ETHNICITY AS IDENTITY AND ETHNICITY POLITICALLY MOBILISED: SYMBOLS OF MOBILISATION IN INKATHA

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Social Science, University of Natal, Durban.
DECLARATION

I, Paul Gerhardus Maré, declare that this thesis is my own work. Any work done by other persons has been properly acknowledged. The thesis has been submitted in the Department of Sociology in the faculty of Social Science at the University of Natal, Durban, for the PhD degree. It has not been submitted before for any other degree or examination at any other University.

Signed: [Signature]

Date: Feb 9, 1996

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This thesis, entitled ‘ETHNICITY AS IDENTITY AND ETHNICITY POLITICALLY MOBILISED: SYMBOLS OF MOBILISATION IN INKATHA’, presents two major contributions. The first is a discussion of ethnicity that not only draws the distinction between the phenomenon in its mobilised political form, on the one hand, and on the other ethnicity as social identity presenting life stories through which individuals live part of their social existences, but also follows through the theoretical and policy implications. The implications of this distinction suggest ways in which the issue of ethnicity can be approached within attempts to avoid the conflictual dimension. The second is a study of the manner in which political mobilisation of Zulu ethnicity has occurred, especially during the 1970s and 1980s, through the Inkatha movement. The case study effectively illustrates the manner in which politicised ethnicity functions, in defining a rigid interpretation that allows little flux and movement within, and from and into the ethnic camp.

The author integrates the theoretical discussion of the issue of ethnicity and ethnic social identities with comparative and empirical material drawn nationally and internationally as well as from the extensive case study of the mobilisation practices of the Inkatha movement and its leadership. In the theoretical approach the complex nature of all identities, and of ethnicity specifically, is stressed, arguing for the multiple experiences of what is presented as homogeneous within ethnic mobilisation. Ethnic identities are gendered, and subject to the effects of class, age, and ‘race’ distinctions. Ethnicity is, furthermore, much more flexible than would appear to be the case from such mobilisation. It is in this flexibility that an approach to resolving ‘ethnic conflict’ lies.

Within ethnic mobilisation the stress in the interpellations addressed at ethnic subjects is on rigidity, inflexibility, and single and centralised interpretations. These elements are illustrated through the case study of Inkatha operating from within the previous KwaZulu bantustan. Themes and approaches within the discourse of mobilisation employed to mobilise a regional population into Inkatha are examined, and set against the background and effects of social, political and economic factors.

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This thesis owes much to the public discussions that occurred around the published versions of sections of the present work (this thesis). Reviews, conferences and seminars produced more comment than can possibly be individually acknowledged here. The students who registered for the courses that I taught are also owed a debt of gratitude, as are research assistants (especially those involved in maintaining the Natal Room).

People who must be thanked by name are Georgina Hamilton, Cathy Campbell and Cherryl Walker, co-authors, colleagues and friends, with whom I have participated in projects around the issue of identities in contemporary South Africa and shared and received many ideas; Glenn Moss, first and foremost friend, but also fellow student for several years, colleague, and editor at Ravan Press; Charles Meth, always a keen companion on hiking trips that either hindered the earlier completion of this (and his) thesis, or were an essential element in ensuring the mental and physical health on which it finally rests (probably both); my supervisor Ari Sitas, for being an imminent presence down the passage, and for some perceptive comments at the end. Finally, to the members of the 'Capital Reading Group' (present and past), without whose regular intellectual stimulation this work would have been much the poorer.

The whole thesis, as it appears here, unless specifically indicated to the contrary in the text, is the original work of the author.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The need for a 'politics of diversity' and a society that recognises a plurality of identities in the political terrain, has been acknowledged by many contemporary theorists often operating from very different political and theoretical perspectives (for example, Lijphart, 1979, 1993; Wright, 1985; Laclau, 1993; 1993a). This need arises, in part, out of the 'universalisms' that had collapsed with the fragmentation of the Soviet Union and other eastern European countries (cf Laclau, 1993a; 1993b; Aronson, 1991). What is being undertaken less frequently, or with much less confidence, at least from a Left perspective, are attempts to construct such a society, theoretically or in consistent policy-making, partly (I would suggest) because of the difficulty that lies in establishing a new 'grand narrative', that would allow for non-conflictual diversity (Gutman, 1992). It is a brave person, indeed, who enters this field, so dominated by the horrors of what is the apparent inevitable consequence of plurality rampant - a field that sees not the 'massive foes' (captured in Ronald Reagan's perception of the USSR as the 'Evil Empire') of the Cold War, but the many 'micro' battles of Hot Wars, where size and internationally perceived importance has less to do with numbers killed than with geo-political location on the map of the 'new world order'.

This field, graphically demonstrated through the pictures and words brought to our attention by international and local media showing the total fragmentation of societies (civil and state) such as in Somalia, the new horror of 'ethnic cleansing' in Yugoslavia, the genocidal 'war' in Rwanda, the separatist struggle in Chechnya, and the inability to recognise the right of opposition that characterised both the apartheid past and much of the transitional present in South Africa (see, for example, report on IDASA-supported study, Sunday Tribune, 4 Dec 94), presents a minefield to any analyst and theorist.

Are these the inevitable horrors of diversity checked and unrecognised, or can it be that the carnage and confrontation is, at least in part, due to the privileging of politicised ethnicity, the misrecognition of identity? For that is the other 'common-sense' of post-modern pluralism, that all would be well if diversity was given free reign within the model and terrain of national self-determination.
However, it is essential that suggestions be made for possible resolution of the apparent strong connection between violence and diversity, of the tension between 'multi-culturalism' and conflictual demands or extreme separatism. Such a task is even more pressing in South Africa where the politics of identity, and actual and threatened violence that calls on identity politics, has achieved a higher place on the agenda of social change than has the politics of class or of gender. There was, however, within the violence in South Africa a common acceptance that change towards democratisation would occur (even if only ultimately) through a process of negotiation.

It is to address the central issue of diversity that I have reworked some of my previous unpublished and published work on the subject of ethnicity, and specifically on the mobilisatory project by cultural brokers using the notion of 'Zuluness', and to which I have added considerable new material. In this thesis I examine ethnicity and ethnic social identities, arguing for a definition and an approach that can be applied to provide comparative perspective under a wide range of circumstances. Importantly, I argue for the separation of ethnicity as social identity, on the one hand, and, on the other, ethnicity as factor in the political mobilisation of people. I propose that a successful politics of diversity, or a theory of difference, is not possible unless this theoretical and empirical distinction is maintained, and the implications drawn out.

This thesis is, however, not simply an adaptation of already written material to the specific demands of formalised and micro-scale academic recognition. The revision, rethink and extensive re-working has inevitably benefited from the comments - many of them constructively and critically taking issue with what I had offered for public evaluation - made in reviews, seminars, letters, and many informal discussions. The thesis has also been expanded into areas that were un-developed, or had not received any attention at all in the earlier versions. Finally, it has had to respond to a rapidly changing context, both locally and internationally. Hopefully it has been improved by these interventions, and hopefully, although with much less conviction, noting the form, it remains within the arena of debate.

The material has been organised as follows: in chapter one, this Introduction, I explain the inter-relationship of the elements of the task at hand. Chapter two consists of a theoretical and comparative discussion of ethnicity, assessing whether sufficient content can be given to the notion to make it useful in understanding the dynamics of social identity formation. It also starts extending the exploration of the difference between ethnicity as social identity in everyday life of individuals, and ethnicity as mobilising ideology. Chapter three examines the distinction between ethnic
mobilisation and the symbols employed in such mobilising action, on the one hand, and, on the other, ethnicity as one of many social identities in everyday life. In addition I note the heterogeneity of ethnic, and other, social identities. In the next chapter, chapter four, I discuss Zulu ethnicity in its mobilised form and the symbols employed to give image to it, and its existence within political practice. The developing contestation, between political organisations, over the claim to all or part of the notion of 'Zuluness', is noted. I place the discussion within an historical context that is contoured by class struggle. Finally, in the concluding section, chapter five, I suggest the implications of the material to the project of creating a politics of diversity, a democratic practice that is conscious of and informed, but not shaped and rigidly cast, by the complex boundaries of identity. I explore whether the notion of democratic citizenship can meet the demands of social diversity within a common political practice.

This study traces a journey from the early-1970s to the mid-1990s by following a thread that gave continuity to the political and other social relations within the region of Natal/KwaZulu (what is now, since May 1994, the province of KwaZulu-Natal, or KZN) - the thread is that of ethnic mobilisation. It is a journey through a landscape that was, for decades already, and that still remains, painted in the common sense of the existence of ethnicity, of the 'Zulu nation'. However, common sense is frequently common non-sense, or only part sense.

Our understanding of ethnicity is far from adequate. That might sound strange being said in a country that is only just starting to move beyond a formal policy that rested fundamentally on ethnic fragmentation for 30 years; and continued to rest even after the process of negotiations was launched - not a single bantustan, or ethnic 'homeland', had been dissolved until just before the elections in April 1994, despite the much-vaunted demise of apartheid post-February 1990; and still informs social thought in post-election South Africa. One of the costly mistakes made by the African National Congress in the transitional period after 1990, was in not insisting on the prior re-incorporation of all bantustans before the negotiation process was launched through the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) One (see Maré, 1993a, for a discussion of this issue). Such an omission allowed an even greater degree of ethnic identification to flourish than would have been the case, and to be fired in the heat generated by the issue during the negotiation process.
However, it is precisely apartheid, in its form of 'separate development', of 'cultural pluralism' and 'cultural nationalisms', of 'peoples' and 'nations', that closed the door on many serious investigations of a phenomenon that is not simply contained by apartheid, that is not unique to Africa, and that is not an anachronism in the modern world. Apartheid largely tainted ethnicity for local researchers, except to examine the phenomenon as the obvious tool that 'they' 'used' to divide 'the people' (an unexamined notion that still exists problematically on the political terrain). The major problem with that approach is that it implies that many millions of fellow South Africans, who lived and live their lives as ethnic subjects, along with the many other identities that shape daily interaction and social perceptions, are fools, duped by the manipulators, so many sheep. I do not accept that. A variation of this perception underlies the equally obvious attempts to manipulate symbols of ethnic mobilisation to counter already existing ethnically-based organisations and practices. The struggle over the symbol of the Zulu king, in the period after the April 1994 election, between the African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party is a case in point; as is that over the manner in which some Afrikaners are struggling to be defined and provided with a political home.

A brief summary of changing academic and political perceptions of 'race' and ethnicity is necessary. It is a summary, and incomplete treatment because it is not essential to this study, which takes a different (and more theoretical) route, and because little secondary material is immediately available. What is clear is that a comprehensive study of the place of 'race', nationalism and ethnicity, as well as other non-class issues, within the concerns of sociology (and related disciplines) in South Africa, is necessary. Such a study would contextualise the early contributions by people such as Van den Bergh, whose Caneville: the social structure of a South African town (1964) examined the 'ubiquitous factor of "race" [which] in South Africa is no less real for its irrationality' in a small town in Natal. He noted that while much work had been done on the economic, political and legal aspects of South African 'race relations', other aspects such as 'racial attitudes and etiquette are still largely uncharted' (1964:6); Leo Kuper, who with fellow sociologists Hilstan Watts and R Davies published an even earlier study of Durban: a study in racial ecology (1958), and subsequently wrote on pluralism (Kuper and Smith, 1969), 'race' and class (1974), and ethnic relations and conflict (1977), to name but a few; Monica Wilson and Archie Mafeje's study of the Langa township (1963); John Rex's many writings on 'race' and ethnicity (for example, Rex and Moore, 1967, and Rex, 1973, dedicated to Nelson Mandela); Dickie-Clark, and his study of coloured people in Durban (1964); Meer (1969) on the 'Indian community'; and many others. Such a study would, in addition, deal with the place of issues such as class, 'race', gender and ethnicity within teaching and research
programmes; the effects of European marxist debates on the concerns and approaches of local academics; the effects of the approaches of the liberation alliance to analyses of South African society (such as the SA Communist Party’s ‘colonialism of a special type’ approach); and the changes within, as well as resistance to, the repressive apartheid society that affected intellectual development. Webster’s (1991) review of sociology at the University of the Witwatersrand provides an example of such an overview, as do the contributions by anthropologists to the Annual Review of Anthropology (see Pauw, 1980; Gordon and Spiegel, 1993), and historians (see, for example, Bozzoli and Delius, 1990, especially 1990:31, and references in note 74 to ethnicity).

Simon Bekker disappoints in this task in his overview of ethnic studies in South Africa, despite the claims and sarcastic comments made in the introduction by Lawrence Schlemmer, and despite the task Bekker set himself (1993). Where Bekker, and Schlemmer, are correct is in noting the lack of serious analyses of ethnicity within South African left scholarship (see my own earlier comment on this lacuna - 1992:1-2). Dubow (1992:209) similarly noted that the ‘general amnesia about the place of racist ideas in Western thought... has been exacerbated [in South Africa] by materialist scholarship’s fear of “idealism”’. His comments apply even more to ethnicity.

During, and even before, the 1950s and the 1960s debates around ethnicity within South Africa were dominated by those who operated within an apartheid framework, or who provided the justification for the policy (for a discussion of the earlier period see Dubow, 1987; 1992). Dunbar Moodie, for example, traces the complex shifts and lapses between ‘race’ thinking and policy formulation, on the one hand, and ‘positive apartheid’ based on an ethnic approach, with several ‘nations’ having to co-exist in South Africa, on the other (eg 1980:276-7). A powerful figure within these debates was Dr WWM Elselen who, before he became Hendrik Verwoerd’s secretary of native affairs, had been a lecturer and then professor of anthropology (Moodle, 1980:272). He argued vigorously for ‘difference’ rather than for a hierarchy of cultures; for the preservation of ethnic values and practices (especially of language) rather than their destruction through assimilation:

‘The future will teach us whether the Bantu have a sufficient ethnically conscious stratum to persist and win for their languages a firm and abiding place in South Africa. From our side we can do much to encourage these Peoples in their struggle for cultural existence if we try to understand and respect their language and culture’,
wrote Eiselen as early as 1934 (quoted Moodie, 1980:273). That argument was to inform ‘positive apartheid’, as discussed below.

John Sharp characterised the apartheid ‘vision’ as involving:

- a particular interpretation of the terms ‘ethnic group’ and ‘nation’. It held that ethnic groups differed from each other by virtue of objective cultural differences. The members of an ethnic group spoke one language, held to a distinctive set of practices, and shared a common system of beliefs (1988a:79).

Such an approach, of ethnic definition from above, as part of a policy aimed at removing all effective power from the majority, excluded from political power at the centre, had to rely on notions of identity that were simplistic, fixed and easily categorised and stipulated in identification documents. Gordon and Spiegel noted the way in which anthropologists within the Vereniging van Afrikaanse Volkekundiges emphasized ‘the boundedness of cultures, focuse(d) on ethnic difference and (were) generally motivated by an ideal of volksdien (service to one’s people -….) for maintenance of ethnic purity’ (1993:84-85; see also the discussion of volkekunde and its links with racism and apartheid in Gordon, 1991). Thirteen years earlier Pauw had similarly drawn attention to the split between Volkekunde, with its ‘organismic’ approach, and social anthropology with its sociological approach (1980:316-7). He did, however, note attempts to bring the cultural and social anthropologists closer together, for example through the efforts of Hammond-Tooke, professor of social anthropology at the University of the Witwatersrand. Pauw refers to Hammond-Tooke when he noted an approach that did not fix the boundaries between people, but saw them as often ‘vague, with many individuals or groups having only a marginal relation to one or more ethnic or cultural units, and with units tending to change, merge or regroup’ (Pauw. 1980:319; Hammond-Tooke, 1970; also see West, 1979).

In their later disciplinary overview for the Annual Review of Anthropology, Gordon and Spiegel noted the strengths as well as the dangers within an oppositional anthropology that saw the South African situation under apartheid as unique: “The strengths include a praiseworthy development of an exposé tradition with roots in liberal scholarship and using ethnography to focus on people made invisible by apartheid”; but also dangerous, ‘particularly when the object of ethnography becomes indictment and challenge only and excludes increasing knowledge and theoretical development’ (1993:89). The same, once again, could be said for sociology.
Eddie Webster (1991) examined the teaching of sociology at the University of the Witwatersrand since 1937. He noted the development of the discipline from a service function, teaching on social pathologies for other departments (such as Social Work), and later, with the introduction of industrial sociology in 1968, for business, to a critical sociology concerned with the operation of capitalism and the state. The areas of 'race' and ethnicity (as well as gender studies) lagged behind, as illustrated by the numbers of papers dealing with these issues presented at the Association of Sociologists of Southern Africa (ASSA) conferences between 1979 and 1988: class, 'race' and gender together were dealt with in about 25 papers (ethnicity is not even mentioned), while education accounted for 42, health for about 36, labour studies 34, and state and politics about 30 (Webster, 1991:72).

Webster noted that while during the 1980s 'the search for relevance has preoccupied the members of ASSA [the progressive sociological association]... Most striking is the absence of courses on ethnic and race relations in departments of sociology underlining the failure of many marxist academics to come to terms adequately with national oppression and racism' (1991:73). In the field of industrial sociology, too, during this period, the dominance of specific kinds of labour process studies led to 'a neglect of non-class workplace relations...' (Webster, 1991:73). I would argue that this is still true in large part, although less so than during the 1970s and early-1980s. Ethnicity makes its appearance in left discourse, but then as something that is acknowledged to be powerfully there, but only because it has displaced, for the moment, class discourses and organisational strength within the situation being studied, a version of false consciousness (see the discussion of such approaches in Segal, 1991). What has not been achieved adequately in the South African context is a synthesis of social identity theory (not necessarily that developed within social psychology) into materialist analysis. Much work remains to be done, and probably will as these issues promise to remain at the centre of political conflict, nation-building efforts, and demands for particularistic recognition in South Africa (see Maré, 1995; 1995a, for discussion of the politics of recognition in post-election South Africa). There have been three large conferences in South Africa since 1993 dealing with the issue of ethnicity and identitarian political claims, the most recent in 1995 on coloured demands in the Western Cape province (see Maré and Wright, 1994, for a discussion of two of the conferences, in Pietermaritzburg and in Grahamstown).

The pervasiveness of apartheid as racial discrimination and oppression, and as ethnic fragmentation, has meant that serious examination of ethnicity has been rare among left intellectuals, although it had not 'virtually disappeared' as suggested by Bekker (1993:3; see, for example, SPP, vol 4, 1983; and the discussion by Gordon and
Spiegel, 1993), in any case warned off by the difficulty (or even imposibility) of finding a necessary relationship between ethnicity (a set of ideas, amongst others, through which we live our lives) and the 'economic base' of society; between an ideology, a way of making sense of the world, and the central relationships that arise from the way in which goods are produced and distributed (for a discussion of this issue in relation to analyses of South African society see, for example, Norval, 1994).

The strength of structural marxism in South Africa during the 1970s and early-1980s, while generating very useful research and analysis, stood in the way of giving ethnicity and 'race' (both as 'race' thinking, as well as racism), and gender a place within materialist analysis of this society. Gordon and Spiegel located the shaping power of the ideas of neo-marxism both internationally and locally:

This genre was endorsed by social anthropology, sociology, and historiography in the 1970s and 1980s because its metropolitan development coincided with a local search for new means to challenge the prevailing liberal wisdoms that apartheid was the result of white attitudes and prejudice. Arguing that apartheid was the result of structural features of local capitalism, neo-Marxist analysis also provided a new emblem of opposition to apartheid (1993:90).

Once the attempt to reduce all other societal relations and actions to an unmediated causal relationship to the economic base, or even the recognition of any such necessary connection, has been abandoned, alternative and fruitful avenues for investigation are opened up. My own separation from the restraints of the prevailing left idiom came through the early work by Laclau (1977, 1977a) and by John Saul (1979) on populism and fascism, and on tribalism, respectively. Simultaneously, strict disciplinary boundaries have to be abandoned. Such an approach informs this thesis.

Several years ago I wrote, in a paper on populism (Maré, 1984), that that investigation ended where social psychology should enter. It was only in 1992 that I could start to combine some of the insights offered by debates within psychological social identity theory with the analysis that owed more to political sociology (especially that within the study of and debates over ideology). The new task, the first ideas of which are contained in this thesis, is to leave the now fairly unproductive field of social psychology and its investigations of identity, and explore what sociology has to offer to the study of identities (a proliferation of identity studies no doubt triggered in part by the theoretical challenges and extreme claims of post-modernism, but even more so by the simultaneous fragmentation and globalisation of the world during the last two decades of the twentieth century) (see, for example, Hall, 1993, for an
overview of the direction). Hall argued that if the 'character of change in late-modernity' is globalisation, it not only draws people into common experiences (mediated by the media and experienced through the spread of capitalism, but also decentres and dislocates, demanding new approaches to identity formation and notions of the individual (1993:277-9). This thesis is situated within these debates, but located in the specific form demanded by local political contestation. Decentring and dislocation, as well as the local impact of globalisation, demand that social scientists here test and, if necessary, adapt theoretical approaches to the question of identity formation and reformation.

The published work on which this thesis is based (especially Maré, 1992) dealt with the 'socially structured content of identity', identified by Campbell (1992:2) as having received 'inadequate attention' from social identity theorists. They had 'tended to focus their research and writing in two areas, namely the process and structure of social identity formation'. Process refers to 'the cognitive mechanisms underlying identity formation'; structure to 'social identity theory's account of the organisation of the self-concept in terms of a loose association of group memberships'; and content to '(a) those particular group memberships available to individuals in socially and historically specific situations, and (b) socially and historically specific characteristics of these group memberships' (Campbell, 1992:2).

Without directly referring to the important work by other social scientists and historians who have argued a similar need to locate analyses of ethnicity within their specific historical contexts, Campbell finds herself within a school of thought that denies the a-historical approach to this phenomenon (see, for example, Maré and Wright, 1994; Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds), 1984; etc).

Within this thesis the case study material on the mobilisation of an ethnic group is located within an historical context, and the growth and decline, as well as the struggles over, ethnic identities, are periodised.

This is an interdisciplinary study, an attempt to amalgamate in a necessary manner the areas of theory and study within the discipline of sociology (and then especially of political sociology), social psychology, political science and history. I did it because it is only possible truly to reach towards an exploration and explanation of social dynamics through crossing the limits of disciplinary boundaries. The study owes much to the areas or disciplines within which I received my own academic training, namely comparative literature; political science; development studies; sociology; and then the insights of social psychology, mediated through joint research with colleagues.
at the University of Natal (Durban). I will refer later to the comparative and theoretical insights offered by recent sociology and sociologists, such as Pierre Bourdieu.

Methodologically I have employed several approaches, all informed by an attempt to understand how subjects are interpellated by the 'hailers' of ethnic mobilisation. These appeals to ethnic identification have been set against the historical background against and within which the calls for recognition and action are made, the structural conditions that shape the appeals and the responses, and the public, and hence observable, actions of those who are the recipients of such appeals. It should be obvious that no single methodological approach was possible. The results of the test of their suitability over time, since my interest in these issues was first stirred, has been the usefulness of the analyses generated, measured against both social understanding and predictive ability. These results have been gratifying.

Most of the material on the mobilising calls made within the Inkatha movement has closely followed discourse analysis, through the examination of speeches, letters, and documents located in my own collection (now the Natal Room at the University of Natal, Durban). These documents are essential in establishing the content of the interpellations directed at an ethnic community. Not only are they heard by an audience directly present at meetings (of which Buthelezi has held hundreds, if not thousands), but, in addition, they have been widely reported. Sitas, in an interesting, if somewhat romantic, analysis and description of 'worker gatherings and performance-genres in Natal', provides an approach that may usefully be applied to Inkatha meetings. He noted the manner in which ‘their [the working class audiences] cultural formations and their sociopolitical histories have precoded a series of rules... that influence how people participate in mass events’ (1992a:97). He wrote that what dominates in these meetings of oral communication is ‘the ritual affirmation of identity, comradeship and defiance... and/or... the discussion, argument and resolution of issues’ (1992a:98). It is especially the former, the ‘ritual affirmation of identity...’, that serves in the use that Buthelezi makes of oral communication, and that therefore makes analysis of his addresses so important. It is worth noting that Sitas, while covering the 1980s, does not refer at all to Buthelezi’s frequent use of oral performances with their own supporting spectacle, even if just in contrast; nor to the rich analysis that is possible of the ‘cultural formations’ and ‘sociopolitical histories’ of those who attend his meetings and respond to his calls. This is regrettably, and oddly, a much neglected field of investigation as it offers a rich range of uses of, and responses to, oral communication. It is an acknowledged gap in my own work as well.
As this study largely focuses on the mobilisation of ethnic identity I use the term 'discourse', 'as a means of describing ideologies that attain something of a life of their own, and as a means of drawing the analysis into questions of symbols, language, and meaning' (Bozoli, 1991:2, and 1991:244, note 7). Bozoli's primary concern, with 'hegemony', 'ideology', and 'consciousness', are also relevant here, but the first and the last less so; 'consciousness' was at issue in a later study (see Campbell et al., 1993).

While millions of the population of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) are illiterate, publicity for Buthelezi's views has not been restricted to a largely sympathetic press (during the main period under review), but in addition received extensive coverage over Radio Zulu, a powerful medium in the region. Buthelezi's awareness of the importance of media in the process of mass mobilisation has been illustrated by his willingness, at certain times even eagerness, to appear on television and radio (nationally and internationally), the various publications that have been issued by Inkatha over the years, the wide distribution of printed copies of his speeches (in both Zulu and English), and the acquisition of the Ilanga newspaper from the Argus group's Natal Newspapers, and even attempts to supplement Radio Zulu with its own radio station in the 1970s (this attempt was firmly rejected by the National Party government). What has, unfortunately, not been possible consistently to examine is the 'show' and display of ethnic mobilisation (use of 'traditional' dress; colours; spectacle; celebrations; etc).

Wetherell and Potter (1992:2) noted that the study of discourse... focuses, above all, on quintessentially psychological activities - activities of justification, rationalization, categorization, attribution, making sense, naming, blaming and identifying. Discourse studies link those activities with collective forms of social action, and thus have the potential to integrate psychological concerns with social analysis (emphasis added).

That potential is tentatively advanced in this study, as it has provided extremely useful approaches in teaching programmes that have been initiated in the inter-disciplinary or cross-disciplinary courses in the Centre for Industrial and Labour Studies at the University of Natal. Such teaching has, for example, drawn on sociology, anthropology, political studies and social psychology in approaching the issue of conflicts between groups (national and ethnic) on the gold mines in South Africa.

Another consideration in the study by Wetherell and Potter also applies to the study of ethnicity and ethnic mobilisation undertaken for this thesis, namely their emphasis on
'how forms of discourse institute, solidify, change, create and reproduce social formations' (1992:3).

The documents have all been examined for consistency, change, method and symbols. Fortunately a very large amount of material reflecting the changing mobilising discourse employed by the Inkatha president chief Mangosuthu G Buthelezi and other leaders, is accessible. While sensitivity had to be shown to the audience Buthelezi or the king (Goodwill Zwelithini), or other leaders, were addressing, and while acknowledging that Buthelezi sometimes departs from the written speeches both in English and in Zulu, the hundreds of speeches and other documents consulted indicate a consistency that allows for generalisation, periodisation, and analysis. Furthermore, the volumes of the transcripts of KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA) Debates (KLADs) served as a further check on the views and manner of presentation of Inkatha. The amount of material available allowed longitudinal study over more than 20 years for this thesis.

Such discourse analysis cannot be undertaken separately from the historical and immediate context within which the appeals have been made. Contextualisation demanded a measure of familiarity with the history of the region, gained largely through secondary sources and discussion with historians of the time period under review and of the region. In addition I consulted material on the social conditions, demography, and other opinions and analysis of the social dynamics of the region during the period 1970 to 1995 (see the bibliography for an indication of available material).

My approach, in large part gained through the years involved in comparative literature study, has always been comparative - for similarities and for contrasts and contradictions that have to be explained. Such comparative approaches have shaped this study as well, especially to the degree that it allowed me to find a definitional approach to ethnicity that facilitates general and internationally relevant comments to be made on the phenomenon, and to confirm an approach that demands the specific examination of the form that each example of ethnic mobilisation takes (see chapter two).

A much more extensive analysis of the mobilising discourse that I have drawn on is possible (see the possibilities as illustrated in Wetherell and Potter's, 1992, examination of the 'language of racism' in New Zealand), and should be undertaken. There are other themes and approaches immediately available in the material that was consulted for this study, but not explored here.
Finally, this is also a work of theory located within an approach that questions the apparently fixed and unchanging presentations of the social world, and examines these versions as, in the final instance, interpretations and constructions of social reality that are always in flux and reconstruction. Such construction and reconstruction does not make them any less 'real' as they come to form the basis of the 'stories' that serve to guide individuals through social interaction. While I remain guided by the critical foundation I received within a marxist paradigm, I was influenced by the more satisfactory approach of such theorists as Ernesto Laclau in his earlier work, a direction that offered fruitful pointers because of my own concern with the mobilising power of ethnicity as ideology.
CHAPTER TWO
ETHNICITY - WHAT IS IT?

Introduction

Ethnicity as explanation, or ethnicity in need of explanation? I will deal mainly with the latter, which will then clarify the status of the former. The term 'ethnicity' is frequently used as though it has a largely unproblematic status. Such a 'common-sense' approach to the notion is not limited to popular use (media, in cultural and fashion descriptions, tourism, etc), but is also to be found in academic discourse. At a conference on ethnicity and violence held at the University of Natal (Pietermaritzburg) in 1992 it was noticeable how many of the participants, despite different conceptualisations, did not feel it necessary to define or discuss their understanding of this central term in their presentations (see Mare and Wright, 1994). However, a survey of the literature makes it clear that there are several fundamentally different approaches to the concept. I will return to some of these below.

If we understand what ethnicity is we can start making sense of why people act in terms of this socially constructed social identity. We have to understand the origins and the maintenance of ethnic identities, the place of identity in everyday life; we have to understand identities to make sense of how they are used in mobilising groups of people to action, and to grasp what intense meaning is sometimes attached to being a member of an ethnic group, sufficient to engage in the most extreme and violent action. It is, especially, the violence associated with ethnicity that has captured media attention internationally.

The novelist and documenter of social and artistic life, John Berger, recently wrote that

If every event which occurred could be given a name, there would be no need for stories. As things are here, life outstrips our vocabulary.
A word is missing so the story has to be told (1991:77).

An ethnic identity can be seen to be a story, not simply a name, which can never fully encompass the complexity of a way of dealing with the present through a sense of identity that is rooted in the past. Maybe the word that is missing, in this story of ethnic identity, is 'progress', a belief that the future opens up new and exciting
possibilities, a better world. Instead ethnic identities call on stories of what has been, what appears to be known, what we have some certainty about in an uncertain world. These stories need not even be told - as Hofmeyr (1993:4-5) noted about the absence of a 'performance life' of certain oral 'historical narratives'. However, people do live with stories of the past:

...many 'traditional' societies foster a non-formal and loosely institutionalised view of the past which is extremely difficult to capture, unwittingly burdened as we are in the academy by a more contemporary, highly institutionalised, text-bound, linear and chronological understanding of history (Hofmeyr, 1993:4).

My concern in this thesis is, however, primarily with a similar 'text-bound', often linear and chronological view of the past in the strategies of mobilisation employed by ethnic entrepreneurs, as distinct from the un-performed stories of the past that are held by individuals in their stories of social life (for a reference to the latter, see Campbell et al, 1993).

Stories, in this sense, whether of the past, of modes of behaviour, of organising deities, or whatever, are no trivial matter. Whether they are 'true' or not is also not immediately at issue - that they are adequate and accepted to be adequate to make sense of events and behaviour is what matters. It is not even asked that they be free of contradiction, either internally or by other stories functioning at other moments or compatible with other people's stories around the same events. Religion is a case in point of such stories that are able to bear the extreme contradictions between themselves and other social identities in the life of any one person or social group.

However, stories also refer to the manner in which people are addressed/interpellated to 'make sense' of the world, and not just the stories we 'already always have' about our own worlds. I will examine this as well, and especially the stories that are told about why people belong together, what makes them different from others, why they are in conflict with others, and what their collective histories are (racialised, ethnic or nationalist). Here we are dealing with those who fabricate, reinforce, redefine and reinvent ethnicities - those who have been called the 'cultural brokers', 'ethnic entrepreneurs' in society (the 'big political-story manufacturers'). Such manufacturers of stories have to be distinguished from the many ways in which socialisation occurs in an un-selfconscious manner, the ways in which people are born into an ethnic world, a world already there, whether that world be large or small. At times, however, this distinction is anything but clear because we do not ever just receive an easily distinguishable story from 'outside' - these stories resonate with agreement, with
adaptation, with our biographies. We are not passive recipients, nor are our worlds shaped ab initio by the dealers in imagined communities (I will return to this point below).

It is in literature that the two approaches frequently overlap. The novelist is both an 'entrepreneur' and a confirmor of what is there; both a manufacturer and also an essential part of the subtle socialisation into identities. Fazil Iskander, in his novel Sandro of Chegem, wishes both to engage in 'Ironic mockery of another people's way of life... the most peaceful form of ethnic prejudice', and 'to reveal, to the best of my abilities, the significance of the epic existence of the little nation' (Iskander, 1993: foreword). A few years after having read this novel for the first time the Abkhazian 'little nation' once again achieved media mention and my notice, even at the tip of Africa, in reports of their struggle for self-determination against Georgian authorities (see, for example, Natal Mercury, 17 Jul 89).

However, ethnicity does not only refer to a common or social identity for people. It is also a term that is used to explain occurrences. As such it is the name that has been attached to many events and general conflict in the recent past in South Africa and in eastern Europe. This short-hand, especially in the press, in statements from some politicians, or in popular conversation, has been of two main kinds. Firstly, it has been welcomed as a descriptive and explanatory term. In this sense events appear to confirm what the users had always suspected or predicted, namely that people are fundamentally grouped ethnically and that such identification serves to explain a range of actions, especially conflict. Ethnicity is then most frequently seen as a primordial identity, which has to be recognised in political structures.

Secondly, the term is used but only to reject it out of hand, which sometimes happened in response to the unthinking attribution of all political, inter-group violence during the 1980s to ethnicity (‘there is no such thing as ethnicity that motivates actions; ‘it is simply white journalists showing their racism; 'it is all the fault of apartheid and will go away with majority rule'). What has been remarkably absent is any regular discussion of what is meant by this term that is used so freely in the media and in public pronouncements both by its critics and its supporters. It is certainly not because there is total agreement on what it means, and not on what we attribute to ethnicity as cause - not in its every-day usage, nor, most certainly, in the academic world.

Ethnicity' and 'ethnic conflict' has become part of our day-to-day 'common-sense' language and thought, much like 'tribalism', 'race', 'the family', 'community', 'the
people', or even 'democracy' - everybody 'knows' what they mean and think when they use the terms to make sense of the world and their place within it, and they imagine that all others use it in the same way. 'Common-sense' usually means that there is little consistency beneath the apparent clarity, and that even contradictory ideas can be held simultaneously. 'Common-sense' frequently refers to that which we have not properly challenged in terms of its validity in the quest to understand our lives or society; often it is simply 'received wisdom', uncritically accepted. 'Commonsense thinking obscures reality', wrote Rick Turner (1980) in his defence of utopian thinking and the need to go beyond what is immediately around us, constantly to challenge and question. There is a lot of common-sense thinking about ethnicity as well, as there is about 'race'. That cannot be afforded. We, as social scientists, have to explore the origins, challenge the accepted, investigate what is valid to people's lives, present alternatives in the reconstruction of South Africa - in Edward Said's evocative phrase, to 'consider... [the stability of the 'victors and rulers'] as a state of emergency' (1994a:26).

The relative absence of clarification is even more astonishing when we consider the context of large-scale killing and destruction within which the term 'ethnicity' so readily functions as an explanatory tool; when we consider the explanatory power that is being attributed to the phenomenon of 'inter-ethnic conflict', in South Africa and in contemporary eastern Europe, as well as in many other parts of the world. To give an extreme recent example: journalist Andrew Roberts set the 'unimaginably war-like' Zulus against the ANC (Natal Witness, 21 Jan 92). The unexplained existence of the 'Zulus', with a range of stirring attributes, served, for this journalist, to explain the violence and to allow him to warn against 'a civil war so brutal that blacks of all tribes would look back to apartheid with nostalgia' (echoing RW Johnson in The Independent on Sunday, 14 Oct 90).

**What is ethnicity?**

If the culture of the nation [in our case of the ethnic group] is only so much wool, then the eyes over which it is pulled must belong to sheep. And so everything disappears, except the possibility of farming (Patrick Wright, 1985:5).

The term 'ethnicity', to refer to the 'character or quality of an ethnic group' (Mann (ed), 1983:114), dates back as recently as 1941 (see Sollors, 1986:23). It is one of several usages in the English language of words that have been derived from the Greek *ethnos*.
('a people'). In other words, it refers to the common character of a group of individuals. So, for example, 'ethnarch' is defined as 'a governor of a people or province' in *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*. The same (1944) edition does not contain the word 'ethnicity'.

An important distinction is maintained in this thesis between 'ethnicity' and 'ethnic identity'. 'Ethnicity' refers to the concept, the abstraction, one of the categorisations 'imposed' by social scientists and theoreticians to make sense of the diversity of social identities that are to be found in social life. 'Ethnic identity', on the other hand, refers to social identities, i.e. identities shared in their basics with others, that are based on stories that are characterised by the definitional attributes isolated through and in the categorisation of ethnicity (see below). Ethnic identities are frequently garbled in their presentation, and are part of multiple identities - they could not be other as it is individuals who are the bearers of ethnic identities and, most frequently, which are expressed in the actions and trivia of everyday life, the rituals of being, and not as self-conscious awareness and considered statement.

To understand the manner in which the concept *ethnicity* is to be used in this thesis it is, therefore, necessary to say what is meant by *ethnic group* - what is that 'character or quality' that such a social group possesses? We also have to have clarity on the sociological use of the terms 'group' and 'category'. It will become clear that it is important to avoid definitional confusion, because that can lead to analytic, policy and strategic confusion. If the 'name' is used, then at least let us use it in a similar way or be aware that we differ. How can policy options or a political approach be discussed if we use the term in an uncritical manner and find that we are not even aware of the different usages and their implications?

By a *category* is meant the labelling of a number of people, or things, 'on the basis of a particular characteristic they share... they do not necessarily attach any particular importance to the common characteristic they share' (Giddens, 1989:275; Mann, ed, 1983:34). A category of people is created by an outside observer and the 'members' of the category may very well have no idea of similarity or awareness that they have been so allocated. For example, we can refer to income, educational or occupational categories. I may even place all people with green eyes in the same category if I should be examining whether eye colour makes certain people more prone to a specific eye disease.

A *group* of people, on the other hand, is aware of and accepts (and may defend) belonging together and being categorised as similar - 'a distinct unit with an overall
social identity' (Giddens, 1989:275). Members of a group accept their inter-relationship, even though they may not all know each other member of the group. Supporters of the same soccer team at a match accept being part of a group, and will frequently act together, even though very few share close bonds of friendship or are even acquainted. They are an 'imagined community' (Anderson, 1983), at least while they watch the game. The distinction drawn between group and category is not maintained so strictly by all theorists referred to. However, it will be clear what is meant when deviation occurs.

If we take the example of a category of green-eyed people given above we might very well find that people so categorised, if commonly oppressed, discriminated against, or treated differently in general, might become a group, acting in concert to defend themselves against others, or to improve their lot. They might become 'green-eye conscious' in response to say eye tests that are routinely done on them before they gain employment. They might even start creating a history that gives credence to their 'groupness'. It is an absurd example (except if we think of some responses to the AIDS epidemic), but some of the attempts to give ethnic consciousness to groups are equally far-fetched and self-conscious, and can be dated with a measure of accuracy, despite the often wild claims by the group for distant points of shared origin.

Why do people belong to groups? There are many reasons, but the most obvious is that humanity evolved socially - the isolated individual is so rare that it becomes newsworthy when such a person is found. From the first bands that came together and remained together for purposes of hunting and protection, through the slow evolution of ever more complex social interaction in which language played a central part, to the multitude of local and global inter-relationships that characterise modern society, humanity has formed groups of various sizes and for different goals and to serve different needs. Families, homesteads, hunting groups, work teams, political parties, religious, feminist, and national groups, proliferate. Sometimes competing for allegiance, sometimes meeting different needs in the same or overlapping membership, sometimes conferring power, and sometimes stripping of power, producing and reproducing, consuming, etc, social groups, more than the individual, characterise society. With each group 'membership' goes a shared, to various degrees, social identity.

Hogg and Abrams wrote that, 'belonging to a group... confers social identity, or a shared/collective representation of who one is and how one should behave' (1988:7). I wish to qualify this claim made by the social psychologists. Belonging to a group may reinforce notions of 'groupness' that are not necessarily 'conferred' by group
belonging. Socialisation into social identities is much more complex than 'confering' through belonging. For example, Stuart Hall (1992:284), in discussing the contribution that sociology has made to our understanding of the 'individual', wrote that:

(Sociology) located the individual in group processes and the collective norms which, it argued, underpin any contract between individual subjects. It therefore developed an alternative [to psychology's approach] account of how individuals are formed subjectively through their membership of, and participation in, wider social relationships; and, conversely, how processes and structures are sustained by the roles which individuals play in them. This 'internalizing' of the outside in the subject, and 'externalizing' of the inside through action in the social world (...), is the primary sociological account of the modern subject, and is encapsulated in the theory of socialization.

This two-way process of identity formation is more useful in capturing the contribution that individual agents make to social identity formation (for a fascinating social anthropological account of socialisations of the self into society, see Cohen, 1994:chapters three and four).

The relevance that Bourdieu might have for theories of social identity lies in his concept of 'habitus' ('system of enduring dispositions', stories created through socialisation) which he illustrates as follows:

the effect of the habitus is that agents who are equipped with it will behave in a certain way in certain circumstances. That being said, this tendency to act in a regular manner which, when its principle is explicitly constituted, can act as the basis of a forecast (the specialized equivalent of the practical anticipations of ordinary experience), is not based on an explicit rule or law. This means that the modes of behaviour created by the habitus do not have the fine regularity of the modes of behaviour deduced from a legislative principle: the habitus goes hand in glove with vagueness and indeterminacy. As a generative spontaneity which asserts itself in an improvised confrontation with ever-renewed situations, it obeys a practical logic, that of vagueness, of the more-or-less, which defines one's ordinary relation to the world (1990:77-78, emphasis original).
The range of self-conscious choices about action is not limitless. As Calhoun explained it, 'it was crucial to grasp. Bordieu argued, that agents did not generally adopt the theoretical attitude of seeing action as a choice among all objective possibilities; they usually saw only one or a few possibilities' (1993:74). Calhoun continued:

It was necessary [for Bordieu] that a theory of practice give a good account of the limits of awareness involved in lived experience, including both misrecognition and nonrecognition, as well as show the kind of genuine knowledge which was involved, often nondiscursively, in practice (1993:74-75).

Paul Connerton, in his book on the social remembering of societies, noted one way in which the options of social agents are limited, when he wrote that '(m)any forms of habitual skilled remembering illustrate a keeping of the past in mind that, without ever averting to its historical origin, nevertheless re-enacts the past in our present conduct' (1989:72). We carry the past with us, in the memories of behaviour (our own and that expected of others) (see Hofmeyr, 1993).

The more risky the situation, the more habitus gives way to 'codified ritual': Codification minimizes ambiguity and vagueness, in particular in interactions. It is particularly indispensable and just efficient in situations in which the risks of collision, conflict and accident, hazard and chance (a word which, as Cournot used to say, designates the encounter between two independent causal series), are particularly important. The encounter between two very distant groups is the encounter between two independent causal series. Between people of the same group, equipped with the same habitus, and thus spontaneously orchestrated, everything goes without saying, even conflicts; they can be understood without people having to spell things out, and so on (Bourdieu, 1990:80).

Bourdieu says that what is lost in highly codified societies is a 'certain charm'. In my argument this may indicate another way to refer to the distinction between politicised/mobilised identities is the loss of 'charm', of spontaneity, of habitus that characterise social identities:

Codification makes things simple, clear communicable; it makes possible controlled consensus on meaning, a homologuein: you are sure of giving the same sense to the words. This is the definition of the linguistic code according to Saussure: that which enables the emitter and the receiver to associate the same word with the same
sense and the same sense with the same sound (Bourdieu, 1990:82-83).

I would argue that the task, and the measure of success, of the mobiliser of identities (such as ethnicity) is the extent to which 'controlled consensus' has been achieved, the extent to which external codification of what is a range of 'biographical' variants of a social identity has taken place through interpellation.

I know that I have taken an aspect of Bourdieu's approach to social action by agents, as well as the notions of habitus and codification, into areas where he does not use them himself. However, I would argue that such an extension, as brief as it is here, is legitimate and adds to an understanding of social identity theory and social action.

Hogg and Abrams noted that 'while a society is made up of individuals, it is patterned into relatively distinct groups and categories, and people's views, opinions, and practices are acquired from those groups to which they belong'. Furthermore, individuals with their unique life experiences 'potentially have a repertoire of many different identities to draw upon' (1988:19, emphasis added). The stories we draw on to shape our actions and perceptions are not only those of ethnicity. In fact, ethnicity need not necessarily be one of the several identities in that 'repertoire'. I would, however, qualify the 'rational choice' approach of Hogg and Abrams implied by the phrase 'repertoire of many different identities to draw upon', and rather associate myself with Calhoun's presentation of the limitations that Bourdieu places on such choice, without going into further detail on these restrictions here.

These authors (Hogg and Abrams) argued, within an approach known as social identity theory (focusing primarily on inter-group theory), or social categorisation theory (with a focus on intra-group theory) (see Campbell, 1992:15, also for other differences between the two approaches), that the process of categorisation (referred to above) 'simplifies perception', it structures infinite variety into manageable proportions. Similarities are stressed within categories (or groups) while differences with other categories/groups are accentuated. Accentuation within the categorization process is selective, leading to stereotypic perceptions; leading, in other words, to 'the perception or judgement of all members of a social category or group as sharing some characteristics which distinguish them from others' (Hogg and Abrams, 1988:20; Giddens, 1989:247-8). Robert Miles (1989:70) uses the term 'signification' to refer to the similar process of 'selection: from an available range of objects, features and processes, only certain ones are chosen to convey additional meanings'. Miles added that '(s)ignification is therefore a central moment in the process of representation, that
is, the process of depicting the social world and social processes, of creating a sense of how things "really are" (1989:70). Stereotypical thinking is usually 'rigid and ill-informed', similar to the term 'common-sense' that I used earlier, and demands the same warning against its effect of 'obscuring reality'.

A process that clarifies group boundaries and strengthens social identities is that of social comparison, with a 'tendency to maximize intergroup distinctiveness - to differentiate between the groups as much as possible on as many dimensions as possible... especially on those dimensions which reflect favourably upon ingroup' (Hogg and Abrams, 1988:23). I would add that the 'tendency to maximize' should be treated as just that, a tendency, and that we should also acknowledge and examine the dissolution of groups, and the porous and flexible boundaries that exist, especially when social identities exist outside of their mobilised form. Reference to the 'tendency to maximize... distinctiveness' might take our attention away from the fluidity of identity formation, to the continuous process that is involved (more of which below).

One of the most obvious ways of signifying distinctiveness lies in dress and ornamentation - whether this be the colourful dress of many religious sects, the rebellious extremes of punk or other youth trends, or the khaki of the Afrikaner Weerstands beweging (AWB). Inkatha and especially, but not exclusively, its leadership, draws heavily on dress to signify group boundaries, group cohesion, and historical continuity and social memory. At events such as tzimbitzo (gatherings of the nation) and Shaka Day celebrations Buthelezi, the king, amakhosi (the chiefs), and many others would appear in 'traditional dress'. More recently (1995) such 'Zulu dress' has also been worn in the KwaZulu-Natal provincial parliament. The ANC and other groups contesting Inkatha's mobilisation have also, at times, displayed their acceptance, and contestation, of Zuluness in this manner.

Another point from social identity theory that is of relevance to my discussion of ethnicity, and that links to the idea of a 'repertoire of identities' to 'call up' (noting, however, the qualification introduced above) is the distinction that Hogg and Abrams make between the social and the personal dimensions of an individual's self-concept (see figure below).
Hogg and Abrams argue that self-concept is not experienced as an entirety, but as 'relatively discrete self-images' which are dependent on "context". Which of these 'self-images' or 'identifications' are held to be appropriate depends on time, place, circumstance - to discuss social identities we are discussing history and the social context, as well as self-concept ('mother', in common with other mothers, but also 'mother of this child', the biographical dimension). It is, therefore, clear how the self is both 'enduring and stable', and at the same time changing as responses to outside factors are demanded (and the identity is itself a product of 'the outside'). We are frequently surprised by the contradictory, or unexpected, roles that people can assume. Separation through time and context can allow these to 'co-exist', usually unproblematically; an articulating principle can bring together what would otherwise be incompatible, such as 'God's will'.

The social identification of 'Zuluness', for example, does not determine a constant set of responses and interpretations from the same individual (nor, I may add, does it include the same set of self-descriptions for each and every member of the Zulu ethnic group). At times, however, this 'Zuluness' becomes the dominant identity as its relevance to a range of additional, and previously possibly excluded, situations is argued ideologically. It may then serve not only to 'confer social identity... who one is and how one should behave' (Hogg and Abrams, 1988) during moments of affirmation of a cultural identity, but be extended to political behaviour and even affiliations in the workplace and other such 'inappropriate' overlaps (see chapter four).
The most fundamental reason for social life has always been, and still is, production for material existence - people have to work in groups in order to survive, whether it be in hunting groups, cattle herding, in agriculture, in the complex labour processes demanded of assembly lines, or the information industry. However, while many other reasons for social groupings relate directly to the way in which society is structured around production (in our case the system of capitalism), there are motivations, needs, and social units that are only obliquely connected or maybe only given a specific 'ideal' form by the economic relationships of society (such as 'the family'). The relationship between a range of social interactions and the need for productive cooperation between people to ensure the survival of all was easier to determine in less complex, because more precarious, societies. There was less distance between rites and rituals and ensuring that life continued, between cultural practices and the survival of the group.

I do not, however, wish to argue for an unstructured multiplicity of identities, a grab-bag of stories. These identities are made available in specific configurations under capitalism, as they are under any other major mode of production, such as feudalism or socialism, and their specific relationships to the dominant structuring relations within any society need to be examined.

In modern society those relationships, when they exist, are often mediated - there is a bigger space that lies, even if sometimes only apparently, outside of production, beyond the clearly defined area of 'work', of the economy. We even have a clear spatial distance, in most instances, between work and living quarters, between production and reproduction, or, rather, between what is accepted as 'work' and 'home' (the social construction of what is 'work' becomes especially clear when we examine domestic labour and what 'housewives' do).

Some additional important reasons for group formation are: to struggle against structurally determined inequalities in society. The most important here would be the example of trade unions: organised groups with membership, fees, meetings and constitutions, formed to advance the interests of workers in relation to their employers. Revolutionary movements, organised to overthrow the experienced oppression or exploitation by an illegitimate regime, would also fall into this category. Social movements characterise the contemporary world, and may be defined as 'a collective attempt to further a common interest, or secure a common goal, through collective action outside the sphere of established institutions' (Giddens, 1989:624).
In addition, groups may form around the attribution of certain characteristics to perceived physical/biological differences - for example, in response to sexism (where gender is presented as showing 'different qualities inherent in women and men' and where these 'supposed differences explain and justify the differential and inferior treatment of women' (Miles, 1989:88)). The women's movement may also be seen as a social movement generally. Racism would be another case, where, on the basis of some visible (somatic) characteristics, the people so identified are 'attributed with additional, negatively evaluated characteristics...' (Miles, 1989:79). The attribution need not lead to group formation, but may well do so if a 'race consciousness' develops. In the former example, feminism also reflects group formation following on negative characterisation of women (sexism).

Groups may form for reasons of social psychological (and 'spiritual'), rather than physical and economic, 'security' - achieved through the 'certainties' of religious faith, through 'belonging' to a family, or nation, or ethnic group. Patrick Wright quotes Sartre on 'being French', on shaping and sharing the 'values' of that society: 'Belonging' is to renew a tacit social contract with all members of that society. At one stroke the vague contingency of our existence vanishes and gives way to the necessity of an existence by right' (Wright, 1985:91). The sociologist Emile Durkheim spoke of the 'moral reawakening' of the individual in the group, which 'cannot be achieved except by the means of reunions, assemblies and meetings where the individuals, being closely united with one another, reaffirm in common their common sentiments...' (quoted Moodie, 1980:18). Connerton (1989:72), too, noted that 'we preserve versions of the past by representing it to ourselves in words and images. Commemorative ceremonies are pre-eminent instances of this. They keep the past in mind by a depictive representation of past events'.

Karl Marx stressed the social aspect of existence, beyond the obvious social interactions with nature for purposes of survival:

Activity and enjoyment are social both in their content and in their mode of existence; they are social activity and they are social enjoyment... The human significance of nature is only available to social man (sic): for only to social man is nature available as a bond with other men, as the basis of his own existence for others and theirs for him, and as the vital element in human reality... (1844); and later (in 1857-58) he rejects the notion of *individuals* producing in isolation as something as absurd as the development of language would be without social interaction:
Man (sic) is in the most literal sense of the word a zoon politikon, not only a social animal, but an animal which can develop into an individual only in society (both quotations from McLellan, 1977:90 and 346).

What are the characteristics of an ethnic group that one belongs to? The most important are those of cultural affinity (language, dress, rituals, values, and so on); a sense of common historical origin, a unique ‘past’ (whether it be from common ancestors, under a common ruler, from the same territory, etc); and that the ethnic identity is different from those of other groups (whether these ‘others’ feel that their identities are important, or even whether they exist or not - the ‘Endurskies’ in Fazil Iskander’s novel ‘are the mystery of ethnic prejudice’, (1993:vii): The Abkhazlans have a very complicated attitude towards the Endurskies [we are told by old Khabug’s mule]. The main thing is that no one knows how they got to Abkhazia, but everyone is sure they’re here to gradually destroy the Abkhazlans (1993:215).

In other words, an ethnic group can only be a group amongst other people who do not belong, and depends for its existence on the existence of other groupings. An ethnic group is distinct from other groups, but does not imply a necessarily antagonistic relationship. I will take each of these three characteristics in turn.

**Cultural distinctiveness**

Small groups can rely on the knowledge of all individual members for their solidarity. That is not the case with large groups - here the ‘community’, the sense of those who belong, is ‘imagined’, in the words of Benedict Anderson (1983). It is not possible to know all other members of what is felt to be a nation. And yet individual members feel a social affinity with this community of personal strangers. The same holds for ethnicity.

What becomes important then are certain symbols of that community, aspects that make it visible, that are felt to be obvious, ‘common-sense’ signs that show that people belong together with those who are in every other way strangers, and that continually reinforce that sense of belonging together. The symbols for that bond are most commonly cultural aspects of life: the language in which we express ourselves, the religion we belong to, the dress that we associate with our cultural history, the festivals, and even the values that are associated, or that we associate with the group - such as French passion, German precision, Zulu military prowess. It is on these
similarities, especially that of a common language, that assumptions of sameness beyond the immediate symbols are based.

In addition some physical characteristics may also play a part, such as was found with some Puerto Rican youth in America, where 'the people who want to be white' are despised (see Bourgois, 1993:29; similar examples are to be found in South Africa); or with present self-definitions of some Afrikaners or of Boere in South Africa, where skin colour serves as a cultural symbol, as it did with the mobilisation of Afrikaner ethnicity earlier in the century.

In an article dealing with the notion of ethnicity in the Godfather book and films, Thomas Ferraro noted that the rhetoric of solidarity works to organize (in his case the Corleone syndicate) because of its hold over the imaginations and passions of leaders and those in the common ranks alike... (E)thnic symbols function in lieu of formal structures precisely because of their trans-utilitarian, emotional appeal (1989:184, emphasis original).

No matter its origin, the emotional appeal stresses security and familiarity (and even 'family'). These people draw together into the ethnic group despite the frequent absence of other expected similarities, and despite other solidarities (such as class or gender). The cultural symbols form the 'symbolic apparatus' (Abner Cohen's term - see, for example, Cohen, 1981) of ethnicity.

These symbols of community can be added to, invented and reinterpreted over time. Dunbar Moodie wrote, for example, that the notion of 'culture' changed as the Afrikaner identity took form - it 'shifted from emphasis on the creative arts to a more technical and ethnic sense that limited "culture" to the civil-religious conception of traditional forms of Afrikaner life' (1980:107). 'Invention of tradition', too, plays an important part seeking 'to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past' (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1984:1). Below I will deal with the central notion of 'the past'.

It is necessary to say a bit more about the use of the concept culture at this point - without, however, moving unnecessarily far into an area that is notoriously slippery. The way in which I use it here owes much to the discussion by Robert Thornton (1988). Thornton wrote that 'culture is the information which humans are not born with but which they need in order to interact with each other in social life'. It is a changing resource for people, but it also changes in the manner in which we think
about it (see, for example, Raymond Williams' discussion (1976)). This resource is used (although there is most often not such a self-conscious attitude to culture as this verb might imply) by people 'to make statements to each other and about themselves. One such statement, perhaps the most significant for our understanding of the concept, is the statement about identity and group membership'. Culture creates 'the boundaries of class, ethnicity (....), race, gender, neighbourhood, generation and territory within which we all live' (Thornton, 1988:26-27). We construct meaning through culture - for example through using symbols to draw the boundaries around the ethnic group.

Important to an analytical approach to ethnicity is Thornton's reminder that an understanding of culture is more than 'a knowledge of differences, but rather an understanding of how and why differences in language, thought, use of materials and behaviour have come about' (1988:25). It demands an historical examination, as do all the aspects of ethnic group formation.

Are ethnic groups then no more than cultural groups? No, although cultural organisations can serve to reinforce an ethnic identity this is not sufficient to define ethnicity. We could invert the terms and make the statement that cultural groups do not equal ethnic groups. We can speak of workers' culture and a business culture, without in any way implying an ethnic identity. Culture serves to define boundaries, as Thornton (1988) argues, but there are only certain boundaries which we call ethnic.

The definition of ethnicity cannot be based only on references to culture.

Certainly organisations for the advancement of language rights, or to promote cultural festivals, in many cases, play an important part in giving coherence to an ethnic group. Cultural symbols may be legitimated as 'traditional', as that which we have always possessed; cultural events may be perceived to be that which we have always celebrated - whether they in fact originated at some distant beginning or are simply believed to have done so. They form part of our social memory. Cultural 'tradition' may be much wider than found within ethnic groups (such as 'Western culture') and does not, on the other hand, capture the full range of what is drawn from the past to serve the present in ethnic mobilisation. That past, in itself and as a catalogue of uniqueness, also serves the ethnic project.
The presence of the past

Ethnicity is characterised by a sense of history and origin that gives coherence and legitimacy to the present existence of the group - 'we have always been, therefore we should be now'. This sense of history is more accurately captured by the term 'the past' - it is backward looking, seeking continuity, for a confirmation of the present. I will call the specific way in which history is used to confirm the ethnic group 'the past'. It is not to imply that there is a neutral history that is somehow the truth, whereas this usage is false. 'The past' does, however, serve in a specific way to self-consciously bind the ethnic group. The distinction between history and 'the past' is important for strategies that might be devised and attempted to counter the excesses of ethnic mobilisation (see chapter 5). Anthony Smith argued that, in fact, what distinguishes an ethnic from any other kind of social grouping is the rationale that sustains the sense of group belonging and group uniqueness, and which links successive generations of its members. That rationale is to be found in the specific history of the group, and, above all, in its myths of group origins and group liberation (1981:65).

'The past' cannot be chronologically separated from the present in this use made of history - it is not simply thought of as 'history', as a set of events that 'exist', that have already happened, but as experienced here and now, as part of a present identity, as a present ideology, that through which we live and experience our every-day lives. It is part of the story with which we make sense of day-to-day living, part of 'the information which humans are not born with but which they need in order to interact with each other in social life', as Thornton argued (1988:24).

'The past', or rather a specific past, unique to that ethnic identity, is needed for several reasons. First, because it legitimates, through continuity, the ethnic group (as it does with nation). As Inkatha president Mangosuthu Buthelezi said in 1988, 'we have the tremendous advantage of being a product of history itself - by implication others in South Africa do not have this advantage and have to invent their traditions, or live outside of history, or, at best, they are products of distinctively separate histories. Through this superficially trite statement he is also saying that there is a 'we' because of that history (BS, 24 Sep 88:1). Buthelezi is using history here as 'the past', and not in the more accepted sense, of events that have occurred. His claims illustrate the point made by Smith (1981:65) that 'the more striking and well-known these myths of group formation and group deliverance, the greater the chances for the ethnic group to survive and endure...'. The converse also holds (I will return to the specific claims made on behalf of 'Zulus' in chapter four).
Dunbar Moodie went so far as to describe the Afrikaners' sense of 'their' history as a 'sacred' text (at least in one very powerful interpretation of that past). As example he quotes (in translation, 1980:11) a review of the Ossewa Gedenkboek (ox wagon commemoration book) that appeared in 1940 in the Cape newspaper Die Burger. The Gedenkboek was issued in 1940 in connection with the 1938 centenary celebration of the Great Trek, an historical event that was used to familiarise hundreds of thousands of Afrikaners with the myth of origin, a shared sense of groupness that was essential to political mobilisation:

'In all reverence, I would call it the New Testament of Afrikanerdom. Again with the greatest reverence I would declare that it deserves a place on the household altar beside the family Bible. For if the Bible shaped the Afrikaner People, then the Gedenkboek reveals that product in its deepest being...'

Second, a specific sense of the past serves, as does culture, to draw the boundaries of the ethnic group - it serves as a 'template of exclusion and inclusion' (a phrase that I have borrowed from colleague, professor John Wright). Individuals have to accept the dominant version of the past presented in the discourse of mobilisation to be part of the ethnic group; and, on the other hand, those who do not share the same history, or even the same version of a similar history, are excluded or exclude themselves. It is also possible to be a traitor to your ethnic past - the past demands loyalty and commitment.

Once more to turn to the Afrikaner ethnic identity for illustration, Moodie summarises it as follows:

... according to their creation story, Afrikaners were Calvinists of Western European origin and a nation in their own right before the arrival of the English.

The subsequent history of this people, as interpreted by the civil religion [the set of symbols legitimating uniqueness and state power], centers on the Great Trek. The latter forms the national epic-formal proof of God's election of the Afrikaner people and His special destiny for them (1980:2-3).

This 'chosen people' notion of Afrikaner ethnic identity raises an interesting issue with regard to the differences between religious social identities and ethnicity. The Christian religion sets out to win 'unbelievers', to gain converts. On the other hand ethnicity is not usually proselytising - 'the past' has defined who belongs and by its
very nature cannot be presented as changeable (in practise, of course, it is open to vast reinterpretation and invention). 'The past' excludes, by definition, all those who do not share it. It is not future oriented with a heaven to win, but is shaped around a past to protect and to stay true to. In the case of the Afrikaners religious events have become part of 'the past', such as the 'battle of Blood River', where God ensured the survival of the Trekboere against overwhelming odds thanks to a covenant, and the notion of the 'chosen people' within a dark and barbaric continent. For a people with such a claim to Christian faith and a destiny, the missionary aspect of Christianity could not be neglected but, at the same time, it could not be allowed to dilute the ethnic group boundaries - especially that of skin colour. The solution was to create separate churches ('daughter' churches) for those who could become Christians, but not Afrikaners.

By way of contrast, Judaism marries ethnicity and a non-proselytising religion. It is not a smooth process though. In South Africa, for example, the central role of religion to mould the ethnic coherence had to struggle against the faultline of class. Large-scale immigration of Jews occurred between 1880 and 1914 - more than half of the immigrants were Lithuanians aligned either to the labour movement (one of the best known being SA Communist Party leader and subsequently, until his death, minister of housing, Joe Slovo) or the political movement for a Jewish state (Childester, 1992:176). The Jewish 'community' was marked by extremes of poverty and of wealth (the latter concentrated in mine ownership). After the Anglo-Boer war the Jewish Board of Deputies was formed with the specific task of addressing 'the problem of community formation'. However, this middle-class organisation, 'by suppressing elements of its immigrant heritage', could define the 'mainstream Jewish community... as white, English-speaking, middle-class, urban, and upwardly mobile' (Childester, 1992:178). While there was an alternative labour oriented, Yiddish-speaking definition, outsiders, through anti-Semitism, forced, or at least contributed to a common definition of the 'Jewish community'.

Third, 'the past' enables action, in that it provides a sense of efficacy and of precedents - in discourse it would be expressed in the form 'Look at what we have achieved in the past, look at the glory of past moments. Let us repeat them'. It enables action because it both justifies present action and informs how it should be done based on precedents. We can say that this sense of the past resonates most powerfully with individuals who need the security of a yesterday, of a sense of continuity - even if that yesterday has been invented. This security may also be linked to the socialising function of the past, conveying ways of accepted behaviour, both to employ or to strive for, with various demon responsible for the loss of those ways, the loss of 'the past'.
An extremely conservative use of the past potentially lies in this element of ethnic mobilisation. "The past" is that which is hankered after, as providing a romanticised model for a static present. If the present into which people are born and socialised is one in which "the past" features strongly, in a specific version that borders on nostalgia, then future- or change-oriented events and programmes are read as threatening in the extreme. The close link between a re-identification as Afrikaner or Boer and resistance to transformation or reform in the early-1990s South Africa is an example, albeit extreme and obvious.

Ethnicity as a backward looking social and group identity can be illustrated with reference to John Berger’s discussion of the ‘much-proclaimed’ conservatism of the peasantry (1988:204-5). Berger argues that peasants live within a culture of survival (a point that is stressed by John Wright, drawing on Leroy Vall’s work, when he discusses the growth of ethnic sentiments during times of crisis (Wright, 1991)), as against a culture of progress. The former sees the future as ‘a sequence of repeated acts for survival’, whereas the latter sees the future widening into extended opportunities. Berger offers us this diagrammatic presentation (1988:205):

![Diagram](image)

They are mirror images.

David Harvey (1992:359) ends his discussion of the condition of post-modernity by drawing attention to a similar point on time perspective and arguing for ‘becoming rather than being’, through quoting Poggioli (1968):

'In the consciousness of the classical epoch, it is not the present that brings the past into culmination, but the past that culminates in the present, and the present is in turn understood as a new triumph of ancient and eternal values, as a return to the principle of the true and the just, as a restoration or re-birth of those principles. But for the moderns, the present is valid only by virtue of the potentialities of the future, as the matrix of the future, insofar as it is the forge of history in continued metamorphosis, seen as a permanent spiritual revolution' (emphasis added).
Berger describes the peasantry as 'a class of survivors', involved in an 'economy within an economy', where the 'political and social systems offered them the minimum of protection. For this they had to look to themselves - within the village community and the extended family' (1988:196-7, emphasis added). And so the ethnic group also claims to offer 'protection' (literally in some cases); security; a 'past' that justifies, that offers glorious deeds (and the potential of repeating them); a 'past' that is distinguishable from that of others; and the trappings that allow that distinction (whether these be cultural weapons or the blessings of a racist god in the Church of the Creator) (for a fuller discussion, see Hayes and Mare, 1992).

Fourth, 'the past' (and the sanctity of 'tradition', which is another expression of the same notion) may legitimate present authority (either of institutions, gender, age, social practices or of the status of individuals). 'The past' is used as justification for selecting specific cultural practices, certain relationships, giving them the sanctity of 'tradition', and suppressing others through ignoring them. The Zulu case is illustrative here (and I will return to that), but it is far from unique in the legitimation of authority that occurs within its contemporary expression. Importantly, 'tradition' and with that 'the past' has served and still serves regularly to exclude comment on and 'speaking for' those whose 'past' or 'tradition' you do not share (see, for example, the debate within the pages of the journal Agenda, such as Agenda, 1991; Funani, 1992; Fouche, 1993; Gouws, 1993; Hassim and Walker, 1992; Kemp, 1993; Sunde and Bozalek, 1993; Campbell, 1993; Meintjes, 1993).

It needs to be stressed that the domination bestowed, and attempts to give such domination authority, through 'the past', need not rest within a single person. It may be of men over women, such as briefly discussed by Terence Ranger (1984) - the colonial printed records reflected 'traditional' gender roles as 'derived from male informants', determined by men's fears of changing power relations under colonial administration. Men decided which relationships had to be preserved, which were 'traditional'.

Leroy Vall notes, in the introduction to a book of essays on 'tribalism' in southern Africa, that ethnic ideologies helped, in an industrialising society, 'to provide the control necessary to minimize migrants' natural anxieties about what occurred at home'. Chiefs, so important to colonial indirect rule, also served to watch over the world left behind by those forced to enter capitalist production:

It was they who brought into daily practice those 'rediscovered traditions' which emphasized control in the name of 'custom'... The good chief was a proxy who protected the interests of the migrant
workers and, for that, they were ready - if not eager - to reward him materially (Vall, 1989:15).

It was migrant men who most strongly supported ethnic ideologies in these early days of capitalist penetration in Africa - including, importantly, the 'traditional' role of the chiefs and the position of women (both, ironically, 'traditions' interpreted and frozen by colonial administrators).

Cherryl Walker (1990) argued that, for various reasons, early migration in southern Africa was 'largely gender-specific'. Women as the primary producers in the rural homestead 'allowed' the export of male labour, and also allowed the exploitation of the 'single' male migrant by mining capital (see also Guy, 1990). Rather than having to pay a wage that would allow the survival of an urbanised family, the mine owners argued that the families' subsistence needs were catered for on tribal land through the labour, essentially, of women. For a range of (different) reasons it benefited husbands, chiefs, the state and capitalists, all men, to ensure that women remained on the land during the early period of capitalist development in southern Africa. The alliance 'based on very different objectives... nevertheless threaded through with a unifying presumption of male power over women' (Walker, 1990:180), 'Native opinion', on which state legislation was based, 'amounted to male opinion'.

Migrant workers, interviewed in the Dube hostel during the violence in the Transvaal in 1991 that centrally involved these workers against other permanent township dwellers, expressed themselves in the following way, calling on the past to justify supposedly ethnic characteristics:

'We can go to Natal to see our wives. This thing of being away from your wife doesn't kill any man.'

Asked if it wasn't normal for husbands and wives to live together, another man says: 'No. That is true on the side of the white people. They do have such a feeling but on the part of black Zulu people the husband can be away for five years. They can come back and the wife is still at home looking after the children and there is no quarrel.'

Another man speaks up: 'This comes from our great-great-grandfathers. They used to come to the mines and left their families in Natal - we are not prepared to change what our forefathers were doing' (Weekly Mail, 30 May 91).
So historical facts relating to the penetration of capitalism in the nineteenth century, and the establishment of the highly repressive and exploitative migrant labour system, have become the ethnic 'past' in the last decade of the twentieth century.

In a study based on these interviews Lauren Segal noted that the male migrants perceive the hostels, and their urban life, as partial - "we are here to work"; "we know that we are here temporarily because our homes are in Natal" (Segal, 1991:37). Their call on the past to justify absence from wives and girlfriends served to make sense of an economic necessity.

Afrikaner women were taken up into ethnic mobilisation during the first half of the twentieth century in a particular role, as 'volksmoeders' (mothers of the nation). This notion served as 'role model for Afrikaner women'; a 'deliberately constructed ideal, the work of male cultural entrepreneurs who deliberately promoted a set of images surrounding women... (centering) mainly on their nurturing and home-making roles'. However, Elsabe Brink (1990) pointed out that this notion was also cultivated by, especially, middle-class women. Amongst those younger Afrikaner women who were proletarianised in this period there was an alternative mobilisation (into trade unions) that did, however, still take account of Afrikaner ethnic symbols and identity, but articulated these within a working class mobilisation. It became 'a contested idea', laying claim 'to the common Afrikaner cultural heritage', such as during the 1938 centenary celebrations of the Great Trek. In the Garment Workers' Union, however, the Afrikaner women workers 'linked the struggles of the Voortrekkers with their own struggles in an industrial environment' (Brink, 1990:289).

Women were not always relegated to an inferior position within Afrikaner ethnic mobilisation, although the exceptions may say something about class differences within the ethnic group. A somewhat different focus on the role of middle-class Afrikaner women as 'cultural brokers' (rather than the men who were predominantly identified by Brink), sees a more active role for them in a small Karoo town, Cradock, in the fields of language and religion. Butler (1989) argued that these women, operating through the Afrikaanse Christelike Vroue Vereniging, were instrumental in shaping an Afrikaner ethnic identity during the first half of the twentieth century, that could be distinguished from the political mobilisation of that identity:

We are dealing here with a society in which women were playing the role of culture brokers, incidentally creating an ethnic self-consciousness and policing a social boundary (Butler, 1989:73).
A case where an ethnic identity, based on certain traditions, can serve to reverse the trend towards male domination, and where women played an active and creative role, was offered by David Webster in his study of the Thonga in the Maputaland area of Natal (1991). Here males, having to fend within a world of migrant labour, adopt a ‘Zulu’ ethnic identity in order to benefit from the positive perception that frequently exist with white employers of the Zulu ethnic group (stereotypical characteristics such as masculinity, strength, militarism and reliability are held to apply, explaining why Zulu-speaking migrants were, and still are, deemed by employers to be ideally suited to be night guards). Women, on the other hand, have a more favourable status within Thonga society than they would have in Zulu ethnicity and, hence, adhere to such an identity. Within this identity ‘a woman has a great degree of independence - her mind and political allegiance are her own’; certain kin positions ‘confer enhanced status on women’; women play a significant role within ‘family councils’; younger women have greater freedom from the ‘highly elaborate’ rules of respect towards in-laws and ‘status superiors’; and women had a right of divorce under certain circumstances in which the husband failed her (Webster, 1991:257-9).

Women are the bearers of the Thonga ethnic identity, continuing to speak Tsonga, for example. As Webster commented:

The paradox is that migrancy (and its attendant concept of Zuluness) brings in the money without which no family could survive, but the price is female subordination. In contrast, the Thonga idiom speaks of women’s defiance, independence and emancipation (1991:268).

Here is a clear case where ethnic social identities can differ even between brother and sister, reminding us forcibly that social identities are held by individuals, allowing biography (in this case of gender) to shape the social identity in a meaningful way. In the Thonga case the dominant group awareness(es) lie outside ethnic group formation and allows the society to continue, even though the contrasting male and female ethnic identities may introduce tensions - or, as Webster wrote, ‘ethnicity is a metaphor for the regional and domestic struggles being contested between men and women’ (1991:267). This case, with the similarities of the migrant labour context that it shares with that studied by Segal within the hostels (above), provides an interesting contrast in gender perceptions and illustrates well the flexibility of ethnic identities and the process of creation and maintenance of such identities.

The contributions in Hobsbawm and Ranger’s Invention of Tradition (1984), a phrase that must vie with ‘imagined communities’ for frequency of use within the social sciences, illustrate the variety of uses of a past within specific contexts. When the
situation has demanded, groups have been willing to accept an imposed tradition, or invent their own traditions. Hobsbawm and Ranger agree that since the industrial revolution these invented traditions (to a large extent what I have referred to as the need for a 'past' within ethnic group formation) have served to 'establish or symbolize social cohesion...'; to 'establish or legitimate social institutions [and organisations], status or relations of authority [or leadership]; and to 'socialize, inculcate beliefs, value systems and conventions of behaviour' (1984:9). Whether 'true' or 'invented', the past serves similar functions in ethnicity.

For social relations of survival, which include not only the material well-being or even life of individuals and groups, a sense of 'the past' (even when invented) is most potent in the ways suggested above. Is it any wonder then that history should play such an important part in any ethnic mobilisation and identity formation. What is included as relevant within 'the past', whether it contains some agreed-upon 'factual' history or whether it is clearly created, and whether it is of fairly short duration or not, does not concern me at this stage. Its potency lies exactly in the apparent 'lawlessness' of modern society where ethnic identities, as group identities, as well as many others (family, religion, etc) serve to give meaning through stressing community, through stressing continuity, through stressing a 'genesis' - a point of origin, and the further back the more potent. David Harvey, in his stimulating book on the 'condition of post-modernity' (1992), commented:

The greater the ephemerality [of the post-modern world], the more pressing the need to discover or manufacture some kind of eternal truth that might lie therein. The religious revival that has become much stronger since the late sixties, and the search for authenticity and authority in politics (with all its accoutrements of nationalism and localism...) are cases in point. The revival of interest in basic institutions (such as the family and community), and the search for historical roots are all signs of a search for more secure moorings and longer-lasting values in a shifting world (1992:292; also see Hayes and Maré, 1992; and the discussion of decentring by Hall, 1992:285-91).

It is in this area that the potentially conservative nature of all ethnic identities lies. A romanticised past may be all that allows some measure of self-worth, of dignity, in a present that is characterised by loss, poverty, degradation, insecurity. This is the past as refuge, the past as remembered glory. In addition, it would seem that ethnicity, maybe more than any other identity, needs what Jeff Peires (1987:22) called 'time-depth' for confirmation.
Groups apart

The third characteristic of ethnicity is that it sets a group apart from other groups and the population in general. The legitimacy of any group, by definition a part of a larger complex (whether of other groups or of a total population), depends on its uniqueness - in other words, 'we' are not the same as 'them', different from the 'other'. 'Our' culture, 'our' language, and 'our' unique history sets 'us' apart.

For Afrikaners that uniqueness of the ethnic group was, and for some still is, loaded with 'sacred significance' - 'their language, their Calvinist faith, their customs and conventions, their very dress' - wrote Moodie (1980:15).

That 'apartness' may not be based on notions of inferiority or of superiority, although such an absence would be rare. It might simply signify differences which are worth singling out for group identity. However, most frequently an ethnic identity (as felt by the group) is attached to superiority or inferiority - it is through competition of some sort that the identity is confirmed or established. The particular status of an ethnic group may be 'accepted' by the outsiders and it may even be created or reinforced by the outsiders. For example, colonialism was not only a materially exploitative relationship, but also involved ideological domination, shaping the way in which colonised people came to perceive themselves and act on the world around them. This cultural imperialism, creating an inferiority complex, so well illustrated by Frantz Fanon in Algeria (in his book Black Skin White Masks),

... is the outcome of a double process:
primarily, economic;
subsequently, the internalization - or, better, the epidermalization - of this inferiority (Fanon, 1970:10).

A reaction to this aspect of colonialism also formed the basis of the black consciousness movement in South Africa in the 1970s. Its component organisations demanded that the dominated group had to 'restore' its past, in order to give the group an identity, to establish pride in the boundaries of the group:

The black man (sic)... will continue to address his black brother and sister because the events and the rich heritage that are their history have not been made fully available to them in the usual way in which a society informs its membership about the significant aspects of its development. Blacks want to know, and must know, more about who they were and who they are if they are seriously concerned about whom they intend to become (Khoapa, 1973, emphasis original).
While the example from black consciousness mobilisation reflects a racialised consciousness and not strictly an ethnic mobilisation, it was a response to being treated as social inferiors. In a similar fashion the Afrikaner ethnic group had been perceived in a negative way, not only by those they oppressed but also by the majority of white English-speakers. The former relationship (Afrikaners to black people) could be ignored by Afrikaners because they themselves felt superior to this population - a 'superiority' which did, of course, also lead to strong group formation, but because of a threat that lay in numbers and competition for jobs, from 'below' rather than from 'above'. Africans had been, to an extent, written out of the ethnic 'other' because people with black skins had been racialised beyond cultural comparison with Afrikaners. Racism left a social-psychological legacy much more complex than establishing ethnic boundaries for Afrikaners. On the level of group identity, however, it was simple - black people could not be Afrikaners and, therefore, did not define Afrikanerdom.

A more complex relationship existed in relation to coloured people as was the case with the negatively stereotyped image of Afrikaners by English-speakers in the way in which it affected ethnic group formation. The latter relationship reflected both a strong antagonism from Afrikaners, a resentment that orginated in the British wars of imperialism fought against the (white) citizens of the Boer republics (and the atrocities of scorched earth and concentration camps), and an attraction to the dominant British colonial culture in South Africa. The fact that African participation and immense suffering during the Anglo-Boer war was so effectively written out of many histories indicate the predominant use made of that struggle in subsequent mobilisation (for correction see, for example, Warwick, 1983).

The struggle over identity formation was fought out especially during the first half of the twentieth century and reflected also the different processes of class formation for the two language and ethnic groups. Afrikaners, from a predominantly rural existence, became workers within the mining and industrial concerns of the 'English'. This was the 'race problem' early in the twentieth century and not the relationship between black and white.

It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which Afrikaner group identity has offered protection against and been reinforced by such epithets as 'hairy back', 'rock spider', 'spark plug' (from NGK - Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk (Dutch Reformed Church) and a brand of spark plug), etc. As Pieter le Roux commented:

But the historic wrongs [of British action during the Anglo-Boer War and subsequent cultural imperialism] would in my opinion not have
been sufficient to keep the fires of resentment burning had English people not repeatedly rekindled the flames by often unconscious revelations of feelings of superiority (1986:196).

The same could be asked of many other negatively stereotyped identities, such as that of the Irish within the English-speaking world. There are many examples, other than those of Afrikaners, that could be drawn from stereotyping between ethnic groups on the African continent. Little examined, in the South African context, is stereotyping among black Africans.

In South Africa it would be difficult to agree on the presence of an 'English' ethnic group. In southern Africa the British settler presence was really only felt from 1820 - and then the connection was with the imperial power, the home country, rather than with a unique local, African identity. The cultural definition of being 'English in the colonies' rested firmly on language and values that were confirmed in Britain and not in the colony, through publications, education, travel, aspirations, etc. The Afrikaans derogatory epithet for English-speaking South Africans reflected this ambiguity - 'sout piel' ('salty penis', because it dangles in the ocean, with one foot in Africa and the other in Britain). The equivalent (to Afrikanerdom) social identity for many English-speakers remained one located within the British nation, the 'mother country'. 'Die republikeinse strewe' (republican goal) of the Afrikaners, an African (albeit racialed) republic, was not shared by English-speaking South Africans - the 1960 referendum amongst white voters on whether to become a republic was won by the very close margin of 52.3% in favour. In Natal, with its large white English-speaking population a mere 24% voted for a republican form of government and a break from the British Crown (see Survey, 1959-1960:7).

The boundaries of groups are, therefore, important: for assertion of an ethnic identity, for protection, and to advance interests. However, they are flexible. They change both in the way in which the group is defined, and in the identities of individual members of the group. Ethnicity, as a social construction, finds or loses its potency in its ability to meet the historically specific and particular needs of its adherents (and of those who manipulate those identities, in some cases). There is no such thing as an unchanging ethnic identity and it is possible to find the genesis of any ethnic group identity, which might have little in common with the source that exists in the group's own myth of origin. The boundaries that are drawn are flexible because the specific cultural elements and historical interpretation that are deemed to be important to give content to 'us' changes. Ethnic groups, and the 'makers' of ethnic identities, exist within a changing social environment. (At this point I am still talking of ideological boundaries and not physical space, whether symbolic or geo-political).
A frequent struggle in ethnic group formation, especially when such identities are being manipulated into political mobilisation, is to shape the ethnic identity to 'suppress' other potentially competing identities. These competing identities may be ethnic or of larger or alternative social groupings. When ethnicity moves into the political arena the faultline (possible division or fissure) of class poses a potential threat to the apparent homogeneous ethnic group. For example, simply put, not all Afrikaners had the same economic interests or benefited to the same extent from 'ethnic power mobilised' in the 1930s and 1940s. In the 1990s Afrikaans-speaking farmers, threatened by the demands for the restoration of land made by previous black occupants, and an insecure white working class provide fertile soil for the seeds of a new ethnic mobilisation, believing that they had been sold out (both economically and ethnically) by the FW de Klerk reforms.

Similarly John Saul (1979) pointed to the potency of ethnic mobilisation against a common colonial enemy in Africa, providing solidarity in the struggle for independence. We could, with some justification, talk of ethnic populism, where a call to a specified 'people' hides a range of conflicting class and gender interests. In the colonial example, a broad mobilisation that easily overcame potential divisions could succeed because the 'other', the colonial state or a colonially-favoured ethnic group or region, was available to mobilise against as it was experienced as the exploiter of all, irrespective of class, etc (see also Smith, 1981:141-7; and below).

The case of the Thonga, mentioned above, illustrates the division of gender that affected the ethnic identity chosen by males and females. Any group of individuals who meet most or all of the requirements of belonging to the ethnic group and yet who do not accept what belonging means, threatens the 'obviousness' of ethnicity. I will return to this point when discussing the specific case of Zulu ethnic mobilisation, as well as in chapters three and five.

Can we now define?

The discussion above allows me to propose a working definition of *ethnicity*, although it bears repeating that the particular mix of elements that go to form an ethnic identity must be a matter of historical examination rather than definition. This necessary greater complexity will be returned to in chapters three and five. Ethnicity as an analytical concept, is not just a definitional 'invention', useless analytically except to give credibility to an endless variety of manipulations of group identities. On the
contrary, ethnicity has sufficient common elements to justify a generalisation, thereby providing a conceptual tool that can be applied in different circumstances. Ethnic groups exist even if they differ from each other in many respects, are not fixed, and are perceived in a variety of ways by each individual member who at the same time employs an array of identities. Once again I must stress the biographical element of social identities, displaying (or perhaps exactly not 'displaying' in any visible form) greater variety than the mobilisers of ethnic identity would, or can dare, allow.

The concept of ethnicity, then, refers to social identity formation that rests on

- culturally specific practices and a unique set of symbols and beliefs, the combination and strength of which have, however, to be examined in each specific case, and how they are held and valued by individual agents;

- a belief in common origin and a common history ('the past') that is broadly agreed upon, and that provides an inheritance of origin, symbols, heroes, events, values, hierarchies, etc. and that confers identity;

- a sense of belonging to a group, that in some combination (to be examined in each case) confirms social identities of people in their interaction with both members and outsiders (members of other groups).

The ideology of ethnicity involves the process by which ethnic subjects are formed, and the way in which they are called on to accept or to rally to an ethnic identity as adequate to 'explain'

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\text{what exists... [and in this case, what had existed] that is who we are, what the world is, what nature, society, men and women are like. In this way we acquire a sense of identity...; what is good...; what is possible and impossible...} \]

(Therborn, 1980:18).

We can see how close Therborn's definition of ideology is to what Hogg and Abrahams (1988:7, and see above) said about the effect of belonging to a group - it 'confers social identity, or a shared/collective representation of who one is and how one should behave'. Ethnicity constitutes the way in which people think of themselves and others, the way in which they act upon the world around them. Ethnicity refers, therefore, to both the appeal or call addressed to ethnic subjects in their actual or potential mobilisation and to the outlook and practices of members of ethnic groups (their social identity). The former, while by no means static, allows for little deviation (the line between membership and defection, between loyalty and treachery is narrow, and mostly out of the control of those so labelled). The latter, ethnicity as social identity
that carries the story of appropriate behaviour and is carried by the individual social agent, each with her or his biographical detail, is less clear, is less public and hence more open to alteration (even if such adaptation may not be the result of conscious choice). It allows for, and is characterised by, greater flexibility, and the consequences of deviation are not as potentially extreme as that carried by the label of ‘traitor’ on the political terrain.

Patrick Wright, in a book about the way in which the past is used in contemporary Britain, also used the notion of ‘story’ (similar to that employed by Berger, referred to earlier, and to Therborn’s definition of ideology). The relevance to my discussion of ethnicity should already be clear. He wrote:

(E)veryday life is full of stories and... these are concerned with being-in-the-world rather than abstractly defined truth... The essential thing for a story is that it should be plausible... (S)tories play a prominent part in the everyday activity of making sense. They help to bring things into the order of our world - to thematise events, making them explicable in a way which also defines our present relation to them. Making sense is a fundamental activity of everyday life and, while it can obviously lead to different conclusions in different situations, it tends to follow the same basic form. It works, for example, by naming things and events, and it accounts for phenomena in terms, say, of analogy or causality. It explains happenings in terms of the machinations of fate or in terms of voluntary intention, and it has always a powerful sense of what is probable or possible (Wright, 1985:14-15, emphases in original).

This brings me to the next point - what can we say about the way in which the ethnic identity is formed? Who tells the stories and to whom are they told?

Born Ethnic?

In a review of the book *Brothers Born of Warrior Blood* (Maré, 1992) Rupert Taylor (1994) noted that what was not explained was the origin of ethnicity as a social identity. He was partly correct in that that book did not make any generalisable statement about the historical origin of ethnicities. It is difficult to say whether that could be done, at least not without a very wide historical survey. What can be said is that the existence over time, for whatever initial or continuing reason, of any group will leave the sedimentation of shared culture, commonly experienced ‘past’, and
'groupness' that may take ethnic form. However, I did make reference to the social and psychological origins of ethnic group formation. I wish to expand on that point below.

There are several prevalent approaches to, or perceptions of, ethnicity. By calling it a social identity and drawing attention to its changing appearance I wish to note some of these. Firstly, ethnicity is not something that we are born with, although some anthropologists did argue that it was an intrinsic identity, and many politicians and political analysts grace the phenomenon with similar unchangeable centrality, even if just in their approach. There is probably a fairly widespread popular perception that many identities are 'inherent', such as the attribution of cultural characteristics and capacities to the pseudo-scientific notion of 'race', the most often examined 'common-sense'.

A clear example of such an 'intrinsic' ethnic identity approach is offered in the claim by professor PJ Coertze who wrote that 'Sooos elke mier aan 'n mierenes behoort en elke by aan 'n bynes, so behoort elke mens aan 'n etnos' ('In the same way that every ant belongs to an ant nest and every bee to a hive, so every human being belongs to an ethnic group') (1979). In other words, nature determines the place of each of us in an ethnic universe of ultimate social security. The argument here, and while put in rather extreme terms, is not that uncommon. Within this argument there is no escape from the genetically determined ethnic identity with which we are born. This approach, and its extension into the political field, underlay the crudities of apartheid.

Another perspective on ethnic identity is instrumentalist - in other words, the focus is not on what ethnic identities involve but how they are employed to advance certain interests, usually political and economic (see Webster, 1991:245). This approach may well leave the impression that ethnic identities are solely manipulated and that adherents are simply recipients of social identities which are then used to advance interests that might include their own personal desires and goals. It is this dismissive attitude towards human agency that prompted Patrick Wright to say that if that was the case all that is left is farming with so many sheep! (1985:5). Some crudely deterministic approaches are very similar, interposing the 'shepherd' between the material conditions and the sheep. Rather, and it is to that which I have suggested approaches in the previous section, the question remains:

What is the actual basis for the nation (in this case, once more, the ethnic group) in contemporary experience and how can the forms of self-understanding which it promotes come to be shared by people of strikingly different situation and circumstance? (Patrick Wright, 1985:5).
While ethnic identities are not necessarily 'primordial sentiments' (there 'at the very beginning', the original identities) or 'natural', they are in each case presented as having 'existed from the earliest stage'. While such identities are certainly used in mobilisation to achieve political and economic ends they cannot be collapsed into such manipulation. I would argue that analytically the most useful approach is, in the first instance, to examine the ethnic identities that we are frequently born into. In other words, we are made members of an ethnic group (as we would achieve other identities), we are socialised and mobilised into ethnic identities that mostly pre-exist our own immersion into the practices, language, social conventions of an ethnic or other identity (each with more or less coherence) into Bourdieu's habitus (1990), and sometimes even into ethnically-specific organisations. The sociologist Anthony Giddens stressed this aspect when he wrote that '(e)thnic differences are wholly learned, a point which seems self-evident until we remember how often some such groups have been regarded as "born to rule" or, alternatively, have been seen as "unintelligent", innately lazy and so forth' (Giddens, 1989:244, emphasis original). Those perceptions of the group exist before the individual learns and is taught to be an ethnic subject; the community nearly always pre-exists the imagining of membership, the imagining of community.

Glenn Bowman (1994) in a chapter on Palestine in a book on political identities, comments that while Benedict Anderson (1983) is correct in noting that 'the particular systems of communication characterizing societies with popular literacy allow the imagined community to be extended far beyond the bounds of the knowable or face-to-face community of societies characterized by oral communications' (Bowman, 1994:140), such popular literacy does not 'automatically interpellate the reader within the subject positions they proffer; the text, and its positions, are objects to be interpreted... there is already in play in the reader an identity...' (1994:141, emphasis added).

Determining the characteristics of the ethnic group, in their specific relative importance and mix, and the historical process of ethnic group and social identity formation (of socialisation) are, thus, the prior tasks. Subsequently, we must examine the manner in which, and whether, such an ethnic group is given organisational form and whether such an identity serves to advance political and economic interests; to ask the question about the extent of the ethnic group, how big is the imagined community; and how is it presented and by whom?

It is immediately acknowledged that the two aspects might not be separable at all. The 'cultural brokers', 'ethnic entrepreneurs', the 'organic intellectuals' of dominant or
dominated classes, might have had a political role in mind from the moment of giving organisational form to an ethnic identity, and they and their interpellations are part of the social world into which children are born, they are part of the socialisation (this would partly explain the horror of the involvement of young children in the extremes of ethnic conflict). However, even then we are left with the question as to why there should be a population available (Saul, 1979:397) for ethnic mobilisation - why do individuals respond to a call to act as ethnic subjects in the political field? Some answers have been suggested above, but others lie in the historically specific process of ethnic mobilisation of which there have been several revealing studies both locally and internationally. The historical context of such mobilisation is essential to an understanding as to why certain elements dominate in giving substance to the group; why such identities wax and wane; whether a specific class project dominates in the politicisation of ethnicity; and why, in other cases, ethnic identities should co-exist as reflecting cultural pride, alongside directly political social groups such as that provided in national identities. Bowman (1994) has given nuance to the analysis of the different notions of political identity that are possible, the different interpellations that are made, in his case all subscribing the notion of the 'Palestinian nation', but taking various forms.

The making and the makers of ethnicity

The socialisation to which we are all subject in order to reproduce society - in other words, to maintain it largely as it is - and to allow each individual to function with the minimum of conflict in daily social activity, starts immediately after birth. We are frequently dressed, in a western context, in blue or pink to signify our sex, and to start a gender-specific socialisation - a specific identity that continues in a multitude of ways until most of us function as gendered beings assuming the roles assigned to men and women in our self-perception and in relation to one another. This gendered perception is, in turn, reinforced by and reinforces the institutions and practices within society.

We are socialised into dressing in certain ways, appreciating certain kinds of food (think of how many ethnically- and nationally-specific cookbooks there are, and how often 'getting to know the other' means an introduction to 'ethnic cooking'). We are brought up to belong to a specific religion, and so on. Most importantly, we are taught to express ourselves in a certain language which not only allows us to communicate and to share in recorded material but places us in a specific cultural context - one of
the important elements of an ethnic identity. Each of the areas of communication that
language opens up, whether it be written or oral, such as films, books, education,
speeches, stories, newspapers, radio, add to our culturally-based identities. However,
language also closes us off, makes statements about our group boundaries: a preacher
gets killed on a commuter train from Soweto in the early-1990s because he conducted
his prayers in Zulu; Afrikaans, for many, is the language of oppression, and all those
who speak it have part in domination; an accent often determines the response of
those you talk to; who we are is often 'lost in translation' (Hoffman, 1989).

The specific language in which we are raised allows us to be brought into a historical
continuity - 'the past' - that defines boundaries and teaches us about the differences
between us and others. Language serves as the prime socialising means - we
communicate through language - although by no means the exclusive one. But it does
more than that - language locks children into a specific set of 'communications' and
excludes them from others. In her discussion of French-speaking children in a
minority school in Toronto, Canada, Monica Heller notes:

Language use is... involved in the formation of ethnic identity in two
ways. First, it constrains access to participation in activities and to
formation of social relationships. Thus at a basic level language is
central to the formation of group boundaries. Second, as children
spend more and more time together they share experience, and
language is a central means of making sense of that shared

Our histories are frequently also the history of a language. The origin of the Afrikaans
language, and the date from which it could be called a distinct language (and not a
dialect of Dutch), features strongly in the formation of the ethnic group and its
distinctive history. Isabel Hofmeyr aptly called her contribution to a book on race,
class and nationalism, 'Building a nation from words: Afrikaans language, literature
and ethnic identity, 1902-1924' (1987); while Glenn Bowman notes that

All communities are 'countries of words' in so far as the rituals of
inscribing borders, picturing territories and populations, and
thematizing issues salient to those terrains and the communities
believed to occupy them occur within discourse (1994:140; also see
Said, 1994, and his discussion of narrative in the formation of the
'imagination of empire'; and Hofmeyr, 1992).

Those who came to lead the building of an Afrikaner ethnic identity were aware of
language as a building block. Moodie noted that it was feared that anglicisation would
occur with urbanisation, where English was the language of commerce and expressed the links between the colonial power and the colony. The Afrikaans language, and its use, had to be linked to a larger motivation, that of protecting the volk. He quotes Dr DF Malan, later to be the first apartheid prime minister:

'A living powerful language is born from the soil of the People's history (volksgeskiedenis) and lives only in the mouth of the People (volksmond)... Raise the Afrikaans language to a written language, make it the bearer of our culture, our history, our national ideals, and you will raise the People to a feeling of self-respect and to the calling to take a worthier place in the world civilization... A healthy national feeling can only be rooted in ethnic (volks) art and science, ethnic customs and character, ethnic language and ethnic religion and, not least, in ethnic literature' (1980:47).

Here we see many of the characteristics of ethnicity being presented, but what is important is the manner in which these are cast as a project, as something that has to be done, to be created.

From that earliest group within which we absorb so many aspects of our various social identities, the family, we are exposed to an ever-increasing circle of structures and institutions that can be used to concretise an ethnic identity (the identity that concerns us here). These include, importantly, the educational system (in the case of the Afrikaners, Christian National Education), churches, youth groups, political parties, cultural associations, and members of the ethnic group already in existence to welcome us into its apparently pre-ordained fold.

In the political mobilisation of an Afrikaner ethnic identity religion played an important role - the church confirmed the 'volk', and justified certain distinct ethnic practices and later even the apartheid policy. However, in contrast, in the Inkatha movement religion has played no visible role at all, indicating that the cement of other aspects (for example, the central role of 'the past' and cultural attributes other than religion) were sufficient for mobilisation - religion in this case might have proved extremely divisive of the common-sense of a common Zuluness, a Zuluness whose myth as to the moment of origin pre-dates the introduction of Christianity, precluding the use of a 'chosen people' approach (or at least of a people chosen by God). Furthermore, the central personality in Zulu ethnic mobilisation, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, is a practising Anglican, excluding non-Christian forms of religion as central mobilising symbols.
Ethnic socialisation, as with all other socialisations, starts early in life, and is filled with contradictions - the manner in which children assimilate ethnic differences is frequently not at all the way in which we interpret their perceptions (see, for example, the contributions to Phinney and Rotheram (eds), 1987). A very important factor, that we need to keep in mind in our own perceptions and attitudes and in analysing behaviour around us, is that

Young children, like adults, try to construct their ideas and integrate new information in ways that will make the world meaningful and predictable. They frequently reduce the complexity of information by forming global assumptions and thinking in absolute rather than relative terms... [what I called categorization, above].

In their search for coherence, people often suppress individual variations to support group generalizations (Ramsey, 1987:67-8).

This process applies not only to the way in which we are socialised into 'our own' ethnic group and accept an ethnic identity, but also in the way in which we create, and reinforce, groups for others, in the way in which we stereotype people. How many people have not been forced into an ethnic identity in the conflict in the Transvaal over the past few years, through no choice of their own, by being defined as 'belonging' to a group?

What may also happen is that a cultural (or even an ethnic) identity is shaped by associations smaller than the major societal socialising structures - that would be the case, especially, in illiterate societies or where small groups are isolated from others who share ethnic aspects with them. In such cases imagination of the community is limited (in extent, but certainly not in intensity and complexity) by oral culture. The full complexity of the transmission of ethnic identities cannot be dealt with here. I have mentioned just the major channels of socialisation and communication, where the various structures are coordinated so as to reinforce the message, the call, to individuals to respond and to define and live their lives as ethnic subjects.

It is, however, not in all cases that these various structures are brought together and coordinated, mutually to reinforce a specific identity. Frequently they meet different needs, and what we gain from belonging and learning from each, need not be compatible with every other. The youth group may well focus on transmitting the skills necessary for social interaction, or might focus on adventure and the environment. The religion, or denomination, we become part of may be such that it stresses the common factors of humanity and spirituality and not be linked to a
culturally exclusive group. Education need not have a 'civic' component, or may stress that which defines the role of the citizen within state boundaries or the citizen within a world context. It is not inevitable that an ethnic identity will be transmitted so that it dominates others, or even that there be an ethnic identity at all - cultural distinctiveness in a broad sense; yes; ethnicity, in the way defined above, not necessarily.

Ethnicity serving a purpose

It is necessary to return to a distinction made earlier. Ethnicity can be an identity that demands no more than a sense of belonging (or as little as acceptance). For many people it might be something that has no significant relevance amongst the many social identities they would acknowledge, one story amongst several. However, it can also be an identity that serves a political and material purpose, or is seen to advance these 'extra-ethnic' interests. Examples will illustrate the difference.

First, a social psychological investigation by Joha Louw-Potgieter (1988) of Afrikaner dissidents showed that the people she studied distinguished between their ethnic identity and the specific way in which that identity had been linked to a particular political mobilisation. The dissidents, 'white, politically left wing Afrikaans speakers', mostly insisted on holding on to a form of Afrikaner ethnic identity, while strongly rejecting the latter, the politicised version of that identity - what has become known as Afrikaner nationalism. As one respondent said, in response to a question about situations in which 'he felt more Afrikaans than would normally be the case', he would rather answer and say when he felt 'less Afrikaans':

'(When I read things that are said by Afrikaners who are blinded by the ideology of apartheid and how they accept things like chosen people ideas, superior race, superiority, using the Bible to justify things... I feel, it's no use, my volk is being destroyed by ignorance'.

Said editor, of the 'dissident', mainly Afrikaans-language weekly, Vrye Weekblad, Max du Preez, expressing the same separation that I am arguing for -

'I am not detribalised, and I don't see any reason to be... but at the same time, I see no conflict between being an ethnic Afrikaner, writing Afrikaans, loving Afrikaans, being Afrikaans in my environment - and not a Nat, a racist, or in favour of white leadership' (quoted in February, 1991:128).
Interestingly, in some cases the rejection by the dissidents of apartheid and pre-apartheid politicisation of Afrikaner ethnicity also led to a questioning of the specific version of the past that was essential to Afrikaner group formation; or else seeing that 'past' as one amongst others advanced by other ethnic (or racialised) groups, where these also included tragic events (and heroes). However, this did not hold for all. As Louw-Potgieter commented, '(s)ome respondents... reported residual feelings of solidarity with the Afrikaner group when reading Afrikaner history' (Louw-Potgieter, 1988:79). Her study also illustrates the point that ethnic social identities are not composed of the same 'mix' of items for all individuals, even while accepting the existence of a common group identity.

What these 'dissidents' rejected was politicisation of the ethnic group, or of a class-specific ethnic project. The political mobilisation of ethnicity was primarily the way in which Afrikaners who accepted the hegemonic project advanced or secured material interests within the larger South African society. Even more specifically than that, it illustrates the manner in which a class-specific project can mesh with ethnic mobilisation. Dan O'Meara (1983:chapter 5) discussed the manner in which the ideological interpellation of, a 'call' to, 'Afrikaners' developed, in competition with other interpretations of Afrikaner identity. It showed many of the characteristics already discussed: the nation had to be established as 'the primary social unit from which all individuals draw their identity'; class divisions had to be papered over, a position clearly stated by Dr N Diedrichs (later to be Minister of Finance and State President) in the 1930s -

'If the worker is drawn away from our nation, we may as well write Ichabod on the door of our temple... He must be drawn into his nation in order to be a genuine man. There must be no division or schism between class and class' (quoted O'Meara, 1983:71);

the volk was presented as threatened by an external onslaught in order to strengthen the boundaries of the group, a perception captured by the statement that "our existence as a volk was threatened in various ways by imperialists, Jews, coloureds, natives, Indians, Afrikaner renegades and so on" (quoted O'Meara, 1983:73); culture, including language, was deliberately used to strengthen a specific definition of what it meant to be an Afrikaner, initially at a distance from party politics and class politics -

... sonder die bestaan van Boerekultuur is daar by die Boerenaste geen sprake van kultuurbewustheid nie; en verder, sonder die bestaan van 'n eie soortige Boerenaste is sowel die eie kultuur as die bewustheid daarvan natuurlik onbestaanbaar (Van der Westhuysen, 1950:44) (... without the existence of Boere [or
Afrikaner culture there is no possibility of cultural awareness in the Afrikaner nation; and, without the existence of a unique Afrikaner nation, both an own culture and the awareness of it obviously cannot exist).

It is little wonder that the Great Trek should occupy such a central role in the Afrikaner ethnic mythology. The departure of the Voortrekkers from the Cape Colony is presented as a statement against 'racial mixing' and described as the 'most generally self-conscious cultural action' by Afrikaners ever (Van der Westhuysen, 1950:58). Dan O’Meara wrote that

Through this strong emphasis on kultuurpolittiek (cultural politics) rather than partypolittiek, the Bond [the Afrikaner Broederbond formed in 1918] was increasingly able to delimit the legitimate parameters of Afrikaner culture, and to direct mass campaigns on cultural issues. This culminated in the Bond-organised celebration of the centenary of the Great Trek (O’Meara, 1983:76).

The Great Trek celebrations (the Eeujees or centenary festival) in 1938 culminated in a rally in Pretoria which 100 000 people attended, and the laying of the foundation stones of the Voortrekker monument occurred. Unity of the Afrikaner ethnic identity (Volkseeenheid) was the message, even if, as O’Meara points out, it meant different things to different people. 'By the beginning of 1939, the Bond’s persistent emphasis on kultuurpolittiek was slowly beginning to politicise the issue of Afrikaner culture', wrote O’Meara. Furthermore, kultuurpolittiek was given a 'specific class content, politicising class cleavages in cultural terms' through an onslaught on trade unions and an 'economic movement' which 'made explicit the economic basis and petty-bourgeois character of Afrikaner nationalism' (1983:77). A decade after the Eeujees Afrikaners captured political power.

An interesting study would be to explore in much greater detail the differences between both ethnic stories and ethnic mobilisation of Afrikaners and Zulu-speakers. The former ethnic group drew on the trek, the journey, to a place where volks, or ethnic, identity could be lived; it drew on the God-given task of a chosen people, with a missionary obligation of establishing 'Christian civilisation'. The Zulu task (through Inkatha), on the other hand, is seen as a return to an ideal and idealised past, to the re-establishment of a 'nation' and a kingdom; absent, except in mobilisation (where it exists as the exhortation to 'conquer in order to incorporate'), is the notion of a missionary duty.
A second example of the way in which ethnic mobilisation can serve material or political interests is offered by Terence Ranger (1989) who showed the manner in which an ethnic identity was manufactured and then accepted in order to secure specific kinds of employment in Rhodesia. He took the example of the Manyika, and the development of an ethnic identity in response to, and reinforced by, socio-economic change during the late-nineteenth and the early-twentieth century.

While before 1890 a common Shona language was spoken and cultural traits were shared, 'these Shona-speakers were not conscious of a cultural identity, still less a political one'. Through colonial manipulation of territory and, more importantly, the language work of mission stations that privileged a written language based on the Manyika dialect, an ethnic identity was created around a sub-unit of Shona-speakers, the Manyika. The Manyika migrants, furthermore, benefited from literacy skills that gave them 'access to much desired jobs in domestic service and in hotels' - the "Manyika" came to be thought of as "natural" domestic servants" in the towns of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Even migrants from areas where a Manyika ethnicity was resisted had to capitulate in the urban areas and claim to belong to such an ethnic group.

By the late-1950s wider identities came to dominate, albeit not to the total exclusion of what Ranger calls 'sub-ethnicities', such as that of 'Manyika'. He wrote:

- All these factors - the aspirations of a second-generation African elite, 'print-capitalism', the enlargement of urban ethnicities, and so on - meant that the movement towards a unified Shona language and a sense of wider Shona identity became irresistible (1989:143).

Guy and Thabane (1988) have also written about the acceptance of a work-related ethnic identity, in their case by Basotho miners. They argued that while state and capital in southern Africa, as elsewhere, have created and benefited from ethnic and 'tribal' divisions, the 'existence of ethnic solidarity of some kind -... - has time and again been used by workers as protection in an hostile, violent, and rightless environment'. Similarly Ranger (1989) had noted that the ethnic identity provided more than 'a convenient reference group, but (also) an ideal which sustained them during their migration'. Reference was made (above) to the study by Segal (1991) that also deals with this issue.

In their paper Guy and Thabane examined an ethnic stereotype in the mining industry about Basotho being excellent shaft sinkers. Without going into the detail as to how it was created (specifically out of the relationship between the technical and dangerous
demands of a specialised labour process - shaft sinking - and stereotyping of workers who came to undertake this task), and detailing the fascinating investigation by the authors, what is relevant here is to note that the ethnic stereotype was accepted and repeated by the Basotho miners themselves. Especially in the period from World War II until the early-1960s 'management used the sense of ethnic identity and superiority to motivate and organise (the Basotho shaft sinking teams) - while labour used its ethnic reputation as sinkers to obtain better pay and working conditions' (1988:274).

The examples above also illustrate the *situational* nature of ethnicity. Terence Ranger (1983:252) quotes, with approval, the conclusion by John Iliffe that 'Europeans believed Africans belonged to tribes; Africans built tribes to belong to' to capture this dimension of ethnic identity formation. The need to assert an ethnic identity at any particular time needs to be explained for it is not always there - it might not even have existed for any significant number of people at times during the fairly recent past, at least not within the life that is subsequently claimed for an ethnic identity and existence (such as has been the case with both the Afrikaner and Zulu ethnic identities). It draws attention to the need to examine these groups within an historical context, to test the myth of origin, to critically examine 'tradition' and cultural distinctiveness, to probe flux in the supposed rigid boundaries - to examine the waxing and waning of ethnic identities.

The situational character of ethnicity is also borne out by an examination of the particular, and changing, mix of elements that are said to constitute the essence of any ethnic identity. Firstly, there is variety between ethnic identities. In one case a myth of origin might be the most important factor that binds members, in another it might be a common religion, and in yet another it might be language. Or else various factors in apparently inseparable combination will provide identity. The 'articulating principle', the 'dominant' discourse that can 'sew' the elements (for example, Salecl, 1994:209), needs to be examined in each case of ethnic identity formation and maintenance.

Secondly, even within ethnic groups the stress may shift according to the specific needs of the moment, or even depending on the character of the 'other' against whom the boundaries of the ethnic group is drawn. In an article on the central Asian republics of the USSR, described as the 'colonies of the Soviet Union' by an advisor to Gorbachev, Ahmed Rashid of *The Independent* wrote that for 70 years Moscow has 'plundered Central Asia for raw materials'. Against the common enemy of Russian domination, therefore, 'Islam is the main prop for ethnic nationalism... but forgotten when confronting their fellow Muslims belonging to another ethnic group, who are potential rivals for better housing, jobs or food supplies' (reprinted Daily News, 15
Jun 90). The competition that fragments Islam is stirred up, in addition, by 'corrupt, feudal-minded local party bosses, who are too scared to implement radical reforms and fuel ethnic conflicts to keep themselves in power'. This is similar to the 'national' mobilisation that was possible against colonial powers in Africa, creating a temporary and fragile unity that collapsed in many cases when the older patterns of social identity, reinforced or created by the colonial administrators, revived in post-colonial competition for resources and power.

Thirdly, individual members might experience their ethnic identity, within the group and against others, in remarkably different ways - and yet be willing to consider themselves part of the group. The disagreement over whether 'coloured' people in South Africa should be considered as part of the Afrikaner volk (ethnic group), from within the Afrikaner group itself, is an example of such flux. It reflects both basic agreement that there is such a social unit as the Afrikaner volk and simultaneous disagreement about the characteristics for inclusion and exclusion, and hence of the relevant and essential boundaries. A more recent phenomenon is the self-conscious mobilisation of coloured identity in itself (see Maré, 1995; 1995a; 1995b).

Bowman's Palestinian study is relevant here as well. He comments that

Central to this inquiry is the way Palestinians, in the numerous places to which they have been scattered by the loss of their homeland, discursively construct images of themselves, their homeland, and the antagonists that have prevented them from achieving the national fulfillment which grounds their identity... The nation-building process... is, I contend, made difficult by the different senses of what it means to be Palestinian engendered by more than forty years of dislocation and dispersal (1994:138-9).

He then discusses the presentations of the Palestinian nation by three authors and analyses the differences in conception based on the differences in experience. I will return to the looseness of deliberate social identity construction in chapter five.

Fourthly, it is in the first instance individuals who share social identities. Each of these individuals are subjected to a multitude of other experiences that cannot all be incorporated into the ethnic social identity. There is no single social identity for each individual in society. On the contrary, we draw on a wide range of such identities, and we receive socialising discourses based on our individual experiences, our 'biographies', to use C Wright Mills' term (1971:11-20). At the same time we must not lose sight of the wider structural aspects of society; nor of the manner in which
identities articulate, interact with each other, so that women will experience and live ethnic social identities different from men, and young people different from an older generation.

Ethnicity and ‘modernisation’:

Frequently part of the common-sense view of ethnicity is that it is linked to rural society, and that it pre-dates capitalism and is, therefore, simply an anachronism in a modern urbanised and industrialised world. It is felt to be a kind of primitive sentiment out of place in the 'global village'. This view, in some ways, reinforces the idea that ethnicity is primordial.

It is, however, not only in the common-sense perceptions of social reality that this view exists and existed. Anthony Smith has written several studies on the phenomenon of ethnicity. In a book called The Ethnic Revival in the Modern World (1981) he pointed to the failure of the predictions of both liberal and socialist analysts and politicians that rational, urban, industrial, achievement-oriented society, within a world context marked by mass communication and frequent deliberate attempts to suppress ethnic group formation, would lead to the demise of ethnicity.

Within this argument it was, and probably still is, thought that the process of modernisation (the inevitable goal of which was symbolised by its apex, the United States of America - see Rostow (1960) for the classic argument on ‘stages of growth’) would make ethnic identifications irrelevant; that new forms of solidarity, frequently much smaller or arising out of urban industrial society, would take its place; that the individual, the basic unit of consumption and production, would no longer need support in groups beyond the family; that where support was needed it would be materially functional (such as in trade unions) or linked to recreational and spiritual needs - clearly defined needs would be met by discrete organisations.

In the USSR (that other symbol of a direction that modern society could take in the twentieth century) it was argued that a new identity within the workers' state would obviate, in the medium- to long-term, the need for such social supports as ethnic identities seemed to offer. While constitutional provision was made for predominantly ethnic republics, even providing for independence from the USSR if they should so desire, it was strongly argued that ethnicity would fade away and policy was directed to this aim. 'National in form, socialist in content' was the slogan that informed this approach. There was little doubt in the minds and the writings of the theorists of the communist state that the socialist content would make the nationalist/ethnic form
redundant in the future, which was perceived to be both classless and internationalist (for a detailed discussion see, for example, Connor, 1984).

There was no long-term place for nationalisms or ethnicities within socialist or communist societies. The lessons of post-perestroika fragmentation in both the Baltic republics (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) and in Trans-Caucasia (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) confirmed that 70 years of socialism did not dim the embers of an ethnic, or nationalist, revival here either (see Suny, 1990). However, the fragmentation went beyond the fringes and what appeared to be the final collapse of the USSR occurred, to be replaced by the Commonwealth of Independent States. At the time of writing (1995) that process has not ended with Russian helicopters, planes and tanks pounding the city of Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, nominally part of the CIS.

In Yugoslavia the Croatian and Slovenian republics voted overwhelmingly in 1991 for independence and a subsequent loose alliance with other Yugoslav republics, leading to civil war against the Serbian-dominated centre and Serbian minorities within these regions (see, for example, Magas, 1993; Salecl, 1994). And in Czechoslovakia the same process of intense ethnic conflict has contributed to the fragmentation of eastern Europe into many mini-states or federal units with greater political and social, if not economic, autonomy than was ever envisaged, and with the spectre of long-term violence as populations and borders get redrawn.

Do these examples not strengthen the hand of those who argue for ethnic identities as somehow inherent, something near-genetic in its perseverance in shaping social interaction? The referendum campaign in South Africa in 1992 was fought, from the side of the advocates of a 'no'-vote to reform, in terms of exactly such a position - holding up as example the collapse of the USSR as confirmation of the inevitability of ethnic mobilisation and the moral and historical right of 'peoples' to 'govern themselves'. In 1995 the same examples serve the cause of Zulu autonomy and of claims by coloured people, Griquas, Namas, and Bushmen (San) for distinct recognition.

In the east European cases that I have referred to, and in many other examples of ethnic fragmentation and conflict, there are two important aspects present: the first is the spark that gave rise to any form of revolt and the context that allowed it to suddenly flare up; and the second is the ethnic form that it took. The spark has been the feeling that a definable population (whether regional or cultural) has been oppressed and exploited by a central authority (whether that be the central state in a federation; a conquering nationality or nation-state; or an exclusive political party).
The immediate context in the USSR has been the perestroika policy followed by Mikhail Gorbachev, itself a response to the collapse of the Soviet economic and political system. The new openness and a weakening of the central authority allowed protests that would have been unthinkable even a few years before. There has been a general collapse of what has been called 'globalising ideologies', along with the ability to maintain cohesion, either through force or through ideology, over populations.

The form has often been the most immediate mobilisation that seems to encompass the full variety of experiences of oppression and exploitation, namely ethnicity and nationalism. As I argued in developing a definition, ethnicity can, furthermore, call on a real or 'invented' tradition of valour and resistance, with examples of previous resistance against invaders and conquerors. Politicised ethnicity (and I will discuss its relationship to nationalism below) answers the need to mobilise geographically and across classes; it legitimates and explains present conditions in terms of a past history of conquest and incorporation (whether actual or reinterpreted); and it provides a multitude of readily-available cultural symbols for group formation and exclusion of the 'other'. It is apparently the most appropriate answer to the most visible and immediate form of uneven development and cultural oppression. What ethnic mobilisation does not do is to answer the question of exploitative relations within the ethnic group (see chapter three).

Ethnicity and some other concepts

If ethnicity is defined in the way that I have done, it has implications for the way in which other concepts are used. I will discuss some of these in the rest of this chapter in order to draw distinctions where I believe terminological and analytical confusions have arisen.

Ethnicity and tribalism:

A frequent and reflex response, in the African context, is to term ethnic identities 'tribal', even when it would appear to be otherwise inappropriate - possibly to communicate with that 'common-sense' that exists around ethnic groups. So, for example, the term 'tribe' is often used in reference to Afrikaner identity - such as 'the white tribe of Africa'. In this case it is also implied that African ethnic identities are tribal, with the attached meaning of 'primitive' in a derogatory sense (see the very useful discussion of the origins and usages of the term 'tribe' by Peter Skalnik, 1988). Would Serbs or Croatians be called 'tribes', or Quebecois in Canada? We can see...
already that to collapse ethnic identities into tribalism is incorrect: a ‘tribal’ or clan unit or chiefdom referred to a much smaller functional societal grouping under pre-capitalism or under conditions where aspects of that small society relate to a pre-capitalist past, drawing a number of smaller homestead productive units together. The primary reason for such social units would have been productive, and still is in some cases.

It could be argued, as Benedict Anderson did with regard to nationalism (1983), that an ethnic group, in the way defined here, could not exist in a world dominated by small, production-based, isolated, pre-literate groups. For example, in the Manyika study Ranger refers to the absence of a ‘cultural identity, still less a political one’ amongst Shona-speakers before 1890 in Southern Rhodesia. He added that the reality ‘of which the Shona-speakers were conscious, was the local chieffaincy group’ (1989:120). All of these units, therefore, are characterised by a variety of forms of leadership by a ‘chief’, whether hereditary or appointed.

Welsh (1973:5) defined the pre-capitalist version of ‘tribe’ as societies that possess, _inter alia_, the following characteristics: they are sovereign political entities, small in scale, economically self-sufficient and non-literate.

Under colonialism this institution was distorted, legislatively frozen, made subservient to colonial demands, and created when they did not exist, specifically in order to fragment larger potentialities of mobilisation against foreign domination and exploitation. ‘Tribes’, furthermore, served as essential elements in indirect rule policies, such as in nineteenth century Natal where Britain was not keen to spend money where there appeared to be little financial return. Shula Marks wrote that ‘tribes’ were defined by the colonial government in Natal in 1891 as ‘... a number or collection or body of natives forming a political organization or community, and composed of not less than twenty kraals under the government, control, or leadership of a chief, and which organization or community has been recognized or established by the Supreme Chief’ (1970:31n).

She noted that ‘tribes’ no longer had their kinship base under this administrative definition. The term preferred by Marks in her study of the Bambatha rebellion is ‘chiefdom’.

Welsh remarked on these changes and argued that the term should not be applied to the colonial period when these ‘societies’ lost their sovereignty, were incorporated into
a wider society, suffered a steady decline in their economic viability, and were 
Christianised and educated into a literate society. He would prefer the term 'local 
group', and only used 'tribe' to avoid confusion with the common usage at the time 
(Welsh, 1973:5).

Leroy Vall, too, in both the preface and introduction to his edited volume of articles on 
'tribalism' (1989) was careful to distance himself by using quotation marks around 
'tribe' and 'tribalism', and rather used the terms ethnicity and ethnic group for the 
social groupings he refers to (although he does, also refer to 'the development of 
ethnic consciousness, or tribalism' (1989:10)).

What is important to note in the South African context, and for my concerns in this 
thesis, is that while 'tribes' have frequently been taken to coincide with ethnic groups 
or putative 'nations' (especially under apartheid policy), such as Swazi, Zulu, Venda, 
such neat categorisations or coincidence is not possible. The 'political units as can be 
identified in history were small and highly variable... "micropolities" by subsequent 
standards (...) and were a far cry from the "tribes" so readily identified today' 
(Skalnik, 1988:74).

Ethnicity, politics, nationalism and territory:
I have implicitly argued that ethnic identities and belonging to an ethnic group are not 
automatically and inherently political acts. An ethnic identity is not necessarily also a 
politically mobilised identity. Members of ethnic groups, meeting all the requirements 
of the manner in which I am using the term 'ethnicity' here, may well belong to 
different political persuasions and parties. Furthermore, a number of ethnic groups 
may co-exist within a single national identity. The mobilisation by FRELIMO during 
the war of resistance against Portuguese colonial rule was characterised by its stress 
on the Mozambican nation "united by the same historical experience and the same 
political, economic, and social aims, engaged in the same sacred task - to fight for 
their liberation" (FRELIMO document, quoted Saul, 1979:418). Saul comments that 
he saw how, in the cultural arena, the movement actively supported "the attempt... to 
realize a genuine "fusion" of diverse aspects of the cultures and "popular traditions" of 
Mozambique into a novel national and revolutionary form, a fusion which people 
could be expected to make their own'. He asks, pertinently for our task in South 
Africa and for the subsequent struggles in Mozambique, that the success of 
FRELIMO's response to "other diversities which can have an ethnic edge - those linked 
with different economic situations created... by uneven development" still had to be 
observed (1979:418). I will return to the attempt to create wider solidarities within the 
nation-state, especially through 'nation-building', in chapter five.
In its 'pure' form - not directed at political power - ethnic social identities can, nonetheless, take on an organised form, and the boundaries that exclude and include can still be clearly drawn. These boundaries may be less militantly claimed and defended than in the politicised version of ethnic groups but they may well be extremely difficult to penetrate - in other words, it may be very difficult to meet the requirements of membership of the ethnic 'community' at any one moment, without necessarily implying that the boundaries are fixed in the longer-term.

Ethnic identities, however, are frequently manipulated and mobilised in the service of class and political interests (such as in the case of Afrikanerdon discussed above). It is not surprising as ethnic groups function as such strong representations of common identities, and carry such powerful mobilising sentiments. That strength arises from the multiple reinforcement (cultural, emotional, historical, antagonism to or simply difference from the 'other') that they enjoy, and the multiple needs that they service (social support, historical motivation, ideological clarification, and so on). The clout of ethnicity is equalled by that other social unit that is probably loaded with as much meaning in some societies, the family. For this reason 'the family', or a particular version of it, is sometimes claimed to be the building block of an ethnic group.

What the politicisation of ethnicity adds is to direct those bonds towards a goal that has no essential link to ethnicity. Political manipulation moves ethnicity into the arena of competition for power against other groups. Politicised ethnicity (ethnic nationalism) moves social identity to political agency, provides the means for political mobilisation and organisation, and submits this identity and group to another set of rules - those of competition for institutional power.

Politicised ethnicity is not, however, identical to nationalism. Nationalism can be, and most often is, multi-ethnic - nation states, the territorial form in which most nations exist or strive for, are 'plural societies' in which distinct ethnic groups 'share the same political and economic order' (Giddens, 1989:244). Smith noted that in 1971, of 132 independent states, 'only 12 were ethnically homogeneous, representing 9.1% of the total, while another 25 (or 18.9%) have a single ethnic community comprising over 90% of the state's population' (1981:9-10). Nations have become linked to nation states, a fairly recent, but nonetheless powerful ideological notion and political and economic unit. Nationalism is, therefore, seen as the supra-ethnic collectivity - that which binds people together who otherwise would find their greatest sense of belonging in ethnic groups, religious groups, productive units, and so on, and probably still find those to be the most immediate identities in day-to-day existence. Not that it works that easily - we only need to look at the listing of ethnic conflicts that
Anthony Smith provides (1981:10-11), a list that was drawn up a decade before the present fragmentation in eastern Europe.

However, while the nation state gives territoriality to a community of people that probably includes many ethnic groups, it does not exclude political competition between ethnic groups over territory and political independence. In this case we would talk of ethnic nationalism, or the striving for political and territorial independence on the basis of ethnic identity. The June 1991 votes by the Croatian and Slovene republics within the Yugoslavian nation state for independence, is a clear indication of the power of ethnic nationalism, as have many other east European struggles since then illustrated the same force.

As Smith (1981:18-20) argued, ethnicity is boosted by the nationalism of the nation-state: 'Perhaps the single most potent influence on the ethnic revival has been the birth and diffusion of nationalism. As an ideological movement, nationalism seeks to attain and maintain the autonomy, unity and identity of a social group' - confirming the group that is so similar to the nation, the ethnic group, in its quest for political autonomy. He then argued that a 'nation' can be created in two major ways: 'territorial nationalism or political community', and a 'community of culture'. The revival of ethnicity, therefore, is strongly bound up with the widespread acceptance of nationalist ideologies in the modern world, and with the rise of self-conscious nationalist movements. The principles of self-determination, popular sovereignty and cultural diversity which nationalism enshrines, lend movements on behalf of ethnic communities a self-confidence and legitimacy that was absent in the case of previous ethnic revivals.

The model that is on offer is that of politicised ethnicity, a mobilisation that strives for 'self-determination, and popular sovereignty'. Successful ethnic nationalism can, potentially, be the ethnically exclusive nationalism and nation state of tomorrow.

Smith added that 'n)ationalism has also extended the scope and intensity of the current ethnic revival in two other ways' - the first is the idea of 'citizenship', which means that 'nationalism binds together elites and masses in a single ethnic nation with a single legislative will'; and secondly 'nationalism extends the scope of ethnic community from purely cultural and social to economic and political spheres: from predominantly private to public sectors' (1981:19, emphasis added). This is the realm of politicised ethnicity.

The first point is relevant to ethnicity and populism; while the second relates to 'politicised ethnicity'. Examples of the demand for ethnically pure states are the
Balkan states in the Soviet Union - as are the Transcaucasian republics and Croatian and Slovenian struggles in Yugoslavia, and the several Afrikaner or Boer groups in South Africa, appealing to the same or largely overlapping constituencies, calling for their particular versions of a 'homeland', a 'Volkstaat'.

The distinction I have drawn here between ethnic group and nation is similar to the distinction previously drawn in the Soviet Union (with a difference in terms employed) between, on the one hand, the nation - 'a human grouping whose members share an intuitive [imagined?] sense of kindredness or sameness, predicated upon a myth of common descent... (such as the Russians, Tibetans,Croats, and Slovaks)', in other words what is more commonly called ethnic group; while, on the other hand there are people 'who are conscious of their multi-ethnic background (for example, the Czechoslovak people, the Soviet people, or the American people)' (Connor, 1984:xiv). The latter refers to what we might also call a nation, citizens of a nation-state.

Territory and space serve ethnic mobilisation and ethnic nationalism in two distinct ways. Firstly, territory can serve as a powerful marker for group identity, and even to delineate inclusion or exclusion from the specific past that serves that group or its leaders - in other words, the combination of space and ideology as telling subjects what exists and what has existed; secondly, territory may serve to establish the physical boundaries of political claims for ethnic nationalist groups - creating new nation states in the mould of those that exist around them (ethnic separatist moves, such as those in Quebec, or Kurdish, Welsh or Scottish nationalist organisations, or the Volkstaat section of Afrikaner or Boere groups' demands; or amalgamation with a larger ethnic identity, such as those by Catholic Irish in northern Ireland). The two aspects may well function in combination, such as when a mythology of space, of holy territory, of the land on which and for which blood has been split, serves to strengthen claims for a physically bounded area. The speeches of Eugene TerreBlanche of the far-right Afrikaner Weerstands beweging in South Africa are replete with examples of this approach.

The case of laying claim to symbolic space for purposes of ethnic mobilisation and group boundaries can best be illustrated with reference to the Inkatha case study and will be dealt with below.

However, it is not only in the more obvious examples of space and territory in ethnic mobilisation that this issue needs to be examined. The complexity of space and identity, in the South African case, needs separate and extensive study. For example, I would argue that the distinction between ethnic story in everyday life, on the one hand,
and ethnicity mobilised, on the other, has to be extended to the issue of ‘land’ as well. The notion of ‘land’ plays a different role, and is transmitted through different discourses, in the two cases (at the two ‘levels’). In addition, while related, we have to maintain a distinction between the cultural notion of land (which, as with other cultural elements within ethnic identities, has to be examined in each specific case), the ‘imagined’ space, and the ‘thing’, land that can be occupied and utilised productively. These and other dimensions would provide most informative studies in themselves, as well as in comparative studies of claims for restoration and restitution from aboriginal/indigenous inhabitants in South Africa, Australia, Canada and the USA.

Ethnicity, community, and the people:
The terms ‘community’ and ‘the people’ often serve in political rhetoric in South Africa. For analytical purposes they need to be subjected to scrutiny. However, that task largely moves beyond the specific aim of this work. I wish to deal with just one example of the use of the term ‘community’ because it is frequently implicitly used as a synonym for ethnic group. That example is of the ‘Indian community’ - as in the sentence ‘... sociologist Yunus Carrim said there were people within the Indian community who were anxious about their future, but so too were people within all communities within South Africa’ (Natal Witness, 19 Jun 91).

The Natal Indian Congress, formed in 1894, has served within the alliance of resistance organisations within South Africa to give expression to demands for political participation by its members in the central parliament. Nearly a century later, when the ‘Indian community’ was to be given secondary representation through the tri-cameral system introduced in the 1980s, the NIC and Transvaal Indian Congress were at the forefront of opposition to such incorporation into apartheid reform measures. The Indian Congresses were part, and remained part into post-election South Africa, of a broader alliance of racialised (‘racially’ specific) Congress organisations.

However, the retention of the ‘Indian’ label while engaged in a struggle for ‘non-racialism’ came in for strong criticism, and still does, as post-February 1990 they decided to continue with their ‘community-based’ existences. The criticisms were set out earlier in an article by Singh and Vawda (1988). The authors argued that the history of the NIC showed ‘a conceptualization of the oppressed people as racially segmented’, while the organisation’s presentation of its own history ‘expresses the notion of community as being a homogeneous and unified whole...’ (1988:5). So in
this sense the mobilising call to 'the community' is similar to the populist, levelling aspect of ethnic mobilisation discussed above.

There is no doubt that the descendants of the people who initially arrived as Indian indentured labourers and who were subsequently joined by traders and professionals have experienced many levels of common oppression and discrimination, even if exploitation was not shared by all. However, I would argue that the common features arose out of a racialised identity or categorisation ('the Indian community') that originated in the specific historical introduction to Natal in the nineteenth century and the existing and subsequent racist policies of colonial and South African governments. This 'racial' identity could, however, be, and frequently is fragmented by ethnic divisions that rest on religion for coherence. 'The past' is not strong enough as a common factor to hold the 'Indian community' together as an ethnic group. As Fatima Meer had written:

[Indian South Africans'] feelings of common identity was to an important extent thrust upon them by their very precarious position as a minority. Surrounding non-Indians saw them as a single political and status entity... Yet, despite their integration into a community, the dependents of the three streams of immigrants from Bombay, Calcutta and Madras, continue to maintain, to some considerable extent, the cultural differences that marked them in India, and are thereby divided into a number of sub-groups, most conspicuously recognisable by language and religion (1969:60-61).

'Community', whether used in this wide sense to refer to 'Indian' people in South Africa, or to smaller residential or geographic units, should not be taken for granted as common-sense expressions of group belonging. As with ethnicity the question should rather be asked as to the situational relevance of the term for participants or members, and the specific content given to it.

On the other hand, the appeal to 'community' may well serve to provide a situational cohesion that cuts across ethnic divisions - this has been the case with some residentially-constituted appeals to 'community'. The ideological notion of 'the people', while similarly problematic as an analytical category, may serve under certain circumstances to bond rather than fragment (see Saul, 1973; Laclau, 1977; Maré, 1984).

In this chapter ethnicity has been defined and the process initiated of making it more complex than common usage would indicate. The notion is distinguished from other
concepts that would seem to overlap or which are confused with ethnicity, a necessary task in formulating a useful definition to be employed in the rest of the study. In the next chapter a more satisfactory, because complexly articulated with other identities, conceptualisation of ethnicity and ethnic social identity is developed.
CHAPTER THREE
ETHNIC STORY OR ETHNIC STORIES

There is no single, unified, commonly-shared ethnic identity among all members of an ethnic group. The various ethnic stories, despite general acceptance of the broad 'principles' informing each one, are shaped by social categories that, in addition, may assume the form of identities in their own right. Second, these various identities articulate, mutually reinforcing or contradicting each other. Third, identities are subject to what C Wright Mills called 'biographies', experiences of the 'individual as biographical entity' (1971:15), the unique bearer of social identities but always in social relations (see Campbell, 1992:35). Fourth, ethnic identities wax and wane and even disappear and change (see Waters, 1990, for analysis of material relevant to this point in the USA). As d'Entreves writes, the 'process of identity-construction is never given once and for all, and is never unproblematic. Rather, it is a process of constant renegotiation and struggle...' (1992:158).

While a distinction has been made throughout between politically mobilised ethnicity and ethnicity as social identity this should not be read as arguing that the latter is separate from any notion of power. On the contrary, the discussion below well illustrates that identities relate to power, as does politically mobilised ethnicity, but in the latter case to institutionally-located power. Pettman, for example, notes that '(p)lurality needs to be placed within the structure of power relations' (1992:136). Campbell criticises Social Identity Theory for failing 'to accommodate the societal level of analysis, ignoring the fact that group memberships are located against the background of a social hierarchy of unequal power relations' (1992:38). I would go further and say that it is not just a 'background' of power relations but, as Campbell's own study shows, that unequal power relations are embedded in social identities.

While the primary focus of this thesis (within the case study presented in chapter four) is on attempts by ethnic brokers to provide a single version of what it means to be ethnic subjects, the attempt that is essential to ethnicity mobilised under a political banner, I also need to discuss the factors that divide and that shape different calls and experiences of ethnic stories - ethnicity as social identity. In addition, there is the need to isolate and stress the different ways in which subjects are interpellated even within a single ideological discourse, depending on sex, age, class, 'race', and biography. If
Ideologies, the creation of the stories by which we live our everyday lives, tell us, relate us, and make us recognise 'what exists', 'what is good', and 'what is possible' (Therborn, 1980:18), then it does so differently for men and women, for the young and the old, etc. They exist in different power relations to each other within the same social identity. I will deal with some of these differences in this chapter.

If, as Laclau argued (1977a:101), the 'unifying principle of an ideological discourse is the "subject" interpellelated and thus constituted through this discourse', then those subjects are at the centre of the articulation of various identities, and each ethnic identity is criss-crossed by such elements as religion, age, gender, 'race', by personal biographies. Laclau also referred to the existence of
different types of interpellelations (political, religious, familial, etc.)
which co-exist whilst being articulated within an ideological discourse
in a relative unity... By unity we must not necessarily understand
logical consistency - on the contrary, the ideological unity of a
discourse is perfectly compatible with a wide margin of logical
inconsistency - ... (1977a:102).

These 'impingements' on the ethnic identity offer other identities as appropriate to
deal with certain or even the same situations, and/or give unique form to the manner
in which the broad 'imagined community' is acted out by the individual. It is after all
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These 'impingements' on the ethnic identity offer other identities as appropriate to
deal with certain or even the same situations, and/or give unique form to the manner
in which the broad 'imagined community' is acted out by the individual. It is after all
individuals who respond to the socialisation and the interpellelations that make up, that
create, social identities. There are, indeed, imaginnings of the imagined community.

The stories of ethnicity are criss-crossed by many injunctions, some of them shared
with most or all other members of the ethnic group (especially in its mobilised form,
where a common discourse is directed at creating a single perspective of both self and
other). However, some are located within individual experience, or within specifically
differentiated social and/or structural experiences shaped by gender, ethnicity, 'race'
and class (see Campbell et al. 1993). It would be a mistake to take the discourses of
mobilisation of ethnic identities as reflecting homogeneity within the 'community' to
which appeals are directed. On the contrary, not only are the strictly ethnic elements
articulated in a variety of ways, but these elements are also gendered, 'classed', and
'aged', etc. David Harvey argues, from the perspective of a more complex class
analysis than economic determinism, that it is required that theoretical development
should occur in several areas, the first and foremost being that:
The treatment of difference and 'otherness' not as something to be
added on to more fundamental Marxist categories (like class and
productive forces), but as something that should be omni-present
from the very beginning in any attempt to grasp the dialectics of social change (1992:355, emphasis added).

I have previously argued that Inkatha's mobilisation is in many respects ethnic-populist, and that the claims made for populism can be extended as well to ethnicity, namely that 'all antagonism [is transformed] into simple difference' (Laclau, 1977:173; also Maré, 1984:24; Raby, 1983:15; McCaul, 1983:61; Salecl, 1994:215; Pettman, 1992:vii, 4). This covert (and sometimes even overt) aspect of mobilisation is as powerful in creating rigidities as is the overt selection of events and interpretations that characterise the centrally propagated, and singular, ethnic story of the mobilisers.

Patel (1991) argued, strongly, against the 'powerful myth' of multiculturalism, and against the position 'that "ethnic minority communities" [in Britain in this case] are homogeneous entities, without internal divisions, acting in complete unison in the face of racism' (1991:209). The effect of this argument for internal homogeneity, implied by the multi-culturalism approach, is that 'those who have benefited are the conservative, orthodox and often fundamentalist forces within our communities, while those who are the least powerful, such as women, lose out' (1991:210). She concluded:

The task ahead is twofold: to resist constructions of our identities which fix us in immutable and essentialist moulds, and to create a new political agenda, away from one based on simple "shared oppression", towards a shared strategy for change which reflects the multi-layered realities of our existence (1991:213).

The indications are there. We have to guard against an unexamined acceptance of ethnicity as internally devoid of several interpretations and of conflict, and that conflict and antagonism is only located in inter-ethnic relations, and not also in intra-ethnic relations. Ethnicity, as with other social identities, carries its own contradictions. The importance of this argument is that cross-cutting identities and interests can serve to dilute the apparent inviolable strength of ethnic mobilisation.

**Ethnicity and class**

In 1977 Ernesto Laclau published an essay in which he argued towards a theory of populism. That contribution to the debate on ideology and the relationship between class and ideologies was very influential on my own work on Inkatha and its mobilisation of a population using an ethnic-populist discourse, with 'the people'
Laclau wrote that to avoid crude reductionism in analyses of mobilising ideologies such as nationalism and populism we have to differentiate, first, between 'the general problem of class determination of political and ideological superstructures, and the forms of existence of classes at the level of these superstructures' (1977:158, emphases original). Without entering into the debate on the architectural metaphor of base and superstructure we can still follow Laclau's argument. He said that class determination did not establish the form in which this determination is exercised', and, importantly for my own position, argued that not 'every ideological and political element has a necessary class belonging' (1977:158-9, emphases original). Laclau continued:

If classes are present at the ideological and political levels - since relations of production maintain the role of determination in the last instance - and if the contents of ideology and of political practice cease to be the necessary forms of existence of classes at these levels, the only way of conceiving this presence is to say that the class character of an ideology is given by its form and not by its content. What does the form of an ideology consist of? ... the answer is in the principle of articulation of its constituent interpellations. The class character of an ideological discourse is revealed in what we would call its specific articulating principle (Laclau, 1977:160, emphases original).

Ethnicity, as is the case with nationalism or populism, is, therefore, not necessarily a class ideology in content in the process of mobilisation. What needs to be done in each case is to examine not only the various elements that together make up the ideological appeal and the content of the ethnic social identity, but also to take account of the 'specific articulating principle' that gives it its class form. One of the most important such formative methods, as argued above, is that of 'transforming... all antagonism into simple difference' (Laclau, 1977:173).

Laclau used this phrase in relation to the ideological interpellations of the ideology of the dominant class, and it is in that way that I used it in the earlier paper (Maré, 1984) and that Salecl (1994:215) used it in her discussion of Serbian nationalism. However, I would wish to extend that claim to other dimensions of the ethnic discourse, specifically that of gender relations (see below), where the domination of men over women is also presented as 'simple difference', sanctioned by 'tradition'.
In studies of social relations and the development of analytical paradigms to apply to African societies there has sometimes been what John Saul termed 'crudely polarize(d) ethnic analysis and class analysis' (1979:392). This means that frequently those who hold to an explanatory framework that rests on class analysis deny the validity of ethnicity as an explanatory factor for people's actions and social interaction, or else ethnicity is relegated to a mere unfolding of class relations - the specific form that class conflict takes. On the other hand, by opponents of an marxist approach, ethnicity is frequently advanced as providing the obvious lie to those who would argue for class conflict as the major tool for understanding societies. The momentous events in eastern Europe, in this perspective, have apparently confirmed that ethnic and nationalist sentiments are the enduring motivations for human social action. How, then, do 'Marxist and other progressive writers' approach this 'minefield', as Saul calls the phenomenon of 'tribalism' (or ethnicity, in this case)?

In the first place the two social relationships function on different levels. Ellen Meiksins Wood (1990:64), in a discussion of the notion of 'civil society' warned against the implications of 'a particular method' of focusing attention on the legitimate and frequently neglected areas of 'human experience' and 'social movements, not based on class', as well as on 'social identities'. That particular method would be an indiscriminate pluralism, or 'conceptual portmanteau', as Wood describes it, an approach that leaves a fragmented world 'with no over-arching power structure, no totalizing unity, no systemic coercions - in other words, no capitalist system, with its expansionary drive and its capacity to penetrate every aspect of social life' (1990:65).
In other words, she argued, the system of production and of exploitation remains capitalist, even though not all aspects can be reduced to class relationships and interests.

Class has its structural location in the 'hidden' economic relations that centre around production. At its simplest level, therefore, the existence of classes derive from differentiated control over the means of production - under capitalism a few own the means of production and thereby gain control over both machinery and over direct producers. That does not mean that workers will necessarily act as workers, at all times acting in such a way as to advance material interests against other class interests, and definitely not exclusively as workers - there are powerful interests and stories outside of class relations. In other words, classes may exist without class agents (such as the working class) acting in a way informed by class-specific social identities (the most obvious, and frequently cited, example is that of hundreds of thousands of members of the working class voting for conservative governments). This position has always been acknowledged in attempts to explain either 'false
consciousness', or the inability of the numerically-superior working class to use democratic political rights within struggles to overthrow the capitalist system.

Ethnic groups, on the other hand, do not exist outside of social identity. To refer back to Anderson's (1983) notion of 'the nation' as 'imagined community', an ethnic group does not exist outside of 'the imagination'. There is no structured position in society that determines an individual's membership of an ethnic group. An ethnic group may, or may not, exist. The fundamental relationship in society remains, therefore, a class relationship, without claiming an essential course of action associated with membership of a class.

This does not deny the need to contextualise ethnicity within a context of material conditions and class relations - a full understanding of any social identity demands such contextualisation. Political or economic mobilisation of ethnic sentiments occur within a context of class relations and class power. Ethnic mobilisation frequently occurs in situations of uneven development, of colonial exploitation, and of political and economic domination. This factor has to form part of the investigation of the origins of ethnic identity, the re-awakening of ethnic sentiments, and the operation of ethnic manipulators. To return to Laclau, he wrote (1977a:160) that nationalism (as an example),

Considered in itself... has no class connotation. The latter only derives from its specific articulation with other ideological elements...

He then referred to Bismarck's and Mao's nationalisms so as to illustrate his argument, and asks the question, with direct applicability to the discussion here on ethnicity,

Is it the case that nationalism refers to such diverse contents that it is not possible to find a common element of meaning in them all? Or rather is it that certain common nuclei of meaning are connotatively linked to diverse ideological-articulatory domains?... If, therefore, the second solution - which we consider to be the correct answer - is accepted, it is necessary to conclude that classes exist at the ideological and political level in a process of articulation and not of reduction (1977a:160-1, emphasis in original).

The elements, the particular mix of elements within an ethnic identity, as argued earlier, cannot be reduced to class, and may have no necessary class belonging. At the same time there is a sufficiency of 'a common element of meaning' in all instances of ethnicity to justify the use of the term, without denying the various ways in which ethnicity can be articulated with class ideological practices.
The second major point I wish to make in relation to class and ethnicity is that the relationship between ethnicity and the way in which people organise society around production is tenuous and mediated - analysis demands that we move between the two investigations, of structure and of identities (which includes class identities - which are not the same as class structure or class positions within production), to arrive at a fuller and more satisfying picture. Thus, for example, Patrick Wright presents Agnes Heller's argument on class and 'every-day life', and writes:

while everyone belongs to a class..., the lived relationships of everyday life are not in themselves class relationships. The crucial point, then, is that while everyday life is indeed moulded and delimited by social structure, it does not in itself simply express this social structure (1985:7-8, emphasis added; also see Smith, 1981:43).

At the same time, the powerful mobilising field of ethnic symbols is frequently entered by politicians operating with a class-specific agenda - to hide the class interests of the 'cultural entrepreneurs'; to paper over horizontal stratifications and conflicts, such as those of class and gender, through a kind of ethnic populism; and to directly advance the class interests of the mobilisers.

If the power of ethnic social identity lies in its potential to mobilise, then the power of class, and of some other identities, are perceived by mobilisers to lie in their potential fragmentation or dilution of the politicised ethnic identity. Hence, class-specific ethnic mobilisation frequently operates through the explicit denial of class interests or gender divisions, re-articulating them as difference, fixing them in a set of practices that are presented as unchallengeable - here, once again, the power of the 'the past' plays a role. Such re-articulation can give rise to an ethnic populism characterised by calls to the 'Afrikaner people', or the 'Zulu people', in the same way that there are racialised populisms or nationalisms addressing the 'African people'.

I have already referred to the way in which Afrikaner ethnic mobilisers aimed to subsume worker identity and the divisions of class within Afrikaner identity. "What I do here I do as a worker, but I do it in the service of my nation", wrote Dr Diederichs in 1937 (quoted Moodie, 1980:169). O'Meara commented in his analysis of volkskapitalisme (people's or ethnic capitalism) that:

As Lenin pointed out time and again, the specific forms of organisation (and Gramsci would add, ideology) of various class forces are a vital element in the determination of the manner in which the temporary resolution of class contradictions takes place... This
study then seeks to explore the material conditions, contradictions and struggles in the development of capitalism in South Africa which gave rise to 'Afrikaner nationalism' (Afrikaner ethnic mobilisation) as the (...) form in which specific class forces came to be organised...
(1983:3).

One cannot take the 'organic unity' of the Afrikaner group (or any ethnic group, for that matter) for granted, as so vividly illustrated in the recent past, with splits in the late-1960s (when the Herstigte Nasionale Party was formed) and a multitude of far-right groups being formed in the 1980s and 1990s, each claiming to represent the soul of Afrikanerdom. Such fissures reappeared in what was a crisis period for Afrikaners during the late-1980s and early-1990s, when new identities were being shaped (or, rather, rearticulated), new identities that formed the bases for power struggles (see, for example, Van Rooyen, 1994; and the contributions in Friedman and Atkinson (ed), 1994).

However, Afrikaner ethnic mobilisation was not only concerned about the potentially divisive effects of class identities and organisation, but also aimed to win over the working class to capitalism - albeit an ethnic variant presented as 'volkskapitalisme'. As Moodie commented (1980:203), what the Afrikaner 'had therefore to do was not overthrow capitalism but to seize his (sic) rightful share of the fruits thereof'. As one of the mobilisers into volkskapitalisme, Professor EP du Plessis, argued:

'... the new ethnic movement is intended to prevent the further destruction of the Afrikaner People in an effort to adjust to a foreign capitalist system, and intends rather to mobilize the People to conquer this system and to transform it so that it fits our ethnic nature' (quoted Moodie, 1980:204).

This is similar to Inkatha's arguments for 'African communalism' as the basis for an economic system (see Maré, 1984; Maré and Hamilton, 1987:chapter 6). Ethnic flexibility or reinterpretation to suit economic relations is dealt with above (in the case of the Tsonga).

**Ethnicity and gender**

Gender refers to the social roles attributed to men and women and the relationship that exists between men and women, as they have been socialised into those discrete roles. When we examine the gender aspect of ethnic group formation it is, therefore, necessary to question the characteristics attributed to both male and female ethnic subjects, both the 'warrior' and the 'mother of the nation'.

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Gender relations occupy a similar status to that of class, where the structured position is that created by sexual (biological) differences. As in the case of class this does not necessarily say anything determining about the actions of agents or the historically-specific form that gender relations or gender identities will take, but it does provide an apparently determining 'essence' on which to construct attributes.

Ethnic mobilisation is never gender neutral. Campbell (1992:46) wrote:

gender is more usefully conceived of as a set of ideological power relationships underlying all group memberships in a patriarchal social order, in such a way that group memberships present men and women with a systematically different set of behavioural possibilities and constraints (emphasis original).

The constitution of ethnic social identities occurs within the general social relations of society. Furthermore, the few examples referred to above clearly illustrate the hierarchical relationship that accompanies 'tradition' and 'traditional' roles that are ascribed to men and women within the ethnic project.

This locally under-researched and under-theorised area, the gender dimension of ethnicity, is further complicated by the presentation by males of ethnic homogeneity or of a generally unproblematic clarity and fixedness to, and acceptance of, the roles ascribed to males and females within the ethnic group. The case of the Tsonga (discussed above) illustrates that such presentation should not be accepted at face value. Furthermore, the gender dimension of ethnic group formation needs to be historically situated. As Walker (1990a:26) noted:

... it should... be clear that a static and culture-bound understanding of gender is inadequate... The meaning of 'woman' [also in ethnic terms] was not the same in precolonial as it was in twentieth century southern Africa [and nor was that of 'man'];... The differences went beyond obvious ones in the type of work and responsibilities assigned to women, to encompass the structural significance of the sexual division of labour within these societies, as well as the social meaning assigned to women's roles (emphasis added).

That meaning is assigned not only by the participants (male and female) in the ethnic social identity, but also by those who stand outside of it. The term, and the labelling of what is deemed 'ethnic', proliferates in fashion, food, and tourism, to name but a few areas, and in many cases it reflects what outsiders want to sell rather than a version acceptable to those who are part of the ethnic group. It may, of course, become
'acceptable', integrated into identity over time. It may well be that these images coalesce around a 'new tradition'. Women feature pertinently in the 'ethnic sales drive', partly because they feature in certain specific roles within the various ethnic identities being sold (they feature in many aspects of the 'exotic'), and partly because images of women are in any case essential within the general advertising of commodities in contemporary capitalist society. In the next chapter I examine the stereotypical roles within which Zulu men are presented (by insiders and outsiders) as a 'warrior nation'.

The family is a strong element in ethnic mobilisation, serving to reinforce not only authority of age and parents but of the gender hierarchy that exists in this social institution. The ideal of the family provides a notion of continuity, stability and order. For example, within Afrikaner ethnic mobilisation, the family as patriarchal, conservative and religious unit was stressed as an element binding the ethnic group: *In ons volkswording het die hutsgesin so 'n sentrale plek ingeneem en in die bepaling van die kultuur van ons nasie was dit sodanig van deurslaggewende betekens dat die Afrikanerdom met reg as 'n by uitstek 'familiale' volk bestempel kan word* (In the formation of our ethnic group the family played such a central role and in the determination of the culture of our nation it was of such cardinal importance that the Afrikaner nation can justifiably be called an essentially 'familial' ethnic group) (Cronje, 1945:309; also Botha, 1952:222-3).

Rachel Holmes (1993:12) noted the use of 'the language of the political family to authorize the right to protect social-subjects...' (emphasis added). She was referring to the homophobic manner in which Winnie Mandela (briefly deputy minister of arts science and technology) justified her actions in 'saving' three young men and a boy ('Stompie' Seipel, who was murdered after his kidnapping) from alleged sexual abuse - "What should I have done about Reverend Paul Verryn raping our children?" - where the 'our' clearly refers to the African 'family' (1993:12; also see Lawson, 1993, on this case). The notion of the 'political family' accurately captures an aspect of ethnic mobilisation, namely the attempt to clearly allocate gender and age roles within the social grouping and simultaneously to give it the common-sense stamp of approval that 'the family' enjoys within society. How often are the terms 'mother' and 'father' of 'the nation' used in different contexts and times?

In the next chapter I will give another example of the horrifying consequences of the 'disobedience' of children within this politicised ethnic family.
Ethnicity and ‘race’

The authors Phlzacklea and Miles wrote that

Viewed historically, the ‘race’ concept has tended to be used when people are being classified in terms of their physical characteristics: thus, if a population consists of two groups which are clearly physically distinguishable, and significance is attached to some aspect of this distinguishability, it is usually concluded that the two groups belong to different ‘races’ (1980:21).

Despite the commitment by most political organisations in South Africa to a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic future, the common-sense of the existence of ‘races’ permeates every facet of our society and accusations of racism often serve to explain the actions of individuals and groups, with little evidence being presented. It needs little to break through the slogans and to expose the manner in which the laudable commitment has little content and no programme. Most people believe that ‘races’ exist, even if only in the weakest sense of a signification of physical differences, at present largely a categorisation based on skin colour. Many, if not most, also accept that these physical differences are linked to certain cultural attributes, patterns of behaviour, ability, and so on. These beliefs inform their actions, as do the many structures and practices that form the racialised sediment of post-apartheid South Africa.

Robert Miles has argued that a discourse of ‘race’ ‘in the everyday world’, having lost all serious validity in the biological sciences where genetics has replaced it, rests on a process of signification. This refers to ‘the representational process by which meanings are attributed to particular objects, features and processes’. To arrive at a notion of ‘race’ two selections are made in the process of signification: the first selects physical features ‘as a means of classification and categorisation’ of people; the second selection is from the range of ‘somatic characteristics’ which signify ‘a supposed difference between human beings’ (1990:70-71). These ‘races’ are then frequently deemed to have distinct cultural characteristics - really a third level of selection and signification.

When ‘social relations between people have been structured by the signification of human biological characteristics in such a way as to define and construct differentiated social collectivities’ a process of racialisation has occurred. These relations vary historically (Miles, 1990:75). Racism then refers to a process of racialisation where ‘the group so identified must be attributed with additional,
negatively evaluated characteristics and/or must be represented as inducing negative consequences for any other' (Miles, 1990:79).

Using Miles' argument, we can see quite clearly how racialisation occurred in South Africa, leading to policies based essentially on the supposed existence of 'races', where in addition, and essentially, practices of racism permeated and still permeate much of social and inter-personal relations, structures and policies (see Maré, 1995). The ideological and organisational practices of resistance tended to operate within the same terrain of racialised social and political interaction, with the Congress Alliance of the 1950s involving a 'multiracial' alliance of four 'racial' organisations. In this regard, it is interesting to note that Robert Sobukwe of the splinter Pan-Africanist Congress argued that 'multi-racialism' perpetuated divisions and that 'there is but one race, the human race' (see Lodge, 1983:85; Pogrund, 1990). The present PAC and other Africanist positions are, however, despite the veneer of socialist rhetoric in some cases, racialised perceptions of social relations. In the case of the PAC this apparently all-encompassing approach, as articulated by Sobukwe, has not translated into consistent organisational practice or discourse.

Racialisation occurs on the basis of the signification of physical characteristics. This is very different from the basis of ethnicity. As diverse ethnic groups can exist within nations, so ethnic groups can exist within the racialised collectivity. It is probable that all members of an ethnic group will belong to a single racialised social unit, but this is not the essence. While all members of the 'Zulu nation' are black or African, for example (although symbolic exceptions have been made), the Afrikaner ethnic group has come under frequent assault through the need to define the position of coloured people who in all essential aspects, except that of 'race', qualify for inclusion. It can be expected that the plastic and elastic boundaries of Afrikanerdom will be stretched under the new mobilising strategies of the National Party where the Afrikaans language has already come to play a central role in the mobilisation of a constituency since 1990.

On the other hand a clearly racialised alternative Afrikaner identity (such as that of 'Boerenaste') will contract and rigidify the boundaries, as it had for much of the past of this ethnic group. For example, it was unambiguously stated in the publication commemorating the completion of the then major symbol of ethnic mobilisation, the Voortrekker Monument, that this 'volk' was 'blank' (white) (not 'European' but 'white'). Summarising the content of messages sent to the monument from all over South Africa it was stated:

_Die handhawing van 'n blanke beskawing in Suid-Afrika tot in die_
The 'Indian community', discussed briefly above, reflects the racialisation of social relations in South Africa and not the existence of an 'Indian' ethnic group. That process was both the mirror image of the racialisation of exploitation by colonial and white-ruled South Africa, and also necessary to provide a wider oppositional (to apartheid) constituency than that allowed if ethnic (including centrally the issues of religion and language) and class divisions were to have shaped organisational strategy. While attempts continue to be made to racialise this population, by several political parties, including the NP and the ANC, who address their appeals to 'the Indian community', intense religious antagonism came to the fore between Muslims and Hindus during 1995 within KwaZulu-Natal.

**Ethnicity and age**

If the political family is characterised (permeated) by specific gender relations, then it is also shaped by notions of age and a hierarchy of generations. This is an extremely under-researched area within ethnic studies (many anthropological studies could, however, be examined to extract the wider implications of their findings). Only a few comments will be made at this point, with an illustration in the next chapter. Here, as elsewhere in this study, the distinction between the mobilising discourse around ethnicity and the actual 'every-day life' stories of ethnic identity has to be kept in mind. The former may well reflect, but also shape or present an 'ideal type' of the relationship between generations, the status of the old or the young. Furthermore, the position attributed to old and young men and women is not the same - age is gendered.

In his study of Tsonga-speakers on the then Transvaal lowveld, Stadler noted the 'cultural construction of age categories... while ageing is a biological process, age categories are not reducible to physiology' (1994:1). He wrote that 'age categories are elaborated upon and acquire meaning in terms of cultural knowledge', and that these...
categories display an apparent inappropriateness within contemporary local life. The people whom he studied cast current events and experiences into a traditional mould.

The use of tradition in defining age stages can be seen as a conservative response to change which threatens to transform generational relations (1994:2).

Stadler's case study illustrates the ruptures that are already present.

If women are frequently presented within the discourses of nationalism and ethnicity as 'mothers of the nation' then children occupy an ambiguous position between being interpellated as givers of respect to their elders, and simultaneously as being at the forefront of change and ensuring that goals are achieved or protected. Old people also occupy specific positions within different ethnic groups.

Ken Blakemore and Margaret Boneham's (1994) book deals with 'age, race and ethnicity' among immigrant black communities in Britain. They noted, for example, that age differences have meant different life experiences - 'one generation's or cohort's experience of history and of old age will be different from that of succeeding generations' (1994:57). While older people from the Caribbean islands have only recently come to identify with the term 'West Indian' (having thought of themselves rather as 'Barbadian', 'Jamaican', etc, an 'island identity'), younger immigrants have had different experiences ('independence from colonial rule, ... the West Indian Federation (....) and the development of Black Consciousness and "black" identity...').

So while an 'ethnic group' [the inverted commas indicating awareness of a more complex notion of ethnic group used by the authors] such as 'Afro-Caribbean' may be defined as one which shares a common past or history, it is important to remember that the past has different meanings for different age groups (Blakemore and Boneham, 1994:57, emphasis added).

This is a specific case of immigrant people, but the case holds for other situations as well. We could examine each of the aspects in the definition of ethnicity proposed in the previous chapter to illustrate the generationally-specific experience of them - language, dress, 'the past', perceptions of other groups, and so on.

Campbell (1992), in her study of social identity construction and action amongst Zulu-speaking township youths, provides an insight into the complexity of
Inter-generational relations. For example, the notion of 'respect' (\textit{ukuhlonipha}) plays a large role within the ethnic mobilisation employed by Inkatha, as essential to Zuluness (see chapter four). Campbell, however, found that while 'respectful inter-generational relations', centred around the family, did

at a superficial level... appear to be the central guide of youth’s behaviour... closer examination of the interview material revealed evidence of a range of subtle challenges..., with alternative possibilities being provided by a range of competing group memberships... (1992:276).

Her interviews show convoluted adaptations of the notion of respect and justifications for contradictory behaviour. In one case a young man said that

the current political conflict in the township made it necessary to be selective regarding those adults one would obey. He said it would go against his political principles to treat an Inkatha member with respect (1992:279).

Conclusion

It is not possible to talk of the 'age dimension' of ethnicity (in the same way that it is not possible to speak of the 'gender aspect' of ethnicity). Ethnic identities are inextricably informed by perceptions and social practices shaped by age, as they are by gender. Identities are possible to label, and are frequently so labelled by the 'holders', but they have to be theorised and investigated as articulated composites that are gendered, 'aged', 'classed', etc. Campbell (1992:315) writes that 'while it is possible to isolate gender from race and class for analytical purposes, in the "real world" these three sets of power relations are inextricably intertwined'. Similarly Pettman notes that 'Gender is constituted in and through racial and cultural difference, and race and cultural difference are experienced in gendered form' (1992:15).

Further work needs to be undertaken on the articulation of ethnic, gender, class, generational and racialised identities. We have to understand these processes if we are to formulate the correct strategies to make the noble and essential goals of a democratic South Africa realisable, a society that claims that it is constructing a 'multi-cultural (but non-'racial') nation'. More studies are required to understand the specificities of the social construction of these articulated identities - studies that will be essential if we are to reconstruct them, or at least allow the conditions for change.
These studies have, in addition, to take account of the two dimensions of ethnic identities, namely that of social identity in everyday life, and ethnic identities mobilised. The articulations are different within each domain, and have to be approached differently; the former, for example, through examining the many facets of socialisation (the creation of the stories that guide us through everyday life) and the interpellations of mobilisation (that 'petrifies' social relations with a clarity that they lack in daily discourse).
CHAPTER FOUR
ZULUNESS MOBILISED

Introduction

On 1 May 1986 the Inkatha movement launched a pro-capitalist trade union amid great media fanfare. The next day newspapers reported that a poll conducted by the University of South Africa in 1985, ten years after Inkatha had been formed, had shown that Pretoria businessmen preferred chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi to president PW Botha as leader. Clearly Inkatha's message was reaching one of its most coveted audiences. Buthelezi had not always been received so well, even by this obviously conservative audience, but through persistent effort he had managed to present a picture of himself as a man offering a commodity that is increasingly valued by certain interests - it is not for nothing that he had described himself as a politician of the 'marketplace'.

In the view of some very influential reformers, in the mid-1980s, the Inkatha movement had an essential role to play in a changing South Africa. This was partly due to the way in which chief Buthelezi had made himself and his followers available (with an added perception of being indispensable) to conservative reformers. Whereas ten years before Buthelezi and the National Cultural Liberation Movement, Inkatha, were perceived to be part of the radical opposition to apartheid and his approaches for participation were scorned, by the mid-1980s the same overtures, in the context of other contextual changes, had gained a level of acceptance by the state and even by business that would have been unthinkable in the mid-1970s. It is not that Buthelezi's position had changed much, but that under pressure there were more takers for what he had to offer.

The same Afrikaans-language newspapers that criticized Buthelezi as recently as 1983 when he opposed the new constitution now, two years later, advised that reform was all but impossible without his participation. The state that castigated and threatened him, and repeatedly attempted to undermine his position in the bantustan it had created under the apartheid vision of a fragmented South Africa, now nodded with approval at his local endeavours to ensure stability and profitability, and tentatively offered him a national role. Probably the USA government and large-scale economic
interests in South Africa had been most consistent in their support for Buthelezi and his actions over the years, especially over the decade after the formation of Inkatha. They, and the media they control or influence, had given both the man and the position that he holds greater coverage than any other opposition politician. The state’s direct involvement in aiding Inkatha’s political initiatives (such as funding for the Inkatha-initiated United Workers Union of SA, formed in 1986 to oppose the Congress of Trade Unions of SA, itself formed in 1985), and collaborating with Inkatha structures in violence on the ground, can be dated back to this time.

However, the same pressures that brought what Buthelezi had to offer into line with what a number of conservative interests now felt they needed were also rapidly making those offerings, those political commodities, inadequate to the times. It was the fear that they may already be obsolescent that had the business community scurrying to Lusaka to confer with the African National Congress, whose time was then perceptibly closer than at any other time in the 75 years of its existence to re-establish itself to a position of pre-eminence in influencing change in the country. While Buthelezi was not irrelevant to that change, he was probably being forced to define his position too clearly too soon, to reveal too many of the compromises he had had to make, to associate with the wrong interests (especially within the state ‘security’ forces), when political survival then depended on lack of clarity, on greater ambiguity and on fewer open compromises, the politics of closed door diplomacy and then the politics of consociational negotiations during the 1990s.

Broadly speaking, Buthelezi and Inkatha then stood for a ‘multi-racial’ capitalism untainted by apartheid; for the politics of non-violence towards the central state, and hence for negotiations with the current holders of power; for ‘constituency politics’, which increasingly had come to mean less democratic representation of interests and more control over members (an indispensable element in the politics of consociationalism that Buthelezi engaged in). The leader and his movement had come to represent ‘stability’, which in the context of mass insurrection had come to mean taking action against the many other organisations of resistance, and compromising on its own stated previous position, both in terms of the nature of the vote (away from demands for universal franchise) and of the structure of a future South Africa (away from a unitary state). It was clear that it is more in the detail than in the principles that the apparent gulf between Buthelezi and the state then lay, the National Party itself trying to find ways of lessening the damage of open and all-inclusive negotiations that were to follow on acknowledgements that apartheid had failed.
In the political 'marketplace' there are many competitors offering their ideas about change and attempting to gather a following to boost the relevance of their wares. The big prize at the time was acceptance within the 'reform' process, a future place in a South Africa that would not have been too radically altered. Those who would be indispensable then, it was thought, largely depended on the kind of future that could be shaped through reluctant and piecemeal concessions. Outside the 'marketplace' in the mid-1980s were the organisations carving a new South Africa through struggle ('ungovernability' and 'armed struggle'), largely rejecting the new facades that still rested firmly on the old foundations (SARS (ed), 1983).

There were competing notions of what the struggle for transformation in South Africa was about. To struggle for the vague constituency, 'the people', defined simply by their common (if variable) experience of domination, at that stage in South Africa's history was not as simple as it had been ten years before, when Inkatha was formed. Even when populist mobilization succeeded its hold was tenuous (as it is in the 1990s), open to alternative views of what holds people together and what sets them apart, and of what post-apartheid South Africa would look like. The specific role of the working class could not be unproblematically collapsed into populist mobilization. Buthelezi's populism, clearly class-specific, was the populism of the dominant classes (albeit within the black population commonly discriminated against) demanding a reordering of the alliances of capitalism rather than a populism directed against capitalism itself (on the class nature of populism, see Laclau, 1977; on Inkatha and populism, see Maré, 1978, 1984).

The Inkatha movement, inextricably tied as it was to the bantustan policy and the structures created under that policy, was subjected to the same buffeting and erosion by mass revolt that had been directed at the central organs and policies of racist and capitalist South Africa. This clarified many aspects of the movement, exposing what had been hidden, confirming what some had argued and suspected. Inkatha had also had to enter into new alliances as old ones fell away - the fickleness of opportunist politics has never made for long-term political friendships. For some supporters Inkatha offered the last hope for a peaceful, negotiated settlement, a settlement that would be based on acceptance of group rights. For the state, at least after 1986 and until 1990, it seemed to be the most hopeful partner in the first tentative steps beyond or away from the bantustan policy, steps aimed at bringing African people into the central power structure while maintaining a policy based on 'power-sharing' between 'groups' - a plurality of minorities. For millions nationally Inkatha was a sellout organisation. For hundreds of thousands of its members Inkatha, like any populist organisation, represented many options - they may belong to the same organisation,
but they had not all joined for the same reasons; the interpellations of mobilisation
drew responses depending on many factors, but the most important, the articulating
principle, was an appeal to 'Zulus' to stand together.

While the major focus of this study is on the period 1975 to 1986, the period during
which Inkatha was formed, struggled to establish itself and to counter central state
strategy, and had to change from a national goal (at least in part) to regional
consolidation, mention will also be made of continuities and change. In December
1990 the Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement changed its name to the
Inkatha Freedom party (IFP), as well as its structures and the qualifications for
membership, to attempt to again enter national politics (see Survey, 1991/92:32ff).
Section three of this chapter will include a brief overview of the first five years of the
1990s.

At the end of the decade of the 1980s, with the unbanning of the African National
Congress and other organisations, political relations in South Africa were irrevocably
altered. However, the increasing desirability of Inkatha (now the IFP) to conservative
forces had moved it into strategic alliances with, and into similar political space as
cpolitical actors to the right of the National Party. The 'unholy alliance' that preceded
the elections between these right-wing organisations, such as the Conservative Party
and the Ciskei and Bophuthatswana bantustan governments and governing parties,
was first known in 1992 as the Concerned South African Group (COSAG) and then
the Freedom Alliance (see Harber and Ludman (eds), 1994:326).

Of central importance to understanding the path along which Inkatha leaders have
steered the organisation is the distinction that is made within the organisation
between regional and national involvement and aspirations. This was as true during
the 1970s and the 1980s as it is now in the 1990s. This distinction can take many
forms (not all of them compatible and not consistent over time), such as that between
'Zulu' on the one hand, and 'African' on the other, or between 'ethnic group' and
'South African nation', 'KwaZulu/KwaZulu-Natal/Zulu kingdom' and 'South Africa'.
Chief Buthelezi expressed it like this in 1976:

We must accept regional politics as a reality which existed long before
we were conquered. The danger comes only when some people allow
themselves to be blinded by regional involvement to the exclusion of
any participation in the cause of all Blacks... (I)t is so much
poppycock... for people to imply that, being involved in regional
politics, one is necessarily undermining Black unity. The people in
these Reserve areas have to exist and they should be helped by us,
and we by them, in our attempts to eke out an existence, even within our dreary circumstances.

This means that we have to face the fact that we have day-to-day goals, as we have to live for 365 days each year and every year. On the other hand, we must have long-term goals which are in the interests of our common Black struggle in the whole of South Africa. *I have never been confused about the line between these two phases of our Black struggle* (KLAD 8, 1976:85-86, emphasis added).

This important statement draws attention to the tension between regional involvement (which Buthelezi equates in the excerpt with 'short-term day-to-day goals'), and national aspirations ('long-term goals'). This tension has, over the years, brought about many apparent ambiguities in the role that Inkatha and Buthelezi have played within South African politics, and has consciously been used to foster confusion. While Buthelezi claimed never to have been confused about the distinction he drew, this study shows that the nature of his involvement in regional politics, because it was ethnic politics, irrevocably tainted his claim to be involved in the interests of 'our common Black struggle'. What the quotation, and the approach that it illustrates, also shows is the direct link that is drawn between space and identity, a link that has been at the centre of Inkatha's political mobilisation, as well as of claims against the central authority (especially after 1986, and increasing in intensity in the 1990s).

This issue, of the local and the national as it relates to ethnic mobilisation, will form one part of the subject matter of this chapter. I will present a history of the Inkatha movement's strategies, especially of the first decade of its existence, strategies geared to organise an 'available' population into a circumscribed version of the shared social identity that existed among Zulu-speakers, in order to provide a context for a discussion of the use of ethnic symbols and ethnic mobilisation of a regional population generally.

Inkatha, as an integral part of apartheid's policy of ethnic separation, cannot be part of the successful transformation of South Africa into a new politics of diversity and of democracy - whether 'nation-building' can be that policy will be discussed in chapter five. Neither can Buthelezi successfully hold what he claims to be a 'traditional' leadership role within the 'Zulu nation' and at the same time fulfill a role within national politics that is compatible with the way in which he has defined, and been defined into, ethnicity. Inkatha's history, I argue, is the history of the dangers of political mobilisation of ethnic identities. The themes developed in the previous three
chapters are illustrated here through an investigation of the discourse of mobilisation employed in the Inkatha movement.

The region within which Buthelezi chose to wage the ‘day-to-day’ struggle on behalf of the population is largely confined within what became the province of Natal in the late-nineteenth century. Unless otherwise stated ‘Natal’, in this chapter, refers to the territory within provincial boundaries, including KwaZulu (the bantustan until 1994). The term ‘KwaZulu-Natal’ (KZN) is applied to the province created through the Interim Constitution under which elections took place in April 1994. Natal was one of the four provinces that were created within the Union of South Africa in 1910, while KZN is one of nine provinces created through the Interim Constitution. The Union brought together the Boer Republics that had been defeated in the Anglo-Boer war at the turn of the century and the Colonies of the Cape and Natal. It also integrated the African, coloured and Indian populations without their participation in deciding the form or the content of the new state.

Natal occupied an area of some 91 355 km$^2$, or 8.1% of the total land area of South Africa, but, with 20% of the total South African population resident there, it has a population density more than twice as high as the national average. These official figures for 1985 excluded the so-called ‘independent’ bantustans (see, for example, Survey, 1985:278-83). If these territories were taken into account Natal would have accounted for an even smaller percentage of the total land area of South Africa. Official figures are notoriously unreliable in South Africa, and past statistics are qualified by the policy contortions of apartheid. For example, the populations and the land area of the ‘independent’ bantustans (the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and the Ciskei) were excluded from national statistics. It is, therefore, frequently necessary to refer to unofficial counts and estimates. The bits and pieces that made up the KwaZulu administrative area totalled about 38% of the province’s land area, but accounted for 55% of its population. KwaZulu, as a political and spatial entity, was created in 1970 with the formation of the Zululand Territorial Authority (changed to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in 1972).

Most of South Africa’s Zulu-speaking population is concentrated in KZN (75% of the national total), while about 90% of Africans resident in the province are Zulu-speaking. The remainder are mostly Xhosa-speaking who live in and around the urban areas (The Buthelezi Commission, vol 1, nd:69-72). The African population of Natal in the 1980s was about 4.7-million (or 77% of the total population of the province). Official figures allocated about 3.9-million to KwaZulu and all but 700 000 of these to ‘rural’ KwaZulu. With the enormous and rapid movement of people into
'informal settlements' - shanties, slums, squatter areas around the Durban/Pinetown and Pietermaritzburg industrial areas - this last figure was clearly already a vast underestimate, even by the mid-1980s. Haarhoff (1985:39) argued that about 1.5-million Africans lived in an urban environment in the Natal region, 65% of them in the Durban metropolitan area.

Several processes were at work here. First, the state attempted to relocate as large a part of the African population as was possible to the bantustans, and to confine them there except for periods during which they sold their labour within 'white' South Africa. The bantustan land areas were legally established through the 1913 and 1936 'Land Acts', and given separate ethnic and political identity under the National Party (NP) government through, for example, the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959. Control over movement from the bantustans was attempted through influx control - the 'Pass Laws' (abolished in 1986). Second, there were African South Africans who attempted to establish a legal presence outside the bantustans, through so-called 'section 10' rights. 'Section 10' of the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act spelled out the strict conditions under which Africans may live outside the bantustans (see Horrell, 1978:174; Hindson, 1987). In Natal these 'rights' were frequently abolished through the administrative incorporation of townships, such as KwaMashu, into KwaZulu. While the residents of these townships were then located within the jurisdiction of KwaZulu they continued to live within daily commuting distance of the industrial areas situated within 'white' South Africa. The third process was the movement of people, in defiance of the law as it stood until 1986, from the bantustans to live in 'white' South Africa in order to be with family or to find employment.

Finally, there was the conglomeration of people into the urban areas of Natal, but still within the boundaries of KwaZulu. This movement had been motivated by a number of factors, probably the most important of which had been, and continues to be, the destitution of the outlying areas and the possibility (no matter how remote) of employment, or some other means of making money, closer to industrial and urban concentrations. In Natal such movement was possible without breaking the Pass Laws because of the proximity of pieces of KwaZulu land to industrial and urban areas. This was in contrast to the western Cape, where squatter camps such as Crossroads were hundreds of kilometers from the nearest bantustans, the Ciskei and the Transkei in the eastern Cape. The African residents of Crossroads were, therefore, always in contravention of influx control laws unless they had acquired 'section 10' status (see, for example, SPP, vol3, 1983; Platzky and Walker, 1985).
The distribution of KwaZulu's land also affected the number of people who commuted to work daily, rather than migrated to industrial areas within the province. Of a total of 1,329,000 African migrant workers in South Africa in 1981, 280,000 (or 21%) were from Natal (obviously not all were migrating to jobs within the region). This compares with 384,200 commuters in Natal, or 52% of the national total of 'frontier commuters employed in “white” areas' (Survey, 1983:138).

The Indian population of the province, having arrived primarily as indentured labour for the fledgling sugar industry in the 1860s, today comprises about 11% of Natal's population. This makes them the second largest 'population group', followed by whites (10%) and coloureds (1.5%). Both whites and Indians often provided the racialised, and class, 'other' in Zulu ethnic mobilisation.

Immediately after its annexation by the British in the mid-nineteenth century, Natal lacked a viable base on which a settler economy could be built, and was starved of financial resources. This changed with the planting of sugar. The first public sale of the crop occurred in 1856, and by the end of the decade sugar was being exported to the Cape colony. It was also at this time (1860) that the labour needs of the sugar growers forced them to look beyond the colony and to import indentured labour from India (for further discussion see below).

Both sugar and wattle, Natal's other major agricultural resource, were established and maintained over the years as extremely labour-repressive activities, with poverty wages and poor living conditions. This and the fact of foreign ownership made both industries the subject of critical enquiries into wages and working conditions during the 1970s and early-1980s.

African economic activity during the nineteenth century was not solely agriculturally based. As Etherington commented:

By the time of the Anglo-Zulu war, African Christian communities had not only established a flourishing peasant economy, but had also embarked upon entrepreneurial capitalist ventures on a significant scale.

He suggested that measures taken by white settlers to curb the economic activities of Africans through legislation were not so much designed to safeguard Whites against potential Black competition, but aimed rather to undo progress which had already been made. Moreover, it is at least arguable that the rise of
political activism and religious separatism at the end of the nineteenth century owed more to the loss of valued economic opportunities than to a newly awakened desire to compete on equal terms in the dominant society (1985:265).

Defence or promotion of commercial interests by a petty bourgeoisie claiming a 'Zulu identity' came to the fore both in the 1920s and the 1970s around 'Zulu' political movements - both called Inkatha. Agricultural activity became more and more difficult after the 1913 Land Act had frozen the acquisition of land by Africans. During the time of the first Inkata it was largely around agricultural activity, based on mission land and freehold farms, that the petty bourgeoisie consolidated and sought to safeguard their 'valued economic opportunities'. In the 1970s, trading and services were the areas of most rapid expansion, largely through the involvement of the state's Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC), which, by the 1990s, became the KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation (the KFC), under the control of the dominant party within the bantustan.

In the 1920s the worries and the woes of the African petty bourgeoisie were peripheralised within the growth of colonial and settler capitalism in the region (except when they were needed as allies in labour recruitment for larger concerns). The centre of the economy was provided by the sugar industry and the concerns that grew up around it (Sitas et al., 1984:6). This made for a regionally-specific economy, even if not an independent economy (see Marks, 1986:11), until the central state policy to stimulate a national capitalism started having its effects on Natal. After 1910, when the Union of South Africa came into being, 'the Natal bourgeoisie became part of a national bourgeoisie' (Marks, 1986:13). This was not a sudden event but a process, and for some time there was inter-capitalist conflict over the flow of labour from the atrocious conditions of the sugar, wattle, and coal industries in the province to the slightly better conditions of the Transvaal mines.

The process of incorporation through ownership and control took rapid strides during the decades starting from the 1960s. Sitas et al discussed 'some of the linkages which ultimately subordinate a large proportion of Natal's industry to the control of large national or foreign corporations' (1984:22). They found that with concentration and centralization of ownership and control of capital in South Africa generally, employment was stabilized, but this stability applied to a smaller and smaller proportion of the work force. Manufacturing output increased during the 1960s by 8.5% while employment in this sector grew by 5.6%. During the 1970s output grew by 5.4% and employment by a mere 2.8% (figures quoted Sitas et al, 1984:24).
Natal had not been exempt from this trend that had thrown about 25% of South Africa’s workforce (or 3-million people) out of work by the 1980s (Thomas, 1986).

Sitas et al argued that the maintenance of a relatively stable work force, linked to skill and length of employment, had occurred in Natal as well, with the concomitant unemployment on a fairly permanent basis especially of young entrants to the job market and people far removed from urban centres (1984:28; 48; also Maré, 1982).

Much productive activity remains regionally tied, though it is no longer correct to talk of a regionally specific capitalism. Access to the port, labour (at reasonable cost, with the appropriate skills, and preferably unorganised), water, decentralization subsidies, favourable climatic conditions, etc, all serve to favour one place against another for accumulation purposes. As Harvey noted:

The free flow of capital across the surface of the globe, for example, places strong emphasis upon the particular qualities of the spaces to which that capital might be attracted. The shrinkage of space that brings diverse communities across the globe into competition with each other implies localized competitive strategies and a heightened sense of awareness of what makes a place special and gives it a competitive advantage (1992:271).

Probably the most important aspect of regional preference during the period of Inkatha’s growth (the 1970s and 1980s), at present and in the foreseeable future, is that of stability, or the lack of it. It is in this context that the ‘regional options’ such as the KwaZulu/Natal ‘Indaba’ became central, and political and economic alliances with African economic interests became essential to a nationally-controlled but regionally-based large-scale capitalism and to its political representatives (on the Natal economy, also see Stanwix, 1983).

The policy of ‘separate development’ (as the so-called ‘positive aspects’ of apartheid came to be called) attempted to give dignity to the idea that South Africa is basically composed of ‘First’ and ‘Third World’ components, rather than the more directly racist categorization of backward African and advanced white segments of the population and of the economy. The terminology was used to ‘explain’ and justify the stark contrasts (in living standards, educational and social facilities, incomes, health, etc) between white society and the African population. The internal ‘Third World’ was then given convenient geographic form through the enforced separation of Africans into the bantustans. Within this dualism everybody is ‘developing’ but each had started from a different point and hence advances at different rates. At some distant future point the existing inequalities will, so the argument goes, be overcome. Until
then the slogan is 'patience' (for a discussion of the ideological function of the notion of 'worlds', see Sharp. 1988).

That was, and in many circles still is, the dominant argument in the KwaZulu-Natal region, except that the clear geographic distinction does not exist to the same extent as elsewhere in South Africa and on certain levels, even if only administratively, an interrelationship between the 'racial groups' had to be acknowledged. Artificial separation, it was argued in the region, leads to instability. It was not by chance that the report of the Buthelezi Commission in 1982 was entitled The Requirements for Stability and Development in KwaZulu and Natal, taking the many levels of interdependence between bantustan and province and their populations and economic activity as a starting point. The same demands for stability and acknowledgement of the interwoven character of the socio-economy of Natal revived interest in the 'KwaZulu/Natal Option' at various stages during the 1970s and 1980s, as it is doing in the 1990s. At present, however, the advantages, for capital, of strong and competing regions, are (in KZN) often outweighed by the political instability that has accompanied the fight for federalism: while the SA Chamber of Business (Sacob) called for greater regional powers (Mercury, 6 Apr 95), local business leaders warned against the manner and extent of the powers demanded by the IFP (see, for example, Mercury, 31 May 95; 18 Jul 95).

The inter-relationship that was stressed during the 1980s was, however, not only on the level of employment, residence, infrastructure, services, recreational facilities, etc; another element was that the wealth that had been channelled into white hands originated through the poverty of the black, especially the African, population. Nattrass wrote (1985:50) that

South Africa enjoys the somewhat dubious distinction of having one of the most unequal distributions of income in the world. Not only is income unequally distributed here, but the inequality also has a racial overlay and is partnered by the continuance of significant poverty.

She compared the national picture with that of Natal, and concluded:

Whilst KwaZulu/Natal region has a different demographic, ethnic and economic structure from that of the rest of the Republic, these differences have not had a marked impact on either the income distribution or the lifestyles in the region. White standards of living in this area are, on average, five times better than those of the Indian and Coloured communities and nearly 12 times greater than those of the Black regions, and within the Black community there is a gap emerging between urban and rural lifestyles.
The same gross inequality was noted in the Carnegie Enquiry into poverty, as was the marked discrepancy between urban and rural populations (see Wilson and Ramphele, 1989:23-26, chapter 11).

In 1976, 56% of the economically active population of KwaZulu was employed outside the bantustan (SPP, vol 4, 1983:4). This meant that in typical KwaZulu rural areas 'between 70 and 80 per cent of families have members away as migrant workers' (Nattrass, 1985:55). More than a third of the population of KwaZulu was landless and where land was available the resources to use it productively were not available. It is therefore no wonder that migrant remittances far exceeded KwaZulu's internal revenue creation. Nattrass referred to a study of three districts that showed that these remittances, even though a small percentage of the migrants' actual incomes, about 17%, still made up some 75% of total household incomes (1985:55). Apart from employment within the KwaZulu administration services (as public servants, nurses, labourers in the department of works, teachers, etc), there were few jobs. In 1981 a mere 6,122 people were employed in industrial undertakings in the bantustans themselves. All except 700 of these jobs were at the Isithebe industrial 'growth point' on the Thukela river. Some 30,000 new job-seekers entered the job market in the region every year (SPP, vol 4, 1983:4). By 1984 the number of employees at Isithebe had increased to 11,000, while another 1,200 people found work at Ezakheni, also within KwaZulu. 'Other things being equal', said Corporation for Economic Development chair Professor SP du Toit Viljoen in 1977 at Isithebe, KwaZulu could become the 'Ruhr of South Africa' (Financial Mail, special report on KwaZulu, 11 May 79). But of course 'other things' are not equal in South Africa, and one of those inequalities was and remains the totally skewed power relations that have existed for so many years, both between 'races', classes, with black women in rural areas by far the worst off (see, for example, Wilson and Ramphele, 1989).

KwaZulu, for which chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi took responsibility and in which he hoped to achieve some measure of development, could not ever hope to feed its population, provide them with jobs, and significantly improve the general standard of living measured in terms of basic facilities, infant mortality, education levels, employment, social and health services, etc. Under the grossly uneven structural power relationships that pertained under apartheid (see Gilliomee and Schlemmer (eds), 1985; Wilson and Ramphele, 1989), and even in some solutions for the future, this inequality forms part of the whole.

In fact KwaZulu was only a distinct region in that it was artificially maintained as such, reinforced through participation of some Africans in that maintenance, even if
such participation was hedged with qualifications. The effect was that its existence, as with the other bantustans, served to deflect responsibility from the central state and capital in South Africa on to the KwaZulu authority and on to the people who lived, and mostly continue to live there (the 'Third World' component). In 1986 parliament was told that 'South Africa's Third World component was too large for (the) housing goals' that would have to be met if influx control was truly scrapped, instead of being replaced with the euphemistically named 'orderly urbanization strategy' (National Party Member of Parliament, quoted Daily News, 6 Feb 86).

Stanwix (1983:55) noted that the population in Natal was then poorer than in South Africa as a whole (probably in large measure due to the relatively small white population in the province, which served elsewhere to push up the average income). He also noted that in Natal 'there are severe inequalities between the KwaZulu component and the rest of the region as well as marked differences in their composition of economic activity'. However, he warned that this did not prove the 'existence of two clearly differentiated sub-regions... [but rather these factors] reflect much more the integration of these components and the arbitrary (in economic terms) nature of the KwaZulu boundaries' (1983:55).

A glance at the apartheid map shows the fragmented nature of KwaZulu, and also casts a great deal of doubt on Buthelezi's contention that his involvement in KwaZulu was partly justified by the need for regional development (that region being KwaZulu). KwaZulu existed as a separate entity in terms of administration and legislative control, and of ideology (to justify the vast inequalities between the 'races'), but geographically and economically there was little to justify it. However, in the rest of this thesis it will be shown how the involvement of Buthelezi and his supporters was based much more on the potential for political mobilisation (or that that was the only really successful project) than on the development needs of the KwaZulu bantustan.

The rest of this chapter falls into three main sections. First, to provide background on the formation of Inkatha. Here I deal with the historical material without which it is impossible to understand the dynamics that allowed such a movement to arise and to grow to the prominence it has achieved. The history of distinctly African politics in Natal from 1948, the year in which the National Party (NP) came to power, is discussed. The first legislation in the process of fragmentation of the African population that was to lead to the 'Independence' of the Transkei 25 years later was the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951. This Act reaffirmed and redefined the role of chiefs and the 'tribe' as the base of an administrative pyramid. The bantustan legislative assemblies were to become the peaks of these pyramids. It was into this
apartheid-affirmed structure, and not (as he was to maintain later) simply into some idealized notion of traditional authority, that chief Buthelezi stepped in the early-1950s, to take up his position as chief of the Buthelezi clan.

In 1959 the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act made provision for the ultimate independence of the bantustans, and gave greater clarity to the other two layers within each ethnic pyramid, namely the regional authorities and territorial authorities (tribal authorities had already been provided for since 1951). The regional authorities were to supply the majority of members of the bantustan legislative assemblies - their 'parliaments'. This meant that chiefs always outnumbered elected members in these bodies. The territorial authorities became the legislative assemblies: for example, the Zulu Territorial Authority (ZTA), formed in 1970, became in 1972 the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA). Chief Buthelezi, although rejecting the state-envisioned final goal of 'independence' and having resisted the establishment of tribal authorities for a while during the 1960s, became head of the ZTA in 1970 and remained in command of the KLA until it was disbanded with the elections in April 1994.

The next section deals with the formation (or re-formation) of the Inkatha movement in 1975 and with the structures of the organisation. The process of reformation, and the earlier origins of a specifically Zulu organisation in the Inkata of the 1920s of which King Solomon was the patron, is examined; while the constitution and constitutional changes that have taken place, the Women's and Youth Brigades of Inkatha, and membership and methods of recruitment, are discussed to the extent that it gives context to the focus of the thesis, namely an examination of ethnic social identity mobilised.

The last section gives content to the previous chapters by examining the Inkatha movement 'in action', as the organisation through which such ethnic mobilisation took place. In it I discuss the early and increasing involvement of Inkatha in direct economic enterprises, albeit largely through development corporations and white-owned capital, and spell out some of the implications of this involvement for its strategy of mobilising the 'Zulu people'.
SECTION 1:

THE AVAILABILITY OF THE PAST, AND
THE PAST THAT IS AVAILABLE

King Cetshwayo kaMpondle... was my maternal great grandfather. I am the son of his granddaughter, Princess Constance Magogo Sibillie Matithi Nganezinye kaDinuzulu, full sister to King Solomon Nkayishana kaDinuzulu, and of the Senior Prince Mshiyeni Arthur Edward, former Zulu Regent during the minority of King Cyprian Bhekuzu Nyangavezizwe kaSolomon, father of our present Monarch, His Majesty King Zwelethini Goodwill kaBhekuzulu. I am also proud of the fact that on my father's side my family has served the Zulu Kingdom for so many generations, and that my paternal great grandfather, Myamana Buthelezi was Prime Minister of the Zulu Nation during King Cetshwayo's reign and also Commander-in-Chief of the Zulu army.

With these words chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, then chief minister of KwaZulu, president of Inkatha and chairman of the South African Black Alliance, laid claim to a specific ethnic tradition within 1980s South Africa. He was writing the foreword to a booklet on king Cetshwayo published by the KwaZulu Monuments Council (Laband and Wright, 1983).

Buthelezi continued with several references to the 'Zulu Nation', and placed the administrative capital of the KwaZulu bantustan, Ulundi, within that history: 'From this place of our forefathers, we are pursuing the ideals of establishing a free and open society...' (In Laband and Wright, 1983:xl). Chief Buthelezi was extremely aware of and sensitive to the historical tradition that underpins modern 'Zulu' identity and gives legitimacy to his participation in the politics of the 'Zulu Nation', as distinct from participation in the apartheid-created KwaZulu bantustan. The same 'Zulu Nation' history achieved even greater prominence in the lead-up to the elections in 1994 and since then. This awareness is displayed in frequent tracings of his genealogy in his speeches (eg Sunday Tribune, 6 Nov 83; Ngubane, 1976:121-2; BS, 26 Oct 76:4-6; BS, 7 Feb 79:1).

However, it is not only Buthelezi's personal history that has given a measure of coherence to the mobilising version of ethnic identity of the Zulu-speakers of Natal (a
point to which I will return), but also the history of Africans in south-eastern Africa since the late-eighteenth century, and especially since the colonial occupation of Natal in the 1840s. It was in this period that the patterns of government, labour exploitation and land occupation were established that were subsequently to be given extreme expression under apartheid, with its massive population removals, racial separation, political exclusion, labour exploitation and allocation, and concomitant repression of the vast majority of the country's people (this section of the chapter relies heavily on Beall, et al., 1984, 1986; and Mare, 1982).

In the early-nineteenth century the strongest state yet seen in south-east Africa emerged under the leadership of Shaka Zulu. The formation of this state involved deep-seated changes in the social and economic structures of the productive units that made up the Zulu nation. As Peires wrote (1981:8), the effect of all these changes was to produce 'one of the most arresting features of the Zulu state... its capacity to harness the energy of its subjects in its service'. This, in turn, meant that the Zulu state was able to withstand the political, military and, importantly, the economic pressures of colonialism until late in the century. The existence of such a distinct and relatively long-lasting political entity, as well as its resistance to colonialism, has made available to Buthelezi, as it had to ethnic politicians before him, a rich tradition of symbols that could be used to mobilize a regional population.

The first penetration of the Zulu state by the forces of colonialism was through the agency of hunters, traders and missionaries, even while the political power of this state was wholly unchallenged. Later, while the area in which the Zulu kings continued to rule was drastically reduced through first Trekboer and then British colonial occupation of the area south of the Tugela river, trade still did not fundamentally disrupt the economic and social organisation of the kingdom. Trade between Natal and Zululand in the mid-nineteenth century was mainly (except for firearms) in industrially produced goods that were already available in the precapitalist society, such as blankets, hoes and picks, even if the products from Europe might have been more efficient. Moreover, the trader gained possession of the surplus commodity already produced in the country (cattle or hides) and thus demanded no alteration to the process of production (Guy, 1982:15-16; also see Guy, 1982a).

Zulu society was, therefore, left fairly intact under the economic pressure of merchant capital.
In colonial Natal the fact that colonialism made its effect felt in the form of finance capital (or speculative capital), also served (at least in part) to allow a measure of resistance on the part of the African population to the ravages of wage labour. Speculators bought up large areas of Natal in the hope that land prices would increase and profits could be made. By 1870 the land area held by speculators reached a high of nearly 30% of the land available in Natal (ie excluding Zululand) (Christopher, 1969:351). This land was used for what was known as 'Kaffir farming', or renting out to Africans, much to the disgust of colonial farmers, who felt that this practice was depriving them of labour. At the time the colonial administrative authority was not willing to use reduction in the land area available to Africans to force African labour to work on commercial farms. It does not mean that other methods, such as taxation, were not used. However, the local colonial authorities were sufficiently aware of the realities of the situation to know that a frontal attack on the African way of life, and the appropriation of their land was not possible. He [Shepstone, the Secretary for Native Affairs in Natal] therefore supported the idea of leaving Africans in possession of large tracts of land, but, by gradually usurping political control, diverting the surplus products of labour created in African societies to support colonial systems of government (Guy, 1979:9; also Etherington, 1979).

The effects, first, of colonial demands for cheap administration and the inability to subdue militarily the Zulu kingdom north of the Tugela river, and, second, continued access to speculators' land, reserves or locations in Natal, and the land within Zululand proper, allowed the Zulu state to retain its essential autonomy. Africans in Natal generally were able to avoid having to labour for colonists - at least on a large-scale - until the last quarter of the nineteenth century. It was only in 1897 that the Zulu kingdom was incorporated into the colony of Natal, and only in the early-twentieth century that white occupation of land within Zululand took place, 'later than almost every other case in southern Africa' (Beall, et al, 1986). The effect was to leave a legacy of unconsolidated land occupied by Africans, and the symbols of continuity, resistance and apparent Zulu political and cultural coherence that could be used by subsequent regional leaders.

The availability of land was not only important in the avoidance of wage labour for a longer time than elsewhere, but also allowed the continuation, albeit under perpetually changing 'tribal' conditions, of 'traditional' authority structures - the chiefs (amakhosi) and their councillors. The system of indirect rule established in the mid-nineteenth century, in part as a result of demands for cheap administration in a poor colony,
sought to transform the administrative power of the chiefs (both hereditary and appointed). As Justice Beaumont pointed out in 1905,

'In Natal you are undermining the authority of the Chiefs every day. Every act dealing with the Natives that is passed more or less undermines the authority of the Chiefs, and, on the other hand, you are trying to bolster them up to retain their position...' (quoted in Marks, 1970:41).

The powers that were given to chiefs by the colonial authority were of a different kind to the powers they had had in independent pre-colonial societies; the effect was to undermine the legitimacy, if not the power, of their position because such absolute power would not have been countenanced. Furthermore,

... the most fundamental prop of chieftainly power, the chief's power to grant his followers land and cattle, had been undermined by the pressures of population within the Reserves, and the severe cattle diseases which had decimated African-owned cattle in the colony at the turn of the century (Marks, 1970:41-42).

While the Zulu kingdom and Africans in Natal had been able to hold out against the demands of capitalism for labour and land for longer than most, when the inevitable collapse came it was as overwhelming as elsewhere in its impact on the economic, social and political life of Africans. It benefited white agriculturalists, industrialists and mining interests, who now had greater access to cheap labour. The turning point came with the Bambatha rebellion in 1906, the last major resistance of an African chief against capitalist encroachment, and, in the light of the nineteenth century history of the region, it was no surprise that it should have occurred in Natal, now including Zululand (for an excellent and full discussion of the events see Marks, 1970). Roux wrote that the rebellion distinguished

between two periods in the history of the black man in South Africa: the early period of tribal wars against the white invaders... and the second period, one of struggle for national and democratic rights within the framework of present-day South Africa where black and white intermingle in complex economic and political relationships (1964:87, emphases added).

On one level the divide was as great as pointed out by Roux, but on another the past lived on in subsequent political practice. The rebellion was about labour, and specifically the one pound head tax imposed by the Natal Government in 1905 on every male over the age of 18. This tax, it was hoped, would both raise revenue and
force Africans into wage employment. The rebellion of chief Bambatha of the Greytown district drew the full wrath and military power of the colonial and settler authority because of fears it would lead to a consolidation of resistance under the Zulu king Dinuzulu. In a massacre in which British troops used machine guns against the warriors, between 3000 and 4000 of Bambatha's followers and those of the chiefs who had joined him were mown down in the Nkandla forests (Marks, 1986:29). Bambatha's head was cut off and displayed to prove that he was dead and the rebellion over. In the same year, 1906, John Dube, who was to become the first president of the movement that was later called the African National Congress, started a newspaper in Natal called Ilanga lase Natal (decades later Inkatha was to buy the newspaper that still carried that name). This was to be the new direction of political action.

The population mix of modern-day Natal was also largely established in the nineteenth century. The African population had been scattered by the wars that accompanied the formation of the state under the Zulu people led by Shaka. It was this disruption that allowed Boers and British to settle south of the Thukela river and then to contain many Africans within reserves (locations) in Natal on their return to all of their land. Natal never attracted large numbers of colonial settlers, for which there were several reasons. The threat that was continually felt to be posed by the unvanquished Zulu kingdom just to the north, the difficulty in finding crops that would provide an economic base for the various emigration schemes that were offered to people in Britain, and the greater attraction of emigration to established colonies such as Canada, all served to place Natal low on the list for potential settlers. It was on the Cape that the British first placed their hope for a viable colonial economy in southern Africa. However, the settlers who did arrive in Natal were largely of British stock, and many of the Trekboere who had preceded British occupation and ultimate annexation in 1845 left Natal to avoid the colonial system they had fled in the Cape colony (see, for example, Brookes and Webb, 1979).

The Indian 'community' that now outnumbers the whites in the province (each constituting about 10%) owes its presence to the unwillingness of Africans in Natal to work for the wages and under the conditions that applied on the sugar plantations in the colony - the process of proletarianisation was far from over in Natal and Zululand at that stage. About 90% of the Indians who came to Natal arrived as indentured labourers from 1860, and stayed on after the completion of their period of indenture. They remained as labourers, servants, in the fishing industry, as traders, professionals, market gardeners, farmers and in many other occupations. Today most
of the economically active Indian population is employed in industry, filling many of
the positions of supervision between white owners and unskilled African workers, but
also working alongside Africans in all occupations and together came to belong to
worker organisations and political organisations such as the United Democratic Front
(UDF), the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO), and the ANC. At the same time, as
mentioned earlier, Indians also maintained a separate identity (or identities) through
political organisations such as the Natal Indian Congress, and were racialised into a
'community' that was anything but homogeneous on ethnic, gender and class lines (see
for example, the recent contribution by Freund, 1995, and discussion above).

In the twentieth century the discriminatory practices established in Natal during the
previous century were formalised. Land allocations were given legislative form in the
'Land Acts' of 1913 and 1936, allocating 35% of Natal and a derisory 13% of the total
land area of South Africa to the bulk of the national population. As the Surplus People
Project (SPP) commented:

By providing that only strictly defined areas would henceforth be open
to African ownership and occupation, and by placing the power to
determine and regulate these areas in the hands of the all-white
Parliament, it put a stop to the previous very limited purchase of
freehold land on the open market by Africans and furthermore made
isolated African properties that had already been bought vulnerable to
the charge that they were misplaced in white territory (SPP, vol 4,
1983:34).

Years later these 'isolated African properties' came to be called 'black spots' by the
National Party government, and their populations (owners and tenants) were
subjected to forcible removal from the midst of white-owned areas which surrounded
them. After 35 years of the removals policy, the populations of these areas can for the
first time, in a democratic South Africa, claim restitution of the land from which they
had been removed after 1913.

As in the rest of South Africa, the clearing of 'black spots' was not the only reason
Africans were relocated into the reserves and later the bantustans (see Maré, 1980;
SPP, 1983; Platzky and Walker, 1985). Whatever the reason, and they have all been
'racially' discriminatory in their conception and/or execution, the effects have been
human misery, anger and a settlement pattern that crowded the bantustans far
beyond any possibility of subsistence production. The SPP (vol 4, 1983:53) estimated
that between 1948 (when the National Party took power) and 1982 about 750 000
Africans, Indians and coloured people had been removed in Natal and relocated
elsewhere, with another 600 000 Africans then under threat of removal.
On a national scale this shift in population is illustrated in the table below (Roux et al. 1982):

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<tr>
<th>Geographic Distribution of the De Facto African Population:</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Urban Areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rural Areas</td>
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<td>Bantustans</td>
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If we look at Natal we find confirmation of this population shift. In the Nqutu area of KwaZulu, infamous as a relocation site, the Tomlinson Commission, investigating conditions under which the African areas could be made economically (agriculturally) viable, recommended a population of 13 000. If implemented this would have meant that at the time (the early-1950s) about 5000 families would have had to be moved from Nqutu. Most of the people there could only live on their own produce for between five and seven months of the year. However, rather than decreasing, the population had risen to an estimated 200 000 people by 1979 (Maré, 1980:13). At that time ‘30% of the householders had no land at all to cultivate’ (Clarke, 1978:11), while 70% of the economically active population of the area were forced to migrate in search of work (Barker, 1974:5). This example could be multiplied countless times in KwaZulu, and in other bantustans. The social and economic disintegration of these areas was and remains enormous, and is integrally related to the affluence that characterizes most of what was ‘white’ South Africa and the manner of maintaining profitability of capitalist production in the country.

Not only had a slow but steady increase in population density and land degradation made any but the most limited production an impossibility by the mid-1960s, but the conditions were aggravated by the abolition of the labour tenant system on white farms, which forced some 300 000 African people mainly into the bantustans (Surplus People Project, vol 4, 1983:53; Maré, 1980:8-15). In the words of the 1932 Native Economic Commission, labour tenancy referred to ‘the giving of services for a certain period in the year to the farmer by the Native and/or his family in return for the right to reside on the [white] farmer’s land, to cultivate a portion of land, and to graze his stock on the farm’. A 1972 report painted this picture of the ravages caused by the forced abolition of this system in favour of full-time wage labour by a reduced number of workers living on the farm or migrating as ‘single’ workers from the bantustans:
Scores of farm workers and their children, shunted away from the Weenen district into the bleak homeland settlements after the abolition of the labour tenant system, are starving in the Msinga district...

Once a progressive community, these people were pastoral peasant farmers and each had more than 200 goats. Now they are living in a rural slum (*Natal Mercury*, 17 May 72).

Dr Anthony Barker, for many years based at the Charles Johnson Hospital, wrote in 1974:

> Where I live at Nqutu (in KwaZulu), just as in a hundred other areas, the numbers of people are greatly increased, throwing out of balance the older equations of economic viability on a basis of subsistence agriculture. The homelands have become the nation's overcrowded back yards (1974:1; also Clarke and Barker, 1974).

On the administrative level a similar process of exclusion from central processes and the simultaneous maintenance of supposedly 'traditional' structures (such as the chiefs) occurred. The provincial system of second-tier government for whites within the Union of South Africa that was created in 1910 was in part the result of a reaction from the other delegations to the demands for even greater autonomy made by the Natal contingent to the pre-Union conference. White Natalians (Africans were totally excluded from the deliberations) wanted a federal system to allow the province freedom to give expression to its 'British tradition', which they felt would be lost under a centralized government (as Buthelezi and King Goodwill argued in the 1990s the 'Zulu character' would be lost to a central government). Thus the other delegates were not willing to grant, fearing the 'sort of plague spot and public danger' that Natal's administration of Africans had created in the region. The memory of the Bambatha rebellion was still fresh in the memory of the delegates. It was hoped that Natal's closer incorporation into the Union, as a province, would put an end to this 'mismanagement' (Marks, 1970:353). The provincial system was, therefore, a compromise between a unitary state and a federation. In a way similar to the manufacturing or maintaining of the tradition of the 'Zulu Nation', there has also been a created and maintained tradition of white Natalian identity (ethnicity?) over the decades, with a set of proclaimed values that bear little relation to the practice of this community. Language rights, 'liberalism', a more easy-going attitude to life in general and a less tense relationship with the African population, were claimed to be important elements of these values.
As if their exclusion from the deliberation that led to Union was not enough, all anti-Union meetings by Africans in Natal were banned, and the few Africans who had the vote in the colony (three in 1903, six in 1909, and only one in 1936) were later removed from all participation in a vote for central authority (Brookes and Webb, 1979:77).

In 1936 two important Acts were passed: the Trust and Land Act, which added a 'quota' of land to the land 'scheduled' for African occupation in the 1913 Land Act (Horrell, 1978:203), but confirmed the principle of 'racial' separation; and the Representation of Natives Act, which entitled Africans in Natal to elect, indirectly, a single senator to the central government. The elections were to take place through chiefs, local councils and advisory boards. The Act also established the Native Representative Council (NRC), on which one nominated and three representative members from Natal were to serve. The nominated member, until the NRC was disbanded in 1951, was Mshtyeni kaDinuzulu, acting paramount chief of the Zulus. Other posts were filled by such people as John L Dube, first president of the South African Native National Congress (later the African National Congress), and Chief Albert Luthuli, later to become president of the ANC until the organisation was banned by the state in 1960. They were both involved in Natal as well as national politics.

The NRC was initially called the 'official mouthpiece of the African people' by the conservative president-general of the ANC, Rev S Mahabane, who had been re-elected in 1937 (Walshe, 1970:127). For some years the ANC tried to make support for the NRC a major part of its policy. In the 1942 elections for the NRC the ANC gained 'an informal but real influence through at least seven of the 16 member Council' (Walshe, 1970:271). James Calata, secretary-general of the ANC from 1936 to 1949, said the Congress had 'succeeded in sending Congressmen to the NRC without saying so'. However, by 1944 some of these members were urging the government to abandon all segregationist legislation, and by 1946 a resolution was moved in the ANC proposing a boycott of the NRC. The futility of the previous policy of 'working within the system' was becoming clear. As Walshe wrote:

At this point [by 1948] Congress, with the Youth League in the vanguard, came to accept the need for non-collaboration in the NRC, the 'Programme of Action' and the systematic use of passive resistance as in the Defiance Campaign of 1952 (1970:370).

'Working within the system' was to become the strategy employed by Buthelezi, with reference to the ANC's efforts in the past as justification.
The NRC was eventually abolished by the National Party government in 1951. The Bantu Authorities Act of that year both did away with the NRC and made provision for tribal and regional authorities, redefining and re-emphasizing the resolve of white political authority to maintain control through untraditionally static and strong 'traditional tribal' structures. What must be borne in mind is that while the origins of these structures lie in the policies developed by the colonial authorities in Natal from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, their purposes have changed over time. Initially they served as an economic and political link between pre-capitalist society and colonial administrators. In many cases even today (in the mid-1990s) chiefs and tribal authorities (with some notable exceptions) form part of the control mechanisms over an African population superfluous in the long- and short-term to capitalist labour needs. The role of chiefs, and the approaches by both the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party, will be returned to below.

African politics in Natal, outside of state-created structures, is far too complex a subject to enter into in this thesis, and is not strictly necessary to the main purpose of the case-study. A few general comments do, however, need to be made, especially in the light of the frequent references made by chief Buthelezi, not only to his Zulu past but also to the specific ANC tradition within which he places himself and the Inkatha movement. The tradition is that of the 'founding fathers' of the ANC (the term used by Inkatha leaders). In other words, it refers to an expression by the pre-1940s ANC of the 'need for equal opportunity for all, and hence the rights of educated and qualified Africans to advance in the modern sector of the economy and to participate in the provincial and parliamentary institutions of government' (Walshe, 1970:413). These sentiments - a fair share for those who deserve it (the educated and qualified) - are adequately encompassed by Buthelezi's 1970s and 1980s ideological stance.

His references to the ANC usually took the form of allegiance to '... the ideals of the African National Congress as propounded by the founding fathers in 1912, built on the solid rock of our Ubuntu-Botho ideal' (BS, 18 May 80; also see, for example, 24 Sep 83:6; 5 Nov 83:5). The Ubuntu-Botho approach has been described as follows by then Inkatha secretary-general, now ANC minister of education, Dr Sibusiso Bengu:

Inkatha strives for the promotion of African patterns of thought and the achievement of African Humanism otherwise commonly known in Nguni languages as Ubuntu and Sotho languages as Botho (Bengu, Lecture 4, 1977:5).

As in the case of the early-ANC, chiefs always played a prominent (if not always pliant) role in Inkatha. In the ANC during the early years of its existence this was because of
the organisation’s rejection of the 1913 Land Act which centrally affected chiefs and their control over land. Subsequently it was predominantly in Natal that the ANC managed to gain significant support in the rural areas: Albert Luthuli, Natal ANC leader from 1951 and later national president, was himself a chief. However, even here the banning of the organisation prevented support from being converted into organisational strength (Lodge, 1983:290).

The similarities between the ANC in 1912 and the Inkatha movement in 1975 should not be stressed to the exclusion of fundamental differences - differences that increased as Inkatha gained confidence in its own independent role in South Africa. The ANC was founded in 1912 in the self-conscious desire of the ‘founding fathers’ to ‘encourage a sense of supra-tribal unity’ (Walshe, 1970:412), while Inkatha was born out of the ‘tribal’ or ethnic institutions of the apartheid state. It has tried to escape the legacy of that birth ever since, in repeated calls (with little success) for ‘black unity’ under the banner of Inkatha. The most important step in the attempt to shed itself of its ethnic image came with its conversion to a national, ‘non-racial’ political party, the Inkatha Freedom party (IFP) in December 1990. However, the results of the 1994 elections showed that it had not to any extent been able to escape its regional and ethnic base (see Hamilton and Maré, 1994; Maré, 1995).

A fairly strong ethnic homogeneity, a ‘Zulu identity’, has been created in the region, particularly in the twentieth century with increased urbanization and improved communication. This ‘identity’ has built on the history (‘the past’) of political consolidation under Shaka, and of decades of successful resistance to political domination from colonial authorities. Because of the availability of this identity for mobilisation, and of the politicians to make use of it, social movements in the region have frequently taken a rather idiosyncratic and chauvinistic line towards national movements. This tendency is well illustrated by the political actions of such individuals as AWG Champion, renegade in both the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU), a mass movement that had its origins ‘in the early post-war attempts by white socialists to organize black labour in Cape Town’ (Lodge, 1983:5), and in the ANC in Natal, from which he was ousted by Albert Luthuli. ‘An embarrassingly conservative colleague’ is how Walshe described Champion as Natal president of the ANC in relation to Xuma, the national president. To strengthen its independence the Natal ANC even went so far as to seek more money from chiefs (Walshe, 1970:393-5; on Champion also see Marks, 1986; Webster, 1974).

It is ironic, as Brookes and Webb pointed out, that ‘from conservative Natal and Zululand came the institution which for many years was for many Africans the symbol
of liberation' (1979:296; Rich 1984:132-3). It says much that it should be from the Natal leaders and from the 'founding fathers' of the ANC that Inkatha should draw its claim of continuity with the ANC and its ideas. The tactics and the content of the demands made by the ANC started moving away dramatically from those of the founders with the formation of the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) in 1944. It is necessary to add that while Inkatha draws its claims to a national political direction from the 'founding fathers', Buthelezi has never been shy of calling on a vast array of ANC leaders of subsequent generations to add credibility to his actions. As he told his audience when celebrating ten years of Inkatha existence:

From my mother's knee onwards, I was drawn into politics. The great founding father of the ANC, Dr. Pixley ka Isaka Seme, was my uncle. I spent many a long hour on numerous occasions talking about the struggle for liberation with Chief Albert Luthuli. I knew people like Walter Sisulu, Nelson Mandela, Zami Conco, M.B. Yengwa, Oliver Tambo, J.K. Ngubane and Joe Matthews personally. I was a member of the ANC's Youth League. Thus both by hereditary right and by voluntary association, I was steeped in the struggle for liberation (BS, 29 Jun 85).

The ANCYL saw the possibilities of mass organisation, essential for pressure rather than petition politics, in the poverty of a rapidly growing African urban population increasingly severed from any contact with rural subsistence production. Lodge wrote:

[It was] this recognition of the political opportunity presented by these popular outbursts [among the urban poor in the 1940s] that was the most important contribution made to the nationalist movement by the Africanists [in the ANCYL]. From such struggles they distilled a strategy of mass action, centred on the use of the boycott weapon... but also involving strikes, civil disobedience and non-cooperation (1983:22).

Such actions, rather than merely the threat of them, remained largely anathema to Buthelezi and Inkatha and it is no wonder that the modernising political origins of the Inkatha movement should have been sought in an era that predates the ANCYL, this despite Buthelezi's own brief membership of the Youth League while he was a student at the University of Fort Hare in the late-1940s (for more detail see Maré, 1988).

In 1948 much of the social fabric of South Africa was fundamentally altered when the National Party came to power. The disappointment felt, even by conservative African politicians, that the relaxation of controls on urbanization and the increase in job
opportunities forced by wartime demands for labour were not to be carried through by the Smuts government, was turned into firm knowledge that white South Africa had no intention of willingly sharing power, never mind of ever submitting to majority rule. A barrage of legislation to crush opposition to the state was passed and ruthlessly used, as was the power of the repressive apparatuses (the army and the police). To confirm their exclusion separate political structures were being forced on the black population, and not only on Africans. Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, contentious heir to the Buthelezi chieftainship, became part of those separate structures in the 1950s. In the year that the National Party came to power he went to the University of Fort Hare in the eastern Cape, as so many of central and southern Africa's political leaders have done.
SECTION 2:
THE POLITICAL CONTEXT AND THE FORMATION OF INKATHA

Administrative separation

As chief Buthelezi told the Inkatha Annual General Conference in 1985, he became involved, not only in the 'struggle' as he would have it, but also in the structures of apartheid, both 'by hereditary right and by voluntary association' (BS, 29 Jun 85:10-11). To understand the implications of involvement in the structures of the state, it is important to examine the nature of what the apartheid policy had been and remains in its effects. It can be seen as a series of separations (the word apartheid does, after all, mean 'separateness'), the most obvious of which are 'racial' and territorial.

The previous section dealt with the racialised separation of land areas and of administrative bodies in Natal and Zululand, as it developed during the nineteenth century. Centuries before that time the early European settlers at the Cape had already started the pattern of protecting what they had laid claim to, and excluding the indigenous population. This at times occurred not for 'racial', but for religious or purely economic reasons, such as the fear of competition for land, and later for markets. However, the land they laid claim to was already inhabited by the existing African population, and over time all other factors became racialised. By the end of the nineteenth century, through the use of superior military technology, a 'divide and rule' policy, and the help of collaborators, the settlers had 'largely stabilised' territorial separation between settlers and the African population. Such separation was given legislative force soon after the Act of Union, the Land Act.

Separate areas are important to justify separate administration and exclusion from central political power. The 1913 Land Act continued not only the principle of territorial separation but also that of administrative separation. The Act was 'an important prerequisite for the establishment of separate government institutions for these [reserve] areas' (Kotze, 1975:25), as distinct from bodies established for Africans in 'white' South Africa.

There had been two possibilities for government over Africans. The first was to weaken the institution of chieftainship and rule through the colonial bureaucracy and
a council that attempted to involve ‘non-traditionalists’ in government - this was the system attempted in the eastern Cape. The second was to rely on chiefs, appointed and hereditary, for (indirect) rule - the system developed in Natal. At first the former method was tried, and the council system was extended to all African areas through the 1920 Native Affairs Act. Whatever the reasons, the councils were never enthusiastically implemented and by 1948, when the National Party came to power, there were only three local councils in Natal (out of 25 outside the Transkei), while the sole general council, an umbrella body, existed in the Transkei (see, for example, discussion in Greenstein, 1995; Hammond-Tooke, 1975).

In urban areas outside the reserves the state established native advisory boards (under the Native Urban Areas Act of 1923), with extremely limited and purely advisory functions. They were replaced in 1961 by the possibly even more despised urban bantu councils (the UBCs, or ‘Useless Boys Clubs’ as they were scathingly labelled). The UBCs were in turn replaced, first by the community councils (from 1977), and then by black local authorities (after 1983) and Regional Services Councils (Joint Services Boards in Natal and KwaZulu) (see contributions in Heymans and Totemeyer (eds), 1988; Grest, 1988). It is only in November 1995 that elections are planned to be held for democratic local government structures for all people living within specified wards.

On a national level at the time of Union there had been extremely limited participation in central government allowed to Africans. Before Union there were 6633 Africans on the common voters roll in the Cape. In Natal there were at one time six. Africans in the Boer Republics (to become the Orange Free State and Transvaal provinces) never had any vote. This representation was totally eroded under the National Party government. Even before the NP came to power the threat posed by black voters in a few marginal constituencies in the Cape set in motion a process that was to lead to the separation of voters' rolls in 1936. From then on Africans who had qualified for the vote would elect three (of 153) white members to the House of Assembly, while four indirectly elected senators would represent all Africans in the Union of South Africa. At the same time a Natives Representative Council (NRC) was established, but this proved totally inadequate to the increasingly militant demands for representation at central government level (see above).

In 1948, when the National Party came to power, the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) presented a 'Programme of Action' around the mobilising idea of African nationalism and involving a mass organization, boycotts, strikes, and civil disobedience (Walshe, 1970:289). The pressure was for the ANC to move away from the negative strategy of
reaction and to take the initiative. While the Congress was still wary of the left, it had by the early-1950s shifted slightly from the Africanist position that had characterized it during the 1940s (Lodge, 1983:37). The Programme of Action, adopted at the 1949 annual congress of the ANC, rejected white leadership and all forms of segregation in national government. It led to the 'appointment of a council of action which would organize a boycott of all differential political institutions' (Lodge, 1983:26).

'Ethnic' separation

In 1951, with the passing of the Bantu Authorities Act, the National Party government started on the process of establishing or reinforcing separate political institutions for Africans. The Act made provision for three levels of administration - tribal, regional, and territorial authorities. The minister of Native Affairs, dr Hendrik Verwoerd, said this three-tier system of government would reintroduce traditional tribal democracy to African people. Kotze (1975:26) commented that only the first tier, 'consisting of tribal authorities, resembled the traditional system'. The next two levels, regional and territorial authorities, simply brought the local level bodies together on a spatial basis. The council system was to be replaced, and the focus shifted to ethnic fragmentation of the African population, away from predominantly 'racial' definitions and consequent 'racial' administrative or advisory bodies (see Hammond-Tooke, 1975). The NRC was also abandoned - partly because it was 'racially' rather than ethnically based, largely because it was already a discredited body.

On the established territorial and 'racial' base the new government, through the Bantu Authorities Act and then the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act in 1959, added administrative structures for what were now ethnically defined 'homelands'. The 1959 Act was introduced by the minister of Bantu Affairs, De Wet Nel, who spoke of 'cultural nationalism' and 'ethnic particularities', attempting to move away, at least rhetorically, from racism. However, the tension between the racism of the apartheid policy and what Moodie called 'positive apartheid' or 'cultural pluralism', was there from the start:

Major public proponents of apartheid have tended to shift their ground depending on the argument, thereby creating an ideological system which is riddled with inconsistencies... cultural pluralism is a morally acceptable reality, whereas racism is not; and protagonists of apartheid tend to justify racism on the grounds of cultural pluralism (1980:275-6).
The apartheid policy, with its ethnic separation and ethnically-based administration, was an attempt to defuse several pressures that were mounting against the central state. Growing worker militancy was reflected in the fourfold increase in the number of strikes involving African workers between 1950 and the mid-1950s. The South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), later a member of the Congress Alliance which brought together most radical opposition to apartheid, was formed in 1955 (see Luckhardt and Wall, 1980). Rapid urbanisation of African people during the 1950s was making a racially exclusive political system more untenable by the day. Instead of exclusion from central power the state was attempting to shift the focus to separate political power. The 'winds of change' of African nationalisms that swept through the continent after the second world war set an example as they forced aside the direct control of the colonial powers. Verwoerd acknowledged the effect of international pressure when he commented that "we cannot govern without taking into account the tendencies in the world and in Africa" (quoted in Moodie, 1980:264).

International pressure came from the United Nations as well, and in addition South Africa was soon to leave the Commonwealth. Moodie quotes the author of the book Van Malan tot Verwoerd, Beaumont Schoeman, as saying that prime minister Verwoerd told his cabinet that he "wished to show the world something great and new which would confirm the just intentions of the government's policy, and also provide a basis for the western members... to prevent action against South Africa in the UN" (Moodie, 1980:264). This message was given just before the Transkei Constitution Act was passed (a direct result of the political path taken through the principles of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act). Verwoerd had to persuade the other members of the cabinet of the necessity of the policy of 'separate development' as they perceived it as an undesirable extension of the autonomous power of African government.

The apartheid policy was designed to meet all these threats to white supremacy and exclusive control over wealth and political power. It fulfilled many other needs as well, most importantly that of maintaining separate areas for the social reproduction of the labouring class where increasing poverty and a criminal imbalance in resource allocation could be justified in terms of 'dual economies' and 'Third World' components rather than racism, sheer greed and the necessities of capitalist development. From these separate areas labour could, furthermore, be allocated to the politically powerful but economically weak agricultural sector, where wages were too low to attract workers from the mining sector and the by now dominant manufacturing sector (see Lacey, 1981; Posel, 1991:30-31).
More important for the present study, however, concerned as it is with the political consequences of apartheid on regional political structures, is the attempt to create or rekindle ethnic nationalisms. 'Positive cultural nationalism' was to take the place of the wider African nationalism - "the monster which may still perhaps destroy all the best things in Africa", as Bantu Affairs minister MC de Wet Nel described it in 1959. He admitted that there were two bonds that kept the black population of South Africa together: "their colour" and "their hatred of the white man" (quoted in Moodie, 1980:265).

'Cultural nationalism', on the other hand, meant that "the Bantu too will be linked together by traditional and emotional bonds, by their own language, their own culture, their ethnic particularities". Underlying the policy was not white social engineering, he argued, but the fact that:

'The Zulu is proud to be a Zulu and the Xhosa proud to be a Xhosa and the Venda is proud to be a Venda, just as proud as they were a hundred years ago. The lesson we have learnt from history during the past three hundred years is that these ethnic groups, the whites as well as the Bantu, sought their greatest fulfilment, their greatest happiness and the best mutual relations on the basis of separate and individual development... the only basis on which peace, happiness and mutual confidence could be built up' (quoted in Moodie, 1980:266).

In these words De Wet Nel presented the grand justification for a policy that was to cause untold misery in its implementation, but that was also to provide the basis on which ethnic particularisms could flourish where the historical subjects for such identities were available (see Norval's non-reductionist approach to the analysis of apartheid, 1992). Norval argued that there are basically two characteristics of the functioning of 'frontiers' (in the creation of imagined communities): first, 'through constant re-creation through a process of homogenisation and destruction of differences' (nation-building in one of its forms? - see chapter five); second, as in apartheid, the other is there to remain... here the frontier can only exist through a constant construction of differences and production of equivalent exclusions... (T)his process of construction is constitutively ambiguous: it requires a simultaneous affirmation and the exclusion of the other. This ambiguity - undecidability - is characteristic of all forms of domination and distinguishes them from purely antagonistic forms in which one force tends to the destruction of the other (1992:1-2).
This stimulating approach to an aspect of the apartheid policy cannot be investigated in this thesis. However, I will return to the approach below.

It was not only 'racial' dominance that was to be safeguarded through apartheid. The system of cheap labour was to be continued with the added measure of greater control over the allocation of that labour. Verwoerd had said in 1956 that the opposition in Parliament

'... apparently did not understand the difference between one national economy and one State... The simple fact is that the opportunity of separate government, the opportunity of living separately, and the opportunity of developing separate tertiary industries for each of the race groups does not of necessity mean that the economic activities of the country should be split up' (quoted in Davenport and Hunt (eds), 1974:49).

The single economy relied heavily on what had euphemistically been called 'the principle of impermanence'. This meant that Africans outside the bantustans were either there temporarily as migrants or commuters, or, if resident, would have no property or political rights, precious few amenities, and would be subject to the same humiliations of pass checks as all other Africans (Hindson, 1987).

The 'principle of impermanence' meant that wages could be kept low on the by this time quite untenable grounds that such income was supplemented by family subsistence agriculture in the bantustans. Union organisation was also made very difficult with the workplace instability caused by a migrant work force, and housing and other social facilities could be kept to the very minimum, away from the obvious contrast with the standard of living of white South Africans, and away from industrial areas in case social unrest should spill out of the townships. Profits, however, were high in the 1960s. Sharpeville caused a brief scare and foreign capital flowed out of South Africa, but the trend was soon reversed as the state clamped down on opposition. The rate of return on United Kingdom investment in South Africa in 1965 (by which time the post-Sharpeville outflow of capital had been reversed) was 12.1%, higher than in any other country in which Britain had substantial investment. The equivalent figure for US investment was 20.6%, as against 10.4% average return on investment for all other countries in which the USA was economically involved (see Maré, 1982:115; Seidman and Seidman, 1977; First, 1972).

As the apartheid policy unfolded after 1951, and especially post-1959, 'racial' categorization of people continued: even the tricameral constitution of South Africa in
the 'reform' period of the 1980s, with its claims to 'widen democracy', was essentially based on 'racial' categorization, and 'racial' domination - what was 'widened' was the number of direct (reluctant or enthusiastic) participants in the structures and execution of the policy. For African people, however, the policy meant further separation into state-defined ethnic groupings. These groupings had, furthermore, been elevated into political 'nationalisms', each one allocated to a land area fragmented and scattered to varying degrees. There were ten of these 'national states', four of which had been granted 'independence' from the rest of South Africa by the time the whole policy collapsed. The participants in the Surplus People Project, in their investigation of population relocation in South Africa, documented some of the bitterness created between communities through the policy that defined access to social facilities, jobs, education, housing, medical services, etc., on the basis of allegiance to an unacceptable ethnic unit (see, for example, Platzky and Walker, 1985:23; SPP, vol 5, 1983).

The tragedy of the social violence implicit in the policy of enforced ethnic separation was clear from early on. In 1960, already, JCM Mbata wrote a report for the South African Institute of Race Relations in which he commented on one area that he had visited:

The Tsonga admit that until the Bantu Authorities system was imposed, they had lived peacefully, and successfully together with both Venda and Sotho people... (T)here was... intermarriage on a large scale... no one in the past sought to impose his authority or way of life on the others... The Shangaan argue that the Bantu Authorities system has upset this delicate balance of co-existence.

He concluded most pertinently:

It is clear that the fragmentation of South Africa and its peoples has had the effect of creating antagonisms where none existed, and opening up old wounds where these were healing. To 'unscrebble' the population of the country is impossible, hence the failure of the Government to follow to the letter its policy of ethnic separation...

(emphasis added).

What happened in South Africa, especially since the introduction and implementation of the Bantu Authorities Act, clearly illustrates a process in which 'cultural pluralism' becomes the politicization of tribal differences, to paraphrase John Saul. As Saul wrote:

For 'tribalism' (the politicization of ethnicity which is all too characteristic a pathology of dependent Africa) does not spring
primarily from the bare fact of the existence of cultural differences between people. Rather, it has been teased into life, first by the divide-and-rule tactics of colonialism and by the uneven development in the economic sphere which colonialism also facilitates, and secondly by the ruling petty bourgeoisie of the post-colonial period...
(Saul, 1979a:309).

In other words, precapitalist social, economic and political forms of organization were and are artificially maintained or recreated. However, they are 'used' in a distorted form, and in a context where they have very little relevance (other than to create antagonisms and to serve as a handy point of reference if conflict should arise) (see Saul, 1979:391-423). However, this evaluation should not detract from the very real existing non-opportunistic value that many people attach to the form of 'traditional leadership'. In the same manner that ethnicity serves as a safe haven within the turmoil of socio-political change, so do elements within an ethnic appeal. 'Traditional authority' then comes to stand for that which is being lost, for 'the past' when social relations were ordered (see Hayes and Maré, 1992; Campbell et al, 1993; and below, chapter five). What is to be noted is that the support structures and stories of 'cultural difference' exist without the mobilisation, without being 'teased into life' in the public domain.

It comes as no surprise that over the years competition for scarce resources, whether educational facilities, jobs, most importantly land, and many other necessities, should often have been, and will continue to be defined in ethnic terms. The state handed over land, budgets, job allocations, infrastructural schemes, and political power, on an ethnic basis to the various groups (or 'nations') created by the policy of apartheid. There have been many land disputes such as that between Bophuthatswana and QwaQwa in the Thaba 'Nchu area of the Orange Free State, between the Ciskel and the Transkel over Glen Grey and Herschel, between KwaZulu and the Transkel over Umzimkulu (and now, in 1995, also over East Griqualand), between Lebowa and Gazankulu over the Bushbuckridge, Tzaneen and Phalaborwa region, between KwaZulu and KaNgwane and Swaziland over the state's intention (in 1982) to hand over the KaNgwane bantustan and the Ingwavuma region to Swaziland.

On a smaller scale the same 'ethnic' definitions have also lived on to define antagonistic groups. To take just KwaZulu: the conflict over land in southern Natal was presented as a clash with the Transkel (now, in 1994 and 1995, with the Eastern Cape province). Much of the continuing debate over the future of the Ingwavuma district is put in terms of age-old histories of conquest and allegiances and whether
people are 'Swazi' or 'Zulu' or 'Tsonga'. Clashes in the shanty towns surrounding the formal townships around Durban took on an ugly 'factional mask' as war between 'Zulu' and 'Pondo' at the end of 1985 and early in 1986. A small Sotho-speaking community near Nqutu came in for criticism for wanting to hold on to their language in a Zulu-speaking area - this particular tension increased over the years leading to the suspension of chief Elphas Molefe by KwaZulu chief minister Buthelezi, then also holding the portfolio of 'traditional affairs' in the bantustan government, and a tragic attack on the chief's homestead in November 1993 in which he was wounded and 11 children killed (see for example, Natal Witness Echo, 21 Jul 94).

Buthelezi on the stage

Chief Gatsha Mangosuthu Ashpenaz Nathan Buthelezi was born on 27 August 1928 in Mahlabatini to chief Mathole and princess Constance Magogo Zulu. Some five months before his birth Inkata KaZulu had accepted a new constitution. This document, that of an 'organization designed by the Zulu aristocracy and the African petty bourgeoisie to gain state recognition for the king [Solomon]' (Marks, 1986:36), was to receive mention in the first constitution of the Inkatha movement revived by chief Buthelezi 47 years later in 1975. (I have retained the original spelling of the first Inkata movement to distinguish it from the 1975 Inkatha).

In 1948 the young Buthelezi arrived at Fort Hare, the university for black people in the eastern Cape that produced many southern African leaders of later years (see, for example, Beard, 1972:172-3). He studied for a BA degree, majoring in Bantu Administration, under professor ZK Matthews, an important ANC figure. Buthelezi was 19 when he started his student days, and he was a member of the ANC Youth League from 1948 to 1950. He often refers to this fact, but does not give it the content which would enable his position within Youth League radicalism to be clarified (see, for example, Deane, 1978:24). An ANCYL-led boycott of the visit to Fort Hare by the governor-general of the Union of South Africa, Brand van Zyl, in 1950, caused Buthelezi's expulsion for action taken by him and others against students who had welcomed the governor general. Buthelezi's biographer hinted that the 'heartbroken' Buthelezi might not have been guilty of any offence, and that he felt that he had failed in his duty towards his tribe, within which there had been some opposition to his university career (Temkin, 1976:36-37). Tribal opposition had been in part directed at the 'radical' company that he had been keeping (such as then journalist Jordan Ngubane). To make matters worse, in 1949 Buthelezi, then in his second year of study, had helped in the offices of the ANC in Durban in attempts to calm the 'racial'
tension that had erupted between Indians and Africans (Temkin, 1976:36; see, for example, Webster, 1977, on the '1949 riots'). These events have since become a symbol of the racialised form that social and economic tensions can take in South Africa's racist society.

It is not clear what Buthelezi's role was in the attempts by the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) and ANC to restore calm, but Temkin commented that, 'as a future chief, he had to play his politics in as low key as possible' (1976:34). 'Low key' appears to be a fair description of Buthelezi's actions over the next few years. Having assured liberal senator Edgar Brookes 'that he would steer clear of politics for the time being', Buthelezi took his exams at Natal University but graduated at the University of Fort Hare. He was then interviewed by Dr WWM Elselen, secretary for Bantu Administration, and warned that if he wanted to become a tribal chief (as he was destined to become) he would have to "wipe out" the Fort Hare episode (Temkin, 1976:39). Temkin said that it was to achieve this cleaning of his slate that Buthelezi joined the Department of Native Affairs for nearly two years, instead of serving his articles, as he had planned to do, with Rowley Arenstein, 'a Durban lawyer, who was a self-confessed communist' (Temkin, 1976:39; BS, 24 Sep 83:9; 24 Aug 85:16).

Temkin noted Buthelezi's 'single-minded' approach to becoming chief, a post with little prestige and a small income, and adds that Buthelezi had been greatly influenced by chief Albert Luthuli, who gave up teaching to become a chief at Groutville (Temkin, 1976:39). What Temkin fails to mention here is that Luthuli was never officially recognized by the central government as chief because of his decision to involve himself in national liberation politics. Luthuli became ANC president in 1952. Lodge wrote of Luthuli:

A man of great dignity and courage, he was immediately at home in the world of popular politics... His experiences as a local administrator gave him an insight into the parochial worries and concerns of ordinary people. His religious faith and training brought to his politics a principled belief in non-violence and a remarkable optimism about the capacity of whites to undergo a change of heart. For him, passive resistance, even on a mass scale, held no fears (1983:61; also 68).

Lodge quotes Luthuli at this point in words that could easily have been uttered by Buthelezi years later in a very different context:

'It [mass passive resistance] is not subversive since it does not seek to overthrow the form and machinery of the state but only urges for the
inclusion of all sectors of the community in a partnership in the government of the country on the basis of equality' (1983:61).

There are many similarities of language (the claims to Christian values, adherence to non-violence, calls for equality and sharing without changing the system, and belief in mass action), but there are also important differences, such as Buthelezi's claims that his espousal of non-violence is simply a tactical move, his ambiguity towards a politically-involved Christian action, and, most important, his central involvement in purely 'Zulu' politics and state administrative machinery.

The Bantu Authorities Act was passed in 1951, during Buthelezi's period of employment with the Department of Native Affairs. In November 1952 the Buthelezi clan decided that Buthelezi, who was 24 at the time and had married in July, should become chief and take over from the regent, chief Mallyamakhanda. In March 1953 he was installed as acting chief and four years later his position received government approval (Temkin, 1976:45). Temkin wrote that Buthelezi saw it 'as his role to help re-establish the paramountcy of the Zulu king' (1976:46), even though the king, as chief of the Usuthu seemed to have decided to accept the Bantu Authorities system for his people, something which Buthelezi's clan members were apparently not willing to do. The term 'Usuthu' came to be applied to the followers of Cetshwayo, one of the sons of the Zulu king Mpande in their struggle against the followers of another son, Mbulazi, who were known as the Gqoza, in 1856 (Guy, 1982a:13; 96, note 34; 246).

The 'single-mindedness' of Buthelezi's move towards chieftainship, in itself a fairly small prize, has already been mentioned. However, this particular chieftainship was also the source of the claim to 'prime ministership' or 'premiership' to the Zulu king, a post that Buthelezi's father had held under king Solomon (this became an extremely contentious issue in the struggle between Buthelezi and Inkatha and the ANC - see Mzala, 1988; and chapter five below). It could thus expand the young man's political horizons considerably, but only if the king should be restored to something of his previous central position in Zulu society (this time as figurehead and not as an executive monarch). The similarities with what the Zulu 'elite' had hoped to do with the kingship of Solomon early in the century are striking. A wide 'Zulueness' with a distinct political definition had, therefore, to be created (or recreated), but it had to be prevented from falling totally into the hands of the ethnic planners of the central state - which would have meant apartheid 'independence' for KwaZulu.

It was not enough for Buthelezi to remain at the level of tribal authorities, with its extreme small-scale fragmentation of a specifically 'Zulu' polity. Natal had been
divided into more than 280 'tribes'. A larger unit had to be accepted, namely the political entity that later became the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, claiming to speak for all 'Zulus'. In the same way, at the ideological level, Buthelezi 'was also doing his best to restore the pride of the Zulu in their nation', setting up a committee to honour Shaka, 'the founder of the nation' (Temkin, 1976:48). On 23-25 September 1954 celebrations were held at Stanger, where Shaka lies buried. Temkin claimed that Luthuli, on behalf of the ANC, donated the largest ox to the celebrations (1976:116).

Jordan Ngubane, who had been requested by the paramount chief to write on the Stanger ceremony, wrote to Buthelezi, congratulating him on the role he was establishing for himself - 'once more [we are going to] employ all our resources for our own good as people'. He said that it was only because of Buthelezi's position that he would write about the ceremony. That the king would be the 'rallying point' and Buthelezi the 'premier' is what 'many Zulu intellectuals' hoped would happen, according to Temkin (1976:49).

During a 1955 visit to Natal by Hendrik Verwoerd (then minister of Native Affairs), when he addressed some 300 chiefs and other leaders at Nongoma, Buthelezi 'welcomed the government's promise to retain the chieftainship' and asked that the position of the king (Cyprian) be changed: "Most people resent the fact that the king is only used as a tool whenever there is trouble and they want him to have more of a say in our affairs" (Temkin, 1976:51; Survey, 1955/6:66). Buthelezi was to change his mind on the executive position of the king once he had consolidated his own position within the bantustan structures, and had gained greater confidence and support. Verwoerd confirmed the position of Cyprian as head of the nation, but this was 'not acceptable to all the Zululand tribes, some of whom felt that the authority of the Zulu king did not extend to them' (Temkin, 1976:56-7). It is difficult, even today, to see to what extent the king (now Goodwill Zwelithini) has ever served as a 'rallying point for the nation', or to what extent he has served politically to fragment African people in Natal through the inappropriateness of his position as 'traditionally' a figure of specific Zulu tribal allegiance, and even more so the struggle over appropriating him for various political mobilisations.

On 6 September 1957 Buthelezi was officially installed as chief. He had steered clear of the pass protests that his wife and mother had been involved in so as not to jeopardize official recognition of his position. Luthuli, who could not attend the ceremony because of illness (says Temkin, although Luthuli could hardly have done so with the ANC opposition to Bantu Authorities) sent a letter (which arrived late, wrote Temkin) in which he restated ANC rejection of Bantu Authorities because chiefs would become 'official mouthpieces' (1976:59). The director of the Institute of Race
Relations. Quintin Whyte, who attended the ceremony, wrote that 'while leaders such as Buthelezi had no part in making the laws, they had to administer them. Buthelezi and others could only do their best to reduce the harshness of these laws and to develop their people within their framework' (Temkin, 1976:61).

**Working within the system**

With this reference to Whyte's comments, Temkin set the scene for a frequently repeated explanation, or justification, of Buthelezi's involvement in state policy over the next three decades.

At a meeting of the Mashonangashoni Regional Authority in 1968, before the Authority had been formally established, Buthelezi as chair justified his participation in the Bantu Authorities system. This meeting is said to have signified capitulation to the state's political plans in Natal. Buthelezi said that 'co-operation was not acceptance of the apartheid system but evidence of a desire to progress within whatever system was imposed upon them' (Temkin, 1976:118). This idea is repeated at least 15 times in Temkin's biography of Buthelezi, reflecting the chief's undoubted sensitivity to accusations of working within, and hence supporting the apartheid system. This justification also extended to obeying the laws and authority of the land: for example, when Buthelezi opened the first session of the Zulu Territorial Authority in 1970 he pointed out that "essentially" they [the Zulu people] had co-operated "as subjects with whichever government... [was] in power" (Temkin, 1976:127).

While much has been made in the political rhetoric of bantustan politics in Natal of resistance to the imposition of Bantu Authorities during the 1960s, the basis of that opposition is not clear to this researcher. Nor is it clear whether chiefs and commoners opposed the move for the same, or even similar reasons. There are vague reports that some 'tribes' wanted to wait and see how the implementation would work elsewhere, and that people resisted simply because they had not been consulted by the state. This aspect of regional political history needs much further study.

There is some suggestion that opposition at local level from the chiefs (the linchpins of the policy) could have been conservative rather than a rejection of the state's attempts at greater and more efficient control through reintroduced 'traditionalism'. Temkin (1976:63) and Hill (1964:89) suggest that the chiefs feared changes in the degree of local autonomy they had over such matters as the fines that they imposed on their 'subjects'. It is possible that suspicion about loss of income and authority was behind
their reluctance to accept the system (as it was with the formation of Inkatha in 1975, and as it is with political change in South Africa since 1990, and not only in KwaZulu-Natal). If this was the motivation, then for some of the chiefs an understanding of the system government that was being established under apartheid would have made clear that some chiefs were going to benefit beyond anything that had occurred under previous governments. Some chiefs were going to be absorbed into the bantustan legislative assemblies providing salaries and possibilities of patronage far in excess of that which they had enjoyed before.

Buthelezi, for example, asked for the system to be made compulsory, long before the state made it clear that the initial element of choice had been removed. At the time of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act (1959) Buthelezi wrote to a 'white political friend':

'I have stated at public meetings in the presence of my tribe that it would seem that the best thing would be to co-operate with it [the Bantu Authorities Act] since my cousin who is the Paramount Chief has done so. The people have not rejected the Act as far as I am aware. All that they have said is that I am trying to rush them despite the choice given by the government - that they are watching it in operation in the Usuthu ward [that of the Paramount Chief].

I am not the person standing in the people's way to acceptance. I am prepared to abide by any Act passed by Parliament. Parliament has chosen to make this particular one permissive. My suggestion is that it should be compulsory like Bantu Education and other Acts of Parliament' (quoted Temkin, 1976:72; similar sentiments were expressed in Daily News, 28 Apr 64).

This remarkable letter was quite correct in that acceptance was voluntary at that time. However, with the ANC opposing the system, there must have been a fair degree of popular resistance to it (although little evidence for such resistance to tribal authorities exists in the sources consulted), for different reasons from that offered by the chief (see Temkin, 1976:89). As late as 1965 the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development said in parliament that "under no circumstances would I allow a Bantu Authority to be forced upon any tribe", and that the Act stated that consultation had to take place (Survey, 1965:133). At the same time Bantu Affairs commissioners (white district officials functioning as magistrates) said that it was 'consultation, not acceptance, that was called for' (Sunday Times, 18 Apr 65; see also Buthelezi, 1972:7; Temkin, 1976:93-96).
In 1974, looking back on this period in the 1960s, Buthelezi told the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA) that 'Mr Oltman, who is a member of my department here', and Mr Otto (the magistrate at Nongoma) had told his tribe that there was no option. He alleged Otto had said that 'magistrates were wrongly instructed when they told tribes and chiefs that they had an option in the matter. There was no such option.

I complied because I am a law-abiding non-citizen of South Africa' (KLA D4, 1974:214; also Survey, 1969:131). Buthelezi said at the time that he was relieved to hear that acceptance was unnecessary, and that while he did not believe that the system was the answer to South Africa's problems, he would co-operate. Little time was wasted and under a Government Gazette notice in September 1965 a tribal authority was established for the Mahlabatini tribal area, consisting of Buthelezi and 67 councillors.

It would seem that Buthelezi was not the centre of resistance. In 1966 107 tribal authorities had been established for the 282 government-recognized 'tribes' in Natal, and 12 regional authorities were functioning (Survey, 1966:147). By the next year, remembering that a tribal authority had been established in Buthelezi's Mahlabatini tribal area two years earlier, only a further 12 tribal authorities had been established amid continuing resistance, and early in 1968 there were still 135 to be created. However, during this year no fewer than 50 were formed and it appeared that the tide had turned. It was also in 1968 that chief Cyprian Bhekuzulu (the paramount chief of the Zulus) died and Buthelezi became head of the Mashonangashoni regional authority in the Mahlabatini district.

In 1969 prince Israel Mncwayizeni became regent until prince Goodwill should come of age and marry. A rift developed between Buthelezi and prince Israel, who apparently wished to ask for a Territorial Authority for the Zulus, while Buthelezi claims that he did not want it to be initiated from within the royal family. This was the beginning of the rift between the royal family and Buthelezi that was to absorb much regional African political energy over the following decades, a conflict that the central state was quite willing to fan during its initial opposition to Buthelezi's loyal resistance, and that flared up yet again after the 1994 elections involving several of the same actors that had played a part in the 1960s and 1970s.

Whether he was going to initiate moves to establish a Zulu Territorial Authority (ZTA) or whether he was simply going to go along with its creation, there is little doubt that Buthelezi benefited politically from this apartheid structure. If his accession to chieftainship had been perceived by observers like Jordan Ngubane in the 1950s as enabling the mobilization of Zulu society by the use of traditional authority in a
modern context, he lost that advisory role as prime minister to the royal house after the death of Cyprian (at least for several years), and again - at least in the eyes of a reconstituted royal council and of the ANC - in 1994. The ‘prime ministerial’ role of the Buthelezi clan to the Zulu royal house dates back to the prominent role of Nqengelele under Shaka, and especially to the ‘prominence in Zulu affairs’ accorded to the Buthelezi chiefdom with Nqengelele’s son Myamana being prime minister to Cetshwayo (see Buthelezi, 1978; Marks, 1970:31; Guy, 1982:46).

Brenda Robinson, one of the local journalists in the English-language press who had kept Buthelezi’s name and image in the public eye in an extremely sympathetic way, wrote at the time, shortly after Cyprian’s death:

‘In 1968, after the death of Cyprian whom he had served for sixteen years, Buthelezi was elbowed out of Zulu royal affairs in a manner far from subtle. But to elbow him out of the public eye or the Zulu people’s esteem proved a simple impossibility’ (Sunday Tribune, 16 Jun 70, quoted in Temkin, 1976:121).

Ironically, it was the creation of the Zulu Territorial Authority (ZTA) - based on the state’s definition of ‘traditional’ society - that enabled him to continue to play a central role. Apartheid saved the chief from possible obscurity.

Temkin offered reasons for Buthelezi’s decision to enter into the highest level of the administrative system devised for Africans by the National Party government since 1951. It was suggested that he was ‘reluctant’, but that his friends and political mentors of many years standing, bishop AH Zulu and the journalist Jordan Ngubane, urged him to enter. However, despite his alleged resistance and indecision it must be clear that this was simply the next step on a road of prior participation in government structures (whatever the justification) on which he had started many years earlier.

Why did Buthelezi feel it worthwhile to participate here as well? First, he would have a ‘platform’ from which he ‘could draw attention to the iniquities and inequalities of the system’, wrote Temkin (1976:123, 216). The plausibility of this reason is diminished when one recalls that this ‘system’ had been in existence for nearly two decades, and its ‘iniquities and inequalities’ had been shown up and popularly rejected times without count. It would hardly seem necessary to expose the disastrous effects of a system that prosecuted hundreds of thousands of people under the pass laws, that relocated as many into the hell-holes of the ‘resettlement’ camps (see, for example, Desmond, 1970), that banned organizations of resistance, and condemned thousands to a life of migration. Participation in the bantustan structures would seem to have carried such a taint as to negate any value it might have had.
In an interview with the *Financial Mail* (14 Feb 75) Buthelezi was asked if he had any regrets about working within the 'framework of separate development'. His reply was as superficial as the earlier justifications: 'No. If the government does not deliver the goods, it only proves that I was right in the first place. And if I have exposed certain fallacies and frauds in the system I have accomplished something' (also see Langner, 1983:11). As will be argued later, this circular argument does not hold if at the same time claims are made for a clear political direction.

A second claim was that participation would offer 'some hope for the Zulu' if a 'Zulu homeland' was effectively led. It was implied, in this argument, that developmental possibilities could have arisen out of the apartheid system and that administrative efficiency would assure such a direction.

This strand of Buthelezi's justification for involvement in, first, Bantu Authorities and then the next stage of the apartheid structure - the pragmatic, realistic argument - is well captured in his first report to the ZTA:

'We as a people need development more than any other race group, and, for this reason, we say to those who have these reservations that a negative attitude will deprive us of the development that is available to our people within the framework of the policy.

Let us, therefore, unite as a people as whites are united and glean whatever development is allowed us in our lifetime, for the benefit of posterity.

What will be more gratifying to us as we close our eyes on our deathbeds than to think that we did our best in the circumstances and to the very limit of what was possible... Let us make mistakes and learn by them instead of folding arms' (quoted in Temkin, 1976:131).

Temkin comments that this approach of 'doing the best within the legal limitations' (while condemning the limitations) has been Buthelezi's 'standpoint to the present time' (1976:131). There are several criticisms to be made of this approach. Some have already been mentioned. There is also more than a hint that 'legality' was equated with participation in state structures.

Third, his 'abstaining could have a destructive effect on the Zulustan government' (Temkin, 1976:123). However, by the mid-1980s after 16 years of the ZTA and then
the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly under the leadership of Buthelezi, the bantustan was having to screen pensioners as they could not all be paid, a fraction of the jobs had been created that would have been necessary to absorb the unemployed, let alone new workseekers, and there had been frequent complaints of mismanagement, corruption, and totally inadequate infrastructural and health facilities. Buthelezi and his administration may not have directly caused this situation, but participation in a system that had these and other ‘iniquities and inequalities’ as its inevitable and sometimes conscious effects entails some responsibility for them - especially when Buthelezi and his administration claimed credit for small victories that allegedly arose out of their participation.

Buthelezi argued that he was doing no more than participating in this technical task. In this vein Buthelezi told Justice and Police minister Jimmy Kruger in 1977 (Inkatha, nd:7), when the latter called him in to warn him against taking non-Zulus into the Inkatha movement: ‘In fact, the Ulundi thing as far as I am concerned is nothing more than local administration of the Zulu people... we are just a section of the South African people’. In 1976 he told the KLA (KLAD 8, 1976:85-86) that the people in these Reserve areas have to exist and they should be helped by us, and we by them, in our attempts to eke out an existence... This means that we have to face the fact that we have day to day goals, as we have to live for 365 days each year and every year. On the other hand, we must have long-term goals....

Fourth, the most credible stated justification for Buthelezi’s participation was no doubt that fact that he had resisted the very strong push from the NP government for KwaZulu to take ‘independence’. Such a step would have been the jewel in the intended ‘constellation of states’ that was envisaged as ‘the Zulus’ were the largest ethnic group in the apartheid plan. Buthelezi rejected this status. However, such a justification was voiced only after he had already entered the system.

Fifth, participation was justified in terms of the continuity of pre-capitalist political and cultural traditions. This is probably the most frequently used explanation of why Buthelezi had chosen the path of ‘separate development’, not because it is the policy of the central state but because it is primarily the historical continuity of ‘Zulu’ society and of Buthelezi’s own political destiny. This is the strand that is focused on in this study.

Buthelezi restated this position in an article written after the results of the referendum of white opinion on the ‘tricameral’ parliament became known in 1983 (Sunday Tribune, 6 Nov 83):
I was the traditional Prime Minister to my first cousin, King Cyprian for 16 years, long before there was any KwaZulu Legislative Assembly. I never thought that the Prime Minister was so politically illiterate to the extent of him being unaware that I am not Chief Minister of KwaZulu by the grace of the Nationalist Government.

And in remarkably similar language he had written in the Sunday Times (16 Jan 83):

I do not owe my political power to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly or to Pretoria. King Shaka never owed his political eminence to any colonial power. The solidarity of the Zulu people was not dependent on white-created institutions when they defeated the might of the British Army. White South Africa observes a so-called Day of the Vow as testimony to the fact that the people I now lead have their own will and their own sense of destiny. An act of history made us South Africans and South Africans we are and will remain.

Here is a restatement of that short-term and long-term strategy that Buthelezi referred to in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (the KLA). The former is expressed in this version in terms of a separate ‘Zuluness’, and a specific history that dates back to pre-colonial south-east Africa. That in itself is fairly trite. What is remarkable is that this specific local history should have been used in the last quarter of the twentieth century to justify involvement in a policy as divisive and generally abhorrent as that of apartheid. Temkin, in trying to justify Buthelezi’s participation, effectively condemned him, through pointing to the ‘heads I win, tails you lose’ basis of the argument: ‘Homeland’s [sic] policy has been superimposed on Buthelezi’s own position: his mandate does not require acceptance of the policy, only its exploitation and conformity to its statutes’ (1976:357).

It was probably a measure of discomfort with this justification that made Buthelezi call upon the legitimating approval of certain ANC figures for the path that he had chosen. In a letter to the Daily News (28 Mar 79) he wrote, in response to something that Natal University sociologist professor Fatima Meer had said about him:

... I want to know whether the suggestion is that I should abandon my people at the Buthelezi tribal level, and also at the Zulu ethnic group level in order to be passed by her [Fatima Meer] as the authentic voice of my people? Must I leave the Zulus to the wiles of BOSS-sponsored ambitious characters so that they can lead them to Pretoria’s pseudo-independence? Neither Chief Albert Luthuli, Nelson Mandela or Walter Sisulu (and some leaders in exile), have ever told me that
there was any conflict in serving my people at home and the black liberation struggle in which I am engaged on a wider basis.

His reference to 'BOSS-sponsored ambitious characters' was to attempts made during the 1970s by the central state, through the Bureau for State Security (BOSS) and the Department of Information, to unseat him and replace him with an executive king, working through ultra-conservative traditionalists in the royal household. His fears were real.

In an interview with Graham Watts (Sunday Express, 1 Jul 84) Buthelezi said that '... when he was a young man, he was advised by ANC leaders Chief Albert Luthuli, Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu to take up his hereditary position of chief minister of the Zulus'. He added that this was before the 'homeland policy' and that he did not choose to work within 'the system'. (There might not have been a 'homeland policy' when the young Buthelezi took up his chieftainship, but the Bantu Authorities system had been created and the role of chiefs within the system of indirect rule had been in existence for nearly a century, albeit initially outside Zululand).

These claims were somewhat soured, without necessarily casting doubt on them, when in 1983 Albert Luthuli's eldest daughter, Dr Albertina Luthuli (living in Zimbabwe at the time) said: 'I ask myself where Buthelezi went wrong. I remember so well years ago at my home in Groutville when he used to visit my father and he was a youth member of the ANC... And now he stands for the very things my father opposed...' (Star, 16 Sep 82). By the 1980s the context of Buthelezi's (and the ANC's) politics had changed dramatically.

Sixth, there is a justification that can be called one of 'moral affront'. It goes something like this:

'Each and every person in South Africa, white or black, is willy-nilly working and living within the system imposed by oppressors on all of us. Vociferous black spokesmen who thrive on reiterating these cliches live in the native townships under WRAB (the West Rand Administration Board) and other administration boards to which they pay rent. They are educated in black schools that are financed directly by the Department of Education and Training. They attend separate black universities financed by the Government' (Star, 14 Jul 78, reporting on Buthelezi's address to the Inkatha central committee meeting; also Cape Times, 10 Apr 78).
The argument is that there was little difference between simply living in South Africa as a black person, and actively participating in the structures of that society. To call those who opted for participation 'stooges' or 'puppets' was and remains, according to this argument, totally wrong. However, there was a big difference between living in apartheid South Africa - carrying a pass, attending schools, living in group areas set aside for different racial groups, etc., and becoming part of the structures that had been set up for the maintenance of the society in this form. Becoming part of ethnically fragmented bantustan administrations, running an ethnic police force, fighting battles with other ethnically defined units over resources, was a far cry from doing those things that apartheid society enforced, doing them under pressure and, more and more often after the 1970s, dying while resisting apartheid. To have equated these two aspects to justify participation in the apartheid structures reflected a measure of unease about such participation, which might account in part for Buthelezi's well-known sensitivity to whatever he has perceived as a slight. It was precisely this inability to adapt to escape the strictures of what may well have been a correct strategy of 'using the system' (and supported as such by the ANC initially), that made Buthelezi and Inkatha the object of hatred from the new generation of opposition in the period after 1976 and especially during the 1980s.

Whatever the justifications offered over the years, and they fluctuated according to the audience, the origin of the attacks and the general political climate, the direction and effect was that of consolidating power for political and economic entrepreneurs, using the government's bantustan policy.

On 9 April 1970 a meeting of chiefs eventually decided upon the establishment of a Zulu Territorial Authority (Survey, 1970:141). Proclamation 139 of 22 May 1970 set out the regulations for the ZTA. As elsewhere, chiefs and their 'traditional councillors' formed the basis of the Authority, the head of which had to be a chief. Buthelezi was unanimously elected the chief executive officer. Two out of five of the other executive members also had to be chiefs. At this stage there were 188 tribal authorities (out of 282 'tribes') and 22 regional authorities.

Buthelezi, replying to the minister of Bantu Administration and Development who opened the first meeting at Nongoma on 9 June 1970, assured him that reservations about the system had not meant 'disloyalty or "communism"', and he called for an acceleration of the process that had been set in motion - 'we cannot be expected to move towards self-determination and self-realization at ox-wagon pace' (Survey, 1970:143).
Buthelezi was now ‘on the national stage’. He turned down an invitation to open the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) congress, ‘because he believed it better to avoid such a possibly controversial engagement so soon after his election’ (Temkin, 1976:129). He did take part in ‘controversial’ political events during the early-1970s (including participation in calls for the release of Nelson Mandela, one such campaign initiated by the National Union of South African Students), but possibly the memory of student clashes with police in the general protest at detentions during 1969 and 1970 was too immediate during the year that the ZTA was formed. NUSAS had also been the target of several state threats and direct action against the movement.

It must be kept in mind that both white and black opposition groups and individuals perceived the newly-formed bantustan structures and some of the individuals who occupied places within them in a far from unfavourable light during the early 1970s, or at least were ambiguous in their responses. To take just some examples: dr Richard Turner, a radical Natal University lecturer who was very influential in both black and white student circles (and who was assassinated in January 1978), wrote in an early-1973 postscript to his book, The Eye of the Needle, which was originally written in 1971:

\[
\text{In a sense, black consciousness has certainly furthered the development of black solidarity in South Africa. But it is people like Chief Buthelezi who are recognised by the bulk of Africans as their present leaders, while the BPC (Black People's Convention) is probably known by a relatively small percentage of predominantly middle-class blacks (Turner, 1980:127).}
\]

While voicing caution about the future, the liberal-Christian oriented Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid Society (SPRO-CAS), for whom Turner had written his book as well, commented in 1973 that:

\[
\text{Chief Gatsha Buthelezi has led the way among Bantustan leaders in voicing demands that could be satisfied only by a substantial modification of, or indeed by the abandonment of, separate development (SPRO-CAS, 1973:39).}
\]

In 1973 there occurred what was described by SPRO-CAS director Peter Randall as an event that ‘may serve as a turning point in the history both of Black Solidarity and of Coloured-white relationships’. Clashes between students and university authorities at the University of the Western Cape for coloured students led to several mass meetings being called. At one chief Buthelezi, Fatima Meer (the University of Natal, Durban,
sociologist with whom Buthelezi was subsequently to clash), and other leaders appeared together. Randall wrote that 'significantly enough, the SASO [the black consciousness student organization, the SA Students Organisation, that had split from NUSAS in 1969] President was prepared to share the platform with a homeland leader...' (Randall, 1973:32). Steve Biko himself had shared a platform with Buthelezi in 1971 under the theme 'Development of the African Community' (Khoapa (ed). 1973:8).

The justifications, as well as the explanations, for Buthelezi's involvement in apartheid structures need to be treated with greater understanding for the context within which they occurred than was and is often the case within the apparent clarities of a struggle against a system so abhorrent as apartheid. A fuller regional history of the 1950s to the 1990s, reflecting the circumstances under which decisions were made, as well as the continuities ('the historical conditions for possibility' (Norval, 1992:7)) and contingencies, still has to be written. In the next sections I will add further information and analysis to this task.

The system develops

Political development in KwaZulu did not take place at the 'ox wagon pace' that Buthelezi had feared, and by 1972 the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly was created to replace the Zulu Territorial Authority. This was a major step forward in the state's general constitutional planning for the bantustans, giving limited legislative as well as executive powers to these regional administrations on their paths towards 'independence'. The Act under which the KLA was created, the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act of 1971, made provision for 'Chapter 1' and 'Chapter 2' powers. During the first stage, which started for KwaZulu in 1972, an executive council was allowed, which was to become a cabinet in the next stage ('Chapter 2'). Excluded from 'Chapter 1' powers were important areas, such as establishment of townships and business undertakings, the appointment and dismissal of chiefs, and educational syllabi. This meant that the bantustans were forced to move to the next stage, even if they should reject the 'final' stage of 'independence', as KwaZulu had already done (see Horrell, 1978:52-53).

In 1972, then, a constitution was drafted for KwaZulu. This constitution contained two changes to the constitution submitted by the central government. The king had been 'downgraded' to a figurehead position, at the insistence of Buthelezi and the other executive councillors. This occurred against the wishes and petitions to the
central state of such royalists as prince Clement Zulu who had wanted an executive 'paramount chief' (king) (Kotze, 1975:55-58; Schmahmann, 1978:93; Butler et al, 1977:40). There was also a pledge of 'respect' for 'all laws applicable in the area of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly', rather than to the South African government (Temkin, 1976:149).

The issue of the constitutional role of the king was, and has remained, of central importance to the detail of specifically 'Zulu' politics. Buthelezi's tactics have all along rested on occupying a commanding position in KwaZulu that could not be challenged by an alternative tradition, such as that of the king, with the potential or actual backing of the central state (then the NP, now the ANC). As mentioned above, powerful forces in opposition to Buthelezi in the 1970s were trying to set up a system of government similar to that in Swaziland, another monarchy but with an executive king. These forces were operating not only within Zulu society, but also found ready allies in the state, and later amongst a disgruntled petty bourgeoisie. Their allies within the state did not want a sometimes rebellious Buthelezi running the bantustan for the largest ethnic group in South Africa, a potential showpiece. Buthelezi tried to delay the installation of Goodwill as king of the Zulus. This was interpreted by some as a tactic to get the constitution for the KLA passed first, with its clauses defining a non-executive role for the king. This interpretation is rejected by Temkin, but on somewhat unconvinning grounds (1976:140). Such a move would have made sense within the strategy Buthelezi was to follow in out-manoeuvring the central state's ambitions to install a less rebellious leadership in the bantustan.

Both parties in this conflict for the political power (real or imagined) of the king drew heavily on 'tradition' to justify their particular claims (see, for example, Temkin, 1976:139-46; and below). It comes as no surprise that the first debate within the ZTA should have referred so often to the idea of a 'Zulu nation'. The ambiguities of this message when read together with rejection of the South African government's policy of trying to create a 'Zulu nation', are clear. Within that 'nation' and its cultural history there were at the time, and for a long time into the 1970s, two interpretations. One came from Buthelezi and the politicians (many of them ex-members of the ANC in Natal) and economic interests that perceived their aspirations to be best served with a less direct involvement of the king. However, they were not stepping away from the specifically 'Zulu' element in the rules of this political game. On the contrary they were simply defining or redefining the rules of 'Zuluness': for example, Schlemmer and Mull (1975:125) said that moves by the king and his advisers were opposed because 'they violated custom'. On the other side were a mixed bag of security police agents, black apartheid apostles, another brand of 'Zulu traditionalists' proposing an
executive king (which they claimed was historically correct), and trading interests who felt threatened by the close links that Buthelezi and those around him had built up with ‘white’ (especially monopoly) business.

Twenty years later similar struggles are being fought out in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, now with a democratically-elected central government in place. Once again the struggle is over political power and the role of the region in relation to central authority; now, ironically, with the central state attempting greater integration of a recalcitrant regional government, that of the IFP (see, for example, Maré, 1994).

The 1972 KLA constitution provided for 24 September to be an official public holiday in KwaZulu, to be known as King Shaka Day, a matter dear to Buthelezi since 1954. The KLA would comprise a personal representative of the king, three chiefs (or chairs of community authorities) appointed by each of the 22 existing regional authorities, and 55 elected members (elections were, however, not held until 1978). A comment by Butler et al (1977:41) draws attention to a point that has been mentioned in connection with Buthelezi’s denial that he participated in apartheid:

It is important to emphasize the limited nature of the changes in the constitutions of the homelands. The legislation of 1970 and 1971 (the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act and the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act) provides no major break with the system established in the Transkei in 1963, the roots of which go back to the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951. What has been achieved constitutionally in recent years is the extension of Transkei-type models to the other former reserves.

A further concession that Buthelezi won was the right to select members of his own executive council, although the names still had to be presented to the KLA for approval.

The status achieved in 1972 was that of stage one self-government. The Zulustan was one of the last of the at first eight envisaged ethnic groups to get to this point (two further bantustans were added after the original 1959 Act was passed). Buthelezi fairly consistently came out against the final step, as envisaged by the political planners in Pretoria, and the KwaZulu bantustan never became one of the ‘independent national states’ (of which there were finally four), politically recognized only by each other and by the South African state. Some of Buthelezi’s early statements might have been read as leaving the way open for this largely fictitious independence, especially those that made demands for a consolidated KwaZulu.
something that had been ruled out by the inadequate consolidation proposals made over the years by the state (see Temkin, 1976:165).

The *KwaZulu Government Diary* (1974:10) carried a 'statement of policy' in Buthelezi's foreword:

We believe that it is in the interests of the Zulu nation that we gear our approach towards full political rights with the least political delay and that means nothing less but unqualified independence.

We will therefore in terms of our constitution from time to time ask that more and greater powers and more comprehensive duties in respect of KwaZulu matters be handed over to us that we can orderly develop towards full autonomy.

This is followed by another statement which, although vague, seems to refer to protection, on an ethnic basis, of certain resources, such as trading facilities that were to become a major issue during the mid-1970s. This point reads as follows:

We firmly reject any policy or move which could have the tendency and/or ultimate result that the wealth, resources and commercial opportunities of KwaZulu would no longer be reserved and developed exclusively for us.

To be fair to Buthelezi, the speech on which he (or the compiler of the *Diary*) based this foreword (quoted above) was given in the KLA the previous year (*KLAD* 3, 1973:168-9). Here the phrase 'unqualified autonomy' rather than 'unqualified independence' was used. It would be correct to say that while one may find such instances where he envisaged 'independence' under certain conditions (conditions that were extreme and impossible to meet under the apartheid policy as then envisaged), generally he had rejected the climax of the bantustan policy. When *Drum* magazine wrote (December 1982) that he had seen the establishment of the ZTA as a 'step towards eventual independence', Inkatha secretary general Oscar Dhlomo was quick to respond that 'it was blatantly untrue to allege that there was ever a time when Chief Buthelezi ever contemplated taking so-called "independence"' (*Drum*, February 1983).

During 1974 the KLA asked to move into the next phase of self-government (with greater legislative powers) in terms of the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act. The minister of Bantu Administration and Development replied sympathetically but said that it would have to await elections in KwaZulu. This was a pointed reference to the delay in holding elections in the bantustan because of the KLA's reluctance to use
'reference books', the notorious pass-book ('dompas'), and the decision that KwaZulu 'citizenship certificates' were to be issued prior to elections (Langner, 1983:51).

Greater status and power were again requested in 1976, and were finally granted in February 1977, still without elections and with KwaZulu divided into as many fragments as before.

Internal bantustan politics had by the mid-1980s not changed greatly except that the level of direct repression had already escalated dramatically (for example, Haysom, 1983; 1986). However, the changing political climate in South Africa as a whole had fundamentally altered the position originally envisaged for these regions. The KwaNdebele 'homeland' was due to gain its 'independence' at the end of 1986, but popular resistance forced the South African state and African supporters of 'independence' for the 'state' to back down and postpone plans for further fragmentation of South Africa. Fewer attempts were subsequently made to force the remaining five into 'independence'. Instead, a greater measure of incorporation of these bantustans into 'white' SA was on the cards (see, for example, Cobbett et al., 1986). This new policy, only in its initial stages in the mid-1980s, meant that it became counterproductive to find a way of circumventing Buthelezi or forcing him into 'independence'. As the lines during the period of mass resistance appeared to be drawn ever more clearly in class rather than just racialised terms, so the traditional opposition to Inkatha and to Buthelezi from the state and NP-controlled media changed. Gone were the days when every session of the KLA was dominated by revelations and accusations about Department of Information and security police involvement in KwaZulu politics in attempts to replace Buthelezi with someone more pliant. Even business had, in the early-1970s, wanted Buthelezi and other bantustan politicians to be legislatively excluded from the labour field. However, the name and face of Buthelezi was in the 1980s frequently to be found making a point that supported the state's or capital's new direction, or attacking the enemies of 'reform' in South Africa. In this new definition of a common South Africa, albeit still composed of 'minorities', there was certainly a place for Buthelezi and his ethnic support base. The question was simply, where? How could concessions be made without opening the doors to majority rule?

It is in this context that the federal option, advocated by Buthelezi for so long, came to demand serious consideration from politicians and academics. It had been given the stamp of approval by business leaders in Natal, through their participation in deliberations of the Buthelezi Commission and then in the discussions for a joint administration and legislature in Natal and KwaZulu (the venture known as the KwaZulu-Natal 'Indaba', or consultation). Buthelezi and Inkatha were by then turning
the weakness, on an ideological level, of being part of the bantustan system, into a strength through making the bantustan and its politics a central part of regional and hence national politics. The presence in force of KwaZulu police, armed with automatic weapons, at the 1986 May Day launch of Inkatha's trade union in the heart of 'white' Durban was a sign of the future, as was the fact that the union, UWUSA, was subsequently revealed to have been state funded (Maré, 1991).

Inkatha re-formed: parallels from the past
On 22 March 1975 Inkatha YaKwaZulu was revived at KwaNzimela Diocesan Centre near Melmoth in northern Natal. More than 100 delegates were present from Natal, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. The gathering represented 18 of the by then 26 regional authorities in Natal, the KwaZulu executive councilors, most of the members of Ubhoko (an interim preparatory body) and prominent Zulu women (see Langner, 1983:20).

The first constitution of this 'new' inkatha not only used the term 'Zulu' (ie made the movement ethnically exclusive at its start), but also referred to the first Inkata of the 1920s: a bracketed reference at the head of the first constitution read '(Founded in 1928 - by King Solomon ka Dinuzulu)'. Langner claims that by the time the first copies of the Inkatha constitution were published, 'Inkatha YaKwaZulu' had been altered to read 'Inkatha Yesizwe' ('Inkatha of the nation', rather than 'Inkatha of the place of the Zulus') (1983:21). This ambiguity of being caught between the 'Zulu nation', on the one hand, and national aspirations (the 'African nation'), on the other, continued to haunt the movement.

This was not the first attempt to revive the Inkatha movement in Natal since king Solomon's times. In an interview Zephaniah Mahaye, a Mtubatuba businessman, said there had been an attempt in 1943 (KCAV, no number). Langner cites an interview with chief Buthelezi as his source for the claim that chief Albert Luthuli, then president of the ANC, also tried to revive Inkatha even before the ANC was banned (Langner, 1983:12). Buthelezi, then the 30-year old chief of the Buthelezi tribe, allegedly supported this move. Paramount chief Cyprian Bhekuzulu, apparently after being dissuaded by the Department of Native Affairs, opposed the revival and claimed that it was just a vehicle for Buthelezi to establish a power base outside formal structures as his (Buthelezi's) tribe had rejected the Bantu Authorities system. Buthelezi's biographer, Ben Temkin, denies this claim and says that Buthelezi went as
far as calling a 'conference of leading Zulu' at the insistence of 'many of the older Zulu, including a number of ministers of religion'. This meeting was, however, 'gatecrashed' by CB Young, secretary for Bantu Administration. Bishop AH Zulu, the first black Anglican bishop in South Africa and a close friend of Buthelezi, wrote a letter to Buthelezi in which he said he knew that the chief 'did not want this thing... The conference must certainly not meet if it will be interpreted as your attempt to create a counter-attraction to Bantu Authorities. If some people in Zululand and Natal want to view this matter from that angle you can be sure Pretoria will do so as well' (quoted Temkin, 1976:75).

As it turned out, Buthelezi established himself firmly in the Bantu Authorities structures and in the KwaZulu bantustan before forming Inkatha in 1975.

Further 'attempts to revive Inkatha by the ANC in the 1940s and by Buthelezi in the 1960s' are referred to in a dissertation completed in 1977 (Bernstein, 1977:122). It is not clear whether these are references to the same moves that have already been mentioned. What is clear is that the conservatism and Zulu 'nationalism' or ethnic consciousness that had characterized much of Natal African politics during the twentieth century also lay behind attempts to revive Inkatha.

While the first Inkata became effective in 1924, arising out of a prior 'Zulu National Fund', it was the rejuvenation of the organization in 1928 that has received most frequent mention in historical overviews. A new constitution was written in 1928 (see the excellent study by Cope, 1993:chapter 8), hence the reference to the 'founding' in that year by Solomon in the 1975 constitution of Inkatha and the claim to a link with the past. While this explicit attempt at continuity was dropped, because it would interfere with the 1970s movement's national political aspirations, it does draw attention to the ironies of history. To paraphrase Marx, history repeats itself - the first time as farce and the second time as tragedy. If the farce of the 1920s was to be found in the overt misuse of Inkata funds collected from the poverty-stricken population of Natal to maintain king Solomon in a style that included large liquor debts (he was an alcoholic) (see Marks, 1986:chapter 1; Cope, 1983:202) and ostentatious motorcars, the tragedy of the 1970s lies in the effects on national and local political struggle of the Zulu chauvinist and ultra-conservative elements in Inkatha and their actions.

It is worth mentioning some of the continuities and ironies of the links between the two Zulu-based movements. First, the 1928 constitution, presented by Buthelezi as an element in a tradition of Zulu politics, was drawn up by a white Durban-based lawyer...
at the instigation of sugar interests in Natal. George Heaton Nicholls, in the mid-1920s member of Parliament for Zululand and president of the South African Planters' Union and its affiliate, the Zululand Planters' Union, and a strong segregationist, instructed Nicolson and Thorpe (solicitors) to draw up the 1928 constitution (Cope, 1993:196, 217), a document that ensured that the interests of the conservative African petty bourgeoisie and tribal elites were firmly entrenched in Inkata. The whites who influenced Inkata at this time operated behind the scenes, and explicitly kept their names out of any link with the movement. This has a parallel in the later Inkatha, which, despite Buthelezi's hypersensitive denials, had at various times also collected a number of white advisers coming from similar agricultural and industrial backgrounds (such as Chris Saunders and Tony Ardington), from academic institutions (such as professor Lawrence Schlemmer of Natal University), from the press, where a long line of journalists ensured that Buthelezi and the Inkatha movement were kept in a very uncritical focus for many years (people such as Tim Mull, Brenda Robinson, Roy Rudden, Suzanne Vos, and Arthur Konigkramer), and of course Walter Felgate (social anthropologist, businessman, and for many years the least publicised personality in this constellation despite the frequency with which his name was connected to Buthelezi and Inkatha) and Rowley Arenstein (a communist lawyer, 'banned' under apartheid South Africa's 'security legislation', Buthelezi's lawyer and long-time friend). Inkatha had maintained links with white political personalities (such as Ray Swart, of the Progressive Federal Party) and parties, but this had been on a much more overt level.

In 1928 Heaton Nicholls went so far as to write a speech for king Solomon, in which the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union, the ICU, was attacked and Zulu 'traditions' praised (see Cope, 1993:194-5). Through the mouth of Solomon, but from the pen of Nicholls, the traditional virtues of the Zulu people were extolled. Temkin made the claim, implausible if only because of the number of speeches given every year, that Buthelezi 'researches and writes all his own speeches in longhand...'
(1976:4). It appears that the process became somewhat more sophisticated in the 1970s and 1980s, using modern technology to transmit, if not write, the chief's speeches, but bore many similarities with what happened in the 1920s. Such a statement is not to suggest that Buthelezi was not capable of writing his own speeches or devising his own policies, but to argue that once again 'white' conservative interests in apartheid racialised politics found fertile common ground with Zulu ethnic-nationalism - politically, ideologically and economically.

Second, the first Inkata was the creation of the African petty bourgeoisie in Natal in the 1920s, which had seen the possibilities of using Zulu 'traditionalism' as a political
tool and a means of economic advancement. In addition, it was not only white interests that shaped the 1928 constitution, but also specific class interests (white and Zulu). It suited both sugar planters and white commercial farming interests to 'retribalize' Zulu society, and to attempt to cement close links with the tribal elite and, especially, with the Zulu royal family (offers were, for example, made to repay king Solomon's large debts). While Solomon had not been accepted as paramount chief of all Zulu people by the South African government officialdom (out of fear of a revival of Zulu political and military might), he had been acknowledged as chief of the royal clan, the Usuthu. At the same time his acceptance in Zulu society stretched far beyond the measure of official recognition he had gained.

Such 'retribalization' at a regional level, already part of the national strategy of the state through the 1927 Native Administration Act, was perceived by regional agricultural interests to be a necessary step to secure what was being lost to the mining industry - sufficient, cheap Zulu labour, disciplined in production, as well as through tribal structures and values (for example, Cope, 1993:209).

As early as 1916, when Solomon was officially installed as paramount chief, the limit of formal recognition from the government, the motivation was that he could be used for 'administrative purposes'. The immediately most important of such purposes was to recruit labour for the war effort in 1917 (Marks, 1986:33-34). Sugar producers in the 1920s wanted to use Solomon, through Inkata, to preserve Natal labour for the region. More than five decades later chief Buthelezi was being 'used' in a similar function as labour recruiter, but now by the mining industry, reflecting the changed economic circumstances. It was no longer possible to talk of purely regional business interests, at least not as far as the manner in which large-scale capital operated, and in any case there was probably enough labour to take jobs in Natal even at the low wages being paid. I will return to this theme below, when discussing the way in which Inkatha 'traditionalism' had been used to discipline the working class in the 1970s and 1980s.

In the 1920s Inkata conservative petty bourgeois interests were well personified in John Dube, president of the ANC from its formation in 1912 to 1917 and then, 'virtually for the rest of his life... to run the Natal provincial branch of Congress virtually as an independent fief' (Marks, 1975:163). A point made by Marks, that Dube's apparent later conservatism did not mean 'that he had changed from an earlier radicalism, ..., but that the world around him had changed' (1975:165), applies in large measure also to Buthelezi and Inkatha, within the changes in political context from the time of formation in 1975 to the radical rupture in February 1990. Dube, by
his ‘avoidance of violence... his deeply ingrained desire for law and order...’ and other attributes (such as a stress on self-help and the value of education), prefigured the Inkatha leadership of the 1970s and the 1980s. However, most ‘prophetically’, Dube, in his close alliance with large-scale (sugar) producers in Natal, set a pattern that was to be repeated half a century later. Marshall Campbell, the sugar baron, apparently provided financial aid for Dube’s educational institution (Marks, 1975:174). Today the Mangosuthu Technikon in Umlazi stands as a monument to the close relationship that existed between Buthelezi and the Anglo American Corporation.

Third, the use made of ‘tradition’, and especially of Solomon as effective (if not formal) king, found an echo in the initial direct use made of king Goodwill as patron of the 1975 Inkatha. Even the term ‘patron’ was used of both Solomon and Goodwill, both relegated to (powerfully) symbolic positions as ‘figureheads’ of the ship of the ‘Zulu nation’. The ‘Zulu nation’ as a term of political mobilisation is still available to contemporary African politicians (as it was in the 1920s), but has come to be associated with the most conservative of political interests, partly because it carries with it the baggage that the apartheid policy had attached to it. It does not just stand for a history of resistance, as was argued above, but also for the fragmentation of a national struggle in South Africa, and was linked to racial domination and economic exploitation. However, it also carries that conservative tag because it has served within ethnic political mobilisation, and not only for Inkatha.

A difference between the political and ideological struggle of 1928 and of 1975 lies in the central role that Buthelezi had taken upon himself to ensure continuity of Zulu tradition. This is not really surprising as the ‘prime ministerial’ role that Buthelezi had ‘inherited’ from his paternal great grandfather, Mnyamana Buthelezi, ‘prime minister’ to King Cetshwayo, grandfather of Solomon, was only being reinstated under Solomon. Solomon married several women from the Buthelezi clan to resolve the tensions that had built up over the years between them and the Zulu royal family. He also married off one of his sisters, Magogo (Chief Buthelezi’s mother, who died in 1985), to Mathole, chief of the Buthelezi. While chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi managed to shift the king, Goodwill, into a subsidiary position (with no executive powers), both in regard to the KLA and to Inkatha, he at the same time drew as much legitimacy as possible from his own direct blood relationship with the royal family and from his ancestors’ political relationship with the royal house (see for example, Buthelezi, 1978; Laband and Wright, 1983).

Fourth, the 1928 constitution and reconstruction of Inkata served not only to advance the direct interests of the classes involved, but also to counter the threat posed at the
time by the large grassroots support that the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (the ICU) was gaining in Natal. Ironically the organisation of workers was happening under the leadership of, amongst others, AWG Champion, another Zulu leader who had to a large extent broken away from the national body within which he was functioning, as Dube had from the ANC.

The speech referred to above, written for king Solomon by Heaton Nicholls, was aimed at attacking the ICU and bringing the weight of royal displeasure to bear on those who supported the movement. The ICU was drawing support because of the intense pressures exerted on the African rural population through changing conditions in agriculture, pressures such as land hunger because of the rising value of agricultural land, and the need for labour as the importation of indentured Indian labour had come to a halt. The supporters of Inkata, specifically the sugar industry's Heaton Nicholls, saw a segregationist policy and 'retribalization' as a counter to class-based politics. These were the themes of the speech Solomon delivered in 1928, the year in which 'an emotional pitch', unsurpassed by anything 'since the days of the native rebellion of 20 odd years ago' swept the small Natal midlands town of Greytown, brought on by the real, albeit exaggerated, threat posed by the ICU in the district (Bradford, 1984:128; also 1987).

Fifty-eight years later Inkatha engaged in a process of trying to crush unions affiliated to the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and establish its own union (UWUSA) instead, the latter arising out of the perception a non-antagonistic relationship to capital and support for continued foreign investment during the sanctions years. Nicholls, through Solomon, called the ICU leaders a 'noisy band of self-seekers'. In 1986, with the formation of the United Workers' Union of SA, the 'Inkatha union' (funded in part by the SA security police (Survey, 1991/92:294-7; Mare, 1991)), Buthelezi referred to COSATU's 'celebrity leaders who prance and posture as real leaders' (BS, 18 Mar 86:5).

The campaign by the alliance of business interests, the conservative African petty bourgeoisie and the tribal elite during the 1920s was given publicity by the editor of the Ilanga newspaper, John Dube. In 1985 Ilanga journalists went on strike in protest at the pro-Inkatha editorial bias of the newspaper. The newspaper was subsequently bought by Inkatha on 14 April 1987 from the Argus Printing and Publishing Company, and placed under the Mandla-Matla publishing company with the then Inkatha secretary-general, dr Oscar Dhlomo, at the head (Survey, 1987/88:815). The newspaper then had a circulation of 100 000, making it a very powerful political vehicle.
The analogies between the two periods could be expanded, but the point should be
clear: the tradition of the ‘founding fathers’ of the ANC and of the first Inkata to which
the revived Inkatha leadership appealed is a very conservative tradition with strong
elements of anti-popular and anti-worker rhetoric and action. In part this history,
even just through the appeal made to it, served to shape the present of the 1970s
formation of the next Inkatha.

**Inkatha in the 1970s**

The African National Congress was formed in 1912, when ‘several hundred of South
Africa’s most prominent citizens: professional men, chieftains, ministers, teachers,
clerks, interpreters, landholders, businessmen, journalists, estate agents, building
contractors and labour agents’, met in Bloemfontein (Lodge, 1983:1). In 1975 the
formation (or re-formation) meeting of Inkatha, the vehicle for Zulu ethnic
mobilisation since then, was attended, in the words of chief Buthelezi, by ‘the cream of
the elite Zulus in this province (Natal), from the Transvaal and the Free State’ *(KLAO
7, 1975:772)*. Sixty three years had passed, but it appears that the two groups were
remarkably similar, if not in occupational composition then in class interest and
aspiration. What distinguished the two meetings and the immediate concerns of those
present was that the 1912 gathering aimed to create a national movement, to work
against the exclusion and fragmentation strategies of the state that was formed in
1910 out of the Boer Republics and British Colonies (under the slogan of white unity:
‘Ex Unitate Vires’). The 1975 gathering met to form an ethnic organisation within a
state-created administrative region of an already enormously divided South Africa.

The first president of the ANC was the reverend John L Dube, educationalist and
editor of *Ilanga lase Natal*, who was seen as the man ‘to weld the supra-tribal unity
Congress had set itself to achieve’ (Walshe, 1970:35). More than 60 years later
Buthelezi was to appeal repeatedly to the personal and ideological links that Inkatha
supposedly had with the early ANC, a link that carried little of the radicalism and
direct resistance that is usually associated with the ANC as political symbol, but that
did resonate with ANC positions at various stages during its long resistance existence.

The process during the early-1970s that led to the formation of Inkatha is not all that
clear. As already mentioned, there are several references to the existence of a body
called ‘Inkatha’ predating the official formation in March 1975. So, for example, in
1972 Buthelezi told the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly *(KLAO 1, 1972:10)* that the
first Inkata was something that Solomon kaDinuzulu had ‘dreamed up’, to promote
the economic development of the Zulu people (whose economic interests were served by the 1920s Inkata, was discussed above and it was certainly not those of the ordinary 'Zulu people'). He stressed that what he was talking about was not a political party but a 'national movement'. He continued:

As Chief Executive Councillor I would like to propose that this 'Ibandla' is not a party when we call ourselves 'Inkatha Ka Zulu' so that whoever has ambitions will be outside this 'Inkatha kaZulu'. That is something that was bequeathed to us by our late King Solomon ka Dinuzulu. I wish to stress that this is not a party. It is a national movement, but I would imagine that we of this Government when elections come we shout 'Inkatha' and they will say 'Ka Zulu'.

In 1973, the year after this rather cryptic reference, Buthelezi distributed the 1928 Inkata constitution to members of the KLA (Bernstein, 1977:117; KLAD 3, 1973:281). Buthelezi repeated an earlier reason for the suggested revival of Inkatha, namely 'economic upliftment' (KLAD 3, 1973:174): 'We should not stop to do anything to improve our economic situation... Once we have a measure of economic power our battle will be half-won. That is why we should all support Movements such as Inkatha kaZulu and the Black Bank'. During the next session of the KLA Buthelezi said that he had received a telegram from a 'Mr Madlala of Johannesburg', who is 'the Chairman of Inkatha KwaZulu' (KLAD 4, 1974:101). Wentzel (1977:6) wrote in the introduction to her interview with dr Nyembezi and John Mavuso, chair and executive member respectively of the Black Unity Front, a movement formed with Inkatha at the forefront in frustration at central state political recalcitrance (Maré and Hamilton, 1987:157-8), that:

Inkatha had started in Dr Nyembezi's house in 1974 while a public meeting was being organized to receive Chief Gatsha Buthelezi and introduce members of his government to the Soweto public. The organizers of the meeting felt they would like to establish something more permanent and asked Chief Buthelezi for a name. He suggested the name Inkatha be revived...

In 1974 [sic] the revived Inkatha was officially launched.

While the name was certainly around, and may have had several organizational forms before the formal reconstitution of Inkatha in 1975, what is clear is that the immediate fore-runner was a group known as 'Ubhoko' (a walking stick). Langner wrote that according to dr Alpheus Zulu, a group of 'leading Zulus' began meeting during the early 1970s 'functioning as a "think tank" to try to work out a strategy for
founding a national movement to halt the divisive effect of separate development and at the same time to act as a vehicle for the evolution of Black cultural patterns and self-reliance' (1983:17). This body developed into Ubhoko.

According to Langner, Buthelezi had claimed that the revival was his idea, with support from bishop Zulu. In 1972 he started punctuating his speeches with the cry of 'Inkathal kaZulu!'. Interestingly enough, in the light of the origins of the 1920s Inkata in the Zulu National Fund, Buthelezi also opened a trust fund which would be used for the development of KwaZulu and its people and in particular in the fields of industry, commerce, agriculture, education, public relations and communication. He said the money could be used, for example, for the formation of a company to run a newspaper, a public relations office, and a planning and development body (Langner, 1983:17).

Ubhoko was formally constituted in February 1974, a year before Inkatha was formed.

In the KLA Buthelezi presented Ubhoko as a vehicle for the KwaZulu cabinet for 'liaison with the Zulu public and access to all those celebrities to advise us on any matter informally in the interests of the Zulu nation' (KLAD 5, 1974:63). Members of Ubhoko included church figures such as bishop Zulu as chairperson, members of the Zulu royal family such as prince Gideon Zulu, academics such as Otty Nxumalo of the University of Zululand and professor CLS Nyembezl, as well as businesspeople (Edward Ngobese, RS Ngobese) and professionals (see Langner, 1983:18). One of the tasks of Ubhoko was to decide on a constitution for the planned Inkatha and in particular to examine the Zambian United National Independence Party (UNIP) constitution with this task in mind. Buthelezi had been impressed with this document during a 1973 visit. The UNIP constitution, with minor changes, was adopted by Ubhoko for Inkatha.

Buthelezi had also been a member of 'the group of leading politicians and academics of all races and parties who meet regularly and who are known as “Synthesis”' (Introduction by ES Munger to Buthelezi, 1972). This must have been at the time when the idea of Inkatha was first seriously discussed, but whether there was any link is not known. ‘Synthesis’ was then an exclusive and apparently influential discussion group composed of representatives of, for example, large-scale capital, sympathetic academics and some politicians, who invited speakers from a wide range of perspectives to brief them on contemporary issues that might have bearing on the decisions they had to make.
Before we look at the kind of organisation that was created in 1975, it is necessary to say something about the immediate reasons for the creation of Inkatha. Late in 1973 nearly all the bantustan leaders met in Umtata (Venda and QwaQwa were not represented). This meeting decided that an interview with prime minister BJ Vorster would be sought early in 1974. It also asked for more money from taxes that were generated in the 'white' areas of the country, and the repeal of the influx control legislation (Survey, 1973:164-5). Buthelezi claimed that this meeting showed the solidarity that could be achieved through working within state policy.

The eight bantustans (two more were still to be created) met with the South African prime minister in 1974 in a 'spirit of goodwill' and it was agreed that further meetings would take place. After a meeting early in 1975 it was reported that Vorster had not agreed to any of the major requests made by the bantustan representatives, although minor concessions were made, such as the inclusion of Africans on the boards of bantustan development corporations. Consideration would be given to the return of non-communist exiles, and the recognition of trade unions for Africans could be discussed with the minister of labour. Buthelezi took exception to the suggestion that bantustan leaders meet with Department of Bantu Administration and Development officials to discuss the 'easing of the hardships caused by influx control regulations' (Survey, 1975:26). He was concerned with the abolition of the system.

Langner argues that the last straw before the formation of Inkatha was this 'homelands' leaders conference with Prime Minister Vorster in 1975. Eight days after a report-back meeting that was addressed by Buthelezi in Umlazi, Inkatha was formed in Zululand. This might be stretching the events somewhat on the part of Langner, as the process of re-forming Inkatha was already well under way, but the Vorster meeting, as another example of the frustration experienced by the bantustan leaders that dates back much further, could have influenced the decision to go ahead with the formation meeting at KwaNzimela.

According to Langner, the motivation for Inkatha lay in attempts, first, to oppose the divisive effects of the apartheid policy, and, second, to stimulate self reliance (1983:33). On a political level Buthelezi must have realised that he had reached the end of the road of what the apartheid policy had to offer. Without taking 'independence', an act that would have meant political suicide for anyone with sights higher than regional politics, he had to open options beyond the KLA.

However, Inkatha's potential as a vehicle for achieving national goals only became clear later. At first the movement was locked into regional and ethnic politics, both in
structure and in motivation. When Inkatha was discussed extensively in the KLA for the first time during April 1975 (shortly after its formation), Buthelezi made the claim that the organization was the 'base from which to plan our liberation... I said in the past we need liberation even from such things as ignorance, poverty and disease. It was for this reason that I announced... that we were reviving "Inkatha", a National Cultural Liberation Movement founded by King Solomon ka Dinuzulu in 1928' (KLAD 5, 1975:134). Not only was it to concentrate, in conception, on issues that could in effect only be resolved through further participation in the bantustan structures (the same justification was earlier offered for taking part in the regional administration of KwaZulu), it was also initially for Zulus only.

When Buthelezi re-emphasized in April 1975 that Inkatha was not a political party he continued:

In other words, all members of the Zulu nation are automatically members of Inkatha if they are Zulus. There may be people who are inactive members as no one escapes being a member as long as he or she is a member of the Zulu nation (KLAD 5, 1975:134).

Probably Buthelezi never again stated this position as clearly, and would not have done so outside the confines of this ethnic administrative institution, the KLA, but these sentiments are of direct relevance to understanding the apparent ambiguities of the Inkatha movement. To oppose Inkatha was to oppose the 'Zulu nation', was the message that he gave, a message that was to lead to increasing violence over the years; to form any other organisation was to break the unity that Inkatha gave; to criticize Inkatha and its leadership was to meddle in the legitimate struggle of the Zulu nation.

The first national council and general conference meetings of Inkatha, held in July 1975, accepted Buthelezi as the "unchallenged leader of the 4 1/2 million Zulus in their struggle...", and he was empowered to speak on behalf of all Zulus' (Langner, 1983:25). To unravel the complexities of what is and has historically been meant by the 'Zulu nation' is beyond the scope of this thesis, but a fuller discussion follows below (for historical discussion of similar issues, see Wright, 1983; Hamilton and Wright, 1990). On a political level an appeal to Zulu 'nationhood' has had a profound impact. The stress on a separate Zulu identity, excluding those outside the 'Zulu nation', started very early on in the life of the ethnically-defined KwaZulu authority. When the ceremonial mace was received by the chairperson of the KLA from the minister of Bantu Administration and Development in 1973, Buthelezi reassured the minister that '... it will be kept as a token of the cordial relationship and good neighbourliness between our respective nations in this country' (KLAD 3, 1973:1).
Buthelezi, proposing that Shaka Day should replace Settlers Day as a public holiday in KwaZulu, said that ‘... he [Shaka] united all the tribes which is depicted on those strands of “inkatha” of our Mace, each strand representing a tribe in the KwaZulu area, and amalgamated these tribes into one nation’ (KLAD 4, 1974:334-5). In 1974 the positive, inclusive expression of Zulu nationalism was given form around the figure of the king. Buthelezi told the KLA that:

The young man who was sitting here a few days ago, King Zwelithini Goodwill kaCyprian, is the King of 4 1/4 million Zulus in South Africa and when we are now being moved in the area of separate nationhoods as a nation, I think that he deserves such a place befitting a King of 4 1/4 million in South Africa... [Buthelezi was arguing for expenditure of R300 000 on a palace for the king]. This House in fact belongs to the Zulu nation itself... If the Zulus want a monarchy, they must pay for it... If we are going to be independent, Sir, I think it is known that the King is a future head for the Zulu nation. I mean, for instance, just across here the King of Swaziland has not only one palace, but a number of them. And the Swazi nation, with all due respect to them, is a smaller nation than the Zulu nation...


In the early-1970s Buthelezi answered a question with the opinion that the ‘Zulu nation’ was, at the time, ‘more united than it has been for the past 100 years’ (Buthelezi, 1972:10). Buthelezi has argued consistently in this vein, sometimes against strong evidence of conflict - approaching a civil war in the region - to the contrary. There are many instances when he referred to the policy of the National Party as divisive and argued for a wider South Africanism, but the much stronger and contradictory element of mobilised ethnic identity remained and still remains, an approach within which the Zulu people are the largest ‘group’ in South Africa. In an interview in 1980 Buthelezi said that ‘(w)e in Inkatha recognize cultural identity... we cannot wish it away. But I think most blacks would agree with me that cultural identity has been abused under the separate development policy’ (Star, 19 Aug 80). In the same year, however, Inkatha secretary general Oscar Dhlomo wrote that the ‘Zulus are not a tribe: they are a nation...’ (Natal Witness, 7 Feb 80).

Also in 1980, Buthelezi distinguished between ‘national groups’ (of which the Zulu people is one) within ‘the nation of South Africa’, using language that reminds of the approach in the Soviet Union (Buthelezi, 1980:3; Connor, 1984). On Soweto Day (16 June) in 1986 two of the very few meetings allowed to continue under the state of emergency that had been declared in South Africa were addressed by chief Buthelezi...
and by king Goodwill. The latter told his audience that 'Zulus' should 'root out those among them who are undermining their national unity'. He warned against "new -fangled" political organisations which 'propagated values which were total anathema to Zulu pride and culture' (Daily News, 17 Jun 86). There was little doubt that he was referring to the ANC and ANC surrogate or supporting organisations in South Africa, such as the United Democratic Front. Nine years later the king was to side with these organisations against Buthelezi and Inkatha.

There is a degree of fluidity attached to the terms 'tribe', 'ethnicity', 'nation', etc (see above). What is clear is that the audience and the event shape the strength of the 'nation' appeal made to Zulu speakers - the clear references to 'the nation' quoted above were addressed to the KLA, composed nearly totally of chiefs at that time, and when the identity of this body had yet to be created in many ways. When addressing the Luthuli Memorial Foundation meeting, the stress was placed on the 'African nation', composed of a rich variety of ethnic (cultural) groups (see Bernstein, 1977:145-6; Langner, 1983:133; Booysen, 1982:160).

Without the clarity of commitment to a single 'nation' in South Africa (no matter how broadly inclusive), the appeals to a separate Zulu identity, within the context of the state's policy of a quarter of a century since 1959, were potentially very dangerous, and have remained so. Unscrupulous manipulators of existing ethnic sentiments fed on the tensions that had been created under the apartheid policy, ready to attempt to direct and redirect antagonisms to advance their own ends. 'Ethnic nationalism' also does not bode well for a future united South Africa, where regional politicians and the remnants of the old apartheid order are sure to attempt ethnic mobilization, and where previously denied identities come to the fore in political contestation. It leaves a very difficult task of meeting legitimate demands for cultural recognition and political demands for fragmentation, and finding a consistent basis for separating them (see chapter five).

There are several cases where opposition to Buthelezi, the KLA and KwaZulu administration, and to Inkatha, had been labelled in racialised and ethnic terms, where the group ('Zulus') can only exist against other similar, but antagonistic, groups (see chapter two). For example, the celebration of historical figures in a regional past, so necessary for political mobilization (see Connerton, 1989), on occasion took on a reactionary tone. Annual Shaka Day celebrations (launched in 1954, see above) were held all over South Africa. In 1981 dr Frank Mdlalose addressed 1000 Inkatha followers in Soweto, and Buthelezi, who appealed to employers to let their workers off for the day, spoke at Stanger, a town with a mainly Indian population on the Natal
north coast. The Stanger Businessmen’s Association had called for the closure of shops during the Shaka Day celebrations, mindful of the ‘disturbances’ that occurred in the town during these celebrations the previous year, when ‘many stalls were looted and owners assaulted for not allowing their workers the day off’. It was suggested that 24 September be declared a public holiday in Stanger as well as in KwaZulu proper (The Leader, 25 Sep 81). Buthelezi told the 10 000 people assembled that Indians had a great future, but that they should share ‘their gifts with Africans’, and in his familiar indirect style reminded them that “It will be a sad day if I have to advise my people not to buy from these [Indian-owned] shops” (Natal Mercury, 25 Sep 81). The Inkatha movement, as did ethnic mobilisation and confirmation of the ‘Zulu nation’ generally, denied a direct and a single role for either members of a black nation, a South African nation, or a regional or national citizenship.

The speakers in the KLA, who followed Buthelezi’s introduction to the Inkatha movement in 1975, took up the theme of continuity with the 1920s Inkata. Chief O Sithole, councillor for agriculture and forestry, reminisced in April 1975:

I was still a young boy when King Solomon inaugurated this movement. Our fathers were very much determined about this thing.

A man from the Royal clan named Matshe used to collect contributions up in my area. Whenever this man addressed our people in our area, he would tell my people that there was so much money at the Royal Kraal Mahla, that he used to indicate a mealie tank that stood next to my father’s house, a very big tank, which contained about 60 bags of mealie meal. He would tell us that, out at Dlamahlaha kraal, there were six tanks full of money. People were very impressed by this, and this man used to go back to the Royal Kraal with many herds of cattle and a lot of money in his pocket. He would come not only once, but time and again he would come to collect...

... Let us sacrifice and give all that we have, let us fill the six tanks with money (KLAD 5, 1975:195).

The KLA debate was dominated by the themes of the ‘Zulu nation’ and how it was to form the base for the new Inkatha, references to the first Inkata and the need for sacrifice, as the romanticised version of that early history demanded, and the theme of Inkatha fees, as the historical lesson from chief Sithole indicated was appropriate to the new challenge. What is striking is that while several pages of transcribed debate
were devoted to the issue of the amount of the contributions to be demanded from KLA members and Inkatha membership fees. In contrast there was very little discussion about the principles and aims of the new organization: ‘... you have to pay if you want to become free’ was the general message (KLAD 7, 1975:710). Even the unemployed were not excluded. Buthelezi argued that unemployed people should pay according to their means, but that people ‘must not stay at home. This is another liberation that I mention here, the liberation from slothfulness’ (KLAD 7, 1975:716).

The one issue, other than membership contributions, that raised debate was the relationship between the KLA and Inkatha. The first constitution stated that, should there be conflict between a decision of the Inkatha central committee and the KLA cabinet, the decision of the former should prevail. Buthelezi said hesitantly that ‘... we feel that this is African participatory democracy. I think it is a new form of constitutional law... I do not think that it is constitutional law, I think it is African participatory democracy’ (KLAD 7, 1975:721-2; also see Buthelezi, 1975:15). His confusion about how to justify this measure, which would have taken power away from the chief-dominated KLA (one of the intentions behind the formation of Inkatha), must have been apparent for it offered one of the few examples of members challenging his wishes. Paul Sibeko queried the idea of ‘African democracy’, to which Buthelezi retorted with the claim that ‘... African democracy is democracy expressed through the medium of African culture, as evidenced by the people who make up the nation...’ (KLAD 7, 1975:723).

Later in the debate Buthelezi amended the contentious section, and asked whether it would be in order to say that the cabinet would ‘seriously consider’ the views of Inkatha. This was agreed upon. The reason for this unusual disagreement between Buthelezi and the chiefs may lie in one of the most important immediate motivations for the formation of Inkatha. The various moves that led to the actual constitution in 1975 had taken place within the context of the state’s and the arch-traditionalists’ attempts to unseat Buthelezi and to install an executive king. Buthelezi knew well how precarious any politician or structure was when it did not meet the needs or approval of the central government. The KLA was the weak link in his ambitions, built as it was on the potentially fickle support of the chiefs, and in the last instance under the thumb of the state. Inkatha, in its initial conception, would have removed power from the chiefs and made Buthelezi less vulnerable to such state-directed or supported undermining in that it gave him a power base away from the apartheid structure. However, it proved to be unnecessary as Buthelezi continued, until the present, to carry the support of the large majority of chiefs, and the KLA and Inkatha came to overlap in most important functions and personnel. In this way the support for
Inkatha from the chiefs was ensured, although it remained a sometimes difficult relationship.

The 1891 Natal Code stipulated that the Governor of the Colony, as 'Supreme Chief', could appoint chiefs and remove them, and that the chief 'in charge of a tribe or section of a tribe, is a minor deputy of the Supreme Chief...'. Daphne wrote that:

As 'minor deputies' of an administration which was often hostile to the interests of the black people of Natal the chiefs were, by definition, no longer the representatives of the people. The power to appoint and to remove chiefs was taken out of the hands of the tribe although in fact the system of hereditary succession was allowed to operate provided it did not challenge the colonial government (1982:2).

After Union, subsequent legislation dealing with the role of chiefs, most importantly the 1927 Native Administration Act and amendments, did little to change this position. Later the state president became the 'Supreme Chief' to reflect the Republican status of South Africa. Even the KwaZulu legislation dealing with the functions of chiefs followed the central state's allocation of roles and duties (see Appendix 4, Maré and Hamilton, 1987). Control is the predominant theme, with, 'almost as an afterthought', the stipulation 'that a chief should "generally seek to promote the interests of his tribe and of the region and actively support, and himself initiate measures, for the advancement of his people"' (Daphne, 1982:5; Maré, 1982a).

The 1978 elections in KwaZulu reduced the total dependence on chiefs but it still left them as the numerically dominant component within KwaZulu politics. Not all chiefs have been enamoured of the Buthelezi style of 'traditionalism' and, at various times, often with some central government support, they rallied round the king or the symbol provided by the king as an executive figure (both under apartheid and now under the ANC-led Government of National Unity). This could have been embarrassing during elections within the bantustan that were required to show a massive degree of solidarity in support for Inkatha. Both Schmahmann (1978) and Langner (1983) refer to a meeting held at Ulundi at the end of September 1977, ostensibly to 'explain the election role of chiefs', but also to warn that the institution of chieftainship could last as long as it served the interests of the people, and to spell out their role in Inkatha (also see Rand Daily Mail, 1 Oct 77). Most of the chiefs attended. The KwaZulu urban representative said chiefs had resisted being drawn into Inkatha because they believed the state's accusation that the movement would strip them of their power (Schmahmann, 1978:304), and that the meeting had been called to clarify the position. Buthelezi addressed this meeting, and denied the state's allegations that he...
was standing in the way of an 'envisioned rebirth of the Zulu nation', pointing out that he was a chief himself and that, 'being morally and pragmatically opposed to apartheid, he did not regard his vision of Black unity as militating against Zulu unity'. As for Inkatha, he warned that if chiefs did not involve themselves in the affairs of the movement it 'would be regarded as dereliction of duty and active involvement against Inkatha would be "of course much worse"'. He pointedly reminded them that Pretoria no longer controlled their 'fate as chiefs' which would be decided at Ulundi 'if necessary' (Langner, 1983:174). Langner said the meeting of chiefs subsequently became an annual event.

There is no doubt that Buthelezi 'believes' in the position of chieftainship and its validity in late-twentieth century society. He is extremely sensitive about his own chieftainship (as well as to his role as 'premier' to the Zulu king), and has repeated claims for its legitimacy to justify the authority due to him. It is an essential element in the repertoire of social identities with which he functions. It would, therefore, be wrong to see his support of the role of chiefs as simply pragmatic or Machiavellian. However, as has been argued, it is nonetheless support for a specific version of the role of chiefs in Zulu society, placing himself at the top, and one that demands allegiance to his position. In the *KwaZulu Government Diary* (1974:10) Buthelezi wrote:

> We will preserve the traditional system of Chieftainship in KwaZulu and re-affirm our constitutional relationship with the Paramount Chief and will *build our future state* with due regard to our cultural heritage and traditions adapted and fructified by the ideals of Western civilization and democracy and modern scientific principles.

He said the KLA was not a 'mere transplant of Western democracy upon the Zulu nation', preferring 'to view it merely as a natural extension and development of traditional Zulu Culture and government' (KLA, nd:5).

To consolidate this reliance on chiefs a 'special section' was created in the department of the chief minister 'to accelerate the activation of tribal authorities and to train them in local government techniques' (*KwaZulu Government Diary*, 1981:39). Thus, 30 years after the Bantu Authorities Act had been passed, after many people had lost their lives in opposition to these structures, and after having claimed to have resisted them for years in KwaZulu, Buthelezi 'activated' the institution as a central element in local government.
Efforts were made over the years to make the chiefs more effective. An illuminating debate took place in the KLA in 1976 when certain amendments to the Natal Code were proposed, the most important being one to replace references to the state president as 'Supreme Chief' of all Africans with the 'Executive Council of KwaZulu', not so much for what it said about processes, but what it revealed about the function of chiefs. It was submitted by the executive councillor for justice on the grounds that the requirements that decisions by chiefs be referred to the state president caused unnecessary delays. The example he gave - delays in deporting various kinds of 'disobedient people' - received support from several speakers during the debate. Councillor Conco said that 'we have already reached a solution in terms of which to end the riots and fighting and disorder', but that it was negated by administrative delays (KLAD 8, 1976:40). Chief M Ngcobo agreed that the delay in deportation was troublesome.

During the debate KLA members spoke of 'insolence', violent behaviour, 'hot headed disobedient people', and the need to maintain law and order. Some wanted the fines imposed by chiefs to be increased from R4 to a maximum of R100 (this was agreed after an initial amendment to increase the fine to R40 was rejected), to bring it in line with the 'value of a beast', which was the usual form in which the fine was paid. The central government gave permission to increase the fine to R200 (KLAD 9, 1976:602). A revealing remark was made by KLA member A Kholwa, who said that increasing fines 'would not change the insolent behaviour which exists in the community because we normally find that people who are disobedient to their chiefs are the poor people', for whom corporal punishment might be necessary as they were not in a position to pay fines (KLAD 8, 1976:45-46).

Later in the debate a chief proposed a motion that 'the advisability be considered of empowering the chiefs-in-council to eject undesirable persons and/or families from their areas, and that a place be made available by KwaZulu for such ejected people' (KLAD 8, 1976:243). Another chief added that the problem was due to the lack of employment, and he moved that the KwaZulu government be given the power to place people in employment without choice - 'In this way this problem of unemployment will diminish. Communists and house breakers can be given a separate place where they can be kept' (KLAD 8, 1976:246-7). A year earlier the term 'communists' had been used for 'strangers' in a chief's area (KLAD 7, 1975:778-80).

In the 1976 session, after the formation of Inkatha, moves were made to 'strengthen the chiefs' criminal courts', but this had to await the next stage of administrative authority. An 'administrative guide' setting out procedures for greater effectiveness of
the courts was accepted: "... it will become obvious now which chiefs are not using their power to the full in the maintenance of law and order in their areas", said Buthelez1 (KLAD 9, 1976:413).

It is clear that even, or especially, at the local level the KwaZulu authorities were not accepted as wholeheartedly by the administered population as they liked to present the case. The references above indicate social dissatisfaction; so does a remark in an article in the publication celebrating ten years of the existence of the KLA (KLA, nd:10) in which the author acknowledged that because of the standards of administration KwaZulu had set itself 'it has to work within the frustrations and the anger of the people'. There are many causes, other than high standards, of such frustrations and anger. The allowances for chiefs were based on the number of taxpayers in their areas and this led to increased overcrowding in some areas, and anger had been directed at the tax collector for many years now (see, for example, Survey, 1959/60:108; KLAD 1, 1972:12). Corruption and bribery accusations appeared in newspaper reports and were even made in the KLA.

In 1975, during the period of massive social disruption in part due to the eviction of labour tenants from white-owned farms (see above), chiefs were warned 'not to continue with the unlawful practice of receiving money or kind in return for the allocation of a site' (KLAD 7, 1975:695). The chiefs were literally cashing in on the land hunger of displaced people. In 1978 Buthelez1 attacked chiefs for 'fleecing' the people in that they were charging for sites, arable land and services such as pensions (Daily News, 11 Dec 78). These practices were confirmed by Zulu, in a paper based on research conducted in the early 1980s (nd:2-3). He wrote that 'nine out of every ten respondents who required a site on which to build a house had to make some monetary payment either to the chief or the local induna', and in some cases this payment became an annual 'rent'. In his sample 40% of the respondents had to pay for an induna to approve pension or disability grant applications. While gift exchanges had been a traditional practice, the obligation now fell on only the subjects:

It is common practice that chiefs 'demand' some contributions from their subjects. These may include collections towards the purchase of a new car, or a new building, a son's marriage, etc. (Zulu, nd:3).

In 1982 a newspaper report spoke of corruption in various tribal 'locations' (settlements) falling under the Vulindlela Tribal Authority, involving workseeker permits (costing a R20 bribe), and pension applications needing a KwaZulu government stamp or tribal signature (Natal Witness, 22 Apr 82).
Many other cases could be quoted to substantiate the argument that chiefs are often corrupt. Bekker, in his report for the Human Sciences Research Council, dealing with the role of chiefs, wrote that they were guilty in other areas: the most common fault mentioned by magistrates of all chiefs in their areas was that of favouritism; they did not know how far their powers went; and they continued to hold power after serving sentences for theft, arson, and assault. They were immediately biased against the accused or defendant; in a study covering a four-year period, the 551 cases tried by seven chiefs did not once favour the defendant. Bekker recommended that chiefs not be expected to fulfill judicial, administrative or legislative functions (undesirable in itself, but aggravated as chiefs had generally received no training in these functions) (Bekker, 1983:60-65). Nearly all of these points were confirmed by Zulu, who wrote of tribal authority members not being trained for their duties, and the absence of job descriptions for the tasks they were expected to fulfill. He concluded that the tribal authority system 'is more of an extension of the state apparatus than an organ representing the interests of the people' (nd:7), and that the system was inimical to rural development projects (nd:8; also Daphne, 1982:12).

In 1980 the KwaZulu minister of justice reported that his investigations into the apparent increase in 'lawlessness' led him to find the cause in 'very slack' 'discipline in the enforcement of customs and law and order at the chiefs' court and tribal authority levels' (KLAD 19, 1980:496). There have been many complaints about chiefs failing in their duty in the maintenance of law and order, but also counter-complaints from chiefs about being unarmed or inadequately armed. For example, Chief SH Gumede said that the issue of small-calibre firearms to the chiefs made it impossible 'to guard against Communists in his area' (KLAD 16, 1979:452) (also see discussion above).

Despite all these failures and illegalities, many of them admitted by Inkatha leaders, Buthelezi has consistently argued that the chiefs are the 'base of government' in KwaZulu (for example, KLAD 6, 1975:412; 10:72). When he opened the Makhanya tribal authority headquarters and offices, Buthelezi told the gathering: 'I respect Chieftainship as an indigenous African institution of the people. In KwaZulu it is the very basis of our administration'. However, he warned that the institution had to keep pace with the twentieth century (BS, 3 Sep 83).

The revived Inkatha was not only placed squarely within Zulu ethnicity (the 'tradition' of the 'nation') and even 'nationhood', but also relied on the authority of chiefs in the rural areas, or in areas in which the power of chiefs held sway - not to give the chiefs great power or policy involvement, but to demand of them participation in
recruitment, and because their role was appropriate within the conservative mobilisation of a Zulu social identity. A suggestion was made early on that branches should coincide with the area of authority of izinduna (headmen or councillors to the chief). For urban areas branches would be formed in voting wards for the bantustan's elections. Regions in rural areas would then coincide with regional authority areas. To ensure rapid membership increases this strategy made a lot of sense: not only could pressure be applied by the chiefs on people subject to them in a range of ways, but pressure could also be applied on the chiefs through the KLA and the KwaZulu administration generally. So, for example, during the same year (1975), while Inkatha committees to run the planned elections (which in the event did not occur before 1978) were being discussed, Buthelezi said that he was '... distressed to find that the districts here in KwaZulu - for instance here in Nongoma,... Inkatha is almost dead. It is a dead duck' (KLAD 7, 1975:921). The blame was laid squarely on the shoulders of obstructionist chiefs, who were called to account in the KLA - the assembly was by then already being used to advance the Inkatha movement. It was only later, when Inkatha was established and national political considerations gained greater weight, that it became important to deny the symbiotic relationship between the two bodies, the KLA and its traditionalists, and Inkatha.

This debate around the role of the chiefs in preparation for elections also made it clear that the decision to form Inkatha had been taken by 'the cream of the Zulu elite', and that at grassroots level there had been very little knowledge, and certainly no consultation. For example, a representative from the Hlanganani Regional Authority complained that the formation was taking place in a great hurry and he wanted time to go back and inform the people. The KLA chair assured him that he would '... be given the opportunity to go back to your people and to tell them what is going on' (KLAD 7, 1975:801). Inkatha had been formed, to represent all the Zulu people, a couple of months earlier.

It was not only the chiefs that appeared to be reticent in certain areas. The month after the formation of Inkatha Buthelezi was already complaining that civil servants ('... some of them are in this House'), were 'running down' the Inkatha constitution (KLAD 6, 1975:350), an accusation that was to be repeated over the years, but with an ever larger number of people being included in the anti-Inkatha conspiracy, a conspiracy that was increasingly being presented as being against the 'Zulu nation', an inevitable conflation within ethnic mobilisation.

The chiefs, as should be clear from the presentation above, were not only an administrative necessity within the bantustan and the Inkatha movement. They were
also a central ingredient in the package of elements that together constitute the 'Zulu kingdom', 'nation', and Zuluness as presented within regional ethnic mobilisation.

Inkatha was formed in 1975 within the KwaZulu bantustan and, whether as a matter of strategy or less self-consciously, it defined its issues at that stage within the bantustan. It was clearly necessary for purposes of gaining membership that an appeal should be made to the most immediate constituency, that over which administrative responsibility had already been accepted. However, there seems to be a similar 'inevitability' about the politicisation of 'tribalism' that went hand in hand with this mobilisation. Inkatha arose as a 'Zulu' organisation, inextricably tied to the bantustan structures of KwaZulu, and has never been able to escape this past in any significant way. As a Zulu body it was able to mobilise readily, and as a bantustan movement it was relatively protected from state action during its early years, but these apparent advantages became serious hindrances as the general mood in the country changed. These advantages were also those that brought the movement into the direct ambit of the state's nefarious activities to ward off the 'total onslaught' in the second half of the 1980s.

**Inkatha's Structure**

The Inkatha constitution was modelled largely on that of the Zambian UNIP. KwaZulu interior minister Dr FT Mdlawose commented: 'We took several Ideas from the 1928 Inkatha structure, but obviously it was defective in a number of ways', and that is why they turned to the UNIP constitution (KCAV, 157 and 176). In 1979 Inkatha secretary general Oscar Dhlomo told Inkatha youth delegates that the constitution 'grew out of the Lusaka Manifesto drawn up in 1969 by 14 African states and adopted by the United Nations Assembly by 113 votes to two' (Natal Mercury, 26 Mar 79).

The Lusaka Manifesto committed the 14 signatory states in eastern and central Africa, and later the members of the United Nations General Assembly, to work towards the abolition of racial discrimination and the right of all people in southern Africa to participate in their own government (see Brownlie (ed), 1971:526-33). It was partly inappropriate that Dhlomo should attempt to place the struggle of the Inkatha movement in the context of the Manifesto, as it states that peaceful change is preferable, but '... while peaceful progress is blocked by actions of those at present in power.... we have no choice but to give to the peoples of those territories (Mozambique, Angola, Portuguese Guinea, Namibia, Rhodesia, South Africa) all the support of which we are capable in their struggle against their oppressors'. On South
Africa the Manifesto advocated actions even further removed from what Inkatha always stood for in its strategy for change in the country:

South Africa should be excluded from the United Nations Agencies, and even from the United Nations itself it should be ostracized by the world community. It should be isolated from world trade patterns... (Brownlee (ed) 1971:532, article 22 of the Lusaka Manifesto).

Buthelezi had opposed the exclusion of South Africa from the United Nations as well as sanctions.

As has been mentioned, the first constitution stipulated that the Inkatha president also had to be the chief minister of KwaZulu, the bantustan (something as difficult to defend in a national liberation movement as the stipulation about Zulu predominance). Patrick Laurence, writing some years after a change in the constitution in 1979 that opened up membership to all Africans, argued that this clause was put in to ‘guard against the contingency of an unprincipled opportunist taking over as Chief Minister and concluding an independence agreement with Pretoria’ (1984:271). This might be true but it is one of many features confirming that the Inkatha movement grew out of, and within, the KwaZulu bantustan, within the structures of the NP version of ethnic mobilisation, even if it obviously had an independent historical route and content.

The movement had a ‘well organized pyramidal structure’, leading up from individual members, branches, regions, to the various top decision-making bodies and conferences. The national council (NC) was the policy making organ. The NC had 300 members on average, although, as Langner wrote, this body, like the general conference (GC), differed in actual composition from the provisions of the constitution. It was composed of the central committee, the KLA members who were also members of Inkatha, four representatives of the regions, members of the brigades’ executives, one representative from each affiliated organisation, and the organisation’s administrative officials. Inkatha had ‘absorbed’ the KLA through the NC, so that it could be regarded as in practice having been ‘the legislative arm of Inkatha’ (Langner, 1983:71). The NC could, in fact, propose legislation to the KLA. Schmahmann, commenting on the ‘absorption’, wrote that ‘[i]f not elitist, the movement has potential for being authoritarian... The potential for abuse by those who control the movement is... great. Intermingling the Legislative Assembly with the National Council and the Cabinet with the Central Committee precludes the growth of effective opposition political parties’ (1978:285). The NC met at least twice a year and, except for the opening, sessions were held in camera (Langner, 1983:79).
It appears, constitutionally, that the *general conference* (GC) would consist of all NC members, along with two or three representatives of every branch. In the early 1980s there could thus have been 2300 delegates to the GC. Langner commented that 'provision for the representation of other interest groups on the General Conference (and the National Council) is negligible'. This provision had been copied from the UNIP constitution. Whatever the reason for its inclusion, in practice 'it is an effective preventive measure against the forming of pressure groups by these affiliated organizations' (Langner, 1983:80). It is at this level that constitutional provision was made for the representation of trade unions, amongst others. The GC could amend the constitution, by a two-thirds majority, and could 'consider, review or change' any policy. The GC had to meet annually to discuss a programme prepared by the central committee (CC), and approved by the NC. Voting was by secret ballot.

The *central committee* (CC) was responsible for 'programming' and implementation of policy. It had to have a minimum of 25 members (the president, secretary general, 20 members elected by the GC every five years, and members nominated by the president in consultation with the CC). The number of nominated members increased dramatically over the years. While in the pre-1979 constitution provision was made for only three such members, a year after the constitution was changed (ie in 1980) the president had appointed 20 members, and the CC had 46 members. It could be that these positions served to co-opt local (community level) leaders and warlords in KwaZulu whom it would be preferable to have within the organisation rather than to have organise opposition from without. Presidential appointment, with the approval of the CC, also avoided clashes in the NC and GC where some of the appointees might be controversial. One such person, for example, was Thomas Mandla Shabalala of the Lindelanl 'informal settlement' outside Durban, who arose as a powerful local figure, apparently outside the formal KwaZulu and Inkatha structures. Shabalala featured prominently in allegations of vigilante involvement in the 1985 unrest in the Durban area and since then, but has, by the mid-1990s, been 'cleansed' through the formal politics of post-election South Africa and election as member to the provincial legislature, as he had been by co-option into the Inkatha CC earlier.

The formation of an 'inner council' may have been an acknowledgement that the strategy of co-opting people on to the CC for political reasons had made it unwieldy. For example, by 1980 it was reported that certain decisions had been taken by the 'newly-created inner council of the movement's central committee. It has been created to deal with urgent business' (Star, 24 Dec 80). Langner confirmed the existence of the inner council, but said it was only formed in February 1981 (1983:86). For further
detail of the structures of the Inkatha movement, see Langner's study (1983) and Maré and Hamilton (1987).

A member of the CC had to be over 21, have no criminal record (a stipulation that could be waived by the CC), and had to be a 'disciplined person'. The 1980 CC had, among others, eight chiefs, six women and seven people from outside Natal as members. Fewer than half were also members of the KLA (Langner, 1983:83), possibly reflecting the initial fear that the KLA could be used by the central state. On elections to the CC Langner wrote that there was 'apparently much control over the candidature and it almost looks as if the outcome of the elections can be regarded as a foregone conclusion', but that democratic provisions did exist. The composition of the CC changed as well, with only 11 members of the first CC still in office in 1981. The CC was extremely powerful, both in the movement and also in KwaZulu politics. Internally the CC had 'overall control of the activities of the Inkatha and shall ensure that discipline in the Inkatha is maintained throughout the country'. Externally, the CC controlled the selection of candidates for 'Parliamentary and Local Government Elections'. The CC functioned through a series of sub-committees, whose members were appointed from the CC and the NC by the president:

1. defence and security committee (12 members);
2. political, constitutional, legal and foreign affairs committee (10);
3. economic and finance committee (5);
4. social and cultural committee (9);
5. elections, publicity and strategy committee (8);
6. appointments and disciplinary committee (6).

What is clear, even from the constitution and not merely from the practice of Inkatha in KwaZulu, is that at several levels the movement was part and parcel of the bantustan administrative structure. The NC incorporated the KLA, the CC decided on candidates for KwaZulu elections (that was the only 'Parliament' and 'Local Government' it participated in, and when participation in democratic elections became possible Inkatha had become the IFP), and the president had to qualify 'to be Head of Government in any government which the Movement, by virtue of having attained a victory at a General Election or for any other reason, is entitled to form'. The Inkatha president was also the only candidate which the movement would support for the post of head of government (Langner, 1983:82; Inkatha, nd(a)).
It meant that, in effect, as was the case before the constitution was changed, the president of Inkatha had to belong to the Zulu ethnic group. Gibson Thula, in charge of publicity for Inkatha for a time, said after the 1979 constitutional change, surely with his tongue firmly in his cheek, that it was now possible 'for a non-Zulu to become president of Inkatha and thus also chief of the Zulus' (Frontline, 1(1), 1979). This would, of course, have made nonsense of the KwaZulu bantustan constitution and Buthelezi's claim to sole legitimacy in the traditional position of prime minister to the Zulu king.

Inkatha was, in one of its aspects, simply another bantustan political party. In terms of the distinction drawn by Buthelezi between short- and long-term involvement, Inkatha was firmly located in the former as the ruling party within KwaZulu. It was probably wishful thinking that made Temkin write in 1976 that the presentation by Buthelezi of Inkatha as a national liberation movement to overseas audiences, rested on:

the already overwhelming and enthusiastic response with which it has been met in towns and cities all over the country... Inkatha is above black suspicions. It is not a government institution nor is it an institution arising even indirectly from official policy. There is no taint of apartheid attaching to it (1976:334).

Apart from the qualification of being able to head a government in which Inkatha had come to power, the president of the movement had to be over 35 years of age. He (because of the 'tradition' appealed to by the KwaZulu leaders there is little doubt that the president would be male) had been given wide, but not free, rein. Article 14 of the Inkatha constitution listed the powers of the president, which included that of giving instruction 'on any matter affecting the Movement', to appoint committees and to take disciplinary action against any member, and provided that he would be the principal spokesman for Inkatha. Below I discuss the centrality of Buthelezi to the ethnic mobilising project into the Inkatha movement. It was essential that Buthelezi's constitutional position should be inviolable, to ensure the various ideological continuities that he came to claim to represent.

Langner's comment on the powers of the president are probably correct:

There is no doubt that the power of Buthelezi's personality is a dominant factor within Inkatha, and superficially it seems as if he has unlimited powers in certain instances. But Buthelezi and Inkatha acknowledge that the President can only act within the precincts of the 'will of the people' and that he can be removed if his orchestration of the affairs of the movement are not acceptable (1983:93).
What needs to be added, though, is that Buthelezi made the movement and his own personality, or rather political persona, virtually synonymous, which made any overturning of his decisions difficult to imagine. The hierarchical nature of the movement, briefly sketched above, was essential not only for efficient functioning but also to allow a single story of Zulu ethnicity to be presented, with Buthelezi also organisational head. Langner acknowledged that the president could 'entrench himself in a virtually unassailable position', as could members of the CC. Inkatha argued that because consensus ruled, the loopholes in the constitution did not present any problem:

He [Buthelezi] says a matter is discussed until agreement has been reached. When asked in which way it becomes clear that there is consensus, he simply said: 'We know.' He pointed out that nowadays they might vote by show of hands, but traditionally - and even today - they knew when consensus had been reached (Langner, 1983:103).

Buthelezi operated by caucusing beforehand, 'planting' ideas rather than deciding. The liberal journal *Realty* (7(5), 1975:3) commented editorially after an interview with the first Inkatha secretary general, dr SME Bengu (now ANC minister of education in the post-apartheid South Africa), that this type of consensus might mean that the 'dissident voice' will not be heard, a fear that was subsequently to some extent borne out by a KLA request to the central government that opposition parties not be allowed to exist within KwaZulu. While the main reason was a legitimate concern about the involvement of the central state security apparatuses within KwaZulu opposition politics in the early-1970s, it was also stated that opposition parties were an unnecessarily divisive force. The KLA did not have the powers under the first stage ('Chapter 1') self-government to implement this wish for trouble-free internal politics. Minister MC Botha turned down the request for legislation to give effect to the proposal in 1975. Once Inkatha had been formed the NC rejected the formation of opposition parties. As 'Zulus were still bound in chains', they had a primary objective 'to free the nation of these chains'. The motion concluded that '(t)herefore we can see no reason for the formation of political parties in KwaZulu' (*Daily News*, 16 Jan 76). This line of argument made sense within Inkatha's self-perception if it is kept in mind that the movement presented itself, and its leaders perceived it, as reflecting the will of 'the people', of 'the oppressed', of the 'Zulu nation'. It is unfortunate that such attitudes created during the period of struggle against apartheid, and not limited to the Inkatha movement, have played a large part and could account for the very high levels of political intolerance evident before the elections and still present in political attitudes after the elections (*Sunday Tribune*, 4 Dec 94).
Inkatha branches

It is important, briefly, to look at the spread of branches and membership because it is on the basis of these that Inkatha claimed to be a national, cross-ethnic movement, going beyond the state’s policy of fragmentation (and beyond its own claims and practice of ethnic representation, creating the ambiguity within the movement already alluded to above). 'Non-Zulu' allegiance to Inkatha and Chief Buthelezi had been a very sensitive issue with the Inkatha leaders, and maybe even more so with politicians and academics who favoured the solution that the movement was said to hold for South Africa as a whole.

Inkatha’s branches had to have a minimum of 30 members, a committee of eight members, and a ‘branch executive committee’ of 14 members. Langner wrote that it is not clear why there should be provision for two committees (1983:75). The large number of committee positions, relative to the minimum size of a branch, also drew comment. Venter (1982:37) suggested that it showed a concern not only with effectiveness, but also with status and ‘elite formation’. This view was supported by a member of the Inkatha Institute in an interview for this study, who then referred to a similar structure in churches. Anthropologist Jim Kiernan (1982:169), writing on Zulu Zionist churches, said it had been suggested that ‘the emergence of elaborate hierarchies serves the purpose of maximizing opportunities for the exercise of leadership, thus compensating for the loss of such leadership opportunities in the political and administrative spheres’. If this is indeed true of Inkatha it would indicate a very manipulative and paternalistic approach to membership. A more sympathetic, if not necessarily accurate, interpretation would be that in the case of a political movement such as Inkatha the abundance of committee seats could serve as a training ground for members in the procedures of the organization. If this was the case, it had not worked that well as a supplementary activity of the Inkatha Institute as late as the mid-1980s was to train members and establish branch procedures.

A month after the formation of Inkatha in 1975 it was reported that ten branches had already been formed in townships around Durban. Nomathemba Sithole (secretary with the United States Information Service in Durban) was elected organising secretary of the interim committee. Buthelezi said that branches had to be formed in consultation with the KwaZulu urban representative, a civil servant (Daily News, 26 Apr 75), indicating that no time had been lost in making use of the facilities offered by the bantustan. Early in 1977 there were 300 branches (200 rural and 100 urban) in existence, 18 of these outside Natal (Schmahmann, 1978:277-8). Lawrence Schlemmer, academic and at one time Inkatha spokesperson, said on SABC-TV (3
Dec 84) that nearly a third of branches were in the Transvaal urban areas in 1984. Schmahmann made an early claim for Inkatha branches in the western Cape, where the African population comes mainly from regions inhabited by Xhosa-speaking people (the eastern Cape). Reference to these western Cape branches, placed specifically in the townships of Langa, Nyanga and Guguletu, were made uncritically subsequently (see, for example, *Frontline*, 1(1), 1979; *Natal Mercury*, 21 Feb 80; Langner, 1983:71). However, researchers in Cape Town whom I approached in the mid-1980s were unable to discover any of these branches.

A thesis submitted in 1983 mentioned 1000 branches of the movement in 20 regions - more than 90% of them in Natal (including KwaZulu) (Langner, 1983). However, Kane-Berman, writing a year earlier, claimed 1200 branches and placed 30 of these in Soweto (1982:155). Despite the contradictory figures, and despite the primary reason for quoting branch numbers and location, namely to show national membership, observers have always accepted that Inkatha was formed as and remained predominantly a regional and Zulu organization. The 1994 election results once again confirmed that observation, even in its new guise of the Inkatha Freedom Party (Hamilton and Maré, 1994; Maré, 1995).

Schlemmer admitted that branches outside the province reflected a Zulu-speaking presence in those areas, and that even though ethnic affiliation did not appear on membership forms, the bulk of its members was Zulu-speaking (over 95%), and that it was a basically rurally-based organisation (1980:115). This Zulu and rural bias correlated very well with organizational patterns of Inkatha during the first five or so years of its existence and beyond. In rural areas constituencies coincided With chiefs' areas of authority (Schlemmer, 1980:115; and above), and Inkatha regions took the same boundaries as the regional authorities in Natal established in terms of the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act. It comes as no surprise then that the movement's 'spectacular growth' could 'in large measure' be ascribed to the 'active co-operation of tribal chiefs' (Schlemmer, 1980:116).

John Kane-Berman, ex-journalist, director of the South African Institute of Race Relations and also vice-chairman of the KwaZulu/Natal talks in Durban (the Indaba in 1986), wrote that Buthelezi confirmed this in that he 'has insisted that traditional authority be respected and that chiefs, as patrons, should exercise a watching brief over local branches' (1982:154). As far as could be established Inkatha never claimed branches in any other bantustan.
Inkatha's brigades

While membership of Inkatha proper was restricted to 'persons' over the age of 18, 'female persons of not less than eighteen years of age' enrolled in the Women's Brigade, while 'persons' under the age of 18 and 'those people who are accepted by the Youth Population as Youth' (a flexible approach to 'youth' similar to that by the ANCYL) joined the Youth Brigade. The latter provision regarding Youth Brigade membership was one of the additions to the constitution in 1979, while an amendment removed the Youth Brigade from the jurisdiction of the CC and placed it directly under the president (the Women's Brigade remained under central committee control) (see Langner, 1983).

The Women's Brigade functioned in parallel with the 'main constituencies, branches and other units' of Inkatha. It was supposed to play an 'instructive role in the mobilization of the womenfolk and upbringing of children towards the objectives of the Movement'. The Youth Brigade was allocated a less supportive role. It was to function as the 'reserve of the Movement and shall play the vanguard role of upholding and consolidating gains of the Movement'. It too existed side-by-side with the main structures. The chairs of both brigades were appointed by the president in consultation with the national women's council in the one case, and with the CC in the case of the Youth Brigade.

The Women's Brigade was inaugurated at the Inanda Seminary at the end of May 1977, and its first conference was held at Ulundi in October of that year. As with the other sections of the Inkatha movement, the conferences of the Women's Brigade were usually attended by large numbers of people. In 1978, for example, it was claimed that 1000 delegates attended (Rand Daily Mail, 5 Sep 78), and they elected Anastasia Thula (wife of CC member Gibson Thula) as secretary general. Ella Nxasana, Women’s Brigade executive member, said in 1979 (KCAV, 194) that the tasks of the members were, for example, ploughing, gardening and sewing. She denied that Inkatha wanted women to stay in the home. W Yengwa, another executive member, said the Women’s Brigade had fought very strongly against the notorious restrictions placed on African women in Natal through the Natal Code and the Bantu Administration Act of 1927. She also claimed that the Women’s Brigade had been aiding unions, through food boycotts (she mentioned the Fatti's and Moni's pasta company boycott of 1978), but was clearly unsure of her facts and finally said that Inkatha was not working with existing unions but starting its own (KCAV, 188). This was in 1979, eight years before Inkatha formed UWUSA.
In 1974 WSP Kanye, executive councillor for justice, introduced a motion in the KLA calling for the introduction of a select committee to investigate the legal disabilities of women under the Natal Code. Kanye was careful not to offend traditionalists, and admitted that there might be some members of the KLA who would be offended by the idea that women be given powers 'which they did not possess formerly', undoing 'that which belongs to the nation'. Buthelezi seconded the motion to study the Natal Code. The debate was notable for sexist remarks (KLAD 4, 1974:64). The committee was to be chaired by SZ Conco. In 1975 an interim report was tabled (KLAD 6, 1975:349), and later in the session presented by Conco (KLAD 7, 1975:823-48), but no debate took place. Conco said that very few replies had been received to the thousand questionnaires sent out. He blamed this on illiteracy, obstructive officials, and social conservatism.

The final report, which was discussed in 1976, was only four pages long. Dr AH Zulu said that if the KLA was committed to freedom then they had to accept the report. He continued that the KLA had previously 'accepted the necessity for adjusting its laws, contrary to custom, if it should be found necessary to do so', referring, for example, to the 'un-Zulu' way in which the role of the king had been defined. He said that the inferior position to which women had been allocated had been 'according to Zulu custom', but that secretary for Native Affairs Shepstone, in nineteenth century Natal, had artificially frozen the position (KLAD 9, 1976:536-8). The changes proposed would not affect the practice of lobolo (paying bridewealth). Conco said that a function of Inkatha would be to implement the recommendations, and made several calls for the total repeal of the Natal Code rather than just Section 27, which was the only part dealt with.

The Natal Code of Native Law, in this case, refers to the 1891 codification by the colonial Natal Legislative Council of what they perceived to be 'traditional customary law', but that in many cases bore very little relation to pre-colonial practice (Marks (ed), 1987:21-22). This was especially the case with regard to property and other rights of Zulu women (cf Welsh, 1971:169). What codification also did was to impart 'a rigidity to customary law which it had not had in its traditional context', the point made by Dr Zulu in the KLA debate as well (Welsh, 1971:171). 'The social base of traditional law' was constantly eroded through the demands of capitalism and the actions of the state, while the codified laws were inflexible and could not adapt to changing circumstances. African women, in particular, 'suffered a deterioration in status as a result of the Code' (Welsh, 1971:176).
Section 27, the only one the KLA decided to request the central government to repeal, dealt with the perpetual minority status in law of African women in Natal. Unless she was 'emancipated',

'a Bantu female is deemed a perpetual minor... and has no independent powers save as to her own person...' She is always under the guardianship of a man... first under... her father, or, if he should die or become incapacitated, the head of the kraal concerned. When she marries, her husband is her guardian; and if she becomes divorced the guardianship reverts to her father... If she becomes widowed, the guardianship is the head of her husband's kraal (who may be her eldest son if he is a major in law) (Horrell, 1968:3).

'Emancipation' could occur if an unmarried, widowed or divorced woman, by virtue of good character, education, thrifty habits, 'or any other good and sufficient reason', was freed by an order of the Bantu Commissioner's Court from the control of her guardian (Horrell, 1968:3).

A motion was accepted in the KLA calling on the central government to repeal Section 27, and to amend Section 226 of the Criminal Procedure Act (56/1955), which would allow exemption from giving evidence against their husbands, not only to women married under Christian rights but also to 'customary union' marriages (KLAD 9, 1976:595-6). During that same session in 1976 the executive councilor for justice said women were to be employed at the same ranks and rates of pay as men in his department. Earlier the education councillor had turned down such a suggestion on the grounds of insufficient funds (the justice department decision would only affect 32 women at that time). However, what remains clear is that changes to the role of women, within KwaZulu, within Zulu social relations, and within the Inkatha movement, were seen and debated within the ideological limitations of 'tradition'. Inkatha's male leadership operated within the rigidities of perceptions of gender roles within a clearly defined, and therefore rigid, idea of ethnicity.

Some introductory remarks on the Youth Brigade are appropriate (for further detail see Teague, 1983; Maré and Hamilton, 1987). The Youth Brigade was formed in 1976, but held its first conference only in 1978, when an eight-member committee under Musa Arnold Mkhize was elected. Mkhize came from Evaton in the Transvaal. He said that Inkatha had to be promoted at universities 'to counter the influence of the South African Students Organization (SASO)' (Langner, 1983:153). SASO was the first specifically South African black consciousness organization to be formed in 1969. It was banned by the state in 1977 (see Davies et al, 1984:302-8). Langner noted that
from 1980 there had been moves to change the Youth Brigade into a 'youth corps':
For the sake of discipline the children were dressed in uniforms and
time was devoted to marching and the singing and shouting of
Inkatha songs and slogans. The children were also involved in
community projects such as soil preservation and gardening, and
Buthelezl foresaw a situation 'where young people who have left
school are going to have to spend a year or so working for the
community in the rural areas'... they would earn their keep and a
'more permanent group' would get 'a modest salary' from Inkatha and
the KwaZulu government (Langner, 1983:154, emphasis added).

From this change in focus came the building of the Emandlenl-Matleng youth camp.
As early as 1974 Buthelezl had envisaged a labour contribution during a 'compulsory
year... similar to the one year during which White youths are compelled to do military
service' (KLAD 5, 1975:141). The 'Youth Service Corps for Social Reconstruction'
(YSC - the Emandlenl-Matleng camp) was established in January 1982. After the 1980
schools boycotts, ruthlessly repressed by Inkatha members in the name of Zulu
parental discipline (Kane Berman, 1982:156; Maré and Hamilton, 1987:185-9),
Buthelezl called for 'well-disciplined and regimented imls in every Inkatha region'
(Sunday Post, 22 Jun 80). The Inkatha Institute drew up the curriculum for the YSC
(McCaul, 1983:27). 'Development' was one of the mobilizing slogans employed by
Inkatha and the KLA. A multitude of activities were presented under the umbrella of
'development', from gardening to involvement in profit-making through bottle-stores.

In a rousing speech to the national executive committee of the Youth Brigade (BS, 23
Nov 80, quoted in Teague, 1983:68) Buthelezl not only referred to the semi-military
role that the Youth Brigade (or rather a 'Youth Service Corps' in this case) was to play
('I can envisage a camp in our rolling countryside where 10 000 youth will be
mustered, drilling, learning, teaching and being taught, disciplining themselves to
become fashioned steel for the struggle'), but also grandiose development projects ('I
can see units of the Youth Service Corps constructing dams, building bridges,
salvaging drought-stricken soil, introducing forms of life-saving technology, building
schools, conducting literacy classes...').

Teague commented that she would conclude that the YSC 'has essentially three aims':
Firstly, on an ideological level, it provides Inkatha with the
opportunity to inculcate members of the Youth Brigade with a strong
sense of loyalty and duty towards the 'Zulu nation' - and thereby
Buthelezl and Inkatha. Secondly, it provides Inkatha with the means
of substantiating Buthelezi’s constant threat that Inkatha will ‘pick up the gauntlet’ thrown down by its enemies, imagined or otherwise. And thirdly, the ‘social reconstruction’ aspect - the training in rudimentary development skills - is part of the recognition by Inkatha that in order to retain and attract support, it needs to become more involved in ‘bread and butter’ issues in the community (1983:72).

It can be added that another important function of the Youth Brigade and YSC was an attempt to absorb at least some of the thousands of young people who annually left, and still leave school with not the slightest chance of a job, and who formed such an important and volatile element in the near civil war in South Africa after 1976 (see Campbell, 1992; Lodge and Nasson, 1991). Schlemmer said in a TV interview that what was needed was a mass youth movement of the unemployed (‘Midweek’, 16 Jan 85), while the head of the Inkatha youth affairs section said in an interview that the Emandleni-Matleng camp arose out of the unemployment crisis in KwaZulu (McCaul, 1983:25).

In 1976, in a KLA debate, the executive councillor for community affairs admitted the problem of youth unemployment. Explaining a R700 000 item in his budget for youth camps, he said that

These are actually places where the youths, who cause a disturbance in the community, are placed... those youths who are undesirable or who are delinquents (KLAD 9, 1976:318).

The existence of such large numbers of young people whose aspirations for jobs and security could not be met under the economic and political system in South Africa was of grave concern to those interests who would lose most through the simultaneous destruction of the apartheid state and of the economy. The Inkatha movement attempted to mould these people into a political and military weapon, under the discipline of ‘Zuluness’ (see section three below), as did other political organisations.

In a briefing paper dealing with ‘development and Inkatha’s role’, secretary general Oscar Dhlomo spelt out very clearly what they had in mind. He and the Women’s Brigade representative were on a visit to Israel where they discussed the formation of a Youth Service Corps, a large-scale, ‘para-military’ project, with a camp ‘for something like 10 000 trainees’. Dhlomo’s document continued:

We need to discuss this [YSC] concept with people who have possibly been involved in military training camps and in small scale community-bound light industries and service industries.
... we would like to meet people who could offer guidance on:

1. The use of military trainees on community service programmes, rural agricultural work and work in building infrastructure for development.

2. The requirements of attaining self-sufficiency in military training camps...

5. The appropriate ratios of training to routine military exercises to leisure in training programmes...

6. The type and duration of specialized training and psychological preparation of leaders and officers in preparation for larger training camps... (Dhloomo, 1981:8)

The Youth Brigade was modelled on the Young Pioneers in Malawi and the Zambian Youth Service. Gibson Thula, then KwaZulu urban representative in the Transvaal, was sent to Zambia in 1976 to study the Youth Service system there (Bernstein, 1977:135-6). Musa Mkhize visited Malawi on a similar trip (Daily News, 27 Mar 80). Members were also being sent to the Coady Institute in Canada to give effect to the 'development' aspect of the Youth Brigade's activities - the Coady Institute also provided training for the setting up of an Inkatha Development Office (McCaul, 1983:21). With the record that the Malawian Young Pioneers had gained for being 'party thugs' and 'storm-troopers', this model could not have been less auspicious (McCaul, 1983:42).

In 1979, at the time of the Inkatha delegation to London to meet the ANC - the meeting that led to the dramatic break in relations between the two movements (Maré, 1988) - Beeld editor Ton Vosloo said that Afrikaners and Zulus should talk: ‘... If the Afrikaners and the Zulus, as the two biggest components in our patterns of people, could make a compact, the road ahead would be infinitely easier’ (Sunday Express, 18 Nov 79). These sentiments had been expressed by Buthelezi as well, and nowhere more clearly than during addresses to Afrikaans students, such as to the Afrikaanse Studentebond (ASB), an arch-conservative student organization. The 'compact' that Vosloo desired had been a de facto achievement through the contacts between the Inkatha Youth Brigade and the ASB. These moves, too, occurred within a framework of ethnic politics.

While the formal relationship between the two parent bodies (the National Party and Inkatha) had been very strained at times, the youth organisations managed to cooperate in joint structures over the years. University of Stellenbosch Students Representative Council members and Inkatha members had discussions on several
occasions before the links were formalised through the establishment of the South African Youth Foundation in 1981 - a ‘think tank’. In 1980 ASB executive members visited Ulundi and invited Inkatha Youth Brigade leaders to their conference. In 1984 Youth Brigade organiser Ntwe Mafole received a standing ovation from ASB delegates at a meeting in Bloemfontein on South Africa’s ‘political future until the year 2000’. During the same year, 1984, the Youth Brigade annual conference condemned NUSAS, Diakonia (the Durban-based ecumenical organization), and others, and said that ‘Inkatha’s youth were aware that the struggle for liberation had been “long inhibited by white, coloured and Indian liberals who thought that they knew what was best for us”’ (Survey, 1984:12). The ideological affinity and cooperation of the various youth groups, such as Jeugkrag SA (Youth Power SA - a body ‘aimed at countering radicalism from left and right’) which planned to hold a joint conference with Inkatha’s Youth Brigade, no doubt facilitated other levels of contact between Inkatha and Afrikaner leaders (political, cultural and economic). The contact, when extreme intolerance of and antagonism to resistance organisations and individuals characterised the Youth Brigade’s other relations, gave a clear indication of the conservative role that was intended and that was played by this branch of Inkatha.

**Inkatha’s membership**

Inkatha’s membership claims over the years of its existence never told the full story, and were open to question and could be disproved, even if just on the grounds of grossly inconsistent claims. However, even if the exact figures could have been established membership does, in the final instance, not equal support nor the ability of an organisation to mobilise around issues. It was not the case for the ANC during the days of its legal existence in South Africa until 1960 and it was not the case for Inkatha (as shown by its election support in KwaZulu-Natal in 1994, and its frequent displays of mass support in the region at rallies in the years leading up to the overthrow of the apartheid government).

The claimed membership increases by Inkatha were nothing if not spectacular. After a ten-year period of existence (1975-1985) it neatly claimed to have achieved the one-million member mark, or an average of 100 000 members per year (for further details and debates around membership, see Maré and Hamilton, 1987:70-73; Brewer, 1985, 1986; Southall, 1986; McCaul, 1983:7; Survey, various years; Inkatha Conference Reports and Memoranda, various years). Exaggerated and contradictory claims were made for membership totals and for the composition of its registered support. For example, in 1978 Chief Buthelezi claimed 150 000 members, but added
that for every member there were between 30 and 50 sympathizers giving true support of between four and seven million people (Survey, 1978:28), an absurd claim. Other examples are discussed in Maré and Hamilton (1987).

What was the purpose of exaggerated claims? First, 'spectacular' totals and 'phenomenal' growth were of tremendous importance to the movement and to those who supported a central, national role for Inkatha and for what it represented. The larger the organization, the more legitimacy for its claim to speak for 'the people'. What distinguished Inkatha from other bantustan-based parties was, in effect, its support. Its 'constituency', that term favoured by Inkatha's leaders, distinguished it from being another 'Muzorewa option' - a reference to the ill-fated attempt by the Rhodesian regime to find a credible black face to forestall a take-over by the liberation groups in Zimbabwe - an accusation sometimes levelled against Inkatha. Here it was also not that important that Inkatha's support should be ethnically specific, as that was the perception for many conservative supporters of the basic units of political contestation and representation.

Second, these figures were important in the struggle for popular support against other, antagonistic organizations. It is quite true that there had never been a mass movement in South Africa that had been able to claim a signed-up membership approaching one million people. Most certainly the ANC had never been able to achieve this, even in its legal heyday. Lodge wrote that the peak during the 1940s was only some 5500; it was no more than 7000 in 1951, but then reached a high of 100 000 by the end of the Defiance Campaign in 1953. However, Lodge concludes that in this case too 'official membership figures do not accurately reflect the full extent of the ANC's influence' (Lodge, 1983:75).

The only contemporary comparison was with the United Democratic Front, which claimed to be more representative than Inkatha, and was certainly a national organization in a way that Inkatha never was, but which was composed of affiliated organizations. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) represented at the time of its formation in November 1985 a paid-up membership of 400 000 workers, organized into a democratic and disciplined structure (Lewis and Randall, 1985; Carrim, 1986). The point to be made here is that Inkatha's massive claimed membership had to reflect, for its supporters inside and outside the movement, not only an ability 'to deliver the goods', but also to deliver in opposition to counter-claims.

However, despite the obvious reasons why Inkatha should have inflated its membership claims, and notwithstanding all the pressures that were applied to
ensure, if not membership then at least obedience. Inkatha did undoubtedly have a large following from its formation and to have ignored that would have been to misjudge the consequences that its existence would have on attempts to construct a post-apartheid South Africa. The failure properly to address Inkatha’s support, its appeals, and its methods had much to do with the failure of the ANC to win an election in the KZN province.

What can be said about this membership? Why were people attracted to the movement for reasons other than short-term gain, the necessity of allegiance to survive in a hostile environment, and other reasons, including violence or the fear of retribution that might ‘nudge’ (Schlemmer, 1980:122) people into paying at least a joining fee or giving other support to the movement?

In this section I have shown that Inkatha functioned as a modern and modernising movement in many aspects of its structure and mode of operation, altering the nature of politics in the region within which it operated, for example through the manner in which it did use the structures of apartheid with a measure of success, and its steps to create regional strengths and legitimacy for the claims to regional powers. At the same time it relied on chiefs for a large part of its organisational capacity; it centralised authority under the president, Buthelezi, who carried much more than democratic approval but functioned as a symbolic condensation in the mobilising strategy; it remained in the bantustan and in the ethnic group (as it was intended to be at and in its formation); and it basically became the regional government through its exclusive domination, and near total overlap with, the KLA.

Inkatha was intended to be, and served as the vehicle for ethnic mobilisation, a vehicle that was perceived increasingly to be in opposition not only to the central state, but to other organisations opposing apartheid. Ethnic mobilisation served its purpose in the extremely confrontational politics that has characterised change in South Africa.
SECTION 3:

ZULU NATION: 'BROTHERS BORN OF WARRIOR STOCK'

Introduction

In this section I examine the specific and immediate case of ethnic mobilisation, that into the 'Zulu nation', having sketched some of the necessary historical, political and social background as well as relevant organisational factors relating to Inkatha. Here I will deal with the discourse of ethnic mobilisation, drawing on the insights provided by the approach presented in chapters two and three. This is an important case. To understand it may indicate an approach to a South Africa in which divisions are perceived to be resolvable, able to be accommodated, rather than as fixed, inherent and trans-historical; and it serves to illustrate many of the more theoretical points made above. I will continue to refer, sometimes in contrast, to other instances of ethnic or other types of mobilisation (such as that of class or nationalism).

While the focus is on South Africa, it is clear by now that ethnicity is not a local or an African phenomenon as is sometimes implied in local political debate - akin to or synonymous with 'tribalism' (which is then seen as specifically black 'African'). Nor does the selection in this study of a Zulu ethnic social identity wish to imply that there are no other ethnicities nor to deny that several other political mobilisations are, or could potentially be, taking place in the country.

Ethnic groups, and political mobilisation of ethnic sentiments, are to be found in all parts of the world. However, ultimately we have to examine the particular unfolding, articulation, the specific 'mix' that constitutes each case, using the general tools that have been suggested. We have to examine the reasons why, and if, ethnic sentiments find fertile ground in each specific case (why people are 'available' for ethnic mobilisation, which is what the first part of this chapter has dealt with), and we have to see who the prime mobilisers are, and what interests are served. Such an exercise will also allow us to test the adequacy of the theoretical discussion.

The many instances of ethnic group formation and of ethnic conflict show that there are large similarities (or else useful comparisons that can add to our understanding) between them. The approach in this section will be to deal with the three elements of the definition developed from these similarities in the previous section - cultural particularity; historical origin; and group boundaries, and to place these against the background provided by the contextualisation in the first two sections of this chapter.
It is, however, not possible, especially at this more concrete level of discussion, to separate the three elements neatly - they exist only in their interaction (their articulation) in composing an ethnic identity, and an ethnic group, also, as will become clear, within the use being made of these elements within politically mobilising ethnicity.

How does a study of the Inkatha movement add to our understanding of the operation of ethnic mobilisation? It provides a clear example of the use of a claimed cultural distinctiveness; it illustrates how historical legitimacy for the ethnic group is presented in mobilisation; it shows how the group is pitched against other groups; it illustrates the politisation of ethnicity which it attempts to organise within an exclusive organisation (Inkatha has essentially been 'organised Zuluness', although changes in the 1990s will be discussed); and, finally, it highlights the centrality of a single symbol, the person of chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, to this case of ethnic mobilisation, something not found in all such groups.

While the example of Inkatha is discussed to illustrate ethnic group formation it should not be read as an argument that all varieties of ethnic identity that rely on an aspect or aspects of 'Zuluness' are to be found encapsulated in this movement (now the Inkatha Freedom Party - IFP). However, I do argue that it has been the most consistent, the most self-conscious and best publicised version of ethnic mobilisation in South Africa in the latter half of the twentieth century (along with Afrikaner mobilisation in the first half of the twentieth century). It has left opponents with a distinct disadvantage in attempting to salvage an ethnic social identity uncoupled from Inkatha, as becomes clear when examining the ANC response since 1990 (see, for example, Maré, 1994). Furthermore, it reinforces a most disturbing trend of generalised intolerance to, and hence lack of understanding of, ethnic identities and other social identities.

I am going to concentrate on the process of ethnic group formation and definition, having dealt with some of the political history and organisational structuring of the Inkatha movement in the previous two sections of this chapter (also see Maré and Hamilton, 1987; and Mzala, 1988: chapter 7, for a fuller account). However, a brief overview is necessary to periodise stages in the process, now as they relate specifically to ethnic mobilisation.

After that the discussion moves to the mobilising strategies, symbols, agents, structures, and practices employed by Buthelezi and Inkatha. Many of these coincide with (such as the notion of nations with their own distinct histories), overlap (that
there are and should be separate regions/space within which nations can have their full existence), or were made available by the apartheid policy (such as the educational system in KwaZulu used with such vigour by Inkatha in its mobilising strategy). It is necessary to repeat that this study focuses primarily on the first decade of Inkatha’s existence, low until the mid-1980s, during which Inkatha’s consolidation took place. During this time its strategies were developed and confirmed. However, reference has been and will be made to the next five years as well, and a brief overview is given to the changes in discourse and political practice after the formation of the Inkatha Freedom Party in December 1990.

A brief periodisation

From its formation in 1975 the leadership of the National Cultural Liberation Movement (Inkatha) relied very heavily for their project on the clout that chiefs carried in rural areas, even though the chiefs had to be convinced that the new movement was not going to peripheralise them and dilute their powers. However, in some ways a more important event occurred nearly 20 years earlier when the young Buthelezi himself contentiously came to lead the Buthelezi clan as chief, with government approval.

When Buthelezi decided to fight for the chieftaincy, he acknowledged the relative ideological clarity of an alternative path that had been available to him up to that point. The other path could have led through the ANC Youth League, of which he had been a member briefly, to a legal career and articles with Communist Party member and lawyer Rowley Arenstein, and continuation in what has always been the mainstream of African nationalist politics in South Africa. It is not that he gave up either Arenstein or the political symbolism of the ANC, but the contradictions that have driven Inkatha, and the ethnic petty bourgeois interests that the movement directly represents, into an increasingly conservative camp were etched into his personal and organisational history at that time. Buthelezi became an agent of administration and an element in ‘the past’ he was part of, and was reviving and recreating.

Buthelezi’s biographer, Temkin, wrote that it was hoped by ‘many Zulu intellectuals’ during this time that Buthelezi would become the ‘premier’ and the Zulu king the ‘rallying point’ of the Zulu nation (1976:49, and above). With the choice that Buthelezi made in the 1950s his own political career started its parallel, and at times criss-crossing path with that charted by the state for African politics. Both the
National Party and Buthelezi, and later Inkatha, drew on the sediments of the past to help shape the present.

The ideas of the past shape and are shaped by the political practice of classes. The remnants of the past were and are serving the aspirations of the present, whether it be a petty bourgeoisie that was attempting to assert itself (see Maré and Hamilton, 1987: chapter six), or the self-interest of established capital such as the sugar industry in Natal as was the case with the first Inkatha in the 1920s (see Cope, 1986, 1993; Marks, 1986); or, more recently, agricultural capital admitting to the failure of their own control measures and attempting new controls over the rural population (Maré and Hamilton, 1987a). Those ideas of the past are mediated through and given form in an ethnic social identity, which is then available to be employed for political mobilisation, control and a specific political and 'moral' direction.

The National Party also gave organisational and, in addition, spatial form to its racist domination and class exploitation. It developed the paternalistic 'guardianism' of the pre-1948 segregation period into apartheid. The blatant racism of this policy was to be coated with the idea of 'cultural nationalisms' and eventual 'independence' for the bantustan areas, modelled on what the Afrikaners said they had wanted for themselves - an ethnic pride, an own 'homeland', and an own political identity - and presented in the language of decolonisation that was sweeping Africa during the 1950s. It was this policy that placed ethnic mobilisation into an own political arena firmly on the agenda for African 'ethnic entrepreneurs' or 'brokers' - it was the politics, and economics (advancing class interests behind an ethnic curtain), that would be allowed to flourish during the next four decades.

In Natal chiefs and the Zulu royal house, as well as the mobilising symbol that is called the 'Zulu nation' (a symbol that in itself needs to be unpacked into its constituent and changing parts), continued to be press-ganged into the service not only of the colonial, Union, and apartheid administrations, but also of African interests, both progressive and reactionary. This is what Buthelezi became part of in the 1950s - a broadly agreed-upon Zulu identity, agreed upon by both 'members' ('Zulus', variously defined) and outsiders (by the apartheid state which had to find a basis of legitimation outside of segregation, and by other non-Zulus). However, in the 1950s this identity existed in a much looser form - it commingled with an ANC-led national identity (with chief Albert Luthuli symbolising that openness as both Zulu chief and last president of the ANC before it was banned in 1960). Attempts at the time, in the 1950s, to re-form Inkatha came to naught, maybe because of the strength of the national thrust then.
In the 1960s Buthelezi agonised over whether to take part in the new role envisaged for the Tribal Authorities he had already become part of in the 1950s. In 1970, he came to head the pinnacle of the Promotion of Bantu-Self Government Act pyramid for the Zulus, the Zulu Territorial Authority.

Initially two broad justifications for participation in state-created institutions clashed (see section two, above, for a fuller discussion): on the one hand, that it was a selfless choice to prevent a stooge from being appointed (with a clear possibility that the royal house would have provided such a person); on the other hand, that he was destined to lead a Zulu nation, in a position that owed nothing to the apartheid policy, over a political entity that pre-existed apartheid (and colonialism), and a territory that approximated in its spread, if not in its size, a 'kingdom' and state that dated back to the 1820s and 1830s. Over time, as his defeat of Zulu king Goodwill Zwelithini was consolidated, the latter justification came to dominate, with additional positive claims made for the strategy of 'working within the system and changing it from within'. Buthelezi refused the politically-suicidal route of 'Independence' for the KwaZulu 'homeland'. Even the National Party, in its attempt to ensure a future role for the Inkatha Freedom Party, in the early-1990s said that Inkatha contributed to the failure of apartheid. There was a grim irony, though. When king Zwelithini and Buthelezi threatened secession and 'independence for the 'Zulu kingdom', it came in January 1994, when apartheid had already collapsed, and in the midst of extreme factional violence in the region.

In 1972 the Zululand Territorial Authority became the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly. In 1975 Inkatha was formed as a purely Zulu movement. In 1977 KwaZulu entered the next stage in self-government, with its powers now exceeding those of the second-tier provincial government, and based from 1984 in multi-million Rand legislative assembly buildings in the new capital, Ulundi (paid for through a re-allocation within its own meagre budget, which had to cover education, pensions, infrastructural development, etc). Inkatha, constitutionally - albeit with little success on the ground - welcomed all other African people into membership under a changed constitution from 1979, a move that irritated the NP tremendously when it was mooted (see Inkatha, nd). Inkatha was so confident of its role by that time that secretary general Sibusiso Bhengu 'said that it was hoped that Inkatha would be recognised as a liberation movement alongside such organisations such as the PAC and ANC or instead of them' (Survey, 1977:36).

Buthelezi's politics in KwaZulu during the first eight years or so of the 1970s was dominated by two struggles: the first against state attempts to create an alternative
Zulu tradition using some chiefs, disgruntled traders, and with the king as central symbolic figure. Within this scheme an executive role was envisaged for the king as was the removal of Buthelezi who was then perceived to be impertinent in his rejection of 'independence'. The second, and not totally separate, struggle, was against opponents of Buthelezi's close links with state development agencies (which he wanted to control for ethnic class-formation purposes) and his cooperation with big capital in the region and in the rest of South Africa. They, this section of the Zulu trading class, felt threatened by the economic impact of the alliance with big capital, and were disgruntled by the mode of operation of the forerunner to the KwaZulu Development Corporation, the Bantu Investment Corporation (see, for example, Maré and Hamilton, 1987:chapter 6; Maré, 1984).

In his attempts to mobilise ethnicity and at the same time to modernise and incorporate potentially opposing class interests, Buthelezi presented a common strategy under the banner of building 'the nation'. I have referred to Laclau's argument that the purpose of populist (also ethnic populist) mobilisation is in part to transform 'all antagonisms into simple difference' (1977; also Mouffe, 1979:196). Nun (see LARU, 1980:17) said that '... the populist organization of the masses tends always (a generalisation with which Laclau disagreed in the debate, not wishing to attribute an essential link within populist interpellations to the dominant classes) to disorganize the workers, in the sense that it decreases the saliency of class as the basis for collective action'. This is how Buthelezi expressed his own approach to class and other distinctions within nationalist (and ethnic) mobilisation:

'The bricks of black nationalism are many and varied. There are ethnic groups, there are tribes, there are trade unions, drama societies, black church groups, student organisations, cultural groups and many others' (quoted in Maré, 1978).

Buthelezi and Inkatha's hand was strengthened during this early period of the existence of the movement through the support he gained for his political agenda from the African National Congress. One powerful set of political symbols of mobilisation arose out of the shading of Inkatha into an internally revived ANC. Colours, political
myth of origin, some leadership figures, were all drawn from the ANC, especially as it had existed as a conservative branch in Natal during the period before its banning (see Maré, 1988). Another set of symbols came from Zulu ethnicity.

There is a fundamental way, though, in which the two traditions are entangled at the ideological level, at the level at which interpretation takes place, where interpellations are 'prepared'. A central aspect of what Buthelezi makes of the ANC tradition was the 'Zulu' character of many personalities in the ANC before 1960, and then, the other side of the coin, to decry the 'dilution' of the Zulu and African presence through the later 'non-racial' policy of the ANC. So, for example, in the Inkatha syllabus, Mdluli (1987) found that

... the selection of leaders (from the ANC)... throws further light onto the slant of Ubuntu-botho. All the leaders who are selected are either Zulu-speaking Natalians or have strong connections with the Zulu royal family... What is of particular significance about these leaders.... is the connection drawn between what they did or stood for and the actions of Inkatha and/or the KwaZulu government.

Mdluli said that 'there is a huge gap [in the Inkatha version of resistance history] between the 1960s and 1975', while the current ANC leadership is practically ignored (only Mandela, Tambo and Sisulu, leaders with links with the ANC of 'the founding fathers', are referred to on occasion). Inkatha's leaders presented their organisation as a continuation of the ANC after a 15-year lull - 'Inkatha was founded in response to the political vacuum that had been created when the African National Congress and Pan Africanist Congress were banned', and it was formed 'on the principles of the founding fathers of the ANC', said Inkatha secretary general Oscar Dhlomo (Swart interview with Oscar Dhlomo, 1984).

On one level it is quite accurate to refer to a 'Zulu' presence in the ANC: there were many Zulu-speaking leaders in the organisation who came from this part of South Africa, but it is also true that they frequently showed a degree of Zulu chauvinism and a tendency to form regional factions. Beall et al (1986:22) commented that while Dube had been the first president of the ANC, formed to coordinate national resistance to political exclusion and territorial confinement of Africans, he was replaced in 1917 and from that date... until his death in 1946 he created a regional base that stood in conflict with the national African National Congress. His Natal Native Congress left a legacy of tension that was only resolved with the election of chief Albert Luthuli as president of the regional (1951) and then of the national Congress (1952).
Buthelezi ignored these difficulties with the ANC tradition he presented and relied largely on an incantation of names to stake his claim (see, for example, speech quoted at length in Maré and Hamilton, 1987:219-20).

The political role of Albert Luthuli, president of the ANC at the time of its banning and also Zulu chief stripped of this function by the NP government, was essential as a link in the tradition created and presented by Inkatha. Frequent links were claimed by Buthelezi with chief Luthuli, with his family and with his memory. However, it goes beyond that as when Inkatha claimed that in 'a symbolic meeting between Chief Luthuli and the Hon. Chief M.G. Buthelezi in the 1960s, the heritage of the leadership of the liberation struggle was passed on to the Hon. Chief Buthelezi' (Inkatha, 1983:12).

Buthelezi pulled the various traditions together in a speech made at the unveiling of the tombstone of H Selby Msimang and his wife. He first established his own position in relation to Msimang ('founder member of the banned African National Congres'), and then linked the ANC of Msimang and Inkatha:

He was a link together with Mr. Champion between the old founding fathers of the African National Congress and the leadership of Inkatha. Mr. Msimang's membership of Inkatha justified what I say so often that Inkatha is structured on the ideals of the banned African National Congress as propounded in 1912 by the founding fathers. He was one of those founding fathers whose membership of Inkatha testified to the fact that it was not us in Inkatha who have deviated from those ideals. The ideals of the founding fathers who were descendants of black warriors were structured on the foundation of non-violence and negotiations... He saw us as forming a continuum of those very ideals... We will not be influenced away from those ideals by any elitist clique whatever they call themselves (BS, 6 Apr '87).

At the end of the 1970s the unequal balancing act, between a regional and 'Zulu nation' mobilisation, and a national African nationalist mobilisation, was to change through a rupture of the relationship with the ANC, but also with the defeat of an autonomous, an alternative, 'traditional' political position under the leadership of the king against Buthelezi and Inkatha (the struggle that had carried the support of the state and its organs in the early-1970s). The 1980s saw an independent, from any major concern with national politics and national political symbols, direction from Inkatha. Inkatha had defined itself outside of the mainstream of political struggle - as that current was defined by 'the youth', by the ANC with its strategies of armed
struggle, sanctions, ungovernability and seizing central state power, and by the United Democratic Front (UDF, formed in 1983) and the newly-formed Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU, launched in 1985), the organisationally-loose alliance that became known as the 'Mass Democratic Movement'.

For Inkatha the 1980s can be summarised as the period of regional consolidation. It was characterised by blatant and dangerous ethnic political mobilisation, by attempts at structurally integrating the KwaZulu bantustan and the provincial administration, by the drawing up of blueprints for regional reform through the Buthelezi Commission and the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba and forming alliances with conservative political and moneyed interests, and by defining 'the enemy' ever clearer (see, for example, Maré, 1991; Forsyth and Maré, 1992; on the Indaba see, for example, Maré, 1987, 1987a; Ardington, 1988; Dhlomo, 1987; Erwin, 1987; Louw and Kriek, 1987; Roberts and Howe (eds), 1987).

The enemy, for Inkatha, was not only political opponents but also those who were not to be found for the specific version of politicised ethnicity propounded by the Inkatha leadership and the Zulu king. Castigating and threatening the traitors to the Zulu cause became a common theme during the 1980s. In 1984 the king said that 'some blacks in urban areas who want to disassociate themselves from their brothers and sisters in the rest of KwaZulu' should be 'cast out of our midst'. They were compared to witches 'preying on our humanness, preying on our Zuluness, belittling our past, and making us ashamed of our present' (City Press, 30 Sep 84). In 1986 Goodwill warned at the main Shaka Day celebration:

'I also say this to you who are working with people and organisations alien to the great Zulu people - if you do not return to where you belong to work for your people, never imagine that you will escape detection for long' (Natal Mercury, 25 Sep 86).

On a national level Inkatha was being drawn increasingly, from at least 1986, into the network of nefarious state-initiated or state-supported activities of which the details have only recently started coming to light. While the Inkatha leadership was maintaining a rhetorical distance from the apartheid state, and most members were undoubtedly sincere in their rejection of apartheid, they were also being funded by the state (police, foreign affairs and military intelligence) and being integrated more tightly into being another functional element of the security network in the struggle against popular resistance and armed struggle. This went beyond the de facto and de jure integration demanded of any bantustan structure - the KwaZulu Police, for example, had always been headed by an SA Police officer, and to have argued for the existence
of independent centres of power within South Africa was preposterous. The new thrust coincided with the appointment in 1987 of Jac Buchner as the Natal midlands chief of the notorious security police. Buchner, interrogator and involved in the creation of the Askaris (‘turned’ ANC operatives), took command of the KwaZulu Police in 1989 (see Maré, 1989; LRC, 1991).

By the time that FW de Klerk made his historic announcement on 2 February 1990, Inkatha and KwaZulu leaders were already engaged in formal consultation with the government. The talks centred on the relevance of their ‘background group’-based federal proposal, encapsulated in the Indaba constitution, and on other ‘obstacles in the way of negotiations’ (including the release of Mandela and other political prisoners).

Then, in December 1991, the latest chapter in the manipulation of ethnicity started when Buthelezi refused to attend the CODESA talks unless recognition was given to the special status of the ‘Zulu nation’ through an invitation to king Goodwill Zwelithini to participate as representative of seven-million Zulus. Buthelezi’s absence from national talks at this crucial time in South Africa’s history, and the call for the Zulu king’s participation signified the failure of attempts to give a significant national presence to Inkatha and a retreat into the ethnic and regional fortress that Inkatha had so assiduously worked at during the 1980s - then as a ‘stepping stone’, now as a kraal behind a moat. The next four years, from 1991 to 1994, was to see a steady increase in the vehemence with which the demand for a separate, ethnically-based future to be conceded to the region, was articulated (see Maré and Hamilton, 1994; Hamilton and Maré, 1994). These demands culminated in the threat of secession, the agreement on international mediation and the recognition of the ‘Zulu kingdom’, and the last-minute participation of the IFP in the elections.

The legacy of apartheid exists as much in the political role it had attached to ethnicity and cultural diversity generally, as it exists in the poverty, relocation of vast numbers of people, deaths, illiteracy, and other indicators of the depredations of that policy, committed on people in the name of ‘separate development’. ‘Independence’ could be undone because, with a good measure of truth, it was a sleight of hand; the services provided through the bantustan departments can become part of national state structures or of rationalised and democratic regional governments; development projects can be undertaken to start a process of redistribution of life chances. However, the depth of ethnic identification and unscrupulous manipulation for political ends of such sentiments, will be less easy to assess, contain and wipe away, or to channel and be allowed to exist in a true politics of diversity. This is especially
true if we examine how it permeated ideas, the transmission of ideas, structures, and informed the actions of people over many years - because as a story it seemed to make some sense of the every-day world.

That 'sense', for example, led to frequent clashes over scarce resources, clashes that were expressed in ethnic terms. One of the most pressing claims has been that over land - the obviousness lies in the allocation of 13% of the land in South Africa for occupation by the African population. That 13% was then fragmented into ten bantustans. Through influx control and forced removals more than half of the country's African people were by the late-1970s located in the bantustans. The Surplus People Project documented many of the clashes that flowed from the policy (for example, SPP, 1983, vol 5; also TRAC, 1985). These clashes were expressed in ethnic terms, because that is the basis on which land allocations had been made, and borders drawn between people, the basis of sufficient justification.

Cultural distinctiveness and a Zulu past

De Wet Nel, quoted earlier, referred to the pride that was said to distinguish the various African ethnic groups in South Africa for over a century. King Goodwill, in the case of 'the Zulus', expressed that continuity in the following way:

The unity between the Prince of KwaPhindangene, Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi and myself symbolise the unity of the nation and what the Prince of KwaPhindangene has said today about the genius of King Shaka and his statesmanship in founding a vast Zulu empire, is a genius which I know is still at work in the hearts and minds of all Zulus (GS, 24 Sep 86).

In Goodwill's conception, two of the elements in the definition and legitimisation of ethnicity are brought together in mutual reinforcement: that of the existence of a distinct group, and of the mobilisation of the past to giving credibility to that social identity. However, it goes beyond that in expressing a quasi-mystical element of 'genius' specific to Zulu people - usually, in speeches, presented as a Zulu 'wisdom'.

The first of the two dominant sets of symbols of legitimisation with which Inkatha functioned (referred to in the previous section), and the one that will concern me here, arises from the pre-colonial history of the region and the manner in which capitalism penetrated this part of south-east Africa, resting on the maintenance and exploitation - through taxes and labour - of the African homestead as productive unit (see Jeff Guy,
1990). The second set comprises those that are made available through the formation of the ANC in 1912 and its pre-eminence as the national liberation movement (discussed above).

It is regionalism, and more specifically the immediate pre-colonial and colonial regionally-distinctive history that has made a population 'available' for ethnic mobilisation and ethnic confirmation in Natal (for a discussion of the outlines of a strong regionalism, see Beall et al., 1986). The uneven penetration and development of capitalism in southern Africa articulated with centralising dynamics within pre-capitalist society (the Shakan kingdom and its successors). How was this past used?

What notion of history?

It must be noted that Buthelezi’s use of history (and he, through his speeches, has always done, and still does, most of the historical interpretation for Inkatha) is multi-dimensional, but inter-related: first, there is a history that gives credibility to his personal role as 'condensation' of what it means to be 'Zulu' (that he is in the royal lineage, that his forefathers served as 'prime ministers'); second, there is a history that justifies involvement in apartheid structures, such as the bantustans (the argument goes that KwaZulu existed long before apartheid, and that his bantustan chief ministership is merely a confirmation of a post that he held in any case, within the Zulu nation - see the discussion above); third, there is a history that places the king at the head of a 'nation', of which he is the symbol and the personification; fourth, there is the history of the subject members of the nation (mostly unproblematically taken as male) who participated in heroic deeds, owed allegiance to a central authority figure, and who behaved in particular ways; and, finally, there is the history that concerns me most here, that of the ‘past’ and origins of an ethnic identity that serves the various contemporary purposes outlined above, and that is present in each of the other dimensions of the use of history.

In Buthelezi’s presentation of this history the 'Zulu nation' was always already there, something that 'Zulus' were at least born into, if not born with. It owed naught to apartheid (a white-designed system that was also based on the 'Zulu nation's' 'imagined' existence, along with nine other African 'nations'). If anyone should deny its existence it was cause for volatile threats and strong language of condemnation. In a recent memorandum delivered during the visit to South Africa of Australian foreign affairs minister Gareth Evans, Buthelezi said that '(i)n dealing with KwaZulu the South African government was dealing with a reality that history structured', and that
the 'homeland framework' was imposed 'on what was an existing Zulu nation' (BS, 12 Jun 91, emphasis added). The phrase that is frequently used, even more so in the early-1990s when the place of the 'Zulu nation' was being discussed in national change fora, is that this social and political unit 'has existed since time immemorial'.

A specific perception of history underlies the use of 'the past' within Zulu ethnicity. It can be simply summarised by saying that 'history' is, in this case, an active agency that intervenes in the present - to confirm, to teach, to trample - as well as 'structuring' the foundations of the present. 'History', furthermore, cannot be defied - because it has already been it cannot be altered, so that what it has destined cannot be undone. It means that the 'Zulu nation cannot be wished away'.

A very good, if slightly extreme example in the repeated use of the term 'history', is a speech that Buthelezi gave on Shaka Day in 1988 (BS, 24 Sep 88). In this seven-page speech he used the notion of 'history' no less than 30 times. Zulus were a product of history, and participated with history to create a new South Africa; history taught, and still teaches; 'history tramples on tyranny and... history moves to uphold justice'; history has 'prepared a place for us'; history is 'guiding us' to a destiny; and so on.

In a revealing study aimed specifically at tracing the utilisation of history 'as a source of political legitimation', Paul Forsyth (1989) wrote that Buthelezi's use of history probably exceeded that of 'any other career politician'. While I would not make such emphatic claims about the uniqueness of this specific case, it does draw attention to a specific context, namely that of self-conscious ethnic mobilisation. As I have argued earlier, it is the use of 'the past' that is one of the defining elements of ethnic mobilisation. Buthelezi stressed 'the importance of Zulu history' to the present at a Shaka Day celebration in 1974 (quoted Forsyth, 1989:88):

No people can wrestle successfully with the problems of the day, unless they have a past from which to draw inspiration, to enable them to face the present and the future with confidence and fortitude.

The other examples of South African politicians who have relied to such a large extent on history also come from attempts at ethnic group formation - Afrikaners, the pathetic attempts by politicians in the Ciskei to create and utilise an own history (see Petres, 1987), and the more recent 'Boer' mobilisation (such as in and through, for example, the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging), come to mind. Forsyth notes that the Afrikaner interpretation of history served as a self-conscious model for Buthelezi's project - as did that group's economic achievements serve as a model to the class aspirations of the 'Zulu' trading class (cf Maré and Hamilton, 1987:116).
The Ciskei example represents an extreme case in the recent history of attempts to invent a 'past'. This bantustan was, after all, even in terms of the apartheid policy, an artificial unit and late creation, dividing the Xhosa ethnic group into the Transkei and the Ciskei. As Peires commented (1987:1): 'The Ciskei is unique among South African homelands in that it has absolutely no basis in any ethnic, cultural or linguistic fact whatsoever'. A 'Ciskei nation had to be created from scratch'. This was attempted through finding 'holy shrines', ancestries 'worth boasting about', and the invocation of 'fallen heroes... to give Ciskei nationhood some sort of time-depth' (emphasis added).

In the absence of the availability of people to respond to something that had a basis in history 'Sebe chose an ideology of "Ciskeian nationalism", thus committing himself to the invention of a wholly novel and therefore bogus ethnicity' (Peires, 1987:22).

Buthelezi did not have the same extreme problems, for here a population was available, in the sense of having the degree of common vocabulary for the imagings to which they were called. When he became chief executive officer of the Zulu Territorial Authority (ZTA), the forerunner to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, he described the event in terms of regaining the power the 'Zulu nation' had lost through defeat by the British in the nineteenth century. His task was to restore 'pride' and 'Zulu national consciousness' through leading the ZTA (quoted Forsyth, 1989:52), a phrase that later became a reference to a 'Zulu renaissance'. There was no doubt in his mind that such an entity as the 'Zulu nation' existed - it needed to be revealed again. A reading of the early KwaZulu Legislative Assembly debates confirms that the participants - chiefs and other 'tribal authority' representatives - held the same overarching common-sensical idea of a 'nation', if not necessarily filling it with the same content.

Within 'the past' that is used to confirm a 'Zulu nation' the figure of Shaka looms large. Most of the relevant lineages, if not biological (Shaka's brother, Dingane, became king after Shaka's assassination) then political, are traced back to the 'founding father' of the Zulu ethnic group. This 'Shaka' (for it is the image in 'the past' that matters) displays all the attributes that had somehow survived the past 170 years to find expression either in king Goodwill, in Buthelezi, or in the 'nation'. This 'Shaka', of Buthelezi's ideological creation, that magnificent forefather of the Zulu nation, already saw the new South Africa as inevitable even while he was putting the Zulu Kingdom together. Before he died [in 1828] he had visions of aeroplanes flying in the air carrying people, and he sent emissaries to go to Cape Town with instructions to go to Britain to see what there was to see and learn, so that the Zulu Kingdom could incorporate the
I am not adding interpretations to historic events. I am telling it as it was. I trace my own ancestry back to the very founders of KwaZulu. From my mother's knee onwards I grew up being seeped [sic] in what it meant to be a Zulu and what Zuluness meant to a man and a woman (BS, 18 Jan 92).

Shaka features in this version, and in the many variations on the theme during Shaka Day speeches, not for historical accuracy or analysis, but for what it adds to Buthelezi and his project as ethnic mobiliser. Forsyth's study concludes that 'Buthelezi's appeals to a range of histories have been successful in political terms, not because of their inherent truth, but because of the skills which he has shown in suiting his historical discourses to his political purposes' (Forsyth, 1989:abstract). That is how ideology operates - by telling a story which provides a plausible explanation of what exists, what was, and what is desirable and possible (Therborn, 1980; and above). 'Inherent truth' may have little to do with it. What does matter is the receptivity of a population to these calls, the availability of people to be so mobilised. Availability does not imply passivity, but draws attention to the historical specificity and socio-economic conditions within which such a 'story' is told; availability should also alert us to the reflexive aspect of identity formation, where the self becomes a 'reflexive project' always in the process of construction and reconstruction (see Giddens, 1990; Campbell, 1992:41-3, 48; Campbell et al, 1993:4).

In Natal and KwaZulu large numbers of people have lived their lives as Zulus, even if there should be several contents given to the notion (see Sitas, 1988). As Forsyth wrote, the appeals and interpretations of 'Zuluness' have been successful precisely because they have used emotive appeals to the "nation" to appeal to a popular perception of Zulu ethnic identity which exists in Natal and KwaZulu' (1989:197).

The regional Zulu-speaking population has also, in many individual cases, lived a socially precarious and deprived existence where promises of material improvement (or even the means of survival) and social and individual worth as people have featured strongly in acceptance or rejection of mobilising calls - or, more accurately, of organisational calls as it is through membership of Inkatha that allegiance to the 'Zulu nation' was most directly measured. The initial positive appeal of the Inkatha movement was to people who accepted a self-definition of being 'Zulus', even if it existed as social identity and not in any mobilised form (as indicated above, you could be a 'passive' member of Inkatha). It was formed as a 'Zulu' movement. Much of the appeal was, therefore, to the consolidation of the 'Zulu nation'. For example, the first
Inkatha secretary general, professor Sibusiso ME Bengu, told a Labour Party conference at the end of 1977 that the Inkatha strategy was ‘to organize the Africans of Zulu origin into a cultural unit, regaining whatever had been lost of their traditional values’ (Star, 28 Dec 77). Jill Wentzel was told, in an interview with Inkatha’s dr Nyembezi, that what was said when recruiting people was ‘you have a fine leader in Buthelezi. You must support him. You must work for the Zulu first and then attract all for the good of the community’ (1977:7).

Buthelezi’s frequent references to his origins and legitimacy within a specifically Zulu tradition no doubt appeal to many people who have maintained links with the land and therefore, of necessity, with the system and ideological justification of chieftainship (an important part in the package of items that collectively constitute being ‘Zulu’). The appeal to a ‘Zulu tradition’ is accompanied by memories of the warrior qualities of ‘Zulu people’, and the history of resistance to British occupation of Natal and to Boer settlement of this part of South Africa (see below). The message is that this was a noble past that can be recalled, and striven for again, with pride. On a micro-level researchers recently found little evidence for such perceptions in the everyday-life stories of respondents. What was present was a strong awareness of what was lost in economic and social terms by leaving a rather idealised rural existence, as well as the loss of personalised customs, no longer possible, or performed with difficulty in the urban world (see Campbell et al, 1993).

Inkatha claimed total representation of what ‘Zulu’ was in the first number of years after its formation in 1975, and remained the sole party in the bantustan government. The only internal (to the KLA) opposition came from Inkatha members who stood as ‘independents’ having lost Inkatha nominations before the bantustan elections. The people who were and are mobilising Zulus are also the people who control pensions, land allocation, education, who signed work-seekers permits, approved bottle store licences, etc. It is not clear whether such politics of patronage persists in the still-evolving relationship between centre and province in the post-1994 South Africa.

There were, therefore, both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ aspects to acceptance of the specific version of an ethnic identity into which Buthelezi organises people, an identity that was given form in Inkatha. The former would be found in the pride, self-worth, solidarity, and discovery of recognition that an illustrious past and specific culture can offer (and that may lie within Inkatha but it may also reside within other mobilisations and social identities that have not taken organisational form); the latter came from an instrumental acceptance of such an identity, or the specific Inkatha-approved and articulated version, due to material and political pressures (sometimes extremely violent) applied to large sections of the regional population.
Authority, or what is a Zulu?

'Brothers born of warrior stock', is how king Goodwill Zwelithini spoke of Zulus when he addressed 'the Zulu nation and... all South Africans' in May 1991. This speech drew together many themes in the political mobilisation of 'Zulus'. It was not unique as there are clear patterns in the language and themes used by the speechwriter(s) for Inkatha leaders. The king placed himself 'aloof from politics' and 'above party politics'; conflated KwaZulu, his person, and 'my father's people' ('I am the Zulu nation'); and also linked the issue of 'cultural weapons' to probably the most frequent characteristic attributed to Zuluness:

The call to ban the bearing of cultural weapons by Zulus Is an insult to my manhood. It is an insult to the manhood of every Zulu man (GS, 26 May 91).

The idea of 'manhood' permeates the vision of what the essence of Zuluness is. That essence is tied to men, and then to men as warriors, men as leaders, men as primary bearers of the dominant aspects of what constitutes this ethnic identity, men as carrying the lineage from Shaka to Buthelezi. The lineage is, however, a male lineage where the role of women is acknowledged only as bearers of men. As Cherryl Walker put it, 'mothers are never mothers of mothers'. Women are placed within the warrior tradition, but then again as the bearers of warriors - women reproduce but are never themselves the product within 'the past':

We the mothers of this part of South Africa have in our inner beings, in our deep wisdom and in our very blood, the lessons that history has taught us. We are the mothers of a great warrior nation... (IBS, 20 May 90),

said Buthelezi's wife at a Mothers' Day celebration at Ulundl.

An essential element in this masculine and hierarchically-ordered view of 'Zuluness' is the institution of chiefship (central also to other aspects, as discussed above). In one of the many boilerplated phrases used in the Buthelezi speeches he spoke of the chiefs, including himself, as having a 'depth of commitment... to each other as Zulu brothers born out of Zulu warrior stock', a commitment that could not be understood by those who call for the disbanding of KwaZulu (BS, 13 Sep 90). In other words, the chief are not just administrative authority figures, or placed within 'tradition' - the aspects dealt with earlier - but 'brothers' (men) and warriors. Elsewhere he had referred to the chiefs as the pillars on which the 'Zulu nation' stands. The chiefs are also sanctioned by history: 'You the Zulu Amakhosi [chiefs] know that history lives on
through you', Buthelezi said (BS, 13 Sep 90). Buthelezi often refers to his own position as chief.

The KwaZulu Chiefs and Headmen Act (1974) made it clear that an important function of chiefs continued to be the maintenance of control. An analysis of the tenor of debates in the KLA supports this view. Buthelezi did not hesitate to use the Act against the rebellious chiefs Elphas Molefe and Mhabunzima Maphumulo, who led anti-Inkatha moves in the late-1970s. Chief Maphumulo was assassinated some time after he had joined the ANC-aligned Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA) in 1989. From Buthelezi's address to a meeting of KwaZulu chiefs in 1989 it was clear that he perceived this defection from the ranks of the pliant Zulu chiefs in a most serious light, and as an assault on the symbolic role of chiefs within the 'Zulu nation'. Buthelezi told the chiefs:

We have come to close ranks and to rejoice in our unity and to tell Chief Maphumulo to go to hell. We must do what needs to be done...

We have a duty to flush out anything that in any way undermines the unity and solidarity of our people (quoted Survey, 1989/90:510).

The theme of 'traitor' to the mobilised social identity, to ethnicity mobilised, posed a threat here even more so as the chiefs were perceived to be central to a 'tradition' of authority.

The Indaba constitution drawn up in 1988, and still referred to as reflecting an important perspective on regional government for Natal and KwaZulu as a unit, provided an important role for the chiefs - 'an indigenous African institution of the people. In KwaZulu the very basis of our administration' as Buthelezi described this anachronistic, inefficient and at times corrupt extension of the Inkatha movement in 1983 (see Maré and Hamilton, 1987:88-92; and above). The Indaba proposals made provision for a 'Council of Chiefs' (one of the envisaged 'Cultural Councils'), for 'tribal authority' to remain as a form of local government, and even for the existence of 'tribal police'.

In the mid-1990s the issue of the role of chiefs has again come to the fore, now in relation to their position within a democratic South Africa. Their position was referred to in the 'Constitutional Principles' (XIII) attached to the Interim Constitution which reads as follows:  

The institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to indigenous law, shall be recognised and applied by the courts, subject to the fundamental rights contained in the Constitution and to
In addition, as part of the agreement that ensured the IFP's participation in the April 1994 election, the following was added to constitutional principle XIII:

Provisions in a provincial constitution relating to the institution, role, authority and status of a traditional monarch shall be recognised and protected in the Constitution (Memorandum, 1994:addendum A).

It is noteworthy that this clause is not limited to KZN, probably to safeguard the ANC from accusations from the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA) that it had favoured one set of 'traditions' above many others (see Dikeni, 1995).

Chapter 11 of the Interim Constitution deals with 'Traditional Authorities' and provides a wide, if at times vague, range of interventions to them. These include the duty on each province 'in which there are traditional authorities and their communities' to establish 'a House of Traditional Leaders', and provides for a Council of traditional Leaders with advisory powers and the ability to delay legislation relevant to 'tradition' by 30 days (Bekker and Carpenter, 1994).

There are several implications of the acceptance of 'traditional authority' and of the contentious role of chiefs within the Interim Constitution and within the discourses of all political parties. I will draw attention to only two here (see Maré, 1992, for a fuller discussion of the implications of politically recognising 'traditional authority'). The first is the weight that has been given to, and the continuing struggle around, the role of chiefs within political ethnic mobilisation, especially within KZN; the second is the manner in which 'traditional authority' reinforces existing gender (and age) relations within ethnic identities and ethnic mobilisation.

While the Zulu king had been the central figure in ethnic mobilisation (see below) after the defeat of an independent political role for him during the 1970s, his post-election decision to cast his lot with an ANC-linked royal council seemed to have given Buthelezi's strategy a major blow. However, what Buthelezi did was to shift his and the IFP's focus to the chiefs (the amakhosi), the majority of whom still support their 'traditional premier'. This move, and the decisions by the chiefs, especially that of affirming Buthelezi's role as 'traditional prime minister' and leader of the constitutionally-approved provincial House of Traditional Leaders, have effectively left the king powerless - unless he does a most 'untraditional' thing and appeals to the
Supreme Court, thereby admitting his powerlessness. Buthelezi has not been prevented from using the notions of the 'Zulu kingdom', the institution of the 'Zulu monarchy', and 'tradition' by this rupture with the king. While the battle rages, literally and figuratively, around these anti-democratic elements with both the IFP and the ANC engaging in redefining the elements, aspects of the transition to democracy in South Africa are being held to ransom (see Maré, 1994; Maré and Hamilton, 1994). The struggle over Shaka Day celebrations (during 1994 and 1995) and who is entitled to call for such events was part of the competition over the symbols of Zulu mobilisation, and will continue to be so.

Accepting 'tradition' and 'traditional authority' not only affects democratic practice but also the position of women and gender relations generally. I argued earlier that ethnic identities and ethnic mobilisation is not gender neutral but is nearly always informed by gender relations of male domination. South Africa, and in this case 'Zuluness', is not exempt. The use made of 'tradition' within the negotiation process and the influence that not only the IFP, and Buthelezi and the king had, but also CONTRALES A and elements within the ANC itself, ensured that 'incompatibles' - 'gender equality and accommodating "tradition"' - were written into the interim Constitution (Walker, 1994).

One of the exceptions in this world of male and 'traditional' authority proved the general rule. In 1992 dr Sibongile Zungu won a Durban Supreme Court battle to become the first female Zulu chief. Her husband, the previous chief, had died in a car accident in 1989, after which relatives and male clan members started the battle to keep her out of the chiefship. This included trying to 'marry' her to her husband's brother, calling on 'traditional practices', to ensure that he became chief; and arguing that it was "entirely unknown among the Zulu people for a woman to be appointed as chief of a tribe" (Sunday Tribune, 5 Apr 92). Recently, in an address to Diakonia in Durban this medical doctor chief said that 'tribal councils and leaders should be recognised as legitimate local government structures'. She said that democratically-elected local government structures would not work in rural areas in their present form (Daily News, 1 Apr 95). She might be a woman chief, but she is also undoubtedly a 'traditional' chief.

The Inkatha Women's Brigade provides an important illustration of the role of women generally within Inkatha and within the 'Zulu nation'. Hassim, in various papers on the role of women and of the Brigade, noted that the appeal is directed at 'mothers', concerned about their children 'in the context of poverty, ignorance and disease'; their children and education; and their children in danger of being attracted into the ANC...
fold (Hassim, 1993). The Women's Brigade (WB), formed in 1977 and placed as 'one of the President's (Buthelezi's) own arms of activity' in 1980, confirmed women as 'homemakers'. As former WB chairperson Abbie Mchunu said in 1985, "there are special virtues God gave us as women in order to be effective home-managers and mothers i.e. patience, tenderness of heart and insight" (quoted Hassim, 1993). Hassim notes, however, that there was a population (women) available for this discourse:

"(T)he conservative discourse that emerges within Inkatha has not merely been imposed by men from above. It is a discourse produced out of a resonance of ideas of motherhood and family that are held by women themselves and which fit into their daily reality."

Such a position is not really surprising when the political role of the youth since 1976, and also in Natal, especially in the 1980s, is taken into account. Combined with extensive unemployment, the perception and creation of 'the youth' as a (privileged) political and social category, had shaken values and institutions such as family structures (see Campbell, 1992).

Hassim's point needs to remind us of the pertinent comment by Bowman (1994:141), already referred to, that it is not necessarily the interpellation that places the reader or listener 'within the subject positions they proffer', but rather that '(t)hrough identification with the position set out in such discourse, the reader is carried out of the isolation of individual experience into a collective phenomenon which the discourse articulates in national [ethnic] terms'. Bowman argues, as I have through employing the term 'availability' and drawing the distinction between social identity within 'individual subject positions', on the one hand, and on the other mobilised social identities, that 'there is already in play in the reader [and listener] an identity which enables him or her to recognize the appropriateness to personal experience of subject positions within a text' (1994:141). The vocabulary for imagining is already in place. Such an argument can go too far as well. At times interpellations are part of the ideological function, of 'socialisation', of creating rather than just presenting or calling upon subject positions.

Buthelezi's wife, Irene Thandekila Buthelezi, called on women to act to restore and maintain not only the values of family and parental authority but also to act to safeguard wider and youth-threatened administrative authority:

When bands of youth take it upon themselves to crush their local authorities, whether they be Amakhosi or township personnel, say no and say no in such a way that the youth are stopped (IBS, 20 May 90).
Such a call would resonate with the lived experiences of many older people in Natal and KwaZulu during the 1980s and 1990s. Implicit is the link between family and ‘political family’, the ethnic group with its generational hierarchy.

Other than the sanctioning of male-dominated gender relations, and a hierarchy of authority in which the chiefs stand appointed by tradition, there are many other elements explicit and implicit in the mobilisation of the Inkatha version of a Zulu ethnic group. These would include: obedience to the law; wisdom; bravery; patience, non-violence, and yet a fearful wrath if any of a number of insults are directed at KwaZulu, Zulus, the king, Buthelezi, etc; humanism; and an approach to life with not a ‘vestige of racism’. In a most fearsome speech in 1986 king Goodwill pulled together many of these attributes to draw a clear line around the boundaries of the Zulu ethnic group, as it was being mobilised behind the leadership of Buthelezi and himself:

Not only do Zulus have valour, not only are they indomitable and not only are they prudent, but Zulus have a quality superior to any of these, as great as these qualities are. The final strength of our Zulu nation has always been wisdom. It is wisdom that led our illustrious Kings and their warriors to conquer and to incorporate.

He then attacked the UDF, COSATU and the ANC for 'underming our national unity as a Zulu people', repeating the frequent theme of the 1980s of 'conquering to incorporate':

I command you to eliminate from your midst all those disgusting usurpers of our dignity without one shred of malice in your beings... Go out my people, conquer evil, but never lose your humanity and never degrade the humanity of those you conquer. Rout them out only to make them one of us. Thrash them, if necessary, only to purge them into becoming better Zulus (GS, 16 Jun 86).

Inkatha is ‘the nation’

The notion that a Zulu nation existed, and was being confirmed through restoring the past, through the leadership of Buthelezi, initially centred on the existence of the Zulu Territorial Authority (from 1970-72) and subsequently through the KLA. These were presented, as argued above, either as structures of apartheid that could be used to overthrow the system, or as having an existence as acknowledgement of the re-awakening of the Zulu nation, as the space within which the ethnic identity could achieve fulfilment.
From 1975, however, the idea of a pre-existing nation was given additional organised form in the Inkatha movement - the bantustan was too fragile a base from which to construct something like the nation. It does not mean, however, that KwaZulu was discarded as administrative and even ideological form for the nation; rather, it was provided with a back-up which came to overlap with the KLA in nearly all respects, as was discussed above.

Inkatha was first and foremost an example of politicised ethnicity. The symbols served to mobilise a 'constituency' (that favourite word of Chief Buthelezi) which found expression through branch and regional structures, women's and youth organisations, events, a variety of media, museums, styles of dress, education, etc (the aspects discussed earlier in this chapter), and in turn these symbols served to define the Zulu ethnic identity, that it at the same time supposedly simply reflected.

It is through 'Zuluness' that the constituency was primarily formed. The other side of the coin was that it was through membership of the organised constituency, Inkatha, that acceptance of 'Zuluness' was implied. Furthermore, these appeals for people to recognise themselves as 'Zulus' at times achieved their potency not only through the availability of the past, but also through the existence of an enemy, real or created, against which they were addressed. The 'other' helped, and still helps, to define 'us' as the 'Zulu nation' (see above; and Norval, 1992, 1994:120-1).

The three major characteristics of an ethnic group are exemplified by 'accepting' a Zulu identity (and, in this politicised version, by belonging to Inkatha). Cultural distinctiveness and a sense of an historical continuity are presented as inseparable (see the discussion of 'the past' above). The former owes its legitimacy to the latter; and the 'past' is expressed in the present through cultural events, artifacts, modes of behaviour, norms and memorials.

The 'past' is both of the movement, and also a more generalised notion of nationhood that originated in the time of Shaka in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. The movement's first constitution, therefore, claimed a continuity with the first Inkata under King Solomon in the 1920s, using it as a further stepping stone from the past to the present. The fact that a Zulu king's name could be linked to it reinforced the line being drawn.

The choice of the name, inkatha, furthermore, not only referred back to the first such movement in the 1920s, but drew on the symbolism implied. Mzala describes the choice thus (1988:117):
In choosing to revive Inkatha, Chief Buthelezi was exploiting a solemn symbol of unity in Zulu culture. Among the most sacred articles of the Zulu, of which the king was a custodian, is the *inkatha*, a sacred coil symbolising the unity of the people, the circular power of which is believed to be able to round up all traitors and disaffected subjects and join them together with the rest of the 'nation' in affection for the king.

This is how the *inkatha* was described as part of the mace of the KLA (Maré and Hamilton, 1987:229, also 227, appendix 1):

1. On top of the mace is a typical ZULU HUT, 'Indlu', to symbolize the birthplace of Zulu culture and custom and the close-knit Zulu family on which the whole Zulu social structure is built.
2. This hut stands firmly on the MYSTICAL COIL - 'Inkatha'. The grass in this mystical coil was plucked from the thatch at the doorways of all Zulu Chiefs' huts and is know to the Zulus as 'Inkatha yokusonga izwe'. This is to symbolize the coil's deep power to unite and keep firm all the different tribes of the Zulu people. Each of the 285 strands around the coil represents one of the tribes composing the Zulu nation.

It went further than that in rooting the organisation strongly if not totally in 'tradition' and in the region. Chiefs were not only to be central in recruitment for Inkatha, but also as another symbol in the continuity from the past (even though they lacked any real power in the movement). The importance of chiefs, furthermore, lay in the legitimacy that the past bestows on Buthelezi within the ethnic group. Their, the chiefs', 'traditional' role confirms his own 'traditional' role:

- I was the traditional Prime Minister to my first cousin, King Cyprian for 16 years, long before there was any KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (*Sunday Tribune*, 06 Nov 83);

and

- I do not owe my political power to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly or to Pretoria. King Shaka never owed his political eminence to any colonial power. The solidarity of the Zulu people was not dependent on white-created institutions when they defeated the might of the British Army (*Sunday Times*, 16 Jan 83).

The regular gatherings of the chiefs, under the leadership of Buthelezi as minister in charge of 'authority affairs' in the KwaZulu cabinet, also served as confirmatory events
of a Zulu past and an ethnic tradition, safeguarded only within Inkatha and under the leadership of Buthelezi. In 1990, for example, Buthelezi guided discussion by the chiefs through a 'Memorandum', in which he warned them that they were engaged in a war in which campaigns were being launched against them through the youth, and through CONTRALES. While this was a planning meeting it served as an occasion for Buthelezi to re-assure them of their future security and to confirm their role within the 'nation':

We must... begin this meeting with a new determination starting to burn within us. It is a determination that must see us leave this meeting later on with an anger that rejects the many bad developments in our areas of responsibility. It is a determination to now be more decisive in our actions to rid us of these bad developments. And it must be a determination that gives allegiance to our Zulu nation and all that our forefathers did to deliver this great nation to us and to history. It is a determination also to reaffirm our loyalty to our King (BS, 23 Mar 90).

All members of the 'Zulu nation' were seen by Buthelezi just after the formation of Inkatha, and much later by some of his lieutenants, as being members of Inkatha (above; and Klad 5, 1975:134). This encompassing certainty was maybe understandable in the early days of Inkatha's existence, in the absence of any clear opposition, both political and in terms of defining a Zulu ethnicity outside of Inkatha. The enemy, the 'other', was then most frequently represented as 'Indians', 'white liberals', 'Xhosas', and the central government. By the 1980s, however, in the presence of a growing internal, organised, alternative opposition to apartheid (the United Democratic Front was formed in 1983 and COSATU in 1985), the 'enemy within' also had to be exorcised. It was acknowledged that there were not only ethnic outsiders but traitors to the potentially inclusive imagined community of all Zulu-speakers as well.

Recently a first-hand account of the experience of 'traitor' (*imbuka*), was given by Duma kaNdlovu (1994), himself a Zulu whose father had grown up 'in the heart of Zululand', himself 'proud of my status as a full-fledged Zulu', until he left South Africa in 1977 to go into exile. He returned in the early-1990s, and through a set of circumstances came into contact with Zulu hostel dwellers. After one meeting he was told by Humphrey Ndlovu, an Inkatha leader:

'The problem with you, Gatsheni [kaNdlovu], is that you are an *imbuka*.'
An imbuka is a turncoat, a person who sides with outsiders, and in pre-colonial times was punished by death. For one Zulu to call another Zulu an imbuka is a little steep (1994:21).

This aspect of the changing ethnic mobilisation of Inkatha, of Zulu traitors to the ‘Zulu nation’, is important in examining the argument that violence within the region (Natal) proves that ethnicity plays no role in violence in the rest of South Africa because here we have ‘Zulus’ fighting ‘Zulus’, and that we can adequately fall back onto an explanation based exclusively on conflict between political parties (Inkatha and the ANC); the manipulation of black agents by and participation of a state-linked ‘third force’: that it is simply a struggle over resources; or the extremely racist terminology of ‘black-on-black’ violence. Of course some of these factors and several others play a role in a complex and full explanation. However, to dismiss ethnic conflict on this basis is to miss the obvious dimension to mobilisation into the Zulu ethnic group that allows for the many dissidents from the single, Inkatha-version of what it means to be Zulu, to be labelled ‘traitors’ (amambuka). Mobilised ethnicity, especially when under threat from alternative stories of everyday life, defines the boundaries ever more clearly and rigidly, thereby creating ever more dissidents.

King Goodwill made clear on several occasions during the past decade that these traitors existed (such as in the speech quoted above). The task was to bring them into the fold through a ‘Zulu rennaisance’ or through chastisement. King Goodwill claimed that ‘(w)e have always rooted out Zulus who turn against Zulus and in so doing we have kept our honour. It does not shame the whole nation when traitors emerge amongst us as a people’. The problem lies in allowing the traitors to ‘go about their hideous divisive work unchecked’. It is clear from this whole speech, delivered in 1986, that two evils had to be dealt with: the one was that of Zulus who did not accept the notion of ‘nationhood’ (or Zulu ethnicity) propagated by Inkatha, and who did not respect ‘my uncle, the Chief Minister’, or the KwaZulu Government; the other was the organisational onslaught ‘that comes from without to creep into our midst to do the hideous things that are now being done amongst you’. Against both these attacks Goodwill called on true ‘Zulus’ to revenge the insult against himself as symbol of ‘national (Zulu) unity’.

This speech, delivered on Soweto day, 16 June 1986, spelled out vividly that not only can there be no alternative organisations and ideologies within ‘Zuludom’, but unity in struggle lay through Inkatha (or through being ‘Zulu’, as Goodwill put it here) (see Maré and Hamilton, 1987:218-21, for an extended discussion of this idea).
In other words, closer examination of what has occurred in Natal and KwaZulu leaves us with a complexity that brings ethnic mobilisation back into foreground of the picture. As I have argued, the boundaries of an ethnic group are constantly changing, being reinforced, or signified by a new central strand, a new articulating principle, in the mix of elements that make up the public profile of that identity, even in mobilisation. This has been the case with the Afrikaner ethnic group, where the boundaries of language and religion became inadequate. The redefinition of an 'Afrikaner' identity (now often as 'Boer') depends in its extreme version on a new religion (that defines 'mud races' as not fully human), and a political myth of origin that is tied to a separate, rather than a dominant, political area - in various guises the old Boer Republics, the Volksstaat, etc. This redefinition is as much, if not more so, aimed at fellow 'Afrikaners' as at a wider population of more 'traditional' enemies. The same language as that expressed by king Goodwill - of traitors (verraaterts) and infiltrators - also characterises that of the Afrikaans-speaking far right as it seeks to mobilise a new Afrikaner identity.

Mobilising the past

Nationalism, unlike ethnicity, insists on political sovereignty within national boundaries (as in the case of ethnic nationalism). But territory can also be used to draw spatial boundaries around an ethnic group. Inkatha and the KwaZulu 'homeland' leadership have done this on many occasions, a few of which are examined below. Furthermore, symbolic events also serve to either reinforce and confirm ethnic boundaries and 'the past', and/or to invent traditions.

Once Buthelezi and Inkatha gained control over the bantustan as political and spatial construct, they tried to define it as having an existence beyond or alternate to that intended for it by apartheid. The alternative that was presented was as the home of the 'Zulu nation'. But in 1982, a threat to a large part of the new 'Zulu kingdom' was launched, ironically, by the National Party government. On 18 June 1982 proclamations in the Government Gazette did away with the Legislative Assembly in the KwaNgwane bantustan and removed the Ingwavuma district in northern KwaZulu from the administrative control of the KLA, in preparation for moves to hand over these land areas, and the people in them, to the Swaziland state. It caused a national and international outcry. Inkatha and the KLA took a central part in opposing the state moves and ultimately won several court decisions on the technicalities of the proposed handover, overturning the decision.
There was considerable speculation as to the reasons for the deal at the time. Here it is sufficient to note that landlocked Swaziland would have benefited from access to a potential port at Kosi Bay; while the National Party government would have shed responsibility for yet another ethnically-defined population, in the way that it had already done with several bantustans through giving ‘independence’, but in this case with an added international dimension as Swaziland was a full member of the ‘community of nations’. The government’s justification was, unsurprisingly, that it was ‘putting together what belonged together’. The deal would also have strengthened relations with a conservative partner, the Swazi government, in combating ANC infiltration through Swaziland.

An essential feature of the ‘land’ deal (actually a people deal) was the ethnic dimension, not only from the side of the government, but also from all others directly involved. Furthermore, appeals were made to historical claims of previous political allegiance and to tribute relationships during the nineteenth century to ‘prove’ that the deal should either proceed or be aborted. The people living in the Ingwavuma district are Thongs, who had paid tribute to Shaka briefly in the early-nineteenth century and later to Cetswayo. What is of greater interest though is the more recent history of ethnic fence jumping, especially by Thonga men, responding to a labour market that they believe is more receptive to the idea of employing Zulus. The core ideas of being Thonga, such as the language and status for women within the family, on the other hand, are maintained by Thonga women (see above, and Webster, 1991). There was no clear ethnic link between the people here and either KwaZulu or Swaziland.

Buthelezi and Inkatha were not interested in the relative fluidity of ethnic identities in the region, but in trying to show that even if these people were not ‘true Zulus’ then at least they had bowed to the ‘Zulu nation’ in the past, the ‘conquer to incorporate’ approach that featured often during the 1980s in Buthelezi’s and the king’s speeches. As proof of the Zulu presence Buthelezi said that king Dingane lay buried in the district ‘adding weight to the correctness of Zulu control’ from Ulundi. At the end of May, 1982, he announced that a tombstone would be built to Dingane ‘to emphasize the Zulu presence’ (DSG/SARS, 1982:10; KLAD 6, 1975:379). In familiar fashion Buthelezi told the press conference that he would ‘not be at all surprised’ if fighting between Zulus and Swazis broke out in mine compounds, townships and hostels in and near South African urban areas (Rand Daily Mail, 25 Jun 82).

He told the Inkatha conference of that year that ‘Zulus had the same right to exist as any other national group. It was
insulting to talk down to them when they were the largest national
group - bigger that the white group, the Swazis or the Sothos - even
though they did not want national sovereignty as spelled out by

What he had done was to extend the symbols of Zulu ethnicity, in this case through
king Dingane, to the territory of the Tembe-Thonga, thereby ideologically
incorporating the people living there.

The Inkatha movement said that membership jumped from 400 000 to 750 000 in
1982. Any increase could indeed have been due to the massive publicity that
Buthelezl, Inkatha, and the KLA received over the issue - most of it apparently
perceived as positive. The movement's image was given a boost with the successful
court action, which rested on crude doses of ethnic chauvinism. While the dispute was
in progress it also allowed Inkatha to deploy its Youth Brigade in the district of
Ingwavuma, and several accusations of intimidatory behaviour were made against
them by the population of this remote part of Natal.

Swazi's had previously served as 'the other' against whom Zulus had to guard. In
1975 Buthelezl was already suggesting that the border with Swaziland be patrolled by
'Zulus' trained by the South African Police (KLAD 6, 1975:577). In a revealing
comparison he referred to a Sotho-speaking group in KwaZulu (see above):

We are now placed in the same position as... when Chief Molefe held
out; you know, in other words refused to conform to the Bantu
Authorities Act and to become part and parcel of this Assembly
because he aligns himself with the Basotho Qwaqwa [bantustan] in
Witzieshoek (KLAD 6, 1975:380).

In addition to supporting ethnic appeals, the incorporation issue, furthermore,
allowed Buthelezl to engage in threats of violence, going so far as to say that 'if we had
guns we would resist with guns' (DSG/SARS, 1982:10).

Other examples could be presented of the extension of ethnically-defined territory by
Buthelezl, such as into the south of Natal where the competition for people and land
was with the Transkei, or into the north-eastern Orange Free State, with calls for
broadcasts by Radio Zulu and the provision of Zulu-language schools in the region.
Ulundi, the administrative capital of KwaZulu, was built with the specific symbolic
goal of re-establishing a geographical and ideological centre for the 'Zulu kingdom'.

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Within the heartland of KwaZulu monuments and historical sites serve to define territory, both physical and symbolic. At each stage it had been Buthelezi and Inkatha who 'captured' the sites and the symbolism. Resistance to Inkatha's appropriation has led to violence and death, such as at the University of Zululand in 1983 with the commemoration of the death of Cetshwayo - a clash between students who were not willing to let Inkatha on to the campus for this celebration and Buthelezi's insistence that he would not allow 'no-go' areas within his territory (see Maré and Hamilton, 1987:195-8).

As is to be expected within the 'warrior tradition' battle sites feature prominently in the commemorations of a 'Zulu' past. In 1981, for example, Buthelezi announced the intention of the newly-formed KwaZulu Monuments Foundation to restore no fewer than 74 historic battlefields (Sunday Times, 23 Aug 81).

At Ondini, near Ulundl the capital of KwaZulu, the royal residence of king Cetshwayo has been restored and a museum of Zulu culture constructed at a cost of R500 000. As Wright and Mazel noted (1991:59) in an article on museums in Natal and KwaZulu, '... history is not a set of facts about the past but, rather, a set of ideas about the past held in the present'. Museums, and other representations of the past are, therefore, important in the use of the past to create group boundaries. Museums play an important part in shaping perceptions of 'shared experiences' - the comments in the visitors' book at Ondini show clearly that perceptions of group identity for the Zulus are shared by members as well as by many outside observers.

Wright and Mazel wrote of the museums at Ulundl that they fulfil several functions: first, they 'assert the legitimacy of KwaZulu as a political entity', through portraying 'the KwaZulu polity as the "natural" successor state of the Zulu kingdom'; second, the museums and their displays 'assert the legitimacy of the present KwaZulu leadership', both the king (presented as the obvious successor in an unbroken line from Shaka), and Buthelezi, presented as a 'natural' leader of Zulus and through connections with the royal family (1991:67-68). The authors commented that the dominant message of the displays is of 'social discipline and order', to the exclusion of struggle and disunity within and over what was to constitute a Zulu identity.

The huts that had existed at the site where the museum is presently situated had been burnt down by British troops after the defeat of Cetshwayo in 1879. At the 1983 celebrations at Ondini during the 'Year of Cetshwayo' Buthelezi spoke of the growing 'Zulu unity of purpose' that was being 'exemplified through the growth of Inkatha' (Sunday Tribune, 21 Aug 83). The KwaZulu Monuments Council has also published
several books on aspects of the Zulu people during this period such as one on the battle of Ulundi and another on king Cetshwayo.

More recently Buthelezi cast the net to include 'Zulus' even wider, throughout southern Africa. In a Shaka Day speech in 1991 (BS, 21 Sep 91) he referred to various 'Zulu' thrusts that produced united peoples - Soshangane 'took with him some thousand Zulu warriors who also conquered where they went, and who also united wherever they conquered' in Mozambique. In the same way he traced the unifying thrust into Zimbabwe and Zambia:

All the Ndebele people [in Zimbabwe] know that they are one people with us. All the Shangane people [in Mozambique] know that they are one people with us. All the Angoni people [in Zambia] know that they are one people with us.

Reports have claimed that Inkatha delegations have ventured beyond the borders of South Africa to 'recruit' and establish links with 'Zulus' in southern African countries (see, for example, *New Nation*, 3 and 10 Apr 92).

There are many examples of the events that have been created to re-affirm a Zulu past and present identity: Shaka Day, the recently revived Reed Dance ceremonies, along with the creation of the Zulu Monuments Commission and the commemoration of such events as the battle of Isandlwana are but a few of these. As Patrick Wright wrote about the raising of the Mary Rose in Britain, 'There need... be no essential discontinuity between past and present as long as the ceremonies of re-enactment are carried out and respected' (1985:178). Paul Connerton noted that '(l)If there is such a thing as social memory,... , we are likely to find it in commemorative ceremonies...' (1989:4).

Already in the 1950s Buthelezi involved himself in these confirmatory events, when he offered to organise the first Shaka Day in September 1954. Forsyth commented that while the ANC had wanted to 'establish an historical continuity between the alleged ideals of Shaka and those of the ANC', Buthelezi benefited from the public recognition and the presentation 'as traditionalist whose support and allegiance lay with the Zulu King' (1989:22). Buthelezi was, of course, already a chief at this stage, in the mid-1950s. In 1971 the ZTA appealed to the South African government to declare a Shaka Day holiday in September - Buthelezi claimed that "all the tribes [in Natal and Zululand] were under Shaka's authority and nobody had any doubts that he was the founder of the Zulu nation" (quoted in Forsyth, 1989:56). In 1972 competition over organising of Shaka Day became part of the contest between Buthelezi and the king.
The KLA did, however, grant an amount of R9 000 to allow the king to stage Shaka Day 'as his late father Cyprian did in 1954' (KLAD 1, 1972:12).

In 1974 the KLA requested that committees be set up to organise Shaka Day celebrations but preferably not to ask for money - 'It is a measure of patriotism not to look to KwaZulu for funds' (KLAD 4, 1974:118). In 1975, however, it was announced that 'On 24.9.75 all and sundry in KwaZulu celebrated the King Shaka Day Public holiday for the first time, and celebrations at the main centres... were subsidized from public funds...' (KLAD 5, 1975:290).

By the 1980s the king had become a linchpin in the belligerent ethnic mobilisation that was taking place. Shaka Day speeches by Buthelezi in many cases introduced the king in glowing terms, to be followed in a smooth textual continuity by exhortations from king Goodwill Zwelithini that would appear to have been written by the same author, both expressing threats against traitors, both Zulu and non-Zulu (see examples above).

In 1994 the Shaka Day celebrations became part, once more, of the struggle between Buthelezi and the IFP, on the one hand, and the king and the ANC, on the other. The king refused Buthelezi or any of his 'traditionalist' opponents permission to organise the celebrations. The essence of the conflict was captured by the headline to an article on the events: 'Who's got the power? Shaka Day will tell' (Weekly Mail and Guardian, 23 Sep 94). Buthelezi used the occasion to tell the several thousand people present that there was no place for an executive king in the region (Sunday Times, 25 Sep 94), as he had done more than two decades earlier. Yet again the king's lack of power was demonstrated when the main meeting went ahead. The 'Reed Dance' ceremony, a few days before Shaka Day, at which Buthelezi had for years introduced the king, was held without Buthelezi's presence, but now with ANC-members accompanying the king (as it was again in 1995).

In October 1986 the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) TV service released a ten-part series called 'Shaka Zulu'. Public statements by people involved in mobilising Zulu ethnicity illustrated the sensitivity of certain aspects of the call to the 'Zulu nation'. Even before the release of 'Shaka Zulu' several pronouncements had been made. King Goodwill Zwelithini stated that the "founder of the Zulu nation" ("from his time on, the Zulu looked upon their nation with pride...") should be saved from a Eurocentric and white perspective and judged 'in the context of African history as recounted by his people' (Sunday Times, 12 Oct 86). In the Official Souvenir Brochure, produced by the SABC in glossy colour, the full statement by the king.
extracts from which were quoted in newspapers, was reproduced. The SABC wrote that ‘... King Goodwill not only gave Faure [the director] the go-ahead, but also bestowed upon the project the blessing of the Zulu royal house, as well as their full support and cooperation’. Buthelezi’s mother became musical advisor, until her death during the filming of the series.

Historians also joined the fray. Carolyn Hamilton wrote in the same newspaper that the ‘Great Man’ notion of history, propagated through the series and through Inkatha’s discourse, ‘is likely to produce passive actors in the present rather than active participants in the building of a new South Africa’. University of Natal historian John Wright said that ‘... if history has shown us anything, it is that politicians use history to further their own ends, and Chief Buthelezi is a politician not a historian’ (Natal Mercury, 30 Sep 86). He was commenting on Buthelezi’s Shaka Day speech of that year in which he described Shaka as in fact a ‘walking human miracle’.

In December 1986 John Wright and I wrote an article that was published in the Natal Sunday paper (Sunday Tribune, 7 Dec 86), under the title ‘The Spice of Coincidence’, dealing with the series as a political statement. We argued that ‘... conflicting interest groups constantly raid the past for justification of their specific policies and practices’, and that in this case the interests of the state, through the SABC, and Inkatha coincided. Buthelezi, through government-created institutions, had established himself as the ‘chief interpreter of “Zuluism”’. Both the SABC and Inkatha were propagating an ideology which underpins the authority of the present KwaZulu leadership on two counts.

First, it portrays the history of the Zulu kingdom as the history of the Zulu royal family. The common people in the film dance, sing, fight, ululate, and grovel in the dust before their leaders, but they do not emerge as having a history of their own.

Second, it portrays the Zulu kingdom as having been politically and socially united. There is nothing in it about the deep political divisions in Shaka’s conquest state between the new Zulu leadership and the chiefdoms it had subordinated.

In fact, Buthelezi and the king went out of their way in the years after that article was written to propagate the idea of ‘conquering to incorporate’, and the notion that unity was brought about in the past through conquest.
The overall effect of the series, we argued, was to reinforce the ideological argument that the Zulu royal house is the unquestioned "traditional" ruler of all "Zulu" people today... It also reinforces the ideological assertion that, but for a few troublemaking dissidents, all Zulu people today are united behind the KwaZulu leadership - this statement has also been borne out repeatedly since then.

Dr Oscar Dhlomo, then KwaZulu minister of education and Inkatha secretary general, responded with an inaccurate and ad hominem attack, offering no alternative information or analysis, except to deny our argument. Clearly the article had struck a very sensitive ideological nerve, questioning as it did some of the basic premises of Inkatha's argument about its legitimacy within ethnic mobilisation. This is the only way in which the repeated responses, in speeches, in the KLA, and in newspapers, to questions about the legitimacy of the ideological claims made by Buthelezi can be understood.

That sensitivity has also been manifest in the reaction by Buthelezi to the publication of a book by an intellectual within the ANC, operating with the pseudonym Mzala (1988). Buthelezi threatened distributors, and even libraries, in South Africa with legal action if they even stocked the book. Mzala set out to explain the 'political behaviour' of chief Buthelezi through 'an attentive survey of his political past, from the time of his incorporation into the institution of chieftaincy in 1953...' (1988:4). To determine what Buthelezi found offensive we need to undertake a similar 'attentive survey', not only of what Mzala wrote but also of the context. That context is the central role that Buthelezi occupies, largely self-created but reproduced extensively by others, within the myth of origin of the 'Zulu nation', and its existence since 1975 through and in the Inkatha movement.

If that role is undermined, the whole house comes tumbling down - at least as far as Buthelezi is concerned. It is not only that he self-consciously manipulates history (although that is also done - see below). He actually lives what he claims to be. The myth and the man (and hence the movement that he represents and personifies in an unmediated way) is one; a specific 'history' (or, more accurately, 'past') and Buthelezi is one. Deny the one (or the way in which he has been constructed) and the other is denied.

Buthelezi has always been most sensitive to claims that politically he was the creation of apartheid - or that, at least, he was tolerated by the apartheid state while many other opponents of apartheid were prosecuted and hounded, jailed or killed. The second claim is that he owes his prominent position as 'prime minister to the Zulu
king' not to apartheid but to his common lineage with the royal house and with previous such 'prime ministers'. He had no choice but to lead 'his' people. Furthermore, he was leading them within a territory that was consolidated by Shaka, the 'Zulu kingdom', the point dealt with in detail earlier.

It is the manner in which Mzala tackled these two central arguments, not as ideological constructions but as factually inaccurate (against another version, Mzala's, that is 'correct'), that is the reason why this book threatened Buthelezi's political persona and became the object of his legally-mediated ire.

Mzala's book, *Gatsha Buthelezi: chief with a double agenda*, is more about the man than about the movement that he leads. A few chapters do deal with the wider issues, but most of the book is directed at what Buthelezi makes of himself. In the introduction Mzala gives us a few clues as to why the book elicited such a strong response: he refers to resistance to Bantu Authorities, and that it was

... not automatic that Gatsha should become chief of the Buthelezis...

Shepstone laid the foundations of the role of chiefs in the present-day bantustan policy, almost a hundred years before the National Party came into power and passed the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951...

Those chiefs who refused to co-operate with Shepstone's administrative hierarchy were simply deposed and new ones appointed from the same tribe. This he did skilfully, selecting from the ranks of the traditional chiefs themselves or their half-brothers, exploiting the existing rivalry for positions among them (1988:27).

Mzala traces the various incorporations of chiefs into colonial, Union and apartheid administrations. He continues his onslaught, not against Buthelezi as such (at least not directly), but against the institutionalisation of chieftainship - separating the good traditionalists from the bad:

From 1927 onwards, no chief who held political views contrary to those of the government was confirmed in his position as 'chief' by the Governor-General, irrespective of his hereditary right by African custom (1988:42).

The author then enters into one of the areas where his analysis wanders into the realm of justification. This occurs when he explains ANC participation in the Natives Representative Council (NRC), created in 1936. He does this on the basis that the question of whether the NRC 'could be used as an instrument of struggle against the government' could be answered not in the 'abstract but in practice'. How does he then
deal with Buthelezi's answer to the same dilemma some years later? He argues (1988:46) that the tactics employed in 1936 cannot be transferred to a later context (leaving himself open to similar accusations of ahistorical 'traditions'); and that the bantustans confirmed the exclusion of Africans from central power (as though the 1936 legislation providing for advisory functions only did not do the same thing); and that the NRC legislation 'at least... recognised the single nationality of the African people' (1988:50). But the point he is making is clear - there is a 'politically correct' way of doing things, and then there is the Buthelezi way.

However, it is not my purpose to take issue here with Mzala's analysis, interpretation and justification. More to the point is that he said that only government-approved chiefs were to be allowed to run the bantustans. Mzala denied that any 'genuine leader supported the Bantu Authorities Act' (1988:51), removing from Buthelezi the approval he claims from such people as chief Albert Luthuli and Nelson Mandela; and that 'all chiefs who valued honour' were expected to follow Luthuli in refusing to be 'a servant of the racist government' (1988:56). He seriously questioned Buthelezi's opposition to the imposition of tribal authorities under the 1951 and 1959 Acts. Instead he argued that there was a long period of participation, albeit under pressure from the state at specific moments, both in fighting for his own chiefship and in proving his worth to the government.

It is chapter six, however, that strikes at the essence of Buthelezi's symbolic underpinnings: Mzala questions his claim to the title of 'mntuwana' (or prince) - he was not the son of a king; to the role of 'premier' - as it was not an 'hereditary title' as Buthelezi claims; and he accuses Buthelezi of being silent about the role his great-grandfather Mnyamana played - 'he betrayed Dinizulu (sic)' (1988:105); Mzala claims that the founder of the 'Buthelezi tribe' was a Sotho herbalist; and, finally, he argues that through placing himself effectively above the king, Buthelezi inverted Zulu history, and that this state of affairs had been made possible through the untraditional powers conferred by the state through the bantustan system (1988:113).

Mzala, himself a Zulu, argued - oddly for a member of the ANC and SACP - for an untainted tradition of Zuluness, while at the same time he struck at the core of Buthelezi's mobilisation of politicised Zulu ethnicity. His book and the arguments it contained served to undermine Buthelezi's version of 'the past' as well as his role as symbolic centre. It did, however, operate within the same terrain as that chosen by Buthelezi - therein lies its strength and its weakness.
Control through ideas and through force

The 1970s and 1980s witnessed massive social dislocation and collapse in the province and, especially, in the bantustan, brought on by the ravages of apartheid and a changing economy (especially in agriculture with the abolition of the labour-tenancy system which caused large-scale misery in Natal). The assault on the structures of apartheid through popular resistance did not spare Inkatha. The movement responded by taking control of as many areas of social life as possible, a process already begun in the late-1970s. Such a strategy was not only reactive, but also part of Inkatha's proactive strategy of changing the 'system from within'. It called the areas which it controlled under the apartheid system 'liberated zones', and attempted to impose and create hegemony (in both senses of the word: leadership with consent, and domination over subjects) under the banner of 'Zuluness' within these areas. The various terrains that it conquered clearly illustrate the use being made of Inkatha's 'Zulu traditions' in the struggle for political power. Two of these involved education and police, respectively.

The educational arena is very powerful in socialising individuals into specific identities, as discussed. In the South African context, however, African pupils had shown great scepticism about the education provided for them and, especially since 1976, rejected Bantu Education (apartheid education) with such vigour that schooling came to a halt for many hundreds of thousands of pupils. Bantu Education could not fulfil any of the tasks that it set itself: it did not train pupils for (inferior) employment (partly because unemployment was growing during the 1970s); it did not socialise them into a broad acceptance of the justness of the society in which they were to live (where 'nations' were to find the political kingdom in 'homelands'); nor get them to accept moral and institutional discipline as correct and desirable.

When the KLA was granted phase two self-governing status in 1977 it set about 'abolishing Bantu Education' (a claim it made in 1978), and then introduced what Inkatha spokespersons themselves called the 'Inkatha syllabus'. It was only later that the KwaZulu politicians became more sensitive to the implications of this name, as protest mounted at what was, correctly, seen to be party-political propaganda. The syllabus was geared not only to pass on information, historical and civic, but also to interpellate the pupils into a specific belonging to the Zulu ethnic group and accepting norms and values desirable to 'being Zulu' and approved of by Inkatha. Respect, acceptance of authority (of various kinds), and discipline were central aspects of the syllabus.
An hour-long weekly period was to be devoted to the teaching of the syllabus and, while not examinable, it was to be enforced through regular reports by the teachers to school inspectors (for background to the introduction of the syllabus, see Maré, 1988:9). The teaching material made available to teachers of 'Inkatha' consisted of 'documents like the constitution, various pamphlets on the aims and philosophy of Inkatha, presidential addresses, and so on', said education minister and Inkatha secretary general, Oscar Dhlomo (KLAD 16, 1979:348). The Inkatha Syllabus Committee said that they were informed, in drawing up the syllabus, by the problem that many adults seem to hold divergent views and beliefs about Inkatha for various reasons. These are passed on to the youth and cloud the youths' minds. It is thus hoped that this syllabus together with its guide will clear many doubts and thus create unified ideas to match with the goals of Inkatha (Inkatha Syllabus Committee, 1978:2, emphasis added).

What were those 'united ideas', Bourdieu's 'controlled consensus' (1990:82)? Mdluli (1987) (a pseudonym for then University of Natal academic dr Blade Nzimande), in his analysis of the Zulu texts written to guide the teachers, focused on some of the core ideas. He pointed to the central position allocated to Buthelezi, not merely as chief minister, but as 'political leader of the Zulu'. 'Ukuhlonphpha' (respect) is, he argued, the central theme of the syllabus. In summary, ukuhlonphpha 'sanctions superiority based on sex, age and social position and reproduces the whole set of authoritarian and hierarchical relations found in Zulu society'. Respect of youth for elders, of women for men (in the words of the syllabus, 'The woman knows that she is not equal to her husband'), of respect for all authority figures, and respect for the law, are all aspects of ukuhlonphpha that are stressed.

On the concept of 'the nation' that Mdluli found in the syllabus, he comments that the 'Ubuntu-botho (humanism) syllabus makes it very clear that Inkatha's aim is not to destroy Zulu nationalism in the struggle against apartheid, but it is to mobilise this nationalism as a launching base' (1987:70). In fact, the syllabus based its presentation on the premise that the building-blocks of South African society are ethnic groups - as was the case with the central government's apartheid policy. This educational mobilisation coincided with the regional consolidation strategy that the movement was undertaking, and personified the struggle for liberation in the figure of Buthelezi.

Mdluli (1987) concluded that the syllabus strengthened the 'three ideological pillars' of Inkatha's appeal in the region, namely 'the tradition of Shaka and other "great" Zulu kings' which is continued in Inkatha; Inkatha 'as the continuation of the early ANC'; and Inkatha as the 'embodiment of Zulu cultural traditions and values' ('UbuZulu' or 'Zuluness').
Natal had initially been relatively isolated from the turmoil in schools that started in Soweto in 1976. It was attributed by Inkatha leaders themselves and by outside commentators to the existence of the Inkatha movement. Buthelezi told a rally in Umlazi in 1977 that ‘(o)ur Zulu youth has shown consistent responsibility. They did not burn down our schools which we built ourselves and by which we raise ourselves’ (quoted Maré and Hamilton, 1987:185). Minister Oscar Dhlomo boasted in 1979 that ‘I haven’t found any evidence of unrest relating to political factors’ in KwaZulu schools. He claimed that this was the case because Bantu Education had been abolished in KwaZulu.

The central government acknowledged the role that Inkatha was playing in controlling school-based resistance against apartheid by allowing KwaZulu educational personnel to become Inkatha members from as early as 1976. In 1977 a circular from the Department of Education and Training told circuit inspectors to allow principals to hold Inkatha Youth Brigade meetings in schools, which Buthelezi said was because the movement had kept unrest out of the region (see Maré and Hamilton, 1987:183).

The need for discipline, specifically through the Inkatha movement, was repeatedly linked to an ethnic identity, both in the syllabus and in public pronouncements. In 1980 Buthelezi warned:

Inkatha as such has proved beyond any doubt to be the best instrument to sort out the problems of discipline and also the problem of lack of patriotism... (T)he reason why that [schools unrest] has in fact not taken off came about as a result of this discipline which Inkatha merely strengthens. In this region King Shaka was the first person to make us a disciplined people, and through the various traumas we have encountered as a people and where we have been split apart, I think Inkatha has been that instrument which sought to re-establish that discipline on which our nation operated at that time (KLAD 18, 1980:356).

Shortly after this warning, and after Buthelezi expressed understanding of the plight of boycotting coloured and Indian scholars, a well-supported boycott took place in the KwaZulu-controlled KwaMashu township. Initially Buthelezi took refuge in the scapegoating of non-Zulus and blamed ‘Xhosa’ lawyers, ‘foreign representatives’, and so on (Maré and Hamilton, 1987:185). He also claimed that the boycotts had been designed to ‘denigrate’ him personally, frequently presented as a wrong to be avenged.
Buthelezi threatened extreme violence, which did occur, now that the discipline of the educational system itself was shown to be illusory. In their experience pupils found the KwaZulu education to be little different from the old Bantu Education. Buthelezi claimed that there was a ‘total onslaught’ against Inkatha. He warned that once the ‘political riff-raff’ had been identified “We will shake them and drive them out of our midst, and if they are not careful they may find that they run risks in what they do, one of which may be having their skulls cracked, as none of us can predict what form the anger they raise takes” (quoted Maré and Hamilton, 1987:186).

This early case of the disciplinary powers of Inkatha - mass meetings were called and marching bands of Inkatha supporters assaulted adults and pupils - gave warning of the violence that was to accompany regional consolidation (ethnic and administrative) during the rest of the 1980s. Along with the other attempts to channel youth activity and anger, such as through the Youth Service Corps and the Youth Brigade (see above), the educational system was used to reach the whole school-going population of KwaZulu.

It was not only on the ideological level, through the educational system, that Inkatha tried to ensure control. The movement, through the KLA, also established a regional police force. Control through education operated at more than the level of ideas, as illustrated in KwaMashu in 1980. Similarly, the police was not only there to enforce control, but was also placed within the ideology of Zulu mobilisation. The formation of the KwaZulu police put Inkatha’s warrior tradition in uniform. The movement had maintained a distance, at least overtly, from the SA Defence Force for many years during the 1970s, but had not hesitated to demand and accept its ‘own’ police force for KwaZulu. In 1975 the KLA requested that the central government be asked to hand over police power to the bantustan. Before that could happen the bantustan needed greater powers than those that KwaZulu had at the time. In 1978, when these powers were granted, Jeffrey Mteawa, KwaZulu minister of justice, said that the KLA ‘... not only aimed at taking over the police but would also ask Pretoria to give military training to tribal regiments’ (Natal Mercury, 12 May 78).

This statement brings together the two most prominent aspects in Inkatha’s direct and indirect organs of control (ie, police and ‘tribal regiments’). Chiefs, too, serve within a broad ‘law and order’ front. In 1974, for example, the KLA passed its own Zulu Chiefs and Headmen Act, repeating in many details the segregation and apartheid governments’ Native Administration Act and its amendments. The KwaZulu Act stipulated that a chief or headman ‘shall be entitled... to the loyalty, respect, support and obedience of every resident of the area for which he has been appointed’. It placed
chiefs and their assistants as local representatives of the KwaZulu government in law and order enforcement, unrest, prevention of the distribution of 'undesirable literature', and the prevention of 'unauthorised entry of any person into his area' (Maré, 1982a).

After 1980 the police in many districts came under KLA control, while the establishment of a 'security section' and camouflaged 'riot police' were envisaged from early on. What is of relevance here, however, is the use made of tradition in the policing of the African inhabitants of KwaZulu and Natal (Maré, 1989). In the establishment of a police force mention was made of the schools unrest in KwaMashu. It was not often that Buthelezi acknowledged the existence and operation of 'Zulu regiments' or 'amabutho'. In 1980, however, he was driven to do so in reaction to a newspaper report on the operation of 'mobs' during the KwaMashu schools boycotts. Buthelezi justified the presence of regiments (the 'mobs' referred to in the press reports) and the sticks they carried as 'part and parcel of the Zulu national grouping, and the formation of regiments, . . . is part and parcel of Zulu tradition'. He said that the king had regiments as did several of the chiefs (KLAD 19, 1980:462). 'Regiments', he added, 'always march around and they also do some chanting at the same time. That is how they operate'.

Buthelezi told the KLA that a police force was needed in the same way that a Zulu man was naked without a fighting stick. '[I]f it came to the push we would clean them up before breakfast', he said of 'any pipsqueak' who spoke against the Zulus (KLAD 19, 1980:411-7). A member of the KLA suggested that to make 'every Zulu... a policeman of sorts is part of our effort of ensuring law and order in the country. That is our traditional way of policing the country...' (KLAD 20, 1980:763).

Buthelezi, who was also KwaZulu minister of police, called the KwaZulu Police 'my first bastion of defence against anything and everybody that mounts threats against the democracy which alone can set us free'. He addressed them as follows:

You now belong to the KwaZulu Police Force and I want you to infuse into our Police Force the sterling character and the great courage which has made the Zulu nation one of the great nations of the world. Right from the beginning of time for KwaZulu, we distinguished ourselves as human beings, powerful as warriors and wise as philosophers with an Ubuntu-Botho [humanism] approach to human problems... (T)here is a vast strength of Zuluness in the society around you, strengthening you and supporting you (BS, 21 Jan 87).
An examination of the discourses employed around education, as well as policing (of which a few examples have been presented), shows clearly how both relate to ethnicity as exemplified in Inkatha, and how the two aspects interact - if education falls in establishing the 'unified ideas' then the police are there to ensure that 'traitors' do not threaten the political existence of Inkatha, the vehicle for those ideas. Such a threat was perceived in the working class which provided the potential for organising a stratum of society that cuts across both politicised ethnic and racialised organisations.

**Disciplining the Working class**

In a survey of union members undertaken by Eddie Webster in 1975, only 19% named Buthelezl as a leader 'present or past' who could 'improve the position of African workers (Albert Luthuli, Natal-based president of the ANC before its banning, obtained 44% and Nelson Mandela, jailed ANC leader, 10%). However, Webster noted that 87% saw Buthelezl 'as their leader' (Webster, 1987:29). It is not clear to what extent this reflected an acceptance of a specifically 'Zulu' political context, on the one hand, in comparison with past leaders who could help workers, on the other (and then it is not clear why Luthuli was perceived by so many to have been able to advance worker interests). Was it an acknowledgement that the only avenue for open politics, without intense harassment, was bantustan political activity? It must also be noted that Buthelezl was perceived at the time by a large range of influential actors as a trouble-maker - local capital, the state, and conservative trade unions all accused him of radicalism. No doubt this, along with the support he then received from the ANC's exiled leadership, would have affected his standing as a symbol of resistance to the apartheid regime.

Two years before the survey was undertaken workers, living in migrant hostels in Durban, had called in the Zulu king to mediate on their behalf with management at the Corobrick plant at one of the first strikes in the wave of industrial unrest that occurred in Natal in 1973. Buthelezl and his KwaZulu government benefited from the petty-bourgeois radicalism of then KwaZulu councillor for community development, Barney Dladla, who became somewhat of a firebrand in the labour field. Dladla was soon afterwards to be axed by Buthelezl for opposing his economic plans for the advancement of certain trading interests and for the support base he (Dladla) was consolidating in the working class in the region. As was to be the case with the first secretary general of Inkatha, SME Bengu, who had benefited from the post-1976 youth radicalism, Buthelezl could not afford social power bases that lay beyond the ostensibly non-class and ethnic politics he was engaged in, and that threatened his centrality in KwaZulu and then Inkatha.
While Buthelezi remained consistent in his support for the legal recognition of trade unions for African workers, Inkatha simultaneously brought the conservative influence of the ideology of 'Zuluness' into the field of labour. It was not that much of a problem while the unions in the region were struggling to survive after a union revival following the 1973 strikes (see Friedman, 1987). The unions were weak and concentrated on factory-floor strength in the 1970s rather than on political opposition to the state. In addition they had a regional base in Natal which demanded sensitivity to the powerful politics of Inkatha, and to its successful mobilisation of Zulus-speaking people. It was argued from within the unions that workers could be members of both organisations as they catered for different spheres of life. On two fronts, therefore, the unions were avoiding confrontation, a position respected by both sides.

This stand-off was to change drastically with the political direction followed by Inkatha in the 1980s, and also with developments within the union movement itself. Inkatha had held the dream that unions would in fact join the movement (constitutional provision was made for such an eventuality, even if the envisaged representation was minor), but the relationship became one of deep suspicion, as was the case with all mobilisation that fell outside of Inkatha's control, on the one side, and all politics that was perceived to be part of 'the system', from the other. From the end of the 1970s Inkatha leaders were hinting at moving into the labour field, but then into a labour field perceived in terms of essential harmony between capital and labour - hardly surprising when Inkatha had already invested heavily in the growth of trading and other enterprises as a movement, and when it offered compliant labour to international investors (see Maré and Hamilton, 1987:chapter 6).

Analysts have argued that an uneasy coexistence between Inkatha and the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) could exist, with each organisation stating that dual membership was possible (Morris, 1986; Maré and Hamilton, 1987). FOSATU was formed in 1979, with only about 20 000 paid-up members, and included a block of unions from Natal which had been organised under the umbrella of the Trade Union Advisory Coordinating Council (see, for example, Baskin, 1991). However, with the formation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in 1985 the possibility of dual allegiances disappeared. FOSATU was absorbed into the newly-formed Congress.

Inkatha had never been able to get any respectable union to affiliate to it and with the COSATU launch, at the end of 1985, the possibility disappeared. It moved ahead with its own plans to establish a union, the United Workers Union of SA. UWUSA was launched on May Day 1986 at the same venue that COSATU had chosen six months
earlier (Survey, 1986 (vol 2):242-3). With a great deal of show Buthelezi landed in a helicopter in the rugby stadium, while supporters carried a coffin with the name of the COSATU president written on it. Buthelezi defined UWUSA as being in opposition to the ANC and COSATU. It set choices of exclusive allegiance before the regional working class when it defined COSATU into the then-banned ANC camp. The same exclusivity had not informed COSATU, with some workers living in the violence-wrecked hostels (Inkatha strongholds on the east Rand in what is now Gauteng) admitting to dual membership and support - COSATU for their needs as workers and Inkatha as representation of their ethnic identities. What is noteworthy is that any workers would have dared entertain dual allegiance in such a violently polarised situation as pertained on the Witwatersrand in the early-1990s, no matter how briefly until such dual allegiance became divided loyalties (see Segal, 1991).

Here I will refer to only three examples of the manner in which Inkatha has brought ethnicity into the labour field - two from mining and the third from agriculture. In the field of labour recruitment ‘Zulu tradition’ continued to play a role, as it did in the 1910s (see Marks, 1986:33-34) and 1920s (see Cope, 1986:322, 1993:209). Buthelezi maintained a close relationship with the mining industry in South Africa during the last quarter of the twentieth century. His dealings, because the major mines are mainly situated in the Transvaal and Orange Free State (except for coal in Natal), had largely been through the recruiting organisation of the Chamber of Mines, The Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA). In November 1981 Buthelezi ‘dedicated’ the new administrative building of TEBA in Ulundi. The need to recruit mine labour locally, i.e. in South Africa, had been forced on the industry by a number of factors, including the liberation of Mozambique. In 1974 only 22% of the mines' labour force came from South Africa, while by 1981 a full 60% were recruited within the country (see, for example, James, 1992:53; Crush et al, 1991:127-9). Labour was also becoming available through growing unemployment within South Africa (Crush et al, 1991:130).

It is noticeable that a larger proportion of Zulu workers on the mines than any other ethnic group had previously been employed in agriculture, probably due to the phasing out of the labour-tenancy system that had predominated in Natal (Crush et al, 1991:130). Wilmot James noted that '(t)he 1980s, the homeland of KwaZulunatal was the third most important area of expansion for recruiting agencies... In the 1980s,..., social conditions... favoured expansion of recruiting' (1992:65). By 1989 the region was supplying close to 40 000 workers to the gold mines, nearly double what it had been in 1985 (James, 1992:65).
Buthelezl, in his support for mine recruitment, felt that both skills and 'the discipline of labour' were being transferred, and reminisced about a personal visit to a mine:

'I have thought of it, that such work situations with their heavy demands on discipline and endurance are a far better training ground than any of the so-called guerilla camps outside the country, in making us men among men' (quoted in Gordon, 1982:30).

Gordon's article is entitled 'The people of heaven: a warrior race enters the industrial environment'. Both the title and the selected quotation serve as forthright statements on the masculine 'world of work'. Cherryl Walker's excellent article on 'Gender and the migrant labour system' illustrates 'the past' of this particular perception, in the form that it has taken in southern Africa (1990). She showed how the pre-capitalist 'organisation of gender' (based on the authority of men and male 'traditional authority') articulated with colonial and Union of South African capitalist and state perceptions and demands. This commonality of interests confined the debate to 'who should control the women - chiefs, the state, or husbands' (1990:181).

The (1982) article by Dennis Gordon on the recruitment of Zulu-speakers for the mines, in the Chamber of Mines journal Mining Survey, offers further fascinating glimpses into the manner in which ethnicity was used as late as the 1980s to attract labour. Buthelezl was described as 'Chief Minister of the partially self-governing state of KwaZulu... also a Prince of the Zulu Royal Family, leader of the Inkatha movement... and one of Africa's most influential voices'. Bill Larkan, district manager of TEBA, was described as having a 'deep commitment to the Zulu nation', sharing a Christian commitment with chief Buthelezl and even being called upon to open a KwaZulu cabinet meeting with prayer; Trevor Nel, in charge of TEBA operations south of the Thukela, 'believes that the traditional discipline to which rural Zulus are still subjected through the tribal structure of chiefs and headmen fits men for work on the Mines'; while TEBA's Nongoma representative 'appeals to the highly-developed Zulu sense of humour by broadcasting facetious remarks as he travels the seasonally dusty or muddy roads' (Gordon, 1982). In 1982 TEBA announced that it was to sponsor a newspaper for 70 000 KwaZulu schoolchildren.

In 1987 the longest mining strike in South Africa's history, involving the largest number of workers (about 250 000), took place over wage demands (eg Survey, 1987/88:678). Thirty-three of the 99 coal and gold mines were involved and some 50 000 workers were dismissed. Two weeks before the strike was settled, on 13 August, Buthelezl addressed the 'TEBA 75th Anniversary Gala Dinner' (BS, 13 Aug 87). He praised TEBA for looking after miners and being 'a friend of my people.
because it is the recruiting agency which takes people from their homes to the mines where they can do that which their wisdom tells them they should do'. He also warned against '(t)hose in the labour movements who use trade unionism for political purposes...'. This warning came a year after Inkatha had formed its own union (UWUSA), which was subsequently shown to have been funded by the Security Police (Maré, 1991a).

The second mining example involves the king who, in 1986, had been brought into the fray to counter the organising success of the National Union of Mineworkers, a COSATU affiliate, in what was considered to be the heartland of the new 'Zulu kingdom', namely northern Natal and Zululand. The king had by now become an effective extension of the project of regional ethnic mobilisation, a far cry from the time in 1973 when he was reprimanded by Buthelezi for taking up hostel-dwelling migrant workers' grievances. Goodwill addressed a gathering that included mine managers, a South African cabinet minister, and chiefs and their councillors. The occasion was the opening of Zululand Anthracite Colliery. He claimed, as usual, to 'rise above politics' and then sharply criticised National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and COSATU officials for undermining the 'free enterprise system'. He then warned some miners who made 'a habit' of insulting Buthelezi that they should desist. King Goodwill appealed to the same social identity as Buthelezi did in his address to KwaZulu Police in early-1987, when he reminded colliery workers:

We come from a warrior race and we know that true power gives gentleness to those who have it where gentleness is demanded... It is my hope that people who work in this colliery will conduct themselves with dignity... We do not discriminate against other Blacks who come to work here because KwaZulu is part of South Africa. They are our brothers. But they must behave themselves and respect Black leadership of this region (GS, 23 May 86).

A few days after the king's speech NUM members at Hlobane Colliery in the area who had been on strike over management action against the union were attacked by UWUSA members, supported by mine management and allegedly also by an outside group of Inkatha supporters. At least 11 people died during the violence and many were injured.

The third example involves farmers and Inkatha. A phrase that Hemson used in his 1979 study of dockworkers in Durban to describe the manner in which management tried to control these migrant workers could as easily be applied to what happened in the Ngotshe district of northern Natal:
Only in the more distant reserves did chiefly authority and the command of indunas carry any social weight. Employers hoped to carry this ideological baggage over to the workplace under the immediate direction of management (1979:419).

It was in the agricultural district of Ngotshe that Inkatha most clearly brought in its tradition of control through ethnicity. In August 1986 the Ngotshe Cooperation Agreement was signed between some farmers in the Ngotshe district in northern Natal, and Inkatha - on behalf of agricultural workers and African 'squatters' on white-owned farms in the district. The agreement allowed Inkatha unprecedented access to farm workers, notoriously inaccessible to union organisers; it also reintroduced chiefs who had been evicted from white-owned land, to 'restore the disciplinary structures of the Zulu hierarchy in our district', as Tjaart van Rensburg, chairperson of the Ngotshe Cooperation Committee, told king Goodwill Zwelithini (quoted in Maré and Hamilton, 1987a).

The Ngotshe district had several problems to deal with in the mid-1980s: it was situated on the border with Swaziland and it was perceived as one of the transit routes for ANC guerrillas from Mozambique; a number of 'labour farms' exist in the district, owned by absentee landlords and inhabited by seasonal workers (Van Rensburg told the Farmer's Weekly (10 Mar 86) that such labour farms were 'units with no discipline' and that 'the intention of the agreement is to repair the disciplinary structure'); chiefs had previously been evicted from the area, probably because farmers could not then, under less threatening conditions, countenance 'dual authority' - their own arising from ownership of land, and that of 'tradition' of the chiefs; and white farmers felt threatened by the moves by COSATU to organise farm workers (moves that have continued to prove more of a threat than an actuality). Amongst a range of objectives, such as development, improving education, and guaranteeing security for farm workers and labour-farm occupants, 'safeguarding the traditional Zulu way of life' also featured. The king, who attended the signing ceremony and who was centrally involved in launching the agreement, spoke of the unity of the two largest 'ethnic groups' (Afrikaners and Zulus) in the country. The parallels with the 1920s and 1930s are worth pointing to again (see, for example, Cope, 1993:205-12).

In meetings prior to the agreement Van Rensburg told the king, in relation to the evicted chiefs, that 'it is our sincere wish to restore the disciplinary structures of the Zulu hierarchy in our district...'; and later he said that 'our aim is now to return the chiefs to their original place of residence with their families where they will once more
form the nucleus of the area and maintain discipline'. The coincidence of interests between Inkatha and the farmers around discipline through 'tradition' was complete. Cope writes that in 1930,

(t)he Chairman of the Ngogo Farmers' Association at Newcastle [in northern Natal] might equally have been speaking on behalf of tribal authorities when he complained of the tendency among youths to 'defy their parents'...; so too when he painted an idyllic picture of the 'olden days' when chiefs and homestead heads were 'respected and obeyed by everyone in the kraal' (1993:208).

In Richmond in the late-1980s, several years later the scene of months of violent clashes between Inkatha and ANC supporters, attempts were made to replicate the Ngotshe agreement. Once more the participants were white farmers and Inkatha. The Richmond Regional Development Association argued that

'we should discuss with the leaders in these tribal areas some form of accord which would prevent the influx of irresponsible trade union movements [read COSATU] that would break down the present predominantly good relations which exist on most farms and to encourage the tribal authorities and farm labour to join the Inkatha Movement which is private enterprise orientated rather than the trade unions which are not' (quoted in Maré and Hamilton, 1987a).

With the extremely conservative and disciplining role that Inkatha and its leaders and union (UWUSA) played in the mid-1980s it made sense that dr Jan van der Horst, chairperson of the giant Old Mutual group should have said in an interview:

I recently saw Chief Buthelezi. We talked very openly. To my mind our future lies in that direction, because we are dealing with a Christian, we are dealing with a man who has Western habits, and who believes in certain Western things such as private enterprise, the business of ownership, and so on. Chief Buthelezi is the leader of a most important tribe (Leadership South Africa, 5(6), 1986).

It is in that mixture of modernising and 'tribal' that Buthelezi had most to offer capitalists in the region. What threatened him, in his mobilisation of ethnicity within a context of social decay and what appeared to be a revolutionary onslaught, also threatened them. Their solutions were, however, not always the same. It was during this period that some people from the South African business world also started having contact with the ANC.
I and the king - condensation of it all

The total representation of the ‘Zulu nation’ was essential to the Inkatha project. While the 1973 strikes had given an indication of the strength of mass action, the more immediate concern of the KwaZulu bantustan leaders during the first half of the 1970s had been the many attempts by state bodies (especially security and information) to dislodge Buthelezi and to form a more pliable leadership around the Zulu king. It was reasoned that Buthelezi did not serve the essential purpose of taking KwaZulu to ‘independence’, and that an alternative repository of ‘tradition’, king Goodwill Zwelithini, was available. The parties formed in opposition to Buthelezi and to Inkatha used names such as the Inala Party (named after one of the king’s regiments and also one of his residences) and Shaka’s Spear - both trying to capture ethnic symbols in their fight against another ethnic project, that of Buthelezi and then of Inkatha (from 1975), and finding an ally in yet another ethnic project, that of the National Party government.

Central state agents also found sufficient numbers of an ethnic petty bourgeoisie disgruntled with the line pushed by Buthelezi in the early-1970s, to attempt to unseat Buthelezi. The economic direction he represented, and hence the benefits offered by him, lay through an alliance with monopoly capital and control of state-created ‘development’ agencies - what was known as ‘white’ capital. His largely urban opponents felt that he was lifting the protective ethnic curtain that apartheid had thrown around their class aspirations just too much. In the struggle, however, Buthelezi had already side-lined the king into a position from where he was later to function, enthusiastically, as symbolic figurehead of the ‘Zulu nation’. He intended to control the monarch through the patronage that the KLA could dispense. He had had the constitution, proposed by the central state in 1972, altered to reflect the supra-political position he wanted for the king.

Despite the appearance of loyalty to an extensive ‘traditional’ role played out in the Assembly, that allegiance was simply one of a variety of contested possibilities. Buthelezi was willing to grant the paraphernalia but not the power to the king. In 1974, in the example referred to earlier, Buthelezi told the KLA that king Goodwill, as the ‘King of 4 1/4 million Zulus in South Africa’ deserved the expenditure of R300 000 on a palace, and that ‘(i)f the Zulus want a monarchy they must pay for it’ (KLAD 4, 1974:360). Matters came to a head in the late-1970s with a threat from Buthelezi that the ‘nation’ could possibly even do without its own royalty (KLAD 17, 1979:662).
The king showed equal enthusiasm in accepting the patronage made available through the KLA. By 1982 the king had no fewer than three palaces (by 1994 there were seven (Maré, 1994:24)) and many other trappings of his 'traditional' postion, and was part of the political project of Inkatha. The new role that he had within a consolidating Zuluness was displayed in the struggle against the incorporation of the Ingwavuma district into Swaziland discussed above. The net of Zuluness had to be cast as wide as possible.

This is how journalist Louis du Buisson described 'KwaZulu 1982 Buthelezi's Year' (Pace, Dec/Jan 1983):

1982 also saw the Zulu monarch, King Goodwill Zwelithini, step more visibly into public life. For the first time in his ten-year reign, King Goodwill shared the political platform and the public limelight with Chief Gatsha Buthelezi. At the height of the Ingwavuma affair, he addressed mass meetings all over his kingdom, culminating in a massive Imbizo (meeting) at Nongoma attended by 20 000 Zulus.

Two days later the king was in Pretoria, discussing the Ingwavuma affair with the Prime Minister, Mr P.W. Botha, and members of his cabinet. He returned triumphantly having extracted from the Government an undertaking to reconsider the move after consultation with the Zulu people.

King Goodwill was greeted with cries of Usutu when he returned - a royal greeting which had faded with the decline of the Zulu monarchy after the defeat of King Cetshwayo a century ago, but which suddenly took a new meaning in the stormy days of Ingwavuma...

It is revealing to note some of the other appearances of the king, since the ethnic revival of 1982, after having been kept constitutionally and politically on the periphery by Buthelezi during the first decade or so of the existence of KwaZulu. In 1986 king Goodwill made two well-publicised public appearances. At one he announced the meeting to launch UWUSA as a counter to COSATU and added his voice to the call for Zulu attendance, and the second was a Soweto Day (June 16) 'Address to the Zulu Nation' at Nongoma. During the latter he called for the 'purging' of Zulu communities of the UDF, the ANC and COSATU. He also appealed for a restoration of 'Zuluness', to counter the 'alien values' that had entered 'the largest population group in the whole country' (GS, 16 Jun 86).
There were two central elements to the function of the king from 1982 until 1994. The first was to give symbolic coherence to, and to give orders in the name of the 'Zulu nation'; and the second was to give legitimacy to the centrality of Buthelezi as political representative of the same 'nation'. Such functions are somewhat different to those noted by Andries Wessels for the British royal house. Wessels argues that '(t)he Royal family holds the attention of the modern public because the institution of the monarchy or perhaps the idea of monarchy, answers a universal desire for the personification of the heroic' (1994:21). This idea differs much from the South African (Zulu) case, where there is little heroic in the present use made of a weak royal figure (personally and politically), where two conflicting political sides (both the IFP and the ANC) agree on just one thing, and that is that the other side manipulates or manipulated him as symbol within ethnic mobilisation.

Let me present one of many possible examples of how this construction works. The event is one of the 'King Shaka Day' celebrations in 1991, held in this case in Eshowe in Zululand on the 24th September. Buthelezi here introduced the king to the assembled KwaZulu, consular, religious, royal and other dignitaries, and to the 'sons and daughters of Africa'. Before that he had presented a history of the achievements of Shaka and the kings after him. Buthelezi said:

Whenever I have to stand up to introduce His Majesty the King of the Zulu on these formal cultural occasions, I burn with a deep sense of pride. It is when one focuses on His Majesty representing the unity of the people in his person, and when you focus on His Majesty summing up Zulu history in his person, that you are confronted with an overwhelming sense of who the Zulu people actually are. What makes it so special is that most of the Zulu Kings are forbears to both of us (South African Update, 3(9), September 1991).

Buthelezi then linked his message to the negotiating process, but from within politicised Zuluness, arguing that a unified Zuluness will ensure a 'new South Africa'.

The king then responded and said that each place he visited confirmed for him 'who we are' - Eshowe itself 'really is the domain of the Zulu people', having been the site of kings Mpande's palace, Cetshwayo's birthplace, Dingane's kraal, place of residence of Dinuzulu, and so on. The king confirmed Buthelezi's call that the 'real power of the Zulus is in their unity, in their purpose and in their collective voice which says yea or nay and then yea or nay it will be' - the last phrase carrying some irony in the light of his own previous and subsequent vacillations. He affirmed that Zulus are a 'warrior nation', fashioned by history, but said that such 'warrior blood' strengthens 'not our
arm only... [but also] our resolve to do good and our resolve to be gentle, and our
resolve to spread power based on discussion and consensus'.

Goodwill functioned primarily as a symbol rather than as a major actor for several
reasons: first, because he was a threat to the Buthelezi project that depended on a
past within which the king is a central element - Buthelezi is cousin because the king
is king, and Buthelezi is prime minister because there is a royal lineage, as is
illustrated by the following excerpt from a Zwellthini speech:

I today want to thank my uncle, the Prince of KwaPhindangene Prince
Mangosuthu Buthelezi, for what he is doing to bring about Black
unity... My people, I know my uncle and he and I represent the
indivisibility of the nation... Put first things first and trust the history
that first created the great Zulu nation and then went on to create the
great Zulu empire and then went further on to take that which it
created and make it a force for the establishment of a new South
Africa (GS, 25 Sep 89).

More recently, since the split between king and premier, Buthelezi has untangled the
king, as he had in the 1970s, from the institution of the monarchy.

Second, because he drew the boundaries of exclusion and inclusion of the Zulu ethnic
group very clearly - those who accepted him accepted Zuluness: 'History has put me
where I am and all Zulu history demands that I make the unity of my people my very
first priority' (GS, 25 Sep 89).

Third, he provided the legitimation for an alternative entity that could live on after
apartheid, into a regional future - the Zulu kingdom. Many speeches in the late-1980s
stressed a Zulu contribution to national change, with the emphasis on cultural and
'national' diversity. King Goodwill told a 1990 Shaka Day gathering that 'I am always
very proud when I think of the extent to which the Zulu nation has been there at every
twist and turn of history to play its role in shaping the new South Africa...' (GS, 23
Sep 90).

Despite the centrality of the symbolic roles that he has played since the early-1980s it
is clear, however, that he could not be allowed to be a politically active leader with an
effective autonomous power base. That role was only possible through his uncle and
'prime minister' (as it is now, since 1994, through the reconstituted 'royal council').
Buthelezi, like the king, claims the attributes that are deemed to be part of being
'Zulu'. However, unlike the king, he has always been placed in an executive leadership
role. So, for example, he told the Inkatha Youth Brigade that 'I come from a very long
line of distinguished Zulu generals which goes right back to the great King Shaka himself (BS, 22 Aug 87). The unqualified nature of this claim suggests that it is 'natural' that he should lead as a general. In the same manner he claims a continuity of office, as prime minister. The king affirmed this view when he frequently referred to Buthelezl as a warrior or as located within the line of Zulu warriors, and as prime minister.

Bourdieu's notion of 'immaterial forms of capital - cultural, symbolic, and social - as well as a material and economic form and that with various levels of difficulty it is possible to convert one of these forms into the other' (Calhoun, 1993:69, emphasis added; also Bourdieu, 1984), may give us an insight into the operations of Buthelezl's use of the symbols of culture and the symbols of 'the past'. What he, in effect, does is to convert or transfer status capital between different time and social frames - from 'tradition' (that is only partly located in the past, and is only partly based on an unbroken continuity), into the contemporary, the world of mobilisation for purposes of power. 'Tradition' is also, by both Buthelezl and the king, converted into status and wealth (it is their due, outside of any notion of having earned it through anything but symbolic 'service').

The use of 'the past' has sometimes necessitated the blatant alteration of research findings in order to maintain an untainted version. In 1984, for example, a copy of the revised draft of the text of the KwaZulu Monuments Council publication Fight Us in the Open (Laband, 1985) was submitted for comment to dr Oscar Dhlomo, then KwaZulu minister of education and culture and Inkatha secretary general. Dhlomo responded by pointing to two objections to the text, both of them involving 'Prime Minister [to Cetshwayo] Mnyamana Buthelezl', Mangosuthu Buthelezl's great-grandfather and an essential link in the prominent political role Buthelezl claims within the 'Zulu nation'. As one of Buthelezl's approved biographers wrote:

This same Mnyamana, Cetshwayo's prime minister, was the great-grandfather of Gatsha Buthelezl, and it was largely owing to him that the royal line in Zululand was preserved as a unifying force in the history of the Zulu people... as Mnyamana brought exceptional diplomacy and strategy to bear in preserving the Kingdom of Zululand, so in more recent years has his great-grandson had to follow a similar course (Temkin, 1976:11).

The first objection Dhlomo raised was to Cetshwayo's narrative, as recorded, which 'gives the impression', wrote Dhlomo, 'that Prime Minister Mnyamana Buthelezl delivered the King (Cetshwayo, in 1879) to Sir Garnet Wolseley'. Dhlomo said that the
impression ‘is clearly unacceptable as it will cause a lot of conflict among the Zulus’. He continued:

‘You will surely understand that many Zulu people who will read the manuscript will not appreciate the scientific fact that this is a mere record of the testimony of historical witnesses. They will take the testimony as gospel truth’ (quoted in Forsyth, 1989:appendix B).

The editors obliged, and Laband’s book (1985:37) does not contain those lines.

The second objection was to evidence taken down that some warriors fighting against the British in 1879 complained of poor generalship by Mnyamana. Laband qualified the evidence by saying, in the original: ‘Whatever the truth in these accusation...’. However, this was not enough and Dhlomo wrote that ‘This allegation will also have serious implications’. It too was removed. Whether there was evidence for these suggestions or whether these were simply perceptions did not matter to Dhlomo. ‘The past’ is most often not about accuracy or historical credibility, but about function in the present. ‘More important than the past itself, therefore, is its bearing upon cultural attitudes in the present’, said Edward Said (1994:18).

‘Kingdom’ and regional base

In her study of the uprising by Bambatha and his followers in Natal in 1906, Shula Marks wrote of a short period of resistance against the centralising authority of colonialism:

In the fortress-like mountains and forests of Nkandla, on the southern border of Zululand, he [Bambatha] began to build up an army of resistance... In the Nkandla, Bambatha, joined by a number of prominent chiefs, conducted guerilla warfare against the white troops for nearly a month, making use of [Zulu king] Dinuzulu’s name as his authority and using also the war-cry and war-badge of the Zulu kings (Marks, 1970:xv-xvi).

Nearly nine decades later the rejection of a central authority is continuing. Within that resistance Zulu ethnicity continues to play the major role in mobilisation. A newspaper article captured some of the continuities:

‘Wherever there is a Zulu, he or she must be made aware that the final expression of Zulu respect for my own leadership and my own line of descent must be expressed in Zulu national pride in the way people vote in elections and referendums,’ he [Buthelezi] said.
'If we fail in making the people aware of what has taken place in the past and what is happening now, the ANC will finally succeed in smashing Zulu pride in who we are and where we come from.'

Whatever else happened, regionalism would be entrenched as important in the new South Africa. Dr Buthelezi maintained (*Daily News*, 24 Mar 92).

These two extracts, and the warning by Michael Massing, writing in 1987, of the 'Savimbi option', encapsulated probable future scenarios for the politicised ethnicity of Buthelezi and his followers (Massing, 1987:22). Events since 1987, when Massing wrote, have largely removed, from the South African context, the extremes of what Jonas Savimbi achieved in Angola: there is no longer the direct support from the South African state for either Savimbi or Buthelezi; the USA would never consider the aid that it gave Savimbi to be supplied to the IFP in the case of KZN revolt; the southern African context has changed; democratic elections within South Africa, no matter how flawed, have set in place mechanisms to be used in resolving differences, thereby removing much of the sympathy Buthelezi would previously have enjoyed in relation to the apartheid state.

However, a struggle over regional power has been fought in a brutal and bloody fashion during the decade since 1985. This struggle has continued on a daily basis since the April 1994 election, often with similar violence and bitter recriminations. The legacy of that struggle, in the context of continuing intense leadership antagonism, will (at the micro-level) prove to be very difficult, if not impossible, to resolve.

Apparently the least problematic aspect was the inevitable regionalisation of a future South Africa - all parties at CODESA ascribed to some form of regionalism, even though the Inkatha Freedom Party, the Freedom Front and the Democratic Party were the strongest advocates of federalism or even confederalism. The NP tempered its calls as the process unfolded. It was also inevitable that such a system as was established under the Interim Constitution would serve as the vehicle through which Buthelezi would attempt, as far as was possible, to create the 'Indaba KwaZulu/Natal' envisaged and so vigorously pursued in 1986 and 1987. The regionalisation that has been created has not solved the question of the amount of power that the nine new provinces would have, under the Interim Constitution or within the new constitution in the process of being drafted since early-1995. That has essentially been the issue of contestation since 1990 (Maré, 1994a).
If open political competition - marked by the right and the ability to hold meetings, to disseminate ideas, to organise, and to differ - was to accompany such decentralisation, it would allow both nationally-directed politics and various strands of 'Zuluness', and ethnic and other identities within a common arena to dilute the exclusive claims of Inkatha. Twenty percent of the regional population (racialised as whites, Indians, and a small number of coloureds) is immediately excluded from potential membership of the Zulu ethnic identity, before a single shot had been fired over claims to a single cultural or political allegiance of those who live in Natal.

'Zuluness', as with any ethnic appeal, is both inclusive and simultaneously exclusive.

However, there was always the reality as well as the potential, and even probability - taking into consideration the extreme ideological claims to exclusive representation by Buthelezi and Inkatha within the construct of the 'Zulu nation' on the one hand, and a history of anti-democratic practice and abuse of the principle of democratic resolution of differences from all positions on the political spectrum, on the other - of another version of decentralisation in Natal and KwaZulu. This KwaZulu-Natal, if the reflection of support (or rather the lack of total or overwhelming support) for Buthelezi in the elections was in any way close to accurate, will mean that only ongoing destabilisation will allow continued effective (if undemocratic) control. This situation has not been just of Inkatha's making. Political contestation in the region has had little history of democratic procedures or acceptance of results and decisions. The intolerance, as well as need for settlement (even if reconciliation seems very far off) of the scars of murders, disruption, eviction, and so on, will make resolution extremely difficult, even under conditions when the killings have stopped.

This situation has meant that the structures set up under apartheid in KwaZulu will continue to hold sway. Those structures, including chieftaincy and a regional police force, consisting in large part of the present KwaZulu police, were built up during the 1980s with an assault in mind - whether to lead it or repel it is at issue, but probably both. Control over both these institutions, therefore, becomes of primary importance, whether by the ANC or by the IFP. 'Tradition' has remained the anti-democratic battleground in the 1990s (see Maré, 1992; 1994), a 'tradition' that is seated within the region (whether the province or the 'kingdom') and within the politicised ethnic construct of 'the Zulu nation'. Inkatha was active in constructing its version of an ethnicised region from its formation, but especially during the 1980s. A deliberate decision had been taken by the Inkatha central committee to consolidate regionally (Forsyth and Maré, 1992; Maré, 1993; and above).
Researcher Colleen McCaul found, in interviews she conducted in 1983, that the total overlap between the bantustan and the ethnic project was by design. She was told by Inkatha regional organiser David Masomi that each KwaZulu cabinet minister was a 'project captain', but "... it's not just a project as seen through the eyes of Pretoria. It's a project which is accepted as a starting point, literally, to achieve the aims and objectives of Inkatha" (McCaul, 1983:14). Another Inkatha official attached to the Inkatha Institute (itself funded in part by the KwaZulu government), told McCaul that "Inkatha lives on the KwaZulu government. It supplies a base, a platform for Inkatha to operate in a deprived community. It cannot survive on membership fees alone".

Confronted from 1990 with an unbanned ANC the ethnic mobilisation strand within the Inkatha strategy has, if anything, increased. Buthelezl and other Inkatha leaders took the extreme step of linking even such discredited or controversial institutions as the bantustan (KwaZulu in this case), migrant labour single-sex hostels, and chiefs' authority, to the 'Zulu nation'. Consolidation against a new enemy was called for. As the king said graphically in 1990:

Sadly, tragically even, there are some in South Africa who just do not understand the depth of commitment of Zulu to Zulu. They do not understand that when you insult one Zulu, you insult every Zulu. They do not understand that when you insult KwaZulu as such, every Zulu is insulted and every Zulu worthy of the name will stand up and say enough is enough (GS, 23 Sep 90).

When the ANC and COSATU called for the dismantling of KwaZulu as a political structure and the scrapping of the KwaZulu police force, in a campaign that included newspaper advertisements to which the king was responding in the speech quoted above, Buthelezl immediately reacted by saying that it was an attack on the 'Zulu nation' and on the king. He claimed that all Zulus were affronted:

I hope that the Zulu people whatever their political affiliations will realise that the ANC campaign of vilification is no longer just against me and Inkatha but also against the Zulu people as Zulu people... KwaZulu is not a construct of apartheid and this is known even by a primary school child who knows the outline of Zulu history (BS, 9 Aug 90).

The ANC and COSATU had made a blunder in its selective appeal for the disbandment of the bantustans during the negotiations process. It appeared that the good relations with coup leader general Bantu Holomisa, governing the Transkei (which served as the ANC's 'liberated zone' during this period), and with some other
bantustan leaders, exempted them from the ANC’s attack directed at these fundamental pillars of apartheid. The bantustans were only formally disbanded when the interim constitution came into effect. In the meantime Buthelezi and the king were in a position to present the ANC’s move as selective morality, opportunist politics, and an attack on the ‘Zulu nation’.

Group boundaries are defined and confirmed by the actions and attitudes of ‘outsiders’. The existence of an ‘other’ displaying hostility accentuates identities (especially in its politically mobilised form). Hostel dwellers interviewed in 1990-91 confirmed this process:

'I only started joining Inkatha last year because of the violence. Otherwise I wasn’t interested. I joined because they said if you were a Zulu, you were Inkatha... All Zulus who live in the hostel were classified as Inkatha and were killed’ (quoted in Segal, 1991:23).

In this case the interviewee had no problem with being a Zulu without being a member of Inkatha, until the decision was forced on him. This is similar to the space that Buthelezi left all Zulu-speakers when Inkatha was formed in 1975, and he said that there could be active and passive members. It was only later that the choice was forced upon every Zulu-speaker by Inkatha.

Several of those interviewed in Segal’s study did, however, deny that the violence was organisationally-linked at all, but that it was ethnic conflict that broke out on the Witwatersrand in 1990 - between Xhosas and Zulus. Segal commented:

What we have witnessed in the current violence is thus the crystallisation, and coming to the fore, at a point of crisis, of one particular set of coexisting identities. In this instance, it is the underlying ethnic fault lines which have become manifest (1991:27).

In May 1991 a SA Hostel Dwellers Association was launched in Natal. This move followed the call by the ANC and civic organisations that the government’s agreement to start the process of both upgrading hostels and as far as possible converting them into family units be implemented. The hostels had once more come under fire during the violence which, on the east Rand, centrally involved hostel residents who were in many cases Zulus and/or Inkatha supporters. The launch was attended by ‘a chanting crowd of spear-wielding Zulus’, who were told by KwaZulu cabinet minister BV Ndlovu that ‘the ANC was seeking confrontation with Zulu people by calling for the end to the system’ of male migrancy (Daily News, 23 May 91).
Similarly Inkatha has used the formation of the ANC-aligned Congress of Traditional Leaders of SA (CONTRALESA) to confirm that it served as the defender of Zulu traditional leadership - the chiefs. In 1990 Buthelezi warned the amakhost of KwaZulu that an onslaught would be launched against them. They had to use tradition and their role as heads of tribal courts to resist the attacks. He raised the possibility of forming age groups ("It is in age groups that earlier Zulu Regiments were organised... Let those who are free to be mobilised as moving task forces for the defence of the people be mobilised"), and asked that there be a 'KwaZulu answer to toyi-toyi politics. Let there be the old dances and the old songs which inspired courage and valour in the hearts of the warriors of the past' (BS, 4 May 92). The defence of Inkatha's version of Zuluness was, not surprisingly, still a masculine cultural enterprise, both in terms of the agents and the methods appealed to.

As argued earlier, Inkatha was, in part, formed to secure the regional base that was essential in the Inkatha strategy of working 'in the system', as a platform to launch into national politics. It was formed to secure the base through political structures and agents, and through the ideology of the 'Zulu nation'. In the early days of the existence of Inkatha that regional base was a fairly unproblematic part of its strategy. In the second phase, during the 1980s, regional consolidation was seen as a defensive step towards a national role. With the De Klerk government and the revitalisation of the prospect of strong regional government ('Indaba'-style), it seemed that the Inkatha rhetoric about evolutionary change was to be given a large boost. However, the costs of working within the system, and the extremes of cooperation with and integration into the apartheid state structures to defend privileges and power that had become inextricably tied to the bantustan and to politicised ethnicity, were waiting to be exposed and counted. That moment arrived with the on-going revelations of the extent that Inkatha had become part of a 'counter-insurgency' strategy. This involvement went beyond even the 'normal' integration demanded of participants in apartheid (such as policing of regional populations and general deflection of discontent away from the central state). Inkatha had chosen to cooperate with the most vicious agents within the 'total strategy' set in place by PW Botha (see Maré, 1991).

It is ironic, in retrospect, that the 200 Inkatha members selected to be trained in Caprivi in northern Namibia, should have been there when journalist Michael Massing was in South Africa, interviewing Buthelezi. Massing described Buthelezi's anti-communism, 'tribal appeals to solidify his ethnic and regional bases', his travels to and warm relationship with free enterprise-supporting western Europe, USA and Israel, and the way in which Inkatha members were being armed. Massing 'was struck by its growing similarities to UNITA' (1987). It seems that the National party government was also struck by the potential offered by the similarities.
The third phase, dating from the unbanning of the ANC, and even more so from the exposés of Inkatha involvement with Military Intelligence and the SAP's security police, marked the acceptance by Buthelezi and his advisers that regional consolidation, and with it extreme ethnic consolidation, had to become an end in itself. The mobilisation of the 'Zulu nation', to a certain extent, had to cut the tie with what was now (since 1991) the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). It did this for two reasons: the IFP, as a party open to all 'races', and aspiring to national relevance, could not claim to be representing the 'Zulu nation' without alienating non-Zulus. The National Party itself had to undergo a long process of conversion to escape the restrictions of being the politically-organised form of Afrikaner ethnicity and exclusively-white power. The second reason is that for wider mobilisation, ostensibly of the Zulu ethnic identity without politically organised form, the king had to be brought to centre stage. This return to the 1975 position was not possible through Inkatha when it was clear on a wide scale since 1983 that it represented only some of the Zulu-speakers.

Why is a 'Zulu renaissance', beyond Inkatha but within KwaZulu, necessary to this project of regional consolidation in its various phases, even after the elections? There are several reasons: it is a mobilising ideology that does not threaten the class interests and aspirations of the petty capitalist leadership and support of Inkatha; it gave and gives greater legitimacy to the strategy of working through 'tribal' structures, so necessary for control and organising at a local level, and for armed assault; it bolsters the chiefs ideologically in a situation where they have little material basis of authority other than naked repression or corrupt manipulation of favours; it allows Buthelezi (and the king, until mid-1994) to offer a supposedly disciplined 'constituency'; it is essential to the task of maintaining a regional base to have clout in a future federal South Africa; it is an essential aspect of the personal legitimation of Buthelezi (and of the king, if Zwelithini or another occupant of the throne could be brought back into the fold). As can be seen each of these open out into a separate range of symbols and inventions. What they all had and have in common though is to advance the political power of, initially, the Inkatha movement as the organised form of Zulu ethnicity, and now a 'Zulu nation' to be consolidated under Buthelezi, and with the structures and agents that had served so well under the bantustan order.

My argument should not be read as though the mobilisers of ethnicity during the 1970s and 1980s merely 'switched on' or 'created', out of nothing, a Zulu ethnic identity. That was certainly not the case. The social identity was there, located in a regional history of consolidation, conquest and colonialism, but not as a politically mobilised and organisationally exclusive group, nor with a defined set of symbols and attributes. Bowman's (1994) argument in qualifying Benedict Anderson's claims about
the central role of the print media in creating the nationalist imagined community, is relevant here:

The reader does not... 'find' a national identity through imagining a simultaneity of thousands (or millions) of others who are reading the same text at the same time. Instead a national identity is constituted by *discovering* a set of concerns he or she 'recognizes' as his or her own within a text or texts (1994:141, emphases added).

The task of mass mobilisation was specific in its forms under the very new conditions of 1970s industrialised apartheid South Africa. The social disruption of apartheid, and the simultaneous creation and favouring of ethnic politics and ethnic enclaves, ultimately allowed free rein to those who were willing to participate in the structures without rocking the boat too much. In KwaZulu, as in all the bantustans, those who benefited most from the 'ethnic curtains', were the traders and a new petty bourgeoisie in the top echelons of the civil service.

**The IFP, the elections and ethnic mobilisation**

A brief comment on the *strategy* followed by Inkatha and, more specifically, by Buthelezi, indicates that the direction of the past two decades was followed into the 1990s,(for fuller discussion see Maré and Hamilton, 1994; Hamilton and Maré, 1994; Maré, 1995; Harber and Ludman (eds), 1994; Friedman and Atkinson (eds), 1994).

The announcement of the unbanning by president FW de Klerk of resistance political organisations on 2 February 1990 came at a most inopportune time for Inkatha. A delay of several years duration before the government formally engaged in discussions around the Indaba constitution had ended less than a year earlier. High-powered delegations from Inkatha and the government had been meeting in 1989 to discuss the relevance of this document, the culmination of Inkatha’s attempts to forge a regional structure that was envisaged as having the potential to be the first state in a future federal South Africa (see, for example, debate in Roberts and Howe (eds); also Forsyth and Maré, 1992). The February 1990 address changed that, apparently irrevocably. Negotiations about South Africa’s future had now shifted to national solutions, acceptable to parties that had a much wider constituency than that of Inkatha.

At the end of 1991 the new negotiating forum, reflecting the changed political context, met. The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) reconvened in May 1992, without Buthelezi but with the IFP. The ‘traditional prime minister’ to the Zulu
king did not attend in protest against the refusal of full participatory rights to the Zulu monarchy. The stop-start formal process continued until the lead-up to the elections, set for 27 April 1994. In June 1993 the IFP also withdrew in protest at the setting of the election date through the controversial 'sufficient consensus' ruling. The IFP argued that what it amounted to was that the ANC and the NP unfairly constituted 'sufficient consensus' within the negotiating forum, excluding the party.

What Buthelezi's approach was during this period, with the staunch support of king Goodwill, was to argue for a special position for the 'Zulu kingdom', based on 'the past' of a package around the notion of 'tradition'. Within the discourse of 'tradition' there were several elements: the king as symbol of the unity and the continuity of the Zulu 'nation'; a 'kingdom', over the precise borders of which there was some dispute; a 'prime minister' (Buthelezi); a government (the KLA was now being 'laundered' of its apartheid links and presented as the government of the Zulu people); and amakhosi (see Maré and Hamilton, 1994).

Historian Jeff Guy commented on the use being made of history within the claims to a legitimacy-bestowing past, in this case on the borders of the 'kingdom':

Zulu nationalists will emphasize the expansionist military aspects. Those supporting a more broadly based South Africanism will emphasize the restricted side of Zulu rule, and the divisions within the kingdom. In fact it is my feeling that these complex, but emotionally charged, historical debates are being raised at this moment not to make the past clearer, but to make the present more obscure (Sunday Tribune, 20 Feb 1994, emphasis added).

While the effect might have been to make 'the present more obscure', as a further complicating factor in the extremely tense and violent transitional period, that was not Buthelezi's intention. I have argued that the purpose is to present a 'past' that cannot be challenged, towards which all ethnic mobilisers strive. Buthelezi's call for the restoration of a 'Zulu kingdom' was to appeal to the common-sense of the subjects (in both senses of the word) of this kingdom, to posit the 'kingdom' as the symbol of what is good, what exists, and what is possible (Therborn, 1980), within the 'Zulu nation'.

It was appropriate that king Goodwill should issue the most extreme version of recognition of the 'kingdom', when in early-1994 he called for the possible secession of the region. International mediation was called for, but aborted: a meeting took place in a game reserve to attempt to resolve the issue of the IFP's participation (which had now again been linked to the position of Buthelezi and the king); and participation was gained a week before voting took place.
At the Skukuza game reserve meeting on 8 April 1994 the ANC offered Zwelithini most of what Buthelezi had made of the king's role within 'the past' (the ANC wrote of 'the institution of the Royal House of KwaZulu and its royal head, His Majesty the King'). However, the ANC's agreement did not envisage any executive powers either (except those constitutionally provided 'together with the Royal Court, as determined by Zulu custom and tradition', which might have been an early indication that the ANC had taken control of this institution). The king would exercise 'ceremonial and traditional powers', open the provincial legislature, and would have 'his dignity restored'. There were two important exceptions to the relative powerlessness, namely the 'authority to install all chiefs', and to adjudicate in cases of dispute over succession of chiefs (ANC, 1994), both very important as already argued.

The king's 'presentation' to this Skukuza meeting makes for interesting reading in the light of events that were to follow a few months later (GS, 8 Apr 94). He stressed that it was not his person that was important, but the 'institution of the Monarchy': he referred to Buthelezi as his cousin and 'Prime Minister'; and attacked CONTRALESA leader Phathekile Holomisa and ANC leaders for 'insulting' him:

A Zulu King is not just another black leader who should be approachable by just anybody. When your lieutenants either sought to see me themselves, or sought an audience with me for you (Mandela), they did not understand that the way to the Monarch has necessarily to go through the protocol of making arrangements through my Prime Minister, the Prince of KwaPhindangene [Buthelezi].

The protocol route demanded by the king here was the same as that voiced by Buthelezi and KZN premier Dr Frank Mdlalose a few months later around the invitation issued to president Mandela to attend Shaka Day celebrations, but now rejected by the king and by the ANC.

The ANC's offer to Buthelezi and the king was spurned. One reason may well have been that the offer that the movement made was too specific, for when the IFP did enter the elections it was on the basis of a much less detailed document (Memorandum, 1994) which simply stated:

The undersigned parties [IFP/KwaZulu government, ANC and the SA government/NP] agree to recognise and protect the institution, status and role of the constitutional position of the King of the Zulu and the Kingdom of KwaZulu, which institutions shall be provided for in the Provincial Constitution of KwaZulu/Natal immediately after the holding of the said elections;
and, importantly, referred all 'outstanding issues with respect of the King of the Zulus... [to] international mediation which will commence as soon as possible after the said elections'.

After the election the king, open to a new set of influences, agreed to a new 'Royal Council', which represented the interests largely of the ANC. This council rejected Buthelezi as 'traditional prime minister', claimed control over the chiefs, and asked that both the monarchy and chiefs be paid through Pretoria (in the 8 April document the ANC had itself suggested that the king be paid through the provincial government). Buthelezi, and the chiefs (whose overwhelming majority support he still has), again hinted that while they support the 'institution of the Monarchy', they feel that the king, because of his advisers, had betrayed the institution.

The details are not at issue in this study. What is important is that once again there was, and remains, intense contestation over what content there should be to politically mobilised identities, and what (and, therefore, whose) 'past' should serve to legitimate these identities and the political (and gendered) power that is at stake. There has not been a relaxation of debate around identities. On the contrary, elements within the ANC seem to be fighting the battle with equal rigidity and vigour. Under such conditions violence has not abated (Maré, 1995a).

**Conclusion**

What are the implications of the material presented as well as the argument in this chapter? There are several major points, both general and of specific relevance: the material serves to illustrate the political mobilisation of a social identity, namely ethnicity; this mobilisation has only been successful to the extent that it resonated with an existing social identity. For many thousands of people in the region such mobilisation meant being 'carried out of the isolation of individual experience into a collective phenomenon which the discourse articulates in national [or ethnic] terms' (Bowman, 1994:141). The dominant 'tradition' with which Inkatha operated is that of Zulu ethnicity (an ethnic populism) which depended in content (at least in part), structures and agents on the apartheid system (without wishing to argue that Inkatha supported the apartheid system). The regional political direction (even if it be to demand representation in a central authority for a 'Zulu nation', and not simply semi-independence in the Natal-KwaZulu region) to which Inkatha leaders have committed the movement, also increasingly depended on the same consolidation of an ethnic and regional base.

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Historically the two elements of the ‘Zulu’ tradition have been there to be manipulated by unscrupulous leaders in order to consolidate regional power. What John Saul (1979) has called ‘certain historically resonant ideologies’ were present. The choice, or post facto justification of a strategy of ‘working within the system’, when the system is apartheid, reinforced that tradition. It was also reinforced by the clear failure of an alternative tradition within Inkatha, symbolised through reference to the ANC’s ‘founding fathers’ and aimed at national popular political intervention, to make any impact - a failure illustrated by the regional/ethnic membership of Inkatha, and the break with the ANC (albeit a ‘mission in exile’ as Inkatha called the movement) that occurred in 1979/80, as well as by the 1994 election results.

The ethnic exclusivism of Buthelezi and other Inkatha leadership had led to what amounted to a ‘racially’ exclusive position at the same time. They argued that it is not possible for people of other ‘races’ to understand either the culture or plight of Zulus or of black Africans generally. In 1987 one of the Inkatha leaders involved in the conflict in Pietermaritzburg attacked the UDF in the following terms: ‘The worst is that the UDF has a diverse membership, whereas Inkatha has only black people [ie Africans] as its members. The UDF just doesn’t care what is happening in the townships’, said Ben Jele (Natal Witness, 17 Aug 87). The same sentiments had been expressed about the ANC in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, many years before.

Recently chairperson of the Inkatha Youth Brigade, Musa Zondi, responded to an article by Durban lawyer, Peter Rutsch, on the manner in which amakhos! had been incorporated into structures of control:

... he displayed very clearly the usual arrogance of some ‘know-all’ whites who apparently even in this day and age have not satisfied their appetites to insult and belittle African culture, which in any case, is to them mere ‘kaflir culture which is not civilised enough’ to warrant any respect by them (Daily News, 23 Jan 95).

The ‘traditions’ made use of by Inkatha served both to mobilise and to control. They mobilised into the Inkatha movement as the organisational representation of ‘Zulu’ and of ‘national liberation’; they mobilised into structures of control; they mobilised against opposition from within and from without (to consolidate against class opponents, and to crush internal dissent as was the case with the king and with other defectors); they mobilised into a ‘constituency’ that was then offered as a bargaining pawn in national power play (eg at CODESA); they mobilised to advance directly specific class interests (such as the aggressive pro-capitalist stance of Inkatha).
The presence of the past in this region of South Africa owes much to a specific set of symbols and history of resistance, but it also owes to the manner in which the apartheid policy had frozen and distorted the past. This duality has meant that the modern manipulators of an ethnic and regional past simultaneously landed up with the essentially divisive aspects of politicised ethnicity in South Africa. In their 'attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historical past' and to provide social cohesion through 'conventions of behaviour', Inkatha leaders were simultaneously saddled with what the apartheid state had made of history in the country. The state's social cement was politicised ethnicity. It was also that for Buthelezi and those around him.

In the media, from social commentators and academics, in the common-sense of public thinking, the idea of ethnicity as a basic and largely fixed political identity lives on. The 'Zulu' case serves to reinforce this perception, whether these be popularly held or reflect the views of power holders and upholders. In the December 1987 judgment in the case of Mangosuthu Gathsha Buthelezi vs Dents Becket and Saga Press (6/42/87), for example, where Buthelezi sued the Frontline magazine for defamation (a case he won) Justice Howard found that some allowance must surely be made for the fact that much of his [Buthelezi's] rhetoric [the 'bellicose passages' threatening violence to people who, for example muddled his name] is designed to appeal to the instincts of the warrior nation he leads, the overriding object being the politically important one of preserving his constituency (emphasis added).

The discussion of the content and method of constitution of a political version of the 'Zulu nation' supports the argument that ethnicity should not be politically privileged, for it is in freezing a changing, 'created' and contested identity, that conflict lies.
CHAPTER FIVE
AN APPROACH TO DIVERSITY

Introduction

There is nothing mystical and holy about ethnic identities - they are social constructions, and, therefore, demand analysis, exposure and demystification as is the case with any social phenomenon. The central theme of this thesis is the distinction between ethnicity as flexible and reflexive social identity, in flux and always in process of being constructed and reconstructed, and ethnicity as rigidly defined and embedded within its politically mobilised form. The same approach and distinction could be applied to other social identities that lend themselves to mobilisation as well. The case study effectively illustrates the latter aspect.

Giddens (1992:20) argued that the

... reflexivity of modernity has to be distinguished from the reflexive monitoring of action intrinsic to all human activity. Modernity's reflexivity refers to the susceptibility of most aspects of social activity, and material relations with nature, to chronic revision in the light of new information or knowledge.

'Chronic revision' may be something in which to revel, such as noted by Eva Hoffman in her engrossing story of her own slow integration into American life in the 1960s and 1970s. She discusses identity formation during the 1960s, a process from which she herself felt alienated, as follows:

The more I come to know about America, the more I have the dizzying sensation that I am a quantum particle trying to locate myself within a swirl of atoms. How much time and energy I'll have to spend just claiming an ordinary place for myself! And how much more figuring out what that place might be, where on earth I might find a suitable spot that feels like it's mine, and from which I can calmly observe the world. 'There are no such places anymore,' my fellow student informs me. 'This is a society in which you are who you think you are. Nobody gives you your identity here, you have to reinvent yourself every day.' He is right, I suspect, but I can't figure out how this is done. You just
say what you are and everyone believes you? That seems like a confidence trick to me, and not one I think I can pull off. Still, somehow, invent myself I must. But how do I choose from identity options available all around me? I feel, once again, as I did when facing those ten brands of toothpaste - faint from excess, paralyzed by choice (Hoffman, 1989:160).

Hoffman, dis-located at age 13 from Poland to Canada, Jewish but with no commitment to what it means in terms of rituals and expectations, finds herself searching for an identity in the USA of the 1960s with this extreme fluidity amongst the youth generation of the time, and she does it in a second language, finding herself 'lost in translation': 'I've come at the wrong moment, for in the midst of all this swirling and fragmenting movement, the very notion of outside and inside is as quaint as the Neoplatonic model of the universe' (1989:196). She remarks that her age cohort in the USA managed to avoid the strictures of place and position, usually brought about, for example, through marriage and career, for longer than most, trying to redefine both identities and social relations. However, the full range of opportunities for, and offered by 'revision', are neither welcomed nor available to all (as Hoffman's own alienation from the identitarian fluidity indicates). Scott Lash also noted the limits of reflexivity... Here I shall argue first that modern subjectivity should be understood as only capable of subsuming a limited amount of content under the reflexive self. That is, that there is an excess of 'flux', 'contingency', 'difference', 'complexity', that cannot be subsumed under the reflexive subject. The implication of this is that contradiction and contingency are far more characteristic of the predicament of the contemporary self than any of the above theorists (Giddens, Beck, etc) of reflexivity will allow (1993:3-4, emphasis added).

In the case of ethnicity, discussed here, the mobilisation, and responses to such mobilisation, of this identity restricts the degree of identitarian choice frequently available. Eva Hoffman's friend's 'nobody gives you your identity here' is not true for many people in a world of conflictual and mobilised identities.

The reflexive process means that '(s)elf-identity.... , is not something that is just given.... , but something that has to be routinely created and sustained in the reflexive activities of the individual' (Giddens, 1992:52). Even maintenance of a social identity is a reflexive process, even though it feels as if the 'choice' is made only once.
Arguing for the (qualified) fluidity of identity formation, or identity as reflexive process, does not imply an attempt to deny the potency of such association with social identities, nor an essential aspect of continuity that gives a measure of certainty. On the contrary, I have argued that it is the strength of ethnic identities that makes them such 'obvious' material to which mobilisers can resort. In this conclusion I wish to suggest ways in which to construct an approach to ethnicity that could potentially avoid the extremes of identitarian conflict, especially within South Africa. The essence of the argument lies in the separation between politicised ethnicity and ethnicity as social identity, and attempts to strengthen the latter and weaken the former. It is the former that denies, or attempts to deny, the reflexive process; that freezes identity by giving it the blessing of 'the past'; that denies options; that creates the fear of the threatening other.

In their perceptive analysis of ethnic consciousness among Basotho miners, and the manner in which the making of ethnicity is not only part of the project of employers, but also of the miners themselves, Guy and Thabane (1988) wrote that:

(T)he existence of ethnic prejudice, rivalry and violence amongst Africans is one fact of Southern African life - and to analyse it in the hope of explaining it, is a prerequisite to gaining greater control over it.

The suggestions in this thesis must be read in that light, as pointers to the way in which to conceptualise ethnicity - a social identity that shapes people's behaviour through the way that they (we) interpret the world around us. What I did in the second and third chapters was to clarify the concepts to be used in this thesis, especially that of ethnicity. In addition the essential distinction between ethnicity as story of everyday life, and ethnicity mobilised was introduced and then employed. Those clarifications and distinctions are necessary to developing a theory of a democratic politics that is relevant to recognition of difference - 'explaining it' is indeed, in Guy and Thabane's words, 'a prerequisite to gaining greater control over it'. Ethnicity can meet real needs of security, or it can tip insecurity into exclusivist mobilisation and fuel antagonistic organisational forms and violence. It can express social and cultural variety within a larger commonality, or it can serve to demarcate insular social groupings fearful of their personal and group existence. However, ethnicity is but one of several powerful social identities that fulfil such roles, and should not be uniquely elevated within the debate around a politics of diversity. Much of my argument has a wider validity.

Ethnic social identities and ethnic group consciousness have now been tied inextricably to violence in South Africa (as in many cases elsewhere). From the racism
of colonial conquest and slavery, and the years of racialised segregation in the 'Union' of South Africa, to the 'sacred history' of the Afrikaner volk with its claims to a God-given mission in Africa, to the vicious consequences of the implementation of a policy based on separation (apartheid), politically mobilised and repressively enforced 'group politics' has meant violence in struggles for political and economic power. There has been very little chance to de-emphasise ethnic group or racialised consciousness in the political field. Such a de-emphasis need not - in fact, should not entail the denial of cultural variety, ethnic consciousness, or the need for a range of social identities to find recognition (such as through religious tolerance), but to shift these into a democratic practice within the relationships that constitute society as a whole (an encompassing social structure, capable of acknowledging and welcoming variety - 'that impossible object' (Laclau, 1990:89-92)).

Such an approach will demand enormous change in approach to the issue of social identities, and not simply a glib commitment to a single 'nation', 'a united democratic South Africa', 'non-sexism', the 'rainbow nation', or 'many cultures' (see Maré, 1995a). The problem of ethnicity, which involves the manner in which it has been mobilised for conflictual politics, is not going to be solved through a centralised parliament passing legislation, or through a concern for 'traditions' - whether justified from within the apparently contradictory frameworks of post-modernism or of an ahistorical Africanism. Neither will it be solved through denial of the phenomenon, or a belief that once 'apartheid has been abolished' such conflict will also disappear. The latter may be necessary, but is certainly not sufficient.

The example (discussed in chapter four) of labelling people as 'traitors' in the process of political mobilisation, people who would otherwise meet every requirement of shared ethnic social identity except political allegiance, illustrates the intolerance of variety and change.

In KwaZulu-Natal, for example, it will have to be recognised, and accepted, that there is not, and cannot be, a single or even politically dominant version of being Zulu, cast in false clarity and singular rigidity. The variety of biographical, as well as movement-linked, stories of Zuluness must be brought to the fore. Variations of a common, and proud, Zulu ethnic social identity, expressed within trade unions, squatter settlements, local cultural groups, choirs and music groups, schools, religious movements, and so on, should collectively and in dialogue, define what that identity is at the end of the twentieth century.
In the rest of this concluding chapter I will pull together some of the ideas explicitly referred to or implicit in the discussion and presentation of material above, and then suggest pointers to a way forward. First, I return to the issue of politicised ethnicity, its relationship to stratification through which it is often reinforced, and the political answer offered through the ‘nation-building’ approach; second, the alternatives, located within a more fluid approach to social identities is examined. The suggestions contained in this chapter cannot possibly be developed adequately in this thesis, but they can be located in the arguments above and referred to the case study material, and are being and will be extended in future work.

**Politicised ethnicity**

In this thesis I have argued for the theoretical, empirical and practical separation of ethnicity as social identity from ethnicity as political mobilisation, manipulation and fanning of deeply-felt sentiments. In the previous chapter a specific discourse of such mobilisation and the organisational vehicle was examined in some detail and some of the effects and implications highlighted. The first point, then, is to insist that ethnic groups are not constitutionally rewarded for their group identity, in the same way that no other social identity is. nor should be. so rewarded. Obviously, ethnic group membership should not be the grounds for political discrimination either.

The ethnic social identities held by *individuals* should, however, be visibly protected in a bill of rights that bases itself on individual rights and freedoms. Religious groups, language groups, and so on, are not rewarded with a special *group* political dispensation, other than the right of individuals to practice, associate and to be protected in these areas. Why, therefore, should an equivalent identity - ethnicity - claim such reward? Only because, for some politicians, ethnicity serves within an available mobilising strategy of considerable strength, which also tends to hide class and gender divisions that might otherwise derail the projects of such cultural brokers and entrepreneurs; and because ethnic political recognition has been internationally privileged within the model for constituting the ‘political’ within a world system, namely the nation-state.

Campbell (1992:5) points out in her study of the behaviour of South African township youth, that ‘(t)he starting point of the project was that individuals were faced with a range of possible behaviours in their everyday lives. The choices the individuals would make from this range would be influenced by his or her group membership’. There are, thus, ‘choices of behaviour available to subjects’ (Campbell, 1992:6, emphasis
added). In times of rapid social change 'individuals will be faced with the task of reconstructing or refashioning existing recipes (for living)' (Campbell, 1992:51).

However, I would add, individuals will also be faced with the option of consolidating existing or new certainties in times of social crisis (see Hayes and Maré, 1992).

These choices are shaped by perceptions of appropriateness which, in the case of politicised ethnicity, are to a very large extent formed within the public arena, by public discourses of mobilisation - local, national and international. In other words, if the social conditions, the relationships of power and access to resources have been defined, or are definable in terms of ethnicity, ethnic mobilisation is likely to occur and will serve as the ideological grounding for appropriate behaviour: what exists, what is good, and what is possible will be read against the background of the ethnic story - in this case a public story because the resources are public resources. In the study of social identities of a number of people in Umlazi (Campbell et al, 1993) the ethnic identity resources at issue were perceived to reside in the 'personal' sphere (even though they were shared aspects of a social identity), and their loss or continuation were part of a personal story of social relations, within biographies (or biographical accounts or experiences of social identities).

The strength of ethnicity lies in the density of articulation of elements of the social identity, each with its own common-sense legitimation (the range of shared cultural attributes such as language; a shared 'past' that cannot be denied because it has been; and the perception from within and confirmed from without, of group boundaries amongst other groups). The common-sense of cultural elements included in the mobilisation (because they are part of everyday life), such as agreement on a 'past', on 'tradition', on the obvious group boundaries against others similarly defined as ethnic, but the other ethnic, stressing difference rather than commonality of 'type' of identity (whether these be territorial, language, religion, common oppression or discrimination, or any combination of these), all serve to strengthen this social identity. In other words, the conflictual perception is that 'our language' is under threat, rather than 'our language' is valued in the same way that language is valued within other similar social groups.

The existence of politicised ethnicity in this country, as there has been and remains in many parts of the world, will continue to bedevil the best intentions of alternative constructions of social reality. Cultural variety, in its politicised form, has in addition come to fall under a broad intolerance of the political opponent, the political other. An essential step towards resolving conflict in which ethnicity motivates immediate behaviour and in which ethnicity is presented as essentially political is that it will have
to be 'sensitively and self-consciously depoliticised in as many areas as possible and severed from the arena of competition for resources, privilege, power and rights in future transformation' (Maré, 1987). I argued this position in 1987 in connection with the Indaba proposals that were constructed on notions of rewarding ethnicity defined euphemistically as 'background groups'. The Indaba constitution not only took ethnic groups as a valid political construct, but then privileged ethnic groups within the proposed constitution.

The Indaba constitution with its powerful second house, with its racialised and ethnic representation, remained the model that was referred to by both the National Party and Inkatha Freedom Party at negotiations in the early-1990s - the NP because of the enormous difficulty it had in shaking off its past of group-based political structuring, and the IFP because 'group' and, especially, regional solutions would allow it a say beyond its clear absence of national strength. The NP, ironically, gradually had to distance itself from the excesses of ethnic division during the negotiations, because as a political party it had the potential of wider mobilisation (especially amongst coloured people). The Inkatha Freedom Party, on the other hand, continued to exist essentially as an ethnic party (albeit on national platforms) through a regionalised ethnic appendage (the 'Zulu kingdom') (see Hamilton and Maré, 1994).

In an article in the Afrikaans-language Sunday paper Rapport, professor Willem de Klerk of RAU wrote an article under the heading 'Bring so bymekaar wat bymekaar hoort' (13 May 90). He was referring to a slogan used by the first apartheid prime minister, dr DF Malan - 'Bring together that which belongs together out of inner conviction'. Malan's call was for the continued mobilisation of an Afrikaner ethnic group to consolidate political (and economic) power. De Klerk wanted to give new content to this slogan - 'Kultureel sal etniteit altyd spinglewendlg bly, maar as 'n primère politieke magsinstrument is dit morsdood' ('Culturally ethnicity will always remain very much alive, but as a primary political instrument of power it is stone dead'). He was clearly being prescriptive rather than descriptive, for ethnicity as a 'primary instrument of political power' remains alive in South Africa as indicated in the case study above. However, what he proposed is to be taken seriously - the depoliticisation of ethnicity, as first step. The next step is, of course, to ensure that the economic, and other relations within the country are structured in such a way that ethnic mobilisation is deprived of its politicising spark; where ethnic mobilisation is not perceived as the situationally appropriate response.
**Politicised ethnicity and social stratification:**

Politicised ethnicity arises, in large part, out of frustrated economic and political goals and out of social insecurity more generally, such as during times of rapid social and political change. Not only is the task in each case to examine how a population is available for an ethnic response to material discrimination (such as in the Inkatha case study), but also to examine whose goals are frustrated and whose ambitions advanced through ethnic mobilisation. The factors that make a population available for ethnic identity formation (to be historically located), on the one hand, and the immediate sparks that give a conflictual edge and makes available the politicisation of ethnicity, on the other, are not the same. However, to insist on such a clear distinction may, in many cases, have more of a necessary analytical value than an actual distance. In other words, the mobilisatory gathering together of the elements that constitute ethnicity thrives on tension and conflict, on crisis and exclusion, on exploitation and discrimination, or on insensitive centralisation (whether political, administrative, or ideological).

However, it is not just the availability of ethnicity for mobilisatory purposes that concerns me. Ethnic identification does sometimes serve as the basis of, or justification for discriminatory treatment. Therefore, the issue of redressing stratification based on socially constructed groups remains one of the strongest arguments for formal recognition of 'groups', of a range of descriptions. Social identities, in this case ethnicity, it is argued, need to be politicised and given 'special' recognition within democratic representation to overcome discrimination and stratification. Some of the most extreme versions of each in the cases of ethnicity, class and gender have been, respectively, ethnic-nationalist separatism and secession, the 'dictatorship of the proletariat', and gender quotas in parliamentary representation. Affirmative action is another much-debated response that not only aims to correct group discrimination, but is necessarily based, at least in the medium-term, on a recognition of groups (see, for example, the essay by Charles Taylor, in Gutman (ed), 1992:40).

The debate around this issue can be and is often located in the tension between the individual as basis of political (democratic) practice through the notion of citizenship (and the development of the idea of the 'individual'), on the one hand, and, on the other, discrimination against social groups (on the basis of class, gender, ethnicity, 'race', religion). Is the recognition of individual rights insufficient to prevent or correct a range of exploitative or discriminatory practices? Does the notion of the citizen (or even of the individual) carry within it the seeds of discrimination, or at the very least of insensitivity?
The organised campaigns and demands of these social groups, such as through trade unions and the feminist movement in its many forms, as well as the collapse of the previous certainties of universal values and beliefs (so that we exist within one aspect of the condition of what has now been broadly called post-modernism), have been the major contributing factors within an effective challenge to the seeming common-sense of equality through citizenship. The ideas presented below, through referring specifically to two authors, can only touch on this extensively-debated subject.

Tom Bottomore (1993) raised the distinction between 'democracy as type of government' and 'democracy in society' to illustrate the limitations of liberal democracy to solve the problems of class stratified societies. Anne Phillips, similarly, dissects the fallacy of the gender 'neutrality' of the notions of citizenship and of the individual (1991). Phillips stated her position, and that held by Bottomore, as follows:

Democracy cannot stand above sexual [and class] difference but has to be reconceptualized with difference firmly in mind. One obvious implication is that democracy must deal with us not just as individuals but groups (1991:149).

Neither of these authors argue that the gains of the vote, based on citizenship, should be denied and ignored, and Phillips admits that the 'vision of a desirable future is in fact unfashionably androgynous... But it is one thing to wish for this future and quite another to wish differences away' (1991:151). However, both authors point to the inadequacy of democratic policies based on equal citizenship unless other corrective measures are taken at the same time.

There are two responses to the dilemma identified by the authors. Bottomore sees the solution lying in the direction of changes in society in general (or 'societal policy', the term he borrows from Ferge (1979)); Phillips in incorporating 'groups' into formal political processes - through the 'practices of what is known as consociational democracy...' (1991:153).

Bottomore (1993) argues for the separation of the processes of democracy as type of government (where equality of citizenship serves as the unit of participation, say in elections), and democracy within society (where the inequalities of class shape life chances and affect the apparent equality of citizenship). Here, in a book first published in 1979, he draws attention to the "progressive" feature of capitalism, namely of seeing 'the human being as a citizen - as a member of a community endowed with equal civil and political rights'. However, Bottomore contrasts that with the 'development of social classes on the basis of industrial capitalism' (1993:12, 13).
In a later essay, that responds to the optimism of TH Marshall's 1949 contribution on 'Citizenship and social class', Bottomore uses Marshall's useful distinction between, and comments on the uneven development of three aspects of citizenship, namely the civil, political and social rights that it came to encompass (Marshall and Bottomore, 1992:90), as his own starting point (also see Bottomore, 1993:26-27). Bottomore notes the slow growth of both civil and political rights (in many west European countries adult franchise was only achieved well into the twentieth century), but takes specific issue with social rights, which potentially most fundamentally affect the societal inequalities established by class (and also by discrimination against other groups) (Bottomore, 1993:27; 1992:91).

This is not the place to enter in any depth into the debates around citizenship, other than to acknowledge that the detail of what I suggest as a possible approach to accommodating ethnicity is partly to be located within this debate. Further, we must note that Bottomore, without giving a clear answer (his last chapter is entitled 'A kind of conclusion'), admits that while 'the conflict between classes and class-based parties still plays a leading role as a principal source of policies intended to limit or extend the scope of human rights' (which in Bottomore's argument encompasses all the rights TH Marshall noted as included within the notion of citizenship),

it is clear that in the late twentieth century other kinds of inequalities besides those of class - between rich and poor countries, between the sexes, between ethnic groups - have become more salient than they were, even if in some cases they can be related, in part, to the inequalities engendered by capitalism (Bottomore, 1992:89).

Their salience can in large measure be ascribed to the struggles of new social movements and the demands for a much wider notion of democracy than that struggled for within class organisations and perspectives, whether it be of the bourgeoisie or of the working class, or within notions of the equality of individual voters.

Here is a clear acceptance of the need to go beyond the 'equality' of individuals implied by the notion of citizenship as conferring political rights. The argument is that inequalities (material or of power) cannot be solved under 'equality' of individual citizenship, because it is group inequality that is at issue (of women, classes, ethnic groups, 'races'). Bottomore (1992:70-71) noted how the 'New Right' is degrading the rights won within citizenship over the centuries, especially the social rights that provided TH Marshall with so much optimism after World War II, the period of the growth of the welfare state. Is it, however, the correct response to introduce group
entitlement or 'quotas' into democracy? Even those who seem to argue for such a position, such as Phillips, agree that such a measure should be temporary (1991:153-4), and that it does not resolve the difficulty of deciding which 'groups' deserve such favourable treatment (for example, 1991:155) or on what basis, but that at the same time these problems should not stand in the way of 'arguing for sexual [or any other kind of] equality' (1991:154).

Bobbio (1987:4) refers to Carlo Rossell's comments in the 1920s on liberal and socialist democracy and, while rejecting the crude distinction Rossell drew between the two, concludes that '(m)ore lasting, ... , is the conclusion he drew from his analysis, namely, that Marxists had insufficiently addressed the problem of individual autonomy, essential to liberalism. Whilst Marxism correctly regarded social and economic reform as necessary preconditions for the liberation of the proletariat, this in itself did not guarantee the civil liberties of individuals after the revolution'. As Ron Aronson wrote:

The fact is that free elections, free discussion, the protection of civil rights and civil liberties - the political components of the bourgeois-democratic or liberal heritage - are vital accomplishments of all humanity, and not just a facade for concealing class power (1991:15, emphasis added).

I would argue that the answer rather lies:

1. First, in reinstituting, maintaining and extending the full rights under citizenship (see Bottomore, 1992:72), and certainly not giving up on the gains of democratic struggles over centuries, including the notion of the free, and equal, individual;

2. Second, in disentangling, as far as is possible, the different loci of discrimination - some are material, to be addressed through extending the social rights of citizenship; others are ideological, and cannot be altered through the legal process but have to be tackled over a long period and in a range of ways;

3. Third, in extending and protecting aspects of civil society which alter not only status perceptions but also the power relations within society (for example, educational content that neither ignores, nor 'freezes' cultural diversity into the exotic attributed to the other, but stresses difference as well as change and flexibility, and that notes interaction between what appears to be closed particularities (see Said, 1994:21; Hall, 1992); protects and extends the civil right of free association, for here lies the capacity to ensure societal equality - through pressure group activities of women's organisations, trade unions, and even ethnic associations. Here the
problem of which groups need special attention can be resolved in a democratic way (also see Aronson, 1991:17);

- Fourth, through maintaining proportional-representation voting as it ensures and allows specific interests representation within parliament;

- Fifth, in extending levels of decision-making 'downwards' so that 'local' (more specific) interests can have an effect in both allowing for and reflecting diversity.

'Nation-building' the answer?:
The social organisation that has most often been burdened with, and claimed for itself, the task of building an over-arching social identity in South Africa is the 'national liberation movement', now the unbanned ANC and majority party in the Government of National Unity. I argue that such a political hegemonising project is not where the solution to a politics of diversity lies, or not only from where we should await solutions to the problem of apparently inevitable societal fragmentation. Rather, the most important tasks lie in developing civil society in its broadest sense (as noted in point three immediately above), allowing and building structures and interactions between people that are not immediately related to centralised state authority and power, but that can reinforce the perception and experience that routes and structures of influence have been created, and that issues that relate to social identities are being responded to in a meaningful way.

However, it is, and will not be an easy task. Unity within 'the struggle' had both a positive and a negative dimension. Aronson noted that '(t)o the degree that the iron lid imposed by the apartheid state has been lifted, the shared resistance to repression can no longer serve to unite people', but that one of the greatest achievements of the anti-apartheid organisations 'was simply staying united' (1991:7). On the negative side, with the centralisation of repression in the racial, class and gender exclusivity of the apartheid state, the ideological representation of opposition and rejection was frequently shaped as an unproblematic mirror image of that state, a resistance that had to be defined only in its 'obvious' opposition to what was internationally recognised as evil, allowing little dissent and independence in 'the struggle'. A clear case in point has been the perception of the purpose of the organisation of women that prevailed at times, namely as a necessary adjunct to the primary, and separable, task of national liberation (see, for example, Hassim, 1991). Furthermore, a high level of intolerance that also marked the period before the elections continues to mark the post-apartheid period (see Rapport, 4 Dec 94; Sunday Tribune, 4 Dec 94, for reports on an extensive study commissioned by the Institute for Democratic Alternatives for
South Africa: see Muller and Cloete's (1993) discussion of this issue in relation to intellectuals. How then to deal with the post-apartheid fragmentation, or the continuation of the apartheid divisions, as the old rigidities collapse?

While arguing for the legitimate growth of organisations and representation of interests in the spheres outside of a 'single mind' I am not implying that these are in some way apolitical. On the contrary, it is to argue for the legitimation of a range of activities directed towards power and representation of ideas and demands (but outside of formal protection of selected 'minorities' and 'groups') within the political rights of citizenship.

Vall (1989:x) introduced the book he edited on tribalism in southern Africa with an anecdote set in Malawi. He referred to the post-independence (1964) policy of 'building the nation' and the way in which this had 'evaporated' within four years. Are we to repeat this 'politically correct' approach unquestioningly in South Africa? What do we mean by 'nation-building'? There are divergent views of what it might entail, but here I wish to focus on 'nation-building' as the ideological construction of a national identity, conterminous with the total citizenship of the nation-state, an over-arching identity that either encompasses or supercedes other social identities at the political level (for a more extended discussion of 'nation-building', see Maré, 1995a).

The most public advocacy of nation-building in South Africa has been the energetic efforts of The Sowetan editor Aggrey Klaaste. The most thorough discussion of the notion of 'nation-building' in South Africa has been that by University of Stellenbosch's professor Johan Degenaar (nd, 1991).

Degenaar argues for an approach that distinguishes between what he calls 'Nation One' (or 'the concept of a nation based on the congruence of culture and power, of people and state') (nd, 1991:2), where the most extreme version lay in Nazi Germany - he quotes Hitler as having said that '(p)olitics have to cease in the national family'; and 'Nation Two', referring to 'a multi-cultural situation in which the nation is constituted by a common loyalty to a transcendent factor with regard to a particular ethnic culture' (nd, 1991:7).

Within approaches to the 'convergence of people and power' (Nation One) in South Africa, Degenaar recognises four positions, depending on how many 'nations' are perceived to constitute the polity in the country: multi-nations, four-nations, two-nations, and one-nation theses (nd, 1991:3). Degenaar argues that through the stated congruence between culture and power (whether it be the exclusivism of
Afrikaner power or of Klaaste's version of 'nation-building'), and within the 
'multi-cultural situation within South Africa, Nation One disqualifies itself by 
excluding citizens' (nd, 1991:6). In other words, within this approach either the 
political rights of some citizens are curtailed, or some people are excluded from 
citizenship (as was the case under apartheid). Although there are signs of such an 
approach in South Africa (the curtailment of the rights of citizenship, in that 
limitations are placed on aspects of individual rights, for example in a hierarchy of the 
previously discriminated against, and against the 'racially' privileged), these are likely 
to remain minor tendencies in the medium-term.

Under the Nation Two approach Degenaar provides four lines to the question of a 
'transcendent culture' which can produce a 'transcendent nation': common, 
modernisation, socialist and democratic cultures. He defines 'culture' rather loosely, 
in this text, as 'the form of life or the life-style of a community' (nd, 1991:7), but we 
can read it as relevant to ethnicity as used in this thesis. Later he does discuss culture 
as being open to other influences.

A 'common culture' is dangerous, according to Degenaar, because there is the 
tendency for a dominant culture within a multi-cultural society to be imposed as the 
transcendent culture, or to claim that a 'shared constitution' constitutes the nation - 
he raises a problem similar to that discussed above when he noted:

The myth of a constitutional nation [which protects individual rights] 
does not, however, solve the problem of conflict between cultures in 
the same society. Competition on certain issues between communal 
cultures can be destructive of the ideal of a constitutional nation, a 
state-nation or a civic state (nd, 1991:8).

The 'constitutional nation' approach seems to overlap with the suggestion that a 
'modernisation culture' will transcend 'folk cultures' through the "establishment of an 
anonymous, impersonal society, with mutually substitutable atomized individuals" 
(Degenaar, nd, 1991:8, quoting Ernest Gellner). This approach also leaves the 
problem of what will happen to existing cultures, especially with the clear failure of the 
idea that modernisation overcomes divisive social groupings (see argument in chapter 
two).

The same holds for the 'socialist culture view' where 'the working class' (or, even more 
specifically, the black working class) is argued, 'through their objective interests', to 
have the interests of all citizens at heart' (nd, 1991:9). In the South African context 
Degenaar draws most directly on Neville Alexander's writing (1985) to illustrate this
argument. Alexander does acknowledge the difficulty of both transcending and recognizing cultural diversity. A redefinition of the relationship between socialism and democracy, rejecting the 'dictatorship of the proletariat', or a necessary dominance of 'working class culture', is offered by Aronson (1991), referred to above, in his argument that 'out of a commitment to the most democratic possible settlement, the issue of socialism's relevance will pose itself all over again, and in a new way' (1991:18). He, Aronson, does not offer clarity in this article on what it will mean, but argues that 'if we are not sure precisely what it means, the meaning of democratic socialism will have to be debated, created, described, and explored, in theory and practice' (1991:20).

Finally, the ‘democratic culture view’, which Degenaar writes is a ‘theory of democracy according to which the democratisation of society by the state creates a loyalty to the state which can form the basis of nationhood’ (nd, 1991:10). The definition of democracy with which Degenaar works in this essay is, I would argue (and see above), inadequate. It is a definition that is based nearly exclusively on political rights, with a reference to a bill of rights. However, he does say that what is necessary within the process of creating the political form of democracy is 'the need for the value infrastructure of democracy. Of prime importance in this context is the cultivation of a culture of tolerance of differences' (nd, 1991:11; also see Bobbio, 1987, and his argument for acceptance of the democratic 'rules of the game'). Degenaar selects 'pluralist democracy' as that most suited to coping with the demands of 'nation-building', and then questions 'whether the concept of nation is in any way the appropriate concept to use in this connection' (nd, 1991:12). He continues, and I would go some way with his argument:

In one sense we can still speak of nation as the congruence of culture and power, but now culture has shifted from a communal culture to a democratic culture which has, as one of its main characteristics, the accommodation of various communal cultures but limits them in terms of the principles of democracy.

Pluralist democracy exposes the absolutist claim of the nationalist view of nation as a congruence of communal culture and power. The task of democracy is precisely to depoliticise communal culture in the sense that this culture does not claim sovereignty, that is, the absolute power of the state, but relativises itself on behalf of the constitution (emphases added).
It is exactly the 'depoliticising of communal culture' that has been argued for here. However, it is more than 'mutual respect' that is necessary to ensure that ethnicity does not become the obvious form for political competition and competition for material resources. It is not sufficient, as Degenaar writes, to claim that 'democracy can accommodate common citizenship as well as communal identities' (nd, 1991:14), and that '(i)instead of the unity of a nation we should aim for the diversity of a democratic culture' (nd, 1991:15). I have referred to Phillips, who takes this issue seriously as it manifests itself in social stratification and highly unequal power relations, and suggested a possible solution. Degenaar's references to the ANC's apparent inflexible oppositional approach to ethnicity is also belied by more recent events, as well as by earlier positions (such as that argued for by Mzala, 1988, discussed in chapter four), which indicates either a cynical use of ethnicity under certain circumstances, or a muddled approach that carries its own dangers in the unexplored contradictions of unstated partial recognition (where the basis for selection is not clear and debated).

Patrick Wright, too, issued a warning against a process of creating a coherent national identity, through exclusivity, from the top:

Let there indeed be a greater expression of cultural particularity in this society, but let it be articulated according to democratic principles and let it therefore also reflect a truly heterogeneous society rather than the unitary image of a privileged national identity which has been raised to the level of exclusive and normative essence (1985:255, emphasis original).

This struggle, for it is not an event that arrived in South Africa with the first elections, cannot only, or even predominantly, be waged by political parties or the 'national liberation movement'. These organisations operate too directly in the field where politicised ethnicity competes for space, rewards and members, and themselves often fall into the trap of countering ethnic politics with ethnic politics. It is too easy, in the absence of a coherent policy on cultural diversity and with the collapse of the unifying factor of 'the nation' or, more commonly, 'the people', a construction that had been clearly and largely defined in its opposition to an apartheid state, to conflate and denigrate political organisations either with an alternative ethnic identity (the ANC is Xhosa) or with an antagonism to, for example, a 'Zulu' identity. That is not a democracy of diversity.

Unless the values and goals and structures that were offered as alternatives to the apartheid state and system had been, and continue to be, clearly defined in their own
terms, which are not homogeneous, then they are in great danger of collapsing along with their reason for existence, apartheid itself. An interesting parallel is offered here by the intense and at times emotional debate around 'cultural' (as in the narrower definition as artistic production) diversity, in part triggered by ANC activist Albie Sachs' call within South Africa in February 1990 'that our members should be banned from saying that culture is a weapon of struggle' for a period of five years (Sachs, 1990:18; see De Kok and Press (ed), 1990, for contributions to the debate; for earlier discussions on 'culture' see Campscheur and Divendal (eds), 1989). Revisiting the 'Sachs debate' may also give indications of the potential stultification of the 'obviousness of the struggle' on artistic production, a limitation referred to here in relation to the nation-building project.

Renata Salecl wrote in connection with the collapse of Yugoslavia, that '(p)ast ideology [in that country] had never used the concept of pluralism of opinions, ideas or interests; rather it had clung to the notion of unity at any price' (1993:208). However, this was not to last, and there came

... a point where elements, which had until then formed an ideological structure, now achieved independence and began to function as 'floating signifiers' awaiting new articulation.

The new signifiers could be an intolerance based on central power (the 'Reconstruction and Development Programme' functions as this for some people in South Africa), or 'the nation' (especially De Genaar's Nation One) enforced by a centralised state, or on violently conflictual ethnicities.

Journalist Carmel Rickard, in 1991, warned against the 'ANC's insistence on unity' that 'might be weakening it as a unifying force'. She referred to Dr DF Malan's call on an Afrikaner ethnic identity in the election of 1948 that placed the National Party in power and launched this country into the misery of apartheid for the next forty years, and commented that 'Malan's victory shows the danger of not having a policy which takes into account those people who rally to the call of the volk' (Weekly Mail, 30 May 91). One cannot simply deny the importance and effect of politicised ethnicity because it runs counter to plans for national unity. Sensitivity has to be shown towards those elements of cultural diversity and the celebration of the past that could function in ethnic mobilisation, at the same time guarding as far as is possible against their manipulation into rigid political mobilisation. Do we deny culturally particularist museums and 'ethnic' art a place in society if they acknowledge diversity, to take a concrete example? Do we allow (and that means 'tolerate') political parties to organise on the basis of ethnic groups? My argument has been that ethnicity should not be
privileged, but neither should it be granted a special status through prosecution or denial.

Robin Blackburn (1991), in a different context and concerned largely with economic planning, but with relevance to the broad principles drawn here, presented an argument that central planning ‘lacking general criteria, would necessarily foster interests of a spuriously “natural” character, such as those based on national or ethnic categories’. He later comments that ‘(w)hat is implied is not a single mind [to meet “social need and public good”] but institutions that will encourage a meeting of minds’ (1991:208). A closed centralised system, also on the level of social identities, presented as the obvious greatest good, does not bode well for the eradication of politicised ethnicity. Rather, without the necessary institutions that will open debate on diversity, and organisational activity to support communal claims, and the space to engage in both general cultural and more specific ethnic identitarian confirmation, such centralisation will foster divisions. There are enough conservative interests, both nationally and internationally, to give support to the ‘Savimbi option’ (even if not in its extensively militarised form) not to feed it through providing the fuel of an unfounded, at this stage, and morally correct national identity.

Our task is to show that ethnic diversity can, at appropriate (ie non-politically prescribed) levels be accommodated - in language policy, educational systems, cultural recognition - museums, festivals, the media - and so forth. What is necessary is that various levels of rights be acknowledged and catered for: first, individual rights that are not only protected through common and equal citizenship and participation in formal political processes (such as casting a vote), but that are contained in a bill of rights, utilising and protecting the advances gained through liberal democracy; second, ‘affiliation’ rights that allow the variety of social identities that provide the stories for our social lives to exist, flourish, and change (low not be frozen through the rigidities of mobilisation); third, collective rights that allow and protect an organised response to discrimination and exploitation (such as has been debated and granted to trade unions recently) (what Bottomore (1993), Bottomore and Marshall (1992), and Phillips (1991) argued for) (I thank Ari Sitas for suggesting this summary ordering of the material).
Alternative group identities and alternatives to group identities

It is not sufficient to say that ethnicity should not be rewarded politically. The range of alternative group identities and organisations that reflect other interests that are available need to be strengthened, with the self-conscious purpose of removing ethnicity as the (only) 'obvious' presence at this level of social representation. For example, women's organisations, trade unions, churches, sports bodies, and also local level democratic structures around housing, services, education, all need to be drawn into the democratic process. Secondly, the apparent clarity of the presentation of group identities needs to be unravelled into a 'complex politics offering different and changing possibilities for alliances, affiliations and identities...' (Pettman, 1992:157).

Ironically, the defeat of apartheid may present us with (and has already given evidence of) continuing, or herald new fixed divisions, including those of ethnicity. Rachel Holmes (1993) pertinently warned against the approach that argues for immutable cultural differences, in her case in the context of a discussion of presentations of sexuality in the Winnie Mandela kidnap trial:

The homophobia of the Winnie Mandela Trial should serve as a timely reminder of the need to constantly challenge apartheid's logical failure of fixed identities locked into unchangeable power relations... Such an argument [of an unhistorical claim of the absence of homosexuality from pre-colonial 'black culture'] can only be sustained by suggesting that it is meaningful to talk of a hegemonic black culture or white culture, thus erasing the plurality of cultural forms existing in South Africa, an historical plurality which apartheid has constantly sought to repress and deny. The idea of colour-coding sexuality is as ludicrous as the notion of separate development itself. It is not homosexuality, but the insistence on fixed homelands of 'essential' singular racial and sexual identity which causes violence, sexual policing and the subsequent alienation of sexual plurality from the democratic process (1993:14; see also the recent, 1995, attack on homo-sexuality by president Robert Mugabe, and his denial of such relationships within African society; on an African essentialism, see contributions in Lemelle and Kelley (eds), 1991).

Similarly Edward Said (1994:xxiii) has warned against the view of hermetically separated cultural spheres (national and ethnic, as well as 'racial'):

In our wish to make ourselves heard, we tend very often to forget that the world is a crowded place, and that if everyone were to insist on
the radical purity or priority of one's own voice, all we would have
would be the awful din of unending strife, and a bloody political mess,
the true horror of which is beginning to be perceptible here and there
in the re-emergence of racist politics in Europe, the cacophony of
debates over political correctness and identity politics in the United
States and -... - the intolerance of religious prejudice and illusionary
promises of Bismarckian despotism...

Within the argument I have advanced it is easy to see how a similar 'insistence on the
fixed homelands' of ethnic identity, within the process of mobilisation, 'causes
violence, (ethnic) policing, and the subsequent alienation of (cultural) plurality from
the democratic process'. Pettman (1992:126) wrote that:

Recognising difference without recognising affinity or connections
across category boundaries can undermine opportunities for alliances
and for inclusive claim which may be necessary to effect significant
change....

Cultures are not set, separated, or bounded by impenetrable borders.
The impact of industrialisation and urbanisation, the
 commodification of relations, the differential incorporation of
different groups within the labour market and the penetration of the
institutions of the state at all levels of civic culture, have placed people
into complex relations with each other.

Difference, as a principle, can be dangerous to a politics of tolerance. Difference as a
principle, that carries rewards, is a recipe for 'fixing' what should be fluid. Harvey
(1992:345), too, obliquely noted this danger: 'reproduction of the social and symbolic
order through the exploration of difference and "otherness" is all too evident in the
climate of postmodernism' (emphasis added). Rather, we should simultaneously allow
'hybridity' (Salman Rushdie and Stuart Hall's term, see Hall, 1992:310-4; and see
Laclau, 1990) and change.

Mary C Waters, after studying United States census returns and following these up
with interviews, commented:

... people's belief that racial or ethnic categories are biological, fixed
attributes of individuals does have an influence on their ethnic
identities. This popular understanding of ethnicity means that people
behave as if it were an objective fact even when their own ethnicity is
highly symbolic. This belief that ethnicity is biologically based acts as
a constraint on the ethnic choices of some Americans, but there is nonetheless a range of latitude available in deciding how to identify oneself and whether to do so in ethnic terms (1990:18, emphasis original).

Her study displays the great flexibility and the choices that are made in a society where ethnicity may very well be the basis of discrimination, but is not often a matter of life and death. Such flux occurs even when people were not themselves conscious that they were making a range of selections in employing ethnic identities. The choices became apparent in the recounting of ethnic identities in the interviews Waters conducted.

This point needs to be expanded upon. Patrick Wright (1985:26), in the stimulating book I have referred to already, wrote of the task of examining British conservative glorification of 'living in old country':

If we are to consider this Conservative nation carefully, it must surely be with a view to discovering other possible articulations of cultural particularity, articulations which are respectful of the heterogeneity of contemporary society and also capable of making a coherent political principle of difference (emphasis added).

He captures here two desirable movements within society: the first is to acknowledge the need for and make 'a coherent political principle of difference', while the second argues against a 'privileged national identity' which does not allow variety. I have argued, through positing a difference between ethnic social identities (Wright's 'cultural particularity') and the (frequently cynical) political manipulation of such ethnic identities, that 'respect' lies in removing ethnic identities from political reward and competition, and opening identities to change and contestation. The 'coherence' of a 'political principle of difference' cannot lie in reifying difference, but in allowing difference the freedom for both expression and for change.

Salman Rushdie, in a British Channel 4 television programme entitled 'Fin de Siècle: the end of history?' (a five-part series shown between 28 January and 3 June 1992), with Stuart Hall and French philosopher Alain Finkielkraut, said that he did not 'accept any notion of pure cultures... I did not experience the West only when I came to Britain'. Rushdie asked that we 'celebrate' the notion of 'cultural impurity', and noted that the new only came from 'fusion and hybridisation'.
However, on the other hand, on this tight-rope it also demands a simultaneous commitment within the field of the 'national' - the field that demands a level of political coherence, the field of competition for resources - that ethnicity be 'taken seriously'. The celebration of 'impure cultures' should not blind us to the fact that there are different impurities, and that most often people live with the perceptions of clear boundaries enclosing 'pure' and recognisable difference - the perceptions of 'biological' identities that Waters (1990) found. This is especially important in the areas where cultural resources are at stake (the obvious being language, education, religion), and where regional (and hence potentially ethnic or racialised) allocation of material welfare is decided - I have argued that ethnicity can easily be linked to region, to territory, where the effects of uneven development are felt and are open to (mis)interpretation into the ethnic field. After all, uneven development is a social phenomenon expressed on the regional plane (it involves people and their conditions of life). In South Africa the regional plane was for decades shaped in racialised and ethnic terms (see Maré, 1995; Robinson, 1990). The sedimentation of place-bound identity was confirmed or laid during this period, leaving the most unexpected continuities into a democratic South Africa.

The direction of a solution?

It is essential that a clear response to ethnic diversity in South Africa be articulated. It cannot be left simply to the participants in the political field of constitution writing. That field is already partly tainted for constructive discussions of difference (certainly that of ethnicity, and even possibly that of class), and the exclusive or predominant location of such discussion there presupposes that the solution must be struggled for in the realm of formal national politics. That is precisely what apartheid had made of ethnicity, and that is where Inkatha leadership still locates the struggle over 'Zuluness'. At present there is little sign that any coherent response is being formulated, or even that debate is being initiated. There are many signs of the continuation of political conflict that directly and indirectly relates to difference, and not only around the violence that in part flows from ethnicity as crudely mobilised as in KwaZulu-Natal. The issues of 'tradition' and 'traditional authority' in several provinces, regional powers, border disputes, the volkstaat, coloured, Nama and Griqua identity, are just some of the tensions that exist.

What is 'cultural particularity... articulated according to democratic principles' (Wright, 1985:255); what is a 'principle of diversity' that is not conflictual? Years after these comments Patrick Wright again referred to this dilemma, this time in a review of
Mordecai Richler's book on Quebec separatism:

Richler's story... provides a timely account of the follies of trying to conjure politics out of cultural roots.

He has no alternative scenarios to offer Quebec, and readers will search his book in vain for thoughts on how democratic politics might arrive at a more adequate accommodation of national and cultural diversity (Wright, 1992).

I have already suggested several answers, albeit tentatively, for in this field little certainty is possible. Let me, in conclusion, pull them together. I do not for one moment wish to diminish the probably insurmountable, at least in the short- and medium-term, obstacles within the contemporary world marked by violently conflictual particularities, of 'enclave communities', in Stuart Hall's vivid description in the television programme referred to above. In a way my argument is addressed in the first place to South Africa, a society in violent, but nonetheless hopeful, social transition, reflecting both inherited and new rigidities, but also a large degree of flux and possibility.

The first is to maintain the distinction between politicised ethnicity and ethnic social identities. While those two are conflated in analysis, in the media, and in policy and constitution-making there is no prospect of resolving conflict. With the near-exclusive presentation in political thinking and contestation, in the media, and in every-day common-sense, of ethnicity only as political identity comes an image of unchangeability, of inflexibility and of exclusivity.

As argued above, this approach of maintaining a distinction between the two fields of the operation of identities depends on the continuous extension of democracy and the rights of citizenship, as encompassing political, civil and social rights. Bottomore located his discussion of democracy specifically within the conflicts and constraints of class society. However, in referring to the work of Joseph Schumpeter on democracy, he made a comment that has direct bearing on my argument here:

What Schumpeter [in his Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy] called the 'classical doctrine' of democracy... conceives democracy as a historical movement which aims constantly to extend the area within which members of a society can govern themselves by participating fully and freely in the regulation of their collective life (1993:18).
To once more refer to the Hall, Rushdie, Finkelkraut debate, they called for 'sharing the world through public space', through democracy, a space where dialogue takes place, where 'people quarrel, collide with each other...'; a dialogue that is 'unafraid'; a dialogue where all that is excluded is 'incitement' (read, in my words, the exclusion of crude antagonistic politicaisation and rigidification of group identities). Amy Gutman, in her discussion of the issue of limits on 'the legitimate demands for political recognition of particular cultures' (1992:5) and limits on free speech, suggested the need to distinguish between 'toleration' and 'respect':

Toleration extends to the widerst range of views, so long as they stop short of threats and other direct and discernible harms to individuals. Respect is far more discriminating. Although we need not agree with a position to respect it, we must understand it as reflecting a moral point of view... A multicultural society is bound to include a wide range of such moral disagreements (as on legalizing abortion), which offers us the opportunity to defend our views before morally serious people with whom we disagree and thereby learn from our differences. In this way, we can make a virtue out of the necessity of our moral disagreements (1992:22).

I argue that while acknowledging that discrimination and exploitation can be related to structural and group dynamics, this cannot be resolved through incorporating groups into constitutional politics. Such privileged political access freezes the definitions of group identity propagated by the most powerful, and of the moment.

The second answer lies in extending the solidarities caused by, and addressing the material stratificiation and practices of domination and exploitation associated with structural and structured divisions within society, especially those of gender, class, ethnicity, and of 'race'. These solidarities must be debated and opposed within social movements that have an identity and a space that is not encompassed by the formal political processes, even though they will most frequently be directed at those processes. The 'green' movement is a very good case in point, where there have been few cases of successful 'green' parties, but a large measure of success in fighting environmental issues and introducing environmental concerns into formal political processes (Germany serves as an example).

It is in addressing the structural horizontal interests in society, primarily those of class, gender and 'race', and making that the fundamental task (overcoming class exploitation, poverty, inequality, gender domination, and 'race' discrimination), and
organising and appealing to people around the profound injustices of apartheid and the economic system it protected and advanced, and their abolition, that a way beyond the strength of ethnicity lies.

These issues have a reality, even if they cannot compete with ethnicity as a mobilising package, and should not try to do so. When demands and commitments are made for certain proportions of representatives to be women, this does not arise out of a gendered identity but out of the stratified position occupied by women in society. Similarly, class identity (despite the attempts to advance a ‘working class culture’) does not ring with the same clarity as ‘the past’ in ethnic mobilisation, does not exist primarily on the symbolic level of cultural signs, is shaped as a collectivity in the hidden (albeit brutally real) connection of labour. Nonetheless, the inequalities, anti-democratic practices and exclusions of a class-structured, a capitalist society, serve as a powerful rallying point across the ethnic divide. In the case of ‘race’ it is not as easy to draw the distinction between resistance to exploitation and politicisation of identity. The proximity of ‘race’ to ethnic political mobilisation has been noted. For this reason ‘race’ may well serve to rigidify the types of identities that need to be diluted. A corrective policy based on unexamined notions of ‘race’ contains dangers of mirroring the old (apartheid) order, while class divisions within racialised and ethnic collectivities introduce new and fundamental fissures that have to be noted in analysis.

Third, flexibility, ‘impurity’ and ‘hybridity’ must be introduced into the way in which the politics of diversity is approached. For example, in a small way the manner in which history is taught, as representing contesting interpretations, can weaken the rigid interpretation of ‘the past’ or conflicts between different rigid ‘pasts’. Thus, something as obvious as a gender-sensitive reconstruction of historical processes and events shows that the apparent clarities of most ‘history’ hide a multitude of exclusions of people and power relations, most often of the role of women and the domination of men over women. In turn, this approach, as discussed in chapter three, introduces fractures into the apparent solidity of ethnic (or ‘racial’) mobilisatory discourses.

When it comes to the use made of history and the essence of a sense of origin to shape and motivate for an ethnic group identity, the task of responding to this phenomenon is equally difficult. Great sensitivity will have to be shown in ‘expanding’ a nationally-propagated history - disseminated through the media, through education, through the practice of statecraft - a sensitivity that does not allow for a new ‘truth’. If I can once again refer to Patrick Wright:
Far from being somehow 'behind' the present, the past exists as an accomplished presence in public understanding. In this sense it is written into present social reality, not just implicitly as residue, precedent or custom and practice, but explicitly as itself - as History. National Heritage and Tradition (1985:142).

He refers to attempts to separate history as an intellectual process ('the endeavour to establish the truth of earlier events -') from 'the past' ('a more mythical complex inherent in the present as a "created ideology with a purpose"'); to the task of cutting 'through the ideological mists of the "past" and in this way contribute to changing the political agenda of the present'.

Wright suggests that there are pointers as to how this might be undertaken. For example, 'the "past" has been substantially rearranged so that it now contains a wider acknowledgement of, for instance, women and the working class' (1985:142). Through such expansion of 'the past' other groups (social identities) can be given a presence that is wider than ethnic particularity, or ethnicity can be made more complex by looking at the class, age and gender divisions within that identity. The story is multi-layered. Criticism of 'the past' should, however, not be detrimental to 'everyday historical consciousness - of stories, memory and vernacular interpretations...' (Wright, 1985:143), that form an essential part of social life.

Furthermore, it is not possible (appealing as it might be) simply to offer an alternative to the 'wrong' history presented in the ethnic 'past'. Wright warns against such treatment of 'national (ethnic in our case) traditions and institutions as if they were merely contested items in a claim over inheritance. They have no such singularity and come with whole philosophies of history attached' (1985:155, emphasis added; see my discussion of Mzala, 1988, above). Edward Said wrote that:

What matters a great deal more than the stable identity kept current in official discourse is the contestatory force of an interpretative method whose material is the disparate, but intertwined and interdependent, and above all, overlapping streams of historical experience (1994:378).

I argued for the complex interaction of the past, of cultural uniqueness, and of group boundaries in coming to an understanding of ethnicity. To tackle one aspect is to sever one head of the dragon, and, to continue with the metaphor, it is to ignore the environment in which the dragon has thrived.
In line with the argument put forward in chapter three it is essential to recognise that as little as there is homogeneity within social identities, there is as little justification in acting as though each individual

... simply (falls) into one definition or another; more typically in politics, each of us flits through a number of identities, forming and reforming tentative alliances that may not survive the issue at hand.

And just as well, for one common thread that links sexism, racism, nationalism and religious bigotry is the defining of self and others by a single characteristic and being able to see nothing more... The notion that our politics (or our social lives) can simply reflect one of our identities seems implausible in the extreme (Phillips, 1991:155).

Fourth, as many arenas as possible for the non-confictual expression of diversity must be created. Education is at the centre of creating such space, the space of the democratic 'bazaar', with its jostling, quarreling and collisions; with its hubbub of many voices. It has to be a politics of interactive diversity, and not a politics of singularity, or of a new conformity and rigidity, albeit expressed in more encompassing terms than those of apartheid. As Amanda Gouws writes:

The more our society claims to be gender- and race-blind, the more the issues of similarity and difference will plague us... We will have to learn to deal with the divides, to understand and honour the safe spaces and to come to grips with our own racist and sexist selves. But most of all we have to teach each other about our different ways and our different oppressions (Gouws, 1993:69).

The same issue is addressed in a different context but in a similar way by Amy Gutman (1992:3): '...it is hard to find a democratic society these days that is not the site of some significant controversy over whether and how its public institutions should better recognize the identities of cultural and disadvantaged minorities'. She makes the point that it refers not only to minorities, but also to women. However, the recognition is not just of diversity, as though each exists in a distinct cultural cocoon, but of the porous boundaries and myriad interactions and influences between people in their personal as well as social identities.

Said, once again, argued that 'we are mixed in with one another in ways that most national systems of education have not dreamed of'. He concludes that '(t)o match knowledge in the arts and sciences with these integrative realities is, I believe, the intellectual challenge of moment' (1994:401).
A concern with the destructive consequences of the multiplicity of mobilised identities in the wake of the collapse of several meta-narratives shapes Ernesto Laclau’s (1993) argument for a new universal to overcome the antagonistic particularities of the post-modern world. In the introductory essay to a collection he edited (Laclau (ed), 1994:4-5) he repeats this call when he refers to ‘the question of the relation between proliferation of particularisms and decline of universal values’. Raising this question does not mean a return of...

... the idea of a subject which, in its own particularity, incarnates the universal as such - as, for instance, the ‘universal class’ in Marx - (which) is definitely on the wane. And, in actual fact, there is little to regret in that loss. The notion of a subject that is, by itself, pure and universal human essence, is profoundly anti-democratic and can only be accompanied by a disrespect for all forms of particularism. Does this mean that the only alternative is a particularism which disregards all universal values and opens the way to various kinds of xenophobic exclusivism? That this is a real possibility is convincing enough... But I do not think that these are the only alternatives. For the very emergence of highly particularistic identities means that the particular groups will have to coexist with other groups in larger communities, and this coexistence will be impossible without the assertion of values that transcend the identities of all of them... a universality that is the very result of particularism. It is, in this sense, far more democratic... clearly, it is something worth fighting for (emphasis added).

What Laclau suggests is that the transcending values will lie in defining the relationship between particularisms and ‘larger communities’, and grounding that relationship in ‘rights’.

What are these larger communities, what are the particularisms we speak of, and what is that (democratic) relationship? The particular answers are to be found in specific contexts, but the start would be to accept the framework within which these questions are asked. I have also argued that the ethnic particularism is an articulation of aspects (such as class and gender and age) that could be identities themselves at appropriate, and at times inappropriate moments.

Finally, to bring these various approaches together in the field of political contestation requires an organising principle that lies in citizenship (and the civil, political
and social rights implied by this notion) and democracy. 'Democracy', as should be clear, needs to be defined in its broad sense as the manner of facilitating decision-making following the so-called 'rules of the game' (see Bobbio, 1987) based on the notion of citizenship, leading to an ever-widening sphere of control over one's own life. It is through the ideal of the equality conferred by citizenship, with its three component parts of civil, political and social rights, that the participants of the democratic process are in the first instance defined. It is through the rights of citizenship that the freedom of group association within society should be ensured; that the struggle towards the widest level of participation should take place; that the tolerance for dissenting positions and difference should be protected and cultivated; that discrimination and exploitation be countered; and that universal and interactive characteristics be cherished as well as that which is exclusive, 'own', and defining. Democracy, in this case, does not equal just a vote, but a voice: a voice in dialogue, receiving and being received with respect.

With Peter Høeg's Miss Smilla I must conclude on this subject:

Tell us, they'll come and say to me. So we may understand and close the case. They're wrong. It's only what you do not understand that you can come to a conclusion about. There will be no conclusion (1994:410).

It is not a conceit but an acknowledgement that the complexity of the subject matter does not allow a conclusion to what is a process of social interaction, struggle and change, a permanent debate.
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