THE EFFECTIVENESS OF RE-INTEGRATION OF FEMALE EX-COMBATANTS: RWANDA AS A CASE STUDY

BY

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DECLARATION

This study is the original work of the author and has not been submitted in any form for any degree or diploma to any University. Where information from other sources is used in the text, it is duly acknowledged.

Signed_____

Rosemarie Aurore Umurerwa

CERTIFICATION

It is hereby certified that this dissertation entitled “The effectiveness of re-integration of female ex-combatants: Rwanda as a case study” is an original work carried out by Rosemarie Aurore Umurerwa (Student Registration Number 203519461).

This work was carried out under my supervision and guidance and is hereby accepted and recommended for Approval for the Award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Social Science by University of KwaZulu-Natal.

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Prof. N. I. Okeke-Uzodike

Supervisor

Date: _____

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my family for being a source of inspiration to me throughout the entire period during which this work was carried out.

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ABSTRACT

The disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and reinsertion of ex-combatants generally and female ex-combatants specifically constitute one of the most fundamental activities in the 1994 post-genocide and war period in Rwanda. Initiated in 1997, the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) had the task of supporting the effective social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life so as to realise national security, reconciliation, development, and sustainable peace.

The findings of this study show that there is a tendency to regard former combatants as a homogenous group, overlooking significant variations based on gender, age, disability, military ranking, education and vocational skills, which are found in even small groupings. This study found that the needs, capacities and expectations of former combatants tend to be wide ranging, depending on these specificities/characteristics. On the whole, the transition from reinsertion to reintegration is often marked by drawn-out processes, and considerable difficulty in catering to all beneficiaries and developing comprehensive programmes.

The findings revealed that, as they re-join their former communities, female ex-combatants are often affected differently in terms of identity crises, stigma, stereotypes, trauma, vulnerability, and power relations within society through intra-house and social relations. Even though the RDRC has made some progress, it has become clear that more needs to be done to help female ex-combatants through the reintegration programme. From the viewpoints expressed by the respondents during focus group discussions, one can conclude that in the planning of reinsertion assistance, it is imperative that the overall socio-economic dynamics and the challenge of poverty are factored in as key variables to minimize resentment and marginalisation of broader war-affected communities. This would ensure a better linkage between reinsertion and reintegration, contributing to the sustainability of the identity transformation of female ex-combatants.

Key words: Combatant, Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration, and Peace building.

ACRONYMS

AGs	Armed Groups
APROSOMA	Association for the Social Movement of the Masse
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AU	African Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BBTG	Broad Based Transitional Government
BICC	Bonn International Centre for Conversion
BNK	Basic Needs Kit
CBR	Commercial Bank of Rwanda
CDR	Coalition pour la Défense de la République
CFSVA	Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CTP	Cape Town Principles
DC	Demobilisation Centre
DDR	Disarmament Demobilisation and Re-integration
DF	Destacamento Feminono
DPKO	Department for Peacekeeping Training Centre
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EPLF	Eritrea People's Liberation Front
Ex-FAR	Ex Rwanda Army Forces
FRELIMO	Mozambican Liberation Front/ Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIZ	Gesellschaft fur International Zusammenarbeit
HIV	Human Immuno deficiency Virus
HRW	Human Right Watch
HSM	Hutu Social Movement
ICCs	Interim Care Centres

IDDRS	Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration Standards
IGAs	Income Generating Activities
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
IPU	Inter Parliament Unit
KAIPTC	Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre
LPC	Liberia Peace Council
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
MIGEPROFE	Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MONUC	United Nations Missions in Congo
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MRND	National Revolutionary Movement for Development
MRNDD	National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development
NCDDR	National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration Commission
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NR	Nicaraguan Resistance
NRA	National Resistance Army
NRM	National Resistance Movement
NRM	National Resistance Movement
NUR	National University of Rwanda
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-peration and Development
OUA	Organisation of African Union
PARMEHUTU	Party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement
PDC	Parti Democrate Chretien

PILPG	Public International Law and Policy Group
PL	Parti Liberal
PLAN	People's Liberation Army of Namibia
PM	Prime Minister
PSD	Parti Social Democrate
PTSD	Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
RADER	Rwandese Democratic Rally
RDF	Rwanda Defence Forces
RDRC	Rwanda Demobilisation and Re-integration Commission
RDRP	Rwanda Demobilisation and Re-integration Programme
RENAMO	Resistencia Nacional de Mocambique (Mozambican National Resistance)
RG	Reintegration Grant
RPA	Rwanda Patriotic Army
RPF	Rwanda Patriotic Front
RSA	Recognition of Services Allowances
RTLM	Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SACCD	Spanish Agencie Catalane de Cooperacio el Develupement
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SCR	Security Council Resolution
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
TCC	Technical Coordination Committee
TPLF	Tigrean People's Liberation Front
UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
UNAR	Rwandese National Union
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VFOs	Veteran Field Offices
VP	Vice President
VSW	Vulnerability Support Window
WAC	Women's Artillery Commandos
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

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Chapter One

Introduction and Orientation

1.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a brief history of Rwanda. It covers the background to the study, the problem statement, the aims of the study, the hypothesis, the research questions and finally the structure of the thesis.

1.2 A brief history of Rwanda

The Republic of Rwanda is a land-locked country nestled within the Great Lakes area and located in the central Africa. It is bordered on the east by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with which it shares the shores of Lake Kivu; on the north by Uganda; on the west by Tanzania; and on the south by Burundi as shown in Figure 1.1. Rwanda covers an area of 26,338 square kilometres or 10,169 square miles (Encyclopaedia of the Nations, 2010). All of Rwanda is at high elevation, with a geography dominated by mountains in the west, savannah in the east, and numerous lakes throughout the country, this why Rwanda is entitled the name- “Land of a Thousand Hills”. The climate is temperate to subtropical, with two rainy seasons (February to April, November to January)and two dry seasons every year (Wikipedia, 2012).

Figure 1.1 A map of Rwanda.

Source: The World Factbook 2007. From the Library of Congress Country Studies of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The capital city is Kigali located in the centre of the country while some other cities are Gitarama, Butare, Ruhengeri, Gisenyi etcetera. The population is about 10.7 million (United Nations, 2011). There are three ethnic groups in Rwanda namely; Hutu which makes up 85% of the population , Tutsi 14% of the entire population and Twa 1% of the population (United Nations, 2011). The three official languages are English, French and Kinyarwanda (which is spoken by most Rwandans). Christianity is the largest religion in the country (93.5% which consists of religion like Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Adventist), Muslims are 4.6%, 1.7% claim no religious beliefs while traditional African consists of 0.1%. According to United Nations (2011), Rwanda gained independence on the 1st of July 1962 from Belgium. Currently, it has a presidential system of government. The economy is based mostly on subsistence agriculture. The cash crops are mostly tea,

coffee, sorghum, beans, bananas and potatoes. Tourism is also a fast-growing sector and is now the country's leading foreign exchange earner.

1.3 Background

The war that started in Rwanda in 1990 and which ended with genocide in 1994 confirmed that women can join the ranks of warriors. During the war in Rwanda, women took on tasks habitually performed by men in addition to supporting the war effort more directly. This study examines the unique situation in which such women find themselves in the post-1994 period in Rwanda. The study focuses broadly on the re-integration experiences of Rwandan female ex-combatants with a view to assess how effectively they have been integrated within broader Rwandan society. In general, the post-conflict environment is difficult for ex-combatants as government at all levels looks to harness productive resources for the reconstruction of their communities. Typically, such reconstruction involves a range of crucial but competing areas and issues: the restoration of social services; the development of human capacity; the revitalisation or improvement of devastated infrastructure; and the resurrection of economic activities and productivity.

According to the Boutros Boutros-Ghali, (1992:46), post-conflict peace building is defined as: “Action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”. In Resolution 1325 of October 2000 on Women, Peace and Security, the United Nations (UN) Security Council recognises that achieving gender justice is as central to social transformation as any other form of reparation after war. Resolution 1325 draws from a growing body of feminist scholarship and proposes that once starts after violent conflict ends, understanding the effects and implications of gender dynamics is essential to successful peace building (Farr, 2002: 4).In this resolution, the Security Council acknowledged that women and men ex-combatants and their dependants have different needs in the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme. To leave women and girls out of the process of reconstruction and rebuilding the country after war is not only to violate their right to

participate but also to undermine the aims of DDR, namely sustainable and equitable development. Dealing with the needs of women ex-combatants is a crucial challenge that calls for an effective solution in post-conflict reconstruction, peace building, and the general development of the country. Their full involvement in all efforts towards the sustainable resolution of a country's conflicts and its reconstruction is essential, even when they are small in number. This study seeks to assess the effectiveness of the reintegration process using Rwandan women ex-combatants as a case study. It assesses key variables to determine how well they are re-adjusting and reintegrating into the mainstream of Rwandan society by putting into context their social and economic experiences and perceptions.

1.4 Problem statement

In most societies generally, and in the post-1994 genocide and war in Rwanda specifically, women constitute a highly vulnerable class of citizens. This translates into poor access to economic opportunities and social welfare facilities such as education and healthcare. Not surprisingly, women are often among the least educated and poorest people in their communities. This is also true of female ex-combatants in the post-1994 genocide and war in Rwanda. While women were called upon to contribute to wartime efforts, they were marginalised in the post-war period. When they returned to their civilian communities, they remained oppressed and poor. Baden and Oxaal (1997) highlights that this is "despite demobilisation programmes aimed not only at enabling ex-combatants to improve their well-being and stability but also to make a positive impact within their communities".

The Rwandan experience and that of many other post-conflict societies, reveals that atrocities committed during war against civilians, including their own communities, create suspicion and fear about the prospect of ex-combatants returning to their communities. Other factors also impeded the reintegration of female ex-combatants in Rwanda. For instance, despite external aid, it was difficult for women ex-combatants to secure employment. This raises the danger of disgruntled ex-combatants drifting into criminality or even renewed conflict. Gender relations are another critical issue. When the war and

genocide in Rwanda were over, the contribution made by women ex-combatants received minimal recognition; one reason for that was that the needs and priorities of a post-conflict society were very different from those of a society at war where men and women are encouraged to act out similar roles as fellow soldiers in an army or guerrilla movement. Enloe (2000:21) observes that female ex-combatants in many post-conflict societies, who have broken rules of traditional behaviour and gender roles, are marginalised during the rebuilding process. In Rwanda, some female ex-soldiers preferred to mask their military past rather than face social disapproval.

The changes experienced by women ex-combatants in the post-1994 war and genocide in Rwanda are manifold, and they need assistance to build a civilian existence where they can care for themselves, and their children and dependents. While men and women perform similar roles during periods of war, they have different roles during peacetime. While men do not experience a break in their gender socialisation, women do. Even though the vast majority of women and girls in Rwanda were mobilised to join the war, they faced persistent stigma from their own families and communities once demobilised. Baden and Oxaal (1997) notes that some of the specific prejudices include the assumption that the women had been sexually abused and hence have lost their 'purity', the fear that they would return with sexually-transmitted diseases, the fear that their military commander or 'husband' would pursue them and threaten their families, neighbours and community, and a presumption that these women would incite bad or 'promiscuous behaviour' in other girls. Host communities are sometimes fearful of the aggressive behaviour they believe the women may have acquired through their association with the armed forces. They also think that the female ex-combatants will be out of synchronisation with culturally accepted gender norms. Women's own assumptions about how they will be perceived when they return to their community can reinforce the above perceptions. Aware of the stigma and barriers they may face, some women ex-combatants choose to marginalise themselves from the community, thereby forming a group of particularly vulnerable ex-combatants who are disproportionately affected by conventional barriers to socio-economic reintegration.

1.5 Aims of the study

The aims of the study cover overall objective and the specific aims.

1.5.1 Overall objective

The study seeks to investigate how effectively female ex-combatants are reintegrated into the mainstream of Rwandan society.

1.5.2 Specific aims

The specific aims of the study are as follows:

- To assess female ex-combatants' views on gender relations generally.
- To assess the post-military experiences of female ex-combatants.
- To assess female ex-combatants' views on the overall effectiveness of the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (RDRC).
- To assess the impact of RDRC on female ex-combatants.
- To determine the socio-economic problems facing female ex-combatants.
- To analyse how a sample of female ex-combatants views their reintegration.
- To assess female ex-combatants' new skills and employability.
- To assess the role of female ex-combatants in the post-conflict environment.

1.6 Hypothesis

Female ex-combatants will not re-adjust successfully into civilian life if their demobilisation and re-integration programme is ineffective.

1.7 Research questions

Drawing directly from the objectives, the investigation will focus questions on three major sets of issues:

1. Major challenges faced by female ex-combatants seeking to re-integrate into civilian life.

- Are female ex-combatants properly trained in new skills suitable for employment in a civilian environment before and after demobilisation?

- What is the role of female ex-combatants in both the design and implementation of RDRP?
- How accessible and appropriate are RDRP benefits to female ex-combatants?

2. Comparative assessments of female ex-combattants and male ex-combattants.

- How are the Rwandan female ex-combatants faring after demobilisation in comparison with male ex-combatants?

3. The existence of societal barriers to the re-integration of ex-combatants (such as stigmatization, stereotypes, identity crises, vulnerability, a society which does not understand them, and training which is not adapted to female needs).

- How is female ex-combatants' newly acquired role in the military impacting on traditional gender relations in society?
- To what extent are efforts to reintegrate female ex-combatants (after demobilisation) affected by their military experiences and training?

As will be seen in the literature review**,** concepts relevant to this study include: combatant, child soldiers, peace building, demilitarization, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.

1.8 Structure of the thesis

This study is comprised of seven chapters.

Chapter one: Introduction and orientation

The first chapter introduces the study by providing a general background. The chapter discusses the problem statement. It describes the aim of the study (overall objective and specific aims), the hypothesis and the research questions. The chapter also explicates the research design.

Chapter two: Research methodology and theories

The second chapter explicates the methodology used in this study and the principal theories upon which it is based. A case study approach has been adopted and feminist development

theory was used as a tool to identify and explain the extent and nature of the state policy regime, which highlights the Rwandan government efforts to demobilise and reintegrate female ex-combatants.

Chapter three: Women, war and the historical context of the Rwandan conflict

The third chapter explores the context and problem of the study. It presents background information on the Rwandan conflict, and assesses the way in which the colonial powers succeeded in politicising ethnic differences in Rwanda. It discusses pre-colonial and colonial Rwanda, post-independence and pre-Arusha agreement. It shows not only how the ethnic identity crisis created tension among the Rwandan population but also how it led to deadly civil war and genocide. It explicates the comparative role of women in war and peace, with particular attention to the Rwandan experience as a case study.

Chapter four: Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes

The fourth chapter contains a review of the relevant literature on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Programmes, by means of an overview of DDR Programmes in general and in Africa in particular. It presents the definitions of key concepts such as combatant, demilitarization, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The chapter focuses on the context of DDR Programmes with particular emphasis on female ex-combatants in some African countries.

Chapter five: Data presentation and analysis: Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission. The fifth chapter examines the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission. It explicates the mission, objectives, and the activities of the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission. It focuses on the reintegration of female ex-combatants in post-conflict society and presents the study findings and analyse the views of key informants on the reintegration of female ex-combatants as well as the potential and risks of demobilisation and reintegration programmes.

Chapter six: Statistical analysis of findings and discussions of results

The sixth chapter discusses the statistical analysis of the findings of the study and presents the results. It addresses the major findings of the study and important themes in the literature on the reintegration of Rwandan female ex-combatants.

Chapter seven: Conclusion and recommendations

The seventh chapter presents the final conclusion and recommendations.

Chapter Two
Research Methodology and Theories

2.1 Research methodology

For this study, a mixed methods research has been adopted; as both qualitative and quantitative research are important and useful. Burke and Onwuegbuzie (2004:15) state that if you foresee a continuum with qualitative research anchored at one pole and quantitative research anchored at the other, mixed methods covers the large set of points in the middle area. They point out that mixed methods can also help connexion the break-up between qualitative and quantitative research. The study adopted a qualitative method as the nature of research questions required the use of qualitative data from both secondary and primary sources. A number of qualitative and quantitative data analysis techniques were used to analyse the secondary data and primary data respectively.

For this research, a case study approach has been adopted. As Cresswell (1994:16) notes, a case study may be viewed as an investigation through the analysis of a bounded system. Actual cases, which often take a wide variety of forms, may be represented as a process, activity, event, programme or individuals (see De Vos, 2005:269). According to Feagin, Orum and Sjoberg (1991:6), a case study is an "ideal methodology when a holistic, in-depth investigation is needed". For Yin (1989), a single case may be utilised to confirm or challenge a theory, or to represent a unique or extreme case. He continues: A case study investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin, 1989:23). Hammersly, Gomm and Foster (2000:4) note that "the main concern may be with understanding the case studied in itself, with no interest in theoretical inference or empirical generalisation". They conclude that there may also be attempts at one or other, or both of these.

For the purposes of this study, one case was used: Rwanda. As a Rwandan citizen, the researcher has developed a long-term scholarly interest in the country. More importantly, however, Rwanda ─ with its reputedly progressive social policies ─ will provide a crucial opportunity to assess the degree to which a formal policy framework is linked to desirable policy outcomes. Data collection was designed to be participatory as much as possible and involved a mixture of primary data collection techniques such as interviews, discussions and observations. A structured questionnaire was administered and interviews were conducted with key informants and individuals from different walks of life. Focus group discussions, as a research tool, were used to triangulate and validate the findings of the structured questionnaire and the researcher used a tape recorder to ensure accuracy.

The key concern of this study was to assess the effectiveness of the reintegration of female ex-combatants into Rwandan society. The concept 'effectiveness' is subjective as its understanding varies from person to person in such a way that it may not be measurable with any degree of absolute precision. However, by examining policy objectives and assessing the degree to which they were achieved, one can still deduce policy effectiveness. Kumar (1999:48) observes that: "there are some who believe that scientific methods are incapable of measuring feelings, preferences, values and sentiments". He notes that most things can be measured, although there are situations where feelings or judgment are not adaptable to direct measurement "but can be measured indirectly". He concludes that these feelings and judgments are based upon observable behaviours in real life, though "the extent to which the behaviours reflect their judgments may vary from person to person" (Kumar, 1999:48). This can be accomplished by not only finding documents and collecting data but also by specifying relevant criteria or patterns that would suggest particular outcomes, and conducting analysis of collected documents and data to reveal the patterns and note the number of occurrences of the expected or unanticipated indicators.

With respect to this study, the researcher applies the concept of 'effectiveness' in relation to 'reintegration' of female ex-combatants into Rwandan society. The study examines

whether the re-integration programme has been effective or not. As effectiveness measures the extent to which the programme has been successful in achieving its key objectives, this study assessed the success of the RDRP (if any) in demobilising and re-integrating female ex-combatants. Relevant major indicators for measuring 'effectiveness' would include employment, 'good' social behaviour (for example, the interaction between ex-combatants and the societies that receive them), personal development, degree of societal acceptance (such as how they are welcomed: very warmly, with suspicion, or not welcomed; if they are encountering adjustment problems with their families, and whether they are treated as inferior or the same as male ex-combatant returnees), participation in community activities, and their decision-making role in the community. For this study, the findings were analysed according to the frequency of open-ended and close-ended responses, taking into consideration the respondents' views and perceptions around the themes of the study as discussed. The information was collected, tabulated and classified according to variables (see Table 2.1 below) and relevant data on indicators. Thereafter, the information collected were analysed. The findings were summarised by showing the extent to which the RDRP has been effective (or not) in achieving its key objectives. As a certified counsellor, the researcher was able to assist interviewees in a relevant manner to cope with any stress caused during the interviews.

A sample of the relevant questions and indicators used for data gathering is presented as follows:

Table 2.1: Sample of questions and indicators

Variables	Indicators	Items of question
Dependent variables: Economic and psychosocial re-integration of female ex- combatants Independent variable: RDRP	Economic re-integration (income, employment) Psychosocial re-integration (acceptance by their family and relationship with neighbours, friends…)	Q8
	Skills training Start-up kit	Q9
Dependent Variable: Social Re-integration Independent Variables: Quality of reception Organization into the mainstream of civilian life	Social behaviour Structures of reception for the demobilized (province, sector)	Q12.16 to Q12.23.2
	Participation in community activities and decision-making	Q4
	Roles in the community and sense of belonging	Q12.14; Q12.15; Q12.24 to Q12.32.7
	Degree of acceptance	Q12.1 to Q12.13; Q10, Q11

Source: Researcher, 2010

Thus the following methods were used to collect data:

1) Literature review: A review of appropriate literature was undertaken to develop an understanding of the subject matter by focusing on past and present thinking. This helped in providing a conceptualisation of the role of female ex-combatants in the post-conflict period generally and in the Rwandan case, specifically. The Rwandan Commission of Demobilisation's reports and the Ndabaga Association's reports as well as various other

publications were closely examined. The literature review also helped to direct and inform the other steps of the study, including the formulation of the questionnaire as well as data collection and analysis.

2) Structured questionnaire: The structured questionnaire format is a standardised technique where the researcher presents questions in exactly the same way ─ in terms of the actual wording and the ordering of the questions ─ to all respondents. The technique also has the potential of being used to gather data from a larger pool of respondents than would be normally possible through personal interviews. The idea is to allow the researcher to conveniently compare the responses against one another, to facilitate the interpretation of the responses, to analyse and present the results in statistical formats, and make generalised statements about the study population. For the purposes of this study, the intention was to use the fixed alternative questions structure, which asked the respondent to choose one of a set of specified alternatives. The questions were designed in such a manner that they solicited responses that could present respondents' views and perceptions around the themes of this study.

3) Focus group discussion: The researcher also used focus group discussions (FGDs) to generate data and complement the quantitative data. This technique enables a researcher to obtain detailed information on issues, concepts, perceptions, and ideas from a group of people over a short period of time. According to Fontana and Frey (1994:364), the purpose of group interviews is the collection of qualitative data. This method gives the respondents the freedom to formulate their own responses, and hence can unveil new and important aspects that had not been anticipated by the researcher. The aim of using group interviews is not to replace individual interviews but to gather information that perhaps, cannot be easily collected by means of individual interviews. A small number of such individuals (from different fields of work), brought together as a discussion and resource group, is much more valuable than any representative group (Blumer 1961:41 highlighted in Fontana and Frey, 1994:365). For this study, these discussions were conducted in the

local language. The researcher used a tape recorder and was assisted by a moderator, an observer (not a participant), and a trainer. Nine separate focus group discussions were conducted in three provincial centres:

Kigali ─3 FGDs (three separate groups of about five persons each)

Southern Province ─ 3 FGDs (three separate groups of about five persons each)

Northern Province –3 FGDs (three separate groups of about five persons each)

The researcher conducted discussions with four groups of female ex-combatants, one group of male ex-combatants, and one mixed group of male and female ex-combatants.

4) Direct observation: The researcher spent six months in Rwanda, observing female ex-combatants' activities. This provided the opportunity to verify and supplement the data contained in the official reports of their activities. It was also an opportunity for the researcher to engage some female ex-combatants on their views, experiences and perceptions regarding the opportunities and constraints facing them during the post-conflict period in Rwanda. This data not only supplemented information collected from the questionnaire and other techniques but also helped to verify it. The researcher closely examined the fit between the information provided by ex-combatants and those contained in official sources and documents of their activities. The direct observation technique helped to identify whether the process of re-integrating female ex-combatants is poorly implemented, or effectively implemented, and if additional inputs are needed.

5) Interviews: The researcher conducted interviews in 2008 with four academics from the National University of Rwanda (NUR); two historians, one educationist, and an anthropologist. Two are Hutu while the other two are from the Tutsi ethnic group. Two had witnessed and survived the different conflicts in Rwanda since 1950.

Data analysis: After the fieldwork, the researcher collated and analysed the collected data within the framework of each stipulated objective. For instance, the relevant responses of key informants were outlined as they were provided. The data were read carefully,

analysed, related to the questions asked, and transposed into a computer after editing (which was done at the end of each day) to ensure consistency. The answers that seemed to belong together were categorised and coded with a key word. All responses were coded for analysis; this was followed by the interpretation of results. Data from the questionnaire and focus group discussions were carefully examined and analysed as well. The researcher ordered and reduced the data by relating it to the objectives of this study. The collated data were subjected to rigorous analysis and statistical calculations using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) for Windows. During the analysis and interpretation of the quantitative data, inferential statistics - namely the chi-square test - was used to test the independence of variables. This helped the researcher to measure if a characteristic is differently distributed among female and male respondents. Assuming that the variable being measured is not differently distributed among female and male ex-combatants (*null hypothesis-denoted as* H_o), this hypothesis will be rejected if the value of p is less than 0.05. The researcher was able to conclude that there is a relationship between the two variables at a "significance level of 0.05". In the tables produced by SPSS, this value will be displayed in the column of asymptotic significance (*Asymp. Sign.*) of a test statistic. If the value of p is higher (>0.05), the apparent relationship between variables might be a fluke or the result of a sampling error. Such significance tests are used in the study whenever there is a need to adopt a comparative point of view between female and male ex-combatants.

In essence, the researcher collated and summarised all collected data for analysis and interpretation before integrating the results into the report and confirming (refuting) the hypothesis of the study. At the end, the researcher's recommendations are informed by the evidence accumulated from the data.

2.2 Principal theories upon which the research is based

Research on women- and- development subjects involves in-depth understanding of both development and feminist theoretical frameworks. The experiences of policymakers and

activists gave rise to revised theoretical formulations of development and feminist apprehensions. Some researchers have worked on feminist and development theories and have contributed to the additional development and, most of the times, the integration of these theories. The researcher adopted the integration of these theories. For the purposes of this study, feminist development theory was used to assess the reintegration of Rwandan female ex-combatants. Clearly, for a country that is coming out of a major conflict, such a reintegration exercise is a fundamental part of nation-building. Traditional development theories do not adequately capture the nuances vital for studying and understanding the special case of women ex-combatants. The feminist development theoretical foundation of this study emanates from the available literature on demobilisation and reintegration of female ex-combatants. As noted by Ferris (2004), despite its diversity in constitution and objectives, the feminist movement has profoundly influenced our understanding of the nature and extent of gender dynamics in nearly every aspect of human endeavour, particularly in western societies. Indeed, as feminist principles have become deeply ingrained throughout the world, many of these ideas have come to be seen not so much as specifically feminist but as routine parts of societal values. This is due in part to the efforts of feminist scholars who have sought to widen the theoretical foundations of a wide variety of scholarships. For instance, feminist authors such as Tickner (1992:86) have challenged Marxism by observing that Marxist theory is flawed by its claim that autonomous development, which meets the economic security needs of all people, can be achieved only through a socialist revolution. On the one hand, some feminists maintain that the Marxist understanding of knowledge is (unintentionally) helpful because it supports their claim that knowledge has been constructed in such a way that it denies a voice to women. On the other hand, feminists criticize Marxist theories for ignoring women's reproductive and domestic roles. Marxist theory focuses on class as the basic unit of analysis. Rather than being discussed as a group with particular needs, women have been subsumed under this class analysis. In fact, Marx provided many of the concepts and analytical tools commonly used to discuss inequitable social relations. He alleged that conflicting material interests, based on one's economic position and the way one earned a living, resulted in conflicting

perceptions of social reality and transferred individuals and families to social classes. Some Marxists such as Bill Warren (1980) established the prospects for capitalist development relatively good in many underdeveloped countries. He observed that capitalism did not cause underdevelopment. Classes and contradictions within Third World nations and their impact on relations with the North must be understood if one is to properly evaluate Third World development (Warren, 1980). Feminists argue that class-based capitalist oppression is not synonymous with the oppression of women (Tickner, 1992:86). They also argue that class-based analysis ignores two important facts: a woman is oppressed in specific ways attributable to patriarchy rather than to capitalism; and classical Marxism has ignored or omitted women's roles in the family from its analyses. By leaving the unpaid labour that women perform in the family out of the analysis, certain issues that are peculiar to women (regardless of class position) are neglected (Tickner, 1992:87). Feminists fight for the equality of women and claim that women should share equally in society's opportunities and scare resources as men.

Indeed, the close connection between revolutionary movements and women's participation demands an analysis of this phenomenon. Some authors such as Farr (2002: 10) observe that with ideologies and stereotypes firmly in place, it seems natural that it will be men and not women who predominate in peace agreements and reconstruction processes that are set in motion when wars end. She noted that a careful deconstruction of ideas about space in wartime shows that gender stereotypes naturalise ideas of how people behave. Feminist scholars have worked to nuance our understanding that women's roles and the identities they assume to fulfil these roles during the build-up to war, during wartime, and afterwards, are strategic and shifting. Gender is an important factor explaining men and women's experiences and roles as both victims and perpetrators of violence in conflict and post-conflict settings. Gender refers to masculinities and femininities, women and men, the relations between them, the power inequalities between men and women and the way that boys and girls are socialized to adhere to specific roles and norms. For example, gender patterns in many settings reinforce the idea that women and girls should do caregiving and

care for the home, while men and boys may be expected to work and produce outside the home. Other norms reinforce the idea that men must use or be willing to use violence to defend themselves and those around them. Arguing against the predominant stereotypes of women as innately peaceful and men as inevitably warlike, feminists insist on the need to recognise the complexity of gender ideologies and the multiple roles they play in drawing different social actors into war (Fukuyama, 1998; Goldstein, 2001). In peacetime as well in wartime, females display a wide variety of responses to organised and/or state-sanctioned forms of violence (Farr, 2002: 6).

There is a long and much celebrated history of feminist pacifism, and some females - as peace activists - play essential roles in maintaining social connections and building coalitions across communities divided by violence and are therefore well positioned to play important roles in rehabilitation, reconciliation, reintegration support, and peace building roles in the aftermath of conflict (Anderlini, 2000). Although many feminists have noted that women's peace building activities receive too little recognition in the period of reconstruction (Anderlini, 2000; Enloe, 2000), it is also true that women who saw active combat are not allowed to participate as leaders in the development of transition and reconstruction processes. They are often acknowledged only as mothers, sisters, wives or daughters (Farr, 2002). Even if their levels of participation in the business of war are varied, females remain at the margins of political, economic, and social power, and their voices and experiences tend to disappear when peace processes begin (Goldblatt and Meintjes, 1996). Despite the problem of the invisibility of women, countries that have emerged from conflict and war situations are often seen as potential sites of positive change. Some theorists observe that war and the aftermath of war can present opportunities to influence social and political structures that in peacetime were beyond women's expectations (Farr, 2002: 11).

As already noted, the focus of this study is to assess the reintegration of female ex-combatants by using feminist development theory. According to Barbanti (2004),

development should be understood as a process, not a product. Societies are always changing: some improve while others fail to do so. For Barbanti, development theory aims to explain both processes, and he argues that development practice intends to provide tools that can be applied to entire societies or specific communities such as female ex-combatants. Such interventions are intended to move communities or societies from a situation in which they are believed to be worse off to a situation in which they are assumed to be better off. Clearly, traditional development theories – including Dependency Theory, International Trade Theory, Modernization Theory, Capability Theory, and Import Substitution Theory – can provide vital insights into the nature, thrust, and relational dynamics of development. For instance, Modernization theory emerged in the 1930s, with the early development initiatives of colonial rulers and economists, and gained momentum in the postwar and postcolonial periods. Western economists and sociologists began to theorize in the 1950s about how to promote "development" in the newly independent countries, and development planners designed projects to modernize "less-developed" countries all over the globe. Modernization was the dominant approach underlying development research and policy in the postwar period and continues to guide development efforts today. As stated by Rostow (1960:4), the basic idea of modernization is that development is a natural, linear process away from traditional social and economic practices toward a Western-style economy. He identified societies, in their economic dimensions, as lying within one of the five categories which are the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass consumption. The measures of success include gross national product, income levels, employment rates, education levels, and industrial structure, and all of which emphasize the adoption of Western economic institutions, technologies, and values. The challenge is to identify barriers to self-sustaining growth. These barriers may be technological, educational, or cultural (Rostow, 1960:4). Modernization theory has been the dominant guide to the policies of the main international financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, as well as the main aid organizations, such as USAID.

With regards to the traditional development theories, one can observe that their relative gender-insensitivity and inadequate attention to micro level units within society render them less useful for understanding the special challenges and circumstances of groups such as female ex-combatants. Though diverse and with origins in different social science fields, development theories are often heavily skewed in the direction of economics. This has serious implications not only in terms of the way that ideas around development are perceived but also in terms of the consequences that policy frameworks have for societal peace and security.

This study aims to capture the broad scope of the impact of war on the socio-economic, political, and emotional domains. Impacts may be assessed and analysed at different levels, including the personal, household/community, national and international levels. Articulating the links between these levels is vital if the complete range of explanations for individual and group behaviour is to be understood. For instance, the impact of armed conflict is enormous and the effects are different for men and women. Poverty and dispossession are increased in a society at war. Feminist theorists have shown that women and femininity form an important part of the process of constructing a male identity that is regarded as necessary for a warring society (Farr, 2002:11). The feminist movement, sometimes known as the 'women's movement' or 'women's liberation' is made up of diverse groups of people in different countries with an equally varied set of objectives. Despite this diversity in constitution and objectives, the feminist movement has profoundly influenced the nature and extent of gender dynamics in nearly every aspect of human endeavours, particularly in western countries. Indeed, as feminist principles have become deeply ingrained throughout the world, many of these ideas have come to be seen not so much as specifically feminist but as part of societal values. Feminist development theory is a potentially useful tool for understanding the power dynamics in society that determine the role of gender in shaping the actual distribution of power and opportunities (Cagan, 1983:93). While there are quite a few ideas about what it seeks to accomplish, very little is available in terms of conceptual precision. This is because feminism means different

things to different people. Nevertheless, it is clear that it provides a framework for wrestling with the intersections between feminism and development by concerning itself with the broad areas of power relations that shape gender opportunities and interactions in society (Cagan, 1983:94).

According to feminist literature, there are two variants relevant to war: peace and culture. Cagan (1983:94), an American feminist and social activist, offers the following definition of feminism: Feminism is a political perspective that demands an end to the oppression of people because of their gender, and an end to the institutional and individual structures that define men as more valuable than women. Feminism rests on a belief that we can live in a world without hierarchies of control and domination, that people can exercise control over their own lives and live in harmony with others, and that women can share equality of opportunity and freedom. There is a very active body of work by feminist peace researchers whose writings are directly linked to the study of war and peace. A small selection of these writers includes: Elise Boulding (1987); Betty Reardon (1985), Riane Eisler (1987) and Birgit Brock-Utne (1985). Many others (such as Leslie Cagan) have written extensively on women and peace. There is also a body of feminist literature not directly linked to peace but which has been used by women peace researchers because of the relevance of such studies to their work. For example, Carol Gilligan, the Harvard educator's book *In a Different Voice* (Gilligan, 1982) became a touchstone for many peace researchers who argued that the different moral development of women makes them more prone to peace than men. Other works by feminist theoreticians of language such as Thorne, Kramarae, and Henley (1983), have also "fed into feminist critiques of the dominant male discourse of the military establishment". The last example reflects an increasing number of feminist peace researchers who feel that deciphering the forces of militarism must ultimately lead to a critique of Western scientific rationality and, in particular, technology. Here, the works of feminist scientists and science philosophers such as Sandra Harding (1986) and Evelyn Fox-Keller (1985) have been of great value. It should also be noted that although much of it does not have an explicitly 'feminist' orientation, "the work being done on women's

representation and role in the media and popular culture can offer support for a feminist approach to peace" (Roach, 1991). For most feminist writers on peace, the violence of war is profoundly linked to violence against women. Many feminists such as Reardon (1985:71) noted that the main link between sexism and war is that both rely on the prevalence of violence. They argue that "since widespread violence towards women is socially sanctioned by prevailing cultural norms - with the mass media and mass culture playing a very important role - it serves as a sort of 'primal' paradigm for violent warfare against other peoples". Furthermore, Cagan (1983:95) observes that: the ever-present possibility of rape parallels the threat of military intervention strong nations use against weaker ones. Stay in line or you will get hurt. Play by the rules or the most brutal force will bear down upon you. In both cases a broader and more subtle system of ever-present inequality lies behind and is defended by the more overt form of coercion. Reardon (1985:71) concludes, as do many other feminists, that women are not just victims of physical violence but are also much more oppressed by the structural violence perpetrated in highly militarised societies than any other social group. Historically, the world has been silent about the situation of women in war; almost as silent as the women who stay on the side lines during war or who are excluded from peace negotiations. Women often lack the confidence and knowledge needed to participate in peace building and re-construction (Ferris, 2004:12).

In contrast with development theoretical formulations, feminist development theory is potentially a more useful tool for understanding the power dynamics in society that determine the role of gender in shaping the actual distribution of power and opportunities.
In this study, the feminist development theory was used as a tool to identify and explain the extent and nature of the state policy regime, which underpins the Rwandan government's efforts to demobilise and reintegrate female ex-combatants. If the demobilisation and reintegration process is properly implemented, it can provide an opportunity for positive change. For instance, it can increase rights for women who make up about 50 percent of the society and can enhance their participation in decision making as they take on greater responsibilities in the formal governance structures within society. This raises the potential

for change at all levels of life and development. The researcher's analysis is inspired particularly by the work of Farr (2002), which shows how gender awareness in the earliest transition and post-conflict period impacts on the possibility of peaceful development in the long-term. This study is anchored on the theoretical assumption that gender awareness and sensitivity are vital for long-term peace and development. The Rwandan government's ability to craft effective transformative policy will hinge directly on how well it can translate its officially gender-sensitive policies to reflect a broadly-accepted outlook for the nation. The meaningful integration of women ex-combatants is a litmus test of the government's policy framework. Using feminist development theory, the researcher seeks to analyse the effectiveness of the Rwandan reintegration experience to draw conclusions about how demobilisation processes can be improved to better address the needs of female ex-combatants. She explains why plans for effective reintegration, through which female ex-combatants become productive social and economic players, must incorporate a careful analysis of the gender ideologies at work in the society under review. The reintegration process must interact with other social reform activities after the war in order to improve the chances that this interaction will be peaceful and constructive; an awareness of long-term goals such as promoting greater social equality as well as enabling political and economic practices are important for the successful implementation of demobilisation and reintegration strategies.

2.3 Summary of the chapter

The chapter discussed the methodology used in this study. A case study approach has been adopted and feminist development theory was used as a tool to identify and explain the extent and nature of the state policy regime, which highlights the Rwandan government's efforts to demobilise and reintegrate female ex-combatants. The study adopted both qualitative and quantitative methods of research. This study shows that demobilisation and reintegration can play a significant role in achieving the broader goal of social transformation and development. Using feminist development theory, development activities will be regarded as having many dimensions such as economic, cultural, and

religious and gender influences that affect and are affected by change. Beyond economic growth and the expansion of social and economic infrastructure, effective development can facilitate the attainment of desirable objectives such as overcoming human rights abuses, social inequality, and gender-based discrimination while ensuring poverty eradication and the empowerment of women. This will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter Three

Women, war and the Historical Contexts of the Rwandan Conflict

3.1 Introduction

This chapter uses relevant literature to provide not only a historical background to the Rwandan conflict from the pre-colonial period to the post-genocide era (after 1994) but also a comparative historical assessment of the role of women in war and peace both generally and with specific reference to Rwanda. It shows how a long history of domination and inequality between the Hutu and Tutsi population has been methodically politicised and how this has been developed, consolidated and changed into a contemporary ideology of racism and ethnic discrimination among the Rwandan people. This led to the recruitment of military personnel among refugees, especially those who fled the country in 1959 (mostly Tutsi) and another portion of refugees who fled to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1994 (mostly Hutu). The post-genocide Rwanda experienced an influx of a large number of men and women ex-combatants and, thus, necessitated the reduction in the size of the armed forces through the DDR programme that started in 1997.

This chapter also discusses how the regional political and social dynamics in Burundi, Uganda, and the DRC enabled Rwandese refugees (both Hutu and Tutsi) to create a coalition, identifying them as a population reclaiming their motherland. In terms of the historical background to the Rwandan conflict, the researcher conducted interviews in 2008 with four academics from the National University of Rwanda (NUR); two historians, one educationist, and an anthropologist. Two are Hutu while the other two are from the Tutsi ethnic group. Two had witnessed and survived the different conflicts in Rwanda since 1950.As previously indicated, this chapter will also discuss women's role in war and peace and assess gender perceptions on conflict, and how these issues affect women in Rwanda.

3.2 History of Rwanda leading to genocide

3.2.1 From Colonialism to ethnic hatred and Independence

Historians agree that pre-colonial Rwanda was highly organised and had a centralised system of administration. The kingdom was presided over by the *Umwami* (King), mainly from the Nyiginya clan, a Tutsi sub-group. The *Umwami* had almost absolute powers but was assisted by three main close collaborators. The first was a military head/general, who was like a modern day army commander/or Joint Chief of General Staff. This collaborator was responsible for the army, ensuring territorial integrity and expansion. The second collaborator oversaw all matters pertaining to cattle keeping, grazing and settling related disputes. The third collaborator was the land chief who was responsible for agricultural land, produce and related affairs. Behind the scenes, the queen mother also played a significant role in the administration of the kingdom.

On the other hand, historians are divided on the origins of Rwanda's three ethnic groups, Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa. It seems that the people themselves identified one another according to clan affiliation rather than ethnicity. David Newbury has shown that while the terms 'Hutu and Tutsi' existed in pre-colonial times, they were not as entrenched (Newbury, D. 1979; Newbury, C. 1980:88). All in all, 19 clans made up the members of what are now the three ethnic groups. Some argue that up until about the middle of the 19th century, clan identities mattered more than the Tutsi, Hutu or Twa categorisations (Personal Interview, Butare, 21 May 2008).While the description of Rwandans in terms of ethnic groups was partly based on indigenous people on the one hand, and inferior and superior race anthropological theorisation on the other, the idea of ethnicity is believed to be a colonial concoction which gained currency in the latter part of the 20th century. Gourevitch (1998:47) states that before colonialism, ethnic differences in Rwanda were very fluid and subjective to the extent that the social mobility of Hutu and Tutsi was possible. However, the Belgium and German colonial powers managed to create and institutionalise ethnic

differences in the country and consolidated political control in the hands of the Tutsi minority who were said to be more 'civilised' than the Hutu (Gourevitch, 1998:49).

In 1899, Rwanda effectively became a German colony under German East Africa. The Germans ruled indirectly through the *Umwami* and his close collaborators. While the German colonial presence was very limited, it started to transform relations between the Hutu and the Tutsi. Having discovered that the existing kingdom functioned as a fully-fledged centralised administration even before the arrival of Europeans and also, undoubtedly, because of a shortage of colonial personnel, the Germans chose to administer the colony indirectly through the *Umwami*. The military hierarchy and the administrative chiefs answerable to the *Umwami* continued to be both Hutus and Tutsis. Thus, the relations between Hutu and Tutsi were forged through a shared loyalty to a common institution (Scherrer, 2002:26-35)

With the defeat of the Germans in World War I, the League of Nations mandated Belgium to administer Rwanda. The Belgians were impressed by the highly ordered social structure they found in Rwanda and believed that continuing the German policy of indirect rule was the best way to administer the country (Lee, 2001:5). However, they were befuddled by the complexities of the Rwandan socio-economic and political relations and contexts. Des Forges (1999:3) states that the administration within central Rwanda, including the least important representatives of the *Umwami* who sometimes governed only a few hundred people, necessitated a comparatively high quantity of labour and local goods for its support. Kimber (1996:1) is of the opinion that the Belgian ruling class was not willing to make the effort to deal with the "intertwined fingers" of Rwandan Tutsi-Hutu relations. It was much easier to divide the Hutus and Tutsis and pit one group against the other. The previous system of having three chiefs for each area, at least one of whom was normally a Hutu, was replaced with a single chief for every locality (Desforges, 1999:30). The Belgians introduced a series of measures that radically transformed the social structure. *Umwami* Musinga was the last of Rwanda's *Mwami* who openly adopted an anti-colonialist attitude.

He was deposed in 1931 by the Belgian governor Tilkens Auguste Constantin who replaced him with his son, Rudahigwa, who had been educated at a missionary school. The *Umwami* were described as Tutsi (personal Interview, Butare, 21 May 2008).

Surprisingly, the colonial powers characterised the Tutsi as perfectly constituted – just like Europeans: "a European under black skin" and "a superb human"– and, consequently, civilised (Mamdani 2001:103). Malkki (1995:25) notes that, in the eyes of the colonial administration, "the secret of Tutsi domination lay in their innate superiority of intelligence and smartness". According to Mamdani (2001:112), social institutions like the schools and churches that were run by the missionaries under the colonial powers echoed ethnic differences and excluded the Hutu from having access to them. With the Belgian policy of favouring the Tutsi to fill the administrative posts, the Catholic schools, which represented the dominant educational system throughout the colonial period, adjusted their educational policies and openly favoured Tutsi and discriminated against Hutu (Scherrer,2002:27). Prunier (1995:33) notes that the Catholic missionaries purposefully reinforced the Tutsi feeling of superiority since the missionaries believed that the Tutsi were the "natural-born chief". Therefore, they were given priority in terms of education so that the Church would have an influence over the future ruling class. On the other hand, the majority Hutu people were left with no choice with respect to educational opportunities except to become theology students at the seminaries. They experienced difficulties in finding employment after graduation and this led to frustration and embitterment in the long run. Prunier also argues that the policy that institutionalised Tutsi supremacy deeply enlarged the power of Tutsi chiefs at the local level. Hutu chiefs were summarily replaced with Tutsi by the colonial administration. These chiefs were now responsible for performing the duties of the colonial state, which included the collection of head taxes, providing men for free labour to build roads, and other public works projects (Prunier, 1995:35).

According to Desforges (1999:4), after the Belgian colonial authorities decided to limit opportunities for higher education and selection for administration posts to Tutsis, they

were faced with the problem of distinguishing between the local ethnic population groups – the Tutsis, the Hutus and the Twas. Finally they created a procedure of registering everyone according to their affiliated group. The information obtained was recorded at the offices of the local government and each Rwandan was issued with an identity card that indicated his or her ethnicity. The distinction between the Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa was definitely fixed with the introduction of the ethnic identity card in 1933. This identity card resembled a solid fence between the three groups that could no longer be crossed or reversed. This eliminated the "fluid movement between castes and permanently fixing the identity of each individual, and his or her children, as either Hutu or Tutsi" (Scherrer, 2002:27). This segregation policy sowed the seeds of hatred of the Tutsi by the Hutu. The net effect was a fundamental shift in the nature and tenor of the relationship between these people both as individuals and as separate groups. The Hutu and the Tutsi started to look at each other as the enemy. Although some authors like Destexhe (1995) deny the existence of ethnic groups in Rwanda, arguing that it was merely 'certain distinguishable social categories', it was (in the end) the ethnic classification system of identity cards introduced by the Belgians that enabled the Hutu regime to carry out the genocide of Tutsis (Destexhe, 1995: iii and 34). In other words, the political demands in Rwanda were formulated in ethnic terms and the colonial policies were merely grafted onto a foundation that already contained potential for conflict.

In the mid-1950s, the tide of decolonization swept through Africa. In Rwanda, the Tutsi elites asked for independence. One interpretation was that the Tutsi elites saw this as a way of consolidating their seemingly hegemonic position, which was being threatened by Hutu awakening -- ostensibly encouraged by the Belgians. Another interpretation was that Tutsi demands had irritated the Belgians who concluded that their interests were no longer being served by the Tutsi (Personal Interview, Butare, 21 May 2008). Officially, the Belgian position regarding the switch was motivated by the fact that the colonial authorities realized that the long term security of Rwanda could not rest on minority domination. Perhaps, those (singularly or collectively) were some of the factors that may have pushed Belgium to

switch its alliance preference from the minority Tutsi to the majority Hutu. However, no one can ignore that during that period, many other African countries were struggling politically and /or militarily for the decolonization of their countries. Given that context and the need to ensure efficient and beneficial post-independence relationship, the shift of support toward the majority Hutu by Belgium seems to have been a calculated and rational exit strategy as the pressure for independence increased.

On the other hand, given the post-World War II environment that not only encouraged and valued national autonomy and freedom but also social justice, it is also plausible that the colonial authorities may have realized that the long term security and stability of Rwanda could only rest on principles of broad political participation and socio-economic justice rather than minority domination. Rwanda underwent another social revolution that resulted in the ousting of not only the Belgians but also the minority Tutsi elites in what the Hutu claimed to be "double liberation" (Mamdani, 2001:103). This dislodged the Tutsi from power. According to Prunier (1995:44), the international community through the United Nations had criticized Belgium for their discriminatory activities. By giving the political field to the Hutu, the Belgians managed to address both problems together. The Catholic Church, which was working closely with the Rwandan government, started to sponsor the formal education of Hutus to generate educated Hutus. The increased calls for the emancipation of the working class and the growth of trade unionism in Europe also influenced the missionaries to revise their policy towards the Hutus. Van Hoyweghen (1996:381) is of the opinion that the missionaries felt they had a moral obligation to protest against the social injustices suffered by the Hutus. Given the fact that the colonial authorities were working closely with Roman Catholic Church missionaries and based on the view of Prunier, the Belgians could have been influenced by the position of the missionaries to change their support to Tutsi leadership. The educated Hutu, supported by the Catholic Church and the Belgian colonial authorities, organized pro-colonial interest groups that were quickly transformed into the first ethno-political movements (Scherrer, 2002:28). It could be argued that there were also more complex issues at play. It might be

a strategic move given that, as a group, the Hutu were not ready to join the independence movement as it was likely to be dominated by the Tutsi who, rather than the Belgians, were their main rivals for the control of postcolonial Rwanda. On 24 March 1957, Grégoire Kayibanda (a Hutu leader), the then Chief Editor of the Catholic newspaper *Kinyamateka*, and one of the first graduates of the renowned Nyakibanda Roman Catholic seminary, penned the famous Bahutu manifesto in which, for the first time, the racial and political problem was explained, demanding the emancipation of Bahutu and a racial quota system in education and employment. He created the Hutu Social Movement (MSM) in June 1957 and Joseph Gitera formed the "Association for the Social Promotion of the Masses" (APROSOMA) in November 1957 (Prunier, 1995:47-48). In response, the Tutsi elites organized themselves into the Rwandese National Union (UNAR) movement. As noted earlier, this movement was hostile to Belgian colonialists. Realizing that the Tutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs with whom the Belgians had worked for many years were starting to show hostility towards Belgium, Jean-Paul Harroy -- who was the last Belgian Governor General -- embarked on reforms that replaced many Tutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs with Hutu on the grounds of advancing democracy and acting in the welfare of the oppressed majority (Taylor, 1999:44). To counter the demands of the UNAR, Belgium sponsored a liberal and multi-ethnic political party known as the Rwandese Democratic Union (RADER) (Taylor, 1999); however, it attracted very few followers because of the extreme polarization between the Hutu and Tutsi groups. On 1 November 1959, a group of UNAR's members attacked a sub-chief who was a member of the Movement Party for Hutu Emancipation (Parti du Mouvement pour l'Emancipation des Hutu [PARMEHUTU]). The false news of his death provoked reprisals against the Tutsis, particularly against UNAR members. Hutu activists gathered their troops and attacked the Tutsis, burned their houses, and stole their cattle. These attacks occurred throughout Rwanda, particularly in the northern part where Tutsi domination was deeply resented (Taylor, 1999:44). According to Taylor (1999), the violence claimed thousands of Tutsi lives and tens of thousands of Tutsi took refuge in neighboring countries. Prunier (1995:49) observes that from the outbreak of the violence,

the Belgian authorities showed extreme partiality towards the Hutus and did not intervene vigorously to stop the Hutus from burning Tutsi-owned houses.

Historians have dubbed the era from 1959 to 1961 that led to the abolition of the monarchy and the removal of all Tutsi political administrative structures 'the Hutu revolution'. This revolution definitely placed Rwanda on the road to a range of social and political conflicts. The immediate net result was that a large number of Tutsi people were either killed or fled the country. An election was held on 25 September 1961, which resulted in a victory for the main Hutu party. PARMEHUTU gained 35 seats out of 44, while UNAR only won seven seats. Gregoire Kayibanda was elected as President and Rwanda gained formal independence on 1 July 1962 (Personal Interview, Butare, May 21, 2008). However, this political situation was followed by a crisis. According to Cherry (2000), the Hutu, who felt oppressed and aspired to liberation, played the ethnic card on gaining political power. Rather than revering in their victory and using it as a prop for ensuring long term national reconciliation and stability, the new government pursued a policy that effectively nurtured a brand of retributive justice that forced tens of thousands of Tutsis into exile as refugees. As underscored by Cherry (2000:9-26), both those who fight in the defense of unjust causes and those who fight for just causes must respect and take into consideration human rights, otherwise the two could be considered one and the same according to the acts of violence perpetrated. Because this situation was not questioned by the leaders of the first republic, which was born in 1962, the situation became worse (Nkunzumwami, 1996: 88-90)

3.2.2 From Post-Independence to Genocide and Post-conflict

President Kayibanda led the country in an authoritarian manner until 1973. During his reign, armed Tutsi refugee groups organized raids into Rwanda from the borders of Burundi, Zaire (DRC) and Tanzania. The raids created a fragile humanitarian situation; in turn, they resulted in reprisals against Tutsi still living in Rwanda, which were so severe that many thousands of Tutsi were either killed or fled into exile (Taylor, 1999:44). Prunier (1995:56) notes that in 1963 the Tutsi rebels (called *Inyenzi* or cockroaches by the Hutu

authorities) launched an invasion that came close to the capital -- Kigali -- but were beaten back by the Kayibanda government. Again, the government seized this opportunity to justify massive reprisals against the Tutsis. According to Nkunzumwami (1996: 88-90), it was estimated that nearly 10,000 Tutsis were slaughtered from December 1963 to January 1964 including every single Tutsi politician living in Rwanda. A mass of refugees again fled the country by crossing the neighbouring borders.

In July 1973, the Minister of Defence and head of the National Guard, Major General Juvenal Habyarimana led a coup against President Kayibanda on the pretext of re-establishing order (Taylor, 1999:45). He then became the President of Rwanda. Habyarimana suspended all political activities and proclaimed a military regime referred to as the Second Republic. He declared equal socio-economic and political access for all Rwandans, Hutu and Tutsi alike. Under Habyarimana's regime, the persecution of Tutsi was brought to an end and a policy of regional and ethnic equilibrium was designed to allocate state administrative jobs, school and university placements on the basis of equal representation. Hutus would not be favoured over Tutsis or southerners over northerners. However, while the Tutsis were no longer being killed or harassed in principle, they were still discriminated against in practice (Taylor, 1999:45). President Habyarimana introduced a one-party system in 1978 in order to strengthen his power base (Clapham, 1998:198). For Prunier (1995:76-77), this party -- known in French as "*Mouvement Revolutionaries' National pour le developpement*" (MRND) -- was a totalitarian party which every Rwandan (including babies and the elderly) had to belong to.

However, Habyarimana's government failed to resolve the issue of the hundreds of thousands of Tutsi refugees living in neighbouring countries who were demanding the opportunity to return (Taylor, 1999:47). On 1 October 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), mainly composed of former Tutsi soldiers serving in the Ugandan army, launched an invasion from the north (Mamdani, 2001:160). The force was composed of Rwandan refugees from neighbouring countries such as Burundi, Tanzania, and DRC. They invaded

from northern Rwanda and occupied several towns in the north and north-east. On the one hand, the RPF may be seen as deriving from a regional context, mostly in relation to the socio-political and citizenship crisis in Uganda that threatened the status of Tutsi refugees there (Mamdani 2001:159-184). On the other hand, it seems likely that without the support of the Ugandan Government (especially) and other supporters, the RPF would not have managed to operate from Uganda. Because they had served in the Ugandan army, it is likely that most of the RPF forces came from Uganda in the beginning. In addition, some other factors pushed Rwanda youth (both male and female) from Burundi to join the RPF front. Such factors would include:

(1) a growing sense of insecurity among Rwandans living in Burundi because of repeated attacks. During the 1987 "coup d'état" by Pierre Buyoya againstJean-BaptisteBagaza, many Rwandese living in Burundi perished in Ntega and Marangara – the same case happened after the death of the elected president Ndadaye Melchior in 1993;

(2) the fact that, generally, Rwandan refugees in Burundi (mostly Tutsi) felt they were oppressed and wanted to return home (see Green, 2002: 733-776).

At the beginning, the RPF seemed disorganised and many of its members, including its leader (Fred Rwigyema), were killed. However, under the command of Paul Kagame, the RPF made progress in 1991 and controlled an important part of the Rwandan-Ugandan border. As the RPF advanced on to Rwandan soil, large numbers of the local Hutu population fled their villages as they thought that the Tutsi "invaders" would kill them. A local propaganda radio station warned the local population to defend themselves against the Tutsi invaders. Panic ensued as the Tutsi's return was seen as a perspicuous return of the pre-revolutionary operation of the Hutu (Prunier, 1995: 167-168; Gourevitch, 1998:49). In fact, the invasion by the RPF served to create a bargaining situation with MRND (Clapham, 1998:202).Despite the will to bargain, there was a series of unsuccessful attempts to negotiate a transitional government. A transitional government based on a broad coalition incorporating four main opposition parties -- the revived Democratic Republican Movement (MDR), the Parti Démocratique Chrétien (PDC), Parti Liberal (PL), the Parti

Social Démocrate (PSD) -- together with MRND was agreed to and announced in the latter part of 1991. The seven smaller parties were included by Habyarimana, reputedly in a mockery of multi-partyism (Howard, 1999:67-69). Prunier (1995:127) notes that these seven smaller parties were not very active and were manipulated by Habyarimana to serve National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRNDD) purposes. Due to regional and international pressure, a ceasefire between the RPF and Habyarimana's forces was initiated and later a concerted peace process began. At a later stage, according to Durch (1996:370), RPF attacks prompted the international community to advocate a ceasefire between the government forces and the RPF. The Organization of African Unity (OAU), led by Tanzanian president, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, was to play a major role by mediating between the two belligerent forces. On the other hand, political liberalization and forced negotiation with the RPF pressured Habyarimana and his political circle to preserve the remaining power they had. Subsequently, this led to the formation of the Hutu extremist CDR (Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique) party in January 1993 (Ohlsson, 1999:96). According to De Forges (1999:14), the donor nations, including the World Bank, threatened Habyarimana that financial assistance would be halted if he did not sign a treaty with the RPF by 9 August 1993. Given the fact that the government coffers was close to empty due to the economic recession and expenditure on the war, Habyarimana was obliged to sign the peace agreement on 4 August 1993 at Arusha, Tanzania.

The Arusha Accord consists of two protocols. Firstly, it covered the integration of the government armed forces and the RPF. Secondly, it dealt with various other issues including human rights violations, the rule of law, power sharing, and transitional institutions, resettlement of displaced persons and reparation for refugees. A timetable was drawn up for a projected period of two months in which a Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG) had to be established 37 days after the signing of the agreement (10 September 1993) and end with free and fair elections (Barnett,2002:62). For Barnett (2002:62), the parties to the negotiations seemed to be successful in paving a way forward for a stable Rwanda, but "underneath they were quite fearful of the future because the

extremists were venomously opposed to the accords". Howard and Astri (1999:85-87) view the Arusha Accord as a recipe for disaster since it was viewed by the Hutu extremists as an agreement that was imposed on them by outsiders. Clapham (1998:204) notes that the only real achievement of the Arusha Accord was the ability of the international mediators to persuade all the parties involved "to put their signatures" on a piece of paper. Prunier (1995:194-195) concludes that even Habyarimana himself signed the agreement as "a tactical move calculated to buy time, shore up the contradictions of the various segments of the opposition and [to] look good in the eyes of the foreign donors". Against this setting, the United Nations (UN) deployed its peacekeepers, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) to assist in implementing the Arusha agreement and support the BBTG according to the mandate passed by the UN Security Council. The deployment of UNAMIR was structured into four phases. Phase I began with the departure of foreign forces and the Mission's objective was to establish a secure environment within which a BBTG would be established. Once the BBTG was installed, the UNAMIR would move into Phase II that called for the preparation for disengagement, demobilization, and integration of former belligerents. In Phase III, the objective was to disengage, demobilize and integrate the former combatants. In the final phase, the objective was to normalize the situation and to subsequently withdraw the UNAMIR upon completion of the elections. Unfortunately, Habyarimana kept delaying the formation of the BBTG by challenging the interpretation of the Arusha Accord.

The genocide began on the evening of 6 April 1994 after the aircraft carrying Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot down while approaching Kigali Airport. Initially, the shooting was attributed to RPF by people like Burguiere (a French anti-terrorist judge), and according to "Liberation, premiere edition No 9538. 2012",the shooting was attributed to the extremist group within the Habyarimana inner circle. The latter inquiry was very close to another conducted by a group of experts commissioned by the government of Rwanda (controlled by RPF leaders). According to Shawcross(2010), regardless of who shot the plane down, the genocide started at that time as a youth militia

group known as “Interahamwe” (meaning “those who attack together) was promptly organized by the ruling government. Additionally, from the views of the respondents during the focus group (Focus Group discussions, 2010), they mentioned that most of those young people enrolled in *interahamwe* were unemployed and were happy to do whatever they were told – killing every Tutsi and moderate Hutu they could find. Green, (2002) mentions that news broadcast on radio stations like the British Broadcasting Corporation(BBC) showed that as the RPF was advancing, the “Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines” (RTLM) continued to incite the local authorities and other ordinary Hutu by advising them to kill all the Tutsi found in the hills of the country. They were asked to take the ‘job’ seriously. The violence that followed was one of the worst in the history of human kind. According to Howard and Astri (1999:234), during the first phase of the slaughter, prominent opposition politicians, human rights activists, lawyers, critical journalists and moderate civil servants were targeted. Among these was the Rwandan Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana.

According to Prunier (1995:244), the Catholic Church played a key and direct role in the genocide. The majority of the killings took place in churches. While 80 per cent of Rwandans were Christians, large numbers of church leaders and church members participated in killing church goers. Hutu extremists -- who were church leaders at the time -- became active participants in planning and perpetrating the massacre of their fellow Tutsi believers (Tom 2005:1). According to Caplan Gerald (2004:35-36), the Roman Catholic Church in the country, which was very close to the government, did not denounce the genocide. During the first week of the genocide, the UN Security Council’s attention was focused on the task of evacuating foreign nationals from Rwanda (Barnett, 2002:100). However, the safety of the Rwandan civilians was not assured. According to Barnett (2002:134), on 21 April, the Security Council voted to reduce the UNAMIR’s strength to 270 personnel with an adjusted mandate, that is, to negotiate a ceasefire, provide humanitarian relief operations, and monitor developments in Rwanda. He adds that on 17 May, Resolution 918 was passed that increased the UNAMIR’s strength to 5500 troops

with a number of provisions: to provide safe passage for displaced peoples; assist and protect the relief efforts of humanitarian organizations; and provide protected sites for displaced peoples throughout Rwanda (Barnett, 2002:139). Almost 850,000 Rwandans were killed (Prunier, 1995: 261).

On 22 June 1994, the UN authorized France's intention to conduct humanitarian intervention for a period of 60 days. This was called "Operation Turquoise". The 2,500 French soldiers who were deployed promptly established a "humanitarian protected zone" in the Cyangugu- Kibuye-Gikongoro triangle in south western Rwanda. Although this operation provided refuge for around 1,500 to 25,000 Tutsis, it was criticized for providing a safe passage to the withdrawing genocidaires and Rwandan forces who fled the advance of the RPF (Barnett, 2002:149). The RPF succeeded in defeating the Hutu regime's forces and established a new government in Kigali on 17 July 1994 (Prunier, 1995:299). Among the new leaders, Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu, was named as the President and Faustin Twagiramungu, another Hutu was named as Prime Minister (Shawcross, 2000:141). The then Chief of Staff of the RPF, Major General Paul Kagame, a Tutsi, was named as Vice-President. Nevertheless, some political analysts, especially from the opposition groups from the Rwandan Diaspora claimed that, even though Kagame was VP in the new government, he was in charge of the country despite the fronting of Hutus as President and PM. The RPF leadership announced that the new transitional government would serve for five years and hold to the Arusha Peace Accord.

Despite the fact that the RPF controlled most of Rwanda by 24 August 1994, the situation of refugees was a serious challenge for the new government, as there were almost three million refugees, which included both *interahamwe* and innocent people who were doubtful of the way RPF was going to treat them. Inside the country, a national referendum on a newly drafted constitution was held in July 2003. In the presidential election held on 25 August 2003, President Paul Kagame won 95.05 per cent of the total votes cast, making him the first Rwandan President elected through a multi-party election (IRIN News, 2004).

In spite of this landslide win, Dagne (2011) makes it clear that some individuals and organisations criticised the election process as having been fraudulent – a claim that was refuted by the Electoral Commission in Rwanda (Dagne, 2011). The above criticisms continued even after the elections, this time Human Rights Organisations talking about the oppression of the media by the Rwandan government. However, given the way the media was used to spread ethnic divisions which culminated to the 1994 genocide, some organisations supported the views of Rwanda to keep an open eye on the media. In spite of these criticisms, many organisations appreciated the way Rwanda has made a remarkable transition from post-conflict reconstruction to development. In fact, the new government inherited a deeply-scarred nation whose economy had ground to a complete halt, where social services were not functioning, and public confidence had been shattered. It was within the confines of these enormous challenges that the government initiated a new multi-party political system of democracy.

The Rwandan population is not involved in all decision-making processes, especially in electing local government representatives. Special social groups such as youth and women are represented in parliament. The main political thrust is decentralisation to ensure participation by the whole population. The United States Agency for International Development USAID (2003) noted: "local government is beginning to assume responsibility for many of the social services previously maintained by the central government. The government is involved in an impressive effort to educate and inform citizens of their rights and responsibilities under a more pluralist system". However, transparency and inclusiveness at all levels is a prerequisite for developing democratic governmental processes and for sustainable peace. Moreover, Rwanda is still dealing with armed refugees in the DRC in the DDR programme. These armed groups are still recruiting youth for an offensive attack against Rwanda.

3.3 A comparative role of women in war and in peace

According to Coulter, Persson and Utas (2008:7), in typical views on war and violent conflict, women and men are frequently placed at contradictory ends of a moral range, where women are considered peaceful and men aggressive; women passive and men active. These scholars also observed that the view that men and women are dissimilar on issues of war and peace is common; but that is not without its problems. They noted that the image of the aggressive male is not only a stereotype but also, and more importantly, the tendency for conflict and aggression to be seen as something that is naturally male is an effective way to mask how women are affected by, and more significantly, actively participate in, violent conflicts and war. From this perspective, war remains an exclusively male concern, and women are seen only as victims and are therefore not organised. In contrast to men, they are often not perceived as actors in social, economic and political structures. Coulter et al. conclude that presenting women as having more peaceful traits both supports and reproduces patriarchal values, in war as in peace (Coulter et al., 2008:7).

The term 'gender' is most commonly used to refer to women. Basically 'gender' refers to perceptions of suitable behaviour, manifestations and attitudes for women and men arising from social and cultural expectations. The empirical facts, however, indicate that gender is a powerful shaper of individual experiences of war. There is overwhelming evidence that war affects men and women differently. However, in trying to understand the complexities of these experiences, the male/female opposition seems an unnecessary limitation, one which hinders more than it helps. It must be granted that stereotypes about men and women cannot be easily ignored as they are powerful and help to reproduce inequalities (Coulter et al., 2008:8). Nevertheless, in current African wars and violent conflicts (as in many such wars and conflicts elsewhere), women have shown themselves to be as skilled as men in performing violent acts. However, as soldiering has been included in the moral universe of men in ways that it has not for women, women in combat are often considered by their very existence to be transgressing accepted female behaviour. By definition the

very act of fighting makes women less feminine and, by extension, ‘unnatural’. Women who oppose or transgress female stereotypes in war will thus often be regarded as deviant (Byrne, 1996:35).

On the one hand, in terms of numbers, men - not women - are still overpoweringly the perpetrators of violence, and both men and women are victims. On the other hand, by focusing on women only as victims we hide their full range as political and social actors. (El Jack, 2003:3). Coulter et al. (2008:8) note that the presence of so many female combatants in Africa and elsewhere today requires inquiry into what women ‘really do’ in war and the critical analysis of women’s roles as perpetrators and perpetuators of war and armed conflict, while acknowledging that while one can talk about the violence of women, as in the example of female combatants, one often finds violence against women as well. In order to understand what women actually do in war-torn societies, it has to be acknowledged that women not only have their own agenda but that they constitute a highly differentiated social category (Coulter et al., 2008:8).

During the 1980s, when Iraq was engaged in a devastating war with Iran, many progressive reforms were instituted because women were needed to maintain civil society while men were at war. However, while Iraqi women were making gains in civil life, they were also suffering the effects of armed conflict in the wider society, politically, personally and economically (UNDFW 2005). After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 when the UN Security Council (by means of Resolution 661) placed Iraq under economic sanctions, followed by the 1991 Gulf War, the economy of northern Iraq plummeted. Although men were not spared from the various consequences of war such as losing their lives during the conflict, women were severely affected in all areas of their lives, physically and psychologically. The Baghdad government cracked down brutally on any signs of dissent to consolidate its hold on power, and women, “whether because they had family members suspected of dissent or because they were oppositionists in their own right, were harassed, imprisoned, ’disappeared’, tortured, beaten, raped and executed, or lost their husbands, sons

and brothers to similar treatment" (UNDFW, 2005:1). The Security Council Resolution (SCR)1483 (22 May 2003) re-affirmed, in the second paragraph, its commitment to a "rule of law that affords equal rights and justice to all Iraqi citizens without regard to ethnicity, religion, or gender, recalling its pledge to promote gender equality as outlined in resolution 1325".

3. 3. 1 Women's experience in war

All over the world, women have participated to some extent in combat; several recent wars (since the last three or so decades of the 20th century) have seen them fighting on the front lines and taking on leadership roles. In countries such as Angola, El-Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Namibia, Nicaragua, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe, female participation in regular armed forces or guerrilla groups offers a concrete example. Women participated in wars of liberation against colonial powers as well as in contemporary rebel insurgencies, serving as both foot soldiers and in high-ranking positions (see Nzomo, 2002:9 and Bennett, Jo and Kitty, 1995). It has been estimated that there is a substantial minority of female fighters, sometimes up to 30 percent, in many armed forces in Africa (Mazurana, 2004:18).Currently, women in Africa participate in insurgencies and rebel movements, but they are also frequently employed in state-sanctioned violence. For instance, they have taken part in the activities of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda since the on-going conflict in northern Uganda started in 1986. Mackay and Mazurana (2004) have estimated that as many as 80 percent of the LRA fighters were child soldiers and of those approximately 30 percent were girls (Mckay and Mazurana, 2004:29). Furthermore, Mackay (2007:390) argued that most of these soldiers are abducted and conscripted by force. According to Fox (2004), female combatants have not always been acknowledged by organisations working in northern Uganda. From the mid to late 1990s non-governmental organisations (NGOs) started recognising their presence and roles within the LRA (Fox 2004:472). Most reports on girls and young women within the LRA highlight their role as sex slaves and captive 'wives'. However, as in so many other conflicts, the roles of women and girls are much more diverse and complex than this. It has been confirmed that nearly

all girls abducted by the LRA received military training. In one study, 12 percent of the respondents reported that their primary role was as fighters, while 49 percent stated that their secondary role was as armed forces (Mckay and Mazurana 2004:73). Abducted girls were also given as 'wives' to LRA commanders. Apart from being fighters in frontline combat (some with command positions), and 'wives' to LRA commanders, girls and young women have also carried out supportive tasks such as preparing food, carrying loot and moving weapons (Mckay and Mazurana, 2004:75).

After Eritrea's independence in 1991, female fighters had made up at least 25 to 30 percent of the total forces of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) during the war. Women were first permitted to join the EPLF in 1973 and encouraged to do so throughout the war (Klingebiel, Garke, Kreidler, Loner and Schutte, 1995).Women's liberation and new alternative roles for women were important aspects of the EPLF's ideology and part of the overall struggle for a liberated Eritrea (Barth, 2002:11). This ideology of the EPLF, and the opportunity to expand existing gender roles, could have been one of the most important reasons for young Eritrean women and girls' decision to join the movement. There is some evidence that the social environment created by the liberation struggle could have also spurred young boys and girls to join as part of their social responsibility. According to Mehreteab (2000:51), Eritrean women have always been involved at some level in all aspects of life within their society; this is despite the fact that they held a subordinate position. However, full participation in politics was unprecedented since they were traditionally prohibited from formally participating in public affairs. Mehreteab observes that Eritrean women's participation in the armed struggle and their contribution to realizing independence had changed their status in Eritrean society. Thirty percent of the fighters were women, who participated in production, education, health, and administration; 13 percent of these were frontline combatants (Mehrteab, 2004:54).

In Mozambique between 1964 and 1974, female combatants in the guerrilla army Frente de Libertacão de Mocambique (FRELIMO) fought a liberation war against the Portuguese

colonial power that resulted in independence. West (2000) states that FRELIMO engaged in systematic recruitment and deployment of girls and young women; and in 1967, the Destacamento Feminino (DF) was created as a fully functioning female-only unit. The DF was composed of girls and young women who were given military training. The DF participated in armed combat, collected intelligence and mobilised civilian support. FRELIMO saw the liberation of women as a fundamental necessity for the revolution; it was decided that it was in the interests of women and girls to contribute to the struggle as FRELIMO would liberate everyone from oppression and exploitation (West, 2000:183). Women and girls within FRELIMO were respected and treated well. Sexual relations between male and female fighters were not permitted. To some extent these measures were put in place to protect women from abuse by armed men (West, 2000:190). FRELIMO's ideology contributed to voluntary female mobilisation. On the other hand, it has been noted that during the civil war in Mozambique from 1976 to 1992 between the rebel group Resistencia Nacional de Mocambique (RENAMO) and the government forces of FRELIMO, young women and girls were involved in both fighting forces. During this period, the recruitment of female combatants differed from that during the war of liberation. According to Mckay and Mazurana (2004) some women joined FRELIMO to escape from the rural areas, to improve their education or career opportunities and to expand gender roles, although others were obliged to join. Women were also abducted by RENAMO; others joined because of discontent with FRELIMO's socialist policies and the lack of educational opportunities under their rule. Some female fighters were also promised educational opportunities in other countries by RENAMO, which never materialised (Mckay and Mazurana, 2004:107). The female combatants in FRELIMO and RENAMO performed a range of diverse roles such as fighters, trainers of incoming recruits, intelligence officers, spies, recruiters, medics, first-aid technicians, weapons experts, forced and domestic labourers, and captive 'wives' of male combatants (Mckay and Mazurana, 2004:109). West (2000) observes that the female fighters in FRELIMO's 'Destacamento Feminino' in the liberation war in Mozambique were ideologically empowered and motivated. This was the same for women participating in the liberation

movements in both Zimbabwe (Staunton, 1990) and Eritrea (Bennett et al., 1995). These women recognised themselves as 'freedom fighters' and were said to be compelled by a sense of freedom and camaraderie, most of the time expressed in terms of a struggle for gender equality or social justice, as in Zimbabwe and Mozambique (West, 2000:195).

According to Nzomo (2002:10), in many of the African 'independence wars'; the liberation of women was seen as an integral part of the overall struggle, often with a socialist agenda. In 1991, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) started their armed revolution against Sierra Leonean government forces in a civil war that lasted until January 2002. The number of women in the various forces in Sierra Leone has been estimated at between 10 and 30 percent; children constituted half of the RUF fighting forces and up to one-third of these were girls. According to analysts, women and girls played several roles within the forces but at least half received military and weapons training (Mazurana and Carlson, 2004:110). Although female combatants were in commanding positions, and in so doing had higher status, most women and girls were also forced to be 'wives' to male fighters and were repeatedly subjected to sexual violence, rape, and gang rape (Coulter, 2008, Mckay and Mazurana, 2004:110).Brett (2002:2) and Utas (2005:208) argue that the circumstances for women fighting in the recent post-independence wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Uganda were very diverse. While many were abducted, others confirmed that they joined the fighting forces for their own protection or private personal success. Barth (2002:12) has shown, however, that in guerrilla warfare and liberation movements a strategy of outnumbering the enemy force often results in the recruitment of as many combatants as possible, including women and girls. In liberation wars, female fighters may also add legality and symbolic power to the war effort, as they may symbolise unity. Different conflicts, such as liberation wars, might attract women to a higher degree than others, as women's rights and equality are frequently emphasised in these struggles.

In Africa, many women in fighting forces are still stereotyped according to their gender roles and responsibilities. According to Mckay and Mazurana (2004:112), women and girls

in fighting forces in, for example, Mozambique, Uganda, and Sierra Leone carried out traditional female roles such as cooking, cleaning, and serving men, which replicated the tasks that women and girls undertake in wider society. Utas (2005:209) observes that female fighters in different conflicts have been described by both other fighters and civilians as even more cruel and cold-blooded than male fighters. However, as Barth (2000:12) notes, it is likely that when women act aggressively it comes as a surprise to many people. Such behaviour will therefore stand out as it contradicts traditional gender roles. Women's (and girls') participation in fighting forces could result in new opportunities for them, such as achieving positions of power and learning new skills that previously would have been impossible. Therefore war can oppress women and girls and at the same time it may also expand their potential opportunities (Mckay and Mazurana, 2004:17). It has been observed that women who volunteer to do battle are often those who possess strength, independence, courage, persistence, and character according (Keairns, 2002:6). They desire to establish a life of their own and often behave in ways contrary to social expectations. These qualities – strength, independence, courage, persistence, and character – are not highly valued female characteristics in many traditional African societies, which frequently promote women's submission, servility, and willingness to endure and accept their secondary place (Coulter, 2008:14). The researcher feels that the qualities described above are a stereotype of African values. In any society, in Africa or elsewhere, physical strength is not a highly valued female quality. The researcher agree that while character is a highly valued female quality across virtually all African societies, strength and courage are important qualities for women in carrying out certain tasks such as household chores, farming and supporting their families.

In most of the warfare forces in Africa, men have (in general) held the leading positions; however, a few young women held positions of command and authority (Mckay and Mazurana, 2004:113). Ellis (2007:144) cites examples from the Liberian civil war, where well-known female commanders included Martina Johnson in the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), Ruth 'Attila' Milton in the Liberia Peace Council (LPC) and 'Black

diamond' in Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). Despite the fact that some of the females in command positions led smaller groups consisting of female combatants, many commanded both men and women. In this way these women gained access to influential positions that they probably would not have had access to but for the war. Female combatants who did not hold important positions also experienced a new sense of freedom, as life with the fighting forces could expand traditional gender roles (Coulter, 2008:15). According to Mckay, female fighters said that by carrying arms they gained power, status, and control, and that they felt pride, self-confidence, and a feeling of belonging. However, he notes that except for the most powerful female combatants who had commander status or were commanders' favourite 'wives', most female fighters were subjected to abuse from men because of their low status in the gender as well as the military hierarchy (Mckay, 2007:388). Specht (2006:15) observes that in the fighting forces in Liberia there was no true gender equality for female fighters, as male commanders were above them in the military structure, men who could force them to marry or demand sexual favours. In the same vein, Utas (2005:207) confirmed that even though some of the most senior women commanders in Liberia were spared this kind of abuse, before they achieved a command position sexual abuse and gender discrimination were part of their experience.

As seen above in the cases of Eritrea and Mozambique, women and girls generally had a relatively high status as the liberation movements viewed women's rights and equality as integral parts of the overall struggle for independence. According to Arnfred (1988:5), Mozambique was a powerfully patriarchal society prior to the eruption of war; women and men led separate lives with a clear division of labour and different rules for gender conduct. Women were subordinated to patriarchal family authority. However, during the war women's emancipation was an important aspect of the revolutionary struggle. Men and women came together on equal terms as Mozambicans in the struggle against the Portuguese colonial power. This recognised a new female identity and created the opportunity for new gender relations. In Eritrea female fighters occupied an elevated

status within the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). According to Barth (2002:15), the general view was that female combatants strengthened the EPLF's struggle. He argues that women's dedication to the liberation struggle was said to have inspired the men to do their best. The greater aim was a liberated Eritrea and this demanded the very best of all combatants, men and women. When men tried to oppress women within the fighting forces due to their gender, women would complain to their leaders, and those men were criticised for their behaviour in formal sessions. This strengthened the rights of female fighters in the EPLF (Barth, 2002:16).

In Liberia, the first Liberian civil war began when the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor attacked Liberia in December 1989. After eight years the war came to an end in 1997 and Taylor was elected president. However the security situation was still unstable and in 2000 civil war broke out once again as Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) launched a raid from Guinea (Coulter, 2008:16). According to Specht (2006:15), women and girls were part of the fighting forces in both fighting and non-fighting roles. There were also some units composed entirely of female combatants generally known as Women's Artillery Commandos (WAC). It is not easy to approximate how many female combatants joined voluntarily and how many were forced to join the fighting forces; estimates vary depending on the source of information. Amongst those who volunteered, the majority said that they did so to survive and to protect themselves, but other reasons such as economic motives, poverty, and the wish for revenge or for equality with men were also contributing factors (Specht, 2006:32). Utas found that the majority of the young women who fought in the civil war became involved through combatant boyfriends (Utas, 2003:208). Most young women in the Liberian war zone were under immense pressure and many had no other choice but to attach themselves to a fighter with enough power to protect them. With no protection these young women were at immediate risk of, for example, being forced to provide sexual services or of being raped (Utas, 2003:176). Utas also remarks that even though most young women were in a fragile position in the war zone, some female fighters who gained positions as commanders and

high-ranking officers were able to turn war into a successful endeavour. With looted goods some were able, for example, to build up business enterprises after the end of the war (Utas, 2003:212).

In the province of Tigray in Ethiopia, the Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF) was founded in 1975 as a movement opposed to the military dictatorship. Women and girls were involved in active combat within the TPLF, and numbered approximately a third of the combatants. Most female fighters were voluntarily recruited (Coulter, 2008:14). Veale (2003:26) notes the contribution of female fighters to the liberation struggle is seen as almost legendary in Ethiopia, and within the TPLF women were highly regarded and respected as fighters. The Tigrean movement also had a clear agenda of addressing women's equality in addition to the overall aim of liberation. Work within the TPLF, such as supportive tasks and fighting, was allocated equally between men and women. Women and girls seemed in general not to have been subjected to forced sexual relations and sexual abuse, as discipline was tight with respect to sexual relations. Rape was also rare and severely punishable.

In the DRC, women and girls were actively involved as combatants within the armed forces during the six-year conflict from 1998 to 2004. Thousands of girls were forcibly recruited by armed groups in the towns and villages of the Eastern Provinces (Verhey, 2004:10). Some revealed they joined the struggle by choice, while in a few cases they claimed to have participated because of patriotic values. In other cases girls joined because they wanted to flee challenging domestic relations or because joining was seen as the only way to access food and material goods (Coulter, 2008:19). Within the armed groups of the DRC, the vast majority of the girls served multiple roles at the same time. As Verhey (2004:10) has noted, the view that girls in the DRC were only used as 'wives' and did not serve in active combat roles is incorrect. As in many other conflicts, it is hard to estimate how many female fighters were parts of the armed forces in the DRC. However, in 2005 the Save the Children agency reported that there were up to 12,500 girls in the armed groups, and that

girls were estimated to make up 40 percent of all children in such groups in the DRC (Save the Children, 2005).

Female participation in conflicts in Africa is presented as follows:

Table 3.1Summary of female participation in some African conflicts

Country	Year and % of females	Roles played by females	Specific experience	
			Positive	Negative
Uganda (LRA)	1986 30%	Fighters, sex slaves and captive 'wives'. Supportive tasks: preparing food, carrying loot and moving weapons		Abducted and conscripted
Eritrea	1991 30%	Fighters (13% of them) - production tasks, education, health, and administration.	Motivation of social responsibility	-
Mozambique (FRELIMO + RENAMO	1974-1974	Armed combat, intelligence and spies, mobilised civilian support, trainers, recruiters, medics, first-aid technicians, weapons experts.	Participation in the liberation and seek education and career opportunities	Forced and domestic labourers, and captive 'wives' of male combatants.
Sierra Leone (LUF)	1991-2002 (30%)	Some women in command position		Forced 'wives' to male fighters Sexual violence, rape
Liberia	1989-1997	High command position	Access to higher positions, improvement of traditional gender status, economic motivation, and protection.	-
Ethiopia	1975	Fighter and supportive tasks	Higher status and improved gender equality	-
RDC	1998-2004 12,500 girls	Diverse roles including sexual 'wives'	Economic motivation	Forced recruitment

From the Table 3.1, it is clear that the roles and status positions of female fighters vary between different conflicts and fighting forces. On the one hand, it has been observed that in the wars in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Mozambique, women's participation was regarded as strengthening the overall aim of liberation and women thereby gained higher status positions. On the other hand, in other conflicts like those in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Uganda, and during the war between FRELIMO and RENAMO in Mozambique, individual female fighters might have been in positions of power and some also enjoyed more organisational power than prior to the outbreak of war, but their general status was low as many had been abducted, forced to labour, or were abused. However, even in those cases where female fighters may have had high status positions during the war this was not necessarily maintained after the war.

During non-revolutionary conflicts, women's military participation has been largely limited to industrialised countries such as the Gulf War in 1991 that narrowed the gap between the duties of men and women in the US. Females were allowed to launch patriot missiles, while they were excluded from 'combat positions'. As military intervention progresses technologically, it is likely that women will play ever more active military roles (Ferris, 2004:20). In 1776, the Berlin Garrison of Frederick the Great consisted of 17,056 men, 5,526 women and 6,622 children (Olsoon and Torrun, 2001:23). According to Skjelsbaek and Smith (2001:7), United States of America and Israeli armed forces deploy women in direct roles in units of the Bosnian government army including the 17th Brigade, which was reported to be one of the most effective Bosnian units. Women combatants are often employed in direct combat, such as in the case of the Liberian Tigers of Tamil Ealam, and the Secessionist forces in Sri-Lanka, who were said to have more than 3,000 women fighters in the early 1990s.The Sandinista forces in Nicaragua employed women in relatively large numbers, both during the insurgence against Anastasia Somoza in 1978 and 1979 and, in the 1980s war against the 'Contras' (Skjelsbaek, 2001:7).

3.3.2 Women's experience in peace time

Women play a vital role in creating and maintaining peace at the community level in the Solomon Islands even though they have been greatly affected by the conflict through displacement, vulnerability to rape, harassment, and economic hardship. Despite their exclusion from formal decision-making processes, Solomon Islander women have tried to move between the different combatant groups, persuading men to lay down their arms. Thus, female negotiators took on the "traditional go-between role, which is a traditional method of conflict resolution" in the Solomon Islands (World Health, 2006). The Farabundo Marti Liberation Front in El-Salvador recruited large numbers of woman guerrillas. During its 30-year war of independence against Ethiopia the Eritrea People's Liberation Front (EPLF) used women in combatant roles. While many people believe that women tend to be more "peace-loving" than men, there have been always aggressive women such as Joan of Arc who was glorified for her military prowess. Rani Lakshimi Bai of Jhansi, a warrior in the great Maratha tradition, who led her troops against the British in India, is another example. French women were incredibly violent towards Nazi collaborators after the Second World War. In some Native American traditions, females were responsible for the torture and mutilation of prisoners. It has been noted that females have played important military roles in violent struggles for national liberation (Ferris, 2004:7). However, when compared with male violence, female violence may be more "unstructured and anarchic, but the potential for violence is still present, though perhaps in different form from that within the men" (Ferris, 2005:3). The heroism, aggressiveness, or violence of women fighters has never been proven historically. Rather, the issue is that on balance women appear to share certain qualities that suggest that they are more peace loving and violence-averse than men.

Today, women's stories of their struggles for social change and peace are beginning to be told. There are women protesting against violence in Northern Ireland, Japanese women protesting against nuclear power and racism, and Palestinian and Israeli women trying to

overcome barriers of distrust and enmity. South African women's long history of non-violent resistance has been central to the country's liberation struggle. Although women have played a prominent role in military service, they are still marginalised in many countries during and after the resolution process. For centuries, females have played very important roles in peace movements both as activists and organisers. They have taken leadership positions in countries such as Israel, Northern Ireland, and Argentina. Yet, when issues of war and peace are discussed in the mainstream media, women's voices are heard about as often as they are in the corridors of military power. Despite the important work being done by some of the feminists cited above, peace research is still, as Betty Reardon observes, very much "another male preserve" (Reardon, 1985:7l).According to Ferris (2004:11), women were rarely present in the negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union during the 1980s; in the one or two cases where a woman was involved, it was at junior level. This was explicated by former US President Ronald Regan example when he observed that "women were not at the 1986 US-Soviet summit because for him, they are not going to know missile throw-weights or what's happening in Afghanistan or what is happening in human rights. Some women will, but [not] most women…Believe me, your 'female' readers, for the most part …would rather read the human interest stuff of what happened" (Ferris, 2004:11).

In times of peace, a woman's place is regarded as being in the home (Mehreteab, 2004:51). Women seem to share one characteristic, which is limited access to benefits when peace is realised. For Mckay (1994:23), dealing with conflict is in effect a male-dominant issue and during reconciliation times, women ex-guerrillas are pressured to put aside their needs in the name of peace. This has also been the case in some countries in Africa. Enloe (1993: 257) observes that "Polish women are being urged to worry less about unemployment…and to take more satisfaction in bearing children for the sake of nationalist revival. Angolan women are being urged to put their own needs as women on the political back-burner for the sake of keeping afloat the fragile boat of post-cold war Angolan democratisation". Edward (1994) notes that the dedication to and sacrifices for the common cause of women

who participated in Marxist liberation movements in Central America did not translate into leadership in post-war civil institutions. He observes that Nicaraguan women advise Salvadorian and Guatemalan women not to equate participation in the armed struggle with gender equality (Edward, 1994:52).Urdang (1989:11-12) noted how little change had taken place at household level in Guinea-Bissau. Although the liberation of women was part of the ideological perspective of building a new society, women have been actively called upon to put gender issues aside and wait for the appropriate time to tackle them. In Somalia, women who want to help shape the reconstruction of their country were faced with the consequences of breaking tradition when men felt threatened by their new roles. The most active women community workers were shut out of negotiations for peace and reconstruction, and women were excluded from nearly every formal meeting where Somalia's future was determined (Osman, 1993:12).Mathabane (1994) notes the significance of women's involvement in South Africa's national freedom struggle and observes that their agenda can no longer be ignored, postponed, or compromised. These women are insisting that their emancipation should not be regarded as incidental to overall liberation from apartheid. The two struggles are indivisibly linked. They want to ensure that South Africa doesn't go the way of many independent states in Africa where women contributed as much as men to the overthrow of colonisation and yet find themselves still oppressed, discriminated against, and treated as second-class citizens (Mathabane, 1994:346).

Farr, (2002:10) observes that with ideologies and stereotypes firmly in place; it seems inevitable that men and not women will predominate in the peace agreements and reconstruction processes that are set in motion when wars end. During the Arusha Peace Negotiations on the Burundi conflict, women were granted observer status only when male delegates insisted that, "the women are not parties to this conflict. This is not their concern. We cannot see why they have come, why do they bother us? We are here to represent them (Anderlini, 2000:10).Furthermore, Shikola (1998:147) notes: No one mentions the contributions women made during the struggle. That's true all over the world. You never

find an appreciation of what women did. Men appreciate women, who cook for them, and they respect women who fought war with them, but after independence, they [don't] really consider women as part of liberation movement.

The table below summarises women participation in the peace building.

Table 3.2 Participation of women in peace building and post-conflict outcomes

Level	Model	Cases
Active	War makers (Jean d'Arc, Rani LakshimiBai)	France and India
	Violence breeders	French women were incredibly violent towards Nazi collaborators Yugoslavia Native America
	Traditional go-between role, negotiator	Salomon Islands
	Peace building and social change	Japan Ireland Palestine Israel
Passive	Mere observers in the peace building process	Burundi peace negotiations
	Absence/exclusion in the peace building process	Negotiations between US and the Soviet Union during the 1980s
	Give up gender equality and women's rights after women's active participation in the war effort	Angola Central America Guinea Bissau Somalia

For De Pauw (1998:p.xiii), "women have always and everywhere been inextricably involved in war [but] hidden from… During wars, women are ubiquitous and highly visible; when wars are over and the songs are sung, women fade away". As noted by Farr (2002:11), a careful deconstruction of ideas about space in wartime shows that gender stereotypes naturalise ideas of how people behave. Recognising a pattern in the ways in which societies manipulate gender ideologies, feminist scholars have worked to nuance our understanding of how women's roles, and their identities that fulfil these roles during the build-up to war, in wartime, and when the war ends, are strategic and shifting. Arguing

against the predominant stereotypes of women as innately peaceful and men as inevitably warlike, feminists have suggested that we recognise the complexity of gender ideologies and the multiple roles they play in drawing different social actors into war (Fukuyama, 1998:36; Goldstein, 2001:60).In peacetime as well in wartime, females display a wide variety of responses to organised and/or state-sanctioned forms of violence (Farr, 2002:6). There is a long and much celebrated history of feminist pacifism, and some females, as peace activists, play essential roles in maintaining social connections, and building coalitions across communities divided by violence, and are therefore well positioned to play important roles in rehabilitation, reconciliation, reintegration, support and peace building roles in the aftermath (Anderlini, 2000:12). At the same time, there are also many cases of women embracing "revolution with hope and war with enthusiasm" (Hill, 2001:21).

As noted above, women may participate in conflict through supporting and maintaining guerrilla forces even though they are not recruited as soldiers. They provide the essentials of war: information, food, clothing and shelter. They nurse soldiers back to health like the work undertaken by other women - their contributions are too often overlooked after the conflict has come to an end (Farr, 2002:6).Many feminists have observed that women's peace building activities receive too little recognition in the period of reconstruction (Anderlini, 2000:13); it is also true that women who saw active combat are not allowed to participate as leaders in the development of transition and reconstruction processes. They are often acknowledged only as mothers, sisters, wives or daughters (Farr, 2002:7).While their levels of participation in the business of the war are varied, they remain at the margins of political, economic, and social power, and their voices and experiences tend to disappear when peace processes begin (Goldblatt and Meintjes, 1996:96).Coulter et al. (2008) provide an overview of the situation of women in African war and post-war situations, with particular focus on gender-sensitivity in the DDR programmes. They describe the difficult reintegration process that many of the former female combatants experience, and note that "surviving war does not automatically mean surviving peace" (Coulter et al., 2008:28).

Tonheim (2009:40) observes that in the DRC that women are often overlooked both as victims of war but also as resourceful survivors of war. Documentation on their victimhood is more accessible than documentation of their coping mechanisms and increased independence and self-confidence. Even though Congolese women have taken several initiatives in the peace process, the author claims that they remain largely untapped and sometimes deliberately excluded resources. Tonheim calls for women to be included in the peace process at an early stage, and argues that if this does not happen it will be more difficult to insert them at a later stage.

Despite the problem of the invisibility of women, countries that have emerged from a situation of war and conflicts are often seen as potential sites of positive change. Some theorists observe that war and the aftermath of war can present opportunities to influence social and political structures that, in peacetime, were beyond women's expectations (Farr, 2002: 11). The following section examines the gender perspective and conflict.

3.3.3 Women and the gender perspective

To be a man or a woman means facing different and well-defined social expectations about appearance, qualities, behaviour and work. Relations between women and men - whether in the family, in the market place, or in the community - are structured around a culture-based understanding of the characteristics and behaviour appropriate to each. The social nature of gender is evident in the variation between classes and ethnic groups in the same culture or in changes over time. However, the following basic facts are evident: Men and women do different types of tasks and have different jobs within the family, in household production and in the marketplace. Women have less access to power, status, resources, choices and benefits than men.

The division of labour along gender lines is crucial in understanding and addressing inequalities between men and women. Although the power and roles of women vary across countries, women are universally unequal in both the economic and political spheres (Scott,

1986:21). The structural inequality of power that exists between men and women across societies creates the conditions for the social control of women. Furthermore while the levels of violence prevalent in specific social situations can limit the degree of violence used to control women, violence against women reflects relations of domination and subordination. Gender, according to UNPFA, is a multi-faceted aspect of discrimination with issues of gender determining roles, power relationships, responsibilities, expectations, and access to resources (UNPFA, 2003). For Caprioli (2003:5), gendered structural hierarchies are based on stereotypical gendered behaviour that values masculine characteristics over feminine ones and that accord men a higher social status in relation to that of women. The roots of violence may be found in power relationships with a patriarchal hierarchy enabling "men to use and abuse their power" (Pillay, 2001:39). The relationship between militarism and patriarchy has been studied by feminist researchers such as Reardon (1985:12) who observes: Authoritarian patriarchy, which seems to have emerged with the major elements of 'civilisation' - human settlements, organised agriculture, the state, and male domination – invented and maintains war to hold in place the social order it spawned.

The fact that males are more likely than females to engage in fighting is often ascribed to their greater physical strength and to cultural beliefs that warfare is appropriate male behaviour. According to Adcock (1982:214):Militarism is primary a male phenomenon and the ultimate of power patriarchy is the organised, legitimised violence of the nation-state. For millennia, part of women's role has been to decry male aggression. We often see ourselves as posing a better way – a more loving, nurturing way of life than masculine mode poses. Sometimes love and hatred seem polarised along sex lines …We have generally portrayed ourselves as the victims of male domination, downplaying the areas in which we ourselves hold power. Seidman (1993:291) noted that since at least the turn of the century, nationalist movements have regularly promised to improve women's status before taking power. They have pledged to end gender-based subordination. Just as regularly, however, most of these promises have gone unfulfilled. Gender stereotypes have

also affected women in the military, and their participation has been limited because of their gender. As observed by Olsoon and Torunn (2001:23), popular opinion would have it that women do not make good soldiers because they are physically and emotionally weak. According to Shikola (1998:147-148):[No] one mention (s) the contributions women made during the …struggle. That is true all over the world. You never find an appreciation of what women did. Men appreciate women, who cook for them, and they respect women who fought the war with them, but after independence, they [don't] really consider women as part of the liberation movement.

It has been observed that war brings about only temporary changes in gender roles. While not necessarily true for all women and girls, life as a female combatant can provide opportunities to occupy powerful positions and gain agency in a way that would not have been possible prior to the war. Women may also hope to change their status positions after the war has ended, but more often than not they revert to more traditional or conservative gender roles (Coulter et al., 2008:30). In the outcome of war, women are gradually pushed in the direction of a gender role that is considered appropriate in that particular society (Barth, 2002).To add to the debate put forward by Honwana (1998) and Dyregrov, Gupta, Gjestad and Raundalen (2002), Denov and Maclure (2007:259) points to one element that is not discuss by either- the reality and importance of gender. Culturally accepted traditional gender stereotypes limit the potential of both males and females, and the author raises the question of whether gendered exclusionary customs, such as discrimination against women, should be accepted and perpetuated. She uses the DDR programmes in Sierra Leone as an illustration of how, due to traditional gender roles, girls were made invisible and excluded from the programmes, and thus inequalities were reproduced and gendered power differentiation was extended as the girls and women are left alone to fend for themselves. She concludes that the pluralistic approach to psycho-social intervention must be gender-sensitive and avoid reproducing inequalities. For Marlowe (1993), men and women have different capacities for "certain kinds of things". He argues that fighting is one of these things, certainly in the forms required in land combat, and that, "the male's greater

vital capacity, speed, muscle mass, aiming and throwing skills, his greater propensity for aggression and his more rapid rise in adrenaline make him more fitted for physically intense combat" (Marlowe, 1993:190).

However, while different attitudes toward our bodies constitute a basic part of our self-identification as feminine or masculine, these attitudes are also contradictory, given the fact that some women are stronger than men. Rwandan anecdotes illustrate how weak some men have always found reasons for being challenged by women. In the Rwandan culture, people have always assumed that there are fairly substantial innate sex differences in body form that explain why men generally show superior performance in tasks reflecting strength or athletic ability. In the context of this research, we will see later how such assumptions have powerful personal and social consequences on women ex-combatants. In view of this, traditional gender roles must accordingly be reviewed. Enloe (1998) holds that the manipulation of gender-appropriate behaviour is a central component of ethnic nationalism. She adds that the "militarisation of women has been crucial for the militarisation of governments and of international relations" as well as the militarisation of men (Enloe, 2003:3). For Stiefel (1998:p.iii) gender roles and social values [are] extremely affected by the experience of war, so that the reconfiguration of gender roles and positions is a fundamental part of the challenge of reconstruction. Cock (1991) concluded that while significant attention has been paid to the ways in which men and ideas about masculinity are mobilised as part of the war machine - and this attention has not always been critical - it is only in recent years that people have begun to understand that women, and deeply-held beliefs about femininity, are also militarised and mobilised in support of the ideology of war.

3.4 The case of Rwanda

During the violence and conflicts in Rwanda, men, rather than women and children, have been the main targets. While churches had been places of refuge for people threatened with violence in 1994, they also became chambers of death and the massacres targeted women

and children as well as men. Although some Hutu women were victims of sexual abuse, it was mainly Tutsi women who were at risk; rape became a weapon of war, and ethnic cleansing primarily targeted Tutsis. On the other hand, during the 1994 genocide individual women were at risk simply because of their gender; others were targeted because of their actual or presumed membership of particular groups. Because of their ethnicity, Tutsi women were targeted generally, and a large number were killed, normally after having been subjected to sexual violence and torture (Newbury and Baldwin, 2003:3). Even though this situation was fuelled by the war and politically motivated in the post-genocide period in Rwanda, gender-based violence continued to be a problem; women and small girls continued to be raped and defiled as in many other war-affected African countries (MIGEPROFE, 2004). Newbury and Baldwin (2000) estimate that 200,000 or more Rwandan women were victims of some form of sexual violence during the genocide. As Human Rights Watch has documented in "Shattered Lives, Sexual Violence during the Genocide in Rwanda and its Aftermath", sexual abuse was used as a weapon to humiliate the Tutsi by destroying their women. The survivors of this brutal treatment have been described as the 'living dead'; some were sexually mutilated, and others have had to deal with chronic pain, in addition to the fear of pregnancy, AIDS and other sexually-transmitted diseases. The psychological burdens are also severe, as the *Interahamwe* militia often sexually abused Tutsi women and some Hutu women from moderate Hutu families in public, even in the presence of their own families (Newbury and Baldwin, 2000: 22). Eyewitnesses during the period of the fieldwork highlighted that, in some cases, Tutsi women were forced to serve as 'sex slaves' for Hutu men (Focus Group interview, 2010)

Women who have been violated often hesitate to talk about it, mostly because of the trauma of rape, but also because of shame and threat of rejection by their friends or families. Psychological trauma thus leads to social isolation. As a Rwandan testifying at the Fourth International Conference of women at Beijing noted, "Raped women are doubly punished by society. First, judicial practice does not grant them redress for rape as long as graphic evidence is not brought out into the open. Second, from society's point of view there is little sympathy, for at the moment that men and children died without defence, these

women used the sex card, 'selling their bodies to save their lives'. Thus they are judged from all sides, and even among their families they are not easily pardoned. Even worse, people reproach them of having preferred survival through rape" (Newbury and Baldwin, 2000:23).Many women who have been raped are denigrated by society and their families. Their chances of getting married are low and some have given birth to children who are scorned. This situation was aggravated by the fact that many women would not want to report or talk about this issue. As many as 5,000 children are estimated to have been born as a result of rape during the genocide. Some women choose not to keep these babies. Those who did often encountered resistance and reprobation from their families and society. The terms used to describe this off-spring reflect such reprobation: 'children of bad memories', 'devil's children', as well as 'little *Interahamwe*' (Newbury and Baldwin, 2003:24).One example of the stigma attached to rape is a young girl who had been forced to be a slave of a Hutu militia man during the genocide. She was engaged to be married to an RPF soldier, but when she told her fiancé that she had been raped, and that one of her parents was Hutu, the soldier called off the wedding and ended the relationship. She was depressed and worried about what kind of future she would have.

Many Rwandan women have dramatic stories to tell and the issue of gender stereotypes is even more pronounced when it comes to demobilisation from the army. Almost every Rwandan woman who survived war and genocide experienced serious problems such as social and economic insecurity, hunger, fear, loss of family and friends, and female-headed households that are often very vulnerable. Socially, politically, and economically, the situation of the Rwandans in general and women in particular after the war and genocide is catastrophic. As a result of the genocide, it is estimated that 60-70 percent of Rwanda's population is now female, 50 percent of whom are widows (Kumar, Tardif-Douglin, Maynard, Manikas, Sheckler, and Knapp, 1996).Women in Rwanda face many problems, including: family responsibilities such as caring for their own children, orphans, children's relatives or friends as well as caring for elderly or infirm relatives. Vulnerable women include widows, women whose husbands are in prison, and young girls heading households. Rwandan women are still suffering from poverty in general and the number of

women-headed households increased dramatically after war and genocide. A demographic survey conducted by the government in 1996 estimated that 54 percent of the population was female and that 34 percent of households were headed by women, most of them widows (Layika: 1998). The Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (2009) CFSVA and Nutrition Survey data shows that the population of Rwanda is characterized by a relatively high proportion of female-headed households. Eleven percent of the households are single-headed, mostly by females, as shown in the diagram below:

Figure 3.1 Heads of single-headed households in Rwanda



Source: Rwanda National Institute of Statistics, Comprehensive Food Security andVulnerability Analysis and Nutrition Survey (CFSVA), July 2009, Kigali.

Almost all of the single-headed households are female-headed: 94% of the households headed by a widow(er) were female-headed in 2009. This is why it is important to take gender into account in reconstruction efforts in Rwanda after the genocide. The evidence of poverty reinforces this point; the World Bank has estimated that 70% of the population in Rwanda is living below the poverty line. It is also estimated that the average income per

household per month rarely exceeds Rwf2,500 (two thousand, five hundred Rwandan Francs which is equivalent of US $7) (Human Rights Watch).

This has been linked to the low educational level of females compared to males and diagrammatically represented as shown in figure 3.2.

Figure 3.2 Literacy and education levels for Household Heads



Source: Rwanda National Institute of Statistics, Comprehensive Food Security andVulnerability Analysis and Nutrition Survey (CFSVA), July 2009, Kigali.

Female heads of household were less likely to be literate (43 percent) compared to male heads of household (73 percent). Male heads of household were the most likely to have at least some education (28 percent had none) while female heads of household were the most likely to be uneducated (56 percent with no education). Rwandan women have become increasingly directly involved in the development and implementation of policies that affect them as part of their efforts to ensure not only the eradication of poverty and the promotion of education and literacy but also an end to discrimination against women. In their situation of vulnerability, Rwandan women have had to assume new roles and responsibilities previously dominated by men. Women in Rwanda are playing a central role in the reconstruction of the country. At the national level and in local communities, the role that

women's associations and individual women are playing has shown encouraging initiative in addressing the challenges of rebuilding the country and their communities. The number of women in high positions in the central government has increased but is still limited. Rwanda's new constitution stipulates that women must constitute 30 percent of decision-making mechanisms of government. Rwanda is leading the world ranking in terms of the number of women in its parliament as a result of the 2008 parliamentary elections. The September 2003 elections saw 48 percent of seats in the National Assembly going to women. This is admirable achievement in light of the fact that previously only 25.7 percent of the seats were occupied and even more so considering that the world average is 15.2% (Inter-parliament Union, 2003). Since 2009, women have held a third of all Cabinet positions, including the position of Foreign Minister, Supreme Court Chief and Police Commissioner General. Rwanda became the first country in the world where women are in the majority in government; 56percent in the Chamber of Deputies and 34 percent in the Senate. The current Speaker's chair is held by a woman. In post-genocide Rwanda, women took work which was traditionally done by men such as working on construction sites, driving taxis and trucks, etcetera.

Economically, the country has a new persuasive economic force which is women. Women are building their own homes, they are investing in their families, increasing savings, and they are paying school fees for their children. Nevertheless, despite these tremendous achievements, as in other African country, the freedom and emancipation of women in the rural areas of Rwanda are still jeopardised by patriarchal beliefs whereby men treat women as second class citizens. On the other hand, some women abuse their freedom and mistreat men in different ways, and this creates backlash from men. Women have assumed new roles in Rwandan society and some efforts have been made to promote gender equity following the war and genocide. These include the establishment of the Ministry of Gender and Social Affairs. The government is also in the process of creating a legal framework that recognises women's rights. The revision of the matrimonial code offers couples a choice of property regimes, including the option to own land and property equally. New

legislation enacted in November 1999 gives men and women the equal right to inherit land from their parents. In the past, according to customary land tenure system in Rwanda, only men had the right to own land. Upon marriage, women had to leave their families to join their husbands who inherited land from their parents. In her new family, a woman could not inherit her husband's property. A woman could inherit land only when she had neither male children nor living male relatives of her deceased husband. However, the widow had the right to use her late husband's land as long as she stayed in her husband's house and raised their children. In the proposed new comprehensive land law, women and men have equal land rights; women will be able to inherit land and property from their parents and husbands. In terms of judicial reforms, a number of discriminatory aspects of some legislative provisions such as the penal code and civil code were revised. A Bill on amendments to the family code is in its final drafting stage and will be sent to the cabinet for endorsement. In connection with this research, all of these reforms created a good environment for women ex-combatants in their integration process. Indeed, in the post 1994 Rwanda, one can see a proliferation of associations of women ex-combatants involved in different businesses, even the businesses formerly taken as taboo like taxi driving. In other words, the improved circumstances and achievements by women in post-genocide Rwanda due different policy reform could be seen as an indication of progressive and successful integration programs for female ex-combatants.

This study critically examines the current situation of women with a view to identifying opportunities that are available for female ex-combatants to reintegrate into the mainstream of society and how they can contribute to the rehabilitation and reconstruction process in post-genocide Rwanda. Despite numerous challenges, women in Rwanda are proving to be key actors in the reconstruction process and have the potential to contribute to poverty eradication.

Chapter 4

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will use the work of various authors to assess the demobilization and reintegration of combatants. This literature review will be undertaken not only to develop an understanding of the subject matter but also to situate the study within the broader theoretical literature. It presents the definitions of key concepts such as combatant, demilitarization, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The first section discusses the implementation of DDR Programmes, where the researcher identifies the key themes found in many scholars' assessments of DDR programmes. These are DDR as a prelude to post-conflict social transformation; demobilization as demilitarisation; DDR as a social contract; the international community as support to DDR; DDR as support of transitional justice; DDR as support of security sector reform; the conception of demobilization; DDR in the peace building environment; and the success of a DDR programme. Each of those themes is discussed in different sub-sections.

The second section focuses on the context of DDR Programmes with particular emphasis on female ex-combatants in some African countries as an introduction to the experience of female ex-combatants in Rwanda which will be discussed in chapters five and six. In section two, different sub-sections discuss female ex-combatants' participation in DDR programmes; the exclusion of female ex-combatants from those programmes; female ex-combatants and gender issues; the education and skills gained by female ex-combatants during and after the struggle; female ex-combatants and health issue' as well as their stigmatisation.

4.2 A conceptual clarification

To understand better the discussions in the next sections, concepts that are relevant to this study such as combatant, demilitarization, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration

will be defined. More details of these concepts are found in the annex. A brief attempt at definitional clarity is crucial given that the concepts are most often confused and used interchangeably. This is despite the fact that each of the concepts signifies different steps of the whole peace process.

4.2.1 Combatant

The term "ex-combatant" has not been well-defined. The United Nations recognises when dealing with DDR officially that combatants become ex-combatants when they are registered as disarmed (UN, 1999:52). For Nilsson, this is of little use as it says nothing about who should be considered as a combatant or a fighter. It is therefore necessary to first establish what a combatant is (Nilsson, 2005:15).All members of armed groups, including people working in administration and women and children, who have stayed with an armed group, may be targeted for demobilisation. However, for Houghton (2000), a combatant is one who engages in combat or armed struggle: a belligerent, fighter, soldier or warrior. As with Houghton (2000), this study will define a 'combatant' as a person or a combat vehicle that takes part in armed strife.

4.2.2 Demilitarization

Harris (2002:6) holds that the term 'demilitarisation' refers to a significant and sustained reduction in terms of the power and influence of the military, which is indicated not only by a reduction in military personnel but also the projections of force. Demilitarisation refers to a social environment within a society where the emphasis is on the non-violent resolution of conflicts and the attainment of personal and social justice (Harris, 2006).For Lamb(1997), 'demilitarisation' includes some or all of the following components: civilian control over the armed forces; demobilisation of combatants; disarmament; cuts in military spending; conversion of arms industries; the formation of solutions to conflict; and an effective means for obtaining and defending power.

4.2.3 Disarmament

Disarmament involves reducing military forces and weapons numerically. This includes a reduction in weapons, military personnel and/or military power according to the Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC, 2001:13).For the United Nations (2000:2), 'disarmament' refers to the collection of small arms, as well as light and heavy weapons from combatant groups within a conflict zone. Initially, this entails the gathering/assembly of combatants following the cessation of conflict after which disarmament, weapons storage and accounting under national auspices. Demining could also be part of the process of disarmament.

According to Ollek (2007), the disarmament phase of DDR is understood as the first step in reducing the possibility of future outbreaks of hostilities. Disarmament programmes may include incentives to combatants to turn in their weapons such as cash payments or weapons-for-development schemes.In essence, 'disarmament' can be defined as the collection, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often the civilian population. This process includes the development of responsible arms management programmes (Jennings, 2007:205).Disarmament refers to a part of demobilisation where the aim is to reduce the number of fighters, or to disband an armed unit. Gleinchmann, Ian, Kees, Wilkinson and Buschmeier, (2003:29) identified the following steps in disarmament; weapons survey, weapons collection, weapons storage, weapons destruction and weapons re-utilisation. The process is essential as a confidence-building measure aimed at increasing stability in a very tense, uncertain environment with nervous participants and a wary population. Gleinchmann et al., conclude that all measures must be aimed at changing the mindset of participants, irrespective of whether these are standing armed forces, guerrilla groups, paramilitary or militia forces or civilians (Gleinchmann et al., 2003:17).

4.2.4 Demobilization

According to Kingma (2000:26), 'demobilisation' is a process that significantly reduces the number of military personnel as well as the civilian personnel employed by the armed forces. This process involves a reduction in the size of regular military and military forces. In this way, 'demobilisation' is a process whereby government forces or opposition factional forces reduce their force size or completely disband, as part of a broader transformation from war to peace (UN, 2000). As such, 'demobilisation' refers to the process of dissolving the forces in opposition after their integration into new regular armed forces (Kingma, 2002:182).For Kimberly (1995:2), the term 'demobilisation' refers to the process of converting a soldier to a civilian. Carames and Sanz (2008:9) noted that the demobilisation process is "the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups". They added that the first step in this process could be the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres or the massing of troops in chosen camps for this activity. This includes cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks. They conclude that the key steps of demobilisation involve the planning, stationing, registering, disarming, and orientation of ex-fighters prior to their release, as well as their release. McLeod (1999:2) defines 'demobilisation' as the process where regular soldiers stop working as soldiers. He holds that the process starts with the identification of soldiers who will be demobilised and ends with formal acknowledgment of discharge from military service. 'Demobilisation' helps to restructure the armed forces to make them more efficient. Similarly, Batchelor, Cock and Mckenzie (2000:41) note that 'demobilisation' refers to a significant reduction of people employed in the military and their reintegration into civilian life.For Dzinesa (2006), "demobilisation" is a planned process whereby the number of personnel under arms and in military command structures is significantly reduced. The demobilisation process includes a reduction in the size of the regular military, and paramilitary forces, as well as rebel groups (sometimes after their integration into new regular armed forces).

However, in practice, demobilisation often involves the assembly, disarmament, administration, counselling, skills assessment and then the discharge of ex-fighters, with a compensation package and/or assistance programme in place. Demobilisation follows closely after a core, integrated force has been formed and the decision to demobilise the rest. According to the UN (2000:2), this involves disbanding military structures and leads to the transformation of ex-combatants into civilians. According to Ollek (2007), the demobilisation phase concentrates on decreasing the numbers of participants in armed groups in order to begin their transition to civilian life. For Tonheim (2009:8), demobilisation is: "the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilisation may extend from the processing of individual combatants in individual centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas, or barracks). The second stage of demobilisation encompasses the support package provided to the demobilised, which is called re-insertion".

The Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards, IDDRS' definition of demobilization emphasises the importance of the discharge of individual fighters and the disbanding of entire military structures, compared to earlier UN definitions of demobilisation. The amassment of combatants in cantonment sites facilitates their registration, information meetings, the identification of vulnerable groups, and pre-discharge orientation (IDDRS, 2006:10). Although closely related, demobilisation is quite distinct conceptually from 'demilitarisation' and 'disarmament'. Whereas demobilisation seeks to significantly reduce or eliminate altogether certain military personnel, demilitarisation and disarmament seek to accomplish slightly different objectives.

4.2.5 Reintegration and reinsertion processes

4.2.5.1 Reintegration process

The reintegration process refers to the reinsertion of ex-combatants and their dependants into society to enable them to experience and exercise civilian economic, social and

political life. Kimberly (1995:2) defines ‘reintegration’ as the process that facilitates the ex-combatants’ transition to civilian life. For Nilsson (2005), the reintegration of ex-combatants is “a societal process aiming at economic, politic, and social assimilation of ex-combatants and their families into civil society”. In other words, reintegration is “the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income”. He adds that this process involves social and economic activities with open timelines, primarily within the community. Reintegration is a component of the broad development of a country as well as a national responsibility and often requires long-term foreign aid (Nilsson, 2005:27). McLeod (1999:1) holds that ‘reintegration’ refers to the process wherein ex-combatants and their families are assimilated into social, economic and political life in civilian communities. For Kingma (2000:28), “re-integration” is a complex process that encompasses social, political or economic aspects. The integration process also involves the families of ex-combatants and takes some time. Social reintegration refers to the process where the ex-combatant and his or her family become a full part of decision-making processes as stressed by Kingma” (2000:28). Reintegration programmes also include cash assistance and compensation in kind, as well as vocational training and income-generating activities (Kingma, in Reycheler and Paffenholz, 2001:405).

The IDDR standards also address the reintegration of children and state that it “includes family reunification, mobilising and enabling the child's existing care system, medical screening and health care, schooling and/or vocational training, psychosocial support, and social and community-based re-integration. Reintegration programmes need to be sustainable to take into account children’s aspirations (IDDRS, 2006:20).According to the United Nations (2000:2) ‘reintegration’ refers to the process that enables ex-combatants and their families to adapt economically and socially to productive civilian lives. In general, they receive a package including cash, in-kind compensation, jobs and encouragement to embark upon self-help projects, and training in income generating activities. These programmes should be ‘tailored’ to the specific needs of former combatants, should reflect their different political, social, economic and educational

backgrounds and should cover topics such as accommodation, education and training, economic activities, medical and health issues, psychological assistance and legal and civil matters (Keiss quoted in Reychler and Paffenholz, 2001:406).The following is a list of the types of reintegration support that have been provided by governments and/or donor agencies: cash payment, foodstuff (or coupons), healthcare, clothing, housing - furniture and housing equipment and building material, seed or agricultural equipment, agricultural extension services, scholarships and school fees for children, counselling and vocational guidance, legal and business advice, job placement or apprenticeships, general referral services, access to land, public works and public sector job creation, wage subsidies, credit schemes and managerial and technical training.

4.2.5.1.1 Economic reintegration

For Kingma (2000:28) economic reintegration is the process wherein an ex-combatant's household builds up its livelihood from production and other gainful employment.It is the process through which retired soldiers or ex-combatants achieve financial independence by securing a livelihood for themselves and their families. The process is often difficult in areas where unemployment is high, where there is low growth and where the individuals in question do not have marketable skills. Researchers and DDR practitioners put forward some definitions of political, social, and psychological reintegration during a DDR Advanced Course on Reintegration at the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC, 2 June 2010) as follows:

4.2.5.1.2 Political reintegration

Political reintegration is the process whereby retired soldiers or ex-combatants participate in the political life of their communities through membership of organisations or participation in various activities such as local councils, school committees, churches, trade and industry bodies and neighbourhood watches.

4.2.5.1.3 Social reintegration

Social reintegration is the process whereby ex-combatants and their families consider themselves to be part of, and are accepted by, the communities in which they live and society at large. The attitudes of communities towards categories of ex-combatants are often dependent on the perceptions of the historical role these individuals played, and, if a major armed conflict has taken place, the degree of reconciliation in that society.

4.2.5.1.4 Psychological reintegration

Psychological reintegration is the process through which ex-combatants make the psychological adjustment from a military lifestyle, which is generally characterised by a hierarchal system of command and control, where an individual's life is defined by a clear set of rules and regulations, to a less formal and more flexible civilian lifestyle. Support and counselling may have to be provided to former soldiers who may suffer from psychological disorders as a result of being exposed to traumatic or life-threatening events. In addition, some ex-combatants may have lost the ability to be self-sufficient, as the military organisation to which they had belonged, had consistently provided for their basic needs during the period of armed conflict (KAIPTC, June 2010).

4.2.5.2 Reinsertion process

According to Tonheim (2009:8), re-insertion refers to short-term assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilisation prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothing, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. It is a short-term process and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year. The amount of reinsertion assistance offered to ex-combatants differs according to criteria such as individual needs assessments, rank, and the number of years with an armed group. IDDRS's definition of reinsertion identifies it as a short-term process, which is different from the longer-term process of reintegration. Ball and Van de Goor (2006)

concur that most of the activities associated with reintegration are better understood as reinsertion support that connects the 'DD' (disarmament and demobilisation) aspects of DDR with the 'R' of reintegration. Reinsertion, rehabilitation and resettlement can be inserted in the reintegration process, because they provide ex-combatants with opportunities for vocational training and a social component in a society that is undergoing post-war restoration. According to Dzinesa (2006), re-integration is a complex economic, political, social and psychological process whereby former fighters make the transition from a military to a civilian life. Therefore, a distinction is often made between economic, political, social and psychological reintegration.

4.3 The implementation of DDR programmes

Different DDR programmes adopt different terminologies. These vary according to the context in which DDR programmes are implemented. DDR aims at a comprehensive reversal of the conditions of war to conditions of peace amongst belligerents and serves to bring about peaceful conditions, and enhance human security, stability and development through the transformation of the role and behaviour of armed combatants (United Nations Report, 2000:2). Hence, one can say that DDR is part of a wider strategy of peace building. With this in mind, and as noted above, the researcher will attempt to identify the key themes in scholarly assessments of DDR programmes such as: DDR as a prelude to post-conflict social transformation; demobilization as demilitarisation; DDR as a social contract; the international community as support to DDR; DDR as support of transitional justice; DDR as support of security sector reform; the conception of demobilization; DDR in the peace building environment; and the success of a DDR programme.

4.3.1 DDR as a prelude to post-conflict social transformation

The critical objective of DDR is the stabilisation of the security environment and the establishment of a peaceful post-conflict environment (Ollek, 2007:12). Thus, it highlights the creation of a process of long-term transformation. Divergence is observed up until the stage at which DDR itself must contribute to this long-term process. The most significant

debate considers whether the major reason for addressing short-term security is that DDR is a programme for post-conflict social transformation. The IDDRS (2006:24) notes that the objective of DDR is to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments and, consequently, when recovery and development can begin. However, the disarmament, demobilisation, and re-integration of ex-combatants are complex processes with political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions. On the one hand, DDR aims to deal with the post-conflict security problems that occur when ex-combatants are left without livelihood or support networks, especially during the vital transition period from conflict to peace and development. On the other hand, through a process of removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking them out of military structures and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society, DDR supports ex-combatants so that they can become active participants in the peace process (IDDRS, 2006:25). The narrowest approach to DDR is simply as a short-term security project (Jeong, 2005:27). In the latter context, disarmament, followed by the demobilisation of combatants, becomes the primary concern. By contrast, social development is approached as a secondary goal when compared to the security objectives. The Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) argued that a failure to immediately and effectively disarm and demobilise combatants might contribute to an immediate deterioration into conflict (UN, 2000:16) if the process of demobilisation fails or becomes inefficient. The military-centred perspective views DDR as one of many post-conflict programmes that must co-ordinate with parallel peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Knight and Ozerdem (2004:506) argue that the UN is linking demobilisation too closely with disarmament so that disarmament becomes the key strategic and political focus. They contend that concentration on the disarmament aspect of DDR does not go far enough in meeting the socio-economic needs of ex-combatants and their dependants. However, there is no automatic relationship between disarmament and security except that it is connected to a reconciliation process (Beldal, 1996:38).

In view of the above, it can be argued that a successful demobilization programme requires several integrated actions such as:

- classifying ex-combatants according to need, skill level, and their desired mode of subsistence,
- offering a basic transitional assistance package (safety net),
- finding a way to deliver assistance simply, minimizing transition costs while maximizing benefits to ex-combatants,
- sensitizing communities and building on existing social capital,
- coordinating central yet decentralized implementation authority to districts, and
- connecting the DRP to ongoing development efforts by retargeting and restructuring existing portfolios.

4.3.2 Demobilization as demilitarization

There is no demobilization without disarmament and discharge, just as there is no reinsertion without resettlement and reintegration. In other words, the DDR programmes and demilitarization are interconnected. However, demilitarisation is less well-defined than militarisation (Batchelor, 2004:13). The mobilisation of civilians in support of the war effort is part of the process of militarisation (Enloe, 2002:3). Militarisation is "a step-by-step process by which a person or a thing gradually becomes controlled by the military or comes to depend for its well-being on militaristic ideas" (Enloe, 2002:3). The more militarisation transforms an individual or a society, the more that individual or society comes to see military needs and militaristic presumptions as not only valuable but also normal. In other words, militarisation involves cultural as well as institutional, ideological, and economic transformation. Thus, war becomes the "dominant mode of production" in society (Barth, 2002:1). Furthermore, militarisation contributes to the increasing involvement of both men and women in warfare (Gamba, 2006:9). For women, militarisation is an input element into that of men. In summary, demilitarisation is a social process of reducing societies' involvement in warfare through redirecting resources from conflict-related activities, decreasing the strength of armed groups, and shifting combatants

into civilian life. Farr (2005:197) refers to DDR as part of a broader demilitarisation process that includes both the demilitarisation of state apparatus and the demilitarisation of society. The demilitarisation approach to DDR understands demobilisation as the dismantling of the whole military organisation and apparatus of armed groups (Knight and Ozerdem, 2004:506). This perception stresses that the failure to fully dismantle this device not only allows chains-of-command to persevere but also increases the chances of a resumption of violence. A focus on demilitarisation implies an increasing role for communities in DDR processes. In conclusion, disarmament/demilitarisation or demobilization and reintegration programmes form part of a usual continuum in the peace process and necessitate an inclusive, integrated and coordinated approach in their planning and implementation. When disarmament or demilitarisation ends, demobilisation begins and where demobilisation ends, reintegration commences.

4.3.3 DDR as a social contract

DDR is viewed as a social contract in the sense that there are two parts involved in the DDR process. In this process, ex-combatants and those who conceive and implement DDR must be able to rely on one another to keep their agreements. In other words, the social contract is an agreement intended to explain the appropriate relationship between DDR and the ex-combatants. One perspective forecasts a bigger role for DDR in post-conflict socio-economic transformation. As noted in the previous section, this examines DDR as a social contract between ex-combatants and those in charge of the design and implementation of DDR programmes. In disarmament and demobilisation, combatants surrender the source of their primary means of revenue, their weapons, and the support and organisation offered by armed groups. Thus, it is the obligation of DDR to offer socio-economic assistance to ex-combatants as they integrate into civilian life (IDDRS, 2006:24-26). In its operational guide IDDRS offers a more comprehensive approach to DDR, going beyond disarmament to address the needs of combatants, and recognising the impact of DDR on long-term development and peace.

The DDR programmes are related to broader peace building initiatives; this means that sustainable re-integration support must go beyond immediate reinsertion support (Berdal, 1996:4). Despite the fact that the link between DDR and peace building is apparent, critics argue that DDR itself can only influence a narrow range of political and security objectives as part of the wider process of security sector reform. It has been noted that DDR is not intended to be either a substitute for development initiatives or a promise of the successful reintegration of fighters. It is clear that as DDR programmes assume a significant role in providing long-term socio-economic support to ex-combatants, questions arise at the operational level about the responsibilities of the different implementing agencies and the mobilisation of resources to support these programmes (United Nations Report, 2004:3-4). Ollek (2007:15) notes that it is a gross simplification to suggest that different approaches to DDR are mutually exclusive. Whereas there is considerable overlap between the approaches, each contributes to a different orientation during DDR programme design and implementation. Ollek argues that "the context in which DDR programmes are designed, particularly the basic framework for DDR, affects the prioritisation of these different goals. Most basic frameworks for DDR programmes are laid within ceasefire agreements and further anchored in peace agreements between armed groups". In most DRR programmes, these are implemented through DDR national commissions and the role of the UN is to encourage the parties to provide assistance for the planning and implementation of DDR processes (IDDRS, 2006:25-26). Thus, the DDR national commission supports the DDR of a combination of state armed forces and other armed groups through the demobilization of part of the state armies or regular armed forces. This applies to the disbanding of irregular or informal armed groups. Furthermore, the DDR is necessary to support security sector reform and the re-establishment of legislation controlling arms (IDDRS, 2006:26).

4.3.4 The international community as support to DDR programmes

The presence of the UN has been noted in most of the countries with DDR programmes. However, the mission mandates differ considerably, depending on the country. For a mission depending on the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, it is imperative for

DDR to play a direct role, although this is not always the case. However, the mission of the Department of Political Affairs and the political missions of the DPKO have a tendency to refrain from participating in DDR apart from secondary tasks. Where there is an absence of UN missions, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has served as the central institution for international interventions and, in many instances, for the DDR process. There is also the World Bank and the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Re-integration Programme (MDRP), although these institutions play a more modest role compared to other international organisations. In terms of funding, the UN has become increasingly involved in DDR processes since the early 1990s. Since 1992, it has engaged in more than 24 DDR-related processes, 22 of which are currently ongoing. Only six are outside Africa while the 16 within the continent account for 81 percent of the UN's involvement (Spanish Agencie Catalane de Cooperacio el Develupement [SACCD]: 2007).

Turning to specific DDR programmes in Africa, some (especially Angola, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda) have been innovative and significantly effective. Others such as Sudan, following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 and Somalia (with its disparate and incessant conflicts) have been far less effective. The UN has not been alone in its involvement in DDR processes on the African continent. The African Union (AU) played an important role in west and southern Africa and the Horn of Africa; regional economic and security groupings have also played an important role. Other aid and support has come from the European Union Multi-Country Demobilisation and Re-integration Programme (MDRP) and the group of Scandinavian states. The MDRP, which is managed by the World Bank and established in 2002 by more than 40 western governments for the purpose of creating support for DDR, focuses on the Great Lakes region as well as west, central, southern and east Africa (Quarterly Progress Report,2006). The following countries are part of the MDRP: Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda. In Liberia, UNICEF leads child DDR, and no less than six other groups -including the World Food Programme (WFP), the World Health Organisation (WHO), Action Aid, and

the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) were involved in adult DDR. Recently, there has been a need to transfer the work of DDR from international groups to national commissions that co-ordinate the efforts of all international partners such as in Burundi, the DRC, and Rwanda. Lastly, institutions such as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) have offered concrete assistance to post-war reconstruction and DDR, for which the rest of the world provides minimal international intervention. Despite the expressed desire to transfer the work of DDR from international groups to national commissions that coordinate the efforts of all international partners, UN organisations and donor agencies continue to use a top-down and non-holistic approach towards DDR in post-conflict countries. In the demobilization process, the abovementioned organizations do not consider the context of countries. Furthermore, they fail to emphasise preventive measures such as educating school children about peace making. This would allow children to develop ideas about peace, conflict, and violence. Efforts to break the cycle of violence must focus on prevention, and a peaceable environment provides the best possible foundation for helping the younger generation to understand peace as members of a democratic community.

4.3.5 DDR as support of transitional justice

Transitional justice involves the full range of processes and measures linked to a society's attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. Nevertheless, transitional justice is not a 'special' kind of justice, but an approach to achieving justice in times of transition from conflict and/or state repression. By means of accountability and redressing victims, transitional justice provides recognition of the rights of victims, promotes civic trust, and strengthens the democratic rule of law.

Turning to the DDR in Rwanda, most DDR programmes begin once adversary groups sign a peace agreement to end armed conflict, and agree to a cessation of hostilities and the start of a new political cycle, normally involving joint participation in political and military

matters. One of crucial aspects of DDR is the legal and political treatment of ex-combatants once these actors/agents have surrendered their arms. Generally, this involves discussion on the criminal responsibility of armed groups who have participated in conflict that may have resulted in serious human rights violation such as massacres, genocide, and crimes against humanity.For Sanz and Carames (2008:15), transitional justice refers to judicial and extra-judicial processes that facilitate or permit transition from a dictatorial regime to democracy or from a situation of war to a situation of peace. Transitional justice strives to clarify the identities and fates of victims and persons responsible for human rights violations, to establish the facts related to these violations, and to design ways in which a society might deal with the crimes perpetrated, as well as reparations. Fisas (2004:15) argues that the objectives of transitional justice are mainly the search for truth, the clarification of the identities and fate of victims, the identities of the perpetrators, the establishment of responsibilities, and the development of reparations mechanisms. If the armed conflict has been longstanding and resulted in many deaths, the psychosocial context may favour amnesty, pardon, and reconciliation, but this is never achieved without difficulties, contradictions, and opposition from other affected individuals or groups. Reconciliation is a very long process. It involves truth, justice, and reparations, the results of individual and collective efforts to find a higher good and a future which allows the transcendence of individual pain. Sanz and Carames (2008:15) observe that the normal outcomes of ceasefires, cessation of hostilities and the signing of peace agreements, are amnesty, the creation of transitional structures, the distribution of political power, and the reform of the security sector, amongst others. This occurs in the context of a lack of special courts, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, and other measures connected to core concepts of truth, justice, and reparations. Truth Commissions, according to Duthie (2006:14) are great opportunities to provide impartial explanations, to clarify the events of a conflict, and to provide structures of models that arise in conflict. In this way, perpetrators are able to explain their stories, although this may serve to reinforce stereotypes and resentment if commissions exclude ex-combatants or members of the community in which this process occurs.

It has been noted that reparations are the key issue in the process of transitional justice. The purpose of reparations is to recognise victims, strengthen trust between citizens and the state, and reduce resentment between victims and communities. This objective cannot be fulfilled if a perception remains that ex-combatants have obtained benefits at the expense of other affected groups, or if victims of human rights violations have not agreed to welcome ex-combatants into their community. In general, mechanisms of transitional justice can have a positive impact on the security of citizens, but they can also intensify resentment among ex-combatants and increase tension between communities. For example, in Colombia, where demobilisation has not affected all armed groups collectively, the situation led to endless conflict, and a psychosocial environment favourable to amnesty and pardon could not occur because the cycle of violence has not yet been entirely broken (Sanz and Carames, 2008:16). This has left some with a sense that certain impunities or more favourable treatment are offered to select groups accused of crimes. However, the Peace and Justice Law that Colombia approved in 2005, along with amendments to the Constitutional Court in 2006, offered demobilised paramilitaries reduced sentences if they confess to their crimes. In turn, this revelation of crimes acted as a foundation of justice for the victims of these crimes. This kind of achievement is very rare at the international level.

In summary, and drawing from the previous section, one can state that transitional justice aims to contribute to accountable DDR programmes that are based on more systematic and improved coordination between DDR and transitional justice processes, so as to best support the successful transition from conflict to sustainable peace. Transitional justice provides a legal framework, guiding principles and options for policymakers and programme planners who are contributing to strategies that aim to minimize tensions and build on opportunities between transitional justice and DDR. However, coordination between transitional justice and DDR programmes begins with an understanding of how transitional justice and DDR may interact positively in the short-term in ways that, at a minimum, do not hinder their respective objectives of accountability and stability.

4.3.6 DDR as support of security sector reform

In 2007, Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) published a new edition of its manual on security sector reform. The manual's objectives are to provide donors with new guidelines on understanding the relationship between security and development, as well as to illustrate certain key positions on evaluating the design, implementation, and evaluation of security sector reform for different institutions, including the police, the armed forces, and intelligence services (OECD 2007).The DDR programme refers to security-sector reform, in many instances, through the reduction of the number of participants in the security sector, the professionalization of security institutions, and training focused on human rights and international law (Sanz and Carames, 2008:17). Measures to reform the security sector resound throughout the DDR process. These may touch on the creation of new eligibility criteria for ex-combatants of armed opposition groups to enter the official military forces. Even though there is a need to carefully consider the details of each, in reality some processes are identical, for example the process of absorption into new armed forces, the demobilisation of child soldiers, and examination for HIV/AIDS, etcetera (Sanz and Carames, 2008:17).

In order to prevent armed conflict and violence, as well as fight the impact of uncontrolled and excessive proliferation of small arms in peace-building contexts, it is important that governments take into account the control mechanisms that go beyond DDR programmes. According to Sanz and Carames (2008:17) the possession of illicit small arms by the civilian population, or the discovery of territory with landmines, are indications that in post-war contexts, the disarmament of armed groups must be combined with other types of initiatives, ranging from landmine removal and the collection of arms from civil society to the strengthening of state legislation on related issues. They stress that disarmament initiatives must be understood as a practical means for disarmament. These means may be divided according to objectives: on the one hand, by decreasing demand, or influencing the

motivations which generate the need for arms; on the other hand, by controlling the existing supply of arms through legislation and practices which restrict their use; and lastly, by restraining surpluses through the collection, reduction, and destruction of arms in the hands of the civilian population, in illegal armed groups, and in government arsenals.

4.3.7 The conception of demobilization

Generally, demobilisation is understood to be the second stage of the DDR process, after the disarmament process; its form and functions differ according to the given context. Tanner (1996:171) notes that "…demobilisation refers to the disarmament and dissolution of the force structures and the transition of combatants to civilian status". He sees disarmament as an element within demobilisation and not a pre-condition for the fighter to enter the demobilisation phase of the DDR programme. This differs from Berdal's (1996:39) argument that does not establish disarmament as an imperative either before or as an integral element of demobilisation. Rather, he not only describes the objective of demobilisation as the disbanding of the fighting forces but also stresses the activities required to achieve this.

Drawing on different discussions, arguments and debates with reference to the purpose and meaning of demobilisation, the UNIDDRS (UN, 2006) concluded that effectively: DDR programmes should support the process of turning combatants into productive citizens. This process starts in the demobilisation phase, during which the structures of armed forces and groups are broken down and combatants formally acquire civilian status (UN 2006a, 2 and10).Within the different definitions of demobilisation, there is either an explicit statement that the structures of the armed forces should be dissolved, or an implied understanding that this can be achieved through processes involving encampment and the targeted distribution of assistance to individuals. In view of DDR within a context of war-to-peace transition, this requires the dissolution of the structures of the insurgent organisation (Knight, 2008:9). It is clear that:

DDR aims to deal with the post-conflict security problem that results from

ex-combatants being left without livelihoods or support networks, other than their former comrades, during the critical transition period from conflict to peace and development (UN 2006:10).

According to Knight (2008:11), there is increasing evidence from countries that have experienced DDR processes -- such as Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Eritrea, East Timor, Northern Ireland and Namibia -- that 'former comrades' maintain a support network, and the veterans associations have become significant political actors. On the other hand, governments that failed to properly reintegrate ex-combatants later found themselves with a price to pay as restless ex-combatants threatened national stability.

In conclusion, demobilization is the process of standing down a country's ex-combatants from combat-ready status. Demobilization may be the net outcome of victory in war, or because a peace situation has been reached and military force will not be needed. In the final days of World War II, the USA Armed Forces initiated a demobilization plan which was set up to discharge soldiers based upon on a point system that favoured length and certain types of service. The British armed forces were demobilized by means of an 'age-and-service' scheme. However, with regard to the gender aspect of demobilization, experience has shown that international implementing organisations have not planned for the inclusion of women's needs and concerns in demobilisation programmes. The impact of returning male fighters on women and the existence and needs of female fighters have historically been overlooked. This neglect of the mainland complex roles that women play during war and peace leads to a less effective, less informed demobilisation that does not fully extend to the community level and may not lead to long-term or sustainable peace.

4.3.8 DDR in the peace building environment

International peace building is now measured as a critical instrument of the international community in addressing countries emerging from conflict or countries under risk of violent conflict. Bryden (200:27) argued that a growing awareness of the inter-relationship

between different elements of post-conflict peace building requires conceptual clarity as a precondition for co-ordinated, coherent and comprehensive interventions. He observes:

The need to understand and operationalize the linkages between DDR and SSR is increasingly recognised. It forms part of a growing awareness of the imperative to provide more coherent and co-ordinated support from the International Community across the post-conflict peace building agenda. Peace building is defined as "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:11). For Knight (2008:3-4), the DDR of ex-combatants constitutes one such activity, and within the perspective of the war-to-peace transition it can have a number of important effects upon the wider transitional development. The well-organized implementation of the DDR programme can restore confidence between belligerent parties in the possibility of a permanent cessation of hostilities, as they are often the most visible element of the peace agreement. In addition, a well-planned and flexible re-integration process can also promote the viability of long-term peace locally, nationally and internationally.

Berdal (1996:73) refers to the relationship between DDR and peace building as 'interplay' and 'a subtle interaction'. Clearly, a sustainable recovery after war cannot be achieved without a successful DDR process; on the other hand, without a successful peace building process in general, the viability of a DDR process would be questionable. In this regard, Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer (1996a:18) stress the relationship between the economic reintegration of former combatants and the sustainability of the peace process. A successful long-term DDR process can make a major contribution to national conflict resolution and also to the restoration of social capital. In other words, failure to achieve a successful DDR process can lead to considerable insecurity at the societal and individual levels, including rent-seeking behaviour through the barrel of a gun.

When DDR programmes are badly planned, conceived and poorly executed, they may become a source of future conflicts. The incomplete disarmament in Mozambique

contributed to the proliferation of weapons not only throughout that country, but also in neighbouring countries such as South Africa, Zambia and Malawi. In 1998, Mozambique was the single largest source of small arms in the South African domestic market. Kingma and Grebrewold (1998:12) categorize a number of situations in which the reintegration of displaced populations and former combatants may have an impact on the re-appearance or the development of conflicts. These include the absence of a functioning state and legal system, lack of economic opportunities, competition for natural resources, political marginalization and the absence of appropriate conflict management systems, and the availability of light weapons. In other words, war-torn countries with demobilized combatants run the risk of returning to conflict if they are not provided with a comprehensive DDR strategy. DDR programmes have featured in post-conflict reconstruction from Afghanistan to Haiti. The failure of early DDR programmes in Somalia and Liberia, mainly attributed to their vague mandates, prompted a shift in recent years toward more focused interventions. The DDR programmes in Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, and the DRC have disarmed hundreds of thousands of combatants; however, these programmes are still poorly funded, and a lack of research has prevented practitioners from developing better re-integration efforts (Hanson, 2007:2). In 2007, 14 African countries participated in one way or another in a DDR programme. On the one hand, some countries did so in order to reduce their armed forces, while on the other hand, other countries participated in the programme in order to disarm and demobilize armed opposition groups. In countries like Uganda and Sudan, which had a huge number of child soldiers, the DDR programme focused mainly on the demobilization of the children.

In combination with the macro-insecurity structure, if the frustrations of ex-fighters are not addressed through a DDR strategy, they can easily re-organise and create security risks at a regional level; this occurred in 1998 following the border conflicts between Eritrea and Ethiopia (Knight, 2008:5). Knight highlights three conditions for ensuring an effective relationship between peace building and a DDR process. Firstly, it must consist of a coordination of activities. While a wide range of programmes are carried out by a diversity

of agents, these are but not necessarily coordinated by a single vision for the future. Secondly, armed conflicts also affect cultural norms and reciprocal relationships in a society. For example, women as both fighters and war-affected civilians acquire new roles during a war. However, they are expected to revert to their traditional roles after the war. Thus, there is a need to provide female ex-combatants with special assistance to enable them to participate fully and equally in social, economic and political life. Thirdly, the trauma of war can have a profound psychological impact on the population, particularly on children, both as soldiers and civilians, affecting their social and emotional development. Knight (2008:6) proposes three key components to address this trauma: family reunification, psychological support and education, and economic opportunity. This has been observed in Sierra Leone where the DDR process was seriously disrupted by the outbreak of renewed hostilities, and many child soldiers whose distinctive needs had been abandoned in the process, returned to the conflict in April 2000.

On the subject of the peace building-DDR relationship, there are a number of issues connected to social and cultural norms and psychological impact that may require attention. Social reintegration involves the re-establishment of family and community ties that play a significant role in the achievement of reintegration programmes (Knight, 2008:5). According to Kingma, (2000:25), in a number of cross-cultural experiences, there is a pattern of more successful reintegration in rural than in urban areas. This trend is explained by the likelihood of there being stronger supporting societal networks in rural than in urban areas. In the rural areas of Ethiopia, a key factor for successful social reintegration was acceptance and support by the community as well as their extended families (Knight, 2008:5). Knight concludes that armed conflicts also affect cultural norms and mutual relationships in a society. As noted earlier, women as both combatants and war-affected civilians gain new roles during a war. However, they are expected to revert to their traditional roles after the war. Kingma, (2002:12) links this attitude to the high divorce rate in Eritrea, where about one-third of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) were women. Knight, (2008:5) notes that the analysis of socio-economic and demographic data

on former combatants in Guinea-Bissau and Eritrea has also shown that female former combatants were more vulnerable than their male counterparts. Thus, there is a need for special support for female ex-combatants to enable them to participate fully and equally in social, economic and political life.

As noted above, the cessation of hostilities or at least the end of widespread armed conflict provides an opportunity for war-torn people and countries to rebuild their societies, economies, and political institutions and to embark on reforms and restructuring. Nations transitioning from conflict to peace face an immense challenge in rebuilding their societies. Ex-combatants must shift into newly formed national military forces or be reintegrated into civilian life. Experience has shown the nations that endured civil conflict, such as Afghanistan, Haiti, Colombia, Angola, Ethiopia, Burundi, Liberia, Eritrea, Mozambique, Sudan, Somali, Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe …etcetera, required a highly effective programme for demobilisation and reintegration, not only as part of the process toward peace, but also to ensure that in the post-conflict stage peace agreements brought stability. This may lead to the success of DDR programmes.

4.3.9 The success of a DDR programme

The United Nation's Briefing Note for Senior Managers (IDDRS) notes that DDR is basically a politically driven process, and that many DDR programmes stall or are only partially implemented because of the political climate. The success of the DDR process is therefore dependent on the political will of the parties to enter into the process in a genuine manner (UN, 2006:3). It has been observed that the success of a DDR process is not only the political will to enter the process but rather the maintenance of this will. In a comparative analysis of peace agreement provisions that address paramilitary groups and programmes for DDR, the Public International Law and Policy Group (PILPG) notes that political goals, such as constitutional or legislative reform, are conditional upon the completion of DDR programmes (PILPG, 2006:11). The maintenance of political will is vital to the success of the wider peace process and transition from conflict to peace, all of

which is conditional upon a successful DDR process (Knight, 2008:7). In an analysis of DDR programmes, Escola de Cultura de Pau (2006:7) notes that:

> In the great majority of cases the decision has been made to opt for the creation of a National Commission for the DDR (NCDDR), with the military component playing a predominant role in this, either because the Commission itself is co-ordinated by the Ministry of Defence or due to the existence of a military sub-commission.

The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006) states that the literature on DDR concepts, design and implementation correctly asserts that national leadership and institutions should play the leading role and bear political responsibility for the DDR of ex-combatants, while the UNIDDRS (2006:25) stresses that one of the key characteristics of DDR is that it should be nationally owned:

The primary responsibility for the successful outcome DDR programmes rests with the national and local actors, and national stakeholders are responsible for planning, co-ordinating and running institutions set up to manage different aspects for the peace agreement. As noted in a UN (2006:24) briefing to senior managers, the success of the DDR program depends significantly on the political will of the key parties to undertake seriously the project of disarmament demobilisation and re-integration of the targeted ex-combatants. An alternative perspective for international stakeholders would be to view the implementation of the DDR process as a continuation of the political dialogue that led to the peace agreement, and approach the implementation as an essentially political task. Within this view the process and structures established to perform DDR are correctly viewed as the political field in which the belligerent parties to the conflict continue the process of dialogue with the aim of cementing the commitments that would lead to a sustainable peace (Knight, 2008:7). The structures and membership of these structures would be conceived and established based on the requirement to maintain the political will of the two parties. Furthermore, the demobilisation and reintegration programmes for military downsizing and socio-economic revitalisation are essential for the country's transition to sustainable peace and development. If these programmes are well planned,

structured and well-managed, increased employment, social justice and decreasing social tension will follow (Kingma, 2000:35).

The end of the Cold War and persistent economic deterioration in many sub-Saharan African (SAA) countries has created a situation in which a growing number of countries, whether emerging from internal conflict or at peace, are exploring ways to reduce their military expenditure in order to redress persistent poverty and growing inequality. Worldwide, the demobilisation of former fighters over the past decade has been impressive (Kingma, 2000:36). Since 1989, the total number of armed forces personnel has declined considerably and continuously. As noted above, the end of armed conflict and hostilities supply an opportunity for war-torn people and countries to reconstruct their country and to launch reforms and rebuilding. This applies to Rwanda as well. The former ex-combatants may be useful in assisting the process of development if their experience is properly used; however, they may become a destabilising factor if a number of them fail to re-integrate properly into civilian life. The experience of many war-torn societies indicates that when effective demobilisation and re-integration programmes were not, or could not be implemented, fragile peace arrangements could be jeopardised and conflicts reignited (World Bank: 1995).A survey of demobilisation in Africa in the early and mid-1990s shows that it has occurred in the following circumstances:

- after a peace accord between fighting parties;
- after the defeat of one of the fighting parties;
- with a perceived improvement in the security situation;
- as a result of a shortage of adequate funding; and
- through the perceived economic and development impact of conversion or as a result of changing military technologies and/or strategies (BICC, 2000).

As already noted, the context in which DDR programmes are implemented should inform the objectives and structure that the programme adopts. Alusala (2007:47) argues that in order to achieve an effective result, each DDR programme should be based on a clear

understanding of the dynamic foundation of a particular post-conflict environment. It has been observed that in all armed forces or groups, there was a presence of women and girls; however, in most cases women were excluded from the DDR programme. In order to be successful, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes must be planned in a gender-sensitive way.

4.4 Female ex-combatants and DDR processes

DDR programmes for ex-combatants represent a very important part of peace-keeping operations and post-war rehabilitation processes. The main objective of this kind of initiative is to ensure the transition of ex-combatants (including members of government and non-governmental forces as well as armed groups) from military to civilian status. These programmes differ widely in terms of the number of troops to be demobilised and re-integrated, their budget and the bodies implementing and financing the process. It is clear that child soldiers, women combatants and disabled soldiers require different approaches as collectives with specific needs. This section focuses on female ex- combatants and DDR processes.

In general, female ex-combatants are seen as a threat to their male counterparts. Theoretically, female fighters have been included in African DDR programmes; however, as Mazurana and Carlson (2004:2) noted, most programmes are more effective in reaching out to male fighters than female fighters who are constantly underserved. The agenda for the majority of DDR programmes for ex-combatants is negotiated in official peace agreements. The objectives of these programmes are to collect, register, and destroy all conventional weapons, to demobilise, and lastly to re-integrate ex-fighters. Combatants who are enrolled in DDR programmes are generally given some monetary and material support as well as vocational or literacy training. Women and girls who have registered in DDR programmes in Africa are small in number and are not reflective of the number of female fighters. The majority of DDR programmes in African countries with high numbers of women in the armed forces experience a low attendance of girls and women because

most women do not demobilise unless specific measures are made to include them in the process (Coulter et al., 2008:20). Most female ex-combatants do not join official programmes and consequently do not benefit from the DDR programmes. On the other hand, there are other reasons that push female ex-combatants not to disarm; these include local, social, and cultural factors. Female combatants are advised by commanders, fellow-fighters or relatives that it is not appropriate for women to disarm. There may be local cultural taboos concerning young women and violent practices that must be considered by planners and implementers of DDR. In general, female fighters do not occupy a position that can be easily reconciled with predominant gender ideologies (Farr, 2002:8). In contrast with their male combatants, they are often excluded from the new army, and from new political structures, and are also refused access to retraining or land. Many are also regarded with fear and suspicion when they try to return to the lives they lived before war broke out (Coulter et al., 2008:27). Gardam and Charlesworth (2000:152) observe that the treatment of female combatants by the military institution reflects the subordinate position of women in society in general. The majority of girls and women silently go back to their families or communities, and although this secrecy protects them, it also hides their need for support (Coulter et al., 2008:27; Mckay and Mazurana, 2004:35). Utas, (2005:25) notes that during the years female combatants spent in fighting forces, often under immense pressure, former women combatants learned survival techniques, made strategic choices, and obtained the skills and strengths that kept them alive. Watteville, (2002:1) notes that while the roles and status of female combatants vary broadly during war, they all seem to share the characteristic of limited access to benefits at the time of peace and demobilisation. Female ex-combatants are often doubly punished: they are often excluded from DDR programmes due to the failure to implement these programmes in gender-sensitive ways, and they are not easily welcomed back and are stigmatised by civil society, often because they have transgressed traditional gender roles (Coulter et al., 2008:28).Furthermore, the society's rejection of female ex-combatants when they return to civilian life and their history of having resorted to 'unwomanly' behaviour like being aggressive or having been sexually abused sometimes cause them to feel enormous shame, which makes reintegration

more difficult. While they bear the physical scars of combat, torture and sexual violence, female ex-fighters also suffer from trauma which presents additional post-conflict challenges. Female ex-combatants become invisible when the guns become silent and they do not join national armies. This will be discussed in the sub-sections below with a focus on female ex-combatants in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mozambique, Eritrea, and in Ethiopia. The section discusses also the participation of female ex-combatants in DDR processes, their exclusion, gender issues, the skills they gained during struggle and education, and health, as well as stigmatisation.

4.4.1 Female ex-combatants in Sierra Leone

When the Sierra Leone DDR programme ended in December 2001, a total of 72,500 combatants had demobilised; of those, 4,751 (6.5 percent) were women and 6,787 were children; and of the children, 506 (9.4 percent) were girls (Mazurana and Carlson, 2004:6). They agreed, however, that the few women and girls who entered the official DDR programme do not represent the actual number of female combatants.

Figure 4.1 Ex-combatants who have been demobilized in Sierra Leone, by gender



Source: Adapted by the Researcher 2010

Despite the low female participation, the Sierra Leone DDR was not only considered a success by the UN, the Sierra Leone government, and many others, but also a model for future DDR programmes in other countries. However, the low participation rates of female fighters has led some to question the design, implementation, and success of the DDR programme in Sierra Leone (Mazurana and Carlson, 2004:7). It has been observed that the UN Security Council Resolution 1,325 seemed to have little impact on the design and implementation of the Sierra Leone DDR, which has been described as either "gender-discriminatory", or then absolutely "gender-blind" (Coulter et al., 2008:21). The DDR is a process aimed at adult combatants, but in Sierra Leone many combatants were under the age of 18 and, as such, were categorised as child soldiers. With regard to the demobilisation of child soldiers, the Cape Town Principles are a strong guiding policy document. However, as with Resolution 1,325, these principles were not fully implemented in the

Sierra Leone DDR. Many child soldiers had either to produce weapons or demonstrate experience in using them in order to be registered and sent to Interim Care Centres (ICCs) (Coulter et al., 2008:21). In a study by Coulter *et al*., half of the female ex-combatants who were interviewed declared that they had wanted to disarm, but only a small number did. Out of these, 22 percent revealed that the cause for this was that they did not have access to a weapon (Coulter et al., 2008:24). Mazurana and Carlson (2004:20) noted that 46 percent of the female ex-combatants who did not go through DDR in Sierra Leone revealed that the reason for this was their lack of a weapon, and the authors concluded that one of the reasons that female ex-combatants lacked access to weapons at the time of disarmament and demobilisation was that their commander had already collected their weapons. In this regard, Mazurana (2005:33) states that when "weapons are used as a condition to get access to a DDR programme, and when access to the programmes also means access to money, women and junior soldiers are often tricked out of their weapons by senior, predominantly male commanders".

4.4.2 Female ex-combatants in Liberia

After the war in Liberia, an official DDR programme was launched that lasted until late November 2004. Specht (2006:82) states that by that time 22,020 (22 percent of total ex-combatants) women and 2,517 (2 percent of total ex-combatants) girls had gone through the DDR process. According to Specht, as many as 14,000 young women participated in the armed conflict but, for a range of reasons, did not legitimately demobilise.

Figure 4.2 Shallow outreach of DDR vis-à-vis young women in Liberia



Source: Adapted by the Researcher 2010

After the war in Liberia, the vast majority of girls were left by male combatants to fend for themselves and their children, often ending up in camps for the internally displaced (United Nation Children's Fund Liberia, 1998). Mazurana et al. (2002:21) observe that while it is clear that the international community and responding agencies are aware of the fact that girl soldiers constitute a significant number of the fighting groups, they are still unable to access and respond to the needs of those girls through DDR programmes. In a report to the UN Security Council on the situation in Liberia, the UN Secretary-General stated that special measures should be taken to address the gender-specific needs of female combatants as well as the wives and widows of former combatants through the DDR programmes. The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM, 2004:4) observed some weakness in the Liberian DDR. For example, an initial target of only 2000 female combatants to be demobilised was established, which proved to be an underestimation. The Sierra Leone experience had shown that women were associated with fighting forces to a larger extent than was originally estimated. That could and should have been integrated when planning DDR in Liberia. The UNIFEM (2004:5) adds that despite the fact that women supporters and dependants and not just female combatants were supposed to be

incorporated into the DDR process, no preparations were made to accommodate them. Other reasons why female combatants were excluded from DDR included the fact that they did not trust the process to help them, or that they were scared of repercussions and social stigma if they were identified as ex-combatants.

Specht (2006:82) observes that the first criterion for entering the DDR programme in Liberia was possession of a weapon or ammunition to hand in. For female combatants under the age of 18 this was not a problem, as child soldiers could demobilise without handing in a weapon. On the other hand, the adult programme was much more difficult as fighters over the age of 18 were denied access if they did not hand in a weapon, which only a small number were able to do. Another reason for the exclusion of female fighters in the DDR programmes that Specht noted in Liberia was the use of lists of all members made by commanders within a unit. Access to the DDR and any cash payment depended on being on the list. This process has been used in many DDR programmes around the world and may be effective in conflicts where it is more or less clear who the fighters are.

However, in contexts such as in Liberia where the armed forces are more fluid and the distinction between civilians and combatants is difficult to establish, commanders have occasion to abuse their authority. Female combatants in Liberia were in general discriminated against under this system as they were often omitted from the lists in favour of friends and relatives of their commander (Specht 2006:92). Many female fighters who should have been eligible for DDR benefits were denied access. Mazurana and Carlsson (2004:21) observe that there is an over-classification of girls and young women as 'bush wives', camp followers, and sex slaves, which has prevented the organisation of DDR programmes to address these girls' and women's actual lived experiences. It is also apparent that both disarmament and reintegration are explicitly gendered processes, a factor that has not been addressed in many DDR processes in Africa. The focus of most DDR programmes is on disarming male fighters, and as girls and women had in part played other roles in the war their classification as dependants effectively excluded them from the

process. Practitioners and policy makers in the field of DDR often take as a point of departure the narrow and conventional way of defining fighters as young men over the age of 18 in possession of weapons. Women and girls are excluded from this group (Mckay and Mazurana, 2004:114; UNIFEM, 2004:4).

It has been observed that war involves an impermanent change in gender roles. Although not true for all women and girls, life as a female combatant can provide opportunities to achieve a position of power and gain agency in a way that would not have been possible prior to the war. Women may also hope to change their status after the war has ended, but normally revert to more traditional or conservative gender roles (Coulter et al., 2008:30). After the war, women are gradually pushed in the direction of a gender role that is considered appropriate in that particular society (Barth, 2002).

4.4.3 Female ex-combatants in Mozambique

In Mozambique, during the independence war a new female identity emerged and some women developed a new idea of themselves as women, with new aspirations and new goals (Arnfred, 1988:6). Such include support and equality with men. FRELIMO encouraged such changes in gender roles. But after the war, FRELIMO either failed to provide support for or directly opposed the women's struggles (Arnfred, 1988:10). It is evident that women's liberation was promoted only when women were needed in the overall struggle for independence. When Mozambique was finally liberated and FRELIMO took power men were not ready to share power with women, resulting in traditional gender roles being reinforced (Coulter et al., 2008:30). Barth argues that if women leave their traditional gender roles this will clearly affect gender relations in general, and ultimately also necessitate changes on the part of men, although alternative male gender roles are not on the agenda of many poor, post-conflict states in Africa today (Barth, 2002:22). Fuest (2008) states that the post-conflict settings may bring about windows of opportunity with regard to equality between women and men and the expansion of traditional gender norms. But, as noticed by Coulter et al., such changes will not come easily. It is of fundamental

importance that these opportunities are acknowledged and seized; otherwise, there is a risk that peace will come as a disappointment (Coulter et al., 2008:30).

According to Coulter et al., (2008:31), in post-war Mozambique, it has been observed that female combatants looked back at their experience in FRELIMO and Destacamento Feminino (DF) with nostalgia as they felt that their participation in the liberation struggle had broadened their horizons and expanded and extended their independence from their families. During the war, female combatants felt that they were equal to the men, but after the war this was no longer true. Arnfred notes that women felt that after the war men took back what they had lost in the way of patriarchal power and many women expressed anger that they had been forgotten by their one-time supporters (Arnfred, 1988:7). According to West, the post-independence period was the most traumatic experience for female ex-combatants as they said that FRELIMO had abandoned them. The promises made to DF about the empowerment of women were never fulfilled. Leadership roles for women were inadequate and the employment market was non-existent. Many female ex-combatants also lacked social networks because they had left their families as girls or young women, and also because they had not married during the war. Many found it difficult to get married as they said that men – even former guerrillas – did not want equal partners in marriage after the war. Men complained that former DFs were too aggressive and independent to be married (West, 2000:189). Mckay and Mazurana (2004:34) state that in the UN and government DDR programmes that followed the end of the war between FRELIMO and RENAMO in 1992 male combatants were prioritised even though girls constituted up to 40 percent of the minors in the RENAMO. It has been observed that only a small number of female ex-fighters participated in Mozambique's DDR and most did not receive any support at all from the government. The reason for this was that the FRELIMO government did not want to acknowledge or collect evidence of their use of girls (Mackay and Mazurana, 2004:35). An additional reason for female ex-fighters not being present for demobilisation could have been that they were deliberately excluded or not informed (Watteville, 2002:6).

4.4.4 Female ex-combatants in Eritrea

In Eritrea, a study of female ex-combatants found that their reintegration is more difficult than male combatants. While Eritrean female ex-combatants experienced relative equality during the independence struggle, their newfound freedom disappeared soon after the end of the war; this was regardless of the fact that the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), which won the war, had particularly stressed that it was also fighting for gender equality. During the war, female fighters gained significant equality with male fighters but when the war ended these young women were again confronted by patriarchal Eritrean society. On the political and legal level, women are deemed equal but, in practice, patriarchal traditions are deeply rooted in civil society (Klingebiel, Gärke, Kreidler, Lobner and Schütte, 1995).Barth observes that many Eritrean female ex-fighters felt that the years of war were preferable to the post-war period. Within the EPLF they had felt respected, equal and empowered but these were all lost after the war when women were pushed towards traditional gender roles (Barth, 2002:34).

Mehreteab (2007:29) observes that when the DDR process started in Eritrea it was decided that women were going to be treated in the same way as men and that at least one-third of the trainees in the programmes should be women. Women were also trained in traditionally female fields such as mat-weaving, basket-making, tailoring, embroidery and typing. This did not generate enough income opportunities, so this support was phased out in 1995. However, training in traditionally male trades did not automatically make them employable. Female ex-fighters had a hard time getting married after the war as men asserted that these women had lost their femininity during the war. Many male ex-fighters divorced their fighter wives for this reason and married civilian women (Mehreteab, 2007:34). Therefore, female ex-fighters, despite being empowered and treated equally during the war, faced cruel challenges afterwards. Persson (2005:42) notes that on occasion, even female ex-combatants from fighting forces where the status of women and girls was low in general, or who had been abducted, abused or kept as sex slaves, said they

missed being in the armed forces. Bearing in mind how hard life was for most women and girls in armed conflicts, such statements seem to point to the complexity of the civilian life facing female ex-combatants after leaving the military. Surely, such views reveal just how challenging surviving peace is for female ex-fighters. When male and female ex-combatants return to civil society they are received differently; while men are supposed to have strengthened their gender role through fighting, women are increasingly marginalised (Coulter et al., 2008:30).

Table 4.1 summarises the efficiency of DDR programs in the aforementioned countries as far as female ex-combatants are concerned.

Table 4.1 Efficiency of DDR programmes *vis-à-vis* female ex-combatants in some countries

Country	Expected female beneficiary	Actual female beneficiary	Reasons or observations
Sierra Leone	Not known	Less than half	Poor design of DDR programme Pretext that females did not have weapons Desire to conceal that young women had been soldiers
Liberia	More than 14000 young women	2517 young women	Poor design of DDR programme (underestimation of the number of female ex-combatants to be demobilized) Poor planning Poor definition of the term 'beneficiary' that disadvantages females Resistance of females themselves who get back to the traditional schema of gender roles Gender discrimination
Mozambique	40% of all the ex-combatants	Very few	Men's patriarchy (do not want to share power with women) Government wants to conceal the use of girls in the military Lack of information Gender discrimination
Eritrea	1/3 of the beneficiaries	1/3	Females could not get value from the programme, because they were trained in non-marketable trades. Persistence of gender discrimination and yoke of traditional values.

4.5 Female ex-combatants' participation in DDR programmes

Many female ex-combatants are reported to have severe difficulties in adapting to civilian life for different reasons. In conflicts such as the liberation wars in Eritrea, Ethiopia, and

Mozambique female combatants had relatively high status positions within the fighting forces. Women and girls joined these movements partly because women's rights and equality for both men and women were included in the overall liberation ideology, but at the time of peace women's expectations of what their struggle should have resulted in were seldom fulfilled (Coulter, 2008:30).

For Barth (2002:20), it was surprising to hear many Eritrean female ex-combatants expressing their views that the war years were preferable to the time that came afterwards. They described the war years as a time when they were treated as equals and experienced empowerment. When the war was over, all of this was lost as women were expected to return to their traditional gender roles and status. DDR practitioners have noticed the fact that many female ex-combatants choose not to take part in official DDR programmes because they simply panic, or they think that they have nothing to gain. It can be a question of security with regard to the demobilisation camps. The facilities in Sierra Leone were perceived to be dangerous for women and girls because of the large numbers of men and inadequate protection (Mazurana and Carlson, 2004:28). Watteville observed that on some occasions female combatants in Mozambique and Zimbabwe never showed up during encampment for demobilisation. She argues that this may have been because they were not informed or were intentionally excluded. In Mozambique the encampment phase lasted several months, and soldiers became increasingly aggressive, stressed by their immobility and inactivity in the poorly-equipped camps. Watteville concluded that had women been present, their security would have been at risk if no measures to protect them had been put in place, such as armed guards and fenced female quarters (Watteville, 2002:6).

However, female ex-fighters may also not turn up for disarmament and demobilisation out of fear of having their identity as former combatants disclosed. This issue has not been critically dealt with in the planning and implementing of DDR programmes. There is often a high degree of stigma attached to being a female combatant, and women and girls may

feel that registering at the DDR centres will result in further social exclusion by the civilian community. Given that female fighters are not easily accepted back into civil society and are often looked upon with fear and suspicion, these concerns may be justified. Therefore, DDR might become counterproductive for the reintegration of female ex-combatants. One effect is that female ex-fighters will self-demobilise and therefore not receive the assistance or benefits they are entitled to as ex-combatants (Coulter et al., 2008:26-27).

4.6 The exclusion of female ex-combatants

In most African countries, female ex-combatants have been excluded from DDR programmes. Mazurana's study of female fighters from Angola, Burundi, the DRC, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, found that the majority of the women and girls within the armed forces neither participated in nor benefited from DDR programmes. Among the number of reasons given, the main issue was that women were excluded because they had not been identified as 'combatants' (Mazurana, 2005:33).The reason why DDR programmes do not work actively to include girls and women could be that female combatants also perform additional roles – they are labourers, 'wives', girlfriends, domestic workers, farmers – and this can cause confusion over who is a fighter and who is not. They are regularly represented, incorrectly, as being only dependants or wives of male fighters, and few efforts are made to determine whether in fact they were also combatants (McCay and Mazurana, 2004:120). The different roles played by female combatants, according to Brett and Specht, could prevent the UN, aid organisations, and civilians from considering girls and women as 'real' fighters, excluding them from the process of demobilisation (Brett and Specht, 2004:99). Enloe (2000:37) notes that women and children associated in one way or another with male soldiers are still in general considered as 'camp followers'. She argues that in the late twentieth century, females who have been mobilised to serve the military's needs are still vulnerable to the stereotype of camp follower – dispensable, disreputable – no matter how professional their formal position is in the military (Enloe, 2000:40). Women's participation in war-related activity may be overlooked because stereotypical notions of gender-appropriate labour are,

most of the time, remobilised after war, when a society strives to return to "normal" (Farr, 2002:7). The literature notes that the DDR programmes in some African countries such as Sierra Leone and Liberia require a combatant to produce a weapon in order to be identified as a combatant; this poses a problem for many women's and girls' demobilization as it excludes them from benefiting from the DDR programmes.

The exclusion of female ex-combatants from decision-making has a negative impact when demilitarisation is set in motion, because women who have seen active combat are even more marginalised than other women in the society under reconstruction: they do not occupy a position that can be easily reconciled with predominant gender ideologies, and militarised women pose a unique set of challenges in the demobilisation phase (Farr, 2002:8). Ranchod-Nilsson (2001) observes that unlike male combatants, female combatants are drummed out of the army; excluded from new political structures; refused access to retraining or land; overlooked in veteran's organisations; and regarded with fear and suspicion when they attempt to return to the lives they lived before war broke out. Women who contradict the stereotype of appropriate female behaviour (through active participation in the violence associated with war) "are regarded as more deviant or unnatural than men" (Byrne, 1996:18). Thus, to address the challenges faced by female combatants after war, demobilisation planners may have to recognise the different needs of combatants of both genders, and not assume that one action plan will be suitable for all ex-fighters (Farr, 2002:8).

As stated above, girls and women combatants face special problems after war. DDR programmes often ignore their problems. Turshen and Twagiramariya (1998) highlighted in Teckla, (1998) observe that in some countries where there is a severely restrictive gender ideology after war, female combatants who were active in the conflict, in whatever roles they played, are likely to become invisible in demobilisation process because of the threat they pose to this ideology. The DDR process represents an opportunity to lay the groundwork for long-term changes in the political status of women combatants (Farr,

2002:24). Special attention is required to ensure that women and girls are included in DDR programmes and that women also benefit from reconstruction efforts, otherwise DDR activities run the risk of widening gender inequalities.

4.7 Female ex-combatants and the gender issue

As far as DDR of female combatants is concerned, Watteville (2002:11) has drawn attention to gender issues in official demobilisation and reintegration programmes in post-conflict contexts. Mazurana et al. (2002:31) report that the disarmament and demobilisation programme in Mozambique gathered no data on how many women were linked to the rebel movement. In Angola, thousands of boys were formally demobilised compared to no girls, even though there was systematic evidence that large numbers of girls had been abducted and forced to be part of the Angolan armed forces. In the South Sudan, Bouta (2005) highlights that DDR programmes had become associated with security risks, unfairness to female combatants, and other poor outcomes, and that establishing criteria for participation in DDR quickly presented particular challenges. In fact, the 21-year civil war in South Sudan had involved the entire Southern population in one way or another, and distinctions between civilians and combatant generally, and specifically between female-ex-combatants and the society on the other side - were often difficult to establish (Bouta, 2005). Once again, this reinforces the idea that female ex-combatants should be involved in planning and carrying out any programme developed for them.

Investigation should also be conducted into whether distinct cultural and religious rituals could be used to help girls re-integrate, as well as the role of gender-specific psychosocial support in assisting reintegration and healing (Mazurana et al., 2002:32). The host community could be prepared to receive female combatants before they arrive because sometimes the community do not trust them. According Farr, (2002:32) gender-aware demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants is important because it formally recognises female's participation in armed conflict, but can also prove a catalyst to increasing the participation of women in political life in the post war period, and support to

long-term peace building. Farr (2002:34) concludes that feminist accounts of reconstruction after war have indicated that "the process by which people become aware that gender roles are not fixed in stone but are adapted to meet changing social circumstances will, in the long term, aid the development of a social and political environment which facilitates positive changes in women's status". The potential social benefits of this shift in perceptions are enormous, as there is growing evidence that there is a higher rate of success in peace processes in which women play a significant role (Anderlini, 2000; Cock, 2001; Hill, 2001).UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on "Women, Peace and Security" was passed on 31 October 2000. Point 13 of the Resolution specifically addresses DDR programmes and notes that the UN "encourages all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependants". The Resolution also notes "the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution". However, in the eight years since its inception the Resolution has rarely been implemented and there are no built-in mechanisms of accountability or follow-up procedures (Coulter et al., 2008:25). Resolution 1325 commits governments to find ways to help women, including ex-combatants, to participate in post-war reconstruction.

Peace building and advancement of human rights would be strengthened if Resolution 1325 were to be implemented (Farr, 2002). Female combatants would be enabled to play an important role in the reconstruction of country as peace builders. The Cape Town Principles (CTP) addresses the fact that many child soldiers involved in African wars are below the age of 18 and, therefore, do not fall within the official category of children. In 1997, UNICEF and the NGO working group on the Convention of the Rights of the Child held a symposium in South Africa. The Cape Town Principles and Best Practices were a product of this symposium. The document specifically addresses the prevention of the recruitment of children into the armed forces as well as the demobilisation and social re-

integration of child soldiers in Africa. One of the recommendations is that the definition of child soldier should be:

> any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers, and those accompanying such groups, other than purely as family members. It includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and forced marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried arms (Coulter et al., 2008:25).

There have been some attempts to extend the definition of combatants, but although both UN Resolution 1325 and the CTP address this issue, and have included those not bearing arms in the category of combatants, this has not improved the situation for female fighters who continue to be excluded from DDR efforts. If the goal is to include all combatants, including women and girls, it is essential to understand the mechanisms behind female fighters' lack of access to official DDR programmes and the reasons why they sometimes choose not to participate (Coulter et al., 2008:25).

The Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995 set the stage for women's needs in conflict and post-conflict zones to be better addressed. The following strategic objectives were set:

- to increase the participation of women in conflict resolution at decision-making levels,
- to protect women living in situations of armed and other conflicts or under foreign occupation,
- to promote non-violent forms of conflict resolution and reduce the incidence of human rights abuse in conflict situations,
- to promote women's contribution to fostering a culture of peace,
- to provide protection, assistance and training to refugee women, other displaced women in need of international protection and internally displaced women (McKay and Winter, 1998:167).

It has been noted that the changes the women go through during wars make them reluctant to go home. Female ex-combatants should be assisted to find alternative ways of living. Education and training may help as there is a need to value the skills that ex-combatants have gained within armed groups.

4.8 Female ex-combatants and the skills gained

It is evident that useful skills gained during war are often not recognised in peacetime. In Eritrea, female fighters learned a number of skills, apart from the actual combat and shooting. They were, for example, involved in public administration, health, construction, teaching, electronics, and communications on the frontline. Unfortunately, these qualifications were not accepted by civil society because they could not be formally confirmed (Barth, 2002). Mazurana observed that skills developed by female fighters during conflict could be built upon in post-conflict settings. It is therefore important to identify which activities female fighters undertook during war and conflict and what skills they acquired. Some of the skills that were identified in Mazurana's study were: medical skills, military intelligence work, management skills, decision-making skills, negotiation skills, mediation and conflict resolution skills, searching for common ground and mobilising women (and men). Such skills could be well-utilised in livelihood activities in post-conflict settings (Mazurana, 2005:41).Those responsible for planning and implementing programmes for reintegration should therefore be made aware of which skills women and girls may possess so that these skills can be made use of and strengthened. As Mazurana and Carlson state, when women and girls are treated as passive victims or 'dependants', with no acknowledgement of the skills and resources they have achieved, female ex-combatants are again exposed to control over their lives and a sense of loss of dignity. Thus, DDR programmes risk losing remarkable social capital that could be of importance for post-conflict reconstruction (Mazurana and Carlson, 2004:15).

4.9 Female ex-combatants and education

After the end of the struggle, the majority of female ex-combatants want to receive an education when they return to civilian life. As many young women and girls lost educational opportunities due to the war they feel a strong need to access education for themselves and their children once the war is over (Coulter, 2008:22). According to Mazurana, this wish was especially expressed by women who had been abducted or pressured into the armed forces, been held as forced wives or had given birth to children as result of these unwanted relationships. He argues that, of all the groups returning from the war, young mothers were most often stigmatised (Mazurana, 2005:29).These young women probably saw education as their opportunity to regain control over their lives and to offer their children a brighter future (Coulter, 2008:22). As Veale reports, female ex-combatants felt that being educated also meant being independent. These women ex-fighters focus mainly on economic independence and/or having political awareness (Veale, 2003:11).

4.10 Female ex-combatants and health issues

It has been observed by several DDR practitioners that many female ex-fighters return from war with physical and psychological health problems. Given the extent of sexual violence, a major problem for young women who have been associated with the armed forces is sexually-transmitted diseases. However, McKay and Mazurana (2004:62) note that few are diagnosed and treated unless they go through a rehabilitation or interim care centre where such services are offered or if primary medical care is provided by an NGO, but in war-torn countries there is an almost total absence of sexual and reproductive health services. In order to prevent further infections, female ex-combatants must be informed and educated before they are discharged as the demobilisation phase presents a unique opportunity to do this. In the most of cases, they are tested during the demobilisation process. Post-war trauma is a major health issue for many girls and women ex-fighters. These traumas are medical, psychological and social, and must thus be dealt with in all their aspects. In many African post-conflict zones, various kinds of traditional healers provide trauma counselling

at both individual and social levels. Female combatants tend to turn to these healers. Churches and other religious institutions are also very active in helping women deal with trauma (Utas, 2004:14).

4.11 Female ex-combatants and stigmatization

Female ex-combatants feel stigmatised when they return to civil society. They are looked upon not only with suspicion and fear but also are viewed typically as perpetrators of violence who have violated established gender roles. The feelings of shame begin when they are called a 'rebel' or accused of having a 'rebel child'. In this and many other cases the issue is less a sense of personal guilt than of social shame (Coulter, 2008:35). The social stigma of having been ex-combatants pushes them often times to hide their past and result in them turning their backs to the option of drawing from the benefits they are entitled to from the DDR programmes (Persson, 2005:28). Another effect of having been a female combatant is the difficulty of getting married. This is of great importance in many African societies as marriage is seen as mandatory for women. Unmarried women are sometimes likened to social outsiders (Mckay 2007:393).

From Persson's observations in Sierra Leone and Uganda, female ex-combatants were worried about their marriage prospects. The female ex-combatants often discovered that when the war was over, men preferred civilian women, those without battle scars, women who were sexually 'untouched'. In both countries, men said that they preferred not to marry a woman who has been associated with the armed forces. Female ex-fighters were believed to have been sexually active with many men, but what seemed more important was that men feared that these women would be unpredictable and aggressive due to their past experiences (Persson, 2005:40).In Eritrea, for example, it has been observed that most female ex-combatants who were married did so with male ex-fighters, and that most male ex-fighters were married to civilian women. By contrast, female ex-fighters were hardly ever married to civilian men (Barth, 2002:26). Similar observations were also made by West after the Mozambican liberation struggle. Female ex-combatants said that men, even

male ex-combatants, did not want equal partners after the war. Men complained that the female ex-fighters were too aggressive and independent to be appropriate marital partners (West, 2000:190). This could be interpreted as meaning that even though female ex-combatants were highly respected within the armed forces, they were not preferred marriage partners in the aftermath of war due to their war-time actions, and that they faced stigmatisation (Coulter, 2008:36). In this way, the female ex-combatants often found themselves further marginalized and effectively inhibited from fitting into or transitioning seamlessly into civilian life -- unlike many of their male ex-combatants.

4.12 Female ex-combatants in the post-war situation

It has been shown that the post-war situation of female ex-combatants is not unknown to the national and international institutions dealing with post-war rehabilitation. Women have frequently been identified as the most vulnerable category in war-torn societies. However, little funding has been allocated to projects targeting them, particularly if they are ex-combatants. Despite the goodwill of the UN and NGOs, the types of vocational training offered to war-affected women are often not geared towards securing an income for girls and women. The training programmes are often too short and there is a lack of training materials. The variety and differentiation in the types of training is also extremely limited and demonstrate a lack of vision more than anything else (Utas, 2005:16). Most programmes in post-war projects targeting female ex-combatants are not successful in terms of economic viability. Although few women can actually manage to make a living from the skills they learn, many women revealed that the projects provide them with something new. Some said that these types of project make them more self-confident and help them to cope better socially. For women known to be marginalised and stigmatised in African post-war societies, this is significant. Some projects, although unintentionally, seemed more successful as a form of ‘trauma healing’ or ‘psycho-social activity’ than they were in terms of long-term economic benefits (Coulter, 2008:37).

4.13 Summary of the Chapter

The chapter discussed the implementation of DDR Programmes. The key themes arising from the literature on DDR programmes were discussed. The chapter also examined female ex-combatants and the DDR processes. It has been noted that most female ex-combatants do not join official programmes, and therefore do not benefit from such programmes. Female ex-combatants become invisible when guns fall silent and/or they do not join national armies. An overview of the situation of female ex-combatants in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, the DRC, and Eritrea was presented. Finally, the chapter discussed the participation of female ex-combatants in DDR processes, their exclusion, female ex-combatants and gender issue, the skills they gained during the struggle, education, and health issues and stigmatisation, as well as the situation of female ex-combatants in the post-conflict situation. In re-integrating female ex-fighters, in line with the findings of this chapter, it is crucial to examine their social position and the links between being able to make a living and social well-being, and between economy and social life. This applies to Rwanda as well, as will be observed in the coming chapters.

Chapter Five
Data presentation and analysis:
Rwanda Demobilization and Reinsertion Commission

5.1 Introduction

Since the Rwandan war and genocide in 1994, the government has been engaged in re-establishing state institutions and re-organising the public administration for better service delivery. During the period 1994-1997, the focus was on restoring the public administration structures and reconstructing the basic social and physical infrastructure that were destroyed during the war and genocide. One of the programmes that were introduced was the demobilisation and reintegration of combatants. The selection of combatants for demobilisation was left to the Ministry of Defence, while the process of demobilisation and reintegration was entrusted to the Rwanda Demobilisation and Re-integration Commission (RDRC). With the above in mind, this chapter examines the work of the RDRC with specific focus on its prosecution of its official mandate. It discusses the main activities performed by the RDRC that are re-grouped in four issue areas: demobilisation and repatriation of armed groups, reinsertion, economic reintegration, and social reintegration. In essence, the chapter will assess the nexus between the mission and objectives of the RDRC and the data collected on the reintegration of Rwandan female ex-combatants. The researcher solicited and collected data on the views and opinions of key informants, including local leaders, military officers, RDRC Commissioners and the female ex-combatants themselves with respect to the nature and extent of their reintegration into civilian life.

5.2 The Rwanda Demobilization and Re-integration Commission

The RDRC is located in Kigali Urban Province, Kacyiru District, in the suburb of Remera. It came into existence as part of the Arusha Peace Agreement of August 1993 between the RPF and the former Rwandan Government. Although Protocol III of the agreement provided for integration of the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) into the Rwanda Defence

Forces (RDF), the opposite actually occurred: the ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises (ex-FAR) members were integrated into the RPA. According to the Arusha Accord, any excess number of military personnel was to be demobilised. At the end of the war, and given the associated genocide and massacres, the former government had calculated that it needed to maintain and sustain a large army. In reality, it was now a mixture of both armies, taking into account the absorption of ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises into the RPA during and after the war. As a result, demobilisation became a priority, especially considering the scarcity of national resources. The RDRC was formed in January 1997 to effectively implement and achieve the demobilisation and to oversee the reintegration process. The RDRC has a mandate to oversee the planning and implementation of the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (RDRP). The RDRP is currently in its third stage since January 2009. Stage I started in 1997 and ended in 2000, while Stage II started in 2001 and ended in 2008.

5.2.1 Mission and objectives of the RDRC

As noted earlier, the following tasks were assigned to the RDRC:

- To reduce the expanded RPA or the actual RDF to a size that is economically sustainable (freeing up resources for economic and social development).
- To achieve the successful reintegration of demobilised RPA veterans and ex-child soldiers (*Kadogo*) in such a manner that they are able to contribute to national unity and economic development.
- To reintegrate ex-FARs returnees into civilian life (RDRC, 1998).

The four principal objectives of the RDRC are to:

- Demobilise an estimated 20,000 ex-combatants from RPA/RDF and 12,500 members of armed groups and support their transition to civilian life in the spirit of the Arusha Agreement;
- Support the reinsertion of up to 13,000 ex-FAR troops;

- Support the social and economic reintegration of all ex-combatants to be demobilised in Stage II (2001-2008) and all Stage I (1997-2000) ex-combatants who remain socially and economically vulnerable; Under RDRP stage III which started in 2009, the Government of Rwanda aims to demobilise and support the social and economic reintegration of up to 4,000 ex-combatants from the RDF and 5,500 members of Rwandan Armed Groups operating mainly from Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The programme also includes support to dependants of ex-combatants from the armed groups who returned with them from the jungles.
- Facilitate the reallocation of government expenditure from defence to the social and economic sectors (RDRC, 1998).

Figure 5.1 Components of DDR



Source: Adapted from RDRC, http://www.rdrc.org.rw/mainstreaming.phpDecember 2011.

The Rwandan government also adopted the following guiding principles for the RDRP:

- Target all ex-combatants irrespective of previous military affiliations;
- Affiliation in the interests of national reconciliation;
- Allowing ex-combatants to choose their community of settlement and path to their economic re-integration;

- Ensuring consistency and fairness, by providing all assistance to ex-combatants through the RDRP, developed and supervised by the RDRC;
- Relying on existing government structures to the fullest extent possible in order to build sustainable capacities beyond the programme's duration; and
- Addressing pension and social security issues for ex-combatants outside the RDRP, in accordance with their respective terms and conditions of service.

5.2.2 Activities of the RDRC

The activities of the Commission focus on demobilisation and the reintegration of ex-combatants. The socio-economic reintegration process includes more than a dozen, diverse focal areas:

- Preparing ex-combatants for a new civilian life
- Reinsertion
- Reintegration: fighting poverty and fostering unity
- Vulnerability support: grants for widows
- Formal education
- Vocational training
- Apprenticeships: as they learn, they earn
- Support to cooperatives formed by ex-combatants
- Adult literacy
- Employment
- Child ex-combatants: rehabilitation and reintegration
- Vocational training for child ex-combatants
- Medical treatment and rehabilitation for disabled ex-combatants
- Psychological support
- Information and sensitisation activities

In order to better assess policy implementation and effectiveness, the key focal activities of the RDRC are re-grouped into four issue areas that are mapped in this section: (1)

demobilisation and repatriation (2) reinsertion (3) economic reintegration and (4) social reintegration.

5.2.2.1 Demobilization and repatriation of members of armed groups

5.2.2.1.1 Demobilization

The soldiers to be demobilized were selected by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) on the basis of a recommendation by the army. At the brigade level, committees composed of the brigade commander, the head of intelligence, a medical doctor, a social worker and the person responsible for civil-military relations drew up the initial lists. These lists were forwarded to the army headquarters, where the chief of staff and his deputy prepared the final recommendation. It should be emphasised that demobilization was open to members of all services of the RPA. The fundamental criteria for being included in the demobilization were disability, age and health status. Those who wanted to pursue their education were also allowed to leave. This applied particularly to those who had joined the armed forces during the war, but did not have any intention of becoming professional soldiers. After the selection for demobilization, the RDRC visited the relevant army units to conduct a socio-economic survey of all soldiers to be demobilised and these soldiers were then transported to the demobilization camp where they were given information, among other things, on their entitlements, their opportunities for economic reintegration, and the general challenges of their reintegration into civilian life. Before leaving the camp, combatants were registered and their records were checked and updated. Each was then given a demobilisation card and the first financial instalment. The ex-combatants were then released and were free to go to the location of their choice.

Table 5.1 Demobilization up to 2007

Affiliation	Target	Demobilised	% of target
RDF	22 000	22 362	101.6%
Ex-FAR	13 000	12 969	99.7%
Ex-AGs	12 500	6 397	51.1%

This includes 661child ex-soldiers (RDRC, 2007).

Table 5.1 illustrates that one of the key problems facing the RDRC is the repatriation of members of armed groups (AGs). In 2007, only 51.1% of ex-AGs were demobilized. Since 2006, the RDRC has increased its capacity to receive these ex-combatants. The programme also supports the dependants of returning members of AGs with reinsertion packages in order to assure them that their families will be secure while they are undergoing demobilization (RDRC, 2007). From December 2001 to 31 May 2007, the RDRC demobilized 20,039 RDF soldiers, 12,310 ex-FAR, 5,873 ex-AG combatants, and 624 ex-AG child soldiers. These totals include 57 women and 2 girls (RDRC, 2008).

The demobilization of RDF soldiers began in April 2002 and ended in 2006. The formal criteria for demobilizing RDF soldiers included illness, disability and age. Every RDF soldier received a demobilization allowance amounting to three times their last monthly pay. Ex-combatants from AGs were usually disarmed in the DRC by MONUC before being transported to the Mutobo demobilization camp in northern Rwanda. To be eligible for Stage II, all ex-combatants went through sensitization training in “solidarity camps” (*ingando*) as part of their demobilization. This training covered Rwandan history, civic education, national unity and reconciliation, traditional justice (gacaca), micro-financing and public health (particularly HIV/AIDS). The length of the sensitization training varied: ex-RDF and ex-FAR combatants completed two-week courses, while ex-AG combatants attended two-month courses in a separate camp (Mutobo in northern Rwanda). Ex-FAR who passed through solidarity camp (ingando) during Stage I, were given refresher courses

during Stage II. While *ingando* has been criticized as political propaganda, the ex-FAR and ex-AG fighters researcher interviewed generally expressed satisfaction with the training.

5.2.2.1.2 Repatriation of members of ex-armed groups

The RDRC has met its target goals for demobilising RDF and ex-FAR soldiers, but has only reached a third of its goal for ex-combatants from the AGs in Congo. In 2005, 664 members of AGs out of the revised target of 3,000 were repatriated and received at the Mutobo Demobilisation Centre (DC). It had initially been estimated that 12,000 members of ex-AGs would repatriate in the first year, but this was revised downwards before mid-year to 3,000. Of the 664 repatriated ex-AGs combatants, 653 were from the DRC, while 11 were from Congo Brazzaville. The United Nations Mission in DRC (MONUC) brought in 592, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR 11, while 61 surrendered to the Rwandan government authorities near the DRC borders. In addition to the ex-AGs combatants, 687 civilian repatriates were also received at Mutobo DC. Out of the 687 civilians, 242 were dependants of ex-AGs members while the rest (445) were civilians who initially presented themselves as returning members of the AGs (RDRC, 2006).

5.2.2.2 Reinsertion

Reinsertion is designed as a transitional stage for each ex-combatant, although it is also necessary to provide help with their family members' basic requirements. The main objective is to ensure the return of former combatants to their communities, and facilitate a financially sustainable position for them and their families for at least a limited period. They are given a basic subsistence kit: enough food for three months and basic survival tools valued at around US$100. These services, along with other forms of assistance and advice on reinsertion, are also extended to the people demobilised during Stage I. In terms of reinsertion, all ex-combatants demobilised in Stage II have received a Basic Needs Kit (BNK) equivalent to Rwf60,000 each (approximately US$100) as a once-off payment to facilitate their initial transition to civilian life in order to buy food, seed, tools, basic

household items and transport to their community or settlement. In addition to the BNK, all former professional soldiers (ex-RDF and ex-FAR) received a Recognition of Services Allowance (RSA) as part of their reinsertion assistance. The amount is differentiated by rank, ranging from Rwf180,000 (approximatelyUS$300) for a private to Rwf600,000 (approximately US$1, 000) for a colonel. The RSA is paid in two instalments. The first (RSA1) of Rwf60,000 was paid after one month of settlement in the community for ex-RDF or registration with the RDRP for ex-FAR, and the balance is paid two months later. This instalment system was not well-received by ex-combatants; they would prefer to collect it all at one time. As of May 2007, 38,846 ex-combatants, including 260 women, had benefited from reinsertion support while 40,068 ex-combatants, including 346 females, received reintegration funds. The most vulnerable ex-combatants are eligible for a once-off payment.

Table 5.2 Structure of payment

Ranks	Reinsertion Stage	Reintegration Stage		Other potential benefits	
				Bonus	Training
		1st month	3rd month	6th month	
Privates	US$ 100	US$ 100	US$ 200	US$ 220	US$ 720
Colonels	US$ 100	US$ 300	US$ 700	US$ 220	US$ 720

Source: Author, 2011.

Ex-combatants are able to choose the place they will be reintegrated; this is an attempt to minimise market distortions and it involves the communities that combatants will be joining. Six months after signing up, members of the former RPA receive a bonus of US$220, with special attention paid to the most vulnerable groups. Ex-combatants also receive a subsidy up to US$720 for university studies or other training of their own choice.

The RDRC established four Veteran Field Offices (VFOs) and deployed staff there to receive the veterans, and help solve their problems and provide them with guidance as they settled into civilian life. The offices were established in four different zones where large

numbers of veterans were expected to resettle. The main functions of the VFOs are the following:

- To oversee the veterans' economic and social reintegration and initiate corrective measures when required.
- To undertake, with the collaboration of the local administration, regular tours of the districts in order to sensitise the communities to facilitate the reintegration of the veterans.
- To prepare and submit monthly reports to the Commission on the progress of the programme's implementation in their province.

5.2.2.3 Economic reintegration

The main effort to support the socio-economic reintegration of combatants into civilian life has been the establishment and implementation of a micro-credit scheme implemented by the Commercial Bank of Rwanda (CBR) with whom the RDRC concluded a memorandum of understanding. Economic reintegration aims to provide sustainable living conditions for a limited period, thus avoiding the creation of a culture of dependence. The possibility of creating employment in the long-term is closely linked with the role played by the private sector, with emphasis on ex-combatants as a resource and in terms of their contribution to the civilian economy. For example, through the Reintegration Grant and Vulnerability Support Window, the RDRP provides ex-combatants with economic support to help them achieve sustainable livelihoods by supporting their economic projects via the RG. The programme also gives additional support to ex-combatants who remain vulnerable after exhausting all their benefits through the VSW. All ex-combatants that receive RG are sensitised on profitable investment. Through sensitisation and training, ex-combatants have formed associations that are generating income. Despite the limited employment opportunities in the country, the RDRP continues to advocate for ex-combatants' employment. Indeed, ex-combatants' associations are getting financial support through advocacy and partnerships.

Generally, the programmes provide economic reintegration assistance and access to employment through job counselling and referral services, skills development, micro-enterprise support schemes, rural development activities and employment promotion activities. A number of individuals and groups of ex-combatants benefited from training support provided by the programme and its partners. This mainly relates to building economic skills through training in entrepreneurship, project planning and management, agriculture, waste management, and painting. Individual ex-combatants received sponsorship from the German Technical Co-operation (GTZ), and were skilled in welding, plumbing, electrical installation, masonry, carpentry, motor vehicle mechanics, bricklaying and construction. The reintegration process only starts when ex-combatants come face-to-face with the socio-economic realities of civilian life in their chosen resettlement communities. The transformation from military to civilian life is a long process that requires a lot of effort not only on the part of ex-combatants, but from all relevant groups, especially the recipient community. For the ex-combatants and the community to come to terms with reality, both parties require substantial support, be it social or economic. The RDRP is the main broker of such support. Reintegration support to the individual ex-combatants is targeted at helping them initiate economic self-sustenance while re-establishing them in the social fabric of the community.

In the general context of the Rwandan community, life involves access to (or, preferably, acquisition of) personal shelter, opportunities for subsistence and economic prosperity, and access to social services for oneself and one's children (the main social services being health and education, both of which can be either formal or informal). It also involves cross-cutting issues such as the needs of special groups (women, the disabled and the chronically ill, as well as children).Ex-combatants have been taught how to work together; the net result is that a sizable number became active members of different associations. The RDRC constantly supports these associations, mainly in the area of institutional capacity building, through facilitation of training in different relevant aspects such as project planning and management, entrepreneurship, agro-business, and HIV/AIDS

awareness and prevention. At an individual level, the RDRP has facilitated counselling on the rational use of their benefits to enable a number of vulnerable ex-combatants to acquire and develop marketable skills. Many have used their programme benefits to acquire formal education, or skills training and development, which have boosted their competitiveness in the labour market. On the other hand, a sizable number of ex-combatants have invested their benefits in income-generating activities (IGAs) and/or the acquisition of shelter. However, a lot remains to be done as homelessness, unemployment, a lack of marketable skills, HIV/AIDS, and lack of access to land remain major challenges to the effective reintegration of ex-combatants. To address the issue of shelter, the RDRP involves the local authorities and the ex-combatants themselves. Turning to education, the programme delivered education support through VSW to ex-combatants pursuing secondary and tertiary education around the country; this is in addition to those who received training in different trades. The acquisition of literacy and numeracy skills is regarded as a pre-requisite for vocational training.

5.2.2.4 Social Reintegration

The RDRP social reintegration activities covered community perceptions, participation in community life, access to social services (health, education, shelter) and cross-cutting issues such as gender and HIV/AIDS awareness. The programme regards community perceptions as the cornerstone of social reintegration (RDRC, 2006). Social reintegration focuses on support for the family network, although there is also an opportunity to create informal networks of former combatants in order to aid reintegration such as discussion groups and associations of former combatants. This is also aimed at preventing any stigma based on previous military status. In order to ensure more effective reintegration, the RDRP works with ex-combatants, local authorities and other community-based actors in promoting positive community perceptions. This is done through sensitisation in all meetings with local partners and ex-combatants' associations and the different forums when the RDRC addresses ex-combatants. The programme continues to sensitise ex-

combatants on the significance of participating in community life, which involves monthly community work, community meetings in which a cross-section of issues is discussed, and participation in rituals such as funerals and weddings. The following sensitisation activities have been conducted;

- Joint RDRC/MONUC field visits to reintegrated ex-combatants and their families; MONUC gathered testimonies and transmitted them to combatants still operating with armed groups in the DRC.
- A theatre drama entitled "HABURIKI" which encourages members of AGs to repatriate.
- A weekly radio programme known as "Isange mu banyu" on Radio Rwanda, which keeps ex-combatants and the general public informed on issues related to demobilisation and reintegration.
- A documentary film entitled "Nta heza haruta iwanyu", which is screened by MONUC to members of AGs still in the DRC, encouraging them to repatriate.
- Radio spots on Radio Rwanda.
- Print media supplements (RDRC, 2008).

In terms of health issues, the programme works jointly with local government authorities, NGOs and district representatives of ex-combatants to encourage ex-combatants and support them to subscribe to medical insurance. The programme continues to raise HIV/AIDS awareness among ex-combatants during the training for ex-combatants' associations and other meetings involving RDRC/RDRP officials and ex-combatants. Ex-combatants living with HIV/AIDS continue to receive counselling and referral to support services. This is in line with the RDRP approach of integrating ex-combatants into mainstream support structures for specially disadvantaged groups.

5.2.2.4.1 Partner involvement

On the one hand, the RDRC's partners are encouraged to include ex-combatants in their activities. On the other hand, the ex-combatants are encouraged to seek services from the

existing government agencies and NGOs in their communities (RDRC, 2011). The RDRC has continued to work closely with its partners for technical advice and information sharing through the Technical Coordination Committee (TCC). The TCC members and donor representatives continue to work closely with the RDRC on issues of demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants. The Stage I DDR, which was originally budgeted at US$40 million, received only US$18.3 million in financing, approximately half of which came from the Rwandan government. Donor reluctance to fund demobilisation was attributable to Rwanda's involvement in the Congo wars during this period. For the Stage II DDR, which started in 2001, the international community created a regional programme, the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), to promote DDR in seven countries affected by the second Congo War: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, DRC, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Rwanda and Uganda. The US$500 million program was co-financed by the World Bank and a Multilateral Donor Trust Fund. The programme's ambitious goal was to demobilise and reintegrate 350,000 ex-combatants from national armies and irregular forces over a five-year period (2002–2006). The MDRP envisioned national ownership: each state would manage the DDR process with technical assistance and financing from the MDRP. Rwanda set up the RDRP late in 2001 and placed the RDRC in charge of the programme. The RDRP benefited from the MDRP and the budget for this stage of DDR was US$57.3 million. While the programme was scheduled to end in 2005, it was extended to the end of 2008 because of the slower than expected return of AGs from the DRC (RDRC, 2008).

5.3 Reintegration of female ex-combatants in Rwanda

Rwandan women participated in the liberation struggle on both sides of the internal conflict. Some participated as civilian cadres; for example, they did political work such as diplomacy. Others participated as combatants and contributed in combat, medical, logistics and other areas. The military newspaper "INGABO" has a regular women's page, which explains the role of women in the military and in the general reconstruction process of the country: 'Uguhiga ubutwari muratabarana' meaning that it is at the battlefield that

courageousness is proven…women were there…Among liberators there were women who sacrificed a lot, they had the will, the courage and the patriotism to sacrifice their life and fight for the liberation of Rwanda. They were not scared of the cold, hunger in the mountains and all the hardships; they participated in the medical field, in the mass communication for example 'Radio Muhabura', in logistics and political education among other things (*Ingabo Newspaper* 114, July 2004).Rwanda does not have a tradition of preparing women for combat. This is illustrated by the fact that only 500 female ex-combatants were demobilised, which is less than 1% of all former combatants registered as demobilised since 1997. According to the 2004 RDRC report, Stage I provided no special support for female ex-combatants and was not concerned with gender issues within the communities in which the ex-combatants resettled. Despite their small number, the significance of female ex-combatants as important role players in the Rwandan socio-political and military contexts should be underestimated.

Overall, DDR has not been gender sensitive in Rwanda, except for the fact that a large percentage of Vulnerability Support Window grants went to demobilised female soldiers. Out of the 111 (66%) demobilised female ex-combatants in Stage I only 73 accessed the fund (RDRC, 2004).The small number of female ex-combatants demobilised thus far is unlikely to be an accurate reflection of the actual number of women associated with the army. The MDRP secretariat notes that the number of women combatants in Rwanda is under-reported by combatant groups at the front end of the process, and that more needs to be done to encourage women combatants to present themselves, and to properly identify and incorporate them into national DDR processes (MDRP, 2004).The RDRC describes several other steps that are being taken to support female ex-combatants, including:

- ensuring women's needs are met in demobilisation centres;
- ensuring benefits for ex-combatants are equal, and equally accessible;
- encouraging implementation partners to facilitate women's participation in reintegration activities;
- strengthening the gender awareness and capacity of staff;

- including women in community-level counselling activities; and
- monitoring the impact of the demobilisation programme on women (RDRC, 2004).

In Rwanda, as in many other African countries, effective socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life is proving to be more challenging for women than men. The perception that society and female former combatants have of each other is crucial to the effectiveness of any reintegration process. As noted earlier, Rwanda does not have a tradition of preparing women for combat. They are often not understood, as the following illustrates:Ibintu byageze iwa Ndabaga, meaning that under exceptional circumstances even women can take up arms and fight (*Ingabo Newspaper* 114, July 2004:24).Women went to the front line and some died; they did different things including combat. Many women in exile got the patriotic call for the love of their country. Normally they say that women have no strength, but they survived the bush, climbed high mountains, stayed in the swamps and even hungry (Ingabo Newspaper114, 2004:25).In Rwanda, there is a cultural precedent for women taking up arms in Ndabaga, a figure in Rwandan popular history. Ndabaga was a young woman whose father had left for war, leaving no son to replace him so that he could, according to the tradition, retire from combat in his old age. In the absence of brothers, she disguised herself as a man and went to war. She fought with such courage that she helped the king to victory. Ever since, she has been associated with unusual means to resolve a desperate situation (RDRC, 2004).

During the liberation struggle, Rwandan women participated as combatants on both sides of the internal conflict. In 2001, female ex-combatants formed the "Ndabaga Association" which was the first association of female ex-combatants in the Great Lakes Region, if not in Africa. Its members are from both sides of the conflict. Its aim is to assist women with reintegration into society. However, they also have an interest in seeking a greater role in regional peacekeeping missions in Africa in order to ensure that these missions are gender sensitive (IRIN News, Nov 18, 2004).In essence, then, despite their comparatively small numbers (when compared to their male counterparts), Rwandan female ex-combatants were

important contributors to the war effort. They also have an equal stake and responsibilities (with other members of society) in the social and political order of post-conflict Rwanda. As such, support from the society receiving them, and assistance with their psychological trauma and social reintegration would serve the collective interests of both the ex-female combatants and the general society. As the expert-consultant to the RDRC expressed, there is hope that these female ex-combatants could play important roles as peace builders in their communities as some of them are already active in grassroots organisations.

5.4 Assessment of key informants

In this section, the researcher will evaluate the views of some key actors or stakeholders on the problems, challenges and overall effectiveness of the Rwandan government's efforts to facilitate the resettlement of female ex-combatants through its demobilisation and reintegration programme. The views of a variety of actors such as local leaders, military officers, RDRC Commissioners and the female ex-combatants themselves will be presented.

5.4.1 Profile of the study participants

Given the main purpose of this study, which is to investigate how effectively female ex-combatants are integrated into the mainstream of Rwandan society, the researcher randomly selected 20 (twenty) local leaders[1]; 10 (five males and five females) in Kigali city, five local leaders (three males and two females) in the Southern Province, and five local leaders (two males and three females) in the Northern province. Ten (10) military officers were interviewed as well as four (4) RDRC commissioners. The researcher also interviewed four (4) female ex-combatants and five (5) experts on DDR in order to get their views on the reintegration of female ex-combatants.

[1] Local leaders are usually elected by the local communuty within a decentralised structure and may range from the head of the village (umukuru *w'umudugudu*) to executive secretary, to head of sector (umukuru w'umurenge) of the same village. In other words, a village may have several local leaders at any given time. Although unpaid, they wield a great deal of power due to the recognition given to them by state authorities. As a result, they are highly respected by the general population, and are frequently the individuals tasked with the responsibility of mediating and resolving conflicts and addressing a wide range of community issues and challenges.

For ethical reasons, respondents' names are not mentioned. Instead, a local leader is described as LL; MLL stands for male local leader and FLL means female local leader. Military officers are referred to as MO, Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commissioners are represented as RDRC-C, experts on DDR as EDDR, and female ex-combatant as FEX. LL 2, for example, represents interview number two with a local leader. LL 2KC, represents interview number two with local leaders from Kigali City and LL 2SP, represents interview number two with local leaders from Southern Province, and LL 2NP, means interview number two with local leaders from Northern Province.

A purposive sampling technique was used to select the study sample. As noted by Cohen (2000) in purposive sampling, researchers handpick the cases to be included in the sample on the basis of their typicality. In this way, they built up a sample that meets their specific needs. As its name suggests, in terms of this approach, the sample is chosen for a specific purpose. (Cohen, et al., 2000:103.)

Table 5.3 Key informants

Position of the informant	Number of informants interviewed
Local leaders	20
Military officers	10
RDRC commissioners	04
Female (ex-)combatants	04
Experts on DDR	05

Source: Author, 2010.

The local leaders were chosen because they are members of the host communities where female ex-combatants settled. The military officers shared experiences with the female ex-combatants during military service; some served as their commanders. The RDRC commissioners were chosen as agents in charge of the DDR programme for ex-combatants.

They play a significant role in the effectiveness of the reintegration programme. It was crucial to access the views female ex-combatants themselves on the programme; this will be further explored in chapter six. A group of experts on DDR, including researchers, designers, planners, and programme practitioners, were also interviewed. What follows is a summary of the views articulated by members of each of the identified constituencies.

5.4.1.1 Local leaders

Local leaders revealed that the problems facing female ex-combatants mainly relate to reintegration. For example one male respondent highlighted that they return to discover that their civilian friends are much better off than they are; this causes frustration (MLL, 16NP: 20 June 2010). Furthermore, in the African context, women ex-combatants have special needs and responsibilities, such as seeing to the education of their children as well as the survival of their households. A dedicated programme is therefore needed to give them special attention. Two male local leaders from the Northern Province observed that preparation should involve psychosocial support (MLL, 16 and 17 NP: 21 June 2010), while a local female leader from the same area stressed that, "receiving societies should be sensitized to receive female ex-combatants" (FLL, 18NP: 21 June 2010). However, a male local leader from the Southern Province indicated that, "it is more costly to reintegrate a woman than it does for a man (MLL, 4KC: 06 June 2010)". As noted earlier, even though both women and men are responsible for the care and education of children, the bulk of the responsibility falls on women's shoulders. For example, a female local leader explained that: some women join the military as an opportunity to address livelihoods challenges (excluding ex-FAR), but unfortunately when they don't achieve their expectations, they get frustrated and prefer to be demobilised. They have remained in poverty (FLL, 7KC: 08 June 2010).Moreover, it was noted that women joined the military to challenge traditional gender stereotypes. A female local leader from Kigali City remarked: "female ex-combatants sought the freedom to earn a salary, wear trousers and take on leadership roles" (FLL, 6KC: 09 June 2010). The female local leaders argued generally that there was a need

for a more sensitive approach to the DDR programme, particularly given the patriarchal social order in Rwanda and male attitudes. One respondent argued that:

> "reintegration is seen as returning a woman who thought she had emancipated herself back to the life she left, which is not easy; hence the training of female ex-combatants should be sensitive to their situation for example; near their homes, less time/duration and relevant skills, and that the reintegration package for male ex-combatants should be given to their families because some men misuse it (FLL, 10KC: 10 June 2010).

The female local leaders were generally of the opinion that female ex-combatants were often better organised and more responsible than many of their male counterparts. For example, a local leader noted that some female ex-combatants have used their package well, with others investing it (FLL, 14SP: 12 June 2010). In general, local leaders raised three crucial points:

- Reintegration is affected by voluntary and non-voluntary demobilisation. Those in the latter category take time to comprehend why they were demobilised. They ask what wrongs they have committed (FLL, 8KC: 05 June 2010).
- A large number of female ex-combatants are working as local leaders, Gacaca judges or INYANGAMUGAYO (this is voluntary work, and does not provide an income), while a small number are trying to set up businesses; however, society also has a complex about them; nobody wants to marry a female ex-combatant except soldiers or fellow ex-combatants; they lost the opportunity for formal education and have no formal qualifications (FLL, 9 and 10KC: 04 June 2010).
- In general, women in the whole district have a long way to go as far as poverty alleviation is concerned. Although women's councils help female ex-combatants to gain a certain level of confidence, they are still very vulnerable and much more needs to be done to enable them to improve their lives (FLL, 19NP: 23 June 2010).

Considering the phases of DDR programme, the views of the local leaders are presented in the following way:

Table 5.4 Views of local leaders on the lives of female ex-combatants compared with the objectives of the DDR programme

Phases	Demobilization	Reinsertion	Reintegration	Mainstreaming
Expected outcome	Disarmament, discharge, orientation and relocation to a community of the ex-combatant's choice.	Provision of a transitional safety net of cash and in-kind payments spread out over a period of several months.	Assistance in the form of access to productive assets (particularly land and capital), training and employment and information and counselling services.	Partners encouraged to include ex-combatants in their activities. The beneficiaries to seek services from existing institution.
Current situation	-No needs assessment was done before demobilization -Some females were not mobilised in a voluntary manner; not surprisingly, some of the ex-combatants view the process a form of punishment	Support given to men who misuse it.	-Frustration at being left behind economically, and have not achieved what they expected from being soldiers. -No attention given to their needs. -No psychological support. -Not enough preparation of female ex-combatants. -Lack of formal qualifications or education.	-No special attention. -Host communities not sensitise d enough before attempting reintegration.

Asked about the effectiveness of DDR for female-ex-combatants, a local leader responded as follows: “The overall outcome of DDR for female ex-combatant is negative. The Rwandan government authorities not only failed to do needs assessment before demobilisation but also failed to convince many of the female combatants that the exercise was actually in their best interests, with the net effect that some amongst them actually viewed the programme as a form of punishment (MLL, 11SP: 11 June 2010)”.Another local leader highlighted that, not surprisingly, “reintegration became a challenge as many of the projected beneficiaries became frustrated after discovering that while they were away fighting they had fallen behind their peers at the economic level and that the DDR programme was not really a panacea for rectifying the perceived gap” (MLL, 1KC: 02 June 2010). According to him, this is due to the fact that DDR did not adequately factor female ex-combatants’ psychosocial needs into the design and implementation of the programme before rolling it out.

5.4.1.2 Military officers

The researcher conducted interviews with ten (10) military officers to ascertain their views on female ex-combatants. One military officer from the Ministry of Defence revealed that women played a largely supportive role while in the military (MO, 2KC:18 June 2010). Another stated: “the role of women in the military ranged from being radio operators at Muhabura to medical caregivers, administrative officers, and political mobilizers” (MO, 3KC:25 June 2010). One military officer stressed that “some also worked in the areas of logistics, intelligence and counselling. They did not forget their natural roles as care givers. Civilian women cadres played some roles, while military women cadres played others” (MO, 5KC:10 June 2010). He concluded: “the participation of women in the liberation struggle was much appreciated by the military officers” (MO, 5KC:10June 2010). Another respondent pointed to the national record of female empowerment and argued that it is no surprise that the government of Rwanda is ranked among the best in the world in promoting women in decision-making. He linked this directly to the role of women in liberating

Rwanda (MO, 7KC:29June 2010).During the interview, military officers further argued that:

- the RPF/RPA leadership tried to design ways and means to encourage women to participate in areas where they can excel (MO, 1KC:7 June 2010);
- during the ceasefire, military officers pulled women into their own unit – YANKEE – for reorganization, different reflections, seminars and specialized training. With the resumption of war, they resumed regular work in their units (MO, 4KC:7 June 2010).
- the combative atmosphere of the struggle brought a certain level of maturity in terms of experience and exposure not found in non-combatant women. As one military officer concluded: "These women saw colleagues die, were exposed to danger, and learnt crisis management" (MO, 6KC:28 June 2010).

The military officers noted the following:

- that the intensity of female combatants' experience was high (above average), as was the volume of work. A nurse could do what a doctor does under normal circumstances. Unfortunately, although these are valuable experiences, they are still informal and do not translate into academic qualifications or diplomas (MO, 8KC:21 June 2010);
- that the military experience was advantageous in so far as it gave female combatants confidence and leadership skills and the capacity to endure and take risks in life – this helps them to be role models to young girls. However it could be disadvantageous in a society which has a complex about them, and which sees them as unusual. The women combatants could have also undergone transformation; a lot should be done to help them reintegrate in society (MO, 9KC:30 June 2010).
- few women in the army are deployed to the front line; the majority are deployed in different departments like welfare, medical logistics, political administration and information; this is done in good faith to protect them and deploy them where they can be useful. But this sometimes becomes counter-productive; work in departments is more specialized and people with education are easily promoted. Soldiers at the frontline are promoted whether they are educated or not. This is why most women/females found

themselves with low rankings at the end of the war. This affects their demobilization process; they find themselves lost since all they have is informal experience. Their demobilization benefits have also been affected, since the lower the rank, the less the package (MO, 10KC:13 June 2010).

- Support in vocational training and income generating activities is crucial; an advisory committee to help orient female ex-combatants would be useful. This group should not be too big, but should include people with different experiences, including men who are gender-sensitive. It would be useful to organize special fundraising for female ex-combatants. People are sensitive to their needs and would be willing to contribute; it just needs a team to organize it. This would provide support for various activities, because it is hard to do anything without money (MO, 4KC:7 June 2010).

Table 5.5 Views of the military officers

Phases	Demobilization	Reinsertion	Reintegration	Mainstreaming
Expected outcome	Disarmament, discharge, orientation and relocation to a community of the ex-combatant's choice.	Provision of a transitional safety net of cash and in-kind payments spread out over a period of several months.	Assistance in the form of access to productive assets (particularly land and capital), training and employment and information and counselling services.	Partners encouraged to include ex-combatants in their activities. The beneficiaries to seek services from existing institution.
Current situation		-Low support package due to low rank of females		
Suggested options			-Vocal training -Income generating activities -Set up advisory committee to orient demobilised girls. -Organise fund raising for FXC and set up a committee for that	Sensitisation of the stakeholders to the needs of the FXC

In conclusion, the military officers were concerned by the fact that the skills that women acquired in the military were not converted into academic qualifications or diplomas. Only a few women were deployed to the front line; most were deployed in different departments like welfare, medical logistics, political administration and information, and many other fields. The view of the military officers is that acknowledging these skills would help female ex-combatants reintegrate in society. This means that the Demobilization Commission's economic reintegration programme must aim to equip former fighters generally and female ex-combatants specifically with productive skills and employment options so that they can return to civilian life.

5.4.1.3 RDRC commissioners

The third group of key informants is the RDRC commissioners. The researcher interviewed four commissioners; all male, as the commission does not have a female commissioner. All were clear that women need specialised training. For example, one of the commissioners noted that: "the tourism industry and hotel industry in Rwanda is slowly picking up; they should be encouraged in those areas" (RDRC-C, 2KC:17 June 2010. Another suggested that: "female ex-combatants could learn to put on lipstick, put on trouser, despite the fact of having served in the military" (RDRC-C, 1KC:01 June 2010). The commissioners indicated that the RDRP has tried to be gender-sensitive. For example, a large percentage of Vulnerable Support Window (VSW) grants were awarded to women. They said that they are open to more ideas and highlighted that the researcher's study would help them plan better to cater for female ex-combatants. One of the commissioners said: "I must congratulate you on this study, it is good, and I have never doubted the need of having a separate study to understand issues of gender in our programme. We have started the 'all inclusive' policy for VSW for women, but this is just the beginning" (RDRC-C, 3KC: 05 June 2010).

The chairman of the RDRC observed that the Commission has been associated with the Ndabaga association, which helped them since their inception. They have tried to include civilians from the beginning; continued support to such organisations would no doubt be of great help to female ex-combatants, as they may take the place of the Commission in future. Some of the female ex-combatants still have issues that keep them in the jungles of the Congo; they are afraid to come home. The Commission has everything it needs to help with their demobilisation and reintegration (RDRC-C, 4KC:16 June 2010).

Table 5.6 Opinion of the RDRC Commissioners

Phases	Demobilization phase	Reinsertion	Reintegration	Mainstreaming
Expected output	Disarmament, discharge, orientation and relocation to a community of ex-combatant's choice	Provision of a transitional safety net of cash and in-kind payments spread out over a period of several months	Assistance in the form of access to productive assets (particularly land and capital), training and employment, and information and counseling services	Partners encouraged to include ex-combatants in their activities. The beneficiaries to seek services from existing institutions
Current situation (positive)		The programme is gender sensitive: VSW	- VSW	Females becoming agents of change
Suggested options	-Be more gender sensitive. - Combatants still living in DR Congo to come back and undergo process of demobilization	-Be more gender sensitive	-Need for specialized training fit for the current market. - Support for Ndabaga Association	-Role of Ndabaga Association in the commission of demobilization -Support for Ndabaga Association

In summary, and as illustrated in Table 5.6, the RDRC commissioners divided the process into three phases:

(1) Demobilization: disarmament, discharge, orientation, and relocation of the ex-combatants to a community of their choice.

(2) Reinsertion: provision of a transitional safety net of cash and in-kind payments spread out over a period of several months.

(3) Reintegration: assistance in the form of access to productive assets (particularly land and capital), training and employment, and information and counselling services.

While the whole process is gender-sensitive, implementation in the field when women return to their respective communities is not. Even though this cannot be attributed to the RDRC, some positive things happened. As soldiers, women found they were able to rise above some of the limitations in their lives. When they left home to take up arms, they also left behind their traditional roles. Women shed their docile image, strapped on bandoliers and wielded guns – much like men. The idea that a woman could take up a non-traditional profession such as a soldier was a radical one. Many women were active participants during the war in Rwanda.

5.4.1.4 Female ex-combatants

The fourth group of key informants is the female-ex-combatants themselves. In this section, they are classified according to their rank. Interviews were held with one female ex-combatant (other rank and former ex-FAR from the Northern Province), two captains (former RPA from Kigali City), and two lieutenants (former RPA from Kigali City).

Female ex-combatant number one (FEX1) is from Northern Province and a former ex-FAR army. At the time of the interview, she was 43 years old, a widow and the mother of four children. She has become a successful entrepreneur in the clothing sector. She was demobilised in 2002 through the RDRP which provided her with demobilisation and reintegration assistance. "I was a member of the Forces Armees Rwandaises or Ex-FAR." The researcher met her where she is based in the Northern Province. She said that her first priority was to find a way to look after her family. With regard to the reintegration programme, she argued that: "Before joining the FAR, I had practiced tailoring, and I had always loved commerce. With that same spirit of business, I used my RDRP reintegration benefits to start business in selling second-hand clothing. Then after, I applied for an

RDRP Vulnerable Support Window (VSW) grant and thank God, I received it. This helped me overcome my weak economic situation (FEX, 1NP:20 June 2010).She continued: I am a happy woman and mother. I can sell over 15 bales of seasonal second-hand clothes a month; I also employ five sales agents in neighbouring districts. This has enabled me to pay for the education of my children and to build a house for my family. She saved 2.5 million Rwandan Francs (almost US$4 500) and invested this in various business projects. "My wish is to spread out my business and supply more markets in the neighbouring districts," she revealed. As for her successful reintegration into civilian life, she noted that: "because of my good behaviour and the result of entrepreneurial activities, I benefited the trust and confidence of local community members, and have been appointed secretary of the community bank in my district" (FEX, 1NP: 20 June 2010).

Female ex-combatant number two (FEX2) is an ex-FAR captain from Kigali-City. She was generally unhappy with the performance of the RDRP with respect to female ex-combatants. She underscored the universal plight of female ex-combatants: In general, female ex-combatants are living in bad conditions. Some of them do not have accommodation, no jobs, and are not benefiting from medical care. A lot has to be done by the RDRP by helping groups at least as it may be difficult to help individuals. I am sure that we can make it, we are hard-working (FEX, 2KC: 04 June 2010). FEX2 argued that most female ex-combatants are not well educated. She was quick to confess that: "In my case, I am surviving on the informal knowledge I got from the army, I used to be a political commissar, then a quartermaster. Currently, I am working as volunteer for one international organisation in stores. In my community, I was a chairman of the Gacaca local courts and leader in women councils. My wish was for example to have an opportunity to study English and do small course in store management in order to formalise what I learnt as a quartermaster in the army (FEX, 2KC: 04 June 2010). FEX2 concluded by bemoaning her life experiences since leaving the army and her need for psychosocial assistance to enable her to better negotiate her way in her new civilian life: "I know that it is difficult to survive out of the military. I have a big family to look after. I will appreciate if [I] can

benefit from guidance and counselling on how to survive in civilian life" (FEX, 2KC: 04 June 2010)".

Female ex-combatant number three (FEX3), a captain from Kigali City, was demobilised in April 2002 through the RDRP. As with other demobilised soldiers, she was provided with demobilisation and reintegration assistance. She noted that: "I was a member of the Rwanda Patriotic Army. Before I joined the liberation struggle, I was a nurse and I performed the same duty among others [during] my army services" (FEX, 3KC: 10 June 2010). FEX3 outlined her experiences after demobilisation: "After my demobilisation I continue my occupation as a nurse and I am earning a monthly salary to provide my needs. I benefited from a peacekeeping mission where I served as a military observer in United Mission in Darfur. I passed the test prior [to] my deployment and I competed along with my male counterparts (FEX, 3KC:10 June2010)".However, she is suffering psychologically. She is not married and does not have children. She said that it is difficult to survive out of the army because of the stigma and stereotype. "The society does not understand us and sometimes we get frustrated". She thought she had emancipated herself from the army back to the same life she had left. But this is not easy: "you realize that you missed a lot when you meet your former friends who did not joined the army service, married and carrying children" (FEX, 3KC: 10 June 2010).

Female ex- combatant number four (FEX4) is a lieutenant from Kigali City. She viewed the programme as ineffective in rendering the kind and level of support required by female ex-combatants. She noted: "We tried to form an association of female ex-combatants called 'Ndabaga', however it is still weak. We do not have technical support in designing various projects. We do not have donors fund." She added that the female ex-combatants want to form cooperatives so that they can organise themselves where they are and receive assistance. However, "We still need support for the issue" (FEX, 4 KC: 08 June 2010).

The researcher observed that, generally, these women are vulnerable and marginalised in both conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. The challenges that women ex-combatants have confronted in the reintegration process include an acute shortage of skills to support sustainable livelihoods, and the fact that many are not capable of benefiting from the opportunities offered in the post-conflict reconstruction period. It was clear that many ex-combatants have inadequate educational, and few marketable skills; hence their absorption into the formal sector, including the civil service, is not possible. In view of this finding, skills development is imperative if women ex-combatants are to achieve economic reintegration.

The table below shows views on the demobilization programme.

Table 5.7 Views of the female ex-combatants on the demobilization programme

Phases	Demobilization Phase	Reinsertion	Reintegration	Mainstreaming
Expected output	Disarmament, discharge, orientation and relocation to a community of ex-combatant's choice	Provision of a transitional safety net of cash and in-kind payments spread out over a period of several months	Assistance in the form of access to productive assets (particularly land and capital), training and employment, and information and counseling services	Partners encouraged to include ex-combatants in their activities. The beneficiaries to seek services from existing institutions
Current situation (negative)		Assist through VSW	-Poverty, joblessness -No formal education. Some are surviving by using informal education received when in the army -No guidance on how to survive in civilian life -Stigma and frustration of having joined the army and come back	-No support to Ndagaba association
Current situation (positive)		Assist through VSW	-Some success stories (self-employed economic independence) -Pride in economic independence -Active participation in decision-making bodies at local level	

Suggested options		- Assist through VSW	-RDDP should help people in groups -Training in more valuable areas -Guidance on how to survive in civilian life	-Real assistance and support to the female ex-combatant associations. Different donors should be sensitized.

In summary, the views of female ex-combatants on the demobilisation programme are not that different from the other respondents. They highlighted that there is no formal education to prepare them to reintegrate into civilian life. Some are making a living using the informal education they received while in the army. There is little guidance for female ex-combatants on how to survive in civilian life. They experience stigma and frustration at the fact that they come back to very little.

5.4.1.5 Experts on reintegration of ex-combatants

The researcher interviewed five experts on DDR (EDDR): three males (two working with the United Nations as DDR officers and one as a researcher/academician); and two females: one researcher and the other a UN DDR staff member. These respondents generally argued that, while each country has its own plans and preferences, it is essential that gender sensitivity be built into the social fabric of all societies, particularly Rwandan society. One UN staff member contextualised the difficulties being experienced by female Rwandan ex-combatants as follows: “Female ex-combatants lost the opportunity to study because of the long time they spent in the military. They lack formal skills. They need formal skills, training and assistance to start income generating activities. This is due to the fact that there was no needs assessment from the first place” (EDDR, 1KC: 03 July 2010).Arguing for a more holistic approach to assisting ex-combatants, a researcher on DDR (EDDR2) argued that “Informal training gained in the military should be formalised so that female ex-combatants can be self-employed. Female ex-combatants need assistance to get jobs as it is difficult for the community to trust them immediately”. She added that “the efforts for reintegration of special groups of ex-combatants have to be more employment-focused in

order to be successful and to ensure real social economic reintegration" (EDDR, 3KC: 13 July 2010).

According to an expert on DDR, in Southern Sudan, female ex-combatants and other female community members were provided with the means to start economic cooperatives, adult literacy and numeracy support groups, and livelihood groups such as tailoring, brick making, a catering cooperative, and the production of indigenous arts and crafts. This model can be applied in Rwanda as it reduces the tension between female ex-combatants and their fellow women in the foster community on the one hand, and, on the other hand, it empowers women ex-combatants economically (EDDR, 5KC: 15 July 2010).An expert on DDR noted that, for most female ex-combatants, demobilisation was a total surprise. The Rwandan demobilisation exercise started with the disabled, child soldiers, and women. The soldiers had not been adequately prepared (if at all) for the life-altering experience that demobilisation represented, and their inputs on how best to proceed with the programme were not sought or factored into the planning teams, which had no representatives from their groups. Female ex-combatants who were demobilised are often not only young but also uneducated. As a result, they did not participate in decision-making, had no role in planning the demobilisation programme and were rarely consulted (EDDR, 4KC: 15July 2010).This was emphasised by a female UN DDR officer, who stressed that the DDR Programme in Rwanda must prioritise the demobilisation and reintegration of women ex-combatants generally, with specific attention to special needs women – such as the disabled and war wounded, and elderly female ex-combatants. Furthermore, this project should not exclude vulnerable civilian women in the foster communities (EDDR, 2KC: 15July 2010). While female ex-combatants are still expected to fulfil traditional roles and carry a lot of responsibilities, they receive a very small package on demobilisation. There are no effective gender-sensitive programmes. The RDRP should provide referral services, research the labour market and link female ex-combatants to it, as well as recommend them as employees. As most of the female ex-combatants are facing psychological problems, there should be a special socio-psychological centre for them. At demobilisation and during

orientation sessions, female ex-fighters should be given extra counselling exclusive to them.

The views of the experts on reintegration of female ex-fighters are presented as follows:

Table 5.8 Views of experts on reintegration

Phases	Demobilization phase	Reinsertion	Reintegration	Mainstreaming
Current situation (positive)	Most people are not gender sensitive			
Suggested options	-Engendering all demobilization process		-Need for formal skills, training and assistance to start income generating activities. Informal training gained in the military should be formalized so that they can be self employed. -Female ex-combatants need assistance to get jobs as it is difficult for the community to trust them immediately	-Association

It has been observed that women and girls are too afraid of repercussions from the male military or the community to report for DDR, or that they are misinformed about the DDR programmes and who benefits. Consequently, they may not benefit from the DDR programmes. There is a lack of designated funding for female or gender initiatives. Few

programme officers are skilled in gender budgeting. They might not know how to identify women's specific needs, and they do not know how to plan for gender programmes for women associated with the fighting forces and armed groups.

5.5 Potential and risks of demobilization and reintegration programmes

Effective demobilisation involves a well-structured and well-planned reintegration programme. Demobilisation that discounts the social, economic and political factors inherent in the reintegration process, risks endangering peace arrangements and can lead to renewed fighting with its inevitable humanitarian implications (World Bank., 1995). Given the Rwandan experience, the effectiveness of the DDR programmes in reintegrating ex-combatants into civilian life depends on three crucial factors:

- Insightful and comprehensive planning that is based on sound research and analysis in order for a realistic strategy to be developed.
- The requisite political will must exist at all of levels of the implementation strategy in order to positively influence the processes.
- The question of cost or adequate resources to undertake the initiative must be taken into account. The DDR programmes are extremely expensive and time-consuming; the necessary resources, namely financial, material and technical expertise, need to be secured. Contributions and support from outside the country are crucial to the success of the programmes (Second Conference on DDR in Africa, DRC: June 2007).Some successes have been noted in countries like Mozambique, Burundi and Angola, where protracted conflicts were followed by political will at the central government level that led to successful DDR programmes.

The longevity of conflicts affects demobilisation and reintegration in different ways. Military service socialises ex-combatants in a military culture such as following orders without critical reflection. As civilians they may be reluctant to seek explanations or to participate effectively in demobilisation programmes (Mehreteab, 2004:48). The example of Zimbabwe shows that training in participative approaches to planning and decision-

making may help ex-combatants to overcome this obstacle (ILO, 1995).On the other hand, as noted in earlier sections, training and education can serve as remedies and can reduce trauma by helping ex-combatants to rebuild their self-confidence. However, ex-combatants must wrestle not only with their material needs but also deal simultaneously with the loss of their comrades and their lives as soldiers. They may feel abandoned if they do not find a new economic, social and psychological standing in society (World Bank, 1998). Reintegration of ex-combatants may also be affected by how they are received by their families and communities as well as the capacity of each individual. Well-structured and well-planned reintegration programmes tend to be more effective than less structured and poorly-planned programmes. The reintegration of ex-fighters is rendered more different and complex by the scarcity of resources as well as the war-ravaged nature of the post-conflict economic environment. Factors that block effective DDR programmes are a lack of political will, culminating in intransigence amongst the former fighters, lack of adequate resources and foreigners and outsiders who influence belligerents not to disarm.

However, despite the economic challenges that impede the reintegration process, we cannot ignore other social challenges. Some ex-combatants who have learned to use violence during conflict do not abandon this pattern of behaviour when they return to their families and communities or are integrated into the security sector. Nevertheless, the support and acceptance ex-combatants receive from families, community members, and peers are critical to their resilience and their successful reintegration. Apart from disciplinary factors, a UNDP report (May 2011) indicates that ex-combatants are sometimes implicated in violence against community members; ex-combatants (regardless of whether they are men or women) therefore become stigmatised or seen as a drain on scarce resources, or are perceived as a threat to elders or authorities within the communities to which they return (UNDP, May 2011:10).On the other hand, during the reintegration process, both male and female ex-combatants often face the expectation that they will return to more narrow or restrictive gender roles. They struggle to renegotiate their roles and relationships in the

household and the broader community, to gain social acceptance, and to change their wartime identities and create a new identity in civilian life.

Chapter Six

Statistical analysis of findings and discussion of results

6.1 Introduction

In order to better understand the life of female ex-combatants after demobilisation, there was a need to adopt a comparative view and establish the differences with their male counterparts. This helped to understand the effectiveness of their reinsertion and reintegration in mainstream life after demobilisation. A structured questionnaire and focus group discussions were used to collect data on this issue. The two parts of this chapter reflect the results of the survey conducted with the main sample of 50 female ex-combatants and 50 male ex-combatants. The first part presents the profiles of the respondents, and the second discusses the respondents' views on the current DDR programme in Rwanda as well as the programme's efficiency and role in the demobilisation of women ex-combatants. Given the overarching objective of the study, which is to assess how effectively female ex-combatants have been reintegrated into the mainstream of Rwandan society, this chapter also tracks and evaluates the actual integration of women ex-fighters into the economic and social life of their communities, compared with men. It investigates the extent to which the DDR programme is helping or has helped female ex-combatants to return meaningfully to civilian life.

6.2 The Impact of Women's military service experience on the reintegration programme

6.2.1 Introduction

As noted previously, Rwanda does not have a tradition of preparing and sending females into combat. In the Rwandan culture, when women were engaged in struggle, these females were perceived as having unusual courage. Women played a role during the Rwandan liberation war and in liberating their country. Surprisingly, very little has been written about their lives and roles during that period. The phenomenon of females in the

army is not new, as they served in the RPA, in the former FAR and, most recently, in the armed rebel groups.

The female ex-combatants who were interviewed for this study argued that their service in the army changed them considerably. They revealed that they gained new skills, capabilities and confidence in contrast to other Rwandan women. They are often so self-assured that they view themselves as having the capacity to hold any position. Because of these qualities, female ex-combatants are called on as agents of change and positive role models for other women, and to lead the way in redressing gender prejudice in the community. During the focus group discussions, one woman ex-combatant revealed that: "during the war, our lives even changed in terms of biology; some missed their monthly periods for a while" (FGD, 1KC:20July 2012). Most of the female ex-combatants interviewed said that they joined the army to fight injustice, to pursue a military profession or were following their friends. Their services included the following: office work, leadership, logistics, health, communications, political education, social affairs, intelligence, security and also kitchen work. As one female ex-combatant underscored, "Women performed different work such as social work, catering, office work, logistics, night patrols and cleaning" (FGD, 3KC: 21 July 2010). Women were rarely deployed to the frontline; however, their contributions to the war effort were still considered remarkable by some observers. As noted by one expert, "their [female combatants] contributions to the war efforts cannot be judged simply by looking at their marginal presence in the battlefield itself but rather by considering the preparatory and supportive roles they played in the war effort which was fundamental in the successes of the then rebel forces against a sitting government" (EDDR, 4 KC: 6 July 2010).

However, the fact that women did not go to the front line like their male counterparts prejudiced their chances for promotion with the net effect of a disproportionate number of them languishing as low rank soldiers. This had significant impact on their demobilisation benefits as ex-combatants. While the frontline females got promoted whether or not they

were educated, those who performed non-fighting roles such as administration, logistics, and political administration were largely ignored when it came to promotion, especially those who were not appropriately educated. Nonetheless, a large majority of the female ex-combatants who were interviewed were proud of having participated in the liberation struggle. Furthermore, the majority (70% of the respondents) indicated that they joined the army with the consent and support of their families. Nevertheless, as will be explained later, many still found reintegration very difficult. By contrast, a relatively small group (30% of the respondents) joined the army without telling their families as they knew that military service was considered a duty best left to men. Despite their pride in having rendered important services to their country, many of the respondents harbour serious resentment or reservations about the wisdom of having done so when they reflect on the opportunity costs associated with that service. Many believed that the army had failed to reciprocate their devotion and service with demonstrable commitment in taking care of them as ex-combatants. As one female ex-combatant revealed during a focus group discussion, "sometimes I regret seeing my friends who did not join the army but instead have finished schooling which lead to their better life compared to me"(FEX,2FGDKC:23 July 2010).Some female ex-combatants attributed some of their life's misfortunes to their exposure to the military. According to another female ex-combatant, "some female ex-combatants married to soldiers and who are widows believe that if they had not been in the military and married to military men, perhaps they would not be widows now"(FEX,1FGDKC: 20 July 2010).

Generally, Rwandan society perceives women as a weak and vulnerable group; however, the focus group discussions revealed that the female ex-combatants felt strong, and the proof is that they endured similar conditions as their male counterparts during the war. Female ex-combatants have demystified the notion that women cannot go to war. However, although they performed valuable duties based on training received while on the job, their lack of formal training and the associated documentation (certificates, diplomas or degrees), left them with unmarketable skills. Thus, a critical aspect of the demobilisation

and reintegration process has been how to harness and repackage the informal skills they gained in the military as the first stage of skills development, which could, with additional formal training, be utilised to improve employability and reintegration. FEX-FGD recognised this when she noted that, “without supplementary training to use our skills, it is difficult to compete with others in the labour market” (FGD, 4SP:5 October 2010).Fifty percent of the female ex-combatants interviewed were young when they joined the army; most of them were studying and couldn’t complete their studies. They cannot compete with women who did not join the army. Their friends finished school and can find jobs more easily than them. They expressed frustration at the fact that some people treat them as difficult, and that they are not trusted. Men sometimes refuse to marry female ex-combatants because they do not trust them. They are also not trusted by their fellow civilian women. However, they reported that they were treated the same by their fellow combatants or officers. Those who were in RPA were thankful that the hierarchy allowed them to participate in areas where they could make progress, such as attending seminars and specialised training during the cease-fire periods. Asked about sexual harassment, most of respondents said that they were not pressurised into having sex. However, some of them have children who were conceived during their military service. On the one hand, this may be explained by the possibility that females had much more control of their environment and may have desired the prospect of motherhood, even in the military. On the other hand, the troops may have been sufficiently disciplined to be mindful of such issues.

6.2.2 Summary of findings

The summaries of the female ex-combatants’ life and experience in military service and its impact on their lives, as reported by the respondents in the focus group discussions is represented in figure 6.1.

Figure 6.1 Women's military service experience



Source: Researcher 2011

As Figure 6.1 and the views of the respondents outlined in the previous section show, many females who served in the military had the opportunity to gain new skills, capabilities and confidence in contrast to other, traditional Rwandan women. This was despite the fact that, for some, the skills acquired were often informal and not marketable in civilian society where they had to be reintegrated. Indeed, most of the ex-combatants took great pride in their service to their country and what they saw as their contribution to a more just social

order in Rwanda. Respondents argued that women were motivated to join the RPA for political reasons such as to fight injustice, whereas a significant number from ex-FAR joined the army for professional reasons, and most former members of armed groups were conscripted. Unfortunately, there is a paucity of systematic scholarly literature on women in the military. Some of the literature that is available actually describes women combatants as having been abducted and 'unusual' people. An overwhelming majority (85percent) of the female respondents highlighted that female ex-combatants were sometimes frustrated by the way they were generally treated by people: some regarded them as difficult; men did not view or accept them as good marital partners and, sometimes, their fellow women did not trust them. Although Rwandese traditional norms expect a woman to be shy and submissive, female ex-combatants posed special challenges to those they rejoined in civilian life who found their temperament and carriage contrary to their expectations. Perceived by the general society as neither men nor women, many female ex-combatants developed psychological problems as they battled their relative isolation and rejection in civilian life. This was recognised by three-quarters (75percent) of both female and male respondents who felt that gender prejudice has a palpable impact on the reintegration of female ex-combatants. One male ex-combatant from Northern Province stated sympathetically: "there is a need for a proper sensitisation programme for families and community hosts to address the issue of reintegrating female ex combatants" (MEX, 7FGDNP: 25 October 2010),

6.3 Demographic profile of the respondents

6.3.1 Introduction

The demographic profile of respondents presented here promotes an understanding of the context in which individual efforts at demobilisation and reintegration took place. This includes information about the age, marital and educational status, and place of residence, category, rank, and number of dependants. Collectively, these variables are expected to reveal important information relating to the socio-economic conditions and wellbeing of female ex-combatants after their demobilisation. As a demographic factor, the age and

gender profile of female ex-combatants is a crucial variable for understanding the developmental capacity, social and economic opportunities and adaptability of female ex-combatants in their new civilian lives. It might also shed light on the nature of their experiences within the military if one assumes that younger entrants would have not only been less socially experienced, but also more malleable to manipulative and abusive activities on the part of male colleagues. Certainly, age and gender (see appendix one, questions 1 and 3) would be a crucial factor for determining or influencing the female ex-combatants' ability and opportunities to reintegrate meaningfully and make appropriate choices on how best to participate actively in the social, economic and political life of their communities during their reintegration process.

Table 6.1 Age and gender

Age group	Gender				Total	
	Female		Male			
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
<31	8	16	20	40	28	28
31-34	13	26	9	18	22	22
35-39	9	18	21	42	30	30
>=40	20	40			20	20
Total	50	100	50	100	100	100

Table 6.1.1 Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Age2	100	24.00	51.00	35.7000	6.2401
Valid N (listwise)	100				

The age of the respondents ranged from 24 to 51. The youngest respondent was 24 years old and the oldest was 51. The average age was 35. This means that the respondents fall into the most economically active age groups. Female respondents were rather older than

male respondents. Only 16 percent of female respondents were 31 years old or less, whereas the comparative figure for male respondents stood at 40 percent. On the other hand, 40 percent of female respondents were 40 years old or more, and there were no male respondents in this age group. The age profile was used to determine how age might influence the female ex-combatants' ability to actively participate socially, economically and politically in their communities during the reintegration process. The significance of the age profile of female ex-combatants is multi-pronged. Their relatively older age profile compared to their male counterparts suggests that they would have had greater levels of maturity and social experience. This would have entailed greater confidence and control in their interactions with the males, which, in turn, would have led to the perception that female ex-combatants have strong male characteristics and, as such, are undesirable marital partners. Nevertheless, from the chronological age perspective, the relatively young profile of the female ex-combatants meant that most of them were still strong, in child-bearing age brackets, and potentially productive socially and economically.Sixty five percent (65 percent) of the respondents had served between five and ten years in the army. For effective reintegration, and given their age profile, they needed vocational training and marketable skills in order to contribute positively not only to the development of both their communities and the country but also to activities aimed at sustainable peace.

The researcher deemed it necessary to establish the educational level of the respondents in question number 10 from the questionnaire. There were ten possible answers made available ranging from no school to vocational. The responses are presented in the Table 6.2.

Table 6.2 Educational level of respondents

			Female	Male	Total
Education	No School	Count		1	1
		% within gender		2.0%	1.0%
	Some primary school	Count	4	11	15
		% within gender	8.0%	22%	15.0%
	Completed primary school	Count	12	14	26
		% within gender	24.0%	28.0%	26.0%
	Some secondary school	Count	11	11	22
		% within gender	22.0%	22.0%	22.0%
	Completed secondary school	Count	11	8	19
		% within gender	22.0%	16.0%	19.0%
	Some university	Count	3	2	5
		% within gender	6.0%	4.0%	5.0%
	Completed university	Count	9		9
		% within gender	18.0%		9.0%
	Completed Institute/polytechnic	Count		3	3
		% within gender		6.0%	3.0%
Total		Count	50	50	100
		% within gender	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The Chi-Square test for educational level of the respondents is presented as shown.

Table 6.2.1 Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig (2-sided)	Exact Sig (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	17.094	7	0.017	
Fisher's Exact Test	17.496			0.007

Each stage of education is represented in the study sample. From the figures and the statistical value of p (0.017<0.05), there is a correlation between the gender of an ex-combatant and his/her level of education; indeed, this level is significantly higher for female respondents than for male respondents. While slightly more than half of the males have not gone beyond primary school (2 percent of them did not go to school, 22 percent of them did some primary school and 28 percent completed primary school), 68 percent of female respondents have gone beyond primary school; 22 percent had some secondary schooling, 22 percent completed secondary school, 6 percent had partially completed university studies, and 18 percent had completed university studies. In essence, nearly half (46 percent) of the female ex-combatants had at least completed secondary education as compared to 23 percent of their male counterparts. Basically, female ex-combatants had collectively achieved a much higher average educational level than their male colleagues at the point of demobilisation. One clear implication is that a better differentiation of needs at the point of demobilisation would have been beneficial for all concerned, especially the female ex-combatants. For the RDRP, focussed planning would have meant that they would have identified a more appropriate pool of developmental options that could attract increased subscription and commitment by the ex-combatants. Furthermore, it would appear that (collectively) the male and female ex-combatants came from slightly different social backgrounds – a factor that may also serve to explain their highly varied levels of work ethic, motivation, and happiness with the RDRP. This is despite some evidence that, generally, ex-combatants had opportunities to improve on their formal qualifications or training while in the military.

However, the focus group discussions revealed that although there were some opportunities, only a small number of ex-combatants acquired education during their time in the military. In the main, the vast majority of the female ex-combatants acquired what educational qualifications they had before they joined the army rather than while in the army. As one female ex-combatant argued, "when you are an educated man or woman it is different, even when you are demobilised you can look after yourself, because there are greater opportunities and there is a lot one can do (FEX, 5FGDSP:7 October 2010).After the demobilisation, the Commission assisted ex-combatants who wanted to acquire formal education or skills by paying their fees from the reintegration grant. The Commission also provided support to some of the institutions willing to admit ex-combatants or to provide specialised training for the disabled. According to the respondents such programmes focus on:

- Professional and vocational training
- Formal education
- Employment support, including tool kits or initial financial requirements for employment, etcetera.

Life in the military was demanding, hard and mind-numbing. The realities of military life meant that there was not much time for formal skills training. It has been observed that formal education or skills training may act as a healing measure because it rebuilds hope and identity and reduces the trauma caused by the situations that combatants endure during their military life. As one female ex-combatant underscored, "I did not realize that it would be so hard to live as a civilian. Suddenly, your life changes so much. No more training, no more routines, and you are on your own. But you know you have to survive. For me, it was a challenge for me to change my life, my thinking. It was difficult to adjust to military life but I was too busy and scared to think too much. Now, it was difficult to adjust as a civilian. I had to do so for my future" (FEX, 6KC:20 June 2010).

Although it has been observed from our sample that as a group female ex-combatant respondents have better educational qualifications than their male counterparts, one of the challenges that has confronted the reintegration of women ex-combatants has been an acute shortage of relevant skills to support sustainable livelihoods whether still in the military or in the post-military environment (see appendix one, question number 15). Many female ex-combatants have limited educational backgrounds with no marketable skills and, consequently, their absorption into the formal civilian sectors, including the civil service, was either difficult or not feasible at all.

Table 6.3 Respondents' profile by household size

Dependants	Gender		Total
	Female	Male	
1	19.0%	0.0%	11.4%
2	14.3%	0.0%	8.6%
3	40.5%	46.4%	42.9%
4	7.1%	21.4%	12.9%
5	19.0%	7.1%	14.3%
6	0.0%	25.0%	10.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Respondents reported that they are responsible for the maintenance and welfare of between one and six people. A significant number of respondents (42.9 percent) support three dependants. In line with traditional cultural arrangements, which often require extended family responsibilities, male respondents carried greater burdens in their households. The majority (53.5 percent) of men versus 26.1 percent of women support four or more people (21.4 percent of men versus 7.1 percent of women support four dependants; 7.1 percent of men versus 19 percent of women support five dependants; and 25 percent of men versus 0 percent of women support six people).

It is not particularly surprising that males in Rwanda have bigger roles when it comes to financial responsibility for household maintenance. Patriarchal cultural imperatives require males to assume responsibilities that often go beyond their immediate family. However, as in other parts of the world, women in Rwanda are heavily burdened with a disproportionate portion of household activities and care responsibilities that demand huge amounts of their time. These often mean that they have to structure their employment preferences and options differently from men with negative net cost effects with respect to job quality and associated income. As the World Bank (2011:198) underlined in its World Development Report 2012, "Far from being a simple decision about whether or not to join the labor force, participation in market work involves reallocating time across a variety of activities - a process that can be difficult and costly, particularly for women. And a focus solely on participation masks gender differences in the nature and dynamics of work." This implies that, although female ex-combatants may have fewer people to take care of financially, they have far more people to care for not only on the basis of routine daily chores but also in terms of family health and welfare. The net effect is that they require education and training arrangements that have built-in flexibility

In question number five from the questionnaire, the researcher explores the places where the respondents were living before the war began in 1994.

Table 6.4 Place where ex-combatants were living before war

		Female		Male		Total	
	Place before 1994	Count	%	Count	%	Count	Percent
	Outside of Rwanda	33	66.0%	9	18.0%	42	42.0%
	Kigali	6	12.0%	3	6.0%	9	9.0%
	Other towns in Rwanda	2	4.0%	1	2.0%	3	3.0%
	Rural settlement in Rwanda	9	18.0%	37	74%	46	46.0%
Total		50	100.0%	50	100.0%	100	100.0%

Given that the majority of the female respondents (66 percent) were living outside of Rwanda while most of the male ex-combatants were living in rural areas in Rwanda (where more than 90% of the population is based), it would seem logical that the typical urban versus rural tendencies observable in population groups around the world would also be reflected in the attitudes of the ex-combatants**.** Disadvantaged in terms of the availability of educational resources, infrastructure, and job opportunities, rural areas often suffer from underdevelopment and poor socio-economic conditions. Given greater opportunities in urban areas, it is not surprising that female ex-combatants (with a largely urban background) would have better education and skills when compared to their male counterparts (with largely rural roots).

6.3.2. Categories of demobilized respondents by army

In question number eight from the questionnaire, the researcher establishes the various military groups in Rwanda. The responses made available ranges from RDF to FDLR.

Table 6.5 Military groups of the respondents

			Gender		
			Female	Male	Total
Military group	RDF	Count	23	31	54
		% within Gender	46.0%	62.0%	54.0%
	RPA	Count	20	1	21
		% within Gender	40.0%	2.0%	21.0%
	FAR	Count	7	4	11
		% within Gender	14.0%	8.0%	11.0%
	FDLR	Count		14	14
		% within Gender		28.0%	14.0%
Total		Count	50	50	100
		% within Gender	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Respondents were from four military groups, namely RDF (54 percent), RPA (21 percent), FAR (11 percent) and FDLR (14 percent). Female respondents served mainly in RDF (46 percent) and RPA (20 percent), while a few served the FAR group (14 percent). RDF presents the high percentages because, while most males served in all four groups, the majority were in RDF (62 percent).Most of the female respondents were former RPA and RDF soldiers. This does not suggest, however, that RPA forms the largest category of demobilised soldiers, but simply refers to the high percentage in terms of their rehabilitation in Kigali province.

Nevertheless, in the focus group discussions, it was said that many armed groups are found in the Northern provinces due to its geographical location[2], but they don't want to be identified. Moreover, it was noted during the focus group discussions in the Northern Province that females do not like to reveal that they were associated with armed groups to the extent that they lacked courage to register with the RDRC in order to benefit from its

[5]The Northern Province is bordered by the Republic Democratic of Congo, where so many armed groups' insurgents are found to be a problem to both Rwanda and the DRC.

programmes. This is due to gender-related issues. For example, existing gender norms may prevent women from making themselves known as a member of an armed group due to social stigmas and stereotypes (UNDP, 2011). This applies to Rwandan women associated with armed groups, as confirmed by a group of experts from the UNDP: "There is an inconsistency between numbers of women who participated in armed conflict and those who effectively register in DDR programmes. Female ex-combatants and women associated with armed groups face complex barriers to formal registry as well as equal access to DDR programme benefits and services. This is why a number of women and girls self-demobilized" (UNDP, 2012).

6.3.3. Respondents' profile by rank

The research study probed the rank of the demobilised sample (see appendix one, question number nine) in order to establish which rank was most affected. Ranks range from other rank (named private) to Lt Col, but higher ranks are better represented among female respondents with 34 percent (as opposed to 6 percent of males) represented in the ranks of commissioned officers. However, most of the respondents (54 percent and 64 percent for females and males, respectively) have lower ranks, from "private" to "Corporal". This categorisation was important to the researcher in order to establish whether all the ex-combatants, irrespective of their job designation, are treated equally or whether their rank in the service was given due recognition when they were demobilised. It was noted that the senior officers and junior officers are given extra assistance known as Recognition of Service Allowance (RSA), which is different from the allowance given to the lower ranked (other rank/NCO). According to the RDRC officials, this amount is differentiated by rank. Ranging from Rwf150,000 (approximately R1,500) for a private to up to Rwf500,000 (approximately R5,000) for a colonel, the RSA is paid in two instalments. This is not appreciated by all ex-combatants as was revealed by an ex-combatant who prefer to collect his allowance in one instalment. A female ex-combatant from the Southern Province stated: "the money given is not enough and its distribution in small instalment does not encourage us to save, I would rather prefer to have money in one lump sum, with part of it in a

revolving fund". Surprisingly, at the demobilisation stage, female ex-combatants are not well-prepared in skills like managing income generating activities and small credits so as to use their benefits well and facilitate reintegration.

Table 6.6 Rank of respondents

			Gender		
			Female	Male	Total
Rank	Lt Col	Count	2		2
		% within Gender	4.0%		2.0%
	Major	Count	3		3
		% within Gender	6.0%		3.0%
	Captain	Count		2	2
		% within Gender		4.0%	2.0%
	Lt	Count	6		6
		% within Gender	12.0%		6.0%
	2Lt	Count	6	1	7
		% within Gender	12.0%	2.0%	7.0%
	SM	Count	1	3	4
		% within Gender	2.0%	6.0%	4.0%
	S/SG	Count	2	3	5
		% within Gender	4.0%	6.0%	5.0%
	SGT	Count	3	4	7
		% within Gender	6.0%	8.0%	7.0%
	CPL	Count	5	8	13
		% within Gender	10.0%	16.0%	13.0%
	L/CPL	Count	6	7	13
		% within Gender	12.0%	14.0%	13.0%
	Private	Count	16	22	38
		% within Gender	32.0%	44.0%	38.0%
Total		Count	50	50	100
		% within Gender	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Another issue raised during the discussions was the allowance given to the ex-combatants according to their rank. This was explained by a female ex-combatant as follows:

Women in the army are rarely deployed to the front line. Just very few, the rest are deployed in different departments like, welfare, medical, logistics, political administration and information, this is alright because it is done in good faith to protect them and deployed them where they think they can be more useful. But this sometimes becomes counter-

productive, work in departments is more specialised and especially people with education are easily promoted. Soldiers at the frontline are promoted whether educated or not, in departments when you are not educated it is difficult to be promoted since duties become more specialised. That is why most girls find themselves with low ranks at the end of the war. This affects their demobilisation process, they find themselves lost since all they have is experience gained informally and their demobilisation benefits is affected, since the lower the rank, the less the package (FEX, 8FGDNP :27 October 2012).The views of this respondent (FEX 8FGD) present a gloomy picture of the context and experiences of many female ex-combatants at the time of demobilisation. Female ex-combatants perceived themselves as having been denied equal opportunities to be highly ranked. However, the picture of the overall military ranks of our respondents is better for females than for males. Questions five and eleven from the questionnaire illustrates that the respondents came from different backgrounds when they joined the army. The majority of female ex-combatants came from outside the country, where they were generally living in cities and therefore, had opportunity to attend formal educational institutions. The men were mostly from rural areas, and were characterised by lower levels of literacy or less access to formal education. Because of their lower educational achievements, male ex-combatants are also lower ranked when compared to their female counterparts. Indeed, among the demobilised ex-combatants, females as a group were also significantly more highly ranked than the male ex-combatants (as a group). On the other hand, controlling the variable of education, the above views of the female respondents suggest that the ranking process may not have been gender-sensitive and has consequences for the demobilisation of female ex-combatants, especially those with lower educational levels.

6.3.4. Occupation

As shown by Table 6.7, the respondents pursued different occupations before they joined the army, but most were students (56 percent of female and 50 percent of male respondents). Others, to a lesser extent, were farmers, members of the military, traders, etcetera (see appendix one, question number eleven). However, after demobilisation, the

female ex-combatants found it difficult to go back, for example, to school or into farming activities.

Table 6.7 Occupation before the war

Occupation before the war		Gender		
		Female	Male	Total
Farmer	Count	6	13	19
	% within Gender	12.0%	26.0%	19.0%
Trader	Count	4	5	9
	% within Gender	8.0%	10.0%	9.0%
Civil servant	Count	1		1
	% within Gender	2.0%		1.0%
Military	Count	3	7	10
	% within Gender	6.0%	14.0%	10.0%
Teacher	Count	4		4
	% within Gender	8.0%		4.0%
Medical worker	Count	2		2
	% within Gender	4.0%		2.0%
Student	Count	28	25	53
	% within Gender	56.0%	50.0%	53.0%
Unemployed	Count	2		2
	% within Gender	4.0%		2.0%
Total	Count	50	50	100
	% within Gender	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

As Table 6.7 illustrates, after the demobilisation process, the respondents are occupying different positions in society (see appendix one, question number twelve). This may be a reflection of their greater maturity and the need to take on greater responsibilities as parents and contributing members of their households. Men are mostly farmers (57 percent). In fact, the table shows that, in contrast to men, no female respondents are involved in farming activities. The data on current employment, education and income suggest that female respondents in the sample hold down better positions in terms of income than male respondents after demobilisation. This could be the outcome of demobilisation programmes such as the DDR or other parameters. Indeed, once they have completed their studies, women prefer to leave the army. Women ex-combatants are engaged in very varied and

divergent occupations. Female ex- combatants prefer to settle in urban areas such as Kigali where they can improve their formal skills and employment opportunities. As one female respondent noted during focus group discussions: “There is a problem of poor economic conditions in the rural areas in our country and women think that urban areas are centres for employment and other survival projects” (FGD,6SP:9 October 2010).

The researcher establishes the occupation of the respondents after demobilisation in question number twelve. The possible answers range from farmer to others as it was in the previous question number eleven.

Table 6.8 Occupation after demobilisation

			Gender		
			Female	Male	Total
Occupation today	Farmer	Count		28	28
		% within Gender		57.1%	32.6%
	Trader	Count	6		6
		% within Gender	16.2%		7.0%
	Civil Servant	Count	4	2	6
		% within Gender	10.8%	4.1%	7.0%
	Teacher	Count	4	5	9
		% within Gender	10.8%	10.2%	10.5%
	Artisan	Count	4		4
		% within Gender	10.8%		4.7%
	Student	Count	2	2	4
		% within Gender	5.4%	4.1%	4.7%
	Other	Count	17	12	29
		% within Gender	45.9%	24.5%	33.7%
Total		Count	37	49	86
		% within Gender	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

This brings into question the relevance and appropriateness of the training options offered by the RDRC programme, which should respond to the needs of the demobilised ex-combatants, bearing in mind their socio-economic and psychosocial requirements and the Rwandan developmental context – particularly the inequality in economic conditions and opportunities between rural and urban areas. The urban bias in the design of the RDRP seems to have been intended to track and concentrate available resources and skills – with

respect to the trainers and relevant infrastructure – as a cost saving measure. An alternative explanation may be that the urban bias might have been intended to maximise the economic opportunities available to the ex-combatants at the point of completing their training, particularly given the low financial rewards associated with opportunities available in the rural setting (as evidenced by the very low earnings of ex-combatants who chose farming shown in Table 6.8). Regardless of the reason, the net effect was that long-term planning and the need to create opportunities in the rural areas with an eye to more holistic and integrated national economic and social development may have been lost in the short term.

6.3.5. Income of the respondents

The income levels of the ex-combatants according to occupation group are established in question number fourteen and presented in Table 6.9. The average monthly income ranges from Rwf7,231 to Rwf291,111. Farmers have the lowest income and traders have the highest average income. The women surveyed are earning much more than men (Rwf291,111 per month for women versusRwf41,960 for men). This is because more women are engaged in different income generating activities, such as small businesses, compared to men. For example, more women than men are street vendors and artisans in Rwanda.

Table 6.9 Current average monthly income of the respondents

Occupation	Gender		Group average
	Female	Male	
Farmer	-	7 231	7 231
Trader	600 000	-	600 000
Civil Servant	400 000	70 000	268 000
Teacher	250 000	65 000	147 222
Artisan	35 000	-	35 000
Other	192 000	98 000	160 667
Group average	291 111	41 960	171 327

Many women ex-combatants, in common with other women in Rwandan society, sell food, mostly fruit and vegetables and second-hand clothes. However, in general, both formal and non-formal education has allowed women ex-combatants with the necessary skills to compete with men for employment. Nonetheless, the Demobilization Commission has failed to assist both men and women ex-combatants to obtain the skills to obtain secure and well-paid jobs; they have been relegated to subsistence-level activities in the informal sector. These findings raise the issue of human security in Rwanda. Clearly, if men, who make up the overwhelming majority of ex-combatants, are rendered jobless and financially vulnerable – despite being overburdened with immense familial responsibilities – they may be tempted to turn to criminal activities.

Some respondents talked about the option of a vocational training centre before and after the demobilization process. One of the major components of the RDRP programme is vocational training for female ex-combatants in areas such as plumbing, carpentry, computer services, refrigeration, and mechanics. The programme relies on Rwanda's existing vocational training system, using their schools and facilities. This programme can assist these schools to hire more qualified teachers, reopen schools by rehiring teachers, increase capacity by building annexes and improve equipment and facilities. This can be a way of building links between former soldiers and the civilians and a good way to help ex-combatants reintegrate into society.

6.4 The DDR's role in the life of ex-combatants

The role of the DDR programme is evident in the training and material support granted to ex-combatants when they are demobilised and reintegrated into mainstream life. This section examines the different activities undertaken by the DDR programme to help ex-combatants return to civilian life. These activities encompass, among others, different types of training and financial support.

6.4.1 Training and financial support

Training plays a major role in the life of ex-combatants. When they leave the army, they have to find other activities to generate an income. Many need to be trained before they can integrate into their new economic and social environment. This is the reason why they join the DDR programme. At the last stage of their demobilization, the ex-combatants receive a cash payment from the RDRC, as established in question seventeen and presented in Table 6.10 below. While the large majority (84.4 percent of women and 92 percent of men) of the respondents received a cash reinsertion benefit from the DDR programme, some did not receive it.

Table 6.10 Cash benefit received from the DDR programme

			Gender		
			Female	Male	Total
Received cash reinsertion benefit	No	Count	7	4	11
		% within Gender	15,6%	8,0%	11,6%
	Yes	Count	38	46	84
		% within Gender	84,4%	92,0%	88,4%
Total		Count	45	50	95
		% within Gender	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

In Rwanda, the reintegration process involves a mandatory benefit of Rwf100,000 (equivalent of R7,000) for ex-combatants from the RDF and the AGs, to help them start income-generating projects. The benefit is paid to eligible beneficiaries six months after demobilisation in order to allow them time to gain a critical understanding of the local socio-economic dynamics and to make informed investment decisions. One wonders if this amount is sufficient to enable them to resettle, taking into account that they would have to pay rent, school fees, start a business, etcetera.

The focus group discussions revealed that female ex-combatants as well as their male counterparts felt that as long as they were involved in military service, they did not have time for economic development. During the focus group discussions, 20 female ex-combatants revealed that they received financial benefits which they used to sustain their

livelihoods, and invest in income-generating activities or housing and education for their children. However, there were some complaints that the package was insufficient, while others explained that they would have preferred a lump sum instead of small amounts paid at intervals. The reinsertion package provided by the RDRC is paid in several instalments; some of ex-combatants have no idea how to use their package at demobilisation. The other group of female ex-combatants who were interviewed said that: "a certain agreed percentage of our benefits would be kept in a pool where members may have access to it as a form of credit" (FGD9, FGD10, FGD11 N P: 28 October 2012).On the other hand, female ex-combatants married to their male counterparts proposed that the benefits should be given to the family, as some males spend the benefit in bars. It was observed that most of the ex-fighters are demobilised without proper preparation and planning for their new life. On demobilisation, ex-fighters lose their only reliable formal income; their salary. This means that they require immediate support to compensate for what they have lost as well as to enable them to carry on with their lives as they face new challenges and realities.

Thus, the main objective of reintegration support for female ex-combatants is:

- to ensure that special needs, including protection, sanitation and counselling of female ex-combatants are taken into account in demobilisation centres,
- to ensure that all benefits for ex-combatants are equal for, and equally accessible to men and women,
- to encourage the implementing partners to ensure that their reintegration support activities within the Vulnerability Support Window facilitate the participation of female ex-combatants,
- to encourage female ex-combatants to participate in existing women's associations; including partners of ex-combatants and women in communities of return in community-level counselling activities;
- to strengthen the gender awareness and capacity of the RDRC staff and CDCS as well as the need to revisit issues to ascertain if they are on track (RDRC, 2009).

One may well enquire whether these guidelines have been adhered to. The study findings revealed that the modalities of giving the benefits are not always accepted by the beneficiaries. Some women indicated that some female ex-combatants did not benefit from the VSW because they are married, although not all of their husbands are supporting them. During our interviews with ex-combatants, a female ex-combatant stated: “for a better reintegration, we must be prepared both physically and psychologically before demobilization stage for the forthcoming demobilization” (FGD, 12 KC: 22 October 2012), while another stressed: “There is a need to provide counselling to ex-combatants and skills to start their new life and confront its challenges” (FGD: 13KC:22 July 2012). It has been observed that some married women did not receive the cash payment; their husbands got it. According to the RDRC staff from the Northern Province, some females associated with armed groups were scared to identify themselves as female ex-combatants, with the negative impact of not being able to benefit from the DDR programme.

In question number eighteen of the questionnaire, the researcher explores the rate of ex-combatants participation in the DDR trainings and presented in the table below.

Table 6.11 Participation in DDR-funded trainings

			Gender		
			Female	Male	Total
Participated in DDR funded trainings	No	Count	21	25	46
		% within Gender	46,7%	50,0%	48,4%
	Yes	Count	24	25	49
		% within Gender	53,3%	50,0%	51,6%
Total		Count	45	50	95
		% within Gender	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Up to 53.3 percent of women and 50 percent of men respondents reported that they had participated in DDR-funded training, while 46.7 percent of the female respondents and 50 percent of male respondents did not participate in these programmes. These statistics show that this is a complex issue. Although more female ex-combatants are participating in the programmes than their male counterparts, it would be useful to understand the underlying issues that have led to the apparent unwillingness on the part of half the intended

beneficiaries to participate. Some of the difficulties raised were the duration of the trainings. As a female ex-combatant from the Northern Province explained, "the kind of training organised is not convenient for a woman with children/family. How can I attend a training of 2-3 consecutive weeks when I have a family behind?" (FEX, 5NP:26 October 2010)". Indeed, the importance of time has been underscored by the World Bank (2011:215): "Time is a resource. It can be devoted to productive activities, including market work, other (unpaid) work within the household, and child care, or it can be invested in personal activities (such as eating and sleeping) and leisure." For many of the female ex-combatants, vital care-related responsibilities for their families took precedence over education and training activities. The RDRP programme therefore failed to take the special needs of women on whom such responsibilities rest, into account. The female ex-combatants did not participate as fully as they would have liked to because they thought that the programmes would take up too much time and they cannot leave their children and go to the training centres. However, some women have attended certain training courses and they appreciated them. The researcher met with a group of women who were attending hotel and tourism courses in Kigali City. One of them complained that: "the course takes a whole day and we are given no money for lunch, either the course should end half day or lunch be provided because some people have already stopped attending, in fact most of them cannot even afford to pack their own lunch" (FEX,6KC:4 November 2010).Others felt that the training venue was too far away. Had these female ex-combatants been told that they would be able to collect benefits (such as money or food packages) at the same training sites, they might not have stayed away. Another concern is that women do not live in the same areas and it is not easy to measure the distance from different homes to the training venue. While it would be impossible to have training sites near every eligible person, one solution would be for participants to stay at the venue for the duration of the course, or to be given more money for transport costs.

Many female ex-combatants did not take up the offer of training because they felt it was not relevant to the needs. The failure on the part of the DDR programme to establish what

kinds of training female ex-combatants want points to limitations of the programme in terms of gender sensitivity. As stated by a DDR expert: "Gender sensitivity is not about pitting women against men. On the contrary, education that is gender-sensitive benefits members of both genders. It helps them determine which assumptions in matters of gender are valid and which are stereotyped generalisations" (EDDR, 4KC:6 July 2010). Gender awareness requires not only intellectual effort but also sensitivity and open-mindedness. It opens up the widest possible range of life options for both women and men. Thus, the DDR programme could consider some sort of affirmative action measures. This should not result in unequal or separate standards and should be continued even when the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved (EDDR, 4KC: 6July 2010). If the reintegration process is to be effective, it has to offer training that aligns with the ex-combatants' personal goals, choices, and interests.

Table 6.12 Participation in DDR programme and the year of joining the programme

			Participated in DDR funded trainings		
			No	Yes	Total
Year of joining the DDR program	Between 1998 and 2000	Count	22	8	30
		%	73,3%	26,7%	100,0%
	Between 2001 and 2005	Count	15	26	41
		%	36,6%	63,4%	100,0%
	After 2005	Count		13	13
		%		100,0%	100,0%
	NA	Count	9	2	11
		%	81,8%	18,2%	100,0%
Total		Count	46	49	95
		%	48,4%	51,6%	100,0%

Half of the respondents (49 percent) reported that they had participated in DDR-funded training. While 73.3 percent of those who joined the programme in 2000 and before reported that they have not participated in any training, most of those who joined after 2000 said that they had the opportunity to participate in such training. As noted in Chapter Five, the RDRC started in 1997 with Phase I; Phase II followed a few years later in 2001. This

may explain why ex-combatants started to register for the training programme after 2001 with approximately half (49 percent) of the targeted group actually participating in the programme. Some of the implications of the enrolment figures will be explored in the next sections of this chapter.

Perhaps indicative of the thrust of the program design and bias, the least-educated ex-combatants were the ones who seemed to benefit from the training opportunities. This is illustrated in Table6.13. In all, only about one-third of respondents who had received secondary or university education before joining the military, received training. In essence, the kinds of training provided by the RDRP are more suitable for less educated people. This shows that the RDRC failed to plan and design the DDR training programme properly, as the programme is not responding to the preferred needs of many of the ex-combatants.

Table 6.13 Training and education

			Education			Total
			Primary	Secondary	University	
Participated in DDR trainings	No	Count	12	27	7	46
		% within Education	27,9%	65,9%	63,6%	48,4%
	Yes	Count	31	14	4	49
		% within Education	72,1%	34,1%	36,4%	51,6%
Total		Count	43	41	11	95
		% within Education	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 6.13.1 Chi Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	13,254	2	0.001

The training programmes received by the ex-combatants are represented as shown in the figure below.

Figure 6.2 Kinds of training



Source: Field work 2010.

The DDR training from which ex-combatants benefited consisted of public works, agriculture, vocational skills and, for some, entrepreneurship and apprenticeships. Formal education was also offered, mostly to those who had secondary or tertiary qualifications. If the programme is to be effective and the training suitable for the ex-combatants, the RDRP should consider including adult education classes.

As shown in Figure 6.3 below, the bulk of the training options are aimed at providing ex-combatants with specific skills, which would enable them to pursue artisan career paths. Such professions are largely perceived in Rwanda as more suitable for individuals with low level educational training.

Figure 6.3 Skills provided by DDR training and education



Source: Field work 2010.

Some courses, such as carpentry, masonry, tailoring, entrepreneurship and livestock farming are accessed by men only, while others are subscribed to by both genders. It should be noted that some female respondents had participated in training activities traditionally reserved for men, including auto-mechanics and welding. The issue here is why these women would be willing to take up these trades, but baulk at tailoring, entrepreneurship or livestock farming. Even when women are trained in male-dominated occupations such as auto-repair, they may not get jobs. This was confirmed by a woman from the Northern Province during our focus discussions. She complained: "I was trained as a mechanic but I cannot get a job anywhere because they think that I will damage their vehicles instead of repairing them" (FGD, 8NP:27 October 2012). This leads one to wonder whether the RDRC actually reflected on and planned the training options offered to demobilised soldiers before rolling out the programme. Did the RDRP not consider that the training must enable ex-combatants to use their newfound skills to make a living? Clearly, the RDRP offered no career counselling sessions for the ex-combatants before they chose from the options provided. This is a programme design problem. How can the RDRP be

effective or optimise its effectiveness when the target group apparently received no assistance in planning their future at a time when they were weak and very vulnerable (having just been demobilised)? Figure6.3 shows that the participation of women seems to be limited to five activities out of the ten options available while male respondents are more polyvalent.

The researcher established the duration of DDR training in question number twenty three (see appendix one, question number twenty three).

Table 6.14 Duration of the training

Count

	Months of training							
Gender	0	1	2	4	6	12	36	Total
Female	5			4	12	2		23
Male	6	1	8	3	8	2	1	29
Total	11	1	8	7	20	4	1	52

Table 6.14.1 Descriptive statistics
Months of training

N	Valid	52
	Missing	48
Mean		4.7885
Median		4.0000
Mode		6.00

Training can take from less than one month to a year and longer; one respondent talked about 36 months of training. The average time of training is 4.7 months. The length of the training depends on the kind of training and may also depend on the availability of the beneficiary. A short training suggests that the skills acquired are low-level skills, which would explain the fairly low rate of subscription. The link between the duration of training and choices of options by the different genders will be discussed in the following sections of this study.

Thus far, the DDR programme's activities have consisted of helping ex-combatants reinsert and reintegrate in society, by providing them with different types of training and financial support. But not all ex-combatants have received, or are receiving this training/financial support. While financial support is normally given to many of the respondents, it has been demonstrated that training is given to less educated people and is directed at occupations that are traditionally reserved for men, rather than for women, such as auto mechanic, masonry etcetera. It has been observed that ex-combatants are sometimes not free to choose what sort of training they want. Again, this is a matter of programme design. Challenges will arise, such as an ex-combatant choosing computer skills when there is no electricity in the area of reintegration; this would not help him/her. In a case like this, it is important that, while designing and planning a DDR programme, the authorities should also plan for the necessary support equipment such as generators in case of power outages, for example. It does not make sense to have something on the list of options when it is effectively not available to those that might enrol.

6.4.2 Relevance and efficiency of the DDR programme

In question number twenty-four of the research questionnaire, the researcher explores the duration after completing the training programme. On average, the respondents had finished training one-and-a-half years previously (mean of 17.4 months). Women had finished earlier, with an average of 21.87 months versus 15.21 for men. This demonstrates that women are leaving the training before it is completed, or choosing programmes that have a short training period. As with other women, for many female ex-combatants, their roles in civilian life as pre-dominant caretakers and mothers do not permit them to be absent from home for extended periods of time. Clearly, this not only has implications for their choices of training but also may serve to restrict their career opportunities, dedication to the training routines, and job prospects after the completion of training.

Table 6.15 Time elapsed since the training

			Mean
Gender	Female	Months since training	21.87
	Male	Months since training	15.21

Table 6.15.1 Descriptive statistics
Months since training

N	Valid	44
	Missing	56
Mean		17.4773
Median		11.5000
Mode		0.00

Given the above context, the RDRP needs to come up with flexible and innovative training options that would accommodate female ex-combatants' social and economic realities. At the end of training, beneficiaries were supposed to receive a start-up kit from the DDR programme.

As a result, the researcher explores the extent to which the Commission adhered to an essential aspect of the programme. The Table 6.16 below shows the extent to which toolbox or start up kit were received at the end of the training.

Table 6.16 Handing out a toolbox or start-up kit at the end of training

			Gender		
			Female	Male	Total
Did you receive a toolbox or startup kit?	Yes	Count	4	7	11
		% within Gender	13.8%	17.1%	15.7%
	No	Count	25	34	59
		% within Gender	86.2%	82.9%	84.3%
Total		Count	29	41	70
		% within Gender	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The start-up kit consists of material assets to kick-start the ex-combatants' chosen career. For example, ex-combatants who have trained as farmers received assorted vegetable seeds/seedling pack, basic cultivation tools- for example hoe, sickle, plough; basic

irrigation equipment such as baskets, pipes, connecting parts; and pesticides and herbicides. For livestock/animal husbandry, ex-combatants will receive goats, sheep, cows, poultry etcetera. A basic veterinarian kit would include things like medicine, vaccination tools, supplementary feed, and a shelter or construction materials. For a fishery, they will receive a fishing net, boat/canoe, and other equipment such as paddles, hooks, floats weights etcetera. For a tea/ coffee shops, ex-combatants will get tools for tea/coffee making such as heating equipment, glasses, tray, kettle, and jerry cans for water, and start-up consumables such as coffee, tea, sugar, and milk powder. They will also get appropriate furniture such as tables, chairs, and a tea/coffee stand. For hair dressing, the ex-combatants are supposed to receive hairdressing equipment such as chemicals, weaves, driers, trimmers/cutters, as well as styling equipment. They will get furniture such as rinsing sink, mirrors, tables and chairs. The RDRP also encourages partnerships in the form of collectively-owned businesses. For example, those intending to open a bar would be eligible to receive appropriate bar equipment, furniture, and start-up consumables such as beer, soda, and water. They will also get electrical equipment such as a generator and wiring accessories as well as material for constructing a bar.

Table 6.16 reveals that very few respondents (15.7 percent) confirmed that they had received the toolbox or start-up kit for their new profession. Although the differences between men and women are small, slightly more men than women reported receiving these kits. The reasons for the respondents not receiving the tool kits could be that they are expensive and the RDRP could be facing financial constraints. However, the failure to honour this obligation compromises the effectiveness of the training and prevents ex-combatants from embarking on successful careers.

As Table 6.17 illustrates, male ex-combatants were more optimistic that they would receive the tool kits (see appendix one, question number twenty-five); this might be because, given their lower educational status, they chose more simple professions to be trained in than the female ex-combatants, and the start-up materials for these careers are less expensive.

Table 6.17 Expectation of receiving a toolbox or a start-up kit

			Gender		
			Female	Male	Total
Do you expect to receive a toolbox or start up kit?	Yes	Count	13	21	34
		% within Gender	44.8%	50.0%	47.9%
	No	Count	16	21	37
		% within Gender	55.2%	50.0%	52.1%
Total		Count	29	42	71
		% within Gender	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Forty-seven percent of the respondents were expecting to receive a toolbox or a start-up kit from the DDR programme, while the majority (52.1 percent) were not. As noted above, fewer female (44.8 percent) than male (50.0 percent) respondents expected that they would receive a start-up kit. This attitude is linked to certain opinions that female and male ex-combatants may hold about DDR programme. It was a bit difficult for the researcher to get more information about the kits delivered by the RDRC. While the Commission officially confirmed that ex-combatants received tool kits on completion of their training to enable them to re-adjust to civilian life, this was not easy to verify with the ex-combatants, as the research study took place several years after the completion of the training.

Table 6.18 Abandonment of training

			Gender		
			Female	Male	Total
Finished trainings	Yes	Count	18	22	40
		% within Gender	42.9%	45.8%	44.4%
	No	Count	24	26	50
		% within Gender	57.1%	54.2%	55.6%
Total		Count	42	48	90
		% within Gender	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

At the time of the interviews, 44.4 percent of the respondents had completed DDR training, and 55.6 percent had not was no significant difference between male and female respondents as established in research question number twenty-one Aside from those who completed training, some respondents had abandoned training for different reasons.

The different reasons for not completing the training are explored in question number twenty-two and presented in the table below:

Table 6.19 Reason for not finishing training or formal education

			Gender		
			Female	Male	Total
Why did you not complete your training?	I am currentrly in training	Count	4		4
		% within Gender	36.4%		12.9%
	I lost my DDR card	Count		3	3
		% within Gender		15.0%	9.7%
	DDR stopped my benefits	Count		8	8
		% within Gender		40.0%	25.8%
	Other	Count	7	9	16
		% within Gender	63.6%	45.0%	51.6%
Total		Count	11	20	31
		% within Gender	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The reasons for not finishing the training or formal education differ from individual irrespective of the gender. Apart from those who are still undergoing the training, 63.6 percent of the female and 45.0 percent of the male respondents abandoned training for reasons they did not want to discuss. Others lost their DDR cards or stopped because the programme was no longer giving them support. As previously explained, this could be linked to the issues of family responsibility and programme design. Clearly, training and skills development should ideally be linked with support for job placement. The RDRP should seek to create sustainable income-generation opportunities that are appropriate for male and female ex-combatants. The RDRC should look at providing counseling and life skills training, alongside vocational skills in order to address the needs of ex-combatants.

The overall observation is that the ability of the DDR programme to produce results is still lacking. Of the 50 respondents who did not finish the training (see Table 6.19), only four were still undergoing training and the rest had abandoned it for different reasons. One of the key reasons is that the trainees realise that even after the training, it is still difficult to get a job; women wait longer (21.87 months) than men (15.21 months) for a job. The fact

that only 15.7 percent of the respondents had received a start-up kit at the time of the research study made it even more difficult for the ex-combatants to become self-sufficient.

The most effective way to establish the efficiency of the DDR programme is to examine both the opinions of respondents about its different activities and tangible achievements in the field. The data from the fieldwork reveal that, despite the demobilisation of many ex-combatants in Rwanda, whether female or male, and various reforms to strengthen democratic institutions in the post-1994 war and genocide period, the Rwandan reintegration experience has been less than satisfactory. The following lessons can be drawn from this experience:

1) Reintegration plan: a framework for reintegration is necessary and should best be coordinated at the central level. In Rwanda, where this was not the case, there were several delays due to fears on the part of combatants that they would not be provided with adequate reintegration assistance.

2) Encouragement, incentives and participation: female ex-combatants need to be made aware of the benefits due to them for disarming in addition to the benefits to be derived from a reintegration programme. Although the data reveal that the females appear to be more involved in the programmes than males, this does not hold true for all female ex-combatants in Rwanda. As the previous sections show, some female ex-combatants said that they were not informed about the DDR programme, while others maintained that the training sites were too far away to enable them to attend to their children while engaging in training. They need to be informed about potential benefits from the programme and given space to participate in its design.

3) Education and training: in order to reintegrate successfully, it is necessary that female ex-combatants acquire skills that will make them marketable candidates for work as civilians. This is very difficult in economies with high unemployment rates and in a post-genocide society where human, social, natural, physical and financial capital were destroyed.

The above three observations are the cornerstones for a successful and efficient mobilisation programme.

6.4.3 Ex-combatants opinions regarding the DDR programme

An assessment of the significance of DDR programme rests on the extent to which it helped ex-combatants to reintegrate economically, socially and psychologically into civilian life.

In terms of its formal design, the role of the DDR programme in the economic integration of ex-combatants included equipping them with relevant education and skills to enter a competitive labour market.

The respondents were asked whether the training they received provided them with such skills. Please see appendix one question number twenty-eight. The responses are presented as shown below.

Table 6.20 Capacity of DDR programme training to prepare beneficiaries for work

			Gender		
			Female	Male	Total
The training I received has prepared me well for my work	Agree	Count	8	17	25
		% within Gender	25.8%	42.5%	35.2%
	Disagree	Count	7	15	22
		% within Gender	22.6%	37.5%	31.0%
	Neither agree nor disagree	Count	16	8	24
		% within Gender	51.6%	20.0%	33.8%
Total		Count	31	40	71
		% within Gender	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 6.20.1 Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig (2-sided)	Exact Sig (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	7.800	2	0.020	0.23
Fisher's Exact Test	7.584			0.24

The data from Table 6.20 illustrates that 35.2 percent of the respondents agreed that training prepared them for the world of work, while 31 percent disagreed and 33.8 percent neither agreed nor disagreed. Nevertheless, the chi-square tests show a significant

difference between the opinion of male and female respondents, at the significance level of 0.024 (0.024<0.05).Women are less appreciative of the quality of the training they received with only 25.8 percent agreeing that DDR training prepared them adequately, versus 42.5 percent of men. On the other hand, more women (51.6 percent) than men (20 percent) were neutral about the usefulness of the training. This could be explained by the fact the programme may offer training according to its means rather than the personal choice or interests of the beneficiaries. If the training is not generally appreciated, one wonders if the skills it imparts are marketable in the reintegration environment of the ex-combatants. The negative perceptions of female ex-combatants could also be linked to other issues such as the limited choice of career paths, some of which for example, mechanics, society does not perceive as women's work. Again, the RDRC needs to allow the beneficiaries of the programme to choose what they wish to be trained in, even if such career is not on the RDRC's current list.

Support for income generating activities is crucial. As one female ex-combatant noted during a focus group discussion, "an advisory committee to help orient female ex combatants is convenient. This advisory group should not be too big but should include people from different experiences, even men who are gender sensitive" (FGD, 2KC: 19 October 2010).The fact that 51.6 percent of women ex-combatants expressed neutral opinions (versus 20 percent of men) shows that women are more doubtful about the effectiveness of the training. This is a significant indictment of the programme design and effectiveness – especially with respect to the needs of female ex-combatants. The problem is exacerbated when one adds the 22.6 percent of the women who disagreed that the programme was useful. In effect, 74.2 percent or about three-quarters of the female ex-combatants did not feel that the programme was an effective instrument for resettling women back into their civilian lives. Another way of looking at this is that, if we add the 25.8 percent of female ex-combatants that felt the programme was useful to the 51.6 percent that were neutral, it could be argued that 77.4 percent of the female ex-combatants found some merit in the programme structure, design and effectiveness. However, this

argument is belied by the reality that the continued presence of the women in the programme would suggest that their options were already so extremely limited that many would continue to find a measure of value in what RDRP offered them monthly.

Furthermore, the researcher explores the need for the skills in question number twenty-nine from the questionnaire.

Table 6.21 Need for skills learnt in the immediate environment of the trainees

			Gender		
			Female	Male	Total
the skills I learnt are neededby employers in this area	I agree	Count	6	23	29
		% within Gender	19.4%	62.2%	42.6%
	I disagree	Count	9	9	18
		% within Gender	29.0%	24.3%	26.5%
	Neither agree nor disagree	Count	16	5	21
		% within Gender	51.6%	13.5%	30.9%
Total		Count	31	37	68
		% within Gender	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 6.21.1 Chi Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	15.317	2	0.000
N of valid cases	68		

The data from Table 6.21 reveals that the majority of the respondents (42.6 percent) agree that the skills learnt in the programme are needed by employers in the immediate environment where they live; however, more than half of the respondents are not convinced about the marketability of the training in their current environment. Once again, there are gender discrepancies, with 62.2 percent of the male respondents agreeing that the skills provided by the training are needed in the area, but only 19.4 percent of the female respondents. Just over half of the female respondents (51.6 percent) are neutral versus 13.5 percent of the men. In addition, 26.5 percent of all the respondents (29 percent of women and 24.3 percent of men) disagree that the skills learnt are needed in the local labour market.

The above findings suggest that the type of training provided by the DDR programme is not likely to assist all the ex-combatants to fend for themselves. Female ex-combatants, in particular, do not feel that they are being provided with skills that are needed by employers in the area where they live. As noted earlier, the fact that many ex-combatants drop out of the programme, and that some are not participating in it, suggests that many ex-combatants may not be interested in the options offered by the RDRC. Clearly, most of the options available to the women were not in line with their needs or preferences.

Informal discussion with an RDRC staff member revealed that some female ex-combatants prefer to start small businesses such as selling fruits, vegetables, or clothes. A female ex-combatant from Kigali revealed during our discussion that: Some of us are not well educated. For example, “I survive on the informal knowledge I got from the army, I used to be a political commissar, then a quarter master, today I work as a volunteer for the Rwanda Red Cross in stores, I also participate in the community as the chairman of the Gacaca local courts and leader in women councils, given an opportunity I would for example study more English and do a small course in store management to formalise what I learnt as a quarter master in the army” (FEX,10KC:2 October 2010).Respondents rated not only the training, but also the training material, the trainers and finally the DDR programme as a whole. This is the subject of the following three tables.

Table 6.22 Appreciation of the training material

			Rate the material/content of the training					
			Excellent	Good	OK	Poor	Very poor	Total
Gender	Female	Count		8	14	2	7	31
		% within Gender		25,8%	45,2%	6,5%	22,6%	100,0%
	Male	Count	8	15	3		8	34
		% within Gender	23,5%	44,1%	8,8%		23,5%	100,0%
Total		Count	8	23	17	2	15	65
		% within Gender	12,3%	35,4%	26,2%	3,1%	23,1%	100,0%

The test of statistical correlation is presented in the table below.

Table 6.22.1 Chi Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	19.217	4	0.001
N of valid cases	65		

There is positive appreciation of the training material, particularly on the part of male respondents. As the female ex-combatants are less optimistic about the type of training as a whole, they are equally less satisfied with the material. Indeed, none of them rated the material as excellent (versus 23.5 percent of men) and only one out of four (versus 44.1 percent of men) rated them as good. Men and women's points of view are significantly different (level of significance of 0.001<0.05).

Table 6.23 Rating the trainers by respondents' level of education

Gender				Rate trainers			Total
				Good	Ok	Poor	
Female	Education	Primary/ professional	Count	10			10
			% Education	100.0%			100.0%
		Secondary level	Count	4	8	5	17
			% Education	23.5%	47.1%	29.4%	100.0%
		University level	Count			4	4
			% Education			100.0%	100.0%
	Total		Count	14	8	9	31
			% Education	45.2%	25.8%	29.0%	100.0%
Male	Education	Primary/ professional	Count	23			23
			% Education	100.0%			100.0%
		Secondary level	Count	5		6	11
			% Education	45.5%		54.5%	100.0%
	Total		Count	28		6	34
			% Education	82.4%		17.6%	100.0%

The test of significance for the relationships between the variables is presented as shown below.

Table 6.23.1 Chi Square Tests

Gender		Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Female	Pearson Chi-Square	26.658	4	0.000
Male	Pearson Chi-Square	15.234	1	0.000

Differences in educational levels resulted in different levels of appreciation of the trainers (significance level of 0.000 for both male and female). All the respondents (100 percent) with a level of education up to primary school, rate the trainers as “good”, while the rating becomes worse and worse at subsequent higher levels of education (see appendix one, question number thirty-three). In essence, this is a case of the lower the education, the higher the appreciation. One reason for this could be that the training focuses on manual trades, rather than intellectual careers. Given this context, a pertinent question that emerges is: How has the DDR programme fared so far? Please see question number thirty-four.

Table 6.24 Rating the DDR programme

			Rate the DDR Program					
			Excellent	Good	OK	Poor	Very Poor	Total
Gender	Female	Count		17	12	2		31
		% within Gender		54.8%	38.7%	6.5%		100.0%
	Male	Count	7	23	11		2	43
		% within Gender	16.3%	53.5%	25.6%		4.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	7	40	23	2	2	74
		% within Gender	9.5%	54.1%	31.1%	2.7%	2.7%	100.0%

Table 6.24.1 Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Degree of Freedom	Assumption Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	10.268	4	0.036

Respondents view the DDR programme as generally good. Some men even find it excellent (16.3 percent). However, it should be noted that male informants are more appreciative of the programme than women. There is a significant difference between the two groups (0.036<0.05). The respondents have a better opinion of the DDR programme than the trainers and the training material. The idea of the programme is overwhelmingly appreciated by both the female (93.5%) and male (95.3%) ex-combatants. Clearly, the programme serves a useful purpose in the lives of the ex-combatants by providing monthly stipends as well as new professional options that otherwise might not have been there. However, there was unhappiness with programme design and implementation. The programme is good per se, but the process does not really make the beneficiaries enthusiastic, particularly women.

To sum up, the opinions of respondents regarding the DDR programme and its capacity to deliver marketable skills leaves much to be desired, especially with regard to females who demobilised. It was noted earlier in Table 6.20 that a very few women (25.8 percent) agreed that the DDR programme prepared them to get a job, compared with 22.6 percent who felt that it did not do so. This suggest that the issue of effectiveness may be somewhat nuanced. Women feel that the skills they receive are not marketable in their economic environment; the material is better rated by men than by women, and the trainers are rated very poorly by women and more educated respondents. Opinions about the DDR programme are one thing; another is what outcomes it has led to in the lives of the ex-combatants. How has the programme helped the ex-combatants, particularly women, to effectively reinsert into civilian life? As highlighted in the previous section, the root of the inefficiency of the demobilisation programme seems to lie elsewhere. Skills training development has not only been undermined by the loss of this capacity within Rwanda, but also by a lack of data on the needs of the labour market. The Mobilisation Commission should target the informal sectors through apprenticeship schemes, along with selected in-centre formal skills training. Female ex-combatants need to acquire skills through apprenticeships and vocational training. Some could be placed in informal businesses,

while others would benefit from skills training such as carpentry, car mechanics, building, plumbing, and metal work; tool kits for trades such as carpentry, plumbing, and bicycle repairs should be provided after the apprenticeship or training scheme is completed. Ex-combatants with recognised formal sector employment skills should be provided with incentive skills to help them gain employment, while also receiving support should they wish to continue with their formal education. In addition, the DDR programme should provide counselling on job-seeking strategies, training and employment opportunities, and should refer ex-combatants to labour intensive public works, or development projects implemented by other parallel programmes.

6.5 Effective re-integration of ex-combatants

Experience over the years has indicated that (long-term) reintegration of demobilised ex-combatants remains a challenge. Reintegration depends largely on two factors. The first is the trust of ex-combatants in the (political) process. The DDR cannot develop the political process, it needs to follow it. Secondly, the presence of economic alternatives is critical. The DDR is fundamentally political in character and should be seen as part of a broader integrated approach to reconstruction processes, including security, governance, and political and developmental aspects, requiring integrated context analyses and subsequent comprehensive strategy development.

As noted in Chapter two, the key concern of this study was to assess the effectiveness of the reintegration of female ex-combatants into Rwandan society. The concept 'effectiveness' is subjective as its understanding varies from person to person in such a way that it may not be measurable with any degree of absolute precision. However, by examining policy objectives and assessing the degree to which they were achieved, one can deduce policy effectiveness. The researcher applies the concept of 'effectiveness' in relation to 'reintegration' of female ex-combatants into Rwandan society. The study examines whether the re-integration programme has been effective or not. As effectiveness measures the extent to which the programme has been successful in achieving its key

objectives, this study assessed the success (if any) of the RDRC in demobilising and re-integrating female ex-combatants. Relevant major indicators for measuring 'effectiveness' would include employment, 'good' social behaviour of ex-combatants, the interaction between ex-combatants and the societies that receive them, personal development, degree of societal acceptance, if ex-combatants are facing adjustment problems with their families, and/or whether female ex-combatants are treated as inferior or the same as male ex-combatant returnees, participation in community activities, and their decision-making role in the community. The findings in this section illustrate the extent to which the RDRC has been effective (or not) in achieving its key objectives.

The RDRC is charged with the responsibility of organising programmes linked to the national development strategy and working to improve the livelihoods of the ex-combatants as they seek to fully reintegrate into civilian life. As the activities of the RDRC focus on the reintegration of ex-combatants, this study seeks to evaluate how effectively female ex-combatants are reintegrated into the social and economic networks of a civilian society. In general, the programme provides economic reintegration assistance and access to employment through job counselling and referral services, skills development, micro-enterprise support schemes, rural development activities and employment promotion activities. For the purposes of this study and the RDRC objectives, four issue areas are discussed in the following section: economic reintegration, social and psychological reintegration, the quality of the relationship between ex-combatants and their host community; and the empowerment of female ex-combatants. The effectiveness of the programme will be discussed in sub-sections accordingly.

6.5.1 Economic reintegration

The capacity to find a job or to be self-employed is one of the criteria on which the success of the economic integration of ex-combatants rests. If the DDR programme is to be effective, it must provide beneficiaries with this capacity and, because they have undergone training, ensure their competitiveness. In order to establish whether this is the case with the

DDR, this sub-section evaluates the ability of ex-combatants to get a job and what role the DDR programme plays in this process. This point is underscored by the RDRC when it states categorically that, "Economic re-integration implies the financial independence of an ex-combatant's household through productive and gainful employment" (RDRC, 2005:62). The successful long-term socio-economic reintegration of an ex-combatant inevitably requires gaining employment and thereby securing a livelihood. Employment is thus one of the most crucial aspects of the reintegration phase. The RDRC uses a range of measures to facilitate ex-combatants' entry into the job market in Rwanda. The training and education processes of the DDR programme aim to give beneficiaries the capacity to find a job or be self-employed, generate income and face other financial responsibilities in their daily lives.

Few respondents (38.5 percent) reported that they had found a job after receiving training (see appendix one, question number thirty-one). There is no significant difference between men and women (level of significance: 0.326>0.05). Both female and male ex-combatants are facing problems of unemployment as the public sector is saturated and the government is downsizing the public service. While the private sector is becoming the main source of jobs, the economy of the country is still evolving. National unemployment levels stand at around 70 percent, and the insufficiency of land in some parts of the country is a big problem for the Rwandan population in general, particularly ex-combatants. This makes difficult to find land for shelter or agriculture. Although ex-combatants achieve the same average standard of living as that of the community members where they settle, some simply join the ranks of the unemployed and eke out a miserable existence.

The data relating to finding a job after the training is presented in the table below.

Table 6.25 Getting a job

			Since the training, have you had a job?		
			Yes	No	Total
Gender	Female	Count	10	21	31
		% within Gender	32.3%	67.7%	100.0%
	Male	Count	15	19	34
		% within Gender	44.1%	55.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	25	40	65
		% within Gender	38.5%	61.5%	100.0%

Table 6.25.1 Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Degree of Freedom	Assumption Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	0.964	1	0.326

As explained earlier, the training may provide self-employment opportunities; however, this possibility is reduced if start-up kits and post training support are not provided. It was observed during the field work that a large number of female ex-combatants have some form of employment upon which their livelihoods are constructed.

However, during the focus group discussions, female ex-combatants revealed that what they call 'employment' means working mainly for other people in different activities such as on a farm, in people's houses, in security companies, and in small businesses and secretarial services, among others. As one female ex-combatant indicated during a focus group discussion session, the idea of finding employment does not necessarily correlate with the notion of appropriate employment that is based on formal training: "I just work in the house of people to get something little to feed my family, just to survive. I consider this as employment because I am not just seated at home or in bars busy drinking. What can I do? I am struggling!" (FGD, 3KC:21 July 2010).Female ex-combatants working in security companies said that they are trying to adjust to civilian life. Some of them have been integrated into small businesses like street parking management. It was noted during field

work that ex-combatants are often involved in more than one income-generating activity. While some female ex-combatants are involved in some kind of employment, many are earning less than a dollar per day. Surprisingly, female ex-combatants acknowledged that the reason for their unemployment is not necessarily the fact that they are ex-combatants but rather that unemployment is a challenge facing the general population within the Rwandan political economy. In fact, it has been observed that being an ex-combatant may be an advantage when it comes to getting a job in some enterprises. A military background is an advantage for many ex-combatants who gained jobs in the private security sector as security guards. Getting a job is a long process that takes time and adaptation.

The researcher explored the length of time after completing of the training and getting a job and presented as follows:

Table 6.26 Time elapsed before getting a job

Months elapsed before getting a job

		Frequency	Valid Percent
Valid	1.00	2	8.7
	3.00	6	26.1
	4.00	4	17.4
	6.00	2	8.7
	8.00	3	13.0
	24.00	6	26.1
	Total	23	100.0

Respondents who were working took between one and twenty-four(24) months to gain employment. The time taken could depend on their education levels, skills or trends in the labour market.

Whatever the parameters contributing to the length of time after completing the training and getting of job, it appears that men have a slight advantage, as illustrated in the table.

Table 6.27 Time elapsed between training and getting a job

			Months elapsed before getting a job						Total
			1.00	3.00	4.00	6.00	8.00	24.00	
Gender	Female	Count			4			6	10
		% within Gender			40.0%			60.0%	100.0%
	Male	Count	2	6		2	3		13
		% within Gender	15.4%	46.2%		15.4%	23.1%		100.0%
Total		Count	2	6	4	2	3	6	23
		% within Gender	8.7%	26.1%	17.4%	8.7%	13.0%	26.1%	100.0%

Six out of ten women (as against no men) waited 24 months before getting a job whereas eight out of 13 men did not wait more than three months to get a job. This may illustrate that the programme is not really gender-sensitive; or, that females are not effectively trained compared to their male counterparts. On the other hand, females may not be motivated as the programme is not responding to their personal choices or interests. As previously noted, female ex-combatants revealed during the focus groups discussions that some of the training programmes were mostly in male-related domains like welding, carpentry, auto repairs, among others. One female was trained as a mechanic but cannot find a job because people refuse to trust her with their vehicles; they think that she would damage them instead of repairing them because she is a woman. Gender bias exists and the community at large needs to sensitise on gender issues in order to address such prejudices.

Table 6.28 Is the type of training responsible for the respondents' job?

			Gender		Total
			Female	Male	
The training I received was responsible of for the job I received	I agree	Count	13	21	34
		% within Gender	41.9%	52.5%	47.9%
	I disagree	Count	14	12	26
		% within Gender	45.2%	30.0%	36.6%
	Neither agree nor disagree	Count	4	7	11
		% within Gender	12.9%	17.5%	15.5%
Total		Count	31	40	71
		% within Gender	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The relationship between variables is tested and presented in the table below.

Table 6.28.1 Chi Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.742	2	0.419	0.448
Fisher's Exact Test	1.726			0.424
N of valid cases	71			

An average of 47.9 percent of the respondents (52.5 percent of male and 41.9 percent of female) stated that training played a role in their getting jobs. However, the utility of the training should not be overestimated, as the table reveals that 52 percent of respondents do not really agree that the training was responsible for their getting jobs (36.6 percent disagree, and 15.4 percent neither agree nor disagree). There is no significant difference between the views of male and female respondents (at the significance level of 0.448 >0.05). Although 47.9 percent of respondents recognise that there is a link between the training received and the jobs they got, on the other hand, a surprising 52 percent completely disagree or feel that the jobs they have only had an insignificant link with their training. Insertion into the economic system is also measured by the ability to get jobs or to be self-employed.

In question number thirty-seven, the researcher explores the possibility of the respondents being self employed or being employed by someone. The data is presented as shown below.

Table 6.29 Employer of the respondents

			Whom have you worked for		
			Somebody else	Myself	Total
Gender	Female	Count	8	14	22
		% within Gender	36.4%	63.6%	100.0%
	Male	Count	15	25	40
		% within Gender	37.5%	62.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	23	39	62
		% within Gender	37.1%	62.9%	100.0%

The table below shows the correlation between the variables.

Table 6.29.1 Chi Square Tests

	Exact Sig. (2 –sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Fisher's Exact Test	1.000	0.576

Perhaps due to the difficult economic climate and high unemployment levels within the Rwandan political economy, the respondents seem to have a high level of ability to create their own jobs with 62.9 percent (both men and women) having worked for themselves. The gender of an ex-combatant seems not to have influenced their chances of being self-employed.

The duration of the employment is explored in question number thirty-eight and presented as follows:

Table 6.30 How long did you do this job?

		Gender				Total	
		Female		Male			
		Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
How long did you do this job (months)	1.00			2	16.7%	2	6.9%
	6.00	6	35.3%			6	20.7%
	24.00			2	16.7%	2	6.9%
	60.00	5	29.4%	8	66.7%	13	44.8%
	72.00	4	23.5%			4	13.8%
	84.00	2	11.8%			2	6.9%
Total		17	100.0%	12	100.0%	29	100.0%

The jobs lasted from one month to seven years and the jobs of female respondents lasted longer than those of men. The duration of a job may be influenced by the ability of the worker to maintain good productivity levels. Has training enhanced those skills that are useful in the current jobs? To answer this question, one has to establish whether the job requirements have meaningful relationships with the skills of the respondents.

Table 6.31 shows that 44.2 percent of the respondents reported that their current occupation is directly linked to the skills learnt in DDR training. A quarter (25 percent) said that their job is indirectly related to the skills received. Indeed, the data showed that about 47 percent

of the respondents found jobs thanks to the training received. The more a job is related to the skills received from training, the more an ex-combatant is likely to be working for him/herself. This is an indication of the DDR programme's capacity to help beneficiaries to create their own jobs.

Table 6.31 Relationship between employment and skills from training

		Whom have you worked for				Total	
		Somebody else		Myself			
		Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Did/does your work relate directly to you skills?	Directly rel ated	4	19.0%	19	61.3%	23	44.2%
	Indirectly related	7	33.3%	6	19.4%	13	25.0%
	Not related	10	47.6%	6	19.4%	16	30.8%
Total		21	100.0%	31	100.0%	52	100.0%

The data from Table 6.32 shows that female respondents still gain fewer advantages from training. Only 23.8 percent of them claimed that their jobs are related to the skills learnt from the DDR programme, compared to 54.5 percent of male respondents. For seven out ten women, their jobs are either indirectly related (47.6 percent) or not related (28.6 percent) to the training received.

In question number thirty-nine, the researcher explores the relationship between the respondents' work and training skills acquired and presented as shown below:

Table 6.32 Relationship between employment and the skills from training (by gender)

		Gender				Total	
		Female		Male			
		Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Did/does your work relate directly to you skills?	Directly related	5	23,8%	18	54,5%	23	42,6%
	Indirectly related	10	47,6%	3	9,1%	13	24,1%
	Not related	6	28,6%	12	36,4%	18	33,3%
Total		21	100,0%	33	100,0%	54	100,0%

Table 6.32.1 Chi Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	10.993	2.000	0.004

It has been noted that the DDR training structure and options are not gender-sensitive as they are focused mainly on activities reputed to be masculine and reserved for men. The consequence is that many female ex-combatants are not endowed with enough skills to create their own jobs or be employed. If they do get a job, it is not because of the DDR programme training. This led the researcher to explore if the relationship between finding a job and training affect the respondents' income?

Table 6.33 Relationship between skills learnt and the monthly income

		Gender	
		Female	Male
		Income	Income
		Mean	Mean
Did/does your work relate directely to you skills?	Directelyrelated	.	21000.00
	Indirectly related	138000.00	.
	Not related	125000.00	81500.00

The data show that getting a job directly related to the skills provided by DDR training does not necessarily lead to an increase in income. Men who got jobs related to their skills are earning much less than those who say their jobs are not related to the skills received from training. The income levels of female respondents do not really show any such relationship. Entry positions for low level jobs are often fairly comparable in terms of the benefits that may be accruable when compared to non-skilled jobs. But these job incumbents often have much higher chances of increasing their levels of income with experience. While gaining skills does not necessarily lead to a higher income, other social dynamics seem to come into play. After the genocide, the role of women in the economy and in the political arena changed significantly. In fact, Rwanda's new constitution stipulates that women must constitute 30 percent of decision-making structures of government. Rwanda is leading the world in terms of the number of women in its parliament as a result of the 2008 parliamentary elections. Since 2009, women have held a third of all Cabinet positions. Rwanda became the first country in the world to have women in the majority in government; 56 percent in the Chamber of Deputies and 34 percent in the Senate. The current Speaker's chair is held by a woman. This arose as a result of specific mechanisms to increase women's political participation and empowerment, among them a constitutional guarantee, a quota system and innovative electoral structures.

In Rwanda, both male and female ex-combatants faced the expectation that they would return to their traditional roles in civilian life. Female ex-combatants are often expected to return to domestic responsibilities and caretaking roles, or to employment in sectors that are traditionally acceptable for women, while male ex-combatants often struggle to fulfill their expected roles as providers, or to find employment or livelihood options that give them a sense of self-respect. However, in post-genocide Rwanda, women took on work that was traditionally done by men such as working on construction sites, driving taxis, etcetera. Economically, the country has a new persuasive economic force: women. Women are

building their own homes, they are investing in their families, increasing savings, and they are paying school fees for their children. While there has been remarkable progress at the political level, this does not translate automatically to substantive gains for females. According to a UNDP report on Rwanda, over 60% of individuals live in poverty and 42% in absolute poverty. Using the household as a unit, 57% live below the poverty line. Rwanda has a high female population (53%), of whom large proportions are widows and/or single women. Nearly one-third, or 32.1%, of Rwandan households are headed by women. In terms of poverty gender disparities, 62% of female-headed households lie below the poverty line compared to 54% of male-headed households. The incidence of poverty is much higher in rural areas (66%) than in urban areas (12% in Kigali and 19% in other towns). Inequality runs deep, with the richest 10% of the population holding approximately 50% of the national wealth compared with 50% of the population sharing just 10% of the wealth (UNDP, 2010).A Rwandan government official stressed: “in general in the whole country women have a long way to go as far as poverty reduction is concerned, they are very poor. Women councils help them to get some level of confidence, but at the rural level we will continue to work harder to improve their lives” (GO, 1KC23 October 2010).

As women, female ex-combatants are called upon to compete for leadership positions within the community and run income generating projects under the umbrella of the women’s empowerment process that is underway in Rwanda. The demobilisation programme is not the last chance for women ex-combatants.

Some of the reasons for not finding a job is explored (see appendix one, question number forty) and presented as follows:

Table 6.34 Cause of not finding a job

			Main reason of not getting a job				
			Misjudge my ability as an-ex combattant	Do not have enought skills	Cannot find job providers	Other reason	Total
Gender	Female	Count	4	6	2	13	25
		% within Gender	16.0%	24.0%	8.0%	52.0%	100.0%
	Male	Count	14	13	7	6	40
		% within Gender	35.0%	32.5%	17.5%	15.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	18	19	9	19	65
		% within Gender	27.7%	29.2%	13.8%	29.2%	100.0%

Female respondents report more varied reasons for not finding a job. The majority (52 percent) cited “Other reasons”. In contrast, men are more specific about these reasons; 35.0 percent of male respondents argued that, as ex-combatants, their abilities are misjudged, or that they do not have enough skills (24 percent). Social stereotypes about ex-combatants may play a role in their chances of getting a job; this is more the case for men than for women. More male respondents (35 percent versus 16 percent of women) affirm that they have had problems in getting a job because some people do not trust ex-combatants. They need to be helped to get jobs because it is not easy for the society to trust them immediately.

During focus group discussions, participants talked about the scarcity of jobs in the formal sector in Rwanda. Regardless of their skills, the chances of not finding jobs would be high in a country with a 70 percent unemployment rate. Nevertheless, there are other reasons for not finding jobs. For example, the benefits of newly acquired vocational skills or micro-enterprise schemes created as part of reintegration can only be realised if there is sufficient demand and absorptive capacity in the economy. Corruption, economic insecurity and infrastructural challenges in the financial system can also undermine the utility of certain types of reinsertion, reintegration assistance and finding jobs. Therefore, it is essential to consider macro-economic indicators and issues of poverty in planning DDR responses.

Another crucial issue with the reintegration process is that of beneficiaries. There is a mistaken tendency to regard the caseload of ex-combatants as homogenous, overlooking significant variations based on gender, age, disability, ethnicity, military ranking, education and vocational skills which even small case studies encompass. The range of needs, capacities and expectations of ex-combatants tends to be wide, depending on these specificities/characteristics.

The researcher explored the need for using the skills acquired in the future in question number forty-one and the data are presented in the table below.

Table 6.35 Need for learning skills in the future

			Acquired skills will be usefull in the future			
			Yes	Not likely	Do not know	Total
Gender	Female	Count	10	10	11	31
		% within Gender	32.3%	32.3%	35.5%	100.0%
	Male	Count	19	6	16	41
		% within Gender	46.3%	14.6%	39.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	29	16	27	72
		% within Gender	40.3%	22.2%	37.5%	100.0%

Table 6.35.1 Chi Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp Sig (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	3.396	2.000	0.183

Opinions on the need for skills in the future are not clear, or negative. About 60 percent of the respondents either do not know (37.5 percent) or think it is not likely (22.2 percent) that their skills will be needed in the future. There is no significant difference in points of view between women and men ($p=0.183>0.05$).Few of the respondents find jobs immediately; most wait for a long time before getting jobs after their training; even though this training seems to play little or no role in getting jobs for at least half of the respondents. The majority of the female respondents are self-employed, but their occupation is rarely related to the skills received from the training supplied for women. Why are the choices for

females so few and limited? Although they are small in number, and the RDRC cannot ensure that all female ex-combatants become economically active or that they are able to subsist, the programme needs to promote the inclusion of females in the economic activities of the country. This would entail an advocacy approach and networking with various women groups in the public and private sectors, as well as civil society, to include female ex-combatants in the business sector as well as community and government development projects. Again, the RDRC needs to revise its training programme to enable female participation in the programmes that are attractive, such as entrepreneurship and not only focus on male domains.

The main points that arise concerning economic integration are the low quality of the skills provided by the training and the lack of gender sensitivity. It has been shown that the skills given to ex-combatants are not necessarily making a difference to their income. Those who have jobs related to the skills provided are earning much less than those who occupy jobs not related to the skills. The DDR training seems to provide some skills, but not enough to guarantee sufficient income. As a consequence, female ex-combatants who are disadvantaged with regards to the type of training provided are paradoxically doing much better than their male counterparts. Only 40 percent of the respondents said that the skills they received would be of no use in the future. This is the reason why they provided suggestions to improve the programme as a whole. However, while advancing the idea of reinforcing the programme, other measures are needed. Social dimensions, that is, the interplay between a community's physical and social capital, and the ex-combatant's financial and human capital, ultimately determine the ease and success of reintegration. Efforts to strengthen social capital - for example, using existing community organisations and channels of communication - enable communities to take development into their own hands and facilitate the reintegration of ex-combatants. Hence, informal networks of ex-combatants - discussion groups, veterans' associations, and joint economic ventures - are key elements for successful economic and social reintegration. Such associations can be extremely helpful when social capital has been depleted. In other words, a community

which is receiving ex-combatants has a significant role to play in assisting them. Community sensitisation and political awareness are paramount in this effort. Care should be taken that ex-combatants are not stigmatised as unfit for military service or as conveyors of disease, violence, and misbehaviour.

On the economic dimension, one can say that the peace dividend needs to be understood in social and economic, as well as financial terms. The reinvestment of some savings from military downsizing into the development of a disciplined, high-quality defence force can itself produce a peace dividend by increasing security, building confidence, and reducing public fear. It is useful to link a country's overall macro-economic reform programme, especially as it concerns the public expenditure mix, to the planned reintegration programme. Furthermore, jump-starting the economy by rehabilitating critical infrastructure can also be linked to reintegration programmes that involve training and employment schemes for both reconstructing material assets and building human and social capital. On the other hand, continental demilitarisation is a precondition for reviving civil society, reducing poverty, and sustaining development in Africa. The realisation of this objective hinges on disarmament, the demobilisation of forces, and the reduction of the flow of arms into the continent, on one hand, and on the reintegration of ex-combatants into productive civilian roles, on the other hand.

In question number forty-two from the questionnaire, the researcher deemed it necessary to establish the need for improvement of the DDR programme. The data is presented as shown below.

Table 6.36 Suggestions for improvement of the DDR programme

How can DDR program be improved?		Gender		Total
		Female	Male	
Make training longer	Count	6	6	12
	% within Gender	16.2%	12.0%	13.8%
Make allowances larger	Count	11	17	28
	% within Gender	29.7%	34.0%	32.2%
Provide more support in finding jobs afterwards	Count	8	7	15
	% within Gender	21.6%	14.0%	17.2%
Provide more support in setting up new business afterwards	Count	2	7	9
	% within Gender	5.4%	14.0%	10.3%
Better treatment by DDR staff	Count		2	2
	% within Gender		4.0%	2.3%
Give training with something else	Count	7	5	12
	% within Gender	18.9%	10.0%	13.8%
Must be gender sensitive and provide more attention to vulnerable group	Count	3	6	9
	% within Gender	8.1%	12.0%	10.3%
Total	Count	37	50	87
	% within Gender	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Respondents made a number of suggestions. The most important are: “to make allowances larger”, affirmed by 29.7 percent of women and 34.0 percent of men; and “provide more support in finding jobs afterwards”, affirmed by 21.6 percent of women and 14 percent of men. Minor differences appear for some suggested items. For example, women emphasise that the DDR programme should help them find jobs, but more men suggest that it should provide larger allowances. To sum up the role of DDR in the economic life of the respondents, it can be said that this role is somewhat present at a rate of 40 percent to 50 percent. It appears that male ex-combatants are getting more from the DDR programme than their female counterparts. Furthermore, this programme is somewhat well-rated by male respondents, but the female ex-combatants interviewed are not very appreciative of it, but do not seem to dislike it either. It has been observed that female ex-combatants perform

better in the programme than the males. This is despite the fact that the programme is not really tailored for them. In spite of the advantages on the side of male respondents, women are more successful in their economic lives. The demobilisation process does not only involve the integration of the ex-combatants into economic life; it also prepares them to be part of social life.

In conclusion, from the above discussions and Table 6.36, some implications can be drawn about the effectiveness of the demobilisation programme in enabling the reintegration of female ex-combatants. The Table 6.36 illustrates women ex-combatants' views on whether it is necessary to make training longer; 16.2 percent of women and 12 percent of men respondents agreed while 29.7 percent of women and 34 percent of men respondents felt that the allowances should be increased. When it came to providing training in other areas, 18.9 percent of women and only 10 percent of men agreed. The starting point is that assistance programmes must be aware that female ex-soldiers do exist, and then seek them out. To help these women on their way towards reintegration, if not within their original community, then somewhere else of their choice, is a great challenge. Reintegration planners must also pay special attention to disabled women (and girl) veterans. It cannot be denied that directing support to ex-soldiers is a complex process. Programmes designed to benefit ex-combatants may work against the overall goal of integrating that particular group into civil society.

From the previous tables, one can state that reintegrating female ex-combatants requires a holistic approach that is mindful of their actual social and economic needs, especially with respect to care and time use issues. They frequently lack education and training and these should be offered through assistance programmes. Childcare facilities are very important for the employment prospects of female ex-soldiers. A range of skills should be encouraged, not only typical female skills. Some of the knowledge acquired by ex-soldiers through politicisation programmes within revolutionary groups should be acknowledged as

being of value. In addition, ex-soldiers are experts on their own situation and can be used to train other ex-soldiers in dealing with returning to society.

6.5.2 Social and psychological reintegration

Psychosocial issues are receiving increased attention in Rwanda; this is reflected, for example, in the establishment of the national psychosocial centre in Kigali. This is also mirrored in the RDRC's efforts to design a programme for dealing with ex-combatants with more serious psychosocial problems such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). To varying degrees, ex-combatants suffer from psychosocial problems that inhibit their ability to reintegrate properly into civilian life. A minority suffers from the more serious PTSD, but more suffer from milder forms of this condition, with typical symptoms such as nightmares and flashbacks, difficulty sleeping, and a lack of concentration and listening skills, as well as problems with temper, and nervousness. This will sometimes lead to conflict with other people. It is not only psychological problems that lead to conflicts between ex-combatants and other people. As noted earlier, a range of other challenges facing ex-combatants in the reintegration phase may lead to conflict. Even though female ex-combatants have left the military life behind, some members of the civilian community seem to regard them as government spies. Ex-combatants often have difficulties finding a job and securing a livelihood, and may find it difficult to adjust to the demands of civilian life and a new social environment. Furthermore, ex-combatants are often reinserted into already poverty-stricken communities where they will have to compete with other community members for meagre resources.

Many ex-combatants, who have spent a significant part of their lives in the army or in armed groups, need support to learn basic social skills such as how to manage stress, alcohol, drug abuse, depression, anger and social relationships in a non-violent manner. Respondents alluded to their traumatic experiences during the interviews. Witnessing as well as experiencing events that are potentially life threatening to one or others activates extreme fear, shock and/or feelings of helplessness and puts individuals, particularly female

ex-combatants at risk of post-traumatic stress. The researcher asked respondents what type of traumatic events they had experienced in life, including the time of genocide and war in Rwanda. The reported experiences varied widely among individuals. Some women were sexually assaulted by their fellow men soldiers, mostly their superiors in the army. Four respondents said that they had attempted suicide on at least one occasion. The main reasons for doing so were twofold. Firstly, the hardship of their current life circumstances, especially poverty. Secondly, medical concerns and pain. One respondent reported during the interview that he wanted to commit 'extended' suicide, he wanted to kill members of the community first and thereafter himself. Providing a package of kitchen materials, seed for farming and some money is not enough. Psychosocial support is also essential. Clinical assessments should be an integral part of DDR. One respondent reported that they used to use marijuana, but had stopped; another person reported that they had frequently taken anxiolytic (a medication to reduce feelings of fear) when going into combat, but had also stopped. No use of local drugs was identified among female ex-combatants during the interviews, except for chewing tobacco. Nicotine use was frequent.

Finally, even though the researcher did not establish alcohol addiction in any of the interview respondents, alcohol abuse was established in two cases. Both women and men reported that they frequently drink too much even though they know that this will have adverse physical effects or will put them in situations where either they or others are at risk (for example domestic violence). However, alcohol intake followed an irregular pattern in ex-combatants, and respondents stated that they did not experience physical or psychological problems if alcohol was not accessible to them. This is an overall pattern that seems to be characteristic of the sample group (especially male respondents): If alcohol is available (and/or affordable) large amounts of alcohol are consumed at one time; at other times it is not consumed due to a lack of money or inaccessibility. Increased accessibility of alcohol (for example cheaper prices or even increased income) could lead to greater consumption and also to higher rates of substance abuse disorders. In a programme that focuses on the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants this component should be

monitored carefully, so that negative effects can be prevented in the long run. It should be noted that the frequent use of alcohol was reported to have lowered the threshold for using violence – against one's own family or against others. In most post-conflict societies, social reintegration starts with the re-establishment of contact between ex-combatants and their families, as well as their host community. The effective social reintegration of female ex-combatants is based upon their ability to adjust once back in the community.

In the context of Rwanda, this depends on the individual's ability to reintegrate into her family on the one hand, and how her family treats her on the other. Acceptance, trust, social cohesion and inclusion in the community are crucial for the social reintegration of female ex-combatants.

6.5.2.1 The DDR programme and the social integration of demobilised women

One can assume that female combatants are more likely to suffer from social prejudices and stereotypes than males. This sub-section will discuss the extent to which this is true and the role of the DDR programme in helping them to get back into mainstream life, both psychologically and socially. The positive role of DDR training in social reintegration is undeniable. A total of 66.2 percent of the respondents agreed with this statement. This is particularly true for men, 80 percent of whom agreed. There is a highly significant difference of points of view depending on whether a respondent is a man or a women ($p=0.000<0.05$).

Table 6.37 Role of training in social reintegration

			Gender		
			Female	Male	Total
I am better socially because of the training I received	I agree	Count	15	32	47
		% within Gender	48.4%	80.0%	66.2%
	Neither agree nor disagree	Count	4	7	11
		% within Gender	12.9%	17.5%	15.5%
	I disagree	Count	12	1	13
		% within Gender	38.7%	2.5%	18.3%
Total		Count	31	40	71
		% within Gender	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The correlation between variables is tested in the table below.

Table 6.37.1 Chi Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	15.381	2	0.000	0.000
Fisher's Exact Test	15.728			
N of valid cases	71			

Female respondents said that DDR training is of less use in their social integration; while 80 percent of male respondents agree that training helped them in social integration; only 48.5 percent of women shared this view; on the other hand, 38.7 percent of female respondents (versus 2.5 percent of men) disagree with the assertion that "they are better socially because of the training they received". This raises the question of the treatment of women by the programme, and the necessity of setting up a specific programme for female ex-combatants (see appendix one, question forty-nine).

Table 6.38 Comparison of treatment of female and male ex-combatants with regard to DDR programme

			Gender		
			Female	Male	Total
Do you find that female ex-combatants are treated in the same way like male ex-combatants in regard to DDR program?	Treated the same	Count	31	42	73
		% within Gender	79.5%	85.7%	83.0%
	Treated differently	Count	8	7	15
		% within Gender	20.5%	14.3%	17.0%
Total		Count	39	49	88
		% within Gender	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 6.38.1 Chi Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp Sig (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	0.596	1.000	0.440

Most of the respondents (83.0 percent) confirmed that women and men are treated equally, while 17 percent think that they are treated differently. If the programme does not make a distinction between men and women, it might not focus on the specific needs of each

group. Indeed, a number of factors suggest that the gender aspect is overlooked by the current DDR programme. It has been noted that at the demobilisation centre, females are only provided with information on the programme benefits; there was no special session related to gender awareness and other issues specific to women. Many of these issues, such as rape, periods ceasing because of the life women lived during the struggle and which could negatively affect their social reintegration, might best be discussed in women-only groups. Although the RDRC is planning to strengthen the gender awareness and capacity of the Commission staff, it has been observed that there are only a small number of women in the structures of the Commission and there is no gender-awareness programme for the staff. Females are not represented at higher levels of the Commission. They are not included in decision-making and are not involved in planning the demobilisation programme. Another issue observed on the ground is that there is an absence of programme officers who are skilled in gender-budgeting issues so that they can identify women's specific needs, or raise funds to give to female ex-combatants when they begin a new life. They are also not well informed on issues related to gender relations in communities.

Table 6.39 Opinion on the necessity of a special programme for female ex-combatants

			Gender		
			Female	Male	Total
Do you think that female ex-combatants deserve a special program?	Yes	Count	20	29	49
		% within Gender	51.3%	58.0%	55.1%
	No	Count	19	21	40
		% within Gender	48.7%	42.0%	44.9%
Total		Count	39	50	89
		% within Gender	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

A total of 55.1 percent of the respondents felt that such a special programme was necessary, while 44.9 percent did not. Another variable would help to establish more clearly who feels that a specific programme is necessary.

This is established in question fifty (see appendix one) where the researcher asked the respondents to indicate whether female ex-combatants deserve a special programme. In addition, in question sixteen, the researcher explores the year the respondents joined the

DDR programme. The responses to both questions are presented as shown in the table below.

Table 6.40 Opinion on the necessity of a special programme for female ex-combatants (by year of joining DDR programme)

Gender				Year of joining the DDR programm			Total
				Before 2001	From 2001 to 2005	After 2005	
Female	Do you think that female ex-combatants deserve a special programme?	Yes	Count	11	5		20
			%	73.3%	25.0%		51.3%
		No	Count	4	15		19
			%	26.7%	75.0%		48.7%
	Total		Count	15	20		39
			%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%
Male	Do you think that female ex-combatants deserve a special programme?	Yes	Count	13	4	11	29
			%	86.7%	23.5%	84.6%	58.0%
		No	Count	2	13	2	21
			%	13.3%	76.5%	15.4%	42.0%
	Total		Count	15	17	13	50
			%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 6.40.1 Chi-Square Test

Gender		Value	df	Asymp. Sig (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)
Female	Pearson Chi-Square	12.249	2	0.002	0.001
	Fisher's Exact Test	11.849			
Male	Pearson Chi-Square	20.097	3	0.000	0.000
	Fisher's Exact Test	19.811			

Table 6.40 shows that the year in which ex-combatants joined the DDR programme introduces different points of view on the necessity of setting up a specific programme for female ex-combatants. In the two groups (female and male), most of the respondents who

joined the programme in 2000 and before (73.3 percent for women and 86.7 percent of men) felt that it was necessary to set up a specific programme for female ex-combatants. Those who joined the programme from 2001 to 2005 have an opposite view: the majority feels that a specific programme is not necessary. On the other hand, the majority of respondents propose changes to make the programme more gender sensitive. How does the inadequacy of training impact on the social integration of female ex-combatants?

6.5.3 Quality of relationships between an ex-combatant and the host community

The quality of relationships between the ex-combatant and her/his family or community is a sign of social and psychological integration. It can be seen by the way demobilised women are accepted by their biological or marital family, neighbours and the host community as a whole, and the role they are playing in the reconstruction of this community. This is affirmed in question number forty three.

Table 6.41 Acceptance of the respondents by the family

			Gender		
			Female	Male	Total
After leaving the army, did you face problems in gaining acceptance from your family?	Yes big problems	Count	7	6	13
		% within Gender	18.9%	12.2%	15.1%
	Some problems	Count	10	11	21
		% within Gender	27.0%	22.4%	24.4%
	No problems	Count	20	32	52
		% within Gender	54.1%	65.3%	60.5%
Total		Count	37	49	86
		% within Gender	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 6.41.1 Chi Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig (2-sided)	Exact Sig (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.244	2.0	0.537	0.556
Fisher's Exact Test	1.302			0.183

The first level of social re-integration is the family. The level of integration seems good, with 60.5 percent of the respondents asserting that they did not have any problems. This is

true for 54.1 percent of women and 65.3 percent of male respondents. However, the situation seems better for men; 18.9 percent of women reported big problems in their family versus 12.2 percent of men reporting the same problems. However, the difference between male and female respondents is not statistically significant.

During the focus group discussions, some women said that their families/relatives still consider their action 'unusual' and feel that they should have stayed at home and taken care of their families instead of doing 'men's' work. The fact that around 40 percent of respondents reported having some or big problems being accepted in their family, leads to the conclusion that ex-combatants may suffer discrimination in the social context, even within their family. Furthermore, female ex-combatants may be subjected to gender discrimination. This requires further analysis. On the understanding that education can influence the way someone is considered in society, the researcher decided to measure whether it makes a difference in the stereotyping of ex-combatants, particularly women.

Table 6.42 Acceptance of the respondents by the family (by education)

% within Education2

			Education level			
		Gender	Primary	Secondary	University	Total
After leaving the army, did you face problems in gaining acceptance from your family?	Yes big problems	Female	40.0%	14.3%		18.9%
		Male	10.7%	15.8%		12.2%
	Some problems	Female	20.0%	38.1%		27.0%
		Male	28.6%	15.8%		22.4%
	No problems	Female	40.0%	47.6%	100.0%	54.1%
		Male	60.7%	68.4%	100.0%	65.3%
Total		Female	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		Male	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The table below presents the relationship between variables from Table 6.42

Table 6.42.1 Chi Square Tests

Gender		Value	Exact Sig. (2-sided)
Female	Fisher's Exact Test	7.631	0.075
Male	Fisher's Exact Test	2.000	0.810

The results from Table 6.42 show that the higher the level of education of an ex-combatant, the fewer the problems he/she experiences in acceptance by the family. All of the respondents that had a certain level of university education said that they do not have problems; the percentages drop as education levels drop. The table shows that at the lowest level of education, fewer female respondents report no problems (40 percent versus 60 percent of males,), but more women report big problems with acceptance (40 percent versus 10 percent of males). Even though the level of education seems to play a significant role in the acceptance of female/male ex-combatants by their family, the statistical test does not show significant difference.

The following table illustrates whether similar trends are evident in acceptance by neighbours.

Table 6.43 Acceptance by neighbours

			Gender		
			Female	Male	Total
After you left the army, did you face problems in gaining acceptance from your neighbors?	Yes big problems	Count	6	5	11
		% within Gender	15.4%	10.9%	12.9%
	Some problems	Count	6	16	22
		% within Gender	15.4%	34.8%	25.9%
	No problems	Count	27	25	52
		% within Gender	69.2%	54.3%	61.2%
Total		Count	39	46	85
		% within Gender	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 6.43.1 Chi Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp Sig (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	4.165	2.000	0.125	

Acceptance by neighbours is equally distributed for men and women. The majority (61.2 percent) had no problems. Nevertheless, almost four out of ten respondents had some problems (25.9 percent) or big problems (12.9 percent). The difference between the two

groups is not significant (0.125>0.05), even though more women (69.2 percent) admit to not having problems being accepted by neighbours. If we introduce another variable, differences become apparent. The gap between the males and females with respect to the degree of acceptance could be psychosocial, with male and females adjusting differently in their search for social acceptance. It is possible that males are seen by neighbours as more threatening than the females and, as such, would face more challenges. However, as mentioned earlier, although females seem to have encountered fewer problems, they felt less accepted in terms of access to marital partners from within civilian society. Female ex-combatants may face rejection or stigma within communities due to their role in combat, or to their informal relationships with men. On the one hand, marriage may be seen as the only way to gain acceptance; on the other hand, they may find it difficult to marry due to their past experiences or activities in the military.

Table 6.44 Acceptance by the neighbours (by education and sex)

% within Education2

			Education Level			
		Gender	Primary	Secondary	University	Total
After you left the army, did you face problems in gaining acceptance from your neighbors?	Yes big problems	Female	33.3%	9.5%		15.4%
		Male	7.1%	18.8%		10.9%
	Some problems	Female	33.3%	9.5%		15.4%
		Male	32.1%	43.8%		34.8%
	No problems	Female	33.3%	81.0%	100.0%	69.2%
		Male	60.7%	37.5%	100.0%	54.3%
Total		Female	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		Male	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 6.44.1 Chi Square Tests

Gender		Value	Exact Sig. (2-sided)
Female	Fisher's Exact Test	9.504	0.027
Male	Fisher's Exact Test	4.128	0.385

When female ex-combatants left the army, they had more problems being accepted by their neighbours if their educational levels were low, but fewer problems if their educational levels were higher. The statistical test shows significant difference (significance level:

0.027<0.05). Education does not exert a real influence on men's acceptance (significance level: 0.385>0.05); higher percentages of men with primary levels of education were in a much better situation: 60.7 percent of men with primary level education had no problems versus 37.5 percent with secondary level education; 18.8 percent of men with secondary level education had big problems, versus 7.1 percent of men with primary level education. This suggests that education is of greater importance in increasing the acceptance of women ex-combatants in the society than it is for men. Perhaps the issue is attitudinal; men with primary education may have been seen by their neighbours as "knowing their place" while those with secondary education may have been less willing to accept poor treatment or negative attitudes from their neighbours. Again, it is entirely possible that the neighbours were simple less willing to accept men with military backgrounds who are assertive.

The focus group discussions corroborated these findings. The participants perceived the female ex-combatants as Rwandans who deserve special consideration because of the sacrifices they made during the liberation struggle. They feel uncomfortable or bad when they see ex-combatants suffering. However, this has not always been the case; some female ex-combatants reported that they had problems integrating, as society regarded them with suspicion. Demobilized women felt that demobilization and reintegration were proof that they were unworthy to serve, and therefore a testimony to their character and personality. People use to call us 'demob' and this appears to have negative connotations and is often resented by the ex-combatants. In fact, most of demobilized soldiers get out of the army because of bad behaviour, medical or other reasons. But women get out of the army service because they are women. We are heroes; we want to be recognised as veterans not as 'demobs' (FGD, 6SP:9 October 2010). During the discussions, it was noted that there is a lack of psychological preparation and counselling of female ex-combatants before reintegration into civilian life. Most female ex-combatants said that after demobilisation, they were disappointed as they found life very difficult. Indeed, as noted above, they often join communities that do not understand them and the DDR programme

is not designed to help them address such issues. There are people who think that we are a no-nonsense group. Civilian men are undecided to propose marriage to us, that we are difficult people, we are neither men nor women – unacceptable among men, and yet we are not trusted among fellow women. People always say, “be careful she was in the army” (FGD, 1KC:20 July 2010).To sum up, the majority of ex-combatants were accepted by society, but female respondents with lower educational levels were generally not accepted by their family and neighbours. Education significantly improves their image in society; more than it does for men. This gives them more freedom than uneducated women. The situation did improve from the time of demobilisation to the time of the research.

Table 6.45 Evolution of the acceptance of ex-combatants by their family

	Female		Male		Total	
	After leaving the army	2009	After leaving the army	2009	After leaving the army	2009
Have big problems	18.9%	5.1%	12.2%	0.0%	15.6%	2.6%
Have some problems	27.0%	23.1%	22.4%	42.0%	24.7%	32.6%
No problems	54.1%	71.8%	65.3%	58.0%	59.7%	64.9%

As Table 6.45 and Figure 6.4 illustrate, there is an overall improvement in the acceptance of ex-combatants by their families. The respondents who had “big problems” just after leaving the army decreased from 15.1% to 2.2%, whereas 60.0% of respondents had “no problems”. Women noted a greater improvement than men. The majority of women (71.8 percent) had no problem being accepted by their family once they were back home (versus 54.1 percent of when they left the army) whereas 58 percent of men are in the same situation (versus 65.3 percent when they left the army). The other figures in Table 58 support this observation. The integration of female ex-combatants improves at a faster rate than that of their male counterparts.

Figure 6.4 Evolution of the acceptance of ex-combatants by their family



Source: Field work 2010.

The pattern of integration of the ex-combatants into the local community is not quite the same as integration into the family. There is a minor evolution in the acceptance of ex-combatants by their neighbours. The group of female ex-combatants (15.4 percent) who had big problems at the time of demobilization disappeared, while that of men remained unchanged over time This may be explained by the behaviour of the ex-combatants after their demobilization. As a female explained during our discussion on the behaviour of male ex-combatants, “the reintegration package for male ex-combatants should be given to their families because some men are behaving badly, are drunk and misuse it. I myself, I got my reintegration package and I invested it. This is not always the case for males” (FEX, 5 KC: 23 July 2010). The researcher experienced the case of two families whereby the wives benefited from their husbands’ reintegration package because of their behaviour. According to the mayor of the District, the two demobilised males were irresponsible and were not

taking care of their families. After receiving information that the wives are trying to subsist in small business, and with the agreement of the RDRC, the two men's reintegration packages were given to their wives. However, this does not mean that females are always better integrated into their community than males. It depends on the efforts that are made to reintegrate into civilian life.

Table 6.46 Evolution of the acceptance of ex-combatants by their neighbours

	Facing problems in gaining acceptance from neighbours				Total	
	Female		Male			
	After leaving the army	In 2009	After leaving the army	In 2009	After leaving the army	In 2009
Yes big problems	15.4%	0.0%	10.9%	10.5%	12.9%	6.1%
Some problems	15.4%	28.6%	34.8%	26.3%	25.9%	27.3%
No problems	69.2%	71.4%	54.3%	63.2%	61.2%	66.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The data from Table 6.46 is presented as shown in the figure below.

Figure 6.5 Evolution of the acceptance of ex-combatants by their neighbours



Source: Field work 2010.

During focus group discussions, ex-combatants were asked how they feel about the relationship between them and the community. The majority said that the relationship is improving. Community and social networks have welcomed them. A small minority reported that their poor relationship with their neighbours is caused by issues such as financial problems, different opinions and gender disparities. Female ex-fighters who served with armed groups found that there is a poor relationship between them and society; this situation was improved by the Gacaca court. In general, the majority of the respondents reported that their relationship with the receiving community is improving because of the increased level of trust in them and the improvement in their behaviour. The above paragraphs affirm that the quality of the relationship between ex-combatants and the host

community does not only depend on the demobilised, but also on the community in which she/he is living. This is illustrated in Tables 6.47 and 6.48.

Table 6.47 Current community of the respondent

			Gender		Total
			Female	Male	
Are you living in the same community as you were before you joined the army?	Yes	Count	23	31	54
		% within Gender	69.7%	63.3%	65.9%
	No	Count	10	18	28
		% within Gender	30.3%	36.7%	34.1%
Total		Count	33	49	82
		% within Gender	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

About two-thirds of all informants are living in the community they lived in prior to joining the armed forces and one-third is living in a different community. New host communities may be a challenge for ex-combatants and hinder better integration. The following table shows how community can have an impact on the way ex-combatants are accepted.

Table 6.48 Acceptance by neighbours and the host community of the ex-combatants

% within Are you living in the same community as you were before you joined the army?

			Today, do youface problems gaining acceptance from your neigbors?			
Gender			Yes big problems	Some problems	No problems	Total
Female	Are you living in the same community as you were before you joined the army?	Yes			100.0%	100.0%
		No		66.7%	33.3%	100.0%
	Total			28.6%	71.4%	100.0%
Male	Are you living in the same community as you were before you joined the army?	Yes		20.0%	80.0%	100.0%
		No	15.4%	23.1%	61.5%	100.0%
	Total		11.1%	22.2%	66.7%	100.0%

Table 6.48.1 Chi Square Tests

Gender		Value	Exact Sig. (2-sided)
Female	Fisher's Exact Test		0.015
Male	Fisher's Exact Test	0.793	1..000

The host community seems to have a significant impact on the acceptance of female ex-combatants, but no impact on male ex-combatants. As shown in the Table 6.48, all female respondents who are living in the community they lived in before they joined the army have no problems, while two-thirds (66.6 percent) of those who are living in a new community have some problems. Indeed, there is a statistical significance between the host community and being accepted by neighbours in the group of female ex-combatants ($p=0.015<0.05$). Returning to the same community plays a big part in the acceptance of female ex-combatants and this may be the basis for the acceptance of females as compared to males who are perceived as far more dangerous and threatening to the welfare of neighbours than females, given their capacity for greater aggression and violence. Eighty percent (80%) of the male respondents who resettled in the same community that they lived in before their military life reported no problems with acceptance. This contrasts significantly with the 61 percent of those who chose to resettle in a new community. However, the statistical test does not support a significant difference ($p=1>0.05$) in this group of male respondents.

The way the female ex-combatants are accepted by the host community may determine their role in current social issues such as unity and reconciliation. Social relations in Rwanda have been affected by genocide and war. This also applies to female ex-combatants. Participants in the focus group discussions said that the receiving communities treat them with suspicion and do not trust them. Because of this stereotype, demobilised women try to be nice to everybody. Female ex-combatants tend to be distressed. They face difficult situations in being widows, when they are ill, or if they are not able to send their children to school. Some women revealed that sometimes they feel inferior when they meet their civilian friends who have made progress in their lives and then they think that they made a mistake when they joined the army. The most important element in effective reintegration is to establish whether the community trusts these female ex-combatants, and also if the ex-combatants trust the receiving community. It was observed during the FGDs that female ex-combatants did not trust the population at the beginning. Some of them

believe that society does not trust demobilised people. However, the majority of the female ex-combatants interviewed demonstrated a level of trust in the receiving community. Most also trust their families, government officials, the army and the police.

Female ex-combatants were asked how they feel about the neighbourhood where they live and their activities in the community. They were also asked how they are treated by the receiving communities and how they evaluate the relationship with their neighbours. It was observed that the majority of the respondents were actively involved in community projects. There is a clear indication that the social cohesion and inclusion between the receiving community and ex-combatants is remarkable; this is facilitating the social reintegration process. This is illustrated by the case of the female ex-combatant in Kigali who received a cow from the government. There is a policy in Rwanda known as, "one family, one cow". The government gave a cow to the poorest families. Ex-combatants also received cows. In the Rwandan culture, if someone gives you a cow, it means a lot. The researcher met a female ex-combatant who received a cow from the government. She said: "from one cow, I gained four and I give two cows to my neighbours" (FEX, 14 KC: 5 November 2010). She is well-perceived by her community and is contributing to the development of her country. Indeed, she now employs two people.

The researcher explores how ex-combatants share their quality time in question number forty-eight.

Table 6.49 People sharing most of the ex-combatants' free time

			Gender		
			Female	Male	Total
With whom do you spend most of your free time?	On my own	Count	2	2	4
		% within Gender	5.1%	4.0%	4.5%
	Family	Count	29	40	69
		% within Gender	74.4%	80.0%	77.5%
	Friends from before the war	Count	5	4	9
		% within Gender	12.8%	8.0%	10.1%
	New friends that i met after the war	Count	2	1	3
		% within Gender	5.1%	2.0%	3.4%
	Friends I met in the army during the war	Count	1	3	4
		% within Gender	2.6%	6.0%	4.5%
Total		Count	39	50	89
		% within Gender	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 6.49.1 Chi Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig (2-sided)	Exact Sig (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.867	4.0	0.760	
Fisher's Exact Test	2.076			0.788

Female as well as male ex-combatants spend most of their spare time with their family. A few spend their free time with friends, dating from before, during or after the war. The difference between the two groups (male/female) is not statistically significant (0.7>0.05). The fact that most of the ex-combatants stay with their families may have a negative impact on their reintegration process, in terms of getting information on available resources within the broader society. The content of reintegration programmes varies from the provision of access to land and education to vocational training and micro-enterprise development projects. Former combatants tend to have limited information about their society and the opportunities available to them when they arrive back home. If this aspect has not received

attention during the demobilisation phase, then information, counselling and referral services should be established in order to provide the vital link between former combatants and the services planned for them. The reintegration of former combatants, whether in a rural or urban areas, would first of all need to consider a number of basic needs such as housing, infrastructure and services. However, the most important consideration in the reintegration of former combatants in rural areas is access to land (Lis Bruthus, 2004).

Data from Table 6.49 illustrates that a large majority of the respondents said that they were warmly received when they joined their communities. It should be noted that male respondents seem much happier regarding their welcome than the female respondents; 56.4 percent of female and 70 percent of male respondents rated their welcome as 'nice'. Reservations are evident in the small percentage (3.4 percent) who said that female ex-combatants were warmly received. The support and acceptance ex-combatants receive from families and community members are crucial to their successful reintegration. On the one hand, some communities will see ex-combatants as freedom fighters or heroes, while on the other, ex-combatants may be stigmatised or perceived as a threat to the communities to which they return.

During focus group discussions, a female ex-combatant stated that some families or communities treated female ex combatants as "unusual people". She was sometimes blamed by her family: "what you did was wrong"; "why did you not stay at home, get married and bear children?"; "you have chosen to perform men's work" (FXE,6SP:9 October 2010). The above findings confirm the problems the female ex-combatants might face when they rejoin their community or family (see Table 6.41 through to Table 6.48) due to negative attitudes that the society adopts towards them.

The following table shows what ex-combatants think about societal attitudes.

Table 6.50 Opinion of the respondents on the kind of welcome given to female ex-combatants

			Gender		
			Female	Male	Total
Do you think that male ex-combatants are better received by the communities than their female counterparts when they returned?	Very warmly received	Count	2	1	3
		% within Gender	5.1%	2.0%	3.4%
	Nicely	Count	22	35	57
		% within Gender	56.4%	70.0%	64.0%
	Female are received with suspicion	Count		2	2
		% within Gender		4.0%	2.2%
	Not well received	Count	2	2	4
		% within Gender	5.1%	4.0%	4.5%
	No response	Count	13	10	23
		% within Gender	33.3%	20.0%	25.8%
Total		Count	39	50	89
		% within Gender	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

There is a discrepancy between the points of view of male and female respondents. Even though three-quarters of interviewees overall, feel that female ex-combatants are treated equally to their male counterparts, opinions differ according to the gender of the respondents (significance level: 0.001<0.05). Female respondents are less convinced that they are treated equally with men. Some 59 percent think that they are treated equally, 30.8 percent think they are treated as inferiors and 10.3 percent felt that they are treated better. In contrast, most of the men (89.6 percent) said that female ex-combatants are treated equal to them.

The researcher explores the opinion of societal attitudes towards female ex-combatants in question fifty-two from the questionnaire.

Table 6.51 Opinion on societal attitudes towards female ex-combatants

			Gender		
			Female	Male	Total
Do you think that female ex-combatants are treated as inferior, superior or equal to their male counterparts?	They are treated as equal	Count	23	43	66
		% within Gender	59.0%	89.6%	75.9%
	They are treated as inferior	Count	12	5	17
		% within Gender	30.8%	10.4%	19.5%
	They are treated as superior	Count	4		4
		% within Gender	10.3%		4.6%
Total		Count	39	48	87
		% within Gender	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 6.51.1 Chi Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	12.142	2	0.002	
Fisher's Exact Test	11.692			0.001

Both male and female ex-combatants are confronted with the expectation that they will return to gender-stereotyped roles once back in civilian life. They may struggle to renegotiate their roles and relationships within the community, to gain social acceptance, and to transform their wartime identities and form a new civilian identity. Female ex-combatants may face rejection and stigma within the receiving communities due to their past role in the army and this may affect their reintegration into society.

During a focus group discussion, one ex-combatant stated: "People always say, be careful she was in the army. Some people still think military life has changed us. Sometimes we regret when we are facing problems such medical issue, school fees for our children, or when we see our former civilian friends who did not joined the army and are doing well. Sometimes we regret our decision and think that we are facing problems because we joined

the army" (FGD, 3KC:21 July 2010).One should not only consider the attitudes of the ex-combatants and their families, but also the community's perceptions of the female ex-combatants. Measures to support reconciliation and strengthen social cohesion and address stigma at the community level are often required as well as good behaviour on the part of ex-combatants, as they have a crucial role to play in their successful demobilisation and reintegration effort.

In question fifty-three, the researcher investigates the relationship between the ex-combatants and the host community. The data is presented in the table below.

Table 6.52 Opinions on the quality of the relationship with the host community

			Gender		
			Female	Male	Total
How do you qualify your relationship with your host community?	Excellent	Count	1	2	3
		% within Gender	2.6%	4.0%	3.4%
	Good	Count	38	47	85
		% within Gender	97.4%	94.0%	95.5%
	Not sure	Count		1	1
		% within Gender		2.0%	1.1%
Total		Count	39	50	89
		% within Gender	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 6.52.1 Chi Square Tests

	Value	Exact Sig. (2-sided)
Fisher's Exact Test	0.973	1.000

Almost all the male and female respondents (95.5 percent) confirmed that the quality of their relationships with their host community is good. However, only 3.4 percent described them as excellent. There is no difference in the assessment of the quality of the relationship between the two groups ($p=1>0.05$). Where they described the relationship as good, the respondents gave reasons. Thus the reasons for the good relationship between the ex-combatants and the community are presented as shown in the table below.

Table 6.53 Reasons for the good quality of the relationship between ex-combatants and their host community

			Gender		
			Female	Male	Total
If your response is "excellent", it is because:	We are their sons, daughters	Count	5	7	12
		% within Gender	50.0%	22.6%	29.3%
	They respect our contributiontowards peace and stability	Count	1	6	7
		% within Gender	10.0%	19.4%	17.1%
	Because we brought peace to the country	Count	4	6	10
		% within Gender	40.0%	19.4%	24.4%
	They need helping hands	Count		10	10
		% within Gender		32.3%	24.4%
	Other	Count		2	2
		% within Gender		6.5%	4.9%
Total		Count	10	31	41
		% within Gender	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Different reasons were given by the respondents. The main reasons put forward by female respondents was the relationship with their family (50 percent), and the role they played in bringing peace to the country (40 percent). Men pinpointed more varied reasons including the help they bring to their family, relations with their family and their role in bringing peace to the country. However, when considering the reasons for the good quality of relationships between ex-combatants and their host community, one must view the reintegration of ex-combatants into the community not as one general process but rather as thousands of micro-stories, with individual and group efforts and setbacks and successes. Furthermore, before the reintegration, the community is aware that the ex-combatants are newcomers in the community, and according to Rwandan culture, they must be welcomed with dignity. The objective of social reintegration is to create an environment in which former combatants and their families feel part of, and are accepted by, the community. On the other hand, political reintegration is the process through which they become a full part of decision-making processes, while economic reintegration enables them to build their livelihoods by having access to production mechanisms and other types of gainful

employment (Kingma, 2000:28). Indeed, the long-term objective of reintegration is to enhance economic and human development and to foster and sustain political stability, security and peace. It is also crucial that the reintegration process recognises and reinforces local reconciliation processes, since reintegrating former combatants in society can contribute in the long term to the overall strengthening of peace and to reconciliation through growing interaction not only between the community and the newcomers (ex-combatants), but also between different groups and former warring factions. In other words, successful reintegration helps to build mutual confidence among the former combatants who are at the same time former belligerent groups, thereby reducing the risk of renewed hostilities which can affect the community that hosts them (Kees, Kingma and Sayers, 1994).

6.5.4 Empowerment of female ex-combatants

While a woman can suffer from having been in the army, she can also gain some prestige from having done so. The focus group discussions confirmed this. According to the participants, female ex-combatants have the power to make decisions in their daily activities and this has an impact on them in terms of self-confidence. They stated that the community and the local government value their concerns and that they are listened to by local leaders. This enables female ex-combatants to achieve a certain standard of living as well as to contribute meaningfully to national development and sustainable peace. The interviews with local leaders revealed that female ex-combatants participate in various activities, such as “Umuganda” which is community work on the last Saturday of each month, “Gacaca” (local courts), and in local leadership. This is an opportunity for women ex-combatants to improve their lives and play a vital role in national peace-building and the development of their communities. Most ex-combatants state that they have the power to make important decisions in their lives, that their opinions are considered by the local leadership and that, in general, they feel valued by the society. More and more ex-combatants are rapidly building social capital and significant advancements have been made in the past two years. Society views female ex-combatants as brave, courageous and

strong. This leads to them receiving work and respect. Because of their military experience, people think that female ex-combatants can manage anything.

To summarise, the role of DDR training in the social integration of female ex-combatants leaves much to be desired. Only 48.4 percent of the female respondents felt that the DDR had played a positive role, in contrast to the views of men (p=0.000). Some female ex-combatants had problems being accepted by their family, like their male counterparts (p=0.537) and by neighbours. Integration problems decreased over time, faster than was the case for men. However, education played a more significant role in increasing the level of integration of demobilised women than it did for men (p=0.027 for women, p=0.385 for men). It has been noted that when the host community is different from the former community of the female ex-combatant, integration is slower. The newness of the host community has a negative impact on the social integration of female ex-combatants (p=0.015), which is the opposite for men (p=1).It has been noted that some female ex-combatants suffer from stigma for having served in the army, a job normally reserved for men. A number reported that were treated as inferior to men; but on the other hand, a large number admitted to being treated equally to men and even felt that they have been empowered and that society considers them courageous and brave and accords them respect.

6.6 Conclusion

The role of the DDR programme in the integration of female ex-combatants was demonstrated at four levels: services provided by the programme, that is, training and financial support; relevance and efficiency of the programme; appreciation of the programme; and effective integration. The DDR programme's activities consist of helping ex-combatants reinsert and reintegrate in society, by providing them with different services. These services relate mainly to training and financial support. Not all ex-combatants received or are receiving this training/financial support. The training is given to less-educated people and is known to be reserved for men, rather than women. Female ex-

combatants do not find the training that is offered suitable for their needs and some have to make do with 'masculine' training. This leads to the question of the efficiency and relevance of the service. It has been noted that the ability of the DDR programme to produce results is still lacking. Among the 50 respondents who did not finish the training, only four were still undergoing training and the rest had abandoned it for different reasons. Even after training, there remains the problem of getting a job; women wait longer (21.87 months) than men (15.21 months) before they get a job. Upon demobilisation, few ex-combatants received a start-up kit. Only 15.7 percent of the respondents had received a kit at the time of the interview and 47.9 percent were expecting to receive it. Female respondents were more pessimistic about receiving it (44.8 percent versus 50.7 percent of male respondents).

The findings show that, in general, the respondents had good opinions about the programme per se, but the process does not really make the beneficiaries enthusiastic, particularly women. Female respondents felt that the programme failed to provide them with adequate skills that can be useful in their future life. Very few women (25.8 percent) agreed that the DDR programme prepared them to get a job. Women feel that the skills they receive are not marketable in their economic environment; the material is better rated by men than by women, and the trainers are rated very poorly by women and more educated respondents. As a consequence, male ex-combatants are getting more from the DDR programme than their female counterparts. That is why the female ex-combatants who were interviewed do not appreciate what it is doing to prepare them for economic reintegration. In spite of the advantages enjoyed by male respondents, women are more successful in their economic life. Their higher education may be among the reasons for this. Only 48.4 percent of the women respondents felt that the DDR programme is playing a role in their social integration, while the male respondents have a different opinion ($p=0.000$). Women have more problems being accepted by their family and by neighbours, compared to men. But this situation gets much better over time, faster than is the case for men. Education plays a more significant role in increasing the level of integration of demobilised women than it

does for men (p=0.027 for women, p=0.385 for men). It has been noted that when the host community is different from the former community of the female ex-combatant before she joined the army, integration is slower. Thus, the newness of the host community has a negative impact on the social integration of female ex-combatants.

In spite of some social and psychological problems linked to gender-based prejudice, a number of demobilised women admitted to being treated as equal to men and feel that they have been empowered and that society considers them as courageous and brave and accords them respect. Furthermore, it has been shown that the benefits of newly-gained vocational skills or micro-enterprise schemes created as part of reintegration could only be realised if there is sufficient demand and absorptive capacity in the economy. The issues of corruption, economic insecurity and infrastructural challenges in the financial system may also undermine the utility of certain types of reinsertion and reintegration assistance.

Therefore, it is essential to consider macro-economic indicators and issues of poverty in planning DDR responses. Another crucial issue with the reintegration process is that of beneficiaries. There is a mistaken tendency to regard the caseload of former combatants as homogenous, overlooking the significant variations based on gender, age, disability, ethnicity, military ranking, education and vocational skills, which even small caseloads encompass.

Chapter Seven

Conclusion and Recommendation

7.1 Introduction

Before presenting the findings of the research, the researcher presented the profile of the respondents. These are mainly adult people, women and men, holding different responsibilities. Women are older and more educated than men. Respondents were living in different places before the war, but most women (66 percent) were living outside the country, in contrast to male ex-combatants, most of who were living in Rwanda. They served in different military groups and are likely to have had different life and military experiences.

7.2 Conclusion

Demobilisation can be challenging for a former fighter who is obliged to work to earn money in a competitive environment. Female ex-combatants are believed to be more subject to problems of adaptation and integration, when they return to civilian life. The DDR programme is necessary to facilitate the demobilisation process, and its role is a determinant in the success of female ex-combatants' demobilisation. This study assessed the role of the DDR programme in the reintegration of female ex-combatants. This was done at four levels: services provided by the programme, that is, training and financial support; the relevance and efficiency of the programme; appreciation of the programme; and, finally, effective reintegration of female ex-combatants.

As reintegration cannot be effective if the DDR programme is not gender sensitive, this study adopted a comparative approach to gauge whether it is taking into account the specific needs of female ex-combatants. Concerning the services provided, the DDR programme's activities consist of helping ex-combatants reinsert and reintegrate in society, by providing them with different services. These services are mainly training and financial support. However, not all ex-combatants have received or are receiving this training/financial support. The training is given to less educated people and is known to be

reserved for men, rather than women. Female ex-combatants do not find that the training meets their needs and some of them have to be content with 'masculine' training. This reality of poor fit for female ex-combatants leads to the questions regarding the efficiency and relevance of the services. It has been noted that the ability of the DDR programme to produce results is lacking. Among the 50 respondents who did not finish training, only four were still undergoing it and all the rest had abandoned it for different reasons. Even after the training, there remains the problem of getting a job; women wait longer (21.87 months) than men (15.21 months) before they could get a job. This was quite aside from the fact that women were collectively better qualified than the men. Perhaps, the longer time spent finding jobs may be explained by the fact that some of the women chose professional training in areas traditionally considered male domains. Beyond the choice of professional training, there is also the fact that upon completion of training, many ex-combatants do not receive the range of equipment promised by the RDRP at the time of commencing the training. As Table 6.16 underscores, only 15.7 percent of the respondents had received their tool-kit at the time of the interview and 47.9 percent were still expecting to receive it. Female respondents were more pessimistic about receiving it (44.8 percent versus 50.7 percent of male respondents).

While the findings showed that opinion about the programme per se is generally good, the process does not really make the beneficiaries, particularly the women, enthusiastic. Female respondents exposed weaknesses in the programme in terms of giving them adequate skills that can be useful in their future life. Very few women (25.8 percent) agree that the DDR programme prepared them to get a job. Women feel that the skills they receive are not marketable in their economic environment; the material is better rated by men than by women, and the trainers are rated very poorly by women and the more educated respondents. As a consequence, male ex-combatants are getting more from the DDR programme than their female counterparts. That is why female ex-combatants interviewed do not appreciate what it is being done to prepare them for economic integration. In spite of the advantages on the part of male respondents, women are more successful in their

economic life. Their higher levels of education may be among the reasons for this. Only 48.4 percent of the women respondents felt that the DDR programme is playing a role in social integration, while the male respondents have a different opinion (p=0.000). Women have more problems being accepted by their family and neighbours, compared to the men. However, this situation gets much better over time, faster than is the case for men. Education plays a more significant role in increasing the level of integration of demobilized women than it does for men (p=0.027 for women, p=0.385 for men). It has been noted that when the host community is different from the community of the female ex-combatant before joining the army, the integration is slower. Thus, the newness of the host community has a negative impact on the social integration of female ex-combatants.

In spite of some social and psychological problems linked to gender-based prejudices, a number of demobilised women confirmed that they were treated as equal to men and feel that they have been empowered and that society considers them courageous and brave and accords them respect. The initial study hypothesis was that female ex-combatants will not re-adjust successfully into civilian life if their demobilisation and re-integration programme is ineffective. This has been partially confirmed by the survey and focus group discussions. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that the DDR programme is not gender-sensitive. The training provided to ex-combatants is mainly 'masculine', and does not take into account the specific needs of demobilised women. This results in a lack of skills among women and inadequate acceptance of female ex-combatants by the host community. Demobilised women have more problems regarding social integration than men. However, the weakness of the DDR programme is compensated for by other social dynamics. Current trends in the political and economic spheres foster women's empowerment and female ex-combatants are reintegrated faster than men. While a woman can suffer from having been in the army, she can also gain some prestige from having done so. This was confirmed by most of female ex combatants during the focus group discussions. Female ex-combatants have the power to make decisions in their daily activities and this has an impact on them in terms of self-confidence. They have the power to make important decisions in their lives,

that their opinions are considered by the local leadership and that, in general, they feel valued by the society. Because of their military experience, people think that female ex-combatants can manage anything. Although women are victims of conflicts, it was observed that they are agents for peace, and they are playing important roles as community builders in their communities. In post genocide Rwanda, Rwandan women took work which was traditionally done by men such as working on construction sites, driving taxi and trucks, etcetera. Female ex combatants gained power, control, self-confidence, and the feeling of belonging in their reintegration into society. As was stated by interviewed former women combatants, their service in the army changed them considerably. They revealed that they gained news skills, capabilities and confidence in contrast to other women. They called on as agents of change and positive role models for other women and to lead the way in redressing gender prejudice in the community both politically and economically. While the reintegration of female ex-combatants is real, the role of DDR programme in this process remains minimal.

Finally, reintegration activities in urban areas, according to one source, need to be more diverse and of longer duration (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996a: 58). In the Ethiopian reintegration experience, it was found that .the urban target group was more complex and difficult than that of the rural ex-combatants because of the diverse social and economic backgrounds of the ex-combatants, and the tightness of the urban labour market.

7.3 Recommendations

The main recommendations arising from this study are summarised below. They clearly have a number of implications for how DDR programmes are structured, coordinated, funded and implemented, and how they can underpin broader reintegration processes:

1) Reintegration is a complex and drawn out process. The way in which ex-combatants are introduced to reintegration programmes needs a more human sensitive and human security approach. Ex-combatants cannot be deprogrammed in a mechanistic mode to be civilians; rather, the social bonding elements of community based reintegration can

help heal the wounds of conflict. Reinsertion packages can facilitate the initiation of this process, by reintroducing the basic semblance of civilian existence through its effects on the well-being and economic sustainability of ex-combatants in the post-discharge period.

2) It needs to be acknowledged that a combatant-focused approach can easily create resentment and dissatisfaction among the civilian population and consequently, targeting decisions and the question of who the beneficiaries of DDR should be will be a point for debate. This study adopts the position that community-based approaches are best for long-term reintegration support, and calls for a reinsertion assistance approach that prioritises the return and immediate resettlement needs of ex-combatants.

3) A change in DDR programme policies is needed in order to allow female ex-combatants to better integrate economically, socially and psychologically. There should be special programmes for women ex-combatants because of their unusual situation related to their gender. At the very outset, demobilisation and reintegration programmes should have been designed in such a way that they could provide for women's special needs and women themselves should be involved in planning. However, it has been observed that women were given the same package as men. While a special programme for women may be necessary, the existing programme also needs to be more gender sensitive.

4) The DDR programme should integrate women in its decision-making structures in order to understand the specific needs of female ex-combatants. The RDRP should be gender-sensitive as female ex-combatants have said that they have special problems which are different from those of their male counterparts. Power relations, identity crises, vulnerability and co-operating with the community through intra-house and social relations are all factors affecting women differently from men as they rejoin civilian life.

5) Training material and contents should be revised and more women should be integrated in the group of trainers to meet the needs of women ex-combatants. Education is a major factor in the integration of women. This should be a great focus in the demobilisation of the female ex-combatants.

6) The host community of the demobilised women should be sensitised, particularly if it is different from the one the demobilised women lived in before. In order to help female

ex-combatants to regain their self-confidence and feel appreciated for all they did during the liberation struggle a lot has to be done by the communities and female ex-combatants themselves with support from the RDRC. For example, special events to express appreciation of female ex-combatants should be organised and they should be recognised on national days.

7) Attention should be paid to uneducated women when they are demobilised and formal structures should be set up to help them progress in civilian life. Psychological and social problems need to be dealt with. Again, at demobilisation, in addition to existing orientations, women should have an extra women's session exclusive to them. Psychosocial preparation at a designated centre when the programme nears completion would also be an advantage; because they already see the Commission as a parent; when the programme closes they may be displaced again.

8) From this study, it has been observed that the community is the main resource for rehabilitation and the successful outcome of the reintegration process. As the former fighters successfully adjust to civilian community life, it is important for the RDRC to maintain good working relations with the communities who host female ex-combatants. Effective monitoring and evaluation of the process is vital to determine how it is faring. As stated in the focus group discussions, there is insufficient monitoring of the female reintegration process and insensitivity to their specific gender situations. It would be advisable for the RDRC to review and strengthen its activities locally; by visiting female ex-combatants in their reintegration communities in order to understand their problems and personal situations.

9) The entitlement or inducement debate in DDR is probably one of the most controversial issues that planners and practitioners need to bear in mind. Reinsertion benefits should be viewed outside of this framework as a demobilised combatant returning home empty-handed could easily become a potential security risk; the period immediately after demobilisation is particularly critical in their transformation in identity from a combatant to civilian. Their potential involvement in crime for example, could easily worsen the social reintegration prospects in later stages of DDR. Therefore, although this

study advocates a human resource development perspective in the reintegration phase which would be expected to address the challenges regarding the receiving communities' absorption capacities as much as possible; for reinsertion assistance to be effective it needs to target ex-combatants first in their transition from demobilisation to reintegration.

10) In order for financial reinsertion assistance to make a real difference it is necessary to identify the specific needs of each target group within the broader ex-combatant caseload. This requires careful planning, adequate monitoring and sufficient funding to tailor the reinsertion assistance in terms of its selection criteria, amount and delivery.

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APPENDIX

Appendix One

Questionnaire for Ex-combatants

0 1 Questionnaire number _____

Background Information

Q 1 Enter the respondent's sex ☐Male ☐Female

Q 2 Enter the respondent's coded initials (optional)

Q 3 What year were you born? 19….. or years

Q 4 Where were you born in?

☐ Rwanda ☐ Burundi ☐ Uganda ☐ DRC ☐ Kenya ☐ Tanzania

☐ Other

Q 5 Where were you living before the war began in 1994?

☐ 1 Kigali ☐ 2 Other town in Rwanda ☐ 3 Small urban village in Rwanda

☐ 4 Rural settlement in Rwanda

Q 6 What is your marital status?

☐ 1 Single, never married ☐ 2 divorced/ separated ☐ 3 Widowed ☐ 4 Married, monogamous ☐5 Married, polygamous

Q 7 What is your religion?

☐None ☐Adventist ☐Catholics ☐ Muslim ☐ Protestants ☐ Other

Q 8 What military group were you in before your demobilisation?

☐1 RDF ☐2 RPA ☐3 FAR ☐4 Armed group 5 FDLR

Q 9 Please state what rank you had at demobilisation

☐1 Col☐2 LtCol☐3 Major ☐4 Captain ☐5 Lt ☐6 2Lt ☐7 WOI

☐8 WOII ☐9 SM ☐10 S/SG ☐11 SGT ☐12 CPL ☐13 L/ CPL ☐14 Private

Q 10 What is your highest level of education?

☐ 1 No school

☐ 2 Some primary school

☐3 Completed primary school

☐ 4 Some secondary school

☐ 5 Completed secondary school

☐ 6 Some university

☐ 7 Completed university

☐ 8 Some Institute/ Polytechnic

☐ 9 Completed Institute/ Polytechnic

☐ 10 Vocational

Q 11 What was your main occupation before the war? (Choose one)

☐ 1 Farmer ☐ 2 Trader ☐ 3 State functionary (Civil servant) ☐ 4 Soldier ☐ 5 Teacher ☐ 6 Medical worker ☐ 7 Artisan ☐ 8 Work in someone else's home ☐ 9 Housewife ☐ 10 Student ☐ 11Odd=jobs/ Part time ☐ 12 No employment ☐ 13 Other Specify _____

Q 12 What is your occupation today? Profession: …… (Enter code from last question or)

13 Other Specify: _____

Q 14 If you are comfortable telling us, what is your monthly income?

(Include only cash income) _____Enter Income in Rwandese francs

Q 15 How many people do you support with this income? _____ (Enter number)

Q 16 When did you join the DDR programme? Month ….. Year…..

Q 17 Did you receive a DDR cash re-insertion benefit? ☐ 1 Yes ☐ 2 No

Q 18 Did you participate in DDR funded training or educational training?

1 Yes☐ 2 No ☐

If YES, answer the next two questions; if NO mark NA for Q 19 and Q 20

Q 19 In which DDR funded training programme did you or are you participating in? (Mark as many as apply)

☐ 1 Public works

☐ 2 Agricultural

☐ 3 Apprenticeship

☐ 4 Vocational/skills training

☐ Formal education

☐ 6 Other….

Q 20 What DDR funded training did or are you participating in?

☐ 1 auto mechanic ☐ 2 bicycle repair ☐ 3 carpentry ☐ 4 computer studies

☐ 5 electrical installations ☐ 6 hairdressing ☐ 7 masonry ☐ 8 plumbing

☐ 9 radio mechanic ☐ 10 tailoring ☐ 11 welding ☐ 12 building

☐ 13 formal education ☐ 14 Other specify ……

Q 21 Have you completed your DDR funded training or educational programme?

1 Yes☐ 2 No☐

If NO, answer the next question

Q 22 Why did you not complete your training?

☐1 I am currently in training

☐2 I lost my DDR card

☐3 DDR stopped my benefits

☐4 other……

If YES, answer the following questions

Q 23 How many months did your training last? ……number of months

Q 24 How many months since you completed your training? …..number of months

Q 25 Did you expect to receive a toolbox or start up kit?

1☐ Yes 2 ☐No

Q 26 Did you receive a toolbox or start up kit? 1☐ Yes 2☐ No

Q 27 Are you agree or disagree with the following statements?

Q 28 The training I received has prepared me well for my work

☐1 agree 2☐ disagree 3 ☐neither

Q 29 The skills I learnt are needed by employers in this area

☐1 agree ☐2 disagree ☐3 neither

Q 30 I am better socially because of the training I received

☐1 agree ☐2 disagree ☐3 neither

Q 31 The training I received was responsible for the job I received

☐1 agree ☐2 disagree ☐3 neither

Q32 In general, how would you rate the materials and content of the training course?

☐1 Excellent ☐2 Good ☐3 OK ☐4 Poor ☐5 Very Poor

Q 33 How would you rate the trainers?

☐1 Excellent ☐2 Good ☐3 OK ☐4 Poor ☐5 Very Poor

Q 34 Overall, how would you rate the DDR Programme?

☐1 Excellent

☐2 Good

☐3 OK

☐4 Poor

☐5 Very Poor

Q 35 Since completing the training programme, have you had a job?

☐1 Yes ☐2 No

If YES answer the following questions

Q 36 After finishing the training programme, how long was it before you started working?

……number of months

Q 37 Have you worked, either for somebody else or yourself?

☐1 For somebody else

☐2 For myself

Q 38 How long did you / have you been doing this work?

Q 39 Did / does your work, relate directly, indirectly or not at all to your training skills?

☐1 directly related

☐2 indirectly related

☐3 not related

If NO, answer the following questions

Q 40 Which of the following statements best describes why you have not found a job? (Choose two max)

☐ When employers find out that I am an ex combatant, they do not want to hire me because they think that I am a bad worker

☐ I do not like any of the jobs that I have found

☐ I do not have good skills

☐ I do not know where to find employers that need people to work for them

☐ 5 Other

Q 41 Do you think that the skills that you have learnt will ever be used for work sometime in the future?

☐ Yes ☐ Not likely ☐ Do not know

Q 42 Of the following list choose the two most important improvements that should be made to the DDR Programme

☐ Make training longer

☐ Make allowances larger

☐ Provide more support in finding jobs afterwards

☐ Provide more support in setting up new business afterwards

☐ 5 Better treatment by DDR staff

☐ Give training is something else (What?) ……

☐ Must be gender sensitive and provide more attention to vulnerable group ☐ Other……

Q 43 After leaving the army, did you face problems in gaining acceptance from your family?

☐ Yes big problems ☐ Some problems ☐ No problems

Q 44 After you left the army, did you face problems in gaining acceptance from your neighbours?

☐ Yes big problems

☐ Some problems

☐ No problems

Q 45 Today, do you face problems gaining acceptance from your family?

☐ Yes big problems

☐ Some problems

☐ No problems

Q 46 Today, do you face problems gaining acceptance from your neighbours?

☐ Yes big problems

☐ some problems

☐ No problems

Q 47 Are you living in the same community as you were before you joined the army?

☐ 1 Yes ☐ 2 No

Q 48 With whom do you spend most of your free time? (Choose one)

☐ 1 On my own

☐ 2 Family

☐ 3 Friends from before the war

☐ 3 New friends that I met after the war

☐ 4 Friends I met in the army during the war

☐ 5 Other friends that I met during the war

Please answer the following questions

Q 49 Do you find that female ex-combatants are treated in the same way like male ex-combatants in regard to DDR Programme?

☐ 1 Treated the same

☐ 2 treated differently

Q 50 Do you think that female ex-combatants deserve a special programme?

☐ 1 Yes

☐ 2 No

Q 51 Do you think that male ex-combatants are better received by the communities than the female counterparts when they returned?

☐ 1 Very warm received

☐ 2 Nicely

☐ 3 female are received with suspicion

☐ 4 not well received

☐ 5 no response

Q 52 Since demobilisation, do you think that female ex-combatants are treated inferior, superior or as equal as their male counterparts?

☐1 treated equal

☐2 treated inferior

☐3 treated superior

Q 53 As a demobilised combatant, how do you qualify your relationship with your host community?

☐1 Excellent

☐2 Good

☐3 Bad

☐4 Not sure

If your response is excellent, it is because

☐1 we are their sons, daughters

☐2 They respect our contribution towards peace and stability

☐3 Because we brought peace to the country

☐4 They need helping hands

☐5 Other

If your response is bad, the main reason is because

☐1 I fought on the wrong side

☐2 I returned to share the meager resource

☐3 Because my livelihood depends on them

☐4 Perceptions/ Attitude towards female ex-combatants is negative

☐5 Other