THE FEDERAL PARTY, 1953-1962: AN ENGLISH-SPEAKING
REACTION TO AFRIKANER NATIONALISM.

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A thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in the Department
of History at the University of Natal.

Durban, 1979.
PREFACE

The assistance of all those who, in various ways, helped in the preparation of this thesis, is gratefully acknowledged. In particular, I would like to thank the staffs of the following institutions: the Library of the University of Natal; the Gubbins Library of Africana and the Wartenweiler Library, both of the University of the Witwatersrand; the United Party Archives at the University of South Africa and the State Library, both in Pretoria; the Institute of Contemporary History of the University of the Orange Free State; the Killie Campbell Africana Library; the Municipal Libraries in Durban and Johannesburg; and the Natal Society Library in Pietermaritzburg. I should also like to thank the staffs of the libraries of the following newspapers: Natal Mercury, Natal Daily News, Rand Daily Mail, The Star and, especially the Natal Witness.

I wish also to thank the many private individuals whom I interviewed and who kindly made private papers available to me. In this regard I wish particularly to mention Mr. Brian Batchelor, Mr. Derek Heaton Nicholls, Mr. Gillie Ford, Mr. Roy Fenhalls, Col. A.C. Martin, Mrs. Joan Stewart and Professor W. Kleynhans.

I also wish to acknowledge the guidance and helpful criticism given by my supervisor, Professor A.H. Duminy. His untiring effort - especially in the final, onerous stages of preparation - are greatly appreciated.

I also owe a debt of gratitude to Mrs. Joyce McLean-Reid, who so ably converted a difficult manuscript into typescript.

Finally, I thank Miss. H. du Mollard, without whose assistance this work could not have been written.

In conformity with the regulations of the University of Natal, I hereby state that what follows is my own original work, unless specifically indicated to the contrary in the text.

DURBAN.
December 1979.
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ABBREVIATIONS

In order to avoid repeating, in full, the names of certain collections of papers and organisations, abbreviations have been used in the text and/or in footnotes. The key to these abbreviations is as follows:

Collections of Papers.

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<tr>
<td>B/P</td>
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Miscellaneous.

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<tr>
<td>A.R.L.</td>
<td>Anti-Republican League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.N.E.</td>
<td>Christian National Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.A.P.</td>
<td>South African Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.F.P.</td>
<td>Union Federal Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESSA</td>
<td>United English-speaking South Africans</td>
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<td>U.P.</td>
<td>United Party</td>
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<td>W.V.T.C.</td>
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PART I

THE FORMATION AND GROWTH OF THE FEDERAL PARTY
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The year 1948 is rightly regarded as pivotal in the history of South Africa. Before then, the principal tensions in South African politics had been between Afrikaner nationalism and the English-speakers, and had centred around such issues as South Africa’s relations with the British Empire and, later, with the Commonwealth. In 1948, for the first time in South African history, an exclusively Afrikaner government came to power and it appeared as if the Anglo-Afrikaner controversy was reaching a climax.

However, the issue which brought the Nationalists, and their Afrikaner Party allies, to power was not conflict with the English-speakers, but ‘apartheid’. This emotive policy, to entrench legally the dominance of the Whites in South Africa, brought the colour issue into the centre of South African politics. The collapse of the colonial empires and the emergence of the new nations of Asia and Africa, made apartheid an international issue. Thus, the controversies between Afrikaner and English-speaker were apparently overshadowed by the race question. Even the word ‘racialism’, which had previously been used to denote discord between the two White groups, now came to be applied to tension between White and non-White.

But, despite appearances, the Anglo-Afrikaner dispute remained a dominant force in South African politics. Historians, with the aid of hindsight, might often view the race issue as the paramount question of the 1950s. However, the dominant White group continued to regard ethnic differences within its own ranks as being important, even to the extent of often viewing the new race issue as subservient to Anglo-Afrikaner relations. White-Black racial questions, in fact, often bolstered the old ethnic disputes. For example, it can be argued that removal of the Coloureds from the common voters’ roll, was viewed by the English-speakers largely as a threat to the

1. Vide infra: Ch.6. p.137.
constitution and thus to their 'entrenched' language rights. Furthermore, the existing political parties, had entrenched their parties before the colour question sprang into prominence and continued to represent the wishes of the section of the White electorate which traditionally supported them. In this way, the 1950s was a continuation of Union politics based on Anglo-Afrikaner differences. It was, in fact, the last decisive phase of this dispute. When minor groups of the 1950s, such as the Liberal and Progressive Parties, tried to shift the centre of political focus from the ethnic to the racial problem, they were singularly unsuccessful. Only after 1960, and the triumph of Afrikaner nationalism in the republic, did the race question become the dominant issue in South African politics.

The literature dealing with South African history for the period 1948-1960, does not reflect this. The main emphasis is on apartheid and inter-race relations. The general works such as L. Marquard's The Peoples and Policies of South Africa, E.A. Walker's A History of Southern Africa, D. Denoon's Southern Africa since 1800 and T.R.H. Davenport's South Africa: A Modern History, as well as the works of Selby, Lascour-Gayet and Muller (ed.) tend to ignore the issue of the English-speaking reaction to Afrikaner nationalism in favour of the race issue. The titles of the excellent works by E.S. Munger (Afrikaner and African Nationalism), G.M. Carter (The Politics of Inequality) and M. Ballinger (From Union to Apartheid) are indicative of what was viewed by the authors as the central issue in modern South African politics.

Because the apartheid policy was devised by the leaders of Afrikaner nationalism, it has become the subject of many studies. (10) It is obvious that any study of the growth of Afrikaner nationalism must deal with the Anglo-Afrikaner dispute in some depth, but this is usually done only up to 1948 and is then largely abandoned. Instead, the concentration moves to White-non-White tension.

Other authors have chosen to concentrate on the liberal reaction to Afrikaner nationalism. (11) Although this did involve mainly English-speakers, the movement never enjoyed more than marginal support, illustrating the fact that these were no more than a tiny, untypical fraction of the group.

A number of works do contain sections on the position of English-speakers in South Africa in the 1950s. Broughton, Randall and van den Berghe all deal with the issue, (12) but in each case the English-speakers' reaction to Afrikanerdom is not dealt with in any depth. A similar criticism can also be made of Patrick Duncan's English South Africans Face the Future, (13) a work of politics rather than of scholarly historical study, while N. Mansergh's The Price of Magnanimity (14) is polemical rather than analytical in dealing with this period, and hence is only of limited value.

There are two works which attempt to explain the actions of the English-speakers in the 1950s. Brookes and Webb deal with the issue in their History of Natal (15) and discuss why the English-speakers remained loyal to the United Party (U.P.). The section devoted to this is small and, because of the nature of the study, is limited to Natal. R. de Villiers in

the Oxford History of South Africa (16) also discusses the reaction of the English-speakers to Afrikaner nationalism but, once again, the treatment is very brief and is part of a chapter on Afrikaner nationalism which is followed by the chapter entitled African Nationalism in South Africa, 1910-1964. (17)

The emphasis of the work is thus on the Afrikaner-Black clash and not on the Anglo-Afrikaner dispute.

As a powerless minority, the English-speakers could react to Nationalist initiatives in one of three ways. They could abandon their group identity and be absorbed into the Afrikaner majority, as many Nationalists suggested, to form a White bloc. Very few followed this option. Another alternative was to adopt a cautious, middle-of-the-road stand to all South Africa's problems, thereby hoping to attract sufficient Afrikaner support to unseat the government. (18) The third reaction was to form a strongly sectionalist party for the English-speakers. The U.P. represented the second of these options and the Federal Party, which is the subject of this study, represents the third.

Any attempt at such a study is faced with a very real problem: the paucity of material. As has been discussed, the published material on English-speakers in the 1950s is meagre. As regards the Federal Party in particular, it is practically non-existent. Where mention is made of the party, it is done in a sentence or two, (19) or, at most, in a page. (20) The context is usually the disintegration of the U.P. and no detailed examination of the party or of the reasons for its existence are given. Only Craig's slim volume, Lost Opportunity, which was comm-

17. Ibid., pp. 424-75.
18. Vide infra: Ch. 2. pp. 9 and 32. Ch. 6. p. 133.
issioned by the Federal Party and deals with the history of federalism in South Africa, deals exclusively with the party and its ideals. Because it was written as a propaganda work, it is of limited value and is poorly researched.

This paucity of material is not only found in secondary sources. In the primary material, too, there are gaps in the available information. The archives, both national and provincial, do not allow access to deposits of the 1950s. How then is contemporary research justified? One response to this criticism is that from a purist point of view, all research becomes outdated as new viewpoints are taken and new assessments are made, even if new material does not come to light. Another response could be that there are positive advantages for a researcher who now works on this period, for he has access to sources which will be lost to future historians. By drawing on oral testimony, he can thus hope to compensate for his exclusion from public papers. As far as private papers are concerned, it can also be argued that the advantages lie with the historian of near contemporary history, for he is able to use papers which, as experience shows, are more than likely to be lost or destroyed. In the course of writing this thesis numerous persons were interviewed and no person who possessed private papers refused the writer unrestricted access to them.

Public libraries made their material available. The Heaton Nicholls Papers in the Killie Campbell Library, a number of political documents at the Institute of Contemporary History at the University of the Orange Free State and, most important, the United Party Papers at the University of South Africa, have been particularly useful.

The official papers of the three Federal Parties would be an obvious source. The parties, however, did not deposit their records in any collection and even the most exhaustive inquiry has not revealed their fate. The Cape party was small and badly organised and, if it ever kept detailed records (which is unlikely), they have disappeared. The Transvaal party was more substantial, but its papers, according to Mrs. Brathwaite, the widow of the party's leader, 'have been lost'.

None of the many Natal Federal leaders, who were interviewed in the course of preparing this work, knew what had become of the party's official records. Col. A.C. Martin, the last leader of the party, informed the author that they were probably in the 'lorry load' of papers which he had destroyed in the 1960s. (22)

The most valuable sources for this thesis were the documents of private individuals supplemented by personal interviews. Extensive attempts were made to trace 118 people who were either election candidates, office-bearers or prominent party members. The names were obtained either from party lists or from the contemporary press. Of this number, fifty-two were traced. Eighteen had died or had left the country. Contact was made with the remaining thirty-six persons, twenty of whom could supply limited documentary or oral information. The position with the remaining sixteen persons, (23) however, was different. They, especially B. Batchelor, Mrs. J. Stewart and D. Heaton Nicholls supplied extensive documentary evidence. As important, these sixteen people granted the author interviews in which the attitudes, hopes and aims of the English-speakers and of the Federal Party were fully and openly discussed. These interviews were important to all parts of this thesis and vital to some (such as the planning and creation of the Federal Party) where there are few other sources. Because of the pitfalls and limitations of memory, attempts were made at every stage to corroborate and check such information against known evidence. In addition to Federal Party members, D. Mitchell and L. Boyd, former Natal leaders of the United and Progressive Parties, R. Fenhalls of the Torch Commando and Professor W. Kleynhans of Unisa were interviewed and/or supplied documents.

Also of the greatest importance were the newspapers of the day. The information which they supplied regarding the activities of the Federal Parties and their allies, the attitudes of the English and Afrikaans-speakers, and the political developments in South Africa was indispensable to this study.

22. Interview with A.C. Martin.
It will be argued in this thesis that the Federal Party was essentially an English-speaking reaction to Afrikaner nationalism. It grew out of frustration at the powerlessness or unwillingness of the U.P. to represent the English-speakers effectively. The study is divided into three sections. The first concerns the failure of the United Front in 1952-53 and deals with the launching of the Federal Party, with its structure and organisation and its attempt to establish itself in the elections of 1954. The second section deals with the decline and demise of the Federal Party. Defeat in 1954 necessitated a change of tactics, and in spite of the attempt that was made to do this, apathy and disunity beset the party. After the elections of 1958-59 and the coming of the republic, the Federal Party faded away. The third section is concerned with the reasons for the Federal Party's inability to attract a sufficient number of the English-speaking voters and hence establish itself as their mouthpiece.

It is hoped that this detailed examination of the Federal Party and the reasons for its failure will contribute to a better understanding of the history, not only of the English-speakers or of the 1950s, but of modern South Africa.
CHAPTER TWO
THE FAILURE OF THE UNITED FRONT

In 1948 an alliance of the National and Afrikaner Parties won the general election. The two parties, which merged in October 1951, were inspired by Afrikaner nationalism. So all-pervading was this influence that every Cabinet member, and indeed every parliamentary member, of the two governing parties in 1948, was an Afrikaner. The ultimate constitutional goal of the government was the founding of a republic, thus separating South Africa from the British Crown. In addition, the governing parties preached a rigid separation of the races (i.e. apartheid) in politics, the economy and in society. It was this apartheid policy, rather than republicanism, which had brought them to power.

In opposition were the U.P. (the Official Opposition), the small and declining Labour Party and the three Native Representatives, who, although not tied to a political party, generally opposed the Nationalists. The U.P. lacked the inner cohesion of the National Party. It enjoyed the support of the overwhelming majority of the English-speakers, who found little to attract them in the governing parties. As a result, every predominantly English-speaking constituency elected either a U.P. member or one of their Labour allies. At the same time, the U.P. drew the support of a substantial minority of Afrikaners. Clearly, if it hoped to return to power, it would have to increase its support amongst this group. Thus, the U.P. became increasingly sensitive to the views of what it termed the 'moderate' Afrikaners - both within its own ranks and among government supporters.

1. Carter: op. cit., p.37. It was the first time in the history of the Union that the Cabinet had been drawn entirely from one language group.
Within the first two years of its first term of office, the Nationalists passed legislation segregating society. The most significant acts were the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, the Amendment to the Immorality Act, the Population Registration Act to classify the whole population into race groups, and the Group Areas Act, allotting separate residential and business areas to different race groups.

On a political level, the government was determined to enforce complete segregation. This necessitated the removal of Coloured voters from the common roll with the Whites, despite the fact that the Coloured vote was protected by one of the two 'entrenched' clauses of the Union constitution(3) and therefore could be altered only by a two-thirds majority of a joint sitting of both Houses of Parliament.

The government, which did not command a two-thirds majority of both Houses, passed the Separate Representation of Voters Act in June 1951 through each House separately, in the normal fashion. The opposition interpreted this action as a challenge to the constitution and, while the opposition political parties fought it in parliament, the War Veterans' Torch Commando was formed to oppose it outside parliament. Led by Group-Captain A.G. 'Sailor' Malan and comprising mainly ex-servicemen, the Torch Commando, which eventually acquired a membership of 250 000 (4) was the largest extra-parliamentary political group in South Africa's history. The Torch Commando was based on five principles. These were:

To uphold the spirit and the solemn compacts entered upon at the time of Union as moral obligations of trust and honour binding upon Parliament and the people.

3. The other 'entrenched' clause guaranteed equality to English and Afrikaans as official languages of South Africa.

To secure the repeal of any measures enacted in violation of such obligations.
To protect the freedom of the individual in worship, language and speech and to ensure his right of free access to the Courts.
To eliminate all forms of totalitarianism, whether Fascist or Communist.
To promote racial harmony in the Union. (5)

In January 1952 the National Executive of the Torch Commando, in anticipation of the general election to be held the following year, issued a declaration entitled *The Election Policy of the War Veterans’ Torch Commando.* (6) This declaration committed the Torch Commando, as the only 'practical course' open to it, to 'accept' the existing opposition parties and to assist them both in the fight against the Nationalists and in the formulation of 'positive and dynamic' alternatives to the government. (7) The independence of the Torch Commando, however, was expressly emphasised and the purpose of the organisation was seen as adding moral and numerical strength to the anti-government forces in the country. (8)

This rapprochement of the Torch Commando and the United and Labour Parties was given added impetus by the Appeal Court's decision on March 20 that the Separate Representation of Voters' Act was unconstitutional, and even more so by the government's refusal to accept defeat and its determination to find some other means of legally removing the Coloureds from the common roll. As a result of these developments, the national leaders of the Torch Commando and the U.P. met in Cape Town to discuss possible joint action. (9) These discussions, in turn, led to the formation of the United Democratic Front; an alliance between the U.P., the Torch Commando and the fast disintegrating Labour Party to defeat the National Party at the next general election. The three organisations

retained their separate identities and the principles of the Front were made sufficiently wide to appeal to all non-Nationalists. (10) The problem of the acceptance of this alliance by many Natal Torchmen, however, lay not in the principles of the United Democratic Front but in the fact that they distrusted the U.P. and saw what they considered as Natal’s rights as well as the Torch Commando’s ideals sacrificed to U.P. electoral expediency.

The most influential Torchman in Natal was E.G. Ford. He was a foundation member of the Commando, had in May of the previous year led the Natal contingent in the spectacular torch-lit parade through Cape Town to parliament, and was chairman of the Coastal Region of the Torch Commando, the larger of Natal’s two Torch regions. He had, while in the Torch Commando, developed a dislike of what he considered to be the U.P.’s ‘wishy-washy’ policies of trying to be all things to all men, and began thinking in terms of a bold political movement which would take account of South Africa’s linguistic and racial differences. (11) This would oppose the centralising tendencies of the Nationalist government and, with a ‘background of federation’, would allow all groups a say in the running of parts, at least, of the country. (12) On the crucial colour issue, Ford was implacably opposed to the National Party’s apartheid policy, while he was critical of the U.P.’s policy which, in his eyes, was apartheid enunciated with ‘honey in the voice’. (13)

These ideas of Ford, with their anti-U.P. bias, were aired in Natal Torch Commando circles and received support from the Rev. J.B. Chutter, Torch Commando chairman of the Inland Region and Roger Brickhill the Natal organiser of the Commando. (14) The views of Natal Torch Commando leadership were thus moving away from the U.P. at the very time that the Torch Commando’s national leaders were arranging the United Democratic Front with it. In October 1952, J. Alexander gave

10. Ibid.
11. Interview with E.G. Ford.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
as the reason for his resignation from the Torch Commando
the fact that '... since March-April of this year our policy
here in Natal has been anything but national. It has clearly
been an embarrassment to the national leaders.' (15) This
divergence of view between the Natal and national leaders also
affected the U.P. While the Natal leader of the U.P., Douglas
Mitchell, was a firm supporter of the party's national leaders,
Heaton Nicholls, the U.P.'s leader in the Senate, believed that
the U.P.'s days were numbered and felt that the party could not
long survive after Smuts's death. (16) In addition, he had grave
misgivings about the party's intentions even before the Natal
Torch Commando leaders experienced the same feelings. As early
as June 1951, he saw the U.P. as being 'jealous' of the inde-
pendence of the Defenders of the Constitution. (17) It would
be 'fatal to the movement' he commented, 'to allow the [U.P.]
party machine to have anything to do with it.' (18) With this
opinion of the party, it is not surprising that Heaton Nicholls
agreed with Ford as regards the United Democratic Front when
they met for long discussions on politics. (19)

Heaton Nicholls was particularly sensitive on the question
of 'Natal's rights' and he was therefore particularly concerned
about Natal's relations with the rest of the Union. Speaking
in the Senate in May 1952, on the High Court of Parliament
Bill, he argued that the Bill, which was part of the govern-
ment's attempt to remove the Coloureds from the common roll
and which therefore aimed to destroy one of the 'entrenched'
clauses, was a 'definite stage' in the repudiation of the
South Africa Act. (20) The Senator tacitly conceded that the

16. Interview with D. Heaton Nicholls.
17. The Defenders were a group of citizens committed to
'preserving' the Union's constitution and to upholding the 'rule of law'. Defenders of the Constitution: The Covenant of the Constitution, n.d.
18. KCM 3779: G. Heaton Nicholls to L. Egeland,
21 June 1951.
19. E.G. Ford to B. Reid, 15 November 1978. (In the possess-
ion of the author)
government may have the legal right to alter the constitution but he drew a clear distinction between legal grounds which ‘... belonged to lawyers’ and the moral foundation of the constitution which belonged to ‘the people’. This non-legalistic argument, based on claimed moral considerations, was fundamental to later Federal thinking. If the Act of Union were destroyed, he argued, the ‘Union compact ... [would be] at an end’, and Natal would be free to decide her own future.

On 29 May 1952 Heaton Nicholls returned to the question of the constitution, this time discussing the issue of propaganda for a republic. This he flatly stated, amounted to high treason. (22) Developing his point, he declared that Natal did not wish to secede from the Union but that, if parliament ‘seceded from its Constitution, then Natal will not follow it in that secession.’ (23) Heaton Nicholls then introduced what was to become another theme in this line of thought, namely, that Natal was economically viable and could stand alone. (24)

The Senator’s speeches caused a sensation and considerably embarrassed the U.P.’s national leaders, (25) who could neither support nor repudiate Heaton Nicholls for fear of alienating some major section of its supporters. The Natal Provincial Council, on the other hand, was sure of its support and planned to pass a resolution on 4 June 1952 calling on parliament to convene a National Convention to re-consider the Act of Union in view of the government’s attacks on an ‘entrenched clause. (26) Before this could be done, the Torch Commando in Natal organised a rally in Durban on 6 June 1952 to support the Provincial Council resolution. Mitchell had to be pressurised by Heaton Nicholls and the

22. Ibid., col. 3468.
23. Ibid., col. 3472.
24. Ibid.
Natal M.P.’s to agree to the meeting, which drew some 45000 people. With deep emotion, the huge crowd then took an oath which was to play so large a part in the life of the Federal Party.

The oath bound the people:

To preserve the sanctity of the engagements entered upon at the time of Union as moral obligations of trust and honour binding upon the Parliament and the people, and to secure the repeal of any measures enacted in violation of such obligations;

To oppose any attempts to violate the Constitution embodied in the South Africa Act, and more particularly to maintain respect for the Entrenched Clauses of that act;

To maintain the rule of law as the basis of our civil liberties.

The oath was administered by Heaton Nicholls and immediately afterwards Ford asked the crowd: ‘Are you prepared to take the consequences if Natal is forced to stand on her own?’ They roared ‘Yes!’ This constituted the base of what was later to be termed the ‘Natal Stand’.

This rally had a lasting impact on the participants and hence was crucial in the formation of the Federal Party. The Natal Torch Commando was deeply involved in an issue which concerned mainly the Natal Provincial Council and the people of one province. The policy shift by the Natal Torch Commando from a national to a provincial level, which Alexander had noticed in March and April of that year, was thus dramatically and publicly affirmed. In addition, the intense feeling against the Nationalists, who were seen as threatening the constitution, so keenly felt by Heaton Nicholls and the Natal Torch leaders, appeared to be shared by a large section of the Natal public. This put considerable power into the hands of Heaton Nicholls and Ford. Furthermore,

the defence of the constitution was linked, by Ford’s question following the oath, with the possible breakup of the Union and Natal standing on her own. Natal’s resistance to the government was thereby shown to be of a unique type. As significant, Ford and Heaton Nicholls had appeared together at the largest political meeting in Natal’s history. From then on, their political careers remained closely linked and resulted in the creation of the Federal Party.

Despite the enthusiasm of the huge crowd and their apparent willingness to have Natal stand alone, the leaders of the rally were not entirely convinced that the people would act, should this become necessary. Derek Heaton Nicholls afterwards contended that the Natal Torchmen merely used the Natal Stand as a threat to ‘... hold over the Nationalists’ heads’, but that they did not really want any type of secession. (29) His father, Senator Heaton Nicholls, went further and confided in a private letter to his son a little over three months after the rally that he very much doubted whether Natal ‘... could be got to stand alone.’ (30) Ford agreed with this view and later stated that the Natal Stand was simply a symptom of popular frustration at the rapid growth of Nationalism and the weak attitude of the U.P. ‘Very few visualised Natal ever daring to stand alone politically and economically’, (31) he commented. Whatever the private reservations of the rally leaders as regards the viability of Natal standing alone, they fully realised the value of the rally itself in halting what they saw as the government’s attack on the constitution; behind which lurked the danger of a republic.

In order to strengthen Natal’s position, the Natal delegation to the first Annual Congress of the Torch Commando, led by Ford, pressed for the acceptance of the Natal Stand by the Torch Commando as a whole. The Natal delegation

29. Interview with D. Heaton Nicholls.
'closely knit' with 'well prepared' arguments, persuaded the congress to pass a resolution on 9 July 1952 which stated:

If, in her efforts to save Union, Natal is forced to stand alone, the Torch Commando throughout South Africa and South West Africa affirms its readiness to support Natal to the full by whatever action the National Executive may deem necessary. (33)

The whole of the Commando therefore was tied to the Natal Stand, which was seen as an 'honourable' action taken in reaction to a government which was without honour. (34)

At the request of the national president of the Torch Commando, 'Sailor' Malan, the consent of the other two members of the United Democratic Front was sought before the resolution was published. (35) The Labour Party accepted the resolution but 'requested' that it should not be published. The U.P., on the other hand, rejected the resolution. Mitchell declared that he could not '... under any circumstances accept the Natal Stand'. (36) His interpretation of the oath of the 6 June was that Natal would fight any change in the constitution in elections and, if necessary, through the courts. He disagreed with the contention that her separate opinion had to be sought if the government proceeded constitutionally. (37) The U.P., therefore, and especially its Natal leader, was at variance with the Torch Commando and especially with the Natal leaders of the Commando.

34. Ibid.
Heaton Nicholls further polarised opinion amongst Natal's leaders by resigning from the U.P. on 6 August, as a result of Mitchell's public attitude towards the Natal Stand. He informed Strauss, the U.P.'s national leader, who invited him to Johannesburg for a meeting aimed at healing the breach between the two Natal U.P. leaders.

The meeting was futile, but Strauss was confronted for the first time with the full implications of the Natal Stand. Heaton Nicholls highlighted the difference between himself and the U.P. leaders as being that they were concerned only with court actions and the legal aspect of the government's actions, whereas he was more concerned with the 'moral and constitutional aspects'. Whatever their differences, it was agreed to keep the resignation secret so as not to damage the image and unity of the United Democratic Front.

Heaton Nicholls was thus placed in the 'extraordinary position' of leading the U.P. in the Senate, when he was no longer a member of the party.

On one of his frequent visits to Heaton Nicholls, just after the latter had resigned from the U.P., Ford, 'thinking aloud', expressed the opinion that a new party '... based on Torch ideals coupled with a Federal and a progressive non-European policy' should be formed. Heaton Nicholls stated that he would support such a party. This was the first discussion concerning the formation of a new political party.

All these manoeuverings were conducted behind closed doors because both the U.P. leaders and their Natal opponents inside and outside the party, did not want these

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40. Cape Times: 16 May 1953. See also N/P: G. Heaton Nicholls to D. Heaton Nicholls, 14 February 1953.
41. Ibid.
42. Interview with E.G. Ford.
44. Ibid.
sensitive issues debated in public. Such a debate could only damage the positions of both sides as it would be conducted in the full glare of publicity at a time when apparent unity was vital in view of the court cases surrounding the Coloured franchise, and the looming general election. In view of the excitement of the Durban rally in June and the increasing number of people in the three organisations of the United Democratic Front who were involved in discussions about the question of Natal’s future constitutional position, it could not be expected that the public at large would be unconcerned or totally uninformed about the topic.

Because of the ‘... increase in loose talk and emotional political writing on the subject of Secession’, twelve leading Natal businessmen sent a long letter to the Natal Mercury in August 1952 setting out many of the economic difficulties involved in secession in order to impress on the people of Natal ‘... the great material sacrifices and hardships that must inevitably follow secession,’(45) Heaton Nicholls, who considered that the letter originated in the U.P.’s head office,(46) answered the next day in a letter which was given equal prominence in the same newspaper. He repudiated the major thesis of the businessmen and welcomed the initiation of the topic for public discussion, calling on the economists to ‘lend their aid’ by making a study of Natal’s viability.(47) In the event, the subject received very little further publicity. It was within the Natal political organisations, out of the glare of press publicity, that the struggle was joined to advance the ideas of the Natal Stand and the formation of a new party.

The U.P. in Natal was securely under the control of Mitchell and there was little chance of any major group within it joining a new party. The position in the Torch Commando,

however, was quite different. Here the two Natal leaders, Ford and Chutter, together with the Natal organiser, Roger Brickhill, were in substantial agreement concerning the Natal Stand as well as over the formation of a new party. From the Coast and the Midlands respectively, Ford and Chutter, met Brickhill and other interested parties on a number of occasions at Drummond, midway between Durban and Pietermaritzburg, to discuss the possibility of a new political party. Later, the Federal Party was to claim that the only part which the Torch Commando played in the Party’s formation, apart from supplying ideas and ideals, was ‘... to bring certain people together, and to start them thinking.’(49) This was to a great extent true, but it is important to note that it was only ‘certain’ people who were brought together. By no means all of the Natal Torch Commando were supporters of the idea of Natal standing alone or of forming a new political party.

Some, like R. Fenhalls, the deputy leader of the Coast Region of the Torch Commando was a staunch U.P. supporter and believed that the Natal Stand could not be successful. Apart from its questionable legality, he argued that for any political idea, or party, to be successful in South Africa, it had to have at least twenty per cent. Afrikaner support. An appeal solely to English-speaking sentiment he saw as futile.(50) In addition, he, together with many other Natal Torchmen, felt that ‘history showed’ that splinter parties had little chance of success in South Africa. He therefore preferred to work to ‘regenerate the U.P. from within’. (51)

Fenhalls was invited to a private meeting to discuss the viability of Natal standing alone and because he considered the meeting to be ‘preposterous’ he, and many of the other committee members of the Torch who thought like him, were

48. Interview with Mrs. G. Hamlyn.
50. Interview with R. Fenhalls.
51. Ibid.
'excluded' from the private discussions that were taking place. (52) Other Torchmen feared for the unity of the Torch Commando and gave their first loyalty to the Commando rather than to a new political movement, considering, in any event, that 1952, the year before a general election, was hardly the opportune time to discuss the formation of a new party and thus divide the opposition still further. If, however, members wished to discuss the possible formation of a new party, they felt that the Action Committee of the Torch Commando in Natal was the place to do so. (53)

Ford and his supporters, on the other hand, saw their meetings simply as unofficial private discussions and, because the U.P. had no prior claim on their loyalty, they considered that they were not being underhand in any way. They felt that the Torch Commando had made a grave error in deciding not to become a political party because this meant that, once it had entered agreements with political parties such as in the United Democratic Front, it had 'shot its bolt' and could then exert only moral pressure. (54) The Torch should translate its principles ... into terms of policy and ... constitute itself as a political party committed to put those principles into effect. (55)

The Natal Torch Commando leaders felt this particularly strongly as they considered that the U.P. was effete and, in any event, had sacrificed the interests of Natal, the only real bulwark against the Nationalists, for the sake of trying to swing a few Nationalist voters. (56) This lack of appreciation of Natal's position amongst the U.P. leaders, it was claimed, was also widely felt by the voting public of Natal. It could be pointed out that the destinies of the U.P. were controlled entirely from beyond the Drakensberg. In addition, it was felt that Natal U.P. representatives did not do

52. Ibid.
enough to propagate what Natalians thought. (57) Most serious, many Torch Commando leaders in Natal did not fully trust the U.P. to resist the Nationalists. Because of the wide spectrum of belief amongst the party’s supporters, they felt that certain sections of the U.P. might be willing to come to an agreement with the Nationalists. (58) This suspicion made it ridiculous to discuss the formation of a new party in the Torch Commando Action Committee because those who were actually opposed to the move would then be party to the discussions. As it happened, this suspicion was not entirely groundless because, during the following year, a number of U.P. M.P.s either left or were expelled from the party and voted with the Nationalists on the vital issue of the Coloured franchise. (59) Torchmen generally could not condone such an action and most Torchmen, if they suspected that there were such M.P.s in the party in 1952, could feel no confidence in South Africa’s Official Opposition. On top of all the other problems bedevilling relations between the Torch Commando and the U.P. was a clash of personality between Mitchell on one hand and Heaton Nicholls and Ford on the other. This clash aggravated all other difficulties and added personal and emotional reasons to those of policy in favour of a break. (60)

It was against this background that Ford and his supporters conducted what were termed ‘private’ meetings to decide what action should be taken to defend Natal’s rights and what form the proposed new party should assume. It was at this time that the basic principles of the Federal Party were

59. **Vide infra. Ch. 5, p.97.**
'evolved'; from the ideals of the Torch Commando, applied to Natal's unique position. (61) These meetings were also vital from another point of view - they were aimed at gaining full control of the Natal Torch Commando. Ford and Chutter were determined to swing the influential Inland and Coast Regions of the Commando behind the idea of a new party, so that it would have a powerful base from which to work in Natal as well as a base from which to try and swing the entire Torch Commando behind the new movement.

To this end, Chutter addressed small gatherings throughout the Midlands, (62) while the Natal Coastal Region of the Torch Commando assembled for a confidential meeting in Durban on 25 October. Among the matters discussed was a resolution calling for the stoppage of further payments by the Natal Torch Commando to the National Executive; another was a demand on the U.P. that it give assurance on certain questions such as the guaranteed support of the Natal Stand, as interpreted by the Natal Torch Commando. (63) These resolutions were passed by a 'considerable majority', (64) the planning and organisation of the meeting being a tribute to the abilities of Ford. Fenhalls maintains that the Ford 'faction' had the support of less than half of Natal's Torchmen, while Ford and Derek Heaton Nicholls claim that the majority of the Torchmen supported them. (65) It is impossible to ascertain exactly how many Torchmen supported each faction but what is clear is that Ford's ideas prevailed and that his position, and his ideas, had attained dominance in the Natal Torch Commando. Ford's position was further strengthened when the leading U.P. supporters Professor H. Pollack and Mr. (later Professor) K. McIntyre resigned from the Natal Coastal Action Committee of the Torch Commando, on the eve of

61. Interview with E.G. Ford.
64. Ibid.
the 25 October meeting. After the meeting, five more U.P. supporters, including Ford's deputy, Roy Fenhalls, handed in their resignations. (66)

This triumph of the future Federal Party leaders within the Natal Torch Commando took place in private. The resolutions were unknown outside a restricted circle and the resignations, using the by now familiar reason of preserving the anti-government front, were not made public. (67) Inevitably, however, the press became aware of what was happening, and published some of the facts. The fullest report appeared on the front page of Die Transvaler on 28 October 1952. (68) The report stated that the Natal Torchmen had been holding a number of secret meetings to discuss the question of whether the movement in Natal should break away from the United Front and from its 'own organisation'. (69) The newspaper clearly had very good sources of information because a group led by the Natal Torch leaders was indeed planning a new party and was as a result reluctant to assist the United Front in the election.

Ford suavely dismissed Die Transvaler's report by saying that the Durban meeting had dealt with 'domestic matters', adding that regional conferences were always held 'in committee'. The confidentiality of the meeting was quite in keeping with normal Torch practices. (70) This answer temporarily silenced the press and allayed public apprehension of a divided Torch Commando, but in the inner councils of both the Torch Commando and the U.P. it was known that the Commando in Natal was deeply divided.

In a letter to Chutter and Ford, Ralph Parrott, the national secretary of the Torch Commando, refers to the

circulation of 'confidential memoranda believed to be in connection with the formation of a new party in Natal.', (71)

With 'private' or 'secret' (depending on the speaker's convictions) meetings being held frequently all over Natal during the last three months of 1952, there were doubtless a large number of 'confidential memoranda' in circulation. Easily the most important was a document dubbed the 'Green Horror,' (72) by the U.P. It was drawn up by Ford with the help of other Torch Commando leaders and was circulated confidentially amongst people who were disillusioned with the U.P. and who appeared to be coalescing into a new party. The purpose of the document was to force people to decide between continuing to support the established opposition parties or backing the creation of a new party. (73)

The 'Green Horror' opened with a number of propositions which were 'accepted' by its authors. (74) These included the ideas that the Torch Commando had successfully resisted the government's attacks on the constitution but that it had become an 'embarrassment' to the U.P. in their election campaign. (75) Details of why the Torch Commando had become an 'embarrassment' were not stated. The document then analysed the political attitude of the Torch Commando membership, 'particularly in Natal' and, continuing with its accepted propositions, found that they fell into three distinct categories. (76) The first category consisted of staunch U.P. or Labour Party members while the second consisted of people who were not necessarily party members but who were willing to assist the parties until after the next general election, lest the Nationalists again be returned to power. The third group was clearly that to which the authors of the 'Green Horror'

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72. So called because it was reproduced on green paper.
   Interview with D. Mitchell.
73. Interview with E.G. Ford.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
belonged, and consisted of: 'Those who are anti-Nationalist but who cannot accept the policies or personnel of the Opposition Parties.' (77) The differences between the groups, especially the first and third groups, were seen as 'fundamental and irreconcilable', particularly as Mitchell had refused to accept that the U.P. candidates should subscribe to the Torch Commando's definition of the Natal Stand. (78)

Having dealt with the position as they saw it, the authors of the 'Green Horror' then set out nine resolutions, laying down future strategy for the Natal Torch Commando. The first called for the Natal Torch Commando to assume a state of 'quiescence', with no public meetings or statements directed against opposition parties. (79) It also envisaged the merging of the two Regional Executives of the Commando in Natal. The second resolution called for the integration of the first group with the parties to which they belonged, while the third resolution called for the setting up of a 'Liason Committee' between the second group and the opposition parties. (80) The fourth resolution was the kernel. It stated:

That the members of group (c) constitute themselves under a Provincial Committee in order to maintain a state of readiness against:

(a) future action of an illegal, unconstitutional or immoral nature in the party political field and/or

(b) the breach of any of the Five Principles of the Torch Commando and/or

(c) the establishment of a Republic in South Africa and/or

(d) any attempt to bring about a coalition between any political parties in conflict with any of the Five Principles of the Torch Commando or based on suppressive doctrines

77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid., p.2.
Further that the members of group (c) be free to interest themselves in the establishment of a group or party formed for the purpose of contesting the next Provincial Council Election and/or any General Election due to be held in April, 1953, and thus fully to protect the interests of the people of Natal.(81)

In this resolution are contained all the elements of the thinking of the future Federal Party. There is the accent on moral and constitutional standards as well as on legal principles; there is the implacable resistance to the institution of a republic as well as the defence of the constitution. There is also the smouldering belief that the U.P. could not be trusted because it might enter into an alliance with the Nationalists. There is even an indirect concern with racial matters in that racial harmony was the fifth principle of the Torch Commando. The group committed itself twice in the resolution to defend all five principles. Most important, the group stressed the interests of the people of Natal and thought in terms of the provincial council elections as well as a general election. This was in keeping with the interpretation of the Natal Stand, which held that what the country needed was resolute resistance to the government by Natal, led by men who were uncompromised and uncompromising in their beliefs.

The remaining resolutions of the 'Green Horror' were designed for the strengthening of the second and third groups, that is, the non-party anti-Nationalists and the future Federals. They included a demand for the appointment of full-time organisers for these groups and for the exclusion of parliamentary candidates from serving on the provincial executives created by the groups. Further resolutions called for a comprehensive statement, embodying the ideas of the document, to be republished in the Natal newspapers and, most significant, for the two groups to be '... entitled to draw upon the pooled Natal Funds for their financial requirements.'(82) It will be noted that

81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
the United and Labour Party supporters were excluded from
the Torch Commando's funds in Natal. Ford later maintained
that this was equitable because the U.P. had received
considerable financial assistance from the Torch Commando
in the months between the formation of the United Democratic
Front and the meeting which had met to consider the 'Green
Horror' and that the other two groups were therefore entitled
to the remaining funds. (83)

The resolutions of the 'Green Horror' are of importance
in assessing the position of dominance within the Natal Torch
Commando which Ford and his supporters had attained. The
confident tone of the document clearly indicates that Ford
expected no effective opposition from within the Torch
Commando. He had by this stage complete control of the Natal
section of the Commando and had taken the advice which
Senator Heaton Nicholls, overseas at the time, had given at
that critical juncture to his son, Derek (who was a keen
supporter of Ford): 'One word of advice old Abe Bailey once
gave me was, "never resign", keep a hand on the tiller. I
believe that was very sound.' (84)

The Senator was on a visit to South America and to the
United Kingdom. The British part of his trip, at the sugges-
tion of the chairman of the Natal Mercury, (85) which strongly
supported the Natal Stand, was to ascertain the opinion of the
British Government on the 'contractual' nature of the Union
and its attitude towards the introduction of a republic in
South Africa. (86) As former High Commissioner in London,
Heaton Nicholls had access to the leaders of the British
government and discussed the issues with '... Salisbury and
members of the British Government and other influential people
in England .... ' (87) In his autobiography, Heaton Nicholls

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83. Interview with E.G. Ford.
84. N/P: G. Heaton Nicholls to D. Heaton Nicholls,
3 November 1952.
87. Ibid.
does not record what the attitudes of the members of the British government were and, although he wrote to his son that his trip had been 'eminently successful', (88) he confided to Ford on his return to South Africa early in 1953 that little could be hoped for from the Conservative government, which saw itself as 'fighting for its existence' and was unwilling to support a new issue which could be detrimental to its position in the United Kingdom. (89) With little hope of foreign support at that stage, the Natal Torch Commando leaders had to rely on their own resources.

Meanwhile relations between the Torch Commando leaders and the U.P. were steadily deteriorating. On 20 November 1952 the U.P. congress in Bloemfontein had praised the Torch Commando for its support of the United Democratic Front but passed a resolution which '... denied the possibility of unilateral action by any province.' (90) This alienated many Natalians and led to the Natal Torch Commando calling a joint session of its regional executives on November 29. At this meeting, held at the urging of the National Action Committee of the Torch Commando and especially of the Commando's national chairman, Louis Kane-Berman, who was sympathetic to the idea of the Natal Stand, (91) it was decided to meet the U.P. leaders. The Natal Torchmen wanted to discuss the Natal Stand and a number of issues related the United Democratic Front's candidates and campaign tactics in the forthcoming general election. They sought a guarantee that Natal United Front candidates would not help the Nationalists 'under any circumstances' to gain the two-thirds majority which was required to remove the Coloureds from the common roll with the Whites. (92) The fact that these issues were discussed was made public (93) but there were further discussions, the substance of which were never publicised. These concerned the

88. N/P: G. Heaton Nicholls to D. Heaton Nicholls, 10 December 1952.
89. Interview with E.G. Ford.
90. Carter: op.cit., p.322.
'Green Horror' and the strategy of the Natal Torch Commando leaders for the months ahead. The Natal Daily News's political commentator was aware of these discussions, hinted at them and censured the Natal Torchmen for having 'mixed priorities' in not concentrating solely on removing the Nationalists from office. (94) Ford promptly rejected the notion that the Torch Commando had mixed priorities and deftly evaded a discussion on the proceedings of the meeting on the grounds of 'security'. (95)

At the meeting, the Natal leaders of the Torch Commando, General Selby (a national vice-president), Ford, Chutter and Brickhill met the U.P. representatives. They were Strauss, de Villiers Graaff, Mitchell and Dr. Steenkamp, the deputy leader of the U.P. in Natal. It took place in Johannesburg on December 19 and, because of the disagreements which ensued, only the Natal Stand was discussed. (96) At Strauss's request, the Natal delegation gave a detailed account of the history and meaning of the Natal Stand and pointed out that they spoke for the majority of Natalians: the Torch Commando rally in Durban had attracted 45 000 people, whereas the U.P. could muster only 20 000 members in the province. (97) The U.P. representatives were willing to make a few minor concessions but rejected, in conformity with their congress's resolution of the previous month, any possibility of unilateral action by Natal. (98) In fact, Strauss rejected the Natal Stand 'for all time' and was warned that this could lead to the formation of 'a new party'. (99) On this note the meeting closed. The U.P. and the Torch Commando were at complete variance. The formation of a new party was now only a question of timing.

The first quarter of 1953 was hardly the time for the

Natal Torchmen to break ranks. This was because the government was continuing its struggle concerning the Coloured franchise with renewed determination. In May 1952 the High Court of Parliament Act had created a High Court of Parliamentarians to review Appeal Court decisions. The Judicial Committee of this Court set aside the Appeal Court’s decision and validated the Separate Representation of Voters Act. In November, the Appeal Court upheld a judgement of the Cape Supreme Court declaring invalid the High Court of Parliament Act, thus invalidating its decisions. The Prime Minister, Dr. Malan, announced that, while he accepted the Appeal Court’s judgement, an election would be held the following April to ask the people for a ‘mandate’ on the franchise issue. (100)

Faced with the prospect of a general election, which the Natal press agreed to be the most crucial in the country’s history, (101) it was impossible for the Natal Torch Commando to act independently. Even the sympathetic Natal Mercury warned that in view of Malan’s speech and the election, it was ‘no time for splinter parties’. (102) Knowing the dependence of all political parties, and especially newly-founded groups, on press support, the Natal Mercury went further and, while not denying that there was not ‘complete unanimity’ in opposition circles, expressed confidence that ‘... between now and the Election a plan will be evolved’ to achieve this. (103)

The plan to make the United Democratic Front achieve the appearance of unanimity of which the Natal Mercury spoke was evolved at the congress of the Joint Natal Executives of the Torch Commando in Pietermaritzburg on 17 January 1953. Kane-Berman chaired the meeting and stressed that the Commando stood by its resolution of 9 July 1952 in support of the Natal Stand. (104) Douglas Mitchell was then introduced and invited to address the meeting in an attempt to settle the ‘differences’ which had arisen between the U.P. and the Natal Torch


Commando over the previous months. (105)

Mitchel presented the U.P.'s case with skill. He stressed that the U.P. was trying to defeat the Nationalists and that it needed the help of the Torch Commando with its resources and power. (106) He then dealt with the questions of the republic, coalition between the U.P. and the Nationalists and the Natal Stand — all the issues on which the Natal Torch Commando had attacked the U.P. As regards a republic, Mitchell stated that the U.P. was in favour of maintaining the existing constitutional position (monarchical). Clause 2(d) in the party's constitution, which allowed republican propaganda to be made by members in party circles, had been included so that '... men like General Smuts and Botha who fought for their Republic during the Boer War, might feel included in the aims of the Party.' (107) To maintain that Smuts needed the clause to feel 'included' in a party which he, to a large extent, had created was a little far-fetched and to argue that Botha would have any feelings about a party formed over a decade after his death was indeed strange. The essential point, however — that the clause was inherited by the U.P. from the South African Party and was designed to satisfy anti-Nationalist republicans who had fought for the Boer Republ ics (108) — was made, and what is more, was made more palatable by linking it with the honoured names of Smuts and Botha.

On the question of a possible coalition between the Nationalists and the U.P., Mitchell was emphatic. He stated that the government was led by men whom the U.P. 'did not trust' and that it would have '... nothing to do with a coalition ....' (109) Dealing with the opposite issue of support for the Natal Stand, Mitchell put forward a number of arguments as to why the U.P. could not support it. The party

108. U.P. (Durban), Candidates' Publicity Section: Circular, 8 May 1954.
in Natal, he said, was part of a national movement and had to 'take the line' that was beneficial to the party in the other provinces as well as to itself. (110) From this base, he developed his thought by pointing out that 'unilateral action' by Natal was illegal. On a practical level it would lead to bloodshed. It was as strategically unsound as a '... platoon that was at variance with its regiment.' (111) After his speech, Mitchell answered, at some length, questions from the floor.

After Mitchell's address, the Natal Torch Commando unanimously spelt out the terms of its co-operation with the United and Labour Parties in the general election. The first 'reaffirmed' the resolution of the national congress of the Torch Commando in July 1952, supporting the Natal Stand. The second declared support for the Natal Provincial Council's wish to convene a national convention to discuss the constitution. (112) The third stated that the Natal Torch Commando accepted the nominated candidates of the United and Labour Parties as 'its own' and pledged its active support for them provided that:

Each candidate undertakes publicly and unequivocally to support the Natal Stand in accordance with the Covenant sworn to by the people of Natal at the Mass Rally on June 6th, 1952. (113)

The terms of the oath of 6 June 1952 were then reproduced.

The statement then went on to deal with what the Natal Torch Commando would do in the event of a breach of the 'Union Contract'. In such an event, it reserved its right to take 'separate action', in consultation with the National Executive of the Commando, in defence of Natal's '... undoubted and unchallengable constitutional rights as a contracting party to Union .... ' (114)

The United and Labour Party leaders accepted, in

110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid.
identical statements, the Natal Torch Commando's require-
ments in respect of the Natal Stand. (115) They expressed
their pleasure at the evidence of the 'unity' of 'our'
forces (i.e. anti-government) and 'welcomed' the oppor-
tunity to re-affirm, on behalf of the respective parties'
candidates in Natal, ' ... their previous declaration made
in the vow taken at Durban on 6 June 1952 ... ' and then
proceeded to quote the oath taken by the crowd on that
occasion. (116)

Although the meeting ended on a note of 'elation',
with the national chairman of the Torch Commando declaring
that 'we shall sleep well tonight', (117) the agreement
between the Natal Torch Commando and the political parties,
especially the U.P., was in fact more apparent than real
and was, in any event, forced on the three organisations by
public opinion in view of the general election. The basic
differences remained.

In the first instance, there was no agreement among
the groups as to the full implications of the much-quoted
Durban oath. As the Natal Witness pointed out publicly
and as the Natal Torch Commando leaders realised privately,
the oath could be interpreted 'in more than one way', the
exact interpretation resting with the candidate's conscience.
Nowhere was there reference to unilateral action by Natal.
This meant that both the Natal Torch Commando, which advocated
unilateral action as a last resort and linked the oath to
Ford's questions on the same night, and the U.P., which
rejected unilateral action in all circumstances, could claim
support for its case. Secondly, the U.P. bound only its
Natal candidates to the oath and, in view of Mitchell's
insistence at the meeting with the Torch Commando that the
U.P. was a national party and that the Natal section of the
party had obligations to the rest of the organisation, it was
clear that he did not regard the agreement as altering the

         Bulletin, loc.cit.
U.P.'s stand at all. Thirdly, the Torch Commando's resolution, referring to Natal's 'undoubted and unchallengeable' rights in a union which was simply a contract (and could therefore be dissolved) as well as its reference to Natal's right of separate action, was obviously intended as an interpretation of the Durban rally oath. And, as has been stated, this interpretation was at complete variance with that of Mitchell and the U.P.

Apart from those sources of conflict implicit in the agreement, various actions taken by the Natal Torch Commando at the time indicate clearly its attitude towards the U.P. and the possibility of an open breakdown of the agreement. First, Heaton Nicholls, whose resignation from the U.P. was being treated as an 'open secret' by the party headquarters, joined the Torch Commando and was promptly co-opted onto its Natal Action Committee. Second, in order to strengthen its position, the Natal Torch Commando published the resolution of its National Executive of 9 July supporting the Natal Stand as it was interpreted in Natal. Third, the Natal Inland Region of the Commando, meeting immediately after the agreement with the political parties, resolved to set up a committee to explore the economic 'viability of Natal'. The obvious intent was to show lack of confidence in the ability or resolution of the U.P. to halt the Nationalists.

Fourth, in a confidential circular dated 23 January 1953, less than a week after the agreement, the provincial organiser of the Torch Commando, Brickhill, set out the details of the agreement but included a copy of the Hollander Memorandum and excerpts from General Smuts's speech advocating '... greater powers for the Provincial Councils on a semi-federal basis.' The same circular also instructed Torch Commando

speakers - under the heading Torch Line for Future - to 'keep off party politics' and to be 'frankly idealistic'. (125) Once again, the differences which existed between U.P. politics and the Torch Commando's implied view of U.P. tactics were presented in a barely-veiled fashion.

Fifth, in January 1953 the government introduced a number of pieces of legislation, the Criminal Laws Amendment Bill and the Public Safety Bill, both of which were commonly called the 'Swart Bills'. (126) These Bills were designed to place greater power in the hands of the Minister of Justice in the event of civil disturbance and the declaration of martial law. The Torch Commando strongly opposed the Bills because they were in conflict with its principles, (127) while the U.P. supported them for reasons of national security. (128) The two organisations were in conflict, once again, on matters of principle.

It is important to note that, whatever its differences with the U.P., the Natal Torch Commando still regarded the Nationalists as incomparably the greater enemy and it was prepared to throw all its efforts into the election campaign behind the U.P. Any suggestion of the 'quiescence' which had existed the previous year had disappeared. The circular referred to above publicised the 'Thought for the Month' as being, 'For evil [Nationalists] to succeed - it is sufficient for good men to DO NOTHING', (129) and urged that there be 'no half-heartedness' about the Torch Commando's support. (130) Instructions were given to mobilise the members to help the U.P. with canvassing, while Brickhill prepared to leave for northern Natal to assess what help was needed from the Torch Commando to win back the vital seats in this area for the

125. Ibid., p.5.
126. Named after the Minister of Justice, Mr. C.R. Swart.
129. Capitals in the original.
U.P. (131) Having won the support of the Torch Commando, the U.P. proceeded to nominate candidates and to conduct the election according to its own wishes and paid little heed to the Torch Commando. (132)

After Malan’s announcement on February 12 that the election was set for April 15, (133) both the Nationalists and the United Front conducted ‘highly efficient campaigns’. Professor K.A. Heard maintains that there is no evidence to suggest that more drive or efficiency on the part of the U.P. would have produced a different result. (134) The Torch Commando alone supplied fifteen full-time organisers, enormous sums of money, 5 000 cars and an impressive 60 000 canvassers to help the United Front candidates. (135)

The result, however, was a decisive victory for the Nationalists. They increased their parliamentary representation from eighty-five to ninety-four, while the United Front saw its representation decline from seventy-one to sixty-two. (136) Although the anti-Nationalists would claim, with justice, that the Nationalists received a minority of the votes cast and had profitted from the fact that the opposition votes were concentrated largely in a few urban areas, (137) the undeniable fact was that the Nationalists had increased their majority and had enjoyed a swing, even in Natal, towards themselves. (138) It was depressing, in the eyes of the United Front, that the Nationalists had won the election by making apartheid, the question of the sovereignty of parliament and the Coloured franchise, Communism and the unity of the Whites, (all issues connected to racial and/or English-Afrikaner relations) the central issues. Most depressing for English-

131. Ibid.
speaking Natal was the fact that, in addition to the above questions, the Nationalists had been confirmed in power as the spokesmen for Afrikaner nationalism, with its republican overtones, as well as its apparent Afrikaner exclusiveness. Of the Nationalist candidates (of whom this information was available) all but two were Afrikaans-speaking (and those two stood in Natal), while all the elected Nationalists were members of one of the Dutch Reformed Churches. (139)

For the Natal Torch Commando leaders, the electoral defeat was particularly distressing. They had fought hard to consolidate their control of the Commando in Natal and to sway the national leadership of the Torch Commando. They had battled to rouse the people of Natal to perceive what was deemed a threat to their freedom and future. They had tried, unsuccessfully, to bring the U.P. round to their way of thinking. They saw the verdict of the general election as being a measure of the U.P.'s failure to respond to the demands which they had made upon it. They, therefore, now planned to fight what they saw as an immoral, racially-exclusive minority government by means of a new approach—a new party.

CHAPTER THREE

THE LAUNCHING OF THE FEDERAL PARTY

Immediately the election was over, and lost, the question of the future of the United Democratic Front had to be considered. 'Sailor' Malan had declared the previous year that the United Front would continue to exist '... until sane, democratic government ... [was] once more restored in South Africa.'(1) This had not, according to the United Front's views, happened at the election, but the Natal Torchmen were completely unwilling in the circumstances, to continue supporting the U.P. In a joint statement two days after the election, the chairmen and vice-chairmen of the two Natal regions, together with two national vice-chairmen of the Commando as well as the Natal organiser(2)(all soon to be enthusiastic Federal Party leaders), signed a statement which declared: 'With the end of the election campaign, the member organisations of the United Democratic Front resume their liberty of action.'(3) This state of affairs was accepted by the majority of the delegates to an 'informal' meeting of the Natal Coast Region of the Torch Commando which assembled on 25 April 1953 to discuss, amongst other matters, the future of the United Democratic Front.(4) The Joint Inter-Regional Congress of the Torch Commando similarly, accepted without contradiction Selby's contention that the United Democratic Front had ceased to exist although '... no announcement to this effect had been made public [by the National Executive of the Torch].',(5)

Another development affecting the United Democratic Front was the accelerated disintegration of its third member —

2. They were E.G. Ford and J.B. Chutter; W.F. Hamilton and R. Hughes Mason; A.R. Selby and T. Durrant and R. Brickhill.
the Labour Party. This development, which was particularly marked in the Natal section of the party, began before the Federal Party was formed and continued after that event. Early in May, Raymond Arde and Selwyn Greene, chairman and secretary respectively of the Labour Party in Natal, resigned their positions and were later joined by Roger Brickhill, who was a former secretary of the Labour Party in Natal. More serious, Senator E.R. Browne resigned later in the same month. Both Browne and Arde gave as the reasons for their resignations the refusal by the National Executive of the party to pay any heed to wishes expressed in Natal. As all office-bearers who resigned from the Labour Party later joined the Federal Party, and, except for Arde, played prominent parts in it, it appears clear that their views were similar to those of the Natal Torch Commando leaders.

Heaton Nicholls, already closely associated with the Natal Torch Commando leaders, was also planning a new political future. Within a week of the general election, he publicised his resignation from the United Party, causing a wave of speculation as to his future intentions. The Natal Witness, a firm supporter of Heaton Nicholls's views, reported 'speculation' from Johannesburg as to the likely moves that the Senator would make on his return from the Coronation in June. Although the speculated date was wrong, the rumour that he was planning either to 'reform' the Dominion Party or to start a 'Federalist Party' was partly correct. Even before the general election, he had confided to his son that the Natal Torchmen should go on with '... the intention to form the Torch into a

political party to defend the Natal Stand in the Provincial elections." (14) This view was repeated to a meeting of the Natal Coast Region of the Torch Commando on 25 April 1953. It ignored the fact that the Commando could not, in terms of its constitution, become a political party, but could only support an existing party which upheld its principles. (16) His attitude does, however, express his frustration at the powerlessness of the U.P. to unseat the Nationalists, even with Torch Commando support, and also his frustration at the refusal of the U.P. leadership, especially Mitchell, to accept the Natal Stand.

Discussions between Heaton Nicholls and Mitchell had, in fact, taken place during the previous few days. Heaton Nicholls, acting as a 'go-between', offered to arrange an alliance between the U.P. and the Torch Commando in Natal, if Mitchell would accept the Natal Stand. (17) Mitchell, after discussions with Strauss, declined to support the Commando's view of the Natal Stand and hence the negotiations failed. It is unlikely that such an alliance could, in any event, have been arranged because the Natal Torch Commando was unwilling to accept Mitchell as the provincial leader and he would have had to leave, in the words of Heaton Nicholls, '... the Provincial sphere entirely to the Torch ...'. (18) This no national political party was likely to accept.

Significantly, the central cause of the disagreement was the Natal Stand, which Mitchell maintained was open to various interpretations. (19) In order to clarify exactly what was meant by the Natal Stand, therefore, Heaton Nicholls tabled a 'redefinition' at the Torch Commando's Natal Coast

16. Ibid.
18. Ibid., p.463.
19. Ibid.
meeting of 25 April 1953. (20) This redefinition stated categorically that the Natal Stand meant the determination of Natal to resist '... by any means in its power any attempt to deprive the citizens of Natal of their allegiance to the Crown by the imposition of a Republic.' (21) The resolution continued by demanding a separate referendum for Natal, should a republic be proposed and it closed with a declaration that the Torch Commando, in accepting the Natal Stand, was concerned about the welfare of all the people of South Africa, the future of Western civilisation in the country and the interests of the 'Native peoples' of Natal. (22) The redefinition was referred to the Natal Torch Commando Congress the following month, where it was accepted. (23) By that time, the Federal Party had already been formed.

Having done his best to reconcile the anti-government forces in Natal and being free of all party 'shackles', (24) Heaton Nicholls felt that the time had come to present his views forcibly and publicly. He did so at the Services Club in Pietermaritzburg on 29 April 1953. He drafted the speech - his first since the general election and the publication of his resignation from the U.P. - alone. Although he had frequently discussed his ideas with friends and acquaintances, the contents were therefore unknown to anyone but himself. (25)

Heaton Nicholls began with a survey of the election campaign (26) and then analysed the reasons why the United Democratic Front had not only failed to win the election, but had seen the Nationalists increase their strength. The main
reason (and this removed all hope of a future defeat of the governing party) was that the Afrikaner nationalist party was fighting a 'religious war'. In this it was backed by the Calvinist philosophy of the Dutch Reformed Churches and was supported by three generations of 'indoctrinated youths' who had emerged from Nationalist-controlled schools.

The Nationalists' aim, he maintained, was complete Afrikaner domination and the complete 'elimination' of the English-speaking South African from any influence in a 'theocratic Republic'. This 'theocratic Republic' took no account of the monarchical feelings of the English-speaking sector.

While it was based on the Calvinist faith and led to a 'dictatorship, the opponents of Afrikaner nationalism favoured democracy'. While Afrikaner nationalism was seen as archaic and intolerant, Heaton Nicholls saw the English-speakers as liberal; while Afrikaner nationalism preached 'hatred', its opponents preached 'reason' and, while Afrikaner nationalism stressed national separateness, the English-speakers supported the 'one stream' policy initiated by General Botha.

Having presented a picture of the stark contrast between Afrikaner nationalism and its opponents, Heaton Nicholls declared that Union, as envisaged by its founders in 1910, had 'completely failed'. He therefore turned his thoughts towards reconstructing the Union. He proposed the division of the country into two separate entities - one a republic and the other a monarchy - linked 'on a federal basis'.

The republic, consisting of the Transvaal, the Orange Free

28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., p. 5.
30. Ibid., p. 6.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., p. 1.
33. Ibid., pp. 5 and 7.
34. Ibid., p. 8.
35. Ibid., p. 9.
State and 'a part' of the Cape would be free to choose any form of government it wished, while the remainder, mainly English-speaking, would develop on its own.\(^{36}\) In the federal government, the two areas would be equally represented and, as all local matters would be excluded, it would deal with international affairs only. Failing this, Heaton Nicholls saw the only alternative as Afrikaners and English-speakers going 'separate ways'.\(^{37}\) Because the Nationalists were gaining ground owing to their 'religious appeal', the Union, which was an 'unfruitful and sordid marriage,' had to be brought to an end.\(^{38}\)

Heaton Nicholls's speech embodied some of the basic ideas which many English-speakers in South Africa, especially in Natal, shared. In the first instance, he saw Union under the Crown as the only acceptable form of union and, secondly, he found the dominance of Afrikaner nationalism intolerable. Thirdly, having established to his satisfaction that Afrikaner nationalism could not be beaten at the polls, he was logically compelled to reject Union. The way of life and values of the English-speaking community, as he perceived them, had at all costs to be protected. What is particularly striking about the speech is that his perception of the English-speaker was more a reaction to Afrikaner nationalism than it was based on any coherent philosophy. Because he saw the Nationalist Afrikaners as intolerant, steeped in faith and hatred, inclined towards autocracy and working for national separateness, he saw the English-speaking as being tolerant, liberal, reasonable, democratic and aiming at unity amongst the Whites. Because the government was using the Union to entrench Afrikaner power, Union was a failure. Because the Nationalists favoured the unitary form of government, he suggested a unique federal type of government and, because many Nationalists loudly advocated a republic, he insisted equally emphatically that only a monarchy was acceptable.

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36. ibid.
37. Ibid., p.10.
38. Ibid., p.11.
Heaton Nicholls's speech caused a sensation. The Natal Witness, the Pietermaritzburg morning daily, described Heaton Nicholls as a man of 'panache' which made him stand out amongst the 'ruck of more humdrum figures on the South African political scene'. (39) The newspaper saw the Senator's two basic theses as being, firstly, that in South Africa there were two political faiths, rather than two major political parties and, secondly, that all the demographic, educational and ideological factors favoured the Nationalist faith; a faith which was unacceptable to Natal. Heaton Nicholls did not, argued the Natal Witness, advocate that Natal should secede. What he had actually proposed was a 'highly original' suggestion which gave hope that an 'acceptable solution' to a grave problem would one day be found. (40)

The Mercury adopted a guarded yet sympathetic stance. On the day on which the speech was reported, the newspaper did not comment on it editorially but featured an article headlined Time for Natal to Face Unpleasant Facts, in which the writer adopted the position that the U.P. would never return to power and that secession was the only way out of Natal's dilemma. (41) The following day, the Mercury printed an editorial headed Union at the Crossroads which argued that 'Afrikanerdom ... [was] on the march' and that it would inevitably retain power. (42) Capitalising on this, the 'Extremist' Nationalists were bent on attacking Natal and the English-speaking people and the province therefore had the right to defend its beliefs 'by every means in its power'. (43) The newspaper, like Heaton Nicholls, saw the essential problems concerning the republic and the defence of the constitution as a moral issue and emphasised that this

should 'not be forgotten'. (44) While Heaton Nicholls was referred to by name only once, the whole tone of the editorial was favourably disposed towards his ideas.

The other Natal papers and all the major South African newspapers opposed Heaton Nicholls's views. The Daily News, Natal's largest newspaper, sympathised with Heaton Nicholls's feelings but accused him of advocating 'White apartheid' in suggesting that the two White ethnic groups should be separated, a proposal which in any case was 'impracticable'. (45)

In the Transvaal, the Rand Daily Mail also sympathised with Heaton Nicholls but maintained that the moment logic was applied to his speech, it '... collapsed like a house of cards'. (46) The Friend of Bloemfontein termed his ideas 'impractical'. (47) The Cape newspapers dismissed Heaton Nicholls's plans, with the Cape Times also using the word 'impractical' (48) to describe them and the Daily Dispatch holding that 'many sound objections' could be advanced against the plans. (49) The Afrikaans-language newspapers were, as the Mercury commented 'contemptuous'. (50) They strongly opposed the Senator's conclusions, which Die Vaderland stated were 'unfounded', (51) while Die Transvaler dismissed the speech in a highly critical editorial entitled A Jingoistic Outburst. (52)

As regards the political leaders, the Minister of Economic Affairs, E.H. Louw dismissed Heaton Nicholls's address as the '... drivellings of an outdated old jingo ....' Mitchell's response was both more restrained and more complex. Expressing ideas which were widely felt in U.P. circles and in most of the English-language press, he said that he

52. Die Transvaler: 1 May 1953.
sympathised with the feelings of frustration felt by Heaton Nicholls but he questioned whether his plan could be put into action. Obviously, the Nationalists would oppose it, and until they - the Nationalists - were removed, nothing could be done. Even allowing for a solution to this problem, Mitchell envisaged others, involving the relations between the component parts of the proposed new state. Furthermore, maintained Mitchell, the whole idea of destroying the Act of Union was contrary to the oath taken at the Durban rally, framed by the Defenders of the Constitution of which Heaton Nicholls was chairman. (54)

The Natal Torch Commando leaders, on the other hand, responded positively to Heaton Nicholls’s speech. Rev. J.B. Chutter, Chairman of the Natal Inland Region, stated that in their hearts most Natalians had already ‘... seceded from the Union’, while his deputy, Hughes Mason, informed the press that Heaton Nicholls had ‘hit the nail right on the head’. (55) These sentiments were shared by the other Natal Torch Commando leaders. (56) Equally significant was the well-reasoned pro-federation statement handed to the press by Selwyn Greene, until recently secretary of the Labour Party in Natal. It did not dwell on the details of Heaton Nicholls’s speech but, in supporting many of his ideas, it gave an indication of the direction in which much of Labour thinking was moving. (57)

Heaton Nicholls’s speech and the sensation it caused were of great significance in the founding of the Federal Party. Early in April 1953 the Natal Torch Commando leaders had informed the national chairman that they intended launching a new party. At his suggestion they agreed to wait until after the planned National Torch Commando Congress in June 1953. (58) The Natal Torch Commando leaders, however, later decided to launch the party at a meeting of the Torch Commando’s National Executive during the weekend of 8 - 9 May 1953. Why did they

alter their plans? The answer probably lies in the enormous interest created by Heaton Nicholl's speech and the fact that, except for the references to monarchical and republican sections of the country, the speech mirrored the thinking of the Natal Torch Commando leaders. With Heaton Nicholl's ideas the major news story in Natal and rumours circulating widely concerning a possible new party, it seemed an opportune time to translate ideas into practice. Only one of Natal's three major newspapers had opposed Heaton Nicholl's expressed views, and most of the English-language press and even Mitchell had, while disagreeing with them, expressed sympathy. This augured well for a new party.

The party's manifesto, which had taken months of careful preparation, 'largely' by Ford and Brickhill, had not been seen by Heaton Nicholl before his Pietermaritzburg address, and, as has been stated, the text of his speech was unknown to the Torch leaders and nor were they present on the occasion. They now decided to go ahead because of the interest which Heaton Nicholl had stirred. Ford approached Heaton Nicholl to lead the Natal party that was to be launched at a meeting of the Torch Commando's National Executive which was to be held in Johannesburg on 8 May. Ford's invitation to the Senator came only three days before the Johannesburg meeting. The Natal Torch Commando leaders and Heaton Nicholl had not been in contact before this. It is significant that, less than a fortnight later, they were ready to co-operate in the launching of the new party. This, together with the decision to bring forward the launching date of the party is explicable only in terms of the changed psychological climate caused by Heaton Nicholl's Pietermaritzburg address. The speech had not, as Strauss later thought, supplied the 'political inspiration' for the Federal Party, but it had

60. Interview with E.G. Ford.
forced the hand of the Natal Torch Commando leaders.

The meeting of the National Executive of the Torch Commando at which the Federal Party was launched met to discuss the future both of South Africa and of the Commando. As regards the political future of the country at large, the National Executive was divided; one section felt that the Nationalists would split into two groups, while the majority, including the Natal delegates, believed that the National Party was 'permanently' in power and would press on with its programme. As regards the future of the Commando, the National Executive was divided into three main groups. Some delegates felt that the Commando should cease to exist altogether. Others argued that it should go into 'cold storage' for a while but should retain its executive committee. The third viewpoint was that the Torch Commando should continue to oppose the Nationalist government strenuously. This viewpoint, held by the aggressive Natal delegation, prevailed and was the policy recommended to the National Congress of the Torch Commando which was due to meet the following month.

Having gained a psychological victory in seeing its views on the future of the Torch Commando prevail, the Natal delegation, consisting of Ford and Hamilton from the Coast Region, Chutter and Hughes Mason from the Inland Region and Selby and Brigadier J.T. Durrant (both national vice-chairmen of the Torch Commando) decided to press home its advantage. After the meeting had been formally closed, Ford announced to the assembled Torch Commando leaders that the new Federal Party was being launched. He produced a well-prepared document divided into three sections - an introductory statement, a set of principles and a section entitled

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65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
A Call to the Electorate - which he asked the members to sign in their personal capacities and thus become sponsors of the new party. (70)

Given the varied views of the National Executives’ members and the fact that, outside the Natal delegation, only two members knew of the plans to launch a new party, (71) it is not surprising that this produced heated discussion. Later it became apparent that the members present divided roughly into two equal groups, one for and the other against the creation of the new Federal Party. Nineteen (72) of the thirty-odd members present (73) agreed to become sponsors of the new party. They were joined by three others from outside the Committee, so that the Federal Party was launched by twenty-two sponsors. (74) This number included all the Natal delegates, which meant that they had managed to persuade twelve Transvaal and two Cape delegates to support their movement. No support had come from the Free State or South West African delegates. (75) The national president of the Torch Commando opposed the ideas of the new movement and behaved, according to Selby, with a certain ‘peevishness’ throughout the discussions. (76)

After the party had been launched, the Natal delegates retired to Heaton Nicholls’s hotel, where they presented the signed document to representatives of the press who were, at the same time, informed that Heaton Nicholls had agreed to head the Natal Federal Party. (77) Curiously, he was not one of the sponsors of the party itself. Equally curiously, sponsorship did not commit the signatories to any definite future activity or position. Most of them played no recorded

73. Interviews with E.G. Ford and C.S. Keary.
75. Ibid.
part in the subsequent development of the party and, as one of them, John Wilson, later wrote: 'I really never had anything to do with the U.F.P. Union Federal Party'. (78)

The press statement began by arguing that the general election had given 'Afrikaner Nationalism' a clear majority necessitating a new 'approach' to the country's problems. (79) The South African nation (referring to the Whites) was seen as being sharply divided into two camps, with the Afrikaner government 'permanently' established in office and pursuing policies which inflamed tensions between White and non-White. (80) The statement continued by rejecting 'both major political parties' which were accused of having appealed to 'racial prejudice'. They should be replaced by a movement pledged to a 'realistic and courageous' policy, based on principle and rejecting 'sectionalism or prejudices'. (81) The statement concluded by enunciating the principles on which the future of the country should be built.

The first principle laid down the national aim of the party, which was:

To create in South Africa opportunities for people of all races to enjoy fullness of life and liberty under the protection of the law, to enable our country to play an honourable part in World Affairs and to promote Western Civilisation among the peoples of South Africa. (82)

The second principle, which enshrined what was called the 'long term' policy of the party, envisaged a constitution and a 'way of life' acceptable to all the states and territories of southern Africa. (83) This, in turn, would be the basis

78. J. Wilson to B. Reid, n.d. (In the possession of the author) C.S. Keary, also one of the sponsors, similarly had no further contact with the party. He had signed the statement because of 'war-time loyalty' to Ford. Interview with C.S. Keary.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
of a United States of Southern Africa, consisting of South Africa and its unspecified neighbouring 'States, Colonies and Protectorates'. (84)

The remaining principles were more specific. The third principle required that the 'material' elements of the 'contract' of Union be entrenched and that, within that framework, the existing quasi-unitary system of government be altered to a federal system in accordance with the ideas expressed in the Hollander Memorandum. (85) The right of the provinces in given circumstances to determine their own future was the fourth principle. Specifically, if the letter or spirit of the constitution were violated, a province could opt to 'remain' a part of the Commonwealth under the Crown. (86) It was stated, specifically, that the party would work for the 'maintenance' of the above right, thereby implying that it already existed. (87) In order that there should be no misunderstanding of the type of circumstance which would permit a province to determine its own future (and thus permit the de facto destruction of the Union) a number of possible eventualities were given. These included a weakening of the country's loyalty to the Crown, the setting aside of the 'entrenched' clauses, the denial of the testing power of the courts and the abolition or reduction of provincial powers. (88)

The fifth principle concerned the relationship between the state and the citizen. It pledged the party to maintain the 'Western' democratic form of government and the existing parliamentary institutions, to protect the liberties and freedom of the individual, to maintain the right of access to the courts and to work for the limitation of the power of the executive. (89) Finally, it opposed all totalitarian forces,

84. Ibid.
86. Ibid. For a discussion of this idea, vide infra: Ch. 10.
88. Ibid.
whether Fascist or Communist. (90)

The sixth principle dealt with what was termed 'Racial accord'. (91) The word 'racial' in this document was given two meanings; firstly, it meant either the English or Afrikaans-speaking ethnic group and, secondly, it meant a group based on colour such as the Whites or Blacks. The first type of 'racial' accord for which the party would work was between the two White groups. It would promote 'unyielding' resistance against any attempt at 'domination' by one of the two groups. (92) As regards the second type of 'racial accord', the party planned a 'progressive' rather than a 'repressive' policy in line with 'Western' traditions and 'Christian' teachings. (93)

The progressive 'Non-European' policy was the subject of the final, most detailed and most explicit of the seven principles. (94) The opening paragraph stated that the existing policies offered no hope of 'permanently peaceful' relations between the peoples of South Africa and the new party's 'guiding' principle in this field was the 'abandonment of fear'. (95) As regards actual policy, the Federals saw the rapid improvement of living conditions, welfare services, education and economic opportunities as its immediate aims and the only way to overcome 'political discontent'. (96) As regards the contentious issue of the franchise, the party would adhere to the principle that the existing franchise should in no way be curtailed. The existing system of group representation for the Black population was to be extended.

90. Ibid. This principle was prompted by memories of the republican constitution published in 1942 with its anti-democratic and totalitarian bias and, more recently, the Swart Acts of earlier that year which the Torch Commando as a whole had opposed because the Acts were seen to be an assault on personal liberties. Vide supra: Ch. 2 p.36.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
to the Indians. This would be for an 'interim' period only, after which the main franchise plan and the kernel of the Federal Party's race policy, would take effect. This was a qualified franchise.

The clause which dealt with the qualified franchise envisaged the placing of those '... non-Europeans who have passed suitable tests of a high standard, upon the common roll of voters'. Appreciating its politically explosive nature, this was stated to be a 'long term' policy only and would be 'Subject always to due safeguards against disproportionate representation of any one section of the non-European population ....'. How the Federals proposed to control the number of Black votes once the system had been introduced was not stated. The party had left the whole question of the qualified franchise open for future deliberation and assessment.

Having dealt with the franchise issue, the drafters of the principles were then faced with an even more difficult question - social and residential segregation. They accepted 'desirability' of residential and social segregation, but urged that it be done on a 'fair and equitable' basis and, wherever possible, by voluntary population movements. These could be attained by designing housing and town planning schemes for specific population groups. Not only would this achieve the desired segregation, but it would, by supplying adequate housing, establish 'sound family life'.

The last of the three sections of the document launching the Federal Party was the Call to the Electorate; a section obviously intended for widespread verbatim publicity. This section opened with the statement that, although the signatories had supported the opposition parties in the general

97. Ibid. 
98. Ibid. 
99. Ibid. 
100. Vide infra: Ch. 10. pp.252-4. 
101. Ibid. 
102. Ibid. 
election, the time had come for a positive and independent assertion of principles and hence, as private citizens and not as office-bearers of any movement, they announced the formation of the Union Federal Party. The statement then announced that the party was open to all people who believed in federation and that the broad principles contained in the document would be translated into detailed policy at a convention to be called in the future. The Call ended with a declaration of faith in the good sense and sound judgment of the 'common man' of South Africa. (104)

The Call to the Electorate, like the rest of the document, indicated forcibly that the new Federal Party was to be the antithesis of the National Party. Selby, a Federal leader, on two occasions discussed the formation of the Federal Party. On both of these he maintained that the strength of the Nationalists was the primary cause of the party's existence. The first occasion was a press statement on taking up office in the Federal Party in July 1953. He then maintained that seventy-five per cent. of the Afrikaners had supported the National Party in the election. Because of this electoral majority, there was no hope of a change of government in the foreseeable future. He therefore saw no hope of obstructing the government in its main objectives: the establishment of an 'autocratic Afrikaner republic' and, the imposition of 'repressive apartheid'. (105) The reason for founding the Federal Party was, he stated, to supply a 'positive alternative' to these two Nationalist policies. (106) The second occasion on which Selby discussed this issue was in private, and he was therefore more blunt. He informed a confidential Torch Commando meeting, that the Federal Party had been planned before the general election because the Natal

104. Ibid.
Torch Commando leaders were 'convinced' that the Nationalists were unbeatable. (107) A U.P. victory would therefore have rendered a new party unnecessary. (108)

Voicing the opinion of the U.P. and many of the country's political commentators, Strauss held that the Federal Party was formed as a 'reaction' to Afrikaner nationalism. (109) In this he was supported by Henry Miller, a former organiser for General Smuts, who felt that the Federal Party had been 'born of despair', (110) and Stanley Uys, the political columnist of the Sunday Times who later discerned the 'threat' by Afrikaner nationalism to 'subjugate' all the Whites as the prime motivation for the formation of the Federal Party. (111)

Agreement with the idea that fear of Nationalist intentions was the driving force behind the new party came also from most newspaper editors and from the political commentators of the Natal Daily News (112) as well as from Lawrence Gandar, who saw the Federals as a 'protest movement'. (113) On this point there was agreement between these opposition journalists and Die Transvaler, which also felt that fear of the loss of ethnic identity by English-speakers motivated the Federals. (114)

More important to the party than the press's initial reaction to the launching of the party, was the stand which it took in regard to its policies. Predictably, considering the reaction to Heaton Nicholls's speech at the Services Club, the Natal Witness and the Natal Mercury supported the Federals,

108. This was confirmed by Prof. Durrant at the Torch Commando Congress in June 1953. W.V.T.C.: Minutes, 12 and 13 June 1953, op. cit., p.11.
while the rest of the press continued to support either the United or National Parties. The *Natal Witness* wished the new party well and was to prove a useful ally to the Federals by constantly defending them against attacks and giving their policies wide publicity and sympathetic assessments. The *Natal Mercury* was more selective in its support. The newspaper saw the party's policy as being 'honest' and a sincere attempt to face 'realities'. It strongly supported the idea of federation which it discussed at length, largely ignoring the Federals' other principles. In fact, the *Natal Mercury*, which had strongly supported the idea of a Natal-based party, argued that the time was not ripe for launching it. In addition, the editor and chairman of the *Natal Mercury* felt that the leaders of the Federal Party were not 'the right people' for the task. Heaton Nicholls attributed this attitude to snobbery. Whatever the reasons, the *Natal Mercury*, although sympathetic, never became an enthusiastic supporter of the Federal Party.

The newspapers which opposed the Federal Party included the influential *Natal Daily News*. This newspaper opposed what it termed the 'balkanisation' of the opposition and held that the federation idea would, at best, remove only Natal from Nationalist pressure, while the people of the other three provinces would be subject to Nationalist-controlled provincial councils with increased powers, as well as to a Nationalist-controlled central government. The federation idea was also strongly opposed by *The Star* which saw 'no future' for a party which tried to 'reverse' the course of South African history. In addition, the newspaper viewed the policy as unrealistic because it would need a large parliamentary

117. N/P: G. Heaton Nicholls to D. Heaton Nicholls, 3 December 1953.
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid.
majority to put it into effect. The Star did not believe that this could be achieved in the face of 'Nationalist domination'. The Rand Daily Mail agreed while stating that it could not find 'anything' realistic nor of any merit in the Federal Party’s 'vaguely-worded' programme. The Cape Times also viewed the party’s proposals as vague as well as 'grandiose'; the Eastern Province Herald saw the Federal Party itself as giving 'great joy' to the Nationalists, while the Cape Argus dismissed the party as a 'sect'.

The lack of support from the English-language press in the Transvaal and Cape boded ill for a party which hoped to gain some support on the Witwatersrand and in the English-speaking areas of the eastern and western Cape. Even in Natal, the opposition of the Natal Daily News meant that the Federal Party would face adverse criticism from the province’s largest newspaper. In addition to press opposition, the Federal Party faced the established influence of the U.P. which was quick to denounce the formation of the new party. Mitchell, in a thoughtful statement, commented sadly that the Federal Party had achieved what the Nationalists had been unable to do - it had split the opposition in Natal. This, he felt, would lead to strife, difficulty and bitterness between people who should be friends. Strauss, in an aggressive statement, denounced the formation of the Federal Party as an act of defeatism. Its federal proposals he described as a 'constitutional monstrosity'. He also maintained that, although the formation of the Federal Party had been announced in a way which suggested that it was a 'creature' of the Torch Commando, it was nothing of the kind.

122. The Star: 13 May 1953.
That the Federal Party had been launched in the presence of the members of the Torch Commando was the subject of widespread comment and it was widely reported that there was a link between a section of the Torch Commando and the new party. It was true that the Federal Party had been created by the Natal Torch Commando leaders and launched by many members of the Commando’s National Executive but it is important to note that these members acted in their personal capacities and not as Torch Commando office-bearers. Also, Ford only announced the policy of the new party and called for support after the Executive had completed its business and the meeting was formally closed. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Natal delegation wished the Torch Commando to be linked, in the public mind at least, with the Federal Party. The new party could then capitalise on the prestige and wide support enjoyed by the Commando.

The first reactions from within the Torch Commando to public speculation on the relationship between it and the Federals came from Brickhill and ‘Sailor’ Malan. They are indicative of the split which had now emerged in the Torch Commando. Brickhill re-iterated that the Commando was a non-party organisation but that any Torchman was free to follow his political conscience and join or support any political party which subscribed to the Torch Commando’s principles. He instanced the close association which had existed between the Commando and the United Party before the general election and casually mentioned that the Federal Party had been ‘discussed’ by the Torch Commando’s National Executive. This comment was quickly denied in a public statement by Group-Captain Malan the next day. He stressed that, although Torchmen were indeed free to join any


131. Vide supra: Ch.3. pp. 50-51.


political party which did not conflict with Torch Commando's principles, the National Executive had never discussed the desirability or otherwise of a new party. The majority of the Torch Commando's 'prominent' office-bearers had nothing to do with the Federals, (134) he said. Malan concluded his statement with an appeal that no office-bearers resign from the movement (135).

Despite this, four prominent leaders of the Torch Commando, including its patron, the former Chief Justice of South Africa, Mr. N.J. de Wet, (136) resigned. They gave as their reason the actions of certain Torch Commando leaders in 'supporting and associating' themselves with the formation of the Federal Party. Justice de Wet also denounced the method in which the party had been launched, in that it gave the impression that the step was sanctioned by the Torch Commando. In an attempt to counteract this impression he called on all Torchmen to join the U.P. 'forthwith'. (138)

Realising that the Torch Commando was facing serious difficulties, the Natal Federal Party leaders, who were the Natal signatories to the document launching the party, formed themselves into an ad hoc committee under the chairmanship of Ford, (139) and worked to win support for their new party within the Commando. It was reported on 14 May in the Natal Witness that Natal's eighty Torch Commando branches viewed the Federals' programme 'sympathetically', (140) but the real test was to come at the Inter-Regional Congress of the Natal Torch Commando held in Pietermaritzburg on 16 May 1953, less than a week after the formation of the Federal Party.

The congress was 'less hectic' than was expected (141) as it became clear that the great majority of the delegates, represen-

136. The other three were Lieut.-General G.E. Brink, Mr. A.J. de la Rey and Brig.-General B.G.L. Enslin. Natal Witness: 16 May 1953.
141. N/P: D. Heaton Nicholls to G. Heaton Nicholls, 18 May 1953.
ting all but nineteen of the branches, (142) were sympathetic to the Federal Party. The congress listened to reports from Selby, Brickhill and Ford on what had happened in Johannesburg the previous weekend and then proceeded to discuss the question of the future of the Torch Commando. Midway through the discussion, a telegram came from the National Action Committee of the Commando which called on the Regional Conference to give ‘increased powers’ to their representatives who would attend an enlarged National Executive meeting which would consider ‘folding up’ the Torch Commando. (143) This official indication that the Commando was rapidly nearing its end, produced strong support for the continued existence of the Torch Commando, if necessary in Natal alone. (144) The formal resolution, however, gave the Natal delegation to the Johannesburg meeting ‘full freedom of action’. (145) These developments were what the Federal Party leaders wished. Apart from their support for the existence of the Commando per se, they wished to see its continued existence, at least in Natal, until such time as the Federal Party had accumulated funds and become ‘well established’. (146)

The Federal leaders were supported by large majorities in favour of the formation of the Federal Party. A vote of 148 to 5 (147) supported a resolution affirming the right of any Torchman to join the party of his choice and regretting that senior office-bearers had ignored ‘Sailor’ Malan’s appeal. (148) The sentiments expressed were neutral but the tone of the resolution supported the Federals. Support for the Federal Party became more explicit in a resolution which affirmed the Natal

143. Ibid., p.2.
144. Ibid., pp.3-6.
145. Ibid., p.6.
147. D. Heaton Nicholls to G. Heaton Nicholls, 18 May 1953, loc.cit.
Torch Commando's confidence in its office-bearers and 'in particular' in the delegation which had represented Natal at the National Executive meeting the previous weekend. (149) There were only eight dissentients. (150) Total support was then expressed for a resolution, drawn up by Heaton Nicholls, re-defining the Natal Stand along lines acceptable to the Federals but in conflict with the interpretation of the U.P. (151)

Having taken complete control of the Torch Commando in Natal, the Natal Federal Party leaders left in their capacities as Commando delegates for what was planned as an enlarged National Executive Committee but which was in fact constituted as the Second National Congress of the Torch Commando. The purpose of the congress was to decide whether the Torch Commando was to disband or not, with most political observers feeling that it would be dissolved. (152) The congress, however, decided by a narrow vote of 423 to 399 against disbanding. (153) This vote was achieved because each region was allowed a number of votes according to its regional membership. As a result, although nine of the sixteen regions voted against the resolution, the other seven - numerically stronger, in terms of the number of members they represented, and ably led by the Natal delegates - were able to keep the Commando alive. (154)

Later, at the third National Congress of the Torch Commando held in East London in September 1953, only the casting vote of the chairman prevented the dissolution of the Commando. (155) Instead, the congress voted to maintain the Torch Commando on

149. Ibid.
150. Ibid.
154. Ibid.
a ‘care and maintainence’ basis. (156) It was never to be revived into a fully functioning organisation.

The reasons for the decline of the Torch Commando were various. Some Torchmen saw it as stemming from the disunity caused by the creation of the Federal Party. (157) Others, including ‘Sailor’ Malan, felt that the real reason was that the Torch Commando had achieved its original objective in winning the long drawn-out court battle over the Coloured franchise. He admitted that the inability to remove the Nationalists from office in the general election (158) had also contributed to its decline. Malan is correct in this analysis but there can be no questioning the fact that the creation of the Federal Party by leading Torchmen had divided the opposition to the government. Despite the oft-stated right of Torchmen to join the party of their choice, this had created party-political tension within the movement, destroying its unifying idealism. The rapid decline of the Torch Commando - little more was to be heard of it after September 1953 - removed the Federal Party’s strongest potential ally. This meant that the party now had to face alone the growing threat of a Nationalist republic which, following the 1953 election and the planned ‘settlement’ of the Coloured franchise question by the government using a two-thirds parliamentary majority, now emerged as the dominant fear in opposition circles.

Anticipating this, shortly after the election, the Natal Provincial Council passed a resolution in the last week of May calling on the government to hold a separate referendum in Natal before creating a republic. (159) Although the government did not respond to this, Die Transvaler, argued that the resolution was ‘nonsensical’. The republic would be established only upon ‘the broad will of the people’ and when the government deemed it to be in the interests of the country. (160) These

156. Ibid., p.9.
157. Ibid., p.5. See also W.V.T.C.: Minutes, 12 and 13 June 1953, pp. 1-13 passim.
158. Ibid., p.4.
sentiments were reiterated six weeks later by J.G. Strydom, Transvaal leader of the National Party. Two days later the Prime Minister, in a speech at the election victory celebration for the Cabinet, declared that a republic was the 'ideal' constitutional form for South Africa. It would, he said, bind the two White 'races' together. The government's talk of a republic spurred the Federals to greater action. The party faced the task of establishing itself as a political force in South Africa. If it were to play a role, one thing was clear: it had first to face the mundane but necessary task to create a party structure.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE PARTY'S STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION

Keen to establish themselves as a political fighting force as quickly as possible, the Federals began founding branches. Within ten days of the launching of the party, 'several' had been formed in Natal while three had been constituted in the Transvaal. (1) By the beginning of August, the Federals claimed that there were over fifty branches in Natal alone and the party appeared to be growing quickly. (2) Not only did it have popular support and press backing, at least in Natal, it also had the support of two senators and hence could make its voice heard in parliament and in the parliamentary reports in the daily press.

The two senators were Browne and Heaton Nicholls. Browne resigned from the Labour Party and applied immediately for membership of the Federal Party. (3) This move prompted demands from both the leader and the general secretary of the Labour Party that Browne resign his Senate seat as he had been elected to it by the Natal Members of Parliament and of the Provincial Council—none of whom were Federal Party supporters. (4) Browne refused to resign and gave as his reason that he represented the people of Natal and not a political party. As his principles were the same as those of a large section of Natal's voters, he felt that he was justified in remaining a senator. (5) When a similar demand was made by two U.P. M.P.s that Heaton Nicholls resign his seat in the Senate, he refused on grounds similar to those of Browne. He maintained, however, that he represented the 'bulk' of Natal's population. (6)

Despite this initial progress, the growth of the Federal Party was not as rapid as many had hoped or expected. The party leaders had expected many 'prominent' men openly to support the new party and had anticipated widespread popular support amongst the Natal public. (7) The Rand Daily Mail, however, reported that the Federal Party was meeting 'wariness from both voters and politicians'. (8) Natalians, stated the newspaper, felt that the Federal ideals were impractical and that the Federal Party was simply another splinter group. (9) The sympathetic Natal Mercury agreed that the Federal Party had not captured the public imagination in the way the Natal Stand had done the previous year but gave no reasons for this. (10) As the Federals identified strongly with the Natal Stand, this sympathetic opinion was not encouraging. Even party leaders admitted, in private, that, in the words of Derek Heaton Nicholls, there was no 'wild rush' to join the party. (11) They explained this away by arguing that 'fence sitting' and not opposition was the cause of this reserved reaction. (12)

Before the Federal Party could hope to establish itself further, it needed to be formally organised. This necessity was the more pressing since provincial elections were due in 1954. The party thus turned its attention to its structure and organisation.

The Federal Party, like most political groups, did not emerge as a fully operating organisation within the first few months of its life. Rather, it evolved. Committees and offices were founded or disbanded as the need arose, but certain basic ideas, such as the federal structure of the party remained unchanged.

12. Ibid.
In conformity with its name and one of its basic principles, the Union Federal Party, which was usually referred to as one national entity, was actually three provincial parties. It was organised and legally constituted on a federal basis with sovereign power being invested in each of the provincial parties. The Call to the Electorate of 11 May 1953 stated;

... the centres of sovereign power of the Party shall rest in each Province so that Provincial political activity shall not be exclusively controlled by the decision of a remote and central Party Executive. A consultant Council of Provincial Executives will be formed having advisory powers but not executive powers.(13)

This federal principle was further underscored by the fact that separate parties were founded at different times in the four provinces, each having its own constitution. For instance, 'The Union Federal Party (Natal) (A Constituent Part of the Union Federal Party)' was founded at Durban on 14 and 15 August 1953 and quoted the principle of provincial power and autonomy both in the preamble and in the first clause of its constitution.(14) It was the first, largest and best organised of the provincial parties.

After two abortive attempts in August and November 1953(15) the Transvaal party was constituted in Johannesburg in November 1954(16) and this was followed by the formation of an East Cape Federal Party at a convention at Stutterheim and Kingwilliamstown on 23 and 24 July 1955.(17) A western Cape zone of the party was established in September 1957.(18) Within the month, the west and east Cape Federal groups were united in a single Union Federal Party (Cape) with 'west and

With the Federal Party functioning in three of the four provinces, the idea grew that it was time to have a federal organisation in the fourth province as well. As a result, three Natal officials went on a short propaganda tour of the Orange Free State in January 1957 to try and build up interest there. They were courteously received and politely given a hearing but nothing came of the visit. (20)

While each of the provincial parties existed as a distinct legal entity, there were inter-provincial contacts at both a casual and a formal level. Members were encouraged to call on party officials in other parts of the country (21) and visiting officials from one province to another were accorded guest status at meetings. In addition, officials from all the provincial parties occasionally met to discuss some issue of common importance; such as when Transvaal and East Cape members attended the Natal Provincial Executive meeting on 18 September 1954 after the party had failed to capture any seats in the provincial council elections of that year. (22) Inter-provincial consultation as envisaged by the founders of the Federal Party, was to take place through the advisory Council of Provincial Executives. (23)

The creation of this council, or Inter-Provincial Committee as it was eventually called, was discussed by delegates from the three provinces at the 18 September meeting, (24) and in February 1955 the Natal Provincial Executive acceded to a Transvaal request to hold an inaugural meeting of the committee in Johannesburg the following month. (25) The Inter-Provincial Committee was supposed to meet quarterly and was to be used for the ‘consultation and co-ordination’ of the party’s

effort on a national scale. (26) The meetings never materialised, however, for over two years later the western Cape leader of the party, Mrs. Hope Struben, complained that the committee 'should start to function' and that, as the party's ideas were of national importance, a 'national leader' should be appointed. (27) This suggestion was supported by the Federal Party's influential Natal Provincial Executive (28) and the following year a resolution was proposed by the 'West Cape' at the Natal Federal Party Congress calling for the election of a national leader and reiterating the plea that the Inter-Provincial Committee 'become a reality'. (29) The committee was then at last appointed, representing the Transvaal, Cape and Natal, and duly elected Selby, the then Natal leader, as national leader. (30) While the Transvaal party issued an enthusiastic statement headed, Federal Party now on a National Basis, (31) the Federal News, the organ of the Natal party, gave the new committee and the election of the national leader poor coverage, relegating it to a small report on the third page. (32) Little more was heard either of the committee or of the position of national leader.

In tracing the relationships between the three provincial Federal Parties and in examining the motives, ideas and actions of the party's leaders in relation to the party structure, two questions come to mind. Firstly, why was there such a long delay in electing the Inter-Provincial Committee and the

27. N/P: H. Struben to D. Heaton Nicholls, 28 June 1957.
31. Ibid.
national leader, despite the published intentions of the founders of the party as regards the former? Secondly, why was it that the strong support for the creation of the committee and the national leader should come from the Cape and Transvaal leaders whereas the Natal party was lukewarm, at best?

The answer to the first question lies partly in the fact that the Transvaal and Cape parties took some time to become formally constituted; the Cape party was formally created over four years after the launching of the party in May 1953. More important, however, was the basic concern with federalism. This mitigated against the formation of a supra-provincial body and leader, even though these would have no real power. As each provincial party met to draw up its own constitution and to formulate its own policies on vital issues such as race or republicanism, the importance of the sovereign provincial party loomed ever larger and the importance of a national party receded. Only when they were organised and their policies were formulated did the Cape and Transvaal parties return to, and strongly support the idea of a national body and leader.

At this stage, the Natal party's continued lack of enthusiasm can be explained, firstly, in terms of the fact that from its inception, it drew widespread support from its close identification with the Natal Stand, its constant claim of a right to independence in the advent of a republic and its constant harking back to the lost opportunities and broken promises of the Natal devolution movement of the 1930s. These preoccupations gave the Natal party a parochial flavour and this mitigated against co-operation with organisations in other provinces. Secondly, as the Natal party had by far the greatest resources, there seemed to be little to be gained from any equal participation with the other parties. The Cape and Transvaal parties, on the other hand, could expect considerable

33. Vide supra: Ch. 4. pp. 67-68.
moral and material support from the larger Natal body. The Natal party’s potential resources were also greater because, as the Federal Parties in all the provinces appealed almost exclusively to English-speaking voters, it was only the Natal party which had the potential of being voted into power as it was only in Natal that English-speaking voters predominated in most of the constituencies. Also, Heaton Nicholls, easily the most prominent figure amongst the Federals and the de facto leader of the movement, was the Natal party leader.

The Natal party, therefore, because of its greater resources and the fact that it alone had the chance of power, assumed a dominant position or in the words of Heaton Nicholls was ‘given pride of place’ (34) in relation to the other two provincial parties and could afford to ignore any inter-provincial committees. Gradually, the Natal party’s dominance became so great that the other two parties saw the Natal Stand, as defined by the Natal Federal Party, as vital to the future of the country. As the Transvaal party’s statement after the 1958 Natal Congress pointed out:

Delegates from the Transvaal and the Cape were just as keen as those of Natal on implementing a Natal Stand and were of the opinion that it would save the whole country. (35)

It is not surprising, in view of the relationship between the parties, that one of the Natal branches suggested at that congress that the name of the party should be changed to the ‘Natal Party’. (36) It is indeed ironic that a party which so frequently denounced the U.P. for allowing control of Natal’s affairs to be exercised from over the Drakensberg was tempted to use its own position within the federal movement to control opinion outside the province.

Whatever the relationships between the provincial Federal Parties, the cohesion of each party should constitutionally have depended upon annual congresses, at which party officials and

committees should have been elected. The Natal party held annual congresses, but there is no record of the Cape and Transvaal parties ever having done so, although one was planned for the 'Eastern Cape' in June 1955.\(^{37}\) The annual congresses were never convened in the Cape and Transvaal because, in the first instance, the organisation of both parties was unstable and ephemeral and, secondly, because the Cape and Transvaal leaders attended the Natal congresses, where they enjoyed the right to speak and vote. Party branches outside the province were also permitted to submit resolutions. This meant that Cape and Transvaal members could keep in touch with party activity and thought in Natal. They could meet large numbers of like-minded people socially. In addition to this important social aspect, the party congress also provided the leaders with the opportunity to meet and address the party officials and members as a single group. For example, Heaton Nicholls's plea that the Federals remain aloof from the 1958 general election despite previous public statements to the contrary was made at the 1957 party congress.\(^{38}\) The Natal party congress thus came to play a pivotal role as far as all the Federal Parties were concerned. It therefore merits closer attention.

The congress, which had to assemble at least once every calendar year, consisted of the party's public representatives, members of the Provincial Executive, members of the various Zone Executives and delegates from the branches '... on such basis as may be determined by the Provincial Executive.'\(^{39}\) Once a quorum of representatives of at least one-eighth of the branches had been established, the congress could proceed with its business according to an agenda which had been drawn up by the Provincial Executive. Should any of the delegates wish to add to the agenda, the support of two-thirds of the delegates was required. Most commonly, policy matters were referred to

39. U.F.P. (Natal): Constitution, op.cit., p.5. It was this clause which permitted non-Natal members and branches to attend the Natal congresses.
select committees. Thus, at the convention which established the Natal party in 1953 three committees were appointed to draft detailed policy statements on education, non-White policy and social and economic matters. All three committees were to report to a special congress convened in March 1954. The three committees were made into standing committees at this special congress and a fourth committee, on current legislation, was created.

The first of the committees, the Education Committee under the party's education expert, Martin, worked quickly and published its fifteen-point Memorandum on Education Policy in January 1954, before the special congress met. Simultaneously, it circularised numbered and confidential 'notes' to leading party officials to be read in conjunction with the memorandum. The memorandum became Federal Party policy and later in the year the Education Committee sent copies of the memorandum to school principals in Durban and Pietermaritzburg and also drew up a statement of policy entitled Your Child and the Future for election purposes. Apart from the formulation of policy, the Education Committee publicised its views on certain educational problems, such as the shortage of English-speaking teachers because of low salaries and the withdrawal of subsidies for immigrant teachers.

As active as the Education Committee but with a more involved history was the committee appointed to deal with non-White policy. The committee was first created in 1953 and presented a report to the special congress of 1954. This report

45. Vide infra: Ch.5 p.110.
was approved and published on 27 March 1954 as the Natal party's Statement of Non-European Policy. (47) The statement, however, was not as final as its title suggested because its fourth general principle was that there was 'no final solution' to the country's racial problems and that constant 'adaptation' of any policy was necessary. (48) When the party's statement was released to the press, it was described as the party's 'immediate policy'. (49) At the 1956 congress a standing committee was then elected to make further recommendations. The whole issue of the non-White franchise was raised once more and a third committee on non-White policy, (the special Franchise Committee), was appointed to deal with the matter. (50) 

The terms of reference of the Franchise Committee were to '... investigate and report on the multiple vote and other franchise methods which would best be applicable to South African conditions.' The actual constitution of the committee was left to the Provincial Executive. (51) Five persons were appointed to this committee in November 1956, (52) it being envisaged that it would meet fortnightly and hold interviews with 'distinguished persons in all walks of life'. (53) In the event, sittings were neither as frequent nor the persons interviewed 'as representative as might have been'. (54) This

51. Ibid.
was because the members of the committee, being in full-time employment, had to find time to serve on the committee. They were furthermore without secretarial help and did not have the advantage of access to government records or statistics. Despite these handicaps, its report was completed and submitted to the 1957 annual congress, where its recommendations were accepted, with reservations. (55) Having fulfilled its commission, the Franchise Committee ceased to exist.

The third committee, under the chairmanship of J. Freeman, appointed at the 1953 convention was instructed to draft detailed policy on social and economic affairs. (56) It drew up a wide-ranging if somewhat disconnected interim report. (It was undated but was obviously completed in that same year.) The introduction was concerned with the economic viability of Natal in the event of the province being separated from the rest of South Africa (57) and, as it was this aspect of the committee's work which became crucial, the committee was reconstituted at the special congress of March 1954. It thus emerged as a third standing committee concerned with the 'Economic development of Natal' and its convenor, J. Freeman was asked by the party chairman, Selby, in April 1954, to '... make a study of the economic implications of the Natal Stand as a first and urgent necessity. ' (58) By this time, the committee had completed papers on three aspects of Natal's economy (59) and, during the following few years, it issued several more papers on Natal's economic viability. This appears

59. On 'Ports and Harbours', 'Agriculture' and 'The viability of Natal's Economy'. Ibid.
to have been the only problem which concerned the committee because early in 1957 a prominent party businessman, W. Grimwood, lamented the fact that no committee had been appointed to formulate 'an intelligent economic policy'. (60)

No fresh instructions, however, were issued to the committee, nor was another committee appointed.

The fourth standing committee was appointed by the special congress of March 1954 to deal with current legislation. It was convened by an attorney, a former Labour Party provincial secretary, S. Greene. The committee reported to the 1954 Natal Provincial Congress (61) and to the Provincial Executive during the following year, (62) after which it lapsed.

If the first function of the provincial congress was to determine the policies of the party, its second function was to elect provincial office-bearers. (63) The constitution required the election of patrons of the party (if any), a leader of the provincial party, a chairman, one or more vice-chairmen and a provincial treasurer. (64) In practice, the congress did not elect any patrons and in addition to the above officials, it elected a provincial accountant, a provincial auditor and a provincial secretary. (65) Only the provincial secretary received a salary. (66) The number of vice-chairmen varied from year to year. For example, the 1953 convention appointed three vice-chairmen, one to control planning, one administration and one organisation and policy. (67) The 1955 congress elected

60. B/P: W. Grimwood to B. Batchelor, 4 January 1957.
64. Ibid., p.6.
65. In 1957 they were Mrs. R.J. McIntosh, D. McLean and Mrs. E. Ross respectively. U.F.P. (Natal): Minutes, 18 and 19 October 1957, op.cit., p.4.
66. Ibid.
four vice-chairmen, three to represent the Durban, Midlands and Zululand 'areas' and the fourth, Mrs. Phyllis Argo, to represent 'the ladies'. (68) These provincial office-bearers formed the nucleus of the party's most influential body, the Provincial Executive Committee.

The Provincial Executive included, apart from the provincial office-bearers, two delegates from each party zone plus five members elected at the annual congress. When the congress was not in session, the Provincial Executive was empowered to 'manage the affairs of the Party', (69) an authority which included a wide range of activities. It planned party 'strategy', (70) and briefed the party's two senators (71) just before the convening of parliament. (72) It debated and sanctioned the creation of the Inter-Provincial Committee (73) to control the relationship between the provincial party and its sister parties in other provinces, for which purpose the Natal Executive received reports from its officials on the state of the Cape and Transvaal parties. The executive also decided on the dates and places of the annual and special congresses, but left the detailed organisation of these functions to an appointed committee. (74)

These functions of the executive, however, were peripheral to its central activities which were to oversee and stimulate the zones and branches, to employ and control the party's paid organiser, to debate and decide on the many problems relating to the party's newspaper and propaganda services and to manage the party's funds.

68. Federal News: 22 December 1955. C. Kinsman, R. Hughes Mason and D. Heaton Nicholls were the three vice-chairmen.
73. Vide supra: Ch.4. pp. 68-69.
Firstly, the organisation and stimulation of zones and branches. The province of Natal, according to the constitution, was to be divided into such zones as were '... decided on by the Provincial Executive from time to time.' These were to enjoy such powers that the executive chose to assign to it. The branches, in turn, were formed at 'the discretion of the Zone Executive for the area'. Quite clearly, therefore, the Federal Party was hierarchical. Decentralisation of power operated at a provincial level but not within each provincial party. The originators and early organisers of the federal movement, mostly Natalians, had no intention of losing control of the movement.

When the party was organised in 1953, Natal was divided into five zones: South Coast, Durban Area, Zululand, Midlands and Northern Natal, whereas the Transvaal was divided into three regions (the same as zones) called Northern, Southern and Johannesburg. This dividing up of the provinces, however, was shortlived; the Northern Natal Zone was stillborn and the Transvaal Regions were abolished and 'combined' with the Transvaal Provincial Executive. Other zones, on the other hand, could be divided into two because of their unwieldy size. Examples of this were the South Coast Zone which was divided into an Upper and Lower South Coast Zone in 1954 and the large Zululand Zone which was subdivided into the Northern Zululand and Lower Tugela Zones. It was not always found necessary to divide a large zone into two smaller ones. The

76. Ibid.
81. Ibid., p.1.
Durban Zone, for instance, was divided into two sub-zones, each headed by a vice-chairman. (83)

Once created, the zone with its Executive Committee, made up of two representatives of each branch, was responsible for the 'effective co-ordination' of all party activities within it. (84) In practice, much of the activity of the zone and its Executive Committee was merely to act as liaison between the branches and the Provincial Executive. The Provincial Executive, however, sent circulars direct to the branches. It was rare that a project was undertaken by the zone executive. An exception to this was the summer school arranged for candidates in the 1954 provincial elections. Held over three days in March 1954, the school was organised by the Midlands Zone but was attended by candidates and other interested people from all over the province. (85) Three years later, the Midlands Zone arranged a two day course in public speaking for officials of the party. (86) Most commonly, however, zone executives had little to report of their own activities and were not even represented at Provincial Executive meetings. (87)

The lowest position in the party structure was the branch. (88) This, however, did not correspond with its importance, for apart from the Provincial Executive, the branches were the most important bodies in the party. The editor of the Federal News, the party's newspaper, likened the Provincial Executive to the heart of a person and stated that 'Everybody knows that the arteries ... are ... the branches.' (89) The main function of

arteries is to carry blood, he continued, and the blood of a political party is money. (90) Apart from fund-raising, the functions of a branch and its committee, as defined in the constitution, were to elect delegates to annual congresses and to hold at least two branch meetings annually. In addition, in order to promote 'actively the ideals and principles of the party', (91) it was expected to hold public meetings, to arrange social functions and generally to use its local knowledge to advance the party's interests. An example of this dependence upon local knowledge was the Natal vice-chairman, Roger Brickhill's, instructions to the branches to compile lists, to be sent to the party's chairman, of 'affluent or influential persons' known to them to be in sympathy with the ideals of the Federal Party. (92) These people were, no doubt, to be approached by a senior party official or, later, by the party's paid organiser.

The decision to appoint a full-time paid organiser was taken by the Provincial Executive in September 1954 after the party had failed to capture any seats in the provincial elections of the previous June. (93) The organiser, Leo Vermaak was young (34) and bilingual. He also had an Afrikaans surname and this gave hope of attracting some Afrikaner support. (94)

On 1 February 1955 he commenced duties (95) which were to stimulate branches into activity. In order to do this, and to be kept informed as to branch activity, he issued a circular to all branch chairmen, stipulating that branch meetings were to be held once a month (and not only twice annually as constitution required) and that copies of the minutes were to be forwarded to him. (96) In addition, Vermaak planned to visit all the zones and branches. He 'made contact' with the branches

in the North and South Coast areas, (97) announced that he and Senator Browne would visit all the other branches 'shortly', (98) and arranged a 'very extensive' itinerary in order to accomplish this. (99) Apart from visiting branches, Vermaak also planned to involve the public more fully in Federal Party activities. Starting with Durban, he organised five successful public meetings and planned two more, all within the first two months of his appointment. (100)

Despite this initial activity, the appointment was not a success. One reason for this was that he was soon sidetracked into other activities. During July 1955, for example, he worked not for the Federal Party at all but for the Anti-Republican League. (101) A second problem which Vermaak faced was that the Provincial Executive had not clarified the chain of authority and he, therefore, had 'too many bosses'. (102) This made him disappointingly ineffective and he never even managed to visit all the Natal zones, let alone all the branches. (103) Most serious was the fact that Vermaak failed to generate sufficient funds to make his paid position possible. As the treasurer put it: 'If Leo cannot bring in the funds then we cannot afford a full-time Organiser.' (104) As a result, the position of organiser was abolished in February 1956 (105) and the party had to rely more heavily on the party newspaper, to maintain interest.

To maintain interest and to keep before the minds of the party members '... the great purposes for which the Party was formed' were indeed the stated aims of the Federal News, (106) the official organ of the Natal party and the third major activity of the Provincial Executive. Similar in aims, content

102. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
and format was the Federalist, the official organ of the Transvaal Federal Party. Planned, incredibly, as a daily, this journal appeared every two months in 1955 and 1956 and had very little impact.

The Federal News first appeared on 23 December 1954 and continued publication for four years, the last edition being dated 10 December 1958. During this time the regularity of publication, the circulation, and the size, content and control of the newspaper varied greatly depending on the resources - both human and financial - that were available.

The editorial of the first edition informed the readers that the Federal News would be a monthly paper and, because of limited funds, would be ‘... small in size and circulation.’ (108) Control of the newspaper was vested in a committee which planned to print short interesting articles which, amongst other purposes, would keep the readers in touch with the major political ‘currents of the world’. (109) These aims, except for the question of monthly publication which was found impossible to maintain, were achieved in 1955. At the beginning of the next year, however, there were sweeping changes. In the first instance, the energetic Robbie Hughes Mason was appointed honorary organiser of the Federal News, taking over the function of the organising committee. (110) He proposed to return to monthly publication (which he did) and he further aimed at increasing the circulation from 2 000 to ‘at least’ 10 000 per month. (111) This was to be achieved by means of selected party members each addressing 100 newspaper wrappers to people in their areas who were likely to be interested in the publication. These recipients would receive the Federal News free of charge. Mason expected that increased advertising revenue as a result of the larger circulation would ‘help pay the costs’. (112) To further ensure continued interest,

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111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
he increased the size of the newspaper from four to eight pages and aimed at using only content of a 'very high quality'. (113) All these innovations were, at best, transitory because by the beginning of 1957 the newspaper was in serious financial difficulties. It was reduced to four pages again, with 'a smaller distribution', and still required a grant of £35 per month from the Provincial Executive, (114) a sum which the party could then ill afford.

Throughout the following two years, the newspaper gradually declined. Only seven editions appeared in 1957 and again in 1958. It had in fact become a constant financial drain on party funds and the newspaper was only kept going because it was considered vital for propaganda purposes. Just before the East London North by-election, for example, 12 000 copies of the Federal News were distributed throughout constituency. (115) After this enormous effort, the newspaper was published 'less frequently than hitherto' in an attempt to conserve resources, (116) and in 1958 the Provincial Executive of the party assumed direct control over the Federal News. (117) This responsibility had, in fact, been accepted over the years and reports of the difficulties of the Federal News had taken up much of the time, effort and money of the Provincial Executive. The end of the newspaper came suddenly in December 1958. There was no announcement; in fact, the last edition contained a subscription form. (118) The Federal News had died for the same reason that the post of paid organiser had to be abolished - lack of money.

113. Ibid.
The whole question of money, so vital to any political organisation, was the fourth and last major function of the Provincial Executive. The Natal Federal Party constitution envisaged each branch controlling its own finances and each branch treasurer, together with the provincial treasurer, reporting quarterly to the Provincial Executive, which was to have 'absolute discretion' in financial matters. Within a few months of the adoption of the constitution, however, a special Finance Committee of the Provincial Executive had been established and was issuing financial directives. Relations between this committee, the branches and the zones appear to have been confused until the provincial treasurer suggested measures to regularise them. Early in 1955 he submitted his confidential 'observations' to the Provincial Executive. He reported that money was being spent without 'proper authority' or without records being kept, that proper accounts were not being submitted by zones and branches and that, because of the precariousness of the party's financial position, the whole financial structure should be 'strengthened'.

As a result of these 'observations', the Provincial Executive altered the Party's constitution and permitted each branch to retain only £2. All monies, of 'whatever nature' were to be 'vested solely in the Finance Committee and/or the Provincial Treasurer', unless special instructions were issued by the Executive or the Finance Committee to the contrary. Additional resolutions of the Executive Committee further increased the power of the Committee and provincial treasurer by requiring detailed financial returns to be submitted by zones and branches to the provincial treasurer. These powers were used by the energetic

122. Ibid., p.1.
124. Ibid.
125. Ibid.
treasurer, W. Grimwood, to great effect and he was repeatedly thanked by the party's leadership and congresses for the excellent way in which the party's funds were controlled. Although he was head of a so-called Finance Committee, he personally did all the work because, as he informed the Provincial Executive in 1957, ... members could not be found ... to constitute such a Committee. (126) The position was rectified the following year, however, when a proper Provincial Finance Committee, with powers to co-opt, was formed and duly functioned as an effective committee. (127)

Because the Federal Party, unlike the U.P., had no trust fund to finance it (128) and because the Finance Committee was responsible for running the party offices in Durban and Pietermaritzburg, the provincial treasurer was deeply involved in raising money as well as in controlling it. Funds could be raised by means of regular subscriptions, but irregular income could be raised at fêtes, by sweepstakes, competitions and dances and by donations to special funds organised for specific purposes.

The membership subscription or regular income of the Federal Party was fixed at 2/6d. per annum in 1953 (129) when the constitution was drawn up but was changed to ten shillings 'or less' at the 1956 annual congress. (130) Whether this was paid to the branch or at the central office, it was not included in the target that was regularly set for each branch. (131)

These targets, initiated early in 1954, set a minimum figure for each branch, while all branches were urged to exceed the target. (132) Targets were also set for zones, (£1 per member, except for Zululand where, for some undisclosed reason, it was £3 per person), these targets being the total of the constituent branch targets. Possibly the intention was to give the zone committees a definite function. If this were so, the measure failed because most of the moneys passed directly from branch to headquarters. (133)

The methods employed in fund-raising varied greatly. The largest source of irregular income, indeed the largest source of total income, was the annual fête in Durban and Pietermaritzburg. In 1956 and 1957, for example, the annual fêtes supplied over half the party's total income. (134) It is therefore not surprising that considerable effort was put into these functions. Urged on by the provincial treasurer, ladies committees were formed and, in 1957, they were assisted by a Durban Fête Men's Committee. (135) In a similar way, other fund raising ventures such as sweepstakes based on the Durban July Handicap, dances and a raffle of a scooter merged the party's financial need with the advantages which accrued to the organisation through the personal involvement of its members.

These ventures required effort but did not necessarily require the party member to contribute much money himself. The special funds launched by the Federals, required cash donations from the members. A general Anti-Republican Emergency Fund was established by the 1954 annual congress and appeals for donations were made at the congress but no more was heard of the fund. (136) Thereafter, a Party Organiser's Fund was

launched in 1955. Members subscribed monthly amounts for six months as from January 1955 to pay for the full-time organiser's salary. (137) After July, the organiser was himself required, as has been discussed, to generate sufficient additional funds to cover his salary. (138) This fund was successful in its limited objective, unlike the Blue Card Scheme which was unsuccessful. It was launched by the Provincial Executive in June 1956 and was designed to provide funds for election purposes, the method of collection being a monthly donation by members. (139) In the first year of its existence, only £435 was subscribed to the fund, mainly from two branches, and later it was merged with the East London Election Fund which had been created to finance the election in that city. (140) Unable to raise sufficient funds by these appeals for regular payments, the party relied upon lump sum donations from wealthy supporters: £600 was donated to defray the expenses of this election in response to a single letter of appeal sent to all the party members. (141)

Overall, the control of finance was effective because it was in the hands, for most of the party's existence, of an efficient provincial treasurer who had access to and obtained a sympathetic hearing from the all-powerful Natal Provincial Executive.

As can be seen, the powers of the Provincial Executive were wide and no major facet of the party's business lay outside its control. The committee, however, was large and had some difficulty assembling at short notice. As a result, a five-member Provincial Action Committee was elected at a Provincial Executive meeting on 7 August 1955. It was given the task of coping with 'matters requiring urgent attention ....' (142)

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137. W. Grimwood to B. Batchelor, 11 October 1955, loc.cit.
138. Vide supra: Ch. 4, p.81.
140. Ibid.
functioning of this committee was flexible and members or party officials could contact any member directly, or if none was available, the provincial secretary or the party’s organiser. The committee dealt with a wide range of day to day issues, ranging from public replies to Cabinet Ministers to arranging a tour of the Orange Free State, as well as meetings between the Natal and Cape Federal leaders.

The structure and organisation of the Federal Party was not created overnight; it evolved as the needs arose. As the party’s financial resources grew or shrank, a full-time organiser was appointed or dismissed and the party newspaper grew, shrank and finally disappeared. Committees were appointed, reported and dissolved or remained in being as circumstances dictated. The basic constitution which had given the Provincial Executive its dominant role in the party’s affairs, however, remained largely unchanged.

The overall impression of the Federal Party is that of a small group of dedicated party enthusiasts who tried vainly to overcome public inertia, particularly in regard to raising party funds. From this point of view, the party was never equipped to play a permanent role in South African politics.

143. Ibid.
CHAPTER FIVE

1953-1954 ELECTIONS: A TIME OF HOPE

Within three months of the creation of the Natal Federal Party in August 1953, it was involved in a parliamentary by-election in the Berea constituency and in the Natal provincial elections the following June. These elections, although they were not the only electoral contests which the party fought, represent the peak of Federal effort and achievement. The party functioned with verve and enthusiasm, albeit in an amateur and disorganised fashion, and confidently expected to win at least some of the provincial seats. Failure in these elections destroyed much of the hope and the high expectations of many of the party members. This blow to the party came at precisely the time in national politics in South Africa when there was a shift away from the Coloured franchise issue and towards the republican question: a movement which was considered paramount by the Federal Party.

When the Federal Party was launched in May 1953 there was comment, in British newspapers such as the Daily Telegraph and the Manchester Guardian, that the party wished Natal to secede from the Union. (1) Dr. Malan, who was aware of the influence of these national dailies in Britain and was conscious of possible sympathy for the Federals' Natal policy in the United Kingdom, warned the British press, when he was in London for the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference, that they should make sure that their sources of information were unbiased. There were, he said, sources in South Africa which had an '... undying hate of everyone and anything which was anything other than pure British.' (2) Die Transvaler identified these sources as the Federal Party, and, in an editorial entitled A South African Ulster? warned that because the British Natalians, led by the Federals, could not accept the will of

the majority of the voters, they were heading for the creation of another Ulster. (3) This would mean that the hates and discord similar to that experienced in Ireland would arise in South Africa and the Ulster created would be one of 'blood and tears'. (4)

The Natal Federal Party did intend Natal to remain outside a republic, but whether it would ever be able to create another 'Ulster' depended on the extent to which it represented public opinion, and the extent to which political ideals evoked a response as extreme as that in Ireland. From the time that the sitting Member of Parliament for Berea resigned in July 1953, there was general agreement that the by-election would serve as an important pointer as to the strength of the new party. Senator Heaton Nicholls pointed this out in an interview with the Natal Witness (5), while Hamilton, the party's temporary treasurer and future Provincial Executive member, saw the Berea election as a 'pilot-scheme' for the provincial elections. (6) The U.P., similarly, saw the by-election as the first test of strength of the Federal Party, and as having '... interesting implications for future elections in Natal.' (7) Even the Nationalists, who had no intention of contesting the Berea constituency themselves, were watching the outcome of the election with concern. (8)

The Federal Party entered the Berea by-election and the 1954 Natal provincial elections, the major electoral efforts of its history, without a fixed and detailed policy. Despite the statement, in the Call to the Electorate section of the document launching the Federal Party, that a convention would formulate a more detailed policy, this was never done. The convention in Durban in August 1953 merely adopted the published

seven principles of the party - with one significant alteration. This to make '... non-European policy ... the concern of the individual provinces', (9) thus emphasising still further the importance of the federal principle in the party's thinking.

Apart from the adoption of the seven principles, the convention also appointed committees to examine and report on various pressing social and political issues. (10) As discussed in chapter four, these committees submitted reports to the party congress, (11) but at no time did the Federal Party publish clear and detailed policies on vital issues such as the non-White qualified franchise or the exact relationship between the central government and the Provinces in any future federation. The result was that neither the Federal spokesmen, nor the candidates had a detailed programme to which they could refer. Thus, when the party's leaders, during the first two years of the party's existence, expressed views which were basically in agreement, this may be attributed to other factors such as that the party was small enough to allow a large amount of inter-personal discussion and consultation, allowing for ideas to be examined and agreed upon in an unofficial way. A second reason for the general agreement among the Federal Party leaders was that they had strong ideas in common on a number of basic issues. Not only were they strong monarchists with a deep attachment to their British traditions, but, as far as the Natal leaders were concerned, they shared a common loyalty to the province of Natal. In addition, they were all strongly anti-Nationalist and it was this sentiment which, in addition to the other factors, held the diverse elements within the party together.

Although the Federal Party did not have a detailed policy

10. Vide supra: Ch. 4. pp. 73-76. passim.
11. Vide supra: Ch. 4. pp. 73-76. passim.
in the Berea by-election, it had a forceful and personable candidate in Col. A.C. Martin, the retired headmaster of Durban Boys' High School. He based his first public speech directly on the seven official principles of the Federal Party and used the occasion to emphasise the party's basic policy. (12) At subsequent public meetings, however, he tended to refer to most of the principles in a brief introduction or conclusion and to devote most of his speech to the Natal Stand and republicanism. (13) Other Federal Party leaders such as Senators Heaton Nicholls and Browne, repeatedly also used the Natal Stand and the threat of a republic to accentuate the differences between themselves and the U.P. This was done by their maintaining that the Nationalists would view a win by the U.P. as signifying that Natal was irresolute on the republican issue, (14) or, that in the graphic words of Heaton Nicholls, she 'had no guts'. (15) So obvious had this emphasis in Martin's campaign become that, by the time he was formally nominated as a candidate, the Natal Mercury could confidently state that the 'main plank in his platform is resolute opposition to ... a Republic.' (16)

Martin's selection of one, albeit important, issue on which to base his campaign, is to be explained in a number of ways. As the party's first election candidate he enjoyed considerable latitude and had made it a condition of his standing for election that he would not accept the dictates of a party caucus. (17) In addition, in view of the lack of a detailed policy, he was obliged, when enlarging on the party's principles, to use information and ideas which he believed to be generally

accepted as party policy, although these details had not yet been formally accepted and published. None of the party’s principles had been discussed and analysed by the party leaders to the same extent as the Natal Stand and republicanism, and it was therefore understandable that Martin, who had strong private feelings on these questions, should have chosen these issues on which to base his campaign.

This emphasis on the Natal Stand and resistance to a republic does not mean that all other issues were completely ignored. In keeping with his profession and his position at the head of the party’s newly-formed Education Committee, Martin also dealt with education. He maintained, early in October 1953, that Christian National Education (C.N.E.) was ‘creeping insidiously’ into Natal schools and that it was supported by ‘hundreds’ of Natal teachers. Although he did not devote much time to this topic, despite the seeming import of his disclosures, he had broached a subject that was to form a regular part of Federal thinking and propaganda. Curiously, C.N.E. was not mentioned by name in Martin’s lengthy manifesto; a publication which, apart from the curriculum vitae of the candidate, was divided into fourteen parts, dealing with issues as varied as trade unions, military traditions, old age pensions, the ‘United Party Press’, social work, as well as the Natal Stand and the republican issue.

The U.P. candidate was a well-known Durban businessman, Mr. Ronald Butcher. He based his campaign on the U.P.’s record. It had successfully fought the government in the courts, had strenuously opposed them in parliament and would continue to do so. In addition, Butcher skillfully insinuated that the Federal Party favoured unconstitutional action by maintaining that the U.P. had acted constitutionally.

18. Vide supra: Ch.4. p.73.
Furthermore, he argued, only the U.P. stood any chance of defeating the Nationalists. By fighting the election, the Federal Party was dividing the opposition. (23) This argument, which denied any other opposition party the right to exist on the grounds of its alleged indirect assistance to the government by weakening the Official Opposition, was to become a regular weapon employed against the Federals.

The Federal Party, with all the enthusiasm of a new movement, conducted an efficient and vigorous campaign. By 22 September it had ten voluntary workers staffing its offices, with fifty canvassers calling on voters. Martin by the same date, had addressed three public meetings and had planned another eleven. (24) Public interest caused this number to be increased, within a few days, to sixteen planned meetings - twice the number of meetings arranged by the U.P. The party enthusiasm reflected in all this activity also meant that with the election campaign only half completed, half the constituents had been canvassed. (25)

Whatever the public interest or party enthusiasm, the image of any party, and especially a new party, depended heavily on the support of Natal's three major newspapers. The Pietermaritzburg newspaper, the Natal Witness did not have a wide reading public in Durban, and hence could not influence many voters, but its attitude would condition would-be canvassers and financial supporters of the Federal cause in the Midlands and hence indirectly effect the Berea result. (26) The newspaper adopted an impartial view in its comment and stated that in the Berea contest the 'real foes' (Nationalists) were elsewhere and pointed out that 'one day' the two candidates must be prepared to act together to fight the common enemy. (27)

26. A good example of this was, its headlining on the front page of the announcement of Martin’s candidature on 5 August and of Heaton Nicholls’s assertion on 31 October that a U.P. victory would be interpreted by the Nationalists as Natal having 'no guts.'
The Natal Mercury, a Durban publication, and therefore more directly influential, adopted a neutral stand not dissimilar to that of the Natal Witness. It argued that the U.P. had neglected Natal's interests and that what was needed was a "... properly constituted Natal Party ...." But it stopped far short of full support for the Federal Party. (28)

As regards the candidates, the Natal Mercury twice stated editorially that either Martin or Butcher would make an 'admirable' Member of Parliament and that it was up to the voters of Berea to decide between them. (29) The largest of the three major Natal newspapers, the Natal Daily News was particularly damaging to the Federal Party cause, not so much by its reporting, as by the brilliant cartoons of Leyden. (30) One, particularly damaging, showed Heaton Nicholls and a perspiring Martin in a trench marked 'The Last Ditch', while Butcher and Mitchell drove the U.P. tank into the 'anti-Nat. Battle'. (31)

The result of the election was a victory for the U.P. Butcher polled 4,410 votes and Martin 2,920. (32) The U.P.'s win was sufficiently convincing, considering the Federal Party's claim to speak for the English-speaking Natal, to show the Federals to be a minority party. Mitchell, for instance, maintained, with justice, that if the Federal Party could have won any seat in Natal at that time, then Berea was that seat. (33)

For its part, the Federal Party did its best to salvage something from the defeat. The result was close enough considering the newness of the Federal Party, for the Federals to claim a moral victory. Heaton Nicholls stated that the party was greatly encouraged by the 'astonishing' support it had received and Martin referred to the 'strength and fervour' of the party. (34) Martin also contended that the

by-election had been simply 'preliminary skirmish' for the provincial elections the following year. (35) The idea that the provincial elections were vital to the future of South Africa had in fact been held by the Federal leaders since the launching of the party in May. At his first meeting with the press, Ford had announced that the party would contest the Natal Provincial Council elections of 1954 (36) and this intention had been repeated by him and other Federal leaders on several occasions during the following months. (37)

The accent on the provincial elections and the necessity of winning control of at least the Natal Provincial Council was basic to Federal Party thought and survival. This was because the whole question of federation rested on the rights of provinces as distinct from those of the central government and, in practical as well as tactical terms, control of the provinces was the vital base from which to press for and implement these federal ideas. Also, the Natal Stand was based, as the name suggests, on the province of Natal making a stand against the central government. As the Federal leaders had little faith in either the will or the willingness of the U.P. Provincial Councillors to lead such opposition to the government, it was natural that they should wish to replace them. Furthermore, there existed the view, common amongst Federals, that the National Party could not be defeated in national elections. This was because it based its policy on Afrikaner nationalism, which appealed to the largest group in the electorate. The governing party had won two successive general elections, and its future strength was, in Federal eyes, guaranteed by demographic and educational trends in favour of Afrikanerdom. (38)

as well as by delimitation advantages for its rurally-based support. (39)

There were also tactical reasons why the provincial elections were vital to the Federal Party. It was important that it should capitalise on the enthusiasm which the Torch Commando had aroused and which had again been shown at the great rally of June 1952. The Torch Commando had, in alliance with the U.P., been unable to defeat the Nationalists and had not therefore fulfilled the hopes of Natal Torchmen, nor which was more important, the hopes of the bulk of the Natal public. Unless the Federal Party could assume the mantle as the successor of the Torch Commando and became spokesman for English-speaking Natal quickly, and on a provincial-wide basis, its appeal was likely to wane. The provincial elections provided the ideal opportunity for the party to fulfil these requirements.

The need for a Federal win in the provincial elections was given added incentive by the actions of the government and its supporters late in 1953. In September 1953 the government failed to muster the requisite two-thirds majority to remove the Coloureds from the common voters role, (40) but it appeared likely that this majority would be achieved through defections from the U.P. (41) These defections gave the U.P. an image of disunity and disintegration in the face of Nationalist confidence after its electoral triumph. This confidence was clearly portrayed in a number of editorials in Die Transvaler which reviewed the position of the National Party in Natal. The party, the newspaper declared, could be well satisfied with the size and enthusiasm of its annual congress in Natal, which drew twice the number of delegates as the previous congress. (42) It drew attention, too, to the recent Jeugbond congress in Durban - the 'heart of Jingoland'. (43) The triumphant note

    Cape Times: 13 May 1953.
41. These defections were led by P. B. Bekker. Later, the group which numbered six voted with the government on the Coloured franchise bill. Natal Witness: 15 June 1954.
42. Die Transvaler: 10 November 1953, 16 November 1953, 1 December 1953.
43. Die Transvaler: 7 December 1953.
which permeated these editorials was not lost on Natal Fed-
erals, for whom they were translated by a party member, (44)
and served to make them more determined to defend the English-
speakers' interests and win control of Natal in the provincial
elections.

On 12 February 1954 the Natal Provincial Executive
announced that the Natal elections would be held on 9 June. (45)
Later, the date was changed to 16 June. It was known at the
time that the other three provinces were to hold provincial
elections in August and the suggestion came from the National-
ists that all the provincial elections should be held on the
same day. (46) Some Nationalists saw the decision in favour of
a different polling day in Natal as an attempt by the U.P. to
impress potential Federal supporters with its defiance of the
government, (47) while others saw it simply as another example
of Natal's desire to be different. (48) Much closer to the
truth was the observation that the U.P.-controlled Natal
Executive had chosen a different date for the elections in Natal
so that the U.P. could fight the Federals in Natal in a sep-
parate contest from that in which it has to fight the National-
ists in the other Provinces. (49)

The Federal Party willingly accepted the challenge of a
separate fight. In keeping with its accent on the importance
of provincial power, it had been laying the groundwork for its
campaign during the past few months. On 26 October 1953, at
the height of the campaign in Berea, the party called for
nominations for candidates in the provincial elections. (50) In
mid-January, a month before the election date was announced,
the Natal Provincial Executive of the Federal Party met to
formulate the details of the platform on which the party would
fight. The executive took the seven principles of the party,
and compressed them into six basic priorities, which were to

44. They were translated by B. Batchelor. Batchelor in
an interview.
be dealt with in public speeches. It was stressed by the executive that, although the campaign should depend 'principally' on these six priorities, other issues of interest could be discussed. (51)

The first of the six basic priorities was the 'Revival of the "Torch Spirit"'. (52) Here, the party urged that it be impressed on the electors that the Federal Party was the political 'expression' of the idealism of the Torch Commando. (53) In support of this claim, it was pointed out that the party had been founded by twenty National Executive members of the Torch Commando. (54) The circular continued by giving a history of the turbulent relationship between the Torch Commando and the U.P., stressing the Torch Commando's adherence to the Natal Stand and the U.P.'s refusal to support the idea. After the general election, the Torch Commando had to choose between abandoning the Natal Stand and forming a new political party. Thus, the Federal Party could claim to be the 'spiritual inheritor' of the Torch Commando. (55)

In view of the importance placed by the National Executive of the Federal Party on propagating the idea that the party was the 'spiritual inheritor' of the Torch Commando, it is strange that the Federal candidates did not stress this. In the manifestos of three candidates which have survived, (56) no claim of descent from the Torch Commando is made and, in fact, only one of the three candidates, Derek Heaton Nicholls, mentions the Torch Commando at all - and he did so only in passing. (57) Similarly, among the general pamphlets issued by the Federals which are extant, none deals with the Federal Party as heir to the Torch Commando, nor is there evidence that such a pamphlet existed. Most surprising, in the extensively

52. Ibid., p.1.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid., p.2.
56. A.C. Martin in Umbilo, C. Kinsman in Durban North and D. Heaton Nicholls in Zululand.
reported speeches of the Federal Party candidates, the whole question of the formation of the party and the Torch Commando never once appeared. The major exception occurred at a mass rally two days before the election, when the Federal leaders, the two senators and Ford, none of whom was a candidate of the link between the Federal Party and the Torch Commando. (58) Otherwise, the only occasions when the issue was raised was when Mitchell accused the Federal leaders of exploiting the Commando for their own ends, (59) and when de Villiers Graaff made the same accusation. (60) The Federal candidates left these accusations unanswered.

The second priority of the Federal Executive was stated as being the necessity of convincing the electorate that a republic would bring disaster upon South Africa. The Federal Executive saw the fight against the republic as a matter, not of sentimentality but of 'dire necessity'. (61) This was because it was felt that South Africa could not survive ten years as a republic. The United Nations would increase its pressure and because of its small White population, the country would succumb. In addition, the creation of a republic would lead to a collapse of overseas business confidence and subsequent widespread ruin. As important, 'wide-spread' disorders concerning the Black population could be expected. (62) Quite apart from these dangers, a republic would not be free and democratic but would be created simply to entrench Afrikanerdom. The Federal Executive argued that to counter 'swart-gevaar' which had accounted for Nationalist successes in the past, the fear of a republic could now be used against the government. (63)

In the course of their campaigns, the Federal candidates accordingly, like Martin in the Berea by-election, held up the picture of a future republic as both ruinous and frightening.

62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
Selwyn Greene, Federal candidate for Durban Point, used the arguments as devised by the executive (64) whereas Brian Ross concentrated on the economic consequences of the declaration of a future republic. He envisaged all business as becoming either 'nationally orientated' or ceasing to exist. (65) This would lead, in Ross's view, to an almost complete takeover of business by Nationalists in their 'Broederbond republic'. (66) The phrase, 'Broederbond republic' was now commonly used by the Federals. It was used not only in speeches (67) and in press advertisements (68) but also on street posters. In its efforts to instil fear of the secret Broederbond into the voters, the party issued two posters of a whip-carrying, hooded figure. In one poster it peered over the Drakensberg and, in the other, it advanced on a school. (69) The link with the National Party and a future republic was obvious. Apart from making protests against the reference to schools on the one poster, (70) the U.P. did not take issue with the Federals on the type of republic to be created by the Nationalists.

The third priority was designated as 'The Natal Stand against the institution of a Republic' (71) The executive's directive stated flatly that there was no way in which the South African government could, in terms of the South Africa Act, establish a republic. No matter what its majority, such action would amount to 'Political Revolution'. (72) The Federal Party would only accept the establishment of a republic if, the Union were first dissolved into its four 'contracting' parties (the four provinces), (73) whereafter a new national convention

64. Natal Mercury: 29 April 1954.
72. Ibid., p.4.
73. Ibid.
would have to be convened, at which each province would have to agree to enter the new republic. The executive frankly admitted that it was demanding the impossible and that it would 'never come about'.(74) It therefore set out the course of action it would follow in the event of its gaining control of the Natal Provincial Council and a republic being declared. It would 'refuse' to be party to the 'political revolution' and would 'adhere to the Act of Union under the Crown'.(75) It would declare the Provincial Council to be the 'governing authority' of Natal and appeal for international recognition.(76) Finally, it would work for the creation of a large federation in southern Africa under the Crown. The executive stressed that the Natal Stand was a 'deterrent' to the republicans and was designed to force them to drop their republican aims.(77) The only alternative was to accept the republic with all its envisaged disasters.

It is not surprising that the question of the Natal Stand, became, together with the related issue of republicanism, what General Selby described as the 'main provincial election issue'.(78) The Federal Party candidates maintained, in conformity with the executive's suggestions, that they repudiated a republic in any shape or form and that Natal had a full legal and moral right to remain outside any republic.(79) In addition, they maintained that Natal had the economic resources to do so.(80)

In order to present its views on the Natal Stand more effectively, the Federal Party issued a special pamphlet entitled

74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
The Natal Stand - Past and Present. (81) This maintained that it was 'Natal's Stand' which had restrained the Nationalists ever since the flag controversy of 1927. (82) The pamphlet then faithfully reproduced the party's Provincial Executive's views regarding the province's position should a republic be declared. The pamphlet ended with the slogan: 'Vote for the Federal Party and Veto a Republic'. (83)

In order to contrast its own view with that of the U.P. on the Natal Stand and the republican issue, the Federals issued a separate pamphlet entitled The United Party and the Republic (84) With its own position well known, the Federals called on the people of Natal not to place trust in the U.P. as clause 2(d) in its constitution permitted republican propaganda within the party. As a result, the U.P. was portrayed as being hopelessly divided on the issue and as trying to hide its inefficient stand on the republic behind a 'cloak of legality'. (85) It did this by maintaining that it would accept the decision of the courts on the legality of a future republic. The U.P. had, in Federal eyes, been manoeuvred into this position by 'Big Business' which was anxious for compromise because large profits depended upon political peace, and by pro-Nationalists within the party's ranks, who, because of the party's bleak electoral hopes, hoped for coalition with the Nationalists. (86)

The U.P. was, in fact, in a very vulnerable position. Its difficulty stemmed from the fact that its support ranged from English-speaking royalists to Afrikaner republicans. The party was fundamentally anti-republican, and had expressed a preference for the existing constitutional position, but retained clause 2(d) in its constitution because it did not wish to

82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
antagonise its non-Nationalist republican supporters.

Although there are no figures to indicate how many republicans supported the U.P., there is evidence to suggest that, at this stage, the Nationalists by no means possessed the monopoly of republican support. This point is illustrated by the fact that the Torch Commando in the southern Free State, while being strongly anti-Nationalist, was also pro-republican.(87) With the Nationalists appealing successfully to the Afrikaner sentiment for a republic, it is not surprising, therefore, that at its Natal Congress in November 1953 the U.P. refused to rescind clause 2(d). (88)

On the other hand, the U.P. could not alienate its English-speaking supporters by appearing hesitant and undecided. The republican issue aroused passions amongst the English-speakers, who feared a republic not only as an Afrikaner creation, but as an authoritarian one, based on the republican draft constitution which had been published in 1942. The U.P. thus had to stress its link to, and support of, the Crown and Commonwealth, or risk losing English-speaking support, especially in Natal. And Natal was, after all, the only province in which the U.P. enjoyed the support of the overwhelming majority of the voters.

In the 1954 provincial elections, the U.P. sought an answer to its dilemma by simultaneously adopting a number of different approaches. First, it maintained that the whole question of the imminence of a republic had been grossly exaggerated. In question-and-answer pamphlets designed to assist U.P. candidates and canvassers (but significantly not in a statement or pamphlet issued on behalf of the whole party), the republican support was described as being 'overestimated', (89) and as being a 'bogey', which did not have the support of even

half of the Nationalists. (90)

Second, while denying the importance of the republic as an issue, the U.P. attempted to convey the idea that clause 2(d) was not really designed to facilitate republican propaganda at all. It quoted Strauss as stating that the U.P.'s constitution was opposed to a republic. (91) A clause similar to clause 2(d) had appeared in the constitution of the old South African Party and neither Heaton Nicholls nor the Unionists had ever seen this as advocating republicanism. (92) One of its candidates went so far as to maintain that he had never heard of a U.P. member supporting republicanism. (93) The U.P. even attempted to liken itself to the Royal Society (94) and the British Empire League (95) in allowing free speech and thought on the issue of constitutional change. (What it did not dwell on was that it was a political party whereas the other two organisations were not.) Like the attempt to defuse republicanism, this attempt at negating the importance of clause 2(d) was not put out as the party's considered opinion, but was supplied to candidates and canvassers. In this way, the U.P. hoped that the ideas would reach the electorate without implicating the party as a whole.

The U.P.'s third ploy was to associate itself with the June 1952 Durban rally by publishing a pamphlet which reproduced the oath next to a photograph of the crowd. The pamphlet then stated that the U.P. was an anti-republican party and, that in fact it was the only party strong enough to 'uphold this vow'. (96) In promising to uphold the constitution,

the U.P. clearly meant this in a legal sense, not the secessionist defiance of the Federal Party. The pamphlet then went on to make it clear that it was not attacking Afrikaners, and praised Afrikaners for their support in World War II as well as for their support of the U.P. Despite these pro-Afrikaner gestures, the U.P. attempted, as with the clause 2(d) dispute, to conceal its views from Afrikaner Nationalists. It was decided at a candidates’ meeting that this pamphlet would not be sent to Nationalists.

The U.P.’s fourth response was to introduce the idea of a separate Natal referendum on the republican question. This idea had at first been suggested by Heaton Nicholls the previous year. E. Grantham M.E.C., the U.P. candidate for Zululand, supported by J. Hamilton Russell (M.P. Wynberg) announced that Natal had the ‘right’ to hold a separate referendum to determine the views of its voters on a republic. Hamilton Russell saw the idea as being the essence of the Natal Stand and suggested that the candidates should not really be fighting a provincial election, but should be organising a referendum to ‘tell’ the government the feelings of the people. Mitchell, as U.P. provincial leader, felt that the whole idea of a separate referendum was unnecessary, as the U.P. was opposed to a republic in any event. This view was supported by the U.P.’s Natal publicity section. The U.P.’s vulnerability to Federal propaganda on the republican issue however, forced the party to support the plea for a separate referendum at a meeting of U.P. provincial election candidates. It was unanimously agreed that the U.P. support the view that a repub-

97. Ibid.
99. Vide supra: Ch. 3, p.42.
102. DM/P:D. Mitchell to J. Freed, 10 May 1954.
lic should be determined directly either by the electorate in a special referendum, or by the calling of a national convention. The candidates further agreed that Natal had a 'moral' right to express her wishes separately on this issue, and that the U.P. pledge itself to set up the machinery to hold such a referendum. (104) The party then reiterated its promise to take every 'legal and constitutional' step to prevent the introduction of a republic. (105) In these resolutions, the U.P. made as strong a stand as it could. It was forced into doing this by pressure from the Federals. The fact that its position was a compromise and that it did not assert that Natal possessed legal rights, meant that its position was weak and could in future be exploited by the Federals.

The fifth approach used by the U.P. to tackle the republican issue was to move onto the offensive and attack the Federals' stand. Sir de Villiers Graaff declared in Pietermaritzburg that, if a republic were introduced legally and declared so by the courts, it would then be clear that the Federal talk of resistance would be illegal. (106) This was a telling point, considering the Federals' attacks on the Nationalists for their alleged disregard of the courts on the Coloured franchise issue. The only counter which the Federals could suggest to their candidates was to attack anyone who broached the matter in public as a paid U.P. official and to stress that the Federals were more interested in 'moral and constitutional' issues than in 'trick legalistics'. (107)

The fourth priority of the Federal Party, as drawn up by the party's Natal Executive, was the federal plan for South Africa. At first sight it is strange, in view of the party's name, that federation should be relegated to the fourth priority in so vital an election. The answer lies in the imminence of the Nationalist threat as perceived by the Federal Party. With Afrikaner nationalism dominant, confident

105. Ibid.
107. U.F.P. (Natal): Splitting the Vote -
and moving inexorably in the direction of a republic, long-
term plans, such as federation, had to give way to more urgent
priorities.

The issue of federation enjoyed a low priority not only
in the minds of the party executive but also in the opinions
of the candidates. Little was made by the Federal candidates
of the question, and the U.P. did not pay much attention to
the subject either. The Federals did, however, issue a pamph­
let entitled Federation for a Greater South Africa which
pointed out that the party supported both Union (in the sense
of the four provinces being united in one country) and federa­
tion (as a desirable system of government). The pamphlet
then listed eight advantages of federation. The whole tone
of the pamphlet was thoughtful and non-aggressive and was in
keeping with the unemotional nature of constitutional theory.

An additional reason why federation was not a major issue
in the election was that it was completely overshadowed by other
issues such as the Natal Stand, the controversy over education;
the alleged malfunctioning of the education department, and the
infiltration of C.N.E. into Natal schools. These were the
Natal Executive's fifth priority in the election. The state of
the Education Department was described as 'deplorable', and
the Nationalists were seen as forcing 'their' ideology onto
'our' schools via 'their' cultural societies.

The view of education in Natal held by the Federal Party's
executive was fully endorsed in the detailed Memorandum on
Educational Policy which was published by the party's education
committee on 24 January 1954. This view, especially as
regards C.N.E., was further supported in the confidential notes
which were to be read in conjunction with the Memorandum.

109. Ibid.
For details of the Education Committee, vide supra: Ch. 4. p.73.
The Memorandum was highly critical of the Education Department and charged that its senior officials were appointed by a government-influenced Public Service Commission. It further charged that the department was bureaucratic, dictatorial and secretive and was unresponsive to pupils' needs, examination difficulties, staff shortages and school building requirements. In addition, the department was accused of favouring 'one language group' in its promotions and of allowing the schools to be 'infected' by C.N.E. (112) In contrast to these weaknesses in the department, the Federals proposed to institute an Educational Advisory Council, to be appointed in Natal by the provincial authorities. This council, which would represent a wide range of interested parties, would combat the bureaucratization of education, rectify the system of teacher promotion, eliminate C.N.E., and encourage the private schools to continue their good work. The party also wished to see Zulu introduced as a school subject; it opposed university segregation and favoured the restoration of Black education to the provinces. (113)

The appendices to the Memorandum gave details of the disproportionate number of Afrikaners in senior posts in the Education Department and quoted from the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge (F.A.K.) to support its claim of C.N.E. infiltration in Natal's schools. (114)

The confidential notes accompanying the Memorandum amplified, and in some cases clarified, the points raised in the Memorandum. For example, further details of the strides allegedly made by C.N.E. in Natal schools were given, while examples of distorted history taught in the schools were cited. (115) Where the Memorandum had spoken of 'one language group' being discriminated against, the notes bluntly headed a section Scales weighed against English-speaking teachers and proceeded to attack the system of bilingual testing used by the department. (116)

112. Ibid., pp. 2-3.
113. Ibid., pp. 1-6.
114. Ibid., pp. 6-8.
116. Ibid., p. 7.
To convey all these criticisms, opinions and policies to the general public, the Federal Party issued two pamphlets; one entitled Your Child and the Future and the other headed Do You Know What Christian National Education Means? The first pamphlet listed ten points on what was wrong with Natal's education system and, parallel to the ten points, it also listed the ten remedies advocated by the Federal Party. (117) The second pamphlet quoted from F.A.K. documents to show that C.N.E. represented Afrikaner Nationalist ideology and then likened the whole C.N.E. ideal to that of Nazi Germany. (118)

The U.P. did not publish pamphlets to refute the Federal's argument. Instead, it issued notes to its candidates, who could then use them as the occasion required. These notes were detailed refutations of the Federal stand and dealt with the Memorandum paragraph by paragraph, as well as adding supplementary material. While it is true that some of the Federal charges could not easily be proved, the U.P. contention that they were 'wild' (119) rang a little false when the refutation of these 'wild' statements were themselves often vague, polemical or completely false. (120) For example, in reply to the question of the lack of promotion for English-speaking teachers, the U.P. documents argued that as eighty-four of the one hundred and seventy-two Natal schools used Afrikaans as a medium of instruction, the fact that half the posts from headship upwards were held by Afrikaners was 'reasonable'. (121) What they omitted to state was that sixty of the eighty-four schools mentioned were not Afrikaans medium schools but were bilingual.

with Afrikaners heading thirty-six of these schools, including twenty schools in which English-speaking children were in the majority. (122)

It was apparent to the Federals that they had fastened on a highly emotive issue on which they could attack the U.P. Martin, who had brought up the C.N.E. issue in the Berea election the previous year, (123) launched a scathing attack on the Education Department in a speech at Empangeni in March 1954. (124) The result of this attack was the appointment by the U.P. controlled Natal authorities of the Jarvis Commission of Inquiry to investigate allegations against the Education Department. The Commission sat for two years and exonerated the educational authorities from all blame; (125) but the Federal Party regarded the commission simply as a ruse to save the U.P. from embarrassment in the election. On 3 April a delegation of Federal Party leaders met the Administrator of Natal in an attempt to have the appointment of the commission postponed. This was because, as Selby pointed out, the Natal Provincial Executive Committee members were candidates in the election. The appointment of the commission therefore '... could only be to their political advantage.' (126) The Federals also objected to the terms of reference of the commission. They were seen as being too narrow, excluding such questions as the promotion of teachers, bilingualism tests and the teaching of history, (127) - all areas in which the Federals saw the interests of the English-speaking as being sacrificed to those of Afrikaners and their nationalism. The Administrator refused to allow either the postponement of the appointment of the commission, or the extension of its terms of reference. (128) The Federals felt that

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122. U.F.P. (Natal): Government Parallel Medium Schools, 9 June 1954. This contradicted list supplied details of the language medium of the school as well as the home language of the pupils, principal and vice-principal.

123. Vide supra: Ch. 5. p. 93.


they had been cheated of some of their most powerful election ammunition. The issues of bilingualism, promotion and the teaching of history, it was true, were not within the terms of reference of the Jarvis Commission but they involved the actions of provincial officials who were being investigated and were thus sub judice. Martin held that his campaign had been largely undermined(129) and the rest of the party saw the effects of the commission as 'muzzling'.(130)

The sixth and last priority set out by the Natal Executive of the Federal Party was the issue of non-White policy. It stated that at root the party aimed to replace 'antagonism with co-operation' and felt that control of non-White policy by the provinces would facilitate this.(131) The details of non-White policy were contained in a Statement of Non-European Policy which was issued by the Federal Party at its congress on 24 March 1954.(132) This policy was, as has been discussed, described as the 'immediate' policy of the party, as it was claimed that it was impossible to devise a non-White policy for 'all-time'.(133) The policy statement was divided into four sections dealing with the non-Whites in the towns, the rural areas, in industry and in the 'organs of the government'.(134) The first two sections dealt mainly with social, housing and land problems, while the third promised complete freedom of employment to all races. It was, however, the fourth section, that dealing mainly with the franchise, that was to cause most difficulties for the party. The Federals wished to maintain Black representation in the Senate and to extend this right to Indians.(135) Further, they wished to grant all race groups representation in the Provincial Council. Most controversial of all was the idea that people of all races should be allowed, subject to certain provisions, to vote on a common roll.(136)

129. Interview with A.C. Martin.
132. Vide supra: Ch.4. pp. 73-74.
133. Ibid.
134. Ibid.
135. Ibid., p.3.
136. Ibid., p.5.
No details of the provisions were published at the time, it being left to the future to devise the exact terms of the common franchise. (137)

The Federal Party candidates presented their non-White policy with confidence and vigour. Led by Selby, who declared that the race issue was the 'most urgent' (138) and the 'most vital' (139) facing South Africa, the non-White policy was expounded from nearly every Federal platform. Of all the Federal policies, this was clearly the least popular. Most newspapers and political commentators had commented on the problems of a Natal-based political party advocating a relatively liberal race policy, (140) and the U.P. was quick to take advantage. It issued a circular to all its candidates impressing on them that the party did not accept the principle of direct political representation for non-Whites. (141) Having thus protected his party from attack, Mitchell, realising the weakness of the Federals, again and again stressed the dangers of the Federal policy to a nervous and receptive electorate. (142) His campaign culminated in a scathing attack on the Federals' race ideas when he said that English and Afrikaans-speakers might have to fight 'shoulder to shoulder' in the future as both were 'White men in a Black man's country'. (143) This representation of the Federals cast in the role of traitors to the White cause, was not dissimilar from the attack made on the Federals' race policy by Die Burger, the Nationalist Party's organ in the Cape. (144) Realising the appeal of the U.P.'s

142. Interview with D. Mitchell.
144. Rand Daily Mail: 30 March 1954.
attack, which completely defeated some Federal candidates in argument. (145) Heaton Nicholls attempted, just before the election, to present the aim of the policy as being 'European survival'. (146) Even Selby, despite his early enthusiasm, did not mention non-Whites in a major speech in Durban the week before the election. (147) The damage had been done.

Apart from its attacks on the Federal Party's race policies and its attitude towards a republic sanctioned by the courts, the U.P. fought a defensive campaign against the Federals. In a 'policy statement' drawn up to assist candidates in composing their manifestos, the U.P. expressed no new ideas or policies. On provincial issues it advised its candidates to inform the voters of the benefits of U.P. rule in the past and to ask them for their support in the future. (148) The somewhat cumbersome party slogan suggested was: 'Let the United Party which has laid such sure foundations continue to build on them for the future of Natal'. (149) This same concentration on provincial matters was apparent in the U.P.'s principal election pamphlet which was entitled Natal's Fruitful Years under U.P. Administration. It emphasised U.P.'s 'achievements' in the areas of education, hospitals, housing and roads. (150)

As regards wider national issues, candidates were advised to state that they were anti-republican and that the party was pledged to uphold the constitution. The slogan suggested here was: 'Stand firm. With the United Party there is no surrender'. (151) Apart from the U.P.'s Natal Stand pamphlet, which has already been discussed, two pieces of U.P. propaganda were published. The first, was the Workers Charter booklet. This set out the U.P.'s attitude to the White workers and was used extensively in the White working class areas of Durban. Fourteen thousand

149. Ibid.
copies were distributed in the Greyville, Congella, Umlazi and Umhlatuzana constituencies, so as to capitalise on the strong labour traditions of these localities. (152) The second, was a news sheet entitled Election News, of which 35 000 were distributed on the day of the election. (153) The theme of this newsheet was that the Federal Party was politically irrelevant and that all it would do was help polarise the two main White language groups. (154)

In arranging their election campaign, the Federals devoted considerable thought and effort to organising the party's strategy because they realised that the view the voters would have of them would depend as much on the party's public image as on its formal election platform. The Federals were however, easily outmanoeuvred by the more experienced U.P. For example, early in the campaign, Selby, who appeared to be emerging as the major figure in the Federal party after Heaton Nicholls, suggested confidentially that certain policies, especially education, be held in reserve until midway through the campaign. (155) After the education issue had been broached, the U.P. administration appointed the Jarvis Commission and the carefully laid plan of Selby went awry.

Apart from the problem of timing its presentation of issues, the Federals faced the problem of whether to conclude an election pact with any of the other parties. A rumoured pact with the weak Labour Party was rejected out of hand. (156) The question of a possible pact with the U.P., however, was more complex. There were factors strongly in favour of such an agreement. While it was true that since its inception, the Federals had attacked the U.P. as being half-hearted in its resistance to the Nationalists; it was the Nationalists who remained the principal enemy of the Federals. If the U.P., therefore, could be made to agree to a bolder anti-Nationalist

153. Ibid., p.4.
policy, the Federals were willing to form a pact.

Another major difficulty for the Federals was that they could be accused of splitting the opposition to the Nationalists. As the U.P. had previously received the overwhelming majority of Natal's opposition votes, it was the Federal Party that was seen, by its very existence, as splitting the opposition. The U.P. could claim that it was weakened in its anti-Nationalist fight because it was being forced to divert resources to combat the Federals. (157) The Federals were questioned on this issue 'at every' public meeting. They tried to argue that they were not splitting the opposition but were trying, in fact, to 'create' an opposition. (158) They argued that the U.P. was effete and that the advent of the Federals strengthened and did not weaken the opposition. Despite this, the stigma of having divided opposition remained so strong that the Federals were not even able to capitalise on the advantage which a third party can have in politics: that of selling its support, on terms, to one of the other parties. Both the Natal Mercury and the Natal Witness, who frequently reflected Federal thinking, constantly urged such an agreement against the common enemy. (159)

The U.P., however, would be unlikely to favour such a pact, especially if it would have to make concessions (which appeared to be the case). The U.P. had, after all, to consider the effect of such a pact on the other provinces. Also, it was the incumbent party and therefore acted from a position of strength. An example occurred in the Weenen constituency. Here, the Federals attempted to coerce the U.P. candidate, Colonel Cochrane, into answering a number of questions by threatening to withhold their votes in a straight United Party - Nationalist contest. (160) The Federals believed that they held the balance of

power but this was not really the case. To abstain or to support the Nationalist was not a possibility for the Federals in view of the 'splitting the vote' cry, and so Colonel Cochrane called their bluff and did not even bother to reply to the questions.

With no anti-Nationalist pact possible, the Federals had to fight in the Nationalist-held northern Natal seats. This would maintain the Federals' credibility as an opponent of the 'common enemy' while it fought the U.P. in the rest of Natal. The problem lay in the fact that the Federals could not risk an opposition candidate failing to capture a Nationalist seat because of their intervention. They therefore offered to fight in three northern Natal constituencies, provided the U.P. remained outside the contest. The U.P., realising the Federal dilemma, did not even reply to the offer.

The results of the election (in contrast to Federal expectations) was a triumph for the U.P. Of the twenty-five seats, the U.P. won twenty-one and the Nationalists won the remaining four seats. The Nationalists narrowly carried the new seat of Weenen, by 162 votes, but, as the former seat of Umvoti covered much the same area and was held by the U.P., this could be considered a Nationalist gain. There were no other gains or losses by the parties and the strengths of the parties in the new Provincial Council were, except for that one extra seat gained by the Nationalists, the same as in the old council. All the minor parties, including the Federal Party, were completely routed, with none of them even approaching a majority in any of the constituencies.

An analysis of the election figures underlines the enormity of the Federal Party defeat. The party polled 20,519 votes

or some 20.4 per cent. of the total ballots cast. Against this, the U.P. secured 62,530 votes (62.1 per cent.), the Nationalists polled 14,490 votes (14.4 per cent.) and the remaining 3,227 votes (3.1 per cent.) were cast for the Labour and Liberal Parties and an Independent. It is significant that the U.P. polled over three times as many votes in Natal as did the Federal Party and, even if only the seventeen constituencies which the Federal Party fought are considered, the U.P. vote was still over twice as large as that of the Federals. (165) The highest percentage of votes which any Federal candidate obtained was the 38.5 per cent. which Brickhill received in the Berea seat. There were, however, six other seats in which the Federals obtained more than a third of the vote. (166)

The result stunned the Federal Party. After so much effort, enthusiasm and hope it saw all its hopes dashed. The shock of defeat is best gauged by the reaction of the Federal leaders. The party’s Provincial Executive described the election results as a ‘temporary setback’, deducing from the results a ‘mandate’ to continue its existence. (167) This was a modest enough thought in view of the party’s former confidence. Hughes Mason tried to draw a parallel between the Federals and the Churchill group in Britain in the 1930’s (168) but this idea was not taken up by the other Federals. Heaton Nicholls, in a dignified statement, resigned his position in the Senate as he felt that he had no right to speak on behalf of the Natal people. He expressed the mood of the Federals accurately when he said that they were ‘very disappointed’; (169) more so because the 43,000 Torchmen in Natal had not supported

165. 43 864 as against 20 519.
166. Pietermaritzburg South, Durban Central, Point, Drakensberg, Zululand and Umkomaas.
Cape Times: 21 June 1954.
the party. (170)

In analysing why the Federal Party was defeated, the country's press supplied a variety of reasons. The pro-
Federal Natal Witness attributed the U.P. triumph to the fact that it was 'safe', 'familiar', and 'conservative' and had a large reservoir of 'stubborn loyalty' on which to draw. (171) Other newspapers saw in the Federal defeat the fact that a new South Africanism had developed in Natal and that the province was not prepared to stand on its own. (172) Others interpreted the result as showing that the Natal voters felt that the U.P. was the only real alternative to the Nationalists. (173) As regards the future, there was widespread press comment favouring some sort of reconciliation between the U.P. and the Federals. (174) Mitchell offered this but the Federals set such demanding and uncompromising terms that the U.P. was forced to reject them and any hope of healing the rift between the two parties seemed hopeless. (175)

The full reasons for the Federal Party defeat in the provincial elections were complex, and numerous. From one point of view it can be explained in terms of the failure of the Federal candidates and party in managing the election campaign.

The Federal candidates were, in the main, attractive candidates and were even praised by a hostile press. (176) Of the thirteen candidates whom it has been possible to trace, eight were professional people, three were sugar farmers, one was a businessman and one was the distinguished trade unionist Jimmy Bolton. Only two of the candidates were over sixty while

   19 June 1954.
seven of them were under forty. (177) But, they were inexperienced, were not professional politicians and lacked the skill required to manage an election campaign. They arranged a number of impressive public meetings, drawing up to 3000 people to a single rally. (178) In order to achieve this, they squandered their resources on non-essentials such as 'pamphlet raids' and hundreds of personal invitations. (179) The U.P., by contrast, devoted its resources not only to the obvious and showy dimensions of the campaign, but also to vital 'behind-the-scenes' activity as well. For example, the U.P. candidates were kept extremely well informed by the highly efficient Candidates' Publicity Section in Durban. This group issued literature advising candidates on issues ranging from a detailed refutation, clause by clause, of the Federals pamphlets and education policy to information on the Statute of Westminster and on the problems of immigration. (180)

The Federal leaders tended to function on impressions rather than on hard facts. A good example of this is the expectation of the party as regards the provincial election results. The Federals were confident of a very good poll, with the party winning seven seats on the Natal coast with two others as 'possibilities', as well as a 'fair chance' in the three Pietermaritzburg seats and Drakensberg. (181) These claims were hopelessly at variance with the true facts and were made despite the detailed canvassing which had been carried out. They suggest a high degree of amateurishness in politics. (182)


180. The papers of the Candidates' Publicity Section are filed unnumbered as yet, in the Douglas Mitchell Collection, U.P. Archives, Unisa.

181. The seven coastal seats were Durban North, Point, Greyville, Umbilo, Berea, Essenwood and Umkomaas. The two 'possibilities' were Durban Central and Gardens. The three Pietermaritzburg seats were Pietermaritzburg North, Pietermaritzburg South and Pietermaritzburg District. Natal Witness: 16 June 1954, 18 June 1954. Rand Daily Mail: 22 June 1954. The gist of these reports were confirmed by D. Heaton Nicholls and E.G. Ford in interviews.

182. This view was fully supported by D. Heaton Nicholls and E.G. Ford in interviews.
The Natal electorate had seen the Nationalists win two general elections in a row and even increase their majority in the second election. They had seen the Torch Commando, with its vast human and financial resources, defeated and so could not believe that the Federal Party could succeed where the Torch Commando had failed. It is true that the U.P. had also been defeated in the country at large by the Nationalists but they, unlike the Federals, had a chance, no matter how distant, of replacing the Nationalists. In addition, as the Natal Witness pointed out, the U.P. was 'safe' and, at a time when English-speaking Natal felt threatened on all sides, safety was a quality which could be valued. The demographic and political facts of South African political life indicated clearly that the English-speakers were to be a powerless minority if they chose to clash with the Afrikaners and that they could only achieve power in co-operation with some, at least, of this group. The fact, as the Natal Daily News pointed out, that the eight almost exclusively Natal parties which had functioned since Union had all been completely unsuccessful, was not lost on the voters. English-speaking Natal could not stand alone politically and it was not so much that these voters willingly accepted Afrikaners and a broader South Africanism, as some of the press suggested, but rather that they bowed to the inevitability of their own political weakness.

The U.P. was accepted not only because it was a national, bilingual organisation but also because it convinced the Natal electorate that it was the only possible choice for Natal. Whereas Die Transvaler had asked in June 1953 whether South Africa was to experience an 'Ulster' in Natal. (184) The Times was able to answer at the end of 1954 that 'The province [Natal] is not an Ulster'. (185) In this The Times was right.

The defeat of the Federal Party in Natal was to have far-reaching effects. It was to discourage the Cape and Transvaal

184. Vide supra: Ch. 5. pp.89-90.
Federals from even entering their provincial elections and was to have a profound effect on the whole of the federal movement in South Africa. The movement was forced to change its whole approach to implementing its ideals, as the obvious route via the Natal provincial elections had been so conclusively closed. It had to take stock of its organisation, priorities and policies and to consider what steps it would take to face a militant, confident and triumphant Afrikaner nationalism.
PART 11

THE DECLINE AND DEMISE OF THE FEDERAL PARTY
CHAPTER SIX

A CHANGE OF APPROACH

After losing the Natal provincial elections in June 1954, the Federal Party changed its modus operandi. The reasons for these changes were numerous. Organisational changes stemmed from a realisation of some of the causes of electoral defeat, while policy changes were partly for reasons of propaganda and public appeal and were partly reactions to developments in South African politics generally and particularly in the Nationalist Party.

As has been discussed, the Federals had been confident of winning a number of seats in the Natal provincial elections. When the party failed to gain even a single seat in the elections, they were forced to revise their entire image, their hopes and their organisation. It was now clear that, as they could not claim to speak for Natal; or even for English-speaking Natal, the climb to power would be a long and arduous task that would require more expertise, effort and organisational ability than had at first been thought necessary. 'We were spread far too wide over the province, we were too thin on the ground and we were political amateurs', said Ford of the 1954 elections in later years.

The first result of the failure of the party in the Natal provincial elections was a decision not to contest similar elections in the other provinces, set for 18 August 1954. Although not yet formally constituted, Federals in the Cape and the Transvaal had announced as early as 3 September 1953 that they were planning to enter the provincial elections. The Transvaal Federals repeated this intention several times. On one occasion they stated that they would contest as many seats in Johannesburg and Pretoria as they could, without giving

1. Vide supra: Ch.5 p.120.
2. Interview with E.G. Ford.
3. Vide supra: Ch.4 p.67.
4. The Argus: 3 September 1953.
the Nationalists an opportunity to win on a split opposition vote. (5) On another occasion, while the Natal Federalists were fighting the provincial elections, the Transvaal party promised to fight its elections to the '... fullest extent of its resources in the province.' (6) This intention continued, even after the results of the Natal election had been publicised. They actually began to consider possible candidates. (7) However, on reflection, the Transvaal party realised that the 'extent of its resources' was far smaller than that of its sister party in Natal, which had been soundly beaten, and that the best course of action was to abstain from the Transvaal elections. (8) Similarly, the Federalists in the Cape announced on 25 June that, in view of the Natal results, they 'might not' fight the provincial elections. The following month they announced that they would not contest any seats.

These decisions not to fight the elections (in the Transvaal and Cape) were followed by a flurry of activity to put the parties on a sounder footing. It had become apparent that efficient organisation was crucial. As has been discussed, (9) the Transvaal party had, after many abortive attempts the previous year, been formally constituted in November 1954, and even began to produce its own newspaper the following year. (10) In the eastern Cape, in addition to new branches being founded, (11) the party was formally constituted in July 1955. (12)

This activity in the two largest provinces was paralleled by a similar burst of organisational energy in Natal, where the

5. Cape Times: 9 September 1953.
9. Vide supra: Ch. 4 p. 67.
10. The Federalist.
12. Vide supra: Ch. 4 p. 67.
party already had more than fifty branches. (13) Here electoral failure was blamed partly on the **Natal Daily News** and the **Natal Mercury**. With one of these against them and the other half-hearted and highly qualified in its support, (14) the Federals did not have an effective news medium in the Durban area, where there was such a large concentration of potential supporters. In order to remedy this, the Federals founded the **Federal News** as the party's official organ in Natal. (15)

It was also clear that enthusiasm and energy alone were not sufficient to win elections. The organisational superiority of the U.P. had been a significant factor in its triumph in the provincial elections. (16) It had not depended on voluntary help, but had used professional workers. This disadvantage the Federals now hoped to counteract by means of the appointment of a full-time organiser, and the creation of an Action Committee. The organiser was to motivate and co-ordinate the party, while the Action Committee was to facilitate greater communication between the members and the leaders, as well as to provide a more effective and immediate response to events than the normal structure of the party permitted. (17)

Before the setback of the provincial elections, the party leaders had not contemplated alliances with other political groups. They made no attempt to co-operate with the Liberals and in May 1954 strongly denied rumours of an election pact with the Labour Party. (18) They never explored the possibility of a pact with the U.P. as it was clear that the only conditions under which such a pact could be concluded was for the U.P. to alter its policy. In June their first reaction was to reject Mitchell's immediate post-election appeal for a 'common front', by demanding a virtual acceptance by the U.P. of the Federal policy. (19) But, once the implications of the 1954 defeat became

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14. **Vide supra**: Ch. 3. p. 57.
15. **Vide supra**: Ch. 4. pp. 81-83.
16. **Vide supra**: Ch. 5. p. 120.
17. **Vide supra**: Ch. 4. pp. 87-88.
18. **Vide supra**: Ch. 5. p. 115.
apparent and the threat of a republic became more real, their attitude began to change.

Early in November 1954, Mitchell held unofficial talks in a private home with Federal Party members of the Hilton area. These talks, arranged by the U.P., were an attempt to eliminate 'misunderstandings' and to formulate a common stand on the republican issue. (20) The Federal leadership, having abandoned its self-contained pre-election stand, was now willing to explore the possibilities of co-operation and after long discussions with Mitchell, an agreement was drawn up by Selby at the beginning of December. (21) However, the hope of establishing a common front broke down over the question of clause 2(d) (22) of the U.P.'s constitution. The Federal Party required that the U.P. in Natal repudiate this clause, while Mitchell maintained that such action was both impossible and unnecessary. (23) Despite their failure, there were a number of significant points about the talks. First, it is noteworthy that they were held at all, considering the previous attitude of the Federals. Second, it was Selby who drew up the agreement, an action which also showed a new willingness to negotiate. Third, the agreement failed only because of the single disagreement over clause 2(d). It is also noteworthy that it was the U.P. and not the Federals who rejected the agreement of December 1954, a reversal of the roles which had been played in June of that year.

As in other matters, (24) the Federals outside Natal followed the lead of the Natalians in attempting to arrange a common front against the government. Within a week of the discussions between Mitchell and the Federals of the Hilton area, at the beginning of November 1954, the Transvaal Federals called for a campaign to rally 'democrats' into a solid anti-republican front. (25) This call led to correspondence between the Transvaal

22. For a discussion of Clause 2(d), vide supra: Ch. 2. p. 32.
Federals and the U.P. The former were keen to hold a joint meeting in Johannesburg to show the government the strength of the opposition to it, and also to make known their arguments against a republic. (26) The latter, however, held that its attitude was well known and that, in view of the 'major differences' between the two parties, no useful purpose would be served by a joint meeting. (27) In truth, the U.P. had no intention of assembling a large group of Johannesburgers in order to allow the tiny Federal group to present its views and, possibly, to embarrass the U.P.

While this change in their organisation was being carried out and while the Federals were showing a new preparedness to co-operate with the other anti-government groups, they also manifested a shift in emphasis in their political thinking. This did not mean the introduction of any radically new ideas. Rather, it involved the de-emphasising of certain policies and the highlighting of others. The reasons for these changes in emphasis were complex and numerous. They were a mixture of expediency, necessity and reaction to the rising tide of republicanism following the provincial elections of 1954.

Any suggestion that expediency was a factor in Federal Party thinking would have horrified most Federal leaders and supporters. The U.P. had always been seen by the Federals as vacillatory and vague - a 'jellyfish' in the words of Selby (28) - or as sly and two-faced in its attempts to be all things to all men. (29) By contrast, the Federals saw themselves as being purposeful and honest and wedded to principles, no matter how inconvenient. (30) In the statement which had launched the party, the words '... the pursuance of principle rather than expediency ...' had given expression to these idealistic feelings. (31)

In South African politics, a principled racial policy could be costly. Yet, the party had presented its policy openly and had fought for it with candour. Now, the party concluded that its non-White policy had been costly (32) and very little public emphasis was placed on it after June 1954. The silence is all the more significant in view of the fact that the parliamentary session in the first half of 1956 was dominated, in the words of the Federal News, by 'measures affecting the non-European ....' (33) This is not to suggest that the Federals changed their policy regarding non-Whites, or abandoned their hopes of dismantling apartheid. It was simply that they, for practical political reasons, decided to postpone the fight on the non-White issue in favour of more immediate questions.

The second reason for a shift in emphasis of Federal policy after June 1954, was one of necessity. An example of this involved the Natal Stand. The Natal Stand emanated from the rally in Durban in June 1952, which had been organised by the Torch Commando. (34) In supporting the Natal Stand, and in arguing for its use in halting the Nationalists, the Federal Party had presumed that it had the support of the bulk of Natal’s voters. The Torch Commando obviously had the support of most enfranchised Natalians, and, in identifying closely with the Torch Commando, the Federals presumed that they too enjoyed this support. This explains both their shock at the results of the provincial elections, and their rapid abandonment of the Natal Stand as their rallying cry. It was clear that for the Natal Stand to be implemented, the Federals would have to have control of the Provincial Council. Only the Council could speak for the people of Natal and keep Natal loyal to the Crown outside any republic declared by the central government. With the U.P. in power, the Natal Stand, as seen by the Federals, was therefore dead as a practical alternative and the party had to abandon it as a major propaganda issue. Instead, it had to concentrate all its efforts on the evils of a republic - and not on Natal’s possible individual stand against it.

32. Vide supra: Ch. 5. pp. 113-4.
34. Vide supra: Ch. 2. pp. 14-16.
This change of emphasis coincided with a number of developments which led to greater emphasis being placed by the governing party on both the role of the Afrikaner in South Africa, and on the dream of a republic. The Federals, ever sensitive to trends within the National Party and ever ready to react against them, immediately emphasised its role as the sole defender of the English-speaking group, and emphasised its anti-republicanism to an even greater extent.

While the 1954 elections were a major setback to the Federal Party, they were a stimulus for the Nationalists who won an additional seat in Natal. This was followed by even greater successes in the elections in the other three provinces on 18 August. The Nationalists won eleven additional seats; one in the Orange Free State, three in the Cape and seven in the Transvaal. For the first time in South Africa's history, one party controlled all the seats in a provincial council (the Nationalists in the Free State). Even more significantly, the U.P., because of the three seats gained by Nationalists, lost control of the Cape Provincial Council. Outnumbered two to one in the Transvaal Provincial Council, and in a decided minority in parliament, the U.P. was reduced to controlling only Natal. The final blow was the fact, admitted by the Federals only in private, that the government had actually captured the support of the majority of the voters. Although it was impossible to prove this conclusively because of the uncontested seats, it was clear that with the tide, as Mitchell admitted, '... running in favour of the Nationalists', if this were not already true, it would soon be so. As the Natal Witness headlined dramatically, it was the Nats' greatest election win in the history of their party.

The impact of the elections on the political parties was immediate. While the U.P. could claim that the result meant that all voters should rally to its colours, the Federals could

35. Weenen. Vide supra: Ch. 5 p. 117.
argue the opposite. (40) Heaton Nicholls stated that the results indicated that the U.P. was moribund and should split into two with one wing joining the Federals, and the other wing joining the Nationalists. The Nationalists, he felt, were now on the path to a one-party, authoritarian state planned by the Broederbond. (41)

Malan's resignation and the succession of Mr. J.G. Strijdom initiated the next stage in the alteration of the South African political scene, for Strijdom's succession heralded a new, more forceful era in Nationalist policy and propaganda. Malan himself would have preferred the more moderate N.C. Havenga as his successor (42) but the party caucus, reflecting the mood of 1954, decided otherwise. Strijdom's assumption of the premiership in December 1954 was to encourage and magnify two trends which had always been present in the National Party but which had not always been at the forefront of the party's propaganda and actions. One was the position of the Afrikaner in South African society, and the other was the question of republicanism. These developments in Nationalist thinking led the Federals to shift their thinking to meet the new challenges.

The first challenge was the question of the Afrikaner in South African society. As has been discussed, the National Party was strongly Afrikaner orientated, a bias which was not diminished by the electoral victories of 1953-54. (43) On the contrary, the party remained, in the words of Professor Gwendolen Carter, 'above all else ... an Afrikaner one' (44) and, although it had a few English-speaking supporters, it functioned at this time almost entirely as an Afrikaner organisation. (45) In fact, its ability to identify itself with the Afrikaner people was, to a large extent the secret of its electoral success. (46) After

41. Ibid., p.237. S. Patterson: op.cit., p.104.
43. Vide supra: Ch. 2. p.9.
44. Carter: op.cit., p.236.
H.W. van der Merwe: op.cit., p.49.
June 1954 the position altered only insofar as the Nationalist spokesmen no longer concealed their ideal of an Afrikaner dominance in South African society. In expressing these views strongly, they appeared to exclude the English-speakers even more vehemently than before.

Strijdom had barely assumed the premiership when, amid foreboding in the British press that South Africa's Commonwealth links and the interests of her English-speaking inhabitants would be sacrificed to Afrikaner interests, the Minister of Justice struck the first blow. He instructed public prosecutors in Natal to refrain from prosecuting offenders who had contravened by-laws which had not been promulgated in Afrikaans. The Minister countermanded the instruction after representation had been made by municipal authorities throughout the province. The issue appears to have involved mainly Durban, and concerned a large body of legislation which had been passed before Union. To translate this enormous body of partly obsolete by-laws into Afrikaans would, as the Federals pointed out, be an enormous task, which would not alter the legal position at all. At the same time, the Federals hastily assured the public that they agreed with bilingualism in principle, and considered that the Minister had acted within his legal rights.

In April Dr. A.J.R. van Rhijn, the Minister of Economic Affairs, made an equally provocative statement. He presented South African politics as being a struggle to the death between 'Nationalist ideology and Imperialism'. The imperialists were defined by Dr. van Rhijn as those who 'had their souls outside the country', whereas the nationalists were those who carried within themselves something which was 'in the heart of the volk'. This 'something' came from the soul of the people,

47. For details of the British press comment on Strijdom's accession to the premiership, vide, Federal News: 31 January 1955.
and was ultimately a 'God-given strength' which was supplied to each nation. (53) As such, 'Nationalism is always right and ... [could] never be wrong.' (54) Armed with this God-given justice, the struggle against imperialism, therefore, ' ... was a fight that had to be fought out until Nationalism controlled every phase of life in the country .... (55)

One of the few areas in South Africa not controlled by the Afrikaner was the economic sector. There were, however, plans to alter this. During the same week that Dr. van Rhijn addressed the Nationalist Youth League in Greytown, Dr. N. Diederichs, in a speech to the Afrikaanse Studentebond, urged that Afrikaners support Afrikaner businesses, and so strengthen what he termed the 'Afrikaner economy'. (56) The Durban Skakelkomitee then issued an Afrikaans Buying Guide to influence Afrikaner spending patterns. (57)

The response of the U.P. to these developments was to go out of its way to stress its 'South Africanism', that is, its idea of English-Afrikaner unity in the interests of a peaceful South Africa. It also stressed its widespread support amongst both language groups. (58) With many of the U.P. leaders themselves Afrikaners, and the constant stress which was now placed on Afrikaners' support, Brickhill accused the U.P. of overworking its Afrikaans members in order to prove that it was 'not racialistic'. (59)


The Federal Party's reaction was more complex. Like the U.P., it had at first attempted to show that it was not anti-Afrikaner and, in fact, enjoyed Afrikaner support. George Heaton Nicholls, for example, maintained that the Federal Party was as bilingual as the U.P. Later, he even offered to pay £100 to anyone who could find an anti-Afrikaner utterance in his parliamentary speeches.\(^{60}\) In order to demonstrate its Afrikaner support, the Federals, like the U.P., overworked their Afrikaner members. The Federals had only two identifiably Afrikaans-speaking members. They were Johan Venter and Willem Conradie, both Transvalers.\(^{61}\) Both men had been on an extensive tour of Natal and the Transvaal addressing public meetings in Johannesburg and Durban at the end of 1953 and in 1954.\(^{62}\) While the Federals remained officially non-ethnic, these Afrikaners found it possible to remain members. Even the fact that Heaton Nicholls had spoken openly of Afrikaner-Calvinist domination in his Services Club speech,\(^{63}\) and the fact that the Federals had claimed that English-speaking teachers were discriminated against in Natal education,\(^{64}\) did not affect their loyalty to the party. One was a personal opinion, and the other was, after all, easily demonstrated.

The complicating factor in the Federal Party's relations with the Afrikaners was that it was committed to defending the rights of the English-speakers. When it was launched, many observers had seen it as an English-speaking reaction against Afrikaner nationalism.\(^{65}\) Nationalists, for example, Die Transvaler, referred constantly to the Federal Party and its supporters as 'jingoes'.\(^{66}\) The Federals denied this for the first eighteen months of their existence. After the 1954 provincial election defeat, however, the Federals did not

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63. Vide supra: Ch. 3. p. 43.
64. Vide supra: Ch. 5. pp. 109-11.
65. Vide supra: Ch. 3. p. 56.
emphasise their commitment to both White language groups, and tended to identify almost exclusively with the cause of the English-speakers. This, in turn, alienated what little Afrikaner support the party had enjoyed. (67)

Selby summed up the new Federal attitude in a speech at Umbilo on 8 November 1955. (68) He stated that the Nationalists had rejected the idea of 'one united free and democratic nation', and worked, instead, to make the Afrikaners a '... separate, distinct self-contained racial bloc, a nation within the nation.' (69)

The final intention of the party was that the 'Afrikaner - not the South African - shall rule South Africa.' (70) Selby saw the Nationalists as indulging in Nazi-type propaganda which was frankly anti-British. (71) He then called on the English-speaking South Africans to rally to oppose the Nationalists. (72)

The new orientation of the Federal Party was similar to the appeal which Heaton Nicholls had made at the Services Club in 1953, but, whereas that had been a personal view before the creation of the Federal Party, the new attitude was now accepted party policy. The Federal News, for instance, stated bluntly, in an article in June 1955: 'We are British; it would be pointless to deny it.' (73) The publication developed the idea the following year by stating that to be 'British' was not to be disloyal to South Africa. (74) In addition, the Federal Party

67. At this time both Venter and Conradie left the party. Conradie informed the author in an interview that the Federals were basically 'jingoess'. The only reason why he, a war veteran and war invalid, had joined the party in 1953 was because it appeared to the only group willing to oppose what he felt to be the Nationalists' totalitarian tendencies. He left the Federal Party when it was clear that they were concerned mainly with English-speaking interests and could not, in any event, halt the Nationalists.

68. A full copy of the speech, handed to the Natal Mercury, is in the possession of Professor W. Kleynhans.

69. Ibid., pp. 4-7.

70. Ibid., p.7. Underlining in the original.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid., pp. 7-9.


began to identify strongly with the wider English-speaking world. Despite Heaton Nicholls' plea at the Federal Party's 1955 congress that 'language is not a political weapon', they now printed two large articles in the Federal News, glorifying the English language and stressing its international links. Soon afterwards, the party attacked a former Director of Education in Natal, Mr. C.M. Booysen, for suggesting that books written in England had an 'alien background'. On the international political scene, the Federals identified strongly with the British during the Suez crisis and disapproved strongly of the South African government's neutral stand in the dispute.

The Federal News then went on to praise the war sacrifices of the English-speakers comparing them with the Afrikaans-speaking community's war effort. It claimed that English-speakers were being discriminated against in the Civil Service, the Defence Force, and on the Railways. Replying to the plea of Nationalist leaders, for a greater economic role for Afrikaners, it argued that the superior financial acumen of the English-speakers was already being exploited by an Afrikaner government through taxation. Finally, in reply to the Durban Skakelkomitee's shopping guide for Afrikaners, the Federal Party issued a Federal Shopping Guide in the interests of the English-speaking businesses.

The second development within the National Party, created by the triumphs in the 1954 provincial elections, and confirmed by Strijdom's assumption of the premiership, was a greater

striving for a republic. It is true that the party had always
nursed this dream, but the issue had not always been dominant.
In 1948 Malan, largely as a result of Havenga’s influence, had
soft-pedalled the issue and had concentrated on the colour
question. (83) His lieutenant, the Transvaal leader of the party,
Strijdom, however, had always been staunchly and uncompromisingly
republican, and had held the ideal before the Afrikaner people. (84)
The decline of Havenga’s influence in the early 1950s, and the
simultaneous rise of Strijdom inspired the republicans to a new
effort.

Throughout the latter half of 1954 there was an ever-increasing press and party battle over the question of a republic. The Star opened the contest. In commenting on the Federal Party defeat in the Natal provincial elections, it carefully separated the defeat of the Federals from any weakening of anti-republicanism amongst the opposition. (85) The Nationalist leaders, it commented, were themselves ‘... sensibly content to regard ...
[their republican] aims as unattainable in present circum-
stances, or at least not to make them a major issue ...’, (86)
So as to underline the unattainability of the republican aim,
The Star supported the idea, first advanced by the Federals, (87)
that each province should hold a separate referendum to decide
whether or not it should enter a proposed republic. (88) Die
Transvaler immediately attacked The Star’s stand by maintaining
that northern Natal, once part of the Transvaal, was deserving
of separate consideration. Furthermore, while many people in
the other three provinces would welcome ridding themselves of
Natal’s ‘jingo and coolie problems’, Natal, in the last analysis,
would choose to remain in a republic rather than be dependent

Muller: op.cit., p.382.
87. Vide supra: Ch. 3. pp. 41-2.
88. Ibid.
on the British government for help. (89) After the Nationalist triumphs in the Cape, Free State and Transvaal elections, Die Transvaler stated, on 21 September, that: 'As the National Party grew even stronger by attracting a growing number of voters, the realisation of the republican ideal had to come more strongly to the foreground.' (90) Republicanism, it announced, was now the 'cornerstone' of the Nationalist policy and endeavours. (91)

Within ten days of Die Transvaler's announcement, the Natal Federal Party assembled for its annual congress. Not surprisingly, it was dominated by the republican issue. Heaton Nicholls, in his opening speech, stated that the Federals existed 'primarily' to fight against being 'driven' into a republic. Resistance against Nationalist republicanism was the 'creed' of the party. (92) He then reiterated the demand for a separate referendum, a call which was then taken up by the congress. (93) Most significantly, the congress decided unanimously that '... resistance to the republic must now take priority over all other issues.' (94) In order to implement the resolution, the Federals pledged themselves to co-operate with all other anti-republican groups. The congress then agreed to establish an anti-republican fund. (95) Selby then closed the congress with a speech which dwelt almost exclusively on the republican issue, and culminated with the cry: 'The Battle of the Republic is on ....' (96)

After this, the Federals were totally committed to fighting the republic. At its foundation, defence of the constitution had involved preventing the Nationalists from tampering

95. Vide supra: Ch. 4. p. 86.
with the Coloured franchise, and defending Natal's rights to remain under the Crown. After 1954, the other issues fell away and the main preoccupation became the defence of the constitution of 1910 itself; the constitution which linked the four provinces together under the Crown and within the Commonwealth.

Shortly after the congress of 1954, the country's two major parties, entered the republican debate, making it the most important issue on the South African political stage. At the opening of the Cape Provincial Congress of the U.P. in East London on 18 October 1954, Strauss delivered a long and detailed speech, giving the U.P.'s view on the country's constitutional position. He stated that the U.P. was a 'Commonwealth Party', and gave reasons, both local and international, why South Africa would profit from continued membership of the Commonwealth under the Crown. (97) This speech formed the basis of the U.P.'s constitutional policy for the future. Within days, Dr. Malan, in reply, had pledged the National Party to attaining a republic, a pledge echoed by the government-supporting newspapers. (98)

The whole republican dispute was again headlined by the statement of the new Prime Minister, Strijdom, within a week of Malan's pledge. In his first appearance as Prime Minister, Strijdom announced that the 'ultimate object' of the National Party was the establishment of a republic. (99) In a well-publicised interview with the London Sunday Times three weeks later, on his trip to Britain, he stated that a republic would not be created during the life of the existing parliament, and would only be established after a referendum or special general election showed that the 'broad will of the people wanted it. (100)

These two statements confirmed the worst fears of the Federal Party. After the failure of the Federal-U.P. attempt

to co-operate, they now launched the Anti-Republican Leagues. The Natal Anti-Republican League (A.R.L.) was launched at a mass rally in the Durban City Hall on 19 April 1955. At this rally, addressed by Selby, Browne and Derek Heaton Nicholls, the public were asked to sign a covenant, enshrining their determination to oppose a republic. The covenant stated that the signatories pledged themselves to defend their positions as citizens of '... a free and self-governing dominion under the Crown ...' and to use '... all means that may be found possible and necessary ...' in defeating the coming of a republic. In addition, the covenant demanded a separate referendum for Natal and pledged a refusal to recognise any republic which failed to comply with this demand.

While the purpose and objects of the Anti-Republican Leagues were clear and definite, their relations with the country's political parties, and their place in the South African political spectrum, was not quite so obvious. In the first instance, they claimed to be non-party organisations. In his first announcement to the press, on the formation of the Natal A.R.L., Selby described it as being 'non-party', a claim which the league was to make on many occasions. Similar claims were also made by the leagues of the Cape and Transvaal. Neutrality was regarded as being essential for,

101. Vide supra: Ch. 6, p. 127.
105. Ibid.
only if the Anti-Republican Leagues were strictly non-party, could they act as a 'bridge' between the Federals and the U.P. and so unite anti-republican opposition. (109)

The three Anti-Republican Leagues, despite their claims to the contrary, were creations of the Federal Parties. In addition, they reflected in detail the ideas and thoughts of those parties. The rally launching the Natal A.R.L., for example, was arranged by the Provincial Executive of the Federals which 'gave its consent' to the league's appeal for anti-republican unity and was addressed, as has been mentioned, by three prominent Federals. In addition, much of the early work in the Natal league was done by the Federal Party's paid organiser, to the detriment of the party's interests. (110) Similarly, the launching of the Cape and Transvaal leagues, were 'sponsored' by the Federal Party, addressed only by leading Federals (111) and, like their Natal counterpart, reflected Federal thinking. The close parallel in thinking between the Federals and the Anti-Republican Leagues, can also be seen in the fact that the leagues adopted the most distinctive structural feature of the Federal Party, its provincialism. The dominance of Natal, already a feature of the Federal Party, (112) was also reproduced in the leagues, with Natalians being present and assisting with the formation of the Transvaal and Cape organisations. (113)

Not surprisingly, the Anti-Republican Leagues used very similar arguments to those of the Federals in opposing a republic. Like the Federal Party they argued that the Nationalists were unbeatable at the polls, that they planned to impose a Broederbond republic on South Africa, that the provinces had a

110. Vide supra: Ch. 4. p.81.
112. Vide supra: Ch. 4. p.71.
right to separate referendums and that the resistance to the Nationalist republic must be on a moral as well as on a legal basis. (114) The Natal A.R.L.'s demand for Natal's rights (Natal is mentioned three times in the Natal league's covenant) was faithfully supported, as in the case of the Federal Parties, by the leagues in the other provinces. (115) The Transvaal league went so far as to pledge support for the 'stand' of 'our fellow citizens in Natal and the Eastern Cape'. (116) As the Natal Stand was the only one ever likely to be effective, demands of the Cape and Transvaal leagues for separate referendums really amounted only to support of the Natal league's position.

Considering the very close parallel in organisation, personnel and ideals between the Anti-Republican Leagues and the Federal Parties, the question of why the leagues were launched at all is germane. The Federals launched the leagues for a number of obvious reasons. First, the Federal Party had failed in the provincial elections and, it had been shown that it did not enjoy the support of the majority of voters in Natal. The Anti-Republican Leagues, on the other hand, had no history of defeat, and a divisive election campaign behind them. They could unify where the Federals had divided the opposition. Second, the Anti-Republican Leagues concentrated on a single


issue - republicanism. In this, they could put forward the party's principal political interest, while remaining unhampere
d by other issues such as federalism or the race problem.
Third, the leagues could hope to recapture the élan of the Torch Commando. Anti-republican and hence anti-government rallies,
unlike party meetings, drew large audiences. Finally, the Natal league hoped to become the spokesman for English-speaking Natal.\(^{(117)}\)

In attempting to stir the English-speaking opposition to action, the leagues achieved some success. They filled halls in Natal and the eastern Cape, \(^{(118)}\) and covenants were signed by large numbers of people. By February 1956, the Natal covenant had been signed by 30,000 people and that of the eastern Cape by 28,000. \(^{(119)}\) These figures were far from representing a majority of the voters in the areas concerned, or even a majority of the English-speaking voters. They did represent, however, a larger support than the Federal Party had, or could have, received.

Given the close links between the leagues and the Federal Party, it is not surprising that they failed to 'build bridges' between the Federal and United Parties. In fact, both the United and National Parties reacted to the leagues in much the same way as they reacted to the Federals. Mitchell's initial reaction was guarded, \(^{(120)}\) but the U.P.'s Natal Executive pointed out that the Natal A.R.L. was not a non-party organisation at all but was a creation of the Federal Party. In any event, maintained the U.P., the republican issue was a political

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117. Selby, who led the Natal league, stressed that the aim was to have the covenant signed by 80,000 Natal voters which would constitute a majority of the province's electorate. This was never achieved. Natal Witness: 30 April 1955, 17 February 1956.


matter and should be dealt with by the political parties. (121)

There were occasions in the future on which the U.P. accepted assistance from the Natal A.R.L., as with the registration of voters. (122) There were even occasions on which individual U.P. Members of Parliament praised the A.R.L. (123) But, at base, the U.P. saw itself and the leagues as being in competition with one another for the allegiance of the opposition voter, while there was continued disagreement as to how the anti-republican battle should be fought. (124) The Nationalists saw the Anti-Republican Leagues as powerless groups who had bound themselves to rebel against any republic. Sensing their weakness, the Nationalists dismissed them contemptuously, (125) and did not even devote much time to attacking the leagues.

Because of their failure to create a united anti-republican front, the leagues gradually sank into ineffectual stridency. In addition to their inability to unify the opposition parties on the republican issue, the leagues suffered from being simply a reaction to Nationalist republicanism. As Heaton Nicholls commented privately, the Natal league was 'a mere negation — without a positive political programme ....'(126) It was therefore difficult to maintain interest, because the very strength of the leagues depended on being a 'negation' to the information which their opponents — the Nationalists — were willing to give, concerning the republic. And, apart from stating that the republic was coming, the Nationalists supplied very little additional information. Thus, after the initial meetings and rallies,

there was very little for the leagues and their supporters to do. Inaction proved, as is so frequently the case, to be debilitating.

In addition to forming the Anti-Republican Leagues the Federal Party attempted to fight the government on the republican question by means of an appeal to the Commonwealth parliamentarians. On 17 December 1954, less than three weeks after Strijdom took office, Heaton Nicholls and Selby, as leader and chairman respectively of the Natal Federals, directed an appeal to the Members of Parliament in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The letter, which purported to speak on behalf of ‘citizens of British descent’ in Natal, alleged that the South African government wished to obtain permission from the Commonwealth Prime Minister’s Conference, prior to declaring South Africa a republic, (127) in the same way as India had done. The position of India was however different because she had not signed the Statute of Westminster and was therefore not affected by its provision that:

Succession to the Throne or the Royal Style and Titles shall hereafter require the assent as well of the Parliaments of all the Dominions as of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. (128)

This meant that any change in the constitutional status of one of the Dominions, required the permission of the others.

The letter went on to attack the Nationalist government’s ideals. It stated that the envisaged republic would be based on a constitution similar to that published in 1942, and would be authoritarian in character. Furthermore, it would be the creation of 600,000 Nationalists, in defiance of the wishes of ten million other South Africans. (129) What the letter apparent-

tly hoped to achieve was that the Members of Parliament, would 'withhold judgement' on South Africa's constitutional position until they had received a 'full statement' of the Federal Party's stand. In the meantime, apart from the constitutional issues as such, Heaton Nicholls hoped that the letter would mobilise opinion in the Commonwealth against the Nationalists, who were forcing a republic on Natal. He felt that the Nationalist would not 'defy the expressed wish of the whole Commonwealth.' If the Nationalists persisted in the face of this, he concluded that Natal would have to 'defy the government. With Natal's secession being discussed 'on the world stage', anything could happen. A visit to the United Kingdom, however, dampened his enthusiasm. As on his previous visit, the British political leaders were not keen to involve themselves in South Africa's internal affairs. He was told that the preamble of the Statute of Westminster, upon which the Federals had pinned their hopes, did 'not have the effect of law.' As a result of this visit, Heaton Nicholls came to the '... growing belief that the rest of the world ... [would] not interfere.'

This appeal to the Commonwealth leaders represents the extreme to which the leaders of the Federal Party were prepared to go. They saw South Africa as being permanently linked to the Commonwealth, unless the leaders of that organisation gave the South Africans permission to create a republic. Identifying as they did with a broad Anglo-Saxon culture, they found it difficult to conceive of themselves placed in a country outside of the Commonwealth 'Club'.

The reaction both inside and outside South Africa to the appeal to the Commonwealth leaders was varied. On the interna-

131. N/P: G. Heaton Nicholls to D. Heaton Nicholls, 5 June 1955.
132. Ibid.
135. Ibid.
tional scene, none of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, or even cabinet members, publicly acknowledged the letter. The Federals did, however, receive a 'large number' of replies from all the countries involved and, although the replies were 'favourable', they were 'fairly non-committal'. (136) Inside South Africa, there was silence from most opposition groups. Most of the English-language press ignored the overseas appeals, (137) as did the U.P. until April 1956, when Mitchell referred to 'wishful thinking' in some quarters - an obvious reference to the Federal appeal. (138) As for the Nationalists, Die Transvaler strongly attacked the Natal letter as 'a laughable campaign' in which a group of 'jingoes' were trying to limit the sovereignty of South Africa and her electorate. (139) But the government simply ignored the matter. It neither admitted nor denied the arguments advanced by the Federals, and the question was not in fact raised at the Prime Minister's Conference.

As far as the Federals were concerned, it was again clear that they had lost and not gained politically from the strategy. As with the Anti-Republican Leagues, the campaign to mobilise the Commonwealth foundered, as it appeared to have no object or purpose. The Natal Federals produced an attractive, well-written, thirty-three page booklet stating their case in full, (140) and this was mailed to all the recipients of their letter, but there were no further developments abroad, and the party had difficulty in disposing of the booklets locally. (141)

After the 1954 provincial elections, the Federal Party had been forced to reorientate its thinking and strategy. In addition, it had reacted against an increasingly confident and aggressive Afrikaner nationalism. In doing so, the party fell increasingly under the control of a group of English-speaking extremists.

In a study of English-speaking South Africans, Professor L. Schlemmer has pointed out that:

Afrikaner nationalism, the denials of many politicians notwithstanding, appears to have come to identify in many subtle ways with the state; an expected process with a politically dominant ethnic 'nationalism'. In such a case, non-dominant ethnic groups ... may develop heightened ethnic consciousness. (142)

He concludes that the 'heightened opposition support up to the early sixties ... was a sign of ethnic resistance amongst the English-speakers'. (143) One sub-group, which he identifies within the English-speaking group as a whole, is that which he calls the 'Anglophiles'. (144) This group, comprising between ten and twenty per cent. of the English-speakers, were people who had grown up in the predominantly English-speaking areas of South Africa. (145) They valued highly their links with the wider Anglo-Saxon world, had a strong need for in-group identification, and were characterised by a '... rejection of and hostility towards Afrikaners'. (146) These people displayed an English-language xenophobia, and, lest it be thought that a study concluded in 1974 is not applicable to the 1950s, Schlemmer holds that, '... contrary to appearances, this social type is not a dying imperial fragment, but seems to be the result of a self-renewing tradition'. (147) They represent, in Schlemmer's view, the only approximation to Afrikaans-language chauvinism encountered among English-speakers. This study pin-points the reasons for the English-speakers' reaction of the 1950s, so well expressed by the Federals. It also describes, sociologically, those (the 'Anglophiles') who had come to dominate the Federal Party to an increasing extent, after the Nationalists had consolidated their power and appeared to speak only for Afrikaners.

143. Ibid., p.96.
144. Ibid., p.131.
145. Ibid.
146. Ibid., p.132.
147. Ibid.
CHAPTER SEVEN

APATHY AND DISUNITY

In the long years between the provincial elections of 1954 and 1959, the Federals had to combat weariness, apathy and friction - the corrosive by-products of defeat and innovation - within their ranks. At the same time, they had to counter the attacks which were made upon them by their political opponents.

Of those who left the party after the 1954 defeat, the most able and best known were Ford and Brickhill. Neither of them issued a public statement giving reasons for his decision; nor did they leave the party abruptly. Each simply withdrew from the various offices which he held and, as Ford termed it, gradually 'slipped out' of the party. The main reason for their actions was disillusionment with the Natal voters. Both Ford and Brickhill felt that the liberal racial policies of the Federal Party were so much 'in advance of their time' that there was no possibility of their acceptance in the foreseeable future. They also felt that the Natal public would be unwilling to resist Nationalist 'aggression', even when British traditions and values were involved. Therefore, both men were unwilling to make the personal sacrifices which leadership of a political party involved.

The withdrawal of these two was of major import for the Federal Party. Both were efficient, full of ideas and energy and were, except for the two senators, the most experienced members of the party. They had shown their abilities in the

1. Interview with E.G. Ford. Nowhere was it possible to locate any written views on their withdrawals or even references to the fact that they had left the party.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. For this reason both men emigrated to Rhodesia after leaving the Federal Party.
4. Ford's income from his law practice had fallen by eighty per cent. between 1953 and 1955. Interview with E.G. Ford.
Torch Commando, in which they had held senior positions and also, especially Ford, in laying the foundations of the Federal Party. (5)

While it was still adjusting to the consequences of defeat, the Federal Party was confronted by the disputes over the Senate Act. This was the last phase of the constitutional controversy over Coloured franchise which had convulsed the country since 1951. This phase dominated the political scene in South Africa for most of 1955 and 1956.

The Senate Bill was presented to parliament on 11 May 1955, was passed, and received the Governor-General’s assent the following month. The purpose of the Act was to increase the number of senators from forty-eight to eighty-nine. This was done by granting the Cape and the Transvaal more representatives than the other two provinces, thus abolishing the former principle of equal provincial representation. Moreover, the party controlling a province now received all the Senate seats apportioned to that province, instead of the seats being apportioned in proportion to party provincial strength. In addition, the number of nominated seats was increased from ten to eighteen. The intention behind the Act was to give the governing party so large a majority in the Senate that it would receive the required two-thirds majority in a joint session of both Houses of Parliament so as to alter an ‘entrenched’ clause of the constitution. As a result of the Senate Act, the National Party’s support in the Upper House rose from thirty out of forty-eight to seventy-seven out of eighty-nine.

The Federals opposed the Senate Act for two main reasons. The Upper House was, in the words of the Federals, the ‘Federal Link’ in the constitution. (6) Equal provincial and special interest group representation (such as the non-Whites and minority provincial parties) were the federal aspects of the central government. The effect of the Senate’s

5. Vide supra: Ch. 2. pp. 12-35 passim.
enlargement was to reduce Black representation and to eliminate the old federal principle. To make matters worse, the change had been pushed through by a government which had little sympathy with federalism and which clearly viewed provincial rights and the Senate as being of less consequence than the 'volkswil', as expressed in the House of Assembly. In short, the whole federal dimension of the constitution was at the mercy of a parliamentary majority.

The second major reason for Federal Party opposition to the Senate Act was that it was believed that the Act was a prelude to the establishment of an Afrikaner dictatorship. It seemed inconceivable that the Nationalists had spent so much time and effort just to achieve the 'small profit' of the removal of the Coloured voters from the common roll. Derek Heaton Nicholls summed up this attitude when he declared:

> I believe that the Coloured voters issue, as far as they are concerned is merely a red herring dragged across the path to obscure their real aim which is the complete destruction of the Constitution and all democratic forms of government, in order that an Afrikaner police type state may be formed.

In keeping with its new-found readiness, after the 1954 elections, to co-operate with other opposition groups, the Federals joined with the Liberal and Labour Parties in their call for a revival of the United Front to resist the Senate Bill. 'Once again', declared Federal News, 'we appeal for unity in Natal.' The U.P., however, was against the idea.

8. Speech by D. Heaton Nicholls, 16 November 1955, op.cit., p.6. The Anti-Republican Leagues, similarly, held that the real intention of the Act was to facilitate the establishment of a dictatorship, and, in addition, to allow for the removal of the other 'entrenched' clause (i.e. that guaranteeing the two official languages). A.R.L. (Transvaal): Statement, 5 June 1955, loc.cit.
Mitchell stated that all opposition groups should concentrate on the 'common objective' of defeating the government at the polls. (10) And, as only the U.P. was capable of achieving this, all anti-Nationalists should support it. (11)

After the passing of the Bill, the Federals argued in favour of a boycott of the new Senate by the eight Natal senators, who, together with the four senators representing the Blacks, were to be the only opposition members in the House. It was felt that to participate in the Senate elections would be 'condoning the terrible breach of the Constitution', (12) and supporting what the Transvaal Federals termed the 'House of Frauds'. (13) A boycott, on the other hand, would reveal, according to Derek Heaton Nicholls,

...the nature of this evil institution.

Only Nationalists would be sitting in the Senate. It would be the only second chamber in the world in which all those taking part belonged to one party. As such it would be a joke, it would become the laughing stock of the world. A music hall joke. No more effective way of killing it could be found. The Nationalists would not mind opposition or criticism, but they could not stand for long being laughing stock. (14)

The U.P. did not agree with boycotts. The party was committed to acting within the legal framework of parliament, which included both the House of Assembly and the Senate. In view of this, asked Mitchell, 'If the courts of law should decide that the Senate Act is legal how then would we stand if we boycotted the Senate?' (15) Apart from the legality of the issue, the U.P. considered that a boycott spelt weakness. The party decided to fight the Nationalists in the Senate itself rather than allow them to 'work their own sweet will' unopposed. (16)

The Federals, who did not doubt the legality of the Act, and viewed the U.P. as being "...hemmed in by the constitutionalism of its position to try [to oppose] only through Parliament and the Courts", (17) decided to appeal to the voters to support the idea of a boycott. The party planned mass rallies in Durban and Pietermaritzburg on 16 and 17 November 1955. (18) Here, the Federals planned to express their anger at the reduction of the federal element in the constitution by presenting the following resolution:

The meeting, considering the insult to the people of Natal presented by the Senate Act in depriving them of their just senatorial rights under the Act of Union, begs the electoral college of Natal, as representing the people of Natal, to take no part in the forthcoming election of new senators. (19)

Explaining the resolution, Heaton Nicholls stated that the Act 'reduced Natal's equal representation in the Senate to a nullity' by attacking the 'basic principle' (i.e. federalism) upon which Natal entered Union. (20)

In an attempt to by-pass the U.P. leaders and win the support of the U.P. members of the Natal electoral college, Heaton Nicholls addressed an appeal to all the Natal M.P.s and M.P.C.s to attend the rallies. Mitchell instructed all the U.P. electoral college members to ignore the appeal. (21)

In public statements, in reply to Heaton Nicholls, Mitchell reiterated the U.P. stand on the Senate Act, declaring that the rallies were being used merely to attack the U.P. and not the Nationalists. He therefore appealed to the Black Sash (22) to ignore them. (23) In any event, the rallies were

20. Ibid.
22. The Black Sash, constituted as the Women's Defence of the Constitution League, was formed to protest against the government's manipulation of the constitution.
failures, with less than a thousand people at both meetings.\textsuperscript{(24)}

On 25 November 1955, with the U.P. participating, the new Senate was elected. In February the following year the South Africa Act Amendment Bill, aimed at removing the Coloureds from the common voters' roll with the Whites, was passed by 174 votes to sixty-eight at a joint sitting of the two Houses of Parliament. The Act was validated in test cases in the Cape Supreme Court in May 1956 and in the Appeal Court in November 1956. The Chief Justice declared for the majority judgment of the Court that 'the legislative scheme which was adopted is not open to attack by law'.\textsuperscript{(25)} But, declared the Federal Party, 'it remains immoral and unconstitutional'.\textsuperscript{(26)}

As, during 1955-56 South Africa moved further than ever away from federation, and as the Nationalists' finally triumphed on the Coloured franchise issue, the Federal Party experienced the beginnings of an apathy which was to lead to its end.\textsuperscript{(27)} In 1955 the sympathetic Natal Witness stated that the opposition voters, including the Federals, were 'confused, dismayed and apathetic'.\textsuperscript{(28)} This, it was stated, was because the voters were not being given the necessary guidance by their leaders.\textsuperscript{(29)} Two years later, in 1957, the same newspaper stated that, 'It has been obvious for some time...that the tide has been flowing strongly against the Federal Party...'.\textsuperscript{(30)} Die Burger, on the opposite side of the political spectrum from the Natal Witness, stated in 1957 that little had been heard of the Federals since their 1954 defeat.\textsuperscript{(31)}

Opinion, especially press opinion, could always be refuted, whereas election results had a finality which was

\textsuperscript{24} Natal Witness: 17 November 1955, 18 November 1955.
\textsuperscript{25} Natal Daily News: 11 November 1956.
\textsuperscript{26} Federal News: 22 November 1956.
\textsuperscript{27} For a detailed discussion of apathy in the Federal Party, vide infra: Ch. 10. pp.220-4.
\textsuperscript{28} Natal Witness: 29 April 1955.
\textsuperscript{29} Natal Witness: 29 April 1955.
\textsuperscript{30} Natal Witness: 17 August 1957.
\textsuperscript{31} Die Burger: 3 June 1957.
difficult to contradict. For this reason, the three by-
elections which the Federals contested in 1957-58 were of
particular importance.

The first of these contests was in East London North.
Like the Berea by-election of 1953, the East London contest
was for a parliamentary vacancy. It was the second and last
parliamentary seat which the Federals fought. The decision
to contest this constituency was formally taken at a joint
meeting of Natal, Cape and Transvaal Federal members at Port
Shepstone in May 1957. (32) In reality, the decision to fight
East London North had been taken by the Natal Action Committee
earlier in the month, because this committee then decided
that the election was 'essential' to the Federal movement as
a whole, (33) and resolved to give substantial aid to the East
Cape party. (34) Kettles (leader of the East Cape party) was
urged to bring twelve delegates to the Port Shepstone meeting
to discuss the matter. (35)

Early in June 1957 Kettles announced that Mr. Donald
Woods, the East Cape Federal Party's twenty-three year old
vice-chairman, would be the Federal candidate. (36) The
party was entering the contest, said Kettles, because of
'...the appalling lack of respect and interest towards the
sentimental attachments of English-speaking South Africans
shown by both the Government and the parliamentary
Opposition.' (37) This sentiment echoed Heaton Nicholls's
statement of the previous week that the Natal Federals would
fight all Natal's parliamentary seats in the forthcoming
general election, because 'English-speaking interests...[would
be] more effectively guarded if every Natal constituency was
represented by a Federalist.' (38)

34. The Natal Action Committee began collecting funds for East
London at its meeting before the East Cape party had
even been informed that the election was to be fought.
Ibid.
True to its promise of 'full support', the Natal Federal Party put all its resources at the disposal of the East Cape party. Mention has been made of Natal's financial contribution and of the free distribution of the Federal News. In addition, leading Natal Federals descended on East London to speak, organise and canvass. Apart from the Natalians, Woods, who personally canvassed over 1,000 voters, was ably assisted by Kettles. All this activity received extensive press publicity and the idea rapidly grew in the minds of the Federals that the party would win the election. Heaton Nicholls stated publicly that this would happen while Hughes Mason, who journeyed between Durban and East London several times, stated that Federal support was 'growing daily'. The Federal News spread this euphoric news.

After spending a week in East London, Selby, however, realised that the true picture was very different. At the beginning of the election campaign, he pointed out, the party in the eastern Cape had consisted of 'scarcely more than 10 or 12 enthusiastic'. In fact, it was an 'almost singlehanded effort', and without Kettles, there 'would probably have been no U.F.P. at all in the East Cape.' Selby also perceived the weight of public apathy.

40. Vide supra: Ch. 4, p. 87.
41. Vide supra: Ch. 4, p. 83.
42. All five public meetings were addressed by Natalians who even arranged the addressing of envelopes.
47. Ibid., p. 1.
50. Ibid.
towards the Federals. (51) It was clear to him that, although the Anti-Republican League had been attractive to the English-speaking voters of the eastern Cape, (52) the Federal Party would never attract the same widespread support. (53) Selby concluded that it would '...be a miracle if Woods won this election.' (54)

The U.P., on the other hand, was not relying on a miracle. It nominated a personable young candidate, the former Springbok cricket captain, Clive van Ryneveld, and presented the U.P. as the party of Anglo-Afrikaner unity. Van Ryneveld attacked the Federals as appealing only to English-speakers and chided them for accusing the 'moderate Afrikaner' of unreliability. (55) Although not explicitly stated, his whole speech implied that an English-speaking movement was doomed to fail because demographic and political factors placed the future of South Africa in the hands of the 'moderate Afrikaner'. (56) The Federals' stress on their resistance to the republic, on their defence of the constitution and, above all, on their defence of the English-speakers (57) all appeared to substantiate van Ryneveld's arguments.

The result of the East London North by-election was a resounding win for the U.P. - by 6,716 votes to 728 votes. Kettles, embittered, conceded that the Federals had suffered a 'sound beating', (58) while the other Federal leaders expressed severe disappointment at the result. (59) The

51. Ibid.
52. Vide supra: Ch. 6. p.143.
53. In November 1955, the same year as the A.R.L. rallies in the eastern Cape, not a single person attended a Federal meeting organised in the East London City Hall. Rand Daily Mail: 17 November 1955.
58. The Star: 16 August 1957.
election clearly exposed the weaknesses of the Federal Party and further damaged an already sagging party morale. As Selby stated, in a private letter, 'we cannot obviously afford any more "East Londons"'.(60) Surprisingly, the party was carried into two more disastrous by-elections the following year.

The first of these was in June 1958, in a provincial by-election in the Hospital constituency in Johannesburg, and was the only Transvaal contest in which the party took part. D. Hanafin, the Federal candidate,(61) adopted the slogan, 'South Africa, Queen and Commonwealth'.(62) The National, United and Federal Parties were compared on a number of points of policy. On the question of a republic, the Nationalists were portrayed as being adamantly in favour, while the Federals were shown to be emphatically opposed. The U.P. was dismissed as being 'two faced'.(63) The crucial issue, it was argued, was Afrikaner nationalism. The Nationalists represented only Afrikaners, and viewed all other peoples as 'foreign and inferior'.(64) The U.P. were seen as appeasing Afrikaner nationalism, leaving the Federals to fight for 'equal rights'.(65) This argument, as well as the 'great efforts'(66) of the Federals, had little impact on the electorate. The party secured only 388 votes against the U.P.'s 2,521.(67) No amount of blaming the press for failing to give the party its fair share of publicity(68) could conceal the extent of the defeat in South Africa's politically most significant province.

60. B/P: A.R. Selby to B. Batchelor, 30 August 1957.
61. His opponent, the U.P. candidate, was Mr. Harry Schwartz, subsequently a prominent figure in the United, Reform, Progressive Reform and Progressive Federal Parties.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
Having sustained two severe defeats in the Cape and the Transvaal, the Federals were confronted with a provincial by-election in Pietermaritzburg South. Despite the growing apathy within the party and the adverse political trend, they could not avoid contesting the seat. The party entered the contest on a platform which had been formulated at the Port Shepstone meeting of May 1957. (69) This was encapsulated in the phrase: '...maintenance of the old Natal way of life.' (70)

During the election, the Federals made the defence of the English-speakers the central issue, virtually excluding all other questions. D. Will, the Federal candidate, spoke of the party as being the 'English opposition'. (71) Later in the campaign, he was referring to 'we British', 'our British blood' and the necessity of protecting 'British traditions'. (72) Midway through the election campaign, the Prime Minister, Strijdom, died. His successor, Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, pledged himself in his first public statement, like Strijdom before him, to 'devote all his energies to achieving the republic.' (73) The reaction to this was the most explicit statement of Anglophile sentiment ever published by the Federals. In a letter to the voters, Denis Lowe, election agent for Will, stated that 'co-operation between the Afrikaans and English sections', as practised by the U.P., was no longer possible. (74) What was needed was a candidate such as Will with a 'sense of duty' to the English-speakers. (75) If this seemed a 'little pro-English or extremist', Lowe assured the readers, a determined opposition was needed to serve 'our' interests. (76) The Federals had abandoned their 'equal rights' stand which had been used as late as the Hospital election and had opted for an English-speaking

69. Vide supra: Ch. 7, p155.
nationalism. (77) This was because the 'equal rights' stand was a proven failure in 1954, in East London and in Hospital, and because the Anglophiles were in command of the Natal party. The Federals decided in Pietermaritzburg to force the English-speakers, by plain speaking, to decide whether they would fight for their rights, as perceived by the Federals, or whether they would compromise.

Despite its claimed non-party position, (78) the A.R.L. now entered the political contest. Its leaders addressed a number of questions to all Natal provincial and parliamentary members as well as to both candidates. The questionnaire was designed to gauge the respondent's degree of commitment to the anti-republican cause. Will, himself a member of the A.R.L., (79) responded enthusiastically, (80) while the U.P. was, predictably, ambiguous. Mitchell maintained that, as the league saw no hope of halting the Nationalists in parliament, it had despaired of democracy and therefore its questions were irrelevant. At the same time, he stressed the U.P.'s anti-republicanism. (81) Captain B. Smith, the U.P. candidate, issued a similar statement. (82)

The A.R.L., abandoning all pretence at neutrality, immediately responded by calling on its members in Pietermaritzburg South to vote for Will. (83) The Natal Witness, the only daily newspaper in Pietermaritzburg, immediately supported the league's action. (84) At no other election had a Federal candidate enjoyed so much support, in terms of publicity, press support and voluntary assistance

77. In his manifesto Will stated that he was 'entitled to fight...for the English-speaking section of the people... who were being left in the lurch.' U.F.P. (Natal): D. Will's Manifesto, 6 September 1958.
78. Vide supra: Ch. 6. p. 140.
which could be channelled into canvassing. (85)

The result of the election was almost the same as that of 1954. The Federals gained 1,430 votes and the U.P. 2,196 as against 1,515 and 2,381 votes respectively in 1954. (86) Despite its effort, the party had made no progress. The Federals’ strong appeal to English-speaking sentiment had failed to win the support of the majority of English-speakers. Not even Dr. Verwoerd’s accession to the premiership, his reputation of racial extremism and his strong republican leanings had increased the Federal Party’s support.

While the Federals were sustaining these by-election defeats, the Nationalists acted to remove the last remaining symbols of the British connection. In March 1956 Arthur Barlow, the English-speaking, Conservative Party Member for Hospital, introduced a resolution into Parliament calling for one flag and one anthem for South Africa. (87) He was supported by Strijdom. (88) The following year, Barlow introduced the Private Flag Bill into Parliament. This Bill called for the abolition of the Union Jack as one of South Africa’s flags. (89) Once again the Prime Minister supported Barlow. (90) Unexpected support for the Bill also came from a large section of the English-language press. (91) Even the Natal Witness agreed with Strijdom that ‘...a large section of the English-speaking community was in favour of one flag.’ (92)


Surprisingly, the U.P. promised to fight the Bill in Parliament 'with every means at its command'. (93) When the time came, however, it supported the main clause of the Bill. (94)

Only the Federals and the Anti-Republican Leagues opposed the abolition of the Union Jack. The Natal and Cape parties arranged for protest meetings to be held in Pietermaritzburg, Durban and East London. (95) The meetings were small, badly attended and a total failure. (96) The comparison between these meetings and the huge anti-government demonstrations which had taken place during the flag crisis of 1926-27 was striking. Whereas in 1927 Durban, much smaller than it was thirty years later, could rally 15 000 demonstrators, (97) in 1957 only 250 people attended a protest meeting in the City Hall. (98) The English-speakers, even the Federal Party and A.R.L. supporters, allowed the Union Jack to be removed as one of South Africa's flags with barely a protest.

The proposed abolition of 'God Save the Queen' as an official anthem aroused a little more interest. The Minister of the Interior, Dr. T.E. Donges announced during the passage of the Flag Bill that the government would regard its acceptance as the 'green light' to abolish 'God Save the Queen', (99) and in May 1957 the Prime Minister issued instructions that only 'Die Stem van Suid-Afrika' was to be

93. Natal Witness: 11 February 1957. At the same time it refused to support any protest meetings.
played as a national anthem in South Africa. (100)

The U.P.'s reaction to this move was described by the Federals as 'wissy-washy'; as indeed it was. (101) Caught between alienating either some Afrikaner sentiment if it protested, or some English-speaking sentiment if it did not, the U.P. remained silent. The Natal Witness expressed a widely-held English-speaking view when it stated that the instruction emanated from the 'clique of Afrikaner extremists', which surrounded the Prime Minister. As a result, the municipal authorities of cities such as Durban and Port Elizabeth decided to continue playing both anthems, while Johannesburg decided to play neither. (102)

The reaction of the Federals against the removal of the anthem was, at first, vehement. Heaton Nicholls termed it the 'last humiliation' to which the English-speakers would submit and called on them to stand up for 'their' flag and anthem. (103) The Natal Provincial Action Committee of the party resolved that all Federal meetings would display the Union Jack and sing 'God Save the Queen'. (104) Later, the Provincial Executive altered the instruction, leaving it to the discretion of the organisers of meetings as to whether the Union Jack would be displayed or whether one or both anthems would be sung. Even the Federal Party was infected by indecision in the defence of symbols valued by the English-speakers. (105)

100. House of Assembly Debates, 1957, cols. 482-90. The creation or abolition of national anthems in South Africa was by Prime Ministerial instruction and not by an act of parliament. The playing of both anthems dated from an instruction by Hertzog in 1938. Natal Witness: 4 May 1957.


105. For a discussion of the reasons for this apathy, vide infra: Ch.10. pp.246-7.
The second major effect of the 1954 election defeats and the change of emphasis in the Federal Party was disunity within the party’s ranks. The party had, since its inception, appealed to ‘two entirely different and often conflicting types of sentiment.’(106) The two ‘types of sentiment’ were that which supported a relatively liberal approach to the colour issue and that which valued the British connection above all else. The potential for conflict between these two views was obvious to a number of observers. (107)

The disadvantages of a liberal colour policy had been demonstrated in the 1954 provincial elections. (108) It was clear that the Natal electorate was not attracted to the policy and that it would be wise to soft-pedal it. The realisation of this by Ford and Brickhill was partly responsible for their withdrawal from the party, (109) which, in turn, weakened the liberal wing of the Federals still further. At the same time, the strident republicanism of Strijdom and Verwoerd strengthened the reactive, ‘imperial’ wing of the party.

The first open conflict involved Bolton, the Federal candidate for Durban Central in 1954. He resigned from the party in January 1955 because of the appeal made by the Federals to all Commonwealth parliaments. This action he dubbed ‘un-South African’. (110) Bolton further maintained that, as the Federal policies had proved unacceptable to the Natal voters, the party should unite with the U.P. The alternative, he felt, was simply to ‘create more confusion in the future struggles facing South Africa as a nation.’(111)

While Bolton objected to ‘un-South African’ practices in the party, prominent members such as Greene and Seneque (112)

108. *Vide supra*: Ch. 5. pp. 113-4.
109. *Vide supra*: Ch. 7. p. 149.
were concerned that the Federals were abandoning their relatively liberal colour ideals. As a result, they decided to present a resolution to the 1956 Natal Congress calling for the adoption in principle of the multiple vote system as party policy. In addition, the resolution called for the creation of committees to "...report on the implementation of the system and on the practical administration thereof." (113)

In order to present their case effectively, Greene and Seneque prepared a 'highly confidential' ten-paged memorandum which was sent to the delegates, together with their congress agendas. Apart from arguing their case for a multiple vote system, this document exposed the growing rift between the two wings of the Federal Party. The authors stated that many voters saw the Federals merely as a group of "...Jingoes bent on keeping the Union Jack flying...[and who were] essentially pro-British and Anti-Afrikaner...." (114)

Speaking 'from a personal point of view' Greene and Seneque saw themselves as anti-Afrikaner only insofar as they opposed Afrikaners who adopted a 'harsh Calvinistic' approach towards the non-Whites. (115) But, they argued, as this view of the non-Whites was shared by the English-speaking Durban City Council, it was by no means exclusively Afrikaner.

If [they went on] the core of the U.F.P. is composed of persons who are concerned solely with and distressed by the spread of Afrikanerdom, and who do not give a tinker's curse for the present restrictive policies of the Government directed against the Non-European, then we are in the wrong home and what is more important the Party can have no future. (116)

The resolution, and the thinking behind it, was designed to plumb the 'core' of the Federal Party.

The resolution was moved by Greene who spoke to it 'at length' and provoked a 'very lively' debate, lasting more

113. U.F.P. (Natal): Resolution to be Moved by Selwyn Greene and Seconded by Peter Seneque, n.d.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid., p.2.
than two hours. The result was the adoption of a resolution markedly different from that of Greene and Seneque. A committee was appointed but it was merely instructed to 'investigate and report' upon the multiple vote and other franchise systems. (117)

Greene threatened to resign when his resolution was altered, (118) but was persuaded to join the Franchise Committee set up to investigate the franchise question. (119) Two years later, he resigned from the Federals when they published the party's policy, 'playing down the Native policy'. (120) Seneque left the party immediately. In his letter of resignation he made it clear that he had no quarrel with the 'basic principles' of the Federals. (121) What he objected to was the 'practical policies and implementations' of party policy. (122) While the party failed to make known its stand against issues such as university apartheid, it was quick to enter the dispute over Barlow's Flag Bill. 'Accusations of jingoism', stated Seneque, 'would be difficult to defend. ' (123) Because of its essential 'jingoism', the Federal Party was unwilling to face the vital colour issue squarely. With their 'side-stepping, their opportunism and their chess-like moves...', the Federals had failed to fight the 'Policy of Apartheid'. (124)

Hughes Mason, expressing the views of the 'imperialist' wing of the party, maintained that the removal of the Union Jack was merely a step in the direction of an Afrikaner republic. 'And if I am a jingo for resisting each

118. S/P: R. Hughes Mason to P. Seneque, 7 February 1957, op.cit., p.3.
119. Interview with S. Greene.
120. Ibid.
122. Ibid.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid.
of these steps, then I am proud of it,' he declared. (125)

As regards the colour issue, Hughes Mason believed that, it was 'not...quite as important' as Seneque felt. (126)

The disagreements over the colour question were not solved by the resignations of Greene and Seneque. Others, such as Brian Batchelor, remained in the party and continued to press for a more liberal policy. As he had agreed to 'shadow' the Ministry of Native Affairs, (127) and was a member of the Franchise Committee, Batchelor was a significant force in the party, especially as regards the colour question.

The 1957 Congress of the Natal Federal Party accepted the recommendations of the Franchise Committee for a two-value voters' roll but reserved '...for further consideration the definition of acceptable qualifications [for voters]. (128)

With the whole problem still unresolved, further disagreement developed. Selby felt that the franchise qualifications recommended by the Committee 'should be raised'. (129)

Batchelor replied on 10 November 1957 that he was constantly told to 'be practical' but felt that a policy based on 'progressive and realistic thought' was the only hope for the country. (130)

Selby then informed Batchelor that there were many Federals who felt that the party should 'back-pedal' on the franchise proposals. (131) He stated that he did not share this view for a number of reasons. The party had to be 'honest' and so gain the respect and confidence of Blacks. Furthermore, Selby believed that the U.P. would attack the Federals on the colour issue and that no amount

126. Ibid., p.3.
130. B/P: B. Batchelor to A.R. Selby, 10 November 1957.
of 'back-pedalling' would prevent these attacks. Selby concluded by expressing the hope that the Federals would become 'one party instead of two' as regards the colour question.

Despite his protestations of November 1957, within five months Selby had joined the ranks of those who wished to 'back-pedal'. In a confidential report of 19 April 1958 he asked that the franchise proposals adopted at the 1957 Congress be 'reconsidered'. He maintained that the two-value voters' roll would be rejected by the Black leaders and would be unpopular with the White electorate. Selby conceded that a more liberal policy could be justified on the grounds that it 'ought' to be done. Practical politics, however, dictated that a more conservative policy be adopted so as to 'retrieve' the existing situation. In a forthright conclusion, Selby summarised his position:

I realise that my recommendations may seem like a piece of political expediency which we deplore in the United Party; I do not see them in this light, and the difference is one of motive.

I cannot see that we should be acting in the interests of the Non-European people if, by insisting on proposals which have no possibility of acceptance at the polls, and which we could not implement even if we win the Provincial election, we should throw away whatever chance there is of breaking the Nationalist domination while there is still time.

The following month, Selby formalised his ideas into the

132. Ibid.
134. A.R. Selby: Notes on Non-European Policy. Attached to Circular, 19 April 1958, loc.cit. It is significant that this report was written three days after the 1958 general election in which the Nationalists had scored considerable gains with the use of the apartheid policy.
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid.
137. Ibid.
statement: 'The Party is not convinced that the extension of the franchise to non-Europeans, whether on a common voters' roll or in some modified way provides an acceptable or workable solution.' (138)

The liberal elements within the party resisted these trends. There was a 'long' discussion of the franchise issue at the 1958 Natal Provincial Congress and a compromise resolution was adopted. (139) The party agreed that the government of South Africa should 'remain in civilised hands'. (140) Further, it rejected specifically the system of universal adult suffrage but supported the 'right of civilised non-Europeans to be placed on the common roll of voters...'. (141) The vexed problem of qualification was to be set sufficiently high so as to 'guarantee the calibre of the applicant', but not so high as to be 'virtually unattainable'. (142)

The liberal faction within the party had retained the ideal of the common voters' roll as party policy, but the conservatives triumphed as regards the application of the policy. The debate received little publicity (143) and the details of the qualification requirements were never finalised. The basic differences between the two factions within the party remained unsolved.

Not all the disputes within the Federal Party were on issues of policy; some involved questions of strategy. The East Cape Federal Party lost Kettles, the man who, in Selby's estimation, was the driving force of the group, (144) because of the Federal decision not to contest the 1958 general election. It was, Kettles maintained, an act of 'benevolence'

143. The Federal News of 22 August 1958 carried no report of the discussion.
144. Vide supra: Ch.7. p. 156.
to the U.P. He thereafter disappeared from the political scene and the Federals in the Cape were noticeably weaker.

The Federals had entered the 1954 provincial elections unified and with enthusiasm. In the years following their defeat in that contest, apathy and disunity had eroded their strength. They therefore approached the 1958 general election and especially the vital 1959 provincial elections, disunified and weakened.

In 1958 a general election was held and this was followed by provincial elections in 1959. These provided the first opportunity since 1954 for the Federal Party to demonstrate its support. Failure in these elections, considering the party’s lack of substantial support in 1954 and in the subsequent by-elections, would effectively destroy it.

The importance of widespread support in the 1958 general election was appreciated by the Federal leaders from an early date. The leader of the eastern Cape Federals declared in 1954 that contesting the 1958 election was the ‘main objective’ of the party. (1) The following year, Batchelor, one of the Natal party’s most perceptive members, viewed the general election as ‘the big test’. (2) He maintained that the Federals should announce the names of candidates early, despite the accusation that they would split the opposition vote. Voters, he stated, would thereby be compelled to make the ‘awful decision’ of whom to support, before election propaganda could ‘stampede’ them into the U.P. fold. (3)

The issue of contesting the general election was discussed in detail at the 1956 Natal Federal Congress. The party was careful not to commit itself to anything unreasonable. For example, a suggestion by a Cape delegate that the fight be taken into constituencies such as Calvinia and Waterberg, ‘...even if there seemed no chance whatever of victory...’, was defeated. (4) On the other hand, a resolution limiting the party’s participation to ‘the six most favourable seats’. (5)

3. Ibid.
was similarly rejected. The resolution which was accepted stated that every seat where there was a 'reasonable prospect of success', should be contested.

While the party was considering the extent of its involvement in the election, the Natal Provincial Executive began organising for the contest. On 28 July 1956 it ordered all branches to be put 'on an election footing'. Within six weeks, nineteen branch and public meetings were held in response to this call. During the first half of 1957, the Federals experienced a 'heartening' response to its efforts to prepare for the general election. On 1 June 1957 Heaton Nicholls announced that the Federal Party would contest all the Natal seats. So as to prevent three-cornered contests, he, as in 1954, offered that the Federal Party contest two Nationalist-held seats in northern Natal provided that the U.P. 'kept out' of the contest. The offer, termed 'impudent' and 'unrealistic' by the Natal press did not elicit a reply from the U.P.

Five months later, the party changed its position. On 18 October 1957, the Natal Federal Congress resolved 'almost unanimously' that

...in order not to divide anti-republican sentiment in Natal, the Union Federal Party [would] not contest the General Election, but [would] contest the next Provincial Council Elections with all its resources, throughout the Province.

The resolution was passed on the 'advice' of Heaton Nicholls, who suggested this approach because the U.P. believed that it would win the election. (16) In his congress speech and press statements, Selby stressed that the decision did not imply Federal support of the U.P. (17) Further, he stated that although he could not envisage the U.P. winning the election, the Federal Party was 'not yet' in a position to unseat the government. (18) The real reason for the Federals' withdrawal was that they were anxious not to expose their weakness. The Star pointed this out very bluntly: '...the vast preponderance of anti-Nationalist opinion in South Africa... was firmly wedded to the idea that the United Party offered the only hope of defeating the present Nationalist Government.', (19) it wrote. The Star, then went to the heart of the matter when it commented that the Federals were making a virtue out of a necessity. (20)

The Nationalists made apartheid and republicanism the two main issues in the general election campaign. (21) They argued, specifically, that the election would be a barometer of republican feeling in South Africa. (22) The Federals strongly opposed this line of thought. The resolution withdrawing the party from the election had emphasised that the contest should not be interpreted as a test of republican sentiment. (23) The reason for this attitude was that many in the party felt privately that the Nationalists would win

the support of a majority of the voters (24) and they were therefore anxious lest this be taken as a mandate for the declaration of a republic.

The 1958 general election was a complete triumph for the National Party. In a victory speech to more than 50 000 supporters in Pretoria, Strijdom announced that the republic was nearer than the United Party realised. (25)

This feeling of triumphant Afrikanerdom was eloquently expressed by Die Vaderland:

The lesson [of the election] is that Afrikanerdom has now unfolded its full strength. Its statistical supremacy has established its influence absolutely. It can be expected that its new-found strength will bear permanently against anyone who might try to thwart it. (26)

In the face of such Afrikaner confidence, the Federal leaders called on the English-speakers, as a group, to defend their rights. Selby stated that English-speakers could not rely on 'moderate' Afrikaners to protect their rights. This strategy had led to 'appeasement and surrender'. (27) Derek Heaton Nicholls maintained that the Nationalists had won the election on 'a call to the blood'. (28) He suggested that '...the most effective counter would be a call to the blood of the English-speaking Section....' (29) In this attitude, which was prevalent amongst its members, the Federals received the support of a new organisation, the United English-speaking South Africans (UNESSA).

Selby maintained after the election that the Nationalists had received the support of a majority of the voters. Federal News: 3 May 1958. Owing to computational difficulties, because of uncontested seats, this cannot be established conclusively. Some historians, including Heard and Carter, hold that the U.P. enjoyed the support of the majority of the voters in 1958.
Heard: op.cit., p.88.
Carter: op.cit., appendix V, Chart A.


29. Ibid.
Described by Schlemmer as the "...most recent manifestation of this [Anglophilic] sentiment in an organised form...",(30) UNESSA was constituted in March 1958.(31) It was founded in Johannesburg by M.H. Mallinick, D.W. Crawford and P. Parnwell.(32) Having 'firmly established' the organisation in the Transvaal,(33) Mallinick went on a recruiting tour of Natal and the eastern Cape in December. He founded three branches in the former province and six in the latter area, bringing the total of UNESSA's branches to fifteen.(34) The organisation did not grow appreciably after this because, towards the end of that year, the branch total was still fifteen.(35)

UNESSA was formed, stated Mallinick, because of "...the attacks by the Nationalist Government on the rights and traditions of the English-speaking South Africans."(36) Its objects were formalised later into eight points. These dealt with issues such as honouring the achievements of British South Africans, respecting British sentiment, promoting immigration, teaching 'impartial' history and fighting to retain South Africa's links with Crown and Commonwealth.(37) So important was this last issue that UNESSA adopted the slogan, 'For South Africa, Queen and Commonwealth', and the emblem of a U surrounding a crown.(38)

UNESSA viewed itself as the 'first' and 'only' organisation 'set up to deal exclusively with the rights of the English-speakers.'(39) It differed from other English-

32. UNESSA: Proposed Constitution for UNESSA, n.d., p.3.
35. UNESSA: Statement, 8 November 1959.
38. UNESSA: Report from UNESSA, No.12, September 1959.
speaking patriotic and cultural groups, some of which, like the A.R.L., it absorbed, \(^{40}\) in that they had been concerned only with aspects of the English-speakers' social, cultural or educational life. \(^{41}\) Like the A.R.L., UNESSA was, officially, not connected with any political party. \(^{42}\) It did, however, co-operate with the U.P. during the general election, when it refrained from public activity so as not to 'embarrass' the party in its contest with the Nationalists. \(^{43}\) After the election, UNESSA launched into a spirited defence of British symbols such as the Union Jack and 'God Save the Queen'. There was never an open clash between it and the U.P. as had occurred between the U.P. and the A.R.L. The organisation was also to establish cordial, though not close, relations with the Progressives, after the emergence of this group in 1959. \(^{44}\)

In many ways, UNESSA may be considered merely another offshoot of the Federal Party. Malinick, its driving force, was the chairman of the Transvaal Federal Party. \(^{45}\) It is not surprising, therefore, that the two organisations adopted very similar stands on many issues. For example, both felt deeply about the abolition of the Union Jack and 'God Save the Queen', both adopted a fairly liberal but ill-defined non-White policy, \(^{46}\) both were deeply concerned about the influence of C.N.E. and the Broederbond \(^{47}\) and both

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42. UNESSA: Publication U.1.S.1., loc.cit.
43. UNESSA: Report, No.1, loc.cit.
46. Like many Nationals, UNESSA felt that 'the political question of most immediate urgency [was] the survival of English-speaking South African culture. Only when this problem [had] been solved [could] the colour question be success-
47. Vide supra: Ch. 5, pp. 101 and 108-10.
subscribed to the ideals and the 1910 'compact' of Union. (48) Both organisations, furthermore, despite UNESSA's claim to uniqueness, worked for the interests of the English-speaking group and both considered republicanism to be the greatest danger confronting the country.

UNESSA presumably did not openly support the Federal Party because it could hope to achieve more for the English-speakers if it were not tagged with a party allegiance. Association with a political party furthermore, would mean that it could not champion a sectional interest but would have to adopt a programme 'in the interests of all sections of the community'. (49) Another possible reason is that UNESSA had learnt from the A.R.L. that an independent group could rally much wider support than one identified with a political party. (50) The independence of UNESSA would thus be to the benefit of both itself and the Federal Party, with which it was very closely linked in private.

Having opted out of the 1958 general election, the 1959 provincial elections were a matter of life and death for the Federal Party. Being a federal party by name and commitment and relying on predominantly English-speaking Natal to thwart the Nationalist government's plans, the Federals placed great importance on controlling at least one province, as they had done five years previously. (51) The growth of Afrikaner nationalism and republicanism since 1954 had given a new urgency to the struggle.

As early as August 1957 Batchelor, Derek Heaton Nicholls and Browne had seen the forthcoming provincial elections as the Federals' 'big chance'. (52) Selby concurred with this view and urged that the party be mobilised to act as a rallying point for anti-Nationalists. In keeping with

51. Vide supra: Ch. 5. p. 96.
this line of thought, when it was decided at the 1957 Natal Federal Party Congress to withdraw from the general election, it was stated specifically that the Federals would fight the provincial elections '...with all its resources, throughout the Province.' (53) So important had the election become in Federal eyes that Selby informed the Natal Provincial Executive in November 1957, almost two years before the contest, that the party had 'staked everything...on a swing of opinion' towards it in 1959. (54) The Transvaal Federals agreed. Victory in Natal, they said, had become the 'main target' of Federals everywhere. (55) In October 1958, Selby commented on the importance of the elections to the members in a party circular:

Within the next twelve months, our Party will be facing the most crucial Provincial Election in the history of this Province - a contest which may well decide, once and for all, whether we shall allow ourselves to be absorbed into a Broederbond republic, or stand firm against it. In my view, if we lose this chance, it is highly improbable that we shall ever receive another. (56)

Although the provincial elections only took place in October 1959, a speech by Derek Heaton Nicholls in Pietermaritzburg in March of that year was reported in the press as 'opening the Federal Party campaign', (57) and by 27 May the Federals in Natal had announced the names of five candidates. (58)

As the Federals' Natal election effort gathered momentum, the government, with apparent indifference to Natal's reaction, announced the appointment of J.H. Stander

53. Vide supra: Ch. 8. p. 172.
as Deputy Director of Education in Natal. In May, the Natal Provincial Council resolved that this appointment was 'not acceptable', and the Executive refused to yield to the central government’s demand that the appointment be made. The provincial administration wished to appoint H. Lundie, who was senior to Stander and next in line for promotion.

The real dispute, however, was over Stander’s educational and political views. He was a Nationalist who was believed to be sympathetic to Christian National Education. As Natal was the only province controlled by the opposition, Stander’s appointment was seen as an attempt to bring Natal’s White education policy into line with that of the other provinces. There, compulsory mother tongue education had been introduced by education departments which were controlled by Afrikaner nationalists.

The Stander case immediately assumed large proportions. All the opposition parties, as well as the A.R.L. and the Black Sash, supported the Natal Executive Committee. The city halls of Durban and Pietermaritzburg were filled to overflowing with protestors against the government’s actions. Mitchell declared that Natal would not 'budge an inch' and 'dare not surrender' over the issue of education.

So far from moderating his policy in response to these protests, Dr. Verwoerd, the Prime Minister, added to the crisis by declaring that legislation to enforce a national education policy would soon be passed. There should be, he stated, 'uniformity' in White education. The country could not have one educational ideal in one province and another elsewhere. The provincial authorities would have to 'adjust themselves' to the proposed legislation.

The Federal reaction was immediate. Selby announced that Verwoerd's speech brought Natal to 'D-day'. If the province submitted to the government, he said, there was no hope for the future as the next generation would be 'infected' by C.N.E. All protests, in the face of government intransigence, were useless, he observed, and, as nothing could be done legally to stop the Nationalist government, the only solution was for Natal to leave the Union. As the election campaign progressed, he returned to the secession call time and again. On 7 October, in Pietermaritzburg, he proclaimed Natal's right to secede rather than submit to a Nationalist 'dictatorship'. This, he maintained, could be done 'constitutionally' by the Provincial Council. On 12 October he repeated the argument at the Federal's major election rally in the Durban City Hall.

Despite the support of the party's Provincial Executive, secession was not taken up by any other candidate. Batchelor mentioned it in passing in one of his speeches, but the other candidates did not even broach the subject, nor did they include it in their manifestos (Selby mentioned it twice in his). This was because the demand for secession was proving counter-productive. The U.P.

73. B. Batchelor: Speech at Kingsburgh, 13 October 1959.
74. In reply to a question on secession, Derek Heaton Nicholls replied: 'We do not want to break away from the Union, but we cannot accept a Broederbond Republic. It all depends, though, on whether we have the people behind us.' Natal Daily News: 17 September 1959.
strongly opposed secession and made considerable political capital out of the issue. (76) In addition, the newspaper reaction was unfavourable. While the Witness and the Mercury ignored the subject, the influential Daily News strongly opposed Selby's idea, maintaining that he had 'gone a long way towards forfeiting the confidence of the electorate.' (77) Similarly, continued the newspaper, the suggestion that Stander's appointment could be opposed by any means other than the courts raised '...false hopes and prepared the way for sad disillusionment.' (78)

In September 1959, the government appealed to the Supreme Court on the Stander case and the Natal Executive Committee defended its action in refusing his appointment. (79) It was widely appreciated from the beginning that the Committee's stand was one of principle and that the government was legally justified in its actions. (80) This introduced the Federal argument (81) of moral as against legal resistance to the Nationalists. The Federals maintained that, as the U.P. was willing to accept what was legal, it had no option but to accept the appointment of Stander. (82) In any event, all the parties concerned were to accept the Supreme Court ruling in November that Stander's appointment as Deputy Director of Education stood as from the previous January. (83)

The judgement came after the election and did not therefore affect the campaign, which was dominated by the

educational dispute. The candidates devoted more time to this topic, and more questions were asked about it, than any other. Mrs. J. Stewart, the Federal Party's popular Durban North candidate, was persuaded to stand only because she felt that the province's educational future was threatened.\(^{84}\)

It was Martin, however, who led the defence. As he had done in the Berea by-election and the 1954 provincial elections, he maintained that the C.N.E. ideas were infiltrating the Natal Education Department at an alarming rate, via its 'hundreds of followers' who had been trained at institutions which were 'entirely committed' to its ideals.\(^{86}\)

The Provincial Executive of the Federal Party did not formulate a detailed policy statement in 1959 as it had done in 1954.\(^{87}\) The nearest the party came to issuing a statement of policy for the election was the Talking Points for Federals.\(^{88}\) This document, compiled by Martin, was divided into nineteen sections. Two dealt with the origin of the party and with the divisions which had emerged in the U.P. Of the seventeen remaining sections, eight dealt with education.\(^{89}\)

According to these, the party's education policy remained essentially unchanged from 1954. More prominence, however, was given to the alleged failure of the U.P. to administer the department properly. One section dealt with the 'growth of so-called Christian National Education in Natal', while the following section analysed what C.N.E. involved.\(^{91}\) According to this, science was to be taught within the 'scope of the Old Testament', history and geography were to be 'narrowly South African', and teachers were to

84. Interview with Mrs. J. Stewart.
85. Vide supra: Ch. 5. pp. 93 and 111.
87. Vide supra: Ch. 5. p. 98.
89. Ibid.
90. Vide supra: Ch. 5. pp. 108-12.
"...be spied upon by pupils, parents and church." (92) The Stander issue was then referred to in more detail. The U.P. was blamed for creating the problem in the first instance, because the Natal Executive Committee (U.P. controlled) had in 1949 first appointed him an inspector even though he had then not been recommended for this post by the Director of Education. "In other words, the U.P. created the Stander Problem and it is making a very belated effort to avoid the consequences of it." (93) The U.P. was then castigated for its 'failure to safeguard English culture and heritage in Natal Education', and for its 'failures' and 'broken promises' on education. (94) These involved alleged preferences to Afrikaans teachers and the apparent tardiness, despite the commission of 1954, (95) of the education department in stopping C.N.E. infiltration and the teaching of distorted history. In addition, the educational authorities were taken to task for the administration of school hostels and teacher training, where it was alleged that English-speakers were discriminated against and their values ignored. (96)

The education issue also featured prominently in Federal manifestos. (97) Exceptions were the manifestos of Selby and of J.E.M. Gilmour, the Federal candidate for Greyville. Selby's most prominent manifesto issue was secession, (98) while Gilmour emphasised his support for the government's Bantustan policy. (99) In addition to these hand-outs which dealt with individual candidates, the Federals re-issued the 1954 pamphlets Your Child and the Future and Do You Know What Christian National Education Means? (100)

Apart from its impact on election propaganda, the

92. Ibid.
93. Ibid. Underlining in the original.
94. Ibid., pp.3-4.
95. Vide supra: Ch. 5. pp. 111-2.
100. Vide supra: Ch. 5. p.110.
Stander dispute also led to talks regarding a possible merger between the Federals and the U.P. (101) In January 1959, Martin, on behalf of the Federals, had talks on the subject with Major L. Arthur, a U.P. Natal Provincial Executive Committee member. (102) In July, Martin approached Leo Boyd, also a Natal Provincial Executive Committee member and Natal deputy chairman of the U.P., to inform him that, if the U.P. agreed to pledge to oppose a republic as it had opposed Stander’s appointment, the Federal Party would be prepared to ‘join up with it’. (103) ‘Resistance to the republic’ was later defined by Martin as requiring the U.P. to accept that Natal was entitled to a separate referendum on the issue. In addition, the Federals would expect to be ‘represented’ in the new Provincial Council in order to safeguard what they considered to be vital principles. (104) There is some dispute as to the details of the subsequent abortive negotiations. What is clear is that the U.P. was anxious not to encumber itself with a pledge of a separate Natal referendum. Furthermore, it did not wish to sponsor ex-Federal candidates with strong Anglophilic views when it was trying to sway the Afrikaner vote. (105) As important, the U.P. was now facing deep internal divisions which, in view of the provincial elections, added a new dimension to opposition politics.

These divisions originated in disagreement regarding Black policy. At the urging of Mitchell, the U.P. National Congress voted to oppose further land purchases for Black settlement. Eleven delegates, including six M.P.s, issued a statement, protesting (106) that the congress was guilty of

101. These conversations took place before the Federal Party accused the United Party of being responsible for the Stander question.
a 'breach of promise' towards Blacks. The Progressive Group, as the dissidents were known, then expressed deep concern at the 'whole undertone of the Congress', which had failed to 'face up to' the increasingly urgent problems of 'multi-racial South Africa'. After talks with Sir de Villiers Graaff had failed, the Progressive Group announced its intention of forming a new party. By this time, the number of M.P.s who had broken from the U.P. had increased from six to eleven.

On 17 August, within days of the first announcement of a split in the U.P., the Natal Mercury perceived that the political position in Natal had altered in a way different from that in the other provinces. In Natal there was a '... strong core of Federal Party supporters, whose views coincided with those of the Progressives', on the issues of colour and provincial educational control. Before the Natal Federals could open discussions with the Progressives, their Cape colleagues had acted. They, somewhat unrealistically, invited the Progressive Group on 20 August to join their ranks in the belief that '...no good could come of further division.' The invitation elicited no reply.

The Natal Federals were more realistic. Selby, in a speech in Pietermaritzburg on 25 August 1959, stated that the Federals felt 'closer' and were 'much more in sympathy' with the Progressives than ever they were with the U.P. He therefore suggested that the two parties consider fusion without sacrifice of principles on either side.

110. They included the two M.P.s against whom the Federals had fought - Butcher (Berea) and van Ryneveld (East London North). Robertson: loc.cit.
112. PP/P: N.F. Bowyer to J. Steytler, 20 August 1959.
Progressives, who were approached by the press, gave as their opinions that, in view of the fact that their party had not yet finalised its programme of principles, discussion of amalgamation with the Federals was premature. (115)

Selby then approached Boyd, the Natal leader of the Progressive Group, via a Pietermaritzburg attorney, with the suggestion of an election pact. They met in Pietermaritzburg and Boyd informed Selby that his offer would be placed before the Group's Natal Provincial Executive and its national leader, Dr. J. Steytler. The executive was opposed to the idea and Steytler was concerned that any pact with the Federals would 'taint' the Progressives in the eyes of the 'moderate Afrikaners'. (116) The Progressives hoped to sway this group away from 'apartheid' and it was felt by Steytler, as well as by the executive, that any identification with the 'English-bound' Federals would damage this campaign. (117) Boyd therefore announced that the two parties, while 'respecting' each other, should not make any election pacts. (118) He explained that, as the Progressives believed that they had a 'new political trail' to blaze in South Africa, they could not 'hitch...their wagon to any other'. (119) Once again a Federal attempt to sustain its flagging strength by means of a pact or merger failed.

Next to the education disputes, the most important issue in the Federal campaign was the question of the republic. Verwoerd stated unequivocally that the provincial elections were not a 'test' of republican sentiment in South Africa. (120) A referendum or special election would be held for that purpose. The National Party would use the provincial elections, he stated, to gather 'information for itself' which would be 'useful' in reaching the decision as to when

116. Interview with L. Boyd.
117. Ibid.
a public vote on the republic should be taken. (121) A number of Cabinet Ministers, however, declared that a republic would soon be achieved. P.M.K. Le Roux, Minister of Agriculture, F.C. Erasmus, Minister of Defence and P.W. Botha, Deputy Minister of the Interior all predicted that South Africa would be a republic by 1963. (122)

Such challenges were enough to convince the Federals of the urgency of the matter and they leapt to the defence of Crown and Commonwealth. Noel Roberts, Federal candidate for Pietermaritzburg South and vice-chairman of the dying Natal A.R.L., declared republicanism to be the 'main issue' in the election. (123) It exceeded education in importance because the latter was 'only part of the whole': (124) if a republic were to be created, 'everything would be lost'. (125) Martin, despite the emphasis which he placed on education in his speeches and manifesto, agreed with Roberts. The republic, he stated, was the 'major issue'. (126) Whatever the degree of priority to which they gave republicanismin the election campaign, all the Federals actively opposed the idea.

In March 1959, the Federals attached a detailed anti-republican statement by Selby to their news letter. In this, Selby maintained that the way for Natal to 'challenge' Nationalist republicanismin was to demand a separate referendum for the province. (127) He was re-iterating a well-worn Federal argument. So as to emphasise the point, Hughes Mason, soon to be Federal candidate in Ixopo, added a section to Selby's paper in which he argued the question of a separate referendum for Natal. (128) Like his predecessors, Verwoerd

128. Ibid., p.6.
refused to entertain the idea of a separate referendum for Natal. He declared in the Pietermaritzburg City Hall: 'We are not prepared to allow a provincial authority to thwart a decision of the Government given under the law of the land.' (129) The appearance of the Prime Minister at a public meeting in Natal’s capital, the first in years, marked a new offensive by the Nationalists against English-speaking Natal. He was determined to call the Federals’ bluff as regards the republic and to test how determined the Anglophiles were in their defiance.

In Talking Points for Federals, outlining policy for the election, two sections were devoted to the republic. No mention, however, was made of a separate referendum for Natal. Instead, the U.P. was attacked. It was pointed out that the U.P. still retained clause 2(d), which allowed republican propaganda within the party. This clause, the Federals still believed, permitted pro-republicans to hold influential positions within the U.P. and had led to the party’s ‘half-hearted’ stand. (130)

Another accusation which the Federals levelled at the U.P. was that it ignored the interests of the English-speaking population. The reason for this, maintained Derek Heaton Nicholls, was that it was always trying to sway the moderate Afrikaner nationalists. In the process, the ‘legitimate claims’ of the English-speakers were sacrificed. (131) Batchelor saw the U.P. as being ‘dedicated to the platteland’ and hence not interested in English-speaking Natal. (132) Selby was, as was to be expected in view of his emergence as the most outspoken defender of the English-speakers, the most vehement in his defence of their rights. He stated that they had suffered every sort of indignity and were beginning to wonder whether there was any future for them in the Union. This feeling was re-inforced by the use which the government

made of bilingualism. Instead of being used for practical purposes, Selby argued, bilingual tests had become tests of 'political orthodoxy' (133) and were thus a means of ridding the public services of both English-speaking people and of persons who were opposed to government policy.

While defending the English-speakers, the Federals stressed that they were not anti-Afrikaner. D. Lowe, the Federal candidate for Umzimkulu, maintained that the Federals had no intention of 'anglicising' the Afrikaners. (134) It was the U.P. which had attempted to calumnise the Federal Party in this way. Similarly, the Talking Point for Federals had a section entitled the U.P.'s Misrepresentation of Our Attitude to Afrikaners. (135) It stated that the U.P. 'constantly' accused the Federals of being a 'Jingo' party. (136) This, maintained the Federals, was completely false. In defence, they cited the fact that 'racial accord' was one of their prime purposes, and that Afrikaners had been foundation members of the party. (137)

While they attacked the U.P. for wooing the 'moderate' Afrikaners, the Federals maintained that the Nationalists were unbeatable. This was because they had indoctrinated the Afrikaans youth and had organised the delimitation of constituencies to their advantage. (138) This point linked with the Federal arguments concerning the English-speakers and the republic. The Federals believed that because the Nationalists were unbeatable, it was useless to appeal to the Afrikaners. Rather, the English-speakers should rally together, especially in Natal, to defeat the republic.

There were major Federal policies which received very little publicity in the campaign. The most striking example of this was federation. Talking Points devoted a section to the supposed 'move towards federation', but apart from listing prominent people, mainly academics, who supported the idea of federation, the document remained silent on the issue. The manifestos of the candidates treated the topic in a perfunctory way, if at all. (139)

Another policy which received very little publicity at this time was the party's stand on race. Talking Points did not mention the subject. In contrast to what had occurred in 1954, little attention was paid by most of the Federal candidates to the race issue. Their manifestos referred to it only in passing, if at all. (140) Despite their anxiety to avoid the issue, they were forced not to do so by their critics, who gave the matter 'much prominence'. (141) So great was this coverage that Martin feared that the topic might 'overshadow' the republican issue. (142) He therefore spent a major part of a speech refuting claims that the Federal Party favoured social integration. Nowhere did he put forward the Federals' policy.

While most of the Federal candidates skirted round the issue, only Batchelor, who contested the constituency of Umkomaas, deliberately gave detailed publicity to the party's race policy. He stressed that the Federals planned to give Blacks representation in parliament and on the provincial councils. This would be done, he explained, by introducing two voters' rolls. The 'bulk' of the Blacks would be on the 'A' roll and only the 'sophisticated elite' would be on a common roll with the Whites. (143) The result of this scheme

139. Martin's manifesto did not broach the topic or even use the word 'federation'.
140. Martin, as in the case of federation, did not mention race in his manifesto.
would be to create a 'culture bar' in the place of a 'colour bar'.(144) Batchelor's stand led to repeated attacks on him by his opponents. In an attempt to embarrass him, they quoted letters which he had written when he was still a member of the U.P. Batchelor, in reply, maintained that he had tried to alter the U.P. from within and, only when this failed, had he joined the Federals. It was, he said, the Federals' 'Native Policy' which had attracted him and not its anti-republicanism.(145) Batchelor was also attacked by his colleagues. His stand led to correspondence between himself and Hughes Mason on the party's non-White policy and on the wisdom of his speeches. Batchelor maintained that he had acted correctly in stating that the party's policy called for two voters' rolls. In the end, Hughes Mason had to agree that Batchelor was correct on this point.(146)

The Federal candidates raised a number of issues in the election other than the main policy topics. Martin was deeply concerned at the influence of the Broederbond in South Africa. He devoted almost an entire speech to this single question.(147) Several candidates devoted time to strictly provincial issues such as roads and health services. Batchelor devoted a considerable part of his manifesto and speeches to pollution.(148) He argued that large property investments were threatened by industrial pollution in the Umkomaas area.(149)

The U.P.'s Natal manifesto was a bland, unemotional document which did not even mention the Federals. The slogan of the party was 'We Guarantee Good Government'.(150) The

146. B/P: Correspondence between B. Batchelor and R. Hughes Mason, 23 September 1959 to 24 October 1959.
149. Ibid.
U.P. divided its manifesto into five main sections, dealing with the five principal areas of provincial government: education, hospital, taxation, roads and parks, game and fish preservation. Education occupied the first and largest section. It promised education aimed at the creation of a broad South Africanism, not 'indoctrination'. Parents should continue to choose the language medium of instruction. Further, the U.P. promised to review the position of teachers constantly to ensure contentment in the profession. Finally, it promised to resist central government control of White education, the U.P. being aware of its responsibility to Natal in this regard. 'Recent decisions concerning appointments to senior posts in the Education Department', the manifesto declared, arose from an appreciation of this 'responsibility'. (151) Nowhere was the Stander dispute discussed.

The other four sections were equally bland. As regards hospitalisation, the U.P. aimed at supplying 'financial security and peace of mind' for the population. (152) Taxation was to be administered in the 'best interests' of the people, while the roads policy was designed to benefit the 'greatest number in the shortest time'. (153) Finally, on the issue of parks, game and fish preservation, the U.P. refused to draw these '...priceless natural assets...into the centre of policial controversy.' (154)

The campaign conducted by the U.P. candidates was equally calm and unemotional. In contrast to the Federals, they side-stepped the Stander issue by stating that they stood for education and not indoctrination, and for parental choice in the medium of instruction. (155) Other U.P. candidates ignored the education issue completely and emphasised instead the need for efficiency in provincial

151. Ibid.
152. Ibid.
153. Ibid.
154. Ibid.
matters. This, they maintained, already existed in the U.P.-
controlled Natal administration. (156)

As in 1954, the Federals were concerned about splitting
the vote. At the same time, they had to cope with the
accusation that they were not opposing the Nationalists. In
order to solve this dilemma, the party's Natal chairman, D.L.
Nurcombe, proposed a pact between the U.P. and Federals in
Durban. As there were only three constituencies in the Durban
area in which there was 'any possibility' of a Nationalist
victory, (157) Nurcombe 'invited' the U.P. to withdraw from
one of the three seats. (158) This proposal he justified on
the grounds that the Federals had obtained one third of the
votes in the seats which it had contested in the 1954
election. The U.P. did not even reply to the invitation. (159)

The 1959 provincial elections, unlike those of 1954,
took place in all four provinces on the same day, 14 October
1959. The U.P. and the Nationalists fought the elections in
constituencies throughout the country. The Federal Party
nominated eleven candidates, only in Natal. (160)

The result of the provincial elections throughout
South Africa was a triumph for the National Party. It won
five seats, including the Natal constituency of Ladysmith,
from the U.P. As a result, it strengthened its position in
the Transvaal, the Cape and Natal, while retaining all the
seats in the Free State. The trend was towards increased
majorities for the National Party. (161) In Natal, the U.P.
won twenty seats and the Nationalists the remaining five.

156. U.P. (Natal): C. Hills's and R. Wood's Election Manifesto,
n.d.
June 1959.
160. The number of Natal seats contested were: United Party,
    twenty-two; the Nationalists, six; the Progressives, three;
    the Liberals, one; and Independents, four.
An analysis of the voting figures indicates the extent of the Federals' defeat. (162) They polled 10,392 votes, only 9.5 per cent. of the ballots cast. This was a decline of 10.9 per cent. as compared with 1954. (163) By contrast, the U.P. saw its percentage of the Natal vote increase by 2.8, while the Nationalists experienced a 1.2 per cent. increase. The Progressives won the support of 6.1 per cent. of the Natal vote.

In comparing the 1954 and 1959 provincial elections, it is important to note that, although the Federal vote dropped by more than half, the party contested fewer constituencies. A more reliable comparison than vote totals, therefore, is a comparison between the number of votes polled per constituency in each election. In 1954 the Federals polled, on an average, 1,206 votes per constituency whereas in 1959 the party received, on an average, 945 votes per seat. This represents a distinct decline. The party had failed to rally Natal once again. Furthermore, it was clear that the Progressives were now poised to replace the Federals as South Africa's third largest political party. In the three constituencies which they contested, they polled 6,637 votes, and in the key constituency of Pietermaritzburg South they polled over three times the Federal vote. (164)

Why had the Federals been soundly beaten again? Viewed broadly, the 1959 election was the culmination of a slow process of decline which had started after the 1954 election. The party was unable to counter the prevailing trend of South African politics against an exclusively English-speaking party. As regards the 1959 election specifically, this decline was accelerated in a number of ways. One problem was the lack of unity. A certain diversity of opinion within a

163. Vide supra: Ch.5. p.118.
164. 1,964 votes as against 559 votes.
political party is to be expected, but in the case of the Federals the diversity was extreme. Selby, for example, had been the only candidate to stress secession, while Batchelor was the only candidate who had emphasised the party's non-White policy. A dispute had ensued with a fellow Federal candidate, while another candidate, Seymour, had actually agreed with the Nationalists' Bantustan policy in his manifesto.

Another drawback for the Federals was that the party presented the same ideas as it had in 1954, but with less verve and confidence. They even used the same pamphlets. True, the U.P. campaign was lacklustre but it could afford to ignore the Federal arguments. It directed its attacks rather at the three Progressive candidates. The Federals themselves sensed their weakness. Their attempts to arrange pacts and alliances flowed from this; and these moves, when they failed, only damaged their morale still further.

The Federals never recovered from the 1959 election defeat. Amid speculation that the party would disband, a 'cross-section' of the Natal party assembled in Pietermaritzburg in November 1959. There it was decided to 'adjourn' until March 1960. The reason for this temporising resolution was uncertainty as to whether the Progressives would provide a political 'home' for Federal members. It was hoped by the Federals that the Progressive congress to decide on policy, scheduled for the end of November, would supply the answer.

The Federal congress also announced the resignation of Selby for 'health and business' reasons. The real reason for Selby's resignation was disillusionment and the poor state of his personal finances. Later, he wrote that the

166. The Star: 2 November 1959.
170. Interview with Mrs. Selby.
Federals had been '...trying to flog life into dead mules' and that there was little hope of achieving the Federal aims. (171) His successor, as 'temporary leader', was Derek Heaton Nicholls. (172)

There can be no disputing the fact that the Federals had received a series of staggering blows. In the elections they had been both ignored and defeated, their leader had resigned and the future of the party was in doubt. The party was, therefore, in no condition to meet the greatest challenge of its career - the republican referendum campaign.

CHAPTER NINE

THE COMING OF THE REPUBLIC

The critical year 1960 opened with the Natal Federal Party 'adjourned' and republican sentiment in the ascent. After their provincial election defeat, the Federals faced the anticipated republican election or referendum with few resources. Only the United or Progressive Parties seemed to have sufficient support to provide significant resistance to a Nationalist republic. The Federals did not believe, however, that either of these parties had the necessary determination.

The U.P. was still regarded by the Federals as being compromised and vacillatory in its resistance to the Nationalists. This view was for them confirmed when the U.P. supported the creation of the South African Foundation, which, the Transvaal Federals declared, planned to '...boost the achievements of the South African tyranny.' (1) The U.P.'s support of the Foundation would lead to the party's coming to terms with the Nationalists. (2)

In the belief that there was little which they could do to sway the Official Opposition, the Federals concentrated on the Progressives. When the Natal Congress of the Federal Party met on 31 October 1959 to determine the party's future, (3) the attempt was made to woo the Progressives into a strong repudiation of the republic. A statement was issued stressing the common attitudes which the two groups held, especially on the race issue, but which noted that the Progressive stand on the republican issue was 'not clear'. (4) The Progressives had both pro and anti-republicans amongst their leaders. (5) The Federals were therefore

concerned that there was a 'distinct possibility' that the Progressives would try and get Afrikaner support for their progressive non-White policy by 'offering republicanism' in exchange.\(^6\) In view of this danger, the statement concluded, there was no home with the Progressives for 'thousands who supported the Federal Party'.\(^7\) In view of this strategy, the decision was made not to dissolve the party and to postpone any decision until March 1960.\(^8\) The implications were clear. Should the Progressives declare themselves adamantly against the republic, they would then receive the influx of the Natal Federal Party's members.

The Transvaal Federals were similarly concerned about the Progressives. In a statement dated 10 November 1959, they warned that repudiation of the monarchy by the Progressives would be 'immoral and horrifying'.\(^9\) This was because the 'monarchical foundations' of the country could not be violated without the consent of all the parties to the 'contract of Union'.\(^10\) This 'solemn pledge', the statement declared, took precedence over all other considerations, such as race relations.\(^11\)

Within days of the formal foundation of the Progressive Party on 13 November, the republican issue arose again. Professor I.S. Fourie, M.P. for Germiston District, who was very sympathetic to the Progressive's race policy, refused to join the party because, he said, it '...refused to advocate a republic.'\(^12\) In an immediate counter to the possible pressure which Fourie's action could exert on Progressive policy, the Federal-supporting Natal Witness stated that there was every reason, but one, for 'whole-hearted' support of the Progressives by the Federal Party.\(^13\)

\(^6\) Natal Witness: 2 November 1959.
\(^7\) Natal Witness: 2 November 1959.
\(^8\) Natal Witness: 2 November 1959.
\(^10\) Ibid.
\(^11\) Ibid.
\(^12\) Natal Witness: 16 November 1959.
\(^13\) Natal Witness: 16 November 1959.
That reason was 'uncertainty' about the 'vigour' with which the new party intended to oppose republicanism. (14) Once again, the Federals offered support to the Progressives in exchange for the latter's total commitment in resisting the republic. On all these occasions, by silence, the Progressives did not take up the offer.

On 20 January 1960 Verwoerd announced in Parliament (15) the government's decisions as regards the attainment of a republic. He declared that the question would be decided by means of a referendum. The country would vote as a whole, he declared, thereby rejecting any possibility of separate provincial referendums. A bare majority would decide the issue. The White electorate of South Africa alone would suffice; South West Africa being expressly excluded by Verwoerd from taking part. (16) Verwoerd refused to be more specific. He stated that the referendum would not take place before May 31 but would not commit the government to a specific date or even to a particular year. The government, he said, would choose the best time ' ... in the interests of South Africa', to put the question to the electorate. (17)

As regards the constitution of a future republic, he would go no further than to announce that it would be 'Christian', 'democratic', and that equality of the two White groups would be guaranteed. (18) The government, he stated, had already amended the Union constitution so that it was 'almost' republican. (19) The main difference between the two constitutions would be the substitution of a presidency for the monarchy. Because the monarchy was the royal family of 'another State' it had become the 'background for division'. (20)

16. In fact, the South West African electorate did take part in the referendum.
18. Ibid., col. 12.
19. Ibid., col. 13.
20. Ibid., col. 9.
Once it had been abolished, national unity would be achieved and the '...150 years' struggle between South African nationalism and what...[was] to some extent a foreign nationalism...', would be at an end.

Verwoerd was careful to explain that the question of South Africa becoming a republic was quite distinct from that as to whether she would remain in the Commonwealth. South Africa would remain a Commonwealth member only for as long as it served her interests, he said. As the date of the referendum had not been announced, it was not possible for him to say whether South Africa would wish to be a Commonwealth member when this eventuated. He did assure the voters, however, that, before the referendum was held, they would be told of the government's policy as regards Commonwealth membership.

The speech caused a sensation. It was widely expected that Verwoerd would hold the referendum during the second half of 1960. In that case, the supplementary roll which closed on 28 February would be the last certain opportunity for voters to register. The first reaction of the opposition parties, including the Federals, was therefore to appeal to voters to check the voters' roll. Newspaper surveys showed that the English-speakers were less registration-conscious than Afrikaners. This resulted in a drive for voter registration on an unprecedented scale. In Natal, the Federals, although the party was 'adjourned', co-operated with the Progressives, Liberals and Black Sash in enrolling voters. Similarly, the Transvaal party helped with

23. When 108 English-speakers in the western Cape were questioned as to whether they were on the voters' roll, fifty-three answered that they were, fourteen that they were not and forty-one that they did not know. The corresponding figures for 102 Afrikaners were, seventy-nine, six and seventeen. Cape Times: 4 February 1960.
voters' registration. The U.P. conducted its own registration campaign. (25)

In view of the impending referendum, it was a foregone conclusion that the March 1960 meeting would decide that the Natal Federal Party would continue to exist. It was, however, a very different party from that which had fought the 1959 elections. It now had no permanent office or staff, (26) no provincial congress and no functioning branches. The Federal Party of Natal, like its Cape and Transvaal sister parties, was no longer an organisation which aimed at winning elections. But, although it really now existed in name only, (27) the party's name, and the ideas which it represented, still commanded some influence. The Federals had received a substantial vote the previous year and, in a referendum, where every vote was equally weighted because there would be no constituency divisions, it could still have a crucial role to play. As Batchelor had once observed, '... a party exists as long as it has an address and telephone number and the Press publishes its opinions.' (28) The press continued to publish Federal opinions, especially those of Martin, who now became the party's leader. Derek Heaton Nicholls became his deputy. They were assisted by an Executive Committee which played little part in the future life of the party.

Apart from voting to keep the party alive, the March meeting issued an appeal to the voters of South Africa. It enumerated again the faults of the government. It stressed the Afrikaner republican nature of the National Party and pointed out again the anti-English character of that party. The only way to beat the Nationalists and their republican call was for the opposition parties to 'work together'. (29)

27. Confirmed in interviews with Martin, Heaton Nicholls and Mrs. Stewart.
The Federals, for their part, were prepared to give 'every assistance to all Parties' who worked towards this ideal. (30)

The issue of establishing a united opposition front was complex because, in the months following Verwoerd's January speech, there was great disunity. Early in February, Mitchell stated publicly that the U.P. would not work with other groups in resisting the republic. (31) This was translated in action when the U.P. and the Progressives arranged separate anti-republic demonstrations and launched separate anti-republic funds. (32) In addition, controversies between opposition leaders over clause 2(d) of the U.P. constitution and over the Progressives' republican stand continued unabated. (33)

There was, however, considerable pressure towards unity of action. Questioners at U.P. and Progressive meetings demanded that the parties co-operate and these demands received widespread publicity. (34) Most of the English-language press pressed for the opposition parties to co-operate against the Nationalists. (35) The Natal Witness expressed a common opinion when it urged the Progressives, Liberals and Federals to support U.P. anti-republican rallies, despite its refusal to co-operate with the other parties.

Faced with this pressure, Mitchell shifted his position. At a Pietermaritzburg rally on 9 May he called on all voters to support one of the anti-republican parties, 'not necessarily the U.P.' (36) In addition, he rousingly called on all Natalians to resist republicanism under all circumstances. After the rally, Martin presented Mitchell

with a written statement in which he asked for clarification.

Are we to understand from what Mr. Douglas Mitchell said to-night that he will never tell the people of Natal, against their expressed wish to renounce the solemn compact of Union under the Crown or to submit to a Republic, but that he will tell the Nats to go and be damned? (37)

Mitchell dated, signed and wrote 'agreed' on the document. (38)

Armed with this guarantee of U.P. firmness, Martin committed Federal support once again to a united front against the Nationalists. (39) He wrote to Mitchell in Cape Town discussing the appointment of electoral agents. The Federals, he stated, did not wish to nominate any agents but requested that men of character and popularity be appointed. In addition, he urged that the Progressives be party to the discussions which would take place before agents were selected so as to prevent an impression of 'disunity'. (40) Continuing the unity theme, Martin wrote that he had informed the press that '...once the Parties i.e. U.P., Progressives and Federals get busy,...there will be no differences between them whatever.' (41) Three meetings between Martin, Boyd and Mitchell followed. (42) Some difficulty arose concerning the appointment of electoral agents, (43) but this was eventually overcome. The Federals' Natal Executive thereupon called publically for '...the closest co-operation' between all anti-republican groups in South Africa. (44)

38. Ibid.
40. A. Martin to D. Mitchell, 12 May 1960. (In the possession of the author)
41. Ibid.
43. Nomination of the anti-republican electoral agent was important because he controlled all information collected by the opposition as regards voters. This would greatly benefit his party after the referendum.
The Transvaal Federal Party, however, did not follow this lead. In a press statement it declared that co-operation with the U.P. in the referendum contained the 'grave danger' that this continue after the contest.\(^{45}\) The result would be acceptance of the U.P.'s 'weak-kneed' constitutional policy and its 'reactionary' colour policy.\(^{46}\) In addition, the Transvalers pointed out, there was a basic difference between the U.P.'s standpoint on the republic and that of the Federals. The U.P. would allow South Africa to be declared a republic as long as this was 'legal'.\(^{47}\) The Federals had always maintained that it was not merely a matter of legality and that Natal could not be compelled to accept the verdict of a Union-wide referendum. In any event, the 'compact' of Union could not be broken.\(^{48}\) In a clear reference to the Natal Federal Party, the Transvaal Federals insisted that no agreements be made between opposition parties without consultation on a 'union-wide' basis.\(^{49}\)

The Transvaal Federals were incorrect in accusing the Natal Federals of altering their position. They supported Mitchell because he guaranteed that Natal would be able to decide its own future. Apart from the private assurance which he had given Martin, he stated publicly, 'I am not prepared to accept a decision of South Africa as far as Natal is concerned.'\(^{50}\) Similarly, Verwoerd had stated that he would not be bound by the referendum result. If the government lost the referendum he would '...put the matter to Parliament for a decision.'\(^{51}\) Thus, before the date of the referendum had been announced, major forces on each side refused to be bound by the result.

The whole question of the legality of a possible republic in South Africa which had so occupied the Federals, was finally settled by the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference in May 1960. The final communiqué stated: 'The meeting affirmed the view that the choice between a monarchy and a republic was entirely the responsibility of the country concerned.'\(^{(52)}\) The last chance of a prevention of the republic on constitutional grounds was thus removed.

On 3 August 1960, Verwoerd announced that the republican referendum would be held on 5 October 1960.\(^{(53)}\) Anti-republican centres were opened throughout the country and the Federals co-operated with Progressives and the U.P. in the ensuing campaign. The three parties were united in a 'common cause' declared Mitchell to 40 000 cheering Durbanites.\(^{(54)}\) In fact, there was still an underlying hostility between the opposition parties. The U.P. and Progressives issued their own anti-republican propaganda, while there was open friction between U.P. and Federal workers.\(^{(55)}\)

During the campaign the Nationalists stressed national unity.\(^{(56)}\) In a letter to every voter, Verwoerd asked for assistance in creating a republic to build 'one South African nation'.\(^{(57)}\) The question, he stressed, was 'British Monarchy, or: South African Republic'.\(^{(58)}\) The first alternative would not only keep the country divided but would leave South Africa vulnerable to 'instigated racial clashes', Communism and the 'elimination' of the Whites.\(^{(59)}\) He did,

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54. Recollection by the author.
55. Interview with Mrs. J. Stewart.
57. Letter by H.F. Verwoerd to Each Voter, 21 September 1960. (In the possession of the author)
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
however, envisage a 'democratic' republic within the Commonwealth. The importance of the Commonwealth connection was stressed by the pro-republicans who issued a special booklet on the question. This contained the assurance that 'The Government has sound reasons for its statement that South Africa will be allowed to retain membership of the Commonwealth.'

The United and Progressive Parties based their campaigns on the Commonwealth issue. Little was heard of the monarchy. Most of the comprehensive U.P. booklet Against a Republic was devoted to the economic and political importance of the Commonwealth. Similarly, the Progressives' Twelve Reasons for Opposing Dr. Verwoerd's Republic was devoted largely to the economic and political consequences which would follow loss of Commonwealth membership. The Federals were too impoverished to issue any publications. Individual members worked in the constituencies and the leaders, especially Martin, appeared frequently on anti-republican platforms. The deep and emotional attachment to the monarchy which many of its members felt was, however, not given prominence by other anti-republican spokesmen.

On October 4, the day before the referendum, Martin published his last appeal to the voters. He pointed again to the growing isolation of South Africa in a hostile world. He stressed that a vote in favour of the republic would increase that isolation. His statement ended with the words:

"...any attempt by Dr. Verwoerd to force Natal into a republic against the will of its people would be a violation of the Act of Union, an aggressive act of bad faith comparable with

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60. Ibid.
61. Republican Referendum Committee: Commonwealth Relations: Membership of South Africa, 30 August 1960. The South African government had already given notice to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting in March that South Africa wished to remain a member of the Commonwealth as a republic. Mansergh: op. cit., p. 365.
many of the actions of Adolph Hitler. Natal would resent it as such. (64)

The result of the referendum was a majority of 74,580 votes in favour of a republic. (65) Natal, the province in which all Federals were most vitally interested, voted heavily against the republic. In the heaviest of the provincial polls (92.5 per cent) the province registered 135,598 (75.9 per cent) against and 42,299 (23.7 per cent) for a republic. The remaining 688 (0.4 per cent) ballots were spoilt. Some constituency statistics were even more impressive. Durban North registered the highest percentage vote in South Africa (94.2 per cent), while Durban Musgrave achieved the highest anti-republican vote in the country (93.1 per cent). Despite all the efforts of English-speaking Natal, however, the referendum had been lost.

The Federals, in keeping with their oft-stated ideals, refused to accept that Natal was bound by the result. Martin declared that Verwoerd was attempting to disrupt the 'compact of Union by a bare majority of a small section of the people.' (66) In doing this, he intended 'annexing' Natal and, stated Martin, Natalians would be 'dishonoured and servile' if they renounced their traditions and allowed Verwoerd to gain his ends. (67) UNESSA later endorsed Martin's views (68) as did the Natal Witness. (69)

Martin could make such brave statements but it was a demonstrable political fact that only the U.P. had sufficient strength and influence in Natal to lead any extra-parliamentary resistance to the Nationalists. Mitchell, however, was in a dilemma. He could defy the government and lead the Natal resistance to a republic, as he had promised to do publicly in Pietermaritzburg and in writing to Martin. (70) Such a

move would receive widespread support in the highly charged political atmosphere of post-referendum Natal. It would, however, be resisted by powerful forces in the province (such as by leading industrialists and the Natal Daily News) and it would lead to the certain expulsion of Mitchell from the U.P. It could also be construed as an act of rebellion.

For a time it seemed as though Mitchell would lead the resistance. He declared, on 6 October, that 'Natal's anti-republican fight...[was] not over'. (71) He arrived in Durban three days later, amid reports of the formation of a 'secessionist organisation' in the province. (72) When spokesmen for the 1,500-strong crowd which met him at the airport demanded to hear that Natal was 'not at any price going into Verwoerd's republic', (73) Mitchell balked. He called for calm in a speech described by the Witness as an 'extraordinary piece of shuffling and evasiveness'. (74) In truth, Mitchell was trying to prevent some Natalians from taking a secessionist stand. He was attempting to retain U.P. control over events in Natal, while preserving the national unity of the party. (75) The Progressives had a similar view. Boyd announced on 11 October that they did not take a 'purely Natal attitude' towards the coming republic. (76)

Martin, on behalf of the Federals, went to see Mitchell. He reminded the Natal U.P. leader of his promise of 9 May. (77) Mitchell expressed doubts as to whether defiance of the Nationalists had the support of most Natalians, especially the Progressives. Martin's view was that 'every hour

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72. Natal Witness: 10 October 1960. UNESSA, and especially Mallinick, was heavily involved in advocating secession for Natal. Interview with A.C. Martin.
75. Interview with D. Mitchell.
Mitchell delayed played into Verwoerd's hands', whereas Mitchell 'gave him to understand that he had not made up his mind.'(78)

In an attempt to rally the public and force the political leaders into action, the Federals organised demonstrations against the republic. Martin adopted an attitude 'strongly in favour of secession'.(79) He planned a 'giant protest march' by the newly-created Anti-Republican Youth Movement in order to demonstrate opposition to the republic and to form a secessionist movement to petition the Administrator of Natal to act. (80) Three hundred and fifty young people marched through Durban. They carried banners, several of which read, 'Don't let your leaders betray you'. (81) The marchers were joined by 1 500 other protestors at Albert Park, where Martin urged them to give Mitchell 'a little while longer' to lead Natal away from a Nationalist republic. (82)

Various meetings were held between Martin, Boyd, Mitchell and other officials of the three parties in Natal. (83) At one stage De Villiers Graaff was called in, (84) but disagreements remained. The U.P. Head Committee for Natal announced on 21 October, that the party would enter the republic but would seek 'concessions' from the Nationalists. (85) These 'concessions' included a guarantee of provincial control of White education and control of a provincial police

force. (86) Martin publically disassociated himself from the U.P. stand. (87)

The U.P.'s open acceptance of the republic was a reflection of most opposition opinion in South Africa as well as in Natal. The Rand Daily Mail, for example, stated that, as the republic was inevitable, the opposition had '...better try to make the best of it.' (88) The Daily Dispatch urged the opposition to accept defeat 'gracefully', a line of action supported by the Pretoria News and the Cape Times. (89) Natal's two largest newspapers also supported acceptance of the republic. The Mercury observed that the country's future rested with Verwoerd, (90) while the Daily News counselled the Natal English-speakers to 'live and work' with their political opponents. (91) Professor E.H. Brookes, the prominent Liberal, urged acceptance of the republic, (92) while Archbishop D.E. Hurley appealed to Natal to be 'big-hearted' on the republican issue, while concentrating on the 'quest of justice for all'. (93) Die Nataller summed up the position:

It has already become obvious that Natal will accept the republic without much ado....Two patterns appear from the political developments: the splinter groups and...the Natal Witness support sundry vague ideas of 'separation' and 'action'; the responsible parties are attempting to create a broad unity of English-speaking people who can 'save' Commonwealth membership and can put possible conditions for 'unity' to the Government. (94)

These 'conditions' were set out in resolutions passed by the Natal Provincial Council on 31 October 1960. Their

provisions had been agreed upon by Natal’s three opposition leaders.\(^{95}\) Even before being passed, they were variously construed as being an 'acceptance' or a 'rejection' of the republic.\(^ {96}\) The twelve resolutions demanded that the constitution should contain safeguards on freedom of worship, language equality, parental choice of medium of school instruction, freedom of the universities and freedom of the press. In addition to retaining its existing powers, particularly over education, provincial personnel, local government, and Crown Lands, the Provincial Council would retain its own police force and have greater financial powers.\(^ {97}\) As the four Nationalist Members boycotted the Council meeting, the twelve resolutions were passed unanimously.\(^ {98}\)

In imitation of the huge Torch Commando rally of June 1952,\(^ {99}\) the Natal opposition parties organised a rally, on 14 November 1960, to support the Provincial Council’s resolutions.\(^ {100}\) Martin, Boyd and Mitchell met on 7 November to discuss the rally and the forthcoming deputation to the Prime Minister to present the Provincial Council’s resolutions.\(^ {101}\) The rally attracted a disappointing crowd of 25,000 people. Martin presented a rousing speech in which he still maintained that a republic 'imposed' on Natal, against the expressed will of her people, could not have any

96. *Natal Witness:* 24 October 1960. It was, however, accepted by many of those who rejected the republic that there were no constitutional grounds for doing so. Even the Federal supporters were divided on this issue. *Natal Witness:* 24 October 1960.
100. It was hoped that the attendance figure would top 40,000, exceeding that of the Torch Commando rally and that of the anti-republican rally of September 1960. *Natal Witness:* 4 November 1960.
'legal or moral binding force'. (102) He even suggested, amid 'loud cheers', (103) to have the matter taken before an international court of law. (104)

Dr. Verwoerd received the five-man Natal delegation on 1 December 1960. (105) The Prime Minister was 'most courteous' and promised a reply within a fortnight. (106) In his reply, to the Administrator of Natal, he rejected all but one resolution. Except for language equality, Verwoerd described the first six resolutions as containing 'undefined generalisations'. (107) To accede to these for the sake of 'unfortunate but unnecessary fears' would, in the Prime Minister's view, diminish the sovereignty of parliament. (108) The last six resolutions were rejected by Verwoerd because acceptance of them would 'tend very far towards a federal system'. (109) This the government rejected because it could not renege on pre-referendum promises not to alter the constitution of South Africa more than was absolutely necessary. (110)

The response of the Natal opposition was entirely verbal. The Provincial Council and the leaders of the United, Progressive and Federal Parties stated that, while the government remained in power, there could '...never be security of Natal's rights or freedoms or of Natal's Provincial powers or traditions.' (111) They did not, however, suggest any

102. Martin: Speech at Rally at Durban City Gardens, 14 November, p.2.
107. N/P: H.F. Verwoerd to A.E. Trollip, 6 December 1960, p.3.
108. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
action to establish that security. When Parliament opened in January 1961 Martin telegraphed de Villiers Graaff to '...call his Verwoerd's bluff and prevent him from detaching from their allegiance 15 million people.' (112) How this was to be done was not stated. The following month, Mitchell declared that Natal considered herself ruled by '...force and not by consent and by a hostile government.' (113) Martin pledged the 'unswerving support' of the Federals for Mitchell, who had, he said, spoken for Natal. (114) UNESSA concurred, stating that Mitchell's action was a 'magnificent stand'. (115)

Mitchell had, however, stopped short of leading a secessionist movement. At a rally in Pietermaritzburg he told how Verwoerd had challenged him to say whether he intended leading a 'rebellion'. (116) Mitchell stated that he felt like saying, 'Yes, I'm going....' (117) The remainder of his statement was lost in 'thunderous applause'. (118) Mitchell quickly stressed that the Prime Minister had been 'irresponsible' in provoking him, and that 'civil war' was not a light matter. (119) In view of this, he had 'contracted' Natal out of the republic on the 'strongest possible moral grounds'. (120) This was the limit to which the opposition would go. (121) The Daily Dispatch summed up the Natal opposition's weakness when it stated:

...it is neither courageous nor convincing to

121. The Progressive leader, Steytler, announced that his party regarded the referendum as a mandate for the establishment of the republic. Natal Mercury: 1 February 1961.
say 'we will not accept the republic, we will have no part in it, we will continue to fight it' when those who make this parade of loyalty to the Crown have no desire or intention of taking up arms to retain the Monarchy, no intention of refusing to pay taxes to the republic or of refusing to sit in the republican parliament. (122)

Faced with these insurmountable legal and political problems, Martin appealed to the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth Prime Minister’s Conference was due to meet in March 1961 and was to consider South Africa’s application to remain a member after it had become a republic. Martin composed The Case against Dr. Verwoerd’s Republic(123) and sent it to thirty-five newspapers and the Prime Ministers and leading politicians of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Rhodesia. The postings were staggered so that they would be received at about the same time before 25 February, (124) when the press was requested to publish the contents of the document. (125)

The Case listed all the Federal Party’s objections to the Nationalist government’s policies and, in particular, to its intention to create a republic. The central request was for the Commonwealth leaders not to ‘recognise’ the proposed republic as this would be ‘...aiding, abetting, and approving the subjection...’ of Natal and the non-Whites. (126) Martin asked, instead, that the Conference, ‘...suspend South Africa from the Commonwealth...to prepare the way for a reasonable settlement...’ in the country. (127) Clearly, Martin hoped that the threat of exclusion from the Commonwealth would force the Nationalist government to accede to Natal’s demands.

123. It was in large measure a shortened version of The Case against a Republic which had been published in 1954. Vide supra: Ch. 6. p.147.
125. R/P: A.C. Martin to The Editor, The Times, 16 February 1961.
126. A.C. Martin: The Case Against Dr. Verwoerd’s Republic, p.3.
127. Ibid., p.7.
In an interview with the *Sunday Times*, Martin enlarged on his attitude and intentions. He saw the whole problem in terms of a virtual annexation of Natal by the 'old republics'.\(^{128}\) The demands which Martin hoped to extract from Verwoerd, via the Commonwealth Conference, were for a federation. In this way, Natal could remain a 'Royal province';\(^{129}\) a return to Heaton Nicholls's ideas of April 1953.\(^{130}\) Martin linked the idea of a semi-independent Natal to the government's declared intent to grant self-government to Black ethnic groups. In view of 'separate development', Martin argued that Verwoerd could '...have no possible grounds for refusing self-government for Natal.'\(^{131}\)

On 15 March 1961, Verwoerd withdrew South Africa's application for Commonwealth membership. He gave as his main reason the views which had been expressed by Commonwealth members and their 'future intentions' regarding the race policy of South Africa.\(^{132}\) The Federal Party interpreted this as a victory. The Transvaal party welcomed the outcome of the Conference and called for an all-race convention in South Africa. It added that this should take place after the 'Natal stand' had 'overthrown' the government.\(^{133}\) The executive of the Natal Federal Party declared itself 'satisfied' with the happenings at the Commonwealth Conference.\(^{134}\) Yet, it also castigated the Prime Minister for his 'wantonly irresponsible action' in 'causing' South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth.\(^{135}\) It then called on the Natal Provincial Council to '...take immediate steps to ensure Natal's continued membership of the Commonwealth...as a

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130. *Vide supra*: Ch. 3. pp. 43-44.
132. N. Mansergh: *loc. cit.*
separate state." (136) The executive also called on Natal voters to 're-assess their attitudes towards the non-Whites so as to make Commonwealth membership possible." (137) There was a great divide between the Federal leaders' view of politics and the possibilities for political action. While they made these threatening statements, their last ally the Witness suggested that English-speakers accept the republic. (138) The Federal Party was now alone in its opposition to a republic and it no longer had a sympathetic mouthpiece. South Africa became a republic on 31 May 1961.

In the same year, South Africa faced its first general election as a republic. Reduced as it was to two committees, in the Transvaal and Natal, issuing increasingly strident statements from time to time, (139) the Federal Party was unable to field any candidates. The Federals considered that it still represented 'a not inconsiderable section of informed opinion' and advised this section of the population to exercise 'their consciences' in deciding for whom to vote. (140) The 'cardinal principle' remained the removal of the Nationalists. (141) As regards the political future of South Africa, the Federals suggested the formation of a 'Natal Party' to lead the province. (142)

The last public act of the Federal Party was to issue a statement in November 1961. Of the Federal Parties, only the Natal party was then still functioning. (143) The statement reviewed yet again Nationalist policies and once again condemned them. The government's race policies in particular were seen as fatal for the future peace of South Africa. As

136. Ibid.
137. Ibid.
143. Interview with A.C. Martin.
regards the position of Natal, the Federals' attitude had not changed since 1953. 'By allowing its politics to be dominated by people beyond its borders, Natal traditions and aspirations have been continually ignored and even betrayed.'(144) The agent of this disaster remained the U.P. It had, in the Federals' view, a record of 'appeasement and surrender'.(145) Some of the worst failings of the U.P. were itemised as being clause 2(d) of its constitution, Mitchell's duplicity over resistance to the republic and the 'sorry affair over Stander'.(146) The statement ended in an exposé of the discrimination suffered by the English-speakers in education and how they had been 'let down' by their leaders.(147) To the end, the Federals saw themselves as being essentially defenders of the English-speakers.

At the executive meeting which issued the last statement, Hughes Mason, from the chair, suggested that the party be dissolved.(148) Although the suggestion was not accepted, the party's days were clearly numbered. After the 1959 provincial elections, as its branches ceased to function, members began leaving the party in large numbers.(149) Denis Lowe, the Federal candidate in Umzimkulu in 1959, left to join the Progressives.(150) Mrs. Stewart, the 'most popular and engaging' Federal(151) and the party's 1959 candidate in Durban North,(152) left in 1961 for the same reason.(153) Mrs. Park Ross, an 'indefatigable worker and a brilliant woman'(154) resigned because she believed that '...without

145. Ibid.
146. Ibid.
147. Ibid.
148. N/P: R. Hughes Mason to M. Park Ross, 9 January 1962.
149. Interview with A.C. Martin.
152. She had received the highest Federal vote in the 1959 elections. Vide: Natal Gazette No. 578, op.cit.
153. A.C. Martin to J. Stewart, loc.cit.
154. Interview with A.C. Martin.
any popular backing, the Federal Party could no longer function...[or] serve any useful purpose....'(155) So diminished had the party become that she did not know to whom she should tender her resignation. (156) Hughes Mason, a foundation member of the Federal Party,(157) twice Federal candidate(158) and the 'most energetic' Pietermaritzburg member, (159) agreed with Mrs. Park Ross and also resigned. (160) As Selby wrote in January 1962: 'It was all over.' (161)

The last meeting of a reduced executive was held in June 1962. Here the party was 'disbanded' and Martin was given authority to use his 'discretion' regarding all party matters. (162) He thereupon wound up the party's outstanding business. (163)

155. N/P: M. Park Ross to R. Hughes Mason, 1 January 1962.
156. Ibid.
157. Vide supra: Ch. 3. p.49.
159. Interview with A.C. Martin.
162. Interview with A.C. Martin.
163. Ibid.
CHAPTER TEN

REASONS FOR THE FAILURE OF THE FEDERALS

From the time of its launching, the Federal Party had fared badly. The expected growth of membership in 1953 had not materialised(1) and the 1954 provincial elections had been a stunning defeat.(2) The hoped-for transference of allegiance to the Federal Party of Torch Commando members had not taken place. Thus, the careful manoeuvring of the party's founders in linking the two organisations had not changed the voting patterns of most Torch Commando members. The party did, however, command the support of a significant section of the Natal electorate.(3)

During the latter half of 1954 and during 1955 and 1956, support for the Federals, despite the election defeat, continued to grow. In May 1954 it was reported that there were 'more than fifty branches' in Natal.(4) Subsequently, six branches were formed in December 1954,(5) three were reportedly created early in 1955(6) and one (Queensburgh) was founded in June 1955(7) During this period, the party also founded and enlarged a newspaper, the Federal News.(8) Most important, the Natal party saw its income increase between 1955 and 1956.(9)

This growth was, however, not sustained after 1957, when the Federal Party experienced a growing apathy amongst its members and supporters. This was evident in the party's finances. Some signs of this crisis were already evident in 1956. Despite the increased income during that year, the party still had severe financial problems. In the middle of 1956, the Finance

1. Vide supra: Ch. 4. p. 66.
8. Vide supra: Ch. 4. pp. 82-3.
9. From £1994. Os. Id. to £2308. 2s. Id.
Committee recommended the closing of the Durban office because of the shortfall in income. The treasurer informed the Natal Provincial Executive on 28 July that the party could meet its July accounts, including the August rent, but that 'thereafter no funds were available'. (10) Substantial donations from the executive members, and the anticipated income from the party's fete to be held later in the year, averted the crisis. (11) In fact, the party's response to its financial difficulties made 1956 the peak year for income and even allowed for the establishment of reserves for the future. (12) Early in 1957 the financial crisis recurred. Once again there was talk of closing one of the party's two Natal offices, and once again the idea was rejected. It was felt that the '... closing of either office would be tantamount to the closing down of activity in the centre concerned.' (13) The treasurer blamed the party's leadership for the poor financial position. More funds would be forthcoming, he said, if there was more 'intensive activity from the top downwards.' (14) The Action Committee, on the other hand, saw the lack of funds as stemming from the 'existing apathy' and did not consider the leaders to be responsible. (15) Whoever was responsible, it was clear that the '... future did not look bright for the Party.' (16) Lacking the drive and commitment of the previous year, the Natal party had to use reserve funds to keep going. (17)

No detailed set of accounts of the Natal Federal Party (or of its sister parties) has survived. (18) It is thus impossible to plot the party's declining income in detail.

11. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
18. Interviews with W. Grimwood and A.C. Martin.
as the apathy of its members deepened. There is, however, evidence of a sharp decline in income. From a 1956 peak, income the following year was 'materially lower'. (19) For the nine months ending 31 March 1958, only £1 353.7s.9d. was received, (20) more than half of it being raised at the 1957 fete. (21) While the 1958 figure refers to a period of only nine months, it is much lower than that of 1956 and this is a clear indication of a steady and debilitating decline in financial contributions. Another indication of financial stringency was the closing of the Federal News at the end of 1958. (22) By October 1959, after the Federals had lost the provincial elections, income from the branches had ceased. (23) There was no longer any systematic or organised fund-raising by the party. (24)

In assessing the growing apathy of the Federals after the 1954 election, much of the statistical evidence, apart from the financial, has to be used with caution. The Natal party, for instance, actually increased its membership by over fifty percent. from 919 (25) to 1 500 (26) between June 1954 and October 1957. This is misleading because those who 'slipped out' of the party, like Brickhill and Ford, were never formally removed from the list of members. (27) For this reason, the number of members would always continue to rise, except for the rare instance of a written resignation, even though party activity and member involvement was declining.

Attendance at the Natal congresses, given the important role which these functions played in the life of the Federal Party, (28) supplies a valid yardstick by which party enthusiasm

21. £709.7s.6d. Ibid.
22. Vide supra: Ch. 4. p. 83.
23. Interview with A.C. Martin.
24. Interview with A.C. Martin.
27. Interview with W. Grimwood.
28. Vide supra: Ch. 4. p. 72.
and interest can be measured. By comparison with the 1956 congress, which was the largest in the party's history and attracted 200 delegates, the 1957 congress indicated the party's declining fortunes. It drew only 100 participants. The 1958 congress, however, attracted 140 delegates. Considering that this figure included large groups from the Transvaal and the Cape, there was no significant increase in attendance by the Natal Federals. The number of delegates could not, in any event, continue to increase annually after the 1956 peak attendance because the last Natal branch reported founded was at Queensburgh in June 1955. In 1959 the Federals held their last congress. It lasted only part of a day, had only the single purpose of discussing the forthcoming provincial election campaign, and received little publicity. After 1959 the party was unable to mount even so modest a congress.

This decline in the party's fortunes after 1956 as supplied by statistical evidence was confirmed by the party leaders. While the Natal Action Committee blamed 'apathy' amongst party members for the lack of funds, Hughes Mason, editor of the Federal News, appealed to a prominent member not to resign as this would 'weaken ... [the party] still further.' The Provincial Executive and the Provincial Action Committee showed by the tone of their meetings that the party leadership knew that popular support was waning. The results of the 1959 provincial elections confirmed this knowledge and this accounted

36. S/P: R. Hughes Mason to P. Seneque, 7 February 1957.
for the insignificant part played by the Federals in the 1960 referendum campaign. (38) During 1961, the last full year of the party's existence, the Federal leaders constantly advised their supporters to use their 'consciences' in coping with political decisions. (39) Lofty morality was all that remained to the politically helpless group.

To explain this failure of the Federals to mobilise public opinion and to influence South African politics significantly, it is necessary to examine their policies, the attitudes which created them and the interpretations which were placed on them from time to time. These policies were based on three main issues: federation, the Crown and the Commonwealth, and the race question.

38. Vide supra: Ch. 9. pp. 201 and 206.
SECTION ONE

FEDERATION

The Federals had two reasons for naming their organisation the Union Federal Party. In the first instance, they wished to stress that they stood 'for Union'. By 'Union', the Federals meant the '... decision of the four Provinces in 1910 to join in a single State under the Crown.' As such, any alteration of the 'Union' would mean a dissolution of the country into its component provinces. The 'Federal' in the party's name was to denote that it aimed at '... an increase of the federal element in the Union constitution.'

The drive behind the party's federal ideas is to be found in Natal's hankering for a federation in South Africa, ever since the National Convention in 1909. This wish was inspired largely by 'English' Natal's suspicion of Afrikaner nationalism. One result of this attitude was the creation of the provincial councils. After the Nationalist triumph in the 1929 general election, the question of the abolition of the provincial councils on economic grounds became a major political issue. The Natal politicians, led by Heaton Nicholls, strongly resisted abolition.

Natal's views at this time on the 'extension and development' of the provincial council system, were expressed in a memorandum by F.C. Hollander, a document which was to bear his name. Hollander recommended that the powers of the provin-

42. For a full discussion of this, vide infra: Ch.10. pp.238-9.
cial councils be 'entrenched'. Any alterations to their 'entrenched' status should be permissible only with the 'definite approval' and consent' of the people of the province concerned. The Hollander Memorandum also recommended alterations to the constitution of the councils. Executive Committee members should be individually responsible to the councils for the administration of a department, and the Executive Committee should function collectively as a cabinet. The Administrator should be elected either by the council or by an electoral college.

Apart from the council's 'entrenchment' and its new constitution, Hollander envisaged the extension of its function. In addition to their existing powers, they should control, 'native affairs', police, all education except at a university level, agriculture, immigration and a provincial public service. As regards finance, Hollander suggested that the provinces be permitted to negotiate loans on provincial credit and that an investigation by a commission, presided over by an 'experienced Imperial officer', establish ways to make the provinces viable.

On 14 October 1932 at the Natal South African Party Congress, Smuts declared that the Hollander Memorandum was a 'reasonable basis' on which the party could build a constitutional policy, and he recommended it to the congress. The congress accepted 'in principle' the proposals outlined in the Hollander Memorandum as the basis for 'Home Rule for the Provinces'. Two months later, the South African Party's National Congress in Bloemfontein accepted, with some misgivings, the idea of greater provincial autonomy. In 1933, however, the South African Party and the National Party entered into coalition.

47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
statement Hertzog and Smuts stated: 'The unitary basis of a united South Africa ... would be maintained intact ...'.(54) As a sop to Natal, they promised to maintain the status of the provincial councils and to give 'favourable consideration' to the extension of provincial powers and functions.(55) Heaton Nicholls and many of the Natal federalists accepted Fusion and its negative implications for federation. In fact, except for the Dominion Party, little was heard of the extension of provincial powers until the victory of the Nationalists in 1948.

In 1953 the Union Federal Party had, in the words of Heaton Nicholls, 'gone back' to the Hollander Memorandum and revived '... the politics dropped by the South African Party' in 1933.(56) At the Federal Party's Natal Provincial Convention in 1953, where policy was first formally adopted, the party's federation policy was defined as '... giving a far greater measure of autonomy to the Provinces ... the general principles of which found ... expression in the Hollander Memorandum.'(57) The 1956 Natal Congress detailed the policy. It enumerated the recommendations of the Memorandum, and resolved that they should be secured to the Natal Provincial Council.(58) By 1958, Hollander's recommendations had been published as party policy.(59) The Transvaal and Cape Federal Parties' attitudes towards the Hollander Memorandum were almost identical to that of Natal.(60)

The Federals envisaged many advantages accruing to South

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54. Craig: p.91.
58. Vide supra: Ch. 5. pp. 90-91.
Africa if the federal idea were accepted. South Africa had, ever since 1910, sought to incorporate the Protectorates, but Great Britain had constantly refused. (63) The Federals were confident that there could be no British objection to the incorporation of the Protectorates into South Africa on a federal basis. (64) Furthermore, the Federals aimed eventually to include Northern and Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa, together with the Union and the Protectorates, in a huge 'Federated States of Southern Africa'. (65)

Federation was seen by the Federals as the bulwark against 'tyranny', as it would weaken the power of the central government. Other perceived advantages of federation were that it would provide for local linguistic, cultural and religious needs, thus guaranteeing the rights of individuals, and that it would allow for a variety of plans to suit local conditions. In addition, local people would receive job priority not only because they were 'children of the Province' but also because they were familiar with local conditions and people, such as the Zulus. (66) The over-riding advantage of federation in Federal eyes, however, was that it would create harmony in the country. All the issues which caused dissenion would be handled by the provinces, whereas the central government would take care only of areas of common interest such as defence, posts and telegraphs, railways and foreign affairs. As Heaton Nicholls phrased it, federation would '... take from the centre those things which divide and leave to the centre those things which unite.' (67)

The Federals would not admit to any weaknesses in the

federal idea. Critics, they believed, were therefore totally wrong and were divided into three categories. The first group had 'emotional objections'. These people felt that the concept of union had a 'sort of sanctity'. What they failed to realise, according to the Federals, was that 'federalism was a form of union'. The second category consisted of the 'prophets of Nationalist Afrikaner baaskap' who wished to impose their will on the entire community. The third group who opposed federalism did so for economic reasons. This category was subdivided into two. One section, comprising 'certain great economic organisations', found it convenient to deal with one central political authority and hence favoured union. The other section, consisting of 'ordinary folk', erroneously felt that federalism would damage the economy of the country.

Whatever the Federals' view of their critics, it must be admitted that there were major weaknesses, both implicit and explicit, in their federal plan. In the first instance, there was no unanimity, for most of the party's life, as to what the plan actually was. There was a general feeling in favour of 'federation', but the first fully-formulated plan did not exist before 1958. As federalism was a major issue only up to the election of June 1954, this meant that there was considerable confusion over party policy at the very time when it was being most widely discussed. For example, Heaton Nicholls, in his Services Club speech had envisaged a federation with a monarchical Natal existing together with republican provinces in South Africa. Months after the formation of the Federal Party, the press, including the sympathetic Natal Witness,

75. Vide supra: Ch. 3. pp. 43-44.
believed this idea to be party policy. (76) By this time, however, the Federal Party and Heaton Nicholls himself, far from advocating republicanism in half of South Africa, were equating it with revolution. (77) To add even greater confusion, it was stated that the party's federal ideas were based on the Hollander Memorandum. (78) But, this document did not discuss republicanism at all.

A second weakness in the federal plan was that it was obvious that many of the functions reserved for provincial control would create severe problems if they were implemented. Immigration, for example, was a potentially explosive issue. There would be a national immigration policy to exclude undesirables ('e.g. no communists'), but thereafter the provincial authority, which the party maintained 'knows best the types and number of immigrants required', would control immigration. (79)

If one province admitted an immigrant, it would be unreasonable for any other province to exclude him. In this way, the criteria of admittance, enfranchisement and citizenship would either vary from province to province or would become the subject of contentious inter-provincial negotiations. (80)

Even more problematical was the colour question. If 'native affairs' were left in the hands of the provinces, as the Hollander Memorandum and thus the Federal Party suggested, the ensuing legal, economic, social, educational and political confusion was likely to be limitless. Thus, if the Federals took from the centre those things, such as immigration and the race issue, which tended to 'divide' the country, the result would be chaos and even further division. Even those issues which the Federals envisaged as being controlled by the central

76. Natal Witness: 3 July 1953. The Star (10 September 1953) similarly believed that Heaton Nicholls's speech was the basis of Federal constitutional ideas.


80. The highly contentious South African Citizen Act of 1949 and the disputes over immigration in the early 1950s illustrate how divisive this issue was.
authorities were likely to be grounds for dissenion. Foreign
policy, for example, would have to remain in the hands of the
central government and could easily divide the country - as it
had done in 1939. Federation, despite Federal claims to the
contrary, could thus not guarantee political peace any more
than union could. 'They are pursuing an illusion', declared
the political commentator, Julius Lewin - and most of the elect-
orate agreed.\(^{(81)}\)

A third weakness in the federal plan was that it was im-
practical. There was some dispute as to whether a two-thirds
or a simple parliamentary majority was needed to alter the uni-
tary constitution in favour of a federal one.\(^{(82)}\) In either case,
the possibility of obtaining the required majority was remote.\(^{(83)}\)
The Nationalists favoured central control and, as the U.P. was
strongly opposed to federalism, even a change of government could
not facilitate the federal idea. The parties were merely con-
tinuing the unitary ideas of the South African and National
Parties before Fusion; ideas which had predominated over federal
trends in South African constitutional thinking for the whole
history of the Union.\(^{(84)}\)

Only in Natal had there ever been any sizeable group of
federalists; the other three provinces had always been firmly
wedded to the idea of a unitary state.\(^{(85)}\) Furthermore, the
Natal 'English' were suspect in many parts of the country and
their 'Englishness' had always been an additional reason for
rejecting federalism.\(^{(86)}\) Therefore, with the Afrikaners numer-
ically and politically dominant, there was little chance of this
anti-federal stand being reversed. If the cause of federation

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83. For this reason a section of the press had rejected the
party's federalism from its inception.
Vide supra: Ch.3,pp. 57-8.
84. Duminy: op.cit., p.13. The constant assaults on the
provincial council idea and, in the 1950s, on the consti-
tution of the Senate, are indications of this trend.
85. This created the unpopular notion that the Natal federal-
ists were 'abandoning' their friends in the other provinces
86. Duminy: op.cit., pp. 3-4 and 10.
had failed in 1908 and 1932-3, when English-speaking Natal had been more advantageously placed to exert pressure, its chances of success in the 1950s were remote, to say the least. What is more, there seemed to contemporary observers to be an international trend towards the centralisation of power in the first half of the century and this meant that the idea of federalism in South Africa was out of date.

A fourth weakness in the federal plan was that it was out of touch with realities as regards the Protectorates. Despite Britain's reluctance to transfer the territories to racially-conscious South Africa, and in spite of the rising tide of Black nationalism, the Federals still presumed that their untried federal plan would lead to incorporation. This attitude was based on the presumption that the British government would act in concert with British colonials (i.e. English-speaking Natal) against both Afrikaners and Blacks. The Federals did not realise that the imperial idea of federation organised on a sub-continental scale was no longer realistic. True, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland reflected the hope of a White-controlled 'British' region to the north but this obscured the reality that, in response to post-war pressures, Britain was now embarking upon a policy of decolonisation.

Admitting the many weaknesses in the federal plan, it can be asked why the English-speaking voters, especially Natalians, did not respond to these overtures in the numbers expected by the Federals. After all, the plan was tailored to appeal to them. One reason for this is that Natal was no longer as insular as before. Greater population mobility, stimulated by the

90. The Federals were largely inspired in these dreams by the creation of the Central African Federation out of the territories of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Federal News: 22 December 1955, 10 February 1956, 12 July 1957.
Second World War, meant that Natal had become more fully inte-
grated, socially and politically, into South Africa. As the Daily News stated; '... in Natal there ... had grown up a new South Africanism, which, while proud of its Province, sees that Province in its South African setting. The days of Dominion Partyism of two decades ... previously had gone.'

The appeal of federalism was further eroded by its connection with secession. In the early 1930s the Devolution League had used the slogan 'Separate and then Federate'. When the Federal Party was launched, memories of the 1930s, coupled with the Natal Stand rally of 1952, linked the two ideas in the public mind. The presence of Heaton Nicholls who was popularly associated with the devolution movement of the 1930s, even though he had then fallen out with the Devolution League, served to strengthen the link between federation and secession. While a theoretical idea such as federalism could add little to the appeal of secession, the extremism of the latter did much to detract from the appeal of the former.

A final factor damaging the federal idea was the tendency of the Federal Party to use it as a political catch-all. In an attempt to discredit republicanism, it adopted the slogan 'Federation or Republic'. In an attempt to discredit the nationally based U.P., the Federals used the slogan 'The Caucus or Federation'. In an attempt to force the acceptance of the federal idea, the Federals coined the slogan 'Federation or Separation'.

Whichever way it turned, and however it tried to explain what it regarded as the weaknesses of its opponents, the Federal Party thus, ironically, displayed to public scrutiny a facet of its own policy which did not stand up when subjected to closer examination.

SECTION TWO

THE CROWN AND THE COMMONWEALTH

The British Crown and the Commonwealth were viewed by the Federals as the pivots around which the political, cultural and economic lives of all 'British' people revolved.

The Crown was, emotionally, the 'symbol and focus' of the people. But, in addition to this function, or because of it, the Crown also had a defined legal and constitutional position in every Commonwealth country. The South Africa Act united the several colonies of South Africa in a legislative union under the Crown, which was seen by the Federals as an integral and inalienable part of the constitutional structure established in 1909. As such, it could not simply be lopped away as inessential. From this understanding of the Crown and the constitution, flowed two propositions:

... first, that the South African Parliament is the creature of the constitution, and that its right does not extend to altering the fundamental or the total or the essential character of the constitution which gives it being and to which it owes all its right; the second that the Crown is a fundamental and essential part of that constitution, to the abolition of which the right of the South African Parliament does not extend.

The position of the Commonwealth was different. While South Africa's link to the Crown was legal and constitutional as well as emotional, its membership of the Commonwealth was a free association based on ties of kinship. The Commonwealth was, stated the Federals, '... created by and ... based upon the 70 millions of British people in the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, in Canada, Australia and New Zealand and ...

97. Most Federals used the words 'Britons' or 'British' and 'English-speaking South Africans' interchangeably.
100. Ibid.
These ideas of the Crown and the Commonwealth were based on a concept of the essential unity of the English-speaking world outside the U.S.A. English-speakers in different parts of the globe were seen to have more in common with one another than with other peoples, no matter how close they lived to them. They shared an 'unbreakable loyalty' based on common traditions of language, cultural and political traditions and of symbols such as the monarchy. For these reasons, the Federals spoke frequently of the glory of the English language and of the democratic traditions of the English-speaking world. In short, the Commonwealth was perceived as an entity embracing a single cohesive group of people, far exceeding in importance or significance any local nationalism.

Such ideas were clearly inherited from a time when the British Empire, rather than the Commonwealth, was in existence. Both the Federals and their opponents implicitly acknowledged this. The Federals referred constantly to 1910 and the formation of the Union under the British Crown. This Union, following closely on the British victory in the South African War, was seen as the most creative act in South Africa's history. The subsequent years, a period of increasing Afrikaner ascendancy, were viewed as a betrayal of Union and, the greater the threat to the British connection and the position of the English-speakers, the greater the betrayal. After 1948 the all-Afrikaner


104. *Vide supra:* Ch. 6. p. 136.


Nationalist government was perceived as the final calamity. 'The Union has failed', declared Heaton Nicholls in 1953(107) and many Federals saw the battle as now returning to the South African War stage, with the English-speakers fighting the old Boer enemy. (108) 'They want to reverse the Treaty of Vereeniging', declared Heaton Nicholls. (109) When the New York Times saw the republican referendum of 1960 as the 'last battle of the South African War', (110) it was an estimation with which the Federals would agree. The Nationalists also interpreted the phenomenon of the Federals in terms of British imperialism and the South African War. Heaton Nicholls was portrayed as a 'Victorian' gentleman (111) and a 'nineteenth century imperialist', (112) while the Federals, stated Die Transvaler, '... do not live in the year 1955, but in the year 1902.' (113)

The antiquated vantage point of the Federals led them to perceive of the Crown and the Commonwealth as static and allowed for no constitutional evolution. (114) Even though Heaton Nicholls himself, as leader of the S.A.P. in Natal in 1934, had acquiesced to the Status of Union Act, the Federals tended to view Union under the Crown, as established in 1910, as final and saw any departure from this as 'revolutionary'. (115) Therefore, the

107. Vide supra: Ch. 3. p.43.
108. Often, the Federals were open in their hankering for the British power of the turn of the century. On one such occasion, Federal News featured prominently the retort of Milner to the Cape Boers when they protested their loyalty to the Crown. 'Of course you are loyal. It would be monstrous if you were not.' Federal News: 27 June 1955.
111. Die Transvaler: 3 December 1954.
112. Die Transvaler: 3 December 1954.
114. It is noteworthy that nationalists do not envisage any alteration to the nation state without that state’s express permission. Considering the Federals view of the 'British' Commonwealth, their attitude is at least as logical as that of a nationalist.
Federals believed that not only was the government revolutionary in its ideas, but that all republicans were guilty of treason. This argument had, in fact, been presented by Heaton Nicholls to the Senate a year before the Federal Party was formed. He maintained that, if Ministers of the Crown, who had taken an oath of loyalty to the Queen, wished to 'overthrow the Constitution, it would be considered high treason.'(116) This idea became part of Federal propaganda.(117) Later, 'treasonable' republican propaganda was likened to Communist propaganda as it was maintained by the Federals that there was 'nothing to choose' between an Afrikaner Nationalist Republic, controlled by the Broederbond, and a Soviet Republic. (118)

A final element in the Federal concept of the Crown and the Commonwealth was their idea that the two institutions were inseparable. The Commonwealth was bound, in Federal eyes, 'by a common loyalty to the Crown.'(119) Such a view was logical, given the Federal view of the English-speaking peoples as one inseparable unity.

Equally logical was the Federal view of the relations between the provinces and the Union. These relations were linked to the relations between the Union and the Commonwealth as they were all founded on a common base - the Crown. The Union of 1910 had been a 'compact', or 'contract', of the four provinces under the Crown.(120) Just as South Africa could not reject the Commonwealth without the permission of its other members, so the Federals believed, the Union Parliament could not alter the constitution without the express permission of its constituent provinces. As Natal was the province which objected to the Nationalist government's actions, this idea

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became known as the Natal Stand.

The ideas which emerged as the Natal Stand of the 1950s were first formulated by Heaton Nicholls in the Senate in May 1952. (121) He was, on that occasion, referring to Natal standing on its own because of a breach of the constitution involving the creation of the High Court of Parliament. The Durban rally of June 1952 popularised the idea of the Natal Stand, as the oath taken by the crowd was linked, via Ford’s questions, with the issue of Natal standing alone. It was in this context that the Torch Commando, formed to fight the government on the Coloured franchise issue, supported the Natal Stand in July 1952 and again in January 1953. (122)

By the following month, Heaton Nicholls was seeing the Natal Stand not in terms of defending the ‘entrenched’ clauses but in terms of defeating a republic. He stated that:

Natal … was a partner to a signed contract entered into under specific conditions; if these conditions are not adhered to there is a breach of contract; and Natal in these circumstances cannot be forced to accept any new agreement in which she does not believe; if the other parties do accept a new agreement, (i.e., a republic) which is contrary to the provisions of the original contract, then the original contract … [was] null and void and Natal … [was] free to take whatever action she desired … (123)

When the Federal Party was created, in May 1953, the principle embodying the Natal Stand was phrased wide enough so as to include these various interpretations.

It stated:

We shall work for the maintenance and assertion of the right of the people of any Province of the Union, in the face of any actual, attempted or projected violation of the letter or the spirit of the Constitution, to remain a part of the Commonwealth of Nations under the Crown, a Province so to act in the following, amongst other eventualities:- a weakening of our allegiance to the Crown; the setting aside of the entrenched clauses; the denial of the testing

122. Vide supra: Ch. 2. pp.17 and 33.
power of the Courts; the abolition or the reduction of Provincial powers; the abolition of full protection or of recognition of the equal rights of both official languages. (124)

This clause, by including the phrase 'amongst other eventualities', gave almost unlimited choice to a secessionist-minded province to leave the Union. In practice, however, the Federals restricted the use of the Natal Stand to resisting the republic. (125) The only way, they maintained, that a republic could be achieved legally was for the Union to be dissolved into its constituent provinces and for each of them to agree to a new republican Union. (126) A separate referendum would have to be held in Natal to decide its future. (127) If the Nationalists declared a South African republic in any other way, it would be illegal. If the Federals controlled Natal at the time, they would simply refuse allegiance to the republican government and declare Natal to be 'the only province adhering to the Act of Union under the Crown'. (128) The Provincial Council would then rule Natal as a separate state, and a Commonwealth member, (129) which would appeal to the world for de facto and de jure recognition. (130) Thus, whether the republic was created in what the Federals considered to be a legal or illegal manner, Natal need never be a part of it.

125. Vide supra: Ch. 3. p. 52.
127. Ibid.
129. Federals assumed that 'British' Natal - despite its racial attitudes - would be welcome in the Commonwealth. This led Bishop Inman of Natal to state incredulously: 'Surely no one in his senses can suppose for one moment that a seceded Natal would be any more welcome in the Commonwealth than the Union presently is. The principle of racial segregation, apartheid, separate development or whatever term you prefer, underlies Natal life just as much as it does the other parts of the Union, and I believe that a majority of the electorate loves to have it so.' Natal Witness: 6 April 1961.
In the 1950s, the Federal constitutional argument concerning the Crown and Commonwealth, placed the party in a weak position. This was because, in the first instance, the imperialistic attitude of the Federals conflicted with the rise of nationalism. On the international scene, imperialism, of the European type, had come increasingly under attack by the communists, the socialists, the U.S.A. and the subject peoples themselves. The ideal set against imperialism was nationalism. Simultaneously, the European countries, including Britain, had declined in power and influence in relation to the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. This meant that the confidence of the imperialists of the first decade of the century had largely evaporated. It is true that the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt in the Suez crisis still lay ahead (i.e. when the Federal Party was formed), but this action was a failure and was quickly seen to be anachronistic. The position within South Africa had largely paralleled the international trend. The economic, political and demographic position of the Afrikaners had progressively improved vis-à-vis the English-speakers. Thus, the Federal stand was against the prevailing trend - both globally and in South Africa. (131)

An example of the extent to which the Federal leaders were out of step is their appeal to the Commonwealth leaders in 1954 to withhold their permission for the establishment of a South Africa republic. (132) The Nationalists responded with scorn. Die Transvaler called the campaign 'laughable' (133) and emphasised again the Federals' inability to regard South Africa as an independent state. (134)

131. Many Federals are today clearly embarrassed by having held dated ideas in the recent past. They explain the circumstances in detail, attempting to justify their actions.
133. Vide supra: Ch. 6. p. 147.
English-speakers themselves, on whose behalf the Federal leaders claimed to speak in their appeal to the Commonwealth leaders, remained silent at the time. Doubtless, they were embarrassed by the Federal stand. They accepted the Crown and the Commonwealth but they could not agree with an appeal to the leaders of other countries to restrain the South African nation. Bolton’s public resignation from the Federal Party over this issue expressed the feelings of many English-speakers.

A second objection by many South Africans, including English-speakers, to the Federal Party’s view of the Crown, and especially of the Commonwealth, was that it was dated. The frequent sentimentality — such as Selby’s ‘uncles and aunts’ — only served to drive potential supporters of federalism or of the party’s comparatively liberal native policy away from the party. The Anglophiles referred often to Britain as ‘home’ and lauded British achievements and traditions over those of other groups. Most English-speaking South Africans, however, did not share these attitudes. Many of their families had been in South Africa for generations; or had ancestors who were Irish or not British at all. They supported the monarchy, respected the Sovereign and valued the Commonwealth connection. But they regarded the actions and attitudes of the Anglophiles, who were increasingly dominant within the Federal Party, as excessive.

A third weakness in the Federal view of the Crown and Commonwealth was the idea that there could be no constitutional

135. Vide supra: Ch. 6. p. 147.
136. Vide supra: Ch. 7. p. 164.
137. Vide supra: Ch. 7. pp. 159-60 and 165-66.
evolution and that any departure from the 1910 constitution was revolutionary. This view was clearly untenable because there had already been evolution in the Union's constitution since 1910, involving the Crown. The Statute of Westminster and the Status Act were cases in point. It was also pointed out, by the U.P., that if the Federals were right in maintaining that constitutional evolution was impossible, then any development along federal lines, as suggested by the Federal Party itself, would be *ultra virus*. (138) Also, the precedents of India, Pakistan and Ghana showed that the Federals were incorrect in seeing any republic as unconstitutional. These countries also illustrated that not only could states abolish the monarchy within their borders, but that they could remain members of the Commonwealth after they had done so. The Indian Republic established the precedent and this was reinforced by the continued membership of republican Pakistan and republican Ghana. As Strauss pointed out, Heaton Nicholls implied that the 'Governments and peoples of other Commonwealth countries had been guilty of revolutionary conduct.' (139)

The English-speakers were, in any event, probably not greatly concerned with detailed legal and constitutional arguments. As far as they were concerned, the Federals accused the South African government of revolutionary conduct and maintained that the constitution of 1910 was static. The first contention was clearly fantastic and the other was erroneous. Thus, all the Federals achieved by involving themselves in these complex arguments was to expose the contradictions in their case and to exasperate their potential supporters by cheapening terms such as 'unconstitutional' and 'revolutionary'. A similar effect was produced by the Federal accusations of treason against anyone who propagated a republic. Both major parties permitted republican propaganda - they or their predecessors had done so since Union - and it was ludicrous to suggest that the bulk of the voters in the entire history of the Union had

been involved in treasonable activity.

The Federal idea of the Natal Stand, linked to their view of the Crown and the Commonwealth, failed for a number of reasons. First, it presupposed that provincial rights were more important than the existence of the state. In their arguments concerning South Africa and the Commonwealth, the Federals failed to allow for the existence of a South African nationalism. In their arguments regarding the South African state, they postulated the existence of a 'Natal nationalism'; whereas the 'South African nation' was seen by most voters as an organic whole which could only act as a single entity.

This attitude reflected the legal position. It was the South African state, rather than the province of Natal, which had the legal right to determine the country's future. When Natal entered Union, it had surrendered its sovereignty and there was no way in which it could legally regain its freedom of action. Whatever the Federals might think of the position, most Natalians adhered to what was legal. (140)

Second, in claiming that the Natal electorate was a separate entity and as such was entitled to make a separate stand, the Federals did not take into account regionalisms within the province. The Nationalists claimed the support of northern Natal and maintained that this area would break from the rest of Natal in the event of a breakaway by Natal from the rest of South Africa. (141) Apart from disunity in Natal, it was evident that the people of the province were not a fixed entity. As in the matter of federation, it was becoming increasingly difficult for any party to speak on behalf of a province whose population was highly mobile. Natal had become, as the Daily News stated, a province of 'diverse political views and philosophies'. (142) The Federals spoke frequently on the 'moral' right of the people of Natal stemming from 1910. By the 1950s

140. Being law abiding was another trait which the English-speakers admired in themselves.
a high percentage of Natal’s voters had no connection with the Natalians of 1910 and, as such, no inherited ‘moral right’.

In claiming to speak for Natal, the Federals also failed significantly to win over the majority support of the business community. Even before the formation of the Federal Party, a group of leading Natal businessmen had spoken out against secession. (143) Repeatedly during the life of the Federal Party, business leaders expressed doubts about the wisdom of the Natal Stand. (144) So important was this issue that the Federals appointed a committee to investigate and report on it. (145) This was done, but the report appeared to have had little effect and Natal’s business leaders, with few exceptions, remained overwhelmingly anti-Federal. (146)

In the final analysis, the crucial question was whether the Natal Stand was a real threat or merely political posturing. As the U.P. phrased it, ‘... the question boils down to this: would the Federal Party countenance armed rebellion, or not?’ (147) At first, many Federals felt that Natal should, if necessary, make its stand and that the government should be challenged to attack her ‘at its peril’. (148) Pressed on this question during the 1954 provincial elections, however, they stated that they were against the use of violence. (149) The Federals were trapped. If they suggested violence as a means towards their ends, they were likely to alienate all but a small section of the English-speaking population. If, on the other hand, they eschewed force, the Natal Stand had no viability because, as the Daily News commented: ‘Rights that cannot be exerted are of no more value than guns without bullets.’ (150) The Federals had, therefore, to rely on ‘moral’ resistance to the end. (151)

143. Vide supra: Ch. 2. p.19.
145. Vide supra: Ch. 3. p. 75.
146. Interviews with Ford, Martin and D. Heaton Nicholls.
151. Vide supra: Ch.9. pp. 211-12.
To worsen matters, the exact nature of and the practical actions of this 'moral resistance' were never clarified. The numerous weaknesses in the Natal Stand were appreciated by the Federals themselves and, for this reason, the idea was relegated to the background after the 1954 provincial election defeat and after the Commonwealth leaders had failed to respond to their appeal. (152)

While the Federals were trying to galvanise the English-speakers into an awareness of the Nationalist threats to their ideals, the Nationalists were careful to cultivate a moderate image and presented themselves and their republican idea as the will of the people. The Nationalist leaders repeatedly stressed that the republic would only be declared on the 'broad will of the people'. (154) Promises of special elections or a referendum were repeatedly made by the Prime Ministers so as to allay fears of a minority-imposed republic. (155)

The Nationalists were similarly moderate in their pronouncements on the nature of any future republic which many English-speakers feared would be undemocratic. (156) The 1942 Draft Republican Constitution, which was authoritarian in character, and which was frequently cited by the Federals as an example of government thinking, (157) was firmly repudiated by the Nationalists. (158) They promised time and again that the rights of South Africa's English-speakers would never be assailed. (159)

In the early 1950s there had been a considerable fear that the English-speakers would be deprived not only of their economic and social position but also of their political rights. (160)

152. Vide supra: Ch.6, p.129.
153. Vide supra: Ch.6, p.147.
160. Vide supra: Ch.6, pp. 52-53.
The United Front had expressed this fear in their 1953 election slogan; 'Vote for the right to vote again'. (161) When, as the 1950s progressed, it seemed clear that the Nationalists did not intend creating a dictatorship, English-speakers' fears receded. And, opposition, especially Federal, credibility receded as well.

Although the Federals believed that the issues of the Crown and the Commonwealth were inseparable, in their propaganda they tended to stress the notion of the Commonwealth to a far greater degree than that of the Crown. The economic, diplomatic, military and cultural advantages of Commonwealth membership were obvious and, in large measure, tangible. People who were not Anglophile in inclination or even not English-speaking could support the Commonwealth for these reasons. Loyalty to the Crown, on the other hand, conferred no such material benefits and was therefore more vulnerable to misinterpretation or attack.

The Nationalists appreciated this difference and strove to separate the questions of Crown and Commonwealth. Malan, for example, stated, early in 1953, that the government planned a republic but that withdrawal from the Commonwealth would be judged at the time '...in the light of the then existing circumstances.' (162) Later that same year, he informed a Dutch newspaper that he envisaged a republic within the Commonwealth. (163) This view was subsequently expressed, on many occasions, by Nationalist leaders. (164) Having established that they wished to retain the material advantages of Commonwealth membership, the Nationalists began eliminating symbols of the Crown from South African life. The prayer for the Queen at the opening of the Senate was abolished. (165) This was followed by the abolition of God Save the Queen as one of South Africa's anthems. The Federals protested but the English-speakers allowed the

abolition with surprisingly little opposition. (166) This action was followed by the removal of the royal coat-of-arms from public buildings and of the letters O.H.M.S. from official mail. (167) There was almost no opposition to these moves.

When they discussed the republic, the Nationalists presented it as the fulfilment of South Africa's nationhood. In it, the divisions of the past would be obliterated. The Crown had, stated the Nationalists, always been a cause of contention between the two White population groups. Remove it, the argument went, and there would be unity and peace. Given the numerical weakness of the royalists and the defensive attitude which they had always to employ, this argument of a new fresh republican society in the place of a strife-ridden monarchy was seductive. As the referendum result showed, it did not convince most English-speakers, but it did weaken the Federal support.

The tactics of the Nationalists in eliminating the Crown, while retaining the Commonwealth, were both shrewd and effective. Piecemeal action coupled with skilful propaganda prevented a concerted response. The long term effect was the gradual elimination of the less widely-supported and less defensible institution of the Crown. But, in Federal eyes, the Commonwealth depended on the Crown ('bound ... by a common loyalty') and not vice-versa. Federal resistance declined because their turn-of-the-century attitude placed far greater store on the monarchy than on a largely commercial, and distinctly twentieth century, Commonwealth. With the Crown being eliminated as part of South African life, the Federals gradually lost hope in their cause. Thus, with the Crown reduced in stature and the Commonwealth viewed merely as an economic convenience (with no emotional overtones), the Nationalists were well placed to strike towards their republic. When Verwoerd, therefore, appealed to the country to vote for a republic in 1960, he stressed again his commitment to Commonwealth membership, (168) leaving the voters to decide on a republic which would then amount to little more

166. Vide supra: Ch.7. p.163.
than a constitutional amendment as so many of the exterior symbols of monarchy had already been stripped away. (169)

The Nationalists responded to the Natal Stand by contending that the provincialism of the Federals was undemocratic. If the majority wanted a republic, an attempt by Natal to thwart the national will would, in the words of Verwoerd, amount to the 'autocracy of the minority'. (170) He observed that it was strange that such a move could be contemplated by a party which 'always had their mouths full of sacred democratic rights etc.' (171) This was a telling point. The Federals attempted to counter it with the argument that there was no 'divine' right of a majority. (172) A majority decision was simply '... a measure of convenience to the dispatch of business'. (173) These views looked strange coming from a party which based the Natal Stand on the wishes of the majority of the province's voters.

The essential problem here, as far as the anti-republican English-speakers were concerned, was that the Afrikaners were in the majority. Therefore, if the great majority of the Afrikaners favoured a republic - and this appeared increasingly to be the case - the republic could be achieved, on the broad will of the people, or in a referendum, 'though no person of British descent had cast a vote in favour'. (174) The U.P. offered a way out of the dilemma. It assured the English-speaking public that republican sentiment amongst Afrikaners was greatly exaggerated. (175) Furthermore, the U.P. argued that 'splinter parties' only antagonised the moderate Afrikaners and gave the republican issue undue publicity. (176) Fearing an Afrikaner-dominated republic, yet too weak numerically to stop it, the English-speakers turned to the U.P. which skilfully exploited the situation.

They opposed the republic, supported the Crown and Commonwealth membership and admired many British traditions and customs such as democracy and the idea of 'fair play'. At the same time, they campaigned for a 'South Africanism' in which all the Whites would form one group, free from the excesses of either the Afrikaner or British extremists. In this, they pointed to the distinguished careers of Botha and Smuts and presented their policy as the only solution to the tensions and wars which had divided South Africa's Whites for a century before Union. The frequent use of the word 'moderate' appealed to the sense of reasonableness which all the opposition parties agreed to be a trait of the English-speakers.

In reply to the Federal claim that the constitution was static, the U.P. took a stand which was more in keeping with the aspirations of English-speakers. Strauss, in a major policy speech at East London on 18 October 1954 set out the U.P. view. He committed the party to the support of both the Crown and the Commonwealth - with most accent on the economic advantages of Commonwealth membership. At the same time, he tacitly acknowledged the evolutionary nature of the South African constitution. This was in keeping with the oft-stated U.P. stand that what was needed to defeat a republic (and the Nationalists) was not outmoded imperialistic arguments or an emotionally-based idea of revolution, but the support of all 'moderate' South Africans. In this way, the U.P. countered the Natal Stand with a 'Union Stand' (i.e. resistance to the Nationalists on a countrywide scale). The appeal met with considerable success and was one of the major reasons for the defeat of the Federals in 1954.

177. Vide supra: Ch.6. p.139.
180. Vide supra: Ch.5. p.121.
SECTION THREE

THE QUESTION OF RACE

The third Federal Party policy which must be considered when analysing the reasons for its failure, is its race policy. On this question there was a great deal of confusion. The Federals were clearly to the Left of the U.P. but the exact terms of its policy remained vague. The major questions of franchise qualification and method of election were never settled. \(^{(181)}\) The reason for this delay was that the policy caused division within the party, not least because a liberal race policy ran counter to traditional English-speaking attitudes, especially in Natal. The party, therefore, had to feel its way towards formulating the details of its policy.

With the exception of the Liberal Party, the colour policy envisaged by the Federal leaders was the most liberal of any of the contemporary political parties. The foundation principles of the party called for the abandonment of fear as the guiding principle of race relations. From this flowed the ideas of extending social services and even political representation for the non-Whites. \(^{(182)}\)

When the Natal Federal non-White policy was formulated in 1954 \(^{(183)}\) these ideas were incorporated into it. The policy rested on five general principles. First, the 'dignity of the individual' irrespective of race or colour was seen as fundamental. \(^{(184)}\) From this flowed the second principle that each ethnic group was a 'permanent' part of South Africa. \(^{(185)}\) The third principle was that the Whites, who had brought Western civilisation to South Africa '... must continue to guide the destiny and government of the peoples of the Union.' \(^{(186)}\) The

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181. Vide supra: Ch. 7. p. 169.
182. Vide supra: Ch. 3. p. 53.
183. Vide supra: Ch. 4. pp. 73-75.
185. Ibid.
186. Ibid.
fourth and fifth principles stated that there was no 'final solution' to the country's race problems and that all reforms in this direction should be gradual.\(^{(187)}\) The Statement of non-European Policy went on to envisage extensive social, economic and political reform in the four areas of the urban and rural communities, industry and the organs of government.\(^{(188)}\) In urban areas, all non-Whites should have the right to purchase property under freehold title. Because of their low income level, municipal housing schemes were envisaged. In keeping with the party's declared principles,\(^{(189)}\) the Statement maintained the principle of social and residential segregation. In the rural areas, the party supported the idea of individual ownership of land on the basis of long leasehold which should be convertible, in approved cases, to freehold. Extensive rehabilitation of the 'African Reserves' by soil and water conservation would be undertaken by the provinces, which would become responsible for the reserves in place of the existing 'unwieldy' central government control.\(^{(190)}\)

In industry, the right of the non-Whites to enter 'all fields of employment', and the need for vocational training to achieve this, was stated.\(^{(191)}\) The party argued that all races should be protected from 'unfair competition', but that 'reward regardless of race' should be the basis of South African economic life.\(^{(192)}\)

On the issue of the political representation of the non-Whites, the 1954 Statement envisaged, as has been discussed,\(^{(193)}\) that all races be represented in the Senate and in the provincial councils. In addition, the party adhered to the principle of the '... ultimate extension of the franchise on the common roll to such non-Europeans as are qualified to exercise it.'\(^{(194)}\)

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187. Ibid.
188. Ibid.
189. Vide supra: Ch. 3. p. 54.
191. Ibid.
192. Ibid.
193. Vide supra: Ch. 5. p. 112.
For two years, however, there were no developments in formulating the details of this qualified franchise. In 1956, as a result of a resolution moved by Greene and Seneque, a Franchise Committee was appointed to deal with the question. (195) This Committee rejected the multiple vote system and recommended the 'Two-Value Roll', (196) and this recommendation was debated at the Natal Party's 1957 Congress. (197)

The 'Two-Value Roll' idea, taken from the Tredgold Commission in Rhodesia, (198) envisaged a common roll with two categories of voters. There were the general voters and the 'A' voters. All votes were of equal value except that the number of 'A' votes cast in any constituency could never exceed a stated proportion of the general votes cast. (199) Where this occurred, the number of 'A' votes would be reduced proportionately. (200)

197. Vide supra: Ch. 7. p. 167.
199. The Franchise Committee suggested that this proportion be half, but this was apparently not accepted because the policy booklet of the Natal Federals, issued in January 1958 used the words 'stated proportion'. Ibid., and U.F.P. (Natal): Statement of Principles and Policies, op. cit., p. 14.
200. The example given by the Committee was that the 'A' votes should not exceed half the number of the general votes. It was as follows:

In an election 6 000 votes are cast. Of these, 4 000 are general votes and 2 000 are 'A' votes. They all count equally.

In an election 6 000 votes are cast. Of these, 3 500 are general votes and 2 500 are 'A' votes. Half the number of general votes is 1 750. The 'A' votes cannot count for more than this, and have to be reduced to 1 750 or 1 750/2 500 = 7/10

Thus, if candidate Pampoen received 900 'A' votes they would be reduced to 900 x 7/10 or 630.

The balance of the 'A' votes, 1 600, which went to candidate Mitchling would be reduced to 1 600 x 7/10 or 1 120.

The adjusted 'A' votes would then be added to the general votes cast for each candidate. U.F.P. (Natal): Report of the Franchise Committee, loc. cit.
ended qualifications for admission as an 'A' category voter was an income of £20 per month and the ability to fill in 'unaided' the voters registration form in one of the official languages. (201)

As regards the general voters' category, a detailed sliding scale based on education and means was proposed. This ranged from at least a standard six certificate plus £50 per month (or the occupation of property valued at £1 500) through Matriculation Certificate plus £35 per month (or occupation of property valued at £1 000) up to a recognised university degree with no financial qualifications. (202)

The 'Two-Value Roll' was accepted as party policy by the 1957 Natal Congress and, was seen, according to the party's official policy booklet, to have the following merits:

(a) It would ensure that the government of the country could not pass out of the hands of the European section of the people, which is best equipped to exercise control;

(b) It would mean that both legislative and executive would be responsible, not to a narrow electorate only, but to the people as a whole. Its adoption would thus have a beneficial effect, in that no political party could afford to ignore or flout the interests or feelings of the non-European elements of the people.

(c) It would mean that numbers of educated and responsible non-Europeans would be able to learn democratic practice and to exercise their responsibility through the 'A' vote. (203)

Despite the acceptance by the 1957 Congress of the 'Two-Value Roll' policy, the recommended franchise qualifications were rejected, and an examination of the 'merits' of 'Two-Value Roll' as set out in an official party booklet shows clearly that the party as a whole was more conservative than was the Franchise Committee. (204) This document rejected the franchise qualification, and stated that the government of the country 'could not' pass out of the hands of the Whites.

This policy, as finally agreed upon, contained obvious inconsistencies. (205) It is assumed, for example, (although

201. Ibid., p.4.
202. Ibid.
204. Ibid.
not stated) that the majority of the general voters would, in perpetuity, be Whites. In addition, the party relegated even 'educated and responsible' non-Whites to the 'A' category. Thus, the colour blind suggestions of the Franchise Committee were largely rejected in favour of a common roll with overwhelmingly racial categories of voters. Even this programme was considered too liberal by many Federals. The whole issue was debated again at the 1958 Congress and the idea of a common roll with high, but undefined, qualifications was agreed upon. The issue was never finalised.

The Federals' race policy was a major cause of their failure. It was too liberal. Whether the Federals admitted it or not, the basic principle on which their policy was based - that all non-Whites formed a common society with the Whites - remained consistent from the foundation of the Federal Party to the end. It was fairly well known that the English-speaking electorate, despite the stands taken by many of the English-language newspapers and churches, was not notably liberal. Natal, the province in which the Federals hoped first to succeed, had in the past displayed singularly few liberal tendencies. In addition, the white electorate was accustomed to thinking of non-Whites in terms of groups rather than individuals. This was part of the accepted South African political dialogue. The Nationalists had built their whole, electorally highly successful, ideal of apartheid on this basis. While not as forthright as the Nationalists on group identity, the U.P. still thought in terms of race groups. It rejected 'equality or race mixing', and approved of the Cape Times defining its policies as '...

207. Vide supra: Ch. 7, p. 169.
208. Vide supra: Ch. 5, pp. 113-4. This applied even to the traditionally liberal university student population. Thirty-eight per cent. of Pietermaritzburg students voted for segregated lectures. This figure rose to sixty per cent. if agricultural students alone were considered. Natal Witness: 2 September 1954.
"apartheid" that conforms to realities. \(^{(210)}\) As regards the franchise, the party stood for 'separate representation for Europeans and natives'. \(^{(211)}\) Even organisations such as the Torch Commando, created to fight for the common roll franchise of the Coloureds, thought in terms of race groups when deciding on membership criteria. \(^{(212)}\) And, the A.R.L. and even the Federal Party itself restricted its membership to Whites. \(^{(213)}\) The Federal Party's franchise policy was obviously associated in the public mind with its attack on the industrial colour bar, a proposal which seemed to threaten the base of the economic well-being of many White voters. \(^{(214)}\) Furthermore, the Federal Party was itself divided on the issue. From the beginning the Federal Party comprised, in the words of the Natal Witness, '... not only liberals and near-liberals, but also people who have very little interest in non-European aspirations, and who merely seek salvation from the Nationalists and their republic.' \(^{(215)}\) This group, consisting mainly of Anglophiles, accentuated anti-republicanism rather than liberalism. Martin's by-election campaign in Berea in 1953 is a case in point. He based his campaign on the Natal Stand and resistance to the republic and glossed over the Federals' colour policy as being 'largely long-term'. \(^{(216)}\) In the 1954 Natal provincial elections, on the other hand, the colour issue was a major part of the Federal platform.

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211. U.P. (General Secretary): *Programme of Principles and Constitution*, April 1951, p.3.
214. The only other parties participating in elections in the 1950s which supported the idea of individual worth as a criteria for the franchise, were the Liberal and Progressive Parties. The former, which advocated universal adult franchise, fared even worse than the Federals at the polls, and the latter, despite its many advantages; such as the support of many distinguished people and large financial resources, only achieved a major electoral breakthrough in the 1970s.
After the defeat in that election, from late 1954 onwards, the colour issue receded in importance in Federal thinking, as the Anglophiles achieved dominance within the party. Despite the efforts of people such as Greene, Seneque and Batchelor to formulate a liberal non-White policy, the trend was inexorable. The non-completion of the colour policy was the clearest indication of disagreement within the party, and of the ascendancy of the Anglophile wing. (217) By the time of the 1959 provincial elections, despite the public interest in the colour question, and the efforts of Batchelor, the Federals barely mentioned their non-White policy. (218)

The vacillating stand of the Federals on the colour issue made a difficult task impossible. Branded as a 'liberal' party in the South African context, the party needed a strong united effort if it were to convince the electorate of the justice and necessity of its position. But, many Federals themselves were not convinced of this and wished to remove the liberal aura from the party. In this, they were unsuccessful. The trend of South African politics in the 1950s was to the Right and the abandonment of particular facets of a non-White policy, as for example suggested by Selby, (219) could not possibly alter the public's view of the Federals which had been built up over a number of years. Internal division, therefore, did not save the party from the stigma of liberalism; it only added an impression of weakness and indicisiveness to its already unpopular position. Furthermore, from a purely theoretical point of view, there was a basic illogicality in the Federal Party's position, for, if they maintained that the English-speakers and Afrikaners needed to be separated into different provinces, linked federally, so as to prevent the dominance of one group, how could Whites and non-Whites (with a greater cultural gulf between them than between the two White groups) live within the same

218. Vide supra: Ch.8. p.190.
province? The only logical solution, in terms of Federal thinking, was to have not a common franchise and an integrated economy, but total separation along the lines suggested by the Nationalists.

The three main policies of the Federal Party, federation, the Crown and the Commonwealth, and the non-White question each had differing origins and each contributed in a unique way to the successes and then to the ultimate failure of the Federal Party. They all, however, contained a common ingredient in that they were all largely motivated by a reaction to Afrikaner nationalism. And, this all-pervading reaction was the final factor leading to the failure of the Federals. To obtain inspiration for its federal policy, the party looked 'back' to before 1948 and to before the creation of the United Party in 1934. In short, it gave the impression of wishing to turn the clock back to a time when English-speaking Natal still had substantial political influence before the entrenchment of Afrikaner nationalism. In the 1950s Heaton Nicholls believed that he could use the same bargaining methods against the U.P. which he had employed against Smuts in the early nineteen-thirties. Smuts had accepted the Hollander Memorandum, but had then largely abandoned his tolerance of federalism through Fusion. The questions therefore arise as to why Heaton Nicholls, committed as he was to the federal idea, continued to support Smuts and, equally significant, why the Federal Party consistently maintained, in the face of all evi-


221. Mitchell tried unconvincingly to argue, on one occasion, that Smuts had implemented the Hollander Memorandum by granting the provincial councils wider powers on matters such as housing, water and health. Natal Witness: 3 November 1953.

dence, that Smuts had favoured federation. (223) One current story was that Smuts 'died regretting Union'. (224)

Both questions are answerable only in terms of the threat of Afrikaner nationalism. Heaton Nicholls supported Smuts and Fusion as the most effective way to contain Afrikaner nationalism. With Natal’s electoral strength submerged in an enlarged U.P., this seemed to be the only possible strategy and had to be pursued – even at the sacrifice of federalism. The answer to the second question, as to why the Federals used Smuts's name to support their federal policy, was that Natal (as well as other South African) English-speakers had come to see him as the bulwark against the rising strength of Afrikaner nationalism. As long as Smuts was in power, the English-speakers could feel safe. By 1948, practically the entire English-speaking electorate voted for Smuts or his allies. So significant had he become for English-speakers, that the Federals had, as a propaganda necessity, to appropriate him as a federalist. (225)

When it became clear, after the 1953 general election, that Smuts's U.P. could no longer hold Afrikaner nationalism at bay, the Federals broke away and reverted to the Hollander Memorandum. Even the sympathetic Natal Witness realised the reactionary nature of the party's federalism. It stated:

If the United Party plus Federalists in Parliament became capable of governing, the agitation for federation would immediately die down, since hardly anyone would have thought of federation


225. Selby, who had come to South Africa only after the Second World War, did not appreciate this development amongst English-speakers. He wrote to Derek Heaton Nicholls: 'I confess I have never shared nor understood the almost veneration with which your father, in common with so many of the English-speaking, regarded Smuts.' N/P: A.R. Selby to D. Heaton Nicholls, 4 January 1962, loc.cit.
if it had not been for the Nationalists' election victory. (226)

Similarly, the most important weakness of the Federal position as regards the Crown, the Commonwealth and the Natal Stand was that it was, like federalism, mainly a reaction to Afrikaner nationalism. (227) Of course, because South Africa was constitutionally then a monarchy, the Federals were defending the status quo and would naturally react against any attack on it. The problem, however, went deeper than that. The Federals reacted to every move of the Nationalists and therefore appeared to have no consistent approach. When the Nationalists wished to remove the Coloureds from the common roll, the Natal Stand was the reaction against tampering with an 'entrenched' clause. Later, as soon as the Nationalists had transferred their attention to republicanism, it was employed in opposition to that issue. In their reactions against the republic the Federals also appeared to be inconsistent. They accepted the Clause 2(d) in the U.P. constitution while that party was in power but as soon as Afrikaner republicans assumed the reins of government, they could no longer tolerate even the possibility of a republic. It appeared from the Federal behaviour that the Crown and the Commonwealth would always stand between them and their fellow South Africans and that the Natal Stand was an ever ready weapon to use against any law of which English-speaking Natal disapproved.

In the Nationalist action - Federal re-action situation, the Nationalists held the advantage because they held the initiative. They could emphasize the colour issue (as in 1948 and 1953) or emphasize republicanism (as in 1958), depending on the favourability of circumstance. The Federals, in reaction, were unable to choose the time for the struggle, for example, over the Union Jack and the symbols of the Crown. In this way, the Nationalists could use their initiative, and

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227. For press comment on this point at the time of the formation of the Federal Party. Vide supra: Ch. 3. pp. 56-58.
their legislative power, to make the coming of the republic appear inexorable. Never having the initiative or the satisfaction of achieving a positive victory, the Federals and their supporters could not sustain interest. The failure of the A.R.L. was due to the League having nothing to do after its initial burst of energy (228) because the government refused to give details of when the republic would be created and so provide the opportunity for a political crisis. By the time of the referendum, the Federal Party and its front organisations were barely functioning.

The reaction against Afrikaner nationalism also affected the third main policy issue, that of colour. It is true that the relative liberalism of the Federals was rooted in the wartime experience of the many ex-servicemen who launched the party. Equally true, however, was its reactionary source. While the government strove to remove the Indian population by offering assisted passages to India, while it precipitated the country's greatest constitutional struggle in removing the Coloureds from the common role and while it proposed total separation for the Blacks, the Federals envisaged a common society with a common franchise. For the strong liberal element within the Federal Party this was logical, but for the illiberal Anglophiles, agreement stemmed largely from reaction.

This gave rise to the accusation that the Federals wished only to use the large non-White population to outweigh Afrikaners in the English-Afrikaner struggle. Die Burger summed up this accusation when it stated that the answer as to why the Federals, 'the most British of South Africans' supported a liberal non-White policy was '... the realisation by these people that they are a minority and that they are becoming powerless, the deep-rooted distrust in and fear of the national Afrikaner, and the desire to find political allies somewhere.' (229)

This accusation was untrue in that many Federals were genuinely liberal in their views on race. On the other hand,

228. Vide supra: Ch. 6, pp. 144-5.
it was true in that other sections of the party had definite ulterior motives to their racial liberalism. Early in 1954, Selby wrote that if the Natal Stand were to be put into action, Natal’s case would be placed ‘before the moral judgement of the world.’ (230) As such, Natalians needed a racial policy which the British Commonwealth could ‘underwrite’, and would have to be in contrast to the apartheid of Afrikaner Nationalism. (231) A similar argument was used by Martin in his Case against Dr. Verwoerd’s Republic in 1961. (232)

Like the Federal Party’s statements and policies on federation and the Crown and the Commonwealth, its policies on race were thus extremely confusing. While it won the support of some, it cost the party more support than it gained.

231. Ibid.
232. Martin: The Case Against Dr. Verwoerd’s Republic, op.cit., p. 5.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study is not only to provide a history of the Federal Party, but also to place that history in the wider perspective of the English-speakers confronting an aggressive Afrikaner nationalism. This required an analysis of the issues and pressures which swayed the English-speaking group in what was the last phase of the long Anglo-Afrikaner duel in South Africa. Also, it included an assessment of the reasons for the failure of the Federal response to the country's difficulties. These issues have been dealt with in detail in the preceding chapters. It remains to examine the widespread impact which the Federal Party's ideas and policies, as well as its Anglophile tendencies, had on South African society.

Professor Butterfield has criticised the tendency amongst historians to divide historical personages into '... the men who furthered progress and the men who tried to hinder it.' (1) 'Progress' in this context is whatever contributed directly to the dominant social and political ideas at the time of writing. In this type of classification, the thoughts and prejudices of the present are transported to the past and historical movements are judged accordingly. Thus, the Federal Party and its allies, with their pro-imperial views, which are unfashionable today amongst all but a small group, are almost entirely ignored. (2) When the Federals are briefly mentioned, it is usually as forming an irrelevant pressure group which was a nineteenth century remnant fighting for their ideals long after the cause was lost and history had by-passed them.

But, as Butterfield points out, this tendency to 'under-value' (3) one side in the tensions which create history is to miss the point that the 'whole present ... [is] the child of

2. Vide supra: Ch. 1. pp. 2-4.
the whole past.' (4) All historical development emerges from a clash between antagonists, and therefore all parties to the conflict have a lasting influence. This influence lies not only in forcing the victorious group into particular actions and decisions, or at least to modify many of its attitudes, but also in the survival of ideas and attitudes of the unsuccessful group. These ideas are never completely annihilated and, although not dominant, they remain in the body politic. In this context, the Federal Party is not just a failed political party representing a group of outdated jingos, but rather a major influence on South Africa's political and social development with strands extending into the present.

One of these strands was the rapprochement of the Nationalists and many of the English-speakers. During the 1940s and 1950s the Nationalists were almost entirely occupied with establishing Afrikaner nationalism as the dominant political force in South Africa. The non-Whites and the English-speakers were seen as opponents who had to be contained or overwhelmed. Superficially it would seem that the reaction of English-speaking political groups, such as the Federal Party, only confirmed Nationalist suspicions and therefore reinforced their determination to destroy opposition threats. It could be argued, however, that the strong stand made by the Federals on behalf of the English-speakers was a major factor in forcing the Nationalists to revise their negative attitude to this wealthy and articulate group. Of course, world criticism of apartheid and the spectre of an Africa moving rapidly towards independence were also factors inducing this change. It is not, however, a question of which force compelled the government to accommodate the English-speakers, but rather an issue of seeing all the pressures acting simultaneously. Outside pressure pushed the Nationalists along the path of White unity, while Federal Party belligerence made the government realise that it needed to placate the English-speakers or risk a completely alienated minority within the White community.

Of the political parties, only the Federals could effect-

4. Ibid., p.27.
ively serve the purpose of forcing the Nationalists to widen their conception of who should rule South Africa. The Liberal and Progressive Parties were not concerned with the English-speakers as such, and the U.P., because of its declared beliefs and because of its reliance on the Afrikaner vote, could not champion English-speaking sectionalism. This is not to say that the creation of White unity was one of the aims of the Federal Party. Quite the contrary. What the party wanted was confrontation, not co-operation with the government. But White unity was a seductive idea and, when the Nationalists broadened their appeal, large numbers of the English-speakers, including former Federals, accepted the Nationalist invitation and formed a White alliance against non-White and foreign pressure. (5)

The existence and activities of the Federal Party not only compelled the government to take cognisance of the English-speaking group, it also forced the English-speakers to re-appraise their position within South Africa. Previously, they had no option but to support the U.P. or its allies, in contrast to the Afrikaners who could vote for partnership with the English-speakers in the U.P. or support Afrikaner nationalism in the National Party. Now, with a choice at their disposal, the English-speakers were compelled to face the principal dilemma of their political situation - whether or not to challenge Afrikanerdom. They could support the Federal Party and confront the ruling nationalism with a numerically weaker English-speaking imitation. Alternatively, they could support the U.P. in the hope of influencing policy in partnership with the Afrikaners.

The fact that most English-speakers chose to support the U.P. obscures the basic fact that, without the Federals, the fundamental issue of Anglo-Afrikaner relations would have been blurred by other issues. And, as a result, many English-speakers might never have realised the powerlessness of their group. It was this realisation which helped to create apathy among English-speakers and so made them more susceptible to the National Party

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5. Witness the strong National Party electoral support amongst English-speakers, especially in Natal, in the 1960s. Ford and Grimwood, in interviews, both commented on the fact that 'many' Federals joined the Nationalists at that time.
at the very time when that party was calling for White unity.

Not all English-speakers lapsed into apathy and subsequent support for the government. A large minority, especially the Anglophiles, continued to fight for the rights of the English-speakers. When it became clear that the Federal Party was unsuccessful, this group formed the A.R.L. to fight for the old imperialist ideas under a new banner. (6) After initial activity, interest in the A.R.L. waned and UNESSA was constituted by the same group with the same ideas. (7) This moving of essentially the same group of people from organisation to organisation was the only way in which they could sustain interest in the face of their own powerlessness. Since the demise of UNESSA, no organisation has taken this cry with such vigour and with consistency.

Apart from the aim of defending the English-speakers, the Federal Party, unlike the A.R.L. and UNESSA, also had a relatively liberal non-White policy. This policy, like the party’s sectional ideas, had the effect of compelling the English-speakers to clarify their attitudes; in this instance in relation to the non-Whites. The Nationalists advocated apartheid and the U.P. adopted a stand which, while complex and confusing, was also based, in the last resort, on racism. (8) At the other end of the political spectrum, the Liberal Party, disregarding South Africa’s unique social and political complexities, advocated a common society in keeping with world-wide liberal beliefs. Only the Federal Party argued, albeit gropingly and hesitantly at times, in favour of a policy which took into account both the realities of South African society and the ideal of individual worth. They acknowledged that as there was a great diversity in lifestyle, culture and experience between the race groups of the country, any policy which proposed an immediate common society would win the support of only a tiny minority in the dominant White group. Any party which entertained hopes of coming to power in a reasonable time had to take account of this fact. At the same time, they realised that to

8. Vide supra: Ch. 5. p. 113.
use race as the yardstick of all social and political organisation was becoming increasingly dangerous. For this reason, the Federals planned a policy that was both a plan of action and a statement of belief.\(^{9}\)

Confronted with this policy, the English-speakers could no longer ignore the race issue. No longer could they reject both the liberals and the racists and remain outside the race debate. The Federal Party presented a third alternative and compelled them to define their position.

While it is true that the Federal race policy underwent a number of changes, its position in the South African political spectrum remained between the Liberal and United Parties. In addition, the basic ideas remained unchanged. This means that the Federal race policy occupies a permanent place in South Africa’s political history. The policy anticipated that of the Progressive Party which was similarly based on the value of individual worth while giving protection to group identity. In this way, the Federal Party, while grounded in the past - in the English-Afrikaner dispute - supplied the link with the future, in which the main issue was to be inter-racial relations. Many of the former Federals later joined the Progressives and their comparatively liberal ideals found further expression in that party.\(^{10}\)

The impact of another of the Federal Party’s policies - federalism - was quite different from that of the non-White policy in that there was no successor party to make federalism its central policy. Federation was based, in the ultimate analysis, on ethnicity. The whole drive behind the policy was that only in federation would the interests of the English-speakers be protected against the Afrikaner majority. The idea had only a limited impact and entered the post-1960 period discredited. As the discussion on the constitutional future of South Africa has re-opened in the 1970s, the question of federation is under discussion once again. It is true that the groups involved in any federation are no longer the English

\(^{9}\) Vide supra: Ch. 5.pp. 112-3.

\(^{10}\) Interviews with A.C. Martin, J. Stewart and B. Batchelor.
and Afrikaans-speakers, but rather the Whites and the different Black groups. There are, however, strong similarities between the federal ideas of the 1950s and those of the 1970s. Both are based on ethnicity and both are motivated by the need to protect each group from being dominated by others. During its lifetime the Federal Party was commonly viewed as the product of a group of outmoded English-speakers, whose enthusiasm was more embarrassing than it was productive. Its leaders and ideas were caricatured and lampooned in newspapers generally affiliated to other political groups. Today it is perhaps easier still to fall into the same error, for modern perspectives are affected by ignorance of detail about this period in South African history, such as did not affect the contemporary. It is only through historical research that such errors can be dispelled.
APPENDIX

PROMINENT FEDERAL PARTY MEMBERS
AND SUPPORTERS
PROMINENT FEDERAL PARTY MEMBERS AND SUPPORTERS

The information listed below has been drawn from numerous sources, too numerous to list in the form of footnotes. The most useful sources were newspapers, minutes of various committees and organisations, election manifestos and personal interviews.

Mrs. P. Argo.

Born in the United Kingdom, Mrs. Argo was a prominent welfare worker. She was elected to the Torch Commando's Natal Action Committee in January 1953 and was a Natal sponsor of the Federal Party. For a number of years Mrs. Argo served on the Natal Provincial Executive Committee of the party and, in October 1955, was elected a vice-chairman. In the 1954 and 1959 provincial elections, she contested the Pinetown and Umbilo constituencies respectively.

Mrs. Argo is deceased and her executrix informed the author that she left no political papers or documents.

B. Batchelor.

A Zululand sugar farmer, B. Batchelor joined the Natal Federal Party in 1954. He was a member of the Natal Provincial Executive Committee for a number of years and, in 1957, was a member of a three-man Federal lecture tour of the Orange Free State. He convened the Federal Party's Franchise Committee and was prominent in the liberal wing of the party. In the provincial elections of 1959, Batchelor contested the Umkomaas constituency.

Batchelor made his extensive political papers available and granted several long interviews to the author at his farm in the Richmond district.

J.C. Bolton.

Born in the United Kingdom, J. Bolton became a Durban city councillor and leading trade unionist. He was made a Freeman of the city of York and was awarded the Queens Coronation Medal in 1953 for meritorious service. Bolton
joined the Federal Party in the same year. In the 1954 provincial elections, he contested the Durban Central constituency. On 18 January 1955 he resigned from the Federal Party in protest against its appeal to the Commonwealth leaders to prevent a South African republic.

Mr. Bolton is deceased and, despite extensive enquiries, no political papers could be located.

G.A. Brathwaite.

G. Brathwaite was a national vice-chairman of the Torch Commando and became one of the Transvaal sponsors of the Federal Party. He formed a branch in Pretoria and was the first chairman of the Transvaal Federal Party.

Brathwaite's widow, Sheila Brathwaite of Somerset West, informed the author that he left no political papers or documents.

R. Brickhill.

Born in 1922 and educated at Maritzburg College, R. Brickhill was, in the early 1950s, the secretary of the Labour Party in Natal. He later became a member of the Action Committee and the Natal organiser of the Torch Commando. In July 1953 he resigned his offices in the Commando to join the Federals. The following month he was elected a vice-chairman of the Natal Federal Party. In the provincial elections of 1954, Brickhill contested the Durban Berea constituency. Disillusioned at the attitudes of the electorate, he gradually withdrew from politics and later emigrated to Rhodesia, where he died soon afterwards.

It has not been possible, despite numerous enquiries and letters, to trace his wife or relatives.

E.R. Browne.

A lawyer by profession, E. Browne was chairman of the Labour Party in Natal and a senator from the province. He joined the Natal Federal Party in May 1953, became its legal advisor, a vice-chairman and a member of its Action Committee. For three years he was chairman of the party. Amid controversy, Browne retained his Senate seat until 1954.
E.R. Browne of Westville, the Senator's son, informed the author that his father left no political papers or documents in his estate.

**Rev. J.B. Chutter.**

An Anglican minister, Rev. Chutter was the chairman of the Natal Inland Region of the Torch Commando. He co-operated closely with Ford in laying the foundations of the Federal Party and was one of the party's Natal sponsors.

Rev. Chutter is deceased, and, despite exhaustive enquiries, his widow and family could not be traced.

**W.S. Conradie.**

W. Conradie was a member of the National Action Committee and chairman of the Southern Transvaal Region of the Torch Commando. He was a Transvaal sponsor of the Federal Party and presided over its first meeting in that province. Later, he went on a lecture tour of the Transvaal and Natal on behalf of the Federal Party. One of the two prominent members who were Afrikaans-speaking, he left the party when it became apparent that the Federals were concerned overwhelmingly with the English-speakers.

Conradie granted the author a lengthy interview at his home in Johannesburg.

**Mrs. P.R. Cousins.**

Mrs. Cousins was the honorary secretary of the Transvaal Federal Party for its entire existence.

All attempts to trace her have failed.

**Professor G.H. Durrant.**

G. Durrant was an active Torchman and a Natal delegate to the Torch Commando's national congress in June 1953. Although he never held office, Professor Durrant was an active Federal supporter and organised a speech course for prospective Federal Party election candidates in 1957. Subsequently, he emigrated to Canada.
Although Professor Durrant, now at the University of British Columbia, could not supply documentation other than newspaper cuttings, he supplied useful insights into Federal attitudes.

Brigadier J.T. Durrant.

An ex-chief of the South African Defence Force and the youngest major-general in the Commonwealth forces during World War II, Brigadier Durrant, on retirement from the Defence Force, went farming at Nottingham Road. He was a national vice-chairman of the Torch Commando, a Natal sponsor of the Federal Party and a candidate for that party, in the Drakensberg constituency, in the 1954 provincial elections. In 1956, amid publicity, he joined the A.R.L. and served on its Natal committee.

Despite exhaustive enquiries, Brigadier Durrant could not be traced.

R.L. Fitzgerald.

R. Fitzgerald was the honourary secretary of the Federal Party (Cape) in 1957-58.

He could not be traced.

E.G. Ford.

A lawyer by profession, E. Ford was a national vice-chairman and chairman of the Natal Coast Region of the Torch Commando. Ford was more responsible than any other person for formulating the ideas of the Federal Party and swinging Torch Commando support behind the new political group. A Natal sponsor of the Federal Party, he was elected chairman of the Natal Federal Party in 1953 and 1954. Disillusioned at the result of the 1954 provincial elections, he gradually withdrew from politics. Later, he emigrated to Umtali, Rhodesia.

Ford corresponded with the author and granted him a lengthy interview in which he supplied a large amount of vital information on the formation of the Federal Party.
J. Freeman.

J. Freeman joined the Natal Federal Party in 1953 and served as honourary secretary of the Midlands Zone and on the Provincial Executive Committee for a number of years. He was the convener of the committee entrusted with drafting policy on social and economic affairs and later of the standing committee on economic development of Natal which examined the economic viability of the province in the event of its breaking away from the Union.

Freeman supplied the author with a number of contemporary documents and granted him a lengthy interview at his Pietermaritzburg home.

D. Grant.

A director of companies and a sugar farmer, D. Grant became a Lower South Coast Zone chairman and a Provincial Executive Committee member of the Natal Federal Party. He contested the Umzimkulu constituency in the 1954 provincial elections.

Despite exhaustive enquiries, Grant could not be traced.

S.M. Greene.

A lawyer by profession, S. Greene resigned as Natal secretary of the Labour Party to help found the Natal Federal Party. He became a member of the Provincial Executive Committee of the party and convened the standing committee dealing with current legislation. A member of the Franchise Committee and a strong supporter of a more liberal non-White policy within the Federal Party, he resigned when the party did not move quickly enough in that direction. In the 1954 provincial elections, he contested the Durban Point constituency.

Greene granted the author a lengthy interview at his Durban home.

W.V. Grimwood.

W. Grimwood joined the Federal Party in 1954 and served the party as an efficient honourary treasurer for a number of
years. He also served on the Natal Provincial Executive and Provincial Action Committees as well as being elected a vice-chairman and a deputy chairman of the party.

Grimwood, before his death, granted the author two long telephone interviews.

**W.F. Hamilton.**

A member of the Natal Coast Action Committee and a vice-chairman of the Natal Coast Region of the Torch Commando, W. Hamilton was a sponsor of the Federal Party. He became the chairman of the Durban Zone and, later, a vice-chairman of the Natal party.

Hamilton informed the author that he had no relevant political papers.

**Mrs. G. Hamlyn.**

Mrs. Hamlyn was secretary to Rev. J.B. Chutter and although she did not play a major role in the formation of the Federal Party, she was sympathetic to the party and assisted Rev. Chutter in his efforts to help found the party.

Mrs. Hamlyn granted the author several interviews at her Durban home.

**D. Hanafin.**

D. Hanafin was a member of the Transvaal Federal Party and contested the Hospital provincial by-election in June 1958. Hanafin could not be traced.

**P. Hathorn.**

Born in Natal and educated in Pietermaritzburg and the United Kingdom, P. Hathorn joined the Natal Federal Party in 1953. He was, at various times the vice-chairman of the Midlands Zone, a member of the Natal Provincial Executive Committee and a vice-chairman of the party in Natal. In the 1954 provincial elections he contested the Pietermaritzburg North constituency.

His nephew, P. Hathorn of Hilton and his former partners
at the law firm of Hathorn, Cameron and Co. of Pietermaritzburg informed the author that Hathorn left no political papers or documents.

D. Heaton Nicholls.

D. Heaton Nicholls, the son of Senator Heaton Nicholls and a Zululand sugar farmer, was born and educated in Natal. He was active in the Natal Coast Region of the Torch Commando and joined the Federal Party in 1953. He served the Natal Federal Party in numerous capacities, being elected at different times, chairman of the Zululand Zone, a member, and later chairman, of the Natal Provincial Executive Committee, a member of the Provincial Action Committee, chairman, deputy leader and finally, on the resignation of A.R. Selby, ‘temporary leader’ of the party in Natal. In addition, Heaton Nicholls was the Federal Party’s representative on the Natal delegation which interviewed Dr. Verwoerd in 1960, concerning concessions to Natal in the future Republic of South Africa. In the provincial elections of 1954 and 1959 he contested the Zululand constituency.

Heaton Nicholls made a substantial amount of private correspondence available and, together with his wife, granted two lengthy interviews to the author at his Zululand farm.

Senator G. Heaton Nicholls.

Born in the United Kingdom, Senator Heaton Nicholls settled in South Africa after employment in the Colonial Service in Rhodesia and Papua. He acquired a sugar farm in Zululand and, in 1920, was elected to represent that constituency in parliament. In 1938 he was nominated as a senator. In 1943 he was appointed Administrator of Natal and in November of the following year he became the Union’s High Commissioner in London. He resigned his post in October 1947, was appointed a Privy Councillor in January 1948 and re-entered the Senate, soon to be the U.P. leader in the Upper House.

In April 1953 he announced his resignation from the U.P. and the next month assumed the leadership of the Natal Federal Party, a position he held until July 1957.
R. Hughes Mason.

Hughes Mason, the vice-chairman of the Natal Inland Region of the Torch Commando, was a Natal sponsor of the Federal Party. He served on the Natal Provincial Executive and Natal Provincial Action Committees and was elected, at different times, a vice-chairman and deputy chairman of the party. He was a member of the three-man Federal lecture tour of the Orange Free State and served as honourary organiser of Federal News. Hughes Mason contested the provincial constituencies of Umzimkulu in the by-election in 1955 and Ixopo in the 1959 elections.

Neither his former partners at the law firm of Mason, Buchan and Co. of Pietermaritzburg nor his widow had any, or knew the whereabouts of any, of his political papers.

L. Kane-Berman.

L. Kane-Berman was the national chairman of the Torch Commando and was one of the sponsors of the Federal Party. He held no office in the party.

Kane-Berman, of Houghton, Johannesburg, corresponded with the author and granted him an interview.

M. Kettles.

M. Kettles organised the Federal Party in the eastern Cape and became the chairman of the East Cape Federal Party of which he was the driving force. He resigned when the Federals decided not to contest the 1958 general election.

All efforts to trace Kettles were unsuccessful.

C.S. Keary.

Chairman of the East Rand division of the Torch Commando, C.S. Keary was a Transvaal sponsor of the Federal Party. He held no office in the party.

Keary granted the author an interview at his Durban home.
C. Kinsman.

A retired City Engineer of Durban, C. Kinsman joined the Natal Federal Party in 1954. He served on the Natal Provincial Executive and Natal Provincial Action Committees, and, at various times, as a vice-chairman and the deputy chairman of the party. In the 1954 provincial elections, he contested the Durban North constituency.

Kinsman, an octogenarian, declined to be interviewed and informed the author that he had no political papers.

Miss G.E. Lee.

A keen supporter of the Transvaal Federal Party since its inception, Miss Lee was the honorary editor of *The Federalist*. It was not possible to trace Miss Lee.

D. Lowe.

In the 1959 provincial elections, D. Lowe contested the Umzimkulu constituency.

Despite exhaustive enquiries, Lowe could not be traced.

Dr. L.S. Manion.

A dentist by profession, Dr. L.S. Manion was a member of the Natal Provincial Executive Committee and, in the 1954 provincial elections, he contested the Durban Greyville constituency.

The author was informed that Dr. Manion is deceased.

Mrs. E. McChesney (now Mrs. B. Ross).

In January 1954, Mrs. McChesney became the secretary of the Natal Federal Party and, later, was elected a member of the Natal Provincial Executive Committee.

She informed the author that she did not have any relevant political papers.

R.S. McKie Thompson.

R.S. McKie Thompson joined the Natal Federal Party in 1953, was elected chairman of the Upper South Coast Zone the
same year. In the 1954 provincial elections, he contested the Umkomaas constituency. Later, he served as a Natal representative on the Inter-Provincial Consultative Committee.

Despite extensive enquiries, McKie Thompson could not be traced.

M. Mallinick.

M. Mallinick was the chairman of the Transvaal Federal Party for a short period. He served as a Transvaal representative on the Inter-Provincial Consultative Committee. He was a founder and the national secretary of UNESSA.

Despite exhaustive attempts, Mallinick could not be traced.

Lieut.-Col. A.C. Martin.

Lieut.-Col. Martin retired as a school principal, joined the Natal Federal Party in 1953 and contested the Berea parliamentary by-election the same year. He was appointed convenor of the standing committee on education. At various times, he served on the Natal Provincial Executive and Provincial Action Committees, and as a Natal representative on the Inter-Provincial Consultative Committee. In 1958 he was elected deputy chairman of the Natal Federal Party and, the following year, he was elected the last leader of the party. In the 1954 and 1959 provincial elections, he contested the constituencies of Umbilo and Essenwood respectively.

Lieut.-Col. Martin supplied the author with a number of important documents and granted him several lengthy interviews at his Durban home.

D.L. Nurcombe.


Despite extensive enquiries, he could not be traced.
N. Roberts.

N. Roberts was a vice-chairman of the Natal A.R.L. and, on joining the Federal Party, contested the Pietermaritzburg South constituency in the 1959 provincial elections.

Mrs. G.A. Park Ross.

Mrs. Park Ross joined the Natal Federal Party in 1953 and served on the Provincial Executive and Provincial Action Committees. After the resignation of W. Grimwood in 1958, she became the honorary treasurer of the party. In the 1954 provincial elections, she contested the Pietermaritzburg District constituency.

Mrs. Park Ross had no relevant political papers, but corresponded with the author from her home at Hilton.

B. Ross.

A farmer and former U.P. branch secretary, B. Ross joined the Natal Federal Party in 1953 and served, at various times on the Provincial Executive and Franchise Committees.

Ross made a quantity of press cuttings available to the author.

Dr. B. Sampson.

A former president of the Natal Coast branch of the South African Medical Association, Dr. Sampson served the Federal Party as a Durban Zone chairman and as a member of the Provincial Executive Committee. In the 1954 provincial elections, he contested the constituency of Umgeni.

Despite exhaustive efforts, Dr. Sampson could not be traced.


Maj.-Gen. Selby was born in Australia and commanded British forces in the Middle East during World War II. He emigrated to South Africa after the war. A national vice-president of the Torch Commando, Selby was a Natal sponsor of
the Federal Party. He served the Natal Federal Party, at various times, as vice-chairman and chairman before resigning in 1955 to form and lead the Natal A.R.L. In 1957 Selby returned to the Federal Party to succeed G. Heaton Nicholls as leader. The following year he was elected the first and only national leader of the Federal Party. Selby resigned his offices in November 1959 for personal reasons. In the 1954 and 1959 provincial elections, he contested the Pietermaritzburg South and Pietermaritzburg District constituencies respectively.

His widow, Mrs. P. Selby, informed the author that the General left no political papers. She granted him a lengthy interview at her home near Greytown, Natal.

P. Senegue.

The honorary accountant of the Torch Commando, P. Senegue joined the Natal Federal Party and served as honorary treasurer for a short period as well as on the Provincial Action Committee. A strong supporter of a more liberal non-White policy for the Federal Party, he resigned when the party did not move quickly enough in that direction.

Professor Seneque of Natal University made his personal political papers available and granted an interview to the author.

J.E.M. Seymour.

From East Griqualand, Seymour did not have a great deal to do with the Federal Party until he stood as a Federal candidate in Greyville in the 1959 provincial elections. Seymour made his election manifesto available to the author and granted him an interview at his Durban home.

Dr. D. Standing.

Dr. Standing joined the Natal Federal Party in 1953, served on the Provincial Executive Committee and contested the Gardens constituency in the 1954 provincial elections. All attempts to trace Dr. Standing were unsuccessful.
Mrs. J. Stewart.

A well-known social worker, Mrs. Stewart joined the Federal Party because of a perceived threat to Natal education from the National Party. In the 1959 provincial elections, she contested the Durban North constituency.

Mrs. Stewart made her extensive private political papers available to the author as well as granting him several long interviews at her Durban North home.

Mrs. H. Struben.

Mrs. Struben was the founder of the Federal Party in the western Cape and was chairman of that party. She was the Cape's representative on the Inter-Provincial Consultative Committee.

All attempts to trace Mrs. Struben were unsuccessful.

J. Venter.

One of the two prominent Afrikanns-speaking members of the Federal Party, J. Venter served on the Transvaal Provincial Executive Committee of the party.

All attempts to trace Venter were unsuccessful.

L. Vermaak.

Born and educated in Natal, L. Vermaak joined the Natal Federal Party in 1954 and became chairman of the Stanger branch. In 1955 he was employed by the party as a full-time organiser. This, however, was of short duration owing to a lack of funds. Despite exhaustive attempts, Vermaak could not be traced.

D.D. Will.

D.D. Will was, at various times, chairman of the Pietermaritzburg City branch of the Natal Federal Party, chairman of the Midlands Zone and a member of the Provincial Executive Committee. He contested the Pietermaritzburg South constituency in a provincial by-election in 1958.

All attempts to trace Will were unsuccessful.
J.D. Wilson.

J.D. Wilson was the chairman of the Witwatersrand division of the Torch Commando and was a Transvaal sponsor of the Federal Party. Thereafter he played no part in Federal Party activities.

Wilson corresponded with the author and granted him a long telephone interview.

D. Woods.

A journalist by profession, D. Woods was the vice-chairman of the Federal Party in the eastern Cape and the party's candidate for the East London North parliamentary by-election in 1957.

Before he could be contacted by the author, Woods had left South Africa.
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L. Boyd. Independent member of the Provincial Council since 1943, L. Boyd joined the U.P. in 1953 and became deputy chairman of the party in Natal. He resigned from the U.P. in 1959 to lead the Progressive Group in Natal. When they were constituted the Progressive Party, he was elected its Natal leader.

R. Fenhal Is. A member of the Natal Coast Region Action Committee of the Torch Commando, R. Fenhal Is strenuously opposed the future Federal Party leaders within the Commando.

E.G. Ford. (See Appendix)

J. Freeman. (See Appendix)

S.M. Greene. (See Appendix)

W.V. Grimwood. (See Appendix)

G. Hamlyn. (See Appendix)

D. Heaton Nicholls. (See Appendix)

L. Kane-Berman. (See Appendix)

C.S. Keary. (See Appendix)

A.C. Martin. (See Appendix)


P. Selby. (See entry A.R. Selby in Appendix)

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