¹⁾ and the latter in "He is a good soldier."⁽¹⁶²⁾ He maintains, however, that the distinction between the two uses breaks down when applied to the judgement "He is a good man."

If the starting point of ethics is to be the concept of the good man, the question arises as to what constitutes a good man. The reply to such a question would, in Hampshire's view, have to indicate or provide an outline of the distinctive powers of humanity in terms of which an individual is judged to be a good man. By taking the distinctive powers of humanity into consideration, a separation between moral appraisal and practical judgements is prevented.

Hampshire does not outline a specific theory of virtues which constitute a good man. His purpose is rather to indicate the criterion for the discussion of man as a good man, a concept of which the detail and emphasis may vary from one individual to another. The criterion is, for Hampshire, constituted by a framework within which human excellences and defects can be discussed.

3. The framework within which human excellences and defects can be discussed

First, the term "moral" needs to be considered. According to Hampshire a commonly accepted connotation of the word "moral" is "important."⁽¹⁶³⁾ This much he accepts and sees moral issues, broadly, as those issues to which an individual gives careful thought and consideration. In Hampshire's words

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161 F of M & Other Essays, p.81.
162 Ibid.
163 T & A, p.240.

"A man's morality is shown by the type of question of conduct that he takes seriously, by the type of decision about which he is prepared to reflect carefully, and to entertain genuine and reasoned regrets and criticisms." (164)

But for Hampshire problems arise out of such an account of the word. He asks "What is the status of an opinion that a certain human excellence is important and worth serious attention?"⁽¹⁶⁵⁾ He admits that one is making a judgement of the value of different human activities when applying the contrast between what is important and what is trivial; but he goes on to say that, according to the criterion of what is important and what is trivial, it would not be absurd to claim that the most important human excellence is, for example, creative genius. If this was held to be the most important human excellence, ultimate judgements of value of human powers and activities such as that creative genius must be fostered at all costs, can be inferred from it. Other potentialities and values would inevitably be neglected. Alternatively, the most important human excellences could be seen as those which are attainable by the working of the will, to the neglect of others which are of equal importance in an individual's conduct.

Hampshire says, however, that even if such judgements of what is to be regarded as the most important of human excellences and therefore as the only moral excellences can be described as ultimate in the following two senses:

"... that they are not always and necessarily to be derived from any one already identified

class /

¹⁶⁴ T & A, p.240.
¹⁶⁵ Ibid. p.250.

class of propositions constituting the evidence on which they must be based or the premisses from which they must be deduced." (166)

and

"... that they are of the greatest possible generality and abstractness." (167)

this does not mean that an individual cannot reject one particular ordering of human excellences and accept another.

Rather than defining the word "moral" or employing the criterion of importance to determine what constitutes a good man, Hampshire prefers to see some essential human powers and activities as forming a framework within which the excellences and defects of individuals can be discussed, and within which any particular individual can arrange that which he values in order of priority according to his beliefs of what constitutes the best ends of human life. With regard to his philosophy of mind, Hampshire says that

"This is not the place to consider the connotation of the word 'moral' and the difficulties of finding a neutral and morally non-committed characterization of its proper use. There is an antimony, a contradictory demand in requiring a definition of the moral that is not simply the specification of one morality among others. Either one accepts Kant's transcendental argument that there is only one possible morality, and then one dismisses all other so-called moral systems, or principles,

as /

166 T & A, p.251.
167 Ibid. p.252.

as not moral systems, or principles at all; or one abandons the attempt to define moral judgement as a distinct and specific type of judgement." (168)

He says of this

"This problem does not require a clear solution within Aristotelian ethics; in place of the concept of morality, with its restrictive Kantian associations, one considers only a not further differentiated range of essential human interests and their corresponding virtues." (169)

The framework is, in Hampshire's view, constituted by the fact that any individual necessarily lives in a society in which his behaviour is influenced and formed by the prevailing conventions. Within a society an individual, inter alia, enters into contracts, communicates, has knowledge, skills, memory, follows traditions of behaviour and has social and family relationships. Since these are essential conditions of anything that can be counted as human life, any discussion of the goodness or badness of an individual must take them into account and be within the framework. The criticism and comparison of individuals is not necessarily confined to these essential conditions of human life, but must always include them.

The way in which an individual learns what constitutes specific human virtues is from his own experience and in the history of art and custom. The criteria for judging what may be counted as justice, intelligence, courage /

168 Hampshire, S. The J. of Phil. vol LX, 1963, p.419.
169 Ibid. p.419.

courage, friendship and social order and so on may vary within a particular society or from one society to another, and they may have been arranged in different orders of priority, but the various criteria do, according to Hampshire, have a common centre of meaning in the idea of that which is considered to be distinctive of human life.

Although human dispositions and abilities do develop along with the institutions that express and foster them, there is in Hampshire's view a timeless core of human interests and powers with a common centre of meaning. He says of this

"...we shall not find that, in reading ancient moralists, we confront another subject, or that the line between the essential and relatively trivial features of a human life is drawn in an altogether different place. Prohibitions against murder and violence, some canons of justice, some regulation of the sensual instincts, some obligations of family relationships and of friendship, some obligations of work and mutual aid, are essential in any community of creatures properly to be called human, however superficially various their specific forms in different social conditions." (170)

Because there is a common centre of meaning, if two individuals disagree in their assessment of the goodness or badness of an individual, at the very least the factors which they take to be relevant to the assessment cannot be so different that there is no common ground for the discussion, or no overlap of the concepts which they each employ to outline their views. Their differences of opinion cannot be about

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what constitutes the framework of discussion because this discussion remains essentially within the sort of framework indicated above; their differences of opinion are rather about the correct or best ends of human conduct.

In expressing such opinions about the best or correct ends of human actions, the individual is making judgements of value. Hampshire sees that there may be objections to characterising judgements of value as expressions of opinion and that they could be classified instead as an individual's decisions as to the best ends of human action or the features that characterise a good man.

Hampshire allows that the question as to whether judgements of value constitute expressions of opinion or decision is open to dispute; but his own views are justified by considering what he sees as being necessary characteristics of judgements of value. It is characteristic of judgements of value that they are

"... normally supported by reasons, with the commitment to doubt and reconsider the judgements if the reasons are shown to be indefensible." (171)

Thus, even if a judgement of value is called a decision, it will only be a rational decision if it is connected with the individual's other decisions; if, on reflection or in argument, a particular decision is found to be inconsistent with an individual's other decisions, he would have to reconsider it and its reasons in the interests of rationality. Hampshire sees rationality as a universal requirement for freedom.

There is no fixed and final scheme of values which an individual can discover and live by, and since there

is /

is, therefore, always the possibility that he may be mistaken and change his mind, Hampshire sees the term "opinion" as reflecting the changeable nature of moral judgements. He says of this

"The force of the word 'opinion' is the implication that the demand for supporting reasons is always in place and that there is an acknowledged commitment to doubt and reconsider the judgement if the supporting reasons are shown to be in themselves indefensible." (172)

When an individual expresses his opinion on what constitutes a good man and therefore the best ends of human action, he not only makes judgements of value, but makes judgements of ultimate value. These are, for Hampshire, constituted by the judgements with their supporting reasons to which an individual ultimately resorts as the justification for his opinions when they are questioned. They may be regarded as ultimate but not final or absolute, in the sense that they are the most general in an individual's scheme of values, and do not have to be deduced from more general premisses; rather they constitute the premisses from which he derives other and associated judgements of value.

4. Judgements of moral excellences and judgements that form practical intentions

The emphasis on the discussion of moral questions within a framework of essential powers and interests of men starting with the notion of the good man does not mean that Hampshire is making the mistake of regarding moral issues as constituted simply by

assessments /

172 T & A, p.264.

assessments of moral praise and blame. He is concerned with the individual as a moral agent rather than simply as a moral critic and judge and says

"The typical moral problem is not a spectator's problem or a problem of classifying or describing conduct, but a problem of practical choice and decision."

The basis of this view may be seen, firstly, in Hampshire's contention that the judgements of ultimate value that an individual makes cannot be regarded as finally fixed truths existing apart from his practical intentions; and, secondly, by the same token, an individual's practical intentions cannot be detached from his opinions about the essential powers and interests of men.

To account for the inseparability of judgements of value and practical intentions, reference can be made to Hampshire's rejection of the notion of pure thought and his definition of a practical question in a wider and narrower sense,⁽¹⁷⁴⁾ in terms of which there would be no point in an individual's having moral opinions if they had no relation to his interests and conduct in practical situations.

The definition of a practical question, furthermore, embraces the theory that an individual cannot be said to have a belief unless he sometimes acts on it and, when an individual expresses his value judgements, he may be seen as expressing his beliefs about the best ends of human conduct.

This account can be reinforced by Hampshire's views on the opinions which form practical intentions. He says of the sort of opinions which form practical intentions

that, /

¹⁷⁴ See above Chapter IV "Action", p.121-2.

that, although they are most frequently expressed in action and are not communicated in words, they have their appropriate forms of expression and can be formulated as opinions about human excellences; for example, when an individual deliberately and self-consciously changes his interests, a change of opinion lies behind such a change.

If the individual were to give an account of why he is no longer interested in a particular activity or set of activities, he could only give his account of it, directly or by implication, in terms of a change of opinion about its importance and place amongst activities essential to men. If, therefore, questions about moral issues are distinguished into two kinds, viz.

"What are the distinguishing characteristics expressing moral praise or blame ?" (175)

and

"What are the distinguishing characteristics of moral problems as they present themselves to us as practical agents ?" (175)

it is Hampshire's view that the answer to the second question must contain the answer to the first, and if an answer is supplied for the first question without either explicitly or implicitly including the second, it will be incomplete and distort any account of the nature of moral judgements, of which he says

"One's conclusion reached after deliberation, expressed in the sentence 'x is the best thing to do in the circumstances' is a pure or primary moral judgement (the solution of a practical problem.)" (176)

Hampshire's /

175 Fallacies in Moral Philosophy. F of M & Other
176 Essays, p.46.
Ibid. p.47.

Hampshire's assumption, implied in this definition of a moral judgement, is that the individual has reflected on the alternatives and arrived at his conclusion by a process of argument and reasoning.

The individual's conclusion could not, according to Hampshire, be sufficiently justified simply by reference to personal attitudes and feelings about the matter in question, but only by reference to these arguments and reasoning. To say that a moral judgement is the expression of a personal attitude or feeling is misleading because it excludes the process of deliberation which is essential to the making of a rational moral judgement. (177)

Hampshire also rejects the idea that moral judgements could be made or justified on the basis of intuition or purely imaginative exploration of the possibilities of conduct open to an individual. (178) Of intuition he says

"... the force of the word 'intuition' is to suggest that the conclusion is not established by any recognised form of argument by any ratiocinative process involving a succession of steps which are logically criticisable; the word 'intuition' carries the suggestion that we do not, or even cannot, deliberate and calculate in deciding what we ought to do. But we always can and often actually do deliberate and calculate." (179)

Hampshire's /

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- 177 In this he may be seen to be criticising Ayer, A.J. and Stevenson, C.L.
178 Hampshire attributes the formation of moral judgements on the basis of intuition to a group of post-Kantian philosophers whom he does not name. These may be taken to be Moore, G.E. and Ross, W.D.
179 Fallacies in Moral Philosophy. F of M & Other Essays, p.47.

Hampshire's objection to any attempt on the part of the individual to form moral judgements by means of purely imaginative exploration of the possibilities of action open to him, stems from his view of the limitations of the exercise of the imagination. Hampshire says of the individual that

"... he cannot in imagination alone, without the aid of conceptual thinking, deliberate upon the alternatives; at the most he can only rehearse them. He has not in imagination, as he has in conceptual thinking, the use of tightly controlled and directed comparison with the past and an exact demarcation of the alternatives." (180)

When an individual makes a moral judgement it is not isolated or detached from his experience as an agent in the world. He has to take into account the whole tract of his conduct (in as far as it is relevant) which precedes and follows the moment of judgement to be able to establish how it can be classified. In order to do this he has to represent his situation and his conduct to himself through the relevant features. This is only possible if he has, as in conceptual thinking, the means of identifying the features of the situation and of his conduct which are to form the grounds of his judgement.

Hampshire contends that this is not possible on the basis of intuition and imagination alone, and the conclusions which the individual reaches cannot simply be characterised as the expression of personal feelings or attitudes.

To what extent imagination, intuition, personal feelings and attitudes do play a role in the process of reasoning in the formulation of moral judgements is something with which Hampshire does not specifically deal. That

they /

they are to some extent at least relevant to the formation of moral judgements is evident from the following:

"One has before one, for reflection and comment, whether in one's own person, or in the person of another, always a whole person, including the way he thinks and expresses his thoughts and feelings, the things that he notices and neglects, the attitudes that he accepts, the feelings that he restrains and the feelings to which he allows free play, the words that he chooses to use or that he uses unreflectingly, the gestures and physical reactions that he controls or suppresses, the plans that he makes and the sudden impulses that occur to him. All these are features of the actions and reactions of a person, upon which his own judgement, or the judgement of others, may pronounce." (181)

The point that Hampshire may be taken to be making in his outline of the formation of moral judgements is not that intuition, imagination, personal feelings and attitudes are totally irrelevant, but that moral judgements cannot be formed and justified solely on the basis of these and still retain their status as moral judgements. Some conceptual thought involving reasoning and argument is essential, even if the judgements later prove to be misguided.

5. A particular moral theory cannot be final and indisputable

Hampshire maintains that no final moral system can be established because the criteria of application of the

concept /

concept of morality cannot be fixed. This he sees as determined by two important characteristics of the concept of morality. Firstly, it is connected with human emotions rather than simply with the individual's needs as a biological system; the range of emotions, attitudes and desires does not remain static but changes with the development of knowledge and changing social forms. The second characteristic of the concept, which arises out of the first, is that it is very general and abstract, and its boundary cannot therefore easily be demarcated as the boundary of a more specific concept such as engineering could be defined. The concept of morality is abstract in the sense that there are no specific rules or principles which determine the content of the concept. Common agreement can be reached as regards the nature of a specific and defined system of morality; but this does not fix the concept as being constituted exclusively by the human excellences (and their order of priority) as they are defined in such a system. Not only the specific excellences and their order of priority, but the system itself remains disputable and open to change within the framework of the prevailing powers and interests of individuals. The concept of morality, it appears, is applicable to any scale of human excellences outlined as reflecting the best ends of human conduct and pointing to some ideal for the future.

The idea of that which is essential to human life does, according to Hampshire, provide a common centre of meaning for the criteria of application of terms such as justice, loyalty and courage, but the more specific conditions in the criteria of application change as the conditions of social life change. Therefore, any particular classification of human activities and powers (and by the same token of human virtues) even if it is illustrated with concrete examples drawn from prevailing

forms /

forms of social life, can only be regarded as one of a number of possibilities.

To Hampshire there is no final insight into the essence of man and the nature of the mind, so that even if a particular moral philosophy is an adequate description of the morality of a particular phase of human life, it will have to be revised as the forms of social life change. Hampshire expresses the view that the conclusions of a philosophy of mind are provisional and cannot constitute final knowledge. On this point he says

"This defect of knowledge is not on the same level or of the same kind as the ignorance of the ultimate constituents of matter or of some other feature of the natural order. As the knowledge that we may have of our own mental powers is reflexive knowledge, the object of knowledge and the knowing subject extend their range together." (182)

Just as there can be no fixed and final system of morality, an individual cannot, if he is to be described as a free and rational agent, simply subscribe to an established morality which may be prevalent at the time, and regard it as fixed and final. When an individual is born into a society he inherits the moral outlook or a particular moral outlook within that society. Any particular moral outlook is reflected in the way in which types of conduct and mental states are classified, and is according to Hampshire apparent in the distinctions which are emphasised in common speech. But, just because a particular division of human powers and activities has been established, this does not mean that there cannot be alternatives or that custom is in

itself /

itself a justification for a particular moral system. The distinctions already marked in speech are for any individual only the starting point both for the examination of and critical reflection upon conventional morality, and for further discriminations which he may make amongst human activities and interests if he is to be self-determining and therefore free. He makes these further discriminations when he reflects critically on his own conduct and chooses the terms in which the possibilities of action open to him are to be identified and classified. Such critical reflection, according to Hampshire, consists in the reviewing and comparison of different ways of classifying conduct and its consequences and of finding reasons for choosing one type of classification rather than another.

Even if an individual does commit himself to an established and conventional system of morality, he will still be a free and rational agent as long as he has reflected on it, compared it with other systems and chosen it in preference to the alternatives, as expressing what he regards to be the best ends of human conduct. It must be added, however, that in the examination of a system of morality, the individual cannot simply focus on linguistic distinctions which reflect it. According to Hampshire

"The only honest method would be to review the various recognised concepts of action, together with their moral and evaluative implications, and to look for more general moral grounds for making some choice between them." (183)

This is not, however, to imply that an individual at some crucial moment in his life, after having become aware that he is relatively unfree, suspends all other

activities /

activities and interests in order to examine the grounds of the system of morality which he has accepted, and in this way becomes self-determining and free. An individual must rather be seen as questioning and modifying conventional standards of morality in a piecemeal fashion as and when he is confronted with a situation in which he must act, or with regard to which he must establish his own attitude. A change of opinion on one matter under consideration would not be an isolated change but will affect a whole range of his opinions because his beliefs are conditional upon each other. (184)

6. A rigid morality and why it cannot survive

An individual may accept established classifications of actions, situations and mental powers as self-justifying and therefore correct. It is Hampshire's contention that many people do not deliberate and therefore cannot be said to make moral judgements. They act according to conventional standards of what is considered to be right and wrong. When required to make a moral judgement or justify their conduct they resort uncritically to conventional judgements or express personal feelings and attitudes. Hampshire says of this

"Morality as exploratory thinking, as an unresting awareness of that which he is neglecting in his intentions may disappear and with it the comparison and criticism of competing ideals of human behaviour on the occasions of decision." (185)

The individual is unfree to the degree that he makes his choices only within the familiar habits of thought.

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185 See above, Chapter III, "Knowledge" p.63 ff.
T & A, p.242.

His habits of thought limit the possibilities open to him and therefore also limit what he can be expected to try to do. For Hampshire it would be senseless to blame such an individual for omitting to do something (or for doing something) which he could not possibly think of doing. Hampshire qualifies this by adding that although one could say of some other individual that he could not possibly think of doing X because he is the sort of person to whom it would not occur, one could never say this of oneself. It would, in Hampshire's view, give rise to the contradiction which arises out of referring to oneself simultaneously as the responsible author and as the person being observed. He illustrates this with what he calls the dialectical movement in terms of which an individual is, on the one hand the observer and on the other, the observed. (143)

(1) Emphasis on the observer
in which knowledge becomes
decision.

(A) I (the observer)



(B) observe myself trying
to annoy someone



(C) if I continue with the
same action in order to
annoy him



(D) the initial knowledge that
I am annoying him brings
about a decision to annoy
him.



(E) Knowledge becomes decision
(to annoy him).

(2) Emphasis on the observed
in which decision be-
comes knowledge.

(A) I (the observed)



(B) am observed as acting
in a particular way
which is likely to
annoy someone



(C) once I am aware that
the action is annoying
him



(D) the initial decision to
act in a particular way
has brought about the
knowledge that I can
annoy him by the action.



(E) Decision has become
knowledge that I am or
can annoy him in this
way.

In /

In the one aspect of the dialectical movement, i.e. when knowledge becomes decision, the individual cannot escape the burden of intention and therefore responsibility which he has by virtue of the knowledge of what he is doing, because, if he knows what he is doing or going to do, this knowledge is indistinguishable from a decision to do it. A problem arises out of the idea of an individual trying to annoy someone without being aware that that is what he is trying to do. It would be more acceptable if Hampshire said that in trying to do something an individual observes that he is also annoying someone and then decides, on the basis of the knowledge, to annoy him. In the other aspect of the dialectical movement, i.e. where decision becomes knowledge, while the individual did not know what he was doing he could not be said to have intended it, because, if he intends to do something, he necessarily knows that he is doing it.

The individual can only, according to Hampshire, make a double reference to himself without contradiction if he refers to himself first as the person who is observing and secondly as the person who is being observed. As regards the individual's knowledge of his own limitations, therefore, he could only say of himself retrospectively that he was the sort of person to whom it would not occur to do x; the making of such a remark contemporaneously implies an awareness of his limitations, for which he can be held responsible.

Hampshire maintains that if an individual is confined within a narrowly circumscribed system of morality, he is not inescapably imprisoned in it since it must always be possible for him to achieve some extension of his range of thought. A rigid morality cannot survive because influences bearing upon the individual bring to his attention new ways of classifying human interests

and /

and powers and the discrimination of virtues and vices of which he may not have been aware before.

One of the influences bearing upon the individual, as indicated by Hampshire, is the conduct of others. This is, however, dealt with only in a narrow sense of the inferences drawn for an individual's own conduct, from observing the conduct of others.⁽¹⁴⁴⁾ Hampshire says of this that an individual, in observing the conduct of others, may become aware that they do not take into consideration the wider implications of their conduct or establish the greatest possible degree of consistency amongst their opinions, because their attention is focussed on what they will do in the immediate future. He may notice that they do not attempt to see different aspects of any particular action which they intend to perform in order to discover whether it could be described in terms other than the familiar ones in which they would describe them if required to do so.

In observing these limitations in others and the consequences as they manifest themselves as a result of actions not carefully considered beforehand, the individual may become aware that he is similarly limited, and has acquired a moral outlook and therefore a character which he has not self-consciously chosen.

His awareness of his own limitations opens for him the possibility of overcoming them and places upon him the responsibility for neglecting to do so.

Hampshire, however, appears to place much greater emphasis on the influence which aesthetics has on the individual's moral outlook. He discusses the role of aesthetics at some length and his claims are, to say

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¹⁴⁴ In T & A.

the least, questionable, if only because they are so general.

It is his contention that a rigid morality, i.e. an established classification of human interests and powers arranged in some order of priority, cannot survive if the individuals who subscribe to it are exposed to any serious experience of art. He characterises art as

"... a form of communication,
an expression of feeling, a
celebration of some facet of
experience." (145)

He says of the experience of art that it is

"... by definition an ex-
perience in which practical
interests and ordinary
classifications that reflect
them are for a time suspended." (146)

In his characterisation of art, Hampshire stresses the role of imagination as opposed to the tightly controlled and directed thought which relies on formulated comparisons and the demarcation of alternatives. The artist can, it appears, engage in purely imaginative exploration of possibilities of expression. Instead of formulating an idea in words, he can simply try it out and recognise it as being satisfactory or unsatisfactory without resorting to the sort of reasoning and argument employed in the formation of moral judgements.

An objection can be raised to the effect that if a work of art is to constitute a moral comment the individual would have to employ conceptual thought because it would in principle be no different from the sort of moral judgement that he would make in a practical

situation/

145 T & A, p.245.
146 Ibid. p.244.

situation. With regard to this, Hampshire says that the effect of a "considerable work of art"⁽¹⁴⁷⁾ always extends beyond the artist's intentions in creating it.

By this Hampshire possibly means that the artist does not necessarily intend his creation to constitute a moral criticism of any particular facet of human life as he sees it, but that he focusses on and expresses his experience of it in a unique style. If this is the case, it seems acceptable that the individual should engage in purely imaginative exploration of possibilities of experience; and that the effect it has on other individuals in his society is incidental to his intention in creating it.

The objection, it seems, would hold if Hampshire means the following by saying that the effect of the work of art extends beyond the artist's intention, i.e. that an artist may intend his creation to constitute some specific moral criticism of an incident or a prevailing situation to which individuals within his society have grown accustomed, e.g. oppression of a particular group of individuals or legal discrimination against some individual, and that the effect of the work of art on individuals who appreciate it as a criticism cannot be computed by reference to the artist's intention alone; its effects could possibly only be estimated in part by observing the effect which it has on the opinions and conduct of individuals who see it as a significant additional dimension of their experience, in that it creates a new awareness of a deplorable situation or incident.

Possibly both of these are valid interpretations, and if they are it would be necessary for Hampshire to draw some distinction. Whichever the case may be, the effect of a considerable work of art has great

importance /

¹⁴⁷ T & A, p.246.

importance in Hampshire's analysis because it interrupts an individual's normal habits of thought. Hampshire's statement about this is to the effect that

"Human creativeness in art presents the recognised varieties of feeling, and established conceptions of the mind from ever hardening into a final pattern. There are always surprises, the identification of new attitudes and states of mind through freely invented works of art that seem an exact expression of them for the first time. Any closed morality, so far left to itself, is always threatened with this unpredicted shock and disturbance, which suddenly illumines another possibility of human feeling and desire through the invention of a new form of expression."

(148)

To this he adds

"Without these unexpected achievements we should be left to acquiesce in some much narrower and more static conception of possible human attainment and of possible discrimination. They add another dimension, that of the unpredictable and uncontrolled sources of change in our perception and attitudes, and in our idea of man's normal powers."

(148)

Hampshire's views on the influence of aesthetics on morality certainly point to an area of moral philosophy which could fruitfully be investigated in far greater

detail. /

This is really all he can be said to have achieved in his discussion of this particular topic, and perhaps his aim is to do no more than this.

However, since such great emphasis is placed on the influence of aesthetics certain objections must be raised. Hampshire speaks very generally of "works of art" and "aesthetics", making no distinction between painting, sculpture, literature and music; nor does he indicate which is of greater importance in terms of the nature of the message which could most effectively be conveyed in the particular medium.

He gives no examples of specific works of art which have influenced individuals in the way he claims; he appears therefore to imply that all works of art have this salutary effect. It would also seem that the influence of aesthetics is applicable only to a special privileged class of individuals. He neither denies nor affirms this. The notion of a "considerable work of art" (149) remains vague and undefined as does "a serious experience of art." (150)

Furthermore, his statement about an artist's intentions is vague, i.e.

"The artist's intention is not clearly detachable from the actual performance to the degree to which it is in any uncreative activity. The power and quality of the work is only known and understood in retrospect, often after many years." (151)

Its vagueness is compounded by his further statement on this

"For /

149 T & A, p.246.
150 Ibid. p.244.
151 T & A, p.246-7.

"For this reason, good intentions in art do not have the interest and value that they have in normal conduct." (152)

The reason provided is obscure in the first place and so it is not clear as to what precise distinction he is making between intentions in ordinary conduct and an artist's intentions.

It is accepted that Hampshire is in principle correct and the experience of art may play a significant role in the changes which are made in a particular system of morality as a result of such an experience. But for this acceptance in principle to have any substance, it would have to be shown how a fairly specific type of art influences morality, this being illustrated with concrete detail drawn from existing forms of social life. Illustration is, for Hampshire, essential to any moral philosophy.⁽¹⁵³⁾ This is a demanding requirement but not unfair in the light of the weight Hampshire attaches to aesthetics in the context of moral questions; furthermore, this requirement would possibly account for the implication in Hampshire's philosophy of mind that aesthetic experiences of considerable works of art in a more general way, and not just the experience of specific works of art by particular individuals, influences a rigid morality in the way he claims it does.

What is perhaps most questionable is the importance Hampshire attaches to the influence of aesthetics, to the neglect of another, admittedly more mundane, influence which may be of greater importance because of its pervasiveness. What he does not place enough

emphasis /

152 T & A, p.247.
153 Ibid. p.232-3.

emphasis upon is the importance of the interaction of individuals in a particular society and from one society to another, in their daily lives. He does indicate that an individual can compare concepts, e.g. justice and benevolence as they are classified in different societies,⁽¹⁵⁴⁾ and that this is done from the standpoint of the individual himself, employing criteria which he recognises and accepts; but the emphasis in this is on the comparison of the classification rather than on the effect which the awareness of such differences make to an individual's point of view. With regard to this the following statements are important :

"But I cannot doubt that there are in fact other thinking beings who present me with thoughts that were not originated by me and who refer to me as 'you' exactly as I refer to them, each of us perceiving the other from our own positions in space." (155)

and

"To learn to speak and understand a language, as a child, is to enter into a set of social relationships in which my own intentions are continually understood and fulfilled by others and in which I encounter their corresponding intentions. I learn to describe and to think about things, and to think about my own actions, only because of this interchange and through the social conventions that constitute the use of language." (156)

This /

154 T & A, p.239.

155 Ibid. p.89.

156 Ibid. p.89

This could surely form the basis for a far more extended discussion of the role that individuals play in each other's lives as regards the formation of their characters, not only in their own society but from one society to another.

Furthermore, individuals do not only recognise and fulfil each other's intentions but obstruct and check each other by their expressions of criticism and disapproval. What Hampshire does say of relevance to this topic and which is of great importance is that that which would be an occasion for regret as regards the individual's own conduct, would be an occasion for criticism as regards the conduct of other individuals.

When an individual criticises some other individual, he takes into account the circumstances and powers of that individual, (in as far as it is possible for him to know them) and makes his criticisms in terms of the way in which he would expect a good man to act. When an individual makes a moral criticism of himself this, in Hampshire's view, constitutes an expression of regret that he acted in the particular way in which he did. He characterises regret as

"... a feeling of unpleasure associated with a thought of the past, together with the identification of an object and the announcement of an inclination to behave in a certain way in the future." (157)

This inclination to behave in a certain way in the future is important since it is intrinsic to the concept of regret, i.e. if an individual genuinely regrets his action he must have a determination not to repeat it in the future. If he continues to make the sort of decisions which he knows he will regret, he cannot be said to have a sincere regret; alternatively,

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an individual could admit that he knows he will regret a particular action which he has decided to perform, but qualify his admission by saying that if he did not do it he would regret it even more.

Hampshire says of sincerity that it "amounts to the ideal of undividedness or singleness of mind." (158)

The fuller implications of this are better elucidated by his views on insincerity.

"Insincerity is typically the gap between what I am disposed to say about myself and what I am disposed to do. If it is true that I regret a mistake, it must normally be true that I have some disposition, however ineffective, to avoid a repetition of the mistake. I may discover or notice to my surprise that, when the appropriate circumstances occur, I have lacked and am still lacking, any sufficiently strong disposition; so my conscious thought is without its natural expression in a tendency to act. And this is one typical situation in which I shall say that my expressions of regret are not, or have not been sincere, because there is this confusion and this conflict between my thought and practice." (159)

In his discussion of criticism and regret, Hampshire stops short of the effects of such criticism on others and the possibility that an individual's regret may stem from the criticism of others when the consequences of his actions are detrimental to their well-being or
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158 Sincerity and Singlemindedness, F of M & Other Essays, p.245.
159 Ibid. p.244-5.

are observed to be so. An interesting distinction arises out of this, viz. the distinction between an individual's regretting his action simply because of the criticism of others, and regretting it because he realises that his action was reprehensible; and whether the first as well as the second would be called regret. Obviously in the first case, it would not be called regret if the individual is prepared to act in a similar way on some future occasion providing that he is unobserved. If he has this tendency one could say of him that he does not regret his action, but only his carelessness in being detected.

Linked with this is the importance of the limitations which the checks and obstructions of other individuals place on the freedom of any particular individual, and of greater importance, the necessity or arbitrary nature of some of these limitations.

Despite these shortcomings in Hampshire's discussion of moral issues, he does make an important point, viz. that the rigid morality of an individual, and therefore of a society, cannot survive because of the influences bearing on the individual, the importance attached to any specific influence or set of influences being debatable and to be most fruitfully considered in terms of an individual's circumstances; furthermore, a rigid morality cannot survive because an individual is constantly faced with practical situations in which he must choose to act in a particular way, and for which he will be criticised and held responsible by individuals of varying moral outlooks.

Once an individual deliberates on his conduct he becomes aware that there are different ways of classifying his actions and it is Hampshire's view that if he is reflective in this way,

"He /

"He cannot refuse to notice that the particular concentration that is characteristic of his own purposes is partly a contingency, something that has happened to him, and not an action of his own, when once he understands the cause of this concentration. He cannot then choose to remain confined within the circle of his customary intentions unless either he abandons any claim to rationality or finds by continual comparisons that his habits have some philosophical ground." (160)

Walsh criticises Hampshire for being a proponent of a morality of virtue because he believes that "a morality of virtue is inadequate to the force of certain obligations" and that it is incompatible with recognising "that there are distinctive human powers which are neutral or even evil." (161) Hampshire replies to this at some length. (162) The reply gives a fairly clear overall picture of the stand he takes on the discussion of moral issues in philosophy, and it is therefore quoted in full in an appendix. (163)

160

161 T & A, p.244.

162 Walsh, J.J. The J. of Phil. vol LX, 1963, p.62.

Hampshire, S. The J. of Phil. vol LX, No.14, 1963, p.420-422.

163 See below, Appendix 3.

CHAPTER VI

RESPONSIBILITY

1. Introduction

The question of the individual's responsibility has inevitably cropped up in the outline and discussion of the various concepts and their implications for the consideration of the individual's freedom. ⁽¹⁶⁴⁾

These will not be repeated in any detail but may be seen to be reflected in a consideration of the specific aspect of responsibility dealt with in this section.

In this section the question of the individual's responsibility with regard to his freedom, and the limitations of that freedom will be dealt with fairly succinctly in terms of what may be called a narrower and wider sense, centering on responsibility for both actions and omissions.

2. Responsibility in the narrower sense

In the narrower sense an individual is responsible for his actions, his statements (which are also actions), and the words he chooses for making such statements. The individual performs the action, and its effects and consequences are directly attributable to him as the agent. If his actions are as he had intended them to be, he can in Hampshire's terms be described as a free agent and therefore responsible. Even if an individual constantly or frequently changes his mind as

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¹⁶⁴ See above, pp. 182, 43, 73, 90, 91, 108, 111, 148, 169, 171, 181.

to what he will do, he is still acting freely as long as there is this consistency between his intentions and his action. Of this Hampshire says

"He will still be a free and responsible agent, as long as his activities at any moment are exactly as he had intended them to be a moment before, even if they are not as he had intended them to be at some earlier time." (165)

But a problem arises out of this; to say that an individual constantly changes his mind as new considerations occur to him amounts to saying that he acts on impulse and not after deliberation and reflection. Deliberation and reflection in the establishing of a consistent pattern of action is essential to rationality and therefore to freedom; can it thus be said of an individual that he is free if he constantly changes his mind ?

In Hampshire's terms he is, on the one hand, responsible for his actions, providing that he knew what he was doing and his activities were not "constantly diverted in a direction that he had not himself designed." (166) Such an individual can, on the other hand, also be regarded as acting freely because he has intended the action. This may, however, be seen as expressing only a limited kind of freedom.

A further problem arises, i.e. out of the question of holding an individual responsible for the effects and consequences of his actions simply because he is the agent. Can he be held responsible for the outcome of his actions if he did not foresee them, or, more pertinently, if he could not foresee them ? Both of

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165 T. & A, p.178.
166 Ibid.

these problems indicate the necessity for considering an individual's responsibility in both the narrower and the wider sense.

3. Responsibility in the wider sense

In the wider sense, Hampshire contends that an individual is responsible for the limitations of his interests and ideas and therefore for the limitations of his habits of thought. These limitations may arise out of causes outside of the individual's control. Hampshire gives fairly general examples of these as being the individual's "upbringing, education and circumstances of birth." (167)

But, just because such causes are outside of his control, this does not mean that the individual is necessarily and unavoidably limited by them. Individuals can, in Hampshire's view, identify the causes of their limitations and once they have done so, they have the responsibility for trying to overcome the limitations if it is within their power to do so.

He allows that it may not be possible for an individual to be aware of more than a very limited number of influences which affect his conduct, but even in terms of such a limitation he still regards the individual as being responsible for his character, constituted by the choices he makes with regard to the best ends of human conduct.

If an individual fails to overcome some of his limitations even though he has identified them and their causes, it is Hampshire's view that he can then self-consciously acquiesce in them rather than simply respond to them. It may be added that even if an individual fails to

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167 T & A, p.185.

overcome his limitations, the very identification of their causes and the awareness of the consequences of these limitations for his conduct constitutes a widening of his habits of thought, in that such limitations can be taken into account in any course of conduct on which he embarks and to which they are relevant. This may be seen as providing Hampshire, in part, with a basis for claiming that it must always be possible for an individual to achieve some extension of his habits of thought.

If an individual therefore constantly changes his mind and acts on impulse, he is responsible for the effects and consequences of that action, both in the sense that he intended or decided on the action, and in the sense that if the consequences and effects of his action are detrimental to his other interests, or to the interests of other individuals, and he could have avoided this, he is responsible for not having considered his conduct carefully beforehand in all its aspects, in as far as it is possible for him to do so.

On the question of the individual's responsibility for the limitations of his habits of thought, Hampshire expresses the view that

"Every man has the responsibility to look at all times for the best action of which he is capable at that time, and not to acquiesce in his natural and his socially conditioned limitations of thought and interest without having tried to overcome them." (168)

4. Responsibility for both actions and omissions

From this it emerges that an individual is responsible

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both for his actions and for his omissions. With regard to the omissions, an individual can be held responsible for not having acted in the best possible way according to his capacities because he neglected to reflect and deliberate. He could of course not be held responsible for having omitted to do something of which, after deliberation, he finds he is incapable, or which he could not under the circumstances be expected to think of doing.

To what extent an individual is to blame for what Hampshire calls this "powerlessness"⁽¹⁶⁹⁾ cannot, in his view, be discussed fruitfully in general terms because

"It plainly depends on the type of incompetence or powerlessness, the type of blame envisaged, on the social purposes that the verdict is designed to serve, and on the particular circumstances of the case." (170)

The analysis of the individual's responsibility for omissions as compared with his responsibility for his actions, remains at a fairly general level in Hampshire's philosophy of mind. The reason for this is to be found in Hampshire's statement to the effect that

"No consistent principle of responsibility can distinguish between positive actions and omissions; for instance, between not trying to change and not trying to preserve one's state or condition, or between trying to change, and trying not to change one's state or condition. The sign of negation cannot be used to draw a dividing line, and

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¹⁶⁹ T & A, p.177.
¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

the possibility of substituting a positive verb for a negative verb varies in particular cases from language to language. There is no general, intuitively evident principle upon which a verb that marks an action can be discriminated from a verb that marks an omission of action. If I delay in replying, this is as much an action of mind, for which I am responsible, as the reply will be, when it comes." (171)

CONCLUSION

An outline will first be given of what has been established in the preceding sections as regards the freedom of the individual as it is reflected in his capacities as an agent, observer and language user in Hampshire's philosophy of mind, in order to draw these together to form a succinct overall survey of Hampshire's views on freedom. This forms the background to Hampshire's further views on the nature of freedom.

In order to operate in the world an individual employs a principle of ordering which involves the use of certain organising notions. In the application of such organising notions the individual unavoidably reflects, compares and criticises, not only with regard to objects in the environment but also with regard to descriptions of his intentions, choices and actions and the effects and consequences of these. The unavoidability of such reflection, comparisons and criticism forms the basis of the individual's freedom.

The choices which the individual makes either within the confines of a fairly limited moral outlook, or by means of a revision of his habits of thought, beyond it, constitutes his character for which he can ultimately be held responsible. He is responsible in the sense that he makes his choice from alternatives, and in the sense that if it is within his power to reflect upon and criticise and compare the choices he makes, he is responsible for having neglected to do so, and therefore for making the kind of decisions which, in retrospect, he finds he regrets. The degree to which his choices are made with full and explicit knowledge of what they involve indicates the degree to which he

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is free or relatively unfree.

The individual may not always have full and explicit knowledge of what he is doing, but he always has some knowledge of what he is doing if he is acting intentionally. Hampshire's use of terms such as "full" and "explicit" with regard to an individual's knowledge can be misleading because he is not positing absolute knowledge; however, within certain limitations, an individual can know what he is doing and therefore be acting relatively freely.

These limitations are reflected in their most fundamental form in the connection between intention and consciousness, i.e. the individual always has intentions while he is conscious, and as regards his central intention or intentions, he knows what he is doing; but he does not always know what the consequences and effects of his intentions will be; furthermore, the individual may be mistaken in his assessment of the situation in which he will act, or he may misjudge his own capacities and therefore fail in his attempt to realise his intention.

As regards the unconscious dimensions, which, according to Hampshire, introduces a limitation to the individual's freedom in the form of motives and purposes of which he is unaware, and which effectively thwart his sincerely professed intentions, the basis of this is questionable since the unconscious and its connection to the other concepts which constitute freedom remains unexplained. If the unconscious could be explained satisfactorily, it would contribute to the study of the individual's freedom in the two senses indicated by Hampshire, viz. in the sense that it limits an individual's freedom in that he does not know what he is really trying to do, and in the sense that an

awareness /

awareness of unconscious purposes and motives opens the way to a greater self-consciousness in action and therefore to a wider freedom.

The knowledge which an individual has which is important to his freedom in action is reflected in the nature of the beliefs which he has. An examination of the nature of beliefs forms the basis for an exposition of the types of knowledge which contribute to his rationality in action, viz. knowledge of his environment, inductive and non-inductive knowledge of the future, and knowledge of his own mental states and processes.

The knowledge an individual has of his environment is important since he must situate himself in, and act in, accordance with a consistent world of objects. Without inductive knowledge of the future course of events the individual could not have intentions because in order to have intentions he must see some possibility of realising them; they would otherwise amount to mere idle hopes or daydreams. Without non-inductive knowledge (intentions) of the future, there would be no question of a discussion of freedom or lack of freedom; there would in fact be no question of a discussion of the individual as an agent, observer and language user at all within Hampshire's philosophy of mind.

The individual does not operate simply at the level of reason; he also has knowledge of mental states and processes which Hampshire divides broadly into two categories, viz. those which are thought-dependent since they depend for their existence upon an individual's belief about the appropriateness of their objects, and those which are not thought dependent in the sense that an individual may fear something which he knows to be harmless. These are contributing factors to a situation in which an individual acts and must accordingly be

taken /

taken into account as instruments for or obstructions to the realisation of his intentions. The more knowledge an individual has of his environment, of the future course of events, of his mental states and processes, and of his capacities in action, the greater the possibility will be that his achievements coincide with his intentions.

This correspondence between an individual's intentions and his achievements, i.e. that his achievements are as he had intended them to be a moment before, expresses a fairly limited kind of freedom. For full freedom (in as far as this is possible within his limitations), the individual must become aware of and reflect on the wider trajectory of his actions. This is possible in terms of a continuity through change in action, arising out of the connection between consciousness and action, the individual as an agent and the individual's observation. He becomes aware of patterns of action formed on the basis of policies of belief to which he commits himself. Once he has become aware of such patterns of action, it is Hampshire's view that he must unavoidably reflect upon them even if only to a limited degree.

The beliefs which underlie such patterns of action are not, however, simply beliefs about objects in the environment. These certainly do have a place in an individual's plans of action since his actions are performed in conjunction with his beliefs about a consistent world of objects; but besides such beliefs an individual also has beliefs about the best ends of human action.

Those issues which warrant serious consideration indicate an individual's moral outlook which he has either inherited or has freely chosen from alternatives. The more clear and explicit the grounds of his beliefs which constitute his moral outlook are to him, the

greater /

greater will be the degree of his freedom. There are, however, in any individual's experience areas of intention, choice and activity which do not warrant serious consideration and which do not therefore reflect his moral outlook, e.g. where to spend a holiday or what he should wear.

An individual's moral outlook may be fairly narrow and rigid but there are in Hampshire's opinion influences bearing upon an individual which prevent such a rigid morality from surviving for long. In this, Hampshire places the emphasis on an individual's aesthetic experiences as the most important influence on his moral outlook. It has been suggested in this thesis that this is only one kind of influence bearing on the individual's moral outlook, and a fairly limited one, and that the more important influence is that which individuals have on each other in their daily lives because it is more general and more pervasive. Hampshire does not ignore this influence entirely but does not place enough emphasis upon it.

If it is accepted that an individual's moral outlook is influenced largely by his interaction with other individuals in the sense that he is constantly exposed to the modifying influence of the criticisms of others, and to a comparison of his own system of classification, with alternative classificatory systems as they are reflected in the activities of others or in conversation and argument with others, the question arises as to whether a rigid morality is possible at all.

If an individual is exposed to alternative systems of classification and chooses to adhere to that to which he committed himself in the first place, this is a free choice or decision and he is free to the degree to which he has made explicit the grounds of such a system. This could hardly be described as a rigid morality.

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But if the grounds of an individual's moral outlook are placed in doubt and he nonetheless adheres to it, this could be regarded as a rigid moral outlook, for which the individual, by virtue of the new knowledge which such doubts give him, is responsible if he does not re-examine the grounds of his beliefs and accordingly modify his moral outlook.

As regards an individual's general responsibility as an agent, observer and language user, Hampshire attributes to him responsibility in a narrow and in a wider sense centering on both his actions and omissions. The individual is responsible in an immediate sense as the agent instrumental in creating or bringing about a certain effect as a result of his activities if such effects and their consequences were intended by him; he is also responsible in the wider sense that if it was within his power to foresee the effects and consequences of his actions he is responsible for not having reflected more carefully, even though he may claim that he simply did not think of it at the time by way of excuse. He is not, however, responsible for that which it was not possible for him to foresee or to think of doing.

There is therefore, in Hampshire's view, no question of an absolute freedom or lack of freedom. Individuals unavoidably have a certain amount of freedom in action but are limited in various ways. They are not, however, inescapably imprisoned by their limitations; they always have the possibility of extending and modifying their habits of thought. If there are limitations to an individual's freedom which he cannot overcome because they are caused by circumstances beyond his control, he has the possibility of self-consciously acquiescing in such limitations and of taking them into account in forming his plans of action.

The nature of the freedom which Hampshire posits for individuals, i.e. a relative lack of intellectual freedom, may be seen as arising out of three kinds of contrasts which occur throughout his philosophy of mind either explicitly, or implicitly in the sense that they form the basis for his views on the individual as an agent, observer and language user in the world. These contrasts are

"First, the contrast between the unlimited multiplicity of things and activities, and of features of things and activities, and our limited power to identify and distinguish them in a language," (172)

and

"Secondly, the contrast between an individual's knowledge of his own situation, and of the causes that explain the limits of his own means of identifying the situation, and the intention to change his situation and to extend these limits," (172)

and

"Thirdly, the contrast between a claim to universal validity in the grounds of our conduct, and of our criticisms of ourselves, and the knowledge that the more specific grounds of conduct, and of the criticisms of conduct, reflect a particular phase of social development, and a particular phase of the social institution of language." (172)

These contrasts express most clearly and succinctly the grounds on which Hampshire attributes a relative lack of intellectual freedom to individuals, and it

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172 T & A, p.272.

appears that, in terms of his philosophy of mind these contrasts persist as part of anything that may be called human life; they would therefore form a fairly permanent basis for the examination of the question of freedom. Although they may be seen as a basis for, or at least as unavoidably to be included in an examination of freedom, this does not mean that a philosophical inquiry into the conditions of freedom can be final. It is Hampshire's view that any inquiry will always need to be revised, such a revision in itself constituting a necessary part of extending the freedom of thought of individuals and as reflecting such an extension of thought.

As regards the conditions of freedom, Hampshire sees at least two as being necessary for being able to describe an individual as relatively free and responsible for his actions, viz.

"First, that he generally knows clearly what he is doing; and this condition cannot be fulfilled unless he knows his own situation in the world and generally recognises the relevant features of the situation confronting him at any time," (173)

and

"Secondly, there must be a comparatively wide range of achievements open to him, in which he would succeed if he tried, none of which have been made ineligible by human actions and institutions." (173)

Hampshire, however, raises the question as to whether these two conditions are enough for being able to

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describe an individual as a free and responsible agent and whether a further condition, viz. that of free will, should not be included. He concedes that the problem of freedom of the will has a place in an examination of the question of freedom but sees it as "... only one part of the freedom of the mind in practical thinking, and injunctions (you ought to do this) are only one kind of moral judgement. (174)

In terms of the two conditions for describing an individual as free and responsible, Hampshire sees it as no threat to an individual's freedom that observers may be able to predict accurately what he will do before he actually makes the attempt. Pears comments on this to the effect that

"... if he knew about the spectator's prediction, his freedom of action might actually be increased; for if the spectators based their prediction on a known tendency of his, he might be put on his guard against this tendency, and so might be better able to resist it." (175)

According to Hampshire, a threat to the individual's freedom arises if his achievements do not conform to his sincerely declared intentions, since his own declarations of intention are the most reliable source of information about his future actions. If his declarations of intention are not a reliable guide to his future actions, this means that he is not acting freely but is influenced or driven by forces over which he has no control. It may be added, however, that further threats to an individual's freedom arise

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174 See above, p.144 ff.

175 Pears, D.F. Fr. and the Will, p.80.

firstly out of his confinement to narrow habits of thought if he does not reflect upon, compare and criticise these, thereby either establishing and making explicit the grounds of his habits of thought or revising them in the light of new insights gained on them; and second, a threat to his freedom arises out of a disconnectedness in his opinions which will be reflected in the judgements and actions guided by such opinions.

The concept of rationality, which is the opposite of disconnectedness in an individual's opinions, is seen by Hampshire as an intrinsic part of an individual's attainment of a wider freedom. This is illustrated by his view that

"An irrational man does not pause to establish self-consciously in his own mind the exact order of dependence of his own opinions and intentions. He is not active in reviewing the whole range of his opinions and intentions, but rather passively finds them forming and changing without the deliberate imposition of an order on them. He is so much less free and less self-determining."

(176)

Hampshire allows that full rationality is an impossible ideal at which an individual will never arrive because he is limited by his language, culture and his interests formed by his social circumstances. This is the given material on which his self-consciousness must necessarily operate and which limits him, because he can never totally detach himself from every confining interest and be "open to every possibility in his thought." (177) But if an

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176 T & A, p.268.
177 Ibid. p.256.

individual has rationality (in as far as this is possible within certain limitations since his self-consciousness cannot operate in a void), along with choices between alternatives, this, according to Hampshire

"presupposes a full knowledge of the hitherto unrecognised causes of the confinement of one's choices to a particular range of possibilities." (178)

Hampshire regards the requirement of rationality as universal and not simply as a principle of a single philosophy because, in his view,

".... judgements are made and opinions are held, by men who, in proportion as they think at all, are necessarily trying to connect new judgements and opinions with those already formed," (179)

and, in his opinion,

"Within a single mind there is no alternative to this requirement of rationality except the abandonment of thought." (180)

In conclusion, as regards the concepts which constitute the freedom of the individual, it may be seen from the examination of their nature, their interrelationships and their implications for the individual's capacities as an agent, observer and language user, that it may be said of an individual that it is only that

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178 T & A, p.256.
179 Ibid. p.265.
180 Ibid. p.265-6.

which he does with full knowledge of what he is doing which constitutes that which he does with full freedom, in as far as it is valid to use expressions such as "full knowledge" and "full freedom" of individuals who are unavoidably limited to a certain degree by their circumstances and capacities.

APPENDIX 1

Albino, R.C. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE STUDY
OF LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT

Unpublished paper, 1974.

It is possible that spoken language emerges from the differentiation of pre-speech actions. For if the view is correct that speech is, in the first place, composed of illocutionary acts (such as promises, commands, hints, propositions, doubts, etc.) the precise content of which is specified by specific locutions, then it is to be expected that the capacity to execute an action with illocutionary force would appear before the verbal specification. And, in fact, children do quite early make commands (by banging the table and pointing to the refrigerator, for example) which only later are specified by a verbal element (in the example it might be "milk"). So to study the appearance of language would be to first identify pre-speech precursors of illocutionary acts.

But how is such a pre-speech act (PA) to be identified? Speech acts are easily identified by a natural speaker of the language; knowing the language he can, without any prior observation, identify all the elements of speech and determine their sense. The use of this method is accepted by some linguists. Others proceed as the ethologists would by attempting a taxonomy of observed utterances. And even when studying an unknown language, for all languages have features in common - phonemes, morphemes and syntax. These elements, in an unknown language, are identified by presenting supposed examples to a speaker of the language and asking him to confirm their correctness or otherwise.

Perhaps the PA's of the child are a similar case. It may be that a mother, who has grown with the child, has learned to recognise (and taught him) certain PA's, and that, perhaps, all mothers (in a given culture?) learn and teach in similar ways.

If this is so, then a way of identifying PA's in a child would be simply to ask its mother to do so. It is not to be expected that she would normally identify such acts; she would just respond appropriately to her child. But, by observing the interaction of child and mother, and questioning the mother, perhaps acts could be identified. They could be verified by asking another mother to tell what the identified action meant, in the belief that if the natural and other mothers give the same account, then the behaviour of the child was a

certain /

certain type of PL act. In this way objectivity could be obtained (what else is objectivity but agreement?).

How will we know that the mothers make correct identifications? In the same way as we know that our own identification of a meaningful sentence is correct; if it were not, then our social life would collapse. It is a condition of proper social interaction that we use and recognise the correct forms of language, and this would also be a condition for the successful interaction of mother and child. Thus, inductive verification of linguistic findings is not necessary; two speakers of a language can produce valid information. The same would, I suggest, apply to the identification of PA's.

There is a point to be made here; this procedure does not lead to the identification of movements, or movement patterns, but of acts. That is, a series of movements (that might vary greatly, as a sentence commanding something might) signifying intention. Though this is only, perhaps, part of what is meant by an action.

Once a PA was identified, ethological methods could elucidate its structure and variation. Its subsequent development could be studied in the same child, and the manner in which a verbal specification appears, discovered. Possibilities suggest themselves.

1. That speech substitutes for the PA - that speech is a distinct mechanism, for which the PA is merely a temporary limping kind of device. If you cannot talk, you do the next best. But this is to assume the child to have fully formed intentions to express, which merely wait on language. A little dumb adult making-do with gesture. An unlikely thing; the evidence is that language and thought evolve together.
2. That the PA itself acquires something analogous to syntactic structure, of which locutions become one element. Ultimately they replace the PA almost completely.
3. If 2 is the case, then an important connection between syntax and movement patterns would be established.
4. That PA's and illocutionary acts develop in parallel, with PL's disappearing as the illocutionary act increases in sophistication. (This case is different to 1 above.)

The kind of account that will emerge from the proposed investigations will not be a causal one. It will merely describe the process of evolution of speech; material will be provided for explanation (presumably on learning principles, though they might not be sufficient for

explanation). / ...

explanation).

If there are such things as PA's which grow into illocutionary acts, then we would expect them to be rule-following in their structure; a possibility also implied by assuming them to be actions and not movement patterns. Though mothers would not be able to state the rules, they might be able to distinguish examples well-formed from ill-formed PA's, as native speakers can distinguish well-formed from ill-formed sentences. If this is so, then it would make possible the elucidation of the rules underlying PA's, and their comparison with verbal syntax.

Objections

1. That the method will only result in description. This is what it is meant to do. But it does provide a special type of description; one in which the pre-speech child is assumed to be developing, not responses, but actions, and thus provides a transition from the purely behaving behaviouristic child, to the acting adult. Or from the lawful organism to the rule-following speaking adult.
2. That the mother's identification of actions may be merely anthropomorphic projection. But if it were, she could never relate to her child, nor would the child be taught language at all. This does not exclude some projection; pet animals suffer this, but even though the explanation of why Fido hangs around the door - that he wishes for a walk - is wrong (perhaps), that a walk is required is well understood by his owner. And only the owner can immediately understand Fido.
3. That simple observation would be sufficient to identify PA's. Only a computation would answer this. But the present programs - primate for example - can deal with only a few relationships between behavioural elements. It is my own intuition that a program to identify both the PA's, their elements, and the rules of their construction, would have to equal - and possibly exceed - any known artificial intelligence program. And those we have are very primitive. I say this for it seems to me that the mother's understanding of a child's action involves a high-order intelligent act. Is there, for example, a program that would discover the rules of grammar when presented with as many examples of English as exist? No. Linguists still have to do it themselves in the manner described here. But there is another reason for the method. What the child will be taught, how it will be understood, are the mother's affair. And she has embedded in her the whole experience, conceptual history and language of her tribe.

The /

The point of the argument is, of course, that children do not merely exhibit patterns of movement, but that they express intentions in movements. And that these intentions are prior to the movements. What the child learns is that certain movements do work for his purposes. But these movements can only be understood by an observer who has prior knowledge of their meaning.

The question at once arises - when do the intentions arise? If it is found that PA's do exist, and they might not, then, by tracing their origins, some understanding of this question might be achieved. How the apparent SR behaviour of the newborn becomes converted into intentional actions might be describable. Or it might be found that something analogous to intentional states might have to be ascribed to the neonate, though of a very primitive kind.

These ideas are not original.

The concept of a speech act is from Searle.⁽¹⁾ The idea that the features of language can be discovered by presenting supposed examples to a natural speaker of a language is from Chomsky (2), and the assumption that a speaker of a language will have a full understanding of the features of the language from Searle. The idea that pre-speech actions are communicative and intentional comes from Trevarthen (3). The only new idea that follows from the rest really, is that pre-speech actions may have a structure analogous to spoken language, and that the latter is a development of the former.

The techniques of carrying out such an investigation exist in some of the methods of the ethologists, combined, as indicated above, with those of the linguists. The data would be collected and recorded ethologically, it would be analysed, and the analysis verified, by the methods of the linguists.

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1. Searle, J.R. Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge University Press, 1974.
 2. Chomsky, N. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1965.
 3. Trevarthen, C. Infant response to objects and persons. Paper presented at the Spring meeting of the British Psychological Society, Bangor, 1974.

APPENDIX 2VERBALISED AND UNVERBALISED KNOWLEDGE

Hampshire draws a distinction between verbalised and unverbaised knowledge and maintains that it can be marked as the distinction between knowing what one is doing and knowing what it is that one is doing; the former means "doing something with a clear intention to bring about a certain result", and the latter is equivalent to "being able to give a correct account in words of what one is doing." (i)

He illustrates this with two kinds of practical intention. In the first he uses the example of an actor who may know exactly how he will play his part, but when asked to describe it finds that he cannot do so and proceeds to demonstrate it instead; alternatively, an artist may find words inadequate to describe what he will create and gives a visual impression of it instead. For both the actor and the artist the fulfilment of the intention is direct, i.e. it is not mediated by a description. The criterion for judging whether they really know what they are going to do, even though they cannot describe it, lies in the fact that if the demonstrations do not coincide with their intentions, they would recognise this immediately.

Hampshire points out that an objection can be raised to the effect that if an individual has a clear intention to do something it must be possible for him to give some account of it in words. He allows that this is in general true, but that it is possible for an individual to know exactly what he is going to do but be unable to state it specifically and adequately in words, because he does not know the correct words or finds that those which are available to him are inadequate.

The point that Hampshire is making is not that the individual is unable to say anything at all about what he is going to do, but rather that he cannot express it adequately; although he cannot express it adequately, this does not mean that he does not know what he is going to do since being able to find the correct words and state it, is something additional to knowing what he will do.

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ⁱ T & A, p.96.

In outlining the second type of practical intention, Hampshire uses the example of an individual whose knowledge about what he will do is the knowledge that his intention satisfies a certain description; for example, an individual may intend to follow a set of verbal instructions. For such an individual the fulfilment of the intention is mediated by the instructions, and the criterion for judging whether he has achieved what he intended lies in the fact that the activity must correspond to the instructions.

These two kinds of practical intentions are the extremes which Hampshire uses to draw the distinction between verbalised and unverbaised knowledge and he contends that the intermediate type is more common, i.e. that the fulfilment of an individual's intention is partly mediated by a description and partly fulfilled directly. He says

"In a thinking being, neither kind of knowledge, the direct and the propositional, can normally exist in a pure form, quite uncontaminated by the other."

(ii)

APPENDIX 3HAMPSHIRE'S REPLY TO WALSH'S CRITICISM OF A
MORALITY OF VIRTUE

Hampshire, S. The J. of Phil. vol LX, 1963, p.420-422.

I do not understand why Walsh thinks that "a morality of virtue is inadequate to the peculiar force of certain obligations," nor why he thinks that it is incompatible with recognizing "that there are distinctive human powers which are neutral or even evil." Moralities of virtue, and conspicuously Aristotle's, can give justice a central place as pre-eminent among the virtues; a good man must be to some degree a just man, or at least not be a man who is altogether unjust in his dealings with others. If he is a just man, he is ready on occasion to postpone his own interests and to control his desires. A morality of virtue is not incompatible with the recognition that morality itself has its origin in fundamental prohibitions, which each man has to learn to respect in childhood and as he grows up. Such a morality is not incompatible with recognizing that there are certain destructive emotions and desires and that there are conflicts of emotion and desire, which occur primitively in every man's early experience. The necessity of controlling these destructive forces and lessening the conflicts they engender are the origins, or part of the origin, of a later rational concern for moral obligations and duties and for morality generally. We know that we have primitive impulses to kill and to destroy, jealous and punitive impulses, and varieties of sexual impulse, against which some protection is needed if our other interests, both as being attached to persons and as members of a community, are to be satisfied. We know that these destructive impulses are associated with primitive ideas of guilt and punishment and of fears of retribution. There is a sense in which we normally know the difference between good and evil, and between positive and negative impulses, before rational or reflective morality, justifying the distinction, can be understood. In the conflicts of love and hate, and of the pleasure of attachment to persons and the pain of their loss, we no doubt recognize that there is no pre-established harmony among our dispositions and interests.

Let us then assume that men normally have murderous impulses and a natural disposition to hate and to destroy as well as to love and protect; let us suppose that these

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are in fact universal features of human nature. On reflection it is evident, as it is also in primitive experience, that these dispositions must be in some way controlled if any of the other dispositions and powers of men, living in communities, are to be realized. The fact that the destructive dispositions are independently recognized as evil and are associated with guilt and punishment - and perhaps that evil is first distinguished in this connection - still leaves the way open for rational review: within what limits are they evil, and how can they best be controlled ?

A morality of virtue is not necessarily committed to some doctrine of the natural harmony of human interests. It is committed only to the doctrine that a moral prohibition has finally to be justified by reference to the whole economy of needs and interests of men living together. The morality of virtue differs from some other reconstructions of morality in the emphasis that it places on the discovery and identification, never completed, of essential, as opposed to trivial, human interests and, therefore, on the cognitive and exploratory aspects of moral judgements, or at least of certain types of moral judgment. There are obvious requirements, virtues without which no form of life that can satisfy the most commonplace human potentialities is possible, and these requirements - the duties and obligations upon which any form of civilized and satisfying life depends - may not unnaturally be expressed in simple imperatives. But there are also unobvious weighings and balancings of conflicting interests, and discoveries of new potentialities, or new discriminations of them, and here both experience and imagination are involved in assessing the nature and quality of a man's conduct, or in finding the best thing to do in a situation demanding a decision, whether in public or in private life. Those who take morality and political choice together, as constituting a single domain of judgment, are naturally led to this definition of morality, particularly if, like Aristotle, they consider the most important employment of practical reason to be its political employment. Again I agree with Aristotle.

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