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This research project explores the relevance of the available urban political geographic literature to understanding mobilization that occurred in opposition to rent increases, and the proposed alteration of a national political boundary in the urban black township of Lamontville. A theoretical extension to the available literature was proposed. The choice of methods of investigation, was informed by the need for geography to be more relevant to the present political climate evident on the urban terrain, as well as the theoretical necessity to interact with individual intellectuals of the organization. As such direct and indirect methods of investigation and data gathering were utilized. These included Participant Observation, In-depth Focus Interviews and a Content Analysis of the media. In the course of investigation it proved enlightening to move beyond the conventional subject/object dichotomy to engage in the moment of reflexive activity (Willis, 1976).

The research clarified that the theoretical and methodological innovations suggested were necessary; if the process embodied by the organization was to be understood; if geography was to be capable of contributing to such an understanding; and if this understanding was to be relevant and informative to the investigated organization.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

More than a decade ago Harvey (1973), in a critical assessment of the status of geography in general, and urban geography in particular, asserted that:

"there is a clear disparity between the sophisticated theoretical and methodological framework which we are using and our ability to say anything really meaningful about events as they unfold around us" (Harvey, 1973:128)

Following from this:

"It is the emerging objective social conditions and our patent inability to cope with them which essentially explains the necessity for a revolution in geographic thought" (Harvey, 1973:129)

Together, these statements form the fundamental point of departure for this thesis. Expressions of "organic crisis" (Saul and Gelb, 1981) presently besetting South Africa are manifest to a large degree in various processes of opposition within South African cities, and more specifically urban black townships. Urban, and more specifically urban political geographers, however, have provided small measure of analytical understanding of the dynamics, and thus the possible significance, of these processes. The objective of this thesis is, to provide an empirical investigation guided by theoretical and methodological innovations beyond those presently being utilized within urban and urban political geography, in order that a more meaningful understanding of the urban manifestations of the crisis noted above can be achieved.

It is pertinent at this juncture to draw attention to the contradictory nature of the relevance crisis of geography. Following from this, it will be useful to explore the possible origins of the contradiction between the crisis on the ground in South Africa and the relevance crisis of geography as a discipline. This should be instructive as to how the relevance crisis might be overcome. In the first instance the specific location of processes of opposition within urban space, suggests that urban geographers, and more particularly urban political geographers, should be capable of generating enhanced understanding of the presently
urban focussed political crisis. Moreover, the fact that a major concern of traditional geography - that of rents, - often constitutes a central 'issue' within these opposition processes, reinforces the above suggestion. It has, however, been observed that urban political geographers have as yet had little to offer in this regard. It is suggested here that the origin of such a contradiction can be found by examining the nature of the paradigm shift of Anglo-American geographical theory, as represented by Harvey and Castells, since South African urban geographers derive much of their understanding from these sources.

Urban geography's inability to contribute substantially to an understanding of the existing social conditions in the urban realm gave rise to a revolution in geographic thought away from the postivist mainstream. Consequently urban geography was reconstituted as urban political geography through its location within the Marxist-structuralist paradigm. The urban form became understood as an integral and necessary, structurally determined component of the capitalist mode of production. Cities represented units of reproduction (Harvey, 1978a; 1978b; 1982) and in the case of Castells (1977; 1978a; 1978b), units of collective consumption. Having located the 'structural necessity' of urban form, issues such as rent were theorized purely in capitalist economic terms (Harvey, 1978a) such that opposition to the capitalist urban form, and phenomenon such as rents arising from this form, became understood as urban social movements (Castells, 1977). The relevance of these movements, in turn, is decided in terms of whether or not they can modify the power relations of the structurally defined state.

Having significantly re-directed urban geographical thought to the essentially politicized nature of the urban terrain, urban political geography remains frustrated in its ultimate ability to address the highly problematic urban phenomena in existence. It is argued here that the frustration remains due to the structural nature of the marxist understanding offered since this emphasis gives rise to two major effects. In the first instance the all determining nature of the structures inevitably implies the rejection of human dynamics or, in Gregory's (1981) terminology, 'Human agency'. Secondly the urban becomes an epiphenomenon (Gregory and Urry (eds), 1985) which, while being retained as a unit of analysis, cannot be theoretically retained as a component in the analysis (Saunders, 1985), since the urban
represents only an outcome (Soja, 1985) of structurally determined macro processes of the capitalist mode of production (Saunders, 1985). It becomes evident that urban political geography, located in the Marxist-structuralist paradigm retained, and possibly reinforced, the subject/object dichotomy essential to the previously rejected positivist paradigm. The urban then is an object of analysis. Moreover, one cannot interact with people in the hope of creating a "peoples' geography" (Harvey, 1983) since people do not enter into the analysis.

If this thesis is to successfully develop an understanding of an urban social movement and the issues it confronts on the urban terrain, the urban under examination must constitute a subject in the study such that it represents not only the outcome of the forces noted above, but a medium with which people interact such that:

"spatial structures and relations are the material form of social structures and relations" (Soja, 1985:94).

This is not to reject the important structural determination of the urban and related phenomena but to reject the primacy of these structures through a re-assertion of the importance of dialectical interaction where:

"spatial structure is now seen not merely as an arena in which social life unfolds, but rather as a medium through which social relations are produced and reproduced" (Gregory and Urry, 1985:3).

1.1 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

This study, as suggested by the title, focusses its attention on one black township in Durban - Lamontville. It is important, however, to take cognizance of McCarthy's (1983a) model which identifies three phases of state intervention into the South African urban fabric. From this model it is evident that the creation of the urban terrain in respect of blacks has on a national basis, represented much the same process that we shall uncover in Lamontville. As such the case study of Lamontville, while making no claims of being representative of all South African urban black townships should be seen as not dissimilar from these townships. Moreover, Lamontville, as was suggested in the opening paragraphs, is not alone as regards the manifestation of crisis on the specific urban terrain that it constitutes. After all, the
events which led up to the government proclamation of a State of Emergency in 1985 centered largely upon rent boycotts in the Transvaal area. This point is not explicitly developed in the text since this would detract from the focus of the discussion. It should however be kept in mind when the specifics of the Lamontville terrain are examined.

1.2 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY: AN OVERVIEW

The study is organized such that questions of theory and methodology, since they guide the empirical study, are presented in Chapters 2 and 3. Following from this the remaining chapters present the empirical material concerning the case study of Lamontville.

The theoretical foundations for the study are developed in Chapter 2. In so doing a critique of Castells' Marxist-structuralist theorization of urban social movements is carried out. This critique identifies several structurally determined, and thus assumed, 'moments' and argues that greater understanding might be achieved if these moments are granted theoretical and empirical attention. Since urban geography is found to provide some theoretical understanding of two of the identified moments - social base and levels of government, it remains to elaborate theoretical understanding of the process embodied by an urban social movement. This is achieved through Gramsci's (1971) theoretical conceptualization of intellectuals and their role within the process of organization. Understanding an urban social movement as a process involving human agency gives rise to questions of methodological import which are addressed in Chapter 3. The discussion begins by noting the domination of geographical research methodology by the positivist mainstream which, through its fundamental separation of subject and object, precludes the possibility of interacting dialectically with intellectuals involved in the process of organization. Several direct and indirect methods of investigation which permit interaction, are proposed as a means of investigating the organization. Ultimately however, it is noted that to achieve a full understanding one must move beyond the methods themselves to engage in the subjective moment of reflexivity (Willis, 1976).

Chapter 4 initiates the empirical investigation through a brief description of the historical development of Lamontville. This historical
discussion informs an understanding of the specifics of the existing urban terrain examined in Chapter 5. Here, the discussion focusses on the moments previously structurally assumed by Castells (1977). As such, elements of the 'social base' are elaborated, as is the relevant level of local government. In the course of the elaboration of these previously structurally determined and thus assumed levels, the importance of the elaboration becomes apparent. One finds, for example that rent, determined purely in terms of economic relations, is not sufficient since it becomes clear in the discussion that rent is defined through the medium of the objective urban terrain and the levels of government.

The empirical discussion of Chapter 4 and 5, together with the theoretical conceptions proposed in Chapter 2, informs the analysis of the urban social movement - the Joint Rent Action Committee (JORAC) - which was found to exist in Lamontville. The analysis as set out in chapter 6 begins with a brief description of the issues as defined by the levels of government. Analysis then proceeds to a description of the initial development of the urban social movement. The process embodied by the urban social movement is analyzed with reference to four differing organizational forms that were adopted. Chapter 6 concludes by explicitly relating the theoretical proposals advanced in Chapter 2 to the empirical process examined.

The final chapter returns to the content of this introductory chapter in order to assess whether or not the stated aims have been satisfied, and to deliberate on the possible significance of the decision reached in this regard.
CHAPTER 2

URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND INTELLECTUALS - A THEORETICAL DISCUSSION

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The title of the thesis suggests that the subdisciplinary focus is urban political geography. To this end, the theoretical literature to be discussed in this chapter conceptualizes the necessarily political nature of the urban. Theoretical attention, however, is concentrated on the social movements that arise from the contradictory nature of the terrain under consideration. Criticisms of mainstream Marxist-structuralist theory, together with theorizations of the dimension of intellectuals and human agency completes the working theoretical base for this thesis. The theoretical base serves to inspire a reconceptualization of the terrain of urban politics. A reconceptualization moreover that must be "filled in, revised and developed to meet the imperatives of new conditions" (Boggs, 1976:20).

This chapter commences with a critical discussion of Castells' (1977) and Harvey's (1978a; 1978b; 1982) Marxist-structuralist understanding of cities. Following from this, Castells' (1977) theorization of urban social movements, criticisms levelled at this theorization, as well as several typologies of such movements, are elaborated. Gramsci's (1971) writings on intellectuals are proposed as a means of theorizing the elements that are perceived to be lacking. Finally, an integration of the literature reviewed is offered.

2.2 DELIMITING THE URBAN: THE MARXIST-STRUCTURALIST PERSPECTIVE

Castells' (1977; 1983) theory of urban social movements has come to occupy a central position within contemporary urban political geography (Cox, 1985; McCarthy and Swilling, 1984). The urban is specified in the first instance, argues Castells (1977) at the level of the economic. Castells' (1977) theory was advanced within the historically specific context of France in the 1960. The expression of space within the South African city, however, represents an integration of the ideology
of race and the more 'pure' economic forces of capitalism (Davies, 1974; McCarthy and Smit, 1984); and this leads to an analytical distinction between 'legal space' and 'illegal space' in the more recent work of Marxist urban scholars (Cooper, 1983).

Once specified by the economic instance, Castells (1977) emphasizes the consumption oriented nature of urban space or the built environment (Harvey, 1978b); that is, space oriented to the reproduction of labour power (Castells, 1977). In particular Castells (1977) emphasizes certain urban elements (housing, transport, services, facilities, education) that must be collectively rather than individually consumed. This leads to his emphasis upon the politics of collective consumption (Dunleavy, 1979).

Harvey (1978a; 1978b; 1981) complements Castells' theory (1977), but seeks to situate the politics of collective consumption within a more general theory of the role of the built environment in the contradictions of advanced capitalism. For Harvey (1978b:9) the built environment is subject to a range of contradictory material interests:

- "A faction of capital seeking the appropriation of rent either directly (as landlords, property companies, and so on) or indirectly (as financial intermediaries or others who invest in property simply for a rate of return);

- a faction of capital seeking interest and profit by building new elements in the built environment (the construction interests);

- capital "in general", which looks upon the built environment as an outlet for surplus capital and as a bundle of use values for enhancing the production and accumulation of capital; and

- labor, which uses the built environment as a means of consumption and as a means for its own reproduction."

Harvey (1978a) suggests that overaccumulated capital must be invested with a view to the expansion of capital, thereby ensuring the overall reproduction of the capitalist mode of production. The problem is that workers' housing, together with a variety of urban fabric essential to the reproduction of the labour force (Lojkine, 1976) cannot yield a satisfactory rate of profit for individual capitalists (Harvey, 1978a; 1981). Capital's conseq-
uent underinvestment in this sphere is problematic from the point of view of the reproduction of labour power. It is the state, conceptualized as executing its structurally determined role of serving the long term interests of capital (Poulantzas, 1973) that intervenes in the general circulation of capital to provide the goods necessary to labour, and thereby capital's reproduction (Harvey, 1978a). The elaboration of this scheme in Castells' (1977) and Harvey's (1978a; 1978b; 1981) work however, holds only for advanced capitalist societies. It fails to explicate such intervention in countries such as South Africa, as it lacks an element of historicity which might explain the underlying dynamics of such intervention. For this reason McCarthy (1983a) develops a model which, by assuming class struggle as the 'motor' of the urban political process, allows a more historically specific conception of state intervention into the economic rhythms of production and reproduction in the city. According to this point of view, state intervention into the sphere of reproduction in cities creates a set of potential struggles over the 'social wage'.

The social wage is expressed in the form of so-called public goods (McCarthy and Smit, 1984). The worker is paid a minimal wage in the workplace (Harvey, 1978a) which is complemented by the social wage received and consumed collectively in the living place. The social wage is derived, argues Erwin (1985), through state taxation of capital's surplus together with state taxation of workers's wages (see also McCarthy and Smit, 1984). The accuracy of this theorization within the South African context will be contested in the course of empirical discussion. Since rapid accumulation of capital by the owners of the means of production is apparently fuelled by minimizing the social wage (Erwin, 1985), the proportion of such a wage ultimately accruing to workers is continually contested through engagement in various forms of class struggle (Smit, 1983).

2.3 URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

It is these forms of struggle/mobilization that form the central domain of the present work. To concretise this domain Castells' (1977) work, together with the critical literature surrounding this pathbreaking work, form the basis of discussion. The focus on Castells' earlier (1977)
work is a deliberate one given the essentially descriptive nature of Castells' (1983) more recent comparative studies which tend to focus on spatial structures and geographical variability in the minutiae of movement characteristics rather than the structural possibilities of mobilization on urban terrain.

Castells (1977) notes that while state intervention resolves a moment of crisis within the process of capitalist accumulation, politicization of the resultant sphere of collective consumption positions the state centrally in relation to any conflict emanating from the urban terrain. The consequent movements are thus also politicized and constitute an axis of social change. With such structural effects the conflict assumes the proportions of an urban social movement, defined as

"A system of practices resulting from the articulation of a conjuncture of the system of urban agents and of other social practices in such a way that its development tends objectively towards the structural transformation of the urban system or towards a substantial modification of the power relations in the class struggle, that is to say, in the last resort, in the power of the state" (Castells, 1977: 263).

Failure to encompass the above effect through, partly, a divorce of urban and social issues, renders the movement reformist (Castells, 1977). Of major import in Castells' (1977) schema, therefore, are the nature of the issues engendering mobilization and the nature of effects produced. As such the internal dynamics of the organization effecting mobilization are not under direct scrutiny.

"For who are these 'actors'? Can they be defined in themselves, without reference to the social content that they express? ... it is by situating the elements of social structure in a prior theoretical context that one will succeed in making significant the practices concretely observed and then, and only then, can one rediscover this supposed 'autonomy' of the 'actors', that is to say, their determination at a second level, by virtue of the fact of the specific combination of the practices that are produced in a conjuncture. That is to say, the social meaning of the actors is re-discovered as the result of research, and not as the original source of a vital flow which, in spreading outwards, creates social forms" (Castells, 1977: 251)

Yet at the same time the fact that the organizations' existence expresses and articulates structural contradictions is of essence to the theory of
urban social movements. The unarticulated organization must exist as its absence gives rise to either a refraction of urban contradictions through other, probably reformist organizations or the experience of urban contradictions in a 'wild' manner.

"When there is no organization, urban contradictions are expressed ..., in a 'wild' way, a pure contradiction devoid of any structural horizon" (Castells, 1977:271-272).

This 'wild' expression is exemplified, for example in so called 'crime' which, argues Castells (1976:14, emphasis added) is an "individual reaction against structural oppression coupled with the absence of a stable mass-based political alternative".

At this juncture a brief critique and elaboration of the above formulations are necessary. Pickvance (1976) and Dunleavy (1977) argue that Castells' (1977) adherence to the Poulantzian (1973) view of the state gives rise to the proposition that, since fundamental changes are effected only through urban social movement pressure, research initiatives should concentrate on this level. This could engender unidirectional investigation focussing on the protest level, which neglects theoretical and empirical attention with respect to the state and para-statal structures (Pickvance, 1976; Dunleavy, 1977). The latter are acknowledged to the degree that each movement causes a counter movement on the part of the system, which either represses or integrates. All else, however, remains assumed (Pickvance, 1978).

Pickvance (1976) and Dunleavy (1977) argue, moreover, that the emphasis on the salience of issues and concomitant effects is limiting, and results in insufficient analytical attention being directed at the process of mobilization. This neglect, in turn, means that little attention is directed at existing conditions of the social base, beyond a demographic assessment of its revolutionary potential. In particular the conditions under which an organization is successfully implanted, as well as its subsequent organizational dynamics are left unexamined. Moreover Castells (1977) provides no understanding as to how, given the existence of salient issues and a potentially revolutionary social base, an urban social movement develops. This glaring omission leaves one to assume that "the social force appears from the social base at the wave of a magic wand" (Pickvance, 1978:179).
The structurally oriented theoretical arguments regarding urban social movements above are complemented by the more practical typologies of urban movements offered by Borja (1977), Walton (1979) and Castells (1983). More specifically Borja (1977) isolates a range of urban movements developing in response to specific urban phenomena. McCarthy and Smit (1984) investigate the applicability of Borja's (1977) formulations within the South African context. The former's findings indicate that Borja's (1977) typologies are useful in describing the range of urban movements taking place on South Africa's urban terrain.

Castells (1983), while emphasising that any structural formula must be historically specific, proceeds to develop a typology based on similarities that exist within the case studies of urban social movements examined in his work. This typology of urban social movements is such that they must display an interconnection of three basic goals if they wish to accomplish significant changes in "urban meaning" (Castells, 1983). The basic goals are:

- demands focussed on collective consumption.
- territorially based defence of cultural identity.
- political self management.

In mobilizing for these goals the movement must be conscious of its role as an urban social movement. Moreover it must be connected to society through the medium of organizational operators. Particularly important in this regard are the media, professionals and political parties. Urban social movements must, however, maintain political and organizational autonomy from any political party they might be linked to.

This typology of goals, McCarthy (1985) argues, adequately describes the urban protest movements that can be presently observed in South African cities. Nevertheless, Castells (1983) does not take the typology further and rigorously connect it to theories of broader political organization and social change (see also Pickvance 1984 and 1985).

A more general typology of urban movements is found in Walton's (1979) thesis that such movements embody one of two programmes. They are labelled 'clientist' when needs are defined in terms of what the state has to offer, and 'autonomous' when the strategic agenda is determined independently of what the state deems appropriate. Walton (1979) asserts that autonomous movements' 'revolutionary' potential cannot be achieved
outside the context of a revolutionary national movement.

The literature described so far provides foundations upon which an understanding of the case study can be elaborated. This literature, addressing the theorization of urban social movements has informed implicitly or explicitly, the South African literature that examines this prevalent form of protest in South African cities (Bozzoli, 1979; Stadler, 1979; Bloch, 1981; Cooper and Ensor, 1981; Dyason 1984; Lodge, 1983; McCarthy, 1983a; Smit, 1983; McCarthy and Smit, 1984; McCarthy and Swilling, 1984; Robinson, 1984; Swilling, 1984; Wheeler, 1984; McCarthy, 1985; Smit, 1985).

The importance of this literature to furthering an understanding of urban protest movements in South Africa is indisputable. Nevertheless the existing South African literature shows, as in Castells (1977), minimal concern for a theorization of the movements themselves.

2.4 GRAMSCI AND 'INTELLECTUALS'

While fetishization of an organization's form detracts from the conceptualization of an organization as a process (Gramsci, 1971), it is suggested here that theorization and elaboration of the organization could enhance Castells' (1977) conceptions as presented above. It is specifically postulated here that Gramsci's (1971) theorization of intellectuals, their location within societal structure and their organizational role, facilitates a conceptualization of the organizational dimension of urban social movements. Understanding of Gramsci's (1971) concept of intellectuals necessitates elaboration upon his ideas of 'hegemony' and 'force'. Hegemony refers to:

"The 'spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group" (Gramsci, 1971:12)

Hegemony is operationalized within civil society (schools, churches, media etc.) by organic intellectuals of the dominant class. Force, including direct domination and judicial government, is located within political society or the state, defined as:

"The apparatus of state coercive power which 'legally' enforces discipline on those groups who do not consent either actively or passively. This apparatus is, however, constituted for the whole of society in anticipation of moments of crisis of command and direction when spontaneous consent has
failed" (Gramsci, 1971:12).

Anderson (1977) observes that the functions devolved to the superstructural levels as above, do not remain consistent throughout Gramsci's (1971) writings. While Anderson (1976-7) perceives this as indicative of erroneous perception, these 'inconsistencies' should rather be accepted as representing different moments of reality since, as Gramsci (1971) argues, reality produces a wealth of the most bizarre combinations. The crisply stated distinctions between the two spheres are, Texier (1979) maintains, methodologically desirable as distinction facilitates a more satisfactory analysis of reality. The usefulness of such a distinction within the social fabric of South Africa is evident when the simultaneity of the state's extensive use of coercive power and the intimate control over, for example, education and the media is considered (see Tomaselli and Tomaselli, 1985). Moreover, the term state can be utilized in a narrow sense to encapsulate only the dimensions of force or in a broad sense to enable a grasp of the underlying unity of the two spheres (Texier, 1979).

The organic intellectuals of the dominant class then, are the "cog needed to come to grips with the double headed Machiavellian centaur: force and consent, that is the state" (Buci-Glucksman, 1980:38). These intellectuals develop as follows:

"Every social group coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields" (Gramsci, 1971:5).

Organic intellectuals therefore, are not idealistic disinterested creators but are "contaminated by social relations" (Buci-Glucksman, 1980:29). Their distinguishing features lie not in the intrinsic nature of their activities but in the fulfillment of their functions as organic intellectuals (Gramsci, 1971).

"The term intellectual must be taken to mean ... in general the whole social mass that performs functions of organization in the broad sense" (Gramsci cited in Buci-Glucksman, 1980:28).

These organizational capabilites are exerted in order that homogeneity within a class/grouping can be engendered. Organic intellectuals of the
dominant class thus construct, administer and disseminate sciences, art, culture, philosophies and education to constitute a dominant ideology. The dissemination of the ideology intends to persuade the non-dominant (subaltern) class/es/groupings to consent to rule by the dominant force. Without efficient and well directed organizational initiatives, the functions of ideological construction and persuasion cannot be effectively performed. These intellectuals can be described as experts in legitimation (Merrington, 1977) in that the interests of the dominant class are presented (and often accepted) as representing the views of all constituents within society (Karabel, 1976).

Since the study is concerned to examine opposition movements, specifically on the urban terrain, it is to these that attention must be ultimately directed. While Castells (1977) perceived the organization as relevant to the degree that it intervened at the appropriate conjuncture, Gramsci (1971:334) extends the relevance as follows:

"A human mass does not 'distinguish' itself, does not become independent in its own right, without in the widest sense organising itself; and there is no organisation without intellectuals, that is without organisers and leaders, in other words, without the theoretical aspect of the theory-practice nexus being distinguished concretely by the existence of a group of people 'specialised' in conceptual and philosophical elaboration of ideas".

The functions of 'revolutionary' organic intellectuals as conceived by Gramsci (1971) are to:

- arouse the masses from passivity, ie. innovate.
- direct spontaneous energies into various forms of protest.
- educate the masses so as to overcome contradictory consciousness, alienation etc.
- help elaborate a theoretical consciousness of being creators of history.
- combat a sense of naïve fatalism that workers must of necessity, and in time, naturally triumph.

As such intellectuals'* roles are crucial to the creation of any opposition movement that necessarily must produce an alternate hegemony to counter that of the dominant class.

* The remaining discussion refers to 'revolutionary' organic intellectuals.
The intellectuals, argues Gramsci (1971) interact dialectically with the groupings organized such that organization is not imposed. The interrelationship embodies the following dynamics:

"The popular element 'feels' but does not always know or understand; the intellectual element 'knows' but does not always understand and in particular does not always feel. ... The intellectual's error consists in believing that one can know without understanding and even more without feeling and being impassioned. ... One cannot make politics-history without this passion, without this sentimental connection ..." (Gramsci, 1976:418, emphasis added).

The passage above is relevant to the disjuncture between emotive 'wild' urban protest and strategic development of an urban social movement (Castells, 1977; 1978a). The intellectuals' role, then, comprises the guidance of energy through a formalization of the unknown sources of emotional energy (Femia, 1975). A successful interrelationship between intellectuals and the 'popular element' leads to the conversion of structures from an externally crushing force (Gramsci, 1971) to instruments facilitating achievement of desired goods (Bobbio, 1979).

Individual intellectuals are contained within the organizational base which, since it functions as a 'collective intellectual', serves to unite intellectuals stemming from a possible variety of class origins. Gramsci (1971), Bates (1975), Buci-Glucksman (1980) and Sassoon (1980) express their faith in the ability of the organizational base to unite intellectuals of diverse origins. Karabel (1976), however, maintains that intellectual involvement, particularly if from outside of the working class ranks, detracts from the content of the tenet regarding workers' self-emancipation. It is imperative in this regard to recall the dialectical relationship engaged in, and role enacted by, 'revolutionary' organic intellectuals. They do not execute movements on 'behalf' of opposition groupings. Their functions encapsulate guidance such that the culmination is self-emancipation.

There remains, however, both a theoretical and practical problem regarding the articulation of intellectuals from within the ranks of the subaltern classes. Karabel (1976) maintains that since a socialist mode of production is not in evidence, the subaltern classes lack an economic base from which intellectuals can be elaborated. This, however, assumes that only dominant intellectuals can develop from the capitalist economic
base. It is suggested here, together with Williams (1960), that workers constitute a "social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function..." (Gramsci 1971:5) as do the dominant owners of production. As such workers/subaltern groups too are capable of creating "simultaneously, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals" (Gramsci 1971:5).

That practical obstacles do exist is particularly evident given the overwhelming face of the dominant ideology, coupled with the daily struggle for survival. It is important to stress, however, that Gramsci's (1971) conceptualization of intellectuals is not necessarily consistent with the more traditional 'education' oriented conceptualization of intellectuals.

2.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter has revealed, through a critical examination of Marxist-structuralist theorization of urban social movements, inadequate theorization, and research neglect of certain aspects of these movements. Neglected areas include the social base, organizational dynamics and levels of the state. It was found moreover, that both an element of human agency and historical specificity was lacking. The major thrust of the critical observations serve to indicate that allocation of structurally determined roles to certain levels can determine the, possibly misconceived, focus of research at certain levels while leaving crucial specifics assumed. It is suggested that the above mentioned criticisms regarding the theory of urban social movements be incorporated into a revised understanding of such movements.

The elaboration of Gramsci's (1971) concept of intellectuals then, is formulated as a way of introducing human agency and offering theorization of the social force/organization which develops in response to structurally determined crises. Referring to Figure 2.1, the previously assumed levels and characteristics of the theory of urban social movements are summarized in Model one. Model two in Figure 2.1 encompasses the revised understanding of urban social movements. The second model retains what is theorized in the first model, while elaborating those moments that were previously merely assumed, by virtue of their supposed 'structural determination'.
The integration represented by the second model remains incomplete with respect to specific articulations and interrelationships. These are left to be elaborated by historically specific conjunctures which "cannot but be the results of opposing forces in continuous movement, which are never reducible to fixed quantities since within them quantity is continually becoming quality" (Gramsci, 1971:438).

Succeeding chapters will refer to the conceptualizations advanced in Figure 2.1 in order to assess the empirical relevance of their respective propositions. Before such a task can be undertaken, however, there are questions of methodology that require attention.
Figure 2.1: Two Models Illustrating the Assumed and Extended Theoretical Levels of the Relationships between Social Base, Social Force and the State

Model One

STATE

CENTRAL AND LOCAL STATE ARE ASSUMED, A PRIORI, TO FULLFIL STRUCTURALLY DETERMINED REQUIREMENTS. SYSTEMS MAINTENANCE RESPONSE TO SOCIAL FORCE IS STRUCTURALLY ASSUMED

URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENT, STRUCTURAL EFFECTS ALTER STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF THE STATE

NON STRUCTURAL EFFECTS MAINTAIN STATUS QUO

STATE RESPONSE: INTEGRATION/REPRESSION

SPECIFIC EFFECTS DETERMINE CHANGE AT SOCIAL BASE

ORGANIZATION INTERVENES TO EXPRESS AND ARTICULATE STRUCTURAL CONTRACTIONS

INTERVENTION OF ORGANIZATION

CONTRADICTIONS IN STRUCTURALLY ASSUMED SOCIAL BASE GIVE RISE TO ISSUES/STAKES, NATURE OF ISSUES OF VITAL IMPORT TO DETERMINING NATURE OF EFFECTS

SOCIAL FORCE

SOCIAL BASE

Model Two

STATE

CENTRAL AND LOCAL STATE ARE NOT ASSUMED. EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION NECESSARY TO DETERMINE STATE'S RESPONSE TO THE SOCIAL FORCE

URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENT, STRUCTURAL EFFECTS ALTER STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF THE STATE

NON STRUCTURAL EFFECTS NEED NOT BE STATUS QUO MAINTAINING

HISTORICALLY SPECIFIC RESPONSE

SPECIFIC EFFECTS AND SPECIFIC STATE CONJUNCTURE DETERMINE CHANGES AT SOCIAL BASE

ORGANIZATION CONSTITUTING INTELLECTUALS ARTICULATE ISSUES IN RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOCIAL BASE. THE ORGANIZATION REPRESENTS A DYNAMIC PROCESS. INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL BASE AND SOCIAL FORCE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO REALIZATION OF STRUCTURAL EFFECT

INTERRELATIONSHIP

CONTRADICTIONS IN ARTICULATED SOCIAL BASE GIVE RISE TO ISSUES/STAKES. CONDITIONS AT SOCIAL BASE FACILITATE OR DEBILITATE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SOCIAL FORCE

SOCIAL FORCE

SOCIAL BASE
CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

"...every research has its own specific method ..., and ... the method has developed and been elaborated together with the development and elaboration of this specific research ..." (Gramsci, 1971:438).

The character of the present research project, together with the more general location of social scientific research within social relations is from many points of view problematic. A discussion of these problems must thus precede elaboration on the development of specific methodologies for the thesis.

Social science and, more specifically geographic research, is still dominated by the tenets of the positivistic mainstream which adopted and adapted the epistemological, ontological and methodological bases of the natural sciences. Positivism demands that the subject/object dichotomy be adhered to, such that the resultant 'objectivity' engenders a perception of people in society as 'things'. This demands, moreover, a value free, unbiased stance on behalf of the researcher, such that his/her subjectivity does not influence perception of the object under scrutiny. The motivations for carrying out research, ostensibly, are to accumulate facts in order that they can be collated to produce universal laws. Ultimately, such research perpetuates society in its existing state and has thus come to be known as 'counter-revolutionary' (Harvey, 1973; Zelinsky, 1975; Gregory, 1978).

The isolation of the researcher from the object being scrutinized implies a detachment which when combined with a supposed unbiased and value free stance, results in minimal understanding of people interrelating with their social contexts. Consequently the research loses its essentially human character (Filstead, 1970). Researchers inevitably are biased, for, as Gramsci (1971) argues, to live means that one takes sides. It should be self-consciously recognised, moreover, that interest in a particular 'problem' arises both from theoretical awareness (Willis, 1976) and a recognition
of the investigator's role and responsibility in the social relationship of research (Morgan, 1983).

Aspiring to positivistic accumulation of 'facts' in order to effect the creation of laws, can constitute a counter-revolutionary activity, not only because of the subject/object dichotomy, but because the application of such laws requires that people are passive 'things' (Gramsci, 1971; Salamini, 1981). Accompanying law creation is prediction which negates the belief that the outcome of societal contradictions depends on the fluctuation of organized, collective will (Gramsci, 1971).

Given the counter-revolutionary nature of the positivist mainstream, it is argued here that adherence to its criteria results in research which reproduces the status quo. Academics operating within this framework in the social sciences are thus understood to be fulfilling the functions of the dominant class's intellectuals. The persistence of this status quo reproducing research within geography has resulted in a call for a geography more relevant to the crisis of contradiction besetting the subaltern classes (McCarthy, 1983b; Wellings and McCarthy, 1983) such that research constitutes a "peoples geography" (Harvey, 1983). Such a geography should not only challenge, but be formative in changing the status quo. This task must begin by re-conceptualizing the concepts of objectivity, research and methodology.

Since the methods chosen in research define its path of action, such a decision represents a "choice between modes of engagement entailing different relationships between theory and method, concept and object, researcher and researched" (Gramsci, 1971). The researcher's a priori theoretical understanding is informative as it partially determines how he/she intervenes in the social base (McCarthy and Smit, 1984). The methods chosen, then, must be consistent with the theory (Willis, 1976). Care should be taken, however, not to conflate methods with paradigms for, even though quantitative techniques appear the preserve of positivism and qualitative that of humanism and marxisim, this is not essentially true. Both types or techniques can prove valuable tools for any of the paradigmatic stances (Harvey, 1983; McCarthy, 1983b). It is useful to take heed of Willis (1976:136) in this regard:

"The duality and mutual exclusivity of the over-neatly opposed categories 'qualitative' methods
and 'quantitative' methods, suggest already that the 'object' is viewed in the same unitary and distanced way even if the mode is changed - now you measure it, now you feel it."

As such:

"the emphasis on methodological variety may leave the heartland of the positivist terrain untouched" (Willis, 1976:135).

Ultimately then positivist objectivity remains, and, research carried out at a distance, effects only a collection of facts which are said to constitute 'science'.

"Science (however) does not produce significant political changes, only collective and conscious human activity can bring about such changes" (Salamini, 1981:55).

It is clear then, that if geographers are to contribute to the creation of a 'peoples geography' our understandings must develop through interaction with the conscious human activity that constitutes that part of social reality of interest to geographers. This is particularly important for, in our reconceptualization of research, it is argued that:

"... We know reality only in relation to man, and since man is historical becoming, knowledge and reality are also a becoming, and so is objectivity, ..." (Gramsci, 1971:446).

In locating the above arguments within the research agenda it is clarified that the aims of the project are to understand the objective reality of an urban social movement, which is theoretically understood here as the 'collective intellectual'; that is, the base which unites a range of revolutionary organic intellectuals. To achieve such an understanding it is clear that a range of methodological tools are necessary to elicit the maximum amount of information relevant to such an understanding. However, the fundamental manner through which, ultimately, the organization is understood, is described as follows:

"The conventional process takes its 'objective' data gathering as far as possible, and then consigns the rest - what it cannot know, measure or understand - to Art, or 'the problem of subjectivity'. Having constituted its object truly as an 'object', and having gained all possible knowledge about this 'object', the process must stop, it has come up to the 'inevitable limitations of a quantitative methodology'. But it is precisely at this point that a reflexive, qualitative methodology comes into its
own. Having never constituted the subject of its study as an 'object' it is not surprised that there is a limit to factual knowledge, or that factual knowledge by no means exhausts all there is to be known about another subjective system. What finally remains is the relationship between subjective systems.

The rigorous stage of the analysis, the elimination of distortion, the cross-checking of evidence; etc. have served to focus points of divergence and convergence between subjective systems. Reducing the confusion of the research situation, providing a more precise orientation for analysis, allows a closer reading of separate realities. By reading moments of contact and divergence it becomes possible to delineate other worlds, demonstrating their inner symbolic qualities. And when the conventional techniques retire, when they cannot follow the subjects of subjects themselves - this is the moment of reflexivity. Why are these things happening? Why has the subject behaved in this way? Why do certain areas remain obscure to the researcher? What differences in orientation lie behind the failure to communicate?

It is here in this interlocking of human meanings that there is the possibility of 'being surprised'. And in terms of the generation of 'new' knowledge, we 'know' what it is, precisely not because we have shared it - the usual notion of 'empathy' - but because we have not shared it. It is here that the classical canons are overturned. It is time to initiate actions or to break expectations in order to probe different angles in different lights" (Willis, 1976:140,141).

3.2 RESEARCH METHODS

The theory, choice of subject and perception of research demand, above all, that the methods chosen are amenable to interaction with an organization and the people within it. The research should be capable of probing theoretically determined areas of concern while simultaneously interacting with individuals, thus enabling them to contribute beyond the range of pre-identified problems. The techniques possible are understood as two modes of investigating the organization. The direct mode involves contact and interaction with the organization, while the indirect mode encompasses an analysis of the media.
3.2.1 Direct Interrogation of the Movement

(a) Participant Observation/Integration
Observation of some situation or event is central to any research design. The relevance of participant observation to the present research lies in the emphasis placed on the dialectical nature of the relationship between researcher and researched. Participation is necessary to establish social relations and meanings (Philips, 1971). However, it should be emphasized that human sensitivities are such that the 'observer-spy' stance presupposed by the positivist variant of participant observation is self defeating (Willis, 1976). Thus the researcher preferred the research style of participant interaction (Willis, 1976).

(b) Fixed Choice Questionnaire
This format is limiting in that it specifies a range of answers, thus precluding the possibility of obtaining unanticipated information (Smith, 1975). It does, however, constitute a potentially valid and important source of descriptive data when integrated within a broader research programme. This format, however, is inappropriate as it leaves no space for interaction.

(c) Structured, Open Ended Questionnaires
Schwartz and Jacobs (1979) maintain that open ended schedules allow much room for a manouvre. Although the format is structured, the content of the answer is defined by the respondent. While a structured format implies easily aggregated and thus comparable results, it also ensures that the interviewer adheres rigidly to the given, and a priori determined, questions. Such rigidity is problematic insofar as it limits interaction. This is undesirable since,

"It is indeed crucial that a qualitative methodology be confronted with the maximum flow of relevant data. Here resides the power of the evidence to 'surprise', to contradict, specific developing theories" (Willis, 1976:139).

(d) In Depth/Focus Interviews
Runcie (1980) describes this method as one whereby several pre-identified topics guide the respondent in directions dictated by the concerns of the research questions. At the same time however, the respondent has the opportunity to identify and elaborate areas that might not have been
covered. This method clearly accommodates the interactive process of research. Standardization and statistically supportable generalizations are, however, not easily obtainable. This is because uniformity is evidenced with regard to identified topics, but high divergence on a narrow scale is possible. The strength of the method, however, lies in the belief that:

"Qualitative analysis of a limited number of crucial communications may often yield better clues to the particular speaker at one moment in time than more standardized techniques" (George, cited in Holsti, 1969:7).

(e) The Research Process

Having determined the methods to be utilized in the direct research process, it is necessary to elaborate the actual research process. A statement outlining the aims of the research, the envisaged process and discussed topics was presented by the researcher to the executive members of the organization - the Joint Rent Action Committee (JORAC). It was suggested that JORAC assess the validity of the questions and feasibility of the research, noting criticisms and/or changes, where necessary. Suggested participant interaction included attendance of meetings and involvement in activities as identified by the organization.

JORAC responded positively, members felt that a self conscious assessment was crucial to a consolidation of the organization (1). Participation in the research project was perceived as a means of achieving the necessary critical reflection. JORAC agreed to the researcher's attendance of meetings and the administering of in depth, focussed interviews. It is instructive at this juncture to assess the process of research engaged in, in relation to the dynamics of the organization and its individual intellectuals, as well as the reality in evidence on the urban terrain.

Individuals involved in the organization, in many cases held full time jobs, were involved in the problems experienced by individuals at the social base, and in many cases held demanding positions on the Natal Executive of the United Democratic Front (UDF). Despite their enthusiasm for the research, they had little time to spare for an activity encompassing apparently only long term benefit. This was exacerbated by the nature of social forces prevailing in the Lamontville area. The
highly politicized nature of JORAC's activities together with its conflictual relationship with Inkatha, gave/gives rise to a situation where organizers at times, were/are 'in hiding'. It is difficult and very impractical for a relative stranger (the researcher) to attempt to interview such a person. Furthermore, spontaneous eruptions of violence in Lamontville were such that attendance of meetings was a potentially dangerous activity. The outbreak of widespread township violence in August 1985 (see Meer, 1985) and the highly volatile situation prevailing in Lamontville thereafter to a large degree prevented the researcher from attending meetings. Nevertheless, on several occasions during the military occupation (October, November 1985) and internecine violence in Lamontville the researcher was able to travel to meetings.

The repressive force of the state, through the presence of police and at times military forces, in the townships, the detaining of people and the banning of organizations had/has several direct and indirect implications. Firstly, their 'peace keeping' presence exacerbated the tension evident at the social base. In this context the researcher's consistent presence in Lamontville particularly when associated with a UDF affiliated organization, gives rise to state suspicion and harassment. Furthermore, since organizers were arrested/detained, it was not possible to communicate with them. In this case, the detention of Reverend Xundu, the chairperson of JORAC, reduced access to the organization since the major contact with the organization took place through the medium of the Reverend (2).

Despite the range of factors inhibiting the research process, interaction with the organization did take place. While this interaction, given the circumstances elaborated, did not allow for the administration of formal interviews, informal interviews and personal communication, as well as the attendance of meetings were possible. Moreover involvement in one of the organization's programmes also took place (3). While interaction in relation to that anticipated was limited, an understanding and awareness of the organizational dynamics as it interacts with the constituents of the urban terrain was generated. The ultimate value of the interactive process however, lies not so much in the first hand knowledge and enhanced understanding that was produced but in the 'reflexive' activity which the interactive research process enabled.
3.2.2 Indirect Interrogation of the Movement - the Media as a Data Source

The media as a source of data is inherently and by social definition, problematic. While it is not possible to de-problematise the media, awareness of its problematic nature is essential when utilising it as a data source. The media, argues Gramsci (1971) is an integral component of the hegemony created within civil society. It encompasses the area of professional persuasion (Quigley, 1972) and displays vested interests, as a commercial enterprise, in the maintenance of capitalist hegemony (Jack, 1982). The media is thus far from independent from economic and political dynamics (Glasgow University Media Group, 1976). Given the media's location in civil society it communicates middle class consensus politics (Glasgow University Media Group, 1976) which it perceives and presents as elaboration of 'issues' that are of 'public interest' (Bradley, 1972). Such elaboration fulfills social expectations with regard to the manner in which people have been socialised. As such it reproduces social relations (Tomaselli and Tomaselli, 1985).

Reinforcing the media's role in civil society is the role of advertising. A recent article in the journal Work in Progress (1984:14) noted that:

"Newspapers are commercial enterprises, intended first to make money, and only secondarily to supply information".

The information constraints imposed by the capitalist nature of newspapers in particular have been exacerbated by the advent of SABC TV which has not only reduced the newspapers' share of advertising, but reduced afternoon newspapers' distribution numbers (Work in Progress, 1984). In order to retain their dwindling share of advertising, newspaper companies take great care not to offend advertisers, thus effecting a degree of internal censorship (Frederickse et al, 1985).

The nature of the media also defines 'news' as 'events' without elaboration of the background to such 'events' (Fredericks et al, 1985). Thus social processes are transferred into daily reactions as isolated, episodic, naively given social facts (McCarthy and Friedman, 1981). The central state too, has a strong influence over what constitutes news, and how it is reported (Work in Progress, 1984). Moreover, a variety of state legislation constrains the media (Stewart, 1980) to the degree that it is often not clear where state legislative control ends and self censorship, for fear of state retribution, begins (Addison, 1980;
The central state, while so obviously ensuring that the press is not 'free' is able to project an image of a 'free' press through the existence and functioning of the National Press Union - NPU (Manoim, 1982). While the press union has staved off a substantial degree of direct press censorship it has, through the establishment of a code of conduct, agreed to facilitate the establishment of a voluntary disciplinary body to 'watch over' the press. In effect, this is 'secret' internal censorship. This lends credence to the state's mythical concern for the existence and maintenance of a 'free' press, as set out in the Steyn Commission Report (Stewart, 1982; Tomaselli and Tomaselli, 1982).

The event oriented nature of 'news' coverage, the location of the printed media within society, as well as the discussed forces acting on the media, must be borne in mind when analysing newspaper reports on any topic. Some degree of scientific control over such bias can be effected, however, through comparison of news reports with the communications emanating from the grassroots organization, primary research on the area, personal interaction in the area as well as published and unpublished sources which are relevant to the questions raised.

(a) The Generation of Data
In order to rigorously gather media coverage of the development of issues, organizational actions, and development and resolution of conflict, the researcher must attempt to obtain all references to these in the newspapers. The INCH computer search was thus utilized (5). The clippings available in this search date back to 1978. This was considered a reasonable time to begin the search as it would indicate the existence of issues predating those elaborated by JORAC which formed in 1982. The search was thus begun in 1978 and terminated in August 1985 - the date of requesting the search. The search covers South Africa's commercial newspapers. Popular media such as SASPU National, Ukusa and FOSATU Worker News were scrutinized by the researcher.

The search requires that the researcher identify key words. These are utilized to locate all articles referring to the given key words. While the issues directly mobilizing the community were 'rents' and 'incorporation', such keywords would have yielded an unmanageable amount of data, since reference to these issues in all South African communities would
have been identified. Moreover, personal coverage of Durban's daily
newspapers in 1985 (Daily News and Natal Mercury) revealed that elab-
oration of issues always referred to the communities concerned. The
following keywords were therefore isolated:
Lamontville: the community on which the case study is based.
Hambanati: together with Lamontville this was the only community affected
by incorporation in 1983.
Port Natal Administration Board (PNAB)/Natalia: the local government
body administering the townships.
JORAC: the organization established by the communities to oppose the
rent increases.
The search yielded reference to 497 relevant articles*which had to be
analysed (6).

(b) Content Analysis

Content analysis is variously defined (Holsti, 1969; Krippendorf, 1980).
Some texts stipulate that quantification must form the major part of
any content analysis (Markoff et al, 1975; Krippendorf, 1980). But Holsti
(1969) is of the view that content analysis can be qualitatively under-
taken, providing that the task is rigorously performed.

Holsti (1969) indicates that many researchers are of the persuasion that
content analysis without the use of statistics is of little value. These
researchers argue that a reading of a document does not produce accurate

*It was suggested by political scientists at the University of Natal that
'deconstruction theory' be employed to analyse the mass of data at hand.
Investigation however revealed that deconstruction theory has not dev-
veloped an associated method of empirical analysis (Norris, 1982) but
constitutes a form of philosophical interrogation of the major concepts
of philosophy. As such it questions the meaning of consciousness in
language and philosophy, while indicating the relationship of conceptual
apparatus to political institutions (Norris, 1982). Elaboration of decon-
struction theory and subsequent interpretation of the media coverage, an
expert subsequently explained, would constitute a topic of research in
its own right (Personal Communication, Professor David Maughan-Brown,
1985). The innappropriateness of such a theory to the task at hand was
thus clarified.
results that can be stated with a degree of statistical confidence. Markoff et al (1975) and Krippendorf (1980) exemplify this position. They argue that content analysis is a specialized measuring device that is systematic, rigorous, and objective in the positivist sense and should be replicable. The former two stipulations are deemed valuable criteria for the present analysis, whilst the latter two are rejected as necessary research criteria. The criteria of objectivity, which demands that one's interests, values and theoretical stance are abstracted from the analysis is, as discussed previously, not a positive feature of progressive research. Since research, and therefore analysis is perceived as a social process (Philips, 1971) the desirable form of objectivity necessary is that identified by Gramsci (1971) and Harvey (1983) above. Furthermore, society is perceived to be in a continual state of change, with research being a social process interacting with the everchanging society. As such it is deemed impractical to replicate social research.

In an effort to be systematic and rigorous it is possible to isolate units of content analysis. These are identified by Krippendorf (1980):

Physical: These are very general units. They refer to the whole unit of analysis such as interview, book, letter, report etc. A physical unit can also refer to divisions within the broad unit, for example - period of time, length, size, etc.

Syntactical: words, sentences, phases. This unit is favoured by Krippendorf (1980) as it apparently excludes human judgement.

Referential: These are defined by particular objects, events, persons, acts, places or ideas to which the expression refers.

Propositional: The units delineated here must possess a specific grammatical structure.

Thematic: These units refer to themes of investigation. Krippendorf (1980) maintains that these should be avoided as they require the coder's judgement. Holsti (1969) on the other hand perceives these as the most useful units of analysis even though they are not easily identified and rely on human judgement.

Physical, syntactical, referential and propositional units can be useful to the categorization of the data. The problem, however, is that they bear little reference to the social context from which the data derives its meaning. Furthermore, they deny interaction between the data and
the researcher. Thematic units alone allow the data to interact with both researcher and social context. This is essential as units of analysis must reflect and be related to the reality they seek to represent. The units most applicable to the research problem in question are thus thematic units.

The thematic units applicable to this research were identified after all the reports had been read. This ensured their relevance in respect of the context and the theoretical questions. They comprise:
- Incorporation
- Rents
- Violence
- JORAC
- Housing general - not related to rents
- PNAB/Natalia/Community Councils
- General - not specified or incorporating more than four of the above.

As many articles deal with more than one of the identified units the major thrust or focus of the newspaper article was taken as indicative of its appropriate classification.

Once categorized, the data must be analysed. Holsti (1969) and Bailey (1978) direct attention to several inferential indices.

Time/Space: This index measures either the time (e.g., on TV, radio) or space (in a newspaper) allotted to a chosen unit. This simple method facilitates identification of relative importance or emphasis. It is however a gross measure and can be misleading since the actual content is disregarded.

Appearance/non appearance of attitude: When using this index binary oppositions are identified. It is an important index when one cannot assume a linear relationship between the frequency of appearance of an attribute and its importance. Once again the measure is a gross indication of the content. It can, if used indiscriminantly, lead to severe misconceptions and incorrect inferences. As such it should be used with great care and consistent attention to the content of the data. The usefulness of this measure is limited given the nature of the data source under scrutiny. Appearance/non appearance of an item of concern in the media, given the discussion on media above, may be more informative from the point of view of understanding 'the media' than it is to the particular
area of concern. Given however, the elaborated understanding of the media, this index can constitute a useful source of inferences. Frequency: This index requires the appearance of a particular attribute or unit to be counted. Frequency is deemed an indicator of focus, intensity and/or value. It is assumed that each reference to the chosen attribute or unit carries equal weight. Once again, this should be used carefully since indiscriminate use, without reference to content, can generate misconceptions. Again, given the nature of the media, the index is valuable in determining the media's concerns. This does not, however, imply that the indices are indicative of the concerns of the social base. Intensity: Intensity is said to 'fill the gaps' not attended to by frequency counts. This is a useful index but problems could be encountered while ascertaining the strength of intensity. Direction of intensity must also be indicated.

3.3 CONCLUSION

This chapter has served to focus attention on questions of methodology within the social scientific process of research. The discussion has revealed that direct methods of interrogation must be amenable to social interaction, given the nature of understanding sought in this research project. Moreover, it was demonstrated when assessing the research process that the methods selected in an a priori manner must be adapted, extended or discarded as demanded by the specific moments of the process engaged in.

It bears re-iteration that the methods of investigation, together with the rigorous tools of description discussed, constitute the means by which the primary dimension of knowledge and understanding is generated, ordered and described. Beyond this however, the scientific process enters realms foreign to positivism's clinical stance - the moment of reflexivity (Willis, 1976) which relies on the individual's human faculties and frailties. It is this moment, previously emphasised, that constitutes the fundamental dimension of understanding and analysis necessary to this work.
NOTES

(1) Personal communication, Ian Mkhize (JORAC Publicity Secretary), (17/4/1985); Reverend M. Xundu (JORAC Chairperson), (27/5/1985).

(2) Communication had also taken place through Ian Mkhize and Lechesa Tsenoli - also executive officers of JORAC. Ian Mkhize from Hambanati was in hiding for much of the research duration. Lechesa Tsenoli, committed to organizational activities related to International Youth Year, as well as being UDF's Publicity Secretary, had little free time. After Reverend M. Xundu's detention, contact with the organization was continued through Jabu Sithole - also an executive officer of JORAC.

(3) This programme was related to the presentation of evidence to the hearings concerning the Department of Co-operation and Development's Commission for Consolidation. The researcher met with township representatives and members of JORAC to discuss the motivations for opposition and the manner in which these motivations would be presented. As the researcher had access to resources regarding a range of identified historically specific factors concerning each township to be consolidated into KwaZulu, the researcher carried out research on these factors. Moreover, information concerning more general criteria, for example Section 10 rights, was also required. Ultimately a report, providing information on all these factors was compiled. The organization then utilized this information in the compilation of the memorandum lodging with the Commission for Consolidation the intent to present evidence to the hearing.

(4) A fine of R10 000 is possible if legislation is contravened (see Addison, 1980; Driver, 1980; Stewart, 1980; Tomaselli and Tomaselli, 1982). Moreover, newspapers can be, and are, banned (see Volume 33 of Work in Progress, 1984; Harber, 1985).

(5) The INCH computer search is a service offered by the University of the Orange Free State. Here, news articles from all South Africa's national newspapers are categorized and then coded by reference to a range of possible keywords pertaining to the article. Once categorized and coded, the articles are transferred onto microfiche. The researcher must identify keywords pertaining to the subject under study. The computerized search of the news articles itself is carried out at the University of the Orange Free State which provides the researcher with a printout noting all references to the identified keywords. The researcher can then proceed to locate the identified articles on the microfiche housed in the library of the University at which the researcher is undertaking research.

(6) All newspaper references to the widespread township violence that occurred in Durban, August 1985, are not included in this count.
CHAPTER 4
THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAMONTVILLE AND MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION -
AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

4.1 INTRODUCTION

History, Torr (1985a) argues, informs one's understanding of the present. The purpose of this chapter is to focus discussion on those historical processes which facilitate understanding of the objective conditions experienced in Lamontville today (1). As such the twin foci of the chapter are:

1. The physical development of Lamontville and the ideological context informing that development. This discussion will indicate the historical origins of several contemporary community problems.
2. The evolution of Local Municipalities as administrators of black townships, the production and distribution of financial resources and the development of black 'representation'. This discussion is essential to an understanding of the structural origins of today's Administration Boards and Community Councils.

4.2 LAMONTVILLE - DURBAN'S MODEL VILLAGE?

The physical construction of Lamontville (see Figure 4.1) began in 1933 and was completed in 1958. Figure 4.2 illustrates the various stages of the township's development. The first 100 houses, completed in 1934, were fully tenanted by 1935. A further 380 houses were constructed in 1939. A further 1083 single dwelling units were planned for Lamontville, only 200 of which were constructed as single units. The balance constituted flatted houses (semi-detached, double storey) in an effort to keep construction costs low (Torr, 1985a). The final stages comprised an economic scheme of 750 letting units (completed in 1953) together with the provision of 50 sites for self-built houses, with land being 'owned' on a 30 year leasehold basis. This leasehold scheme was later extended by a further 58 sites (Torr, 1985a). By 1958, most of the land available in Lamontville for housing construction had been utilized (South Africa, 1984). An understanding of Lamontville's development is achieved by an elaboration
Figure 4.2: Map of the Greater Durban Area Illustrating the Location of Lamontville
of the internal contradictions besetting the local state.

Durban, given the 'push' of the deteriorating reserves, and the 'pull' of economic development (Maylam, 1980; Morris, 1981), experienced a continuous and increasing influx of blacks from the turn of the century. Since no formal housing for blacks was available, the incoming population rented backyard premises and resorted to the construction of shacks on vacant land (Maylam, 1982). The local state, while being pressurized by the white population to remove blacks from the city, and, itself being concerned with the occurrence of 'crime and disease' resulting from black urbanization did little to resolve the situation (Maylam, 1982). This lack of action on behalf of the local state arises from its central axiom that white ratepayers' money would not be utilized to pay for the construction of black housing (Maylam, 1982). These contradictions, gave rise to the articulation of a system of social control - the 'Durban System' (see La Hausse, 1982). This system operated at no cost to the city since the means of social control that had been developed simultaneously generated funds to administer such control. That a resolution beyond this was necessary, however, became evident with the occurrence of the 1929 beerhall riots (see La Hausse, 1982). The local state, acting in response to this moment of struggle (see McCarthy, 1983a; Reintges, 1983), developed a resolution that was informed largely by ideological considerations, and constrained by the central axiom previously noted.

The local state, locating its understanding of the 1929 'riots' within an agitator thesis, ascribed the heightened labour militancy to labours' manipulation by the emerging black petty bourgeoisie (La Hausse, 1982). As such the development of a low cost, small housing scheme that could be funded by profits accruing to the Native Revenue Account was proposed. The size of the scheme ensured that white ratepayers funds would not be utilized. Moreover, the limited number of houses available would be amenable to the creation of an 'elite' village which could be utilized to appease the petty bourgeoisie. The provision of this housing, together with the creation of local Native Advisory Boards (NAB) was seen as a means of co-opting members of the petty bourgeoisie, and by so doing effect a degree of 'social control' over the then emerging black proletariat. In order to ensure that only the 'desired element' of the black population was admitted to the
township several selection criteria and means of control were developed (see Torr 1985a). The fact that the local state's solution, as above, was expressed in terms of the contradictions with which it was beset, meant that the scheme did not engender the outcome desired.

In the first instance, the emphasis on minimal expenditure restricted physical units to conform to 'council' type housing. Moreover, an unanticipated problem arose when the nature of Lamontville's topography (see Figure 4.2) necessitated excavation and the building of retaining walls*. The expenses incurred in this area gave rise to a reduction in expenditure in other spheres. An efficient stormwater drainage system was not installed (Torr, 1985a), houses were not fitted with guttering, communal rather than individual taps were provided and a pit latrine as opposed to the more expensive water borne sewerage system, was installed (Durban Housing Survey, 1952).

The consequences of the creation of the village as described above were of both a short and long term nature. The village failed to attract the elite petty bourgeoisie who had no desire to live in the very small council type housing. Moreover, the 'elite' were not enamoured with such things as no doors between rooms, the primitive nature of the sanitary system and restricted cooking areas (Torr, 1985a). Long term consequences were evident in the rapid deterioration of houses. The inefficient storm water drainage system, installed in an attempt to keep costs down, resulted in erosion which damaged the houses' foundations. As early as 1936 this structural damage was evident. Authorities, while acknowledging that lack of immediate attention would render the houses irreparable, failed to take action in this regard (Torr, 1985a).

The scheme, having failed to attract the petty bourgeoisie, failed also to attract the average working class black, for several reasons. Men, often earning only a single person's wage, were unable to afford the cost of rent, while simultaneously supporting a family. This fundamental financial constraint was exacerbated by the illegality of trading in the area. Moreover, the relative isolation of the township from Durban's 'white' areas, together with high transportation costs, prevented women from supplementing the family income through engaging in domestic labour activities (Torr, 1985a). As such, the working classes, while possibly desirous of living in the area, were not able to afford

* Retaining walls are structures designed to stabilize unstable slopes
the costs involved. The overall initial rejection of the 'model village' by Durban's black population resulted in a situation where, despite the extreme shortage of housing, the first 100 houses constructed in Lamontville were only fully tenanted approximately two years after the township was ready for occupation (Torr 1985a).

Consequent to the failure of Lamontville as an elite village, the areas' development was informed by local state responses (continually constrained by the contradiction between the desire to enforce 'social control' through the building of houses and a resistance to utilize available economic means to do so) to the development and growth of Cato Manor. The shack settlement at Cato Manor, constituting in 1946 an estimated population of 30 000 people (Ladlau, 1975), presented a 'problem' to Durban's Municipality. Maylam (1982:4) notes that "the absence of basic water and sanitation services in densely populated areas was a constant concern to Durban's Health Department. And in the eyes of many whites, settlements like Cato Manor were a hotbed of crime and vice".

These perceived 'problems' with Cato Manor were heightened by the fact that it was very close to the elite white residential areas (at that time) on the Berea ridge (Kuper, et al, 1958). While the central state was prepared to grant loans for the construction of black housing, the local state's persistent principle that white ratepayers would not contribute to the development of black housing, yet again detracted from a fundamental resolution of the existing contradictions. As such the local state developed black housing within the confines of the finances accruing from the Native Revenue Account. The remainder of Lamontville's development, then, is largely informed by the need to exert some form of social control on the ever growing shack population, through the construction of the maximum number of dwelling units, at the lowest cost. The low cost houses built were not only incapable of redressing the housing backlog, but were subject to the same physical deterioration as those constructed during the first stage of development. It bears noting that the limited number of sites made available on 30 year leasehold, for self building, can be understood as a relatively costless means of appeasing an element of the petty bourgeoisie.
This brief discussion of Lamontville's physical development provides some indication of the origins of the housing problems that became evident in the 1980s. Having isolated the origins of some of the physical problems of the Lamontville environment, discussion can now concentrate upon the development of Municipal departments with respect to black administration and representation, as these form the foundations upon which the present system of local government in Lamontville is built.

4.3 BLACK ADMINISTRATION - THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF CONTROL

Municipal administrative functions of Durban's black townships were superceded in 1974 by the Port Natal Administration Board. The particular forms of administration developed and the conflicts between central and local state levels during the era of Municipal control facilitate understanding of the present nature of the Administration Boards.

In 1910 four independent provinces amalgamated to form the Union of South Africa. The Department of Native Affairs (DNA) was created to assume control over the development of policy and legislation with respect to blacks, but the local Municipalities, which had previously determined all aspects concerning blacks, retained administrative control of this sphere (Bekker and Humphries, 1985). Legislation created at the central level was not imposed uniformly on all Municipalities. Adoption of legislation occurred, therefore, at the discretion of individual Municipalities. Thus, for example, Durban's Municipality adopted the (amended) 1923 Native (Urban Areas) Act only after the 1929 Riots. This legislation facilitated restriction of access of blacks to urban areas (Morris, 1981) and provided for the creation of Native Advisory Boards - a means to co-opt elements of the black population (La Hausse, 1982). While encompassing the means to effect social control, adoption of the Act also provided the central state with the authority to monitor annual expenditures and incomes of Municipalities with regard to the black population under their control (Bekker and Humphries, 1985).

The consolidation in 1945 of the 1923 Native (Urban Areas) Act and its 1930 and 1937 Amendments made little impact on the relatively autonomous position of the Municipalities with respect to black administration. A
degree of conflict did, however, occur between Municipalities and the central state regarding financial resources. The Municipalities were of the view that, since some of their responsibilities with respect to black administration occurred at the directive of the central state, this quarter should offer financial aid. While the central state failed to provide the requested finances until a much later date conflict did not assume grave proportions since most Municipalities maintained self balancing Native Revenue Accounts.

The assumption of power by the Nationalists in 1948 however resulted in stressful relations between some Municipalities and the central state. This occurred because the DNA became increasingly prescriptive of Municipalities' functions so as to ensure their adherence to Nationalist policies and legislation (Todes and Watson, 1985). The DNA's sentiment is best expressed by Dr H.F. Verwoed, Minister of DNA, who in 1950 stated:

"if there is a local authority which tries to obstruct that policy, the government is not excercising dictatorship when it makes the national policy compulsory, ... Therefore when it may become necessary to compel a City Council which is not prepared to implement the policy of apartheid to do so, I shall do so ..." (Dr H.F. Verwoed cited in Bekker and Humphries, 1985:4).

This threatening stance was adopted since Municipalities, in possession of discretionary powers, had the ability to determine the success or failure of central state policy, as success required enactment at the local level (Bekker and Humphries, 1985). The Municipalities resisted the state's centralization initiatives since they had no desire to become prime agents of the central state, possessing no discretionary powers (Bekker and Humphries, 1985).

Despite their resistance, however, the central state steadily centralized its control over black administrative functions. Complete centralization of control, however, only occurred in 1971 with the passing of the Bantu Affairs Administration Act and the consequent creation of Administration Boards. The DNA stated that the Administration Boards had been established with the express purpose of terminating some Municipalities inefficient and reluctant implementation of central state legislation and policy (Bekker and Humphries, 1985). The Administration Boards, directly controlled by the central state (see Figure 4.3), were thus
Figure 4.3 Black Administration After 1970

BLACK ADMINISTRATION AFTER 1970 – THE REALITY, DEPICTING ALSO THE LOCATION OF CIVIC BODIES, URBAN MOVEMENTS

- Power in all aspects of black administration located at central government level imposes decisions on all lower level structures as well as people.

- Administration boards, no power to act outside of confines imposed by central government. All activities prescribed by DCO.

- Structurally impotent, powerless advisory boards. Community councils not representative of township residents, responsible only to higher levels of authority. No credibility.

- Township residents reject imposed structures, incapable of representation.

CIVIC BODIES – ENERGIES DIRECTED TO NON-STATUTORY REPRESENTATIVE BODIES WHICH MAKE REPRESENTATION DIRECTLY TO ADMINISTRATION BOARDS AND OR THE DEPARTMENT OF CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROCESS OFTEN BYPASSES ADVISORY BOARDS, COMMUNITY COUNCILS.

BLACK ADMINISTRATION AFTER 1970 – THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF OFFICIAL STRUCTURES AS PRESENTED BY OFFICIALDOM

- Department of co-operation and development decision making regarding legislation and policy.

- Administration boards. Effect and finance black administration as defined by DCO.

- Advisory boards, community councils represent township residents. Perform administrative service functions defined by higher level authority structures.

- Complaints.

TOWNSHIP RESIDENTS

KEY

- Imposed policy, legislation and control.
- Feedback to representative bodies capable of effecting changes.
- Positive feedback in response to complaints.
- Deflected and dissipated complaints.
- Minimal and/or unrepresentative feedback.
- Confines of statutory bodies.
- Feedback emanating from non-statutory bodies.

DEPARTMENT OF CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT.
created to ensure that central state legislation and policy was fully implemented.

4.3.1 Finances

The 1923 Native (Urban Areas) Act's stipulations regarding the financing of black administration were based largely on the system created in Durban as early as 1908 (Bloch and Wilkinson, 1982; La Hausse, 1982). Funds generated for the Native Revenue Account were to be utilized for the general improvement of black areas. These funds could not be appropriated by the Municipality's general account but, the Municipality was granted permission to provide either loans or grants if expenditure debited to the Native Revenue Account (NRA) exceeded the income. Few Municipalities however subsidized the NRA in this manner (Bekker and Humphries, 1985). A cursory examination of the NRA's finance sources explains why this was seldom necessary. The Municipality's monopoly over beer brewing and sales was/is a lucrative source of income to the NRA. Such a monopoly was first established in Durban in 1908. The substantial profits in this sphere restricted subsidizations, in the period that it was necessary, to an average of 18 pounds sterling per annum over a 15 year period (1923-1938). The consistent nature of this source of profit allowed Durban's Municipality to accumulate substantial capital reserve funds (Bekker and Humphries, 1985). Other, less important sources of income to the NRA included fines, employment registration fees and rents (Bekker and Humphries, 1985).

The Services Levy Act of 1952, stipulating that employers pay monthly fees for each employee, substantially increased the revenue accruing to the NRA. These monies were intended for the development of infrastructural township services or any other purposes as determined by the Minister of the DNA. A second less substantial source of income to the NRA was created in 1961 with the extension of Municipal beer monopolies to the township liquor trade. Of the profits, 20 percent accrued to Municipalities' NRA's and 80 percent to the DNA (Bekker and Humphries, 1985).
4.3.2 Local Black Representation

The effectiveness of the appeasement afforded by 'representation' on Native Advisory Boards was structurally curtailed by the fact that they fulfilled advisory functions only, and because they apparently represented the ultimate political rights that would be granted to urban blacks (Morris, 1981). Their impotent nature was, moreover, emphasized through the fact that no action could be taken without prior consultation with the Minister of the DNA (Bekker and Humphries, 1985). Several incidents regarding Lamontville's Advisory Board highlight the ineffective and unrepresentative nature of these bodies.

Residents' requests for home brewing rights, and their opposition to the Durban City Council regarding the construction of a beerhall, were either ignored or overruled by the Advisory Boards. Residents were fully aware of the non-representative and illegitimate nature of these bodies which, through retardation of communication between residents and Municipal authorities, failed to represent them (finding of the Broome Commission, 1953; cited in Torr, 1985a). Figure 4.4 summarizes both the apparently intended relationship, and those experienced in reality, between the various levels of state, Advisory Boards and residents.

The NAB's, given their purely advisory role, were recognised by residents as being structurally unable to represent their interests. It must be noted however, that there were Advisory Boards that attempted to address national political issues. Lamontville's Advisory Board however, was more concerned with disputes between localized factions contesting Advisory Board control. As such they neglected to even address local residential issues (Torr, 1985a). Despite awareness of the inherent constraining factors of the Advisory Boards, benefits, including exemption from carrying passes, a salary as well as access to, for example, trading rights, obviously attracted people to serve on these bodies. Given the benefits Torr (1985a) suggests that many people serving on Advisory Boards were motivated primarily by self interest.

In 1962 the NAB's were reconstituted to become Urban Bantu Councils, generally referred to by residents as 'Useless Boys Clubs' (Bloch and Wilkinson, 1982). These bodies, created in face of the mass rejection
of the Advisory Boards, supposedly contained extended powers that would make them more amenable to acceptance by blacks. It was emphasized however by the DNA that these bodies constituted non-political agents for local authorities (Bekker and Humphries, 1985). The nature of these 'extended powers' served to exacerbate rather than enhance the legitimacy and credibility crisis of the bodies. This occurred because the areas for which these bodies became responsible included some of the more unpopular functions previously carried out by the authorities (Bloch and Wilkinson, 1982) (2). These 'new' bodies thus remained as unrepresentative as before.

4.4 CONCLUSION

The preceding historical discussion serves as a background to understanding life experienced within the Lamontville township today. The brevity of this chapter is determined by the need to focus attention on issues of specific relevance to the research problem and theoretical framework. This focussed historical discussion informs the more extensive empirical elaboration and analysis of the social base in Lamontville and the levels of central state and local government that affect the social base. It is to such an empirical discussion that attention is now addressed.
NOTES

(1) A detailed discussion of Lamontville's history can be found in Torr 1983, 1984, 1985a and 1985b.

(2) These functions include maintenance of order, control and removal of unlawful people, and the setting up of a community guard.
CHAPTER 5

SOCIAL BASE AND LOCAL STATE STRUCTURES

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The theoretical review presented in Chapter 2 pointed to the need to elaborate both the social base and the particular form of local state relevant to the social base when attempting to understand the development, articulation and effects of an urban social movement. This chapter critically examines several factors pertaining to Lamontville's population and built environment, as well as the dynamics of both its Administration Board and Community Council. Such an examination should facilitate analysis of the emergence of JORAC if the theoretical framework is to be regarded as having scientific utility.

5.2 LAMONTVILLE: THE SOCIAL BASES FOR JORAC IN TERMS OF POPULATION AND BUILT ENVIRONMENT

The social base in Castells' (1977) theoretical framework, it was previously noted, refers to the demographic characteristics of individuals within a population, such that one is able to assess the potential revolutionary nature of the social base. While such characteristics are necessary referents, they are, Pickvance (1978) argues, insufficient to our understanding of how a social base might respond to the development of an issue affecting it. Essential to such an understanding is an elaboration of those elements of the social base which enhance or understanding of the social relations in existence (Pickvance, 1978). It is argued here that such an elaboration, moreover, informs one of the relevance of the social force articulated, to the social base, while being informative as regards any effects the social force's mobilization might have on the social base.

In light of theoretical considerations, it was considered pertinent in relation to Lamontville, to examine population characteristics, the condition and availability of housing and facilities, the degree and nature of organizational activity, the township's future prospects, as well as the objective economic conditions. In order to describe the
factors impinging upon the social relations evident at Lamontville's social base, the researcher relied largely on secondary source materials.

5.2.1 Population characteristics

This brief description of Lamontville's population characteristics is derived from a survey carried out on a stratified random sample of respondents (1). The sample size was 3 percent of the total population of 30 000 (Sutcliffe and Wellings, 1984).

(a) Economic characteristics
Lamontville's economically inactive population represents 54.9 percent of the total population sampled. Of this 54.9 percent, 58 percent are the unemployed and housewives, and 38 percent are students. Of the 45.1 percent of the sampled population that are economically active, 57.5 percent are found within the unskilled, blue collar employment category. Skilled blue collar workers (8.2 percent) and white collar workers (9.9 percent) constitute the smallest employment categories. Employers, professionals or managers constituted 24 percent of the working population.

(b) Length of residence
Of the sample, 62.3 percent was found to have spent all their life in Lamontville. Only 2 percent had lived in the area for less than 10 years.

(c) Age and Sex
More than half (57 percent) of the sample population is below the age of 30, while 31.5 percent are between the ages of 31 and 50. The remaining 11.1 percent are over the age of 50. There are slightly more men (52.4 percent) than women (47.6 percent).

These figures point to the existence of a youthful, stable population in which a substantial number of people are unemployed, and of the employed population, the majority are located in the lowest form of economic activity.

5.2.2 Housing

A breakdown of the size and type of houses existing in Lamontville is
provided in Table 5.1 (2).

Table 5.1: Housing in Lamontville

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size and type of house</th>
<th>Number of houses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 roomed</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 roomed (electricity)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 roomed</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 roomed</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 roomed (flatted)</td>
<td>998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>owner built (small)</td>
<td>610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>owner built (large)</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>re-acquired</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>2 754</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Data Source: PNAB table of approximate actual income for 1983/84 for Lamontville, see note 22, Chapter 6, 23/2/1984).

In Chapter 4 the problem of house size was briefly referred to. The fact that the houses are small remains a problem to the residents (Daily News, 28/1/1977; Sunday Tribune, 17/3/1985). While size of individual units is in itself problematic, the small number of houses available greatly exacerbates this problem. One finds that the backlog of housing under the Natalia Development Board (3) constitutes 115 000 units or 59 percent of the national housing backlog (Daily News, 14/3/1985). While approximately 1000 sites are at present available for the construction of housing in Lamontville, no construction has been undertaken since 1958 (South Africa, 1984) the year in which the Municipal housing schemes were completed and a freeze on housing construction imposed by the central state (Bekker and Humphries, 1985).

In Lamontville one finds an average of 8 persons living in a house (JORAC, 1983). This is due to the limited housing available to the estimated population of 30 000 (Wheeler, 1984). Figure 5.1, illustrating the distribution of household size around the mean, would tend to substantiate the claim that "every room, at night, becomes a bedroom" (Sunday Tribune, 17/3/1985). This overcrowding of already deteriorated houses (see Chapter 4) serves merely to exacerbate the poor housing conditions. In conjunction with the overcrowding of a delapidated housing stock, little or no routine or
structural maintenance has been effected (JORAC, 1983; Wheeler, 1984; Challenor, 1985).

Figure 5.1: Household Size Distribution in Lamontville

(Data Source: JORAC, 1983).

A sample of 100 residents were requested, in a survey by Wheeler (1984), to identify the reasons for their discontent with PNAB administration of the township. The major reasons for dissatisfaction, illustrated in Figure 5.2, are poor maintenance and general housing concerns.

Figure 5.2: Township Residents' Dissatisfaction with Township Administration

One question in a survey by JORAC (1983) asked the sample of residents to identify the nature of house maintenance problems that they experienced. The problems that emerged, as illustrated in Figure 5.3 serve to indicate the extensiveness of the maintenance problems experienced.

Figure 5.3: Township Residents' Maintenance Problems Regarding Housing Units

(Data Source: JORAC, 1983).

While all houses are individually supplied with running water and water borne sewerage (4) only 15 percent of the houses are electrified (Natal Mercury, 9/1/1983). Residents express dissatisfaction, however, with general inadequate service and facility provision (see Figure 5.2). The above discussion provides some indication of the housing in, and conditions under which, Lamontville residents live. It must be emphasized however, that these conditions are by no means unique to Lamontville. While each township might display some peculiarities given its specific historical development, all black townships, ultimately, were developed in response to similar, nationally evident, contradictions. As such, all display similar problems. The fact that JORAC, the urban social movement to be studied, is not only responsible to Lamontville, but all townships under Port Natal Administration Board (PNAB) control, is informative in this regard. Moreover, research results on the Eastern Cape for example (McCarthy, 1985) are suggestive of the fact that the housing conditions described above are endemic to black township life in South Africa.

* Out of a population of 30 000 people a sample of 4 160 was drawn.
5.2.3 Facilities

The unpleasant physical living space described above is exacerbated by the dearth of recreation and sporting facilities. While the township boasts 19 churches, 9 welfare organizations, a clinic, library and a community hall, few recreation facilities are available. Residents pointed out in a survey reported in the newspapers in 1977 that the township had no cinema, park, youth centre, or hotel (Daily News, 28/1/1977) (5). The news report maintained that the absence of recreational facilities compelled the youth to recreate in the streets which, in conjunction with the absence of youth organizations, encouraged the development of street gangs. Despite the obvious negative consequences of neglected facilities it was argued in the 1977 report that imposition of facilities perceived necessary by authorities would fail to address the fundamental frustrations experienced by all residents. These would remain endemic until the housing and general township conditions had been improved. Moreover, the report argued that the provision of facilities without prior consultation aimed at establishing people's needs, constituted mispent energy. These imposed facilities are generally not respected as they fail, through non consultation, to address people's needs. As a consequence they become prime targets for arsonists (Daily News, 28/1/1977).

5.2.4 Organizations

The study cited above indicated that Lamontville experiences high rates of crime, alcoholism, illegitimacy and unemployment. Moreover insecurity, fear and frustration are rife among residents. These factors, combined with a perceived lacking sense of community, were factors seen to contribute to the generally poor organizational activity within the township. While the obvious deterioration of social relationships, in conjunction with township conditions may well have contributed to general 'quiescence' (Dunleavy, 1977), particularly in the political realm, there is at least one other possible contributing factor. Given that the survey was constructed either late 1976 or early 1977 it is possible that minimal organizational activity could be due to state repression of black political organizations following the 1976 Soweto uprising. This speculation, while not being of major import to the central arguments of this thesis, is nevertheless pertinent when the nature of the organizations existing
in 1977 are examined:

YWCA - this group was described by the 1977 report as having positive affects on the problem of street gangs, crime, and alcoholism.

Sports Groups - these groups were prolific but restricted given the lack of facilities.

Inkatha - Inkatha was perceived as potentially successful. However, given its explicit links with the KwaZulu administration, residents viewed it sceptically. As such it had little support, particularly amongst the youth (see McCaul, 1983 and Swart, 1984 for extensive discussions of this organization).

Church Organizations - The church as a whole was described as having lost much of its support because it dissociated itself from the social and political problems experienced by township residents. This low support, according to the report, was detrimental to potential youth organizations since meetings, due to the lack of other facilities, took place in church halls. Because of the negative image of the church, youth organizations utilizing such venues were not well supported (Daily News, 28/1/1977). Clearly with the possible exception of Inkatha, the few existing organizations were explicitly apolitical and, in the case of the church, were criticized for this stance. As will be argued later, much of this changed in the 1980s.

5.2.5 Lamontville's Future Prospects

Over and above the general physical and social deterioration evident in Lamontville there existed, as early as 1978, insecurity as regards the political future of the township. In 1978 the PNAB announced that further development and improvements could only take place if Lamontville was incorporated into KwaZulu, or proclaimed a permanent township (Natal Mercury, 7/11/1978). Rumours were also rife that the township was to be declared an Indian Group Area, a plausible threat given the close proximity of Chatsworth (see Figure 4.2). Both the PNAB and the Ningizimu Community Council (NCC) stated that the above declaration had never been under consideration (Natal Mercury, 13/11/1978). Whether or not the feeling of insecurity persisted amongst Lamontville people is not known. The response at an organizational and residential level to the incorporation announcement in late 1983, however, suggests that this insecurity was long standing. The specifics of this problem will be addressed in the chapter to follow.
### 5.2.6 Economic Conditions

#### Table 5.2: Economic Indicators for Lamontville

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>WAGES*</th>
<th>PHSL**</th>
<th>RENTS***</th>
<th>TSP****</th>
<th>SHSL*****</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>N/D</td>
<td>10.36</td>
<td>N/D</td>
<td>N/D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>11.35</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>88.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>13.47</td>
<td>4.90</td>
<td>91.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>N/D</td>
<td>13.47</td>
<td>N/D</td>
<td>N/D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>13.47</td>
<td>5.43</td>
<td>131.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>13.47</td>
<td>5.89</td>
<td>134.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>13.47</td>
<td>7.22</td>
<td>144.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>14.29</td>
<td>8.68</td>
<td>173.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>17.14</td>
<td>10.54</td>
<td>184.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>21.72</td>
<td>12.74</td>
<td>215.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>23.58</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>246.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>41.84</td>
<td>14.74</td>
<td>282.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>41.84</td>
<td>17.75</td>
<td>308.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>41.84</td>
<td>23.16</td>
<td>349.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* National average monthly wages in Rands for blacks.

** Primary Household Subsistence Level in Rands per month for blacks in Durban. PHSL includes food, clothing, washing, light and cleansing, and is calculated for a family of 5.

*** Rents in Rands per month for Lamontville, presented as weighted average.

**** Transport costs in Rands per month for blacks in Durban.

***** Secondary Household Subsistence Level in Rands per month. Calculated from aggregating PHSL, Rents and Transport.

N/D indicates that no data were available.
Figure 5.4: The Relationship Between Wages, Primary Household Subsistence Level and Secondary Household Subsistence Level

The chart illustrates the relationship between wages and household subsistence levels from 1972 to 1985. It shows a trend where wages and subsistence levels increase over time.

Key:
- Secondary Household Subsistence Level
- Primary Household Subsistence Level
- Wages

Table 5.2, in conjunction with Figure 5.4, provides a basis for understanding the general economic conditions in Lamontville. Reference to the notes of Table 5.2 explains the range of data sources utilized in the construction of Table 5.2 and Figure 5.4. Several factors relating to these data sources must be explained. Wage figures refer to national averages for all employed blacks; that is, they encompass all categories of black employment. The Primary and Secondary Household Subsistence Levels, as well as transport costs, refer to all urban blacks living in the greater Durban area. PHSL and SHSL figures moreover are calculated for a family of 5. The average household size in Lamontville is 8. Rent figures are specific to Lamontville and represent weighted averages. While comparison of locally specific data to national averages does not constitute the ideal situation this must suffice given the unavailability of local data with respect to black wages. The apparent similarity of the objective economic climate with respect to black wage earners on
a national scale suggests, however, that the comparison offered in Table 5.2 and Figure 5.4 is a relatively accurate representation of local reality.

Examination of the wages and Primary Household Subsistence Level (PHSL, refers to food, clothing, washing, light and cleansing) curves indicates that wages remained marginally below the PHSL up until 1977, after which date wages underwent steady, large increases which consistently widened the gap between wages earned and the PHSL. Inclusion of rents and transport costs to yield the Secondary Household Subsistence Level (SHSL), however, produces a curve that appears less favourable than when considering only the PHSL. It appears that financial advances achieved in the workplace are, to a large degree consumed by increasing living place costs. It could be argued, of course, that the consistent nature of wage increases, and the ever widening gap between wages and the SHSL is a trend that might persist. Such an argument, however, fails to take into consideration a variety of factors impinging on these wage increases which suggest an SHSL curve exceeding the wage curve (Keenan, 1983). An examination of macro trends, their interrelationship with local specifics, as well as criteria specific to Lamontville lend credence to the latter argument.

National unemployment trends are such that unemployment has increased from 11.8 percent in 1970 to 21.1 percent in 1981 (Keenan, 1983). This trend of ever increasing unemployment continues beyond 1981 (Keenan, 1983). While reliable figures regarding employment seekers affected are not available (6), Keenan (1983) notes that available figures point to unskilled blacks being the worst affected sector. It is this sector of workers that comprises 57.5 percent of Lamontville's economically active population (7) (Sutcliffe and Wellings, 1984). Consideration of this element alone would offset any community gains due to increases of wages at the point of production. In addition, it should be noted that costs for education and recreation have not been accounted for in the SHSL.

Focusing on Lamontville it is found that rents, which increased sharply in 1983, refer only to the following components:

House rent: rent for the house itself which has remained unchanged.
Site rent: administration costs.
health services including sewerage and refuse removal.
interest payable on and redemption payments of loans utilized
for the purchase of land on which houses are situated.
school levy.
storm water drainage.
street lighting.
streets.
(Source: South Africa, 1983).
The rental figures presented in Table 5.2 constitute the basic rent which
is the lowest amount payable to the Administration Board (interview with
Finance Officer, Natalia Development Board, 17/12/1985). Over and above
this, people are individually charged for water (£), electricity, and any
costs of maintenance that the PNAB is requested to carry out on the house
(9). The Hankinson Report of the Rive-Hankinson Commission (South Africa,
1984) also draws attention to the fact that R3.95 per month is payable to
the PNAB for every 'lodger' residing in the house. The definition of
'lodger' the report of the Commission notes, refers to anyone over the age
of 18, including members of the family. Rentals depicted in Table 5.2,
while being upgraded for different income earners (10) are not downgraded
unless rental exceeds 25 percent of the household's income (11). This
downgrading is in the form of short term 'rent relief'.

Since rent, in the form described above, becomes an 'issue' around which
mobilization occurs, it is important to divert briefly to an examination
of rent theory and its application within urban geography, to determine
whether such theorizations facilitate understanding of Lamontville rents.
Geographical concern with rents has been evident since 1826 with the
postulation of von Thünen's locational ground rent theory (see McCarthy and
Smit, 1984). This concern has been extended in the neo-classical theoriz­
ations offered by Alonso (1960; 1964), Muth (1969) and Mills (1972) and,
more recently the work of both marxist economists and geographers (Edel,
1976; Harvey, 1973; 1974; 1978a; 1982; Scott, 1980) and mainstream
economists and geographers (Richardson, 1971; 1976; Bourne, 1976; Hart,
1976; Papageorgiou, 1976; Hart and Boader, 1978). This wide ranging theo­
retical concern with rents conceptualizes rent as a key explanatory factor
which facilitates understanding of urban form within capitalist society.
However, as Scott and Rowes (1978) observe, the treatment of rent in these
works is usually 'profoundly quiescent':
"Urban land in this model is a scarce resource, and the market perfectly harmonizes and co-ordinates its allocation among competing users. Bidding for land secures an agreement ...") (Scott and Rowes, 1978:47, emphasis original).

It should not be surprising, therefore, that McCarthy (1983a), in an attempt to explain South Africa's urban form from a basis of rigorous social theory, finds the classical rent models currently developed in geography incapable of describing the development of the South African city. As such, a model postulating political class struggle as the 'motor' of urban history, is developed to explain the dynamics of South African city development (McCarthy, 1983a). Moreover, in terms of this view, struggles over rent are regarded as class struggles over the distribution of the social surplus.

The geographical literature referred to above largely utilizes rents, or, in the case of South African development, political class struggle, to explain the development and existence of urban formations. That is to say, it is largely urban geography and not political geography. To achieve such an explanation, rents, within the marxist framework for example, are theorized as expressing certain capitalist economic relations. Rents are thus found to represent surplus value to landlords, and are expressed as differential and/or scarcity rents, or are experienced in the monopoly form (see Harvey 1978a; McCarthy, 1983a). The situation in Lamontville (and all black townships within South Africa), however, does not conform to a model of 'normal' capitalist social relations abstracted from the state. As noted in Chapter 4 (see also McCarthy 1983a), in Lamontville housing has been constructed in response to political class struggle to effect control. As such it is the central state that is ultimately the landlord. Purdon (1981) suggests that under these circumstances rents can be understood as class monopoly rents. While such rents yield negligible profits, they afford the central state the power of a class monopoly. That such a class monopoly is a source of great power to the central state will become evident in the following chapter.

In conjunction with the pertinent conceptualization of rents described above, earlier discussion pointed to a range of factors which suggest that rent might be aptly described as a social relation. While objective economic criteria are vital to understanding the perception of rents at
a local level, it is suggested that the social, political and physical fabric of township life is equally important to such an understanding. The relevance of such a suggestion becomes manifest when mobilization regarding rents is analysed in the following chapter.

Having addressed the nature of Lamontville's social base as well as the question of the possible 'meaning' of rents, attention must be turned to the form of local government representing the central state.

5.3 ADMINISTRATION BOARDS AND COMMUNITY COUNCILS - THE CHANGING DYNAMICS

5.3.1 Structure and Functions of the Administration Boards

The discussion on the determination of Municipal control over black administration in Chapter 4, emphasized that Administration Boards were developed specifically to ensure local enactment of central government policy. Figure 4.4 illustrates the newly created relationship. Administration Boards are directly controlled by, and answerable to the Minister of Co-operation and Development (formerly the Department of Native Affairs). The extent of the control is such that Administration Boards have no power to implement policy or make regulations. All budgetary matters, township and training projects must be ratified by the Department and any decision relating to Administration Board functions are taken at the central state level. The Minister, moreover, appoints Board members, who in turn appoint ministerial staff (Bekker and Humphries, 1985). Nevertheless the Boards, in the words of a Port Natal Administration Board official, "are government" (12). More specifically, they are local government in the sense that they undeniably constitute an extension of the central state to the local level. As such neither Administration Boards nor Community Councils encompass the realms of local state, whose complex relations with, and degree of relative autonomy from, the central state are theoretically addressed by Cockburn (1977), Dear and Clark (1981), Short (1982) and Wilkinson (1983).

Having, through legislation, established the Administration Boards as local extensions of itself, the central state has taken great care to ensure that the Administration Boards do not deviate from or resist central state initiatives as did the Municipalities. It becomes
evident that, through central state appointment of Board directors, for example, 93 percent are Afrikaans speaking, 91 percent are affiliated to one of three Afrikaans reformed churches and 94 percent attended Afrikaans universities. Moreover, given their ages, the Board directors would have received instruction in 'Bantu' or 'Native' administration that was firmly couched within Verwoedian ideology. Given the homogeneity of directors what has developed is a "distinct institutional culture (espousing) a belief in control and efficiency and thereby service to black communities" (Bekker and Humphries, 1985:34). As such the state has created bodies that will carry out specified duties, not only because these are legislatively circumscribed, but because those employed within the Administration Boards share the state's hegemonic ideology.

The functions of the Administration Boards and the departments under which these are subsumed are summarized below. The departments of Administration and Finance function to administer and financially control the departments described below.

Technical - the functions carried out by this department include the development, organization, planning, servicing and maintenance of housing, infrastructure and general community facilities within the townships. Moreover, the physical development of bantustan townships is carried out on an agency basis on behalf of the South African Development Trust. Boards are required to promote settlements of people from their areas of jurisdiction into bantustan townships. This, however, is not specified in law but is paid for by the central state, and payment includes a commission (Bekker and Humphries, 1985).

Services - both 'hard' and 'soft' services (13) are delivered by the Administration Board. This results in the replication of duties of many Municipal departments (14) (Bekker and Humphries, 1985).

Manpower - manpower involves the guidance and placement of black workers and the implementation of influx control. The Port Natal Administration Board administers twenty-three Labour Bureaux and effects a policing and judicial role through the existence of two Aid Centres. This department also collects levies from employers (Bekker and Humphries, 1985).

Trade - this department's major function is to distribute liquor and to produce and distribute beer to the townships directly controlled by the Port Natal Administration Board, as well as those townships and rural areas found in the KwaZulu bantustan (Bekker and Humphries, 1985).
5.3.2 The Administration Boards’ Financial Sources

With the promulgation of the Administration Boards in 1971, no major financial changes were made. The finances of the Municipalites Native Revenue Accounts were transferred to the newly created structures. The only difference was that while Municipalities had, albeit seldom utilized, recourse to loans and grants from their general accounts, the Administration Boards had/have no such facility. The transferred sources of finance were considered:

"sufficient ... to perform their duties adequately without recourse to the state for additional assistance" (Dr P.J. Koornhoff, Minister of Department of Co-operation and Development, 1971, cited in Bekker and Humphries, 1985:130).

While self-sufficiency was not legislatively stipulated, it was an explicitly stated expectation. An overview of the changing financial status of Administration Boards in general and, where possible, the Port Natal Administration Board, is essential to an understanding of later analysis of the rationale motivating the Port Natal Administration Board to increase service charges.

Table 5.3: Estimated Aggregated Surplus or Deficit of the Administration Boards, 1973-1983 (in Rands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>SURPLUS</th>
<th>DEFICIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>482 841</td>
<td>~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>10 225 639</td>
<td>~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>18 817 814</td>
<td>~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>7 989 585</td>
<td>~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>3 611 647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-79</td>
<td>10 084 503</td>
<td>~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-80</td>
<td>19 696 375</td>
<td>~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-81</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>7 889 079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-82</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>12 367 571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-83</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>32 140 057</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Data Source: Bekker and Humphries, 1985:132).

Table 5.3 illustrates that as a whole, Administration Boards, since 1980...
have incurred increasing deficits. Examination of the various sources of income should provide an indication of the origins of these deficits.

(a) Employer Levies

These levies, first created in 1952 (Native Services Levy Act) to fund infrastructural developments within townships (see Chapter 3), were altered with the promulgation of the Black Labour Act of 1972. Employer fees and levies were amalgamated with registration and Labour Bureaux fees, and were to be utilized to fund expenditure incurred by the Department of Manpower. Surplus accruing to this account was to augment funds necessary for housing (including services and maintenance), community services and head office administration costs. While the Riekert Commission (South Africa, 1979a) argued for the removal of employer levies, Administration Boards are of the opinion that levies should be increased. Moreover, the Administration Boards have argued that a proportion, rather than only the surplus, of the levies income should be made available for housing and general township expenditures. This would resemble usage of funds under the Native Services Levy Act (1952-1972) (Bekker and Humphries, 1985). This has been partially achieved through the Guidance and Placement Act of 1982 which stipulates that Administration Boards must be reimbursed for their guidance and placement functions.

While minor changes to this income source have been to the advantage of the Administration Boards, these bodies are unsure whether employer levies will remain an income source. Moreover, the Administration Boards argue that these levies should be increased since increasing costs of implementing influx control and rising unemployment are resulting in a reduction in income.

Table 5.4: PNAB Surplus/Deficit (in Rands) from Employer Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surplus/deficit</th>
<th>Surplus/deficit</th>
<th>Surplus/deficit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980/81</td>
<td>1981/82</td>
<td>1982/83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ 2 329 188</td>
<td>+ 3 199 795</td>
<td>+ 2 536 016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Data Source: Bekker and Humphries, 1985:140).
Examination of the status of the Port Natal Administration Board's account in this regard, as illustrated in Table 5.4 indicates substantial surpluses being generated by this income source. These surpluses, it must be emphasized are available to augment housing and general township expenditures.

(b) Liquor
In 1975 Administration Boards were granted 80 percent, as opposed to the previous (see Chapter 4) 20 percent of profits accruing from Administration Board owned liquor outlets. From 1981 onwards, all such profits were retained by the Administration Board (15). In theory the Administration Boards' profits in this sphere should have increased as a result of this change. In reality, however, profit levels declined. This occurred because black township residents purchased liquor from the more competitive retailers located outside the townships. This source of finance, moreover, is under threat given current privatization initiatives. Such initiatives are to be implemented when alternate sources of finance have been found (Bekker and Humphries, 1985). The removal of this financial source will obviously affect the Administration Boards adversely. Until such time, however, liquor remains an income source that can be utilized in the same fashion as the employer contribution surplus.

(c) Sorghum Beer
The primacy of this income source to the Native Revenue Account was noted in Chapter 4. This primacy has remained consistent with the institution of the Boards. Given, however, increasing preference for liquor, the income generated by this source is undergoing steady decline (Bekker and Humphries, 1985). The Port Natal Administration Board, however, is expanding its rural bantustan market (Bekker and Humphries, 1985). It appears, moreover, that the Port Natal Administration Board is to launch its particular brand of sorghum beer on a national scale (16). These latter factors embody a potential income source to counteract declining beer consumption in the urban areas.

Recent moves to privatize the sorghum beer industry has resulted in strong opposition from the Administration Boards, as this implies the loss of the major income source. Administration Boards argue that
privatization would serve only the interests of private shareholders rather than, as is presently the case, black township dwellers. The central state, however, has affirmed that privatization will take place only when alternate income sources have been generated and, when this occurs, Administration Boards will retain major shares in the industry (Bekker and Humphries, 1985). At present Administration Boards retain their monopoly in the industry, and in 1980 profits to the tune of R148 million accrued to the 14 Administration Boards in existence at that time (Bekker and Humphries, 1985). It must be emphasized that this amount is available to subsidize losses accrued in the sphere of housing and general township maintenance, servicing and administration.

(d) Housing

Table 5.5: Estimated Housing Losses (in Rands) for the Port Natal Administration Board

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980-81</td>
<td>3 747 162</td>
<td>3 019 212</td>
<td>4 000 000</td>
<td>4 801 234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Data Source: Bekker and Humphries, 1985:142).

Table 5.6: Estimated Housing Deficits 1982-85; Port Natal Administration Board (in Rands) for Lamontville

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Present rentals</th>
<th>1982-83</th>
<th>1983-84</th>
<th>1984-85</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total annual rent income</td>
<td>1 000 164</td>
<td>1 183 668</td>
<td>1 380 072</td>
<td>1 575 990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total annual expenditure</td>
<td>3 073 836</td>
<td>3 073 836</td>
<td>3 534 911</td>
<td>4 065 148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deficit</td>
<td>2 373 678</td>
<td>1 890 168</td>
<td>2 154 839</td>
<td>2 489 158</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Data Source: Bekker and Humphries, 1985:155, figures as presented in text).
It is demonstrated in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 that housing represents an overall expenditure, rather than a source of income. It is important to point out that the deficits listed represent the difference between incomes from rent and total board expenditure in the housing sphere which includes the following items:

Services - sewerage, refuse removal, street lights, water (loss on distribution).

Loan charges and contributions - loan charges, contribution to maintenance reserve, insurance.

Maintenance - sewerage, electricity, water, roads, pavements, stormwater, buildings, land and grounds, furniture, plant and equipment.

Administration - salaries, wages, and allowances (township staff), security, miscellaneous township expenses.

Head office - administration, chief director, audit, board's general, stores, organization and works study, computer, finance, management, community services.

Other expenses - sports facilities, welfare, health, créches, libraries, cemetery, bursaries, schools (17).

Given the manner in which this account is balanced, none of the revenue sources described above, designed to offset losses, have been utilized. The diverse arguments that attempt to explain the ever increasing housing deficit must be addressed.

Hughes and Grest (1983) draw attention to the fact that inflation has resulted in a cutback in capital expenditure. It should be remembered, however, that since very little capital development has occurred, this can have little affect on the Administration Board Finances. The Administration Boards argue, furthermore, that unlike the Municipalities, they have no recourse to loans or grants, given the Department of Co-operation and Development's stipulation that the Administration Boards maintain self sufficiency. The feasibility of this argument in explaining increasing deficits is detracted from, given that in 1971 only 21 of approximately 450 Municipalities needed to directly subsidize their Native Revenue Accounts. Durban's Municipality was one of the many which maintained such self sufficiency. From 1959 until the Administration Boards took control, there was no need to increase rents since profits (from beer, employer levies, etc) were such that housing losses were made good and substantial reserves accumulated (Bekker and Humph-
ries, 1985). More feasible is the argument that rapid escalation of costs, after Administration Board take over, occurred because Municipalities had indirectly subsidized the Native Revenue Accounts by, for example, failing to charge full costs of service provision and staff costs (Bekker and Humphries, 1985). An obvious reason for rapid cost escalation, is the Administration Board duplication of certain Municipal functions. This, of course, constitutes a wasteful and unnecessary political cost created by the central state's separatist policy and its desire for direct control over urban blacks.

(e) Discussion

Housing represents the only area in which the Administration Boards as a whole experience deficits. All other areas display an, albeit declining, surplus. Most Administration Boards have attempted to reduce housing related deficits through increasing rents. They have failed, however, to raise rents to the level at which deficits are met without subsidization. Bekker and Humphries (1985) attribute this failure to two factors. First Community Councils, with whom the Administration Boards must by law consult before increasing rents, have largely opposed such increases. This legal requirement can, however, be waived through the intervention of the Minister of Co-operation and Development. Second, the unprecedented politicization of rents that has taken place in the late 1970s and 1980s is said to have curtailed the implementation of higher rents (Bekker and Humphries, 1985). In an effort to reduce housing deficits without engaging in subsidization, some Administration Boards, together with raising rents, have discontinued various items of expenditure and frozen staff positions. The deficits accruing to the housing sphere, however, persist and, given that the Administration Boards receive no financial assistance, accumulated reserves have evidently been utilized for this purpose (Bekker and Humphries, 1985). The 'economic' arguments for rent increases discussed above contain little credibility given the consistency of the surpluses being generated. This is highlighted in the following chapter.

It is argued here that the crux of the housing deficits problem lies in the attempts to develop a self sufficient housing account. The motivations to create such self sufficiency, argue Bekker and Humphries (1985) lie in the declining surplus accruing to beer, employer levy and liquor accounts as well as the future uncertainty of these income sources.
More important in this respect is the promulgation of the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982, specifying the establishment of self sufficient, autonomous bodies that will supercede the Community Councils and Advisory Boards (Hughes and Grest, 1983). That this latter factor is a major one contributing to the Administration Boards' reluctance to subsidize housing costs is argued in the section addressing Black Local Authorities and Regional Services Councils.

Over and above attempting to decrease deficits through raising rentals and cutting costs, the Administration Boards have attempted to compel the central state to fund 'agency activities', 'remaining services' and staff costs. Agency activities refer to those functions that are created through state legislation, for which the state disclaims financial responsibility. The major agency function performed by the Administration Boards is influx control. While the state has, since 1982 re-imbursed the Administration Boards for their role in guidance and placement, this fails to remove the major cost of implementing influx control. The Boards have, since, the 1982/3 financial year been partially compensated for the remaining services, that is those activities not generally subsumed under a local authority (Labour bureaux, welfare and health, aid centres) (Financial Mail, 4/11/1983). The Administration Boards have also argued that Board official salaries (the second largest Administration Board expenditure after influx control which for all Administration Boards combined constitutes an annual expenditure of R90 million) should be funded by the central state (Bekker and Humphries, 1985).

It is necessary at this stage to clarify that the factors subsumed under 'housing' constitute what is commonly termed the "social wage" (McCarthy and Smit, 1984). There is, however, a notable disjuncture between the social wage as defined in Chapter 2, and that which is evident in South Africa's black townships. The disjuncture is as follows. Since Administration Boards are expected, by the Department of Co-operation and Development, to be financially self sufficient, little or no money accruing to the state from the taxation of capital is directed to the townships. Capital itself must pay for the enactment of central state policy such as influx control and Labour Bureaux, through the levy paid to the Administration Boards for each worker employed. Since some of the money derived in this fashion is intended for township development...
this forms capital's contribution to the social wage. The balance of
the so-called social wage for South African blacks, however, is derived
directly or indirectly from the township residents themselves. As such,
sorghum beer, liquor, fines and registration fees are all paid for by
the township residents, only a proportion of which are economically
active. It follows then, that the social wage as explained in Chapter
2 does not resemble the one in existence here. The social wage hardly
exists in South Africa and it is the minimal workplace wage (Harvey,
1978a) that comprises the vast bulk of the source of use value to
Lamontville residents rather than funds derived from state taxation.

Furthermore, the state, in seeking to relinquish itself of local level
financial burdens while generating much needed income (see Schofield,
1985) is engaged in a programme of privatization. Thus, selling off
substantial amounts of township housing to blacks (Mabin and Parnell,
1983; Lamont, 1985) and privatizing, for example, the township beer
industry, provides the state with a substantial amount of cash (18).
The privatization process also provides potential long term financial
resources in the form of future company taxes from, for example, private
liquor firms (Bekker and Humphries, 1985). Political motives are
intimately interrelated with these economic actions. A devolution of
responsibility through the creation of Black Local Authorities and
Regional Services Councils, to the local level is seen 'to kill several
birds with one stone', to borrow Schofield's (1985) imagery. Financial
responsibilities become to a large degree localized, and depoliticization
is effected through the (supposed) absence of direct state control and
intervention. The goal of racial domination through separate self-
government is simultaneously advanced (see Schofield, 1985).

The implications of the above for the social wage accruing to township
residents is, to reiterate, that to all intents and purposes it becomes
non-existent. Having removed the financial resources previously con-
stituting the social wage from the public sphere, the intended auton-
omous, self-sufficient bodies became responsible for their own finan-
cial resources (see Hughes and Grest, 1983; Bekker and Humphries, 1985).
The dynamics of such new forms of local representation have implications
beyond that of negating a large degree of the social wage as they
substantially determine the terrain upon which urban struggles are
waged. The particular organization under scrutiny in this thesis has had largely to contend with the still existing Community Council system and the Administration Boards. At the same time, however, a degree of the mobilization has been informed by the imminent changes in local representation. It is to an examination of the Community Councils, Black Local Authorities and Regional Services Councils that the discussion now turns.

5.3.3 Local Black Representation

The rejection of Advisory Boards and Urban Bantu Councils noted in Chapter 4, in conjunction with widespread urban unrest in 1976, prompted the creation of new forms of local black representation. Given that these bodies were to take on greater responsibilities than their predecessors, and that they would ultimately constitute fully fledged local government bodies, they were seen as potential means of appeasing urban blacks (Bloch and Wilkinson, 1982; Hughes and Grest, 1983; Bekker and Humphries, 1985).

(a) Functions

The range of possible functions that the Minister of Co-operation and Development could devolve to the Community Councils include:

- the allocation, administration and letting of single accommodation dwellings and other buildings.
- the allocation of trading sites.
- combating and prevention of unlawful occupation of land and buildings, approval of building plans for private homes, demolition of unauthorized or abandoned buildings and structures.
- maintenance of services as determined by the Minister.
- control over dogs and the imposition of dog tax.
- promotion of moral and social welfare and sound community development.
- formation of a community guard.

The Community Councils could also make recommendations to the Minister regarding education, township regulations, transport, the imposition of levies, as well as the possible extension of their powers beyond those specified in the Act. Not only does the Minister concerned decide on which functions are to be carried out by the Community Council concerned, he also has the power to regulate meetings and discussions of the Community Councils and dissolve such a body if such an action would
serve the 'public interest' (Hughes and Grest, 1983).

The relationship between Community Councils and Administration Boards was to be such that the Councils would make decisions and recommendations to the Administration Board. The Board then, being in possession of the necessary expertise and staff would carry out what had been decided (Hughes and Grest, 1983). In practice (see Figure 4.4), however, the Community Councils have no power to make decisions - this power remains centrally located. Over and above the central location of power, Community Councils are also constrained by their limited financial resources. The functions allocated to them must be carried out from monies granted to them by the Administration Boards, funds accruing from residents' payments for the use of facilities, as well as fines and the imposition of levies. Table 5.7 illustrates the financial status of the Ninguzumu Community Council in reference to Lamontville.

Table 5.7: Deficits (in Rands) Incurred by the Community Council with regard to Lamontville

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deficits</td>
<td>913 065</td>
<td>815 961</td>
<td>816 688</td>
<td>1 699 236</td>
<td>1 093 232</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Data Source: PNAB Press Release, 7 October 1982).

Given both the structural and financial impotence of the Community Councils, they failed to gain any credibility within the communities they supposedly represent. While, as Bekker and Humphries (1983) note, the Community Councils have at times attempted to assert their objection to, for example, rent increases, their inherent lack of power has prevented success in such spheres. The overall state of Community Councils is that of advanced disintegration (Grest and Hughes, 1984b; Daily News, 8/5/1985). People serving on these unrepresentative bodies are subject to a large degree of township hostility and violence (Laurence, 1985).

Given the extent of the impotence of these bodies and their unrepresentative status, township residents set up civic groups which, as repres-
entatives of the residents, attempted to address residents' grievances. As such Community Councils became 'sandwiched' between Administration Boards and the Department of Co-operation and Development on the one hand, and civic organizations on the other. On both sides decision making and at times, negotiation, excludes the Community Councils. Figure 4.3 illustrates this relationship.

The gross deterioration and rejection of these Community Councils through local level struggles combined with the definition of local government as an 'own affair' and the exclusion of blacks from the Tri-Cameral system, have all contributed to the recent development of Black Local Authorities in conjunction with Regional Services Councils (Grest and Hughes, 1984a). A discussion of these two bodies concludes this section.

5.3.4 Black Local Authorities and Regional Services Councils

The specific functions (see Hughes and Grest, 1983) subsumed under the four different categories of Black Local Authorities (19) are of little import to this discussion. Of major consequence here is an analysis of the previously identified political and economic motivations, and the implications of these changes to local black representation.

(a) Political Factors

"Local authorities will serve to defuse pent-up frustrations and grievances against administration from Pretoria. Local authorities will affect daily existence of these people more directly and intimately than the more removed activities of the central government. In the war in which South Africa is involved and the total onslaught against the country, defusion of this kind has become an urgent necessity which cannot be postponed much longer" (Dr P.J. Riekert, Chief Director of the Western Transvaal Administration Board, cited in Bekker and Humphries, 1985:111).

The institution of self governing, autonomous Black Local Authorities then, becomes for the state a means of depoliticizing the fabric of urban black life. This is achieved through a discontinuation of its direct intervention into and control over the daily lives of urban blacks.

It becomes immediately apparent, however, that the distancing of the state from the local level, supposedly effected through the creation of such bodies, is not as great as the state would have people believe.
Firstly, the mere fact that these bodies constitute yet another set of non-negotiated, imposed structures in itself constitutes direct state intervention. Furthermore, having created several categories of black local authorities, the Minister of Co-operation and Development retains decision making powers regarding which category is instituted at the local level. And in the case of Village and Community Councils, and Advisory Boards, the Minister decides which functions are to be devolved to the local level (Bekker and Humphries, 1985). Finally, these supposedly autonomous bodies are answerable to the Department of Co-operation and Development for decisions made and actions taken (Hughes and Grest, 1983).

Creating self-governing Black Local Authorities in the urban areas that can be represented at third tier government level - the Regional Services Councils - appears to promise substantial reform (Daily News, 16/5/1985). However, within the ambit of the new Tri-Cameral Constitution, local government constitutes an 'own affair' (Grest and Hughes, 1984a), as such the nationalist ideology of self determination is enhanced rather than retarded. Thus

"... self determination ... This is regarded by the government as one of the inalienable cornerstones of any constitutional development in this country on every level of government" (Minister of Constitutional Affairs, Mr. C. Heunis, cited in Schofield, 1985:22).

A further political motivation, Schofield (1985) suggests, is evident in the stipulation that all levels of Black Local Authorities must purchase hard services from the Regional Services Councils. As such, the need for Administration Boards in respect of township administration becomes diminished, given the self governing and self sufficient status of the Black Local Authorities. The functions for which the Administration Boards remain responsible, for example influx control, could be subsumed within regional departments (Schofield, 1985) thus obviating the need for the Administration Boards. Abolition of the Administration Boards could be presented by the state as reform (Schofield, 1985). Furthermore, the state could forge ahead with its privatization of the sorghum beer industry without concern to finding alternate sources of finance since the Administration Boards would no longer be in existence.
(b) Financial Factors

"It is not the Minister's problem to solve the communities' shortage of money. This is something that must be done by the community itself ... the community must therefore elect leaders to act on their behalf, to collect the money needed to provide these services" (Administration Board Document, cited in Hughes and Grest, 1983:127).

This financial self-sufficiency legally required of Black Local Authorities is indicative of the Administration Boards' motives in attempting to achieve self-sufficient finances in respect of housing. As such rents were/are raised in preference to the utilization of surplus funds, given the imminent implementation of Black Local Authorities. That Black Local Authorities will be any more successful than Administration Boards in balancing housing income and expenditure, let alone in effecting development, is unlikely given the limited financial resources available. Rents form a major component of the income that will accrue to Black Local Authorities. Minor components such as fines, payments for use of facilities etc., will have little impact on their income. Since most township houses will remain under the ownership of the Department of Co-operation and Development (cf Mabin and Parnell, 1983) no income in the form of rates will be available to the Black Local Authorities (Bekker and Humphries, 1985).

In economic terms the institution of these authorities effect the removal of the social wage, as defined earlier, from urban blacks. Furthermore, the inevitably bankrupt state of the authorities means that the quality of life in these urban areas will in all likelihood decline even further (Schofield, 1985). Of crucial importance is that the financial status of Black Local Authorities affects political representation on the Regional Services Councils. Representation of any local authority is determined by the amount of services bought. Given the inevitable deficits that the Black Local Authorities will have to cope with, it is unlikely that they will be significantly represented on the Regional Services Councils (see Schofield, 1985).

(c) Discussion

It was suggested when discussing Administration Boards, that their actions, while stated as being economically motivated, were in actual fact determined to a large degree by political factors - in particular, the
restructuring of local level politics. This suggestion has been borne out by the above examination to the degree that

"we are not necessarily going to get the best system or the most economical system. You are going to get a system that is from the political angle achievable... It is a political system and a political solution" (Durban City Treasurer, cited in Schofield, 1985:22).

5.4 CONCLUSION

In the above empirical discussion the nature of the social base and local government as illustrated in Figure 2.1 have been described. These represent the conditions under which the mobilisation to be analysed in Chapter 6 occurred. The mobilization or social force arises out of the interrelationship between the social base, local as well as central government. The preceding discussion is integral to an understanding of the dynamics of any social force.
NOTES

(1) Lamontville's total population is approximately 30,000 people (Wheeler, 1984).

(2) The number of rooms does not refer to the number of bedrooms in a house. A three roomed house, for example, consists of a bedroom, a kitchen and a lounge/dining room.

(3) Natalia Development Board constitutes an amalgamation of the Port Natal and Drakensberg Administration Boards.

(4) The fact that only 6 percent of the 100 respondents stated that they were dissatisfied with rents appears to contradict the formation of a Joint Rent Action Committee. In the discussion concerning both the financial sources and expenditure of townships administration it becomes clear that rents should be utilized to carry out maintenance, provide recreation facilities, services etc. Given the deterioration of the houses themselves as well as the deterioration of township conditions and township life due to the lack of services and facilities, the rent monies are clearly not being used for their intended purpose. These factors indicate that rents as an economic factor, are inextricably interrelated with and even determined by factors indicated in Figure 5.2. Thus the formation of an action committee concerned with rents.

(5) Water borne sewerage was installed when it became evident that the drainage capacity of Lamontville's soils were not amenable to the pit latrine system.

(6) This survey was sponsored by Diakonia - an ecumenical organization. Inquiries revealed that the report had unfortunately been lost. As such the discussion relies solely on the newspaper report.

(7) Personal communication, Charles Meth (Lecturer, Department of Economics, University of Natal, Durban, 3/12/1985).

(8) Only 45.1 percent of Lamontville's population is economically active.

(9) Water is subsidised by the Administration Board, residents pay only 18 cents per kilolitre.

(10) The Government Gazette Notice R823 of 22 April 1983 makes specific reference to the unblocking of sewers. The cost charged to a person is the actual cost, subject to a minimum charge of R10. This is the only maintenance problem mentioned in the Gazette. Given the range of maintenance problems existing in the township, this isolated attention suggests that sewer problems are commonly experienced. This in turn leads one to believe that residents are paying for an inefficient system.

(11) Interview with Finance Officer, Natalia Development Board, Mayville 17/12/1985.
(12) Port Natal Administration Board Notice to all township residents, increase in site and hostel bed tariffs, dated 1/10/1982.

(13) Interview with Finance Officer, Natalia Development Board, at Mayville, 17/12/1985. (The Port Natal Administration Board and the Drakensberg Administration Board amalgamated in 1984 to form the Natalia Development Board. For ease of discussion the earlier title will be used).

(14) Hard Services: water, drainage, electricity, road building, fire brigade services, transport services, health services, town planning.
Soft Services: museums, ambulance services, cemeteries and crematorium, parks and recreation, public library, community halls, zoos, aquaria, traffic control, licences, civil defence, abattoirs, produce markets, computer services.
Hard/Soft Services: refuse removal, housing, valuations, security, negotiation of loans.
(Source: Schofield, 1985:51).

(15) Municipalities retain the following services:
health, for which the Administration Board pays; transport, traffic control and vehicle licensing, all of which represent income sources (Bekker and Humphries, 1985).

(16) In 1981/2, National Liquor profits were 12 million rand (Bekker and Humphries, 1985).

(17) Personal communication with a white collar employee of the Port Natal Administration Board's Congella Brewery, 12/9/1985.

(18) Extracted from a PNAB table summarizing the approximate actual income for 1983/1984 with regard to Lamontville.

(19) The Urban Foundation (1983) indicate that discounts are available to buyers where the house is purchased for cash.

(20) Town Council - at this level all functions (see Hughes and Grest, 1983) are automatically devolved to the Local Authority. Village Councils', Community Councils' and Advisory Boards' functions are decided by the Minister of Co-operation and Development.
CHAPTER 6

THE PROCESS OF ORGANIZATION. AN EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE JOINT RENT ACTION COMMITTEE

6.1 INTRODUCTION

In Chapter 2 it was argued that Castells' (1977) Marxist-structuralist theory of urban social movements neglects the levels of the social base and levels of the state. Explicit analysis of these levels, together with a particular focus on organizational dynamics it was argued, could extend Castells' (1977) understanding of urban struggles. The analysis in the previous chapter, of the social base and levels of state, informs understanding of both the development of issues and the pertinence of the intervening urban social movement's programme. This analysis, moreover, facilitates understanding of the strategies adopted in relation to the levels of state, conditions of the social base, as well as the manner in which the state responds. Being informed of such dynamics as well as the theoretical understanding of intellectuals one can set out to examine the development of, and activities engaged in, by the urban social movement. It it essential to recall and emphasize at this juncture, that the organization constituting the urban social movement is perceived not as a fixed entity. It embodies rather a process, the dynamics of which

"cannot but be the result of opposing forces in continuous movement, which are never reducible to fixed quantities since within them quantity is continually becoming quality" (Gramsci, 1971:438).

This chapter then, being informed by the preceding theoretical and empirical arguments, incorporates an empirical and theoretical analysis of the process of a particular urban social movement. In order to achieve such an analysis several components of the movement must be considered:

- The issues, generated through state intervention in the social base, will be identified.

- The process of the organization's 'movement' that is, why and how "quantity is continually becoming quality" (Gramsci, 1971:438) must be understood. To achieve this it is essential to examine, context-
ually, the interaction of the opposing forces. While it is acknowledged that concrete 'movements' of the organization are elusive (Gramsci, 1971) it is considered useful to identify different organizational moments or phases so as to facilitate analysis of organizational dynamics. Specifically, four organizational 'formations' have been identified. It should be understood that these formations incorporate a temporal dimension since movement of the organization is forward through time. There is, of course temporal overlap between formations. Nevertheless, while representing temporal advancement, each formation encompasses an understanding of the specific forms of the organization at different stages. Subsequent analysis, then, is subsumed within the limits set by the four formations identified.

The final element of the analysis is such that the theoretical arguments elaborated in Chapter 2 are explicitly 'applied' to the foregoing analysis. In the first instance the saliency of Castells' (1977) theoretical propositions will be discussed. Having understood the organization in the Marxist-structuralist sense, the theoretical tenets offered by Gramsci (1971) will be explored.

6.2 THE ISSUES

6.2.1 Rents

On the 1/10/1982, residents of all townships administered by the Port Natal Administration Board (PNAB) were issued with a notice (1) informing them of the intention to increase rents. The notice stated that the deterioration of finances in respect of housing (see Table 5.3) compelled the Administration Board to apply to the Minister of Co-operation and Development for rent increases, as the Board was unable to carry such deficits. The 'revised' rents would constitute an initial high increase, followed by smaller increases at six monthly intervals over three years. Rents in Lamontville were to increase by 63 percent initially and 15 percent every six months after the date of first implementation (Daily News, 13/10/1982). The notice advocated that the rents were 'fair' given that they constituted less than 25 percent of an average household income of R275. As should be clear from Chapter 5 however, this calculation failed to consider the relationship between income, primary and secondary household subsistence levels and factors such as unemployment.
The emphasis in the notice (1) on economic factors to the exclusion of political factors in the budget resembles the Administration Board's general stance as analyzed in the previous chapter. In a press statement (2), however, the Port Natal Administration Board, while elaborating the declining income accruing to the Board from its various sources, and the possible termination of such income sources (Natal Mercury, 28/4/1983; Daily News, 29/4/1983), stated that there was a need for townships to move to financial self sufficiency. This, it was claimed in the statement, was necessary given the imminent implementation of Black Local Authorities. All later arguments for the increases, however, focussed on the economic status of the Administration Board. In the previous chapter the general economic status of the PNAB was examined. It was argued here that the need to achieve a self sufficient housing account was attributable to political rather than economic factors.

Several factors specific to the PNAB substantiate this view:

- The PNAB argued that its accumulated surplus had been fully utilized. As such for the first time since its inception, it faced an overall deficit of R1,3 million in the 1982/83 financial year (Natal Mercury, 25/4/1983). At the same time, however, it was revealed that the Board was carrying a total reserve fund of R22 million. The PNAB was accused at Parliamentary level of fund mismanagement and a New Republic Party MP undertook an investigation of the nature of these reserves (Natal Mercury, 25/4/1985; Natal Mercury, 28/5/1985; Daily News, 29/5/1985). The investigation yielded confusing explanations for the reserve. Evidently more than half the reserve constituted cash reserves and the remaining funds, statutory reserves (Daily News, 15/3/1985). Precisely what this meant was not clarified. What was clear was that the funds were not available for use in the townships since the PNAB continues to state that it is incurring deficits (Daily News, 3/6/1985).

- While the PNAB effects minimal maintenance in the townships due to lack of funds (Daily News, 8/12/1982; Natal Witness, 25/3/1983), it was intent on vacating its luxurious Mayville office block to move to Pietermaritzburg, at an estimated cost of R10 million, once amalgamation with the Drakensberg Administration Board had taken place (Daily News, 6/7/1985; Natal Mercury, 26/7/1985).

- A breakdown of the PNAB's budget as illustrated in Table 6.1, while accounting only for 93 percent of this budget indicates that 63 percent is invested in unspecified ventures - a mysterious circum-
stance given the supposed bankruptcy of the institution.

Table 6.1: 1985 Budget Breakdown for the Port Natal Administration Board

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USEAGE</th>
<th>RANDS (IN MILLIONS)</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL BUDGET</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Invested in property development and equipment (unspecified)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital development fund</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External investments (unspecified)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>17,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash in bank</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owed</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrecoverable debts</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff salaries and wages</td>
<td>15,6</td>
<td>8,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration costs</td>
<td>17,9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leave funds</td>
<td>several</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gratuity funds, golden handshakes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outstanding staff loans</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>0,67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outstanding beer sales</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>164,9</td>
<td>93,57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The above figures relating to the PNAB substantiate the argument that purely economic arguments relating to rent increments do not appear to be justifiable.

In applying to the Minister of Co-operation and Development for rent increases (Natal Witness, 25/3/1983; Daily News, 29/4/1983) the PNAB maintained that it underwent extensive discussions with the Ningizimu Community Council (NCC) concerning the increases (Natal Mercury, 8/4/1983; Daily News, 29/4/1983). A memorandum drafted by the Council (cited in Challenor, 1985:56), however, indicated that the rent announcement:

"caught the Ningizimu Community Council with a feeling of alarm and distrust because it had hoped that there would be no rent increases for the foreseeable future. (The information regarding the increases was) advanced to the Council by the
Administration Board as per Council meeting No 37 of September 28 1982. (This) caught the council unaware and as such ... can not be accepted because the information and the queries were never dealt with to the satisfaction of the Council. (Furthermore the Council) was very much aware that the increase of rents would be used by certain elements within the community to tarnish the good name of the Council, aversing (sic) that the Council in collusion with the Board had decided to increase "the rental".

Since the Minister of Co-operation and Development approved of the increases despite the NCC's objections, Ministerial powers were obviously invoked. It should be considered, however, that the Council's rejection was not communicated to the residents (3), nor were residents consulted in any way by the Council with regard to their responses to the imminent increase.

6.2.2 Incorporation Into KwaZulu

The insecure nature of Lamontville's future was discussed in the previous chapter. After 1979 the question of Lamontville's future was not raised until Chief Buthelezi of KwaZulu, stated that Lamontville should be incorporated with KwaZulu (Daily News, 10/5/1983). Three months after this statement was made, the Department of Co-operation and Development announced that Lamontville, Hambanati and Chesterville (4) were to be incorporated within KwaZulu (Daily News 31/8/1983). Although incorporation has not yet taken place, the state's Commission for Co-operation and Development regarding consolidation proposals for the national state of KwaZulu (Daily News, 23/9/1983) recommended that Lamontville, Hambanati, St Wendolins, Kwa Dabeka, Clermont and Klaarwater (see Figure 4.2) be incorporated into KwaZulu.

While the recent announcement apparently forms part of a broader consolidation programme, the Department of Co-operation and Development provided no reasons for the earlier decision taken in 1983. It merely stated that the decision had been taken as a result of 'an investigation', the results of which could not become public knowledge due to an Act of Parliament. Critical suggestions regarding the state's motivations for incorporation must therefore be forwarded, and will be dealt with later in the chapter.
6.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENT

The announcement of the intent to increase rents did not elicit immediate organized response in Lamontville (5). This could be partially attributed to the fact that only intent, rather than the stipulation of concrete amounts and dates of implementation, was announced. Furthermore, Lamontville, together with another five communities (6) was organizing opposition to a 13 percent bus fare increase instituted by the Durban Transport Management Board (DTMB) and the Public Utility Transport Company (PUTCO) in December, 1982. The communities, since they "were similarly affected by these increases, implemented a strategy of joint action, based on the belief that united action had greater potential than individual township action" (Tsenole, cited in Challenor, 1985:52).

This strategy led to the formation of the Joint Commuters Committee (JCC) which raised several demands (see UKUSA, January 1983, September, 1983; McCarthy and Swilling, 1984). JCC's demands were supported by a one day boycott of the two bus companies concerned. The boycott in Lamontville, sustained to date, has been interspersed with attacks on DTMB buses leading to the occasional withdrawal of the service (City Press, 11/5/1983; Natal Mercury, 2/5/1983; Daily News, 15/10/1985). McCarthy and Swilling (1984) argue that the importance of this organizational activity lies in two areas. JCC's demand to be consulted by the bus companies concerned challenged the structures which exclude residents from the decision making process. Most pertinent to the development of JORAC is the organizational form developed by the JCC. This united community action initiated a base which, argue McCarthy and Swilling (1984:36), "had the potential for development and extension".

While organized community responses to the possible rent increases were not immediately evident, the origins of the process of such an articulation were evident in the activities of a disenchanted member of the NCC - Mr Dube. Mr Dube, who had been instrumental in the formation of the JCC, intervened in the social base to communicate to residents, through meetings and general community activity, the nature and dynamics of the rent increases, as well as the NCC's non-representative and impotent response to the increases (see Challenor, 1985). The extension of such initiatives to the development of an organization per se took place when the rent increases were concretized.
through the Minister of Co-operation and Development's announcement that increased rentals would be implemented in May 1983 (5). Communication between the communities of Lamontville and Hambanati gave rise to a resolve to initiate and develop township-based organizations, in the same manner as that which had been in existence in Klaarwater for several months (5). Once the localized organizations had been created, the intention was to unite these initiatives such that unified opposition to the homogenously imposed rent increases could be effected. In early April 1983, the Lamontville Rent Action Committee, Klaarwater Residents' Association and the Hambanati Residents' Association joined forces to form the "hurriedly put together" Joint Rent Action Committee (JORAC) (DHAC/JORAC, 1983). Having thus established a united force to implement action against rent increments, JORAC made contact with Chesterville, Shakaville and the hostels, which elected representative local organizations that were subsumed under the umbrella structure of JORAC (DHAC/JORAC, 1983).

The umbrella organization thus articulated was perceived by its leadership to represent a temporary structure developed to oppose the increases (Gumede, JORAC Chairperson, cited in Challenor, 1985). Before elaborating the strategies employed and the process of organization resulting from interaction with the dynamics of the social base, the factors determining opposition to rent increases need to be addressed.

6.4 FORMATION ONE (see Figures 6.1 and 6.2)

6.4.1. Economic Motivations

Shortly after JORAC's formation several resolutions stating the motivations for opposition to rent increases were formulated (see Appendix 1). These resolutions summarized issues raised at meetings held in townships by JORAC's constituent organizations.

The analysis in Chapter 5, of economic conditions prevalent at the social base suggested that economic inability to pay higher rentals was of decisive significance in motivating opposition to rent increases (Resolution 2). A survey (JORAC, 1983) determined that 74.2 percent of the 99 percent of residents who were unwilling to pay greater rentals were unwilling for economic reasons. Despite the economic conditions described in Chapter

* The sample size of this survey was 168 Lamontville residents.
Figure 6.1: Key to Figures 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 and 6.8

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**Figure 6.1:** Key to Figures 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 and 6.8

- **—** RENT RELATED ACTIVITY
- **—** CENTRAL STATE ACTION
- **—** KWAZULU GOVERNMENT/INKATHA ACTION
- **—** Trajectories of Conflict-Ideological or Physical Interaction Between Communities
- **—** Incorporation/Consolidation Related Activities
- **—** Indicates differing 'levels' of society according to Castells' terminology
FORMATION ONE

DIRECT CONTACT THROUGH LETTERS

STATE DEPARTMENT OF CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT AND PORT NATAL ADMINISTRATION BOARD

DIRECT PRESSURE

CAPTURING RESOURCES OF REFORMIST ELEMENTS AND LIBERAL SUPPORT GROUPS (PFP, DIAKONIA, BLACK SASH)

MEDIA PRESSURE

UNITING OF AFFECTED COMMUNITIES TO FORM THE JOINT RENT ACTION COMMITTEE (JORAC), AN UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION UNDER WHICH INDIVIDUAL ORGANIZATIONS RETAIN THEIR AUTONOMY. FORMALLY ELECTED ORGANIZATION WITH REPRESENTATIVES FROM CONSTITUENT BODIES, TEMPORARILY CONSTITUTED TO MOBILIZE AGAINST RENT INCREASES.

SOCIAL FORCE LEVEL TWO

INCREASES RENTS

HOMEOWNERSHIP DRIVE

STATE

SOCIAL FORCE LEVEL ONE

LAMONTVILLE RENT ACTION COMMITTEE

HAMNABATI RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION

CHESTERVILLE RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION

KLAARWATER RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION

SHAKAVILLE

HOSTELS

Figure 6:2 Illustrating JORAC's Organizational Form and Activities: Formation One
5, the PNAB argued that rents would not exceed 25 percent of the household income. JORAC argued, however, that this was unfair (Resolution 3) since it implied a higher proportion of income was payable than if the breadwinner's income alone was considered. The obvious link between insufficient workplace wages and high living place costs (see Harvey, 1978b) demonstrated in these economic objections, was not exploited by JORAC, despite its belief in the importance of links with trade unions (Dyason, 1984), and the support of the South African Allied Workers Union (Sunday Tribune, 1/2/1983) as well as the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU Worker News, November, 1983).

Beyond a pure economic inability to pay, higher rents are defined in terms of the physical quality of goods received and their impact on the social fabric of township life. These physical conditions of the built environment, its impact on social life (Chapter 5) and the historical origins thereof (Chapter 4) have been elaborated in respect of Lamontville. That such conditions are endemic to black township life in South Africa was also noted. JORAC noted therefore, in relation to all the townships, the general deterioration of conditions and the absence of facilities (Resolution 6), the shortage of housing and concomitant overcrowding (Resolution 7), the lack of recreational facilities, resulting in crime and delinquency (Resolution 8) and the poor quality of educational facilities (Resolution 9). The combination of the above factors created a situation whereby greater rents were not only considered unjustifiable, but residents were of the opinion that they should decrease rather than increase with time (Daily News, 12/7/1983).

The increase in rents was perceived furthermore, as a reduction in the social wage, as defined in Chapter 5. An awareness that the central state was contributing little to the social wage was evident in the demand that the state should fulfil its responsibility with respect to providing sufficient affordable housing (Resolution 4). To achieve a fuller social wage a meeting of Lamontville residents (Natal Mercury, 4/7/1983) called for the townships to be administered by the Durban Municipality since this body receives direct state subsidization (Natal Mercury, 11/7/1983).

It should be noted at this juncture that despite the justifiable economic
arguments pertaining to the rejection of higher rents, JORAC appeared to implicitly endorse homeownership. This is evident from a press statement (7) in which JORAC suggested that residents were forced to pay higher rents because the choice of homeownership was not available.

After the announcement of the massive state housing sale (Mabin and Parnell, 1983), JORAC's chairperson was of the opinion that people would have to buy houses since rents were likely to increase on termination, in July 1984, of the state's discount offers (Dyason, 1984). This stance lead JORAC to lodge enquiries with the Department of Co-operation and Development regarding the conditions surrounding housing sales (8) (Natal Mercury, 21/1/1984). In contradiction to the above, however, is a JORAC Committee member's rejection of the sale of houses since it represented an attempt on behalf of the state to relinquish its responsibilities (personal communication, 12/6/1985). Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that in relation to the issue of rents and the issue of incorporation, the questions of homeownership appears to have received little attention by JORAC. It did not constitute a serious issue and in terms of JORAC's resolution was not related to the issue of rents.

6.4.2 Political Motivations

JORAC's awareness of the PNAB's accumulated reserves (Resolution 12) (9) led them to argue that PNAB had no 'economic' need to increase rents. Increased rents were perceived as the state's utilization of its monopoly power as landlord to effect political ends. Given the substantially lower rents applicable in the bantustan townships of Umlazi and Kwa Mashu (South Africa, 1984), and the uncertainty of Lamontville's political future, increased rents were perceived by JORAC as a means of encouraging voluntary relocation to the bantustan townships. Living standards in these areas it was argued, were inferior to PNAB administered townships (Resolution 5). Furthermore, residents were fearful that this was a means to re-define their 'legal space' (Cooper, 1983) within the urban realm through a removal of Section 10 rights (Resolution 5).

A very important political motivation to opposing rent increases (10), one which informed JORAC's strategy, is based on the imposition of rents onto residents without any consultation with the communities (Resolution 1). Intimately interrelated with this is the fact that the NCC, supposedly representative of the Communities, failed to communicate the
the PNAB's intent to the residents. Moreover in showing no interest in eliciting residents' responses, they appeared not to represent the residents' interests. JORAC's strategy of facilitating communication between residents and levels of government was thus informed by the identified need for consultation and communication. With the employment of such a strategy, JORAC's development simultaneously embodied a rejection of and challenge to the impotent structures of the imposed Community Councils. Residents' rejection of the Community Councils led to the resignation of all Councillors on the Hambanati and Klaarwater Advisory Boards, as well as the resignation of several Ningizimu Community Councillors (Natal Mercury, 10/7/1983). Extracts from the resignation letter of a Ningizimu Community Councillor (11) illustrate the prevalent community sentiment toward these statutory structures:

"My Ward Committee and the residents have resolved, that in view of the apparent intransigence, arrogance, insensitiveness and inconsiderateness of the Port Natal Administration Board, no useful purpose will be served by my continued membership to the Ningizimu Community Council.

The unilateral action of the Board to apply to the Minister of Co-operation and Development to grant the rent and tariff increases without consulting the Community Council on such a major issue, was to me not only a dereliction of duty but an orchestrated move to insult the intelligence of the Councillors and the residents and a deliberate action to ferment disharmony, hatred and mistrust between the Councillors and the people they represent in the Council.

The Community Council has been labelled as an ineffective instrument which the Board uses for its own convenience and NOT that of the residents. I subscribe to this view.

At the recent residents meetings held throughout the Board's area, the people have stated it unequivocally and in clear terms that THEY HAVE NO MONEY TO PAY THE INCREASED RENTS AND TARIFFS which come to effect on 1st August 1983, and that from henceforth they will not be represented by any councillor in any civic matter.

I cannot go against the expressed wishes of my people" (Letter by G.J. Sithole, 1983, emphasis added).

Together with the rejection of the Community Councils (Daily News, 9/5/1983), residents at mass meetings (Natal Mercury, 4/7/1983) proposed that
the townships under PNAB be administered by the Durban Municipality. JORAC argued that this would constitute a more viable system since there was no need for more than one local authority in the given geographical area (refer Figure 4.2) (12). JORAC argued, moreover, that since township residents contributed to the wealth of Durban through their labour, they should be granted the democratic right to elect representatives to Durban's City Council (Natal Mercury, 11/5/1983). This request is pertinent in relation to the imminent autonomy and self sufficiency to be 'granted' to Community Councils under the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982. JORAC rejected these new local authorities because the communities were not consulted, nor were they afforded any opportunity to negotiate any aspects of these new bodies (Natal Mercury, 28/4/1983; Saspu National, May 1983).

The above motivations represent two interrelated goals in respect of the increased rents. The most obvious goal is the cancellation of rent increases. A corollary of this is the replacement of the existing system of representation with one that is democratic and capable of effecting more than impotent representation of residents' interests.

6.4.3 The Dynamics of Mobilization

JORAC had less than one month in which to impress upon the central state the need to rescind the increases, and negotiate identified issues with the affected communities. This urgency, together with the fact that JORAC perceived itself to be temporary, informed the adoption of the initial strategy whereby JORAC strove to effect immediate pressure on the central state. JORAC thus communicated its Resolution (see Appendix 1) directly to the Minister of Co-operation and Development (13) and the Port Natal Administration Board (14), while appealing to the Progressive Federal Party, the Black Sash and Diakonia to support the demands they had communicated to the state (15). The Progressive Federal Party met with JORAC and undertook to represent JORAC's stated case in Parliament (Natal Witness, 23/4/1983; (16)). The media was also perceived as a means of exerting pressure (10). As such, a press statement (7), publicizing the motivations for opposition to rent increases, was released. This strategy failed to effect either of the two identified goals. In actual fact, the state failed even to acknowledge receipt of the communications directed at it. Changing dynamics of
the social base compelled JORAC to confront unanticipated issues and alter its organizational strategies to accommodate new needs generated at the social base.

6.5 FORMATION TWO (see Figures 6.1 and 6.3)

6.5.1 The Dynamics of Mobilization

The assassination of Mr Dube who, through his involvement in the JCC and JORAC, had become a charismatic community leader (City Press, 8/5/1983) initiated a violent response in Lamontville and Chesterville, particularly from the youth (Wheeler, 1984). Residents (later confirmed) suspicions of the NCC Chairperson's complicity in Mr Dube's assassination gave rise to a perception of the assassination as an attempt to eradicate opposition to rents (Xundu, 1983). This perception ensured that the violent response was not 'wild' (Castells, 1977). As such the violence, focussed in Lamontville, was directed at symbols of structural oppression - PNAB beerhalls, bottlestores, offices and vehicles, DTMB buses and the NCC Chairperson's house (Challenor, 1985).

The assassination, rather than disrupting rent opposition, served to unite the social base against the NCC and the PNAB. The rejection was such that when asked about their attitudes towards various township organizations, 79 percent of a sample of 100 residents interviewed perceived the Community Council to be neglectful or the cause of problems, while only 1 percent perceived JORAC in this manner (Wheeler, 1984). Moreover, 92 percent of a sample of 4,160 residents interviewed responded favourably when asked whether or not they supported JORAC (JORAC, 1983). It bears emphasizing that despite the youth's involvement in violent activity, 72 percent of the sample of 100 residents interviewed felt that the youths were trying to be of assistance to the community (Wheeler, 1984). These figures are suggestive of the degree to which Mr Dube's assassination, in conjunction with the rents issue, served to deepen the credibility crisis suffered by the NCC (Natal Witness, 15/9/1983).

The assassination and consequent unrest afforded JORAC's campaign to oppose rent increases national publicity with reports appearing in Beeld; Citizen; City Press; Daily News; Ilanga; Natal Mercury; Natal Witness; Pretoria News; Rand Daily Mail; Star; Sunday Times;
Figure 6:3 Illustrating JORAC's Organizational Form and Activities: Formation Two
Sunday Tribune; Vaderland. The central state's "counter movement" (Castells, 1977) took the form of violent repression and police occupation of the township (Daily News, Natal Mercury, Rand Daily Mail, Star, 2/5/1983). Further media publicity was generated with the Minister of Law and Order's threat to invoke the Police Act in respect of newspapers publishing allegations of police brutality that were emanating from Lamontville. Given that this threat endangered the (hypothetical) freedom of the press, media publicity was extended to: Burger; Cape Times; Evening Post; Friend; Tempo; Transvaaler.

The extensive media coverage, however, is indicative of the event oriented and conservative nature of the media (see Chapter 3). As such it was found that the category 'Violence', which subsumes the related question of press freedom, constituted 47 percent of all the news clippings examined (17). While this publicity noted the communities' plight in respect of the increases, the concentration of unrest in Lamontville detracted from JORAC's remaining affiliates as well as the united nature of the urban movement.

It was suggested above that police repression affected JORAC's activities. While JORAC maintained organizational activities in respect of rent opposition, the demands of Lamontville's social base were such that JORAC directed its energies to assisting residents (5) to overcome the immediate crisis engendered by repressive police actions (Citizen, 4/7/1983). JORAC captured* the resources of the Progressive Federal Party, Diakonia (18) and the Black Sash (19) to exert pressure on the central state. JORAC itself was engaged in direct negotiation with those in command of the local police force (Daily News, 30/6/1983; 11/7/1983; 18/7/1983) in an attempt to prevent further police repression. As such JORAC's efforts were directed largely towards Lamontville and Chesterville - the communities subject to repression.

The Department of Co-operation and Development's announcement, shortly after the eruption of unrest in Lamontville and Chesterville (Citizen, 4/5/1983), that rent increases would be implemented such that half would fall due in May and half in August, was clearly an attempt to defuse the turbulent situation in Lamontville. Residents did not perceive this as a solution. Demands for consultation and a rescinding of the rent increases were re-iterated (Daily News, 3/5/1983) and the general climate of unrest persisted.

*The term 'capture' here and in Figures 6.2 and 6.3 refers to gaining influence over the organizations to the extent that the organizations assumed control.
On May the 8th, the Minister of Co-operation and Development came to Durban to meet with "the Mayor of Durban upon whose initiative the Minister visited Durban, the Commissioner General, Mr P.N. Hansmeyer, the Honourable Minister of Education and Culture of KwaZulu Dr O. Dlomo and Mr J.T. Zulu Urban Representative of KwaZulu, the Chairman of the Port Natal Administration Board, senior officials and Black representatives of the Ningizimu Community Council, members of the Joint Rent Action Committee and others.

The following points were made and agreements reached:

(a) During the negotiations of tariff increases which have been going on for the past 18 months, the Community Councillors were opposed to any tariff/rent increases:

(b) At the end of lengthy negotiations today, it was agreed after pleas by the Community Councillors and the members of the Joint Rent Action Committee that the tariff increases would be suspend­ed until the 1st August 1983. In the intervening period the persons present would assist in explaining to the people the necessity for increases:

(c) In no case would a household be expected to pay more than 25 percent of its income in rent and tariffs:

(d) The Port Natal Administration Board was now in a position, as a result of a special Ministerial grant from the Department of Co-operation and Development, to immediately spend an amount of R250 000 on maintenance and renovations of houses in the area of the Board:

(e) A further amount of R1 250 000 as a loan for the same purpose for the whole area was being negotiated:

(f) Every effort was being made by the South African Police to apprehend the murderers of Councillor H.M. Dube" (Press Release, Department of Co-operation and Development, Durban, 8/5/1983) (20).

The 'agreements reached' were diverse in character. While (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) constitute 'concessions' to ameliorate a turbulent social base, (a) was an attempt to restore some semblance of credibility to the Community Council system. The latter part of (b), moreover, embodies a further 'counter movement' - the attempted co-optation of JORAC on the state's position of rents. JORAC resisted the attempted co-optation,
disclaiming that it had agreed to persuade residents of the necessity for rent increases (Natal Mercury, 11/5/1983; City Press, 18/8/1983).

Report back meetings regarding the concessions were held (Dyason, 1984). Residents rejected the increases and called for their boycott (Natal Mercury, 11/5/1983). JORAC utilized the attempted co-optation to afford PNAB officials themselves the opportunity to explain to residents the necessity of the rent increases (Daily News, 13/5/1983; Natal Witness, 19/5/1983). JORAC, in consultation with PNAB and Community Councils, organized ten public meetings, to be addressed by PNAB officials. The first meeting, held in Lamontville, found residents rejecting PNAB's explanations and strengthening their resolve to boycott higher rentals. The remaining nine meetings were cancelled by the PNAB who argued that JORAC's neglect of persuasion regarding rent increases, together with their failure to restore order in Lamontville, meant that the meetings would achieve little (Challenor, 1985). The PNAB moreover terminated communication with JORAC, stating that individual representation could be channelled either through the NCC, or the township Superintendent (21).

The termination of communication, however, cannot be attributed simply to JORAC's resistance. The intervention of Inkatha and the KwaZulu government into local politics, it will be argued, provided the PNAB with an alternative. Prior to JORAC's meeting with the PNAB and the Minister of Co-operation and Development, Inkatha had demonstrated no initiative with regard to opposing rent increases, to the extent that 97.4 percent of the 3 percent sample of residents, when questioned about the helpfulness of Inkatha, in this respect, perceived the organization to be unhelpful (Sutcliffe and Wellings, 1984). Despite this neglect and peoples' concomitant perceptions, Chief Buthelezi announced, two days after JORAC's meeting with the Minister of Co-operation and Development and the PNAB, that Lamontville should be incorporated within KwaZulu, and that KwaZulu could "take care of its own people" (Daily News, 10/5/1983). In an attempt to secure urban support through detracting from JORAC's organizational activities (see McCaul, 1983), while simultaneously legitimating the call for incorporation, Inkatha funded a Supreme Court application, lodged by the NCC, to declare the rent increases null and void (Citizen, Daily News, Natal Mercury, 30/7/1983).
Buthelezi's personal request for interim rent relief (Daily News, 1/8/1983) and the legal application were, however, unsuccessful (Daily News, 20/8/1983).

The significance for the central state of the application being lodged by the NCC is that this body could be seen to be functioning in the interests of its constituents, even though they may not be successful. As such Inkatha's intervention created an 'alternative' to communication with JORAC for the central state, since the court action created the impression of an apparently legitimate Community Council.

JORAC continued to mobilize around the rents issue despite the inhibiting and detracting factors previously noted. The boycott of increased rentals was effected such that between July and November 1983, 35 percent of Lamontville's residents were paying no rent and 40 percent only the old rents (Natal Mercury, 3/11/1983). PNAB's attempts to break the boycott through deducting arrear rents from wages (Daily News, 1/12/1983), and through effecting evictions by the locking of houses of those people who had not paid rents for three months or more (Natal Mercury, 21/1/1984), resulted in opposition from JORAC, trade union groups and Diakonia (3). While these attempts to restrain the PNAB with regard to the above activities were unsuccessful (22), PNAB's interventions in this regard were ultimately also unsuccessful. Current arrears indicate that residents in all townships are still not paying their rents (23). The PNAB, moreover, having been subjected to adverse publicity on a national scale is fearful of carrying out evictions given the likelihood that further adverse publicity will be generated (23). Furthermore, the PNAB has not implemented the intended six monthly increments "because of all those riots" (23).

6.6 FORMATION THREE (see Figures 6.1 and 6.4)

Given the central state's announcement of the intention to incorporate Lamontville and Hambanati into KwaZulu (Daily News, 31/8/1983), JORAC was compelled, by virtue of its interaction with the dynamics of the social base, to concentrate its organizational activities on opposition to incorporation. Before addressing JORAC's reasons for opposition in relation to the dynamics of the social base, it is important to suggest
FORMATION THREE

STATE: KWAZULU GOVERNMENT AND INKATHA, AS A STATE CREATED HOMELAND, GOVERNMENT IS A LOWER TIER OF STATE APPARATUS. REQUESTS CENTRAL STATE TO INCORPORATE ON ADVICE FROM COMMUNITY COUNCIL.

IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT

DIRECT CONTACT THROUGH LETTERS

STATE DEPARTMENT OF CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, PNBAB DIRECT PHYSICAL PRESENCE NO LONGER AS PREVALENT AS IN FORMATION TWO

REQUESTS INCORPORATION

DECISION TAKEN

STATE REPRESSSION ARRESTS DETENTIONS

FORMATION THREE

JORAC NOW AFFILIATED TO THE UDF CONCENTRATAES ORGANIZATIONAL INITIATIVE ON OPPOSING INCORPORATION, ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES THUS FOCUSED ON LAMONTVILLE AND HAMBANATI, MUCH OF JORAC LEADERSHIP IS ABSORBED INTO NATAL'S UDF EXECUTIVE. RENTS LITTLE OR NO ATTENTION

SOCIAL FORCE LEVEL TWO

SOCIAL FORCE LEVEL ONE

LAMONTVILLE RENT ACTION COMMITTEE

HAMBANATI RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION

CHESTERVILLE RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION

KLAARWATER RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION

SHAKAVILLE

HOSTELS

SOCIAL BASE AND ISSUES

RENTS

INCORPORATION

Figure 6.4: Illustrating JORAC's Organizational Form and Activities: Formation Three
possible motivations inducing the state's intervention. While the
move to incorporation can be understood in general terms as integral to
the achievement of national policy directives regarding 'self determin-
ation' in respect of the black population, analysis of the Lamontville
case illuminates possible short term motives.

In the discussion of the previous formation it was suggested that the
state's repressive counter movement was superseded by one of co-optation,
in an attempt to undermine the turbulent social base. It is argued here
that the intention to incorporate townships into KwaZulu, represented
a further 'counter movement' by the state given the unsuccessful attempt
at co-optation of JORAC on the rents issue. While the central state
was obviously satisfied that its reversion to communication through
statutory structures was legitimate, the social base remained unconvin-
ced. Given the continuing organization and unrest, the state would be
compelled to utilize further police repression. At this specific
moment, however, given the adverse publicity resulting from such actions,
direct repression did not appear to constitute a favourable option.
The expression of intent to incorporate, then, it is argued,
represented for the state, at this specific juncture, a means of
distancing itself from, and relinquishing itself of, the demands
of the social base as voiced by its representative social force.
Furthermore, it effected a re-direction of the social force away from
the central state, while simultaneously being divisive of the social
base. The relevance of these conjectures become evident as the dynamics
of mobilization against incorporation developed. Initial mobilization
to prevent incorporation, concerned with political issues as well as
factors of resource allocation and consultation, was effected by a strategy
similar to that employed in rent opposition. It should be borne in mind,
however, that the nature of the issue limits the range of activities
that can be engaged in to communicate protest. It is, for example, not
possible to utilize a boycott strategy as in the rents issue. An elab-
oration of the strategies employed takes place in the discussion of
reasons for opposition.

6.6.1 Resource Allocation

The inclusion of any townships into a bantustan effects the loss of
Section 10 rights. These rights refer to the section of the Urban Areas
Act that determines which urban blacks have legal access to work, living space and mobility within 'prescribed' white urban areas (see Bloch and Wilkinson, 1982). A loss of these rights impinges upon resource allocation to the degree that access to employment is adversely affected. JORAC's communication of this fear to the Department of Co-operation and Development (24) combined with the media's publicity of this objection (Sunday Tribune, 23/9/1983; Natal Witness, 11/4/1984, 16/4/1984; Natal Mercury, 17/4/1984; City Press, 22/4/1984; Sowetan, 26/7/1984; Daily News, 13/9/1984) elicited a response from the Minister of Co-operation and Development to the effect that 'theoretical' loss did not imply the 'practical' loss of such rights (Natal Witness, 14/4/1984; Sunday Tribune, 29/7/1984). The cases of the KwaZulu townships of Umlazi and Kwa Mashu, where blacks had access to employment similar to that enjoyed by Lamontville residents, were cited in substantiation of this 'promise' (Natal Mercury, 12/4/1984; City Press, 22/4/1984). Residents of the affected townships however, rejected these assurances.

Employment within the Durban Metropolitan area is allocated in favour of townships such as Lamontville since they fall within the prescribed area (Sunday Tribune, 2/9/1984). The employment seeking procedure for residents of Umlazi and Kwa Mashu is, moreover, of greater complexity and more time consuming than that engaged in by Lamontville residents, since residents of the former townships are not automatically granted work seekers' permits (Surplus Peoples Project, 1983). Consequently Section 10 qualifiers are often preferentially employed.

The assurances from the Minister of Co-operation and Development noted above, moreover, are not statutorily defined. As such, residents have no recourse to legal action (Sunday Tribune, 2/9/1984). It also appears that the PNAB was not averse to disregarding such assurances. This is evident in an attempt by the PNAB to restrict Umlazi and Kwa Mashu workers' access to employment, arguing that the agreement entered into was only a 'gentleman's agreement' (Surplus Peoples Project, 1983).

That the potential loss of these rights is a major factor contributing to opposition, is demonstrated by Sutcliffe and Wellings (1984). In response to a question attempting to determine reasons for opposition,
44 percent of those opposed*, cited the loss of Section 10 rights. The objection to incorporation based on the potential loss of Section 10 rights does not, however, imply acceptance of incorporation subject to the adjustment of legislation to accommodate the objection (Letter from Lechesa Tsenoli, JORAC executive member, to the Daily News, 8/8/1984).

More important, according to the Sutcliffe and Wellings (1984) survey, were residents' perceptions that they would receive a 'worse deal' under the KwaZulu Government. As such 46.8 percent of the 87.2 percent of residents opposed to incorporation presented this factor as their reason for opposition. Similarly, when asked what effects were likely to develop once incorporation had taken place, 88 percent of respondents intimated that conditions would get worse (Sutcliffe and Wellings, 1984).

A combination of factors point to possible perceptions evoking such a reaction.

Residents averred that access to Municipal resources such as libraries and clinics, would be lost through incorporation (25). Furthermore, the "stringent scarcity of resources and very tight financial constraints" (24) would inevitably result in further deterioration of township conditions. KwaZulu's housing backlog of 100,000 units in 1983 (Surplus Peoples Project, 1983), combined with the scarcity of resources (KwaZulu, 1982) (26) created a situation where it was inconceivable that more housing would be made available. The continual outflow of money from KwaZulu (27) is suggestive of a general inability to maintain already low urban living standards, let alone effect any development (KwaZulu, 1982).

In sum, residents perceived that they would experience diminished resource allocation through the possible loss of access to employment, the loss of access to Municipal resources, and a reduction in the quantity and quality of resources that would be likely to emanate from the bantustan government.

6.6.2 Political Issues

The political objections raised in opposition to incorporation were, during this initial phase, directed primarily at concerns related to national policy. As such incorporation was perceived as furthering the

* The sample size was 3 percent of Lamontville's 30,000 residents.
unviable goal of bantustan development (24) which has as its ultimate aim racially specific self determination with a minimal number of blacks in possession of Section 10 rights (Sunday Tribune, 23/10/1983). Since JORAC adheres to the principle of a non-racial, democratic future for South Africa, incorporation, as understood above, was rejected (Daily News, 8/4/1983; 26/7/1983). Incorporation was also understood as a central state tactic intended to divide the previously united social base. In an attempt to avoid the development of such conflict, JORAC clarified that it was averse to the principle of incorporation rather than to KwaZulu per se (Natal Mercury, 22/3/1984).

A political concern expressed by JORAC, that was unrelated to national policy, was that incorporation:

"would deprive us of the right to make our representations directly to the central government where the ultimate and effective power lies" (Memorandum compiled by JORAC, undated).

This statement lends substance to the previous argument concerning the motivations for state intervention, where such intervention was comprehended as a means for the central state to distance itself from the social base, such that it would not be answerable to the demands of the social force.

6.6.3 Consultation

The Lamontville community was:

"shattered by the (incorporation) announcement. The more so because the decision was taken without prior consultation with residents and despite the fact that residents had only recently made it known they wanted to remain part of Durban, and had no wish to be part of KwaZulu" (Reverend Xundu cited in Sunday Tribune, 4/9/1983).

Seen in this light, incorporation represented an infringement of residents' democratic right to decide who should govern them (Daily News 14/12/1984).

JORAC, adopting a strategy similar to that in respect of opposition to rents, communicated to the central state both their motivations for opposing incorporation (24) and the need for consultation (28). The reply (29) was as follows:

"I am instructed to inform you that the Honourable Minister of Co-operation and Development is not prepared to enter into discussions with your
organization" (Dept Co-operation and Development, 14/6/1984). This ratified the Department of Co-operation and Development's earlier decision to terminate communication with JORAC. The Department attempted to legitimate its stance by averring that neither the KwaZulu Government nor the NCC had been consulted (Sunday Tribune 4/9/1983). This affirmation, however, was contradicted by the Council when it stated that:

"Since 1978 we have requested incorporation into KwaZulu, but we are surprised that there are people who are against this move. We have correspondence between Dr Koornhoff and the KwaZulu Government and ourselves" (Daily News, 13/9/1983).

Furthermore, the KwaZulu Government had made formal request, on the strength of the NCC's request, that Lamontville be incorporated (Daily News, 21/8/1983; Sutcliffe and Wellings, 1984). Buthelezi stated, however, that negotiation had not taken place since the central state had informed his Government that the decision in respect of Lamontville had been finalized (Daily News, 13/9/1983). The contradictions noted above suggest that negotiation between the KwaZulu and South African governments concerning long term national goals might have taken place. That such negotiations, if they occurred, were relevant to, or concerned with, short term actions is not yet clear. This lack of clarity arises since the central state, through announcing its intent to incorporate Lamontville into KwaZulu, was apparently attempting to fulfill only short term goals. The examination of mobilization below will clarify the speculations regarding the occurrence of negotiation.

6.6.4 The Dynamics of Mobilization

The communication, described above between JORAC and the Department of Co-operation and Development, represents the limited utilization of this strategy of direct communication. Beyond this JORAC communicated with PNAB, member churches of Diakonia, South African Police, United Democratic Front, the Durban Chamber of Commerce and Chamber of Industries, the Mayor of Durban, the Editors of the Daily News, Natal Mercury and Sunday Tribune, and members of the Progressive Federal Party (28). Support was received from the Catholic Church (City Press, 15/4/1984), Black Sash (City Press, 15/4/1984; Daily News 1/9/1984; 4/9/1984; Sunday Tribune, 2/9/1984), the Chamber of Commerce (30), the United Democratic Front (Daily News, 15/4/1984; see de la Harpe and Manson, 1983) and Natal University's Built Environment Support Group (Sutcliffe and Wellings, 1984). This support, however, had little affect on the state.
Shortly after the announcement of incorporation the Inkatha controlled (31) NCC called a public meeting in Lamontville, apparently to discuss incorporation (Star, 17/10/1983; FOSATU Worker News, November 1983). Conflict ensued between township youths, who argued that the meeting constituted largely non-township residents, and Inkatha men (32). Further violence by Inkatha supporting hostel dwellers was averted when the South African Police Reaction Unit prevented the men from entering the township (Daily News, 18/10/1983). Lamontville's NCC representative later acknowledged the presence of non-township residents, but failed to recall who had been invited to the meeting (City Press, 24/6/1983).

A further attack by armed 'imported' (33) Inkatha supporters on Lamontville residents occurred at the ceremony at which Mr Dube's tombstone was unveiled (Daily News, 24/7/1984). The attack, however, was ultimately detrimental to Inkatha when harassed youths retaliated, killing three Inkatha men (Beeld, 24/7/1984).

The above event added a potential dimension of retribution to the proposed meeting between Buthelezi and Lamontville residents: a meeting, Buthelezi claimed, that had been requested by Lamontville residents (Beeld, 3/9/1984). The meeting was intended to gauge peoples' opinions while serving primarily as an opportunity to pray for black unity and solidarity (Natal Mercury, 18/8/1984). JORAC sceptically questioned the validity and motivation of the meeting (City Press, 29/8/1984). The anticipated retribution led JORAC to lodge a court application to prevent the meeting from taking place (Rand Daily Mail, 1/9/1984). While the application was unsuccessful, JORAC was of the opinion that it would effect a dampening of any violent intentions that might be in existence. The meeting did take place. Lamontville's residents, however, had sought refuge either in Durban's church halls, or the surrounding rural areas (Daily News, Natal Mercury, Rand Daily Mail, 1/9/1984). 'Imported' Inkatha supporters were abundant at the meeting which, confirming JORAC's scepticism, became a platform promoting incorporation and slating JORAC and all organizations supportive of JORAC (Beeld, 3/9/1984).

The nature of this meeting exemplifies what has been styled as the arrogant and undemocratic (Swart, 1984) manner in which Inkatha imposes
itself on black South Africans. Figures 6.5, 6.6, and 6.7 illustrate, moreover, the negative manner in which Inkatha is viewed, as opposed to the high degree of support for JORAC. Further evidence of the lack of support for Buthelezi as spokesperson for South African blacks is found in a recent national survey which revealed that at a national level, 6 percent of urban blacks perceived Buthelezi as their leader. In Durban as a whole, however, the support increased to 27 percent (Sunday Tribune, 25/8/1985). Despite JORAC's confrontation of Buthelezi with such figures, Buthelezi continued to argue that as leader of Inkatha, he was the voice of black South Africans, given that he was (apparently) supported at a grassroots level by several million people (Daily News, 7/8/1984). This "fact" Buthelezi argued, gave him the "divine right" to speak to the people of Lamontville (Sunday Tribune, 26/8/1984).

Despite the above noted sentiments of Lamontville residents, Buthelezi described JORAC as "a few self appointed so-called community leaders manipulating anger in strategies of black on black violence" (Daily News, 7/8/1984), to whom, despite their minimal support, he had granted the right to address Lamontville's residents (Sunday Tribune, 26/8/1984).

The ideological and physical conflict depicted above between those supporting incorporation and Inkatha, and those opposing incorporation and supporting JORAC, has become extended and deepened over time. Of late, it has adopted the dimensions of a general political struggle between Inkatha and the United Democratic Front, despite the fact that leadership elements of both groups have publicly advocated a non-violent stance (Natal Mercury, 7/5/1985; 8/5/1985; Daily News, 22/7/1985).

A summary of the extensive physical conflict that has taken place in both Lamontville and Hambanati is provided in Appendices 2, 3, and 4. Examination of these Appendices, in conjunction with the conflict described above reveals that both groups are responsible for violent activity. It appears, however, that Inkatha's actions are often more offensive than defensive. This observation, together with the relatively unharassed (34) nature of Inkatha's existence and activities (see Meer, 1985), provoked many to question Buthelezi's motivations in supporting incorporation.
Figure 6.5: Township Residents' Perceptions of Inkatha


Figure 6.6: Township Residents' Perceptions of JORAC


Figure 6.7: Township Residents' Support for JORAC

(Data Source: JORAC, 1983).
McCaul (1983) and Swart (1984) point out that Inkatha is essentially rurally based with a low level of urban support. Capturing the urban township 'market' through, in this case, incorporation would thus represent a valuable political resource for an organization such as Inkatha which claims to represent the majority of South Africa's blacks (McCaul, 1983). The consequent promotion of incorporation, however, contradicts Buthelezi's averred rejection of consolidation (Natal Mercury, 25/9/1985). The leader of Inkatha has however stated that:

"If they wish to add any land to KwaZulu they are perfectly free to do so without negotiating because KwaZulu is short of land" (Daily News, 21/8/1984).

These possible motivations need to be critically assessed in relation to the dynamics of the social base, as well as the existence of JORAC.

The addition of land as a prime motivation for promoting incorporation does not appear justifiable. The extensive discussion in Chapter 5 revealed that townships constitute an expenditure rather than an income source. If then, one is to understand Inkatha's support for incorporation as motivated by the desire to expand its political support in the urban realm, the noted antagonism towards JORAC is afforded some clarity. JORAC's request for Municipal control as opposed to control by KwaZulu, for example, represents a threat to the possible expansion of Inkatha's urban base. Moreover, JORAC's obvious extensive support serves to detract from any claim Inkatha could lodge concerning the degree of township support. Such considerations lead to questions concerning, for example, Inkatha's extensive involvement with the Community Councils—an involvement that concurs with its clientist (Walton, 1979) strategy of 'working within the system' (McCaul, 1983; Howe, 1985). It should be noted that such a strategy is reported to be rejected by 73 percent of South Africa's urban black population (Sunday Tribune, 25/8/1985). Given the previously discussed extent of Community Council deterioration due to vociferous rejection by blacks in Durban's townships, it becomes uncertain how such present involvement and its continuance, given the implementation of incorporation, would generate voluntary support. The only means by which support can/will be generated is as a result of Inkatha and KwaZulu's essentially clientist (see Walton, 1979) relationship with the central state. In this manner, KwaZulu is seen as accepting whatever small benefits the central state has to offer. In turn it is envisaged that a pattern of patronage support accruing modest benefits to support—
ers only, could develop. This appears to be the case in Umlazi and Kwa Mashu at present. Inkatha's clientist practices in Kwa Mashu, for example suggest that it is desirous of exercising control over the urban township terrain. If one recalls Inkatha's utilization of the NCC to effect communication with the central state, in the Lamontville instance, this argument becomes more credible. It becomes clear, given involvement on the Community Councils despite their rejection by residents, in conjunction with the coercive removal of opposition (most evident in Hambanati), that Inkatha is desirous largely of effecting control and granting, as was noted above modest material benefits to those willing to support the organization. Thus while it would be politically naïve to assume that incorporation would effect unity, such incorporation would serve to bring townships, such as Lamontville, where urban social movements are not subsumed under Inkatha, more directly under the control of the KwaZulu Government.

It must be pointed out that the violent conflict evident appears to have been exacerbated by the fact that JORAC is an affiliate of the United Democratic Front. Moreover, several of JORAC's executive members are high ranking officials within the United Democratic Front's regional and national structures. By December 1983, the United Democratic Front constituted 560 organizations, representing one and a half million people (Barrel, 1984). Such an organization clearly constitutes a threat to Buthelezi who recently claimed to represent approximately seven million blacks despite what the opinion polls reflect (Daily News, 17/12/1985).

While the short term effects of Buthelezi's stance and related actions as described above are already evident, the nature of his long term objective through the adoption of such a position remains elusive. Despite Buthelezi's avowed rejection of being a subsidized apologist for the South African government (Natal Mercury, 26/7/1985) his apparent goals and actions with regard to incorporation and the removal of opposition forces mobilizing on the urban terrain coincide with the goal of the central state. As such, the kind of debate engaged in earlier concerning the existence of negotiation and collusion between Buthelezi and the central state, is of little consequence (De Villiers, 1985). Of major import is the fact that a climate has been generated whereby membership of the United Democratic Front (the 'enemy' of the central state and Inkatha), of which JORAC is
an affiliate, means "having your house burnt down and possible death" (De Villiers, 1985:33; Meer, 1985). Such a situation affords the central state the opportunity to detract from the political nature of the conflicts, to argue that the forces represent warring factions (Daily News, 9/10/1985).

Local urban social movements such as JORAC have been adversely affected by the fact that local leadership elements have been subsumed within regional and national United Democratic Front structures. Of greater detriment to JORAC, however, as a result of its opposition to incorporation and its involvement with the United Democratic Front, is that it finds itself:

"unable to defend itself and its supporters against the combined onslaught of Inkatha and the state" (De Villiers, 1985:34).

Given the refusal of the central state to negotiate with JORAC, the limited modes of organizational activity possible given the nature of the issue, and the prevalence of conflict, organization appears to be restricted to waging an ideological struggle with Inkatha. The discussion of Formation Four, however, reveals that JORAC's opposition regarding incorporation has produced effects beyond the negative ones described above.

6.7 FORMATION FOUR (see Figures 6.1 and 6.8)

6.7.1 The Dynamics of Mobilization

This formation represents both the process of organizational activity as a consequence of the ongoing violent conflict, as well as an elaboration of the response to the recent state initiative regarding consolidation.

The continuance of struggles on the urban terrain described in Formation Three, suggest a complete dissolution of all organizational activity. Interaction with the Lamontville Co-ordinating Committee and JORAC organizers/intellectuals, however, indicates that this might not be the case.

In Lamontville a range of community based organizations, namely Congress of South African Students (COSAS), Malayo (a youth organization), the Lamontville Residents' Association, the Lamontville branch of the Natal
INKATHA REPRESSION OF SUPPORTERS KWAZULU GOVERNMENT AND INKATHA REJECTS OUTRIGHT ANY CONSOLIDATION PLANS STANCE NON NEGOTIABLE. NO ORJFCTION TO INCLUSION OF LAND INTO KWAZULU

INKATHA VIOLENT REPRESSION OF SUPPORTERS INKATHA REPRESSION/ EXTENSIVE VIOLENT CONFLICT INKATHA AND NON INKATHA SUPPORTIVE RESIDENCE IN COMMUNITIES

STATE, DEPARTMENT OF CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT PNAB

STATE, 'STATE 'PRESENCE' IN FORM OF ARMY AND POLICE IN COMMUNITIES

STATE REPRESSION

REPRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE REJECTING CONSOLIDATION

JKORAC ORGANIZES JOINT AND INDIVIDUAL REPRESENTATION TO THE STATE'S COMMISSION APPARENT FORMAL DISSOLUTION DUE TO REPRESSION EXERTED BY STATE LEVELS.

LOW LEVEL OF FORMAL ORGANIZATION AS IN FORMATION ONE ORGANIZATION APPARENTLY OCCURS LARGELY THROUGH INTERACTION BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL COMMUNITIES RATHER THAN PURELY THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF JORAC.

CONSOLIDATION PROPOSALS

SOCIAL FORCE LEVEL TWO

SOCIAL FORCE LEVEL ONE

CONSOLIDATION – INCORPORATION

CONSOLIDATION - INCORPORATION

Figure 6.8: Illustrating JORAC's Organizational Form and Activities: Formation Four
Organization of Women (NOW), the Lamontville Parents' Association, Hostel representatives, the Education Crisis Committee, together with JORAC, have articulated a Co-ordinating Committee (3). The Committee functions such that individual organization's activities in respect of the community are channelled through the Committee. Since the representatives involved are of both sexes and range in age from approximately fifteen to seventy-five, as well as being of a range of educational and income origins, all groupings of people appear to be represented in any decision that is reached.

The specific programme of organization engaged in at the time of the researcher's intervention, was one of establishing a civic association. Organization was based on establishing house visits, and area committees such that problems experienced by residents in the built environment, could be articulated (35) (36). The evidence of such organizational activity clarifies that the apparent dissolution of the formal organizational structures of JORAC per se, does not imply the non-existence of an organization on the urban terrain. JORAC's leadership has intervened in the social base to initiate low profile, offensive organizations with active support at the social base. Communication between communities is still in existence, but occurs in a more subtle fashion. The possible reasons for emphasis on organization at the first level are twofold.

Given the state's rejection of communication with JORAC, different means of organization need to be established if the community is desirous of experiencing effects of some form. Moreover, if JORAC wishes to effect mass based action as an alternative to the terminated communication with levels of state, a well organized, politically conscious and committed social base is necessary. JORAC was very aware that while the organization was extensively supported at the social base, the forms of their organizational activities had resulted in a neglect of the development of a social base as described above (10). Moreover, JORAC in conjunction with the Co-ordinating Committee was aware of the necessity to create organizational bases capable of effecting continual offensive organization on the urban terrain rather than issue dominated, defensive initiatives (36). Secondly, the violence to which high profile, organizational activity not subsumed under Inkatha lends itself encourages the creation of a more low profile level of organization. The prevalent fear of Inkatha attacks (35) combined with the fact that most Co-ordin-
ating Committee members are also members, or at least supporters of the UDF, suggest that such dangers could not be avoided. The organizational activities in respect of the state's consolidation proposals suggest that the activities described above are already operational.

On the 23/9/1985, the Commission for Co-operation and Development made public its consolidation recommendations for Natal. On the urban terrain it was recommended that Lamontville, Hambanati, St Wendolins, Kwa Dabeka, Clermont and Klaarwater be incorporated into KwaZulu. It was clarified that these represented recommendations that people or bodies affected could contest. All evidence would be considered, and should be presented at the Commission's hearing (Daily News, 25/9/1985).

Given that lack of consultation was a motive for opposition, communities decided to amalgamate their resources such that they could effect unified, as well as individual rejection of the recommendations (37). While three of the communities were not subsumed under JORAC's structure when formed, JORAC was largely responsible for initiating organization of opposition (38).

Representation to the Commission was to be delivered on a joint basis such that the motivations presented in relation to Formation Three would be argued, together with additional initiatives that had developed as a result of the degree of conflict evident on the urban terrain. Furthermore, each community was to present its particular objections in relation to its historical and geographical specificity (39). The supplementary motivations, it bears noting, appear to constitute the central arguments against incorporation at this specific juncture (38).

Discussion with regard to Formation Three extensively elaborated the conflict evident at the social base. Furthermore, rumours to the effect that groups of 'Amabutho' (groups of Inkatha warriors) had been organized to attack certain predetermined targets were evident in Lamontville (35). As such it was argued that incorporation would serve to extend such violent activity.

Related to the fear of overt violence, are objections to the more subtle forms of political coercion and persuasion. Given that the inculcation of Inkatha culture constitutes an integral component of the education programme, the ideological component of KwaZulu education
was objected to. Furthermore, it is evident that children in KwaZulu schools were expected to become Inkatha members, and that non membership invites questioning and harassment (40). McCaul (1983) and Swart (1984) also noted that teachers reluctant to join Inkatha were regarded with suspicion and could face demotion.

The Commission's hearing took place on 18/10/1985. The communities requested an extension in order that they could gather more evidence. This was granted and the hearing set for January 1986 (41). It must be pointed out, however, that the communities' efforts in this regard will in all likelihood be fruitless. Diakonia, the ecumenical organization, presented a memorandum which briefly outlined all the residents' objections. The Commission rejected the memorandum as evidence, on the grounds that its content related to 'political' concerns whereas the Commission was only concerned to hear evidence relating to material land interests (41).

Having extensively elaborated the process embodied by JORAC's organizational activities it is instructive to explicitly relate the theoretical arguments discussed in Chapter 2 to the process examined above.

6.8 · JORAC - A THEORETICAL EXPOSITION

According to Castells (1977:377, emphasis added) the

"... political importance of an urban movement can only be judged by relating it to the effect it has on the power relations between social classes in a concrete situation".

Following Castells' (1977) theoretical schema, our aim is to determine whether or not JORAC constitutes an effective urban social movement. To achieve this one must examine whether or not the required effects have been produced. The achievement of effects is said to be dependent upon:

- The manner in which the organization articulates the issues. That is, whether or not urban issues are linked to the political and economic structures.

- The revolutionary potential of the social base. Castells (1977) argues here that it appears that the lower the socio-economic status of a population, the more revolutionary the potential will be.

- Whether or not the state is able to integrate the movement into its structures.
Turning to such an assessment of JORAC, one finds that, given the theoretical emphasis, analysis must be carried out in relation to each issue.

In terms of the rent issue, it could be argued that JORAC, to a limited degree, affected the power relations of the state. It should be recalled that, given the Marxist-structuralist framework, the state on the urban terrain will only concede benefits under pressure from an urban social movement. Since the state acceded to JORAC's demands for negotiation, albeit temporarily, JORAC can be seen to be altering the power relations as elaborated in the previous section. The temporary moratorium on rent increases can be similarly understood. Given, however, the short term nature of effects, they cannot be taken to represent a substantial modification of the prevalent power relations.

An examination of the process of mobilization on a long term basis, however, reveals that effects are in evidence. The state has not instituted further intended rental increments and, despite the fact that initial increments are still being boycotted to varying degrees, a consistent programme of forced evictions is not being pursued. It could be argued in this case that JORAC, having successfully articulated the issue, has effected modification of the power relations.

In addressing the issue of incorporation it may be argued, given that incorporation has not taken place, that JORAC has achieved an effect in this regard. Such an assertion, however, misrepresents the reality and provides little understanding in the light of the empirical evidence elaborated earlier.

Whilst Marxist-structuralist analysis directs the researcher to assess the political impact that the urban social movement has on the prevalent power relations, it does not allow him/her to understand the political significance of the process embodied by the organization as it interacts with both the social force and levels of state.

While the political significance of JORAC is self evident in the extensive elaboration carried out in the previous section, it is useful to explicitly state such significance through a utilization of the theoretical tenets proposed by Gramsci (1971) (see Chapter 2).
Gramsci's (1971) theoretical tenets, while re-directing the focus of analysis, are simultaneously informative as regards the process by which a social base develops a corresponding social force - a terrain largely unexplored by Marxist urban political geographers (see Pickvance, 1978). Having empirically detailed the process of organization it is possible to explore further political dimensions by proposing that the 'actions' or, in the terminology to be utilized here, the intellectuals, are indeed "the original source of a vital flow which in spreading outwards, creates social forms" (Castells 1977:251). In the discussion of Lamontville's social base (Chapter 4), a lack of political organizational activity was evident. It is suggested here that this un-organized, apparently passive population became organized through the intervention of organic intellectuals - one of whom was Mr Dube. The significance of this person's actions in Lamontville with regard to informing the residents of the nature of both rent increases and the activities of the Community Council, becomes theoretically explicable. Such intervention, together with similar intervention on behalf of intellectuals, gave rise to the formation of JORAC. JORAC, then, is theoretically understood to constitute the collective intellectual.

It has been argued elsewhere (Dyason, 1984), that this collective intellectual's programme of organization, given its emphasis on consultation, neglected to mobilize the social base. Moreover, the form (42) of the organization was said to be responsible for an abstraction of organizational activities from the social base. The combination of these two factors Dyason (1984) averred, resulted in the maintenance of low levels of political consciousness at the social base.

It must be re-iterated in light of the above, that fetishization of form detracts from an understanding of the organization as a process. The formations of the organization described demonstrate that organizational form evolved in relation to the dynamics of the social base, and the actions of state level. Furthermore, this evolving form, given particularly that the organization initially perceived itself as temporary, suggest that the necessary "sentimental connection" (Gramsci, 1971:418) between intellectuals and the social base is in existence. It should be pointed out moreover that intellectuals are leaders in the communities in which they live. This is indicative of a close connection between social base and social force.
To facilitate understanding of JORAC's emphasis on consultation, it is instructive to analyse the multi-faceted nature of this stance. It was argued in the preceding section that the initial strategy adopted by JORAC was informed largely by the urgency of the situation. This prevailed against utilizing organizational resources to mobilize the social base, given that such action might have detracted from the immediate task at hand. Furthermore, the degree of unity and mobilization of the social base, particularly evident after the assassination of Mr Dube, is evident in the effective rents boycott. Demanding consultation, moreover, represented not only a challenge to the undemocratic system of decision making, but provided a means through which the demands of the social base could be communicated and negotiated. Furthermore, this emphasis is informed by JORAC's awareness of the political passivity existing at the social base. A passivity that was understood by JORAC to emanate from the stimuli (media, television, education) to which people are subjected, which inculcates a fear of authority such that people do not question any actions emanating from the levels of the state (43). One sees that JORAC, in resisting the state's attempted co-optation, affords the authorities the opportunity to explain the increases to the residents. This fulfils an educational function since it can function to dispel inculcated misconceptions, while providing residents with an opportunity to question and thus challenge the authorities. The similarly informed Co-ordinating Committee was desirous of organizing a mass meeting, attended by the PNAB and Ningizimu Community Council, such that "these bodies can be exposed and the people can become aware" (44).

It is important to note that JORAC, through resisting co-optation managed to convert the co-opting structures to instruments that it could use to achieve its own goals. JORAC was aware, moreover, that similar conversions could be effected in respect to the media (10). That it utilized the media to achieve its end has been depicted in the discussion pertaining to the four Formations.

Despite JORAC's emphasis on effecting consultation with levels of the state; conscious mobilization of the social base was also engaged in. This was achieved by carrying out a survey in mid-1983. The survey comprised interviews with 521 households or 4166 people. The questions themselves
were concerned to ascertain the nature of Lamontville's residents' problems, their level of support for JORAC, and the manner in which such support could be demonstrated. The numbers interviewed indicate that the survey served to make people aware of the organization's activities, while simultaneously functioning as a means of recruiting people.

While Formations one through three demonstrate the issue related nature of organizational activities, the activities of Formation four, regarding the development of a civic association, indicate an enactment of a perceived need to organize Lamontville's social base so that a process of self-emancipation could be engaged in (40). Attendance of meetings of the Lamontville Co-ordinating Committee (35, 36) revealed that JORAC intellectuals had initiated the Committee. Their role, it is imperative to note, while they were actively involved in the Committee's activities, was guidance oriented. Closer examination of the functioning of the Committee in relation to Gramsci's (1971) theoretical concepts disclose instructive occurrences. Energies of the youth, through the two youth organizations represented, have been consciously and explicitly captured and given direction. The youth are largely responsible, inter alia, for the planning and organization of meetings, printing of pamphlets and the maintenance of links with other communities. It is important to take cognisance of the fact that since the youth groups are part of the Co-ordinating Committee, their initiatives and energies with regard to the community as a whole must be channelled through the Co-ordinating Committee. This serves both to direct energies and to ensure that the high level of militancy displayed on behalf of this grouping is fruitfully utilized.

Having innovated and directed spontaneous energies it becomes evident that the aims of the organizations as mentioned above, are to educate people, to involve people in activities in order that the political consciousness thus developed leads to people organizing themselves to effect self-emancipation. Explicitly relating Gramsci's (1971) theoretical concepts to specific organizational activities has greatly enhanced the understanding of such activities. Furthermore, through the focus on intellectuals, as well as the process of mobilization, it is discovered that certain social relations evident at the social base prior to the development of JORAC, have been modified. The active role of church
ministers in community politics has overcome the negative manner in which the church was previously viewed. The removal of such negative perceptions has given rise to the utilization of church buildings and grounds for meetings as well as sporting activities. Prior to mobilization, no political organizations were evident at the social base. The present constituents of the Co-ordinating Committee indicate that this is no longer the case.

6.9 CONCLUSION

This chapter has served to explicate the dynamics of JORAC. The importance of allowing an organization to constitute more than an entity articulating issues should be evident from the discussion of JORAC's dynamics that has been provided. Furthermore, explicit examination of the pertinence of the theoretical arguments proposed in Chapter 2, in relation to the organizational process, reveals that not only is the understanding of organizational activities enhanced, but their political relevance is clarified.
Notes

(1)* Port Natal Administration Board Notice to all township and hostel residents, increase in site and hostel bed tariffs, dated 1/10/1982.


(3) Memorandum for discussion with Mr H.A. du Plessis (Port Natal Administration Board), compiled by G.P. Kearney (Director of Diakonia), D. Biggs (Housing Programme Organiser, Diakonia), dated 23/2/1984.

(4) It was announced on 22/3/1984 (Natal Mercury) that Chesterville would remain within Durban.


(6) Inanda, Clermont, Klaarwater, St Wendolins and Kwa Mashu.


(8) Letter from the Joint Rent Action Committee to Dr The Honourable P.G.J. Koornhoff, Minister of Co-operation and Development re: proposed incorporation of certain township into KwaZulu, dated 6/3/1984.


(12) Letter from the Joint Rent Action Committee to Her Worship Mrs Sybil Hotz, Mayor of Durban, re: problems in the townships under the jurisdiction of the Port Natal Administration Board, dated 19/5/1983.

(13) Letter from the Joint Rent Action Committee to Dr The Honourable P.G.J. Koornhoff, Minister of Co-operation and Development, re: appeal against rent increases in black townships under the control of Port Natal Administration Board, dated 14/14/1983.

(14) Letter from the Joint Rent Action Committee to Mr. H.A. du Plessis, Chief Director of the Port Natal Administration Board re: rent increases in the townships under your Board's control, dated 14/4/1983.


*The following original source documents (1)-(3); (5)-(16); (22); (24); (28)-(30) are lodged with the author.
(16) Brief prepared by the Joint Rent Action Committee for Mr. Ray Swart's presentation to Dr. The Honourable Morisson on the issue of rentals in the townships under the Port Natal Administration Board's jurisdiction, undated.

(17) This news coverage excludes all references to the widespread township violence that took place in Durban in August 1985. See Meer (1985).


(21) JORAC should submit a memorandum to the NCC who would determine the merits of such a meeting, and if considered necessary, would arrange the PNAB's Chief Director's observation. At the same time, it was noted by the NCC that contact between JORAC and PNAB was undesirable as it discredited the Community Council system (Challoner, 1985).

(22) Observations on a Memorandum submitted by the Director of Diakonia, Mr G.P. Kearney, to the Chief Director of Port Natal Administration Board, Mr H.A. du Plessis, schedules for discussion on 23/2/1984.

(23) Lamontville - R273 000  
Hambanati - R 53 000  
Shakaville - R 57 000  
Klarwater - R114 000  
These figures indicate the arrears as at November 1985, for each township. Figures obtained during an interview with the Finance Officer, Natalia Development Board, at Mayville 17/12/1985.

(24) Memorandum to Or The Honourable G.N. Viljoen on the proposed incorporation of Hambanati and Lamontville into KwaZulu; and alternatives to the Community Council System, compiled by JORAC, undated.

(25) Meeting with township residents regarding incorporation at the Ecumenical Centre Trust, Durban, 4/10/1985.

(26) The Buthelezi Commission (KwaZulu, 1982) disclosed that the KwaZulu Government has insufficient funds to provide social services such as education, health and welfare, general services, or any form of development for the existing population.

(27) The severity of KwaZulu's financial situation is such that for every R6 earned by KwaZulu, R5 is spent outside of its boundaries (KwaZulu, 1982).

(28) Letter from the Joint Rent Action Committee to Or The Honourable G.N. Viljoen M.P. Minister of Co-operation and Development re: request for an interview to discuss (1) the proposed incorp-
oration of Lamontville and Hambanati into KwaZulu; (2) the possible alternatives to the Community Council system for this region, dated 3/4/1984.

(29) Letter from the Office of the Chief Commissioner: Natal Department of Co-operation and Development to the Chairman, Joint Rent Action Committee re: proposed meeting with the Minister of Co-operation and Development, dated 14/5/1984.

(30) Letter from the Durban Chamber of Commerce to Dr The Honourable P.G.J. Koornhoff, Minister of Co-operation and Development, dated 10/5/1984.

(31) Lamontville, a four ward township was represented on the NCC by only one councillor - Mrs Nxasana - life president of the Inkatha Women's Brigade (The Star, 17/10/1983).

(32) The Daily News (17/10/1983), Natal Mercury (17/10/1983) and The Star (18/10/1983) all reported the NCC's understanding of the disruption of the meeting - township youths disrupted the meeting and then stoned the community hall and burnt cars. The Inkatha men responded in defence and one woman was shot. The youths were beaten. FOSATU Worker News (November, 1983) however, states that the youths in the meeting were chased out by Inkatha men with sticks. In response to this the youths set fire to several cars. The woman that was shot later died, as did two youths, as a result of the conflict.

(33) While Inkatha officials denied that supporters had been 'bussed' to the area, two Northern Natal Inkatha supporters who had been thus transported disputed Inkatha officials' claims. They had been 'recruited' to fight the people in Lamontville 12 weeks earlier. On arrival at Lamontville Inkatha officials had stated that there were too few people and more men were consequently recruited from Umlazi (Daily News, 23/7/1984; The Citizen, 25/7/1984; Natal Mercury, 26/7/1984). That this 'recruitment' tactic was commonly employed was substantiated by personal communication with an Umlazi labourer (6/7/1985), an Umlazi apprentice (9/10/1985), a Ntuzuma schoolteacher (25/10/1985). Affidavites to this effect have recently been published - see Meer, 1985.

(34) A pertinent example in this regard is the protest against disinvestment by 34 busloads of Inkatha supporters in an elite white Durban suburb, at the home of an United States' diplomat. This protest received extensive newspaper and television coverage.

(35) Personal records of attendance of a meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee of Lamontville, regarding the establishment of a civic association in Lamontville, at St Simon's Church, Lamontville 18/6/1985.

(36) Personal records of attendance of a meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee of Lamontville, at St Simon's Church, Lamontville, 25/7/1985.


(38) Meeting with members of JORAC regarding opposition to the Consoli-
(39) Meeting with members of JORAC regarding the presentation of evidence to the Commission for Consolidation hearing, at the Ecumenical Centre Trust, Durban, 4/10/1985.

(40) Personal communication with an Umlazi teacher (15/10/1985), an Ntuzuma teacher (26/10/1985); and Umlazi resident (28/10/1985).

(41) Interview with Des Biggs, Diakonia Housing Programme Organizer, at the Ecumenical Centre Trust (29/10/1985).

(42) The representatives for the rent action committees (social force level 1) were elected at meetings held in their townships. These representatives then elected the JORAC executive. The executive comprised, on election in 1983:

- 12 representatives from Lamontville,
- 12 representatives from Hambanati,
- 6 representatives from Chesterville,
- 6 representatives from Klaarwater,
- 4 representatives from each Hostel.

(43) Records from an interview with JORAC, at the Ecumenical Centre Trust, July 1984.

(44) Personal records from the attendance of a meeting between members of JORAC from Lamontville and Hambanati and residents from both areas, at the Phoenix Ghandi Settlement, 14/6/1985.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

Within individual chapters, attention, where it was considered necessary, was drawn to the significance of the 'moments' described by Model Two of Figure 2.1. To a large degree the significance of the theoretical framework was self evident in the empirical analyses and, as such, did not require explicit attention. It is, however, pertinent to note in this regard that the emphasis on economic factors was chosen to stress the need, expressed in Chapter 3, to understand rents in terms other than economic ones. This point is briefly expanded below.

It will be useful to return to the introductory remarks of Chapter 1 in order that the more general political significance of the case study presented can be discussed. The contribution of this research to urban political geography will also be elaborated. In the first instance it has hopefully been shown that rents - the apparent 'hidden hand' underlying land use outcomes in traditional urban geographical models - are not only politically determined by the state, but they are also major areas around which democratic movements mobilize at the local and national level. The struggle over rents, moreover, is deeply implicated in simultaneous struggles over the state and the people's attempts to define South Africa's "legal spaces" (Cooper, 1983). In this respect, the Marxist-structuralist literature on urban social movements has done much to enhance our understanding of the processes which determine patterns of urban development, conflict, and the jurisdictional (or governmental) organization of metropolitan areas.

Nevertheless, guided in the research process by the theoretical and methodological innovations presented in Chapters 2 and 3, it was demonstrated that the introduction of human agency into an analysis of urban social movements and the levels of government with which they interact, gives rise to an understanding of such movements as processes which generate important political consequences beyond those identified in the Marxist-structuralist framework. In conjunction with this observation it can be explicitly stated that articulation of those moments, which
are left assumed by Castells (1977) (refer Model one, Figure 1.2) serves to demonstrate several factors. If the understanding offered is to have any relevance to the "objective social conditions" (Harvey, 1973), the specific urban terrain must constitute a medium in analysis (Soja, 1985). That is, it becomes essential that the urban constitute an integral component in the analysis, rather than simply referring to the terrain on which research is carried out. The recognition of the importance of urban space in the analysis, given particularly the extensive nature of urban social movement activity in South Africa at present, has implications for the polemics currently preoccupying trade unions and urban movements in South Africa. Trade unionists, in line with the Marxist-structuralist argument, stress the importance of workers' contestation of the dominant relations of the capitalist mode of production. Consequently these tend to relegate urban social movement activity to the realm of insignificance if the urban demands do not relate directly to the apparent 'inner dynamics' of the capitalist mode of production. Such a stance fails to acknowledge that the process embodied by the organization might have important political consequences for democracy and socialism. It is suggested that recognition of the importance of the relationship between differing organizational forms, processes and demands; and the terrain and issues which the organization occupies and takes up, might be formative to, rather than disruptive of the workers' struggle. Stated more explicitly, it is proposed that more formative links between urban movements and trade union activity might be achieved if the particular space interacted with is acknowledged rather than being rejected as a non entity. In this regard, trade unions, organizing on the factory terrain, for example, develop their mode of organization and demands not only in relation to the capitalist mode of production per se but the way it is experienced in the factory. In this regard it can be noted that trade union demands concerning, for example, wages, health and safety, working conditions, shop steward representation and trade union recognition are, when transposed into the urban realm, not dissimilar to those stated by JORAC.

It is important at this juncture to recall the concluding comments made by Harvey (1978b:35):

"...the separation between work and living is at best a surficial estrangement, an apparent tearing asunder of what can never be kept apart."
And it is at this deeper level, too, that we can more clearly see the underlying unity between work-based and community-based conflicts."

Struggles waged by trade unions and community organizations must be considered as manifestations arising from their specific spatial contexts factories and residential areas. This is crucial not only because the spatial contexts influence the form of the struggle, but because space is one of the intervening forces and circumstances (Harvey, 1978b) which detract from the underlying unity between the struggles.

In this thesis the specificity of the urban space was incorporated into the analysis. The examination of rents revealed that gains struggled for in the workplace were eroded by state imposed rent (and transport) cost increases in the living place. This economic link between living and work places exemplifies the objective unity existing between them. Non-recognition of this unity in the subjective moments of struggle reinforce the capitalist created (Harvey, 1978b) geographic division between places, so that the struggles that develop occur in isolation from each other. More importantly community struggles, at a theoretical and practical level are relegated to non-worker struggles and, as such, are seen to be peripheral to struggles waged in the workplace. The consideration of rent, as discussed in Chapter 5 has, on the other hand, demonstrated that struggles over rent, given the manner in which they inter-relate with the workplace, are not peripheral to workplace struggles.

Having discussed the importance of recognising both the spatial specificity of struggles, as well as their essential unity, it remains, in closing, to comment on the recent (November, 1985) formation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). The formation of this congress is significant not only in that it unites 33 South African trade unions, but in that it has firmly acknowledged that trade unions should be concerned with political and community issues. Examination of COSATU's constitutional preamble, its aims, objections and resolutions (South African Labour Bulletin, 1986) indicate that despite COSATU's less "workerist" and more politically oriented stance, the geographically separate but fundamentally united nature of living and workplace struggles is yet to be systematically addressed. This thesis will hopefully provide some insight into this realm both for community organizations and trade unions and as such, will contribute to the creation of a "peoples geography" (Harvey, 1983:13).
It is suggested that further contributions to such a "peoples geography" should take note of the interactive research process engaged in, in this research. This thesis has demonstrated that the value of interactive research lies in the fact that both the researcher and the researched are involved in a learning process. Future researchers, informed by the theoretical and methodological innovations of this research, can continue to develop the kind of geography that this work represents.

"...confronts ideologies and prejuduces as they really are, (and) that faithfully mirrors the complex weave of competition, struggle and co-operation within the shifting social and physical landscapes of the twentieth century" (Harvey, 1983:13)
APPENDIX 1

RESOLUTION (adopted by JORAC, 14-18 April, 1983)

Our opposition to the rent increases in the townships controlled by the Port Natal Administration Board and our request for the withdrawal of these increases is based on the following reasons:

1. The community was not consulted on this matter. The community Councillors have failed to represent us.

2. Wages of workers have not kept abreast with the increasing rate of inflation. To pay the existing rentals is a great burden to our people. The increase in rentals will make the situation intolerable.

3. Basing the rent increase and the calculation of rental on total household income we find to be unfair and completely unacceptable.

4. We consider that it is the responsibility of the government to provide housing for all at rent we can afford.

5. We see the rise in rentals in the townships as an attempt by the Board to force people out of the urban areas in order to dump them into homelands where the standard of living is even worse. We fear that this is another way of making us lose our urban rights to which we are entitled as South Africans.

6. We suffer housing shortages, no maintenance of our homes, unsatisfactory refuse collection, an absence of community facilities and deteriorating conditions in our township. There is no guarantee that a rent increase is going to improve these problems.

7. The reluctance of the government to build more homes has left a critical shortage of housing resulting in extreme overcrowding and danger to the health of the community.

8. Our communities encounter the high incidence of alcoholism, crime, and delinquency because of the absence of suitable recreational
facilities which the authorities have not provided.

9. Our people are concerned that while they monthly contribute to the school levy as part of the rent we have no knowledge of how this money is being used. Our schools are very poorly equipped to offer a meaningful and relevant education to our children.

10. In 1982 through a question asked in Parliament we learnt of a R14 million surplus that the Port Natal Administration Board had accumulated. We have not heard of any satisfactory explanation of the utilization of this money. We are also disturbed about PNAB investing monies in dubious ventures such as the Rondalia Bank which we believe has resulted in considerable losses to the Board.

The above reasons have been collated from views expressed at mass meetings held in the townships on the issue of the rent increases. At these meetings the people resolved to strenuously oppose the rent increase and ask for the withdrawal of the increase.
APPENDIX 2

A SUMMARY OF CONFLICT BETWEEN INKATHA AND JORAC/UDF SUPPORTERS IN LAMONTVILLE, 1984-1985

JORAC accused by Inkatha of carrying out a petrol bomb attack on a leading Inkatha member, as well as assaulting an Inkatha supporter in the streets of Lamontville. The Local Inkatha Chairperson's home is subject to a petrol bomb attack (Daily News, 14/9/1984).

The UDF linked Methodist Church in Lamontville is attacked. Mrs Nxasana's (Life President of Inkatha Women's Brigade and only Lamontville representative on the NCC) house is subject to a petrol bomb attack, the bombs fail to ignite (Daily News, 29/8/1984).

Two groups of Inkatha attack Reverend M. Xundu's church. They threaten to return to kill him (Daily News, 23/9/1984).


Crowd stone a Methodist church at which a UDF meeting was being held (Natal Mercury, 15/7/1985).

Youths stone the homes of Inkatha members (Daily News, 18/7/1985).

Inkatha groups attack two blocks of flats where members of JORAC live, two JORAC people hospitalized as a result of the attack (Daily News, 19/7/1985).

The houses of two Inkatha supporters are petrol-bombed by youths, one house burnt down (Daily News, 20/7/1985).

Reverend M. Xundu's Anglican church is stoned and a crowd of 50 people set fire to the Methodist church mentioned above (Daily News, 22/7/1985).

House belonging to a member of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly is destroyed by fire. The houses of two Inkatha members are set alight (Natal Mercury, 22/7/1985).

A 'Peace' meeting between JORAC and Inkatha is held, no resolution is arrived at (Natal Mercury, 23/7/1985).

Mrs Victoria Mxenge, a UDF civil rights lawyer is assasinated. This triggers the eruption of extended violence in all Durban's townships (Daily News, 7/8/1985). During the extensive violence there are suggestions of Inkatha/UDF conflict and evidence that the police and army were at times not intervening to stop the violence (Sunday Tribune, 11/8/1985, see also Meer, 1985).

On Shaka Day, a group of Impi leave the celebrations and enter Lamontville...
and attack residents. Youth retaliate leading to the death of several Inkatha Impi. Simultaneously, Chief Buthelezi is requesting from those present at the Shaka Day celebrations, a mandate to project peace (Daily News, 29/10/1985).
APPENDIX 3

CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT BY IAN MKHIZE ON THE HAMBANATI TURBULENCE. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS AND A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM.

1 July 1984
In the early hours of the morning, Mr. Magwaza's car was gutted. Mr. Magwaza is the Principal of the Hambanati Higher Primary School as well as being an executive member of the local branch of Inkatha.

4 July 1984
A community meeting was held at which this act of violence is condemned by all present, with all members of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in the township joining in the condemnation of this and preceeding acts of violence. There had been an escalation of violence and crime in the township prior to this with several murders at the hostel having been reported. Despite UDF's condemnation of the act, Mrs. Nora Dlamini, member of the Central Committee of Inkatha's Women's Brigade, insists that the UDF has been responsible for the burning of Mr. Magwaza's car.

5 July 1984
Three members of Masakhane Tongaat Youth Organization (MATOYO), an affiliate of the UDF, are arrested at the instigation of the councillor, Amon Zulu, whilst demarcating the township for the UDF's million signature campaign. They are held as suspects in connection with the burning of Mr. Magwaza's car. After three court appearances, during which they are never formally charged, cases against them are withdrawn on August 31, 1984.

15 July 1984
Inkatha attacks the Zamani Creche during the evening whilst an interdenominational service is being held. The office of the Tongaat and District African Child and Family Welfare Society is set on fire and Mrs. Beatrice Makhetha's house is stonned. A case of malicious damage to property is opened, and maximum assistance is given to the South African Police. Mrs. Nora Dlamini, Janet Mhlongo and Hendretta Ngema, all leading members of Inkatha are cited as suspects. Worthy of note
here is the presence of Councillor Amon Zulu, Deputy Community Councillor Chairman in the stone-throwing crowd.

19 July 1984
A delegation from the Hambanati Residents' Association (HRA) (JORAC affiliate) meets officials of the Port Natal Administration Board with a view to finding a formula for ending the tensions in the township. It is suggested that a round table conference should take place between the UDF and Inkatha formations in the township. The HRA agrees to this and sets the following conditions:
- a) a completely neutral chairperson,
- b) a completely neutral venue,
- c) participants should be bonafide residents of Hambanati.
After considerable discussion with H.D. van Wyk of the PNAB the following concessions are made by the HRA:
- a) acceptance of Mr. Potgieter, Assistant Chief Commissioner as chairperson. (Our original stance had been that the chairperson either be drawn from the senior ranks of the clergy with the names of Stanley Makgopa and James Murphy suggested, or from senior members of the legal fraternity if possible retired judges.)
- b) moratorium on the publication of literature critical of the Community Council system.
Note: Inkatha never made any concessions.
Ultimately it was agreed that the meeting should take place on September 4, 1984 - although we made an urgent plea for an earlier date.

23 July 1984
An attempt is made to detonate gas cylinders outside of Ian Mkhize's house.

6 August to 12 August 1984
Tensions develop in Inkatha ranks. During this week, Branch Chairman, A. Majola, Deputy Chairman, W. Shabalala and Treasurer, N. Ngidid are ousted from the local Executive Committee - allegedly for UDF sympathies.

18 August 1984
Mr. A. Majola's house is petrol-bombed.
20 August 1984
JORAC has a meeting with Chief Minister over Buthelezi's intended visit to Lamontville. Meeting ends in deadlock and Buthelezi blames Letchesa Senole, Jabu Sithole and Ian Mkhize of being obstructionists in the matter of issuing a joint press statement. An attempt is made to set Ian Mkhize's car alight whilst it is parked at David Tyaliti's home.

21 August 1984
Inkatha holds anti-election mass meeting at the City Hall. Local (Hambanati) Inkatha Branch and Community Council hold a mass meeting during which people are openly incited to attack houses of certain individuals in the township. A mob of 200 Inkatha supporters, drawn mostly from outside Hambanati, attack the following:
1) Mr. Ian Mkhize: house is stoned and his car set on fire. Mr. Mkhize narrowly escapes death as a mob breaks into the house and categorically state that they are out to murder him;
2) Richard Gumede: house stoned and furniture extensively damaged;
3) Beatrice Makhetha: house stoned and furniture extensively damaged;
4) Alfred Sithole: house stoned and outbuilding gutted—extensive damage to furniture;
5) Elias Hadebe: house stoned and car gutted;
6) Mrs. Ngcobo (creche cottage): house stoned.
Perpetrators are identified and police are informed. A feature of this attack is the involvement of the community councillors.

22 August 1984
An attempt (led by councillor Musa Cibana) to attack David Tyaliti's house is thwarted by the family. A sten gun and bullets are confiscated from Cibana. A bizarre turn of events, David Tyaliti is charged with unlawful possession of a firearm.

25 August 1984
A mob led by Community Council Chairman, A. Majola, accompanied by the South African Police attack (stone) Mr. Manda's house. Mr. Simon Ntaka's and Mrs. Gladness Mzobe's houses are gutted. Mr. Isaac Nxumalo's car is hijacked whilst being driven by his brother, Bernard. Bernard is severely assaulted. Two innocent visitors are murdered.
26 August 1984
Black Sunday for Hambanati. Mob murders community leader Alfred Sithole. Two busloads of Inkatha supporters (bearing NUF registration numbers) and kombi loads of Impis invade the township. Armoured four-wheel drive vehicles equipped with flame torches set the following houses on fire:

R. Gumede - house and car completely gutted,
A. Sithole - house completely gutted,
J. Mbokazi - house completely gutted,
I. Mkhize - house partially gutted,
E. Zuma - attack under the leadership of Councillors Maphumulo and Ndlovu thwarted,
R. Masaka - house completely gutted,
T. Hlatshwayo - house completely gutted,
D. Tyaliti - house stoned,
M. Badumuti - house stoned,
I. Nxumalo - house stoned.

In the intervening period during which lawlessness and licensed crime have become the order of the day, repeat attacks on all of these houses have taken place. Houses attacked during this time include, amongst others, those of Reverend Joe Mpanza and Township Superintendent, A.M. Mahlangu. Law and order finally crumbled in the township and vigilante groups drawn from the criminal section of the community searched vehicles at night. Enforced patrols by all males in the township take place.

28 August 1984
Exodus of affected families as security position in the township deteriorates rapidly.

29 August 1984 to date
Reign of terror continues. More houses are burnt and stoned. On pain of death, people are forced to 'apologise' to Mrs Nora Dlamini.

2 September 1984
Women attending Sacred Heart Church, just outside Tongaat are terrorised (threatened) by members of Inkatha Youth Brigade (in front of the Bishop). They are rescued from the Church by the Police.
2 October 1984
Miss T. Shange's house and car completely gutted. Repeat attacks on Isaac Nxumalo's house. Creche is broken into.

3 October 1984
Houses of Mr. E. Zuma and D. Sithole are gutted.

Present Position
1) There is complete lawlessness and a reign of terror in the township. Residents live in utter fear; looking over their shoulder each time they have to say something critical of the present state of affairs, the Community Council or Inkatha;
2) Over 25 families have been rendered homeless and the list grows longer as threatened families leave the township;
3) Sixty-one children of school going age are without educational instruction;
4) The Tongaat and District Child and Family Welfare Society has had to suspend its services for fear of security for its staff. These services are:
   a) child welfare services including case and children's work;
   b) the Zamani Creche;
   c) the Vumelani Abantwana Pre-school; and
   d) Muziwolwazi Advice Centre.
5) Some teachers have resigned. Others due to fear for their safety or complete lack of commitment as the township plunges into anarchy teach for two hours at most;
6) Community organizations have been paralysed as all of their leaders have left the township.

Some Suggested Solutions to the Problem
The problem has been allowed to embed itself in the township and has now become too immense. The following are some of the suggestions which will make Hambanati a liveable place one more.
1) Stationing of a Permanent South African Police Force
Hambanati citizens have to be guaranteed freedom from molestation, fear and intimidation. It is to this end that it is suggested that the SAP take over from the PNAB the security functions for the township. Ten men per shift could serve well under the circumstances.
This force could gradually be decreased as conditions move steadily to normal. It is also suggested that this force could be drawn from areas other than Tongaat as the local South African Police do not enjoy credibility from the majority of the residents. THE RESTORATION OF THE RULE OF LAW IN HAMBANATI IS AN URGENT NECESSITY NOW IF FURTHER CARNAGE IS TO BE AVOIDED.

2) Peace Talks
There may be some value in the current peace initiative between the UDF and Inkatha hierarchy to allay mutual suspicions. These talks would need to be evaluated on a regular basis to ensure that they stay on course.

3) Judicial Commission of Enquiry into the Role Played by the Hambanati Community Council in the Current Unrest (including possibly the role of the South African Police and the Port Natal Administration Board).
As mentioned above, a disturbing feature of the current violence in Hambanati is the involvement of all the councillors, ie Councillor A. Zulu at Ian Mkhize's house on the 21st August 1984; Councillor Musa Cibana on the 22nd August 1984 at David Tyaliti's house; Councillor A. Majola on the 25th August 1984 when the houses of Mr. Manda and Mrs. Mzobe were attacked. Councillors Maphumulo and Ndlovu on the 26th August 1984 when there was an attempt to attack Mr. Ernest Zuma's house. Remarks emanating from some officials of the Port Natal Administration Board do cause some concern.
A more determined effort on the part of the police to track down the perpetrators of this violence.
I am most hopeful that the people of Hambanati will still "find one and another" and engage in co-operative effort to build their community.
APPENDIX 4

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS, COMPILED BY D.S. NTAKA, CHAIRPERSON OF HAMBANATI RESIDENTS' ASSOCIATION

13 April 1985 - David Tyaliti, a JORAC member, holds a party for his daughter. The party extends to Sunday the 14th April 1985. Some councillors notably Councillor A. Majola are strongly opposed to the party taking place. He falsely alleges that two bus-loads of UDF supporters have been seen entering the township. The colour of these is given as white. These allegations hardly deserve comment. What David Tyaliti had thrown was a family occasion involving the inlaws-to-be of the Tyaliti family and family friends.

Councillor Majola also alleged that he had received a letter from JORAC/UDF threatening to kill some councillors. We cannot comment on that letter, for we have never seen it. It is common cause, however, that such threats are referred to Police for investigation. A Councillor of Mr. Majola's standing and experience should be aware of this procedure. Mr. Ngwenya, the township superintendent, attended the meeting where Councillor Majola, accompanied by Walter Shabalala voiced his opposition to the party taking place. Also in attendance was a member of the Development Boards's Protection Services, a Mr. Cebekhulu. David Tyaliti assured them that this was a peaceful family occasion.

14 April 1985 - The party at David Tyaliti's place continued all day. At least two of the Development Protection Services members attended the occasion in their private capacities and testified to the effect that the ceremony had been peaceful. On the evening of this day Inkatha supporters lead by one Nora Dlamini and Mrs. Henrietta Ngema demonstrated in the streets of the township, shouting most vile abuse at some of the Hambanati residents, including Simon Ntaka, Elias Hadebe, David Tyaliti, Ian Mkhize etc. Stones were thrown by the same crowd at Mrs. Beatrice Makhetha's house. Tongaat Police were fully kept in the picture about these events and so was Mr. H. van Wyk of the Natalia Development Board. Tongaat Police said they were aware of the situation in Hambanati but had been instructed to keep a low profile. They further said that an unmarked Police vehicle was patrolling the township.
Ironically Nora Dlamini and Henrietta Ngema are key members of the Hambanati Community Council's 'Welfare Committee'. Township Superintendent Alex Ngwenya was also informed.

15 April 1985 - (Evening): Inkatha supporters and some mens' hostel dwellers took to the streets again in an aggressive mood, violently knocking at the doors of residents with sticks, knobkerries and slashing some of the doors with pangas. Some doors still bear the marks of this violence. One of the Inkatha supporters was shot by an unknown person during these demonstrations.

As they knocked at peoples's doors Inkatha supporters declared that they wanted UDF people out of the township by 12.00 midnight. At the house of Mr. Mbokazi, No. 14 Hambanati Road, windows were broken and so was the door at Mr. Khoza's house No. 7A White City. It is very dismaying to say the very least that the car belonging to the mayor Mr. Musa Cibana alias Ndimande and Deputy Mayor Mr. Amon Zulu, were amongst this crowd.

Other people positively identified in this violent crowd were Reverend Ndimande of Manzekhofi Road, a Mr. Biyela of B/White City, a Mr. Mduli of White City, Mr. Mngadi of Labuscachne Road, Mr Gumede of Mountpleasant (Sunrise) and who works for Target Furniture, Joshua Nzama and Vusi Mtembu of Jali Road and also Boy Makhathini of Hambanati Road.

17 April 1985 - There is quiet in the township and no demonstrations take place at all.

18 April 1985 - There is also quiet during this day but an Inkatha meeting, lasting till the early hours of the morning of the 19th April takes place.

Many car-loads of people from the neighbouring squatter areas were brought into this meeting which took place at the 'Youth Centre'. It is a dismaying thought once more that cars belonging to the Community Council members - notable the Chairman of the Community Council, Mr. Musa Cibana alias Ndimande, were amongst the fleet that brought these people into the meeting. Some cars bearing NUF registration numbers were also seen at the 'Youth Centre'.

19 April 1985 - Door to door campaign by aggressive and armed Inkatha men summoning residents to a meeting set for 9.00 in the morning. No
reason for the meeting is disclosed to the residents. A state of confusion and panic reigns in the township as people wait for the 'fateful' 9.00am. The pre-school and Zamani Creche are closed and so are the offices and other installations of the Development Board. Armed aggressive thugs roam free in the township. A load of passengers in a bus bound for Tongaat are forced out of the bus to attend the meeting. The bus is forced back into the township to fetch more residents. Buses from town into the township are also forced to off-load all passengers at the hall so that they attend this 'meeting'. There is a strong preponderence of squatters, hostel dwellers and 'prisoner' residents all constituting a captive audience to express 'the will' of the people of Hambanati.

Accusations are levelled at members of the Residents' Association notably Simon Ntaka, David Tyaliti, the late Sithole's family and Ian Mkhize. A demand is made to the Development Board Officials to evict these people from the houses - the demands to which the Development Board Officials do not accede. A warning is also sounded by the Development Board Officials against some members of the audience for talking loosely about some people's names for a possible litigation could flow from this. A strong police presence keeps peace in Hambanati during the entire weekend.

5 May 1985 (Daily News)
Five houses of UDF members set alight, residents allegedly assaulted by Inkatha supporters.

6 May 1985 (Natal Mercury)
Six houses gutted. More than 20 families driven from their homes on the weekend - all members of the Hambanati Residents' Association. 'Burnt out' residents moved to the Ghandi settlement in Phoenix.
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