

DISCONTINUITY WITHOUT CHANGE?
THE PLACE AND DISCOURSE OF COLONIAL MEMORY IN ZIMBABWE'S
POST-MUGABE ZANU-PF POLITICS

NOAH KUPETA

MARCH 2024



**SCHOOL OF APPLIED HUMAN SCIENCES, COLLEGE OF
HUMANITIES**

**DISCONTINUITY WITHOUT CHANGE? THE PLACE AND DISCOURSE OF
COLONIAL MEMORY IN ZIMBABWE'S POST- MUGABE ZANU-PF POLITICS**

Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements of the

degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Social Sciences

Specialising in

Cultural and Media Studies

School of Applied Human Science, College of Humanities

University of KwaZulu-Natal

NOAH KUPETA

2024

Supervisor Dr Musara Lubombo


Co-Supervisor Prof Lauren Dyll

DECLARATION - PLAGIARISM

I, **Noah Kupeta**, declare that:

1. The research reported in this thesis, except where otherwise indicated, is my original research.
2. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.
3. This thesis does not contain other persons' data, pictures, graphs, or other information unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other persons.
4. This thesis does not contain other persons' writing unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other researchers. Where other written sources have been quoted, then:
 - a. Their words have been re-written, but the general information attributed to them has been referenced
 - b. Where their exact words have been used, then their writing has been placed in italics and inside quotation marks and referenced.
5. This thesis does not contain text, graphics, or tables copied and pasted from the Internet, unless specifically acknowledged, and the source is detailed in the thesis and the References sections.

Signed



Date: 28 March 2023

.....

ABSTRACT

Zimbabwean politics are notably complex and difficult to understand, even by scholars with a strong interest in African affairs with a long institutional memory of the historical determinants of the independence and post-independence struggles within Zimbabwe. Through the lens of political culture and functional theory campaign communication, this qualitative inquiry titled “*Discontinuity without change? The place and discourse of colonial memory in Zimbabwe’s post-Mugabe ZANU-PF politics*” scrutinizes the colonial narratives in the political discourses in Zimbabwe’s ruling party ZANU (PF) following the Robert Mugabe era intending to understand how colonial memory shapes the party’s ideological foundations and policy directions. The study draws on eight speeches delivered by former president Robert Mugabe during the 2002 elections, as well as speeches by his successor and current president Emmerson Mnangagwa during the 2018 election campaign. It also incorporates insights from key informants within ZANU (PF), Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), Zimpapers, and Alpha Media Holdings (AMH) to explore the role of media in influencing the nuanced interplay between historical legacies, political discourse, and contemporary governance. By examining the ebbs and tides of electoral politics in Zimbabwe spanning nearly decades through the prism of post-colonial memory, the study concludes that while Mnangagwa’s ascendance as President hinted at a departure from his predecessor’s politics, there is a notable continuity in the streams of colonial memory that informed ZANU-PF electoral strategies. This underscores how political discourses and power dynamics during elections are deeply entrenched within the broader context of Zimbabwean politics and pan-African pursuit of self-determination (*Nyika inovakwa nevene vayo*), identity and independence. Despite certain shifts in Mnangagwa’s ‘New Dispensation’ that deviate from Mugabeism, the persistence of colonial memory underscores its pivotal role in shaping the principles and practices of representative democracy within Zimbabwe. The media’s influence in (re)shaping post-Mugabe discourse sheds light on the implications of memory appropriation in contemporary Zimbabwean political communication.

Key Words: *Colonial memory, ZANU (PF) politics, political discourse, media influence, Zimbabwe Second Republic*

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The journey towards completing this Ph.D., which commenced in March 2020, was a long and often solitary one, nearly derailed by the profound impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, in March 2021, my determination was reignited, and I resumed this journey with renewed hope. Along the way, I encountered both challenges and triumphs, and there were numerous individuals who played pivotal roles in this achievement.

I am profoundly grateful to 'Baba vaFarai', Givemore Tavesure, whose unwavering support, respect, and guidance were instrumental throughout this journey. His influence on my life and academic pursuits cannot be overstated.

My sincere gratitude goes to my wonderful supervisors, Dr. Musara Lubombo and Professor Lauren Dyll for your invaluable guidance and support throughout this study. I count myself lucky to have both of you on board to guide me in navigating the process in highly impactful ways. Thank you, Dr Lubombo, for being tough on me. Your rigorous approach challenged me to strive for excellence. It worked out! Professor Lauren, I am grateful for the bursary you unconditionally gave me towards this Ph. D. Thank you for giving me material support when I flew to Lyon, France to attend the International Association for Media and Communication Research (IAMCR). In 2022, you also paid for my IAMCR Conference paper presentation at Tsinghua University, China. To both of my esteemed supervisors, I am deeply grateful for your unwavering availability and impactful contributions at every stage of the process.

I extend my heartfelt appreciation to the friends, colleagues, and family members whose bonds I inadvertently strained due to my commitments to this Ph.D. program. Despite the distance, Dr. Oswelled Ureke stood by me as a pillar of strength, instilling in me a resilient spirit and unwavering belief in my abilities. Dr. Albert Chibuwe, affectionately known as 'mukwambo wangu', provided invaluable support and advice, always available whenever needed. Additionally, Dr. Lyton 'Alakati' Ncube's encouragement and motivation were constant sources of inspiration. I would also like to express my appreciation to Takunda Maodza, a loyal and supportive friend whose wise counsel and unwavering presence have been invaluable throughout every aspect of my life.

I would be remiss if I concluded without expressing my profound gratitude to all the participants and esteemed officials in the Presidential Communications Directorate for their

invaluable assistance in facilitating access to the necessary data. To the many others whose names I have not mentioned individually, I am deeply appreciative of your contributions. Your collective efforts have made an indelible impact on my journey.

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to the loving memory of my beloved late grandmother, Dorcas. I am saddened by the fact that I have reached this milestone without your physical presence – your '*baba aboy*' is now a Dr. Your absence has left a profound void in my heart, especially during these significant moments. The pain of losing you remains palpable. Your unwavering love and guidance have shaped me into the person I am today, and although I still keenly feel your absence, I take comfort in knowing that you watch over me from a place of eternal peace. I hold your memory dear, and I dedicate this achievement to you with love and gratitude. May God keep you in His paradise, enveloped in peace and love until we are reunited.

ACRONYMOUS

ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African Peoples Union
ZBC	Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation
ZIMPAPERS	Zimbabwe News Papers 1980 Private Limited
AMH	Alpha Media Holdings
COVID 19	Corona Virus
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
FTLRP	Fast Track Land Reform Programme
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe Peoples Revolutionary Army
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZDF	Zimbabwe Defence Forces

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Declaration - Plagiarism	iii
Abstract	iv
Acknowledgments.....	v
Dedication	vii
Acronyms.....	viii
Table of Contents.....	ix
List of tables.....	xiii
Chapter One	1
Transition from ‘First’ to ‘Second Republic’	1
1.1 Introduction	1
1.2 Location and significance of the study.....	4
1.3 Colonial memory as political communication in Zimbabwe	5
1.4 The fall of Mugabe and the rise of Mnangagwa	8
1.5 Competing narratives on transition from the First to Second Republic.....	14
1.6 Context, nature and operationalisation of transition(s) in Zimbabwe.....	19
1.7 Disentanglement: Anatomy of the Second Republic	20
1.8 A new beginning: ZANU PF after Mugabe	21
1.11 Conclusion.....	28
Chapter Two.....	29
Conceptual Framework.....	29
2.1 Introduction	29
2.2 Political Culture Theory	29
2.3 The Functional Theory of Political Campaign Communication	33
2.4 Application of the conceptual framework.....	35
2.5 Conclusion.....	43
Chapter Three.....	45
Historical Account of Colonial Memory in African Politics	45
3.1 Introduction	45
3.2 Liberation movements’ alliances against colonialism	47
3.3 Transformation from liberation movements to governing political parties	49

3.4 (Dis)continuities of alliances between and among liberation movements	51
3.5 Colonial memory among former liberation movements in contemporary politics	54
3.6 Discursive entanglement on politics of memory in Mugabe's administration.....	57
3.7 Post-Mugabe ZANU PF and concealed discourses of colonial memory	60
3.8 Conclusion.....	61
Chapter four	63
Mediation of Colonial Memory In zimbabwe	63
4.1 Introduction	63
4.2 Vestiges of colonial memory in post (-) independent Zimbabwe?	63
4.3 Understanding mediation of colonial memory in Zimbabwe.....	64
4.4 Robert Mugabe and remembrance of fallen liberation war heroes and heroines	66
4.5 Robert Mugabe and nationalist discourse in Zimbabwe	69
4.6 Appropriation of decolonial journalism, enter patriotic history and memory.....	72
4.7 Vicissitudes of patriotic history in Zimbabwe	74
4.8 Nature, context and mediation of patriotic history as an extension of colonial memory	75
4.9 Patriotic journalism as mediation of colonial memory	78
4.10 Versatile and salient sustenance of colonial memory and sustainability in Mugabe era	80
4.11 Conclusion.....	83
Chapter Five.....	84
Methodological Framework.....	84
5.1 Introduction	84
5.2 Research philosophy	85
5.3 Epistemology position of interpretivism in the study	86
5.4 Research Paradigm.....	88
5.4.1 Interpretivist paradigm	88
5.4.2 Hermeneutics and its application in the study	89
5.4.3 Context.....	90
5.4.4 Interpretive Circle:.....	91
5.4.5 Horizon of Understanding	92
5.4.6 Fusion of Horizons	92
5.4.7 Ontological position of interpretivism in the study	93
5.5 Research Approach: Qualitative Approach.....	95

5.6 Research Design: Phenomenological Study	97
5.6.1 Study Sample and Size	97
5.7 Sampling Research Methods	98
5.7.1 Purposive Sampling Procedure	99
5.8 Methods of Data Collection Process	99
5.8.1 Entering the field	100
5.8.2 Conducting of in-depth interviews with research participants	100
5.8.3 Research interview guide.....	101
5.8.4 Research interview schedules	102
5.8.5 Inclusion selection criteria of research participants	103
5.8.6 Significance and application of In-depth Interviews in the study	104
5.9 Collecting data using qualitative content analysis of Mugabe and Mnangagwa's campaign speeches	105
5.9.1 Application of Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA) in the study	105
5.9.2 Data sources for the content analysis	107
5.10 Coding processes applied in the study	108
5.10.1 Conceptual content analysis in the study	108
5.10.2 Relational content analysis in the study	108
5.11 Methods of Data Analysis	112
5.11.1 Qualitative Content Analysis	112
5.11.2 Qualitative Content Analysis of Mugabe and Mnangagwa's campaign speeches	113
5.11.3 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of Mugabe and Mnangagwa's election campaign speeches	113
5.12 Significance and functionality of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in the study ..	114
5.12.1 Production, construction of New Dispensation/Second Republic	114
5.12.2 Explore politics of memory concealed within colonial memory discourse.....	114
5.12.3 Investigate continuity and changes in Mnangagwa's New Dispensation/Second Republic	114
5.13 Ethical Considerations	115
5.13.1 Reliability and Validity	116
5.13.2 Voluntary participation	116
5.13.3 Confidentiality of sources	116
5.13.4 Non-maleficence	117

5.14 Conclusion.....	117
Chapter Six.....	118
Presidential Star Rallies as a Site of Reliving Colonial Memory	118
6.1 Introduction	118
6.2 Ways in which Mugabe and Mnangagwa positioned themselves and engaged with the discourses about former colonisers	120
6.2.1 Presidential star rallies as a site of reliving colonial memory	121
6.2.2 Zimbabwe will never be a colony again!.....	125
6.2.3 Deracialisation of economic resources	135
6.2.4 Discontinuities or continuities without change	138
6.2.4 Construction of Identity, Power and Belonging in Mugabe and Mnangagwa's presidential campaign discourse	142
6.3 Conclusion.....	146
Chapter Seven	148
Serialisation of Presidential Election Campaigns in Zimbabwean Print And Broadcast Media	148
7.1 Introduction	148
7.1.1 Mugabe and Mnangagwa – patriots, heroes and or villains?	149
7.1.2 Commemoration of anti-colonial struggles	151
7.1.3 Revolutionaries and war veterans of the liberation struggle	156
7.1.4 Exclusionary colonial narratives in post-Mugabe Zimbabwe	161
7.2 Conclusion.....	165
Chapter Eight	167
Conclusion	167
8.1 Introduction	167
8.2 Potential areas for future research.....	169
References.....	170

LIST OF TABLES

Table 5: 1 showing mediated messages and the rationale for their selection	98
Table 5: 2. below adapted from (Braun and Clarks Reflexive Thematic Analysis 2017) explains the coding process.	109
Table 6: 1 illustrates Mugabe and Mnangagwa's representations of discontinuities or changes of colonial memory use.....	140

CHAPTER ONE

TRANSITION FROM 'FIRST' TO 'SECOND REPUBLIC'

1.1 Introduction

The central challenge in political communication research lies in theorizing the dynamic and continuously evolving nature of campaign communication practices (Mancini and Swanson, 1996:4), which are heavily influenced by contextual factors. Zimbabwean politics are notably complex and difficult to understand, even by scholars with a strong interest in African affairs with a long institutional memory of the historical determinants of the independence and post-independence struggles within Zimbabwe.

In November 2017, Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe's first post-colonial president since 1980, faced internal opposition culminating in his forced resignation, leading to the current President Emmerson Mnangagwa's succession amidst mixed global reactions. Mnangagwa's assumption of office was perceived both domestically and internationally as an opportunity to address deficiencies exemplified during Mugabe's reign (Hodgkinson, 2019; Greenfield and Wharton, 2019; Southall, 2020; Helliker and Murisa, 2020; Tagwirei 2022). In his inaugural address, President Mnangagwa indeed hinted at a departure from his predecessor's policies, acknowledging past mistakes and pledging reforms (Helliker and Murisa, 2020; Southall, 2020). The advent of the 'New Dispensation', as Mnangagwa's Second Republic administration came to be termed, aimed at fostering harmony, peace, and national development, in contrast to Mugabe's era marked by despotism, violence, and political repression (Raftopoulos, 2006; Stauffer, 2009; Mhandara and Pooe, 2013; Nyere, 2016; Ndebele, 2019; Sibanda, 2022). Mugabe had led Zimbabwe as its first president from the end of British colonial rule in 1980 until his forced resignation in November 2017.

But does Mnangagwa's administration genuinely embody anything new that is a complete departure from the First Republic', as asserted? Amidst scholarly debates on Mnangagwa's transformative nature (Dzenga, 2018; Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya, 2020; Noyes, 2020; Tshuma, 2021), this study employs textual analyses of presidential discourse (Coe, 2011) to examine changes and continuities between the two administrations. The study draws on eight speeches delivered by Mugabe during the 2002 elections, as well as speeches by Munangagwa

during his initial presidential campaign in 2018. Election campaigns encompass various forms of political behavior. The study thus incorporates Zimbabwe's distinct political culture into analyses of campaign communication practices (Gurevitch and Blumler, 2004; Holtz-Bacha, 2004). The primary focus is on discerning differences, if any, in Mnangagwa and Mugabe's engagement with discourses about former colonizers during election campaigns.

As a contextual backdrop, this chapter explores the transition of power from Zimbabwe's 'First Republic' under Mugabe to Mnangagwa's 'Second Republic'/'New Dispensation'. Here, elements of Benoit's Functional Theory of Political Campaign Communication (Benoit, et. al., 2007, 2014a, 2014b; Benoit, Blaney, and Pier, 1998; Benoit, McHale, Hansen, Pier, and McGuire, 2003; Benoit, Stein, McHale, Chattopadhyay, Verser, and Price, 2007) are invoked to provide insights political differentiation from opponents. The study centres on examining the use and place of colonial memory in the presidential election campaign rhetoric.

Various interpretations of the New Dispensation and its relationship within the broader study of political communication in Zimbabwe are explored. The aim is to also demonstrate how such an approach may, as suggested by Chibwe (2013, 2016), may generate novel insights into political communication practice in Zimbabwe. The import of this view, as Chibwe (2013, 2016) argues, is that there could be new forms of political communication practice that may, in significant ways, undercut the rhetoric celebratory of the emergence of the New Dispensation/Second Republic as a complete departure from Mugabe's administration.

Establishing changes and continuities in campaign discourse during the July 2018 presidential election compared to the March 2002 parliamentary election under Mugabe critically engages Noyes' (2020: viii) assertion that 'there is a wide gap between the (Mnangagwa) government's reform rhetoric and the reality on the ground'. In a related study, Chibwe and Munoriyarwa (2023) utilized Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to scrutinize post-Mugabe ZANU PF's governance, focusing on the July 2013 and August 2018 presidential advertising legitimization and electioneering tactics. Among their key findings was that Mnangagwa's administration largely maintained traditional power legitimization tactics. They also observed slight changes in the 2018 election campaign message to reflect evolving political communication dynamics amidst a potentially strong opposition. Chibwe and Munoriyarwa (2023) acknowledge Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya's (2020: 3) characterization of Mnangagwa's administration as 'repetition without change', arguing that only the language changed, while everything else remained the same. Given this observation, this study seeks to establish whether the claim that

Mnangagwa's administration is indeed a 'New Dispensation' or 'Second Republic' holds water at the discursive and legitimation levels (Chibwe and Munoriyarwa, 2023). Existing studies (Dzenga, 2018; Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya, 2020; Noyes, 2020; Tshuma, 2021) have been evasive on the place and discourse of colonial memory in Mnangagwa's administration.

The study also incorporates key theorisations of the Political Culture theory and its key constructs such as parochial political culture, subject political culture and participant political culture propounded by Almond and Verba (1963). Political Culture theory is vital for exploring human communicative ecology (Borgerhoff Mulder, 1991; Cronk, 1991; Smith and Winterhalder, 1992a; Winterhalder and Smith, 2000) to discern possible (dis) continuities in Mnangagwa's election campaign speeches compared to Mugabe's. Arguments suggest that culture provides a fertile ground for understanding such debates (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Boyd and Richerson, 1987; Durham, 1991; Sperber 1996; Richerson and Boyd, 2005; Mesoudi, 2011; Henrich, 2015; Laland, 2017). This aligns with the study's primary argument that colonial memory not only reflects post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics but also potentially constructs and constitutes the New Dispensation's election campaign speeches.

The primary objective of this research is to scrutinize the process of memorialization and (re)imagination of historical events within post-Mugabe ZANU PF electoral politics, juxtaposed with its representation during Mugabe's tenure. Consequently, the study regards political culture as pivotal in dissecting the positioning and dialogue surrounding colonial memory within the ruling party's electoral strategies. Political culture, broadly conceived as 'cultivation', 'a whole way of life', 'like a language', 'power', and 'a tool' (Williams, 1983), encompasses a diverse spectrum of understandings concerning post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics and their potential embodiment of distinct political identities. Du Gay et al. (1997) argue that culture should be viewed not merely as reflective of other processes but as an integral component of the political realm (Williams, 1983), shaping the meanings and practices of individuals within society. The study contends that while the post-Mugabe ZANU PF purports to diverge from Mugabe-era politics, their electoral communication strategies arguably remain situated within the historical transitions, memories, and (re)imaginings of political discourse established during Mugabe's tenure. Importantly, Williams' (1983) arguments shed light on the media's role in shaping colonial memory within post-Mugabe ZANU PF electoral politics, emphasizing the ruling party's continued reliance on official (re)imaginings and the enactment of dominant discursive narratives inherited from the Mugabe era. Thus, the incorporation of these theoretical frameworks is essential for contextualizing and identifying the mediation,

placement, and recollections of colonial discourse within post-Mugabe ZANU PF election campaigns.

1.2 Location and significance of the study

Conceptually, this research sits at the intersection of political communication, media, and cultural studies, aiming to offer fresh insights into the realm of political discourse. Cultural studies play a pivotal role in media and communication by facilitating a comprehensive reconfiguration and scrutiny of political issues, values, and ethics (Bennet, et.al., 2015), thus presenting a significant avenue for exploring political experiences (Geertz, 1973). Consequently, this study responds to the growing imperative to decolonize political communication research and practices, particularly between African and Western contexts (Moyo, 2020; Mutsvairo and Karam, 2022; Chasi and Gumede, 2022). Scholars such as Mutsvairo and Karam (2022) contend that prevailing paradigms tend to overlook the transformative processes occurring in Africa post-colonization (Ahluwalia, 2001), a viewpoint supported by studies (Houtondji, 1997; Ahluwalia, 2001; Mbembe, 2001; Zeleza, 2006) highlighting the biased and misleading interpretations of African politics. Therefore, the study endeavours to challenge dominant Western norms and elevate emancipatory narratives through a cultural lens, acknowledging the complexities and resistances inherent in this process (Nakata et al., 2012; Chibuwe, 2017).

Ayo (2017) underscores the scarcity of indigenous perspectives and innovations in political communication research, advocating for an 'African Policom Stew' approach that embraces decolonial discourse (Osagioduwa et al., 2017; Ayo Olukotun, 2017). Hence, a cultural perspective becomes indispensable in comprehending political communication dynamics in post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics, transcending simplistic characterizations to delve into the multifaceted realities of African societies' emancipatory endeavors (Geertz, 1973). Mugabe and Mnangagwa's election campaign speeches serve as rich sources for understanding Africa's ongoing struggle against neo-imperialism, aligning with cultural studies' mission to foster cognitive and developmental dialogues towards emancipatory human identity (Geertz, 1973).

Crucially, the study was conducted under the auspices of The Centre for Communication, Media and Society (CCMS) at the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN), South Africa. CCMS <https://ccms.ukzn.ac.za/> serves as a vital hub for scholarly research, fostering interdisciplinary collaboration and innovation in the field of communication and media studies. Over the years, CCMS has played a pivotal role in generating and disseminating knowledge through rigorous

research, publications, and scholarly exchange by providing a platform for scholars, researchers, and students to engage in critical inquiry and intellectual dialogue. The centre continues to play a central role in shaping the trajectory of communication and media studies, both locally and globally, by facilitating collaborative research efforts and nurturing emerging scholars in the field.

By bridging the gap in existing literature, which predominantly focuses on Mugabe's discourse (Chibuwe, 2013; 2016), this research offers a nuanced understanding of ZANU PF's electoral communication. The key focus of this study was to explore Mugabe's administration's political cultural variants (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Boyd and Richerson, 1987; Durham, 1991) when compared with Mnangagwa's New Dispensation to respond to the primary questions on the 'newness' of the New Dispensation within the confines of the place and discourse of colonial memory.

Media and cultural studies consider memory as part of everyday communication (Welzer, 2008; Assmann, 2012). In this study, memory is associated with a "re-collective" conception; a conscious and wilful human process of recalling the past to explore the 'newness' of Mnangagwa's New Dispensation/the Second Republic. According to Nora (1984), the materiality of the place is not considered to be decisive; the important issue is the historical event, a gone past and the will to remember it through site embodiments. These discursive constructs are also at the centre of understanding political communication in Zimbabwe's electoral politics.

Physically, the study was conducted in Zimbabwe, with participants drawn from ZANU-PF politicians and political editors from both public and private media entities, including the state-owned Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) and Zimbabwe Newspapers Private Limited (Zimpapers), as well as the privately-owned Alpha Media Holdings (AMH). ZBC and Zimpapers, with their long-standing ties to the state since independence in 1980, have been pivotal in providing pro-ZANU PF coverage, aiming to reinforce the party's dominance amid domestic and international scrutiny. Conversely, Alpha Media Holdings, being privately owned, offers a potentially contrasting perspective, thus enriching the study's dataset.

1.3 Colonial memory as political communication in Zimbabwe

A distinctive aspect of this study is its focus on the political communication dynamics of Zimbabwe's 2018 presidential election, marking the first without Mugabe in power

(Matingwina, 2019; Tshuma, 2019; Helliker and Murisa, 2020; Chipere, 2020). Within this context, colonial memory assumes significance in discerning potential shifts or continuities in Mnangagwa's New Dispensation/Second Republic, aiming to reinterpret fundamental concepts such as truth, justice, patriotism, and belonging (Gwekwerere, Mutasa, and Chitofiri, 2018:3). Despite its potential relevance, few studies have explored the role and discourse of colonial memory in post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics, indicating a significant gap in scholarly research. Moreover, the field of political communication research in Africa has been relatively underdeveloped and marginalized, with limited recognition of its conceptual significance and societal relevance (Lulofs and Cahn, 2001). Popoola (2017) further suggests that the neglect of political communication's unique role in shaping post-colonial democracies may stem from a lack of emphasis on this area in media and journalism training institutions. This study seeks to address these lacunae by investigating the appropriation of colonial memory discourse within Mnangagwa's administration, aiming to uncover its implications for political communication as a decolonial epistemic pursuit. To achieve this goal, the study scrutinizes the memorialization and reinterpretation of past events in ZANU PF's electoral rhetoric, comparing it with the approach during Mugabe's tenure.

Colonial memory holds profound significance for political communication research in Zimbabwe. Prior studies (Osagioduwa et al. and Olukotun, 2017) critically scrutinize the essence and key constructs of political communication within and beyond Africa, highlighting its perceived lack of African nuances. This deficiency reflects the underinstitutionalization of scholarship and limited practical application of the concept in the region (Popoola, 2017). The importance of this study extends beyond contributing to decolonial media education research; it also underscores the pivotal role of memorialization, particularly in the politically charged post-Mugabe Zimbabwean context. Popoola (2017) contends that while considering the global scope and relevance of political communication, it is imperative to examine the extent to which practices and scholarship from the Global North apply to Africa. This necessitates a cautious approach to studying political communication in Zimbabwe, taking into account African sociocultural, political, and diplomatic realities, and avoiding overreliance on Western ideologies. Instead, it advocates for an autonomous exploration of political communication rooted in African contexts, thereby facilitating a more nuanced understanding of its practice during elections and limiting comparison with foreign counterparts (Mazrui, 1977:91).

Rwafa (2014) and Chibuwe (2016, 2017) highlight that existing academic literature on ZANU PF electoral politics predominantly revolves around Mugabe as a symbol of anti-western

imperialism, given his tenure from 1980 until November 2017. Throughout his presidency, Mugabe strategically employed colonial memory in his campaign communication (Chibuwe, 2016; 2017), aiming to reinforce the party's dominance amidst opposition neo-imperialistic narratives (Chibuwe, 2019). An analysis of ZANU PF's use of colonial memory, as advocated by Chibuwe (2013; 2016; 2017), calls for a multi-theoretical approach rooted in non-Western perspectives to yield fresh insights into Zimbabwean political communication. Various scholars (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; 2009; 2011; Ranger, 2004; Kebonang, 2012) have explored ZANU PF's election discourse, often portraying Mugabe as an anti-imperialism champion. Against this backdrop, the study delves into the role and narratives of colonial memory in post-Mugabe ZANU PF election campaigns, investigating how the media perpetuate and commemorate colonial discourses under Mnangagwa's leadership. Downer (2013) and Chibuwe (2016) suggest that Mugabe's persona dominated ZANU PF's campaign rhetoric since 1980. Hence, this study seeks to determine whether Mnangagwa's stance on colonialism signifies a departure from Mugabe's discourse.

Undoubtedly, media and journalism in Zimbabwe play pivotal roles in fostering democracy and development (Alfandika, 2018; Moyo, 2021), serving as conduits for political participation, analysis, and citizen mobilization (Akpojivi, 2018; McConnell and Becker, 2002). Particularly during elections, the media bears the responsibility of promoting peace and transparency, safeguarding national interests, and upholding democratic principles (Alfandika and Gwindingwe, 2020). However, there's a pressing need to scrutinize the media's role in shaping colonial memory within Zimbabwe's electoral landscape. It's argued that public media, in particular, should refrain from exacerbating tensions by vilifying civil society and opposition parties, as such actions undermine democracy (Levitsky and Way, 2002). Despite this, the current regulatory framework in Zimbabwe falls short of ensuring a democratic media landscape (Alfandika and Gwindingwe, 2020). Notably, no prior studies have comprehensively explored the media's influence on colonial memory within electoral discourse, highlighting a critical gap in the existing literature.

This study acknowledges previous scholarship that has extensively analyzed the mediation of elections in Zimbabwe, often through lenses such as agenda setting, framing, or watchdog perspectives, predominantly influenced by Western paradigms (Chari, 2013; Hobart, 2007; Norris, 2000). However, there remains a critical gap in understanding what Hoagland terms as "discursive colonization" and the "coloniality of knowledge" within journalistic practices

(Hoagland, 2020:50). Building upon this premise, the study posits that the media wield considerable influence in shaping colonial memory, evident in both Mugabe and Mnangagwa's election campaign rhetoric. It advocates for a media agenda grounded in peaceful, Afro-centric reporting and decolonial approaches, aiming to scrutinize how mediated discourse either perpetuates or challenges colonial memory, particularly in post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics under the New Dispensation. Despite claims of change from the Mugabe era, the study contends that ZANU PF's election communication practices remain entrenched in historical transitions and reimagined political communication strategies inherited from the Mugabe era.

The discourse surrounding colonial memory in post-Mugabe ZANU PF electoral politics remains largely unexplored within academic debates, which have predominantly focused on issues such as election violence and accusations among various political actors. Election violence, as defined by Reif (2011: 5-6), encompasses a range of actions aimed at influencing election outcomes through coercion or intimidation. Understanding election violence can shed light on both pre- and post-Mugabe electoral practices, revealing dynamics akin to "misanthropic skepticism" described by Maldonado-Torres (2007: 243), where the relationship between citizens and the state becomes vertical rather than horizontal, and ethical considerations are often suspended.

1.4 The fall of Mugabe and the rise of Mnangagwa

Mugabe's fall from power holds significant implications for understanding Zimbabwean politics, particularly within the context of Africa's politics of personality cults. His prolonged tenure and impact on Zimbabwe's global relations mark him as a central figure in the country's history (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009; Machingura, 2012; Ruzivo, 2013; Duri, 2018). Various factors contributed to his downfall, including the Fast Track Land Reform, economic challenges stemming from policy inconsistencies, and the rise of opposition movements in the late 1990s (Chirimuuta and Jongore, 2021; Mamdani, 2008; Moyo and Chambati, 2013; Masiraha, 2021). The military intervention of November 2017, leading to his resignation, was the culmination of a complex series of events at both national and party levels (Mlambo and Kangira, 2021; Masiraha, 2021).

While this study argues that Mugabe's fall from power cannot be wholly attributed solely to the military transition of November 2017, and neither can it be confined to a single factor, his downfall in 2017 is historically contextualised in the context of this study from the party's

December 2014 elective congress, during which former Vice President Joice Mujuru was installed and signaled as Mugabe's natural successor (Ncube, 2014; Nyambi, 2015; Nyambi 2016; Chibuwe, 2017; Lubombo 2018; Ncube, 2020). The congress coincided with allegations that Mujuru led a faction called Gamatox, pitted against her strong rival, Mnangagwa, who at the time was Minister of Defence. According to Christiansen (2007), Mugabe intervened through the Women's League to rescue Mujuru from imminent defeat by Mnangagwa at that elective congress. In fact, as Moyo (2004) argues, Mugabe violated ZANU PF's constitution to endorse a Women's League request for the vacant Deputy President post to be filled by a woman.

Since then, ZANU PF has not experienced relative internal stability, with serious uncontrolled clandestine manoeuvres becoming commonplace. In 2015, Mujuru was ousted from both the party and government by a faction led by former First Lady Grace Mugabe (Southhall, 2020), in collaboration with the Mnangagwa faction (Nyambi, 2015; Tendi, 2016). Mujuru, who had recently assumed the top position in ZANU PF's Women's League as Chairlady, faced ruthless purges of opponents perceived as sympathisers of Mujuru, indirectly compelling other party members to align with her rapid ascent to power within ZANU PF ranks. Following her appointment to the Woman's League post, she embarked on nationwide tours known as "Meet the People" rallies, publicly disparaging Mujuru as weak, incompetent, lazy, corrupt, and even as a prostitute (Nyambi, 2015; Ncube, 2020). Accusations of factionalism and intentions to usurp power from her aging husband, Mugabe, further tarnished Mujuru's image (Chibuwe, 2016; Tendi, 2016; Lubombo, 2018). It became evident that Mujuru's downfall was being orchestrated by Grace Mugabe to prevent her from succeeding Mugabe. These allegations led to the suspension and dismissal of nearly 200 top ZANU PF and government officials, including Mujuru (Nyambi, 2015; Chibuwe, 2016). The intra-party conflicts between the G40 and the old guard intensified, posing threats to those who believed they had earned the right to rule and benefit from Zimbabwe due to their participation in the liberation struggle.

Grace Mugabe's entry into politics in August 2014 was perceived as a strategic move aimed at positioning her for the presidency (Chibuwe, 2016; Chirimambowa, 2016; Marumahoko and Chigwata, 2020). Following Mujuru's removal, Mnangagwa assumed the vice presidency, but his alliance with Grace Mugabe's faction quickly soured, leading to his abrupt dismissal. Additionally, Phelekezela Mphoko was appointed as the other Vice President of Zimbabwe in line with the 1987 Unity Accord between ZANU and ZAPU. Figures such as Saviour Kasukuwere, Professor Jonathan Moyo, and Patrick Zhuwawo were purportedly key players in

Grace's faction (Chirimambowa, 2016). Employing tactics similar to those used against Mujuru, Grace conducted "Youth Interface" rallies laden with hostility, openly accusing Mnangagwa of fostering factionalism and plotting against Mugabe (Chirimambowa, 2016; Reeler, 2016; Ncube, 2020). Eventually, Mnangagwa suffered the same fate as Mujuru, being expelled from both government and party on November 5, 2017 (Greenfield and Wharton, 2019; Ncube, 2020).

Upon his return from China, Chiwenga issued a statement asserting that the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF), the most important stockholders in the ruling ZANU PF, were disgruntled with what had become habitual 'purges' against party members who had liberation credentials (Jordan 2017, Jongwe 2018). ZANU PF stockholders are those former liberation fighters from the two military armies that spearheaded the liberation war. These were the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), an affiliation of Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) an affiliation of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) (Rupiya, 2005; Chung, 2006; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006; Tendi, 2013; Moyo, 2014; Moore, 2014; Maringira, 2017). They became two distinct armies that were merged into the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) at independence from British colonial rule in 1980. There was also a union of Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) which created one political party to be known as the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF). ZANU PF personnel continue to wield significant influence and power over party and government affairs, occupying key positions in state organs, security establishments, government parastatals, and the Zimbabwe Election Commission (ZEC). Their role extends to overseeing, implementing, lobbying, and advocating what they term revolutionary ideology. A body of scholarship (Chung, 2006; Tendi, 2013; Moyo, 2014; Moore, 2014; Maringira, 2017) has extensively demonstrated that the ZANU PF party and government conflation emerged during the war of independence and has persisted since. The ZDF expressed discontent that 'counterrevolutionaries' had surrounded Mugabe, effectively seizing state and party power (Ankomah 2018; Marumahoko and Chigwata, 2020).

Chiwenga's declaration signaled that the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) would swiftly intervene if the recurring 'purges' within the ruling ZANU PF were not promptly reversed. At this juncture, Chiwenga, along with key allies from the ZDF and ZANU PF, orchestrated a military intervention to address internal factional conflicts within ZANU PF (Ncube 2020). On November 14, 2017, heavy military equipment was reportedly strategically deployed in and

around Harare (Ankomah, 2018; Greenfield and Wharton, 2019). In the early hours of November 15, 2017, the military took control of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation Television Vision (ZBC TV), where the late retired Major-General Sibusiso Moyo addressed the nation. He announced a military operation code-named “Restore Legacy” (Ankomah, 2018; Asuelime, 2018) aimed at reinstating ZANU PF’s internal stability and ensuring national socio-economic and political equilibrium in Zimbabwe (Greenfield and Wharton, 2019). The ZDF assured the African Union (AU), Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the international community that external intervention was unnecessary to address Zimbabwe’s socio-economic and political challenges (Kupeta 2018).

The ZDF justified its intervention in national politics by invoking Section 212 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment Number 20 of 2013). According to this section, the role of the Defence Forces is to safeguard Zimbabwe, its citizens, national security, and interests. This includes upholding the country’s territorial integrity and ensuring compliance with the Constitution. Section 213 further empowers the President to deploy the ZDF within Zimbabwe for defense purposes, to assist the Police Service in maintaining public order, or in emergencies and disasters. In essence, military forces may intervene in civilian politics when the government fails to foster socio-economic development for the people, echoing the wisdom of Sun Tzu (1910, 2000).

The intervention by the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) eventually led to Mugabe's resignation, paving the way for Mnangagwa's installment as president-designate on 24 November 2017, following his return from exile in South Africa on 22 November 2017 (Asuelime, 2018; Greenfield and Wharton, 2019; Rodgers, 2019; Ncube, 2020). This ZDF operation received support from the main opposition party, Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T), led by the late Morgan Tsvangirai (Chibuwe and Munoriyarwa, 2023). Tsvangirai had been Mugabe's primary election challenger since the inception of the labour-based MDC-T in September 1999, as noted by Mazango (2005). Before Mugabe's resignation, the ZDF, Zimbabwe National War Veterans Liberation Association (ZNWLA), ZANU PF provincial structures, and civil society organizations such as the #ThisFlag Movement, led by Pastor Evan Mawarire, played crucial roles in mobilizing citizens for demonstrations under "Operation Restore Legacy" (Kupeta, 2018). On 18 November 2017, thousands of Zimbabweans marched in Harare and other cities, demanding Mugabe's resignation (Kupeta, 2018; Rodgers, 2019; Greenfield and Wharton, 2019; Ncube, 2020). Eventually, Mugabe

yielded to pressure and submitted his resignation letter to the Speaker of Parliament, Advocate Jacob Mudenda (Kupeta, 2018). This demonstration marked a significant moment in the country's history since independence from Rhodesia in 1980 (Kupeta, 2018). Denton and Woodward's (1990) analysis of political communication provides insight into this event, highlighting the techniques employed by politicians and political actors to influence political outcomes on non-mainstream individuals such as voters and newspaper columnists.

A growing body of literature delves into Mugabe's departure from power, encompassing various perspectives (Hodgkinson, 2019; Rodgers, 2019; Helliker and Murisa, 2020; Munoriyarwa and Chambwera, 2020; Ndawana, 2020; Tendi, 2020; Mkandawire, 2020; Ndawana, 2020; Masiraha, 2021; Mpofu, 2021; Nyambi et al, 2022). These studies provide cultural and political-economic insights into Mugabe's downfall and the subsequent rise of his former ally-turned-critic, President Mnangagwa. There is a consensus that Mugabe's fall stemmed from intense internal power struggles within the party, revolving around ideological differences and longstanding succession disputes (Ncube, 2014; Chikerema, 2015; Nyambi, 2016; Chibuwe 2016, 2017; Moore, 2018; Mungwari, 2018; Lubombo, 2018; Mangani, 2019; Chikerema and Nzewi, 2020). Some scholars attribute Mugabe's loss of control to his advanced age (Greenfield and Wharton, 2019; Ncube, 2020), compounded by persistent external criticism that undermined his grip on power (Rupiya, 2012, Reeler 2016, Kwaramba, 2017, Marumahoko and Chigwata, 2020).

ZANU PF has historically been perceived as a relatively cohesive entity, both before and after independence (Tekere, 2007; Nyambi, 2016; Mangani, 2019). However, factionalism within the party's ranks, dating back to its formation, has been a persistent challenge (Tekere, 2007), exacerbated by unresolved succession disputes in the post-2000 era, leading to internal turmoil (Chikerema, 2015; Nyambi, 2016; Tshuma, 2019; Hove, 2019). The party's relations with other political entities in Southern Africa and beyond have been strained due to allegations of vote rigging, intimidation, enactment of restrictive laws, and a militant approach to national, regional, and international affairs aimed at maintaining power (Scholz, 2004; Masunungure, 2004; 2009; Kriger, 2005; Muzondidya, 2009).

Some perspectives label the military intervention leading to Mugabe's resignation as a "coup" (Moore, 2018; Greenfield and Wharton, 2019; Beardsworth et al., 2019; Tendi, 2020; Ndawana, 2020; CCJP 1999, Hove and Chenzi, 2020; Chibuwe and Munoriyarwa, 2023), while others term it a transition (Ndlovu Gatsheni and Ruhanya, 2020; Mpofu, 2020). Alternatively,

some assert that there was no coup (Greenfield and Wharton, 2019). Informally dubbed the “coup that wasn’t a coup” or the “not-a-coup coup” by Zimbabweans (Greenfield and Wharton, 2019:12-13), Mugabe's exit from power was framed as a coup by Greenfield and Wharton (2019), a view informally endorsed by jubilant members of the public (Chibuwe and Munoriyarwa, 2023), officially validated by the High Court of Zimbabwe, and tacitly supported by neighbouring states, the African Union (AU), Southern African Development Community (SADC), as well as nations such as the United States of America and United Kingdom who sent election observers to the July 2018 presidential election. Such nuances are critical for understanding the post-Mugabe landscape, beyond simplistic categorisations. Data compiled by University of Kentucky political scientists Jonathan Powell and Clayton Thyne reveals approximately 450 coups globally between 1950 and 2010, with many, including Zimbabwe’s, resulting in minimal change to underlying governance challenges. While Powell and Thyne suggest coups may facilitate democratization, particularly in less likely contexts, scrutiny of current African leaders who assumed power through coups reveals scant adherence to democratic principles, with exceptions such as Portugal’s 1974 coup, Turkey’s 1960 coup, and Ghana’s 1979 coup illustrating potential pathways to democracy (Greenfield and Wharton, 2019).

The study raises the above critical debates because, according to Marumahoko and Chigwata (2020), Mugabe admitted that he did not voluntarily resign but yielded to a "coup" from the military. He saw no reason to remain in power when many of his key allies in government and the party were under siege from the military. However, as stated elsewhere, whether the military intervention was a "coup" or not is not the focus of this study. This study argues that Mnangagwa assumed power through a military intervention further necessitated by fierce internal party squabbles. It would seem to suggest long-held views that Zimbabwean politics is highly militarized in favor of ZANU PF, as demonstrated particularly during elections (Chitando, 2013; Mandaza, 2016; CCJP 1999, Mwonzora and Helliker, 2020; Ndlovu Gatsheni and Ruhanya, 2020; Ruhanya, 2020). What is also clear is that Mnangagwa belongs or belonged to a military faction that he represents or represented in ZANU PF. This is because Mnangagwa is a former skilled military, intelligence, and security-trained individual from countries such as China and Russia who has consistently served under the ZANU PF-led government since 1980. His military and security background continued to dominate and propel his relationship with other former surviving and serving military commanders in the ZDF, Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), Zimbabwe Prisons and Correctional Services (ZPCS),

and Central Intelligence Organization (CIO). Throughout his career under the ZANU PF-led government, Mnangagwa has occupied key government positions beginning as Speaker of Parliament, Minister of Defence, War Veterans, and Ex Detainees, Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, and Minister of State Security. Also, when Mnangagwa formed his first-ever cabinet, there was high expectations that he would reach across the aisle and appoint some members of the opposition (Greenfield and Wharton, 2019). That did not happen. Instead, Mnangagwa's cabinet was highly dominated with long-serving military officers who traded in their epaulets for pinstripes, confirming his historical relationship with high-ranking military personnel serving in the ZDF, ZRP, ZPCS, and CIO years after independence. From the foregoing, this study is of the view that these issues are significant in locating, debating, examining change and continuity in Zimbabwe after Mugabe's demise from power. The study examines Mugabe and Mnangagwa's election campaign speeches to investigate if there is a change of discourse and relations with the former colonizers.

1.5 Competing narratives on transition from the First to Second Republic

Mugabe's rule over Zimbabwe spanned from the end of British colonial rule in 1980 until his dramatic fall in November 2017. Throughout his tenure, Zimbabwe underwent several socio-economic and political transitions, whose significance cannot be generalized to understanding his ouster from power. This is primarily due to the diminishing democratic characteristics, as autocratization has emerged as a notable international issue (Lindberg, 2019). Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya (2020) argue that the era of revolutions is over, influencing the emergence of transitions. Zimbabwe, under Mugabe, is believed to have undergone at least six transitions, acknowledged by Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya (2020), with Mkandawire (2016) describing the phenomenon as 'transition overload' rather than revolutions. It is argued that a post-colonial reading of the state has led to the notion that the change from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe was "change without change" (Moyo, 2004), reflecting continuity rather than change (Masunungure, 2004; Tekere 2006; Chimedza, 2008; Chibwe and Munoriyarwa, 2023). The war of independence, scholars argue, should be seen as a rebellion rather than a revolution (Scholz 2004), aiming to advance black emancipation radically. Such an analysis of post-colonial politics as a mirror image or "simulacrum" of the colonial state (Ahluwalia, 2001: 56; Kebonang, 2012: 32) is considered a misreading (Chibwe, 2017).

Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya (2020) acknowledge scholars (Beach, 1984; Bhebe, 1999) who argue that Zimbabwe's first transition occurred in 1980 with independence from British

colonial rule. Shortly thereafter, the nation was engulfed in a tragic, violent, and bloody tribal and ethnic civil war in 1983, resulting in the massacre of over 20,000 primarily IsiNdebele-speaking people due to Mugabe's ambitious vision of constructing a 'party-state' and 'party-nation' (Kriger, 2003; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009a). Mugabe deployed the North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade to Matebeleland and parts of the Midlands provinces, led by the late retired Air Chief Marshall Perence Shiri, in an ethnic military operation known as Gukurahundi. Gukurahundi, a ChiShona word meaning 'the early rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rains,' entailed a series of massacres carried out on IsiNdebele civilians by the Fifth Brigade between 1983 and 1987 (Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). Mugabe's administration faced constant threats from IsiNdebele-speaking individuals who supported the late vice President Joshua Nkomo and his party, ZAPU (Alexander, McGregor, and Ranger, 2000). Mugabe branded Nkomo and his dissident supporters as 'cockroaches' who posed a threat to Zimbabwe's independence, accusing Nkomo of acting like a self-appointed Ndebele king (Alexander, McGregor, and Ranger, 2000). In 1983, Mugabe deployed the Fifth Brigade to the Matabeleland and Midlands provinces to suppress dissident activities. The Fifth Brigade committed killings, mass detentions, disappearances, torture, rape, and other gross human rights violations against civilians in the region (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 1997: 1; Hill, 2003: 76). By the end of the violence in 1987, at least 20,000 IsiNdebele-speaking people had suffered immeasurable losses (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 1997: 1). The military operation inflicted severe psychological trauma, described by Hitchcott (2013: 83) as a 'prison of pain,' particularly among women who continue to exhibit symptoms such as prolonged distress, depression, heart palpitations, lack of forgiveness, anger, self-blame, fear, shaking, anxiety, and flashbacks, indicative of enduring and inexpressible suffering.

According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya (2020), Zimbabwe's post independent second transition was aimed at dismantling white supremacy in all sectors of the economy. Mugabe's Black radical economic emancipation was anchored on indigenisation and deracialisation of the economy (Dawson, 2011), although the process was marred with orgy of violence, nepotism and corruption perpetrated by his party cronies (Masiraha, 2021). It is argued that, in the 1990s, Zimbabwe's economy plunged into serious oblivion and chaos orchestrated by rapid policy inconsistencies (Mamdani, 2008, Mandani, 2008 cited in Moyo and Chambati, 2013). The crisis also emerged as a result of political decisions by the electorate contrary to the past (Masiraha, 2021). The most notable economic mess was experienced in 1990 as a result of the

demands and conditions of Structural Adjustment Programmes dictated by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Mlambo, 1997; Bratton and Masungure, 2008). Between the years 2000 and 2003, public expenditures lost value as the inflation continued to back bite. The IMF warned that inflation in Zimbabwe between in the years 1997 to 2004 rose from 20 percent to 623 percent while real GDP declined by 30 percent (IMF, 2005: 5). Quasi fiscal policies by the government such as uncontrolled printing of money and quasi fiscal spending increased the deficit with huge impacts on the population. Due to a foreign exchange constrained environment created by the economic crisis investment plummeted while companies were forced to close. A huge, sizeable population of working class lost their jobs and their savings due to inflation (Masiraha, 2021). Once ranked the best on the Human Development index in Sub Saharan Africa, Zimbabwe fell to 144th position out of 177 (Ibid, 2005: 5) According to Levisky and Way (2005), during such times, the relationship of authoritarian regimes to the West in many countries including Zimbabwe led to silence on human rights abuses.

It is argued that that this neo-liberal transition did not only damage the gains that had been recorded in critical sectors such as education and health, but also influenced mass protests from the working class and tertiary students who were the most casualties, a dying economy, declining currency, and mass retrenchments (Masiraha, 2021). Masiraha (2021) buttress the view that Zimbabwe's economic policies were flawed, governance framework and policy inconsistency had not been carefully implemented and therefore the economy was poised to fall in the shortest period. The lavish style of the elite and institutionalised corruption by state institutions and individuals persisted to pose a threat to vibrant economic growth. In his analysis of Latin America in the 1980s, Remmer found out that an economic crisis in general undermines support for incumbents and increases electoral volatility (Remmer, 1991). Indeed, the electorate became very volatile with negative impacts on Mugabe's legitimacy and his traditional hegemony. The International Financial Institutions also alienated Mugabe through withdrawals in investment projects while sanctions by the United States of America, Britain and other western nations remained. Mugabe had lost popularity mostly in the urban areas where the economic crisis was heavily pronounced (Masiraha, 2021). One of the most arguably damaging transition that followed was the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) dubbed the *Third Chimurenga* (Kalaora, 2016) which was aimed at re distributing land to landless Zimbabwean black people (Kalaora, 2016, Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya, 2020). In almost all the country's provinces, people radically and militantly moved into white owned

commercial farms. “In Nyamandlovu, about 800 ‘squatters’ moved onto three properties... In June, several farms in Marondera were occupied” (Selby, 2006:18). The former white commercial owned land invasions were a direct response to the “dire pressure on land within communal areas” (Selby, 2006:9). Former freedom fighters led by the notorious late Chenjerai Hunzvi are claimed to have maimed, raped and grabbed land belonging to white former commercial farmers. The result of this programme was haunting, sickening and eroded national economy, while a pariah status was extended to Zimbabwe by the global community of nations (Moyo and Yeros, 2005; Alexander, 2006; Sadomba, 2011). The controversial land occupations intensified during electoral periods (2001, 2002, 2005 and 2008) and resulted in the expulsion of more than 90 per cent of the 4,500 white commercial farmers who occupied vast tracts of arable land in 2000 (Kalaora, 2016; Chibuwe, 2022).

ZANU PF allegedly exploited land invasions as a patronage discourse, leading to the mismanagement and corruption of policies that destroyed the agricultural and economic sectors, which had long been the backbone of Zimbabwe's economy (Kalaora, 2011). These invasions aimed to revive memories of the liberation struggle, particularly the First and Second Chimurengas, among ex-combatants, using rhetoric and symbolism associated with independence (Muwati et al., 2010; Dawson, 2011; Kalaora, 2016; Chirimuuta and Jongore, 2021). The intention was to mobilise war veterans to support and vote for ZANU PF in elections, rather than genuinely addressing colonial grievances (Maposa, Hlongwana, and Gamira, 2010). Despite its democratic shortcomings and economic contradictions, the Fast Track Land Reform Programme is likely to be remembered as the culmination of Zimbabwe's anti-colonial struggle (Mamdani, 2008, cited in Moyo & Chambati, 2013:12).

Post 2000 marked a unique transition that was influenced by a strong desire for a free and ‘independent’ Zimbabwe from ZANU PF’s rule. It was a period that marked the emergence of a vibrant opposition party, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by the late Morgan Richard Tsvangirai, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) led by Lovemore Madhuku. Among their numerous grievances was the desire to fight for democracy, constitutionalism, and human rights from ZANU PF’s long time despotic rule. The result of this period was the establishment of the Inclusive Government of 2009-2013 (Masiraha, 2021). There was a plethora of problems associated with this period aptly explained within the context of ‘power- sharing’ (Raftopolous, 2013; Michael Aeby, 2015) where government was in control, as or ‘Zimbabwe’s gruelling transition’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya, 2020:3). Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya (2020) are

of the view that the period was highly politically complex arguing that ZANU PF was focused on salient ways to outsmart the opposition at the time -MDC formations (Masiraha, 2021).

Political violence is believed to have at least decreased although ZANU PF remained in firm control of key state organs of power. Resultantly ZANU-PF utilised the five years of the government of national unity to recoil and exert its power, and in the 2013 elections the party emerged more stronger ever than before as they found themselves in charge of government once more (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya, 2020). In fact, the 2000, 2002, 2008 and the 2013 elections in Zimbabwe are the most significant source of reference as legacies of conflicts, violence and intimidation resurfaced influenced by colonial regime era and the war of independence where force was a common toolkit to attain political power (Sachikonye, 2011). Post 2000 Zimbabwe, it is argued, just like in many post-colonial states, elections became a ritual to mask the authoritarian nature of the state (Gatsheni, 2012). According to Masiraha (2021), the opposition –Movement for Democratic Change - also resorted to use of violence. Zimbabwe became a battlefield of political orgies of violence. Levitsky and Way (2005) locate such regimes as competitive authoritarian regimes whose democratic institutions are in existence but biased towards the incumbent authority. Indeed, as Makumbe (2002:87) argues, Mugabe's failure to win two thirds majority in the parliamentary elections of 2000 and the rise of the MDC signalled a change in the mainstream politics of Zimbabwe which had been dominated by ZANU PF since independence.

Scholars (Hodgkinson, 2019; Rodgers, 2019; Helliker and Murisa, 2020; Chipere, 2020) have explained the military operation in November 2017 as the most groundbreaking transition in Zimbabwe. Its significance lies in the interrogation of complexities which led to the fall from the echelons of party and state power of the long-ruler- Mugabe, paving the way for the rise to power of his nemesis, Mnangagwa as the designate President of Zimbabwe (Moore, 2018; Rutherford, 2018). The economic crisis over the years built an enraged citizenry which was prepared to see the fall of Mugabe to create a new start that would address the crisis (Masiraha, 2021). An examination of the complexities that characterise successful political transition in Zimbabwe, as this chapter attempts to do, is critical in the understanding of continuity and change, the place and discourse of colonial memory in Zimbabwe's post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics, which is the focus of this study. Such an examination can also aid an analysis of how the New Dispensation/Second Republic administration remains entangled in a past commonly referred as Mugabeism popularised by Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni. Mugabeism is understood as a nationalist matrix of power that is reinforced by party-state and party-nation constructions

and is championed by those who claim to have emancipated the country from the gory tales and destructions of colonialism (see Ndlovu- Gatsheni, 2009b; 2012b; 2015).

While the Mnangagwa ZANU PF administration claims change and departure from Mugabe politics, their election communication practice is arguably within the context of historical transitions, memory and re-imaginings of political communication that he relied upon. In other words, Mnangagwa exhibits signs of entanglement of the past while desperately struggling to offer the 'New Dispensation'. According to Nuttall (2009: 11), entanglement 'is a means by which to draw into our analysis those sites in which what was thought of as separate identities, spaces, histories come together or find points of intersection in unexpected ways' and 'It is an idea which signals largely unexplored terrains of mutuality, wrought from common, though often coercive and confrontational, experience.' In Zimbabwe, Hammar and Raftopolous (2003: 17) argues that the historicised and racialised claims of land redistribution far beyond the technocratic and ahistorical liberal ideas of individual property rights but included the developmentalism and ideas of good governance and evolving forms of African nationalism buttressed by national sovereignty on the other.

Scholars Mleya (2002) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya (2020) weighs in explaining that the socio economic and political complexities in post-independent Zimbabwe became nasty in post 2000 because of deep-rooted presidential incumbency of Mugabe. The scholars further claim that although there might have some changes that could have happened, they are mere rhetoric as they call them 'repetition without change'. In this study, such claims should not be generalised but calls for comprehensive interrogation of Zimbabwe's historical exploration. As shown in *Chapter Four* ahead, ZANU PF continues to rely on official re-imaginings, conjures, and performs many dominant discursive discourses that marked Mugabe politics. Clearly, this suggests that ZANU PF is a representation of the strategic importance of continued reliance on the rhetoric of colonial memory by African liberation movements in contemporary politics. This is because there are many complex political cultures, which emerged through the entanglement of many different periodisation of settler colonialism, colonialism, the Cold War's ideological impact and African nationalist discourse of liberation (Campbell, 2003).

1.6 Context, nature and operationalisation of transition(s) in Zimbabwe

A critical examination of Zimbabwe's transitions reveals a symbiotic relationship between ZANU PF and ZDF, originating from the liberation struggle and extending into post-independent Zimbabwe (Rupiya, 2005; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006; Bratton and Masunungure,

2011; Tendi, 2013; Moyo, 2014). This relationship underscores the significance of historical roots in shaping contemporary political identities (Hall, 1997). Ruhanya and Gumbo (2022) utilize concepts of Authoritarian Regimes and Competitive Authoritarian Regimes to analyze the ZANU PF-ZDF dynamic, highlighting the military's pivotal role in transitions and its implications for electoral processes, media freedom, and judicial independence. They suggest that the ZDF's influence extends to leadership changes, as seen in the rise and fall of Mugabe and the installation of Mnangagwa, with potential for historical repetition. The study also delves into historical events like the Mgagao Declaration of 1975, demonstrating ZANLA's influence on transition processes within ZANU PF (Riley, 1982; Chung, 2006). Ruhanya and Gumbo (2022) argue that this history solidified the ZANU PF-ZDF alliance, transforming ZANU PF into an elite group associated with the military command element (Mandaza, 2016). These insights form the crux of the study, which explores the memorialization and reinterpretation of the past in post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics, analyzing Mnangagwa's 'New Dispensation,' its relationship with colonial discourse, and the enduring identity politics of the liberation era.

1.7 Disentanglement: Anatomy of the Second Republic

The anxiety in search of truth is probably at the centre of post-Mugabe Zimbabwean political discourse and Mnangagwa's 'New Dispensation' or the 'Second Republic'. Scholarly debates demonstrate ways in which extensive concerns about the ignorance to "truth" and "facts" are clearly visible in contemporary societies (Pohjonen, 2022). The notion of self-rule seems to be under oblivion as a result of populist demagogues who are not willing to abide by recognised rules of deliberation grounded on sensible debate and scientific reasoning (Pohjonen, 2022). This reasoning is significant to critically engage with Mnangagwa's 'new' ZANU PF dispensation or 'Second Republic'. The 'New Dispensation' or Second Republic', much as it was born out of cheerful crowds that protested Mugabe, it must be fully accounted if one has to locate change or continuity in Zimbabwe's post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics. It is however not to undermine Mnangagwa's desperate attempts of his construction of an inclusive 'new' Zimbabwe. For instance, during the July 2018 presidential election, opposition supporters conducted their campaigns in rural areas that had been off limits to them for a decade. Citizens were less fearful of criticising the government in public places. Global media, long denied access and visas to report from Zimbabwe, were able to operate openly and file stories. At least during that period, as this study argues, there were very limited incidents of political violence. Mnangagwa invited international observers from Europe and the United States of America to

observe the July 2018 presidential election (European Union Report 2018), and his government appeared interested in seeking to re-join the Commonwealth (Greenfield and Wharton 2019).

Notable and visible changes were even experienced among ordinary Zimbabweans, when the extortionate actions of the police such as seeking bribes at numerous roadblocks every few kilometres stopped. Mnangagwa needed legitimacy to restore confidence in post-Mugabe Zimbabwe; resolve differences with former allies such as the United Kingdom, the European Union, and the United States of America; rebuild relations with the International Financial Institutions; and attract new investment. On 3 August 2018, the Zimbabwe Election Commission (ZEC) declared Mnangagwa as the winner with 50.8 percent of the vote to his main rival, opposition leader Nelson Chamisa's 44.3 percent of the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC Alliance). These results were also confirmed with public opinion research conducted by Afrobarometer in June and July 2018, so they may well be a legitimate result (Greenfield and Wharton 2019). Although Mnangagwa's rhetoric on issues such as land reform, human rights, rule of law, improving the business environment, and combating corruption was all positive, there was huge disconnect behind the words and what is or was obtaining on the ground (Greenfield and Wharton 2019). Be that as it may, the July 2018 presidential election process was an improvement when compared with 2002, 2008 and 2013 presidential elections, although there remain lingering rich questions that undermine confidence in Mnangagwa's administration. Zimbabwe has not changed much (Greenfield and Wharton 2019). In this regard, Benoit's Functional Theory of Campaign Communication is summoned to dissect and characterise the Zimbabwean political discourse, particularly the policy and character of the 'New Dispensation'/'Second Republic'.

1.8 A new beginning: ZANU PF after Mugabe

Upon attaining party and state power, Mnangagwa's administration was quickly branded as the 'New Dispensation'/'Second Republic'. The term 'New Dispensation' was coined from ZANU PF soon after Mnangagwa assumed power ostensibly to explain a new form, style, shape and practice of politics different from Mugabe. It was a branding technique that was aimed at differentiating his administration as totally different from that of his predecessor, Mugabe. However, in the context of this study, a key observation is that a Mugabe–Mnangagwa entanglement is clearly visible regardless of the calls for change by the 'New Dispensation' or 'Second Republic' discourse. According to Mhiripiri and Ureke (2019), the Mugabe factor is clearly visible even after his demise from power under the incumbent President. Mnangagwa's

‘New Dispensation’ or the ‘Second Republic’ was born out of Mugabeism; indeed, Mugabeism marks its central features of governance (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya 2020; Mpofu 2022). The emergence of the ‘Second Republic’ is clearly interpellated by the continued manifestations of ills such as poverty (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009b, 2012a, 2015). Mnangagwa is Mugabe’s long-time ally, mentee and product. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya (2020) a Mugabe–Mnangagwa entanglement was clearly visible in the conflicting political discourses of Operation Restore Legacy, which was mobilised to sanitise the military coup of November 2017, and the calls for ‘Zimbabwe is Open for Business’, a strategy claimed to be introducing new politics based on neo-liberalism and market-driven economic fundamentals. Be that as it may, the recurring theme of Zimbabwe’s transitional politics is predicated on the nationalist matrix of power influenced by the colonial legacy of violence and authoritarianism aimed at protecting post-colonial power (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya, 2020).

The people who had been part of Mugabe’s closest allies during his 37 years of power and the military hardliners who had tirelessly campaigned for him during national elections were warming up to become ‘new’ government leaders. For instance, retired Air Chief Marshal Perence Shiri, former commander of the Airforce of Zimbabwe, became minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement. Retired Lieutenant General Engelbert Rugeje became the National political commissar for the ruling ZANU-PF party. The emergence of long-serving military officers assuming prominent civilian roles raises pertinent questions regarding power dynamics in Zimbabwe. This phenomenon prompts inquiries into the true authority within the country, the actual novelty of Mnangagwa’s ‘New Dispensation’, and whether a significant departure from Mugabe’s era can be discerned under Mnangagwa’s leadership.

There was general impression among ordinary Zimbabweans that Mnangagwa’s ascension to power had brought improvement, and more importantly, Mugabe was out (Greenfield and Wharton 2019). According to Tagwirei (2022), regardless of the attempts to ridicule Mugabe after throwing him out of power, Zimbabwean history and the struggle against colonialism does not avoid positioning him at the centre, particularly where that past is meant to prop up Mnangagwa whose past is entangled with that of his predecessor (Hammar, Raftopoulos and Jensen, 2003; Meredith, 2002; Norman, 2008; Martin and Johnson, 1998, Mpofu 2022).

Mnangagwa’s administration would soon be concerned with throwing vitriolic and unwarranted attacks on Mugabe using demi- godly status (Chitando, 2020). For example, state media would strip him of his titles such as ‘President’, ‘Comrade’, to ‘Mr’ Mugabe, while key

ZANU PF actors such as Oppah Muchinguri Kashiri publicly accused him of maladministration resulting in Zimbabwe attaining a pariah status. The 'New Dispensation' further went on attacking and even mocking his personhood as 'grandfather' yet the same people used to hero-worship him as 'baba' meaning father. The once revered Mugabe became an enemy of his long-time party and government subordinates.

Rosenberg (1999:327) claims that incoming leaders face several choices regarding strategies appropriate to dealing with a country's past. In 1980, Mugabe's policy of national reconciliation had promised 'a new history' and that 'the wrongs of the past must stand forgotten and forgiven'. He made clear his concern 'that my public statements should be believed when I say that I have drawn a line through the past' (Flower 1987:3). Mnangagwa's 'New Dispensation' is one which is marred with desperate attempts to present itself as different from his predecessor, Mugabe. There remains visible continuities and discontinuities (Hodgkinson, 2019 and Mamvura 2020, 2021, Tagwirei 2022) of Mugabe ostensibly as a way of seeking legitimacy from the very same pro Mugabe ZANU PF sympathisers who were victims of his bloody violent rise to power in November 2017 through a military assisted operation (Ndawana, 2020; Tendi, 2020; Mkandawire, 2020; Ndawana, 2020; Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya, 2020). This put to question, how 'new' is the 'New Dispensation'? There are some scholars who argue that during Mugabe's term of office, there was a "deification of Mugabe" (Siziba and Ncube, 2015:517), to a point where there was a "fetishisation of Mugabe's power and his person (Chitando, 2020) a recurring feature that dominate Mnangagwa's New Dispensation.

It therefore becomes convincing that ZANU PF national politics, whether directly or indirectly, revolves on the personhood of Mugabe. Accordingly, ZANU PF and state organisations should be framed in their dependence on the personhood of Mugabe. Remarkably, it is evident that efforts by Mugabe to create a one-party state worked in line with the centralisation of executive powers around himself. These issues have also become evident in Mnangagwa's 'New Dispensation'. For instance, government institutions are displayed with a portrait of his smiling face perhaps to express submission to his rule, he has all executive powers to appoint his appointees to key government institutions raising very serious questions on his genuine call about championing a new political culture. Mnangagwa's 'New Dispensation'- the Second Republic, however, has grappled with transforming itself beyond Mugabeism. Zimbabwe and ZANU PF remain in the almost same state as when Mugabe ruled over them. Patronage is

attached with cartels which control almost all sectors of the economy and politics. According to Sachikonye (2011:35):

The ZANU PF reigns supreme in the governance sphere- it is difficult to disentangle party structures from state structures regarding the allocation of state resources; there is an inter-penetration of the two sets of structures, especially at local levels.

This study argues that state media remains biased in polarising national issues as key disseminator of ZANU PF, government policies and ideas (Chari, 2010, Aday 2014). This situation challenges the traditional liberal normative function of the media which subscribes to the notion that the media should play the watchdog role over the state while exposing abuses of authority without fear or favour (Curran 2002; Mansell and Nordenstreng, 2006). Despite the political changes and its much-hyped transition in November 2017, state media recalibration is still visible. For instance, *The Chronicle* and *The Herald* have polarised, hero worshipping, yellow journalistic headlines framing the ‘New Dispensation’ as the promising administration, in the first three years of Mnangagwa’s assumption of office (Tagwirei, 2022). Tagwirei (2022) cites headlines claiming confirmation of his ‘New Dispensation’ which include:

- | | |
|---|-------------------|
| - <i>AU satisfied with New Dispensation reforms:</i> | 21 February 2018 |
| - <i>Outgoing German envoy lauds New Dispensation:</i> | 21 July 2020 |
| - <i>SADC behind the New Dispensation:</i> | 22 August 2019 |
| - <i>Zimbabwe’s new political dispensation excites India:</i> | 26 January 2018 |
| - <i>Youths hail New Dispensation:</i> | 03 December 2018 |
| - <i>UN hails ED, New Dispensation:</i> | 27 September 2018 |
| - <i>NGO hails New Dispensation:</i> | 29 May 2018 |
| - <i>New Dispensation charms US govt:</i> | 17 February 2018 |

Post-Mugabe media operations in Zimbabwe remain entangled in the past as they are used to prop and cover up Mnangagwa’s misgivings. His administration’s attitude towards the media in the context of this study is assessed as struggling to reflect the people’s aspirations forgetting that the media are powerful mediators of political processes and rhetoric (Mazzoleni, 2000; Waldhl, 2004; Chuma, 2007; Mbembe, 2017; Tsarwe and Mare, 2019; Munoriyarwa, 2020; Chari, 2022; Chasi, 2022). For example, Munoriyarwa and Chibuwe (2021) used the 2017 change of power as the focal point to explore the media environment under Mnangagwa. Examining the representation of Mnangagwa and Mugabe’s campaign speeches provides a

fertile ground to examine ways in which mediated rhetoric sustain or counter colonial memory in ZANU PF politics. From the foregoing, the study interrogates the continuities or discontinuities by examining memorialisation of the past and what could be said to characterise the post-Mugabe era; the so-called “New Dispensation” or “Second Republic”.

State media in Zimbabwe have largely remained pro ZANU PF to an extent of labelling Mnangagwa’s main rival, Nelson Chamisa of leading a terrorist organisation. Chamisa is an opposition leader who rose to prominence under the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by Morgan Richard Tsvangirai. He is a former cabinet minister during the Government of National Unity (GNU) between February 2009 to July 2013. When Tsvangirai died due to cancer on 14 February 2018, Chamisa, one of Tsvangirai’s three deputies, within the MDC-T, violently took over the leadership of the party under a coalition of pact of all opposition parties – Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC Alliance) and challenged Mnangagwa in the disputed 2018 presidential election. It is alleged that Chamisa, was assisted by the MDC-T’s militant youths, the ‘Vanguards’, to break the party’s internal processes to gain the party presidency (Chibuwe and Munoriyarwa, 2023). He outsmarted his fellow MDC-T deputies Thokozani Khupe and Elias Mudzuri. The party split as Khupe, and her sympathisers left the party. However, Chamisa gained control of the bigger faction and he contested the election under the MDC Alliance banner whilst Khupe contested under the MDC-T name. The July 2018 elections resulted in ZANU-PF square off against a splintered MDC. He has since formed a new political outfit – the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) after the 2018 presidential election. Civil society organisations have been framed as trying to influence mass uprisings against his government – a true reflection of Mugabe during his hey days who had a bitter and frosty relations with private media, western embassies and civil society organisations. For instance, Mnangagwa has swiftly lobbied for a Non-Government Organisation Bill, which if passed into an Act, will result in his government having a heavy hand on their operations in Zimbabwe.

This study argues that there are no major changes or variations in media and political speeches regarding the discourse and place of colonial memory in post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics. Memory is utilised by the incumbent President Mnangagwa relative to how it was used by Mugabe. In his political discourse, Mnangagwa, just like his predecessor has become the law unto himself (Mbembe, 1997). On 1 August 2018, post-Mugabe Zimbabwe was exposed to serious unpardonable electoral violence that left journalists, activists, civil society and

opposition figures wounded while some dead (Ruhanya and Gumbo, 2022; Sibanda, 2022; Mothlante Commission Report, 2018; EU Report,

2018). The EU's Observer Report (2018:1) stated that:

While political rights were largely respected, there were concerns regarding the environment for the polls and the failure to achieve a level playing field. Observers widely reported on efforts to undermine the free expression of the will of electors, through inducements, intimidation, and coercion against prospective voters to try to ensure a vote in favour of the ruling party.

The above is comparable to Mugabe's Machiavellian style of politics that marked his post-independent rule in 1987 when ZAPU aligned nationalists differed with him. Mugabe delivered post-independent Zimbabwe into a grotesque genocide that claimed lives of over 20 000 IsiNdebele speaking people (Laakso, 1999). I summon the concept of Allure of Toxic Leader offered by Lipman- Blumen (2005) who firmly believes that there are leaders that have "deliberately harmed their people, organisations and institutions" (Mpofu, 2016: 30). I argue that both Mugabe and Mnangagwa, exhibit these features as they all display excitable signs of "inhibiting the blossoming of a multiplicity of ethnic, political and social identities to come together in the creation of a Zimbabwean national mosaic". Lipman- Blumen's theory of toxicity, although it is Western centric, is significant to critically question continuity change, the place and discourse of colonial memory in Zimbabwe's post-Mugabe ZANU-PF politics. Under Mugabe and Mnangagwa, ZANU PF's toxicity is exercised in flagrant ways where human rights have been trampled upon, democracy diluted with Zimbabwe increasingly becoming a polarised country (Pilosof, 2008; McCandless, 2012).

Mnangagwa's 'New Dispensation' or the 'Second Republic' politics squarely fits in the characterisation explained by Chabal and Daloz as "an inbuilt bias in favour of greater disorder and against the formation of the western- style legal, administrative and institutional foundations required for development" (Chabal and Daloz, 1999:162). In this regard, the study explores questions surrounding continuity and change in Zimbabwean normative political discourse under Mnangagwa. Gwekwerere and Mpondi (2018) argue that patronage, memory, cronyism, regionalism and identity are recurring issues that continue to characterise pre and post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics. Such observations are central to this study questioning – with specific reference to colonial memory - if there is any transformation or change of political discourse in post-Mugabe ZANU-PF politics -the New Dispensation- in Zimbabwe as claimed by the new administration. This question contributes to increasing exploration of 'memory,'

and in 'collective or social memory' which has become a significant academic concern beginning the 1980s and beyond (Olick et al., 2011: 3; Erll and Nunning, 2012: 1). As such, texts on coloniality, (de-)coloniality and (post-)colonial (-sm) are significant to explain from an informed emerging African context issue at hand.

1.10 Structure of the study

This study comprises eight chapters, each serving a distinct purpose within the broader investigation. In the present chapter, a comprehensive introduction has been presented, particularly the transition from the 'First' to the 'Second Republic' in Zimbabwe examining the shift from Mugabe to Mnangagwa's leadership within ZANU PF and the political developments leading to Mugabe's removal from power.

Chapter Two introduces the Conceptual Framework, which encompasses Functional Campaign Communication and Political Culture theories. This framework aims to analyze election campaigns in Zimbabwe from a broader perspective, accounting for key political issues in the country's mainstream politics.

This is followed by Chapter Three that offers a historical account of colonial memory in African Politics, tracing the formation of liberation movements and their enduring grip on power despite legitimacy challenges. It emphasizes the strong relationship between liberation movements and the past, particularly focusing on how ZANU PF's appropriation of colonial memory shapes political discourse in African politics.

In Chapter Four, the study discusses the mediation of colonial memory in Zimbabwe, arguing that both Mugabe and Mnangagwa are intertwined in colonial memory discourse, with the media used to legitimize ZANU PF rule by reflecting on the past and engaging in a highly politicized act of memorialization.

Chapter Five then outlines the methodological framework guiding the study, employing a qualitative approach to explore political interpretations beyond everyday communicative practices. Phenomenological research design, qualitative content analysis, and interviews were utilized to collect data, with a focus on Mugabe and Mnangagwa's parliamentary election campaigns in 2000 and Mnangagwa's 2018 election campaign speeches.

In Chapter Six, the first data chapter, presidential star rallies are examined as sites for reliving colonial memory, revealing how both Mugabe and Mnangagwa utilize campaign rallies to

evoke memories of the liberation struggle and promote a sense of national belonging while articulating ZANU PF policies.

Chapter Seven serializes presidential election campaigns in Zimbabwe's print and broadcast media, illustrating complicity in the use of colonial memory discourse in post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics.

Finally, Chapter Eight concludes the study, summarizing key findings and suggesting areas for further research to deepen understanding of colonial memory's role in shaping Zimbabwean politics under Mnangagwa's leadership.

1.11 Conclusion

This study focuses on examining the role and representation of colonial memory within ZANU PF's electoral politics, particularly in the transition from Mugabe to Mnangagwa's leadership. It investigates how Mnangagwa and Mugabe engage with discourses surrounding former colonizers and whether any notable differences exist. Drawing from insights by African communication scholars (Chibuwe, 2013, 2017b; Karam, 2018; Ngomba, 2012), it emphasizes the importance of context-sensitive theoretical frameworks in understanding changes in political communication during African election campaigns. By analysing the discourses of post-Mugabe ZANU PF in the 2002 and 2018 presidential elections, the study aims to determine whether there have been shifts in political communication practices under Mnangagwa's leadership. While acknowledging changes in leadership structure, the study also considers the possibility of continuity in political discourse (Chibuwe and Munoriyarwa, 2020). In addition to examining the changes and continuities between Mugabe and Mnangagwa's election campaign discourses, the study seeks to understand how these discourses function within post-Mugabe ZANU PF's electoral strategies. Notably, existing scholarship on political communication in Zimbabwe has yet to adequately address the role and discourse of colonial memory under Mnangagwa's administration, highlighting a nascent intersection between political communication and cultural studies in Africa.

CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

The thesis is based on two complementary approaches to theory. The first is the functional theory of political communication. While at first glance this would appear to be Western, it does provide a level of rigour and precedent that is very useful in dealing with politically charged material. The second approach mobilises Foucault's insights into knowledge, discourse, and power, read through the Stuart Hall's conception of culture as a constructed, evolving set of relationships within both every day and public life. This aspect is rooted in the constructivist epistemological approach outlined in the methodology chapter. The value of the theoretical exposition, which is drawn through in the later analysis, is that massive contradictions exist within this post-Mugabe thrust, with examples of the ways in which the post-colonial mimics the colonial discourse, sets of relations and power structures, with new actors taking the place of old within the patterns that were historically formed.

2.2 Political Culture Theory

Almond and Verba's (1963) Political Culture Theory is deployed to provides lenses to question continuity and change, the place and discourse of colonial memory in Zimbabwe's post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics. It is argued that the term political culture is subject to numerous hypotheses, revisions, and analysis as to what it exactly entails, and "thirty years of definitions and theoretical criticisms have now passed without the earlier promise of the concept being redeemed" (Chilton 1988: 420). According to Almond and Verba (1956: 396), Political Culture refers to a "particular pattern of orientations to political action". It is also defined as "the spirit of public institutions, political passions of the citizenry, goals articulated by the political ideology, and both formal and informal rules of the political game" (Dawson and Prewitt, 1969: 26 cited in Camara, 2008). A further interpretation of the concept now seem to show a paradigm shift from earlier personal behaviourist researches, which were characterised by survey-based studies on personal attitudes, focusing more on collective conceptualisation of political culture as a process through which "political meaning is constructed in the interplay between the attitudes of individual citizens and the language and symbolic systems in which they are embedded" (Da Silva et al., 2015: 1).

Almond and Verba (1963) investigated the political cultures of Germany, Italy, Mexico, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. They found out that parochial political culture, subject political culture and participant political culture are the most common types of political cultures that influence why people's desire to participate in political processes (Chilton 1988). Among these three common types of political culture, parochial political culture was highly prevalent in Mexico, where citizens demonstrated very little literacy levels about their government and very few were interested to participate in the political process. In Germany and Italy, subject political culture was highly dominant; here citizens are at least informed and aware of their government and routinely takes part in the political process. Lastly, participant political culture was found in the United Kingdom and the United States of America, here citizens are well informed and actively participate in the political process (Chilton, 1988).

Although Almond and Verba's (1963) theory focused on three countries and their democracies, this study is aware that their findings may not adequately explain all African democracies, as in the context of Zimbabwe whose mainstream political cultures is largely pro African (Tsarwe, 2020; Gaidzanwa, 2020; Makombe, 2021). However, political culture theory was mobilised in this study because at least some of the key constructs and features squarely fit in a Zimbabwe's post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics because in one way or the other, Zimbabwean citizens have high political consciousness. Since attaining independence in 1980, citizens have highly participated in political processes of various forms and levels such as Council, Parliamentary, Senate and Presidential elections. For instance, although Zimbabwe's post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics exhibit Mexican parochial culture, because many marginalised poverty-stricken citizens are often illiterate of their government are unwilling or ignorant to participate in political processes (Tsarwe, 2020). According to Tsarwe (2020), it is sensible to describe Zimbabwe within the confines of subject political culture, because its citizens are somehow informed and aware of their government and periodically take part in the political process, during periodic national elections. As a result, Almond and Verba's (1963) three types of political cultures should not be viewed as the sole legitimate basis to explain African political culture, rather, caution should be exercised as in the case with this study. This could be true in some countries that are characterised with power contestations in the struggle for democracy. Although significant literature (Eveland and Scheufele, 2000; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Moeller and De Vreese, 2019; Toff and Nielsen, 2022) has explained numerous theoretical and methodological epistemologies informed by different ontological perspectives to

understanding political culture, this study however summons Almond and Verba's (1963) operationalisation of the concept as the basis upon which to explain the nature and context of political culture in Zimbabwe's post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics, the place and discourse of colonial memory.

Political culture theory convincingly demonstrate how changes and continuities of colonial political culture manifest in the New Dispensation since 1980 (Gaidzanwa, 2020). It also within this context that, the place and discourse of colonial memory in ZANU PF electoral politics were examined to determine how and what the appropriation of this discourse in the New Dispensation reveal about political communication in contemporary Zimbabwean politics. Gaidzanwa (2020) argues in her analysis that colonial memory is intertwined in Zimbabwe's post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics in ways that are beyond general characterisations. As such, this study was also focused on investigating changes and continuities from Mugabe to Mnangagwa described as 'repetition without change' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya, 2020) with the view of establishing if there could be some changes in post-Mugabe ZANU PF's political discourse during the 2018 election. Indeed, Gaidzanwa (2020), firmly argues that Zimbabwe's historical political culture continued to exist in post-independent Zimbabwe. Gaidzanwa (2020) acknowledges (Cobbing, 1983) buttressing this argument by citing the Ndebele and Shona political cultures which has remained the guiding principle of governance in Zimbabwe.

Indeed, post-colonial Zimbabwe inherited British political cultures that continue to shape and direct mainstream politics. This include and is not limited to political culture of fear of communism, black economic, political, and social empowerment discourse, and the need to reclaim black independence (Gaidzanwa, 2020). Despite racial, class, gender, and other cleavages within the population, ZANU PF continues to champion Mugabe's selfish belief that the party is the only legitimate representative of the majority (Gaidzanwa, 2020). According to Gaidzanwa (2020), there were no significant changes in political culture after independence, except for very few changes in terms of an overhaul of civil service where black people replaced white people. Therefore, in the context of this study, while the post-Mugabe ZANU PF claims change and departure from Mugabe politics, the study sought to go beyond general characterisation of election communication practice which is arguably within the context of historical transitions, memory, and re-imaginings of Mugabe's political communication. The party continues to rely on official re-imaginings, conjures, and performs several dominant discursive functions.

Citizens' engagement in civic and political affairs is shaped by how they interact with and experience governance institutions (Gaidzanwa, 2020). Thus, the conduct of governance institutions at all levels shape citizens' beliefs, opinions, emotions, and experiences. Citizens may become alienated from governance structures when they are remote and inaccessible (Toff and Kalogeropoulos, 2020; Karlsen et al.; 2020; Strömbäck et al., 2013), resulting in a disconnect between the governed and the governors (Toff and Nielsen 2022). In some cases, governance structures and personnel may be authoritarian, coercive, and intolerant of dissent, resulting in citizens' alienation from their governments. Such governance systems generate dissent, protest, and opposition, resulting in their destabilization as well as that of the structures and societies involved. Citizens, ideally, want the freedom to interact with those who rule them. In an ideal world, societies with responsive political and social systems and structures that allow citizens' opinions and ideas to be heard will generate and promote a positive political culture.

Despite its exclusionary aspects, the racist political culture was backed and influenced by most white citizens in colonial Zimbabwe (Gaidzanwa, 2020). The white liberal opposition, as well as dissenters and radical left-wing politicians, were vilified and labelled as "nigger lovers," "kaffir lovers," and other racially insensitive terms. Those who disagreed with the Rhodesian Front's politics were exiled, deported, or hounded out of colonial Zimbabwe, with Bishop Dodge and Doris Lessing, author of the classic *The Grass Is Singing*, among those who were declared a prohibited immigrant in 1956. She was only able to return to Zimbabwe after the country's independence in 1980. As a result, ZANU-PF has focused its efforts on winning hearts and minds in rural areas, where people have less access to consistent and reliable information such as broadcasting and other mediums that could potentially alienate them from ZANU are scarce. This issue will be addressed later in chapter during the discussion of mediation of colonial memory in Zimbabwe and emergence of a militarised political culture. The increased involvement of military and security sector players in agriculture, mining, politics, and other sectors of the economy is transforming Zimbabwe's political culture. The militarisation and securitisation of economic activities is changing the shape and content of economic and political cultures. De Valk and Wekwete (1990) also noted that attempts by the colonial government to use black traditional leadership to advance colonial political projects, culture, and practices were met with widespread opposition from many black rural and urban populations. In many rural areas, native authorities chose to side with nationalists and liberation forces in their resistance to colonial rule by disobeying directives to control livestock numbers

through culling, rotate land use in native farming areas, and dig contour ridges as required by soil conservation authorities.

Similarly, Mangena et al. (2022) investigate the various ways in which post-Mugabe Zimbabwean politics of crisis and 'newness' are (re/de) constructed to explain Mugabe's memories influenced by political culture. Scholarship Marongedze and Chinouriri (2022) cite Ndawana (2020) and Hove and Chenzi (2020) to examine the ZDF's continued dominance in the fall of Mugabe from power, the nonviolent economic endeavours known as *Kuzvidira jecha* (pouring sand) against Mnangagwa's New Dispensation – the Second Republic, the democracy and (il-)legitimacy debates (Beardsworth, Cheeseman, and Tsinhu 2019), and the new economic diplomacy described within (Ndakaripa, 2020). These studies are important because they help us understand the role and discourse of colonial memory in Zimbabwe's post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics grounded in Political Culture theory. More importantly, these studies are significant to explain how Mnangagwa's engagement with the former colonisers differ from Mugabe. Summoning these studies provided a fertile ground to meet key objectives of this study that the strategic importance of continued reliance on the rhetoric of colonial memory by African liberation movements in contemporary politics remains visible.

2.3 The Functional Theory of Political Campaign Communication

This study is also premised on the Functional Theory of Political Campaign Communication propounded by William L. Benoit (Benoit, et. al., 2007; see also Benoit 2014a, 2014b; Benoit, Blaney, and Pier, 1998; Benoit, McHale, Hansen, Pier, and McGuire, 2003; Benoit, Stein, McHale, Chattopadhyay, Verser, and Price, 2007). This is a 'practical theory' that offers a conceptual and analytical 'toolkit' to explore the underpinning dimensions (character and policy) upon which political competitors distinguish themselves from one another, with an aim, on this basis, to endear themselves among the electorate. The act of distinguishing oneself on the above dimensions involves candidate acclaiming themselves, attacking the opponent, and defending themselves from attacks on who they are (character) and what they have done or will do in office (policy). Based on the American political culture, the theory assumes that voter's behaviour is influenced on their perceptions of candidates' character and policy, and are exposed to various sources of information that influence their perceptions. Accordingly, candidates acclaim themselves, attack opponents, and defend themselves from attacks to foster an impression that they are more worthy of election than their opponents (Benoit 2014a, 2014b). According to Downer (2013: 5) the 'party leader is the core and unifying factor of the

political product: party, candidate and policy’, it is significant to compare the changes and continuities post-Mugabe ZANU-PF used under two different leaders in two different epochs. To summon Downer’s (2013) critical observation, it is arguable that the change in leadership could also have had a bearing on post-Mugabe ZANU-PF’s election campaign discourse, and the policies or promises it sought to sell to the electorate. It is also arguable that the change in the opposition leadership also inevitably had a bearing on post-Mugabe ZANU-PF’s legitimisation strategies and electoral promises (Chibuwe and Munoriyarwa, 2023). Resultantly, this stexamines changes and continuities of the election campaign discourses deployed by ZANU-PF in its July 2002 and July 2018 presidential election campaign when it was under two different leaders facing two different opposition candidates.

Functional Theory of Campaign Communication also distinguishes among three forms of policy (past deeds, which facilitate retrospective voting; future plans (means); and general goals [ends]. The latter two forms facilitate prospective voting. It also distinguishes three forms of character (personal qualities, leadership ability, and ideals, values, and principles. Research in American polity has established that policy is discussed more frequently in the general election than in the primary campaign (Benoit, et. al., 2007). Functional Theory of Political Campaign Communication can help the electorate in polities beyond America to determine populist discourses that exaggerate change. According to Cosentine (2020:2–3) popular narratives can be described as follows:

We now live in a post-truth world, where emotions and beliefs trump evidence-based arguments, where the distinction between truth and lies has become increasingly blurred, and where the very notion of truth seems to have all but disappeared. In its attempt to provide an anatomy of the post-Mugabe politics, this study examines the appropriation of colonial memory discourse in the New Dispensation and what it may possibly reveal about political communication in contemporary Zimbabwean politics. According to Pohjonen (2022) there is need “to do something” about the (real and imagined) dangers posed by this alleged post-truth condition, however, also risks side lining other perspectives on the emerging power or knowledge dynamics of the contemporary societies”. Udupa and Pohjonen (2019: 3051) argue that “it is important to problematize the orthodox understanding of extremism premised on a clear-cut normative binary between the liberal centre and the extreme periphery and to explore how these political inclusions and exclusions are themselves produced globally across a range of cultural and political registers.” It is within this context that this study is of the firm view that studies that systematically investigates contestations over “truth” concerning change and

(dis-) continuities without change in Zimbabwe's post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics are few and far between. This study demonstrates, by way of questioning the New Dispensation or Second Republic's populist rhetoric that the "new" administration is a complete departure from Mugabe's style of politics. This view is demonstrated by exploring the ways in which power or knowledge relations influence "truth" –of the New Dispensation, how they control what is regarded as a "true" Second Republic (Foucault 1977). According to Foucault (1977: 131) "truth" is constructed by various forms of constraint, and in this context "it is possible to see truth as a perspective we have on reality". In other words, by questioning the New Dispensation's election campaign discourse, "power and knowledge are joined together" (Foucault 1978: 100) to (de-) legitimise the New Dispensation. This view is important to locate ways (if any) Mnangagwa and Mugabe's stance and engagement with the discourses about the former colonisers differ. The study thus questions the role the media play in shaping colonial memory in post-Mugabe ZANU PF electoral politics because as Ogola (2021: 305) argues, "we are now faced with a complex and layered contestation over who gets to define the truth and the fake, and under what terms". Therefore, questions on post-Mugabe Zimbabwean politics should not be viewed as abstract universals with little cultural variation; rather they are also always historically embedded in different cultural and political milieus (Pohjonen, 2019).

2.4 Application of the conceptual framework

Western theorisation of African phenomenon is often characterised with coloniality of knowledge (Moyo, 2020). The primary concern of these theories is to explain, question change and continuity, the place and discourse of colonial memory in Zimbabwe's post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics. By so doing, the Political Culture theory in this study serves to illuminate the critical agenda of political campaign communication research in Zimbabwe's post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics. For instance, whereas the Functional Theory of Political Campaign Communication of Campaign Communication may appear an innocent theorisation of the democratic value of campaign speech practices in the West, in a Zimbabwean context, it may interpellates the *Other* as a loyal subject of colonial modernity's *Cogito, ergo sum* (I think therefore I am) (Moyo, 2020). It is argued that when scholars make use of use these concepts analytically, the recurrent practice should be on how to 'choose a convenient definition according to one's particular needs and sensitivities' (Allaire and Firsirotu, 1984: 194). In the context of this study, primary argument is that while the post-Robert Mugabe ZANU PF claims change and departure from his politics, the party's election communication practice is arguably within the context of historical transitions, memory, and re-imaginings of political

communication that Mugabe relied upon. Post-Mugabe ZANU PF continues to rely on official re-imaginings, conjures and performs many dominant discursive discourses that marked Mugabe politics.

The Political Culture theory in this study is significant as means to contribute to de-Westernising political campaign communication research in Zimbabwe in ways that are less ‘dramatic’ and ethnocentric, and more heuristic. According to Ngombe (2012), an approach of this nature involves the circumnavigation of mainstream Afrocentric discourses of de-Westernisation. It implies selecting useful existing ‘Western theories and their critical contribution in research, in a way that offers contextually relevant extensions of such theories. Accordingly, the refer to key constructs of the Functional Theory of Political Campaign Communication of Campaign Communication while those western contextual tenets of the theory are better espoused with the Political Culture theory.

However, the influence of these theories is also subtle and far reaching, going as far as determining what methods and pedagogies are appropriate to use in Zimbabwe’s political campaign communication research. In essence, the theories complement each other to explore Zimbabwe’s electoral politics and through myth, enjoy a revealing or concealing status. It is argued that it is not easy to see beyond the delimiting power of the theories of a discipline (Moyo, 2020). First, Political Culture theory helps us to reflect on the myths behind the Functional Campaign Communication theory in electoral communication research and the extent to which it has constituted the discipline in the image of the West. The Functional Theory of Political Campaign Communication of Campaign Communication by virtue of it being western, hid its locus of enunciation so as to claim universal validity, which is misleading, a reason why this study also mobilises the Political Culture theory. Western theorisation of Zimbabwean phenomenon should be criticised for its ignorance in that it ‘assumed that all societies are knowable in the same way and from the same (Western) point of view’ (Connell 2007:44). In considering this view, the study argues that the Political Culture theory represents the period of the rise of anti-oppression liberatory border theories, pedagogies, and research methods (Moyo, 2020). The primary argument is that media and communication research methodology is historically deeply imbricated in global coloniality and the imperial projects of the Global North (Hardt, 1992; Denzin, 2009; Smith, 1999), therefore the Political Culture theory was mobilised to bridge the gap presented by the Functional Theory of Political Campaign Communication. As such, the Political Culture theory, in this study, is considered as a theory with a counterhegemonic decolonial attitude because it emerges from the histories

of anti-oppression struggles against slavery, colonialism, capitalism, and other new forms of exploitation experienced by the Global South as a non-geographic category. The key constructs of these theories mobilised for the purposes of this study are significant to unpack presidents Mugabe and Mnangagwa's election campaign speeches.

The above significant views are espoused within the idea(s) that Mnangagwa's ascendancy to power in November 2017 was viewed from within and beyond Zimbabwe as the country's opportunity to correct leadership deficiency typified by Robert Mugabe (Hodgkinson, 2019; Matingwina, 2019; Helliker and Murisa, 2020; Southall, 2020; Tagwirei, 2022). His ascendance through what the government calls 'a military assisted operation' that forced Mugabe out of power in November 2017 was presented as a 'New Dispensation' that represents a complete departure from travesties of his predecessor. Under Mugabe, Zimbabwe had experienced despotic rule characterised by violence, chicanery, and muzzling of political opponents (Makumbe, 1991; Raftopoulos, 2006; Nyambi, 2016; Moore, 2018; Ndebele, 2019; Sibanda, 2022). It within this context that the key constructs of the Functional Theory of Political Campaign Communication of Campaign Communication are relevant to this study.

The Functional Theory of Political Campaign Communication is synonymous with western election campaigns especially in the United States of America (Benoit and Sheaffer, 2006). The theory largely investigates American presidential television debates (Benoit, et. al., 2007; see also Benoit 2014a, 2014b; Benoit, Blaney and Pier, 1998; Benoit, McHale, Hansen, Pier, and McGuire, 2003) to understand how they impact on voter behaviour. According to Benoit and Sheaffer (2006) television political campaign debates have been conducted in countries such as Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Holland, Israel, New Zealand, Scotland, South Korea, Sweden, Poland, Taiwan, and the Ukraine. Benoit and Sheaffer (2006) analysed six televised debates in Israel and compared these debates in both countries. In both countries, acclaims were the most common function, followed by attacks and then defences. Policy was addressed more often than character. Incumbent candidates in both countries acclaimed significantly more and attacked less than the challengers. Incumbents used past deeds significantly more often to acclaim and less to attack than the challengers. The similarities discovered suggest that candidates who campaign for elective political office may employ common discursive practices that transcend national borders.

In another study, Henson and Benoit (2010) utilised the Functional Theory of Political Campaign Communication of Campaign Discourse to analyse general content election

television advertisements from American presidential candidates (primary, 1952-2008; general, 1952-2004) and non-presidential political ads (gubernatorial and congressional) in the 2002 Midterm Elections during Bill Clinton's campaign presidency. They sampled 1057 general election presidential television spots espoused within the key arguments of Benoit, et. al., (1999) and Benoit et al. (2007). They sampled presidential primary television spot from 1952-2004 Benoit (1999; Benoit et al. 2003, 2007) and included 269 presidential primary spots from the 2008 campaign through May 2008, a total of 1436 advertisements. They discovered that acclaims, attacks and defences are common during campaigns. Therefore, this study mobilises these key findings to explain the strategic importance of continued reliance on the rhetoric of colonial memory by African liberation movements in contemporary politics. The intention is to locate the place and discourse of colonial memory in the post-Mugabe ZANU PF electoral politics.

Another study by Isotalus (2017) used the Functional Theory of Political Campaign Communication of campaign discourse to analyse Finish presidential election and found out that the theory has been criticised for being too culturally limited. The theory is loosely applied in this study in a more indirect Zimbabwean context where both Presidents Mnangagwa and Mugabe have been ZANU PF presidential candidates against opposition contestants. William L. Benoit (Benoit, et. al., 2007; see also Benoit 2014a, 2014b; Benoit, Blaney, and Pier, 1998; Benoit, McHale, Hansen, Pier, and McGuire, 2003; Benoit, Stein, McHale, Chattopadhyay, Verser, and Price, 2007) key constructs are applied to explain the ubiquitous nature of post-Mugabe Zimbabwe's political election campaigns. The theory is also significant because in this study because it explicates the functional theorisation of both Mugabe and Mnangagwa's election campaign discourse - a fundamental way to understanding post-Mugabe Zimbabwean politics. More importantly, the theory is also significant to unpack the role of the media and election campaigns.

First, the theory views utterances in an election campaign as *functional* or means to an end. This is significant to examine Mnangagwa and Mugabe's campaign speeches to locate numerous assumptions about the nature of political campaigns (Benoit, et. al., 2007; see also Benoit 2014a, Benoit, Stein, McHale, Chattopadhyay, Verser, and Price, 2007). This study harnesses the idea that election campaigns in Zimbabwe are subject to different interpretations. This is because when ZANU PF especially post 2000 felt that their legitimacy to power was threatened by western powers, the party resorted to numerous ways of election engineering. The colonial memory became the primary reason why the party attempted to reconfigure issues

of nationhood, which had seemingly been resolved in 1980 (Masunungure, 2006), with historians pointing out internal and external causes of the crisis (Alexander 2004; Barnes 2007, 2004; Bond and Manyanya, 2009; Gatsheni-Ndlovu and Williams, 2009; Raftopolous 2006; Raftopoulos, 2009; Raftopolous and Compagnon, 2003; Raftopolous and Savage, 2004; Vambe, 2008; Muzondidya, 2004). It is within this context that (Benoit, et. al., 2007; see also Benoit 2014a, 2014b) regards election campaign as *functional* with a lot of numerous assumptions in terms of their execution.

The theory explains that voting is a comparative act where voters are given an opportunity to choose between two or more contestants. During the 2018 presidential election, there were more than two presidential contestants who participated in the process. In this context party candidates only need to avail themselves to the electorate displaying the most preferable perceptions against their opponents. In the context of this study, the 2018 presidential election is significant in that Mnangagwa was availed to represent ZANU PF against his main rival, Chamisa then leader of MDC Alliance. The election was unique in that for the first time over decades, it was the first to be conducted without Mugabe in power (Matingwina, 2019; Tshuma, 2019; Helliker and Murisa, 2020; Chipere, 2020). The key constructs of this theory for this study appropriates political marketing techniques to question the “New Dispensation” discourse in Zimbabwe’s post-Mugabe era. The argument is that the brand knowledge encoded in memory – the New Dispensation- serves to fulfil brand awareness and brand image (Keller 1993). Brand awareness – both presidents Mnangagwa and Mugabe’s campaign speeches- are intertwined with strength of the brand node or trace in memory, as reflected by consumers’ ability to identify the brand under different conditions. These are significant views in this study so as to question continuity and change in Zimbabwe’s post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics. Therefore, an important determining factor for the creation of a brand image is that a brand node be established in memory, and the nature of that brand node affect how easily different kinds of information can become attached to the brand in memory.

Various forms of media were at the disposal of the electorate as they debated numerous issues surrounding the election process. Benoit argues that voters learn candidate distinctions through political messages disseminated by a variety of sources. These include supporters, news media, supporters of opposing candidates and special interest groups. Indeed, the media are powerful mediators of political processes and rhetoric (Mazzoleni 2000, Waldhl 2004, Chuma 2007, Mbembe 2017, Tsarwe and Mare 2019, Munoriyarwa 2020, Chari 2022, Chasi 2022). For instance, post-Mugabe ZANU PF branding during the election was unique following the

introduction of Mnangagwa's face and scarfs branded with Zimbabwean national colour flags, increased appropriation of social media campaigns, and current affairs television election coverage on the national broadcaster -ZBC. This development resonates well with the key arguments of the theory that media – especially television advertising in political campaigns is the most prominent platform of communication between the candidate and the voter (Kaid, 2004:157). The primary reason why researchers focus on advertising is the huge amount of money spent on campaigns (Benoit, et. al., 2007), which influences for the construction of various advertisements which are aired frequently. Advertisements are also scripted, so politicians could frame their messages to audiences. Political advertisements are also relatively short and require little effort on the part of the audience to pay attention.

The Functional Theory of Political Campaign Communication was applied in this study to explain numerous forms in which political candidates are expected to contrast themselves with their opponents. ZANU PF's main rival, MDC Alliance had their campaign message based on economic recovery, transformation, and international re-engagement, Southhall (2020). During the same period, ZANU PF, as aptly captured in the Functional Theory of Political Campaign Communication, they did not disagree on this very important subject that has dominated Zimbabwean politics since post 2000. Benoit is of the view that party contestants aspiring to lead do not need to disagree with their competitors on every salient issue. For example, ZANU PF was tactful in disagreeing on certain policy issues such as land reform programme and gays and lesbians' policy. As such, the Functional Theory of Political Campaign Communication as applied in this study, explains differences among party candidates from their opponents on at least some points of comparison if they are to have a chance to appear preferable to opponents. Given this solid background, The Functional Theory of Political Campaign Communication explores how post-Mugabe ZANU-PF colonial discourse, and their quest for continuity and change “evoke and redefine concepts such as truth, justice, patriotism and belonging” (Gwekwerere, Mutasa and Chitofiri, 2018:3). The key argument is that the functions and messages of presidential advertising in any campaign are very significant (Benoit, et. al., 1999); Kaid and Johnston, 2001). It became clear that a presidential campaign is centred on specific issue(s) of ownership of means of production (Petrocik, 1996) characteristics in presidential (Petrocik, Benoit, and Hansen, 2003-2004) and non-presidential (Benoit and Airne, 2005).

One of the striking key constructs of the Functional Theory of Political Campaign Communication mobilised in this study are *attacks, acclaims, and defences*. It is argued that political parties can attack their opponents as an advertising strategy during elections. During

the Mugabe administration for instance, ZANU PF, would attack their rival - Morgan Richard Tsvangirai in their numerous rallies (Chibwe, 2016) framing him as a puppet of the west, an anti-revolutionary and sell out. This happened in a context where Mugabe was framed as a tried and tested revolutionary who would not betray the gains of the liberation such as black empowerment. It is within this context that the Functional Theory of Political Campaign Communication of political campaigns, among its key constructs – is applied to explain ways in which candidates establishes preferability through acclaiming, attacking, and defending Riker (1996, Amorós and Puy 2013, Simon 2002). Acclaims are used to address a candidate's strengths or advantages. For instance, post-Mugabe ZANU PF's 2018 presidential candidate-Mnangagwa was advertised as a tried and tested revolutionary who would trounce opposition presidential aspirant and main challenger-Nelson Chamisa. In such a context, party candidates are presented as possessing different characteristics, (Groseclose, 2001; Jensen, 2012; Krasa and Polborn, 2012; 2010a; b). The argument is that the Functional Theory of Political Campaign Communication of political campaigns suggests that attacks expose an opponent's weaknesses or disadvantages. Scholars (Petrocik, 1996; Riker, 1996) argued that each candidate acclaims certain issues, such as his or her perceived competency in 'this' issue than his or her political opponent. Such an advantage in perceived competence has many different sources such as a party's history or a candidate's personal professional experience.

In this milieu, *defences respond to, or refute, attacks* against a candidate. Together, these three functions work as an informal form of cost-benefit analysis (Snyder, 1989; Klumpp and Polborn, 2006; Stromberg, 2008). Conceptualising vote choice as a variant of cost-benefit analysis does not mean that Functional Theory of Political Campaign Communication assumes that voters quantify benefits (acclaims) or costs (attacks and defences) or engage in mathematical calculations to make vote choices. Acclaims, if persuasive, tend to increase perceived benefits. Attacks, if accepted by the audience, are prone to increase apparent costs of an opponent. When embraced by voters, defences tend to reduce a candidate's perceived costs. Of course, the attitudes and existing knowledge of audience members and how they perceive messages from and about candidates are very important.

One consistent exception to the general preference for acclaims over attacks occurs in non-candidate messages (Benoit, et. al., 2007). Functional Theory of Political Campaign Communication concerns what might be best understood as reasons rather than causes. For example, candidates have a reason to avoid excessive reliance on attacks: Many voters say they dislike mudslinging. This does not mean candidates must acclaim more than they attack, just

that there is a reason to do so—and most candidates do in fact acclaim more than they attack (and use defence the least).

It is often argued that when political parties embark on political advertising, the most important factor of key concern is supposed credibility among the electorate (Hellweg, King, and Williams, 1988). Scholars believe that increased perceived credibility of a candidate positively predicts vote intention (Yoon, Pinkleton, and Yo, 2005). Furthermore, sophisticated supposed credibility is meaningfully connected to believability (Teven, 2008). For advertisements to be receptive, voters must be convinced that the messages that are made are, at least, meet their everyday aspirations. To enhance the usefulness of political messages, candidates may consider utilising evidence to support the claims they make in their messages. O'Keefe (1998) conducted a meta-analysis of the effects of evidence in persuasive messages: Evidence increased both credibility of the source and persuasiveness of the message. Thus, inclusion of evidence in persuasive messages significantly increases the effectiveness of those messages, and it enhances the perceived credibility of the source.

The Functional Theory of Political Campaign Communication advocates for a campaign discourse as they occur on both policy and character is significant in any election campaign (Snyder 1989 and Iaryczower and Mattozzi 2011, 2013). A candidate's resources for acclaiming, attacking, and defending are who he or she is (character) and what he or she has done or will do in office (policy). Voters develop perceptions of candidates' character and policy, and as noted earlier, are exposed to information from many sources that influence perceptions of the candidates and their policy positions. But policy and character are the two topics on which candidates' acclaim, attack, and defend to foster the impression that they are more worthy of election than the others seeking the office, (Benoit 2014a, 2014b). Functional Theory of Political Campaign Communication also distinguishes among three forms of policy (past deeds, which facilitate retrospective voting; future plans [mean]; and general goals [ends]; the latter two forms facilitate prospective voting). It also distinguishes three forms of character (personal qualities, leadership ability, and ideals values, principles. Research has also established that policy is discussed more frequently in the general election than in the primary campaign (Benoit, et. al., 2007). According to studies (Mueller and Stratmann, 1994; Johnson and Myatt, 2006; Bagwell, 2007; Buhler and Halbheer, 2011; 2012) this form of campaign communication is the most important form of political advertising.

The Functional Theory of Political Campaign Communication is useful in this study because of its firm ability to guide our understanding on whether Mnangagwa differentiates ZANU PF from opponents in a way that is consistent, or different from Mugabe. As already stated, this is achieved by analysing and examining the place and discourse of colonial memory in Mugabe and Mnangagwa's election campaign speeches. Thus, the mediation of the New Dispensation can be explained within the broader study of political communication in Zimbabwe.

2.5 Conclusion

The two theories described above are mobilised guided by what Ngombe (2012) terms the 'culturally nested theoretical framework to research political campaign communication'. It refers to mobilising on selected Western theories and mix them with contextually relevant variables, in ways which can meaningfully aid our understanding of political campaign communication research and their changes in post-colonial Africa (Ngombe, 2012). Therefore, the use of these theories assists the study to situate and locate the mediation, place, and memories of colonial discourse in post-Mugabe ZANU PF election campaigns.

The significance of these theories is to appropriately understand and explain the conducting of and changes in political campaign communication, it is important to adopt a theoretical framework(s) that is context sensitive (Pfetsch and Esser, 2004: 11, Ngoma 2012; Chibwe, 2016). Such a framework will easily offer appropriate entry points for thinking theoretically about the 'main forces that are in play' (Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999: 209) as far as the conducting of and changes in political campaign communication are concerned. As regards political campaign communication, culture is a key context-inclined concept in that it is flexible, trans-disciplinary and useful for encapsulating the main contextual forces 'in play'. This is the reason why the post-colonial theory was also mobilised.

The two theories are also significant in this study to examine the memorialisation and re-imagination of the past in post-Mugabe ZANU PF electoral politics in relation to its memorialisation during Mugabe's administration. In other words, the theories complement each other on those (non-) western aspects of theorising African political communication studies. The Functional Theory of Political Campaign Communication of Campaign Communication assist the study to examine the role of the media in shaping colonial memory in post-Mugabe ZANU PF electoral politics. The study is cognisant to the fact that the Functional Theory of Political Campaign Communication is western in its approach, hence the Political Culture theory is mobilised to bridge in the gap that arises.

CHAPTER THREE

HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF COLONIAL MEMORY IN AFRICAN POLITICS

3.1 Introduction

This study questions continuity and change, the place and discourse of colonial memory in Zimbabwe's post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics. Loomba (2005) argues that colonial discourse studies, among other variables, aims to provide a comprehensive scrutiny of colonial epistemologies, while also linking them to the history of colonial establishments. Colonial discourse, in this study, is used to demonstrate new ways of understanding the operations of cultural, intellectual, economic, or political processes in the creation, continuation and dismantling of colonialism (Loomba 2005). It is also significant to broaden the scope of studies of colonialism by examining the intersection of ideas and institutions, knowledge, and power in post-colonial societies. Discourse is the rules and practices that generate meaningful words in given historical epoch (Foucault 1972). Hall (1997) condense that Foucault's conceptualisation of discourse was aimed to explore a group of words and sentences that generate a language for talking about—away of producing knowledge about a given historical period. This study summons Foucault's notions on discourse to describe the distinct recurring characteristics of colonial memory that characterise certain standards of knowledge within the New Dispensation that are viewed as true (Foucault 1980). Put simply, discourse refers to the production of knowledge and power through language (Hall 1997).

Colonial memory in ZANU PF is a shared experience throughout Africa because, according to Mawere (2015), almost the whole continent was at one time submissive and colonised by imperial countries of Europe colonialism in Africa. Since the end of the nineteenth century, memory has been used to understand and articulate Africa's colonial past. In other words, colonial memory is relevant in media and cultural studies, influencing mediation of the continent's colonial past. This chapter reflects on how Africa's colonial past influences contemporary politics within the region. It provides an overview of liberation movements and formation of alliances against colonialism, transformation from liberation movements to governing political parties as a background to understanding the appropriation of colonial

memory in former liberation movements in contemporary politics. The chapter also examines African liberation movements and politics of memory to locate the place and discourse of colonial memory in Zimbabwe's post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics. The intention is to locate post-Mugabe ZANU PF and concealed discourses of colonial memory and appropriation of colonial discourse in the 'New Dispensation' as political communication in contemporary Zimbabwean politics.

In this chapter, the study explores colonial memory in former liberation movements in Africa to demonstrate how and why they have remained trapped in colonial discourse years after independence. The intention is to provide an overview of the numerous ways in which colonial memory is central to former African liberation movements' political discourse. It is to further explore how post-colonial African society's years after political independence were attained, have managed to arguably wield so much power and influence within the continent. The primary goal of examining the appropriation of colonial memory among and within former liberation movements is to also locate its significance on continuity and change, the place and discourse of colonial memory in Zimbabwe's post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics.

To understand the broader arguments of Africa's colonial past in the above context, the research mobilises Pierre Nora's (1996) theories of memory from a global perspective and what he terms the "acceleration of history" to understand how liberation movements have appropriated the concept in their politics. The study argues that colonial memory is rightfully connected with trauma, mainly related to gory battles and other armed conflicts. For decades, (colonial) memory was described as "a video played back over – the details reported accurately and unchanged no matter how many times, or from how long ago." Van der Kolk and Fisler (2005: 10) are of the view that memories "are invariable and do not change over time." This conceptualisation of memory, be that as it may, is sometimes contested particularly on the course and history of liberation war. According to Mcunu (2013), in the case of apartheid South Africa, when memory is understood in its relationship with past events, it becomes clear that the way in which memory reflects history can differ from reality in various ways. Mcunu (2013) has extensively dealt with how political violence during apartheid South Africa continues to affect the country even after independence in 1994 under the African National Congress (ANC). Mcunu (2013) cite the works of Sarah Nuttall and Cheryl Michael who firmly buttress the view that memory in South Africa is highly influenced by the significance given to politics, resistance skirmishes and race which are the primary determinants of identity. Richard

McNally (2005:12) articulates that “no memory, traumatic or otherwise, is ever frozen and immune from the vicissitudes of time”.

It would seem more apparent that former liberation movements’ existence is anchored on their continued alliances with those countries which offered military and logistical support. Therefore, accounting for colonial memory within former liberation movements, in this study, is significant to aid an understanding of the strategic importance of continued reliance on the rhetoric of colonial memory by African liberation movements in contemporary politics. More importantly, there is need to advance a postcolonial African critical thought to locate the liberation movement’s place in the world.

3.2 Liberation movements’ alliances against colonialism

According to Mazarire (2017), the historical context of colonial Africa was marked by huge ambiguities in the Pan-African movement. First, they were the ‘radicals’ led by Ghana, who advocated for the political unity of African countries and the independence of the remaining African states by launching a vicious armed struggle (Mazarire, 2017). Secondly, they were the ‘gradualists’ led by Nigeria, who preferred a loose union of states and a gradual, calculated approach to independence. The former became known as the Casablanca group (incorporating Mali, Egypt, Morocco, Libya, Guinea and Algeria), while the latter was christened the Monrovia group (with Nigeria, Liberia, Senegal and Cameroon). These differences explain the compromises that marked the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963, which shaped ZANU’s emerging external links. Indeed, in August 1963 ZANU was formed by people who had links with Nkrumah’s Ghana. There had been a gradual demise of Pan-Africanist idealism in favour of practical continental approaches to African decolonization (Mazarire, 2017).

African liberation movements became more recognisable through the formation of what became known as Frontline States (FLS) in their endeavour to fight against colonialism and imperialism. They were determined to operationalise swift and robust military and security institutions in Southern Africa. According to Sithole (2006), these were countries which, because of their geographical closeness, and for psychological and political reasons, were involved in diplomatic and or military efforts, to attain majority rule in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. The frontline states included Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. The then presidents of these countries were Augustino Neto, Seretse Khama, Samora Machel, Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda, respectively, frequently met, at times among

themselves, and at times with leaders of the Zimbabwe liberation organisations to organise and advise on strategies and tactics to be employed at various stages in the liberation effort of colonised countries including Zimbabwe (Bowman, 1977; Shaw, 1977; Ali, 1987; Khadiagala, 1994).

According to Sithole (1997), in Angola, the frontline states, although they were less visible than in the Zimbabwean case, were Congo (Brazzaville), Zaire (DRC), and Zambia, while the superpowers were the Soviet Union, the United States and the People's Republic of China. The reasons were personal and ideological, notwithstanding that Brazzaville, Kinshasa and Lusaka decried the division of the Angolan Liberation Movement.

The case of Mozambique offers another good example. The frontline states were Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi. FRELIMO staged its operations from Tanzanian territory while COREMO operated from Zambia and both organisations were secretly based in Malawi for logistical support. The Angola's MPLA remained solid because Mozambique's FRELIMO had established its presence for several years. ZANU did not enjoy this decisive position in December 1974, particularly during deadly fights within the party.

In the case of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), the "real" frontline states were Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana, which shared borders with Rhodesia. Robert Mugabe faction of the Patriotic Front was housed in Maputo, while the Joshua Nkomo's faction was resident in Lusaka, free to enter Gaborone as it pleased. Nkomo himself was described as a "capitalist", while Mugabe was described as a "socialist". In the absence of a showdown, the superficial will assume personal and ideological compatibility between Machel, Kaunda and Khama, and therefore agreement also on their personal and factional preference regarding the Zimbabwe leadership question. But in the absence of a Nkomo-Mugabe coalition, the case had to remain speculative.

I highlight the above alliances among liberation movements to explain the origins of their unity which, rooted in colonial history, has continued to exist long after independence. According to (Hopmann and Sullivan, 1973; Walt, 1987; Weitsman, 2004), an alliance is an official agreement between two or more countries to work together on national security issues. In the context of this research, the study argues that nationalism became the guiding philosophy and significant political ideology that framed African politics since the early 60's. The colonial domination that influenced the slave trade grouped all Africans together as a target racial group to be brutally exploited by another racial group.

3.3 Transformation from liberation movements to governing political parties

According to Mudimbe (1988), the long-time held Western propaganda have always advanced the belief that the colonialism in Africa began a decade ago was deemed as necessary in that it achieved its aim of inventing or discovering this shrouded continent. Colonisation created a group of people who were once viewed as without a society which later became one and brought them to the light of civilisation. The primary conceptualisation about Africa is therefore the recognition of the continent as a Western construction (Mudimbe, 1988). Mudimbe (1988) earlier argued that the idea of Africa as a continent emerged primarily because of contradictory systems of knowledge that brought about the realisation for the need for total emancipation from colonial rule. The African continent was therefore linked to the colonial forms of knowledge constructed with the sole purpose of truly interpreting and decoding Africa as an object (Ogude, 2012). According to Melber (2009), the armed resistance was therefore part of the solution in the southern African settler colonies of Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa.

There was growing resistance when Africa was increasingly viewed as an ideological and political object, an invention of European imperialism and constantly reinvented by traditional African and diaspora intellectuals and popular media (Mudimbe, 1988, Appiah, 1992). According to Sidney Lemelle and Robin Kelley, such a political thinking, which became popular in the 1960s and 1970s, ‘was an attempt to historicise the very movement that gave rise to the new historiography celebrating Africa’s past and presumed cultural unity, a movement that included Pan-Africanist political and cultural struggles in Africa and the diaspora’. Mozambique’s independence in 1975 gained special recognition when, following the national campaign for the restructuring of FRELIMO in November 1978, its high-ranking leaders opted for the public-shaming strategy. In its entirety, the process of identifying and revisiting the *comprometidos*’ past lasted for nearly four years ending with the meetings held in 1982. “Our power is not revengeful or vindictive” (Machel, 1982) claimed Machel when giving the reasons why FRELIMO had decided for such strategies. “In other countries, you would have been tried or shot” observed Machel (1982) as to emphasise FRELIMO’S practices of clemency toward the compromised.

When former liberation movements assumed office, they adopted a multiplicity of memory narratives. But that does not entail, however, that they acquire equal levels of legitimacy or appeal within a given society at any given moment. What is commonly observed is the fact that

often former liberation movements have “a single script of the past ... widely accepted, or even hegemonic” (Jelin, 2003: xviii) despite the existence of memories capable of challenging them, that is, despite the existence of counter-memories. FRELIMO’s celebratory account of the liberation war has not remained completely static, undergoing small variations every time it was retold. Yet these dynamics of change did not stop it from becoming the official, hegemonic memory narrative about Mozambique’s struggle against colonialism for the last forty years.

The primary goal of the war of independence was the need for self-determination by African nationalists. However, Melber (2003) has argued that in the case of SWAPO of Namibia, there was an inclination to conflate self-determination and self-rule. The conflation of the two was the basis upon which former liberation movements who soon turned into political parties claimed legitimacy to rule and stay in power. The Zimbabwean case is explanatory of such an appropriation of ‘exclusive nationalism’ (Masakure, 2014). The social transformation in many of these African states although shaped by a colonial image, is often characterised as a transition from controlled change to a changed control and is often reflective of the processes that happened in many parts of the African continent (Ottaway 1997). The result was the emergence of a new political group operating from liberation perspective into fully fledged political parties.

The war of liberation was not only meant to dismantle colonialism, but also to usher in a new era in which Africans exercised control over the political process and national resources (Masakure, 2014). The struggle for self-determination was more about equality of peoples as “nations” than it was about equality for people as individuals (Southhall, 2017). Soon after the attainment of independence, former liberation movements found themselves in control of the very states against which they had fought, and in a situation to put in practice dreams and plans learned during their period of relative obscurity (Melber, 2002). The revolutionary parties as they are sometimes commonly referred to, organised themselves into political parties. In addition to ideologically derived ideas about governance, the former liberation movements could also draw their experiences from army formations, governing liberated zones, and refugee camps. Since then, they have maintained their dominance and control of the state (Melber, 2002)

The idea that only liberation movements have the sole right to rule was based on the desire to build a new nation. The postcolonial state, therefore, was used by the élite as an instrument to construct a monolithic nation. The second consequence is that, because they can claim

legitimacy by virtue of dismantling colonialism, dissent was translated as betrayal. Labels were employed and deployed on opponents to delegitimise their claims to nation building and silence them from national discourse. The third notion is what Ranger (1996) has called 'patriotic history' in the case of post 2000 Zimbabwe. Southall (2014) argues that the deployment of 'exclusive nationalism' as an analytical category enables us to understand the reasons that compelled liberation parties to turn into totalitarian and oppressive regimes.

3.4 (Dis)continuities of alliances between and among liberation movements

According to Mawere and Rubaya (2016), many years after the end of the liberation war of independence and the demise of Western colonial governments and imperialism in Africa, liberation discourse, for instance, remains a significant fertile ground to raise and spread the continent's socio-economic and politically sustainable development agenda. Mawere and Rubaya (2016) argue that many African liberation movements remain entangled with the colonial past although there are efforts to establish an arguably new nation-state. For instance, Mawere and Rubaya (2016) are of the view that at independence, there was a desired ability and significance of many historic-cultural sceneries, combat sites, incarceration centres or battle prisons, meeting points, accounts, and nationalist memories, among other essential features of what widely constitutes colonial heritage in Africa. It is the firm view of this chapter that revolutionary parties have remained united against all forms of neo-imperialism. ZANU PF is a former liberation political party which presents itself as responsible for continuously (re-) telling the gory unpardonable sufferings and effects of colonialism while negatively portraying neo-liberal forms of political culture (Mawere, 2013). In light of this development, this chapter also submits that colonialism has undesirably affected the political, economic, religious and socio-cultural beliefs of African countries. It is quite very reasonable to argue that political alliances among liberation movements offer a significant framework to explore change and continuity years after independence.

Liberation movements remain trapped in the history of the war of liberation of the 1970s, alliance systems which have nurtured the development of a unique form of state in post-independent African states. This buttresses existing literature (Chung, 2006; Tendi, 2013; Moyo, 2014; Moore, 2014; Maringira, 2017) that demonstrates that there was a symbiotic relationship between liberation political parties and their liberation armies. In Zimbabwe, two military formations that championed the war for independence, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) affiliated with the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)

and the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) affiliated with the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) which laid the foundations of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) are trapped with political parties whose conduct is assessed as authoritarian (Rupiya, 2005; Chung, 2006; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006; Tendi, 2013; Moyo, 2014; Moore, 2014; Maringira, 2017). Some critics argue that ZIPRA and ZANLA leadership were nurtured by Russian and Chinese training, respectively (Riley, 1982; Mutanda, 2017; Andrew and Gordievsky, 1990; Robinson and Acemoglu, 2012). Some critics further argue that both the ZDF and ZANU PF leaders have defined interests that are common or conflict depending on the situation at hand (Chung, 2006; Diamond, 2008; Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni, 2010). Studies (Riley, 1982; Chung, 2006, Ruhanya and Gumbo, 2022) argue that the most important defining characteristic of ZANU PF politics is the 1975 Mgagao Declaration that was used to depose Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole as president of ZANU who got replaced with Mugabe. This relationship has remained in place for many years after independence.

Among the significant focus of this study was to examine the memorialisation and re-imagination of the past in post-Mugabe ZANU PF electoral politics concerning its memorialisation during Mugabe's administration. The study endeavoured to question ways (if any) Mnangagwa and Mugabe's stance and engagement with the discourses about the former colonisers differ. These issues would seem to justify that there is a strong relationship between African and European forms of government – a significant factor traced back to a strong relationship between ZANU PF and ZDF. According to Ruhanya and Gumbo (2022), this formidable relationship was a result of a continued historical legacy, ideals about leadership and government inherited from the past African patriarchal community and socialisation with Eurocentric standards of government. African communities that emerged during the war of independence emerged from kingdoms and chieftainships - and these largely male-governed forms of governments did not have a clear-cut difference between civilian political leadership and military elites (Nyakatura, 1973; Uzoigwe, 1987; Chidume et al., 2021). Kings, chiefs, and administrators doubled as leaders of armies and the retired component of the army (Ritter, 1955).

It is alleged that in the Ndebele state, for instance, young able-bodied males were naturally expected to join the army (Cobbing, 1974). This reasoning explains the fact that the many years of colonial rule experienced in Africa should not be used as official ways of delegitimising contemporary forms of knowledge, political culture, and principles of government in African societies (Cabral, 1993; Cabral n.d in Manji and Fletcher, 2013). The fact that African

(political) culture exist in contemporary times makes it very convincing to conclude that government cultures and ideals associated with it persisted until independence and still exist today as an inert part of an African being as African languages are (Cabral, 1993; Cabral n.d in Manji and Fletcher, 2013). This is explained by Cabral (1993) as the dilemma of cultural resistance to European domination (Manji and Fletcher, 2013). Ruhanya and Gumbo (2022) argue that the colonial era was able to characterise these ideals with European ideals of a civil government and state. Influenced by this exchange of ideas, liberation movements transformed into a new form of government that was biased towards European and African ideals with the latter being cherished and supreme. The patriarchy in African culture contributed to the obsession with male power, thus the militaristic politics. As a result, African nationalists cherished the idea of military leadership as the apex of power. Political party systems were adopted as subordinate structures subservient to it. In this way, securocracy was birthed.

Colonial Africa was highly characterised by resistance to domination, military violence, rape, abductions, torture, and bombardments deployed by the white settler administration against liberation movements such as in Zimbabwe (Riley 1982; Chung 2006). Liberation fighters would thus appropriate self-defensive and counter-attack tactics – a periodisation described as a 'struggle' (Kornegay, 1969; Sithole, 1979; Chung, 2006). It is argued that when liberation movements 'struggled' to transform from mere pressure groups and trade union movements to political parties that possess strong self-defence and counter-attack architecture (Ruhanya and Gumbo, 2022), interference in political parties and military approaches become inevitable (Chung, 2006; Sithole, 1979). Because these liberation movements were sometimes outlawed, recruitment of military personnel had to be conducted in covert ways through close relatives, friends, associates, and sympathisers of the war (Chung, 2006; Mlambo, 2013). Resultantly, recruitment was conducted among politicians and activists. In addition, a lot of army recruitment was among youths from ZANU and ZAPU (Chung, 2006) which meant that the resultant armies were inseparable from political party militia and the leadership of the parties was not any different from militia leaders and or warlords. This added salient factors that later influenced the development of a 'political-military elite' anchored on interests in maintaining power in the hands of securocrats (Ruhanya and Gumbo, 2022).

It is often argued that colonial Africa nurtured and produced what scholars (Ruhanya and Gumbo, 2022) regard as the identity politics common during the liberation period. According to Ruhanya and Gumbo (2022) identity politics during that time was influenced by the colonial divisionary, exclusionary policies and historical linguistic and or ethnic divisions of African

states. Identity politics was anchored on race and or skin colour that constructed a white vis-à-vis black politics typified by racial segregation, and racist politics against blacks and blacks against whites (Chung, 2006; Gumbo, 2020). This kind of identity politics was orchestrated by racial inequalities and exploitation championed by continuous colonial administrations making it very complex for the development of a Rhodesian 'national identity' enveloping all races (Dzimiri et al., 2014). The liberation struggle was rightfully based on identity politics. In some cases, there emerged tribal identity politics mostly between the majority Shona tribes and the Ndebele tribes that were influenced by historical grievances, hatred, and colonial divide and rule politics (Chung, 2006; Mlambo, 2013). This kind of identity politics threatened the possibility of forming a united nationalist movement and it was responsible for the collapse of the Zimbabwe People's Army, factions within nationalist movements and inter-tribal fights between ZANLA and ZIPRA forces (Sithole, 1979; Chung, 2006; Mlambo, 2013). Given the strong identity politics background, it followed that each side of the political continuum was not safe without militarising its political organisation against the coloniser and fellow black nationalists. Since the independence till date, securocracy has been further strengthened and preserved using securocrats in ZANU PF to capture key state institutions to sustain the securocracy interests. This has transmogrified the state into a 'developed' securocrats state (Ruhanya and Gumbo, 2022).

3.5 Colonial memory among former liberation movements in contemporary politics

This study explores the ways in which an arguably seeming continuation of colonial memory (ies) is manifesting within liberation movements political ideologies, as revealed in the discourses of election campaigns. Anti-colonial wars created new and powerful identities for African people and to challenge colonialism not only at a political level, but also through violence (Loomba 2005). In widely divergent contexts, the idea of the nation was a powerful vehicle for harnessing anti-colonial energies at all these levels. However, Renan (1999) argues that national memories are of more value than victories, for they impose duties and require a common effort that resonates in the colonial situation where nationalists repeatedly invoke the idea of glorious pre-colonial traditions which have been trampled upon by the colonial invader. It would seem more evident that liberation movements are anchored around nationalism to boost an anti-western ideology. This is because nationalism engages in a complex process of contesting as well as appropriating colonialist versions of the past (Loomba 2005). Appiah (1991:150) however critiques nationalists in Africa of making 'real the imaginary identities to which Europe has subjected us.

According to Alexander et al (2020), one of the central concerns of the historiography of liberation struggles is the uses to which these histories are put in the present and how the present shapes how the past is known, encountered, and performed. Both liberation movements and colonial narratives can be overweening in the framing of events as well as ‘the struggle’ as a whole. Mozambique’s violent past, first, the country’s independence in 1975, and second, the end of the civil war between FRELIMO and Renamo in 1992 epitomises the intricate relationship between a bellicose past, the implementation of mechanisms to deal with it, and political leaders’ pursuit for political legitimacy. FRELIMO in Mozambican continues to adopt historical narratives that shape their presence today.

According to Thelen (1989: 1119), by “remembering, we tend to think, it is a process by which people search some kind of storage system in their minds a filing cabinet or computer ‘memory,’ perhaps to see whether they can retrieve some objective record of a fact or experience they had learned or observed at some earlier point”. Memories create the representational “files” retrieved in this process. When we remember, we are called to engage with the past, or history. However, remembering goes beyond the act of cognitive recall. According to Schwartz (1982:374), “to remember is to place a part of the past in the service of conceptions and needs of the present”. In this study, I argue that the thought of memory calls for minimum consideration of “accuracy” or “authenticity” than it does to the values, beliefs, and norms of constructing cultures at a given historical phase. My reasoning is based on the fact that African liberation history is subject to historical revisionism and exclusivism (Halbwachs, 1973; Nora, 1989) depending on a given political administration in power. Perhaps, ‘all discourse is colonial discourse’ (Gates, 1991: 466).

This study summons Foucault (1978) to demonstrate that colonial memory discourse is a significant site of power relations, a key observation that helps this study to account for the appropriation of discourses of colonial memory in colonial Africa. This is because the strategic importance of continued reliance on the rhetoric of colonial memory by African liberation movements in contemporary politics marks their (i)legitimacy power contestations. According to Foucault (1977) operations of power and knowledge, are part of what we generally regard as a reality. Foucauldian notions on discourse may have been produced to explain early societal contexts but are also significant in this study to locate the place and discourse of colonial memory in the New Dispensation’s articulation of their election campaign speeches. The New

Dispensation emerged through a violent bloody bath military operation and there was a need to legitimise the Second Administration as a constitutional government. According to Foucault (1977) there is intrinsic link between power and (colonial) knowledge in that power generates (colonial) knowledge, and (colonial) knowledge produces power (Van de Ven 2012). Basically, Foucault (1978) submits that the significant basis of power is truth, while the (colonial) knowledge of that truth becomes a major mechanism for the authorisation of the hegemonic forms of power within a given society (Escobar 1983).

While the post-Robert Mugabe ZANU PF claims change and departure from Robert Mugabe politics, their election communication practice is arguably within the context of historical transitions, memory and re-imaginings of political communication that Mugabe relied upon. ZANU PF continues to rely on official re-imaginings, conjures, and performs many dominant discursive discourses that marked Mugabe politics. Memories of colonial discourse, thus, draw their legitimacy in a clearly controlled truth (Escobar 1983) of the New Dispensation. Foucault (1980) buttress the view that certain sections of society are more powerful than others because they mobilise certain points of arguments which they portray as “truth” and “natural”. Therefore, colonial discourse in this study explains numerous forms of election campaign techniques employed by the New Dispensation in their efforts to distinguish themselves from Mugabe administration. I summon Hall (1997: 72) who advises that “knowledge has to conform to its paradigms in order to be recognised as legitimate”. Thus, questioning continuity and change, the place and discourse of colonial memory in Zimbabwe’s post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics, is significant to locate if there is a change of election campaign speeches by both presidents Mnangagwa and Mugabe. Foucault asserts that discourse defines and generates the objects of our knowledge and thus regulates the way we engage topical issues confronting society in a sensible manner. The argument is that memories of colonial discourse in Mnangagwa’s New Dispensation –the Second Republic is a way of constructing post-Mugabe reality or truth with regards to election campaign speeches. Mobilising the Foucauldian discourse is significant in this chapter because it helps in the investigation of how the New Dispensation’s Second Republic election campaign speeches are produced, contested, legitimated, normalised, and naturalised in Zimbabwe’s post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics. Summoning Foucauldian notions also assists in questioning ways (if any) does Mnangagwa and Mugabe’s stance and engagement with the discourses about the former colonisers differ. It is also significant in understanding the role the media play in shaping colonial memory in post-Mugabe ZANU PF electoral politics thereby laying bare, how the appropriation of this

discourse in the New Dispensation reveals about political communication in contemporary Zimbabwean politics. Foucault (1977) asserts that truth is bound to discursive regimes, because truths are only accepted as truth when they are contemporary. Similarly, Mnangagwa's New Dispensation truth is regarded as part of the Second Republic truth (Foucault 1977).

Therefore, whether memories present a past that can be generally accepted as objectively "true" is not the primary focus of this study, but rather, to locate the appropriation of colonial memory among liberation movements in their endeavour to legitimise their long stay in power. As Sturken (1997) reasons, "what memories tell us, more than anything, is the stakes held by individuals and institutions in attributing meaning to the past". In other words, this study is of the firm view that colonial memory among former liberation movements must be understood as a vibrant entity, crafted, and redrafted in conversation with the political, social, and cultural imperatives of contemporary African politics. The liberation history has thus influenced the practice of politics of memory among former liberation movements.

Post-colonial Africa has experienced what Ngugi wa Thiong'o (2009) describes as precise and literal executions, interments, and disorientations that left and buried them upside down and took away from their values and concerns. Colonial Africa, in this opinion, is viewed as a zombified headless body that cannot think for itself because it is buried under mounds of colonial words, schema, bureaucratic machinery and other material so that one cannot properly speak of it as a dignified living being whose identity, values and concerns matter. It would seem to suggest that post-colonial societies do not seek out essentialising and restricting absolutist–Manichean view of a native intelligence that do not add value either from borrowing and taking from developments gained elsewhere (Mbembe, 2001) or perhaps from looking at future possibilities as opposed to basically harking back to a lost and idealised past (Appiah, 2010). To summon Freire (2000), the process of conscientisation of both the oppressed and the oppressor needs to take place.

3.6 Discursive entanglement on politics of memory in Mugabe's administration

This study also summons key theorisations of the postcolonial arguments that emerged as a result of experiences of repression and struggles for independence after the "tricontinental" awakening in the post colony (Said, 2001; Kenyatta, 1968:36; Bhabha, 1994; Spivak, 1988:197-221; Ashcroft et al, 1989; 1995; Sugirtharajah, 1996:1-5; Ceasire, 2000; Segovia, 2000:11-34; Loomba 2005). The use of these theorisations was highly significant to situate and locate the mediation, place and memories of colonial discourse among liberation movements'

years after they attained independence. By so doing, the post-colonial examination of the place and discourse of colonial memory in this study was aimed at illuminating the critical agenda of political campaign communication research in African liberation movements' politics. I summoned the post-colonial theory concepts to critic the recurrent practice of continuity and change in the New Dispensation to 'choose a convenient definition according to one's particular needs and sensitivities' (Allaire and Firsirotu, 1984: 194) of the place and discourse of colonial memory among liberation movements. This was in line with the key arguments of this study that while the post-Robert Mugabe ZANU PF claims change and departure from Robert Mugabe politics, their election communication practice is arguably within the context of historical transitions, memory and re-imaginings of political communication that Mugabe relied upon. Mugabe ZANU PF relied on official re-imaginings, conjured, and performed many dominant discursive colonial discourses. The study was aware that the influence of post-colonial arguments could be subtle and far reaching, going as far as determining what methods and pedagogies are appropriate to use in African political campaign communication research (Moyo, 2020). This is because media and communication research methodology is historically deeply imbricated in global coloniality and the imperial projects of the Global North (Hardt, 1992; Denzin, 2009; Smith, 1999). Post-colonial arguments were mobilised to contribute to increasing exploration of 'memory,' and in 'collective or social memory' which has become a significant academic concern beginning the 1980s and beyond (Olick et al., 2011: 3; Erll and Nunning, 2012: 1). As such, texts on coloniality, (de-) coloniality and (post-) colonial (-sm) explain from an informed emerging African context change and continuity among liberation movements. Resultantly, the theory is significant to explain post-Mugabe Zimbabwe's multidirectional perspectives on imperial and colonial pasts and the neocolonial present- 'the new dispensation' or 'Second Republic' as it has become to be known. According to Bhambara (2014) postcolonial and decolonial arguments are significant in a study of this nature because of their abilities to challenge the insularity of historical narratives and historiographical traditions that are Eurocentric.

Therefore, the study summons politics of memory (Coffino 1997), among some few selected national liberation movements: such as the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia and the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF). According to Confino (1997:1393), politics of memory refers to "a subjective experience of a social group that essentially sustains a relationship of power," by questioning "who wants whom to remember what and why".

Interrogating former liberation movement's use of colonial memory is in sync with Loomba (2005) who is of the view that colonial discourse studies in contemporary African politics are not limited to describing the operations of power, but they have tried to locate and theorise oppositions, resistances, and revolts on the part of the colonised. In other words, former liberation movements are ever motivated to safeguard their stay in power by continuously resorting to horror tales of the liberation struggle.

There is much reason to argue that former liberation movements by appropriating politics of memory, they are determined to go beyond the individual and more psychologically organised structures for exploring memory and to a more socially oriented understanding that regards memory as part of a broader network of relationships (Schudson, 1995; Zelizer, 2006). Maurantonio (2017) is of the view that such an approach resonates well with communication studies, given the field's distinct emphasis on issues of identity formation, power, and politics. It is argued that understanding collective memory as a dynamic entity subject to reinterpretation over time and space calls for investigation into the ways in which meaning is constructed, how it operates and is eventually "contested, subverted and supplanted by other memories" (Phillips, 2004:2). This study subscribes to the notion that former liberation movements seldom draw on collective understandings of the past to mobilise remembrance as an instrument of politics. In some cases, they use historical analogies to frame and think through important issues (Khong, 1992); at other times they appropriate the past strategically, manipulating memory to legitimise their actions with reference to formative events in the collective consciousness of their community (Hayden, 1992). Although these debates are commonly premised on domestic cleavages, they usually spill into Africa global relations of power. Clearly, such varying views over the meaning of the past show that "narratives are formidable instruments of politics" (Kotkin, 1998: 403).

The argument is that if memory is understood in this way, it becomes a communicative process whose manifestations are within an environment that is concurrently contested and negotiated. In the context of this study, colonial memory is thus political among former liberation movements. This is because colonial memory has an impact on liberation movement status and the character of their governance after the transition to democracy and how their individual histories and legacies construct the nature and quality of their rule. Such an endeavour is significant for this study to locate liberation parties' ability to cling to power, how they manage the state administration, and how they control organs of government (Southall, 2002).

According to Masakure (2014), liberation movements such as the ANC and SWAPO have continued to use the dominant party approach to national politics. Masakure (2014) reasons that although the ANC has successfully won elections, the party is biased towards greater centralisation of power, unfortunately undermining the separation of powers. The scenario has distorted the distinctions between state and political party, and the independence of parliament is increasingly coming under threat. Furthermore, the ANC has managed to marginalise minorities and curb internal dissent. This has left the ANC largely unaccountable and explains tendencies towards the abuse of state resources. In Namibia, SWAPO has managed to use its dominance to control state resources. Although many national liberation movements have adopted liberal constitutions, the tensions between liberal norms of state–society relations and the legacies of warfare continue to manifest (Thaler, 2014). Violence against civilians because of electoral disputes is generally explained as a product of war strategy or resource availability. Thaler (2014) argues that ideology continues to shape the use of selective versus indiscriminate violence as in the case of MPLA in Angola. Having said this, the next section contextualises central arguments of this study by focusing on continuity and change, the place and discourse of colonial memory in the Mugabe era.

3.7 Post-Mugabe ZANU PF and concealed discourses of colonial memory

ZANU PF was founded in 1963 based on sound liberation ideology which has dominated the party's election campaigns. It therefore follows that ZANU PF politicians usually deploy collective conceptualisations of the past to mobilise remembrance as a tool of politics (Verovšek 2016). In politics, collective memory uses its influence both from the bottom up, as interpretations of the past affect the identities and understandings of political elites, as well as from the top down, as statements by public figures place certain events into the national consciousness while silencing or forgetting others. Political memory research should focus on (1) the substantive content of collective memory as expressed by actors within state institutions and (2) on the interactive channels through which ideas about the past are conveyed, disputed, silenced, and negotiated outside these formal settings.

Memory has real perlocutionary consequences, changing the way that important actors think about and react to situations in the present making it an important new area of research for political science. Existing scholarship about Mugabe's role in constructing topographies of memory that created his heroic identity examines the design of the National Heroes Acre showing his image towering on top of the people he led toward the future, and the 1980

independence celebration iconography depicting Mbuya Nehanda hovering above him (Charumbira, 2013, 2015; Lan, 1985; Lyons, 2004; Machingura, 2012). This has prompted Mpofu (2016) for instance, to argue that ZANU PF's use of the Heroes Acre stand as a communication reminder of the liberation struggle, a platform to express the party's ideology through such a heritage site. Under Mnangagwa, ZANU PF continue to exercise the same *modus operandi*. Therefore, this present study argues that mediation of colonial memory is explained by texts as contextual sites, they are historically embedded, ideological, they have inflections and discursive implications to serve hegemony of particular interest groups (Mhiripiri and Ureke, 2019). Post-Mugabe ZANU PF's mediation of colonial memory and discourse is important in this study to determine how they attempt to cling to power. Mutsvairo and Karam (2022) calls for decolonial explanations, or episteme, to help the academia appreciate what Lewis Gordon (2000) regards as "constitutive blindness".

Going by this argument, Mutsvairo and Karam (2022) warns against taking for granted western methods of research as the only acceptable types of research. This further explains assertions by Fanon (1976) that it is 'the people', while Cabral argues that it is 'popular culture' which is central to the study of anti-colonial political struggle. Fanon (1976) argues that national culture does not exist within the history and domination of colonialism. Thus, Cabral explains that the processes of national culture are in a dialectical relationship with history. For instance, ZANU PF's 2000, 2005, 2008 and 2013 election discourse relied on mediation of patriotic history as the party portrayed itself as the undaunted guardian of Zimbabwean interests on socio-economic development, political stability, land and its restoration into the hands of black people, (Kalora, 2011; Gwekwerere and Mpondi, 2018). Going by these insightful notions, colonial memory is the hallmark of revolutionary parties as is the case with ZANU PF to retain power in national elections. Memory in this study thus contributes to the understanding of the rise of anti-colonial struggles, which challenged accepted narratives (Resina, 2000).

3.8 Conclusion

This study argues that post-Mugabe ZANU PF's preoccupation with the past seems to confirm Friedrich Nietzsche's (1985:4) explanation that "we are all suffering from a malignant historical fever." In the same vein, Jacques Derrida (2001:28) argues for the "universal urgency of memory." The political significance of these views goes beyond the past, providing vital basis to question the legacy of Mugabe in Zimbabwe's New Dispensation's Second Republic. Hodgkin and Radstone (2003) argues that "our understanding of the past has strategic, political,

and ethical consequences. Contests over the meaning of the past are also contests over the meaning of the present and over ways of taking the past forward.” This explains that memory in this study is seeks to locate emerging discourses on the New Dispensation’s Second Republic. In other words, in what ways does President Emmerson Mnangagwa is different from His predecessor- Robert Mugabe.

African former liberation movements continue to appropriate colonial discourse in their political administration as a way of consolidating their long stay in power. What is undeniable is the fact that former liberation movements continue to for example practice politics of exclusionary against an emerging arguably vibrant civil society, media, and opposition parties. They also share similar characteristics as demonstrated by post-Mugabe ZANU PF which find itself entangled in the gory tales of the liberation struggle. Although President Emmerson Mnangagwa has presented his administration as a ‘New Dispensation’ it remains contestable because of deep signs of colonial hangover in his discourse.

CHAPTER FOUR

MEDIATION OF COLONIAL MEMORY IN ZIMBABWE

4.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the mediation of colonial memory in Zimbabwe under Mugabe's rule from 1980 until his dramatic fall from power in November 2017. It lays the ground for analysing continuity and change, the place and discourse of colonial memory in the ZANU PF electoral politics. The chapter argues that colonial memory is part of ZANU PF's electoral communication discourses and practices which further influences its political ideology within and beyond the country. Contemporary media industries present massive access to an abundant supply of news, yet a growing number of people in many countries report consuming little to none of it (Karlsen et al., 2020; Strömbäck et al., 2013). Although huge sections of society say they actively avoid news (Toff & Kalogeropoulos, 2020) or feel regularly worn out by it (Gottfried & Barthel, 2018). These trends seem troubling since the practice of following news, long held up in political communication research as fundamental to good citizenship (e.g., Schudson, 1998), has been linked to improved political knowledge (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Moeller & De Vreese, 2019) and participation (Eveland & Scheufele, 2000). While multiple factors are known to affect news use including political interest (Strömbäck et al., 2013), socialisation (Edgerly, 2017; Shehata, 2016), and the changing media landscape (Prior, 2007), none of these factors are easily altered, which make reducing disparities and achieving a more informed society a challenging proposition.

4.2 Vestiges of colonial memory in post (-) independent Zimbabwe?

This chapter examines the memorialisation and (re)imagination of the past in post-Mugabe ZANU PF electoral politics in relation to its memorialisation during Mugabe's administration. It refers to, for example, the appropriation of national holidays such as Heroes' Day and Independence Day as central to commemorative and national identity construction rituals (Mpofu, 2016). They constitute remarkable signification of mediation of the past in Zimbabwe's Mugabe era. The chapter also discusses the national heritage sites' symbolic meaning and significance to Zimbabwe-hood as modified by ZANU-PF, especially after post-2000 so as to survive the changes in the political landscape brought about the emergence of vibrant opposition MDC in 1999. It argues that former president Robert Mugabe, tainted and

toxified these holidays in his quest to construct the question of Zimbabweanness when commemorating and celebrating these auspicious days in an exclusivist and narrow fashion whose only endeavour was the preservation of his political supremacy and appetite for power (Mpofu, 2016). Key among Mugabe's concern was nation building based on war memories. Mpofu (2016) is of the view that he did so within the confines of the constructivist school of nationalism espoused by theorists such as Gellner (1983); Hobsbawm (1990); Anderson (1991/2006); Hall (1996) among others. Constructionists explain identity formation as a 'construction, a process never completed – always in process' (Hall, 1996: 210).

The chapter refers to the concept of Allure of Toxic Leader offered by Lipman-Blumen (2005) who firmly believes that there are leaders that have "deliberately harmed their people, organisations and institutions" (Mpofu, 2016: 30). It argues that former President Robert Mugabe, exhibited these features displaying excitable signs of "inhibiting the blossoming of a multiplicity of ethnic, political and social identities to come together in the creation of a Zimbabwean national mosaic". Lipman- Blumen's theory of toxicity, although it is Western-centric, is significant to explore a study of this nature if we are indeed to critically question continuity change, the place and discourse of colonial memory in Zimbabwe's Mugabe ZANU-PF politics. More importantly, such a theorisation is significant in exploring mediation of the past in Zimbabwe under former president Robert Mugabe. Mediation, in the context of this study, is the numerous forms of expression, articulation, representation, signification and communication of the past as a credible reference source (Van Dijk, 1993) to postcolonial Zimbabwe under former president Robert Mugabe.

4.3 Understanding mediation of colonial memory in Zimbabwe

The chapter draws critical examples from Zanele Muholi's political artistic works, the portraits she constructed, the recording of testimonies, the photographing of distress, as well as the representation of contexts, the lived realities and the apartheid colonial histories (Karam, 2022). Muholi's works have often been cited as outstanding in representing, challenging and mediating the persistent legacy of apartheid and colonialism which continue to affect the lives of the Black LGBTQIA+ South Africans. For instance, Muholi's film *Difficult Love* (Goldsmid and Muholi, 2020) mediates memory as means of explaining the post-apartheid South Africa, to produce a historical and political consciousness, where the confirmation of recording a lived experience is not only meant to maintain history for future generation but to 'tell their stories to the public, to be listened to, and to be acknowledged' (Goldsmid and Muholi, 2010). Other

similar examples are those of Frassinelli's (2022) use of cinematic film production as political communication in (South) Africa, Nyabuga's (2022) mediatisation of Kenyan Boniface Mwangi's (political) photographs of remembering and memorialising, the efficacy of photography in political communication in Africa, Gumede's (2022) striking examination of transformation, fragmentation, and decolonisation on the contested role of the media in post-colonial South Africa. These forms of (colonial) mediated remembrance and memorialised artistic works have a semiotic political representation, signification, and communication of the broader African continent as is the case with Mugabe's era. In Zimbabwe, Mhiripiri and Ureke (2019) offers four ways of understanding the representation of Zimbabwean narrative(s) which are also central to a study of this nature. These are as follows:

- a. Written texts depend on the published word, and they comprise of the press (newspapers and press statements), fictitious literature, memoirs and biographies, autobiographies, travel journals, historical narratives, and human rights reports.
- b. Filmic texts depend heavily on the iconic signs that almost replicate the thing they represent. These can be films, video, and "cellphilms" of both fictional and documentary nature, billboards, television broadcasts and news, social media content, photographs, graffiti, drawings and cartoons.
- c. Verbal texts include orature, radio broadcasts, podcasts and public addresses such as political rallies and church sermons.
- d. Self-exhibition as text includes cultural performances by cultural workers involved in cultural tourism, and public protests and demonstrations as spectacles. Other media often report on self-exhibitions, and in Zimbabwe's case demonstrations by pro- or anti-government groups are tolerated, praised and extolled, condemned and so forth, depending on the political sympathies and ideological leanings of the media covering the event.

In the context of this study, the above references have a deeper meaning and significance in exploring mediation of colonial memory during former President Robert Mugabe's tenure of office. They are mobilised, in this chapter, to refer to broader polysemic nature and context of texts from a cultural ontological perspective. Communication, thus, should not be generalised as it goes beyond what the eye can see, nor what the ear can hear. However, this is not the only taxonomy that I use to discuss colonial memory mediation. Rather the chapter mobilise, for example, artefacts, statues and onomastics in the entire study as broader ways of understanding colonial memory as political communication.

4.4 Robert Mugabe and remembrance of fallen liberation war heroes and heroines

One of the key characteristics that defined Mugabe's rule was his unapologetic stance about remembering fallen heroes and heroines of colonial and independent Zimbabwe. His reign was highly characterised with looking back to the past to legitimise his party's stay in power. According to Harold-Barry (2004), Zimbabwe's historical past became the future. This reveals that colonial memories defined the outlook of the future during the Mugabe regime. Critics have, thus, been forced to argue that the colonial structures in many African states remained visibly influential. Be that as it may, whether colonial structures of power remained visible or not is open for debate, all what is irrefutable is the fact that the origins of the local did not mean the absolute departure of the Western (Nakata, Nakata, Keech and Bolt, 2012). The situation was made so because both the West and the local were influenced by the colonial experiences of the past (Zeleza, 2006; Mukwedeya, 2016). ZANU PF, for instance, under Mugabe, swiftly constructed a special place in a mountain some few kilometres northwest of Harare known as the *Heroes Acre* where fallen heroes and heroines are buried. This was in recognition of the supreme sacrifices they paid for in their quest to liberate Zimbabwe and that the place should stand as a remainder of the gory tales of the war (Samwanda, 2013; Mpofu, 2016; Marongwe and Magadzike, 2016; Mubaya and Mawere, 2016). Remembering fallen heroes and heroines by Mugabe was meant to, as Van Leeuwen (2007) puts it, propagate, eulogise and legitimise his dominant authority. Mediation of remembrance of fallen heroes and heroines, thus, is a political process in this study. For instance, Tagwirei (2022) describes it as politics of the patriotic present.

The media in Zimbabwe, particularly ZBC was significant in constructing a feeling of belonging to the nation among the citizens and in linking Zimbabwe to the official state structure in a way that contributed to the state's requisite formation legitimacy (Mano, 2008). For example, ZBC's News and Current Affairs department would broadcast programmes such as *The Life of a Hero* – a programme that would chronicle a fallen hero or heroine a day before their burial at the *Heroes Acre*. In trying to demonstrate his uncompromised remembrance to the heroes and heroines of the war, ZANU PF, under Mugabe would organise annual live broadcasts of what was known as Television galas. These were all night live broadcast of music from popular pro-ZANU PF musicians such as the late Oliver Mtukudzi, Ambuya Stella

Chiweshe, the Born Free Crew and Andy Brown among others. To encourage young people to embrace colonial ideology, trending artists and poets were invited so that there would be large gatherings to demonstrate ZANU PF's 'popularity' in the country. According to Chikonzo and Muonwa (2018), representation of post-independent Zimbabwean national identity on ZBC mobilised often forgotten mass grave sites of the war of liberation between the Rhodesian army and African nationalists (1960–1980). ZANU PF, for example, has the tradition of paying homage to Chimoio and Nyadzonja massacre grave sites and colonial-era atrocities. Ironically, although critics were sceptical of the scenario, Western societies are caught up in the same way of remembering the atrocities of the first and second world wars. This confirms the argument put forward by Ehrenhaus (1988:47) that memorials, "speak" to communities. Ehrenhaus (1988) cements his analysis by suggesting that the writings at the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, DC, "focus and direct our appreciation of that greatness, and instruct us in the manner in which we ought to interpret our encounter with the memorial". He further argues that "memory places" guide communities toward specific historical interpretations, frequently limiting the prospect for alternate readings. Be that as it may, as studies have demonstrated, efforts to generate agreement through place have hardly been smooth, creating debates surrounding commemorative form and narrative as well as questions regarding "appropriate" uses of the past.

According to Mhiripiri and Ureke (2019), visibility is an important component of modern society. They also submit that culture in its state is comparative with vision and opinion, implying what we see and hear about ourselves and about other people. Denzin (2001:23) regards human communities as "a spectacle society, (a) cinematic society" which identifies and reifies itself over the reflective gaze of cinematic and additional visual and photographic apparatuses. In the same vein, Jay (1993) correspondingly characterised contemporary society as an ocular-centric one, where visibility is ever dominant. Therefore, knowing is associated with seeing, as demonstrated by expressions such as "You see what I mean" and the tendency to understand societies' "views" on a topic. The similar sight of a community is also regarded as an "interview society", where articles are gathered and created based on evidence extracted from interviews, which objectivise and corroborate the story (Jay 1993). "Reliable" sources and informers, victims and perpetrators alike are interviewed to validate the slant of the narrative, and make the news story, documentary, or ethnographic narrative "evidential" and a representation of actuality.

The country was made to celebrate Independence, Heroes and Defence forces days respectively in honour and celebration to self-rule from Britain. In Zimbabwe, the Independence Day is celebrated every 18th of April. ZBC was used to broadcast documentary narratives which utilised “violence” as a “semiotic identity” angle to frame, codify, construct, and reproduce group identities related to race and political ideology (Chikonzo and Muonwa 2003). Sadly, the development was in violation of robust standards that the media are supposed to be a public platform and a watchdog to hold accountable those that are in power (Dorman, 2006; Windeck, n.d; Moyo, 2005; Mazango, 2005; Lilleker, 2006). This situation was heightened during the years between 1999 and 2008, a period characterised by socio-political and economic crises. ZANU PF caught the attention of international political actors in the last decade as a result of its steady articulation of a supposedly radical, Pan-African agenda of Black Zimbabwean restitution that has since turned out to be a political patronage and corrupt enrichment of members of ZANU-PF elites (Gwekwerere and Mpondi 2018). The primary architects of this idea have been the ZANU-PF elites (Mlambo, 2018; Moore, 2020). The whole idea was to revive the histories of the liberation struggle for political expedience.

The most visible mediatisation and remembrance of heroes and heroines in Mugabe ZANU PF politics was his militant discourse and aligning his party with freedom fighters. War veterans were called upon to participate in the naming and labelling of ‘patriots’ from ‘sellouts’ while authorising them to articulate their sense of entitlement to land, resources and special treatment by the ZANU-PF party. A specific ministry, of war veterans, detainees and restricted was even created for them. In 1997, after they voiced their concern on the need for proper recognition, they were awarded with huge sums of money as gratuities. When ZANU PF was faced with opposition threats, they were often unleashed to silence members of the opposition. Kalaora (2016) and Mhiripiri and Ureke (2019), for instance, cite the period 2000 when ZANU PF embarked on a blood bath, violent and militant unwarranted attacks on former white commercial farmers. It was meant to show off their 1970s guerrilla military supremacy centred on the liberation agenda. There is abundant literature such as Kriger (2003a; 2003b; 2003c; 2005; Makoni and Pfukwa, 2010; Pfukwa and Barnes, 2010) that explicitly demonstrates the deep-rooted relationship between war veterans and ZANU PF as meant to revive the 1970s war of liberation. All said, the intention was to crush the neoliberalism effects as fronted by opposition political parties, global media and civil society organisations.

Although Mugabe justified the need to remember the liberation history, there are some scholars who remained critical of his administration, citing the “deification of Mugabe” (Raftopolous

and Mlambo, 2012; Siziba and Ncube, 2015:517), to a point where there was a “fetishisation of Mugabe’s power and his person (Chitando, 2020). The same has been observed in Europe where the World War II memorial was criticised for its misleading, baffling representation and its lack of emotional resonance with visitors. Balthrop, Blair, and Michel (2010) however argue that when it is interpreted against the memorial’s dedication events, the World War II Memorial can be made regarded as a cite of influencing a United States of America imperialist agenda. It therefore becomes undisputable to argue that ZANU PF national politics, whether directly or indirectly, revolved on the personhood of former president Robert Mugabe. Accordingly, ZANU PF and state organisations were viewed in their dependence on the personhood of former president Robert Mugabe. Remarkably, it became evident that efforts by former president Robert Mugabe to create a one- party state worked in line with the centralisation of executive powers around himself.

4.5 Robert Mugabe and nationalist discourse in Zimbabwe

Nationalism is defined as a political belief system shared by a group of religious, cultural, linguistic and historical commoners (Curtin, 1966). In many instances, these shared interests occur within a specific geographic community. Nationalism draws its influence within a given geographic ontology. It influences people to interpret themselves as a tribe, community or at a wider level as a race. It is this ethnocentrism that motivates people to look at specific objectives they endeavour to realise. The goals are political, meaning they also touch on the social and economic areas. Nationalism, therefore, seeks to block any roots conflict may want to challenge those objectives with neo-imperialism (Sandton, 2012). Nationalism became an ideology that was strongly aligned to African political discourse in the 1960s (Ranger, 1967; Martin and Johnson, 1981; Lan, 1985; Frederickse, 1983; Moyo, 1998). It has influenced monopolistic tendencies to dominate politics and the governance of the newly found African nations. This has done more harm in causing the wide spread of poverty in Africa as a result the denizens of the African continent are poor development players with some African leaders giving little interests in the unity of the continent. In this nationalist isolation marred by poverty, corruption becomes rampant and public governance is limited to individual monopoly (Fanon 1963) with the same individuals not answerable to a bigger multi-national body in the continent. The Zimbabwean state was constructed by deploying nationalist discourses that motivated the war of independence. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009), former president Robert Mugabe’s nationalist discourses were influenced by ideological orientation he acquired at the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute at Winneba between 1958–60 while training to become a

Secondary School teacher in Takoradi, at Ghana's Apowa. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) claims that at the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute, he mastered both Nkrumahism and Marxism principles. Such an ideological orientation was further influenced by the 15 years of exile and the liberation struggle, where he further acquired Marxist–Leninist–Maoist ideologies (Tendi, 2012). It is also believed that he encouraged the 'cadres' to receive both military and ideological training, a scenario that he soon deployed in independent Zimbabwe.

Nationalist discourses became more and more pronounced, especially post-2000, a period often referred to as the crises period (Mhiripiri, 2008; Mhiripiri and Mutsvairo, 2014; Mhiripiri and Ureke, 2019; Mlambo and Gwekwerere, 2019). The term "Zimbabwean crisis" has become synonymous with explaining socio-economic and political problems in post-2000 Zimbabwe (Freeman, 2005). Studies (Mamdani, 2008; Hanlon, Manjengwa and Smart, 2013; Mhiripiri and Ureke, 2019) are of the view that the crisis was triggered and fuelled by Western nations, and not the violent and radical land redistributive agenda of ZANU PF under Mugabe. The primary intention of this programme was aimed at repossessing land although it turned out to be violent (Kalaora, 2016), from former White commercial farmers who unlawfully owned huge pieces of land, some of which possessed through colonialism (Mhiripiri and Ureke, 2019). Mugabe justified the land redistribution programme arguing that it was meant to "indigenising" the economy by taking full control of socio-economic operations. It was in this context that Mugabe's nationalist discourse further became more visible to discredit Western superpowers and internal critics. There emerged a triumphalist scholarship that celebrated land reform and remained essentially uncritical of its process and outcome (Moyo, 1986; 2000; 2010; 2011; Rukuni, Tawonezvi and Eicher, 2006). To those who witnessed the war of independence that ushered in freedom in 1980, their memories were revived to recall that the land question was among the most key reasons behind the war. Zimbabwe then experienced a sad chapter of violence against White community, civil society organisations and private media.

However, just like any other nations, Zimbabwe, is an imagined community whose identity is conflicting in terms of its ontological and epistemic construction (Anderson, 1991; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). This is often demonstrated by the appropriation of ZANU-PF's nationalism discourse in a bankrupt manner as 'the last refuge of a scoundrel' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; 2009; Ranger, 2005). Critics have argued that the discourse is ignorant to the operationalisation of globalisation while it is also biased and exclusionary (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; 2009; Andreasson 2010; Dunn, 2009; Muzondidya, 2007). In some instances, former Robert Mugabe consistently claimed that those who are patriotic and democratic are those who fight for 'our'

sovereignty whereas scholars called for period of ‘free and fair elections’ (Booyesen, 2003; Mazaranye, 2012). Nationalist discourse was then used to frame democracy as a platform for Western re-colonisation and that the West has no moral authority to lecture ‘us’ on democracy because they were ‘our’ oppressors (Mazaranye, 2012).

Nationalism was then vehemently deployed as a silencing weapon against Western superpowers hegemonic discourses. To this end, ZANU PF further appropriated the nationalistic discourses such as anti-imperialism so as to neutralise anti-white and anti-British discourses arguing that the British were warming up to re-colonisation of Zimbabwe (Mazango, 2005; Chuma, 2008; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). Moreover, ZANU-PF, just like any other post-independent African system, eulogised former president Robert Mugabe to the position of a demigod praising him for his role in the war of independence and the resistance of ‘the values of the liberation struggle’ and Zimbabwe’s sovereignty (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). The discourses were often mediated via the state-controlled media in the form of news, current affairs programmes and documentaries on radio and television, opinion pieces and editorials in newspapers and political advertisements, especially at election time (Ranger, 2005; 2004; Mazango, 2005; Kriger, 2005; Chimedza, 2008). For instance, the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) news and ZANU PF adverts repeatedly broadcast images of MDC’s Morgan Richard Tsvangirai receiving money from White commercial farmers to endorse the former’s claim that the former trade unionist was an ‘imperialist stooge’ or a ‘teaboy’; *The Sunday Mail* and *The Herald* framed him serving tea to Tony Blair and George Bush (Chubuwe, 2014). Also, Tsvangirai was framed as a coward, a war deserter in Mozambique, with no moral authority to oppose the land reform programme. Chibuwe (2014) further demonstrates that in order to legitimise nationalist discourses, media were directed to frame Tsvangirai as being responsible for the imposition of economic sanctions on Zimbabwe by the USA and the EU. ZANU-PF was comparatively framed as a revolutionary party that had the interests of Zimbabweans at heart; a party dedicated to economically empowering the indigenes, defending the sovereignty of the country and prepared to ‘fight until the last drop of blood’ to defend Zimbabwe’s national sovereignty and integrity.

According to Tomaselli (1992:20), “where ideology services the maintenance and cohesion of an existing hegemony, propaganda operates when hegemony breaks down. Propaganda occurs, in instances, when the semantic grid is no longer regarded as sufficient to hold together a disintegrating social formation”. Propaganda is appropriated so as to influence huge audience recollections utilising an ordinary top-down systematic method. The term “propaganda” is

usually used to tell truth or absolute lies framed in a specific narrative, and it is punctuated with both positive and negative opinions. It may encompass lying, deliberate discrimination, censorship of information, emotional appeals to desire, exaggeration and sometimes the use of rhetoric (Corner, 2007).

Zimbabwe, under Mugabe, appropriated the ideology of the liberation movement to legitimise leadership of people with histories of the anti-colonial liberation movement. In the late 2000s, many disparate sections of society were made to believe that individuals with liberation war credentials should “naturally” rule and command the dominant narratives of the nation state. According to Mhiripiri and Ureke (2019), the hegemonic control, nevertheless, was threatened by many factors, some of them which are traced to the failure to meet electoral promises that advance the overall standards of living of the populace, due to a shambolic implemented Economic Structural Adjustment Programme that impoverished working class. The willingness of people to voluntarily subordinate themselves to rule by ZANU PF “elites” waned, as was shown through the protest vote for the opposition since 2000 (Tendi, 2008; Mhiripiri and Ureke, 2019).

4.6 Appropriation of decolonial journalism, enter patriotic history and memory

Mugabe’s controversial attempts to infringe public communication was espoused within decolonial journalism in his quest to champion Zimbabwean interests through the appropriation of the quintessential African moral philosophy of *Ubuntu* (Chasi and Gumede, 2022). State media during Mugabe would thus focus on purely Zimbabwean –African content in a manner that framed former colonisers as evil and not competent to be the measure of civilised nations. For instance, ZBC TV had weekly Current Affairs programmes such as *ZvaVanhu/African Pride* and Christianity and Tradition while print media such as *The Sunday Mail* had a weekly column –*Bishop Lazarus* which became a site of decimating opposition parties and western nations. This form of journalism demonstrates how it mediated Mugabe’s arguments for the need to correct colonial imbalances. It was meant to - among numerous functions, guard against half-truths, misinformation, disinformation and lies deemed to be harmful and culturally alienating (Chasi and Gumede, 2022). Mugabe’s appropriation of colonial discourse was guided by Kwame Anthony Appiah (2010) who warns against defining Africans and their moral thought as “other” when compared with their European counterparts. Resultantly, decolonial journalism according to Chasi and Gumede (2022) seeks to inform the transition of black people from the vagaries of colonialism and suffering to harmonious , safe and just

societies. As this happens, media power are widely acknowledged in such a given context, although there are allegations that the media can be manipulated to serve the interests of those who own and control them, depending on the nature and effectiveness of the regulatory framework in place, as well as the political and economic environment they operate in. Critical political economy scholars particularly emphasise the media's role in 'manufacturing consent', where the media are seen as privileging dominant views of ruling and business elites while marginalising other groups such as the opposition or civil society (Garnham, 1990; Golding and Murdoch, 1997; Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Mosco, 1996).

According to Chasi and Gumede (2022), decolonial journalism is a form of journalism that advocate for freedom of expression under conditions cognisant that truth in the public good is meant to uphold the commonly considered view that freedom of expression or dissent is alien to the African cultural identities. It is part of the collective construction of communicative spheres characterised by freedom, justice and dignity within the confines of *Ubuntu* (Chasi and Gumede, 2015). The concept of *Ubuntu* originates from among speaking Africans whose key objective was to explain a moral philosophy that foregrounds the basis for ways in which people should get accustomed to good ways of living and working together. It is seldom interpreted with reference to the isiZulu saying *umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu*, meaning "a person is a person with or through other persons". It is argued that "...a person is without significance if he or she is not in society" (Ramose, 1999 cited in Chasi, 2014: 496). In other words, it means that *Ubuntu* emphasise human actions that are marked by goodwill as correct in their quest to advance shared identity among people (Metz, 2011).

However, Chasi and Gumede (2022) acknowledge that a decolonial African journalism is inadequate to interpret competing opinions meant to serve goals that empower individuals and communities with truths that enable them to meet their needs in ever-changing circumstances. In its basic form, journalism should represent the public good (Alfandika and Gwindingwe, 2020; Chasi and Gumede, 2022). Among the key objectives of this study was to explore the role the media play in shaping colonial memory in Zimbabwe's post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics. In other words, the study aimed to argue that information access remains at the cornerstone of defining commonly accepted global human rights to communication. Indeed, there are some African countries who are signatories to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948); the Banjul Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa (BDPFE, 2002); and other declarations. Zimbabwean Constitution (2013), influenced by the UDHR, states that every person has the right to freedom of expression, including the

freedom to seek, receive and communicate ideas and other information. According to Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (also known as the Banjul Charter) (AU, 1981), it states that every person shall have the right of access to information and freedom of expression. Accordingly, the media are significant to Zimbabwean people for them to have a platform to access and express their ideas, information and culture into social circulation to reach all other segments of society (Hackett, 2000).

4.7 Vicissitudes of patriotic history in Zimbabwe

Post 2000 Zimbabwe was highly characterised with contesting discourses of Zimbabwean history, a tool which Mugabe deployed to delegitimise his main rival, Morgan Richard Tsvangirai. The period also coincided with intense criticism from western superpowers over his administration's unwanted violation of human rights, property rights, political violence against opposition figures, muzzling of media and civil society organisations. The scenario influenced the appropriation of patriotic history by ZANU PF staunch intellectual supporters with some degree of resistance from ordinary citizens. Memory was politicised in favour of ZANU PF further leading to the creation of what has been termed patriotic memories (Ranger 2005; Krigger, 2005; Muwati et al, 2017). It was mainly triggered by military securocrats, ZANU PF's political elites who had been competing for power and access to state resources, using their unchecked often exaggerated war contributions to legitimate their claims and delegitimize others', claims (Krigger, 2007). According to Ranger (2005), this then also influenced the emergence of "patriotic journalism" which was mainly aligned with state media. Armed with patriotic history, patriotic memory and patriotic journalism, former Mugabe remained in firm control ZANU PF, re affirming the significance of his party's rule and stay in power, by framing those who dare challenged him as 'sell outs', 'agents of regime change'. Interestingly, the way in which the ideological war has been operationalised by ZANU PF and the state remains significant when attempting to explore the manner in which a struggling state is trying to widen not only its central economic and political goals, but also its 'intellectual and moral unity, posing all questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate level but on a "universal" plane, and thus producing the hegemony of a necessary group over a sequence of subordinate groups' (Gramsci, 1971:182).

4.8 Nature, context and mediation of patriotic history as an extension of colonial memory

Patriotic history was appropriated by ZANU-PF supporters and sympathisers who believed that there was an unprecedented, biased framing of Zimbabwe by the Western media and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and that former president Robert Mugabe and his ZANU PF party were relentlessly demonised for political reasons (Ankomah, 2008). ZANU PF swiftly responded by mobilising their role in Zimbabwe's war of independence by repackaging and propagating Zimbabwe's war history in a narrow and authoritarian narrative (Tendi, 2008; Ranger, 2005; Krigger, 2005). It was based on four main themes: land, no external interference based on 'western ideals' such as human rights, race and a 'patriots' versus 'sell-outs' distinction. Organic intellectuals sympathetic ZANU PF such as Tafataona Mahoso, Vimbai Gukwe Chivaura, Claude Gumbucha Mararike, Godfrey Chikowore and Sheunesu Mpeperekwi were recruited for the production and repackaging of discourse under the nomenclature 'patriotic history' (Ranger 2003, 2004, 2005) to the Zimbabwean populace. A case in point is that of Tafataona Mahoso, Vimbai Chivaura Gukwe, Claude Mararike and Sheunesu Mpeperekwi who used to (ab-)use ZBC by imposing their own weekly dubbed current affairs programme- *Zvavanhu (African Pride)*.

Scholars (Tendi, 2008; Ranger, 2003; Krigger, 2005) have demonstrated that 'patriotic history' was aimed at framing ZANU-PF as the dominant and authoritative guardian of Zimbabwe's history, present and future. Mugabe himself was unequivocal by stating that:

Measures will be taken to ensure that the History of Zimbabwe is rewritten and accurately told and recorded in order to reflect the events leading to the country's nationhood and sovereignty. Furthermore, Zimbabwean History will be made compulsory up to Form Four (Mugabe, 2001:65).

According to Mafeje (2000:69), the use of 'Africinity' by some 'modern black intellectuals' is synonymous with a 'pervasive ontology that straddles space and time' and extends beyond continental Africans 'to all Blacks of African descent in the diaspora'. This is certainly the case in Zimbabwe where ZANU PF and the intellectuals close to it have made both political and ideological links to a particular formulation of black history in the Diaspora, with no attention to the historical and cultural disjunctions between the two. 'Patriotic history' was thus given a place in National Youth Training camps and was taught under the guise of 'National and Strategic Studies' in Teacher Training Colleges and Polytechnics Zimbabweans. For example,

Muwati and Mutasa (2012) refer to Makata's novel, *Gona reChimurenga* (The champion of the liberation war) (1982), Pesanai's novel, *Gukurahundi* (Washing away chaff) (1985), Mutasa's novel, *The contact* (1985), Samupindi's novel, *Pawns* (1992) and Kanengoni's novel, *Echoing silences* (1997) as part of those texts meant to deepen patriotic history in Zimbabwe. Their signification was aimed to advance, corroborate the liberation war of the 1970s. Those who could not demonstrate 'patriotism' were considered to be 'unpatriotic'. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2020) examines the emergence and appropriation of patriotic history within the confines of post and decolonial discourses. He argues that it is because the cognitive politics of knowledge and African scholarly fraternity was influenced by debates on struggles for epistemic emancipation and emergence of decolonisation in the twenty-first century.

According to Tendi (2008), 'patriotic history' appropriated race essentialism, implying that Zimbabwe was for black Zimbabweans and Africa for black Africans; white people did not qualify to be Zimbabwean or African. The highlighting of race and the reference to historical western evils of slavery and colonialism called for any form of censure influenced by individuals belonging to the white race to be dismissed as 'racist' (Tendi, 2003; Pelican 2009; Dunn 2009; Morten 2009; Carleton 2014; Freeman 2014; Mitchell 2014; Keller 2014; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2010, 2009; Geschiere 2011, 2005; Andreasson 2010). The operationalisation of patriotic history divided Zimbabweans into 'patriots' and 'sell-outs', in a way that direct critics to ZANU-PF party and former Robert Mugabe were framed as 'sell-outs', 'puppets', 'un-African' and 'pro-colonial', while supporters of ZANU-PF were classified as 'patriots. This patriot or sell-out division was also extended beyond Zimbabwe, while those 'against' ZANU-PF framed as 'enemies' of black Africa. Ranger (2004:215) defines this indiscriminate brand of history 'patriotic history', which is 'epitomised by its "narrowing focus" and its resentment of "disloyal" historical questions'.

According to Tendi (2003), one must take serious caution on the appropriation of public intellectuals who found themselves clashing, offering contesting discourses about patriotic history. He poses very thought-provoking questions about public intellectuals: "Does it mean thinker, academic, scholar or simply one deemed intelligent? Does one have to hold a higher education degree to qualify as an intellectual? Is being an intellectual good, in and of itself, or does the intellectual deserve our distrust, loathing and ridicule for floating in the cloud cuckoo land of academia?" (Tendi, 2003:2).

Tendi (2003) uses the nomenclature public intellectual to refer to those individuals who are educated in a particular scholarly area of specialisation. It can be political science, history or media and cultural studies. These academics may prefer to write and speak to a wider audience as opposed to those offered by professional academic personnel. Tendi (2003) explains that these public intellectuals capitalise on their huge audiences, whom they seek to convince to follow a given moral philosophy in favour of 'the ought'. In Coser's (1965) arguments, they attempt to 'increase a society's self-knowledge by making manifest its latent sources of discomfort and discontent'. As a result, the audiences engage with the public intellectuals' plea for recognition by providing their 'psychic income', which, according to Coser (1965), regularly dwarfs the desire for financial gain or material gain. Therefore, public intellectual's secretive or individual obligation to an ideal may offer the motivation to articulate society in this regard. According to Ignatieff (2005:1), 'causes create public intellectuals, as much as public intellectuals create causes.'

Noam Chomsky (1967) offers two types of intellectuals. These are 'commissars', those who aid power, and 'dissidents' those who deny accepting the status quo. Chomsky (1967) regards power as having an influence to destabilisation, such that it gives freedoms on the commissars and defiles dissidents. Resultantly, this oversimplifies a more varied and intricate relationship between intellectuals and power in different contexts. Coser (1965) offers five groups of relationships defining the relationship of intellectuals with power as more nuanced. In the context of this study, they are mobilised to as they are appropriate to the numerous ways in which patriotic history was used in ZANU PF under former president Robert Mugabe. The categories are intellectuals as conveyers of power, consultants to power, authorities of power, opponents of power, and authorities of external power that undermines internal power. Plato (1989) *In The Republic*, view intellectuals as conveyers of power and ideal. Plato (1989) argued that in many cases, those who are intellectually advantaged or the 'philosopher kings' were sufficiently sensible to govern the 'city-state' or polity. Leadership in politics was the entry point of philosopher kings, because of their astute intellect and compressive training. He argued that they had traits of being 'the good' and most intelligent to rule as well.

During Mugabe's tenure, especially post 2000, internal criticism against his Machiavellian style of politics grew. A militant, radical, and critical group of public intellectuals contested the narratives from pro ZANU PF intellectuals. I refer to the critical works of known Mugabe critics such as Masipula Sithole, John Makumbe, Elphas Mukonoweshuro, Brian Raftopoulos and Lovemore Madhuku. Coser (1965) shed light by explaining that public intellectuals critical

of power, act as watchdogs of society's moral principles when it is under threat from those who are in the corridors of power by 'focusing public opinion upon the makers of policy'. They strongly dismissed pro ZANU PF intellectuals framing of Zimbabwean liberation history accusing them of distorting events. Moyo and Yeros (2002) have argued that Zimbabwe experienced contested intellectual war discourse during the *Third Chimurenga* owing to western superpowers who recruited critical public intellectuals to challenge ZANU PF's national self-determination, often exaggerated liberation discourses. Sadly, they were often assaulted and arrested (Tendi, 2003).

4.9 Patriotic journalism as mediation of colonial memory

Borrowing from Karl Marx historical comment, journalists in postcolonial societies may generate their own news but they do not publish it just as they please under conditions selected by themselves but under discursive circumstances and practices constructed and constrained by the colonial archive they draw upon (Manning, 2001). According to Mugari (2020), *The Herald's* morgue is a significant epistemic monument in honour of the ossified news versions of Zimbabwe's colonial past, and presents to historians and researchers the 'first draft' of postcolonial Zimbabwe's history, only that version of it colonially choreographed for posterity to have access to. Although Ranger (2003, 2005) does make strong emphasis on this opinion, in his investigation somehow, he only draws inferences with similar practices in war time propaganda broadsheets of the ZANU nationalist movement during the deadly power struggles within the struggle (Sithole, 1999). According to Mugari (2020), the white colonial administration's own version of patriotic journalism somehow escapes his analytic censure.

Patriotic journalism was a revitalisation or the appropriation of the rhetoric of nationalist movements of the 1960s (Ranger, 2005). It was aided by draconian media laws such as the Broadcasting Services Act (2002) that prohibited broadcasting of anti ZANU PF and or liberation discourse (Zaffiro, 1992; Mano 2008; Ureke 2016; Mugari 2020). Journalists who were pro ZANU PF were appointed to key positions such as news and current affairs television and radio producers and editors. For example, Mugabe's spokesperson who also doubled up as the permanent secretary in the Ministry of Information, Media and Broadcasting Services, George Charamba, had a weekly column in *The Herald* under a pseudo name Nathaniel Manheru where he would attack western powers, MDC formations and private media. According to Raftopolous (2004), such legal tools enabled ZANU PF to zombify the people with their particularist message and clearly to dominate the flow of information to the majority

rural population. It was as a result of such draconian media control that the idea of the Zimbabwean hood was created in essentialist and Manichean terms (Raftopolous, 2004). This building of a long and perpetual past for the nation, regardless of challenging the problems of modernity, is a common characteristic of nationalist movements (Eley and Suny, 1996). Patriotic journalism among its broad aims was also meant to write history so as to ‘legitimate’ the nation state, both in an attempt to ‘naturalise’ it as the central principle of political organisation, and to make it the ‘subject and object of historical development (Berger et al., 1999: xv). For example, ZBC TV used to minimise the number of stories in the main news bulletin so that they would broadcast ‘Special’ feature programmes on the “Comrade President.” ZBC TV highlighted that the idea of providing wide coverage to the top “Comrades” began in 1980, as part of the broader attempts by the national broadcaster to unify the nation in the face of opposition from within and outside the country’s borders (Mano 1997).

According to Tendi (2003), ZANU PF’s public intellectuals’ patriotic history discourses lacked clarity because they did not sufficiently investigate critical public intellectuals’ treatment of Zimbabwe’s war narrative and response. According to Tendi (2003), this was attributed to the fact that patriotic history was a preserve of state-controlled media. Critical public intellectuals were not given access to the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), *The Herald*, *The Sunday Mail* which affected the significance of their messages to their targeted audiences. Their only reprieve for delegitimising patriotic history and state policies was, thus, the private media, which criticised former president Robert Mugabe’s administration. They effectively dismissed the patriot or sellout narratives, arguing with vigour and clarity of thought that land was merely one among many grievances which triggered liberation war of independence.

According to Mhiripiri and Ureke (2019), prominent meanings that were given attention in the media were framed through the semantic framing of terms, words, and images biased towards ZANU PF while dismissing Western superpowers. The fast-track land reform agenda, for instance, was framed by ZANU PF as the “*Third Chimurenga*”, thereby giving it a liberative spin, yet those opposed to it called it “*jambanja*” (chaos) (Mhiripiri and Ureke, 2019). During that time, the metropolitan displacements, code named *Operation Murambatsvina*, were framed in government circles as an exercise of restoring infrastructural order in urban centres but framed in civil society organisation circles as a way of punishing the urban electorate, who traditionally voted against ZANU PF (Mhiripiri and Ureke, 2019). By and large, *Chimurenga* past and its postcolonial “protectors” were reported by state media as the only “natural” and legitimate or legitimising discourses acceptable to genuine Zimbabwean patriots. For instance,

NewZiana is known for producing weekly current affairs programmes known as *Chimurenga Files* while under its flagship, the company has community newspapers across the country's ten provinces that are known for producing pro-ZANU PF liberation content. Critics, on the other hand, preferred to criticise ZANU PF's bad governance, violation of human rights, corruption, and broad-spectrum culture of impunity.

4.10 Versatile and salient sustenance of colonial memory and sustainability in Mugabe era

In cultural and social studies much attention has examined numerous ways in which memory manifests into sites or places of memory, localities of collective remembering (Nora, 1984). Memory in this sense is associated with a "re-collective" remembrance; it is viewed as a mindful and wilful anthropological process of recalling the past. According to Nora (1984), the materiality of the place is not necessarily matter of concern (regardless of the presence of inscribed monuments and memorials); the critical point is the historical event, a gone past, and the ability to recall it using site expressions. Commenting on Africa imperialism, Ngugi wa Thiong'o (2004:3) claims that the biggest weapon mobilised by the Imperialists is what he describes as 'cultural bomb'.

The effect of a cultural bomb is to annihilate a people's belief in their names, in their languages, in their environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities and ultimately in themselves.

Anda (2000) condense that during colonialism in Africa, Europeans possessed attitudes of superiority and a sense of mission. The French were able to accept an African as French if that person gave up their African culture and adopted French ways. In similar fashion, knowledge of the Portuguese language and culture and abandonment of traditional African ways defined one as civilized. One thing worthy of note is the fact that African culture provides them with an ethos they must honour in both thought and practice. It provides people's self-understanding as well as self-presentation in the world through its thought and practice. For instance, African folklore and religion represents a variety of social facets of the various cultures in Africa. Former president Robert Mugabe's administration initiated, championed and identified the development and management of the legacy of the liberation struggle as a significant component of heritage preservation under the Liberation Heritage Programme (LHP). The LHP consisted of a series of sites that demonstrate fundamental characteristics of the Zimbabwean war experience. The programme was further aimed at memorialising Zimbabwe's liberation

war history in an effort to reconnect Zimbabweans with some of the unbearable and emotional incidences of the past.

The exercise was also aimed at the creation of culturally respectable burials for recognised liberation heritage sites outside Zimbabwe. The plan was further intended to include sites recognised as Liberation War Camp and Battle Sites, from former frontline states such as Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana, Angola, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. The stages of the exercise involved: the identification of the Liberation War sites, traditional acknowledgement of the souls of these fallen sons and daughters of Zimbabwe; physical rehabilitation of the burials, erecting memorial shrines and site museums/interpretive centres, conservation and promotion of ZLH. The heroes and heroines identified include freedom fighters and dedicated supporters of the liberation of Zimbabwe caught up in the war in Zambia and Mozambique. In Mozambique, Liberation Heritage Sites are found at Chimoio, Nyadzonya, Doroie, Chibawawa, Nyangao, Tembwe, Maroro, Mavonde, Mapai, Madulu, and others. In Zambia, there are at Freedom Camp, Nampundwe

In Zambia, there is Mkushi Mulungushi, Kabanga, Kavalamanja, Sinde, Solwezi and others. In Botswana, there is Selibe Phikwe, Dukwe and Francis town. In Angola there is Luso and Boma, while in Tanzania, there is Nachingea, Morogoro, Mgagao, Iringa, and others. Usually, these were training camps, administrative centres, transit points and logistic houses for civilians. While acknowledging the large numbers of Liberation Heritage Sites inside and outside Zimbabwe, this chapter focused on sites indicated above as it cannot adequately and convincingly cover all the above-mentioned sites due to its scope. The sites where historical events took place are regarded as highly important, and sacred to a greater extent. This is the reason why groups of war veterans and survivors of such atrocious massacres from across the country pay visits to liberation war sites such as Chimoio, Nyadzonya, Freedom Camp, and Mkushi, among many others inside and outside the country.

The shrines are an expression as well as a symbol of the indefatigable, collective will of Zimbabweans to be the makers of their own history, and to be their own liberators by participating in the protracted, arduous and bitter struggle for self-determination. The shrine arouses national consciousness, forges national unity and identity. Present and future generations will wish to identify themselves with the heroes' ideals, values and actions. The shrine engenders the spirit of patriotism, altruism, and fellow feeling as it allows Zimbabweans to examine their heritage. The shrine shapes and directs the aspirations of Zimbabweans,

orienting them to strive for noble goals. It is a symbol of the masses' struggle for freedom that transcends tribalism, ethnicism, regionalism, and racialism. It exists as a monument to the glory of the final victory in unity. The shrine serves to inspire all Zimbabweans, especially the youth to follow the footsteps of the heroes and heroines.

Colonial heritage remained very significant in articulating historical memories that ushered in Zimbabwean independence in 1980. It sustained former president Robert Mugabe's long stay in power because he was able to strategically mobilise the concept projecting himself as a fountain of wisdom, knowledge and custodian of Zimbabwean independence. According to Duri (2016), Zimbabwe is probably one of the nations in Southern Africa whose many liberation heritage places are found within and outside the country. Inside the country, the National Heroes' Acre and numerous Provincial Heroes' Acres are examples illustrative of this point. At some of these sites, monuments and memorials are erected and conserved in the belief that they will pass down messages for perpetuity.

Although heritage sites were sometimes manipulated to suit prevailing narratives that aided former president Robert Mugabe's rule (Duri, 2016), they formed the greater part of mediation of the unpardonable gory tales of the liberation struggle. There are some scholars (Aina, 1998; Amoah, 2002; Oduyoye, 2007; Okyere, 2016; Marongwe and Magadzike, 2016) who have remained critical of the biased, sexist and misogynistic tendencies in which cultural heritage orchestrated the personhood of women fighters. For instance, Duri (2016) laments the annihilation of revered Zimbabwe's female freedom fighter, Joice Teurai Ropa Mujuru as a result of deep factional battles that rocked ZANU PF in 2014. The former vice President of Zimbabwe is renowned for being the first ever youngest guerrilla fighter who was so brave that at the age of eighteen, she gunned down a Rhodesian helicopter. Such a narrative was soon dismissed in 2014 when she was fired from both government and her childhood party, ZANU PF. This was as a result of continually changing socio-political conditions (Login, 2014) of the time.

Scholarship (Halbwachs, 1980; Schwartz, 1982; Nora, 1989) have largely explained that memory is a social (re)construct generated by a specific section of society at a considerable timeframe. The process appreciates the view that history is always aggressively and selectively mobilised to explain contemporary times. Therefore, countries and memory are inseparable. It is against this background that Myszal (2003: 155) suggests what he terms 'communities of memory', whereby memories assist to identify social limits and describe group identity. As a

social and political tool, the aims of memorialisation generally depend on the passage of time because group memory is controlled with the principal opinions and values of the hegemonic political group.

During former president Robert Mugabe's tenure of office, ZANU PF had arguably enjoyed a one-party state rule because existing opposition parties had not seriously posed threat. The party relied on their parliamentary majority to enact laws such as The Heroes Acre Act of 1994 to aid their historical narrative and stay in power. Indeed, Cairns and Roe (2003) claims that group memory is meant to sustain and aid political purposes. However, post 2000 dramatically changed when the MDC formations proved to be a real threat to ZANU PF rule. Memory was then associated directly to social remembering and forgetting of the fallen heroes and heroines. ZANU PF embarked on the process of re-writing national narratives, where memory was used to select and occasionally distort the past to serve present political interests (Cairns and Roe 2003). Zimbabwe's battle to independence remains debatable conflicting historical accounts in the academic and political fraternity. According to Muwati (2009:1), 'it is an indelible, lived and living reality, a hotbed of controversy, contestations, contradictions, inconsistencies, mysteries, truths, half-truths and untruths.'

4.11 Conclusion

ZANU PF is a former liberation movement turned into a political party at independence with a clear ideology that will not likely change in the near future. The party's ideology is anchored on the past. Indeed, history is a credible source of reference in service of the present although caution must be exercised. The chapter has bridged literature gap in terms of mediation of the past. A Zimbabwean theorisation of internal identities, political communication is significant to come up with an arguably unbiased story. Patriotic history, memories and journalism emerged to counter respond western criticism to ZANU PF's violent militant rule years after independence.

The chapter has discussed mediation of colonial memory in Zimbabwe's Mugabe era. There are numerous ways of understanding artistic forms of communication. In cultural and social science studies, memory goes beyond the 'ordinary' because texts are polysemic. The chapter has also addressed taken for granted forms of mediation that have a central signification in communication.

CHAPTER FIVE

METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

5.1 Introduction

A consistent unique focus of this study is that while the post-Mugabe ZANU PF claims change and departure from Mugabe politics, the party's election communication practice is arguably within the context of historical transitions, memory and re-imaginings of political communication that Mugabe relied upon. Colonial memory is important in this study because the ways in which historical activities are narrated, imagined, packaged and shared can either serve to unite or divide the people (Ndlovu, 2013). The study contributes to the notion that memorialisation is an extremely politicised process that explains the dynamics of political communication of those who are in power (Kriger, 1995; Duri, 2016; Mawere, 2016). In other words, this study argues that ZANU PF continues to rely on official re-imaginings, conjures, and perform many of the dominant discursive discourses that characterised Mugabe's politics. These arguments are influenced by research's significant goal of producing or increasing knowledge on a specific phenomenon (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009), in our understanding of memory as part of political communication research (Bennet, et.al., 2015). This is highly significant in my endeavour to contribute to emerging forms of knowledge about the strategic importance of continued reliance on the rhetoric of colonial memory by African liberation movements in contemporary politics. This conviction is also influenced by the fact that former liberation movements are arguably entangled in the past when articulating electoral politics. In order to articulate this argument, the study is guided by the following key questions:

1. What is the place and discourse of colonial memory in Zimbabwe's post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics? This question was deconstructed further through the following three focused aspects that constitute the objectives of the study.
2. In what ways does mediated rhetoric sustain or counter colonial memory in ZANU PF politics (New Dispensation)?
3. What does the discourse and place of colonial memory in the New Dispensation reveal about political communication in contemporary Zimbabwean politics?

The above questions seek to offer a clear understanding of the changes and continuities, the place and discourse of colonial memory in Zimbabwe's post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics. This chapter therefore offers a clear layout of the research methodology mobilised for the execution of this investigation, beginning by explaining significant issues in research philosophy in an effort to clarify the study's specific methodological implications. The study was conducted in Zimbabwe, focusing on the country's transition from Mugabe to Mnangagwa's New Dispensation, interchangeably code named the Second Republic. In order to maintain the credibility and transparency of the study's findings, this chapter provides a detailed description (Bryman, 2012) of the systematic process (Naidoo, 2011) by which the study was carried out, clarifying the research context and assumptions that constitute the study's main focus.

5.2 Research philosophy

Research is a *systematic* process that allows the researcher to explore the relationship between society and its surroundings in order to validate and refine existing knowledge with the aim of constructing new knowledge (Naidoo, 2011). The word "research" originates from the French word "*recherché*", which means "*search or seek*" and "*search again*" (Naidoo, 2011:2). The major concern for research is that it should be knowledge-oriented in its approach, which means probing for something continuously over a certain period of time in order to increase knowledge of a given phenomenon while following due process (Naidoo, 2011). There are three key issues that then underline research: "systematic," "knowledge," and "methodology" in social science inquiry and methodological developments arising from it. The process is *systematic*, which means a researcher must follow a clear, consistent, coherent blueprint or plan, or *methodology*. The result of this is *knowledge construction*. A methodological framework explains how research is conducted not only based on the philosophies, methods, and techniques of a specific social science inquiry, but also on researcher assumptions (Harding, 1987; Schwandt, 2001). According to Denzin and Lincoln (2005:21), a "gendered, multiculturally situated researcher approaches the world with a set of ideas, a framework (theory, ontology) that specifies a set of questions (epistemology) that he or she then examines in specific ways (methodology, analysis)". One of the common culture that informs research approaches is the culture of the discipline.

Disciplines are essentially communities of practice, and their underlying framework revolves around their stance on the nature of knowledge and the methods of acquiring it. Research methodologies' selection is thus often determined by, among other things, the disciplinary

context, values and beliefs about knowledge (Cohen, Manion, and Morrison, 2000; Creswell, 1994; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). These values and beliefs about what constitute knowledge and evidence are the primary lenses through which research is crafted or designed. The segments below enlighten the methodology mobilised for this study, drawing from the intersection of political communication research and cultural studies disciplines. Political communication is intricately netted, and is thus viewed in this study, from a cultural studies lens. The intention is to also offer multiple ways of exploring political campaign discourse and their impact on voter behaviour, attitude and beliefs in a particular context, which is Zimbabwe.

The common shared believe about knowledge construction in the cultural studies discipline is interpretivism or social constructivism. A comprehensive articulation of the interpretivism paradigm utilised in this research is given further beneath. At this juncture, it is vital to explain, as tabulated below, the methodology mobilised for this study as informed by the interpretivist – social constructivist paradigm. There are two competing theories about the nature of reality, notably objective reality and subjective reality (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2006). The former might be characterised as a positivist method of knowledge construction that is frequently connected to quantitative study. It has to do with the notion that there is a genuine universe out there with a single, observable reality or truth that researchers set out to discover. Contrarily, subjective reality asserts that reality is shaped by social actors' views and behaviors as a result, and it is thought to be the foundation of qualitative research. It recognises the inevitable existence of several socially created realities based on a variety of viewpoints or perspectives (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2006).

5.3 Epistemology position of interpretivism in the study

Epistemology is assumed to be a theory of knowledge concerned with what knowledge is and how it is created (Cater and Little, 2007; Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2006; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). According to Cater and Little (2007), epistemology is usually visible in knowledge generation as a result of its influence in three ways. For starters, it influences methodology, which in turn places specific demands on the researcher, including the methods they employ (Cater and Little 2007; Denzin and Lincoln, 2002). In this case, epistemology is axiological in the sense that it is normative or prescriptive. In epistemology, these values serve as the foundation for validity and the sources of justification for knowledge gained (Cater and Little, 2007; Denzin and Lincoln, 2002).

It is also concerned with the nature and forms of knowledge (Cohen et al, 2007:7), or in other words “a way of understanding and explaining how people know what they know” (Crotty, 2003:3). This study is characterised by a relational epistemology as knowledge and meaningful reality are constructed in and out of interaction between humans and their world and are developed and transmitted in a social context (Crotty, 1998:42). In this study, changes and continuities of the New Dispensation discourse was coined from ZANU PF soon after Mugabe’s demise from power, media were co-opted to radically legitimise Mnangagwa through various means and ways including but not limited to branding. I summon Cohen et al, (2007) to buttress this argument who states that the social world can only be agreed on by the individuals who are participating in it.

Moreso, epistemology influences and manifests itself in the implementation of the selected methods, particularly in the researcher-participant relationship. Participants can be thought of as either co-creators of knowledge or passive subjects of the study, depending on their epistemological position on whether phenomena are independent of the researcher's behaviour (Rubin and Rubin, 2005; Cater and Little, 2007; Snape and Spencer, 2003, see also Tomaselli, Dyll-Myklebust and van Grootheest, 2013). The former is typically associated with the qualitative approach.

In view of the above, epistemology influences the form, voice, and representation in analysis and writing. The active voice, which is popular among qualitative researchers, particularly in cultural studies, where the researcher is heard within the narrative as part of the research. The other format is a depersonalised narrative, in which the researcher is not present during the analysis and narrative (see Dutta, 2011; Cater and Little, 2007). In addition to the three methods mentioned above, epistemology manifests itself in methods of analysis in two ways: inductive analysis and deductive analysis (Snape and Spencer, 2003). Inductive analysis uses findings as the foundation for a conclusion, whereas deductive analysis uses evidence to support conclusions. Both methods of analysis are applicable to qualitative research, though the former is interpretivist and the latter is positivist (Denzin and Lincoln, 2002). This study falls under interpretivism, which holds that a social researcher must explore and understand phenomena by interacting with participants (Rubin and Rubin, 2005; Snape and Spencer, 2003). The epistemological position allowed for interaction with purposefully and carefully selected participants from ZANU PF and media organisations on their interpretation of the New Dispensation. Following is an outline of the methodological approach that was used to carry out this study in accordance with the principles of interpretive epistemology.

Because this research lies at the intersection of political communication and cultural studies, perception, events, and commonly held beliefs are mediated and made real through discourse, interface, and fieldwork stories. As a result, the qualitative approach to knowledge creation is ontologically and epistemologically applicable to producing what cultural studies consider to be real or sufficient political knowledge. This is in sharp contrast for researchers who use a quantitative or positivist paradigm to investigate meanings based on statistics, quantity, intensity, or frequency (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). Although considered hard or empirical science, the quantitative or positivist paradigm generates knowledge based on probabilities influenced by the study of figures, amounts, and percentages of issues to communicate meaning (HesseBiber and Leavy, 2006; Denzin, 2006).

5.4 Research Paradigm

According to Stanage (1987), the notion of ‘paradigm’ is traced to the Greek (paradeigma) and Latin origins (paradigma) meaning pattern, model or example. It refers to a pattern of thinking, shared beliefs of researchers resident or working in a particular discipline. In other words, a paradigm is an action of submitting to a view (Stanage, 1987). This view is supported by Denzin and Lincoln (2000:157) who define a research paradigm as “a basic set of beliefs that guide action”, dealing with first principles, ultimates” or the researcher’s worldviews. Below is the paradigm used in this study.

5.4.1 Interpretivist paradigm

The research falls under the interpretivist paradigm (Bryman, 2012). In this study, "culturally generated and historically placed interpretations of the social lifeworld" were examined using interpretivism (Bryman, 2012). Assuming that reality is socially produced and understanding the polysemic nature of communication studies, the study adopts an interpretive method (Merriam and Tisdell, 2015). The interpretive paradigm, according to scholars Cohen, Manion, and Morrison (2013), aims to comprehend the subjective nature of mankind by giving data meaning based on how the persons being studied are positioned. Bryman (2012) asserts that the interpretative paradigm depends on the four techniques namely hermeneutics, verstehen, symbolic interactionism, and phenomenology, all of which are important approaches in cultural studies. In this study, however, hermeneutics is more emphasised as it bears more on the paradigmatic approach underpinning the study.

5.4.2 Hermeneutics and its application in the study

Gadamer (1989: xxxiii) describes hermeneutics as ‘a theory of the real experience that thinking is’. Hermeneutics, a term derived from the Greek word ‘hermeneuo’, which means to interpret or to explain a branch of philosophy and a methodology of interpretation that focuses on understanding and interpreting texts, especially those that are open to multiple interpretations (Gadamer, 2002). This approach was used in this study to explore and examine numerous ways in which *colonial memory* discourse is appropriated in post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics to generate the meaning of this discourse (Ritchie *et al*, 2013). Hermeneutics was significant for this study because the researcher was able to critically interrogate colonial memory discourse far beyond general conclusions on how Mugabe and Mnangagwa made sense of this discourse during electoral campaigns. This is because language can show evidence embedded within a given historical and cultural epoch (Sloan and Bowe, 2014). In simple terms, hermeneutics is one way of addressing the need to answer certain kinds of questions addressed in this study.

Thus, colonial memory was significant in this study to investigate if there are changes of political discourse between Mugabe and Mnangagwa. The other intention was to also examine if there are variations of mediation of colonial memory in Zimbabwean media landscape in line with commonly accepted ways election reporting. The study also applied hermeneutics to locate various but salient meanings ascribed to texts related to colonial memory, changes and continuities in post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics. The process of textual analysis in this study largely focused on colonial discourse, what it (re)presents and ways in which people appropriate it to generate meanings (Brennen, 2013). This reasoning was influenced by the realisation that everyday language is a significant part of our communications, as a result, it forms meanings of social realities through communication (Brennen, 2013). Resultantly, the study found it equally significant to investigate mediation of colonial discourse, because it influences ZANU PF’s electoral campaign messages in numerous ways (Tanackovic *et al*, 2014).

Moreso, this study acknowledges that mediation of colonial memory in political communication manifests in different forms such as cultural artifacts, broadcast and print media in order to construct meanings of people’s lives (Brennen, 2013). Broadcast and print media are types of texts the study used as a qualitative researcher to make sense of the linkages between media, culture and post-Mugabe Zimbabwean society (Brennen, 2013). For this reason, I applied qualitative content analysis (Schreirer, 2012) and discourse analysis to exhaust all possible meanings that are embedded in colonial memory discourse. My intention

was to further investigate, examine and explore all socially constructed multiple realities, in form of for instance, words, concepts, ideas, themes and issues that are embedded in colonial memory discourse because they are found within specific cultural context (Atkinson and Coffey, 2011) - the post-Mugabe Zimbabwe epoch.

Hermeneutics also allowed for the interpretation of colonial memory discourse from the positioning of research participants, to understand why and how this discourse exists or why people behave the way they do. In other words, it was a significant process that helped me to systematically analyse, examine and investigate the use of colonial memory discourse in post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics in me as a researcher whose key role was to generate knowledge. The technique was also significant in that it helped me to at least acquire a comprehensive understanding of ZANU PF as a political party whose presence in Zimbabwe's mainstream politics stretches more decades. More importantly, this technique was also significant to aid our increased understanding of how colonial memory is being used and constructed to shed light on the complexities of political discourse in Zimbabwe, and potentially inform policies and practices aimed at promoting a more inclusive and equitable political environment.

The following key hermeneutics concepts, as applied in this study, underscore the interest in the stance and presence in the research process of a geo-gendered-cultural researcher interpreting texts, and in conversation with others. It is one of the methodological virtues of hermeneutic research which aptly demonstrate the memorialisation of the past by both Mugabe and Mnangagwa in their capacity as ZANU PF presidential contestants.

5.4.3 Context

Hermeneutics emphasises the significance of considering the historical, cultural, social, and linguistic context in which a text or communication occurs (Schleiermacher 1998). Context provides essential clues for understanding meaning. Hirsch is concerned with what he calls 'radical historicity', the view that we can never understand something except from our historical point of view, and that Gadamer (1989) doesn't hold this view, the paradoxes Hirsch is concerned about arise whenever someone posits knowledge of a limit on understanding. In the context of this study, the researcher mobilised significant historical facts that influence ZANU PF's political campaign discourse. ZANU PF is a political party formed as a result of a strong desire to radically wage a war against all forms of colonisation of Zimbabwe. At independence and until presently, the party continues to appropriate colonial discourses. These views are significant in our understanding of the context in which colonial discourses are at the

centre of interrogating discontinuities and or continuities without change in Mnangagwa's administration.

5.4.4 Interpretive Circle:

This concept suggests that understanding a part of a text requires knowledge of the whole, and conversely, understanding the whole text requires an understanding of its individual parts. Interpretation is an iterative process that involves moving back and forth between the parts and the whole. The basic interpretive principle for Schleiermacher was that any specific thing we possibly intend to understand "can only be understood from out of the whole" (Schleiermacher, 1998: 27) of which it forms a part. This leads to the human understanding that "knowledge is always in an apparent circle, that each particular can only be understood via the general". Resultantly, "the understanding of the whole is ... conditioned by that of the particular" (Schleiermacher, 1998: 231). This principle, known as the "hermeneutic circle", formulated reiterates Tilden's arguments that: "interpretation should aim to present the whole rather than a part..." (Tilden, 1977:9). Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) also argues that interpretation is important not only for understanding texts but for understanding the human world in general. Resultantly, Dilthey (1976) builds upon Schleiermacher's application of the "hermeneutic circle" to incorporate the wider historical and cultural contexts.

The process of interpretation operates on two levels (Lee Martin, 2002; Rundell, 1998). Firstly, a mutually shared knowledge that most adults within a society already know about things through a common language. Dilthey calls this common stock of descriptive knowledge (facts), elementary understanding. It is only by posing questions about gaps, likely links or contradictions. The second level of interpretive understanding is by traversing the hermeneutic circle (Rundell, 1998). Dilthey's distinction of levels is analogous to that found between factual "information" and interpretation in Tilden's (1977: 9, 18-25) second principle. Interpretation for Tilden always "includes information", but much like Dilthey's elementary understanding, this is only a preliminary step towards interpretation. In both cases, the point of interpretation is the "revelation of a larger truth that lies behind any statement of fact" (Tilden, 1977: 8). This search for the larger truth is principally a hermeneutical exercise, in which the interpreter moves constantly from the interpreted to its broader contexts and back again. In this sense, any interpretation is always ongoing, incomplete and "partial". There are always more questions that can be asked of any site or experience.

5.4.5 Horizon of Understanding

Every interpreter brings their own perspective, biases, and preconceptions to the act of interpretation. The "horizon" of understanding is the sum of an interpreter's experiences and knowledge, which can influence how they interpret a text. Hirsch argues that whatever we want to understand is either within our horizon or beyond our horizon. Something with a different horizon would have either to fall within our horizon, in which case understanding it doesn't involve a fusion of two horizons, or fall outside our horizon, in which case we cannot understand it. Hirsch's, is the realization that Gadamer is not using the term 'horizon' in its everyday sense, but as a technical term; the technical meaning has been part of phenomenology. a horizon as that which expands, that which we can see beyond with a little effort, and that which points toward something more. Although a horizon marks the limit of sight at any moment, it is not an insurmountable limit. The horizon is everything we are aware of in the perception of an object above and beyond what is given directly to our senses. It is what is 'co-given' in the perception of the object that makes it intelligible to us as an object. the kinds of horizons into 'internal', 'external' and 'temporal' horizons.

5.4.6 Fusion of Horizons

This study adopts Gadamer's (1960; 1994) sense of a horizon as a site where people engage with a specific type of a text that offers significant avenues of diverse interpretations. A "fusion of horizons" happens at the intersection of two interconnected interpretations: one from our socio-historical tradition and the other from our experience of novel phenomena (Gadamer, 1960, 1994; Myers, 2006). In this study, it is an exhaustive approach in our understanding of dialogue (Vessey, 2009) of Mugabe and Mnangagwa's deployment of colonial memory in their elections campaigns. A hermeneutic horizon consist of both a reader's reflective and creative engagement with a text. Walt Whitman (1890; 1990: 434) argues that the approach brings readers "into the atmosphere of the theme or thought " where they can pursue their "own flight". In the same vein, Ricouer (1984:77) contends that it is the reader who fills in the "holes, lacunae," and "zones of indetermination," in a text. Ricouer (1984: 79) regards a fusion of horizons that intersect through the world of the reader and the world of a text. These perspectives share the idea that the reading process involves acts of the imagination by the reader. For horizons to fuse, the multiple meanings that emanate from reading a text must make sense in readers' minds. This fusion involves a creative process of interrogating the text, exploring the underlying meaning, and going beyond it. Thus, a 'fusion of horizons' leads to

new self-realisations in relation to the world of the text and one's previous experiences and opens up the possibility of writing and expanding on ideas or information in novel ways. Participants were presented with questions to solicit responses underlying the notion of a creative and interpretive reader as argued by scholars (Gadamer, 1960; 1977; 1994; Palmer, 1969; Ricouer, 1984). The intention is to solicit for responses from participants as influenced by their own understanding of the functionality of colonial memory in ZANU PF politics. Gadamer (1960; 1994) for instance, regards an individual's horizons as marked by presuppositions in their understanding of events or texts. As such, participants were asked the following question: 'how do you describe Mnangagwa's stance and engagement with the discourses surrounding Zimbabwe's former colonisers?'. At this juncture, meaning is considered to be context-driven according to one's field of view, and understanding occurs through absorbing a strange horizon into one's own. The intention is to give room to participants an opportunity to provide responses according to their own understanding of ZANU PF politics. Kafka (1997) states that human beings can construct meanings from a given phenomenon only when it relates to their life experiences. Here, the study acknowledges Palmer (1969:237) who states that to realise this tension "between the horizon of the text and that of the interpreter is the task of interpretation". Resultantly, readers are able to relate with "the appropriation of a literary tradition" (p.) which provides one with an experience that is superior to the joys of travel and even other intellectual pursuits (Gadamer, 1994:390). Gadamer also asserts that our horizons of interpretation are linguistically driven because language and understanding are inextricably linked (Linge, 1977: xxviii). Thus, readers' horizons are strongly influenced by the characteristics of their native language (or languages, if they are bilingual). From these considerations, the study posed the following question to the participants: what role does the media play in shaping colonial memory in post-Mugabe ZANU PF electoral politics? The approach explains that not every text has a definite or easily agreed upon meaning. Some texts may be intentionally ambiguous. A work of literary art usually opens itself up to multiple interpretations.

5.4.7 Ontological position of interpretivism in the study

Indeed, scholarly debates have demonstrated how widespread concerns about "truth" and "facts" are clearly visible in contemporary societies (Patterson, 2016; Munoriyarwa and Chabwera, 2020; Pohjonen, 2022; Ncube and Mare, 2022). The study of post-Mugabe ZANU-PF's use of colonial memory discourse, as well as their quest for continuity and change, may aid in "evoking and redefining concepts such as truth, justice, patriotism, and belonging"

(Gwekwerere, Mutasa and Chitofiri, 2018:3). Based on this premise, the conceptual explanation in social science inquiry is that the primary 'theory of truth' is correspondence theory, which implies that there is a connection between what we see or interpret about the natural world and a separate reality (Snape and Spencer, 2003). However, because researchers investigate society in its natural state, which is also a key focus of this study, this occurs within the operations or intersubjective theory of truth because reality can only be measured consensually rather than linearly (Snape and Spencer, 2003). Conversations with participants are emphasised in the theory as a means of constructing reality. In this study, I was the facilitator of the specific data collection methods. In my quest to discover the truth about the New Dispensation, the researcher purposefully selected ZANU PF participants and political editors from Zimbabwe. Because reality is elusive and truth is debatable, this chapter also demonstrates that in study, our everyday view of society is not necessarily based on our observations or readings (Snape and Spencer, 2003; Patton, 2002). Furthermore, there is much disagreement over what really constitutes knowledge. Depending on the objective, the researcher's ontology, and the target audience, research might provide knowledge that is either valuable or not (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhil, 2009). For instance, Toffa and Nielsenb (2022) applied an inductive, qualitative approach to examine the perceptions of lower- and middle-class people in the United Kingdom who regularly access little or no professionally produced news. Among their significant findings, Toffa and Nielsenb (2022) suggest that people's preexisting perspectives about what news is (anxiety-inducing) and offers for them (little practical value) play an important role in shaping attitudes toward news and subsequent behavior. These perspectives, as Toffa and Nielsenb (2022) established, highlight the importance of emotional dimensions of news use beyond its presumed value as a source of information. As Toffa and Nielsenb (2022) established, these perspectives emphasise the importance of emotional dimensions of news use beyond its presumed value as a source of information. They also discovered that, while political communication scholarship has frequently treated news consumption as the cornerstone of good citizenship, avoiders have uneven, weakly internalised norms about a perceived duty to stay informed, in part because they anticipate news will make them anxious without being relevant to their lives, resulting in limited engagement with news, and thus civic and political affairs. Promoting more informed societies necessitates confronting these entrenched viewpoints. As a result, there is still considerable debate about whether the New Dispensation represents a departure from Mugabe's political philosophy. I bring this important point up to demonstrate how the ontological perspectives of the administration's critics affect whether or not there can be agreement on how novel the New Dispensation is.

5.5 Research Approach: Qualitative Approach

This study investigated institutional and social practices and processes to determine whether (and how) there are any differences between Mnangagwa and Mugabe. These questions are investigated using a qualitative approach. Qualitative research is a type of systematic scientific inquiry that aims to create a comprehensive, usually narrative, description of a social or cultural phenomenon to inform the researcher's understanding of it. It is "primarily an inductive process of organising data into categories and identifying patterns (relationships) among categories" (McMillan and Schumacher, 1993: 479). The argument is that data and meaning emerge "organically" from the research context, as is the case with this current study. By 'organically', it means the research data is naturally extracted with the sole purpose of understanding our everyday life experiences. Qualitative research is a method of studying people and cultural practices in human science research (Bryman, 2012; Yin, 2014). In contrast to quantitative research, which focuses on numbers, qualitative research attempts to make sense of or interpret phenomena through the subjective verbal and written expressions of meaning provided by research participants as windows into their inner lives. However, poststructuralists argue that there is no clear window into an individual's inner life because any gaze is filtered through the biographical positions of both the researcher and participants, i.e. "the lenses of language, gender, class, race, and ethnicity" (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005: 21). The study enumerates Snape and Spencer's (2003: 3) significant articulations on qualitative research philosophy to fully understand questions surrounding the 'newness' of the New Dispensation. Qualitative research is mobilised and understood as "a naturalistic, interpretive approach concerned with understanding the meanings which people attach to phenomena within their social worlds," (Snape and Spencer, 2003: 3). It is aimed at exploring natural scientific processes of life. Indeed, according to the earliest researcher, Socrates (469-399 BC), "life without inquiry is not worth for a living human being," arguing that through research, people become aware of the need to know, the act of inquiry, and inductive or deductive reasoning that results in the generation of new knowledge. Against this backdrop, this study draws on Snape and Spencer's (2003: 3) six main characteristics of qualitative research that are applicable in this context are as follows:

- (a) Participants are relatively few and are purposively selected.
- (b) Data collection methods usually involve close contact between researcher and participant, allowing for interaction and allowing for emergent issues to be explored.
- (c) Gather detailed data, as well as rich and extensive information.
- (d) Analysis allows for emergent concepts and ideas, and may produce detailed description and classification, identification and association of patterns, as well as the development of typologies and explanations.
- (e) Its output tends to focus on the interpretation of social meaning through mapping and re-presenting the social world of research participants.

The inductive method is then used to either support or refute theoretical assumptions (Merriam, 1998). Although the qualitative research process is inductive, Merriam (1998:49) observes that most qualitative research inherently molds or changes existing theory in that:

- Data is analysed and interpreted using the concepts of a specific theoretical orientation.
- Findings are typically discussed in relation to existing knowledge, with the goal of demonstrating how the current study has contributed to the knowledge base's expansion.

As a result, this study employs both deductive and inductive methods. This is due to the researcher's desire not to leave any data unaccounted for. Although qualitative research is ideal for this study, the researcher is well aware of its limitations. As a result, this study is mindful of Lincoln and Guba's (1998: 290) warning that "biases, motivations, interests, or perspectives of the inquirer" must be identified and made explicit throughout the study. To manage the above possible challenges, the researcher was very self-reflexive in my approach particularly on those issues the researcher had some bias. The researcher remained very mindful of the fact that my task was to generate knowledge beyond my every day forms of knowing.

5.6 Research Design: Phenomenological Study

The design of this study is phenomenological. It entails the use of thick description (Bryman, 2012) and critical analysis of lived experience in order to comprehend the meaning-making process through the use of embodied opinion (Sokolowski, 2000; Stewart and Mickunas, 1974). It is significant to this study because it contributes to comprehensive ways of knowing lived experiences by revealing commonly held beliefs about commonly held beliefs. Reality is constructed in phenomenology through embodied experience. Phenomenological researchers use critical interrogation of personal experiences to capture the meaning and common features, or essences, of an experience or event. The event's reality, as an abstract entity, is subjective and only known through embodied opinion. According to the argument, people create meaning through the experience of movement. This approach achieves knowledge of social realities through careful observation of behavior and speech practices. Thus, Mugabe and Mnangagwa's election campaign speeches are extremely important within the context of interpretive approaches to history, goal, philosophy, methodology, analytic method, and product (Stark and Trinidad 2009).

5.6.1 Study Sample and Size

For Mugabe's election campaign, seven (7) election speeches at election campaign rallies addressed by Mugabe for the 2000 parliamentary election are examined. The sample for Mnangagwa's 2018 election campaign comprise ten (10) speeches delivered at presidential rallies televised by the ZBC TV. These speeches constituted his first campaign speeches in his capacity as ZANU PF's presidential candidate. Mnangagwa's presidential campaign speeches were significant to explore how he distinguishes his administration as a New Dispensation. As such the study employed Benoit's Functional Campaign Communication Theory and Political Culture theory to establish a comparison as Mnangagwa purposively distinguishes himself and his administration from his predecessor. All the speeches by the two presidents were addressed in Zimbabwe's ten provinces to drum up support for ZANU PF participating members in various key positions particularly as Members of Parliament (MPs). The speeches were broadcast live on ZBC TV Current Affairs productions.

The sample for the textual analysis is based on mediated live broadcast campaign speeches during ten presidential rallies conducted by Mnangagwa during the campaign period across the country's provinces. It also includes seven presidential speeches by Mugabe. Only texts that

constitute part of the sample (mediated speeches) are analysed. Table 5.1 below elaborate further.

Table 5: 1showing mediated messages and the rationale for their selection

MEDIATED MESSAGES SOURCE	RATIONALE FOR SELECTION
Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation Television (ZBC TV) files	Mnangagwa's ten presidential campaign speeches broadcast live were analysed to determine, extract, analyse, examine data relevant to the topic under study.
Mnangagwa's 2018 campaign speeches and Mugabe's election campaign speeches from the 2000 parliamentary election	These are purposively selected from the 2000 parliamentary election because that is when ZANU PF's ever most challenge was recorded from the MDC

5.7 Sampling Research Methods

Sampling is a technique for obtaining information about a whole population from a small number of units (Khan, 2014). In most cases, surveying the entire population relevant to a study is not necessary (Jackson, 2008:97). Pickard (2007) asserts that the sampling method used is critical in any research investigation because the characteristics, composition, and scale of the sample often give weight to any findings that emerge from the study. Only appropriate and proper sampling technique development will result in authentic results. Punch (1998:193) emphasises the significance of sampling in any type of research: "We cannot study everyone, everywhere doing everything". As a result, this study chose to focus on two administrations and their respective presidents, Mugabe and Mnangagwa. Not only must sampling decisions be made about which people to interview or which events to observe, but also about settings and processes. Sampling is closely related to the study's purpose and research questions. These questions lead to the selection of samples from a large pool, which allows the results to be further generalized to the population (Neuman, 2011).

5.7.1 Purposive Sampling Procedure

For data collection, a purposive sampling strategy was used (Marshall, 1996; Latham, 2007; Babbie, 1990). Mugabe's seven (7) 2000 parliamentary election campaign speeches were purposively selected because they marked his fierce challenge of power from within and outside ZANU PF, that warranted need for the party to strongly distinguish itself. The same applies to Mnangagwa who was carving a new ZANU (PF) distinct from his predecessor. The speeches were purposely selected based on the researcher's knowledge about the population while paying attention to the objectives of the study (Terre Blanche et al. 2006). According to Babbie and Mouton (2001), at this stage, a researcher must be able to select the most useful rich cases. This was significant because subjective judgments play a role in sample selection, and the researcher has the option of selecting specific units of the population to include in the sample (Babbie and Mouton 2001).

Purposive sampling is used to select texts and respondents who share specific characteristics or qualities, and the researcher eliminates those who do not meet the requirements (Fourie, 2007). It is a sampling technique in which the researcher actively chooses the most fruitful sample to answer the research question. According to Hycner (1999:156), "the phenomenon dictates the method (not vice-versa) including even the type of participants." I chose purposive sampling, considered by Welman and Kruger (1999) as the most important kind of non-probability sampling, to identify the primary participants. I selected the sample based on my judgement and the purpose of the research (Babbie, 1995; Greig & Taylor, 1999; Schwandt, 1997), looking for those who "have had experiences relating to the phenomenon to be researched" (Kruger, 1988: 150).

5.8 Methods of Data Collection Process

Data collection is the systematic process of gathering and measuring information on variables of interest in order to answer stated research questions, test hypotheses, and evaluate outcomes (Lapan, Quartanoli and Riemer, 2011). This study applied a two-step process to collect data on continuity and change, as well as the place and discourse of colonial memory in Zimbabwe's post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics. I appealed to Polkinghorne (2005) in depth interviews, and qualitative content analysis of both Mugabe and Mnangagwa's election campaign speeches. The process of data collection processes is discussed below.

5.8.1 Entering the field

The researcher started the processes of searching for Mugabe and Mnangagwa's election campaign speeches in March until the end of May 2022. The researcher first approached Mnangagwa's Presidential Communications Department personnel who kept on changing goal posts. The initial plan was to access raw speeches, but the process yielded no results. Among Mnangagwa's key Presidential Communications personnel approached by the researcher disclosed that, *'I joined the President's Communications two months ago so I don't have the speeches you want'*. After several attempts to convince him to supply Mnangagwa's campaign speeches, he later on dismissed the researcher stating that, *'I cannot speak bad about my boss, you can only come for off record conversations to help you write your thesis'*. Another Mnangagwa's communications personnel, a former Mugabe long time spokesperson was willing to assist. However, our often-scheduled meetings could not take place because he was busy, this was also because this study was conducted during the time Zimbabwe was already in the 2023 August presidential election campaign mood. His schedule was ever busy by each day as the man in charge with Mnangagwa's communications at all party and government levels. The researcher was convinced that ZANU PF election campaign discourses necessitate extensive analysis to produce political meanings that may possibly contribute to the growing body of literature on contemporary Zimbabwean political communication.

As a result, Mugabe's 2000 election campaign speeches were finally manually selected from *The Herald's* Knowledge Centre Library at George Silundika in Harare. *The Herald's* Knowledge Centre Library personnel gave the researcher news articles at a fee citing that 'you must pay for a search fee, that's norm' to which he obliged. The researcher thus retrieved specific news articles from *The Herald* which covered Mugabe's 2000 election campaigns across Zimbabwe. The researcher accessed Mnangagwa's campaign speeches for 2018 presidential election from the ZBC without any difficulties. This is because the researcher, a former ZBC Current Affairs Producer, used his long-time professional relationship with colleagues who easily availed Mnangagwa's campaign speeches. Having secured Mugabe and Mnangagwa's campaign speeches, the next stage was to conduct in-depth interviews with carefully selected participants as discussed below.

5.8.2 Conducting of in-depth interviews with research participants

Understanding political institutions and the decision-making process is central to much of political research. Interviewing political elites from ZANU PF was an important method of

gathering information about many aspects the party's use of colonial memory discourse during election campaigns. In the same vein, political editors were of the same value in this regard. Political elites are defined as individuals "who wield disproportionately large influence over the outcome of events or policies in any research area" (Pierce, 2008:119). In-depth interviews provided 'new' information about Mnangagwa attempts to break away from Mugabe, with a focus on the appropriation of colonial memory during elections. This is because ZANU PF elites have access to information that the researcher does not have because they hold positions of great power. The researcher conducted in-depth interviews with ZANU PF elites guided by Tansey (2007: 766) who explains that:

.... interviews with key players can be used to corroborate the early findings. In this way, interviews contribute toward the research goal of triangulation, where collected data are cross checked through multiple sources to increase the findings' robustness.

In-depth interviews proved to be significant in the study's raw data collection processes relating to changes and continuities of Zimbabwe's post-Mugabe ZANU PF's use of colonial memory in election campaigns. The researcher conducted in-depth interviews with three political editors from ZBC TV, Zimpapers and AMH respectively. The researcher also approached ZANU PF's Department of Commissariat, Director for Research, Strategy and Liason to extract firsthand data relating the party's use of colonial memory discourse pre and post-Mugabe Zimbabwe. The other intention was to solicit for data relating to mediation of colonial memory in Zimbabwe's electoral politics. The researcher did not face any difficulties in this regard because he has the phone numbers of the participants to engage them beyond physical geography. The researcher is known by the participants as a former ZBC Current Affairs Producer. However, he was quite very much aware of the slippery nature of politicians particularly in the context of political toxicity in Zimbabwe and also now that he was no longer with the state broadcaster.

5.8.3 Research interview guide

All research participants were provided with an interview guide developed by the researcher. There were specific interview guides for ZANU PF participant, political editors taking into account their media houses they work for – state and private media. The other interview guide was for the political scientist with its own set of questions. All in all, each interview guide had a maximum number of seven questions although they increased during the actual interviewing process.

5.8.4 Research interview schedules

All the interviewees were conducted during the day. The researcher conducted five interviews starting with the ZANU PF participant in Harare from the party's headquarters. The researcher arrived at 9 O'clock but was later attended to at 2 O'clock in the afternoon until 3 O'clock. The researcher also conducted another interview at ZBC at Pockets Hill in Highlands, Harare from 10 O'clock to 12 O'clock in the afternoon. Another in-depth interview was conducted with the AMH managing editor from his car in Harare's central business district. The political scientist opted for an emailed questions and it took him one week to respond. The last interview was conducted at *The Herald* house, in the office of the political editor from 9 O'clock to 12 O'clock in the afternoon. All participants signed consent forms as confirmation that they willingly and voluntarily participated.

Participants selected in this study are of elite status in Zimbabwean society because they hold positions of authority from their respective workstations. They were of significant value to this study in its endeavour to draw possible conclusions about the beliefs or actions of their views about ZANU PF's colonial memory use. The participants also wield enormous intimate knowledge about pre- and post-Mugabe ZANU PF's political conduct. The researcher was aware, however, that getting ZANU PF elites to agree to interviews would be difficult. All research participants were carefully persuaded to participate in the interview process by making them understand their authoritative role in Zimbabwean society. The researcher also convinced the research participants that by participating in this study, they are also contributing to a more informed, united, constructive Zimbabwe. It is within this context that all the participants voluntarily participated willingly and highly corporative.

While conducting interviews with the ZBC news editor, the researcher acknowledges the long-held accusations of partisan reportage leveled against the state broadcaster on national political issues and events such as elections. The ZBC participant however strongly denied the fact that they deny electoral coverage to opposition parties. He even stated that media under Mnangagwa has positively expanded. During the researcher's long stay with the ZBC, on numerous occasions he encountered accusations and views from some sections of the country as being pro-ZANU PF. Some fellow ZBC journalists have publicly supported or attempted or joined the party in various capacities such as members of parliament. According to Masuku (2012) this is because ZBC does not have a binding editorial policy – a development that has naturally cultivated journalists working for the state broadcaster to support ZANU PF.

indirectly or directly. However, the researcher's ideological political views on ZANU PF do not affect concerted efforts to maintain objectivity.

Indeed, Tomasselli (2015) advises that normative academic conduct assumes that academics are in control of their theories and methods, their field procedures and ethical obligations, a significant view that the researcher adheres to. Credibility was also not compromised because after all the focus of qualitative research is not to study participants in order to make any generalisations about a larger population or place from which participants are selected but to obtain a deeper understanding of their experiences and perspectives about a phenomenon under investigation (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). The concern for this study is also not the number of participants but that the selected participants provide sufficient, rich and extensive information that substantially provide insights into understanding of political communication research in Zimbabwe. In agreement with this view scholars (Rubin and Rubin, 2005; Snape and Spencer, 2003), participants in qualitative research of this nature were relatively few and were purposively selected. The researcher had close contact with the purposively selected participants data collection methods involves close contact between researcher and participants.

5.8.5 Inclusion selection criteria of research participants

This study's research participants were selected to provide "substantial contributions to filling out the structure and character of the experience under investigation," (Donald Polkinghorne, 2005: 139). The research participants were significant because they offered fertile and rich knowledge about colonial memory as campaign discourse (Polkinghorne, 2005; Rubin and Rubin, 2005). As a result, ZANU PF elites and political editors were important in this study because they also offered intimate and rich data relating to colonial memory discourse as election campaign discourse. The participants are also well-versed in the ZANU PF election campaign rhetoric. Indeed, they also contrasted in their attempts to come to terms on the discontinuities or continuities without changes in Zimbabwe's post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics. Their different perceptions augment credibility to the study (Rubin and Rubin, 2005).

The participants for this study were carefully selected based on their deeper understanding of Zimbabwe's political discourses. A key consideration in this study was given to participants availability, willingness and ability to "reflectively discern aspects of their own experience and to effectively communicate what they discern through (a mutually intelligible) language" (Polkinghorne, 2005: 138). The participants proved to be very conversant with electoral

processes both in ZANU PF and Zimbabwe from a media and cultural studies and political science perspective. The editors selected in this study have been holding on to their positions pre and post-Mugabe era so they possess experience and knowledge on the conduct and role of the media during election times. The researcher must also point out that he had phone numbers of the participants.

5.8.6 Significance and application of In-depth Interviews in the study

Political research such as this present study required that in-depth interviews be applied to collect meaningful, exhaustive and relevant data (Halperin and Heath, 2017). In-depth interviews, also known as qualitative interviews (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2006; Rubin and Rubin, 2005; Kvale, 1996), provided qualitative knowledge or what Polkinghorne (2005: 138) refers to as 'language data.' The interview processes in this study were professional conversations in which post-Mugabe ZANU PF's use of colonial memory knowledge was constructed through the interaction of the researcher and the participants, regardless of format (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill, 2009; Rubin and Rubin, 2005; Kvale, 1996). While the researcher typically had a lot of carefully designed questions or aspects he wanted participants to describe, the questions were so flexible that the conversations were a give-and-take dialectic in which the interviewer "follows threads opened by the interviewee and guides the conversation towards producing a full account of the experience under investigation" (Polkinghorne, 2005: 142).

The researcher had the opportunity to probe and ask follow-up questions that were not originally planned. In contrast to other information gathering instruments, such as the researcher's knowledge of Zimbabwe's political terrain allowed both the researcher and the participant some flexibility and freedom to clarify issues (O'Leary 2004; Robson 2000; Patton 2002). Interviews were unavoidable as a method of gathering information from participants because all methodological decisions are epistemological manifestations informed by the researcher's position on how knowledge is constructed (Cater and Little, 2007; Willig, 2001). Indeed, in-depth interviews are the most widely used method for generating qualitative data as a knowledge construction site (Polkinghorne, 2005).

Thus, interviews epistemologically related to five aspects of postmodern cultural studies philosophy, which regards knowledge as conversation, narrative, language, context, and interrelationship between interviewer and interviewee (see Kvale, 1996). This philosophy thus

accepts the qualitative interview as the basic mode of knowing because it aims to produce a detailed narrative account of languaged data that, while developing in a general area of interest of the researcher, pictures the interviewee's life-world in its natural context through conversation between interviewer and interviewee (Leedy and Ormrod, 2005; Polkinghorne, 2005; Kvale, 1996).

5.9 Collecting data using qualitative content analysis of Mugabe and Mnangagwa's campaign speeches

Mugabe and Mnangagwa's election campaign speeches were subjected qualitative content analysis as a data gathering process. In the first half of the twentieth century, qualitative content analysis emerged with the primary goal of deepening media industries and a concurrent interest in media effects research. This happened shortly after World War II, when the government of the United States of America became interested in analysing Nazi Germany's propaganda directed at them. The approach is thought to have evolved from a strong desire to employ quantitative approaches to communication research (see Krippendorff, 2004:1; Schreier, 2012: 1). Berelson (1952), who convincingly advocated for quantitative content analysis of communication, is credited with further developments of this technique. According to Berelson (1952:18), "content analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication."

However, Kracauer (1952) disputed Berelson's (1952:18) attempts to quantify communication because they were limited to a description of the manifest of content communication. Indeed, this study expands on Kracauer's (1952) central arguments that meaning is typically complex, holistic, and context dependent, and that it is not essentially obvious by simply engaging with it. Kracauer (1952) warns against the prevalent practice in quantitative content analysis of equating a given theme's coding frequency with its significance. Kracauer argued for qualitative content analysis on these grounds because it is not limited to manifest content and frequency counts. George (1959) adds his voice to the call for 'non-frequency content analysis.' Holsti expressed similar sentiments (1969) emphasising for qualitative content analysis as more applicable in political communication research.

5.9.1 Application of Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA) in the study

In media and communication, qualitative content analysis is used to investigate various issues such as analysis of diverse communication in public relations and advertising (Michaelson and Griffin, 2005), media and violence (Martins et al, 2013), media independence (Nyarko and

Tomaselli, 2018), crisis health communication research (Ogbodo et al, 2020), and controversial issues affecting humanity (Tomaselli, 2021). The study used qualitative content analysis to generate data from Mugabe and Mnangagwa's election campaign speeches, building on the work of Kracauer (1952); George (1959); and, more recently, Mayring (2012); Schreier (2012). This method was appropriate for this study because it was based on a qualitative approach to examine colonial discourse with the goal of determining whether there are changes in election campaign discourse between Mugabe and Mnangagwa (Brennen, 2013). In this study, the technique was used to locate strategic and continued appropriation of colonial memory for the purposes of maintaining ZANU PF's hegemony. The intention is, to summon Mayring and Schreier (2012), was to 'systematically describe the meaning of qualitative data' in context where Mnangagwa's administration was packaged as a New Dispensation or Second Republic. Thus, the most important intention was to investigate the discourses they signal in post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics.

In this study, qualitative content analysis produced comprehensive knowledge about the memorialisation and re-imagination of the past in post-Mugabe ZANU PF electoral politics in relation to its memorialisation during the Mugabe era. According to Schreier (2012), a researcher can also categorise sequential parts of the material into coded themes. The themes from Mugabe's and Mnangagwa's election campaign speeches are at the heart of this method to accommodate all of the necessary data relating to how (if at all) the two presidents' stances and engagement with discourses about former colonisers differ. The themes emanating from colonial memory discourse have a relationship with the key objectives of this study. These include the study's desire to investigate the role of the media in sustaining ZANU PF's hegemony, variations of media discourse between Mugabe and Mnangagwa and their engagement with the former colonisers.

The study was to able to convincingly answer the main questions, which also constitute the study's objectives, by investigating whether there was a change in political discourse between Mugabe and Mnangagwa during the election campaign. Armed with this critical information, the study attempted to construct interpretations about the messages espoused within a specific text/s relating to the place and discourse of colonial memory in the New Dispensation (Mayring, 2010). All of these efforts were aimed at reaching conclusions based on empirical evidence and emerging forms of articulating political communication in a Zimbabwean context. This is due to the researcher being tasked with drawing differences and similarities from data in the form of Mugabe and Mnangagwa's election campaign speeches.

5.9.2 Data sources for the content analysis

The first set of data subjected to qualitative content analysis is Mnangagwa's ten presidential live broadcast campaign speeches from 2018 presidential election campaign. These took the form of recorded live speeches obtained from the ZBC library and archives department. This category of data provides information relating to the strategic importance of African liberation movements' continued reliance on colonial memory rhetoric in contemporary politics, and the qualitative content analysis was used to reveal patterns in communication content in this context (Mayring, 2010).

In order to contrast if there are any changes of political rhetoric in Mnangagwa's election campaign discourse, Mugabe's seven (7) campaign speeches are a significant part of the sample that is purposefully chosen from the 2000 parliamentary election for analysis. During this period, Zimbabwe would first conduct parliamentary elections for all the country's constituencies in preparation for a presidential election in line with the country's constitution. However, Mugabe in his capacity as ZANU PF president addressed the rallies in support of his candidates against Tsvangirai's MDC candidates. The study also purposefully focused on the 2000 parliamentary election because for the first time since 1980, ZANU PF was radically challenged in ways that shook Zimbabwe's political terrain. The researcher retrieved Mugabe's speeches in written form from the *Zimpapers Knowledge Centre* in Harare. Clearly, the study's intention was to extract significant data from this sample relating to the following:

- a. Discourses (if any) that contrast Mnangagwa from Mugabe's rhetoric about the former colonisers.
- b. Establish what the discourse and place of colonial memory in the new dispensation tell us about political communication in contemporary Zimbabwean politics.
- c. Important "points of articulation," "inventors" who give voice to a different competing force at work in a single moment of rhetorical action (Campbell 2005).
- d. Firsthand evidence about discourses on continuities and discontinuities, memorialisation of the past, the role of the media in post-Mugabe Zimbabwe.

Halperin and Heath (2017) advise that when dealing with primary sources of data, a researcher should engage in 'external criticism,' assessing the source's external characteristics such as when, where, why, by whom, and for whom it was produced. The goal was to assess the context and biases that informed the contents of the speeches, revealing what was going on during Mugabe's tenure in comparison to Mnangagwa's administration. According to Halperin and

Heath (2017), at this point, a researcher should use 'internal criticism' to determine the truthfulness, accuracy, and evidential worth of primary sources of data of this type.

5.10 Coding processes applied in the study

In order to make informed sense of Mugabe and Mnangagwa's election campaign speeches, the study adopted a comprehensive coding process. Data from these election campaign speeches was then supplemented with data from in-depth interviews with carefully chosen participants as earlier indicated. For clarity's sake conceptual and relational content analysis techniques were mobilised as discussed below.

5.10.1 Conceptual content analysis in the study

Conceptual analysis was used to determine the presence and constant mentioning of colonial memory discourse in Mugabe and Mnangagwa's campaign speeches. Conceptual content analysis was applied to interrogate and analyse Mugabe and Mnangagwa's number of times they make reference to colonial memory in their attempts to justify ZANU PF's long stay in power. The technique proved to be significant because it contrasts Mnangagwa's New Dispensation/Second Republic from Mugabe's administration. The researcher counted the number of certain words relating to liberation struggle, independence, land among others. The main intention was to examine changes and variations of discourse among the two leaders in the data. The focus was to also carefully locate terms relating to colonial memory, colonisation, independence, resettlement and elections from Mugabe and Mnangagwa's campaign speeches. The same technique was applied from the interviewee responses. At this juncture, the researcher remains guided by the key questions which also constitute the objectives of the study. However, focus was on selective location of texts, words or sentences that in one way or the other relate to colonial memory and election campaigns. In the context of this study, the research participants drawn from ZANU PF, political news editors were significant to the functionality of this process. Information that appeared to have been irrelevant was ignored to maintain credibility and focus of the study.

5.10.2 Relational content analysis in the study

At this juncture, the main focus of the researcher was to connect colonial memory from Mugabe and Mnangagwa's election campaign speeches with responses generated from the interviewees. The key focus at this stage was to relate any relationships that exist between colonial memory discourse and discontinuities or continuities without change in Zimbabwe's

post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics. The study was interested in how Mnangagwa's administration engages with the discourses of the former colonisers in ways that contrast him from his predecessor - Mugabe. Here, the study focused on Mugabe and Mnangagwa's direct and indirect ways in which they emphasise Zimbabwe British colonial relations. The researcher should point out that Mugabe and Mnangagwa's campaign speeches were carefully analysed in a balanced manner to minimise bias. The other intention was to ensure that results are not affected with having information that is too broad. As a result, the coding process was not complex and difficult in the researcher's endeavour to produce meaningful and valuable results. In *Chapter Six* ahead, straight forward themes emerging from Mugabe and Mnangagwa's campaign speeches are fully provided. The actual data are depicted as a result of these coding processes.

Table 5: 2. below adapted from (Braun and Clarks Reflexive Thematic Analysis 2017) explains the coding process.

The conceptual coding process of the study		
Stage	Issue	Description
Stage 1	Data transcription and familiarising	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conceptual analysis was conducted to determine the existence of longitudinal changes in the content of the election campaign speeches. • I then familiarised myself with key terms of the topic to locate their presence in mediated data in the form of the election campaign speeches. • Data from the interviewees was also then carefully examined to determine any link of their words, statements from election campaign speeches.

Stage 2	Data coding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On this particular stage I then then put together statements of the mediated election campaign speeches from ZBC TV to understand their meanings. Also, I wanted to determine how they relate to continuity and changes in the New Dispensation – the Second Republic. • Data obtained from the in-depth interviews was also put within the same category from the mediated data (speeches). • By reducing the text to categories, the study focused on coding specific words or patterns that informed the research question.
Stage 3	Developing categories	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This stage included developing categories, which had diverse ‘patterns of meaning, underpinned by a central organising concept – a shared core idea’ (Clarke and Braun 2017:297). In other words, the themes/categories were “something important about the data in relation to the research question” (Braun and Clarke 2013:82). • I then put together sentences or phrases, visuals developed on the codes in phase 2. By

		<p>organising and re-organising codes, the study developed themes that were necessary for answering the key questions that constitute the objectives of the study</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • According to Terry et al. (2017, 41) the researcher at this stage should gather related subthemes “that are a distinct aspect of a theme but shares the same central organising concept”. It means texts cannot make meaning in isolation, but, rather, they can only do so under interrelated circumstance. • The main goal is was examine the occurrence of selected terms in the data
Stage 4	Review and fine tune categories	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Here I choose words, word sense, phrase, sentence for comprehensive analysis
Stage 5	Defining and understanding categories	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When I felt the categories now represented the data and codes clearly, the themes were analysed rigorously by explaining their significance in the study. Basically, I focused on the most applicable themes that speak to the question under study.

Stage 6	Write a report	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I analysed data semantically to report on the surface and underpinning meanings of the data gathered. • I then interrogated data, guided by the theoretical lenses and literature applied in the study. The intention was to explain that my arguments and conclusions are derived from data rather than mainly preconceptions or biases of the researcher.
---------	-----------------------	--

5.11 Methods of Data Analysis

Data analysis in this study was subjected to robust and comprehensive discourse and qualitative content analytic processes. Integrating different methods of analysis - as will be discussed further below - was an intelligible way of ensuring credibility of the findings in light of any limitations that would arise. Qualitative Content Analysis was used to make sense of Mnangagwa's ten (10) presidential campaign speeches and seven (7) of Mugabe. Critical discourse analysis was used to examine, analyse and investigate if Mnangagwa is still treating post-Mugabe ZANU PF as his private fiefdom based on only rhetorical attention to formal political institutions. Critical discourse analysis was used to make sense of data from presidential speeches in line with the appropriation of colonial memory during election campaigning. Below is the first step applied for the purposes of data analysis.

5.11.1 Qualitative Content Analysis

Content analysis was applied because it is the most commonly applied technique in mass media research, a domain to which it naturally belongs (Deacon et al, 1999:16). It was applied in this study to prove 'objectivity' while emphasising on observable evidence to produce the academic rigour and authority of 'natural' scientific inquiry (Deacon et al, 1999:15) of Zimbabwe's post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics. Its significance was to produce data that is both objective and repeatable or replicable, a goal that is immensely difficult to accomplish with discourse analysis. With this in mind, qualitative content analysis in this study explores recurring meanings attached to specific messages in the context of post-Mugabe ZANU PF election

campaigns rhetoric, place and mediation of colonial memory. These could be “words, meanings, pictures, symbols, ideas, themes or any message” (Neuman, 1997:273). According to Krippendorff (1980) a clear outline of procedures that are used in doing content analysis facilitates the interpretation of the findings and the replication of the process leading up to them. This has been demonstrated in Table 5:1 above.

5.11.2 Qualitative Content Analysis of Mugabe and Mnangagwa’s campaign speeches

The study paid attention on selected aspects of meanings that relate to the transformations or changes of political discourse in post-Mugabe ZANU-PF politics (the new dispensation) in Zimbabwe. The study specifically paid attention to codes that the researcher identified from broadcast rallies in form of speeches from print and broadcast media. This is because presidential actions have substantial meaning and importance of providing the central *function* (Coe, 2011). The researcher also focused on *how* (the content of the message), *why* (the production of the message), and or *with what effect* (the consequences the message) Coe (2011), of both Mnangagwa and Mugabe address the electorate. The researcher aimed to establish discourses that differentiate Mnangagwa’s rhetorical choices from Mugabe. The argument is that by design, presidential speeches aim to illuminate what makes a given president, or era different from other speeches or presidents (Coe, 2011).

5.11.3 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of Mugabe and Mnangagwa’s election campaign speeches

Mnangagwa and Mugabe’s campaign speeches were also subjected to critical discourse analysis. The researcher explored, examined and interrogated the ways in which Mnangagwa deployed colonial discourses in his campaign process within the broader socio economic and political environment in Zimbabwe. According to Masilela (1997), textual analysis should not ignore the environment in which reception and alternative readings occur. Masilela (1997) is of the view that there is need to consider ways in which “media-based textual significations mediated by discourses” occur. Van Dijk (1991) weighs in explaining that present-day discourse analysis recognises that text and talk are enormously more intricate, and call for separate though interrelated explanations of phonetic, graphical, phonological, morphological, syntactic, micro- and macro-semantic, stylistic, super structural, rhetorical, pragmatic, conversational, interactional and other structures and strategies.

5.12 Significance and functionality of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in the study

5.12.1 Production, construction of New Dispensation/Second Republic

It is argued that language and words are a system of signs which can be rendered meaningless if they are independently interrogated. Therefore, CDA in this study present an opportunity to understand how Mnangagwa chooses to look back at Zimbabwe's colonial past while constructing a "New Dispensation". As such CDA in this study is concerned about how colonial discourse is used to explore the ways in post-Mugabe ZANU PF election campaign discourse in their attempt to accomplish total decolonisation and emancipation of the people.

5.12.2 Explore politics of memory concealed within colonial memory discourse

The study is consistent with Van Dijk's (2001) central arguments of CDA as a concept committed to laying bare and problematising "the role of discourse in the production and reproduction of power abuse or domination and doing so in the best interests of dominated groups" (Van Dijk, 2001: 96). I focused on the place and memory of colonial language used in selected political rallies, conversations from in-depth interviews and coverage from ZBC to explore concealed discourse on politics of memory as a way in which post-ZANU PF seeks to maintain hegemony. CDA in this study help the researcher to go beyond questions of whether there is a colonial hang over, nostalgia or ambivalence in post-ZANU PF election campaigns. CDA further help demonstrate on how by deploying colonial discourses post-Mugabe ZANU PF attempt to address contemporary issues characterised by both the past and the present. Van Dijk (2001) argues that language both mediates and constructs our understanding of reality.

5.12.3 Investigate continuity and changes in Mnangagwa's New Dispensation/Second Republic

The study also summoned Norman Fairclough's triple dimensional exploration which examines on three aspects of analysis. Fairclough (1995) offers a methodical "unraveling of the texture and inter-textuality (form and function) of the text, and its relationship with other texts that it enters into conversation with, the relationship of the text to its context of production and to the broader social practices that shape it and are in turn influenced by it". However, to maintain clarity of thought, Bourdieu was highly significant to analyse both Mugabe and Mnangagwa's election campaign speeches. Bourdieu's analysis of speech as a genre that can

be used to explore mediated political discourse was significant for the study to remain at discourse level. Bourdieu describes political discourse as a field of struggle, internal struggle to produce and sustain a coherent political discourse within the current structured set of political discourses, external struggle to constitute a political public and a base of support and trust for that political discourse and the institution and charismatic individuals associated with it. Bourdieu says the relationship between the political order of discourse and the order of discourse of the mass media are critical when analysing political statements. This is because communication between politicians and publics is central to unpack power dynamics in society. According to Fairclough (1995), much critical work on mediated politics has stressed complicity between the media and politicians, but it is also important to be alert to tensions, contradictions and struggles in the relationship between the political order of discourse and the order of discourse of the media. In light of these significant observations, this study is able to question significance and role of the media in post-Mugabe ZANU PF election campaigns beyond the everyday narrative. The study adopts a materialist notion on ways in which a text, as an example of language use, is entrenched in and reinforced by a wider social political environment associated with strong systems for the creation of Zimbabwean normative political culture.

In order to complement Bourdieu, the study further summons Wodak's (2001: 2) who is of the view that CDA aims to "investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, signalled, constituted, legitimised and so on by language use". This also guides this study's exploration of election campaign discourses in post-Mugabe's ZANU PF politics during election campaigns. It is surprising that despite many accusations levelled against ZANU PF, the party retained power in 2018. According to Richardson (2007: 6), it is "strange that the discursive reproduction of class inequalities remains an under-developed issue for CDA". This study is concerned about the need to question how colonial discourse plays in indexing and (re)producing class inequality in post-Mugabe Zimbabwe. In light of this development, the study would want to question if there are transformations or changes of political discourse in post-Mugabe ZANU-PF politics - the New Dispensation in Zimbabwe.

5.13 Ethical Considerations

This study is fully approved as an ethical exemption by the **HSSREC** under protocol reference number: **00003786/2022**. The study observed the following ethics:

5.13.1 Reliability and Validity

“Content analysis involves replicable and valid methods for making inferences from observed communications to their context” (Krippendorff, 1980:69). This study clearly details the steps of its content analysis, so its approach is replicable to another all data gathered and processed. These steps were guided by inductive and deductive themes. In addition, the researcher rigorously conducted the coding process. According to Altheide and Johnson (1994), reliability is the stability of the study’s findings, while validity is known as truthfulness of the study’s findings. Validity and reliability were used in this study because of their ability to increase transparency and decrease opportunities to insert researcher bias in qualitative research (Singh, 2014). Validity and reliability ensured accuracy (Haradhan, 2017). Then, reliability refers to a measurement that supplies consistent results with equal values (Blumberg, Cooper and Schindler, 2005). Reliability measures precision, repeatability and trustworthiness in research (Chakrabartty, 2013).

5.13.2 Voluntary participation

The research participants in this study were not forced to the requests from the researcher during data gathering processes. All research participants were provided with an Informed Consent Form to voluntarily commit themselves to participate. Research participants were given the choice and right to choose where the interview process is conducted and respond to questions, they are comfortable to answer. The researcher respected time stipulations; days research participants are available for the interview process. This resulted in all the interviews being conducted on time frames and places determined by the research participants. During the interview process, participants were given an opportunity to fully explain themselves and clarify issues.

5.13.3 Confidentiality of sources

The study abides by confidentiality of sources for research participants. Recordings of the interviews are not shared with people who have nothing to do with this research to maintain the privacy and confidentiality of sources. In this study efforts were maintained to protect participants by not revealing their actual names. As soon as participants were assured of protection of their identities, they felt comfortable to participate. It was after the researcher assured them that this study is purely academic.

5.13.4 Non-maleficence

The study made sure not to intentionally hurt or harm research participants by respecting their political affiliation, emotions and ideologies. While at ZANU PF headquarters, some officials from the Commissariat department curtly declined to participate after they were acquainted with the nature and objectives of this study. The researcher was referred from one office to the other until late in the afternoon. During the interview process, the researcher was very careful on the tone and pace of asking questions in case he would jeopardise the process. This was in full acknowledgement of controversial manner catapulted Mnangagwa to power. As Mulqueeny and Kasiram (2013) also warn, an interview schedule for instance, should not cause painful issues to surface among the participants. Not harming participants is an ethical consideration that the study consciously and consistently attempted to avoid my own political views does not in any way force or manipulate research participant's political expressions. Therefore, the study did not conduct the interview process in a manner that may cause harm, censor or rebuke as a result of their participation in my study. This is because Zimbabwe's political environment is always violent. There were times when the when the research participants felt a sense of discomfort during the interview process, the researcher constantly reassured them of their privacy strictly maintained.

5.14 Conclusion

Qualitative research methods were significant in unpacking the objectives of this study. The researcher carefully employed specific techniques which relate to the numerous ways of understanding Mnangagwa's administration in more nuanced ways.

CHAPTER SIX

PRESIDENTIAL STAR RALLIES AS A SITE OF RELIVING COLONIAL MEMORY

6.1 Introduction

Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living (Karl Marx, 1888).

This study set out to question changes and continuities in Zimbabwe's post-Mugabe ZANU-PF politics. Colonial discourses are an increasingly important aspect in post-colonial states (Loomba, 2005). Investigating colonial memory discourse is a continuing concern which motivated this study to locate the ways in which the past is memorialised and re imagined in post-Mugabe ZANU PF election campaigns speeches. While the post-Mugabe ZANU PF government established itself on the discourse of a 'new dispensation' which signalled a break from the past, this study argues that post-Mugabe ZANU PF continues to rely on official re-imaginings, conjures, and performs many dominant discursive discourses that marked Mugabe politics as observed by different scholars (Willems, 2005; Muzondidya, 2007; Fisher 2010; Kalaora 2011; Gwekwerere and Mpondi, 2018; Dube, 2019; 2020a, 2020b, 2021). One of the key markers of Mugabe discourse is the use of colonial memory as a tool for legitimisation, and it is from this premise that the study examines the discourse and place of colonial memory in the New Dispensation politics, as the post-Mugabe administration has come to be known - with particular reference to selected speeches by the two presidents during campaign rallies and how they are mediated by both print and broadcast media.

Colonial memory remains strategic in many African political movements which established themselves against imperialism (Veronelli, 2012: 89). While the post-Mugabe ZANU PF claims change and departure from his politics, the party's election communication practices is arguably within the context of historical transitions, memory and re-imaginings of political communication that many liberation fighters, including Mugabe relied upon. As this study title

suggests, there appears to be continuities without change in as far as the memorialisation of the past in post-Mugabe ZANU PF election communication practices is concerned.

Intertwined with the central focus of this study was also an interrogation of the role of the media in shaping colonial memory in post-Mugabe ZANU PF electoral politics. The analysis of ZANU PF's election campaign discourses after the unceremonious removal of Mugabe in November 2017 (Hodgkinson, 2019; Ndawana, 2020; Tendi, 2020; Mkandawire, 2020; Ndawana, 2020; Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya, 2021) has not addressed how memory is re-imagined for political mediation, hegemony, and ideological reasons. Given this context, this study establishes what the appropriation colonial memory discourse in the New Dispensation reveals about political communication in contemporary Zimbabwean politics.

Key questions the study set out to investigate include whether there is any transformations or changes of political discourse in post-Mugabe ZANU-PF politics (the New Dispensation) in Zimbabwe as claimed by the Mnangagwa's administration. The intention is to contribute to on-going conversations about transformations that are taking place in the nature of 'texts' to understand presidential discourse (Coe, 2011). The study also set out to question ways in which mediated rhetoric sustain or counter colonial memory in Zimbabwe's post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics. This and two subsequent chapters present the study findings according to three (3) study objectives discussed in Chapter One. The focus of the present chapter is to show how presidential star rallies are a site of reliving colonial memory in Zimbabwe's post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics. This is followed in Chapter Seven by a presentation of the role the print and broadcast media play in shaping colonial memory in post-Mugabe ZANU PF electoral politics. The study's intention is to demonstrate that whereas Mnangagwa's New Dispensation- the Second Republic- claims change and departure from Mugabe's politics, his administration's election communication practice is arguably within the context of historical transitions, memory and re-imaginings of political communication that Mugabe relied upon. The third findings chapter, Chapter Eight, addresses finding on what the appropriation of colonial memory discourse in Mnangagwa's administration may possibly reveal about political communication in contemporary Zimbabwean politics.

This present chapter is a thematic presentation of findings (Braun and Clarke 2019, 2020) which emerged from a straightforward thematic analyse Mugabe's seven 2000 parliamentary election campaign speeches and Mnangagwa's ten 2018 presidential campaign speeches. Mugabe and Mnangagwa's administrations are at the heart of our understanding of the strategic

importance of continued reliance on the rhetoric of colonial memory by African liberation movements in contemporary politics. Central to the entire discipline of political communication is the relationship between discourse and power. Indeed, the relationship between power and discourse has received considerable critical attention to understand the practice of hegemony by ruling elites. Foucault's (1977) analytical tool to understand power relations is significant in the analysis of these findings. Foucault's (1977) complements different discourse analytic 'strands' (Fairclough, 2005) applied in the analysis of Zimbabwe's memorialisation of the past.

6.2 Ways in which Mugabe and Mnangagwa positioned themselves and engaged with the discourses about former colonisers

This section is significant because it provides clarity in our interpretation of the (mis)reading of African politics which is highly misleading, biased, and beyond the pale of humanity (see Houtondji, 1997; Ahluwalia, 2001; Mbembe, 2001; Zeleza, 2006). The reasoning suggested in this chapter is an attempt to locate Appiah's (1997) elusive middle-of-the-road approach between the western and the indigenous forms of knowledge construction within the context of post-Mugabe Zimbabwean politics. The key themes in this chapter illustrate ways in which Mugabe and Mnangagwa positioned themselves and engaged with the discourses about the former colonisers. The section also demonstrates that there are vestiges, continuities and discontinuities of colonial memory that influence ZANU PF presidential campaigns. It is a site of remembering the past with aim of influencing justice and equality. Given this context, it appears that Mnangagwa's New Dispensation – the Second Republic, is a continuation of Mugabe's administration. Mnangagwa with a strong promise of bringing pragmatic change that would turn around the fortunes of Zimbabwe. Memories of the colonial past are not only evoked and to articulate patriotism and belonging, but to also address vestiges of colonial inequalities that spilled over into independent Zimbabwe. At the centre of memorialisation of the past is the contentious land question that seemingly remained unresolved since the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979. Interrogating these issues also offer a glimpse ongoing effort to address identity, power and belonging in post-independence Zimbabwe. By engaging in these discourses, the findings of the study inform public discourse on issues related to colonial memory, nationalism, and political identity in Zimbabwe. A nuanced understanding of these complex issues largely contributes to a more informed public debate and potentially facilitates greater social cohesion and reconciliation. The following sections illustrate the ways

in which the two leaders positioned themselves and engaged with the discourses about former colonisers.

6.2.1 Presidential star rallies as a site of reliving colonial memory

Mugabe and Mnangagwa use presidential star rallies to recall injustices ostensibly committed by the British colonial government whose effects spilled over into independent Zimbabwe. The two leaders' campaign speeches engage with the British using a presidential rally to consolidate their hegemony while delegitimising and silencing (neo) imperialism. The study found out that during the presidential star rallies conducted and addressed by Mugabe and Mnangagwa, they construct a ZANU PF strong hold party support base in each and every province by regurgitating their role during the liberation struggle. For instance, in *The Herald* of 22 June 2000, Mugabe use his Presidential Star rally to woo party supporters stating that 'Mashonaland Central was the first province to provide people to join the liberation struggle and offer themselves to free their country and die for their cause'. He tactfully delegitimises his main rival – Tsvangirai, whom he accuse of being a puppet of British imperialism. He further smear campaigned Tsvangirai on the same day saying:

These ones are the people who chickened out. Tsvangirai was taken to Mozambique but he ran away. Pfocho! Kwaakamhanyanako hakuna anoziva (Nobody knows where he ran to. But those who persevered, some are now in the army, some in the CIO and some in different government departments' (The Herald 8 June 2000).

From the above data, Mugabe used liberation war credentials as a legitimisation and delegitimation instrument so as to create an impression in the publics' minds that Tsvangirai was not a revolutionary. Presidential Star Rallies are, thus, a battle ground for reinforcing colonial memories in post-independence Zimbabwe. In the same vein, Mnangagwa also engages with Zimbabwe's provinces that are deemed to have played a significant role during the liberation struggle in his Presidential star rallies. ZANU PF conducts Presidential star rallies in each and every province as means to connect with old generations who witnessed the war of independence. The rallies are often conducted in strategic districts or wards which have a symbolic meaning and experiences of the war. On 18 June 2018, while addressing ZANU PF party supporters, ZBC reported that,

‘Masvingo’s mother city is where Zimbabwe draws its name from the Great Zimbabwe ruins. The President Comrade Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa was here in 1964 as a trained guerrilla fighter and it was here in Masvingo that the Rhodesians realised the battle grounds had been drawn between them and the majority of Zimbabweans (ZBC, Masvingo rally, 18 June 2018).

The above news broadcast report by ZBC is anchored on the idea of a Presidential Star Rally whose presence in Masvingo hold memories of the war to ZANU PF. The news report makes emphasises on *‘Masvingo’s mother city’* – where Mnangagwa is mentioned as a *‘trained guerrilla fighter’* whose liberation credentials date as far back as ‘1964’ against the British is emotionalised. Apparently, Masvingo province is one of ZANU PF’s strong holds since the days of the liberation struggle. Interestingly, Masvingo province is houses ancient Great Zimbabwe ruins where the earliest civilisation occurred. It is also where the nomenclature – Zimbabwe come from for the country in remembrances of early wars against White colonisation. To buttress this view, the study also found out that Presidential Star Rallies are a platform to recall the 1980 elections that ushered in independence from the British.

Mugabe and Mnangagwa’s Presidential Star Rallies are highly coloured with colonial memory tones to canvas for support. By so doing, the intention is to constantly remind Zimbabweans about the course to independence while the party often take the opportunity to sell their manifesto. It is argued that a rally is a public event at which party contestants address party supporters in their physicality with the intention of canvassing for political support (Paget, 2019). However, the uniqueness of this study is that it foregrounds Mugabe and Mnangagwa’s Presidential Star Rallies as embodiments of remembering colonialism in Zimbabwe. It therefore further emerged that a Presidential Star Rally is a dynamic, usually convincing platform that engages in meaning making process, spreading ideologies and sharing the sensible through multiple performances, such as slogans, praise-singing, speeches, dances and visual symbols (Rancière, 2006: 13; Gilman, 2009). For instance, in all of Mugabe and Mnangagwa’s Presidential Star Rallies by randomly invoking the party’s slogan colonially constructed slogan. It, thus, is an integral part of the election process and retain a significant role in providing space for parties to seek legitimacy through direct contact with the electorate.

The study appeals to Lewanika (2023) whose conceptualisation of ZANU PF’s Star Rallies is within what he terms bigwig rallies. Lewanika (2023) argues that they are integral to the party’s legitimacy-seeking and voter mobilisation strategies. However, Lewanika (2023) confined

himself to bigwig rallies without going a step further on ZANU PF's covert ways of memorialising the past through a Presidential Star Rally. This study found out that presidential campaigns also emotionalise the past as to recoil the country's colonial relations with the British. Mugabe accuse ZANU PF detractors mainly the British, the former colonial power for trying to influence regime change in Zimbabwe.

Some of the things they do, you cannot believe them..... They are persuading Libya, Algeria and other friendly countries to Zimbabwe to suffocate the country...But let me warn you that SADC and AU will not allow regime change in Zimbabwe. Julias Nyerere, Kwameh Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta and many others taught us to look after each other (The Herald 15 June 2000)

Ironically, Libya, Algeria and 'other friendly countries to Zimbabwe' were key in providing military and logistical support during the war of independence. As indicated in Chapter 3, African liberation was a collective effort through a strong alliance system which has remained intact until this day. Given this context, the study is of the view that post Presidential star rallies are beyond an ordinary rally. They hold significant communicative power of reliving the past in ways that appeals to local people. In the case of Mnangagwa, his appropriation of colonial memories outweighs the practicality of the 'new dispensation' discourse. He remains fixated in colonial memories which he constantly and strategically deploys in various ways. The below interview supports this view.

The tone is not confrontational, as exemplified by the maiden visit of the late Foreign Affairs Minister SB Moyo to Chatham House where he even declared that "chara chimwe hachitswanyi inda", literally meaning one finger could not crash lice. This statement was an appeal to Britain that as the erstwhile coloniser it has a lot of responsibility of ensuring Zimbabwe's rebirth and re-engagement initiative since what tied the two nations historically could not be undone no matter the differences.

From the above revelations, the study found that Mnangagwa is also largely tied and conflated with frontline states such as China and Russia who offered military support to Zimbabwe. The following excerpt further illustrate the above point.

The relations have even become more pronounced now because president Mnangagwa occupy a unique position of having received military training both in Russia and in China. So when President Putin and President Xi see Mnangagwa, they more or less see one of their own, their own product, and each time Mnangagwa makes reference to

that, exploiting that kind of memory. This in a way is utilisation of colonial memory and is a subtle expression to the west that there is no way Zimbabwe's attachment and affiliation with China and Russia could be at par with the west due to Zimbabwe's indebtedness owing to the attainment of independence. The first state Mnangagwa visited outside Africa on ascending presidency was China, it is again another signal. When Mnangagwa openly declares that Zimbabwe stands by Russia's side on the Russia Ukraine war, making it one of the only two countries to do so openly in Africa, it is all based on colonial memory.

Indeed, the above discourse is constantly regurgitated in Mnangagwa's presidential campaign discourse where he attempts to convince former colonial allies to support Zimbabwe. For instance, Mnangagwa has maintained old colonial alliance system sympathetic to Zimbabwe. Although his administration is branded the 'new dispensation', his colonial memory semantics are revived through 'Zimbabwe is a friend to all and an enemy to none' discourse which he coined. Below is an interview which shows the recurrence of colonial memory as ever evident in ZANU PF politics:

In SADC, look at SADC, you would have thought that Zimbabwe would have been marginalised, today because of the President's posture and understanding of the need to work with others, people thought that we were going to be fighting with Zambia. No! People thought that we were going to be fighting with Malawi. No! People thought that the negativity between Botswana with us would persist. No! We are best of friends; we are working together. Zimbabwe is respected in SADC, slowly we are going back – we are clawing back to our influence. In the AU we are OK!

SADC and AU are colonial organisations that were formed to fight and resist imperialism and colonisation. At independence, they have remained operational in support of African agency and voice at global stage. Presidential rallies are elaborate productions at which party contestants engage with their various supporters by reminding them of their past. In this study, it appears that presidential campaigns are grounded in colonial memory to shape party structures, encourage togetherness, and frame candidates, the electoral contest, and their opponents. This was also confirmed by participants who pointed out that ZANU PF's use of colonial memory remained tied to countries which offered them military support against the British such as China as indicated above.

6.2.2 Zimbabwe will never be a colony again!

A very significant data which emerged from Mugabe and Mnangagwa's election campaign speeches is the two leaders' unequivocal stance on defending Zimbabwe's independence. Colonial memory is manifest in Mugabe and Mnangagwa's election campaign speeches through reviving fresh wounds and painful memories of the inhuman nature of colonisation in Zimbabwe. They constantly evoked the controversial and seemingly unresolved land dispute since the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979. Clearly, one of the most important grievances that sparked the war of independence between Zimbabwe and Britain was the land question. This study found significant similarities between Mugabe and Mnangagwa's discourses about Zimbabwe's former colonisers- mainly the British. Both leaders strategically deployed the land discourse as a way of preserving Zimbabwean independence. Mnangagwa's evocation of the land question is interpreted as intending to warn former colonial powers of consequences should they intend to undermine the country's independence. The two leaders demonstrate their principles on Zimbabwe – that the country will never be a colony again in any form whatsoever.

By examining memorialisation of the land discourse, the chapter is interested in political texts, statements or phrases appropriated by Mugabe and Mnangagwa in their endeavour to legitimise the past from the present (Foucault, 1972). This view is supported by Hall (1997) who writes that discourse is a combination of statements that create a language for talking about—a way of representing knowledge about a given historical era. Foucault's (Foucault, 1972) discourse interprets the specific kind of language which specialised knowledge has to conform to in order to be regarded as true (Foucault, 1980). In other words, discourse is about the production of knowledge and power through language (Hall, 1997).

Since independence, colonial memories of unfair distribution of land are among the most sensitive unresolved grievances that define post-independence Zimbabwe. This has resulted in the memorialisation of the land question appropriated as a policy position in Zimbabwe. At this juncture, the Functional Theory of Political Campaign Communication (Benoit, et. al., 2007; see also Benoit 2014a, 2014b; Benoit, Blaney, and Pier, 1998; Benoit, McHale, Hansen, Pier, and McGuire, 2003) as applied in this study, justifies the notion that a campaign discourse occurs on both policy and character as a significant means to attain election victory (Snyder 1989 and Iaryczower and Mattozzi 2011, 2013). For instance, in *The Herald* of 20 June 2000 quoted Mugabe while addressing his 13th campaign rally in Kadoma, Rimuka Stadium saying:

...the President...reiterated his stance over land and the need to jealously guard the country's independence and shun parties bent on selling Zimbabwe to foreign interests...The President's policy on many issues is well known (The Herald 20 June 2000).

From the above print news article, it emerged that Mugabe foreground colonial construction of the land discourse to articulate vestiges of colonial memory. Mugabe's 2000 parliamentary election campaign emphasised the need to 'reclaim the land' from former white commercial farmers as a matter of pro black 'policy'. The relationship between black and whites brings memories of Rhodesia where segregation was reported as excessive. Clearly, the appropriation of equitable 'land redistribution' or 'resettlement' between White and Black Zimbabweans is memorialised to historicise the context in which independence was attained. By so doing, the intention legitimise ZANU PF's political decisions (Donges and Jarren, 2017). This is evident in the numerous references to 'land distribution' and or 'resettlement' by the two leaders presidential messages. During Zimbabwe British colonial relations, Blacks were settled in reserves that were hot and not suitable for agricultural production. This view is supported by a participant who indicates that:

...that's why we have resettlement areas like in Sanyati , in Copper Queen there, you talk of vana Chesa and many other areas. These resettlement areas were created by the British colonial administration. Reserves in Zimbabwe are a creation of colonial administration, the farms and all these areas you see today. So when we talk of the need for land redistribution it is not a political gimmick nor a kid's play, it's an attempt to acknowledge wrongs of the past....

From the above, ZANU PF politics "resonated with strong feelings about colonialism and perceptions of Western hypocrisy about human rights" where upon "inequality of land ownership is key to 'the story' – land hunger and dispossession is plain for all to see – which strengthened the plausibility of the narrative" (Onslow, 2011). The situation spilled over into independence, and it was on this basis that Mugabe instigated the land reform programme in 2000. It is on this basis that post ZANU PF raise Zimbabwe British colonial relations as the basis of constructing national memories and histories. It is also on this basis that Mnangagwa's campaign speeches, appropriate the notion of colonial 'land distribution' and or 'resettlement' with so much emphasis. Mnangagwa is quoted from ZBC saying:

Our history cannot be complete if we do not recognise British colonisation of our motherland – Zimbabwe. They came all the way from the Queen to take our gold, diamond and many other minerals. I have emphasised that how do we preserve our heritage and wealth? To preserve this heritage, we should vote for ZANU PF so that it remains in power. So all of you here as youths, your main task is to preserve your heritage. We should never, never, never compromise on our land! It is our wealth and generations to come. Many of our people died for this land during the liberation struggle.

The above revelations shows ZANU PF's rhetoric on land and race that "all whites living in the country were Occidentalised – depicted as foreigners or usurpers, with little or no permanent stake in the country" (Muzondidya, 2007: 333–38; Raftopoulos, 2004b: 162; Raftopoulos, 2003b: 230 as cited in Muzondidya, 2010). Here, Foucault's (1972, 1978, 1980) discourse, knowledge and power theory can be helpful to show how Mugabe and Mnangagwa's memorialisation of the land discourse may be considered as just but an electioneering strategy. A contextual interrogation of memorialisation of land discourse shows that Mugabe and Mnangagwa regard themselves as the rightful custodians of Zimbabwean independence. It also emerged that their intention is to propel ZANU PF's political hegemony to retain power. A Foucauldian (1972; 1978; 1980) analysis of Mugabe and Mnangagwa analysis of their memorialisation of the land discourse – to summon Farkas and Schou (2018:16) – shows that post-Mugabe Zimbabwe's ZANU PF practices "politics of falsehoods". Colonisation in Zimbabwe did not only affect ZANU PF supporters but all and sundry. Colonial memory discourse is used and designed to raise emotions of the voters by speaking what they expect to hear from their leaders without taking caution of truth and feasibility of their promises. For instance, while addressing a rally in Gweru, Mnangagwa singles out ZANU PF youths telling them that,

As your elders, we fought during the war to secure your dreams and aspirations. We fought for the emancipation of our people. In this country, blood was shed, men and women died. We remember the gallant sons and daughters of our motherland-Zimbabwe by ensuring that land is given to its rightful owners. It is our responsibility as your leaders to create a conducive environment for you to thrive. It is a privilege that did not exist during colonial era.

The above numerous critical discourse analytic "strands" (Fairclough, 2005) applied in this study shows the memorialisation of the past during presidential rallies. Mnangagwa stating that 'as your elders' to his party youths are his recognition of the gap between old generations and

the born frees who do not prioritise colonial memory discourse late alone land. It could be Mnangagwa's desire to put in place new policies that are inclusive of all generations to correct colonial imbalances that permeated into independent Zimbabwe.

In the case of Mugabe, he accused MDC led by Tsvangirai as agents of imperialism and British puppets intending to overturn equitable land distribution in Zimbabwe. *The Herald of 15 June 2000* titled 'War vets won't be forced off farms: President reiterates' shows Mugabe's appropriation of war memories by acknowledging freedom fighters who are recorded in the history of Zimbabwe for standing up against Ian Douglas Smith. War veterans are known for their brutal and militant silencing of ZANU PF opponents and critics since 1980. They are known for evoking war songs, performing guerrilla military drills and tactics as a warning of their potential to repeat the same as they did during the war. In same article, Mugabe is quoted saying:

It's amazing that the British are accusing us of violating the rule of law when way back in 1965 the then government of Mr Harold Wilson refused to send troops in the country to restore order after Ian Smith had declared the Unilateral Declaration of Independence. The UDI was the greatest violation of law that has ever happened to this country.

Mugabe evoked colonial memory discourse responding to criticism that he was violating human and property rights in Zimbabwe as legitimisation seeking tool. From this article, it is reasonable to argue that presidential election campaigns in Zimbabwe are a site of reliving colonial memories whose effects are still painful to those who participated in the liberation struggle. War veterans in ZANU PF are used as foot soldiers of addressing vestiges of colonial injustice as in the context of land ownership. In 2000 elections, they were presented as heroes, heroines by re-deploying the ideology of liberation discourse, guardians of national memory through their well calculated naming and labelling of people and phenomena (Mlambo and Mwatwara, 2012). It is in this context that Mugabe campaigned for reclaiming of land that was lost through colonial pillage thereby bringing wounds and fresh memories of Rhodesia. All these efforts were aimed at locating ZANU PF in national memory of colonial past.

In Mugabe and Mnangagwa's philosophy, colonisation brought about economic prejudice in form of land which is sacrosanct to the Zimbabwean people because it was acquired through war. The two leaders' consistent reference to colonial 'unfair land distribution' between blacks and whites is their attempts to construct truth of a dark past. Foucault (1977) argues that power and knowledge are intertwined with human societal power contestations with a view to

significantly construct what is regarded as reality. Presidential election campaigns are thus a significant site that offers a glimpse of what happened during the liberation struggle. Mugabe and Mnangagwa make use of colonial memory to rubber stamp their authority and legitimacy. The argument is that power produces knowledge, and knowledge produces power (Van de Ven, 2012). In other words, Foucault (1978) contends that one of the key pillars of power is truth; the knowledge of that truth (that is, its invention and confirmation) becomes a major mechanism for the legitimisation of the hegemonic forms of power within a given system (Escobar, 1983).

Mnangagwa as reported by ZBC articulates his land policy as anchored on ‘*correcting colonial land imbalances*’ that existed since ‘*the turn of the millennium*’. Mnangagwa’s presidential campaign is understood as a continuation of remembering colonisation which may possibly did not produce a desired ‘truth’ at independence. In this context, colonial memory discourse in the context of this study derives its legitimacy in a cautiously designed truth (Escobar 1983). Foucault (1980) recognises that some people have more power to make particular ideas appear to be “truth” and “natural”. In all the presidential campaign rallies addressed by Mugabe and Mnangagwa, the centrality of the colonial land imbalances is emphasised as significant to black people and their ancestry. For instance, in *The Herald* of 20 June 2000, Mugabe is quoted saying,

The former colonial government led by Ian Smith are siding with the opposition Movement for Democratic Change who have already declared that the elections will not be free and fair. But let me tell you, even under Smith elections were not free and fair that is why we fought for one man one vote! We have so many of our people who died for this noble cause.... This country will never be a colony again! Never!

At this juncture, a critical interrogation of Mugabe shows that he has strong memories and the subjugative nature of colonisation administration in Zimbabwe. The same is with Mnangagwa even if he attempts to break away from Mugabe, he finds himself presenting the ‘new dispensation’ by making use of colonial memory discourse. The implication of colonial memory discourse in ZANU PF politics is thus a starting point to understand presidential elections as a site of reliving colonisation. A critical discourse analysis of the two leaders presidential campaigns confirms that the change from Mugabe to Mnangagwa was ‘repetition without change’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya, 2020). Both Mugabe and Mnangagwa’s presidential campaigns emphasis that during colonial era, black people were prejudiced for too long. Traditionally, it has been argued that discourse defines and produces the objects of our

knowledge and thus governs the way that a topic can be meaningfully talked and reasoned about (Foucault 1980). For instance, while addressing his party supporters in Mutare, Manicaland, Mnangagwa is quoted live broadcast stating that:

...we must never forget colonial experiences which resulted in all of us here denied access to economic development. My government is committed to ensure fair distribution of abundant resources in this country. The wealth God gave us in this country called Zimbabwe, it is up to us to use it to improve our – mountains, birds, forests, rivers, snakes, those that bite, those that are eaten or not , its ours! (ZBC Manicaland rally).

The above excerpt from Mnangagwa's campaign speech is in reference for his unequivocal stance on the importance of land to Zimbabweans. Interestingly, he made reference to 'Lancaster House constitutional provisions which did not reflect the aspirations of the black majority' the same way Mugabe did on 12 June 2000 in Gokwe Midlands when he was quoted by *The Herald* saying: 'the Lancaster Constitution which tied the hands of government from undertaking the necessary reform over the first ten years of independence through constitutional provisions that protected whites only'. The study appeals to Van Dijk, (2006) to acknowledge the influence of these excerpts owing to the fact that politics, to be specific political communication, is argued to be an 'exclusively discursive' social practice'.

The above data demonstrate, how through the July 2000 and July, 2018 election campaigns Mugabe and Mnangagwa memorialise the land discourse to legitimise ZANU PF's stay in power by looking back to the colonial era. Secondly, it appears that Mugabe and Mnangagwa's 'manufacturing consent' of truth using British colonial injustice propel ZANU PF's hegemony against all forms of threats to the party's hold on power. However, the evidence for colonial memory use is thus not simply legitimisation of 'Our' and de-legitimation of 'Them' (see Chibwe, 2017b) through positive self-presentation and negative presentation of the 'other', but are attempts by Mugabe and Mnangagwa to seek to legitimise ZANU PF given the party's past transgressions which affect their long stay in power. Thus, Mnangagwa can be viewed as Mugabe's protégé who represents continuity of ZANU PF rule. At this juncture, the study argues there may not be real pragmatic change in Mnangagwa's New Dispensation – the Second Republic. In this study, the constant reference to terms such as 'Our' and 'Them' is understood within the context of ZANU-PF, Britain and MDC Alliance (see Chibwe, 2017a). Also, the term 'Us' may both refer to Mnangagwa's New Dispensation – the Second Republic

whilst ‘them’ may, on one hand refer to the former colonisers and on the other hand, refer to Chamisa and the MDC Alliance. Thus, Zimbabwe’s land question is with no doubt a significant entry point in our analysis and numerous ways of interrogating colonial memory discourse.

In view of the above, a significant emphasis which emerged in this study is that the land question is a remarkable way by Mugabe and Mnangagwa’s engagement and remembrance of colonial era. The two leaders’ presidential campaigns and articulation of the land discourse is beyond general conversations. They reveal ways in which presidential campaign messages are deployed. The centrality of equitable land distribution is even emphasised and corroborated by carefully selected participants engaged for the purposes of this study. The participants all highlight ways in which Mugabe and Mnangagwa’s recall colonial transgressions that marked black and white Zimbabweans. The following interview excerpt elaborates this point:

Under Mnangagwa we have partially seen some ad hoc redress of some mistakes such as conferring national hero status to Ndabaningi Sithole, James Chikerema etc ...this is ... close to colonial memory expropriation.... Zimbabwe’s political communication is largely extrapolated from the discourses of liberation politics. Thus, although I personally believe the dictum “Nyika inovakwa nevene vayo” coined by President Mnangagwa is a replica of native colonialism and perpetuation of native coloniality, in liberation cosmology, it seeks to remind all and sundry that Zimbabwe does not look for salvation from any one including the West.

From the above interview, it emerged that Mugabe and Mnangagwa’s administrations are influenced by their colonial experiences. The above interview is an illustration that Mnangagwa’s change discourse is mere rhetoric as he is not different from Mugabe. Colonial experiences are what define both Mugabe and Mnangagwa as articulated in their presidential campaigns. The other below interviewee disclosed that,

The second thing is that he was very clear on the importance of protecting the liberation legacy which meant that the New Government would continue the position of putting everything to ensure that Zimbabwe maintained its Independence, maintained its right to self determination, maintained its position to be allowed to act eh freely as an independent State in terms of the United Nations precincts that essentially give rights to every nation (ZANU PF Headquarters).

The above revelations is what marks Mnangagwa’s presidential campaign discourse of ‘importance of protecting the liberation legacy. to ensure that Zimbabwe maintained its Independence.’. These discourses are understood in the context of this study as reliving of

colonial memory by Mnangagwa. Another purposively selected participant made strong reference to the land issue as highly significant, visible and outstanding in Mnangagwa's New Dispensation – the Second Republic. Such an observation was corroborated in the following interview as saying:

By the way this land issue it's not a new thing, in 1979 at Lancaster House Conference in Britain there were some agreements that the United States and Britain were supposed to provide money for compensation of the land, the land that was supposed to be acquired by the state to address colonial imbalances. Britain actually reneged on that remember the Clare Short letter to Kumbirai Kangai back in 1996 when she unashamedly said 'we come from diverse backgrounds and my background I even Irish and we were colonised' (ZBC, Highlands, Harare: 26 July 2023).

From the above revelations, Mugabe and Mnangagwa evokes the emotive land discourse to revive colonial memories between Zimbabwe and Britain years after independence. The analysis of political communication campaigns context is regarded as significant because it provides an angle through which meanings are constructed (see Chibwe, 2017a; Karam, 2018; Ngomba, 2012). Mugabe and Mnangagwa's colonial experiences wield enormous power in how they attempt to recreate post independent Zimbabwe. According to scholars (Richardson, 2007 cited by Shojaei et al., 2013), indeed, we attach meanings to our performative actions, other people's actions, and we attempt to exclude meanings from our actions and the actions of others. Van Dijk's (1993) critical discourse analytic tool shows that incompleteness is a significant legitimisation technique by which concealment, positive self-presentation and negative presentation of the opponent is achieved. Colonial memory is significant in Zimbabwe's political articulation whose independence was attained as a result of bloody war. Zimbabwe's post-Mugabe ZANU PF's politics is one that show signs of ambivalence and nostalgia, vengeance, the need to revenge and seek ideological clarity. For instance, in *The Herald* of 8 April 2000, Mugabe makes use of colonial memory stating that:

Today is a historic occasion...we meet here today to celebrate yesterday's victory against British imperialism – a significant victory over colonialism, victory over settler rule and settler control. It's a victory in terms of the enhancement of our sovereignty....to celebrate that at last the people of Zimbabwe have acquired their full sovereignty. The liberation war which was fought mainly over land would have been meaningless if the 4 500 hectares of land remained in the hands of a few minority.

Mugabe's election campaign discourse seek to construct proximation (see Chilton, 2004) to create a bond between ZANU PF, party die hard supporters and war veterans. The other intention is to also create discursive co-optation (see Filipescu, 2022) of new voters who are willing to align themselves with ZANU PF's colonially constructed politics. The print and broadcast news articles that reports on Mugabe and Mnangagwa's use of colonial memory apply persuasive tones such as choice of words and 'structural emphasis . . . in headlines' (Van Dijk, 1993: 264).

Mugabe's militant and violent discourse was in reference and reciprocal context to the war of independence. ZANU PF politics is known for inducing coercive strategies such as reliving the war to induce fear among its supporters. From the above data Mugabe encourages his supporters to '*retaliate in self-defence, 'because we cannot be expected to fold our arms while we are being attacked'*'. Here, the intention is to continuously show that Zimbabwe British relations are based on violence of the 1970s that ushered in independence in 1980. The use of fear is a colonially influenced legitimisation strategy which, according to Fairclough (2001) is known as synthetic personalisation. The study therefore argue that Zimbabwe's election campaigns induce fear of former colonisers coming back to recolonise Zimbabwe should ZANU PF loose power. Mugabe and Mnangagwa, by remembering the unjust equitable distribution of land, they seek to manipulate human logic and alter their voter's political behaviour (Javanbakht, 2019). In Zimbabwe, old generations who witnessed the war against Britain are still traumatised; they hold painful memories which influence their strong support for ZANU PF. According to Filipescu (2022:1), such an approach of remembering the past in the context of this study may also refer to, 'a discursive strategy that identifies how aspects of language which are regarded as commonsensical and normal, have ideological power, as they can become manipulative and controlling'. Since independence in 1980, ZANU PF is known for monopolising history especially against opposition parties as a strategy by the party's hegemony and rule in Zimbabwe. By constantly making reference to unresolved equitable land distribution from the British ZANU-PF's politics claim to power by, ' . . . relying on ideologies that appear to be most common and are shared by most participants' (Filipescu, 2022: 4). It is against this reason why findings from Mugabe and Mnangagwa's speeches are ideologically centred on the principles of the liberation struggle. The same is also replicated from the findings that emerged from the interviewees whose emphasis to ZANU PF's unwavering commitment to uphold national principles is beyond measure. In this context, land discourses help post-Mugabe and Mnangagwa to construct a responsible 'nationalistic' Zimbabwe amongst its

supporters that are aligned to into injustices perpetrated by the British. Equally the same, it appears that Mugabe and Mnangagwa's use of colonial land discourse during elections is their attempts to claim rightful use of power (Mulligan, 2006). In this study concealed discourses of colonial memory is not solely understood in the Van Dijk context but as espoused above – ignoring the principle of shared responsibility regardless the fact that ZANU PF is not the only party which fought for independence. Mugabe and Mnangagwa appropriate colonial memory to exercise and influence authority and control in salient ways to prop up ZANU PF from possible contenders (see Kress, 1996; Van Dijk, 1993; 1995). Given this background, the study found that Mnangagwa and Mugabe's political communication are largely anchored on colonial construction of equitable land distribution.

A critical interrogation of Mnangagwa and Mugabe's administrations apart from emerging from their campaign speeches analysed for the purposes of this study, was replicated by the participants. The below interview excerpts explain:

Okay, now there is no deviation from the past – from the First Republic. Here is how it worked, the way I understood it myself, ahmm when the late former President –(AMH, 26 July 2023).

Thus, it quite easily became the language of land redistribution, reliant upon a vocabulary that redeployed and centralised the liberation struggle as the basis against which the agenda and experiences of the years of land expropriation were to be understood and justified. Another participant further emphasises the above view by stating that:

...by the way there is nothing wrong with knowing your history and a people without a roots are not a people at all – a tree without roots cannot live it will die so a nation have to have its roots and our roots as a country was born in 1980 and born out of the liberation struggle, so war has continued to influence people until a particular period that maybe I don't know about when people will be totally disconnected from to that period of colonial past (ZBC, Highlands, Harare, 26 July 2018).

From the above data, the study established that Mugabe and Mnangagwa deployed equitable land distribution as a way of electioneering, seeking their way to top echelons of power. Participants engaged for the purposes of this study, were clear that the two leaders evoked the emotive land issue to rubber stamp their party's communication policies. Throughout his entire rule, Mugabe remained adamant that land appropriation was necessary in multiple ways.

Ironically, Mnangagwa replicated Mugabe by evoking the colonial understanding of land discourse at the centre of his election campaign. Given this context, it emerged that Mugabe and Mnangagwa were caught on this hard rock and this hard place as they attempt to break away from the shackles of colonialism. The study also strongly argue that memorialisation is an emotive political communication tool whose effects should not be underestimated. Those that participated in the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe are conversant with the context within which Mugabe and Mnangagwa memorialise the need to equitably re distribute land. The next section discusses another key important theme which emerged from qualitative content analysis of Mugabe and Mnangagwa's election campaign speeches. As I earlier alluded to, I buttress my reasoning with raw evidence which was stated by the participants.

In view of the above discussion, the study found that that the 2000 and 2018 elections are a significant bench mark influencing memorialisation of the past premised on the land discourse. Zimbabwe's liberation history is arguably centred on unresolved land dispute –a significant and sensitive political question until recently (Kriger, 2019). The party continue to relive and reconstruct emotional relationship that exist between ZANUPF politics and the living old demographics of voters who participated against the war of conquest with the British (Kriger, 2019). The land discourse became more pronounced by ZANU PF's war veterans particularly beginning post-2000 when Mugabe's administration was faced with Tsvangirai's radical MDC party. ZANU PF resorted to colonial memory of the land to prevent Tsvangirai from snatching power in the successive elections through framing him as a British puppet. Resultantly, by stating, 'our land, resettlement', and by saying,

“ by the way there is nothing wrong with knowing your history and a people without a roots are not a people at all – a tree without roots cannot live ,it will die so a nation have to have its roots and our roots as a country was born in 1980 and born out of the liberation struggle so war has continued to influence people until a particular period.’

Mugabe and Mnangagwa are deploying presuppositions. Memorialisation of the land discourse by Mugabe and Mnangagwa construct and relive Zimbabwe British colonial relations based on the liberation struggle, 'an element to produce a point of commonality for the indeterminate audience' (Filipescu, 2022: 7).

6.2.3 Deracialisation of economic resources

One the most significant presidential campaign discourse that characterise Mugabe and Mnangagwa is their ways of deracialisation of economic resources and the Zimbabwean society. Mugabe and Mnangagwa constantly remind their party supporters the evil system of

colonial administrations which brought about racial distribution of the means of production to ordinary citizens. The study appeals to Fairclough (2001) to argue that colonial governments are indeed responsible for inequalities of economic development in Zimbabweans whose effects continued well after independence. Mugabe's economic policies were thus influenced by his desire to uplift standards of living for black people as he remained adamant that they were affected by colonial economic policies. In *The Herald* of 4 May 2000, Mugabe is quoted saying:

Our economy is driven by land to the extent that the white minority that owns the best farming and mining land in our country dominates all sections of the economy simply because the majority of our people are landless. ...Also the former colonial power reneged from meeting its obligation to provide adequate funding for land reform...the media have mischievously sought to separate the land question from the economy in order to justify the injustice of having less than 4 000 white commercial farmers owning some 13 million hectares of our country's best land. The British have exploited our land even before 1890.

Mnangagwa on the other hand, as soon as he assumed power, his administration was birthed on '*Jobs!, Jobs!, Jobs!, Economics!, Economics!, Economics!, until we get better!, and better!, and better!*' (ZBC, *Pfupajena rally* 19 July 2018). Mnangagwa constantly portrays Zimbabweans as victims of the economic colonial inequalities of the past. This is because words have the ability to therefore, significantly influence public opinion (Wodak, 2003). Mnangagwa's thunderous statements stating that, '*Jobs!, Jobs!, Jobs!, Economics!, Economics!, Economics!, until we get better!, and better!, and better!*' at the *Pfupajena rally* notes that he is aware of continued economic racial segregation in Zimbabwe. Mnangagwa deliberately speaks about '*Jobs!, Jobs!, Jobs!, Economics!, Economics!, Economics!, until we get better!, and better!, and better!*' to contrast his administration with that of his predecessor which had been marked with authoritarianism. According to Crawford et al. (2016) authoritarian rulers are known for their desire to use strong language that often distinguishes groups and alienate others. The black economic empowerment discourse is colonially motivated to remind post-independence generation of the unjust access to economic means during colonial rule. During Mugabe's rule, he denied white Zimbabweans to land in toto only to maintain his firm grip on power. In *The Herald*, 1 February 2000, Mugabe is quoted as saying, '*We must remember the problems we went through when they ruled this country*, in reference to unfair economic policies that typified Ian Smith racial colonial government. At this juncture, the study argue that discourse is concerned about what

is left unsaid (Wodak, 2003). What is left unsaid in Mugabe's speeches is whether he also champion white economic independence or he only stand for blacks. In the same vein, Mnangagwa firmly emphasis that sincere economic black empowerment '*brings both closure and a new beginning in the history of the land distribution in our country Zimbabwe*' (ZBC 13 July 2018).

As alluded to earlier, discourses are not confined to what has been said, but what is left unsaid (Wodak, 2003). In this regard, Mugabe and Mnangagwa's attempts of championing black economic emancipation is designed to further black empowerment. Goodrich (2018: 13) clearly describes this point stating that, 'the said and the unsaid are a dichotomy. . . (and have) an ontological dependency. The unsaid can only be accessed through what is said. . .the said can only be understood in the context of what remains unsaid. . .' Mnangagwa was Mugabe's chief enforcer since the liberation struggle until he was appointed Vice President of Zimbabwe -- a post he hold until he was fired in November 2017. The study notices a change of discourse, and difference in the memorialisation appropriated by post-Mugabe ZANU-PF in the 2018 election campaign. Mnangagwa adopted sincere, more inclusive economic development not based on race, creed or colour. The change in discourse with the former colonisers by Mnangagwa's administration could be influenced by changes in, on one hand, context of the 2018 election which was meant to legitimise Mnangagwa as ZANU PF leader.

From the above, the study argues that ZANU PF politics is centred on economic inequalities discourse influenced by colonial tales that defines Zimbabwean identity from British colonial rule. *The Herald* of 4 May 2000 quote Mugabe saying:

For a long time Smith took away our wealth rendering us into poverty. When Smith occupied farms in this country, it was not an issue; it is now an issue because black people are reclaiming what belongs to them? Noooo! What nonsense is that? This land is from our ancestors and their bones are there. How can then someone tell us to buy back our land, which is a source of livelihoods for Zimbabweans. Did Smith bring any piece of land from Britain? No, he did not!

This study also found that in 2000 until Mnangagwa's administration, redressing economic inequalities is aimed at reasserting ZANU PF as a revolutionary embodiment of the Zimbabwean anti colonial struggles of the 1970s beginning the period 1890s when the British colonised Zimbabwe. Mnangagwa as he addressed ZANU PF supporters, portrays himself as a 'democratic' revolutionary, peacemaker eager to chart a new way forward:

As a people we should embrace the current democratic political and social space created by the new administration for everybody. We want everyone on board. We want everybody to say what should we do progress? We live the past behind us. We have the capacity, we have the desire, and we have the will and commitment to have a better life for ourselves across the board. But to achieve that, Rome was not build in a day, not even Jerusalem a Christian city. So we must build brick upon brick, stone upon stone. They never assembled bricks from the top.....But more importantly, we need peace in the country.

The study appeals to Blassnig (2023) to emphasise on the significance of tenets that are often investigated with regard to the content: (*what?*), the style (*how?*), and the rhetoric of political players' self-presentation. ZANU PF's philosophies, principles, values, ethics and ethos to governance are thus centred on memorialising unjust economic practices that emerged during the colonial era. Mugabe and Mnangagwa's engagement and stance with the discourses of the former colonisers are based on the common sense of ZANU PF's self-presentation in all aspects of interest articulation, voter mobilisation, political ideology, policies articulation, and the justification of their actions (Esser, 2013). Colonial memory, within this context, is used to reposition post-independence Zimbabwe among other former colonies. It would seem to suggest that remembering the past is associated with grief, emotional pain and unfulfilled satisfaction of a dark past. In other words, this study is of the firm view that post-independence Zimbabwe's election campaign discourse cannot be enough without the remembering the unjust past committed by colonial government led by Ian Douglas Smith.

Although Mnangagwa's colonial memory discourse are a replica of Mugabe, there are notable instances where he charmed his supporters, business and international audience. While Mugabe's economic agenda is pronounced in his election campaign discourse, what is visible is the violent nature in his presentation. As he attempts to prove that economic development is anchored on land, he is cunning by inciting violent acquisition of the land. Mugabe relies on the wave in the country motivated by war veterans snatching of land from white Zimbabweans.

6.2.4 Discontinuities or continuities without change

This section, in complementing the preceding themes raised above, seek to answer the question, "What is the place and discourse of colonial memory in Zimbabwe's post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics?" The study appeals to Mayring (2010) by determining the intentions, focus, or communication trends of Mugabe and Mnangagwa as ZANU PF presidential contestants how

they engages with the discourses of the former colonisers. This study notes that both Mugabe and Mnangagwa's election campaign speeches are significant for the analysis of ZANU PF political self-presentation- a reason why a qualitative and discourse analytical approach (Hawkins, 2009; van Dijk, 1993; 2015; Wodak, 2013) is significant. Mugabe is radical in his approach with his attacks in response to what he deems as unjust British treatment of post-independence Zimbabwe.

Mnangagwa on the other hand, although attempts to present himself as a constitutionalist, in his land distribution, there is nothing *new* about it because, since 2000, Mugabe had already stated that the '*Government will only pay compensation for improvements on the farms like irrigation and farmhouses*'. Therefore, Mnangagwa's attempts to project himself as championing constitutional land redistribution with white Zimbabweans are just but an attempt to appeal for votes. This holds of Dalmus et al. (2017) who argues that political players can take advantage of popular topical issues that are seemingly important to citizens at the prevailing time. Mugabe and Mnangagwa focus on the context of historical transitions, memory, and re-imaginings of Zimbabwe's colonial past. In other words, Mugabe and Mnangagwa rely on official re-imaginings and perform many dominant discursive discourses associated with Zimbabwe - British colonial rule. Although it is argued that issue ownership is often linked to a political party, other issue specialisation can be identified for individual politicians, upon which they can differentiate themselves from other politicians within the same party (Peeters et al., 2019). Existing studies (see Kalaora, 2011; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009) frame Mugabe as an autocratic racist who denies white Zimbabweans their citizenship in post-independence Zimbabwe. The study argue that the use of 'us' or 'I' and 'them' or 'You' are constructed in ZANU PF's constitutional attempts to continue charting the path to Zimbabwe's total independence (Chibuwe, 2023: 3). Table 6.1 below illustrate my reasoning.

Table 6: 1 illustrates Mugabe and Mnangagwa's representations of discontinuities or changes of colonial memory use

Mugabe: <i>The Herald</i> , 2000	Mnangagwa: ZBC, 2018
<p><i>Our struggle is now coming to an end. Let us finish the elections and then next week you will hear how we are going to start the land programme. This time we don't want to waste time. Today the land has been given back to its rightful owners. Yesterday (Thursday) a law was passed and there will be no longer be debates over land.</i></p> <p><i>Those who want to live with us let us live together and share the land. Today is a historic occasion.... It is a victory in terms of the enhancement of our sovereignty and that the passing of this Bill has rendered</i></p>	<p><i>This momentous event is historic in many respects. It brings both closure and a new beginning in the history of the land distribution in our country Zimbabwe.</i></p> <p><i>The process which has brought us to this event is equally historic as it is a reaffirmation of the irreversibility of land as well as a symbol of our commitment to constitutionalism...</i></p> <p><i>My government is committed to fulfilling rule of law, but this should not mean that we are reversing the gains of our forefathers</i></p>

However, Mnangagwa presents himself as more of a pragmatist and reformist whose administration prioritise rule of law. Mugabe's arguably toxic administration is naturally expected to do away with militancy to governance while Mnangagwa's administration is expected to be the solution. Although Mnangagwa seek to usher in a new style of politics, his appeal to constitutionalism, rule of law and property rights is not only an endeavour to frame himself as a rare and maverick leader in Africa but, arguably, a new political campaigning strategy to de-campaign Mugabe whose administration was characterised by a political violence and extremely vindictive politics (Munoriyarwa, 2020). It is, therefore, priming meant to present a refreshing look at a candidate who was a political anachronist since 1980. In Mnangagwa's memorialisation of the past often describes himself as 'a listening president', and 'a man of action'.. In this case, '*listening President*' and '*a man of action*' might mean his

desire to create a constitutional and law-abiding administration. Both black and white Zimbabweans feel aggrieved in the manner in which Mugabe dealt with post-independence reconciliation.

Mugabe and Mnangagwa, have a different tone on the manner they engage with the discourses about the former colonisers: constitutional reforms, rule of law and property rights that are anchored on a collective shared community. Political communication research investigates *how* political players communicate by differentiating various communication styles (Blessnag, 2023). For instance, Schütz (1992, 1995) cite assertive, offensive, protective, and defensive communication styles. Mnangagwa's engagement and stance with the discourses of the former colonisers is fused with contemporary needs anchored on championing an equal society in a constructive manner. Mnangagwa's election campaign rally with 'Other races' code named the White Interface rally conducted at Borrowdale race course emphasised that, '*At the turn of the millennium, saw government correcting colonial imbalances by resettling landless indigenous Zimbabweans*' (ZBC 26 June 2023). Mugabe as reported in *The Herald* also emphasised that:

The time has come for the people of Zimbabwe to tap on their civil and political rights gained from the heroic liberation struggle to now use their power in Parliament to make laws to reclaim and reassert their social rights to land.

For a long time, Mugabe refused to protect the white Zimbabweans and he directed the compulsory acquisition of the land without compensation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009; Scoones, 2011). Mugabe's memorialisation of the past is strongly tied to the discourses of whiteness, identity, citizenship and belonging, in more exclusionary ways. Mugabe and Mnangagwa's constant labelling of 'British', 'white people' and 'black people', 'our land' and 'they' dichotomies in their political campaign discourse shows how they attempt to re-construct ZANU PF in constitutionally and legally accepted ways. Both Mugabe and Mnangagwa's desire to seek colonial redress of land and economic means of survival are attempts to re-construct Zimbabwean citizenship in a nativist racial way that 'othered' white Zimbabweans. Mugabe constantly emphasise on "Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans" ideology' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009:71) whereas at least Mnangagwa acknowledges '*our motherland ... a better, and better, and better Zimbabwe for all!*'. Constitutionalism, rule of law and property rights are thus a significant site upon which Mugabe and Mnangagwa engage with the past. Colonial memory discourse during election campaign thus serves as ideal event in which present trends in political communication crystallize (Esser and Strömbäck, 2013).

6.2.4 Construction of Identity, Power and Belonging in Mugabe and Mnangagwa's presidential campaign discourse

The study findings show that colonial memory discourse during election campaigns by Mugabe and Mnangagwa are centred on constructing black identities among white Zimbabweans. Presidential election campaign messages are coined in colonial memory discourse to rubber stamp, elevate, advance black people as equal to white Zimbabweans. ZANU PF hide behind colonial memory lenses to speak a language economy with view to mark out boundaries that denote who the real Zimbabweans are between whites and blacks. Such an election message shows ZANU PF's desire to revive the anti-colonial spirit of the 1970s and motivate Zimbabweans to feel a sense of belonging and entitlement. It is also an attempt to remind British government about the origins and causes that birthed post-independence Zimbabwe. Mugabe is quoted in *The Herald* of 8 April 2000 encouraging blacks to resist white superiority when he states that:

We want to thank them today because they are the ones who have taken us to where we are today. I will say to white farmers; today is your day too. We have also liberated you from thinking that this country was yours alone. You now know that this country belongs to its rightful owners (The Herald 8 April 2000).

The above antagonistic use of colonial memory discourse in ZANU PF politics was used to protest the renaming of the Zimbabwean nation by whites during colonialism (Chitando and Mashiri, 2015). Until independence, and recently, colonial memory is a site of power, identities and belonging. Mugabe deploys colonial memory to construct nationalist identities of the 1970s that ushered in independence to claim authority in post-independence Zimbabwe. The mobilisation in which colonial memory discourse is appropriated is in such a way that there is pride in being a nationalist. It is within this context that presidential campaign messages naturally define power and identity in Zimbabwe. The implication of this reasoning seek to justify the argument that colonial memory discourse is not only symbolic, but, it is also coloured with the vagaries of a historical epoch in which Africans were dismembered, dispossessed and de-centred (Asante, 1998). The following article further supports the above findings.

My Highfield house and those of the late Cde Leopold Takawira, the late Cde Herbert Chitepo and Cde Enos Nkala, and some in Bulawayo like that of the late Vice President Joshua Nkomo and other nationalists should be made historical monuments because of their importance in the

history of the country. The houses are the avenues for the formation of the nationalist movements that spearheaded the struggle to liberate the country from colonial rule. Some important meetings of the movements were held at these houses which were constant targets of attacks by security forces of the Ian Smith regime as they descended on nationalist leaders. At one point in time I had to run away from my house ...as the British South Africa Police were tracking me and other nationalists such as the late Morris Nyagumbo to prevent them from recruiting the youths to join in the liberation struggle (The Herald 25 June 2000).

The above article shows Mugabe as reliving the spirit of nationalism, remembering fallen heroes and heroines. ZANU PF has its historical origins in Harare's second oldest township – Highfield. The township was a site of anti-colonial struggle against white supremacist Southern Rhodesia, housing the most influential black nationalists. It shaped the course of the liberation struggle. Many nationalists who fought in the liberation struggle such as Enos Nkala, Herbert Ushewekunze and Joshua Nkomo all emerged from Highfield. Mugabe's reference to such nationalists and visiting the suburb during the time of campaigning are his attempts to challenge what he termed the objectives of neo imperialism (Kriger, 2005; Muzondidya, 2009; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009; Mazarire, 2011; Sandton 2012; Chibwe, 2014, 2016, 2017, Dande et al, 2020). The data emerging from this observation demonstrate the strategic importance of continued reliance on the rhetoric of colonial memory in contemporary ZANU PF broader electoral presidential campaign discourses. It is the view of this study that Zimbabwe's liberation project is not be complete without reference to the role of townships as frontline symbols of colonial resistance. Until recently, township politics are a site of identity, power and belonging influenced by the 1970's anti colonial struggles.

Equally, Mnangagwa's election discourse shows his numerous attempts of reviving war memories through delegitimising opposition parties. Mnangagwa on the other hand, frames Chamisa's MDC Alliance as classical love of 'former white imperialists whom they say development only happens when the white man is involved...'. Nationalism discourse, remembering fallen heroes and heroines is synonymous with old demographics who witnessed Zimbabwe British war of independence. Such old generations have often voluntarily thus offered ZANU PF electoral massive support as part of ongoing efforts to resist (neo-) imperialism. It is evident that ZANU PF's attempts to redress black economic and political extinction of white Zimbabweans -identifying them as 'white or British', or non-African, Rhodesians, land grabbers (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). Blacks are often linked to spirit mediums who are believed to have spearheaded the first white settler regime – Mbuya Nehanda

and Sekuru Kaguvi popularly known as *Chimurenga* war. The word ‘*Chimurenga*’ is traced to Zimbabwe’s spirit mediums who are accredited for spearheading anti colonial struggles against white imperialism that became known as *Chimurenga* 1. ‘Mbuya Nehanda’ and ‘Sekuru Kaguvi’ are also renowned for playing a central role during this period. The first *Chimurenga* happened in the 1890s when Cecil John Rhodes, the British South Africa Company (BSAC) and the Pioneer Column moved in to occupy the country. The liberation war of the 1970s that resulted in independence in 1980 is known as the ‘Second *Chimurenga*’. ZANU-PF’s naming of the black economic empowerment of the 2000s became known as the ‘Third *Chimurenga*’. It drew inspiration from the primary resistance against colonial domination in the 1890s and the skirmishes of the 1970s (Gwekwerere and Mpondi, 2018) that birthed independence in 1980. The below interview supports this view.

Thus, ZANU PF as it stands has a monotheistic narrative of the emancipation of Zimbabwe, coined through successive liberations – chimurengas of which only ZANU PF fulfilled, that is from the first, second and third chimurenga. The colonial memory narrative is skilfully crafted in such a way that you would be forgiven to think that Mbuya Nehanda or Sekuru Kaguvi were ZANU PF nationalists yet in principle existed way before ZANU PF was formed.

From the foregoing, the study found that ZANU PF politics remain trapped and glued with vestiges of colonial memory discourse beyond Mugabe. Memorialisation in the context of this study is thus a process of ultimate decolonisation that attempt to redefine emancipation of Zimbabwe. This, according to Mhanda (2011:211), is because ‘ZANU-PF nationalists who assumed power were transformed relatively quickly into new petit-bourgeoisie elite in a radical departure from the declared goals of the national liberation struggle.’ It is on this basis that election campaign discourse in ZANU PF attempts to create a sense of belonging in post independent Zimbabwe based on memories of iconic figures who stood against colonisation.

Another participant further supports the above explanation stating that:

The heroes are actually heroes mostly of the Second Chimurenga, of course there are heroes of the First Chimurenga, heroes of the Third Chmurenga which is the Land Reform but the majority of them are heroes of the Second Chmurenga and once we talk about them, we are talking about their exploits, what actually did they do? So it’s about again the history and the colonial legacy.

This is also buttressed in the following interview:

We don't owe anybody anything – our housing stock, born frees- everyone owns a house that they live in, everyone owns the car that they drive , everyone owns the jacket that wear , the shoes – we don't anybody anything. We are a grateful people that are proud of their identity, we are happy, and we do that from our own sweat. ...So really, Mr or Mrs Coloniser - you can kiss your influence on which country - goodbye except on mutual basis! (ZANU PF Headquarters 26 July 2023).

The evocation of memories of the liberation struggle enables ZANU-PF to claim communicative platform from which to position the party as guardians of the struggle in mindful of the view that for a previously colonised people, 'the most essential value isdignity' (Fanon, 1967: 46). There is a continuation of bickering based on superiority and inferiority power complex matrix displayed in Mugabe and Mnangagwa's engagement and treatment of the former colonisers. It is used to frame everyone opposed to liberation ideologies as *vatengesi* (sellouts), *zvimwasungata* (errands boys) or *vavengi* (enemies/detractors). This is yet another significant pointer which can help illustrate that Zimbabwean independence may not have fully resolved conflicts that sparked the war. During the violent land reform exercise spearheaded by ZANU PF, it emerged that power, identity and belonging influenced the policy. Blacks who occupied farms owned by white Zimbabweans orchestrated an orgy of violence such as torture, rape, maiming and killing farm animals. True to the study's findings, everything is centred on power, identity and belonging. A key research participant stated that:

The farm belongs to you, however, all these animals that you have found here, for instance farmers – new farmers would kill the wildlife. So they needed to be told, you know guys, you are now taking these farms - this white man did not bring this wildlife from Europe! Noooo! He found it here! (Participant Interview September 2023).

From the above findings, Mugabe and Mnangagwa liberation memories as platforms to reclaim identity, power and authority to blacks over whites. A significant point to note is that these issues are raised in both the 2000 and 2018 elections with a view to retrace Zimbabwe British colonial relations. Post-colonial scholars such as Cesaire (1992) have warned that post-independence did not necessarily refer to full attainment of civil and liberty rights in post-colonial states. Given this context, Mugabe and Mnangagwa's appropriation of colonial memory through reclaiming land from their party as based on revolutionary principles and values (see Stets & Burke, 1998; 2004). Such discourse by Mugabe and Mnangagwa afford thema platform and right to communicate truth to power, separating whites from blacks who

are viewed as opposed to ZANU PF rule. The two leaders have the power to ascribe a name and to represent blacks (see King, 2005) in a context where this power has been taken away from white Zimbabweans by the ‘others’. In other words, self-categorisation or identification provides an opportunity to ‘. . . categorise, classify, or name (oneself) in particular ways in relation to other social categories or classifications’ (Stets & Burke, 1998: 224). It is also used to magnify or positively portray the in-group whilst de-emphasising or negatively portraying the out-group (see Stets & Burke, 1998).

6.3 Conclusion

Mnangagwa’s stance and engagement with the discourses surrounding the former colonisers is rightly informed by the re-engagement and engagement policy, presumably following what the study would characterise as a deadlock stalemate of Zimbabwe and the Western international community between 2000 and 2017. Whereas Mugabe’s stance and engagement with the discourses surrounding Zimbabwe’s former colonisers was largely informed by hostility, confrontation and megaphone diplomacy, there has been a marked departure in Mnangagwa’s administration. Mnangagwa’s stance and engagement with discourses surrounding former colonisers is characterised by cordiality, appeal and negotiation. Mugabe was very confrontational and hyped the anti-colonial rhetoric, hence the demonisation period of almost two decades between Zimbabwe and the Western international community, notably United States of America, the United Kingdom and the rest of the European Union. It became fashionable to coin terms such as *“Zimbabwe will never be a colony again”* *“Keep your Britain and I will keep my Zimbabwe”*.

It emerged that ZANU PF continues to rely on official re-imaginings, conjures, and performs many dominant discursive discourses that marked Mugabe politics. Mugabe and Mnangagwa are colonial products of the liberation struggle whose experiences spans of a decade. Their election campaign discourse is not divorced from experiences of the colonial past. The study find it plausible to indicate that Mugabe and Mnangagwa’s memorialisation of the past can be understood as a power retention matrix, legitimisation tool and ideological clarity of governance. Mugabe and Mnangagwa are viewed as ZANU PF representatives working within the parameters of clearly set out systems and ideologies. ZANU PF politics are influenced and centred on colonial memory which often is revoked during election times. A key significant point is that African political communication is grounded in colonialism discourse. In Zimbabwe, colonialism discourse is memorialised through land, black economic

empowerment, identity, power and belonging. These issues are at the centre of influencing political communication research in an attempt to respond to western centric forms of political communication. Mugabe and Mnangagwa's engagement and treatment of former colonisers are broader ongoing efforts to deemphasise the white racial identities by claiming indigeneity through indigenous languages grounded in colonial memory. The chapter find it reasonable to emphasis Stets and Burke's (1998) arguments that self-categorisation or identification are the hallmarks of identity creation. Mugabe and Mnangagwa not only did do they identify ZANU PF politics with the blacks through appropriation of colonial memory; they also identify with the countries that offered military assistance when freedom fighters fought against the colonial British rule. They both appropriated liberation war histories, eulogised war veterans whilst delegitimising opposition parties, civil society, global media, by demonstrating that they are Western puppets trying to destabilise Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SERIALISATION OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS IN ZIMBABWEAN PRINT AND BROADCAST MEDIA

For much if not most of the public, journalism is a primary source of information about the past and shared understandings of the past. It also is a main site for public anticipation of memory: as ‘the first draft of history’, journalism is also the first draft of memory, a statement about what should be considered, in the future, as having mattered today”.

Carolyn Kitch

7.1 Introduction

Print and broadcast media in Zimbabwe are a significant site can be fully examined intensely political. It influences and shapes public opinions and events ZANU PF consider as significant and worthy of remembrance. There are various representations of colonial memory whose effects goes beyond ordinary meanings. In Zimbabwe’s presidential election campaigns, remembering and forgetting has meant that colonial histories of British imperialism are mediated within the context of colonial memories This chapter examines the discursive roles of The Herald, ZBC and AMH of Mugabe and Mnangagwa’s use of colonial memory in presidential election campaigns. Both *The Herald*, AMH and ZBC have a wider readership and viewership in Zimbabwe respectively. ZBC is the country’s only broadcaster since independence in 1980. The state broadcaster is instrumental for providing ZANU PF live coverage of elections in what critics interpret as the party’s significant platform to consolidate hegemony against local, regional and international criticism and dissent. This is also typical of the Zimbabwe Newspapers Private Limited (Zimpapers) *The Herald* –a state-controlled media house since 1980. Zimpapers has continued to dominate in providing a pro ZANU PF voice in a way that complements ZBC efforts.

Participants were drawn from ZANU PF Commissariat Department, ZBC, *The Herald* and AMH to elaborate ways in which political issues, meanings, values and ethics are reconfigured and examined (Bennet, et. al., 2015). Among the significant focus of this chapter is its contribution to decolonise political communication research, styles, performance, and practices between Africa and western communities (Mutsvairo and Karam, 2022). The study’s attempts

in this regard are premised on Mutsvairo and Karam (2022) who refute commonly long held views that regard political communication approaches as subversive or militant. In view of this view, a discursive analysis on the mediation of colonial memory in this study is also significant because of its attempts to challenge dominant Western norms against emancipatory attempts by Zimbabwean people through (re-) telling their (hi-) stories. The study also demonstrate how memorialisation may, as suggested by Chibwe (2013; 2017), produce newer insights into political communication practice in Zimbabwe. Indeed, there could be newer ways of political communication practice that may, in significant ways, undercut the rhetoric celebratory emergence of Mnangagwa's rise to power as a complete departure from Mugabe's administration. The study regard memorialisation as a "re-collective" conception; a conscious and wilful human process of recalling the past in service of the present. According to Nora (1984) the materiality of the place in such a context is not considered to be decisive; but the most important aspect is the historical event, a gone past, and the will to remember it through site embodiments.

7.1.1 Mugabe and Mnangagwa – patriots, heroes and or villains?

Print and Broadcast media in Zimbabwe are critical in the manner in which they represent Mugabe and Mnangagwa. The two leaders are framed as victims of what they represent in Zimbabwe's quest to preserve hard won independence. Mugabe, as reported in *The Herald* displayed his frustrations and disdain of the manner in which both print and global media vilified him simply because he was protecting the gains of the liberation struggle. The following articles explains this view.

I am cartooned as all sorts of animals and demonised in their newspapers and TVs because of the land issue. My right to the land is a right which cannot be compromised. It is our right...It is our land. Ilizwe lethu (Our country). We must be prepared to die for it.

Mugabe's criticism from the media was instigated by his authoritarian rule particularly towards the end of his presidency. The above article shows that Mugabe was presented as a villain his attempts former imperial powers. When Mnangagwa took over from his predecessor – Mugabe, in both ZANU-PF and government, the media had a presented him as a pragmatic patriot eager to develop Zimbabwe. However, the study also found that print and broadcast media found themselves anachronistic in the face of a new leader whose ascendance they had not contemplated in their fixation with Mugabe's power as divine and eternal. Mnangagwa states that although the people have a right to self-expression in the media, he however would

sometimes send chilling threats to journalists. The following excerpt from his presidential rally while in Beitbridge explains this view.

Regai vanovukura vavukure. Ndinogara ndichitaura kuti ZANU PF inzou, inongofamba, igofamba, ichingo famba, vachingo vukura. Vema pepa nhau monzwa voti ah kwai ndatuka vanhu. Aiwa, hatidi izvozvo, nyorai zvinovaka nyika yokwenyu. (Let those who want to criticise go ahead. I always say that ZANU PF is like an elephant, it walks and walks while they criticise us. So you will hear journalists writing that I have spoke bad about my people. No, we do not want that, write things that build your country (Mnangagwa, June 2018).

It is in this context that Tendi (2010) states that in 2000, ZANU PF embarked on a serious reframing of colonial memories to avert their dwindling electoral support. Part of the reason is that ZANU PF government was faced with economic turmoil, ordinary citizens disenchantment of the party's alleged authoritarian politics. In the same vein, post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics continue to appropriate anti colonial memories as legitimisation tool in face of growing dissent. Given this context, ZANU PF's political discourse adopt robust reframing of Zimbabwe's anti colonial histories as reported in both print and broadcast media. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012:2) weighs in stating that ZANU PF election campaign ignores policy issues but rather, "political actors take advantage of elections to remind the electorate who liberated the country from colonialism, and which political actors have no struggle credentials and are therefore a threat to the state and the nation".

Whereas print and broadcast media are expected to report on truth, Mugabe and Mnangagwa are embroiled in mixed representations of patriots turned out villains. The two leaders' cat and mouse relationship is self-explanatory of revolutionaries in the eyes of Zimbabweans. Among the significant ways of media representations at the disposal of ZANU PF's mobilisation tactic as Muzondidya (2010) argues, is the party's retelling of the discourse of nativism. This is also evident in both Mugabe and Mnangagwa's disdain of former colonial powers whom they accuse of intending to further imperial and ulterior motives. These are part of the attempts by ZANU PF to recoil national memories in what critics say it is just but patriotic history (Tendi, 2010). The following Mugabe speech explains this view.

Nyika ino ine makuva pasi. Vakomana nevasikana vazhinji kwazvo vakasara ku hondo vachirwisana na Smith nemauro ake. Ko, tairwireiko hondo yechimurenga iyi? Yaiva hondo yekutanda mabhunu, nhasi ndovonzi nana Tsvangirai ngavadzoke, aaaaa!

Hazvife zvakaitika izvozvo. Nyika ino ndeye munhu mutema kwete muchena. Kwete, kwete, kwete! (This country has many graves. There are many boys and girls who died during the war fighting against Smith. Why were we fighting in this Chimurenga war? It was a war to fight white settlers whom Tsvangirai want back, ahhh, that will never happen. This country belongs to black people).

In the case of Mnangagwa, he is quoted as saying:

I want to exhort us to live together in peace and harmony as one people. There are no aliens in this country, we all are Zimbabweans. So, the same identity documents recognised in our motherland, you should get them as well. We are all equal (ZBC news report, June 2018).

The importance of print and broadcast media in the context of this study is that it offers us ways to understand the reportage of ‘colonial memories “distorted legitimate grievances by conscripting elements of history which it believed would generate support (for ZANU PF) and undermine opposition” (Tendi, 2010:1). Patriotic history, as reported by print and broadcast media, seeks to influence ZANU PF’s political power against post-independent generations who seem to wield minimum political influence, other than its vote, could do very little to de legitimise the claims it made. According to Chirimambowa (2008), patriotic history is a covert blackmailing approach mobilised by ZANU PF to hold citizens at ransom and coerce them to vote in its favour through what he refers to as the ‘we freed you syndrome’.

From the foregoing, this chapter establish if there are variations of mediations of the past and in our analysis of power relations and ideological underpinnings within ZANU PF politics. To achieve this, Van Dijk’s (2000) Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) toolkit elaborate on memorialisation of presidential campaigns in post-independence in Zimbabwe. A CDA analysis on the role of the media in shaping colonial memory presents fresh memories of colonialism. However, there is still much to investigate by a comparative exploration of how print and broadcast media mediate colonial memory discourse to locate power relations and ideologies of ZANU PF.

7.1.2 Commemoration of anti-colonial struggles

The study found that print and broadcast media are significant in commemorating anti colonial struggles. The discourses of anti-colonial struggles are mediated in print and broadcast media

particularly in the context of Mugabe's administration. Whereas Mnangagwa's New Dispensation – the Second Republic attempts to present a 'new' political discourse, they constantly mobilise the evil nature of British colonial endeavours. Mnangagwa's New Dispensation depict a *continuation* of Mugabe's use of colonial ideologies as means of navigating through criticism and attaining power. Indeed, scholarship (Blumler and Kavanagh 1999) has acknowledged the significant relationship between the media and political actors in their endeavour for self-presentational communication platforms that give them the chance to appeal to their voters directly with minimum journalistic interference. Mediation of colonial memory discourse in Zimbabwe as revealed by the participants, is reported as marked on ideological differences. It thus also emerged that reviving colonial ideologies is a technique of Mugabe and Mnangagwas' self-presentation through print and broadcast news (Bucy and Grabe, 2007). A participant engaged for the purposes of this study explains that whereas Mnangagwa's administration presents itself as 'new', mediation of colonial memory is mobilised for ideological purposes. The participant reveals that:

The Mnangagwa government is absolutely a ruling class without ruling ideas. Mnangagwa does not pretend to prioritise ideas, let alone issues of colonial memory appropriation, it is peripheral to his leadership approach. There are other aspects he prioritises and certainly not colonial memory appropriation, explaining why Zimbabwe is no longer a focal international relations actor at international forum such as the United Nations General Assembly. We no longer see its visibility, because during Mugabe's time, Zimbabwe's narrative which became popular bordered on issues to do with anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism which were largely centred on appropriation of colonial memory (Participant, Interview, October 2023).

From the above data, the study found that mediation of colonial memory in Mnangagwa's administration is marked by a desire to break away from Mugabe's forms of governance. As Mnangagwa attempts to reconstruct a 'new' Zimbabwe, media frames him as showing signs of a struggling and desperate man on how to mediate colonial memory in ways that are ideologically and responsible and 'different'. This enlighten our understanding on how the media are deployed to spruce up Mnangagwa's memorialisation of the past . This was articulated from the below revelations by a carefully selected political news editor who says:

So every year when we talk of independence which is 18 April I would say since when I was News Editor back in 2009 I moved to Radio and came back here but we dedicate the whole month of April as Independence Month. So when we talk of Independence Month we will be having so many stories, so many programmes that go back in time to those days, what actually

happened?, what caused people to cross the borders and take up arms to fight the colonial regime? - what we gained out of it to where we are now so it's a whole month. Then we go to the month of August, there is a Heroes Day and definitely there are programmes, there are stories dedicated to that. The heroes are actually heroes mostly of the Second Chimurenga, of course there are heroes of the First Chimurenga, heroes of the Third Chmurenga which is the Land Reform but the majority of them are heroes of the Second Chmurenga and once we talk about them we are talking about their exploits, what actually did they do? So its about again the history and the colonial legacy (Participant Interview, September 2023).

Given the above data, the study argues that media are powerful in articulating political ideologies, processes and rhetoric (Mazzoleni, 2000; Waldhl, 2004; Chuma, 2007; Mbembe, 2017; Tsarwe and Mare, 2019; Munoriyarwa, 2020; Chari, 2022; Chasi, 2022). This was further unmasked through a critical discourse analysis of the *continuities* or *discontinuities* of mediatisation of heroes and heroines. In this study, “the master commemorative narrative represents the political elite’s construction of the past, which serves its special interests and promotes its political agenda” (Zerubavel, 1995:11). The media are used to emphasise anti-colonial memory struggles to serve the special interests that promote the political agenda of the ZANU PF. This was revealed by a political news editor from AMH who stated that:

.... you needed to have that historical background of Zimbabwe” adding that, ‘the system is not Mugabe, it’s not Mnangagwa. Noo, it’s not Mnangagwa, it’s not Mugabe! It’s a system. Mnangagwa is a product of the liberation struggle. What he has done is decentralising Independence and Heroes and Defence forces commemorations to provinces. Mugabe did that in Harare in the National Sports stadium. But again, you can’t say because Independence Day has been celebrated in in a particular province it’s new, no, it’s not. So Mnangagwa much as he may want to be absolutely ‘new’, it’s very difficult for him, his wings are clipped... (Participant Interview, September 2023).

The above data shows that memorialisation in Zimbabwe as reported in the media is highly ideological and political. Remembering is presented with recalling a dark past whose effects are mobilised to create a sense of entitlement to colonial memories. These are attempts that appear to cultivate the long-created bond that was created during the liberation struggle. Mnangagwa’s decentralisation of ZANU PF programmes could be his attempts to remain in touch with grass roots party supporters. These revelations also show that mediation colonial ideologies as means to governance remains anchored on the Marxist founding principles of ZANU PF politics. The below interview excerpt explains that:

‘In Marxist terms, the ruling class's ideas in every epoch are the ruling ideas: that is, the class, which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. Under Mnangagwa we have ...seen some ad hoc redress of some mistakes such as conferring national hero status to Ndabaningi Sithole, James Chikerema etc. It is not by coincidence that we have witnessed music that has colonial memory tones. Mnangagwa has also created musical groupings that relate his administration as being legitimised by his liberation credentials and his fellow comrades...(Participant Interview, September 2023).

The import of the above revelations is that mediation of colonial memory is tied to colonial ideologies and heroic acts of the past. The media are used to re-brands ZANU PF's political ideologies to cultivate born frees more so in the context of Mnangagwa's New Dispensation to shape collective memory of the past. Their key intention is to construct a new sense of belonging and identity. It is within this context that the study found that the media's functions are dependent upon dissimilar political, social and economic frameworks of their production (Herman and Chomsky, 1988). There is a concrete relationship between the various social class interests as in the case of Zimbabwe, on the one hand and ideology and communicative power on the other (Herman and Chomsky, 1988). Print and broadcast mediation of colonial memory is interpreted as being immensely premised on this relationship (Klaehn and Mullen, 2010). Given this context, mediation of colonial memory in Zimbabwe could be designed to ignore one of the fundamental functions of the media - information dissemination - as it gives more relevance to the propaganda function (Mazzoleni, 2000). Propaganda is interpreted to explain a huge chunk of news content that is anchored on the manufacturing of news that is persuasive and designed to discourage rational thought and suppress evidence (Postman, 1979).

From the foregoing, this study further found that media in Zimbabwe continue to report on colonial ideologies which are central to shaping Zimbabwe's nationalism discourse. ZANU PF canvas for support during elections by evoking sad memories of the war as the basis of preserving colonial ideologies. Colonial ideologies are strategically evoked as presidential star rallies message coupled with musical galas in each of the country's province to woo support for the part. Musical and commemorative galas go beyond entertainment but are a site of power retention, maintaining and consolidating the party's hegemony. They are used to woo post-independence generations to understand Zimbabwe's colonially constructed national political discourse. In order to reach out to all provinces of the country, the commemorative musical galas are conducted in all of the country's ten provinces where liberations icons are born. Below is an illustration of this view:

Being a country that was born out of colonial memory and the liberation struggle, it is inevitable that the media cannot situate itself in that historical epoch and possibly refers to that era in reference to what has happened. You see a lot of media making a comparison post-Mugabe and Emmerson, you would see a lot of stories even writing about, Smith was better and so forth. In the case of Zimpapers, I think the reference to colonial memory has not been flattered. It has always been to evoke in the minds of our audience or our readers how bad the colonial system was. And in highlighting how bad the colonial system was, we are also reminding them that we are in a way also preserving that colonial memory. That own its says while our thrust is on economic development and economic delivery, we are not forgetting the soul of ZANU PF it being that it was born out of the protracted liberation struggle and that's the birth of Zimbabwe – the modern day Zimbabwe (Participant Interview, September 2023).

Print and broadcast media are presented as site to influence ZANU PF's collective and responsible recalibration of the past. Mugabe and Mnangagwa seizes presidential rallies as significant platforms to raise awareness against neo imperialism. This hold true of Stier (1998:69) who state that "collective memory refers to a common, shared awareness of the presence and meaning of the past in a particular contemporary context, delimited and determined according to certain conditions". Zimbabwe's colonial tales is not full without mentioning the role-played external ZANU PF allies who are constantly mentioned in the media. For instance, the following participant reinforces this reasoning stating that:

The way Russia would celebrate victory day in Red Square is the same way ZBC and other media organisations will continuously talk about our history. The way the Germany media would talk about the atrocities of the Nartz and so forth is the same way media in Zimbabwe will continually talk about where we came from, where we are and where we strive to go (Participant Interview, September 2023).

From the above data, it also emerged that the role of the media is to report with honest on the origins and causes of war that led to independence in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe's colonial allies Russia are constantly mentioned further showing the unbreakable solid relationship. Print and broadcast media have a duty to safeguard the founding principles of post-independence Zimbabwe. The media have a duty to maintain colonial ties that have a bearing towards Zimbabwe's foreign policy. The intention is to constantly advance colonial redress for a better future based on an acknowledgement of colonial injustice. In order to seek objectivity, the print and broadcast media in Zimbabwe should include sourcing of news of the victims so that they are given a platform to speak out from an informed point. Collective memory, as it appears, endures and draws its influence from group of people, wherein it is individuals as group

members who remember (Halbawachs cited in Coser, 1992). Halbawachs, contends that individuals, as reported in Zimbabwe's print and broadcast media, rely on a given historical epoch to remember or reconstruct the past (cited in Coser, 1992).

7.1.3 Revolutionaries and war veterans of the liberation struggle

Print and broadcast media are used to present Mugabe and Mnangagwa as revolutionaries and distinguished war veterans of the liberation struggle. The study found that there is prominence given to plurality and diverse reporting of colonial memory discourse to establish wider political discourses that are Zimbabwean. During Mugabe's administration, Zimbabwe had a more monopolised media sector that churned out war memories to propagate ZANU PF politics. The following excerpts illustrate this point.

Our veterans played a significant role against the British and for that, they are our all-time revolutionaries, magandanga makuru enyika, varwi vorusununguko (freedom fighters for this country). They hold firm our party ZANU PF. Our all-weather friends, do you know them?the Chinese have told me that they will support us in our endeavour to economic prosperity. These are people who stood with us in the revolution against colonisation (Participant Interview, September 2023).

An interviewee corroborated making reference to China which played a significant role to liberate Zimbabwe from Britain. At this juncture, it is clear that Mugabe and Mnangagwa's are regarded as concerned revolutionaries and war veterans whose desire is to construct a free Zimbabwe. The principle of comradeship and camaraderie continue to be at the heart of ZANU PF politics largely tied to frontline states. A participant emphasised that Mugabe and Mnangagwa's revolutionary and war veterans' colonial ideological inclination is influenced by their political and military orientation from China. For instance, a participant states that:

They draw a bit from the colonial memory but focusing on the development – on the future. Mugabe and Mnangagwa are freedom fighters who received revolutionary ideologies from China. I know some people say Mnangagwa is worse than Mugabe while say even Ian Smith was better. I was arrested during Mugabe's time on numerous occasions and at least Mnangagwa has opened the media (Participant Interview, September 2023).

The above data resonates with Mugabe and Mnangagwa's role to Zimbabwe's liberation struggle towards the dismantling of colonialism. During the liberation struggle, British

colonial administration framed war veterans as ‘terrorists, communists, malcontents and murdering thugs . . . interested only in advancing the cause of Soviet or Chinese communism’ (Godwin and Hancock, 1993: 11). War veterans did not bother the British colonial administration constructing them as terrorists because they regarded the violence of their struggle against colonialism as revolutionary and legitimate (Fanon, 1967a; Gwekwerere, 2010). The above is also supported by the following excerpt from Mugabe’s campaign speech when he states that:

Our war veterans shall forever be so dear to the liberation of this country. They sacrificed their lives so that we all become free. We extend our gratitude in no apologetic terms. Some of them received military training from China and after independence they continued to serve in government. These are comrades! They are our heroes and heroines. Tinotenda zvikuru (We are very grateful) (Participant Interview, September 2023).

From the above data, the study, CDA elaborate how colonial memory discourse is used to prop power or critique it (van Dijk, 2005; Carvalho, 2008; Mautner, 2008) in ZANU PF’s power retention matrix. In the context of this study, much focus is on the media’s use of colonial memory as revolutionaries birthed from the liberation struggle. Participants paint a bad picture of colonial injustices, inequality and structures of power whose rejection should be understood as the basis for seeking redress, creating a new world order based on equality and justice. For instance, the following interview says:

The Smith regime was a colonial era, a colonial dispensation; you see,.... 1980 was a milestone in that for the first time it’s creating a new set up amongst black people that they were now able -, one they were now be able to, they were able to retain their country, they retained the right to make their own decisions, to shape which way they go, how they wanted to develop themselves and make new laws that affect our cultural and historical experiences and our ambitions as a nation. It was totally a new direction you can talk of a new direction but certainly but not a New Dispensation as if our connection with the colonial era was partially something that we embraced as a people. We never did! The 19, the periodised argument that you are talking, 85 and 90 so on, those were not New Dispensations, it was continuity of government is it?(Participant Interview, September 2023).

The above data also show the role of the media in shaping colonial memory in ZANU PF politics beyond Mugabe. Colonial memory thus is a platform in which politics in Zimbabwe

draws its principles and practices of representative democracy. Soon after independence, Zimbabwe maintained a system of separation of powers and the media were deployed to articulate the essence of conducting elections. The media's reference to coloniality of Zimbabwe's current socio and political relations invites an understanding that logics of colonial colonial memory in Zimbabwe's political discourse. The mediation of these logics includes the idea that survival of the colonial state requires the annihilation of the imperial powers. For example, the below interview excerpt enumerates this point:

I mean – these people actually believe that this President will change Zimbabwe beyond recognition beyond his lifetime and I think that it's very important to have that – to have built a political foundation that inspires people to those levels and when most of these are affiliates and what they are – they are like voluntary force. You know! Nobody is pushing them, they come here! (Participant Interview, September 2023).

Colonial memory is mediated to create perceptions and understanding of political tolerance on behalf of ZANU PF ruling elite. In this study, a significant focus of CDA is its ability to elaborate ways in which how colonial memory discourses are constructed and formed by social and political practice. Fairclough (2001; 23) states that CDA's intention is to raise the readers' "consciousness of the power of language in changing the events and influencing the readers' view". Given this background, mediation of colonial memory is aimed at delegitimising negative criticism directed against Zimbabwe from foreign media. For instance, a news editor states that '...ZBC in particular I would say it's a national broadcaster guided by just one sentence, national principles, the national interest...'. The study articulates this reasoning by employing van Dijk (2000) ideological square's four main pillars to locate the meanings behind the continued use of colonial memory. These are "Emphasise the positive things about Us. Emphasise the negative things about Them. De-emphasise the negative about Us. De-emphasise the positive things about them" (van Dijk, 2000: 44). These four pillars of the framework are significant in this study because they show how ZANU PF politics focus on positive self-presentation and negative others-presentation. Positive self-presentation is appropriated by ZANU PF for the party's self-keeping or collectively, by focusing on the positive aspects of their participation in the war. In contrast to positive self-presentation, there is negative other presentation of the party's critics. The focus of negative other presentation is to attack, for example by utilising derogatory terms on other out-group members (van Dijk, 2000).

...the media is part of society..., we were part of the colonial system and some of media managers especially here at ZBC are actually war veterans they were out somewhere there fighting the Rhodesian forces. They were integrated into different sectors of society and some became journalists and for the media to even ask how we shape colonial memory it's so natural that when we talk about Zimbabwe we cannot talk about Zimbabwe in 2023 without talking about Zimbabwe in 1980, 1979 so it's part of the narrative that is continuous, since 1980, that is continuous now. ZBC in particular it's a national broadcaster guided by just one sentence, national principles, the national interest don't just happen in 2023 they have a history, a rich history of colonial legacy and the liberation struggle, elections, how elections came to be, like it was a struggle for us to come where we are so the media we continuously highlight that, it's not something that is even debatable, something that we can think eehhhmmm twice about it it's so natural (Participant Interview, September 2023).

From the above, this study established that media in Zimbabwe editorialise colonial memory with a view to offer emphasis on historical experiences of the past. The reportage of colonial memory in Zimbabwe is also influenced on reminding us of those countries that stood shoulder to shoulder with Zimbabwe as mentioned by the news editor that *'The way Russia would celebrate victory day ahhhhh in Red Square is the same way ahhhhh ZBC and other media organisations will continuously talk about our history'*. Russia is among the significant countries that trained military personnel who fought against the British during the war of independence. Among such great luminaries are Mnangagwa and the nationalist Dumiso Dabengwa. These issues are given emphasis of coverage from a diverse media as stated below by a news political editor who stated that

We have ZTN here and using my 21 years experience in the media, I think ED has done a lot in terms of opening up the media. This year, if you check with all our online portals, we have agreed not to adopt propaganda but to report on 2023 election as it is. But of course, you will notice that ED's campaign discourse although he attempts to sell his new administration – it is grounded in the 1970s nationalist principles and values. Just look at how much ED is ridiculed on social media and no has been arrested. The guy is pragmatic; he has done a lot in terms of opening up the media space. Unlike Mugabe, we used to rely with ZBC, now look how many community radio stations do now have, television stations including even commercial radio stations (Participant Interview, September 2023).

Print and broadcast media are part of the grand scheme of the commemorating anti colonial struggles with a view to emphasise a historical remembering in Zimbabwe's campaign political

discourse. For instance, Azaryahu (1996:319) states that “the legitimating and explanatory role of a version of history is embedded in the narrative structure of the conventional historical account”. Eyerman (2004:161) argues that “collective memory unifies the group through time and over space by providing a narrative frame, a collective story, which locates the individual and his and her biography within it, and which, because it can be represented as narrative and as text, attains mobility”. This aptly explained by a participant who states that:

....you look at ZIMPAPERS publications they have several publications: The Herald, The Chronicle, Kwayedza and so forth I realise in those months Independence in April heroes in August our thrust is almost the same even if you listen to their radio stations the content we still have that same thrust. Within ZBC, it's not just the news but also the radio stations – the six of them, the content is always towards that so those media organisations that are partially owned by the government or wholly owned by the government always have a duty to do that and they do that every year, every month when such times come (Participant Interview, September 2023).

The above revelations also seek to explain that media diversity is part of a strategy used to show the significance of colonial discourses which were birthed on colonial experiences of the past. In Zimbabwe, both print and broadcast media are central to the annual reportage addressing colonial injustices. Among van Dijk's (2000) common micro-strategies significant to the analysis of this view is history as a lesson. Van Dijk's (2000) history as lesson is when a situation is compared to positive or negative events in the history of a country for the purpose of either negative other-presentation or positive self-presentation. The study also use van Dijk's (2000) national self-glorification micro strategy to argue the good, honourable history of one country or praising one's country's principles and traditions. This could be achieved by opening up more media publications whose focus is refer to colonial injustice. The below interview elaborate this point:

I spearheaded the launching of an Agricultural Magazine because what we wanted to do was simply to then say the new farmers that were being settled across the country would get technical information on how say to, to, to uhmm rear pigs, cattle, goats and all sorts of things. Because at that particular time the white land owners – former owners of much of the arable land they – some of them were ruthless enough - to destroy some of the equipment they would also make sure that they would sell everything. I will give you an example of Ostrich farming in this country. At some point there used to be 37 thousand birds in the country – at the moment there is less than 200 (Participant Interview, September 2023).

The above kind of news production is highly ideological as seeks to promote a sense of truth that has to be told in post independence Zimbabwe. Van Dijk (2000: 55) states that, “sentences that express positive meanings about ‘Us’ and negative meanings about ‘Them’ will typically appear upfront, if possible in headlines, leads, abstracts, announcements or initial summaries of stories”. The positive aspects of the ‘Other’ is shown by Mnangagwa’s administration to liberalise the media sector. Media is thus used to offer multiple ways of giving prominence to the injustice perpetrated by colonial administrations to fight neo colonialism. In an interview, a political news editor explains that government has opened up Zimbabwean media whose key focus is to speak truth and justice relating to colonial injustice. The news editor also speak negative of alternative media which he claims is anti-Zimbabwe.

*I don’t know the type of media people want, like 3KTV it is a privately owned, ZTN is part of the ZIMPAPERS group which is partially publicly owned, but look at KIONA TV I don’t know what people want. I hope my suspicion is not wrong to say when people to say there should be diversity they are talking about anti Zimbabwe crusade. By the way do you know that the **Voice of America – VOA** its specially designed to operate outside America. There is no Voice of America on American soil, its well designed to be in those countries that are purported, that are suspected to have something that might oppose the American agenda or the Foreign American policy. But, have you ever heard people or Zimbabweans or any other country criticising America for having the Voice of America? It’s their choice! So why should do it be a problem when even the private media are writing something positive or good about Zimbabwe? Does it mean that diversity should always be vilifying government?(Participant Interview September 2023).*

From the above interview, the study argue that print and broadcast media is a platform used to respond to neo colonialism in Zimbabwe in form of foreign media such as Voice of America. Media are a battle ground of legitimation and delegitimation in speaking truth to power. This holds true that “the media are government’s little helpers” Zaller (1990:1) as the editor states that ‘*Does it mean that diversity should always be vilifying government? I beg to differ!*’. Media in Zimbabwe are thus focused on multiple ways of reporting and preserving on colonial memory years after independence was attained.

7.1.4 Exclusionary colonial narratives in post-Mugabe Zimbabwe

Mugabe and Mnangagwa make use of colonial memory to construct narrow exclusionary national narratives that suit ZANU PF politics. Media are complicity in advocating narrow and exclusionary political agendas that are aimed at propagating ZANU PF rule. Participants

openly stated that print and broadcast media are significant platforms complicit of ZANU PF power retention scheme because of their continued use of (neocolonial) conversations. This holds true of Wodak (2012) who sees power relations as legitimised or delegitimised in discourses. Texts are often sites of social struggle in that they manifest traces of differing ideological fights for dominance and hegemony (Wodak, 2012). However, from the interviews, it emerged that opposition parties are not willing to make use of the media to either support or refute colonial discourse churned from ZANU PF. This put to question the general conception that mainstream media are structured and operate in ways that does not accommodate opposition parties. News editors stated that ZANU PF is dominant in their coverage because they willingly avail themselves to the media. This development has resulted in ZANU PF enjoying a more uncontested critique in mainstream media. Moreso, the result has been the emergence of what the study term ‘elite’ public sphere. In the context of this study, ‘elite’ public sphere refers to public communication platforms that are more accessible to very senior and influential people in furtherance of their power and authority. In this ‘elite’ public sphere, alternative voices from opposition voices are weak, fragmented and sometimes none existent. This is explained in the following interview:

...the extent of deploying ideological state apparatus through music in form of jingles, local artists and even hiring of international artists from Jamaica etc to spread the gospel of African Renaissance which ZANU PF was championing. In addition you could also easily pick intellectual deployment and ideological state apparatus at work through such popular columns as the other side with Nathaniel Manheru, introduced by the minister of information Jonathan Moyo and later adopted by presidential spokesperson and permanent secretary in the Ministry of Information George Charamba; African FOCUS with Zimbabwe’s philosopher intellectual Tafataona Mahoso. On the broadcast front you could even witness programmes such as African pride and Zvavanhu, where university professors doubled as ideologues of ZANU PF (Participant Interview, September-October 2023).

The above data offers a mosaic of realities on the role of colonial discourses in the (re) production of non-inclusive and authoritarian Zimbabwe with a view to critique the social conditions in which they are embedded (Wodak, 2011). From the above data, the study argue that colonial memory discourse as reported in the print and broadcast media are the basis of discrimination against the discursive construction of inequalities and social injustices in Zimbabwe (Matouschek, Wodak and Januschek, 1995; Wodak et al., 2009). The import of this view further show that the media in Zimbabwe are responsible for the creation of an ‘elite’

public sphere in form of ZANU PF functionaries. The practical implication of this reasoning is the formation of “backstage” politics (Wodak, 2011) against opposition and civil society organisations in their quest to champion socio economic and political change. By so doing, the media are able to construct an ‘elite’ public sphere biased towards ZANU PF. The *‘ideological state apparatus through music in form of jingles, local artists’* represents a well choreographed various genres and public spheres, intertextual and interdiscursive relationships on the role of the media in this regard. Wodak (2011) insights are significant in this study because of the historical context and account in interpreting texts and discourses that constitute colonial memory. The historical orientation of DHA in this study also allows our understanding of the reconstruction of how recontextualisation operates as an important process linking texts and discourses intertextually and interdiscursively in a given epoch Wodak (2011). DHA offered by Wodak (2012) interrogates the historical dimension of discursive actions by exploring the ways in which colonial memory discourse are subject to diachronic changes and continuities in Zimbabwe’s post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics. Participants note that *‘it is on these platforms that issues of colonial memory appropriation were largely and effectively deployed. It is no longer the case now’*. Given this view, it becomes important to acknowledge the role of the media in shaping colonial memory in Zimbabwe’s post-Mugabe ZANU PF.

Because of the above significant observations, colonial memory discourse in Zimbabwe’s post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics is used to sustain and or counter respond any forms of threats to the party’s existence. This is because Zimbabwe’s Electoral Act seem to be tilted in favour of the ruling ZANU PF. Attempts by opposition parties to radically confront or challenge ZANU PF’s legitimisation of colonial memory is futile. An ‘elite’ public is made as a result of stipulations of Zimbabwe’s electoral laws. In Zimbabwe, the electoral body – the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) is mandated to oversee all aspects of election reporting however that is not the reality according to the best knowledge of the writer. Media are thus manipulated as a result of this legal loophole as explained in the following interview.

Firstly, there are no such provisions in the Electoral Act Chapter 2:13 that we give equal coverage. The Constitution of Zimbabwe does not even have that provision of equal coverage; they talk of equitable distribution of airtime. Equity and equality are not the same! When we talk of equitable we are saying a particular political party might file a presidential candidate and 10 (ten) National Assembly candidates, another political party has 210 National Assembly candidates 1 970 Local government councillors and another one has just one National Assembly candidate. How then do

you give equal airtime to those; we use the term equitable so that is distributed according to percentage - to say how big are you and how many constituencies are you competing. You are given airtime in proportion to your size. You don't just get the same because you have contested as somebody with 200 seats, definitely not the same!

Habermas (1996) ideas are of essential significance in our understanding on the complicity of mediation of colonial memory resulting in an 'elite' public sphere in Zimbabwe. The public sphere represents a "deliberative democracy," in which free and equal participation in debate, critique, and decision making are guaranteed by the rule of law (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). Habermas (1996) political model help squarely elaborate media institutions that are expected to mirror "deliberative democracy" premised on an inclusive free public sphere and a strong civil society. Resultantly, Habermas (1996) political viewpoints aid our critique of social and political challenges associated with colonial memory discourse, legitimation, control and influence of political, legislative, judicial, administrative and executive power. Clearly, Wodak (2012) discourse historical approach demonstrate Zimbabwe's post-Mugabe ZANU PF ideology as an (often) narrow interpretation consisting of related colonial narratives, opinions and attitudes. The media are complicit in that they create, establish and maintain unequal power relations through colonial memory discourse. From the interviews, I argue that print and broadcast media in Zimbabwe are able to construct an 'elite' public sphere by framing ZANU PF hegemonic identity narratives confined to clearly designed colonial memory discourses. This was revealed by yet another *Zimpapers* news editor who states that:

The Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) no matter how much we engage them for interviews, they are not forthcoming. Just last week, I have been trying to make a follow up with Fadzai Mahere but she keeps on changing goals by referring me to Ostallos. When I engage Ostallas, he also refers me to Fadzai Mahere. For your own information, contrary. So you see that naturally ZANU PF is dominant in driving national discourse of this country. They may argue that we are not given space but it's their fault.

Print and broadcast media in Zimbabwe as discussed above, are integral to ZANU PF's creation of an elite public sphere. The unwillingness by opposition parties to avail themselves to state owned media is not something new in Zimbabwe. For a long time, print and broadcast media are often accused of biased and partisan coverage of national elections. It could be the reason why opposition often spew disdain against state media and a form of at least spirited attempts to maintain their form and character. The narrow exclusionary narratives in print and broadcast

media are further serialised because of the contentious legal framework. The below interview excerpt explains this view:

The Constitution of Zimbabwe does not even have that provision of equal coverage; they talk of equitable distribution of airtime. Equity and equality are not the same! When we talk of equitable we are saying a particular political party might file a presidential candidate and 10 (ten) National Assembly candidates, another political party has 210 National Assembly candidates 1 970 Local government councillors and another one has just one National Assembly candidate.(Participant interview September 2023).

From the above interview, the study concurs with Muchemwa (2010:506) that ZANU PF relies on the state-owned media to “re-construct and re-invent Zimbabwean national identity as part of a strategy in the contestation, usurpation and closure of narrative space”. This reconstruction and re-invention of Zimbabwean identity is orchestrated through serialisation of narrow exclusionary colonial stories “equally variously propagated in courses taught by war veterans, in collections of Mugabe’s speeches... in textbooks in schools, on state television and radio, and in the writings of Mahoso and others in the state-controlled press” (Ranger, 2004:226). The study thus finds it plausible to state that this scenario has created a monolithic tale of the past that does not capture and accommodate diverse society. The result is what Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009:69) calls a frenzied recalibration of the liberation discourse in very narrow, xenophobic, racist and nativist terms as a front for colonialism. In such a context, this study concludes that ZANU PF rely on print and broadcast media to create an intricate narrative of colonial memory to represent the national mood which serve the party’s propaganda objectives.

7.2 Conclusion

The reportage of colonial memory is mobilised to fragment the people of Zimbabwe into patriots, war veterans, puppets, traitors, sellouts, born-frees and enemies of the nation. Memorialisation is indeed an extremely political exercise whose efforts are aimed to create ongoing efforts of a decolonised nation. Colonial memory is a discourse synonymous with Zimbabwe’s print and broadcast media but often monopolised by ZANU PF. Memorialisation of the past in the media is effective in more authoritarian societies where ruling elites control the media. Print and broadcast media are significant platforms in which the past is remembered, negotiated, contested, debated, reconfigured and redrafted. Without print and broadcast media,

ZANU PF would find it difficult to mobilise colonial memory as a legitimisation tool in Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

8.1 Introduction

This study interrogated the changes and continuities that happened in Zimbabwe's post-Mugabe ZANU PF politics. Mugabe, Zimbabwe's long time ruler since independence in 1980, exited power through a military assisted operation code-named Operation Restore Legacy. The operation resulted in his long-time aide – Mnangagwa assuming the reigns of both ruling party and government leadership. Mnangagwa's administration – the New Dispensation or Second Republic was birthed on the (re)engagement policy with the intention of (re)positioning Zimbabwe as a safe haven for global capital. There was public hope and anticipation that Mnangagwa would bring pragmatic and significant changes to ZANU PF politics. It was within this context that the current study examined the place and discourse of colonial memory in the ruling party's electoral politics. It also explored the memorialisation and (re)imagination of the past in the party's electoral politics in relation to its memorialisation during Mugabe's administration. Memorialisation, in the context of this study, refers to the numerous ways in which the past is appropriated to articulate the present political environment for hegemonic purposes. ZANU PF is a political party born out of the gory tales of war against British colonisation whose memories continue to (re)shape Zimbabwe's mediated political discourse.

The research interrogated the ways (if any) Mnangagwa and Mugabe's stance and engagement with the discourses about the former colonisers differ. It located the role the media play in (re)shaping colonial memory in post-Mugabe ZANU PF electoral politics. The research established what the appropriation of this discourse in the New Dispensation/Second Republic may possibly reveal about political communication in contemporary Zimbabwean politics. While the post-Mugabe ZANU PF claims change and departure from his politics, the party's election communication practice is within the context of historical transitions, memory and (re)imaginings of political communication that Mugabe relied upon. In other words, post-Mugabe ZANU PF continues to rely on official (re)imaginings, conjures and performs many dominant discursive discourses that marked his politics.

The study deployed a conceptual framework by mobilising the Functional Campaign Communication and Political culture. It employed a qualitative research paradigm to locate Mugabe's 2000 seven parliamentary election campaign speeches. The research also interrogated Mnangagwa's 2018 ten election campaign speeches in order to establish changes and continuities of political discourse between the two leaders. The intention was to critically explore how Mnangagwa's administration brings significant changes long desired in Zimbabwe. While Mugabe and Mnangagwa's election campaign speeches were subjected to qualitative content analysis, in-depth interviews were also conducted with purposively selected participants. Data that emerged was analysed using both qualitative content and discourse analytic tools.

The research found out that post both Mugabe and Mnangagwa make use of presidential star rallies as a site of reliving colonial memory. It established that colonial memory during election campaigns is used to communicate deracialisation of economic resources in Zimbabwe introduced by the Smith colonial government. The study demonstrated that there are inherent discontinuities or continuities without change within Mugabe and Mnangagwa's administrations. Both leaders are entangled in the discourse of colonial memory which is well received by old generations who witnessed the liberation struggle. The result is the construction of brand of political communication whose identity, power and belonging culticise Mugabe and Mnangagwa during presidential campaign. Presidential election campaign messages are coined in colonial memory discourse to rubber stamp, elevate and advance Black people as equal to White Zimbabweans. ZANU PF hide behind colonial memory lenses to speak a language economy with view to mark out boundaries that denote who the real Zimbabweans are between Whites and Blacks.

It also emerged that Mugabe and Mnangagwa are framed as patriots, heroes and/or villains in a context where post-independent generations are mounting a radical and fierce critique of ZANU PF politics. War veterans who ferociously fought against colonisation of Zimbabwe against Rhodesian forces highly commend ZANU PF for what they regard as protecting the gains of the liberation struggle. Colonial memory is, thus, a significant political exercise used for speaking truth to power. Commemoration of anti-colonial struggles in ZANU PF is a site of (re)membering the blood that was spilled in fight against British occupation of Zimbabwe. Resultantly, Mugabe and Mnangagwa are viewed as unflinching revolutionaries and veterans of the liberation struggle who defend Zimbabwe's independence through thick and thin. The study found that there is prominence given to plurality and diverse reporting of colonial

memory discourse to establish wider political discourses that are Zimbabwean. The reportage of colonial memory is mobilised to fragment the people of Zimbabwe into patriots versus puppets; war veterans versus traitors; heroes/heroines versus sellouts; older generation versus born-frees and friends versus enemies of the nation. Memorialisation is indeed an extremely political exercise whose efforts are aimed to create on-going efforts of a decolonised nation.

A significant finding which emerged in this study showed that colonial memory is used by the ruling party to advance exclusionary colonial narratives in post-Mugabe political culture. The media are complicity in advocating narrow and exclusionary political agendas that propagate ZANU PF rule. Resultantly, there is an unbalanced national narratives leading to Zimbabwe attaining independence from British colonial rule since 1980. In most instances, the ruling party wields enormous influence on what, why, where and how Zimbabwe's independence was attained.

8.2 Potential areas for future research

Future research may need to consider employing ethnographic methods of conducting political communication research in Zimbabwe. Ethnographic methods in political communication research may have the ability to enrich appreciation of lived experiences of campaign communication in more nuanced ways. There is also a need to employ African theoretical lenses to examine the laboratory attempts of political communication in Zimbabwe's election campaigns. African political communication is influenced by political cultural factors that are common within and among the local people. Although western theories are also significant to unpack political communication, they are inadequate to capture the everyday known political discourse.

It is the view of this study that in order to fully generate new forms of political knowledge, Zimbabwe's media and journalism higher and tertiary institutions need to consider crafting a political communication stand - alone degree programme. For a long time, political communication research is offered only as a module embedded within media and journalism degrees. The intention is to produce researchers who have a grasp of political communication for nation building. The result is that government officials may appreciate the significance of political communication research in a world where there are emerging radical complexities. During the course of conducting this study, it emerged that very senior citizens from across the divide, regard.

REFERENCES

- Acemoglu, D. (2010). *Theory, general equilibrium, and political economy in development*
- Aday, S. (2014). *The US media, foreign policy, and public support for war*.
- Aeby, M. (2015). *Zimbabwe's Gruelling Transition: Interim Power-Sharing and Conflict Management in Southern Africa*. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Basel.
- African Blacksmiths." *Trames: A Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences* 25, no. 1: 69-82.
- African Books Collective. *African Foreign Affairs*, 5(1), 5-24.
- Africans*. *Communicatio*, 40(4), 287-304.
- Ahluwalia, P., (2001). *When does a settler become a native? Citizenship and identity in a settler society*. *Pretexts: literary and cultural studies*, 10(1), pp.63-73.
- Aina, I. O. (1998). *Women, Society*. In: Sesay, A. and Odebiyi, A. *Nigerian Women in Society and Development*. Dokun Publishing House: Ibadan.
- Akpojivi, U., (2018). *Media reforms and democratization in emerging democracies of Sub-Saharan Africa*. Springer.
- Alexander L G. (1959). *Quantitative and qualitative approaches to content analysis*, in Ithiel de Sola Pool (ed.), *Trends in Content Analysis*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. pp. 1-32
- Alexander, D., (2004). *Beyond a learning society? It is all to be done again: Zambia and Zimbabwe*. *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 25(6), pp.595-608.
- Alexander, J. (2006). *The Unsettled Land: State-Making and the Politics of Land in Zimbabwe 1893-2003*. Oxford: James Currey.
- Alexander, J., McGregor, J., & Ranger, T. O. (2000). *Violence & memory: one hundred years*
- Alfandika, L. (2018). *Chaos and (in) security in the nether: Repressive media policies in*
- Ali, Z. S. (2013). *Media myths and realities in natural disasters*. *European Journal of Business*
- Allaire, Y. and Firsirotu, M.E., (1984). *Theories of organizational culture*. *Organization studies*, 5(3), pp.193-226.
- Almond, G., & Verba, S. (1956). *The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Countries*, Princeton 1963. Almond G, *Comparative Political Systems*, *The Journal of Politics*, 18(3,391-409), 396.

- Almond, G.A. and Verba, S., (1963). *The civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five nations*.
- Altheide, D. L., & Johnson, J. M. (1994). *Criteria for assessing interpretive validity in qualitative research*.
- Amin, H. (2002). *Freedom as a Value in Arab Media: Perceptions and Attitudes among Journalists*. Political Communication, 19(2): 125-136
- Amoah, E. (2002). *The challenging perspectives of some Akan beliefs and practices*. In: Amoah, E. and Oduyoye, M. A. "When Silence is No Longer an Option", Sam-Woode Ltd: Accra.
- Amorós, P., & Puy, M. S. (2013). *Issue convergence or issue divergence in a political campaign?*. *Public Choice*, 155, 355-371. *analysis of presidential campaign coverage, 1992–2004*. *Journal of Communication*, 57(4), 652-675. *and features*. Political communication, 16(3), 209-230. *and Social Sciences*, 2(1), 125-133. *and Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift Für Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft*, 102-118.
- Anda, M.O. (2000). *International relations in Contemporary Africa*. Wikipedia. *Encyclopaedia*, [http/ Wikipedia.org/goalrice.about.com/od/people and culture](http://Wikipedia.org/goalrice.about.com/od/people%20and%20culture). Accessed April 04, 2022
- Anderson, B. (1991/2006). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Andreassen, R. (2010). *Sing a song but stay out of politics. Two cases of representation of racial/ethnic*.
- Andrew, C. M., & Gordievsky, O. (1990). *KGB: The inside story of its foreign operations from Lenin to Gorbachev*.
- Ankomah, B. (2018). *Old Wine in a New Bottle? New African*. January, African New Magazine
- Antagonism and the Politics of Falsehood.* Javnost – The Public 25 (3): 298–314. doi:10.1080/13183222.2018. 1463047
- Appiah, 1992). *In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture*. Oxford University

- Appiah, B., (2010). *The impact of training on employee performance: a case study of HFC Bank (Ghana) Limited* (Doctoral dissertation).
- Appiah, K. A. (1997). *Cosmopolitan patriots*. *Critical inquiry*, 23(3), 617-639.
- Appiah, K. W. (1991). *Is the Post- in Postmodernism the Post- in Postcolonial?* *Critical Argumentation and Advocacy*, 41(4), 225-236.
- Asante, M. K. (1998). *The Afrocentric idea (2nd ed.)*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University
- Ashcroft, B, (1989). *The empire writes back: Theory and practices in post-colonial literatures*.
- Asuelime, L. E. (2018). *A Coup or not a Coup: That is the Question in Zimbabwe*. *Journal of*
- Atran, S. (2002). *The neuropsychology of religion*. *NeuroTheology: brain, science,*
- Ayo. O. (2017). *The African Policom Stew*. *Political Communication in Africa,*
- Azaryahu, M. (1996). *The power of commemorative street names*. *Environment and planning*
- Babbie, E. (1990). *The essential wisdom of sociology*. *Teaching Sociology*, 18(4), 526-530.
- Babbie, E. and Mouton, J. (2001). *The social practice of social research*, Cape Town: Oxford University Press
- Bagwell, K. (2007). *The economic analysis of advertising*. *Handbook of industrial organization*, 3, 1701-1844.
- Balthrop, V. W., Blair, C., and Michel, N. (2010). The presence of the present: Hijacking “the good war”? *Western Journal of Communication*, 74(2): 170–207.
- Barnes, K., Marateo, R. C., & Ferris, S. P. (2007). *Teaching and learning with the net*
- Barry Harold, D. (2004). *Zimbabwe: The past is the future*.
- Beach, (1984). *Zimbabwe Before 1900*. Mambo Press, Gweru
- Beardsworth, N., Cheeseman, N., & Tinhu, S. (2019). *Zimbabwe: The coup that never was, and the election that could have been*. *African Affairs*, 118(472), 580-596.
- Becker, H., (1986). *Botany of European mistletoe (Viscum album L.)*. *Oncology*, 43(Suppl 1), pp.2-7.
- Bennet, S.M., Öhman, L. and Simrén, M., (2015). *Gut microbiota as potential orchestrators of irritable bowel syndrome*. *Gut and liver*, 9(3), p.318.

- Benoit, W. L., and Sheaffer, T. (2006). *Functional Theory of Political Campaign Communication and Political Discourse: Televised Debates in Israel and the United States*. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 83: 281–297.
- Benoit, W. L. (2014a). *Accounts, excuses, and apologies: Image repair theory and research*.
- Benoit, W. L. (2014b). *Content analysis in political communication*. In Sourcebook for
- Benoit, W. L., & Airne, D. (2005). *A functional analysis of American vice presidential debates*.
- Benoit, W. L., & Harthcock, A. (1999). *Functions of the great debates: Acclaims, attacks, and*
- Benoit, W. L., Blaney, J. R., & Pier, P. M. (1998). *Campaign'96: A functional analysis of*
- Benoit, W. L., Blaney, J. R., & Pier, P. M. (2000). *Acclaiming, attacking, and defending: A functional analysis of US nominating convention keynote speeches*. Political Communication, 17(1), 61-84.
- Benoit, W. L., McHale, J. P, Hansen, G. J., Pier, P. M., and McGuire, J. P. (2003). *Campaign 2000: A Functional Analysis of Presidential Campaign Discourse*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Benoit, W. L., Wells, W. T., Pier, P. M., & Blaney, J. R. (1999). *Acclaiming, attacking, and defending in nomination convention acceptance addresses*. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 85, 247-267.
- Benoit, W. L., Wen, W. C., & Yu, T. H. (2007). A functional analysis of 2004 Taiwanese political debates. *Asian Journal of Communication*, 17(1), 24-39.
- Berelson, (1952) *Content Analysis in Communication Research*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Berger, L., Speare, R., & Kent, A. (1999). *Diagnosis of chytridiomycosis in amphibians by histologic examination*. Zoos Print J, 15(1), 184-190.
- Bhabha, H K (1994). *The location of culture*. London: Routledge
- Bhabra G. K (2014). *Postcolonial and Decolonial Dialogues*. Postcolonial Studies, 17(2): 115-121. DOI: 10.1080/13688790.2014.966414Bibliography on African Affairs, 2(2), 5-11.
- Blassnig, S. et al (2023). *Googling referendum campaigns: analyzing online search patterns* Bloomsbury Academic.

- Blumberg, et al (2005). *Survey research. Business research methods*, (243-276).
- Blumen, L. J. (2005). *Toxic leadership: When grand illusions masquerade as noble*
- Blumler, J. G., & Kavanagh, D. (1999). *The third age of political communication: Influences*
- Bond. P. and Manyaya (2009). *The US financial meltdown : what really happened - roots of*
- Booyesen, F. L. R. (2003). *The extent of, and possible explanations for, provincial disparities*
- Borgerhoff-Mulder, M., (1991). Dagota pastoralists of Tanzania.
- Bowman, R. S., & Lewis, J. R. (1977). *Annual fluctuations in the recruitment of Patella vulgata*
L. Journal of the Marine Biological Association of the United Kingdom, 57(3), 793-815.
- Boyd, R. and Richerson, P.J., (1987). *The evolution of ethnic markers*. Cultural
Anthropology, 2(1), pp.65-79.
- Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (2005). *The origin and evolution of cultures*. Oxford University
Press.
- Boyer, E.L., (1994). *Creating the new American college*.
- Bratton, M, and Masunungure, E. (2008). *Zimbabwe's long agony*. J. Democracy 19: 41.
- Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2019). Reflecting on reflexive thematic analysis. *Qualitative research*
- Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2020). *One size fits all? What counts as quality practice in (reflexive)*
- Brennan, D. J., Asakura, K., George, C., Newman, P. A., Giwa, S., Hart, T. A., ... & Betancourt,
G. (2013). "Never reflected anywhere": Body image among ethnoracialized gay and
bisexual men. *Body Image*, 10(3), 389-398.
- Brownlee, J. (2007). *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press
- Bryman, A. (2012). *Social Research Methods*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bucy, E. P., & Grabe, M. E. (2007). *Taking television seriously: A sound and image bite*
- Buehler, S., & Halbheer, D. (2011). *Selling when brand image matters*. Journal of Institutional
- Buehler, S., & Halbheer, D. (2012). *Persuading consumers with social attitudes*. Journal of
- Cabral, A. (1993). *National liberation and culture*. In P. Williams & L. Chrisman, (eds.),
Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial Theory: a Reader, New York: Harvester Wheat
sheaf: 53-65

- Cairns, E. and Roe, M. D. (Eds.) (2003). *The Role of Memory in Ethnic Conflict*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Camara, M .S. (2008). *Media, civil society, and political culture in West Africa*. Ecquid
- Campbell, H. (2003). *Reclaiming Zimbabwe: The Exhaustion of Patriarchal Model of Liberation*. Trenton: Africa World Press Christiansen, L. B. (2007). *Mai Mujuru: Father of the nation?* In K. Muchemwa & R. Muponde (eds.), *Manning the nation* (pp. 88–101). Harare: Weaver
- Campbell, M. A. (2005). *Cyber bullying: An old problem in a new guise?*. *Journal of Psychologists and Counsellors in Schools*, 15(1), 68-76.
- Carleton, R. N., et al (2014). *“But it might be a heart attack”: Intolerance of uncertainty and*
- Carvalho, A. (2008). *Media (ted) discourse and society: Rethinking the framework of critical discourse analysis*. *Journalism studies*, 9(2), 161-177.
- Cater, S., and Little, M. (2007). *Justifying Knowledge, Justifying Method, Taking Action: Epistemologies, Methodologies, and Methods in Qualitative Research*. *Qualitative Health Research*, 17(10), 1316-1328.
- Cavalli-Sforza, L.L. and Feldman, M.W., (1981). *Cultural transmission and evolution: A quantitative approach* (No. 16). Princeton University Press.
- CCJP and LRF (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, Legal Resources Foundation). (1999). *Breaking The Silence, Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands, 1980 to 1988 Smmary Report*. Harare: Legal Resources Foundation. <http://www.kubataana.net/html/archive/hr/990401ccjplrf.asp?sector=CACT>.
- Cesaire (1992).A. *A Tempest Absolute Classics Series Modern plays Oberon Modern Plays*
- Cesaire, A. (2000). *Discourse on Colonialism*. New York: Monthly Review Press
- Chabal, P., & Daloz, J. P. (1999). *Africa works: Disorder as political instrument*.
- Chakrabartty, S. N. (2013). *Best split-half and maximum reliability*. *IOSR Journal of Research*
- Chari, T. (2010, October). *Issue framing in Zimbabwe’s 2008 election: An analysis of*
- Chari, T. (2013). *Rethinking the democratization role of online media: The Zimbabwean*
- Chari, T. (2022). *Between state interests and citizen digital rights: making sense of internet*

- Charumbira, R. (2013). *Gender, Nehanda, and the Myth of Nationhood in the Making of*
- Charumbira, R. (2015). *Imagining a nation: history and memory in making Zimbabwe.*
- Chasi, C. (2014). *Violent communication is not alien to ubuntu: Nothing human is alien to*
- Chasi, C. 2015. "A Philosophy for Teaching in a Strange Place." *Africa Education Review*
- Chasi, C., & Rodny-Gumede, Y. (2022). *Decolonial Journalism: New Notes on Ubuntu and*
- Chibuwe, A. (2013). *A Research agenda for political advertising in Africa: The case of Zimbabwe.* *Global Media Journal African Edition* 7(2):116–39. doi:10.5789/7– 2-135
- Chibuwe, A. (2016) "I Am as Fit as a Fiddle": *Selling the Mugabe Brand in the 2013 Elections in Zimbabwe.* *Journal of Political Marketing, University of Johannesburg, Communication Studies, Johannesburg, South Africa*
- Chibuwe, A. (2017). *Language and the (re)production of dominance: Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) advertisements for the July 2013 elections,* *Critical Arts*, 31:1, 18-33, DOI: 10.1080/02560046.2017.1300823
- Chibuwe, A. (2019). 'What a peaceful campaign!' *The peace discourse as ZANU-PF's*
- Chibuwe, A. and Munoriyarwa, A., (2023). 'Repetition without change?': *A critical discourse analysis of selected ZANU-PF advertisements for the July 2013 and July 2018 elections.* *Discourse & Communication*, 17(2), pp.174-198.
- Chibuwe, A., (2022). *Indigeneity, belonging, 'madness' and 'corruption': Brett Muvet and the white man's identity crisis in post-2000 Zimbabwe.* *African Identities*, pp.1-18.
- Chidume, C. et al. (2021) "Warfare in Pre-Colonial Africa: An Examination of the Role of
- Chikerema, A. (2015). *Leadership Renewal and Succession in Zimbabwean Political Parties: A Critical Analysis of Leadership Succession and Renewal Processes in ZANU-PF and the MDC-T.* *Arts Social Sci J*, 6(4): DOI: 10.4172/2151-6200.1000138
- Chikerema, A.F. and Nzewi, O (2020). *Succession Politics and State Administration in Africa.* *Journal of African Elections*, p.146.
- Chikonzo, K and Muwonwa, N. (2018). *Mass Graves and Imagined Identities in Zimbabwe.* *Communication*, 44(4): 48-58. DOI: 10.1080/02500167.2019.1586739
- Chilton, S., (1988). *Defining political culture.* *Western Political Quarterly*, 41(3), pp.419-445.

- Chimedza, T. L. (2008). *Bulldozers Always Come 'Maggots', Citizens and Governance*. Hidden Dimensions of Operation Murambatsvina, Weaver Press, Zimbabwe
- Chipere, M. (2020). Crisis of Political Leadership in Zimbabwe. *Review of African Political Economy*, DOI: 10.1080/03056244.2020.1722089
- Chirimambowa, T. (2008). *Anti-imperialism and schizophrenic revolutionaries in Zimbabwe*. Special Issue on Zimbabwe (ii) Concerned Africa Scholars, Bulletin, 80, 43-46.
- Chirimambowa, T.C., (2016). *Succession politics in Zimbabwe: Grace Mugabe and the end of patriotic history*. Dialogue Online, 1, pp.1-4.
- Chirimuuta, C. and Jongore. M. (2021). *The Land Question and the Legacy of Robert Mugabe: Thinking Zimbabwe's Agrarian Reform Beyond Mugabe*: In Re/membering Robert Gabriel Mugabe: Politics, Legacy, Philosophy, Life and Death: Politics, Legacy, Philosophy, Life and Death: LAN Readers Zimbabwe.
- Chitando, E and Mashiri, P. (2015). *Africa yedu! (Our Africa): African Initiated Church Ideology, Land and Indigenisation in Zimbabwe*. In Makwavarara, Z, Magosvongwe, R & Mlambo, O. B. (Eds.). *Dialoguing Land and Indigenisation in Zimbabwe and other Developing Countries*. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications. 91-115.
- Chitando, E. (2013). *Prayers and Players: Religion and Politics in Zimbabwe*. Harare, Zimbabwe: SAPES Books.
- Chitando, E. (2020). *Politics and Religion in Zimbabwe*. Routledge.
- Chomsky, N. (1967). *The general properties of language. Brain mechanisms underlying speech and language*, 73-88.
- Christiansen, L. B. (2007). *Mai Mujuru: Father of the nation. Manning the nation: Father figures in Zimbabwean literature and society*, 88-101.
- Chuma, W. (2008). *Mediating the 2000 elections in Zimbabwe: Competing journalisms in a society at the crossroads*. Ecquid Novi, 29(1), 21-41.

- Chung, F., (2006). *Re-living the Second Chimurenga: Memories from the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe*. African Books Collective.
- Cleary, M., Horsfall, J., & Hayter, M. (2014). *Data collection and sampling in qualitative research: does size matter?*. Journal of advanced nursing, 473-475.
- Cobbing, E.J. and Pitcher, W.S., (1983). *Andean plutonism in Peru and its relationship to volcanism and metallogenesis at a segmented plate edge*. Geological Society of America Memoirs, 159, pp.277-292.
- Cobbing, J. (1974). *The evolution of Ndebele Amabutho*1. The Journal of African History, 15(4), 607-631.
- Coe, K., & Neumann, R. (2011). *Finding foreigners in American national identity: Presidential discourse, people, and the international community*. International. Journal of Communication, 5, 22.
- Cohen, J., & Grifo, J. A. (2007). *Multicentre trial of preimplantation genetic screening reported in the New England*. Journal of Medicine: an in-depth look at the findings. Reproductive biomedicine online, 15(4), 365-366.
- Cohen, L., Manion, L., & Morrison, K. (2000). *Research Methods in Education* (5th ed.). London: Routledge.
- Connell, R. (2007). *The northern theory of globalization*. Sociological theory, 25(4), 368-385.
- Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment Number 20 of 2013).
- Corner, J. (2007). *Mediated politics, promotional culture and the idea of propaganda*'. Media, Culture & Society, 29(4), 669-677.
- Cosentine, G. (2020). *Social media and the post-truth world order: The global dynamics of disinformation*. London, UK: Palgrave McMillan.
- Coser, L. A. (1965). *The sociology of poverty*. Soc. Probs., 13, 140.
- Coser, L. A. (1992). *The revival of the sociology of culture: the case of collective memory*. In Sociological Forum (pp. 365-373). Eastern Sociological Society. *Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) and Daraja Press*. <https://>

libcom.org/files/Firoze-Manji_-Bill-Fletcher-Jr-Claim-No-Easy-Victories_-The-Legacy-of-AmilcarCabral-CODESRIA-Consei.pdf .

- Crawford, C., Gregg, P., Macmillan, L., Vignoles, A., & Wyness, G. (2016). *Higher education, career opportunities, and intergenerational inequality*. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 32(4), 553-575.
- Creswell, J. (1994). *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
- Cronk, L., (1991). *Human behavioral ecology*. Annual Review of Anthropology, 20 (1), pp.25-53.
- Crotty M (2003). *The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process*. London, UK: SAGE Publications
- Curran, J., (2002). *Crisis of public communication: A reappraisal*. In *Media, ritual and identity* (pp. 175-202). Routledge.
- Curtin, P. D. (1966). *Nationalism in Africa, 1945-1965*. *The Review of Politics*, 28(2), 143-153.
- Cwalina W, Falkowski A, Newman BI. (2011). *Political marketing: theoretical and strategic foundations*. M.E. Sharpe: Armonk, NY
- Cwalina, W. and Falkowski, A., (2014). *Political branding: Political candidates positioning based on inter-object associative affinity index*. Journal of Political Marketing, 14(1-2), pp.152-174. *Society and Space*, 14(3), 311-330.
- Dalmus, C., Hänggli, R., & Bernhard, L. (2017). *The charm of salient issues? Parties' strategic behavior in press releases*. How political actors use the media: A functional analysis of the media's role in politics, 187-205.
- Dawson, M., (2011). *Putting cities on the map: Vancouver's 1954 British Empire and Commonwealth Games in comparative and historical perspective*. *Urban Geography*, 32(6), pp.788-803.
- Dawson, R.E. and Prewitt, K., (1969). *Political socialization: An analytic study*.
- De Silva, D., Tu, Y. T., Amunts, A., Fontanesi, F., & Barrientos, A. (2015). *Mitochondrial ribosome assembly in health and disease*. *Cell Cycle*, 14(14), 2226-2250.

- Deacon, A., & Mann, K. (1999). *Agency, modernity and social policy*. Journal of social policy, 28(3), 413-435. *defenses in the 1960 presidential debates*.
- Delli. M. X., & Keeter, S. (1996). *What Americans know about politics and why it matters*. Yale University Press.
- Denton. J. and Woodward. G.C. (1990). *Political Communication in America*. Praeger series
- Denzin, N. K. (2000). *Aesthetics and the practices of qualitative inquiry*. Qualitative
- Denzin, N. K. (2001). *The reflexive interview and a performative social science*. Qualitative
- Denzin, N. K. (2009). *Qualitative inquiry and social justice: Toward a politics of hope*. Left Coast Press.
- Denzin, N. K., Lincoln, Y. S., & Giardina, M. D. (2006). *Disciplining qualitative*
- Denzin, N., & Lincoln, Y. (2005). *Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research*. In N. Denzin, & Y. Lincoln (Eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research* (pp. 1-19). London: SAGE
- Derrida, J. (2001). *Writing and difference*. Routledge.
- Diamond, L. (2008). *The democratic rollback-the resurgence of the predatory state*. *Foreign Aff.*, 87, 36.
- Dilthey, W. (1976). *Dilthey selected writings*.
- Donges, P., & Jarren, O. (Eds.). (2017). *Studienbücher zur Kommunikations- und Medienwissenschaft*. Politische Kommunikation in der Mediengesellschaft: Eine Einführung (4. Auflage). Springer VS.
- Dorman, S. (2006). *Make sure they count nicely this time: The politics of elections and election observing in Zimbabwe*. *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 43(2): 155-177
- Downer, L., 2013, March. Political branding in Australia: a conceptual model. In *63rd Political Studies Association Annual International Conference*. Cardiff: *Political Studies Association* (pp. 1-25).
- Du Gay, P. ed., (1997). *Production of culture/cultures of production*. Sage.

- Dube, L. M. (2019). *Restitution versus Populism: Revisiting the Dominant Tropes of the Land Question in Zimbabwe*. Open Journal of Social Sciences 7: 203–19. <https://doi.org/10.4236/jss.2019.710017>.
- Dube, L.M. (2021). *Settlerism, Liberation, and Neo-liberalism: Narratives and the Dialectics of Resource Redistribution in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe*. International Journal of African Renaissance Studies - Multi-, Inter- and Transdisciplinarity, 16:1, 100-122, DOI: 10.1080/18186874.2021.1957697
- Dube, L. M. (2020a). *Autocracy, Institutional Constraints and Land Expropriation: A Conceptual Analysis of Land Redistribution in Zimbabwe*. Journal of Public Administration and Governance, 10 (2): 327-49. <https://doi.org/10.5296/jpag.v10i2.17040>.
- Dube, L. M. (2020b). *Race, Entitlement, and Belonging: A Discursive Analysis of the Political Economy of Land in Zimbabwe*. Journal of Black Studies, 5 (2): 24-49. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0021934720946448>.
- Dube, L. M. (2021). *Race, entitlement, and belonging: A discursive analysis of the political economy of land in Zimbabwe*. Journal of Black Studies, 52(1), 24-49.
- Dunn, K. E., & Mulvenon, S. W. (2019). *A critical review of research on formative assessments: The limited scientific evidence of the impact of formative assessments in education*. Practical assessment, research, and evaluation, 14(1), 7.
- Durham, W.H., (1991). *Coevolution: Genes, culture, and human diversity*. Stanford University Press.
- Duri F. P. T (2016) *Presentism, Contested Narratives and Dissonances in Zimbabwe's Liberation War Heritage: The Case of Joice Mujuru* in Colonial Heritage, Memory and Sustainability in Africa Challenges, Opportunities and Prospect, Langaa Research and Publishing Common Initiative Group P.O. Box 902 Mankon Bamenda North-West Region Cameroon
- Duri, F.P.T., (2018). *Witchcraft, Development and Politicking: The Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) Power Struggles and their Poverty Implications in Zimbabwe. Jostling Between" Mere Talk" and Blame Game?: Beyond Africa's Poverty and Underdevelopment Game Talk*, p.315.

- Dutta, M. (2011). *Communicating Social Change: Structure, Culture, and Agency*. London: Routledge.
- Dworkin, S. L. (2012). *Sample size policy for qualitative studies using in-depth interviews*. Archives of sexual behavior, 41, 1319-1320.
- Dzenga P (2018) *Making the 'unelectable' electable through billboard advertisements: The case of selected ZANU PF billboard advertisements for July 2018 presidential elections*. BSC Honours Dissertation, Midlands State University, Zimbabwe.
- Dzimiri, P., Runhare, T., Dzimiri, C., & Mazorodze, W. (2014). Naming, identity, politics and violence in Zimbabwe. *Studies of Tribes and Tribals*, 12(2), 227-238.
- Economic Behavior & Organization, 84(1), 439-450.
- economic. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(3), 17-32.
- Edgerly, S. (2017). *Seeking out and avoiding the news media: Young adults' proposed strategies for obtaining current events information*. Mass Communication and Society, 20(3), 358-377.
- Ehrenhaus, P. (1988). Silence and Symbolic Expression. *Communication Monographs*, 55(1): 41-57.
- Escobar, A. (1983). "*Discourse and Power: A historical perspective on the formation of development theory and practice (1945–1955)*". Paper presented at UNESCO's meeting on philosophical investigations of the fundamental problems of Endogenous Development, Libreville.
- Esser, F., & Strömbäck, J. (2013). Comparing election campaign communication. In *The handbook of comparative communication research* (pp. 289-307). Routledge.
- Eveland Jr, W.P. and Scheufele, D.A., (2000). *Connecting news media use with gaps in knowledge and participation*. *Political communication*, 17(3), pp.215-237.
- Experience. In *New media influence on social and political change in Africa* (pp. 379-401). IGI Global.
- Eyerman, Ron. (2004). "*The Past in the Present: Culture and the Transmission of Memory*," *Acta Sociologica* 47 no. 2
- Fairclough, N. (1995), *Critical discourse analysis*. Papers in the critical study of language, London, Longman
- Fairclough, N. (2001). *Language and Power* (2nd ed). London: Longman

- Fanon, F. (1963) *The Wretched of the Earth*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books
- Farkas, Johan, and Jannick Schou. (2018). “Fake News as a Floating Signifier: Hegemony,
- Filipescu C (2022) *Synthetic personalization and the legitimization of the Crimean annexation:*
- Fisher, J. L. (2010). *Pioneers, Settlers, Aliens, Exiles: The Decolonization of White Identity in Zimbabwe*. Acton: Australia National University Press.
https://doi.org/10.26530/oapen_459443.
- Flower, K. (1987). *Serving Secretly: An intelligence chief on record: Rhodesia into Zimbabwe*,
- Foucault, M. (1972). *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (t. (A.M. Sheridan Smith, Trans.). New York: Pantheon Books.
- Foucault, M. (1977). *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972-1977*. Edited by Colin Gordon, translations by Gordon, Marshall, Mepham and Soper. New York: Vintage Books, 2010.
- Foucault, M. (1978). *The History of Sexuality*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Foucault, M. (1980). *Power/ Knowledge*. Brighton: Harvester.
- Fourie, P. J. (2008). *Ubuntuism as a framework for South African media practice and performance: Can it work?*. Communicatio: South African Journal for Communication Theory and Research, 34(1), 53-79.
- frameworks*. The Journal of Modern History, 70(2), 384-425.
- Frassinelli, S. (2022). *Epistemology of The Sport Performance in COMBAT Sports: Empirical Aspects, Relativism and Inference*. In Подготовка единогоборцев: теория, методика и практика (pp. 147-157).
- Frederickse, J. (1983). *None but ourselves*. London: Penguin
- Freeman L. (2014). *Toward a Phenomenology of Mood*.
<https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/sjp.12089>. Accessed on 19 June 2022.
- Freeman, L. (2005). *Contradictory Constructions of the Crisis in Zimbabwe*. Historica 50 (2): 287–310. “Gays, ‘We Will Cut Their Heads Off’ Says Mugabe.” 2013. Harare24. <http://harare24.com/index-id-news-zk-15596.html> (accessed 10 March 2022).
- Freire, P. (2000), *Pedagogy of the oppressed*. Continuum, New York.
- Gadamer, H. G. (1960). Aesthetics and hermeneutics. *The continental aesthetics reader*, 181-186.

- Gadamer, H. G. (1975). Hermeneutics and social science. *Cultural hermeneutics*, 2(4), 307-316.
- Gadamer, H. G. (2002). *The beginning of knowledge*. Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Gadamer, H.G. (1989). *Truth and Method*. New York: Continuum
- Gaidzanwa, R., (2020). The political culture of Zimbabwe: Continuities and discontinuities. *The History and Political Transition of Zimbabwe: From Mugabe to Mnangagwa*, pp.25-50.
- Galeotti, A., & Mattozzi, A. (2011). "Personal Influence": Social Context and Political Competition. *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics*, 3(1), 307-327.
- Garnham, N. (1990). *Capitalism and Communication: Global Culture and the Economics of Information*, Sage Publications
- Gates Jr, H. L. (1991). *Critical fanonism*. *Critical Inquiry*, 17(3), 457-470.
- Gatsheni N, S. J. (2003). *Dynamics of the Zimbabwe Crisis in the 21st Century*. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 3(1), 99-134.
- Gatsheni S, J. N (2012b). *Beyond the Equator there is no Sins: Coloniality and Violence in Africa*. *The Journal of Developing Societies*, 28(4): 419-440
- Gatsheni, N. S.J (2006a). *Nationalist-military alliance and the fate of democracy in Zimbabwe*. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 6(1), 49-80.
- Gatsheni, N.S. J. (2009). *Making sense of Mugabeism in local and global politics: 'So Blair, keep your England and let me keep my Zimbabwe'*. *Third World Quarterly*, 30(6), 1139-1158.
- Gatsheni, N.S. J. (2009). *Do 'Zimbabweans' exist?: Trajectories of nationalism, national identity formation and crisis in a postcolonial state* (Vol. 3). Peter Lang.
- Gatsheni, N.S. J. (2011). *The Zimbabwean nation-state project: A historical diagnosis of identity and power-based conflicts in a postcolonial state*. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.
- Gatsheni, N.S. J. (2012). Elections in Zimbabwe: A recipe for tension or a remedy for reconciliation. *Institute for Justice and Reconciliation*.

- Gatsheni, N.S. J. (2012a). *Rethinking Chimurenga and Gukurahundi in Zimbabwe: A critique of partisan national history*. African studies review, 55(3), 1-26.
- Gatsheni, N.S. J. (2012b). *Coloniality of power in development studies and the impact of global imperial designs on Africa*. Australasian Review of African Studies, The, 33(2), 48-73.
- Gatsheni, N.S.J (2006b). *The nativist revolution and development conundrums in Zimbabwe*. ACCORD Occasional Paper, 2006(4), 1-40.
- Gatsheni, S.J. N. and Ruhanya, P., (2020). *Introduction: transition in Zimbabwe: From Robert Gabriel Mugabe to Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa: A repetition without change?* In The History and Political Transition of Zimbabwe: From Mugabe to Mnangagwa, pp.1-22.
- Geertz, C., 1973. *Deep play*. Notes on the Balinese Cockfight, Daedalus, 101(1), pp. 1-37
- Gellner, E. (1983). *Muslim society* (No. 32). Cambridge University Press.
- generation. Innovate: Journal of Online Education, 3(4).
- George, A. L. (1959). *Propaganda analysis*. Evanston, Illinois, 30.
- Geschiere, P. (2005). *Autochthony and citizenship: new modes in the struggle over belonging and exclusion in Africa*. In Forum for Development Studies (Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 371-384). Taylor & Francis Group.
- Geschiere, P. (2011). *Autochthony, citizenship and exclusion: new patterns in the politics of belonging in Africa and Europe*. Ethnicity, Citizenship and Belonging: Practices, Theory and Spatial Dimensions= Etnicidad, ciudadanía y pertenencia: prácticas, teoría y dimensiones espaciales.-(Ethnicity, citizenship and belonging in Latin America; 1), 175-198.
- Gilman, J. J. (2009). *Chemistry and physics of mechanical hardness*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Gobel, C., and D. Lambach. (2009). Accounting for the (In-) stability of Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Paper Prepared for the APSA Annual Meeting 2009, Toronto, 2-6 September 2009. https://www.uni-due.de/imperia/md/content/politik/debiel/lambach_apsa_2009.pdf.

- Goodrich, C. et al. (2018). *Reflections on policies for women small and medium entrepreneurs: Status, challenges and opportunities in the Hindu Kush Himalayas and the SAARC region*. In South Asian Women Development Forum.
- Gordon, M. T. (2000). *Public trust in government: The US media as an agent of accountability?*. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 66(2), 297-310.
- Gottfried, J., & Barthel, M. (2015). *How Millennials' political news habits differ from those of Gen Xers and Baby Boomers*. Retrieved from <http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2015/06/01/political-news-habits-by-generation/>
- Gramsci, A. (1971). *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. Edited by Q. Hoare and G. N. Smith. New York: International
- Greenfield, T. L. and Wharton, D.B., (2019). *Zimbabwe's coup: Net gain or no gain*. Military Review, 1(2), pp.6-17. Accessed on 08 February 2022 at <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MA-2019/Thomas-Greenfield-Zimbabwe.pdf>
- Greig, A. D., MacKay, T., & Taylor, J. (2012). *Doing research with children: A practical guide*.
- Groseclose, T. (2001). *A model of candidate location when one candidate has a valence advantage*. American Journal of Political Science, 862-886.
- Gudykunst, W. B. (1997). *Cultural variability in communication: An introduction*. Communication research, 24(4), 327-348.
- Gumede, R. Y. (2022). *The triple oppressions: Race, class and gender in South African journalism*. In Women Journalists in South Africa: Democracy in the Age of Social Media (pp. 15-29). Cham: Springer International Publishing.
- Gurevitch, M and Blumler, J. (2004). *State of the Art of Comparative Political Communication*
- Gwekwerere T. and Mpondi (2018). Memory, Identity and Power in Contemporary Zimbabwe: Movement for .Africology: *The Journal of Pan African Studies*, 12(3)
- Gwekwerere, T., Mutasa, D.E. and Chitofiri, K. (2018). *Settlers, rhodesians, and supremacists: White authors and the fast track land reform program in post-2000 Zimbabwe*. Journal of black studies, 49(1), pp.3-28.
- Gwindingwe, G., et al (2020). *When art is captured, culture is under siege: analysing*

- Habermas, J. (1996). *The public sphere*. Media studies: A reader, 2, 92-97.
- Hackett, H. (2000). *Women and romance fiction in the English Renaissance* (p. viii235). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Halbwachs, M. (1980). *The Social Frameworks of Memory from On Collective Memory*, L.A Coser (ed) (Chicago University Press).
- Hall, S. (1996). *Cultural Identity and Cinematic Representation*. In Houston, B. A, Mantia, D & Lindeborg, R.H. (Eds.), *Black British Cultural Studies: A Reader*. London: University of Chicago Press. 210-222.
- Hall, S. (1997). *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices*. London: Sage.
- Halperin.S. and Heath. O. (2017). *Political Research Methods and Practical Skills*, 2nd Edition, Oxford University Press, London.
- Hammar, A., Raftopoulos, B. and Jensen, S., (2003). *Zimbabwe's unfinished business: Rethinking land, state and nation in the context of crisis*. (No Title).
- Hancock, N. P. (1993). *Healing the Breach: Benjamin Godwin and the Serampore 'Schism'*. Baptist Quarterly, 35(3), 121-133.
- Hanlon, J., Manjengwa, J., & Smart, T. (2013). Zimbabwe takes back its land. Kumarian Press. Hanlon, J et al (2013). *Zimbabwe Takes Back Its Land*. Sterling: Kumarian Press.
- Harding, S. (1987). *The Method Question*. Hypatia, 2(3), 19-35.
- Hardt, D. (1992). *VP ellipsis and semantic identity*. In Semantics and Linguistic Theory (pp. 145-162).
- Hawkins, K. A. (2009). *Is Chávez populist? Measuring populist discourse in comparative perspective*. Comparative political studies, 42(8), 1040-1067.
- Hayden, R. M. (1992). *Constitutional nationalism in the formerly Yugoslav republics*. Slavic review, 51(4), 654-673.
- Helliker T. and Murisa.T. (2020). Zimbabwe: Continuities and Changes. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 38(1):5-17. DOI: 10.1080/02589001.2020.1746756

- Hellweg, S. A., King, S. W., & Williams, S. E. (1988). *Comparative candidate evaluation as a function of election level and candidate incumbency*. Communication Reports, 1(2), 76-85.
- Henrich, J., (2015). *Culture and social behavior*. *Current opinion in behavioral sciences*, 3, pp.84-89.
- Henson, J. R., and Benoit, W. L. (2010). *Because I said so: A Functional Theory of Political Campaign Communication analysis of evidence in political TV spots*. Speaker & Gavel 47: 1–15.
- Herman, E and N. Chomsky, N. (1988). *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of Mass Media*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Hesse-Biber, S., & Leavy, P. (2006). *The Practice of Qualitative Research*. London: SAGE.
- Hill, E.J., Ferris, M. and Mårtinson, V., (2003). *Does it matter where you work? A comparison of how three work venues (traditional office, virtual office, and home office) influence aspects of work and personal/family life*. Journal of vocational behavior, 63(2), pp.220-241.
- Hitchcott, N. (2013). *Calixthe Beyala and the Post-Colonial Woman*. In Post-colonial Cultures in France (pp. 211-225). Routledge.
- Hoagland, S.L., (2020). *Aspects of the Coloniality of Knowledge*. Critical Philosophy of Race, 8(1-2), pp.48-
- Hobsbawm, E. J. (1990). *Echoes of the Marseillaise: two centuries look back on the French Revolution*. Rutgers University Press.
- Hodgkin, K., & Radstone, S. (Eds.). (2003). *Contested pasts: The politics of memory*. Routledge.
- Hodgkinson, D., (2019). *The Mnangagwa era? Periodisation and politics in Zimbabwe*. Journal of Southern African Studies, 45(5), pp.981-992.
- Holtz-Bacha, C. (2004). Political Communication Research abroad: Europe. In L. L. Kaid (Ed.), *Handbook of Political Communication Research*. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.60.

- Hopmann .T. et al (1973). *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative.Studies*. <https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.2307/2129132?journalCode=jop> accessed on 17 September 2022.
- Hountondji, P.J., (1997). *Endogenous knowledge: Research trails*.
- Hove, M. and Chenzi, V., (2020). *A drive to regime change through nonviolent economic warfare: The post-Mugabe era, 2017–2019*. *African Security Review*, 29(1), pp.82-102.
- Hove. M. (2019). When a Political Party Turns against Its Cadres: ZANU PF Factional Infightings 2004-2017. *African Security*, 12(2): 200-233. DOI: 10.1080/19392206.2019.1628450

https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-48631-4_1 accessed on 2 May 2021
- Iaryczower, M., & Mattozzi, A. (2013). On the nature of competition in alternative electoral systems. *The Journal of Politics*, 75(3), 743-756.
- Ignatieff, M. (2005). *Northern Ireland Ocean IRELAND*. Borders and Border Politics in a Globalizing World, (5), 169.in political communication, ISSN 1062-5623 *in progress on reconstruction and development in South Africa*. *Development Southern Africa*, 20(1), 21-48.in *sport, exercise and health*, 11(4), 589-597. *in the'dark forests' of Matabeleland*. Oxford : J. Currey ; Portsmouth, NH : Heinemann; Cape Town : D. Philip ; Harare : Weaver Press Inquiry, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Winter, 1991), pp. 336-357 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1343840> Accessed: 03/07/2021 17:45 inquiry, 6(2), 256-265.
- Isotalus, P., & Almonkari, M. (2017). *Mediatization and Political Leadership: Perspectives of the Finnish newspapers and party leaders*. In *Making Sense of Mediatized Politics* (pp. 47-61). Routledge.
- Jackson, P.G. (2008). *A Review of Methodologies Used in Roadside Surveys of Drinking and Driving*, DfT Road User Safety Research Report No. 90, Department for Transport, London ISBN 978 1 904763 98 7.
- Jay, M. (1993). *Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought*. Berkeley: University of California Press
- Jelin, E. (2003). *State repression and the labors of memory* (Vol. 18). U of Minnesota Press.
- Jensen, A. (2012). *Educability and group differences*. Routledge.

- Johnson, J. P., & Myatt, D. P. (2006). *On the simple economics of advertising, marketing, and product design*. *American Economic Review*, 96(3), 756-784.
- Johnson, M. H., & Ziomek, C. A. (1981). *The foundation of two distinct cell lineages within the mouse morula*. *Cell*, 24(1), 71-80.
- Johnson, M. L., & Farmer, E. R. (1998). *Graft-versus-host reactions in dermatology*. *Journal of the American academy of dermatology*, 38(3), 369-392.
- Jongwe, F. 2018. *Ex-Zimbabwe Leader Mugabe Calls Ouster 'Coup de'tat'*. At <https://citizen.co.za/news/news-africa/1857953/zimbabwe-politics-mugabe-politics/>. Accessed 25 July 2021.
- Jordan, N. (2017). *This Is a Historic Moment for Zimbabwe*. At <https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2017-11-15-this-is-an-historic-moment-for-zimbabwe/>. Accessed 12 Oct 2020.
- Kafka, H. E. L. E. N. E. (1997). *Incest survival, memory disruption, and authenticity of the self*. *Memories of sexual betrayal*, 113-127.
- Kaid, L. E. (2004). *Introduction and Overview of the Field*. In Kaid, L.L. (Ed.). *Handbook of Political Communication Research*. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Kaid, L. L. (2009). *Videostyle in the 2008 presidential advertising. The 2008 presidential campaign: A communication perspective*, 209-27.
- Kalaora, L. (2016). *Madness, Corruption and Exile: On Zimbabwe's Remaining White Commercial Farmers*. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 37(4): 747-762
- Kalogeropoulos, A. et al (2020). [Trust in UK government and news media COVID-19 information down, concerns over misinformation from government and politicians up. https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=0eBsKD0A AAAJ&citation_for_view=0eBsKD0AAAAJ:EUQCXRtRnyEC](https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=0eBsKD0A AAAJ&citation_for_view=0eBsKD0AAAAJ:EUQCXRtRnyEC). Accessed on 10 November 2023.
- Karam, A. A., & Kitana, A. F. (2018). *The impact of social media on human resource management scope activities in Al-Futtaim and Al-Etihad group UAE*. *International Business Research*, 11(12), 145-156.
- Karam, B., & Mutsvairo, B. (2021). *Decolonising political communication in Africa: Reframing ontologies* (p. 254). Taylor & Francis.
- Karlsen, R., et al (2020). *Do high-choice media environments facilitate news avoidance? A longitudinal study 1997–2016*. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, 64(5), 794-814.

- Kasoma, F.P., (1996). *The foundations of African ethics (Afriethics) and the professional practice of journalism: The case for society-centred media morality*. Africa Media Review, 10, pp.93-116.
- Kebonang, Z. (2012). *Of Politics and Anarchy: Zimbabwe's 2008 Run-off Presidential Elections in Context*. The Open Political Science Journal, 5: 28-35
- Keller, M., & Halkier, B. (2014). *Positioning consumption: A practice theoretical approach to contested consumption and media discourse*. Marketing theory, 14(1), 35-51.
- Kenyatta M. J (1968). *Speech by His Excellency President Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, C.G.H., M.P., on Madaraka Day, June 1, 1968*. <https://repository.kippira.or.ke/handle/123456789/2437>. Accessed on 25 March 2024
- Khadiagala, G., & Seedman, S. J. (1994). *Southern Africa's Transitions: Prospects for*
- Khan, N., et al (2014). *Big data: survey, technologies, opportunities, and challenges*. The
- Khong, Y. F. (1992). *Vietnam, the Gulf, and US choices: A comparison*. Security Studies, 2(1),
- Klaehn, J., & Mullen, A. (2010). *The propaganda model and sociology: Understanding the media and society*. Synaesthesia: Communication Across Cultures, 1(1), 10-23.
- Klumpp, T., & Polborn, M. K. (2006). *Primaries and the New Hampshire effect*. Journal of
- Kornegay Jr, F. A. (1969). *Zimbabwe Nationalism in Southern Rhodesia*. A Current
- Kotkin, S. (1998). *1991 and the Russian Revolution: sources, conceptual categories, analytical*
- Kracauer, Siegfried (1952) 'The challenge of qualitative content analysis', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Winter: 631-42
- Krasa, S., & Polborn, M. (2010). *Competition between specialized candidates*. American Political Science Review, 104(4), 745-765.
- Krasa, S., & Polborn, M. K. (2012). *Political competition between differentiated candidates*. Games and Economic Behavior, 76(1), 249-271.
- Kress, G. (1996). *Internationalisation and globalisation: Rethinking a curriculum of communication*. Comparative Education, 32(2), 185-196.
- Kreuter, M. W., & McClure, S. M. (2004). *The role of culture in health communication*. Annu. Rev. Public Health, 25, 439-455.
- Kruger, N. (2003). *War Veterans: Continuities between the Past and the Present*. African Studies Quarterly, 7(2&3): 139-152.

- Kruger, N. (2005). *ZANU (PF) Strategies in general elections, 1980–2000: Discourse and Coercion*. *African Affairs*, 104(414): 1–34
- Krippendorff, K. (2004). *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage (1st edition, 1980)
- Kupeta, N. (2018). *Political Communication Strategies employed by the Zimbabwe Defence Forces During Operation Restore Legacy*, Masters Dissertation thesis submitted to Midlands State University
- Kvale, S. (1996). *Inter-Views: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing*. New Delhi: SAGE.
- Laland, K.N., (2017). *Darwin's unfinished symphony: How culture made the human mind*. Princeton University Press.
- Leedy, D., & Ormrod, J. (2005). *Practical Research: Planning and Design (8th ed.)*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall
- legitimacy seeking tool in the July 2013 election. *African Identities*, 17(3-4), 163-174.
- Laakso, L. (1999). *Voting without choosing: State making and elections in Zimbabwe*. University of Helsinki
- Levitsky, S. and Way, L.A., (2002). *The rise of competitive authoritarianism*. *J. Democracy*, 13, p.51.
- Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1998). *Naturalistic Inquiry*. VALLES, M. Técnicas
- Linz, J. J. (2000). *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*. London: Lynne Rienner. Publishers.
- Locke, L.F., Silverman, and Spirduso.(2004). *Reading and Understanding Research*.
- Login, E.A. (2014). *Set in Stone?: War Memorialisation as a long-term and continuing process in the UK, France and the USA*, Unpublished PhD Thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham.London: Routledge
- Lubombo.M. (2018). *Perfidious Ubuntisation of ZANU-PF Succession Politics: A Discursive Analysis of Grace Mugabe's Campaign against Joice Mujuru and Emmerson Mnangagwa* *Ubuntu: Journal of Conflict and Social Transformation* ISSN: 2078-760X (print) 2050-4950 (Online)Vol. 7, (Number 1), June 2018 pp 117-133
- Lucas, J. (1998). "The Tension between Despotism and Infrastructural Power: The Military and the Political Class in Nigeria, 1985-1993." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 33 (3): 90–113. doi:10.1007/BF02687493

- M Masuku, et al (2012). *Archival development in Zimbabwe 1935-2010: setting the scene*.
https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=VFBeUCMAAAAJ&citation_for_view=VFBeUCMAAAAJ:2osOgNQ5qMEC
- Makombe, R., (2021). *Cultural Texts of Resistance in Zimbabwe: Music, Memes, and Media*. Rowman & Littlefield.
- Makoni, B. S., and Pfukwa, C. (2010). *Language planning, language ideology and entextualization: War naming practices*. *Names*, 58(4): 197–208.
- Makumbe, J. (1991). *The 1990 Zimbabwe elections: implications for democracy*. In Mandaza, I & Sachikonye, L. (eds.), *One Party State and Democracy: The Zimbabwe Debate*. Harare: Sapes Books.179-192.
- Makumbe, J., (2002). *Zimbabwe's hijacked election*. *J. Democracy*, 13, p.87.
- Maldonado-Torres, N., (2007). *On the colonality of being: Contributions to the development of a concept*. *Cultural studies*, 21(2-3), pp.240-270.
- Mamdani, M., (2008). *Saviors and survivors: Darfur, politics, and the war on terror*. New York.
- Mamvura, Z., (2020). ‘*Let us make Zimbabwe in my own name*’: *Place naming and Mugabeism in Zimbabwe*. *South African Journal of African Languages*, 40(1), pp.32-39.
- Mamvura, Z., (2021). ‘*Is Mugabe also among the national deities and kings?*’: *place renaming and the appropriation of African chieftainship ideals and spirituality in Mugabe's Zimbabwe*. *Journal of Asian and African studies*, 56(8), pp.1861-1878.
- Mancini, P. and D. Swanson. (1996). *Politics, media and modern democracy: Introduction*. In *Politics, media and modern democracy: An international study of innovations in electoral campaigning and their consequences*, ed. D. Swanson and P. Mancini, 1–26. Westport: Praeger Publishers
- Mandaza, I. (2016). *The Political Economy of the State in Zimbabwe: The Rise and Fall of the Securocrat State*(Online). Available at: <https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/04/01/>. [Accessed 20 October 2022].
- Mangani, D.Y., (2019). *Effects of Factionalism in ZANU-PF: An Appraisal, 1980-2017*. *Commonwealth Youth & Development*, 16(2).
- Mangena.T. (2022) “*We must aspire to be a clean nation*”: *Ambivalences of transition in “New Dispensation” metaphors of dirt in Cultures of Change in Contemporary Zimbabwe Socio- Political Transition from Mugabe to Mnangagwa*, Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158

- Manji, F., and B. Fletcher Jr. (2013). *Claim No Easy Victories: The Legacy of Amilcar Cabral*.
- Manning, P. K. (2001). *Theorizing policing: The drama and myth of crime control in the NYPD*. *Theoretical criminology*, 5(3), 315-344.
- Mano, W. (1997). *Public service broadcasting in Zimbabwe: A brief on promise, performance and problems*. *Media, Democracy and Development*. IMK-report, 27, 5-40.
- Mano, W. (2008). *The media and politics in Zimbabwe: Turning left while indicating right*. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 13(4), 507-514.
- Mansell, R., & Nordenstreng, K. (2006). *Great media and communication debates: WSIS and the MacBride Report*. *Information technologies and international development*, 3(4), 15-36.
- Maposa, R. S., Hlongwana, J., & Gamira, D. (2010). "*Aluta Continua*": A critical reflection on the chimurenga-withinthird chimurenga among the Ndauro people in Chipinge district, Southeastern Zimbabwe. *Journal of African Studies and Development*, 2(6), 191-200.
- Maringira, G. (2017). "*Politicization and Resistance in the Zimbabwean National Army*." *African Affairs* 116 (462): 18–38. doi:10.1093/afraf/adw055.
- Marongedze, R. and Chinouriri, B., (2022). *Mtukudzi: The (Re) constructor Who Makes Others*
- Marongwe. R and Magadzike. B. (2016)'. *The Challenges of Honouring Female Liberation War Icons in Zimbabwe:: Some Discourses about the National Heroes Acre*. <https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/The-Challenges-of-Honouring-Female-Liberation-War-Marongwe-Magadzike/19faec8284c68095ef3b075af20d9d189d623bc4>. Accessed on 27/07/2020
- Marshall, M.N. (1996). "*Sampling for Qualitative Research*." *Family Practice* 13 (6): 522–526. doi:10.1093/fampra/13.6.522.
- Martins, N., Weaver, A. J., Yeshua-Katz, D., Lewis, N. H., Tyree, N. E., & Jensen, J. D. (2013). *A content analysis of print news coverage of media violence and aggression research*. *Journal of communication*, 63(6), 1070-1087
- Martin, D. (2002). *Pentecostalism: The world their parish*. Blackwell.
- Marumahoko, S and Chigwata, T.C. (2020). *The Idea of a New Zimbabwe Post-Mugabe*. In
- Marx.K(1888). "Manifesto of the Communist Party". <https://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/marx-manifesto>. Accessed on 25 April 2020.
- Masakure, C. (2014). *Nationalism and National Projects in Southern Africa: New Critical Reflections*.

- Masiraha 'A. (2021). *The Fall of Robert Mugabe: From Land Reform to Operation Restore Legacy*, in Sabao Collen, Mahomva Richard R. and Mhandara Lawrence, eds. *Re/Membering Robert Gabriel Mugabe:: Politics, Legacy, Philosophy, Life and Death*. Bulawayo: LAN Readers, pp. 234-251
- Masunungure, E. (2004). *Travails of opposition politics in Zimbabwe since independence*. *Zimbabwe: The past is the future*, 147-192.
- Masunungure, E. V. (2006). Nation Building, State Building and Power Configuration in Zimbabwe. *Conflict Trends Magazine*, 1: 1-10.
- Masunungure, E.V., (2009). *Defying the winds of change: Zimbabwe's 2008 elections*.
- Matingwina. S. (2019). *Partisan Media in a Politically Charged Zimbabwe: Public and Private Media Framing of 2018 Elections*. *African Journalism Studies*, DOI: 10.1080/23743670.2019.1654534
- Maurantonio, N. (2017). "Reason to hope?": *The White savior myth and progress in "post-racial" America*. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, 94(4), 1130-1145.
- Mautner, G. (2009). *Corpora and critical discourse analysis*. *Contemporary corpus linguistics*, 32-46.
- Mawere M. (2015). *Colonial Heritage, Memory, and Sustainability in Dialogue: An Introduction*. In *Colonial Heritage, Memory and Sustainability in Africa Challenges, Opportunities and Prospect*, Langaa Research and Publishing Common Initiative Group P.O. Box 902 Mankon Bamenda North West Region Cameroon
- Mawere, M. (2013). *A critical review of environmental conservation in Zimbabwe*. *Africa Spectrum*, 48(2), 85-97.
- Mawere. M and Mubaya.R. (2016) *Colonial Heritage, Memory and Sustainability in Africa Challenges, Opportunities and Prospects*. Langaa Research & Publishing Common Initiative Group P.O. Box 902 Mankon Bamenda North West Region Cameroon
- Mayring, P. (2012). *Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse: Grundlagen und Techniken*. Weinheim: Beltz (1st edition, 1983).
- Mazango, E., (2005). *Media games and shifting spaces for political communication*. *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture*, London, University of Westminster [Internet] Available from: < http://www.wmin.ac.uk/mad/pdf/zim_art3.pdf > [Accessed 23 April 2021].
- Mazaranye (2012). *Democracy in Zimbabwe. A dream deferred*. Zimbabwe Independent

- Mazarire G. C.(2017). ZANU's External Networks 1963–1979: An Appraisal. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 2017, vol. 43, issue 1, 83-106
- Mazrui, A.A.A. ed., (1977). *The warrior tradition in modern Africa* (Vol. 23). Brill.
- Mazzoleni, G. (2000). *A Return to Civic and Political Engagement Prompted by Personalized Political Leadership?* *Political Communication*, 17(4): 325-328.
- Mbembe, A. (1997). *The 'Thing' and Its Double in Cameroonian Cartoons*.
- Mbembe, A. (2001). *On the Post-Colony*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Mbembe, A. (2017). *Critique of Black Reason*. Translated by L. Dubois. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Macmillan Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
- McConnell, P.J. and Becker, L.B., (2002), July. The role of the media in democratization. In *Political Communication Section of the International Association for Media and Communication Research at the Barcelona Conference, July*.
- McMillan, J. H. and Schumacher, S., (1993). *Research in education: A conceptual introduction*.
- McNally, R. (2005). *Debunking Myths about Trauma and Memory*. The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry – In Review, 50(13)
- Mcunu M. R (2013). *A History of Political Violence in KwaShange, Vulindlela district and of its effects on the memories of survivors (1987-2008)*. Unpublished Doctor of Philosophy (History) at the University of KwaZulu-Natal.
- Melber, H. (2002). *From liberation movements to governments: on political culture in Southern Africa*. *African Sociological Review/Revue Africaine De Sociologie*, 6(1), 161-172.
- Melber, H. (2003). *Limits to Liberation: An Introduction to Namibia's Postcolonial Political Culture*. In Melber, H. (ed.). *Re-examining Liberation in Namibia: Political Culture since Independence*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrika Institute
- Melber, H. (2009). *Southern African liberation movements as governments and the limits to liberation*. *Review of African Political Economy*, 36(121), 451-459.
- Meredith, M. (2002). *Our votes, our guns: Robert Mugabe and the tragedy of Zimbabwe*. PublicAffairs
- Merriam, S. B., & Tisdell, E. J. (2015). *Qualitative research: A guide to design and implementation*. John Wiley & Sons.

- Merriam, S.B. (1998). *Qualitative Research and Case Study Applications in Education*. Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco.
- Mesoudi, A., (2011). *Variable cultural acquisition costs constrain cumulative cultural evolution*. *PloS one*, 6(3), p.e18239.
- Metz, T. (2011). *Ubuntu as a moral theory and human rights in South Africa*. African human
- Mhanda, W. (2011). *Dzino: Memories of a freedom fighter: Memories of a Freedom Fighter*.
- Mhandara and Poee (2013). *ACCORD paper examines successes and challenge of South Africa's mediation efforts in Zimbabwe*. <https://www.accord.org.za/news/accord-paper-examines-successes-challenge-south-africas-mediation-efforts-zimbabwe/>. Accessed on 10 July 2022
- Mhiripiri, & Ureke, O. (2019). *Theoretical Paradoxes of Representation and the Problems of Media Representations of Zimbabwe in Crisis*. *Critical Arts*, 32(5-6): 87-103, DOI: 10.1080/02560046.2018.1548026
- Mhiripiri, N. (2008). *Zimbabwe Government's Responses to Criticism of Operation Murambatswina/ Operation Restore Order*. In Vambe, M. (ed.). *The Hidden Dimensions of Operation Murambatsvina*. Harare: Weaver Press. 146-55.
- Mhiripiri, N. A. and B. Mutsvairo. (2014). *Social Media, ICTs and the Challenges Facing the Zimbabwe Democratic Process*. In *Crisis Management: Concepts, Methodologies, Tools and Applications*, edited by Information Resources Management Association, 1281–301. Hershey: IGI Global. [https:// doi.org/10.4018/978-1-4666-4707-7.ch065](https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-4666-4707-7.ch065).
- Michaelson, D., & Griffin, T. L. (2005). *A new model for media content analysis*. *Gainesville: Institute for Public Relations*. Wikipedia's role in reputation management: An analysis of... institutional environments". *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 43(4), 877-905.
- Mignolo, W.D., (2007). *Delinking: The rhetoric of modernity, the logic of coloniality and the grammar of de-coloniality*. *Cultural studies*, 21(2-3), pp.449-514.
- Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M., (1994). *Qualitative data analysis: An expanded sourcebook*. Sage.
- Misztal, B. (2003). *Theories of social remembering*. McGraw-Hill Education (UK).
- Mitchell, S. A. (2014). *Influence and autonomy in psychoanalysis*. Routledge.
- Mkandawire (2020). *Zimbabwe's Transition Overload: An Interpretation*. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, DOI: 10.1080/02589001.2020.1746751

- Mlambo O. B. and Gwekwerere T. (2019): *Names, labels, the Zimbabwean Liberation War veteran and the third Chimurenga: the language and politics of entitlement in post-2000 Zimbabwe*. African Identities, DOI: 10.1080/14725843.2019.1660619
- Mlambo, A. S. (2012). *Becoming Zimbabwe or becoming Zimbabwean: identity, nationalism and state building in the historical context of Southern Africa*.
- Mlambo, A.S. (1997). *The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme: The Case of Zimbabwe, 1990–1995*. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications.
- Mlambo, O. B. (2018). *Veterans, decolonization and land expropriation in post-independence Zimbabwe, 2000–2008*. In A. Alcade & X. M. N. Seixas (Eds.), *War veterans and the world after 1945: Cold war politics, decolonization, memory*. London: Routledge. 167–183.
- Mlambo, O. B., & Mwatwara, W. (2012). *History and memory in the politics of land redistribution in the late Roman republic and contemporary Zimbabwe (2000-2008)*. Zambezia: Journal of Humanities, 39(ii), 1-15.
- Mlambo, S. (2013) *Becoming Zimbabwe or becoming a Zimbabwean: Identity, nationalism and State-building*, Africa Spectrum 48 (1) 49-70
- Mlambo.N. and Kangira.J. (2021) *Fictionalising Activism, Voicing Contested Terrains and Survival Strategies under Mugabe's (Mis-)Rule* in *Re/membering Robert Gabriel Mugabe: Politics, Legacy, Philosophy, Life and Death: Politics, Legacy, Philosophy, Life and Death*: LAN Readers Zimbabwe.
- Moeller, J. and de Vreese, C., (2019) . *Spiral of political learning: The reciprocal relationship of news media use and political knowledge among adolescents*. *Communication Research*, 46(8), pp.1078-1094.
- Moore, C. W. (2014). *The mediation process: Practical strategies for resolving conflict*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Moore, D. (2018). *A Very Zimbabwean Coup: November 13-24, 2017*. *Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa* 97: 1–29.
- Moore, D. (2020). *Toward Non-hagiographical Reflections on Zimbabwe's 'Heroes': Dumiso Dabengwa's History*. *Review of African Political Economy*, 47(165): 449-468. DOI: 10.1080/03056244.2020.1835630

- Morten, C. J., & Jamison, T. F. (2009). *Water overcomes methyl group directing effects in epoxide-opening cascades*. *Journal of the American Chemical Society*, 131(19), 6678-6679.
- Mosco, V. (1996). *Myths along the information highway*. *Peace review*, 8(1), 119-125.
- Motlanthe Commission Report (2018). *THE MOTLANTHE REPORT WHAT'S NEXT FOR VICTIMS AND THE NATION An Analysis of the Recommendations of the Motlanthe Report Two Years Later August 2020*.
https://www.veritaszim.net/sites/veritas_d/files/The%20Motlanthe%20Report.pdf
- Moyo, J. (1998). *Generational Shifts in African Politics: Prospects for a new Africa*. California: James S. Coleman African Studies Center.
- Moyo, J. (2004). *Tsholotsho saga: The untold story*. Retrieved from <http://www.thestandard.co.zw/2004/12/17/tsholotsho-saga-the-untold-story-3/>
- Moyo, L. (2020). *The Decolonial Turn in Media Studies in Africa and the Global South*. Cham: Springer International Publishing.
- Moyo, P. (2021). *Contested compensation: the politics, economics and legal nuances of compensating white former commercial farmers in Zimbabwe*. *Review of African Political Economy*, 48(170), 630-645.
- Moyo, S. (2000). *Land reform under structural adjustment in Zimbabwe: land use change in the Mashonaland provinces*. Nordic Africa Institute.
- Moyo, S. (2005). *The land question and the peasantry in Southern Africa. Politics and Social Movements in an Hegemonic World: Lessons for Africa, Asia and latin America, CLACSO Books, Buenos Aires*.
- Moyo, S. (2010). *The Zimbabwe crisis, land reform and normalisation. The Struggle Over Land in Africa: Conflict, Politics and Change*, 245-264.
- Moyo, S. (2011). *Three decades of agrarian reform in Zimbabwe*. *Journal of peasant studies*, 38(3), 493-531.
- Moyo, S. (2014). *Changing agrarian relations after redistributive land reform in Zimbabwe. In Outcomes of Post-2000 Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe* (pp. 33-60). Routledge.

- Moyo, S. and Chambati, W., (2013), *August. Unlocking the Economic Potential of Communal Land: Regional/African Experiences*. In 14th Annual Symposium of the Bank of Namibia, Windhoek, Namibia.
- Moyo, S., & Yeros, P. (Eds.). (2005). *Reclaiming the land: The resurgence of rural movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America*. Zed Books.
- Moyo, S., O'Keefe, P., & Sill, M. (2014). *The southern African environment: Profiles of the SADC countries*. Routledge.
- Mpofu, O. M. (2020). *On the Shoulders of Struggle: Memoirs of a Political Insider*. Harare: Lan Readers.
- Mpofu, S. (2016). *Making Heroes, (un)making the Nation? ZANU-PF's Imaginations of the Heroes' Acre, Heroes and Construction of Identity in Zimbabwe from 2000 to 2015*. African Identities, DOI: 10.1080/14725843.2016.1175920
- Mpofu, S. (2022). *Mugabeism otherwise? A critical reflection on toxic leadership and Zimbabwe's "New Dispensation"*. in *Cultures of Change in Contemporary Zimbabwe Socio- Political Transition from Mugabe to Mnangagwa*. New York: Routledge.
- Mpofu, S. (Ed.). (2021). *Digital humour in the Covid-19 pandemic: Perspectives from the global south*. Springer Nature.
- Mudimbe, V. Y. (1988). *The invention of Africa (p. 160)*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Mueller, D. C., & Stratmann, T. (1994). *Informative and persuasive campaigning. Public choice*, 81(1), 55-77.
- Mugari, Z. E. (2020). *Press Silence in Postcolonial Zimbabwe: News Whiteouts, Journalism and Power*. Routledge.
- Muholi, Z., & Goldsmid, P. (2010). *Difficult love*.
- Mukwedeya, T. G. (2016). *Intraparty politics and the local state: Factionalism, patronage and power in Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality* (Doctoral dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand, Faculty of Humanities, School of Social Science).
- Mulligan, S. P. (2006). *The uses of legitimacy in international relations. Millennium*, 34(2), 349-375.

- Mulqueeny, D., & Kasiram, M. (2013). *Dating and sexual challenges faced by HIV-positive people in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa*. *Social Work/Maatskaplike Werk*, 49(3), 354-368.
- Mungwari, T., (2018). *Media framing of ZANU PF internal succession struggles: Mnangagwa and the military factor*. *American Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*, 3(1), pp.1-21.
- Munoriyarwa, A and Chibuwe, A. (2021). *Journalism beyond the Coup: Emerging Forms of Digital Journalism Practices in Post-Coup Zimbabwe*. *Digital Journalism*, DOI: 10.1080/21670811.2021.1957966
- Munoriyarwa, A. (2022). *Data journalism uptake in South Africa's mainstream quotidian business news reporting practices*. *Journalism*, 23(5), 1097-1113.
- Munoriyarwa, A., (2020). *A critical discourse analysis of the Sunday mail's and the telegraph's representation of Zimbabwe's 2008 electoral violence*. *African Journalism Studies*, 41(2), pp.1-16.
- Munoriyarwa, Allen, and Collen Chambwera (2020). "Tweeting the July 2018 elections in Zimbabwe." In *Social Media and Elections in Africa, Volume 1: Theoretical Perspectives and Election Campaigns* : 75-96.
- Murdock, G., & Golding, P. (2016). *Political economy and media production: a reply to Dwyer*. *Media, Culture & Society*, 38(5), 763-769.
- Mutanda, D. (2017). *What Makes Terrorism Tick in Africa? Evidence from Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram*. *Jadavpur Journal of International Relations*, 21(1), 20-40.
- Mutsvairo, B and Karam. (2022). *Key Developments in Political Communication in Africa in Prespectives in Political Communication in Africa*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Muwati, I, et al (2010). *Contesting Representations of Nation and Nationalism in Historical Fiction*. *Literator*, 31(1):147-173.
- Muwati, I. (2009). *Interface of History and Fiction: The Zimbabwean Liberation War Novel*, PhD Thesis submitted to the University of South Africa
- Muwati, I. and Mutasa, D. (2012). *Representations of the body as contested terrain: The Zimbabwean liberation war novel and the politics of nation and nationalism*. <https://www.ajol.info/index.php/sajal/article/view/75360>. Accessed on 27/03/2024

- Muzondidya, J. (2007). *Jambanja: The Ideological Ambiguities in the Politics of Land and Resource Ownership in Zimbabwe*. Journal of Southern African Studies, 33 (2): 325-41.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/03057070701292616>
- Muzondidya, J. (2010). *The Zimbabwean crisis and the unresolved conundrum of race in the post-colonial period*. Journal of Developing Societies, 26(1), 5-38.
- Muzondidya, J., & Ndlovu-Gatsheni, N.S.J (2007). 'Echoing Silences': Ethnicity in post-colonial Zimbabwe, 1980-2007. African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 7(2), 275-297.
- Muzondidya, J., (2009). *Race, ethnicity and the politics of positioning: the making of coloured identity in colonial Zimbabwe, 1890-1980*. Burdened by race: Coloured identities in southern Africa, pp.156-184.
- Mwonzora, G and Helliker, K. (2020). *Learning and Performing Political Violence: ZANU-PF Youth and the 2008 Presidential Run-off Election in Zimbabwe*. African Studies, DOI: 10.1080/00020184.2020.1821351
- Myers, D. G. (2006). *The Elephants Teach: Creative Writing since 1880*. University of Chicago Press. 1427 East 60th Street, Chicago, IL 60637.
- Naidoo. N. (2011). *What is Research? A Conceptual Understanding*. African Journal of Emergency Medicine, Cape Peninsula University of Technology, South Africa
- Nakata, M., Nakata, V., Keech, S., & Bolt, R. (2012). Decolonial goals and pedagogies for Indigenous studies. *Decolonization: Indigeneity, education & society*, 1(1).
- Ncube, L. (2014). *The Interface between Football and Ethnic Identity Discourses in Zimbabwe*. Critical African Studies, 6: 192-210. doi:10.1080/21681392.2014.951153
- Ncube, L. and Mare.A. (2022) "Fake News" and Multiple Regimes of "Truth" During the COVID-19 Pandemic in Zimbabwe, African Journalism Studies, DOI: 10.1080/23743670.2022.2072925
- Ncube.L. (2020). *Misogyny, Sexism and Hegemonic Masculinity in Zimbabwe's Operation Restore Legacy* in The History and Political Transition of Zimbabwe: From Mugabe to Mnangagwa, African Histories and Modernities <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2>
- Ndakaripa, M. (2020). *Zimbabwe's 2018 elections: funding, public resources and vote buying*. Review of African Political Economy, 47(164), 301-312.

- Ndawana, E. (2020). *The military and democratisation in post-Mugabe Zimbabwe*. South African Journal of International Affairs, 27(2), 193-217.
- Ndebele. L. (2019). *Fears over media freedom in Zimbabwe last independent journalists see threat in AMH deal with president's relative*. Sunday Times Online. <https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/2019-10-13-fears-over-media-freedom-in-zimbabwe/>. Accessed on 27/03/2024
- Ndlovu, N. (2009). *Access to rock art sites: A right or a qualification?*. The South African Archaeological Bulletin, 61-68.
- Neuman, B. M., & Fawcett, J. (2011). *The Neuman systems model*.
- Neuman, S. B. (1999). *Books make a difference: A study of access to literacy*. Reading research quarterly, 34(3), 286-311.
- Neuman, S. P. (1994). *Generalized scaling of permeabilities: Validation and effect of support scale*. Geophysical research letters, 21(5), 349-352.
- Ngomba T. (2012). *Circumnavigating de-Westernisation: Theoretical reflexivities in researching political communication in Africa*, Communication, 38:2, 164-180, DOI: 10.1080/02500167.2012.717346
- Ngugi, Wa Thiong'O, (2004). *Decolonising the mind: The politics of Language in African Literature*. England: Oxford.
- Nora, A., & Cabrera, A. F. (1996). *The role of perceptions of prejudice and discrimination on the adjustment of minority students to college*. The Journal of Higher Education, 67(2), 119-148.
- Nora, P. (1984). *Entre mémoire et histoire: La problématique des lieux*. In *Les lieux de mémoire*, Vol. 1, La République, Pierre Nora (ed.), xv-xlii. Paris: Gallimard.
- Nora, P. (1989). *Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire*, Representations
- Norris, P., (2000). *A virtuous circle: Political communications in postindustrial societies*. Cambridge University Press.
- Novi, 29(2), 210-229.
- Noyes A.H. (2020). *A new Zimbabwe? Assessing Continuity and Change After Mugabe*, accessed on https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4367.html on 15 March 2022.

- Nünning, A. (2012). *Narrativist approaches and narratological concepts for the study of culture*. Travelling concepts for the study of culture, 145-183.
- Nuttall, S. (2009). *Entanglement: Literary and Cultural Reflections on Post-Apartheid*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.
- Nyabunga, G. (2022). *Remembering and Memorialising. The efficacy of photography in political communication in post colonial Africa*. In Decolonising Political Communication in Africa, Routledge Contemporary Africa Series
- Nyakatura, J. W., & Uzoigwe, G. N. (1973). *Anatomy of an African Kingdom: a history of Bunyoro-Kitara. (No Title)*.
- Nyambi, O., & Mangena, T. (2015). *The past is the present and future1: Ambivalent names and naming patterns in post-2000 Zimbabwe*. South African Journal of African Languages, 35(1), 139-145.
- Nyambi, O., Mangena, T. and Ncube, G., (2022). Cultures of Change in Contemporary Zimbabwe.
- Nyambi, O. (2016). *Of Weevils and Gamatox: Titles, Names and Nicknames in ZANU PF Politics*. African Identities, 14(1): 59-73. DOI: 10.1080/14725843.2015.1100109
- Nyarko, J., & Teer-Tomaselli, R. E. (2018). *The interface between media funding and agenda setting: The conduit for media independence*. Journal of Creative Communications, 13(1), 34-53.
- Nyere, C. (2016). *The continuum of political violence in Zimbabwe*. Journal of Social Sciences, 48(1-2), 94-107.
- O'Keefe, D. J. (1998). *Justification explicitness and persuasive effect: A metaanalytic review of the effects of varying support articulation in persuasive messages*. Argumentation & Advocacy, 35, 61-75
- Oduyoye, M. A. (2007). *Culture and Religion as factors in Promoting Justice for Women*. In Oduyoye, M. A. (ed.). *Women in Religion and Culture: Essays in Honour of Constance*. Buchanan, Sefer: Ibadan.
- Ogbodo, J. N., Onwe, E. C., Chukwu, J., Nwasum, C. J., Nwakpu, E. S., Nwankwo, S. U., ... & Ogbaeja, N. I. (2020). *Communicating health crisis: a content analysis of global media framing of COVID-19*. Health promotion perspectives, 10(3), 257.
- Ogola, G. (2021). *"COVID-19, knowledge production and the (un)making of truths and fakes"*. Journal of African Cultural Studies 33(3): 305–311. doi:10.1080/13696815.2021.1897536.

- Ogude, J. (2012). *The invention of traditional music in the city: Exploring history and meaning in urban music in contemporary Kenya*. Research in African Literatures, 43(4), 147-165.
- Okyere.K. (2016). *When Yaa Asantewaa Meets Deborah: An African and Biblical Dialogue on Women Leadership in Liberation War Heritage* in Colonial Heritage, Memory and Sustainability in Africa Challenges, Opportunities and Prospect, Langaa Research and Publishing Common Initiative Group P.O. Box 902 Mankon Bamenda North West Region Cameroon
- O'leary, Z. (2004). *The essential guide to doing research*. Sage Publications.
- Olick, J.K., Vinitzky-Seroussi, V. and Levy, D. eds., (2011). *The collective memory reader*. Oxford University Press.
- Onslow, S. (2011). *Zimbabwe and political transition*.
[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277071927 Zimbabwe and political transition](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277071927_Zimbabwe_and_political_transition). Accessed on 27/03/2024
- Osagioduwa, E., Omotoso, S. A., & Olukotun, A. (2017). *The African Policom Stew*. Political Communication in Africa (Cham: Springer Publishers), 1, 13.
- Ottaway, M. (1997). *Ethnic politics in Africa: Change and continuity*.
- Palmer, R. E. (1969). *Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer*. Northwestern University Press.
- Palmer, R. E. (1969). *Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer*. Northwestern University Press.
 panic disorder symptoms. Journal of anxiety disorders, 28(5), 463-470.
- Patterson, A.M. (2016). *The Age of Disinformation: How Wars are Run and Governments are Run on Lies*. Scotts Valley: Create Space.
- Patton, M. (2002). *Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods* (3rd ed.). London: Sage Publications.
- Peeters, B., Pedersen, Å. Ø., Loe, L. E., Isaksen, K., Veiberg, V., Stien, A., ... & Hansen, B. B. (2019). *Spatiotemporal patterns of rain-on-snow and basal ice in high Arctic Svalbard: detection of a climate-cryosphere regime shift*. Environmental Research Letters, 14(1), 015002.
- Pelican, M. (2009). *Complexities of indigeneity and autochthony: An African example*. American Ethnologist, 36(1), 52-65.

- Petrocik, J. R. (1996). *Issue ownership in presidential elections, with a 1980 case study*. American journal of political science, 825-850.
- Petrocik, J. R., Benoit, W. L., & Hansen, G. J. (2003). *Issue ownership and presidential campaigning, 1952-2000*. Pol. Sci. Q., 118, 599.
- Pfetsch, B., & Esser, F. (2013). *Comparing political communication*. In The handbook of comparative communication research (pp. 25-47). Routledge.
- Pfukwa, C., & Barnes, L. (2010). *Negotiating Identities in Guerrilla War Names in the Zimbabwean War of Liberation*. African Identities, 8(3): 209-219.
- Phillips, N., Lawrence, T. B., & Hardy, C. (2004). *Discourse and institutions*. Academy of management review, 29(4), 635-652.
- Pickard, A.J. (2007). *Research Methods in Information*. UK Facet Publ., London, p. 336.
- Pierce.R.(2008). *Research Methods in Politics: A practical guide*: London, Sage Publications
- Pilossof, R., (2008). *The land question (un) resolved: An essay review*. *Historia*, 53(2), pp.270-279.
- Plato (1989). *Ethics and Politics*.
- Pohjonen, M., (2022). *An epistemic proxy war? Popular communication, epistemic contestations and violent conflict in Ethiopia*. Popular Communication, 20(3), pp.236-252.
- Polkinghorne, D. (2005). *Language and Meaning: Data Collection in Qualitative Research*. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 52(2), 137-145
- Popoola, T., (2017). *Political communication: An evolving field yet to berth in Africa*. Political communication in Africa, pp.15-30.
- Postman, N. (1979). *The information environment*. ETC: A Review of General Semantics, 234-245.
- Prior, M. (2007). *Post-broadcast democracy: How media choice increases inequality in political involvement and polarizes elections*. Cambridge University Press.
- Public Economics, 90(6-7), 1073-1114.
- Punch, S. (1998) *Negotiating Independence: Children and Young People Growing Up in Rural Bolivia*, University of Leeds: Ph.D Thesis.

- Ranger, T. (1995) *Are We Not Also Men? The Samkange Family and African Politics in Zimbabwe, 1920–64* (Oxford: James Currey).
- ancière, J. (2006). *The ethical turn of aesthetics and politics*. *Critical Horizons*, 7(1), 1-20.
- Raftopoulos, A. (2003). *Cartesian analysis and synthesis*. *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science part A*, 34(2), 265-308.
- Raftopoulos, B. (2006). *The Zimbabwean crisis and the challenges for the left*. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 32(2), 203-219.
- Raftopoulos, B. (2009). *The Crisis in Zimbabwe: 1998–2008*. In Raftopoulos, B and Mlambo, A. (eds.). *Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-colonial Period to 2008*. 201–32. Harare: Weaver Press.
- Raftopoulos, B. (2013). *The 2013 elections in Zimbabwe: The end of an era*. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39(4), 971-988.
- Raftopoulos, B., & Phimister, I. (2004). Zimbabwe now: The political economy of crisis and coercion. *Historical materialism*, 12(4), 355-382.
- Raftopoulos, B., and D. Compagnon. (2003). *Indigenisation, the State Bourgeoisie and Neo-Authoritarian Politics*. In Darnolf, S and Laakso, L. (eds.). *Twenty Years of Independence in Zimbabwe: From Liberation to Authoritarianism*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 172-198. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403948120_2.
- Raftopoulos, B., and T. Savage, eds. (2004). *Zimbabwe, Injustice, and Political Reconciliation*. Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation.
- Ramose, M. B. (2009). *Globalização e ubuntu*. *Epistemologias do Sul*, 2, 175-220.
- Ranger, T. (1967) *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896–7* (London: Heinemann Educational).
- Ranger, T. (2004) ‘*Nationalist History, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation*’, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 30: 2, 215–34.
- Ranger, T. (2005) ‘*The Uses and Abuses of History in Zimbabwe*’, in M. Palmberg and R. Primorac (eds.) *Skinning the Skunk - Facing Zimbabwean Futures* (Uppsala: Nordic African Institute)
- Ranger, T. (ed.) (2003) *Nationalism, Democracy and Human Rights* (Harare: University of Zimbabwe).
- Reeler, T. (2016). “*Are Former Liberation Movements Inherently Violent as Governments?*” *Report produced by the Research & Advocacy Unit (RAU)*. Harare: Research & Advocacy Unit. https://kubatana.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/rau_zimbabwe_political_violence_elections_180404.pdf

- regarding Swiss direct-democratic votes. *Media and Communication*, 11(1), 19-30.
- Regional Security'. *Regions and Development: Politics, Security and Economics* Stedman.
- Reisigl, M. (2011). *Grundzüge der Wiener Kritischen Diskursanalyse*.
- Remmer, K. L. (1991). *The political impact of economic crisis in Latin America in the 1980s*. *American Political science review*, 85(3), 777-800.
- Resina, J. R. (Ed.). (2000). *Disremembering the dictatorship: The politics of memory in the Spanish transition to democracy* (Vol. 8). Rodopi.
- Richardson, M. J., Marsh, K. L., Isenhower, R. W., Goodman, J. R., & Schmidt, R. C. (2007). *Rocking together: Dynamics of intentional and unintentional interpersonal coordination*. *Human movement science*, 26(6), 867-891.
- Ricoeur, P (1984). *Time and narrative*. Volume 1. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- rights law journal, 11(2), 532-559.
- Riker, W. H. R., Riker, W. H., Riker, W. H., & Mueller, J. P. (1996). *The strategy of rhetoric: Campaigning for the American Constitution*. Yale University Press.
- Riker, W. H. R., Riker, W. H., Riker, W. H., & Mueller, J. P. (1996). *The strategy of rhetoric: Campaigning for the American Constitution*. Yale University Press.
- Riley, P. (1982). *Will and political legitimacy: A critical exposition of social contract theory in Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel*. Harvard University Press.
- Ritchie J and Lewis J (Eds) (2003). *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers* London: Sage.
- Ritter, G. (1961). *Scientific history, contemporary history, and political science*. *History and Theory*, 1(3), 261-279.
- Robinson, J. A., & Acemoglu, D. (2012). *Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity and poverty* (pp. 45-47). London: Profile.
- Robson, C. (2000). *Real World Research (2nd ed.)*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers
- Rodgers. D. G. (2019). *Two Weeks in November. The Astonishing Untold Story of the Operation that Toppled Mugabe*, Short Books
- Roeder, P.G., (1994). *Red sunset: The failure of Soviet politics*. Princeton University Press.
- Rosenberg, S., (1999). *Monuments, holidays, and remembering Moshoeshoe: The emergence of national identity in Lesotho, 1902-1966*. *Africa Today*, pp.49-72.

- Roundtree, A. K., Dorsten, A., & Reif, J. J. (2011). *Improving patient activation in crisis and chronic care through rhetorical approaches to new media technologies*. *Poroi*, 7(1).
- Rubin, H., & Rubin, I. (2005). *Qualitative Interviewing – The Art of Hearing Data* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Ruhanya, P. and Gumbo, B., (2022). *The Securocratic state: Conceptualising the transition problem in Zimbabwe*. *Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal*, 8(4-6), pp.219-237.
- Rukuni, M. (2006). *Patrick Tawonezwi, Carl Eicher witt Mabel Munyuki-Hungwe and Prosper Matondi*.
- Rundell, K. W., & Szmedra, L. E. O. N. (1998). *Energy cost of rifle carriage in biathlon skiing*. *Medicine and science in sports and exercise*, 30(4), 570-576
- Rupiya, M., (2005). *Zimbabwe: Governance through military operations*. *African Security Studies*, 14(3), pp.116-118.
- Rutherford, B. (2018). Mugabe's Shadow: Limning the Penumbra of Post-Coup Zimbabwe. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 52: 53–68.
- Ruzivo, M. (2013). *Civil religion in Zimbabwe: Unpacking the concept*. In E. Chitando (Ed.), *Prayers and Players: Religion and Politics in Zimbabwe*. Harare: SAPES
- Rwafa, U., (2014). *Playing the politics of erasure:(post) colonial film images and cultural genocide in Zimbabwe*. *Journal of Literary Studies*, 30(2), pp.104-114.
- Sachikonye, L., (2011). *When a state turns on its citizens: 60 years of institutionalised violence in Zimbabwe*. African Books Collective.
- Sadomba, Z.W. (2011). *War Veterans and Zimbabwe's Revolution: Challenging Neo-colonialism and Settler and International Capital*. Harare/Oxford: Weaver Press/James Currey.
- Said E.W (2012). *Culture and Imperialism*. New York: Vintage
- Samwanda, B. (2013). *Postcolonial Monuments and Public Sculpture in Zimbabwe*. Unpublished PhD Thesis.Grahamstown: Rhodes University.
- Sandton, A. (2012). *The controversy of nationalism in Africa*. Pearson. London
- Saunders, M., Lewis, P., & Thornhill, A. (2009). *Research Methods for Business Students* (5ed.). London: Financial Times Prentice Hall.
- Schack, T. and Schack, E., (2005). *In-and outgroup representation in a dynamic society: Hong Kong after 1997*. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 8(1), pp.123-137.

- Schedler, A. (2006). "*The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism.*" In Electoral Authoritarianism. The Dynamics of Unfree Competition, edited by A. Schedler, 1–23. Boulder: Lynne Rienner
- Schleiermacher, F. (1998). *Schleiermacher: hermeneutics and criticism: and other writings.* Cambridge University Press.
- Scholz, T., Bray, R. A., Kuchta, R., & Řepová, R. (2004). Larvae of gryporhynchid cestodes (Cyclophyllidae) from fish: a review. *Folia Parasitologica*, 51, 131–152.
- Schudson, M. (1995). *The power of news.* Harvard University Press.
- Schudson, M. (1998). *The good citizen: A history of American civic life.*
- Schutz, W. (1992). *Beyond FIRO-B-Three New Theory-Derived Measures-Element B: Behavior, Element F: Feelings, Element S: Self.* Psychological Reports, 70, 915-937. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pr0.1992.70.3.915>
- Schwandt, T. (2001). *Dictionary of Qualitative Research.* Thousand Oakes: SAGE.
- Schwandt, T. A. (1997). *Qualitative inquiry: A dictionary of terms.* Sage Publications, Inc.
- Schwartz, B. (1982). *The Social Context of Commemoration: A Study in Collective Memory.* Social Forces, 61 (2): 374-402.scientific world journal, 2014.
- Scoones, I. (2011). *Review of the book Whiteness in Zimbabwe: Race, Landscape and the Problem of Belonging - by David Hughes.* Journal of Agrarian Change, 11(4), 603–606
- Segovia, F. F. (2000). *Notes toward refining the postcolonial optic.* Journal for the Study of the New Testament, 22(75), 103-114.
- Selby, A. (2006). *Losing the Plot: The Strategic Dismantling of White Farming in Zimbabwe.*
- Shaw, E. F. (1977). *The agenda-setting hypothesis reconsidered: Interpersonal factors.* Gazette (Leiden, Netherlands), 23(4), 230-240.
- Shehata, A. (2016). *News habits among adolescents: The influence of family communication on adolescents' news media use—evidence from a three-wave panel study.* Mass Communication and Society, 19(6), 758-781.
- Shojaei, A., Youssefi, K., & Hosseini, H. S. (2013). *A CDA approach to the biased interpretation and representation of ideologically conflicting ideas in western printed media.* Journal of Language Teaching and Research, 4(4), 858.
- Sibanda.N. (2022). *Theatres of struggle in post- Mugabe Zimbabwe* in Cultures of Change in Contemporary Zimbabwe Socio- Political Transition from Mugabe to Mnangagwa, Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158

- Simon, A., Gariepy, J., Chironi, G., Megnien, J. L., & Levenson, J. (2002). *Intima-media thickness: a new tool for diagnosis and treatment of cardiovascular risk*. Journal of hypertension, 20(2), 159-169.
- [Singh, \(2014\)](#). A. Singh. *Social media impact on indian politics & political agenda*
- Sithole, M. (1999). *Zimbabwe: Struggles within the struggle, 1957-1980*. Harare:Rujeko Publishers.
- Sithole, M. and Makumbe, J. (1979). *Elections in Zimbabwe: The ZANU (PF) Hegemony and its Incipient Decline*. African Journal of Political Science, 2(1): 122-139.
- Siziba, G. & Ncube, G. (2015). *Mugabe's fall from grace: Satire and fictional narratives as silent forms of resistance in/on Zimbabwe*. Social Dynamics, 41(3), 516–539
- Sloan, A., & Bowe, B. (2014). *Phenomenology and hermeneutic phenomenology: The philosophy, the methodologies, and using hermeneutic phenomenology to investigate lecturers' experiences of curriculum design*. Quality & Quantity, 48, 1291-1303.
- Smith, C., & Wobst, H. M. (2004). *Decolonizing archaeological theory and practice. In Indigenous Archaeologies (pp. 4-14)*. Routledge.
- Smith, E.A., (1992). Human behavioral ecology: II. *Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews*, 1(2), pp.50-55.
- Snape, D., & Spencer, L. (2003). *The foundations of qualitative research* In J. Richie & J. Lewis (Eds.), *Qualitative Research Practice* (pp. 1-23). Los Angeles: Sage.
- Snyder, C. R. (1989). *Reality negotiation: From excuses to hope and beyond*. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 8(2), 130-157.
- Sokolowski, R. (2000). *Introduction to phenomenology*. Cambridge university press.
- Southall, R. (2014). *Liberation Movements in Power: Party and State in Southern Africa*. Oxford/Pietermaritzburg: James Currey and University of KwaZulu- Natal Press.
- Southall, R., (2020). *Flight and fortitude: the decline of the middle class in Zimbabwe*. Africa, 90(3), pp.529-547.
- Sperber, D. (1996). *Explaining culture: A naturalistic approach* (p. 97). Blackwell: Oxford.
- spirituality & religious experience, ch-10. Suny Press.
- Tagwirei. C. (2022). *The patriotic present: The urgency of now in Zimbabwe's "New Dispensation"* in *Cultures of Change in Contemporary Zimbabwe Socio- Political Transition from Mugabe to Mnangagwa*, Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158

- Tansey, O. (2007). *Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non Probability Sampling*. PS: Political Science and Politics, 40(4): 765-72
- Tendi, M. (2016). *State Intelligence and Politics of Zimbabwe's Presidential Succession*. African Affairs, 22(1): 203-224.
- Tendi, M. (2020). *The Army and Politics in Zimbabwe Mujuru, the Liberation Fighter and Kingmaker Blessing*- University of Oxford
- Toff, B. and Kalogeropoulos, A., (2020). *All the news that's fit to ignore: How the information environment does and does not shape news avoidance*. Public Opinion Quarterly, 84(S1), pp.366-390.
- Toff, B. and Nielsen, R.K., (2022). *How news feels: Anticipated anxiety as a factor in news avoidance and a barrier to political engagement*. Political Communication, 39(6), pp.697-714.
- Tomaselli, K. (2003). *Our Culture'vs 'Foreign Culture'An Essay on Ontological and Professional Issues in African Journalism*. Gazette, 65(6), 427-441
- Tomaselli, K.G. (1992). *Communication or propaganda: What's the difference?* Innovation, 4: 17-23.
- Tripp, A. M. (2004). *"The Changing Face of Authoritarianism in Africa. The Case of Uganda."* Africa Today 50 (3): 3–26. doi:10.1353/at.2004.0035.
- Tsarwe, S. (2020). *Understanding Zimbabwe's Political Culture: Media and Civil Society*. In *The History and Political Transition of Zimbabwe: From Mugabe to Mnangagwa*. African Histories and Modernities <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2>
- Tsarwe, S. and Mare, A., (2019). *Journalistic framing of electoral conflict in a politically fragile society: A comparative study of the Zimbabwean weekly press*. African Journalism Studies, 40(1), pp.18-35.
- Tshuma, B. B., Tshuma, L. A., & Ndlovu, N. (2021). *Humour, Politics and Mnangagwa's Presidency: An Analysis of Readers' Comments in Online News Websites*. The Politics of Laughter in the Social Media Age: Perspectives from the Global South, 93-111.
- Tshuma, W. (2019): *Political billboards, promise, and persuasion: An analysis of ZANU-PF's 2018 harmonized elections political campaign*, Journal of Marketing

- Communications, DOI:10.1080/13527266.2019.1683057 *two weekly newspapers*.
In media and elections conference, wits institute for social research Johannesburg.
- Tzu, S., 1910. *Sun Tzu on the Art of war*. Translated by Lionel Giles in University of Virginia Press.
- Ureke, O. (2016). *State Interference, Para-politics and Editorial Control: The Political Economy of 'Mirrorgate' in Zimbabwe*. Journal of African Media Studies 8 (1): 17–34.
- Van der Kolk, B. A, Fisler R (2005). *Dissociation and the Fragmentary Nature of Traumatic Memories: Overview and exploratory Study*. J Trauma Stress 1995;8: 505-25, quoted in McNally, Richard. “Debunking Myths About Trauma and Memory, The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry – In Review, Vol 50, No 13., p. 818.
- Van Dijk ,T.(2001).*The encyclopedia of language and linguistics*,UniversitatPomperu:Fabra, Barcelona
- Van Dijk, T (1993). *Principles of critical discourse analysis: discourse and society*. Discourse and Society, 4(2): 249-283. *visions*. Leader to Leader, 2005(36), 29-36.
- wa Thiong'o, N. (2009). *Translated by the author: My life in between languages*. Translation Studies, 2(1), 17-20.
- Wan, C., C. Chiu, S. Peng and K. Tam. (2007). *Measuring cultures through intersubjective cultural norms: Implications for predicting relative identification with two or more cultures*. Journal of CrossCultural Psychology 38(2): 213–226.
- Wekwete, K. H. (1990). *Decentralised planning in Zimbabwe: A review of provincial, urban and district development planning in post-dependence Zimbabwe (post-1980)*. Journal of International Development, 2(1), 110-139.
- Willig, C. (2001). *Introducing qualitative research in psychology: Adventures in theory and method*. Philadelphia: Open University Press.
- Zaffiro, J. J. (1992). *Political Change, Regime Legitimation and Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation: Lessons for a Post-Apartheid SouthAfrica?* CriticalArts 6 (1).
- Zelizer, B. (2006). *Why memory's work on journalism does not reflect journalism's work on memory*. Memory Studies, 1(1): 79–87.