SOCIO-POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF THE URBAN AFRICAN ELITES IN DURBAN

BY

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DECLARATION

I hereby certify that this research is the result of my own investigation and that it is not being submitted concurrently in candidature for any other degree.

Signed: P.M. ZULU.

I certify that the above statement is correct.

Prof. L. Schlemmer.
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CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 2.
BACKGROUND TO THE SURVEY, THE OFFICIAL POLICY OF SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT

CHAPTER 3.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
1. THE THEORY OF DOMINANCE 15
2. THE THEORY OF A PRAGMATIC RACIAL OLIGARCHY 20
3. THE THEORY OF RELATIVE DEPRIVATION 26
4. THE THEORY OF A CONFLICT OF NATIONALISMS 29
5. THE THEORY OF ALIENATION 39

CHAPTER 4.
REVIEW OF SOME OF THE EXISTING LITERATURE

CHAPTER 5.
A. THE PROBLEM 45
B. WHY ELITES? 51
C. THE SETTING 54

CHAPTER 6.
METHODOLOGY

CHAPTER 7.
EXPERIENCES OF THE SYSTEM
CRITICAL PERCEPTIONS AND EXPERIENCES

CHAPTER 8.
EXPERIENCES OF REALITY AGAINST EXPECTATIONS
THE COMPARATIVE ASPECT

CHAPTER 9.
REACTIONS OF THE URBAN AFRICAN ELITES TO FRUSTRATIONS
DEFINITION OF BLACKS
ACCEPTANCE OF SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT STRUCTURES
CONFRONTATION OR NEGOTIATION

CHAPTER 10.
ALTERNATIVES
1. SOCIO-POLITICAL AWARENESS 99
2. DESIRED ALTERNATIVES - NON-RACIALISM 105
3. INSURGENCY: THE NON-RACIAL GOVERNMENT AS THE IDEAL 115
   A. THE UNIQUE SITUATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN SITUATION 116

CHAPTER 11.
STRATEGIES
1. ATTEMPTS AT VIOLENCE 123
2. ECONOMICALLY-ORIENTED STRATEGIES 129
3. PREFERENCE FOR LEADERSHIP AND ORGANISATIONS - A LINK WITH STRATEGY 135

CHAPTER 12.
COMPARISON OF FINDINGS ON AN OCCUPATIONAL BASIS 139
1. TOWNSHIP ELECTIONS 141
2. HOMELAND POLITICS 141
3. REACTION TO SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONS 142
4. READERSHIP PATTERNS 144
5. PERCEIVED STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE 146
6. ATTITUDES TO CONFRONTATION 147
7. ATTITUDES TO CERTAIN ORGANISATIONS AND LEADERS 148

CHAPTER 13.
CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY
APPENDIX A QUESTIONNAIRE.
APPENDIX B TABULATION OF RESULTS ON A QUESTION BY QUESTION BASIS.
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On the 16th June, 1976, schoolchildren in Soweto demonstrated against the use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in African schools. In a confrontation with the police, who tried to forcefully prevent the demonstration, a schoolchild, Oscar Petterson was shot and killed by the police and violence erupted. Two White officials of the West Rand Bantu Affairs Administration Board were killed. These events marked the beginning of school violence which spread throughout the country. Coloured school children in the Cape Peninsula followed suit, all six Black Universities in the country demonstrated in support of Soweto, and even Natal, relatively calm at the time, had its share in the violence that followed. School buildings were gutted, buildings and homes belonging either to the township administrations or to Africans who occupied positions in the 'politically' created government institutions, were destroyed.1)

The significance of Soweto and its aftermath lies in the objectives and spirit that characterised the whole movement. Was it a spontaneous outburst against an educational system that Africans had loathed for two decades, or was it a revolt against the enforcement of a language regarded in African circles as the language of the oppressor? Or, was this the outbreak of a long expected uprising by Africans against the establishment?

An analysis of the selectiveness of actors in choosing their targets would serve to steer the discussion in a meaningful direction. Firstly, destruction was focussed on school buildings, then beer halls and offices belonging to official administration, next came houses of township 'political' Africans who were regarded as sympathetic to, or, furthering the cause of the South African regime. Even homeland leaders moved in a shadow of threat.* Official utterances laid the blame on communist, political agitators and extremists. The Black Power and Black Consciousness Movements received the largest share of the blame from both the government and government-supported institutions. 2) Later, as events further unfolded themselves, a form of selective economic and labour boycotts followed on the Reef which was apparently becoming the centre of gravity of activism.

The above events, while significant in themselves, add yet another dimension to the perception of the South African socio-political set up. Without arguing whether the movement was planned or not, whether agitators came on the scene or not, the readiness with which masses of people, especially the youth, responded with action is significant. The spontaneity of the violence makes one question official assertions that there is peace and tranquillity, and fortifies claims of a revolutionary situation which was overdue. Colin Legum argues that the flashpoint for violence in Soweto "could have been any one of a score of other frustrating and equally humiliating grievances of the daily lot of five million Blacks living in their urban ghettos." 3) Industrialists, leaders in commerce, educationists, politicians from all walks of life, both Black and White, accepted that all was not well in South Africa.

* Homes and offices of homeland leaders had to be guarded.

2) The banning of Black Consciousness Movements in 1977 was hailed by Chief Sebe.

In order to improve the quality of life in townships, a body entitled the Urban Foundation was formed. Even the government did not oppose the move. Opposition calls for the resignation of the ministers of Bantu Education and Bantu Administration went unheeded. The prime question is what went wrong? And at what point within the South African political scene did this occur?

Soweto is not an isolated incident in South Africa's political history. There was Cato Manor in 1959, Sharpeville in 1960, Pondoland and Sekhukhuniland in 1960, all of which were local uprisings against the aspects of the status quo. The question is, has Separate Development failed to offer South Africa the envisaged peace as the government claims? The South African problem of unequal societies has been the subject of debate for almost forty years. The question of race is further complicated by the polarisation of inequalities which from the African point of view, seen from a national perspective, involves a White upper class and a Black lower class. What amazes some of the social scientists is the persistence of the system in spite of international condemnation and sporadic internal outbreaks of violence aimed at the destruction of the system.
CHAPTER 2.

THE BACKGROUND TO THE SURVEY -
THE OFFICIAL POLICY OF SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT

The macro arrangement of the political future of South Africa's 19 million Africans according to official policy is that:

1. Africans are members of eight different ethnic groups or national units residing in nine geographical areas. Cultural differences among ethnic groups are taken as given.

2. Each group is taken as a distinct cultural unit and, consequently, a separate political entity.

3. Each national unit belongs to a historical-geographical place of origin known as a homeland.

On the intermediate level, what is termed - meso apartheid, there should be separate residential areas in every cosmopolitan metropolis. In places like Soweto, the township is zoned into ethnic wards and up to 1976 members of Advisory Boards were elected on ethnic lines to represent ethnic communities. This is the gist of official policy as spelled out by successive Ministers of Bantu Administration and Development.

1) South African Institute of Race Relations, Survey 1978, p. 49.
It is further stated in the policy, that South Africa is a plural society of the cultural model - that is, the country consists of sub-groups each with a distinct cultural heritage, symbols and sense of values, such that an attempt to form a common society is likely to yield both inter-racial and inter-ethnic conflict. The policy assumes that there is a degree of consensus on separation to preserve each group's cultural identity and heritage. The weakness of and the consequent opposition to the policy, as seen by the government is thus not inherent in the policy qua policy, but comes about as a result of external factors and agitators. The political solution to South Africa's plural society problem, therefore, lies in granting citizenship of a particular homeland to every African. Each African will enjoy full political rights in his respective homeland. Urban Africans and Africans on White-owned farms must identify with their homelands by becoming citizens of such homelands. They will, thus, be able to participate fully in civic and political affairs of their homelands. Their status in urban areas and on White-owned farms is, therefore, that of temporary sojourners who are there only for purposes of selling their labour. This is a view spelled out in the House of Assembly debates by Dr. Verwoerd and later by his followers, Messrs. M.C. Botha and Dr. Connie Mulder, on numerous occasions.

"If our policy is taken to its logical conclusion as far as Black people are concerned, there will not be one Black man with South African citizenship ..... Every Black man in South Africa will eventually be accommodated in some independent new state in this honourable way, and there will no longer be any moral obligation on this Parliament to accommodate these people politically."  

This is the core of National Party policy, the blueprint of earlier statutes: The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 and the Promotion of Bantu Self Government Act of 1959. Each of the nine geographical units can opt for sovereign independence, though the policy authors expect that regional proximity and historic bonds will maintain close links and interdependence between each independent homeland and the mother state - South Africa - and among the independent homelands themselves.

To date, 1980, three homelands have opted for this type of independence - Transkei in 1976, Bophuthatswana in 1977 and Venda in 1979. To what extent the majority of Blacks accept independence in these territories remains a question of academic interest only. Facts are that:

1. In Venda, the pro-independence party of Chief Mphephu lost the pre-independence elections by polling only 11 seats to the opposition's 31 in a 42 member elected assembly. A security crackdown was soon in force and numerous people were detained, of whom eleven were members of the opposition in the Venda Legislative Assembly. The mandate for independence was won with the aid of the nominated chiefs who helped Chief Mphephu obtain the assembly quorum which elected him Chief Minister when the opposition had boycotted the elections as a result of the detention of their members. 3)

3) South African Institute of Race Relations Survey 1978, p. 298.
II. In Bophuthatswana, the National Sepoesengwe Party called for a referendum to determine popular support for independence. Chief Mangope refused the call. The police and chiefs' interferences with the opposition were reported until the Opposition Sepoesengwe Party sent a telegram to the South African Prime Minister to this effect. Their opposition stemmed from their assertion that 80% of Bophuthatswana's budget would come from the Republic. At the pre-independence polls of the 375,000 registered voters, only 50 per cent voted. Chief Mangope's Bophuthatswana Democratic Party won the election. 4)

Transkei proclaimed a state of emergency before elections, and leaders of the opposition were banned on the eve of nominations for elections which were won by the ruling Transkei National Independence Party. 5)

4) South African Institute of Race Relations Survey 1977, p. 334
5) South African Institute of Race Relations Survey 1976, p. 244.
Another significant development which might demonstrate the existence or non-existence of Black support of the homeland policy was an exposition by the Rand Daily Mail of figures covering a 15-year period 1963 - 1978 demonstrating a decline in voting figures in elections in five homelands:

I. Transkei 1963 = 606 320; 1976 = 360 085;
   Percentage drop 40%. However, this figure represents seats where elections did take place; there were uncontested seats where a count was not made.

II. Bophuthatswana 1972 = 425 000; 1977 = 164 150;
   Percentage drop 60%+. The significance of the disillusionment among urban Blacks was illustrated in Bophuthatswana where a record drop of 75% was recorded in the 1977 elections compared to the figures in 1972. 6)
   The decline in interest was perhaps due to the disillusionment with homeland politics after 5 years of non-progress in political matters in Bophuthatswana.

III. Lebowa 1973 = 190 420; 1978 = 146 890;
    Percentage drop 23%.

IV. Kwa Zulu, one election so far held in 1978 yielded 116 058 voters in a population of over 5 million, of whom 50% were likely to be of voting age. Again, there were uncontested seats where a count was not taken.

V. Venda 1973 = 68 300; 1978 = 123 000;
   Percentage gain 80%.

Alternatives

The debate on the acceptability of Pretoria's policy toward Africans has been going on ever since the official inception of the policy in 1948. In an article on Class Status and Ethnicity as perceived by Johannesburg Africans, Philip Mayer questions both the acceptability and validity of a policy that seeks to reverse both the tempo and direction of history. He argues "... for Blacks in the White cities and on White farms, a policy of territorially based decolonisation on homeland lines is not possible, and making them citizens of the rural homelands is not a realistic substitute." He goes on to state that according to the 1970 census, 43.5% of the African population in South Africa lives outside the homelands i.e. in what is officially referred to as White South Africa.

Leo Kuper, in his An African Bourgeoisie, spells out the possibilities which an African may conceive for political fulfilment within the present status quo. He views the first possibility as being through emancipation along Separate Development lines as set out in the official papers, but finds it difficult for Africans to accept it, especially as the Messianic prophecy comes from the very agent of African suffering. The second possibility, as a safety valve, is through the evolutionary change in the structure of South African society. Again he finds that "any such hopes by earlier African leaders" have been dashed.


8) Ibid.

There is a growing belief that the urban African who has severed links with any historical homeland is emotionally distant, if not antagonistic to a policy which threatens to uproot him from his emotional and utilitarian home in town to a distant homeland. The youth, in particular, have never resided in such homelands. Philip Mayer speaks of the "pariah status" among urban Africans in the Easter Cape, a condition of forced subservience to a dominant conqueror who has dispossessed them of their rights. For the success of the homeland policy he feels that Africans will have to possess the following attributes:

I. ethnic loyalty,

II. regional attachments, and

III. identification with the institutions, especially governmental institutions in the homelands. 10)

Do urban Africans in Durban possess the above three attributes as given by Mayer, or do they feel dispossessed and demoralised? Or are there any alternatives? These are some of the questions which this work seeks to answer. It is the townsfolk who stand to lose or gain from identification with any rural homeland, since from a utilitarian point of view they are rooted in the cities almost throughout their life spans.

Both sociological and psychological assertions stress the importance of the development of an individualistic culture in the process of urbanisation - a detribalising factor. Education is another detribalising factor, while the oldest African national mobilisation movement, the African National Congress, was non-racial in philosophy and definitely non-tribalist in structure. These factors point to the probable absence of Mayer's first requirement - that of ethnic loyalty. Residence in townships points to a utilitarian function, tying a home to a place of work. In addition, practical expenses, financial and otherwise, of keeping a home which can only serve symbolic functions in a homeland render the attribute of regional attachments impractical. This argument points to a challenge to the legitimacy of official policy; one remembers how the acquisition of homeland citizenship as a prerequisite to the attainment of a 30 year, and later 99 year, leasehold raised such objections in Soweto that it had to be dropped.

The urban youth, in particular, is demanding a new political dispensation for the Black man. The number of political arrests since the June and August, 1976 riots in Soweto and the Cape Peninsula, and the frequency of political trials point to a salient challenge to official policy. In 1977, 157 persons were charged under the Terrorism Act and the Internal Security Act; while in 1978, 194 persons were charged under the various security laws, including cases which carried over from 1977. 11) As at January 1, 1978, 400 Africans were serving prison sentences in terms of security legislation, as against 16 Asians, 14 Coloureds and 10 Whites. 12)

12) Ibid.
African Response to the Policy: Developments from the Sixties

Up to the time of their proscription in 1960, the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress were the two main organisations which overtly articulated African aspirations and political orientations. The vacuum created by the banning of the two congress movements would, according to official expectations, be filled by the newly created structures within the framework of Separate Development. However, three distinct manifestations have emanated from both the official arrangement and African response to the arrangement.

1. A group, characterised by the ruling parties in Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda, advocates an acceptance of Bantustan politics. The rationale is that the policy offers, in the face of no other alternative, the only logical hope for African aspirations. However, this group perceives the present arrangements as transitional. It envisages the development of a federation of States in South Africa. Both Presidents Matanzima and Mangope have spelled this out on numerous occasions. This is a group with strong regional sentiments and, therefore, meeting Mayer's first requirements. Not suprisingly, it has accepted homeland independence.
II. The second group is a modification of the first. It accepts homelands, not as a matter of policy, but as a platform on which to mount opposition to the official policy and to mobilise the socio-political awareness of the masses. On the inauguration of KwaZulu as a Territorial Authority in 1970, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi spoke of working within the system and carrying the government's policy to its logical conclusion. The logic here was that the policy, as it stands, cannot succeed. While this group rejects homeland independence per se, it accepts, as a temporary measure, the institutions established in terms of the policy. The purpose is a strategy to further African emancipation - a term used to explain a position whereby Africans will have equal political voice with Whites in a common South Africa. The means of achieving this is seen as being through a round table conference of all representatives of both African and White opinion.

A variant of this group, with a slight modification only in degree of compliance, accepts working within the system but advocates taking over government-created institutions and operating them on its own direction. At times it embarrasses the government by refusing to operate governmental machinery which conflicts with the group's basic principles. The Labour Party, a Coloured body with an elected majority in the Coloured Persons' Representative Council, uses this strategy; hence, its refusal to occupy official houses built for their Executive Councillors and the Chairman's refusal to pass the government's budget in 1975 on the basis that it was discriminatory.

What disturbs Africans and government critics in the government's response to this group is what they perceive as attempts by the government at frustrating its opponents. Non-independent homeland constitutions make provision for a majority of nominated members as against elected ones, and within the Coloured Persons' Representative Council, the Chairman is a government nominee while twenty of the sixty members on the Council are government nominees. Nominees in Homeland Legislatures are either Chiefs or government supporters, while the former are paid servants of the State, the latter are generally official policy sympathisers.
III. Third on the list are exponents of the Black Consciousness philosophy who reject any role in the institutions which savour of divisiveness or ethnicity. This group rejects participation in any government-created structure or agencies and regards the other groups in the light of collaborators with the oppressor. The argument is that one cannot be a paid servant and work contrary to the wishes of the master and still keep the job. The best way out is to have nothing to do with official institutions. This will force the government to create alternatives. The sorry histories of the Native Representative Council of the Hertzog-Smuts coalition and the Coloured Affairs Department of the forties are cited as authentic evidence of the futility and impotence of operating within government-created institutions in the hope of espousing the Black cause.

Outside South Africa, new forces which have an influence on local expectations, hopes and fears have come into play. Angola and Mozambique have attained independence under African rule, and both nourish an ideology contrary to South Africa's official stand. Within South Africa, Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda have evolved along the lines officially set out in Separate Development terms. In Windhoek, the Turnhalle Conference has given birth to a constituent assembly, and the Western Five, Britain Canada, France, the United States and West Germany, are endeavouring to find an internationally acceptable solution to the territory's problem. Zimbabwe has been born out of a clash between the guerilla and the security forces, and from sanctions imposed by the international community.

These developments are bound to raise hopes, fears, to dampen spirits and influence a re-alignment of forces in an effort to establish an approach to South Africa's problem acceptable to all strata of the community. They are bound to either encourage or discourage the local Black population which in turn will lead to either a relaxation on the part of official policy or to further intransigence. Either way, behaviour patterns are bound to change and, with them, attitudes.
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CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The contrived existence of the South African socio-political system, can be examined from five distinct theoretical approaches.

1. The Theory of Dominance

Mason argues that throughout generations "men have accepted the premise of inequality as inherent in the world order"¹ and that "the bluff of the rulers has worked."² This argument is relevant to the South African situation. Since 1948, White rule is allegedly founded on the premises of Christian nationalism and, therefore, carries with it the myth of divine preordainment. Africans are traditionally a God-fearing people and, if one adds to this the concept of western technological superiority, the rationale is clear. The unhappy history of wars and conquests adds yet another dimension. In Africa, might was right. This author contends that the assertion of White military might exacerbated a culture of normative submission which later, as political awakening gained ground, gave rise both to alienative and normative compliance. The African National Congress, vociferous against oppression as it was, emulated White norms and patterns.


² ibid. p. 324.
Mason further maintains that, in order to sustain their position, rulers have capitalised on mythological perceptions of differences between the rulers and the ruled. He further contends that "no alternative to inequality has been found that is consistent with freedom", hence Separate Development cannot be a substitute for freedom. Where Christian assertions stressing the equality and brotherhood of man have created spiritual contradictions and feelings of guilt, the alternative has been to assume the non-manhood of the oppressed. Taken further, when the same manhood was asserted, then cultural differences became a yardstick for rationality. Separate Development goes further than that; it states differences not only between White rulers and the Black ruled, but amongst the ruled themselves. The theory of ethnicity avers that Black South Africans are not a homogeneous group, but that, while there are language differences among Whites, they are all bound together by the western Christian ethic.

It is hard to accept this assertion as valid, when language, the very vehicle of communication, is not such a barrier amongst Blacks. The Nguni languages, i.e. Zulu, Xhosa and Swazi are so closely related that communication is effected without the aid of an interpreter. By the same token, Sotho languages, i.e. Tswana, Sesotho and Pedi have a similar relationship. There is a free and normal intermarriage system, which compares favourably with out group intermarriages in other societies, among the various Black sub-groupings. Religiously, they all belong to the ancestral cult, animal slaughtering pattern to appease the spirits. They share universal symbols of culture. On the contrary, no communication can be effected among the various South African White languages in the absence of an interpreter. Jews are even a non-Christian nation with their own set of norms and values. To what extent Africans perceive this "bluff" and accept it, can only be a matter for research. However, the myth has yielded a degree of normative compliance, especially among the less sophisticated masses.
The foregoing socio-psychological dimensions have been reinforced by the authorities' readiness to resort to force if persuasion falls short of gaining the required compliance or apparent acceptance. Expression of opinion outside the prescribed structures carries with it the risk of official frowns and possible reprisals. While homeland-based political parties can make utterances apparently contrary to official policy, any organisation outside the prescribed formula has to contend with official denunciation, if not banning. The Black Peoples' Convention and the South African Students Organisation were banned in 1977. However, their utterances differed very little from those of the Transkei Democratic Party, of 1963-1976, the Coloured Labour Party, or Inkatha. The organisation, Black Community Programmes, a self-help project which operated outside official structures also met with the same fate. What disturbed opponents of the government, was not whether these organisations were subversive or innocent, but because they were perceived to have been victimised for their operating outside the prescribed structures. On various occasions, the South African Broadcasting Corporation, a state owned body, denounced these organisations on its news commentary programme, "Current Affairs."

Various other devices have been used to establish masked dominance. Euphemistic names have been coined either to promote normative compliance or to assuage consciences. The Abolition of Passes and Consolidation of Documents Act of 1952 saw no abolition of passes but rather their consolidation and more rigid enforcement. The Extension of the Universities Act of 1959 barred Blacks from attending open White universities and confined them to ethnically divided institutions which had been or were to be established. The Bantu Labour Settlement of Disputes Act prohibited Africans from striking and the Bantu Labour Relations Amendment Acts of 1973 and 1977, while technically allowing strikes, prescribed such elaborate procedures that it made it almost impractical to strike. The prescribed cooling off period before any contemplated strike can be effected is too long - 90 days.
However, as Mason puts it, "The fear of reprisals is not the only force that keeps the slaves, the serfs, the peasants, the workers subservient." He goes on to list two conditions which should be met in order to perpetuate a system of inequality. Firstly, the subordinates must be made to believe that "the system is part of the order of nature" and, also, that they are so different that they cannot compare their lot with that of their masters. In an examination of socio-political attitudes of the urban African elites, their perception, not only of such differences, but whether they believe the system is consciously promoting a perception of such differences in an effort to sustain and perpetuate itself will be interesting to note. The theory of genetic superiority is not of South African origin, it is an old colonial theory which has been refuted by both educationists and psychologists. For three centuries South Africa capitalised on it; perhaps because Africans refuted it objectively in academic achievements, Dr. H.F. Verwoerd and the National Party instituted the Bantu Education Act of 1954. Speeches by Dr. Verwoerd in the House of Assembly indicated an education designed to fit Africans into tailored positions and not to prepare them for universal demands as do all other educational systems.

3) ibid. p. 11

4) ibid. p. 11
This author's contention is that the philosophy behind this enactment, among other things, included the intention to achieve two purposes:

1) to satisfy African aspirations by providing them with an educational system that could yield large numbers and appear to be under African control; and

2) to assuage White consciences by proving that they were enabling Blacks to run their own affairs but at the same time perpetuating the myth of inequality. Bantu Education would demonstrate that even though Africans could boast the possession of university degrees, these were degrees obtained in "Bantu" and, therefore, inferior institutions. Besides the psychological dimensions perpetuating inequality, the fact is that "Bantu Education" was an inferior type of education designed to provide a lettered but uneducated product. The question of inferiority of Bantu Education is also raised by Tony Morphet in the Introductory Chapter to Richard Turners "The Eye of the Needle".* We still reap the fruits of the system to this day. "Separate but equal" practically implied "separate and unequal". Political dominance yielded and entrenched psychological, legal and educational dominance, besides coercing its victims directly and indirectly into acceptance. The result is a matrix of forms of compliance which have helped sustain the system to the present form.

2. The Theory of a Pragmatic Racial Oligarchy.

Heribert Adam argues that the strength of the South African system lies in its ability to adapt to periodic demands both from within and from without the system. Such adaptability is apparent in three systematic manifestations:

I. **Symbolic alternatives manifested in the Apartheid utopia.** The programme of Apartheid has been, according to Adam, a partial success. South Africa is officially viewed as a constellation of states, independent and interdependent, each with its own distinct population expressing its cultural and political independence through self-determination. These states will be bound together by a common South African heritage and economic interdependence.

II. **Effective police control:** This device has achieved greater efficiency by using Black instead of White police to deal with Black insurgents and deviants; and

III. **Economic integration and improvement in living standards of Blacks.** This often clouds the central issue, thus blunting Black opposition to the system. The argument is that Africans are relatively deprived economically and socially, but that this emanates from political voicelessness. The central issue is, therefore, participation in the decision-making process. This author intends to deal with these three in detail.

a) **Symbolic Alternatives: The Apartheid Utopia.**

Over the years, especially in response to international condemnation and discontent from within, South Africa has moved away from racism to racialism. Racism in this context refers to the neo-Darwinist concepts of racial superiority based on genetic factors, while racialism refers to the South African concept of cultural pluralism.

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The concept assumes differences based on cultural practices and, therefore, the policy of racial separation. White superiority based on biological neo-Darwinist theories has been replaced with cultural pluralism where different cultural groups are not only different, but desire to be different. Cabinet utterances are that South Africa does not discriminate but differentiates. To aid divergent groups to national self-determination, the policy of plural democracies has been devised. Black opposition to Separate Development, especially from the homeland leadership, has centred on the land issue; that 13 per cent of the land is not sufficient to cater for 75 per cent of the country's population. Secondly, that the policy is imposed upon them rather than agreed upon in open discussions. To meet this discontent, Prime Minister Vorster instituted summit discussions with homeland leaders. Here matters of "mutual interest" were discussed. When these were interpreted as masked dictations from above, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of KwaZulu boycotted them. Meanwhile the central tenet of separation, influx control, was assigned to a commission consisting of the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development and three homeland leaders, Chief Ministers Sebe, Phatudi and Ntswanisi. Homelands contributed to the developments by substituting travel documents for reference books - a change in name only. To develop Adams' theme of pragmatic adaptation further, the hated tag "Bantu" was abolished, and "Black", a term which originated with Black Consciousness and Black Power, was officially instated but Coloureds and Indians were excluded from it. As if to further consolidate the differentiation theme, proposals for Indian and Coloured Cabinet Councils, equal in status to a White presidential council, were made. Changes in name from the Departments of Bantu Administration and Development, and that of Bantu Education, to the Departments of Plural Administration and Development and Education and Training respectively were made. The latest is that the former has changed to the Department of Co-operation and Development. Such euphemisms have been accompanied by changes in administrative styles. The new Minister for Co-operation and Development, Dr. Piet Koornhoff, is a 'verligte' pragmatist who can repeal moves to uproot the Crossroads spontaneous urban settlement and visit Soweto and Alexandra.
Emphasis is now on the recognition of the dignity of man, and Prime Minister Botha visits Soweto "to learn". But the policy remains basic, 75 per cent of South Africa's population is being excised from their mother country and given ethnic nationality and citizenship, apparently to rationalise their rightlessness in a land they regard as their own. How these devices are perceived by Africans, will be for this work to prove and illustrate.

Another interesting contention by Adam is that of the psychological impact of Separate Development on Africans themselves. The homeland leadership has to contend with both reality and cognitive dissonance - a conceptual state of mind whereby they try to balance their apparent stand against separation and at the same time enjoy the fruits thereof. Adam contends that the result will be the creation of a class of the oppressed who will defend the very agent of their oppression. Debates in homeland legislatures illustrate the point quite well. The rift between homeland leaders and the Black Consciousness advocates is widening. During the 1976 riots Chief Sebe of the Ciskei blamed "Black Consciousness extremists" for agitation and, when on October 19, 1977, Black Consciousness organisations were banned, he openly stated that they ought to have been banned long ago. The present clashes between Bishop Tutu and Dr. Motlana on one side, and Chief Buthelezi on the other, point to the same direction. The result is that much energy which would otherwise be directed at the system is spent in mutual vilification among Africans themselves. During the 1978 session the KwaZulu assembly spent more than a week discussing and condemning the Graaf Reinet incident where a youth, allegedly directed by the Black Consciousness movement, demanded Chief Buthelezi's expulsion from the funeral of Robert Sobukwe, the late leader of the Pan African Congress, and even went to the extent of assaulting his person. The thesis here is not to make evaluative comments on the justifications of whatever party, but to point out that the ensuing distrust weakens African solidarity and helps sustain a system which both groups feel they are fighting to destroy.*

* Both Kwa-Zulu and the Black Consciousness Movement emphasize their efforts at working to create a unified South Africa.
b) **Effective Police Control.**

The growing number of political trials since the Treason Trial of 1958 - 50 points to the effectiveness of the state machinery in monitoring dissident political activity. Accompanying this trend is the growing number of people who have died in police custody as well as alleged cases of police torture and ill-treatment of detainees. Steve Biko, the father of Black Consciousness, died while in detention as a result of injuries sustained in custody, and Joseph Mdluli died from the same cause. In both cases the state has had to pay large sums of money in out of court settlements to the families - in Steve Biko's case R65 000.

The total impact thus created resulted in what Schlemmer calls "resignation" - a behaviour pattern and attitude which are closely connected with the coercive element in the situation and with fear and insecurity. "Talking politics" is a phrase shunned by many Africans. This view is justifiable in the face of South Africa's track record of political trials. The two decades from 1960 have witnessed a ruthless crushing of any form of opposition outside the prescribed formula of Separate Development. Besides the numerous court cases as mentioned, other means which prohibit political expression outside the prescribed formula include listings, bannings and detentions. The Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, besides banning the Communist Party, "places serious restraints on Black political activity, by including within the definition of communism - which the Act sought to suppress - any doctrine which aims at bringing about any political, industrial, social or economic change ... by the promotion of disturbance or disorder, by unlawful acts or omissions, or which aims at the encouragement of feelings of hostility between the European and non-European races of the Union of South Africa where the consequences are calculated


to further the achievement of political, industrial, social or economic change by the promotion of disorder by unlawful acts.\(^8\) Between the enactment of the Act in 1950 and 1967, 568 persons had been listed, while 675 had been banned. By 1969 almost 1,300 people had been imprisoned for political offences, "almost 1,000 persons, of whom 853 were non-Whites, had been banned."\(^9\) The 90 days Detention Clause from the General Laws Amendment Act of 1963 resulted in detention without trial, at ministerial direction, of 1,095 persons between 1963 and 1965. It was replaced by the 180 days Detention Clause.\(^10\) Later Acts in this direction were the Terrorism Act of 1967 and the Internal Security Act of 1976. The 1960 State of Emergency saw the detention of 11,503 persons, while by 1977 over forty people had died in detention while in police custody\(^11\) for reasons ranging from suicide to injuries whose actual cause is difficult to determine.

Besides legislative enactment, the show of the State's might is amply demonstrated in any instance of an apparent organised challenge to official policy. Student demonstrations and boycotts often witness armed police reinforcements. It was the same incident and show of police might which ignited the spark that saw the Soweto holocaust. Workers' strikes, student protest marches, bus and train boycotts, all see police concentration on the scene to "preserve law and order". And mostly it is the Black police who are sent to the scene. The State can thus forestall any organised challenges, be they educational, economic or political, and at the same time maintain good relations with Blacks since all the show is to "preserve peace and protect the law abiding citizens".

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\(^10\) John Dugard: Op cit. p. 89.

\(^11\) Ibid. pp. 88, 90
c) Economic Integration and an Improvement in Living Standards

Besides actual improvements in Black wages, officials spare no effort in demonstrating how well off Africans in South Africa are compared to fellow Africans elsewhere in Africa. On the home front the government has openly stated that they are not against private enterprise implementing equal pay for equal work policies. Black and White wages are consequently blurred. Meanwhile the late fifties and early sixties saw slum clearance, and numerous townships were built around industrial centres. To meet ideological commitments as well as economic exigencies, these locations were declared parts of the homelands and brought under quasi-homeland administration. KwaMashu and Umlazi are de jure parts of KwaZulu. Township officials are paid servants of the KwaZulu administration. However, both townships are the property of the Bantu Trust, an agency formed to administer land under the Native Land and Trust Act of 1936.

Black wages have considerably improved in spite of an increase in the cost of living and an inflationary economy. The sixties and early seventies, in particular, witnessed an economic boom until the 1973 fuel crisis. Black migration into the industrial centres increased in spite of the Physical Planning Act of 1967, which laid down Black-White ratios in urban industry, and the statutory tightening of influx control since 1968. The shortage of White skills, and industrial expansion proved the ineffectiveness of job reservation within an expanding industrial and commercial environment.

This has resulted in job advancement among Blacks which has improved their education and urbanisation - both of which act as a catalyst to political consciousness.

White opposition parliamentarians have clamoured for the creation of an African middle class, with a vested interest in property and in the economy of the country, as a buffer against any possible revolution. The government's proposal to create the 99 year leasehold might be an adaptive move in their direction, especially after the lessons from Soweto 1976.
Further, the government has turned a blind eye to relaxations in the industrial colour bar, if not abolishing it completely in certain sectors. Opportunities for Black employment, especially after the 1973 industrial strikes in Durban, have improved. Almost all industrialists boast of Black executives, who act as fire brigades in industrial turmoil, if not antennae in diagnosing problems in industrial race relations, and are executors of fair employment policies.

3. The Theory of Relative Deprivation

One exponent of this theory is Ted Robert Gurr. Gurr starts his thesis by pointing out that throughout history men have rebelled against both authority and institutions. He ascribes such rebellion to two developments, collective violence and political violence or, rather, the potential for both. Both forms arise out of Relative Deprivation which he defines as "the discrepancy between the is and the ought" or rather more elaborately as "the discrepancy between value expectations - the goods and conditions to which people consider themselves rightfully entitled - and value capabilities - the goods and conditions which they consider themselves able to obtain and retain." Gurr further explains that, for relative deprivation to exist, it has to be perceived by those experiencing it. Leo Kuper refers to a similar condition when he speaks of status incongruity, and Johan Galtung in his theory of revolution refers to rank disequilibrium. Relative deprivation, status incongruity and rank disequilibrium can only exist in a society inclined to a sense of social awareness and an egalitarian culture. Where social-Darwinist convictions exist throughout the population, comparisons which precede experience of relative deprivation are non-existent. The converse is equally true. History abounds in examples where false consciousness - a condition whereby subordinate groups have been induced to identify with the system that keeps them as subordinates in return for some minor values has failed to endure indefinitely.

13) ibid.
To explain the persistence of the South African system in terms of Gurr's theory, a careful analysis of the applicability of the theory is a prerequisite. Gurr distinguishes between aspirational deprivation, where value capabilities remain constant while value expectations increase, and decremental deprivation, where value expectations remain constant while value capabilities decline. With regard to South Africa in the seventies, the tempo of Separate Development has been accelerated, three independent states have emerged, their nationals have been perceived to have lost South African nationality and even the 99 year leasehold in urban centres is feared to have been tied with homeland citizenship. Non-independent homelands have constitutionally developed to the last-but-one phase in the policy's theoretical structure.

On the other hand, Mozambique and Angola have attained independence under majority rule. In Rhodesia the Smith government has given way and has been 'ostensibly' replaced by Bishop Muzorewa's Black government and Rhodesia has become Zimbabwe to be later recolonised as Rhodesia. Meanwhile talks between internal and external Zimbabwe forces are going on in London, under Lord Carrington's chairmanship, in an attempt to reach an acceptable settlement. In South West Africa/Namibia, the Western Five are trying to diffuse the status quo in consultation with the Black Front Line states.

South African Black elites should thus be experiencing either rising hopes if they support the homeland concept, or, if not, rising frustrations. In Gurr's paradigm, they should be experiencing aspirational deprivation, if they are against homelands, that is a no political change situation at home compared to outside changes in other states in Southern Africa. Whichever form prevails, it is the purpose of this work to explore.
Another aspect of relative deprivation which Gurr explores is that of the source of values, the perception of the non-attainment of which would tend to increase its intensity. He defines values as "the desired events, objects and conditions for which men strive,"\(^{14}\) and distinguishes three categories:

I. welfare values which contribute directly to physical well being i.e. food, shelter, health services and physical comforts;

II. power values relating to influence and perceived freedom to participate in decision making; and

III. interpersonal values which have a bearing on status, recognition, the right to belong to associations and to participate in supportive groups. Research undertakings on African attitudes in South Africa, to be cited later, and particularly on Urban Africans tend to reinforce the presence of relative deprivation among Black people. The salience of certain particular values e.g. political values over economic values, or the perception of the determining influence of one value e.g. political or others, what Gurr would term 'base values',\(^{15}\), is another dimension which only research can illustrate.

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14) Ted Robert Gurr: *op. cit.*, p. 25

4. The Theory of a Conflict of Nationalisms

Writers on South Africa, among them Leonard Thompson\(^{16}\) and Leo Kuper\(^{17}\), assert that the South African situation largely exists because of a conflict of nationalisms - Afrikaner nationalism on one side and African nationalism on the other. Up to 1948 the South African governmental policy largely followed the dominance theory pattern, where assimilated "non-Whites", as they were called, could socially be accepted into White society. However, politically, Afrikaner nationalism had developed a protective and exclusivist outlook, an outlook which had been encouraged by the fear of an English-African coalition. As early as the 1880's, Africans in the Eastern Cape had come to realise that, if properly organised, they could become an effective voting block. Four voting blocks had emerged as the pattern - African, Afrikaner, Coloured and English voting blocks. Any coalition among such blocks could yield the desired results at the expense of others. Furthermore, all Native Representatives in Parliament were generally spokesmen for the African cause and they enjoyed the confidence of Africans. Margaret Ballinger stands as an outstanding example and at election time the slogan among Africans was "vote Ballinger.\(^{18}\)

Afrikaner Nationalism feared even the gradualism of the African National Congress - a qualified franchise. The least dangerous solution perceived by Afrikaner Nationalism was fragmentation of the South African population whereby Afrikaners would not be a conspicuous minority. Even Coloured voters tended to vote for Liberal English party candidates and this further frightened Afrikaner nationalists. A combination of English imperialism,

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18) From a personal account given by an erstwhile Eastern Cape eye witness to the scene - a woman graduate now resident in Durban.
African Liberalism and non-White liberalism was a fearful concept which could swamp Afrikanerdom. It is not intended to dwell on the merits and demerits of Afrikaner nationalism; for purposes of this presentation, but African nationalism merits a broader description as a factor which moulded African attitudes and perceptions.

African Nationalism

Among the greatest contributors to African political consciousness is the socio-political movement commonly known as African Nationalism. The first open manifestations of African Nationalism as an organised and properly constituted movement came with the formation, in 1912, of the South African Native Congress, later to be known as the African National Congress. Africans had operated as an organised pressure group even prior to 1910 - to the extent that they sent three delegations to London in 1909 to protest at the exclusion of Africans from the deliberations leading to the formation of the Union. The African National Congress was a reaction to the exclusion of Africans from the franchise in 1910 and inherited its ideological doctrine from the writings of Thango Jabavu, Rubusana and John Dube. At first, Congress sought inclusion of Africans in the common South African society and later made an open demand to the right to decision-making. The early history of the African National Congress will not be repeated in this work. What this author will attempt to amplify are the philosophical and theoretical developments of African Nationalism and the phases in the same movement up to the formation, firstly, of the Africanist Pan African Congress and, most recently, the Black Consciousness Movement.
The Premise

African Nationalism, especially in South Africa, is premised on what Africans perceive as the oppressive nature of White South African society and the right to justice irrespective of race, colour or creed. From the beginning, therefore, there have been close links between African nationalism as a reaction against oppression and Christianity as the champion of equality of all before God and, therefore, of the rights of man. What obliterated the close links, till the advent of Black Theology, was the close connection between White Christianity and White civilisation. As long as subscribers to the Christian church were predominantly White, the church condoned White practices in the name of gradualism - the recent change of heart is prompted by the renaissance in the psychology of Black Christians who have clamoured for equality within the same Christian Church. Thus, the basic premise to African Nationalism goes together with a social description which saw South African society as unjustifiably discriminatory against Africans and, therefore, unchristian. This was the beginning of the first phase.

But true to the intellectual climate prevalent at the time, this phase sought assimilation of Africans into the dominant culture. Writers such as Jabavu spoke of "civilised man" meaning those Africans who had mastered White ways and norms. This was a phase of middle class assimilationism where the criterion to rights and privileges was civilisation and not humanity. If ever social-Darwinism could claim success, among the subjected groups in South Africa, this was the phase where its greatest triumph was apparent. The early history of the ANC followed this pattern and was characterised by petitions and prayer meetings which saw very little positive response from a White society that could not appreciate any moral justification for a barbarous sub-human race seeking entrance into the holy shrines and preserves of western Christian heritage. The removal of Africans from the remnants of the common voters roll in 1936 dealt the final blow to the first phase and phase two began.
The Second Phase: Africanism:

Africanism drew its theoretical and intellectual strength from the personality of Anton Lembede. With this phase came a shift from seeking acceptance to a White dominant culture to a demand for the right to determine the nature of South African society. Up to till then, the African National Congress relied on gentlemanly and "civilised" approaches to African politics. Africanism came with a shift in both philosophy and style. It perceived the assimilationist pursuits of the ANC as moral degradation which emanated from a loss of self-confidence and an inferiority complex. "The worship and idolisation of White men ensured from frustration which led to the glorification of foreign leaders and ideologies." 19)

The cure to such ills lay in a counter-ideology - "a credo addressed to the deepest strivings and needs of the African spirit." And it is this ideology, which Lembede termed "Africanism", embodied in "...... a new and aggressively positive self-image compounded of pride in the past, confident expectations for the future, and an emotional burning love for the African's God-given blackness." 20)


20) Ibid. p. 58.
What is significant with the second phase was the positive self-assertiveness by Africans instead of the reaction to White determined stances which had characterised the first phase. With Lembede, Africans were creative and not merely reactive - blackness or, as Leopold Senghor called it, "negritude" was a virtue and a source of strength and no longer a weakness and a source of shame. The impact of the second phase lay in the psychological dimensions it promoted. Politically apparent manifestations were the Programme of Action which gave rise to the Defiance Campaign of 1951-52. The emphasis on African self-assertiveness later gave birth to Pan Africanism - a political manifestation. When Lembede prematurely died Mda took over the leadership of the African sentiment but, with the spiritual and intellectual godfather gone, Africanism suffered a setback. It was only in 1959 when the Pan African Congress was founded that Africanism once again gained life.

The Pan African Congress drew both its theoretical and philosophical base from Africanism. What it did was to formulate a governmental policy for the future of South Africa. Africans, according to the PAC theory, were the only ones who, because of their material position, were interested in a complete overhaul of the existing system and structure of South African society. Whites benefitted from the status quo and, hence, could not completely identify with the cause of the oppressed. Any liberal interest in furthering the cause of the underprivileged was for purposes of directing the momentum so that it did not become dangerous to Whites. A Black majority government was, therefore, the answer and it could prepare the grounds for a true democracy in South Africa - after all, Africans were the majority. It is only after pigmentocracy had been done away with that a true non-racial society, relying solely on the human race concept, could be established. Once racial equality and the human race concept were attained, there would be no need for minority guarantees which were contrary to the goal of a non-racial society. Pan Africanism denied that it was anti-White; anti-Whitism was anti-oppression, but oppression was an abstraction represented by individuals - the oppressors. Oppressors were, therefore, hated through their association with oppression - remove oppression and the hatred against oppressors would be removed. Theoretically, this was a truism; perhaps the greatest weakness in Pan Africanism was the failure to take cognisance of the impact of history on society. Societies are moulded on their historical experiences, not on abstractions, and it is these existential experiences which shape and direct reactions of society.
The Third Phase: Black Consciousness:

Two common features characterise the latter phases of African Nationalism. The first is an aggressive self-assertiveness and the second, which reinforces the first, is the disillusionment with the theory that South African society can be altered by working within the South African system. Just as Lembede and the Youth League deprecated the ANC old guard for using the "toothless" Native Representative Council to further African aspirations, so have the exponents of the Black Consciousness movement castigated homeland leaders for trying to work within the system in an attempt to further the Black cause. The results have been in both cases, an aggressive self-assertiveness and self reliance which has posed a threat to officialdom and has resulted in bannings and cripplings of the movements. The rationale behind both phases is that Black liberation cannot be entrusted to White leadership since the same leadership perceives Black liberation as a threat to their privilege. The solution is to go it alone since Whites, especially the liberal establishment, are part of the problem and, ipso facto, cannot be part of the solution. Where the third phase had differed from the second, is on the interpretation of those who constitute the oppressed. Black Consciousness has, thus, moved away from race as the criterion to decision making as far as the oppressed are concerned - it has, therefore, moved a step further from a parochial African sentimentalism to an expression of the Blacks' lifestyle.

An important feature of Black Consciousness is its insistence on the creative role which Blacks can play if properly motivated and guided. Whereas earlier African Nationalism or, for that matter, Afro-American nationalism sought unity in order to be accepted in both South African and American societies, Black Consciousness seeks to unite Blacks for purposes of creating rather than being assimilated into both societies. But, a cardinal point to note is that Black Consciousness does not advocate a destruction of the
present South African society — it rather seeks the creation and promotion of aspects of life which will enable society to note the worth of Black humanity — and in it's admiration be attracted to and be assimilated into it. Black Consciousness is premised on the assumption or belief that South Africa is the Black man's country and it is, therefore, the Black man who must call the tune — hence, the promotion of Black art, theatre, music and the practical self-help projects such as literacy classes, health and welfare project and organisations, such as the Black Community Programmes.

Black Consciousness became more than just a political movement, it assumed a philosophy and theory which transcended politics and ideology, a way of life. The slogan "Black is beautiful" saw the replacement of complexion creams with "non-bleachers", the emergence of Afro-wigs, long hair by youngsters and even adults, a pride in being black. Black people ceased being apologetic for their blackness and challenged White assertions to leadership and tutelage. The term "non-White" assumed a pejorative meaning. It was perceived as a negative definition of a people — a definition which presupposed a norm, Whiteness, and assumed that there were people who did not meet the standard. Blacks were Blacks and that was all and not aberrations of Whites and a regrouping of all Blacks was the sine quo non to Black liberation; hence all those who considered themselves oppressed are Blacks. Blackness became a "status more than colour". 21)

Basic Values

The common base for all Black Consciousness exponents is the rejection of current White values, on the basis of exploitation, racism, and materialism, which conflict with traditional African values and even with Christianity. But again tradition is not conceived in terms of tribal costumes and war dances and old non-rational customs, since these are perceived as making Africa the "museum of human evolution" and the "world's human zoo". These were common pejorative connotations of traditional regalia by the youth during the active S.A.S.O. days. Traditional values are non-racialism, freedom and liberation. Even S.A.S.O. acknowledged, or rather proclaimed, that South Africa was a country in which Black and White, not only live, but shall continue to live together. Black Consciousness does not, it asserts, seek to drive Whites into the sea or even to deprive them of their possessions, but it completely rejects any notion that Whites should consider themselves entitled or privileged to be the only ones who can and should monopolise the country's wealth.

South Africa is seen in terms of a Black-White dichotomy, where Whites maintain dominance over Blacks through racism and economic exploitation. Yet in spite of the Marxist jargon, Black Consciousness, like Africanism, is not a Marxist movement. The desired society is an African communal society where each individual can possess his goods and exploit his talents to the full as long as, in the same process, he does not exploit others. This strikes one as a society more akin to the socialist welfare model than the communist model. As for the history of South Africa, Black Consciousness contends that it is full of factual distortions in an attempt to rationalise White plunder and exploitation in the form of faked treaties and rationalisations in the name of Law and Order together with Christian technological advancement.
Christianity is perceived as having assumed that westernisation meant Christianisation, yet the former represents more of a cultural than a theological dimension. Very little was done by Christianity to recognise traditional values which were only culturally alien to Christians and not anti-Christian in essence. Black theology rejects this aspect of Christianity and avers that Christianity made the Black man "renounce his entire background as paganism and superstition." 22) Humanity is, therefore, defined by Whites in terms of Whiteness and Black Consciousness as a counter to that, a state of being, an attitude of the mind, what Alan Boesak terms "the courage to be" 23), an affirmation of the worth of the Black man. A demand and an assertion to recognition for what Blacks are and not what they should be.

Psychological inferiority complexes by Blacks are, according to Black Consciousness, aggravated by political manipulations in the homeland policies. Homelands are perceived as labour reservoirs for migrant labour and the reason why Urban Blacks are moved to these areas is because they know too much, in fact much more than the lower classes of the Whites do. Separate Development is perceived as meant to fragment the Black resistance to oppression, a divide and rule device. It is a settlement unilaterally defined by Whites, their attempt to define what a just settlement is.


The policy of Black Consciousness is, thus, aimed at making Blacks full South African citizens through ameliorating the lot of Blacks by educational and social conscientisation. It is based on the premise that Blacks are regarded as non-citizens, they are basically exploited economically and politically, that, in order to rid Blacks of this exploitation and oppression, Black living conditions, education, and psychological complexes need revamping. Once this is attained, Blacks will form part of the South African society since by then they will have acquired the courage to be, and will be, in a position to share in the creation of a new society, instead of being assimilated into it as beneficiaries to privileges and concessions. The first step to this ideal is Black solidarity. It is only when Blacks are united and psychologically free that they will be in a position to enter as equal partners to any contract; hence, the emphasis on going it alone. Whatever organisations were to be formed, therefore, they should be directed by Blacks and operated by Blacks to instil a climate of self-confidence and self-reliance. For this purpose, organisations like S.A.S.O., the B.P.C. and the Black Community Programmes were formed. When these were banned in October, 1977, recent ones, like the Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO) and the Azanian Students Organisation (AZASO), have been formed. They all believe in non-co-operation with officially sponsored institutions, like homelands and urban or community councils, which they regard as collaborators with the oppressor.
5. The Theory of Alienation

Another interesting concept to examine with regard to the persistence of the South African socio-political system is that of alienation. Societies throughout the world, and in particular, with regard to political issues, are often blamed for inaction and apathy. There is a general assumption in South Africa, that there is a lack of identification by Africans with the existing political structures created by the government. Could this be due to alienation that stems from a helpless oppositional stand or not?

i) Berger and Luckmann refer to the manner in which society objectifies the institutional order through the process of objectification and reification. According to this version, the institutional order is ".... apprehended as a non human facticity" and reification is defined as "..... the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were things, that is in non human or possible supra human terms". Eventually, Berger and Luckmann contend, man becomes an object rather than a subject of creation, and feels helpless in the face of his own creation.

ii) Durkheim in his chapter on "Melancholy" and the consequent suicide states that man is alienated or estranged from the social forces around him because of the progressive Individualism which separates man from the village, kindred and class, and brings about new forms of authority without the capacity to fuse the individual to the social order. The resulting alienation leads to normlessness, and is the main cause of suicide in individualistic societies.


25) Ibid.
Mills, on the other hand, considers alienation in terms of estrangement, but as a form of collapse into self indulgence, "... a personal excuse for lack of political will". Another concept which, according to Mills goes together with alienation, is objectivity, which he defines as "... a specialised form of retreat rather than the intellectual orientation of political man." Mills' version of alienation carries an element of defeatism, the intellectuals find themselves "overwhelmed by the managerial demiurge in an age of organised irresponsibility." Political alienation, according to him, is tantamount to default and indifference. It is a form of apathy and inaction.

Karl Marx differs from the other authors on alienation in two respects;

(a) his basis of alienation is economic;
(b) his alienated subjects do not despair or drive themselves to self destruction - they actively participate in the eventual overthrow of the existing order against which they find themselves alienated. Marx's alienation arises from estrangement. Man is estranged from the economic order which mutilates him through specialisation and the division of labour. He is further alienated from the existing order by his exploitation by the owners of the means of production. However, from the Hegelian dialectic, Marx concludes that eventually the antithesis (capitalist and labourer) will give to a new synthesis, a classless society. The system against which man is alienated goes through the processes of objectification and reification, but it does not assume the role of subject.

27) Ibid: p. 160
28) Ibid: p. 160
and the supernatural as the alienated proletariat seeks to overthrow the social order.
CHAPTER 4

REVIEW OF SOME OF THE EXISTING LITERATURE

Research surveys on political attitudes of Africans have centred on one or more of the following three dimensions:

1. African attitudes towards Whites.

2. Inter-racial or inter-ethnic attitudes, what psychologists term "the social distance test".

3. African reaction to the general pattern of socio-political and economic domination in South Africa.

The first aspect of research includes the works of MacCrone (1947), Pierre L. Van Den Berghe (1962) and Glenys Lobban. The second includes the works of Van Den Berghe and Glenys Lobban. Both aspects involved the use of scales of identification to elicit respondents' reactions to either racial or ethnic groups. 1) Representatives of the third aspect include Leonard Bloom, 2) Leo Kuper (1963) 3), Lawrence Schlemmer (1975) 4), The Quotso Study (1978), The Markinor Survey (1974) and periodic market research surveys.

2) Ibid.
3) Leo Kuper, op. cit.
Apart from the three dimensions which are listed on the previous page, a fourth dimension did investigate African attitudes to specific forms of policy and legislation. Brecht and Morse, working on a sample of middle-class Africans on the Reef, investigated African reaction to various forms of socio-political limitations that Africans are exposed to, as well as their reaction to specific forms of legislation. 5) Philip Mayer worked on the reaction of Urban Africans to Bantustans on a generalised basis. 6) Melville Edelstein combined the 'Social Distance Test' with projective techniques aimed at investigating African reactions to various facets of official policy towards Africans to find out what young Africans think about their educational and socio-political lot, as well as their response to homelands and future political plans (1972) 7). The Markinor Survey involving 795 respondents in four homelands was conducted to establish attitudes and reactions to homelands in 1974.

FINDINGS:

The above researchers and papers are strikingly unanimous in their findings. The first dimension reveals an anti-White feeling and a hatred for the Afrikaner as the author of Black oppression. (MacCrone, Van Den Berghe, Lobban) including Buxbaum (1970), Edelstein (1972) and Nquist (1972). 8) Also, the above researchers came to a unanimous conclusion that Africans reject the socio-political and economic status quo. (Kuper, Schlemmer, Brecht and Morse, MacCrone, Mayer, Edelstein, Van Den Berghe, and the Quotso Study) 9). The Quotso Study went further and illustrated a great deal of overt hostility among Africans, especially in group discussions. 10)

5) S.J. Morse and C. Orpen, op. cit.
Thirdly, this rejection manifested itself in a dynamic reaction to both official policy and Whites as well as in a degree of militancy towards both the official policy and its authors. (MacCrone, Kuper and Glenys Lobban). Fourthly, Africans blamed the socio-political status quo for their lot and ascribed this to the government and the Afrikaner Nationalists. (MacCrone and Lobban).

What almost all the above authors did not do, was to investigate beyond the apparent direction of discontent. Though many stress the almost unanimity of such discontent, none spells out the possible alternatives. There are no substitutes anticipated for the future to the official pluralist policy other than its rejection and an ideal description of ethical values of egalitarianism and a common society where race does not count. No doubt, this is a negation of present official values, but there are no recommendations as to how the ideal society will be created. This is especially important in view of the limitations and constraints which officialdom has imposed on any African political aspirations and organisations outside the prescribed framework of separate development. Also, in this Author's knowledge, there is no study which has investigated the reasons for what Adam calls the "stalled" revolution.

Henry Lever argues that the criticism against most researches on attitudes, especially African attitudes, is the reliability and representativeness of the samples selected for response. "There are numerous political speeches and writings by African leaders which are available. The difficulty is that their views are shaped by the political stance adopted." Lever's work makes no presuppositions to its scientific exactness and no doubt even previous ones have not. But to deny previous researches any representativeness on Lever's grounds, is probably to refute common assertions regarding leadership and public opinion.

11) Ibid. p. 184.
The core of problem is, thus:

1. How do the Urban African elites, who by and large shape urban African public opinion, perceive their present socio-political position? This question can only be answered by covering, in detail, aspects of political consciousness among the African elites.

The corollary to this question is:

2. What alternatives to the present status quo are perceived and desired by the respondents? And further:

3. What strategies, as perceived by the respondents, are necessary for the attainment of these alternatives?

The above questions call for both perceived and evaluative responses. One argument is that such responses will be shaped by influences which can be drawn from each respondent's existential interpretation of his environment.
Earlier on this author contended that the persistence of the South African socio-political system can be accounted for in five distinct theoretical approaches:

1. the theory of dominance giving rise to normative and alienative compliance;

2. the theory of a pragmatic racial oligarchy which, through adaptation to demands, might eventually culminate in a non-racial integrated society, especially when economic forces begin to untangle themselves from ideological forces;

3. the theory of relative deprivation which, while it carries with it the potential for a violent overthrow of the status quo, can still be accommodated by both the Might of the State and the State's creation of safety valves in the form of politico-economic adaptations and social amelioration of the African lot. This would tend to reduce both the scope and intensity of relative deprivation, but is this the case in this point in time?

4. the theory of a conflict of nationalisms where Afrikaner nationalism, which is exclusive and is perceived as oppressive by Africans, had given rise to a self-assertive and exclusive African nationalism. The question here is where has this militant African nationalism failed?

5. the theory of alienation which might account for the apparent disinterestedness and opposition, from the Africans, to whatever the Government proposes in the form of political alternatives and programme.
The Argument

One point of view is that sporadic outbreaks of violence such as Soweto, Cato Manor and Sharpeville, as well as boycotts, strikes and demonstrations, such as the Durban industrial strikes (1973) and Newcastle bus boycotts (1979), are a demonstration effect which manifests itself in any immediate form of discontent. This is in line with Colin Legume's remark that the flashpoint for violence in Soweto "could have been any one of the score of other frustrating and equally humiliating grievances of the daily lot of five million Blacks living in their urban ghettos."

The official view by the South African government authorities is that Black South Africans are happy with the programme of separate development and, to prove the assertion, three independent homelands, Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda, have evolved from the programme. Not only have Blacks accepted the programme, even voting statistics back this point. They further state that in pre-independence elections in the Transkei, 65.95% of the voters went to the polls where the pro-independence Transkei National Independence Party had a landslide victory. The opposition in Transkei has declined from holding a majority of elected seats in the Legislative Assembly in 1963 to a mere handful in 1976. The same can be said of Bophuthatswana where the opposition to independence was very small in contested seats. Could this be interpreted as an illustration of compliance, albeit alienative? Or, is the boycotting of elections an illustration of apathy and indifference which again is a sign of alienative compliance as the government carries on with its programme without taking any notice.

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Those who oppose the government's view state that the Transkei count was a fallacy as it was worked on the assumption that in the uncontested seats there was a 100 per cent voter turnover. On actual statistics, the figure was 43.45 per cent and not 65.95 per cent; a figure which, while not very low, was obtained after a swoop on the opponents of independence prior to nominations of candidates for elections. The pressures on the electorate put in doubt the validity of the acceptance of independence by popular will, as well as the official mood towards those who oppose the programme.

Opponents of the official government's policy argue that the policy is imposed upon the Black people who have no alternatives, that even those states who have opted for independence would not have done so had there been alternative political expression, and that the South African government has, after all, silenced the authentic opposition to its policies. Boycotts of separate development institutions, although not seriously taken by the government, are regarded by the boycotters as a demonstration of the rejection of official policy; hence a low turnover of voters polled in the Community Council elections in Soweto in 1977. The boycott attitude, unless it manifests itself in such a way as to embarrass officials, can be interpreted as indifference which means covert acceptance. It can only embarrass officials where the moral weight of the motive for the boycott is appreciated by both parties; again this raises a dilemma as interpretations for such motives are surely indifferent. But what alternatives to boycotts can people devise in an environment where active opposition to the programme is treated as crime? This is a question opponents to the programme usually ask.

It is clear from the foregoing discussion, especially from the point of view of a conflict of nationalisms, that both the policy and programme of separate development cannot accommodate African aspirations. The decolonisation process which started with the independence of Ghana from the North has moved closer home with the withdrawal of Portugal from Mozambique and Angola. Internationally, South Africa is regarded as the
black sheep among the Western Christian democracies and, internally, Africans consider themselves as oppressed and discriminated against on the basis of their colour.

Historically, the African National Congress and, later, the Pan African Congress have rejected the policy of separation and advocated a common South African Society. African opinion, including the opinion of leaders who operate within the framework of separate development, has tended to reject separation as the ideal solution to the country's problem. From a political point of view, Africans perceive separate development as a device intended to strip them of the remaining rights that they are entitled to as South Africans. They realise that accepting separate nationhood will render them legally incapable of making any claims to equal treatment in a land where their status is that of guests and not citizens. Even the Africans who actively comply with the policy's requirements do so from a calculative position where they have relatively some gains to make.

Partly because of the history of African resistance to White domination, and partly because Africans perceive separate development as masked domination which can offer them only limited rewards, the policy of separate development, as it stands, will be rejected by the African elites.

Owing to the few rewards which accrue from the policy of separate development, only those segments of the elite population who benefit from the policy will demonstrate any favourable inclinations to or accommodation of the policy. Those segments of the elite population
who consider themselves excluded, either from the few rewards that the policy offers or from the advantages of a common South Africanism, will demonstrate overt militancy to the policy. Where there are perceived gains, members of the elite cadres will find it difficult to reconcile their personal gains and apparent acceptance of the policy with the prevalent alienative mood by the majority of Africans.

HYPOTHESIS

Modes of alienation from the operational socio-political system will vary with the perceived gains or losses accruing from the policy of Separate Development. In more specific and operational terms, the hypothesis can be stated in terms of occupation. Those, whose occupation or material success benefit from Separate Development, are more likely to be conciliatory in a range of political options than those whose occupation or material success are independent of whatever advantages accrue from Separate Development. However, occupation usually correlates with education, especially among the Black sectors of the population, and, therefore, a pattern seen in the results may be due to the education and not the independent variable of occupation stated above. In the analysis, therefore, both occupation and education will be considered as they relate to political views.
B. WHY ELITES?

The elites have been selected for this study, not for any purposes of making a class distinction in a society legally subjected to the same conditions of discrimination, but for practical and academic reasons. They would not only be status elites, but embrace the leader-groups in a variety of contexts. Trade Union Leaders, though not a status group, would be accepted within the definition. Leo Kuper asserts that it is from the elites that Presidents, Prime Ministers and the whole leadership in independent Africa has been drawn. They are the opinion makers and, consequently, the formulators of policy. Further, Kuper states that it is the elites who are exposed to conscious effects of apartheid and the "torment of Tantalus", a glittering prize and its withdrawal. His argument is that apartheid heightens the tension between anticipation and reality. "There is the promise of endless rewards in separation, which conflicts with endless restraints on a ceiling which is unilaterally determined by White power to appease White strata on which the government relies heavily for votes."

All Africans feel the pinch of official policy, but it is the elite who react more overtly than do the masses who are less articulate. Also, it is the elites, as a class, who offer real rivalry between Black and White and provide actual challenge to White privilege. White reaction to elite competition, of necessity, shifts from traditional paternalism to opposition, especially from the lower strata of White society. While elites must figure prominently in opinion-making by virtue of their education and articulateness, they are also a focal point of interest in that they would tend to gain personally in the few rewards that official policy offers.

3) Ibid. p. 404.
By virtue of their economic limitations and competition from the White commercial and industrial sector, both homelands and townships can only offer restricted financial rewards. The elites would thus tend to be the main beneficiaries and yet, also due to the same limitations, that segment of the elites which might find itself excluded from the rewards, would offer resistance to a policy that excludes them from the perceived benefits. Hence, it is within the elites that both relative deprivation and the politics of hope and despair would be more sharply prevalent. It is for these reasons that a study on elite attitudes, reactions and expectations would be desirable.

Definition and Universe of the Elites:

In the absence of any socio-economic differentiation within the settlements in the townships and lacking a clearly defined and recognised political leadership pattern, besides officially created roles, education and occupation remain the two most consistent criteria for elite status. To Africans, both rural and urban, the acquisition of a university degree or professional qualifications, accords special respect to the incumbents. In addition to education and occupation there is a command for political and organisational expertise. Financial standing might also mean a chance to exert some influence on the community, but this is not decisive. Those traders and businessmen who are well disposed towards community oriented projects, such as creches, bursary funds and other social welfare organisations, might incur elitist status but more from their activities than from their business standing. Added to this list are the new political or administrative elites, township councillors and their like, who, because of the officially defined status quo, find themselves referred to in the absence of any other alternatives.
"Elites", therefore, refers to those segments within the African population, who, because of their educational, occupational, financial, political, organisational and administrative standing, exert an influence, either potentially or actively, on public opinion and socio-political trends among Africans.

This loose definition does not depart much from the criteria for elitist status advanced by sociologists. Leo Kuper in his work "An African Bourgeoisie" based his criteria for bourgeois status on occupation. Mia Brandel Syrier based her ideas on township elite status on both occupational and organisational attributes. An African economist, Selby Bongani Ngcobo, writing on African elites in South Africa demarcated his elites into tribal, educational and occupational. In a study of attitudes of White South African elites, Van Der Merwe, Ashley, Charton and Huber used occupations in the various sectors as a basis for elite identification. What this author intends to emphasise here is that clear cut stratification lines are not easily definable in a society where change and especially change in the norms due to acculturation and occupational mobility is so rapid.

Durban has been selected as a focal point for various reasons. It is Natal's largest industrial centre and, thus, has the greatest numerical strength of Urban Africans in the province. Secondly, after the Pretoria-Witwatersrand Vereeninging complex, Durban is the second largest industrial complex in the country. Thirdly, Durban has the trappings of an African cosmopolitan centre which contains many of the facets of official policy planning for Africans. Umlazi in the South is a township within a homeland administration and acts as a reservoir to Durban's industrial and commercial labour complex. In Umlazi, Africans can buy and own houses, but not the land on which their houses stand. Kwa Mashu in the North, was until April 1, 1977, administered by the Port Natal Bantu Affairs Administration Board and then transferred to Kwa Zulu. Hence, all the stringent regulations which affected Africans in townships were applicable. Chesterville and Lamontville will remain as they are, administered by the Port Natal Administration Board, and limitations of non-ownership of houses will apply permanently though the new 99 year leasehold may apply. In the west, Clermont serves the Durban-Pinetown complex and here Africans have freehold titles to their properties.

Above this, Durban played a very important role in the formative years of the Black Consciousness philosophy. She has the University of Natal Medical School which is the only true all-Black Educational Institution in the country and enjoys a longer history than the other five ethnic Universities, excluding Fort Hare. Also, Natal is the only area where a homeland-based political mobilisation movement, Inkatha, which constitutionally transcends ethnic lines, is most advanced. Besides, the last presidency of the African National Congress, before its proscription, was based in Natal. Just as Congress had links with other Black peoples - Indians and Coloureds - so has Inkatha through the South African Black Alliance. This, therefore, makes Durban, and by extrapolation, Natal, an important area of political gravity.
This study assumed that the African society in the townships could be divided into vertical sectors differentiated into functional occupational categories. Eleven occupational categories were created and the selection of respondents was based on the following:

1. Where the various occupations had formal associations, executive members were approached on the assumption that their election into their positions reflected their constituencies' confidence in them.

2. Where there were no formal organisations within the occupational categories, respondents were approached on a seniority basis; that is, those respondents who tended to exert perceived influence within a particular occupation were selected. This author's intimate knowledge of township society was of great assistance in this case. For instance, in school speech and prize-giving days, at Funerals and other township functions, there are those members of the elite cadres who are often invited to give talks or preside over the occasion.
Representatives from the following categories were approached:

1. Medical Practitioners
2. Lawyers
3. Personnel and Industrial Relations Officers
4. Research workers
5. Bankers
6. Laboratory Analysts and Technicians
7. Accounting Personnel
8. Sales and Insurance Representatives
9. Laboratory Technicians and Radiographers
10. Trade Union Officials
11. University and High School Students
12. Community Workers and Social Workers
13. Ministers of Religion
14. Journalists
15. School Inspectors
16. School Principals
17. Hospital Matrons and Sister Tutors
18. Teachers
19. Nurses
20. Civil Servants in Township Administration
21. Businessmen
22. Township Councillors
23. Inkatha Officials.

For purposes of data classification and analysis, the above twenty-three categories were reduced to eleven occupational classes on the basis of shared interests. This was an arbitrary structure imposed by this author on the assumption that persons similarly affected would tend to react likewise.

A structured open-ended questionnaire was administered to all the eighty respondents, forty of whom were personally interviewed by this author. Thirty five were interviewed by two well-briefed assistants, both of whom were university graduates in the social sciences, and five mailed questionnaires were sent to respondents with an explanatory covering note detailing the procedure to be followed in answering the questions. Interviews averaged about two and a half hours per person. In all cases there was a consistency of responses and very little interview bias was noticeable.
SAMPLING

A quota sampling method was adopted, but in the light of societal importance of some occupations over others, the sample was weighted in favour of the more "respectable" professions or occupations, such that the higher professions tended to be over-represented. Education was another influencing factor and out of the eighty respondents, thirty possessed one or more University degrees. All respondents had a junior certificate or senior educational qualification.

ANALYSIS OF DATA

In analysing the data, reference will not be made to specific tabulations of the material in each case, this would have been unnecessarily tedious. The full distribution of answers to items in the schedule appears in Appendix B at the back. The discussion of the results is drawn from these distributions, sometimes singly and sometimes in combinations. The reader should consult Appendix B if confirmation of the text is desired.
Official utterances by the government emphasise a climate of calm and contentment with the system. The only disturbing factors, according to this view, are a few agitators and troublemakers. On the other hand, international opinion, public opinion expressed by the African press and articulate Africans give opposing views. The first question one asks, therefore, is: how do Africans in general experience the South African socio-political system as it affects them? Going through the responses, one is struck by a broad awareness by the elites of the discriminatory nature of South African society. Respondents demonstrated a consciousness, not only of the discriminatory nature of South African Society, but also an awareness of the political motives behind the purposeful exclusion of Africans from any creative and meaningful decision-making process. The results of this experience are both alienation from and externality to the South African system. Elites perceived the South African system as structured to exclude Africans from directing and determining their own fate; thus, rendering them perpetual subservients to White authority and decision-making. They experienced this structured subordination in education, in employment and in the totality of their lives. They demonstrated a conscious awareness of the political and legal sources of discrimination and an awareness that it was not only meant to discriminate against them, but to render them helpless and perpetually dependent on White leadership and tutelage in all walks of life.

Respondents expressed discontent with their daily lot; they perceived themselves as pariahs in a land they regard as rightfully theirs. Expressions of discontent in places of work and public
places pervaded the entire responses to the questionnaire. Most respondents complained of humiliations by Whites in their daily contact with them; they complained about their subjection to a matrix of discriminatory and prohibitive Laws and Regulations. One respondent aptly summed up the situation when he declared: "An African's life is governed by negative documents from the cradle to the grave; we have more don't's than do's in our lives". Life, to many respondents, was interpreted in political overtones, what Leo Kuper referred to as "The Political Baptism" of Apartheid. 1)

What this author referred to as alienation from and externality to the socio-political system was manifest in the numerous references to "they" when referring to South Africa. They clearly distinguished between a South Africa as officially conceived by the "ruling class" and a South Africa as they perceived it. They did not belong to the conceptual South Africa which White officialdom represented, but at the same time felt a sense of belongingness to South Africa as their traditional Mother Country. This estrangement from a country they regarded as their rightful home was revealed in their consciousness of what they regarded as injustices perpetrated against them in an attempt to perpetually make them slaves in the land of their birth. "All we experience", said one respondent, "is domination all round; the past few years have witnessed an all-out effort by the ruling class to make domination more acceptable locally and internationally by trying to mask it". Another pointer in this direction exists in Africans' support of visiting sports teams against the local "Springboks".

According to respondents, political behaviour in South Africa was rigidly regulated by a matrix of Laws. Responses to politically probing questions were, therefore, guarded with understandable caution. Yet, throughout the conversation with respondents, one could not fail to detect this alienation from, and externality to, the South African socio-political system. Respondents acted as participants in a drama which they could not internalise, yet, due to both a pragmatic adaptation and a survivalist instinct, managed to go through the various stages and scenes as if they willingly participated. In an earlier work on attitudes, Lawrence Schlemmer came across the same experience where Urban Africans revealed the ability to go about their daily chores as if all were normal, yet deep-seated discontent dwelt in them without any external manifestations.  

Many respondents expressed the philosophy that, in order to survive, one had to keep going in spite of the odds. They stated that awareness of the consequences of open defiance against "the system" has made many toe the line, albeit grudgingly, not by actively participating in their "own oppression", but by passively going on without openly challenging authority in the hope that eventually justice would triumph. Many regarded this stance, not as submission, but as "the silent protest".

But, in spite of the apparently compliant behaviour, respondents expressed a perplexing confidence and optimism - an optimism for change for the better, an optimism in the eventual triumph of the African cause. Almost all respondents strongly believed that eventually Black men will rule South Africa. Perhaps this was a confidence drawn from the Africans' numerical superiority or from history in Africa as it gradually unfolds itself, from an African culture from which they can draw strength, even from their perceived right to indigenous claims on Africa. A hostile anti-South African world opinion reinforces and

sustains their confidence. Another pointer to the high morale might be an appreciation of literary expositions in the history of nations and a realisation of developments in Southern Africa, 51% of the respondents mentioned border politics i.e. Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, South West Africa/Namibia and Angola, among the events they considered significant in the news media. They cited developments there as signifying a decided shift in the balance of South African politics in favour of Africans. Many also repeated the oft quoted dictum - "that history is on the side of the oppressed." Here there was a distinct link with Black Consciousness utterances, especially utterances from Black Theology. Alan Boesak, in his analysis on the development of Black American Assertiveness (especially the assertiveness of Martin Luther King and Washington), emphasises this historical appreciation of the Blacks' existential experience as necessary for the development of Black self-awareness.

A significant experience of the South African situation emanated from the employment scene. The sample consisted predominantly of people involved in the employment situation as employees. This is understandable; there are very few economically independent Africans in South Africa. Entrepreneurship, in the true sense of the word, is still at an infantile stage; there are no truly African business co-operatives with open shares, so that almost all respondents are dependent upon an employer for a living.

Even the few independents, such as doctors and lawyers, depend upon a wage-earning clientele for their income; hence they cannot express bourgeois sentiments which are contrary to mass expectations. Perceptions of economic inequities logically occupied the top rung of the relative deprivation ladder. Consciousness of unequal opportunities in employment, disparities in salaries and wages, and lack of bargaining power in the employment situation ranked highest on the scale (67% of respondents). Whatever changes are taking place, were labelled as cosmetic and window dressing devices to appease Black opposition on the home front as well as to discourage overtures for disinvestment by the international community with South African financial links.

When asked to sketch an ideal economic policy for South Africa, 56% of the respondents mentioned equality of employment opportunities and trade unionism, whilst only 11% made mention of business and trading opportunities. This is another pointer to the predominance of an employee class among Africans. It could, no doubt, be a pointer to the perception of the economic might of Africans as contributors and supporters in the economic lifeline of the entire country. The Durban strikes of 1973 carried a lesson for both employers and employees. Consequent developments and concessions signified to Africans that they could be a force with which to reckon. Official government attitudes to the freedom of association for African workers and harassment of unregistered trade union leadership by officialdom, convinced the African people that they possessed a potential economic might which officialdom feared and wished to contain.
CRITICAL PERCEPTIONS AND EXPERIENCES

Daily exposure to political and administrative edicts and processes have highlighted the extent to which Africans, as a class, are affected by discriminatory practices. Administrative officials in the townships, though to some extent Black, still refer to White senior officials for decisions. The lower echelons of the White bureaucracy are relatively poorly educated and resentful of educated Africans. In the Administration Boards, White officials with whom Africans come into contact are crude and unsophisticated, but very conscious of their whiteness. The railways cannot boast an "enlightened" personnel policy either. Police who come into daily contact with Africans, also display a nonchalant and bossy attitude, together with preconceived notions that Africans are guilty until proved innocent. The sum total of exposure to these daily harassments is a negative attitude by Africans to everything associated with officialdom. Respondents felt negatively discriminated against and purposefully humiliated because of their blackness. To most respondents discrimination was politically determined; all other facets were ramifications of the political status quo. The absence of African political power was singled out by a majority of respondents as the cause of discrimination since, constitutionally, Africans had no means to alter the status quo, which was perceived as discriminating against Africans in all aspects. In addition to specifics there was a general belief by respondents that one could not probe into aspects of dissatisfaction when the totality of African life was riddled with subjection to discrimination.

Besides politically negative aspects of discrimination, many respondents complained about the education which is prescribed for Africans. They demonstrated a conscious awareness of both the quality and quantity of their education. Lack of African involvement in the planning of syllabi and the administrative aspects of education
were highlighted by many respondents (45%). Many felt the quality of African education was inferior and designed to relegate Africans to an inferior sideline position in South African society. They freely quoted from Dr. Verwoed's speeches in the House of Assembly in 1953 and questioned if any educational system based on those motives could ever be designed to serve any society. Respondents were also conscious of the difficulties experienced in obtaining the means to reach that meagre and inadequate education. One respondent summed up the situation by pointing out that without a sound education one remained psychologically, technologically and politically unfree. "No nation can clamour for freedom, unless it realises its bondage and has the means to sustain its wishes for freedom", he declared, "and this is what Bantu Education denies us. The changes in names and styles have not yet altered facts; until education is organised on non-racial lines, there will always be comparisons - the superior and the inferior".

Influx Laws also occupied a conspicuous position in the relative deprivation ladder. Suprisingly, in spite of the fact that the sample contained no migrants, 26% of the sample mentioned Influx Laws by name as the cause of the daily frustrations of the African people. The elaborate administrative procedures which Africans should fulfil prior to employment and during terms of employment, the behaviour of White officials in administration, and the often humiliating exposures were mentioned as definitely a cause for resentment. When one adds the exposure to a selective all-round readership by the elites and the slant towards liberal newspapers which often publish cases of removals, e.g. Crossroads, Limehill, Dimbaza and other numerous episodes, the explanation is not hard to find. Demolitions and evictions of Africans from urban surroundings (Durban has her Clermonts, Richmond Farms and Mgagas), and official utterances that Africans elsewhere have been moved at their request, reinforced this strong resentment. Respondents stated that when these events were published, it could only be the most credulous who would believe reports when one had first hand experience of similar events nearer home.
One striking feature from the responses was the deep-seated confidence among a substantial number of respondents who thought that change in favour of Africans was not too far remote. More striking was the fact that respondents did not believe that South African Whites had the capacity to institute change, but rather that they would be compelled to grant changes, albeit grudgingly. This consciousness of White intransigence reveals African perceptions of the basic nature of South African society. In an earlier work in Durban, Schlemmer discovered that most Africans perceived Whites as basically bad spirited and selfish. To many of the respondents, White South Africans were bent on perpetuating White dominance to the extent of "masking dominance in sheepskins". However, in the elites' analysis of White political behaviour, Whites were aware of the inevitable, and it was from sheer self-preservation, both politically and economically, that they were making apparent moves away from discrimination to protect their interests. Whites had therefore, embarked upon a crusade of sugarcoating the bitter apartheid pill.

Foremost among these was the White liberal establishment's involvement in multiracial and not non-racial projects to influence both the tempo and direction of change in their favour. Black consciousness was a direct outcome of this school of thinking. Recent moves by the government to "normalise" sport and the "deracialisation" of the South African society, opening of hotels and restaurants by proclaiming them "international" and the reaction of the White official opposition to the same moves, were perceived as White attempts to wrest the initiative from Africans with the connivance of Africans operating within the system. The rationale here was that without change in the basic nature of South African society, there could be no meaningful change in its components. "One cannot play non-racial sport in a racist society" has become the slogan for the opponents of multinationalism in sport and exponents of non-racialism. This line of thinking is among the deepest dividers of African opinion - a cut-off point for those who totally oppose "working within the 'system'" from those who feel the 'system' can be utilised for African benefits.

Out of a total number of 130 possible answers given in response to an open-ended question regarding recent moves "in sport integration" and social integration in hotels and restaurants, 105 answers perceived the moves as desires by the government to subtly apply discrimination or to remove it only on non-issues. Only 25 respondents saw any positive valence in the moves. On the contrary, however, a contradiction in perceptions was apparent when it came to appreciating a change in the lot of Africans between the years 1969 - 1979, as 24% of respondents mentioned changes in the wage structure, an improvement in employment opportunities and salaries for African professionals, forced recognition by the government of the rate for the job, and a probable recognition of Black Trade Unions. However, the apparent self-contradiction became explicable when a majority of respondents attributed any shifts to both international and internal pressures, especially pressures like Soweto and the 1973 Durban strikes. This left one with the impression that there was a consistency among respondents regarding the basic nature of South African society and White attitudes; the apparent self-contradiction was due to the perception of a shift in both policy and application - a shift attributed more to pressures than to ethical and moral goodwill from Whites.
In an analysis of the potential for collective violence in general and political violence in particular, Gurr refers to both aspirational and decremental deprivation. He defines aspirational deprivation as a condition whereby value expectations increase while value capabilities remain static; and decremental deprivation as a condition wherein value expectations remain constant while value capabilities decline. 1) The Southern African situation can be analysed in the light of aspirational deprivation. The years 1974-1975 saw the apparent shift in the traditional Afrikaner Nationalist approach to race relations when Prime Minister Vorster embarked upon his "detente" initiatives into Black Africa. His historic meeting with President Kaunda of Zambia on the Victoria Falls bridge in 1975 raised hopes for internal change among Blacks. Back home Dr. Punt Jansen, as Deputy Minister for Bantu Administration, displayed verligte overtures. The sporting scene was apparently being deracialised when multinationalism was starting to replace completely segregated sport.

In the meantime, three distinct political events of importance in Southern Africa occurred between the years 1974 - 1978. What is significant about them is that all three arose out of a situation comparable in many ways to that of South African society. Another significant attribute connected with them is the impact they have had on the Southern African socio-political scene.

In 1974 Portugal announced her immediate withdrawal from Mozambique and a phased programme of withdrawal from Angola. Black celebrations over the subsequent Frelimo ascendancy in Mozambique culminated in the "Viva Frelimo" rally at Currie's Fountain in Durban and the subsequent Pretoria "Old Synagogue" trial in which leaders of the Black Consciousness Movement were later jailed for varying terms. Angola's pending independence sparked off internecine warfare in which three ideological movements vied for power. Eventually the pro-Soviet M.P.L.A. under Augustino Neto held the day. All movements had backing from outside powers. South Africa herself came to the aid of Jonas Savimbi's Unita which, the aid notwithstanding, has been relegated to the status of a rural rebel movement in the southern part of the country.

The Rhodesian Government announced its willingness to enter into an internal agreement in 1975; eventually in 1978, Ian Smith, the White Rhodesian Premier stepped down in favour of Bishop Abel Muzorewa's United African National Council in an internal settlement. Meanwhile in South West Africa/Namibia, South Africa paved the way for an all party constitutional conference. Swapo, however, refused to participate as parties could not agree on Pretoria's conditions on the conference. Later in 1978, South West Africa/Namibia held elections, but these were not recognised by the United Nations. Five Western powers, the United States of America, Britain, France, West Germany and Canada, together with the five Frontline States, Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique, Angola and Tanzania, intervened in an effort to resolve the stalemate.
Earlier on, this author asserted that developments in these three regions represent very similar situations. All involved guerilla onslaughts against powerful and efficiently administered states and all achieved limited military and psychological success to varying degrees, but at the cost of great losses of life. The issue here is, what effects did these events have on the expectations and hopes of the local population? (Rhodesia will be discussed in a later chapter).

The independence of both Mozambique and Angola had profound effects on African aspirations in South Africa, much more so when the South African government reacted in a manner which could be interpreted as reflecting its consciousness of the disturbance of the South African status quo. Responses to a question probing into African perceptions of events in both Mozambique and Angola, revealed that 59% of respondents supported independence unreservedly while 25% had reservations. Even where respondents expressed reservations, these were not based on the independence concept but rather on the sequel of events consequent upon independence. There was not a single respondent who perceived independence in negative terms. They most frequently saw independence as the culmination of a protracted struggle for self-determination by an African majority that had to face a well-armed and disciplined colonial power, (48%). They could, no doubt, draw a parallel between their position here and that of the indigenous Mozambicans and Angolans prior to independence. In their perception this was an achievement and, as one respondent remarked "a logical historical step - history is always on the side of the oppressed".
Another significant factor, besides the perception of independence in both territories (as achievements in the struggle for self-determination), is the geo-political importance of both territories with regard to South Africa. Earlier on, this author attributed an expressed selective readership preference, for developments of events on the country's borders, to the elites. Writing in 1975, Colin Legum stated that the collapse of the Portuguese leg in the tripod deprived South Africa of the "cordon sanitaire on which it had relied to keep its own borders insulated against the pressures from the North". 2) Indeed, South Africa's military prowess should cope with any invasion from the North. Even guerilla incursions from neighbouring states can be effectively dealt with by the South African defence machinery. The question of hot pursuits across the borders is perhaps a certainty, but herein lies the rub. Pursuits into neighbouring states carry with them a delicate element of internationalising the conflict, thus drawing in foreign elements under various guises. This could protract and escalate the conflict to a position where retreat, short of capitulation by either side, becomes a very difficult proposition.

Respondents demonstrated a clear awareness of the above factors. Besides seeing border developments as significant newsmakers (51%), 26% saw independence as a booster to African aspirations and morale, while 18% saw in it a chance for Africans to exercise full political control and self-determination in the land of their birth. A corresponding number expressed themselves content with recognition and approved of the independence achievements because they accorded international recognition to both Mozambique and Angola. A significant 48% thought that both territories had attained genuine independence which was an achievement.

Earlier, this author's contention was that even those respondents who expressed reservations did not oppose independence as a concept, but, rather, were unhappy about the subsequent trend of events in both territories. Thirteen percent were unhappy about the bloodshed and fighting which had caused much loss of life prior to independence, as well as after independence, in Angola, 14% thought that both territories were not yet fully developed to assume the mantle of independence and that they were still lacking in technical and administrative know-how, whereas another 10% were unhappy about what they referred to as the "Communist Influence in both territories".

The above observations contrast sharply with experiences of the South African reality. Transkei and Bophuthatswana were perceived as pseudo-independent regions where dependency on South Africa in all respects still continues. There was a complete rejection of independence in both territories. Respondents identified with Mozambique and Angola, while they rejected any identification with the cause as espoused by the leadership in both Transkei and Bophuthatswana. Mozambique and Angola had both psychological and strategic significance on African aspirations as reflected in the sample. Colin Legum had also asserted that the independence of the former Portuguese colonies had weakened the White front and this factor had "brought quick reappraisals in Western capitals about their future policies in the area." The view held by this author earlier was that events in both Mozambique and Angola had the potential to internationalise the conflict in Southern Africa and this was clearly spelled out by Colin Legum in the above quotation.

3) Ibid. p. 2.
Indeed, courtships of convenience between South Africa and Black Africa in the years 1974 - 75 were a sequel to this line of thinking. That they eventually failed was, perhaps, due more to the inflexibility of the policy of Separate Development as a fundamental doctrine of race relations, and the commitment of Black Africa to eventual self-determination in the international context, than the realisation by both sides that rapprochement was undesirable. Respondents stated that the significance of Mozambique and Angola and the contemporary diplomatic overtures by South Africa, perceived as a sequel to the Portuguese withdrawal from Africa, was that African aspirations in South Africa were correspondingly raised. The "Viva Frelimo" rally and African jubilation that followed in the University of the North were clear signs of rising expectations.

The above outline prompts one to pose some serious questions which are relevant to the analysis of whatever strategies are considered as instrumental in bringing change to South Africa and meeting African aspirations. Does a positive appraisal of events in Mozambique and Angola mean that African elites support violent means of overthrowing the status quo? The view by this author is that Africans do not cherish a Machiavellian outlook to attaining political power. A fair size of respondents even appreciated that it was more the psychological and economic collapse of Portugal than guerilla military supremacy that won the day. Even the authors of the "Viva Frelimo" rally were not advocates of a violent overthrow of the South African political system. In passing judgement on the accused in the SASO/BPC trial, Mr. Justice Boshoff clearly stated that "neither SASO nor BPC had the characteristics of a revolutionary group and that it was not one of the objects of the conspirational agreement at issue in the trial to bring about a revolutionary change in the political and economic system of the Republic by unconstitutional or violent means". 4

What reinforces African perceptions of their position, and its discrepancy from what they aspire to, is the added dimension of international backing. The international community and the west perceived Portugal as the villain of the peace. This added to the justification of the guerilla cause as the last resort which oppressed Africans could use. The issue of ideology is only of academic significance. Africans in South Africa have no political power save derived power which is limited and exists only within the framework of government-created institutions. They yearn for self-determination and self-assertiveness and definitely not for the self-determination as defined by Pretoria, Press and government. Assertions that Communists are ruling both Mozambique and Angola mean nothing to them. According to elite responses, it was the Africans that rule both states and it was also Africans who were responsible to the masses for whatever action they took. To them, these were bare facts.

From these utterances one would contend that the effects of power deprivation lead to an appreciation of power irrespective of its source and merits. As far as many Africans are concerned, Black rule means democracy because to them South African White rule is undemocratic. They compare their "oppressed" state with the apparent freedom in Mozambique and Angola and wish they could be in the same shoes too. Whatever negative expositions are made regarding these two states, are merely interpreted as propaganda by the White regime in an attempt to perpetuate and justify its own power by negatively portraying African rule elsewhere. The results have been negative in so far as South Africa is concerned, for even homeland leaders like Chiefs Buthelezi and Phatudi, who are acceptable to the government, speak highly of Machel and the M.P.L.A. in Angola.

5) Many respondents defined their present state in South Africa as an experience of oppression. This is confirmed by the frequent description of the Black Society in South Africa as an oppressed society c/f S.A.S.0. B P C Inkatha Constitution.
While detente raised expectations among the local African population and, especially, Prime Minister Vorster's "give South Africa a six month's chance by not making our road harder" speech, developments in South West Africa/Namibia took another dimension. This long disputed territory formed the North-Western border in the cordon sanitaire and, above everything else, conditions there were very similar to conditions in the Republic. While ethnic homelands were in the making, a significant guerilla movement, the South West African Peoples' Organisation (SWAPO), opposed the "fragmentation" of the territory on ethnic lines. However, developments in Mozambique and Angola altered what was referred to earlier in this chapter as the geo political status quo in Southern Africa. South Africa accepted the international character of the territory, and Prime Minister Vorster declared: "This Government and governments before it have never shied away from the fact that South West Africa possessed an international character". The sequel to these developments is that South Africa played a sponsoring role regarding the setting up of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance and the present administrative machinery in South West Africa/Namibia. What raised African expectations in the Republic was not that South Africa sponsored what was apparently change in the much disputed territory, but rather that the last bastion of White rule in Africa was beginning to show cracks. With the fall of Mozambique and Angola, South West Africa/Namibia showing developments towards Black Rule, questions were repeatedly asked "Who's next?"


7) Ibid. p.9.
However, South Africa's sponsoring role in South West Africa/Namibia left much to be desired among African exponents of revision in the status quo. Respondents stated that, firstly, South Africa did not relinquish authority over the territory - rather she apparently moved away from the ethnic and homeland idea regarding the territorial administrative arrangement by sponsoring a single constitutional body. Secondly, negotiations for the territory's future still centred around ethnic lines, as representatives were chosen among the de facto ethnic officials or leaders, and Turnhalle was the outcome of such circumstances.

Responses concerning new developments in S.W.A./Namibia therefore demonstrated estrangement among Urban African elites from the territory's new status. Of those who actively followed developments, 65% perceived them in negative terms, while a number of respondents expressed that they had followed them with interest until they were convinced that they were non-issues, since all that South Africa was interested in was not change but setting up a puppet regime in the territory in order to provide a buffer to African Influence from the North. Where the cordon sanitaire was cracking, South Africa was interested in at least setting up a regime which would be sympathetic to her interests; and her interests were Separate Development which carried with it consequent humiliations for the Black man. The exclusion of SWAPO from the conference dampened African interest even further. A minority of respondents (18%) thought the settlement had some hopes for peace, particularly because the United Nations had played a role. Distrust with regard to South Africa's ability to initiate genuine change was demonstrated by respondents' perception of the settlement as a delaying tactic devised to give South Africa some time for manoeuvre. Only 3% of respondents saw any negative move in the territory - the "Communist influence" as they called it.
Both South West Africa/Namibia and the two ex-Portuguese colonies, Mozambique and Angola, provide similar situations with regard to the position of Africans in the Republic. Both situations represent opportunities for eventual African self determination in so far as the apparent substitution of White rule by Black rule is concerned. Differences only exist with regard to two aspects:

I. Mozambique and Angola represent change brought about firstly by confrontation and later by violence and organised resistance. Although the first factor is present in S.W.A./Namibia, the second is not of the same magnitude. Turnhalle represents a mode of change resulting from regulated political activity. Secondly, in S.W.A./Namibia, the erstwhile colonial power exercises an influential role, while in the case of Mozambique and Angola the colonial power capitulated leaving the field open to Africans to resolve the conflict on their own.

II. That respondents in this sample have expressed more interest in Mozambique and Angola than in South West Africa/Namibia is, perhaps, due to the fact that there was much enthusiasm in the international community on the independence of both Mozambique and Angola, while the South African influence in S.W.A./Namibia generated suspicion. This is evidenced by the role of the Western Big Five and Frontline States in their attempts to influence an equitable solution.
Elites in this sample are exposed to the liberal press and demonstrated a selective readership bias, which not only exposes them to a press which expresses liberal sentiments, but also to a readership bias which they consciously pursued. The most popular papers were the English dailies, and turned to be those dailies known for their liberal stance - "The Daily News" (74%) and "The Rand Daily Mail" (61%), while popular weeklies were "The Sunday Times" (45%), "Sunday Post" (23%), and "The Sunday Tribune" (39%). There was not much interest in "Ilanga" in spite of its circulation as a Natal Zulu newspaper (39%). The "Sunday Post" in particular, expresses a pro-Black consciousness stance and is vociferous against discrimination, its journalists belong to the Writers Association of South Africa, while those of "Ilanga" do not. The editor of "Sunday Post", Percy Qoboza, has once been detained, a mark of respectability in African political circles. This readership bias immediately encourages comparisons to be made from a particular dimension.

While South African officials often declare that Africans in the Republic enjoy a higher standard of living than Africans elsewhere in Africa, thereby implying that they have no grounds for complaints, Africans themselves view such comparisons from a different perspective. They do not compare their material lot with that of Africans elsewhere in Africa - after all, regional developments and the availability of resources are not comparable. They do, however, compare their political and legal status to that of Africans in Africa - these are perceived as universally basic and independent of natural and technological resources. They also compare their lot with that of fellow White South Africans and feel that, while they are South Africans, they are deprived and discriminated against. They compare their position with the affluence, freedom and political power of White South Africans and immediately experience feelings of relative
deprivation. They compare their political and legal status with that of Africans in Black Africa and feel they are legally and politically constrained. As Leo Kuper states "Developments in Africa heighten African feelings of deprivation within South Africa, and African hopes and aspirations for the future". Hence, African elites experienced a sense of relative deprivation. They are consciously aware of the discrepancies between their expectations based on local, regional and international standards and the realities of the South African experience. Their deprivation was reinforced by the local liberal press, international opinion, and by utterances and writings from past African leadership; a leadership that has become highly symbolic to African political aspirations. The present leadership, both homeland leaders and leaders of the Black Consciousness movements, is agreed on the basic fact that Africans in the Republic are not getting a fair deal. Africans thus experience a sense of being wrongfully deprived of a right they justifiably have - and yet are denied, while their brothers elsewhere are not.

But have developments in Mozambique and Angola, subsequent to Independence, been of any encouragement to African elites in South Africa? The answer to this comes from one respondent who analysed the situation and concluded: "Mozambique and Angola may not be completely free but the tyranny there is Black, and Blacks have nowhere else to go. They are responsible to the people and eventually will pay the price". The rationale here is that a Black tyranny is answerable to the people for its activities and is thus likely to act with restraint in the knowledge that the people have power to remove them from office - no matter how remote that power may be. On the contrary, a White oligarchy like the South African one acts in the knowledge that it does not need a mandate from Africans and can thus afford to heed neither pleas nor threats from a group on whose authority they do not rely and are therefore not answerable to. On the basis of the South African

experience, Black rule was equated with democracy while White rule, to Africans, meant only oppression.

In conclusion, African elites in the sample demonstrated sympathetic attitudes to Angola and Mozambique while expressing disapproval of the South African role in S.W.A./Namibia. Developments in the three regions and the South African response in particular, raised expectations among the local African population. However, in spite of intense feelings of relative deprivation, most respondents perceived developments in the three regions as signs for hope. If South Africa is surrounded by a host of non-racial and free nations, she cannot pursue racialism for ever on her own. Almost 100% of respondents were positive that eventually South Africa will be a Black-ruled state - although a majority preferred non-racialism as the ideal. This was not an evaluative comment but a perception of the "history of all colonised people" as they put it. The reaction to colonialism, and in their case to domestic colonialism, tended to be an exclusive nationalism and an assertiveness that perceived any role by the alleged former colonisers as a perpetuation of the dominance stance. South African Whites were perceived as oppressors, whether any partnership with them is conceivable, the following chapters will demonstrate.
CHAPTER 9

REACTIONS OF THE URBAN AFRICAN ELITES TO FRUSTRATIONS

Historically, the obvious reaction by Blacks to their exclusion from a common South African society has been the formation of Black organisations which have championed the cause of inclusion into the broader society. In the past such organisations have emulated norms conducive to acceptance by Whites into a White dominated society. Even up to the present, organisations have been formed in order to pressurise White authority into accepting Blacks as equals in the carving of South Africa's destiny.

Distinctions among present organisations exist more in strategies than in their apparent commitment to an end result which all maintain is a non-racial South Africa. Homeland based organisations have been formed to mobilise support for homeland governments and administrations, while some organisations have been formed to mount opposition against the government, to the homeland concept. Pro-homeland organisations have either been ethnically based or operated on a predominantly ethnic base and ticket.

In an analysis of Black Consciousness as a political theory, the late Dr. Richard Turner stipulated the compatibility among components of a theory, the social description, set of values, policy, strategy and techniques as prerequisites for the acceptance of a theory for analytical and conceptual purposes. Only when these were compatible would any movement or organisation qualify

for a theoretical analysis and acceptance, since organisations, like systems, have interrelated parts which should act in harmony with one another. In the context of elite reactions to frustration in the form of organisational mobilisation or support, how do they define the socio-psychological dimensions of their membership? Who composes the in-group and who are the reference or comparable groups? Secondly, is the projected future as enunciated in organisational philosophy and utterances compatible with the social definitions? And, are the means to the attainment of the end in line with both the social definition and the projected future state?

In an earlier chapter, it was stated that elites demonstrated a commitment to non-racialism as the ideal. An examination of the means to this ideal is essential to assess, not only its attainability, but its durability as well. There should be sufficient psychological dimensions to sustain a non-racial society in a country riddled with historical racial prejudice and episodes, if such a society is to exist at all.

DEFINITIONS OF BLACKS

Respondents demonstrated views ranging from what could be called the Africanist view to those of the Black Consciousness exponents in their definition of "Blacks"; 49% of respondents defined Blackness in terms of shared experiences of oppression and discrimination, - a Black Consciousness definition, - while 35% defined Blackness in terms of indigenous claims to South African soil - an Africanist view. The latter's argument was that Indians and Coloureds were given preferential treatment by officialdom, while Africans as the country's aborigines, were the most oppressed. Some went as far as to state that Indians could own property in towns while Africans were barred from any form of tenure. However, this view had slightly a minority support (10%). The former who defined Blackness in an all embracing concept regarded oppression as the commonest bond to Black identification. Although they were aware of
the varying degrees of subjection to discriminatory practices, they perceived this as a ploy of official policy to further entrench White privileges through the tactics of divide and rule. Coloureds and Indians might escape some discriminatory practices applicable to Africans only, such as the influx Laws and restrictions to property ownership, but they were not responsible for the enactment of such legislation. In actual fact, respondents argued, Coloureds and Indians were being made tools of selective discrimination in order to create divisions among the oppressed classes. But such pretentions had failed to work as it had become apparent in the resolutions by the Coloured and Indian populations to reject Mr. Vorster's Tripartite Cabinet schemes which respondents claimed, were meant to further subtly apply discrimination and masked 'baaskap'.

The pro-Black Consciousness definition demonstrates more attributes of compatibility with a non-racial society, since denial of common fellowship to Coloureds and Indians would negate the concept from the very beginning.

However, an examination of the Africanist view is also essential, not only in terms of incompatibility with professed ideals, but in terms of possible future political arrangements. In the light of the theoretical framework, South Africa is either accepted as a plural society if the policy of Separate Development is acceptable, or a single non-racial society if the theory of Black Consciousness prevails. However, these polarisations do not negate intermediate arrangements - modifications of either theory could yield federations, confederations or some forms of regional arrangements. One could ask with regard to Black Consciousness for instance, if the exclusion of Whites is not contrary to non-racialism. Nevertheless, Black Consciousness exponents accept from the beginning, that the concept is an intermediate stage, a strategy to equal bargaining power. There is nothing barring acceptance of the Africanist view from the same premise, albeit implicit. However, the point of political arrangements will be discussed at a later stage.
When it came to the perceptions of bonds or cleavages among the various Black (formerly non-White) people, respondents again demonstrated equally balancing views with 31% perceiving bonds while 36% perceived cleavages. An explanation for both views could be placed at day to day experiences rather than to ideological differences. Among those who saw more bonds than cleavages was the assertion that socially there were no barriers among Blacks and legally there was no legislation barring social mixing among Africans, Coloureds and Indians. Even the Immorality Act did not apply to Black people as the three groups are known. It was asserted also that groups which are politically aware had closed ranks in an attempt to promote Black solidarity - and all three groups had no say in the running of the country. Respondents cited names of political leaders such as Kathrada and Strini Moodley* as marks in the freedom struggle, while movements such as S.A.S.O. and B.P.C. were mentioned as examples of the existence of bonds.

On the other hand, of those who thought of cleavages, 36%, attributed them more to the South African system than to the groups themselves. Whites were blamed for the cleavages for playing one group against another, (20%). The fact that some could own property while others could not was a legislative measure in which Indians and Coloureds were recipients, that Africans can reside in the Orange Free State and Indians cannot, is an act in which Africans had no say in the carving. Only 8% expressed cleavages in factors for which Indians and Coloureds could be held to blame at all. Among these were the assertions that Indians adopted a sitting on the fence attitude, but again this is understandable in terms of their minority status - and that Indians and Coloureds had voluntarily joined the South African Army and Navy. No mention of language and cultural differences were made, a factor which strongly negates the plural concept as officially assumed.

* Both Kathrada and Moodley are serving sentences in Robben Island for alleged political offences.
ACCEPTANCE OF SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT STRUCTURES

In the theoretical framework, a contention was made that participation in Separate Development structures implied acceptance of the Separate Development theory, if not as a panacea for South African problems, at least as a working solution which might eventually operate as a permanent modus vivendi. Another contention made was that alienative compliance, in spite of its theoretical and academic significance, did not matter as long as it was officially interpreted to mean acceptance - as is apparently the case. Philip Mayer contended that for Separate Development to work, regional loyalty and identification with homeland governmental structures were sine qua non to the policy's success. Transkei and Bophuthatswana were two "independent" states at the time this questionnaire was administered. When questioned about the feelings of fellow Africans at the independence of both states, an overwhelming majority of respondents expressed complete rejection of the independence concept, (94%). One might argue that international rejection of both states augured for the demonstrated negativism to Separate Development. But, there was more to it than that. Of the 94% that opposed independence, 48% opposed the concept on the grounds that the two regions lacked both political and economic viability and continued to depend upon South Africa. They were thus perceived as playing a satellite role which only deceived Africans that they were free when they were not self-sufficient; 16% opposed independence on the grounds that it deprived Africans of their South African birthright. This concept immediately cut across any sentiments of regional or ethnic loyalty for it demonstrated that Africans felt or entertained a broader South Africanism than regional attachments. Another sizeable number, 19%, saw acceptance of independence as 'selling out' on the African cause. The latter two were a politically significant interpretation as respondents felt Africans had a cause to strive for, and that cause was a single united South Africa. This view was supplemented by 16% of respondents who opposed fragmentation of the country on ethnic lines in principle and interpreted such moves in the light of exercising the ancient 'divide et impera' policy in an attempt to weaken any opposition.
The realistic experience and appreciation of international recognition were noticeable when 16% of respondents rejected Independence on the grounds that both states were not internationally recognised. These views are reinforced by the fact that voting statistics among Urban Tswanas demonstrated a significant percentage drop (75%) compared with the votes obtained in 1977. This is a significant drop when consideration is made of the fact that the latter election involved the question of Bophuthatswana's independence. Only a mere 3% rejected both Bophuthatswana and Transkei independence on the issue of insufficient and unconsolidated land. This was, indeed, a serious observation, since thoughts have been entertained that consolidation and enlargement of homeland areas might render the Independence proposition acceptable. One percent of respondents accepted independence on grounds that it fulfilled African aspirations.

The perceived future of homelands offered yet another point of view with regard to South Africa's perceived future political dispensation. An overwhelming majority 71% saw homelands as non-viable and, therefore incapable of lasting for long; 43% considered them as doomed to failure because they were inherently incapable of bringing about any changes, while 39% felt they would be obliterated or legislated out of existence in the creation of a single South Africa. Both views perceived homelands as being the creation of man, and, therefore, artifacts which man could alter or destroy. This view negated the naturalness of the plural society, as homelands were created to accommodate Africans in areas where they would best fit and thrive. Official government policy speaks of historical geographical places of origin - and if this were so, they would be perceived in affective terms. A negative perception of homelands brought to the surface the absence of Mayer's second property, that of regional attachments and loyalty. Only 14% thought that homelands could act as regional administrative entities within a united South Africa. Again, while this view accepted appreciation of administrative structures, it rejected the concept of independence, and reinforced the rejection of any moves at fragmenting the country on ethnic lines.
One view which portrayed homelands in a very negative light considered them capable of aligning themselves with oppressors and fighting the forces of liberation (5% of respondents). Another 2% saw them as possible Trojan Horses in government policy – another view which accepted some merit in operating within the prescribed government's framework. As mentioned earlier, suspicions among Africans themselves have developed to a point where the question of strategy was considered so significant that proclaiming the same goals was considered as being of secondary importance, if of any consequence at all. Official responses to Black organisations have, of course, aggravated such suspicions and in essence, although most organisations and personalities proclaim the same goal, the means to such ends render such proclamations questionable.

The next aspect to examine was that of participation or non-participation in Separate Development structures. Serious debates have in the past arisen and still prevail on the question of voluntary and compulsory submission to Apartheid. Often participants within the Separate Development structures, i.e. homeland leaders and township councillors have argued for their participation in such structures on the grounds that all Blacks, as victims of discrimination, subscribe to participation in Separate Development. The argument has been that all Blacks reside in townships, and attend schools and universities set aside for them, and subscribe to the permit system to enter separately designated areas. "Anti-system collaboration" (Blacks in the Black Consciousness Movements refer to this country's administration as "The System") exponents have argued that to be alive at all, Blacks have to live somewhere, to be educated at all they have to go to certain schools and universities, and that if they have to share any fellowship with other Blacks they have to obtain permits to meet somewhere. The assertion is that they do this "under protest" and only because there is no alternative short of self destruction. But, on the contrary, there are no compulsory moves to either a homeland position or a township councillorship. The argument that intelligent people have to serve in these institutions to give them direction seems illogical once that service only enhances the same institutions in the eyes of the oppressors and gives them credibility among the masses who cannot properly discriminate between derived and actual power.
That there are no alternatives seem to be another unacceptable assertion since many practical alternatives exist. After all, they ask, what community service can one offer or render within a straight-jacketed system whose very design is oppression however masked? There is, therefore, ample discrimination between compulsory and voluntary submission to Apartheid and the two cannot be confused. One opts to serve in voluntary Apartheid institutions for whatever reason and one is compelled to live in and attend some Apartheid institutions without any choice. This forms the gist of their argument.

On the question of participation in Separate Development institutions, respondents seemed to draw distinctions between community-oriented institutions and regionally oriented ones. There was a clear distinction between township council elections and homeland elections, such that a sizeable percentage of respondents voted in township elections but did not vote in homeland elections. Almost half the respondents 39%, voted or participated in township elections, while only 19% voted or participated in homeland elections and politics. Reasons for voting or participating in township elections were that 16% did so in order to help in the daily lives of their people. They considered some form of local organisation and administration necessary for the running of the community. The reason might also be that respondents differentiated between issues and non-issues. Local government, irrespective of race, is derivative and whatever powers it has, it exercises at the mercy of the central government. It thus becomes a non-issue compared to regional or homeland issues which involve a principle. Voting in township elections was, therefore, not so much of an issue with regard to attitudes towards national politics which, in a regional or ethnic sense, homeland politics seemed to engender. However, a majority of respondents, 61%, rejected any participation in township elections on principle. It was regarded as a futile exercise, and 9% had no faith in the candidates who stood for elections, but were unwilling to stand themselves, apparently out of non-commitment. Of the 39% who voted, 9% felt coerced by environmental factors to vote, either out of fear of losing benefits and privileges in their localities or because they feared that non-participation might cluster them together with those whom the State regards as extremists and opponents of official policy.
The question of participation or voting in homeland politics raised more contentious and illuminating issues. An overwhelming majority (80%) almost three quarters of respondents, did not take part in homeland politics; 16% did not take part because they were opposed to the homeland principle and felt that one could not change the system from within. It was, therefore, a useless, futile exercise designed to fail from its inception. It could only benefit one person - the Afrikaner nationalist as its originator, while 31% felt that the homeland concept had inherent designed weaknesses, one of them being that it was meant to serve official government's ends and thus enabled chiefs and government nominees and supporters to predominate, or it discouraged parties and oppositions. One could only vote, therefore, for candidates who supported or subscribed to the official views, since no proper opposition could thrive within the homeland system. Some respondents (20%) felt they could never support a system which sidelined them to dry and arid areas of the Republic when their forefathers had shed blood to maintain a country that was rightfully theirs. One respondent declared, "My forefathers shed their blood and sweat for this country - they toiled to help make it what it is. I, as their successor, cannot accept to be relegated to an arid barren area known as a homeland". The message is clear.

Of the 20% who participated in homeland politics, a third had since changed their minds as the Kwa Zulu experience, in particular, had shown them that emphasis was on non-issues, and was a waste of the tax payers' money to the pleasure of Pretoria. They cited the number of days spent on meaningless internal feuds and condemnation of certain groups and personalities, issues which did not affect the people except that they concerned certain personalities. In their opinion, these were personal and not national issues. Only 3% felt homeland politics gave Africans any power, while the same percentage, felt theirs was a gesture of identification with the masses, since the masses participated, they felt they also had to.
Mayor's second point of attachment to, or identification with, governmental structures in the homelands appears lacking among the urban elites. And if this is so, as respondents demonstrated in this survey, then the acceptance of ethnic differences among Africans is also lacking. Hence the theory of dominance, especially that aspect of it, in the South African context, which stresses not only differences between the ruler and the ruled, but even differences among the ruled themselves, is refuted in this work. The success of the programme of Separate Development is thus in question. Either more attractions will have to be added or the uneasy calm will prevail until some other incident triggers another Sharpeville or Soweto.

On the question of the merits of either participation or non-participation in Separate Development structures, this author infers that there are two fundamental points of view which hold. The first one is that South African authorities can change from both voluntary motives and perceived pressures. The second is that South African authorities can not change on their own but will have to be compelled to change by whatever means. Earlier responses from the elites in this sample indicated that South African authorities in particular, and South African Whites in general, were incapable of changing politically on their own, and that they would have to be pressurised to change. Also, respondents revealed their perceived conceptions that Whites, including the liberal establishment, were bent on directing both the tempo and direction of change. Homelands were perceived by respondents as a White manoeuvre, a ploy to deceive Africans by proclaiming their independence, while at the same time perpetuating their dependency in all spheres of life. At worst, they were perceived as migrant labour reservoirs with homeland administrations as agents of recruitment and, therefore, perpetuators of the dependency syndrome.
From this analysis, it would appear that respondents viewed strategies advocated by homeland leaders, of whatever mettle, to be compatible with both the tempo and direction of change, as advocated and perceived by White power on which all of them thrived or were permitted and seen to thrive. And, secondly, such strategies could, therefore, not bring ends incompatible with goals desired by White officialdom. If there were any differences at all between the ends desired and advocated by homeland leaders, and the goals desired and advocated by White officialdom, it could only be in the timing. This was the fundamental difference between "system supporters" and anti-system exponents. Respondents' view was that if South Africa was to change, and authority was incapable of changing, then it would have to be pressurised to change. Such pressures could only come from the Africans themselves, and they did not need to be violent as many seem to fear. Therefore, operating from within and from without the prescribed framework should not be confused with advocating non-violence and violence respectively, as it was so often assumed and stated. This point will be discussed in the chapter of strategies later on.

CONFRONTATION OR NEGOTIATION

For purposes of this presentation, confrontation is not understood to mean only armed conflict, violence or the use of physical force against any persons or property. Confrontation as understood here refers to those actions which arise as a result of mass anger; the actions may be planned or spontaneous, but they are actions on which authority may frown as a challenge to its authoritative allocation of values; or to its recognition as the sole decider of rights and wrongs. Actions like demonstrations against authority, sit-in strikes and the use of actual physical force will fall into this definition.
The question here, to use Robert Gurr's paradigm, is:

Is socio-economic and socio-political deprivation among Africans so intense that the potential for political violence has been enhanced, or is there still much room left for negotiation? It is accepted that the potential for political violence also varies with the actual and perceived power of the state which can act as a deterrent. This leaves room for simmering anger which can explode at any time, to use Colin Legum's reference. Respondents averred that any demonstration, actual or apparent, to challenge the state's authority, be it in the educational or industrial context, was always accompanied by a concentration of armed police or even military force to demonstrate the state's might. (Following the sit-in at Fort Hare University in June, 1979, soldiers were seen in the campus patrolling the premises - and each was armed). Against this background, how do urban Africans perceive confrontation, and what is their assessment of its chances for success? Again, these questions can only evoke academic answers since emotional outbreaks heed no rationale, although it is nevertheless frequently assumed that such outbreaks emanate from some form of a rational assessment of the situation.

Two well-published and well-known incidents were used to demonstrate an appreciation of the confrontation course, the Soweto riots of 1976 and the Durban strikes of 1973. Also, both incidents were a pattern of periodic confrontation arising out of the frustration of Africans in South Africa. They were, therefore, not isolated historical episodes. What was also significant about them, was that they both evoked official reaction which gave rise to some form of official accommodation of African sentiments; and an acceptance of the South African White public that Africans were getting a raw deal. Both events received international coverage and attracted attention to the South African situation, both were bad publicity for South African authority. A measure of reforms followed both the township riots of 1976 and the Durban strikes of 1973. Consciences were aroused and South Africans realised that Black men had frustrated aspirations that had to be met somehow. Whether enough was done in meeting them becomes an issue which only those who suffer the pinch can ascertain and express.
With regard to the township riots in 1976:

(1) a majority of respondents, (49%), perceived them as an outcome of Black political anger and awakening due to the unbearable frustrations which Africans in particular, and Blacks in general, had borne for too long;

(ii) 19% saw in them another demonstration of official brutality and high-handedness expressed in police readiness to shoot at innocent children who had a genuine cause in demonstrating against an educational system that had enslaved Africans for two decades;

(iii) not a single respondent condemned the riots on any moral or ethnical grounds - a significant feature which legitimises confrontation as a response to frustration;

(iv) Only 10% saw the riots as self inflicted pains, but even this group did not condemn them - they condemned authority as responsible for the outbreak, but regretted that the course which the riots took inflicted more harm on Africans than it did on officialdom. To back their assertions, they mentioned the loss of lives and the destruction of school buildings, which they perceived as detrimental to African education. However this was a minority view.
A sizeable percentage (23%) thought the township riots had brought about positive achievements, notable among these was the realisation by Whites after decades of petitions, that the African lot needed improvement. The Urban Foundation was mentioned as a response to Soweto, when White business interests came to realise that the survival of the capitalist ethic needed Black support. Respondents mentioned that even the language of government officials changed to a conciliatory stance and emphasis changed to consultation with Africans. The international publicity and the ensuing international condemnation of South Africa which the riots evoked, was also seen as a positive gain in the course of the African struggle for freedom. And, above all, Soweto legitimated the claim to recognition by the youth - a claim which shattered tradition and made adults realise for the first time that their children could perceive subtleties which custom had made them oblivious of. Many respondents (36%), regarded this as a great sign of political awakening which no doubt could accelerate the pace to freedom.

Another pointer to the perceived legitimacy of confrontation was demonstrated in the perception and interpretation of the Durban strikes of 1973. Up till then the Law laid down that it was illegal for African workers to strike. Besides the Law, the migrant labour system acted as another deterrent. Contract African workers can not change employers at will as this involves their being re-requisitioned from their homeland areas, a requisition which can only be granted by the host centre - and only on the proviso that there are no African workseekers from the townships to take up the positions. A striking worker thus not only faces the consequences of losing his job, but may lose the right to be in the metropolitan area as well. But in spite of these deterrents, 61,410 African workers in Durban went on strike over the low wages and poor conditions of service in 1973.* Questioned about their feelings on the strikes, 53% of respondents

perceived them as a manifestation of economic frustrations and discriminatory practices in employment; 34% saw in them a demonstration of the effectiveness of collective effort and, in fact, the workers' might. In them, they saw for the first time, a manifestation and demonstration of Black worker solidarity, determination and an awakening." Some respondents expressed the strikes as 'an awakening of the African economic giant who had been asleep till then'. Not only were the strikes perceived as having demonstrated Black worker solidarity and muscle power, they were also perceived as having brought industrialists and employers to the realisation that they needed to put their industrial and commercial houses in order (18%).

Among the perceived gains in the strikes were the fact that they focussed international attention on the South African labour scene, and from this focus came international concern over the plight of African workers in South Africa. Respondents were clearly aware of the consequential codes of conduct by international companies as a result of pressures from their parent bodies abroad. To name a few; the European Economic Community Code, and the Sullivan Code (both foreign), and the Sacola Code drawn up by South African Companies were cited as the outcome of the Durban Strikes of 1973. The second perceived gain was that of improved financial rewards. Salaries and wages were improved, more jobs were open to Africans, especially jobs in the personnel field where most companies went for African industrial relations personnel in an attempt to forestall and quell troubles before they erupted (28%); 18% saw them as having brought about a change in attitude from both employers and the government.
views of the first, declared, "Soweto was an outcome of the Durban strikes, they paved the way for the realisation of African solidarity which later developed to Black solidarity when the Western Cape and a few other areas followed suit". From this, this author concludes that these observations give both events the legitimacy to be perceived as the tools which can be used to force change from an authority which is regarded as incapable of taking the initiative in this direction.

In conclusion to this section on experiences, frustrations and reactions, the pattern was that perceptions of the South African situation by respondents is diametrically opposed to the view officially held by the South African authorities. While all official political formulae are based on the concept that South Africa is a plural society, respondents based their perceptions on the concept that the plural society explanation was a survivalist device which Whites have exploited in order to maintain their privileged position. In actual fact, Africans did not deny the concept of ethnic and language differences. What they denied was that these concepts were so significant that political formulae had to be based on them. They also denied the fact that these concepts were pronounced only among Africans and other fellow Blacks and not among the Whites. If the divergent White tribes were politically homogeneous then surely the same principle applied to Blacks - or even further to all South Africans, hence the commitment to non-racialism.

Earlier when detailing experiences by the elites, of the South African situation, mention was made of their alienation from the system. This factor strongly correlated with elite suspicion and, therefore, rejection of officially sponsored formulae. Hence homelands and township councils were rejected both in principle and
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Earlier when detailing experiences by the elites, of the South African situation, mention was made of their alienation from the system. This factor strongly correlated with elite suspicion and, therefore, rejection of officially sponsored formulae. Hence homelands and township councils were rejected both in principle and
because of practical implications experienced in reality. It was significant to note that during the township riots, the first targets, beside the schools, were official administrative offices and property belonging to the township administration as well as to pro-government sympathisers; beerhalls, bottle stores and houses belonging to "political" pro-government officials. This is significant in explaining not only experiences of externality to the system, but also the polarisation of views between officials and Africans as represented in the riot spirit. Another factor involves the predominant attitude against participation in Separate Development institutions, where there was a strong correlation between non-participation in the institutions and the rejection of officially-sponsored formulae. Again, this became even more significant when considering earlier assertions that Whites were bent on maintaining their privileged position and could, therefore, not change on their own. Whatever institutions they invented were, therefore, meant to perpetuate oppression. They were thus rejected on the merits that they further en enslaved the African by "trying to make White dominance acceptable to Africans" as one respondent explained.

The question of attractions to and, therefore, the legitimacy of the confrontation strategy deserves a closer examination. Negotiation loses attraction because generally the government, and for that matter employers, are seen to prefer negotiating with their nominees. However, such nominees are regarded to a certain extent to be sympathetic to the employers' or government's points of view. In confrontation, it is the people's spokesmen who direct and operate the course of events, and hence the masses feel that they and not the government or employers, have taken the initiative. This legitimises the outcome, however inadequate, especially if it has traces of meeting their aspirations. Confrontation thus gains a logical legitimacy and this survey revealed a strong correlation between confrontation and externality to the system. Mostly, those members
1. SOCIO-POLITICAL AWARENESS

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the aspects of life with which Africans were most dissatisfied,
almost all respondents expressed dissatisfaction in politically
oriented terms. Economically or legislatively-based frustrations
were coupled with the implication that their sources were
political, and a substantial number (39\%), of respondents directly
mentioned the lack of political participation by Africans as the
source of general discontent: 45\% of respondents mentioned political,
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respondent mentioned a non-politically connected factor as a source
of frustration. It would seem to be clear from the above account
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A second factor which reinforces this assertion was the preference for individuals and organisations which respondents felt represented both Africans and an African point of view. Among the leaders which respondents preferred (from no given names or organisations) the African National Congress leadership was regarded by 65% as the authentic representatives of the African people, with 28% mentioning Nelson Mandela and Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, respectively, by name; 24% of the respondents mentioned the exiled, the banned and the imprisoned, while 19% mentioned leadership of the Black Consciousness Organisation and 5% the P.A.C. leadership. (There was, however, a tendency to regard the A.N.C. and P.A.C. as one organisation). Ten percent of respondents felt there were no leaders while 4 percent mentioned leaders in the homeland system, other than Chief Buthelezi. With regard to Black Organisations, the tally was as follows:

- **ANC and PAC**: 70%
- **SASO P.B.C.**: 33%
- **INKATHA**: 16%
- **PFP and SIRR**: 4%

Reasons for the preference of leaders and organisations reflected a bias towards certain stances and strategies - as well as preference for certain basic theories. The philosophies and stances of the ANC, PAC and Black Consciousness have been outlined in the theoretical framework. It is sufficient to say here that their goal is non-racialism. The ANC strategy was definitely racial co-operation although the movement was African in membership. The Freedom Charter of 1956 was a product of racial co-operation between the ANC, the South African Congress of Trade Unions, The Natal Indian Congress, the Congress of Democrats and the African Peoples Organisation. Although the PAC espoused an Africanist cause, this was formulated only as a strategy with non-racialism as the goal. Black Consciousness adherents advocate Black exclusiveness but only as a temporary measure, which they regard as a preparatory phase to a merger of the races into a non-racial society as equals.

* South African Institute of Race Relations.
This leaves Inkatha as the only unexplained organisation. Inkatha's goal is non-racialism in South Africa although the concept of non-racialism might be interchangeable with multi-racialism. (For instance, Inkatha does not repudiate a federal solution to South Africa - a concept which implies acceptance of multi-racialism or even multi-nationalism). Its strategy is to operate within the prescribed framework in order to attain its ideals, hence Kwa Zulu is used as a base. Even Kwa Zulu elections were campaigned for on an Inkatha ticket. What distinguishes Inkatha from other homeland-based organisations is its drive to operate even outside the confines of Kwa Zulu and the Zulu ethnic group - hence the formation of the South African Black Alliance, the participants being Inkatha, the Coloured Labour Party, the Indian Reform Party, Basutho Owaqwa, the Ciskeian opposition (there are doubts regarding the participation of Lebowa and Gazankulu). Inkatha is against homeland independence and regards the concept as a fragmentation of South Africa and the acceptance of independence as the forfeiture of a birthright. Working within separate development is regarded only as a strategy - a means to obtaining a constituency-based organisation. As against Black Consciousness, Inkatha is not in favour of an economic boycott of South Africa but rather advocates "constructive engagement" by multi-national companies on South African soil. (A concept it has queried on many occasions and declared subject to occasional re-evaluation).

On the surface, the goals of Inkatha do not differ from those of the African National Congress, the Black Consciousness Movements or even from those of the Pan African Congress. However, the latter three organisations were and still are, avowedly anti-participation within the separate development system - a strategy they regard as collaboration with the oppressor, while Inkatha believes in working "within the system".
The above account reflects a highly politicised population and it is on this basis that the author finds Mia Brandel Syrier's allegations of an apolitical Reeftown elite very curious. She asserts, "In fact they never discussed politics, they only discussed legislation." 2) And further "they not only had no very strong political involvement, but as Nadine Gordimer pointed out, also scarcely any political theory." 3) She, however, agrees that there might be a group of intellectuals existing, but not as a coherent group but as a few single individuals "who are aroused to and articulate about the needs and discontents of their society," 4) and associates this group with people committed to change through revolution. She finds African elites politically inarticulate, and only echoing the views of White liberals, but blaming their inarticulateness on repression rather than admitting their ignorance. But, at the same time, she does accept some measure of political awareness among Africans - an awareness which is, however, clouded in the problems of cultural adjustment. "Lack of experience of what they really needed to spend their adaptation, to a mid-twentieth century world, made them see their security only in terms of complete racial equality and even sameness, for only when a measure or system applied equally to Whites and Blacks could they be sure it was not intended primarily to harm Blacks." 5

3) Ibid p. 112
4) Ibid p. 112
5) Ibid p. 112
Brandel Syrier's findings view the Black experience as if it were a homogeneous uniformity and not an experience of individuals, although such individuals are affected as a group. Earlier in the theoretical framework, this author's contention was that Separate Development can only offer limited rewards by virtue of inherent limitations in both homelands and the townships. Because of these limitations, only a segment of the African elites could benefit from the few rewards. The second contention was that the segment of the elites which felt excluded from the rewards would adopt an alienative attitude to a system that they felt excluded them from benefits. Brandel Syrier's sample was predominantly predisposed towards that segment of the elite population which, it was contended, benefits from the few rewards that Separate Development offers. The expanding civil service under separate institutions has not only offered jobs to many Africans, but it hasshielded many from any non-African competition. The same can be said of opportunities for small African businessmen. Mia Brandel Syrier's sample consisted only of nine people who can be truly considered as falling outside the benefits which separate development offers - the three medical practitioners and the six ministers of Religion. If relative deprivation implies a sharper sense of political awareness, then her sample does not enhance that probability. One has to note the class of people involved in the frequent political trials in the country to evaluate the standard of political awareness among Africans. What is even more significant to note is the open support and sympathy from Africans, which the accused enjoy and commend in spite of the obvious danger of falling into black books of the Security Service of the State.
Earlier it was contended by this author that 'discussing politics' was a phrase which many Africans wished to avoid due to the perceived political hazards of involving oneself in politics which fall outside of the prescribed institutions. The presence of organisations such as the Black Consciousness organisations and Inkatha as politicising and mobilising forces, augurs for a presence of political awareness, shared consciousness and even a political theory as Black Consciousness was purported to be.\(^6\)

Brandel Syrier's own sample referred to the hazards of discussing politics and the worthlessness of present politicians, apparently referring to the officially approved politicians who operate within the system of Separate Development; or to demagogues who, because of the restrictive climate, emerged and disappeared almost overnight before they could even fully articulate their views to the public. The options left for one to take appear to be the adoption of an officially-approved stance and risk being termed a "puppet" by the masses; or articulate views admired by the masses and be branded an "agitator" by the powers that be. A compromise stand is often difficult to adopt, and many articulate political observers limit their observations to confidantes.

2. **DESIRED ALTERNATIVES: NON-RACIALISM**

Apart from direct questions posed to elicit respondents' preferences for an alternative to the present status quo - two cases which offered comparable parallels with South Africa were presented to respondents. Rhodesia and Namibia offered two examples of regulated political activity where, by projection, respondents could spell out solutions which would be applicable to the South African situation as well. Another advantage of this form of investigation was that respondents could freely discuss politics in these areas without fearing a discussion of politics within the domestic context. Rhodesia presented a two-dimensional analysis - firstly the international settlement between Ian Smith's government and Bishop Abel Muzorewa's United African National Council, and secondly, a projected solution to the entire problem by the individual who was called upon to imagine himself as a Rhodesian African.

Firstly, the Rhodesian internal settlement was perceived as a fraud in which Ian Smith tried to rule the country through using Bishop Muzorewa as a front. Respondents argued that without the participation of the Patriotic Front, (a party that had made the settlement a possibility), there could be no genuine settlement. The majority view was that a round table conference of all parties involved would be the only means that could yield a lasting solution, (31%). The solution desired advocated a non-racial government as the alternative. Another view which gained substantial support advocated a Black majority government with the Patriotic Front as leaders, while a small group, (8%) thought calling in the United Nations to conduct elections was a logical solution to the problem.
South West Africa/Namibia offered another parallel but this time from a different perspective. The territory was, up to 1978, de facto, and de jure an integral part of South Africa in spite of the United Nations protestations. It was divided on ethnic lines as is the case in South Africa, and six White members of Parliament, all members of the National Party, represented the White electorate in the South African Parliament. In response to external pressure, and also to the pressure exerted by the SWAPO guerillas and internal Black groups, the South African Government decided, in 1978, that they would let the inhabitants of the territory decide their own fate. However, representatives to a round table conference would be based on the then existing structures, which meant ethnic leaders and the leadership of internal pressure groups. SWAPO could come in but only when they stopped their guerilla operations. Later, a Constitutional Conference comprising ethnic representatives and the leadership of internal parties and pressure groups met at the Turnhalle - hence the derived name - the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference. Both the internal and external wings of SWAPO refused to join in the deliberations as long as they were sponsored by the South African Government. The SWAPO Democrats, a breakaway group under Andreas Chipanga took part. The reason for non-participation advanced by SWAPO was that the SWA/Namibian question was an issue between South Africa as the illegal occupants of the territory, and SWAPO as the authentic representative of the Namibian people. Another issue which was raised was the question of Namibians serving jail sentences for committing political offences against South Africa in Namibia. However, in spite of this, Turnhalle went on with its normal business and later developments led to elections which culminated in Dirk Mudge's Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, becoming a majority party in the Constituent Assembly in December 1978. The United Nations refused to recognise the elections. Meanwhile, South Africa announced her intentions to relinquish control over the territory, while at the same time withdrawing the South West Africa representation in the South African Parliament. An administrator to the territory was despatched by the South African Government, which hoped to be creating perceptions of South West Africa/Namibia as an independent territory and dispelling all doubts that the territory was a South African appendage.
On questioning respondents on how they viewed the developments, replies reflected a critical stance against the South African inspired solution. The alternative as perceived by respondents, was a non-racial government, and not a settlement worked on by ethnic representatives sympathetic to the South African cause. The whole process was seen as showmanship meant to appease International condemnation of Apartheid by cosmetic applications while "the basic ugly features of unequal power-sharing, discrimination in employment and an inferior African education remain" as one respondent cited.

Both Rhodesia and South West Africa/Namibia offered situations where Africans could participate in the formulation of policy to govern them albeit on a limited scale. However, both situations elicited a negative response from the urban African elites. Both were seen as not the legitimate solutions in line with the wishes of the masses, but rather as imposed means by the White regimes in an attempt to wrest the initiative from the African people in both territories. The resulting societies would be multi-racial instead of being non-racial, thus, giving the Whites the desired opportunity to dominate under a different guise. Until a truly non-racial society was formed, respondents argued, there could never be a lasting solution to problems created out of the polarisation of the races. The solution is akin to peace treaties which last as long as the power relationship remains as described in the status quo, while any shift in the balance of power, precipitates another war. Respondents argued that there was only one race, the human race. Racial delineations were a creation of man in order to maintain dominance by men over their fellow men. The answer to human political problems lay in the recognition of the worth of the individual, and governments should be based on merit - what many respondents referred to as meritocracy.
A non-racial society is in line with the philosophies of all African political organisations - both in the past - and the present ones. A breakdown of the responses leaves one with a few controversial questions to pose. Firstly, is the professed alternative of non-racialism a crystallisation of African ideology based on ethical, utilitarian and philosophical thinking? Or, secondly, is it a reflection of the Africans' living experiences in what they perceive as a racist society and, therefore, a reaction to racism? And, thirdly, is it only a political stance and strategy or a realistic appraisal of the present situation of African powerlessness, so that a stance which does not antagonise White liberal thinking will elicit White sympathy. The contention by this author is that Africans are in the majority, and even under a non-racial constitution, the probability of Black majority government is high.

An analysis of the response to a question enquiring after what Africans perceived as an ideal society demonstrated the following:

1) 59% of respondents preferred a non-racial society as the ideal, their chosen form of government would be a system based on merit, another pointer to non-racialism;

2) as far as their economic and residential systems' preferences were concerned, they opted for an economic system which upheld the principle of equal pay for equal work, equal employment opportunities and a free enterprise system.
On the residential side, they opted for a system which respected the individual's right to reside in an area of his choice. This pattern is highly reflective of prevailing experiences and a personal situation. A majority of respondents are employed as paid employees by various sectors, and almost all have thrived under a capitalist system, which, although highly restrictive and constraining to Blacks, has however produced an elite segment which is sociologically distinct from the Black masses. They thus find themselves in a marginal situation - a complete rejection of capitalism would be tantamount to a rejection of their position, which in terms of the total population, is relatively limited, but in terms of the township experience - is privileged. Indeed, it is a position of what is called status incongruity vis-a-vis both the total South African position and the African situation. People caught in the web of a marginal situation tend to react in terms of common experiences as Dickie Clarke found with regard to the political apathy of the Sparks Estates Coloureds in Durban.7) The difference in marginality lies in that the urban African elite in Durban can draw from the resources provided by the theories and philosophies of former and present African organisations - the African National Congress and the Black Consciousness Movements who have provided the intellectual legitimation to African political thinking.

However, Africans are also traditionally noted for their tolerance. Stratification existed within African society, but the African communal spirit obliterated social cleavages between the upper and lower classes. There were always the very rich but the very poor were protected and accepted into society rather than thrown out as outcasts. It is not surprising that this sociological tolerance could be translated into political tolerance. One could also point out that in spite of technological superiority and superior military system - it would have been relatively easy for an aggressive indigenous society to wipe out the few first White settlers in South Africa. Shaka, in particular, welcomed the first Englishmen in Zululand in a spirit of human comradeship and he did this from a position of strength. It was only when land and stock disputes arose that hostilities between Black and White developed.

This author contends that one of the factors which influences Africans towards non-racialism is the prevailing international climate. Africans in South Africa are perceived internationally as fighting for a just cause. Apartheid is condemned in the forums of the United Nations and in international circles as an inhuman system which denigrates human beings to sub-human levels. The moral weight against South Africa is a cause for concern even among the ruling classes of the country. For Africans, to advocate any cause other than non-racialism would be a contradiction of the International spirit. One cannot condemn a system and advocate for its substitution by a similar system which is only its reverse. This would even create dissonance among those who purport to fight for human rights, and without an international supportive climate, the cause would be lost. It would appear, therefore, from this discourse, that non-racialism is both an ideal and a reflection of the Africans' existential experience under Apartheid. In his suffering under the philosophy of separation, the African has sought refuge in its opposite - integration. And, he has done this because it is an easier choice to make and also because it can be rationalised in terms of the prevalent international climate. He thus can attain a peaceful state of mind in the knowledge that he is striving for a just goal, and also that he has the world's support in his struggle.
However, the question is not as simple as all that. Mention has been made earlier that the African National Congress which is the first mass and countrywide organisation for Africans, advocated the philosophy of non-racialism. Congress had an added advantage in that the leadership cadre was elitist in outlook and commanded mass allegiance. Whatever Congress legitimated, the masses carried with religious fervour. Up to this day, Nelson Mandela is a household name among Africans of whatever class, and the African National Congress still represents the struggle for African self-determination. Nelson Mandela has been in jail for sixteen years and the African National Congress has been banned for almost twenty years, yet when questioned about the true African leadership, and the organisations which are regarded as truly representing the views of Africans, 28% and 56% respectively, of respondents cited Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress by name. And this is despite the fact that in the questionnaire there was no mention of any person or organisation by name.

The third question i.e. that non-racialism might be a stance, cannot be ruled out completely. Ethnic arithmetic, i.e. relying on ethnic or tribal influences for political backing is a common feature in independent African politics. Secondly, Africans regard themselves as having suffered enough under Apartheid, so that the bitterness created might call for retribution. And how does one attain this from a position of weakness? However, if this view prevails, it could not be elicited from this questionnaire, and realistic appraisals of the situation might compel Africans to realise that if peaceful survival is the goal, equality and not revenge is the desirable means. This author's contention is that both the stance and the revenge idea do not hold in this case.
Recently, "The Rand Daily Mail", a Johannesburg daily, invited comment from readers, establishing the first change they would make if they became Prime Minister of South Africa. This author made a collection of letters over a period of two weeks (there were seventy five in total - January 14 - 26, 1980), and a breakdown of thirteen items reflected in the contents of the letters produced the following results in order of priorities or preferences:

**SUMMARY OF PRIORITIES TO CHANGE IF ONE WERE PRIME MINISTER OF SOUTH AFRICA FOR A DAY:**

1. Equal opportunities for all - equal pay for equal work - 14
2. Abolish the Pass Laws and Influx Control - 11
3. Abolish discriminatory legislation - 10
4. Call for equality in the decision-making process - 9
5. Create equal educational opportunities - abolish Bantu Education - 8
6. Dismantle the entire Apartheid fabric - 7
7. Regard everyone as a human being - 6
8. Abolish the Immorality and Mixed Marriages Act - 3
9. Improve housing for Blacks - 3
10. Allow freedom of expression - 1
11. Release political detainees - 1
12. Allowed mixed facilities for all - 1
13. Equitable distribution of land - 1

The above reflection demonstrates yet another situational response to what is widely considered as an unfair and repressive system based on discriminatory legislation. Relative deprivation is experienced in the working environment which creates a deep-seated dissatisfaction and a perception of inequities in the reward system. Next in line come the hated Pass Laws - another manifestation of inequities in employment, movement, and general social security in the urban environment. Discriminatory legislation and a call for equality in the
decision-making process could be taken as one - they are both manifestations of dissatisfaction directed at the political aspect of life. This is a view which tallies with remarks made earlier on the general aspects of discontent; where respondents singled out the absence of real power in the decision-making process as the cause of African frustrations. This was because any legislation made for Africans is perceived not as representing their interests. Awareness of inequalities in the educational system or rather the inadequacy of Black education is also apparent in the above analysis - another existential experience. Mia Brandel Syrier asserted that any measure which could be interpreted as affecting Africans alone was bound to elicit suspicion for "only when a measure or system applied equally to Whites and Blacks could they be sure it was not intended primarily to harm Blacks". The issue goes much further than this simplistic assertion. Respondents realised that in separation they were not only given what was considered as right and befitting for them, but that which was always inferior as well. They were aware of the fact that educational expenditure per Black child was far below that which was provided for White children on a per capita basis. Their argument was that the system produced less qualified teachers and less educational facilities in Black schools. The outcome was an unpolished product that could not compete equally with others on the market.

Recently, at a group discussion, a school teacher amply illustrated the educational deprivation of a Black child within an education system that is considered suitable for him by the ruling authorities. Besides overcrowded classes and unsuitably qualified teachers, the African child is thrown into a university environment which cannot

rectify mistakes incurred in the earlier schooling days, but which rather exacerbates them. University lecturers, in African universities she claimed, come mostly from Afrikaans-medium universities to teach through the medium of English. Students come from an inadequate educational system and the command of English by both lecturers and students is inadequate. "We therefore end with a lecturer who is a poor communicator trying to lecture to students who are poor recipients, at the end there is no communication. And that, dear brothers and sisters, is meant to be education". The significance of her statements lies in the perception by Africans that their education is meant to stifle their intellectual growth and thereby perpetuate a state of subservience to the dominant White group.

It appears, therefore, from the above breakdown, and from a breakdown of responses from the urban African elite sample cited earlier, that the issue, at present, is not that of retribution or of driving the White man into the sea, or even as many Whites fear, of depriving Whites of all that they have created over the years, but rather a question of fair play. Equality of opportunities is perhaps the right phrase to use. Both samples, the Durban and "The Rand Daily Mail" one, emphasised non-racialism as the ideal. As cited earlier in this chapter, the international community has strongly spoken against any form of racism over years. A sample that is widely read as this one, has demonstrated, is bound to display sensitivity to an opinion on which it is dependent for the furtherance of its cause. The perception of the natural and industrial resources of the country as capable of satisfactorily catering for all, might add another strong contributor to the non-racial spirit of fair play.
A majority of respondents supported a non-racial form of government on the grounds that it recognised and emphasised the principle of merit and equality of people irrespective of race. Respondents also asserted that non-racialism rejected the principle of ethnicity thus avoiding a racial or ethnic confrontation. The choice was thus made on the basis of an appraisal of the ethical and utilitarian worth of the non-racial concept. One might question if this view fails to take note of the history of South Africa as well as of Africa in general, where a truly non-racial society has not been able to thrive under Black Majority Rule. An explanation may be given here. Societies in which White settlers accounted for significant numbers such as in Kenya have thrived in spite of a Black Majority Government and Whites have not been driven into the sea. Actually, a non-racial society is developing in Kenya; and Kenya had only eighty years of White occupation, while South Africa has had over three hundred years.
South Africa has the longest history of White occupation in Africa, over three hundred years. Also, Africans in South Africa are the most educated and sophisticated in Africa. In spite of what they perceive as the setbacks in the quality of Bantu Education, there has been an increase in numbers in both literacy and qualifications. In the economic sphere the Black-White contact has developed from the traditional separationist to an integrated phase, especially from the beginning of the Seventies. Politically, Separate Development has promoted a form of dialogue between Black and White although it is generally argued, by Blacks, even from within Separate Development Institutions, that such dialogue tends to be unilateral. Television has exposed Black figures to the public, a feature one respondent asserted was "tantamount to addressing White political audiences". This contact has bred a spirit of inter-racial tolerance. Practical demands in both the economic and political spheres have emphasised the non-feasibility of dogmatic separationism, and enhanced chances for some form of integration.

Gurr argued that when hopes for an improvement in the lot of groups who consider themselves deprived are raised but not met, rising frustrations ensue, and these increase both the intensity and scope of relative deprivation. Heribert Adam asserted that economic expansion in South Africa would lead to a shortage of White skills and an increase in the recruitment of Blacks as substitutes. He further stated that such Blacks would have to be permanent on their jobs and that this would necessitate their permanent residence in the cities thus eliminating the migratory labour system. As a pragmatic system, the South African legal and political system would adapt to accommodate this development. There are apparent symptoms of that adaptation. The "Rand Daily Mail" recently

published a statement by Dr. Piet Koornhoff, Minister of Co-Operation and Development, to the effect that Africans could legalise the stay, in urban centres, of their wives born outside such centres. This is a shift in the Apartheid dogma which recognised only people born in the townships or who had completed a minimum of ten years' continuous service under one employer as legal residents in the townships adjacent to cities.

To go back to Gurr's statement, have any hopes been raised in the Seventies, and is there evidence of rising frustrations? Or have the hopes been fulfilled? If the choice of non-racialism as the ideal indicates a reduction in both the intensity and scope of relative deprivation, one might argue for the perception of an improvement of the lot of Africans. However, earlier on in this work, respondents perceived all what is referred to as "improvements" on the lot of Africans as "cosmetic changes", a fact which does not reinforce the hypothesis for a reduction in the scope and intensity of relative deprivation. How then, one might ask, does one account for a conciliatory stance and the choice of a non-racial ideal when a Black majority government could be a desirable alternative under the circumstances?

The answer to this might lie in the realisation, by the elites, of the entrenched position of White power in South Africa, and therefore, the need for them to open negotiations on an acceptable point of view, at least from some segments of White society. Apparently, this strategy has had some fruitful yields. Afrikaner intellectuals and academics have come to accept that Apartheid as an ideology is indefensible. The basic premise for negotiation is no longer in question - there are South Africans both Black and White, all entitled to equality before the Law. The mechanisms to arrive at equality are now a point for debate. That is partially an answer to the question.
The second answer lies in the dynamics of African perceptions of the Southern African situation in context. Earlier in this paper it was contended that respondents in this sample revealed a hopefulness in the future of Africans in South Africa. Another contention was that developments along South African borders were perceived to be in the interests of Africans in South Africa. Also material progress among the elites is definitely evidenced in the mushrooming of big houses in the townships, although the masses might argue that for them life has not changed. This adds a perception of a false sense of security among the elites.

Looking back at the table on alternative forms of government, one will realise that a Black Majority Government was the second choice, but by a minority of respondents (13%). The majority which opposed a Black Majority Government said that it was racialism in reverse, another pointer to the abhorrence of racialism by Africans. The concept of equal representation for each racial group came third (10%), but received support only from respondents already associated with the institutions of separation - an observation which is in accord with the assertion that those segments of the African elite who consider themselves as benefiting from separation, might adopt an accommodative attitude to the theory of racial separation. The least preferred forms were that of an African majority rule and the equal Black-White representation. Both forms were rejected on the rationale that they exacerbeated racial polarisation, a situation many respondents wished to avoid. Again the rejection of these forms of government reflects both the idealistic and the existential situations. As pointed out earlier, to maintain assonance, Africans reject any concept that may be in accord with the theory of separation, integration has attained a sacred connotation and has become the norm most sought after. To many Africans, separation is an evil which has to be avoided at all costs and any rationalisations for separation are interpreted as pretensions to sustain and perpetuate oppression of Africans by Whites.
It is evident that throughout this theme respondents have opted for non-racialism as the ideal, and reasons have ranged from ethical conceptions of justice to existential reactions and situational experiences of Africans under the practice of Separate Development. Respondents have demonstrated:

1) a reaction to Apartheid which is perceived as relatively depriving to Africans; and

2) an intellectual assessment of the rationale behind the theory of separation. Most respondents believed that Whites have devised a theory of racial separation out of fear that they would be swamped by African numbers in an open society. And secondly, that Whites have been protected for too long against any competition such that many, and especially the lower segments on which the Government relies for votes, would find it very difficult to compete openly. The result of this has been the development, by the Government, of a theory which relies on expediency more than on fact. Respondents asserted that because of fears, Afrikaner Nationalism has overplayed both racial and ethnic differences in order to defend the policy and practice of Apartheid.

Respondents pointed out that in spite of the plural character of this country, differences among South African racial groups do not exclude the probability of peaceful co-existence in a society where the economy is integrated in spite of social separation. And, above everything else, respondents were aware that the call for non-racialism puts the South African Authorities immediately on the defensive. They contended, the call commands a weight which is unassailable on moral and utilitarian grounds. There are many plural societies which have existed on consensus for generations - Switzerland is one of them. Where cleavages have occurred as in Ireland, the problem has been more of an unequal power relationship than of inherent differences among the various opposing segments. In South Africa, Africans believe that feared conflicts are rationalisations for the perpetuation of White dominance and not an assessment of the potential for explosion in a society where the races have lived side by side for three centuries without annihilating each other in spite of the potential for violence.
For purposes of this paper, the concept strategy refers to more than a plan of action. It includes behaviour patterns consciously pursued both overtly and covertly in an effort to attain a predetermined objective. From the onset, it must be emphasised that the subject of strategies is one of the most taxing topics for any researcher to elicit explicit answers within the context of the South African political climate.

Basically respondents saw the position as stated below:

1. Africans perceive the existing situation in South Africa as that of a Black-White confrontation. Whites, irrespective of political affiliations are perceived as bent on either maintaining the status quo, or modifying it in their favour.

2. Blacks are, at present, involved in a struggle for liberation - a concept which represents Black aspirations for recognition as equal partners in the distribution of the country's resources.

3. Because Whites are, on the main, beneficiaries from the existing status quo, they perceive any demands for its revision as a challenge - a device to deprive them of their personal rights. In fact, many Whites consider any suggestion for power-sharing as hostile attempts to reverse the status quo and render them subservient to Blacks.
4. As a result of White perceptions of the status quo, and their perception of Black demands for its revision, the government which acts on a mandate from the White electorate, has not only pursued a policy of maintaining dominance of Whites over Blacks, but has also devised an effective machinery to clamp down on any moves to disturb the status quo.

5. Blacks are, therefore, struggling for change from a position of material weakness, but they are destined eventually to win because of the moral justification of their cause, and their superiority in numbers. Besides, history has provided a basis for assumption that no people can be oppressed forever.

The foregoing analysis is evidenced by the constant recurrence of outbreaks of violence and confrontation within South Africa, albeit on a limited scale which state power has so far been able to contain. The South African political scene is full of surprises, not because behaviour in the periodic outbreaks was not anticipated, but because both the magnitude and direction of such outbreaks has taken even the authorities by surprise. It was common knowledge that there was simmering anger in African circles over the Afrikaans language medium in schools. This had been so ever since the practice started in the early Sixties. However, life had gone on normally till Soweto broke loose in 1976.

This author's contention is that questions of strategy can only be read between the lines. What research can do is to establish and analyse perceptions by respondents, of specific behaviour patterns and from these deduce what one can term a preferred behaviour pattern which might constitute a specific strategy. Even this approach has limitations, for in spite of preferred strategies, perceptions of constraints imposed by both the state's power and limitations from Africans themselves might render some strategies ineffective. However, within a restrictive political climate the most likely form of venting political dissatisfaction is bound to be confrontation or else it will be regarded as irrelevant.
In an analysis of the African definition of the present socio-political status quo in South Africa, it was mentioned that respondents described it in terms of a Black-White confrontation. It is on this basic premise that Black socio-political strategies are formulated. The second feature of the perception of the status quo is that Whites are in a position of material and technological superiority and can therefore act from a position of strength. But this is a position they cannot take advantage of since it is a privilege which is morally indefensible. On the contrary, Blacks are armed with the moral justification of their cause and their superiority in numbers. From this analysis, Blacks operate on the assumption that any direct confrontation with White authority can only bring losses to Blacks, however, at the same time, White authority can not use its armed might until it is forced on the pretext of self-defence.

Respondents asserted that the first strategy by Blacks was that of choosing the path of least hazards, hence the formation of Black Socio-Political Organisations. The basic purpose behind the formation of organisations was that they could act as conscientising agents of change, and also that they could be used as bases from which challenges and calls for revision of the status quo could be made. It was basic human nature to rely on the theory of believing in safety in numbers, and Blacks have over the past decades endeavoured to utilise this principle in an attempt to precipitate change in the status quo. Organisations have risen dating from the Pan African Congress, the Black Peoples Convention, the South African's Students' Organisation and, lately, Inkatha, the Azanian Students' Organisation and the Azanian Peoples' Organisation. It was within the organisational framework that strategies within the operational socio-political constraints have been formulated.
A glance into the history and activities of former and present Black organisations illustrates evidence of operating from a position of moral justification and at the same time a perception, by the same organisations, of their technological and military weakness. This is a point which many respondents mentioned. But, beside this, earlier organisational strategies illustrated their definition of the status quo as it operated at their time. In the theoretical framework, a contention was made that the theory of dominance directed both Black and White perceptions for a considerable time. When this operated, Black organisational strategies tended to be conciliatory in an effort to gain White acceptance. The worst that Blacks could do within the African National Congress strategies was the defiance campaign against unjust Laws where many Blacks risked going to jail rather than comply with legislation they perceived to be morally indefensible.

From the above illustration, and the discourse which is to follow immediately, it is apparent that a shift in the definition of the status quo is accompanied by a revision of organisational strategies in line with the perceived potential for organisational membership. Observations and analysis will be limited to African organisations for purposes of maintaining continuity with earlier discussions. Up to 1960, Africans relied entirely on the moral weight of their cause and the African National Congress's strategies ranged from passive resistance to a call for the withdrawal of African labour.

1. ATTEMPTS AT VIOLENCE

The proscription of both the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress sealed the safety valve that Africans had relied upon in order to vent their feelings against their frustrations.
Political resistance went underground and the formation of both Umkhonto Wesizwe, the military wing of the African National Congress and Poqo, the Pan African Congress counterpart, ushered the phase of political violence in South Africa and, with this, a redefinition of the status quo. However, state might contained both organisations, but at the same time encouraged a wave of exiles who formed significant lobbies at international forums. While the containment of underground violent-oriented organisations brought apparent peace and calm to South Africa, its main weakness was the legitimization of opposition to the South African official policy and, consequently, the government. What officialdom referred to as criminals, Africans and the international community perceived as martyrs in the cause of human freedom. All open opponents of Separate Development were cannonised by Blacks and the International fraternity and to this day there is a distinction from the state's outlook to the same concept. For instance, where official conceptions of the Patriotic Front in Rhodesia were that of terrorists, Africans regarded them as freedom fighters.

Recently, in January of this year, Gibson Thula, who is Chairman of the Election and Publicity Committee of Inkatha, called for amnesty for the exiled and jailed African leaders, including those on Robben Island, in order to participate in a National Convention. 1) Included in the list was the leadership of the ANC, the PAC, BPC and SASO. This is a significant point of departure between the point of view held by the government which has banned the above organisations and African elites who consider such organisations as representing African aspirations and, therefore, legitimate. In the aftermath of the Silverton Siege, Dr. Ntatho Motlana, Chairman of the Soweto Committee of Ten, urged the government "to prevent further occurrences by redoubling its efforts to convince Blacks that the immediate future would guarantee justice and peace and freedom for all." 2) And Bishop Tutu, General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches, asserted that the

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2) Ibid. p.2.
Silverton Siege was a condemnable act but reminded South African authorities that his body had warned "that when people became desperate, they used desperate measures."3) Black leaders operating within the framework of the official policy expressed the same sentiments. Chief Buthelezi and the Rev. Henrickse both deplored violence but expressed the warning that violence was a response to oppression.4) These views reflect the disparity between Black and White in the perceptions of the South African situation, and point to the limitations in strategies which Blacks could perceive as effective. The cited personalities have all expressed their aversion to violence on numerous occasions, but their rationalisation over violent acts demonstrates their appreciation of its underlying causes and the rationale behind its legitimation by the masses.

Questioning respondents about the means they perceived as instrumental in bringing the envisaged change to South Africa, they following responses were given, in order of frequency:

1. Economic and moral pressure from without and from within - 28%
2. Evolution in White attitudes - 24%
3. Bloodshed or violence - 20%
4. Pressure from the South African borders - 19%
5. Internal skirmishes like Soweto and economic pressures - 19%
6. Black and White negotiations over a conference table - 15%
7. Internal Pressure Groups to manipulate masses - 8%
8. Evolutionary strategies, influences from sport and economic mixing - 4%

It is apparent from the above table that 85% of respondents considered change to come through pressure as against 42% who regarded evolutionary means as effective. Even then the impact of pressures cannot be ruled out.

4) Ibid.
What is apparent in the breakdown mentioned on the previous page is that there is considerably less hope in the effectiveness of regulated and controlled political change. That respondents regard change through violent measures, or confrontation strategies as effective, does not necessarily mean that they prefer violence to peaceful change. In actual fact, the observations reflect factual observations rather than evaluative preferences. In a survey conducted among literate Blacks in the main urban centres of Johannesburg, Pretoria, Springs, Durban, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town, by the University of Cape Town's Graduate School of Business under Professor John Simpson, it was concluded that most literate urban Africans did not favour violence as a strategy for change. The paper actually stated that "only a few respondents felt violence was the only means of bringing about significant results." The cited passage only excludes violence as the sole means to effect change but does not rule it out as a perceived strategy. On being questioned, (in more precise terms), about what they thought would bring about change to the present government in South Africa, respondents replied as follows:

1. Border developments and guerilla incursions, especially when Zimbabwe and Namibia are freed - 30%
2. Deliberations over a conference table by all races - 25%
3. Economic and moral pressure from outside to force South Africa to change - 23%
4. Internal Black pressures like Soweto - 18%

Again, the question of perceiving border developments as a significant catalyst for change augurs for the perception of the effectiveness of the confrontationist strategy. A majority of elites consider border developments as demoralising on White's confidence and a strain on the country's resources. This view is perhaps being encouraged by perceptions of the massive state expenditure on defence. Added to this is the legislation making provision for extended terms of compulsory military service among White youths, while in recent years, female cadres have been enlisted in the South African Defence Force as well. Openings for Coloureds and Indian volunteers into the South African Navy have been created. The entire military build-up within the country is symptomatic of the State's preparedness to meet onslaughts against the country, especially when one considers that internally Blacks are unarmed; preparations can only be against an external enemy.

Violence has gained ground in recent years, and the emergence of urban forms of political terror adds to its significance. However, respondents were aware of repercussions even against contemplated violence, hence their consideration that violence was not the only form of bringing about change, might be a realistic assessment of their position more than a rejection of its effectiveness. Following the Silverton Volkskas Bank incident, the Rand Daily Mail published a resume of violent incidents and terror attacks in South Africa since the Rivonia arrests in 1963, and reading through the list, there is an increase in incidents of urban guerilla activities. But again, there is evidence of the realisation of the military superiority of the state's power. Thus, even in desperation, African resistance is focussed on easier targets which are meant to be used more as a bargaining base than as focal points of confrontation. Whatever form violence assumes, it tends to be more indirect than direct.

The second feature characterises more of the potential for violence than its merits as a planned strategy. Soweto was an example of spontaneous mass anger directed at a hated system which was perceived as a source of frustration. In Gurr's paradigm the intensity and scope of relative deprivation had reached a point where the only safety valve was violence. Leo Kuper spoke of the tendency by the African political leadership to capitalise on mass anger against some of the supportive pillars of Apartheid. At times, he went on, leaders might "allow the government the initiative in provoking mass action by its policies". Soweto 1976 might fall into this category; not that the elites deliberately allowed the government to move into the blind alley, but in that once the fuse was triggered, it was the elites who legitimised the vocabulary of rebellion and articulated the motives behind the uprisings. The Black Parents Association came out in support of the students' cause and called on the government to heed African demands for fairness in education. It is a known fact that when people reach the threshold of tolerance, they vent their discontent in the most accessible manner, and that generally within an area of conflict, confrontation ensues.

Mass participation is essential if a measure of success is to be realised. Masses thus need to be emotionally involved in the cause to support it fully. The function and role of elites in such situations is to instil vigour among the masses by conscientising them and thus legitimising the cause and giving it the vocabulary necessary to gain mass acceptance. Elites have often played a significant role in spontaneous mass demonstrations, uprisings and boycotts, albeit indirectly. They need not be actively involved themselves, but their articulateness gives the cause both the respectability and the rationale necessary for its continuance.

Apart from providing a source of spiritual and moral support to mass activity, elites, by articulating mass behaviour and demands, attract the required international attention and sympathy for the people's cause. Where masses tend to think in immediate and parochial issues as they affect them, elites broaden them, integrate and relate them to fundamental perceptions and definitions of the existing South African socio-economic and socio-political conditions. Thus, while spontaneous mass activity is in itself not a strategy, by systematically permitting events to build up to it, it can be effectively used as a strategy for bringing about the desired change and revision to the status quo. It is significant to note that 18% of respondents thought that internal pressures manifested in incidents like Soweto might bring about political change, while 25% thought that the riots themselves had attained a positive outcome. They stated that gains included the precipitation of socio-political reforms by both the private sector and the government, as well as the educational improvements by the educational department which later became the Department of Education and Training. They gave the formation of the Urban Foundation by the private sector as a response to Soweto. The high-handed response by the government, it was stated, brought international condemnation on South Africa and highlighted the political plight of Africans in the Republic. Significantly, for internal developments, respondents asserted that the township riots conscientised Africans and encouraged Black solidarity, thus acting as a catalyst for change.

II. ECONOMICALLY-ORIENTED STRATEGIES

Respondents pointed out that two possible strategies which could turn out to be of significant bargaining strength if carefully pursued were:

(a) Organised withdrawal of African labour as a supportive contributory to the South African economy could threaten the economic lifeline of the country. One consequence to this strategy would be
unemployment which in turn would produce chaos and disorder. This enhances chances for a revolutionary upheaval. Whatever the outcome would be, it can only be a matter for speculation and conjecture. On the other hand, the fear of an economic collapse and the attendant consequences, might force industrialists, employers and ultimately the government, to grant concessions, especially in the face of a hostile and critical international opinion. Respondents cited the sequel to the 1973 Durban strikes as an example of such concessions by the private sector. The cumulative outcome of such concessions would be the creation of equal opportunities and an egalitarian economic society which would facilitate corresponding political developments. The various codes of conduct by multi-national companies operating in the Republic such as the Sullivan Code, the European Economic Community Code and the South African Saccola Code, were examples which could be noted. Heribert Adam has postulated that economic developments could act as a catalyst to political change in South Africa.

(b) An organised selective boycott such as the recent Fattis and Monis one, and the attempted selective boycott of OK Bazaars in Johannesburg in 1976, could also compel the targets of such boycotts to change heart and bow to African demands for change. During the recent Ford Motor Company strike in Port Elizabeth, the Azanian Peoples' Organisation pronounced its support for workers and made hints at the organisation of a selective boycott against Ford. What is significant for purposes of this discussion, is that both versions of an economic leverage call for organisation at grass roots level if they are to succeed. External and internal calls for disinvestment, by foreign owned companies, from South Africa, fall into the same category as the calls for organised strikes and selective boycotts. They all presuppose a conscientised and organised mass of people acting in unison, what Chief Buthelezi calls constituency organisation.

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In discussing both versions of the economically-oriented strategies, two questions immediately come to mind:

1. Are the masses politicised enough to ascribe their economic deprivation to political causes? and,

2. In the event of adequate conscientisation and a consequent total boycott, how is the power relationship between labour power or selective buying power on the one hand, and the power of White employers and suppliers on the other?

Heribert Adam discusses this point at length, and concludes that in the event of a total boycott, the township situation, from which a boycott would be initiated and sustained, is vulnerable. A counter-blockade by White power would see the townships cut off from the main sources of supply of food, water and fuel; and even in the event of food stockpiling, both water and fuel come from the city centres. In short, Whites would "last" longer than the strikers could survive. Would these amenities form sufficient bargaining power among White industrialists, commerce and the public sector, all of whom are dependent on Black labour and co-operation to a very significant extent? And would the moral weight of an international outcry against "Victimisation of the oppressed blacks" even when they resort to non-violent self-help strategies be sufficient to render the withholding of this potential White power?

Assuming the above discourse to be relevant to the present discussion, how far are the elites aware of these ramifications? A majority of respondents demonstrated an awareness of the implications of these strategies and felt that although the suffering would be perceptible and substantial in magnitude, it is the White power structure that would stand to lose in the long run.

3) Ibid. p. 153
A comparable situation is that obtained in the debate between exponents and opponents of the disinvestment strategy. Opponents of this strategy state that if disinvestment were to succeed and unemployment resulted, the masses would not be able to discriminate between political forces as the cause of disinvestment and the resultant unemployment on one hand, and natural forces as responsible for their ill fate on the other. Should this be the case, the ensuing chaos, although significant in magnitude, might lack the required direction.

On the other hand, proponents of the disinvestment strategy assume a conscientised mass response that would destroy the political power as the cause of their ill fortune, and thus usher in a phase of equality and freedom.

In an analysis of perceived strategies which could bring about the desired change, economically oriented strategies came first in the list of perceived catalysts. Emphasis should be made here that this was not a question of a choice in strategies in order of preference, but a perception of probabilities without attaching any evaluations to the merits of each strategy. One would argue that it is the appreciation of the power relationship between White economic power and Black economic muscle power that rendered the effectiveness of economic strategies more appreciated than other forms. Consequently, the enthusiasm with which the Report of the Wiehahn Commission was received by Whites, and the counter-backlash, especially from conservative White miners, might be omens of the realisation, by White working classes, of the inevitable shift in the status quo should the African economic muscle be flexed.
External economic and political pressures in the form of sanctions and boycotts, disinvestment by foreign-controlled multi-nationals, and general isolation could undermine confidence in the country and lead to an erosion of Apartheid. Although the Republic is self-sufficient, a restive internal Black population would add to the burden, thus further contributing to the forces of change. This view was reinforced by a significant proportion who thought that confrontation was an effective weapon.

Coupled with general strikes and selective boycotts, these two could be the most likely strategies to accelerate change. The point to note is that a majority of respondents perceived economic and political forces as closely interwoven. In fact, economic developments were perceived as determined by political forces, such that a shift in economic relationships was likely to backfire on the political forces that produced it; hence the call for an end to job reservation and the corresponding recognition of Black trade unions.

It is not yet clear if Africans will be in a position to successfully utilise the opportunity for collective bargaining created by relaxations emanating from the Wiehahn Commission's recommendations, especially since official sanction for the recognition of Black trade unions has been given. In the South African legal structure, the use of trade unions for political purposes is forbidden as there is to be no official connection between trade unions and political bodies. But in the context of African aspirations and their politico-economic position, the possibility of utilising both concepts interchangeably exists.
What emerged from discussions with many respondents was that within the South African political context, options are limited. Correspondingly, strategies are limited by the nature of political choices open to Africans. The basic alternatives as perceived by Africans remain either non-racialism, which many prefer, or separation which most of them reject. State power, which many saw as both reactionary and repressive, adds to their dilemma. Recently, a survey carried out by British Petroleum and the University of Cape Town reported Africans as resigned, ignorant and misinformed about the nature of political systems. What research has to note is that Africans have, as asserted by this author earlier, operated within a realistic premise, that they are, from a power relationship point of view, the weaker side. Legal constraints armed with the definition of legality in the South African politico-legal context, impose limitations in strategy and hence in all attempts at influencing change. Africans have to make a special effort to constrain their strategies within the limitations of the Law. Further, such strategies should not be construed by official power as subversive. Mention was made in the theoretical framework of the far-reaching definition of subversion as spelled out in the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950.

Strategies in the form of political mobilisation through organisations and economic pressures have become and are perceived as the safest and most effective within the prevailing political climate. Ventures into dangerous versions and extreme forms such as attempted sabotage and leaving the country for guerilla training, have often ended in misery for the participants in spite of international outcries against a "police state" and other labels affixed to the South African governmental machinery. When taking stock of the various attempts

11) South Africa is often compared to both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union where police surveillance of individual political activity is rife.
by Africans at forcing the pace of change between 1968 and 1979, the number of Africans and other Blacks who have been lost to the Black Cause is significant.

Respondents considered the death, in detention, of Steve Biko, Mohapi and others to have been serious crippling factors in the development of an authentic African political leadership. The consequent escape of others, like Barney Bityana and Ben Khoapa, from the country, coupled with the imprisonment of others such as Nengwenkulu, Mokhape and Strini Moodley, compounded their dilemma. They further cited the case of Tozamile Botha and other Black Consciousness leaders who are either in detention or banned as further evidence of the harassment of the opponents of oppression by the government. To them, this has not only left the Black Consciousness cause with a crippled vanguard, but it has deprived the African cause of an effective and articulate leadership, thus limiting their conceived strategies.

III. PREFERENCE FOR LEADERSHIP AND ORGANISATIONS - A LINK WITH STRATEGY

In an earlier analysis of elite's reactions to frustrations, it was contended that respondents drew their line of departure from the premise of conflict in political values between Black and White. They perceived Whites as bent on maintaining the status quo, or modifying it in their favour. Consequently any alliance either with the present White regime, or the "White liberal establishment" were viewed with suspicion. For strategic purposes, the formation of organisations, whether for politicising or conscientising purposes,

12) Botha is a leader of the Port Elizabeth Civic Association which has recently had a successful showdown with Ford Motor Company

13) The PFP, the South African Institute of Race Relations and progressive thinking Whites are referred to as the Liberal Establishment by the "Go it alone" Blacks.
or for economic bargaining, presented the first and least dangerous option in the face of what they perceived as the repressive state's machinery. The most favoured strategy within such organisations was non-co-operation with the government's official plans as any co-operation was regarded in the light of collaboration.

This trend of thinking was clearly demonstrated in the choice of organisations that were perceived to represent African opinion. Homeland-based political parties were completely rejected, while Inkatha was the only organisation with homeland links which received any support, even then a minority support (16%). Chief Buthelezi, the organisation's President occupied a marginal position in elite perceptions. While he was mentioned by a minority in response to a question calling for true and authentic African leaders, 28% a sizeable percentage in the sample 52,5%, grudgingly accorded him respect for his ability to command organisational support from the masses. Almost half the respondents, 45%, rejected him outright for his links with government policy calling him a "systems man".

The African National Congress received the greatest support from respondents - 56%, but the question here is that "Congress" has become highly symbolic in African political thinking. While the link between the African National Congress and guerilla incursions on the country's borders is a very strong one, Congress will always command respectability among the elites who regard such developments as legitimate in the face of internal restraints on what they perceive as free African political participation.
Among the present organisations, the Black Consciousness movements received the second largest support to the ANC, 26%, from respondents, while the Black Consciousness leadership in the personalities of Bishop Tutu, Dr. Manas Buthelezi and Dr. Ntatho Motlana commanded a sizeable amount of support. See table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Highly Admired</th>
<th>Admired</th>
<th>Not Admired</th>
<th>No Answers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bishop D. Tutu</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Chief K. Mantanzima</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bishop A. Muzorewa</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Dr. Manas Buthelezi</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>President S. Machel</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Chief M.G. Buthelezi</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mr. R. Mugabe</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>President K. Kaunda</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>President J. Nyerere</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Dr. Ntatho Motlana</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Leadership philosophies and strategies merit discussion if the point of strategies is to be clearly evaluated. It is evident that Chief Kaiser Mantanzima, the first African leader to accept independence on Pretoria's terms is the most rejected of all. Similarly, Bishop Muzorewa is rejected for what is perceived as his collaborationist role in the Rhodesian internal settlement. Robert Mugabe is highly regarded for what respondents considered as his 'heroic leadership in the struggle for African freedom'. While this view cannot be regarded as support for violence in the light of earlier assertions in this work, it highly reflects perceptions of the inevitability of violence if the present status quo persists.
In the same light, President Samora Machel of Mozambique was regarded as a national hero who led his people to freedom, and he operated on a similar base as Robert Mugabe. Convictions were held among the elites, that meaningful change came only through confrontation. The history of Africa almost without exception, bears this out, for where a large settler population existed, dialogue only followed skirmishes and losses of lives. The two Presidents from the Frontline States, Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda were admired for the support they accorded to guerilla movements against Rhodesia and Mozambique on one hand and against South West Africa/Namibia on the other. There were also acclaimed for what some respondents termed their "moderate political views".

Among names which did not appear in the questionnaire, respondents, in response to a question calling for any other leaders they admired, came with names in the African National Congress, Nelson Mandela, and the leadership in the Black Consciousness Movement. This was another evidence in favour of confrontation oriented strategies, which is also indicative of their distrust of any motives for change emanating from the leadership that operates within the acceptable official government's framework.

In conclusion, respondents felt that for any strategies to be effective, they should emanate from the Africans themselves and be directed by them. Any inclinations from the government to favour certain Black groups immediately discredited such groups as respondents asserted "you can't work against a man and incur his favour". This belief emanates from the asserted conflict of interests and goals between Black and White. Apparently, any accommodation will only come from an equal power relationship, how this will come about is a puzzle to many social scientists.
CHAPTER 12

COMPARISON OF FINDINGS ON AN OCCUPATIONAL BASIS

The strength of alienation from the present socio-political position will vary with each individual's perception of his position in the occupational milieu. Separate institutions have resulted in the replacement of White by Black personnel in various positions in the professional and administrative spheres. For instance, many Africans now occupy positions of school inspectors, principals of high schools, matrons in hospitals, as well as positions in the administration of regional and district health services, educational and welfare institutions. In the sphere of township administration, Africans have been promoted to township managers and section superintendents. Although there is a salary gap between Black and White in the Civil Service, the power which occupants in these positions wield, in relation to the power possessed by the masses in general, is significant. On the business side, separate trading facilities have provided protection for many African businessmen who would not hold their own in an open competition with other races, who, in fact, are financially in a better position than they are. Acumen among African businessmen still lags behind the expertise found among White and Indian businessmen. Separate Development has promoted the existence of an African merchant class that would, otherwise, find it hard to thrive in a free competitive society. Within the industrial and commercial sector, a growing number of Africans has advanced to the executive and semi-executive positions under the Equal Opportunity Policies. However, this is a class of university graduates who are equipped with a rational business ethic of aggression, competitiveness and success, so that they perceive their position as independent of the practice of Separate Development. They, therefore, occupy a marginal position.
On the other extreme, independent professionals such as lawyers and doctors have not gained anything from the creation of the new political and administrative structures. The same position applies to non-executives in the private sector - laboratory analysts, technicians, as well as the sales, service and maintenance personnel. Civil service personnel, teachers, nurses and clerks occupy a marginal position with regard to the perception of the situation, just like the executives in the private sector. They may be aspirant and wish to attain the positions of their superiors, inspectors, matrons and principals, or they may adopt a rebellious and alienative attitude whereupon they may voice opinions in opposition to those held by their superiors. Students stand to lose nothing by their stances, however, their orientations are largely influenced by their exposure to various environmental ideologies and beliefs.

The above analysis indicates two varying occupational positions within the alienated ranks, with those who have personally gained from Separate Development adopting a less militant attitude than those who consider themselves independent of the beneficial trappings from the status quo. Various items in the questionnaire were used to elicit inclinations towards certain strategies to the attainment of an egalitarian non-racial society (which, according to respondents, is the ideal). These inclinations place respondents in their respective categories, that is, those who will not compromise their stand and those who are prepared to negotiate. In the theoretical framework, it was contended that the conflict between African and Afrikaner nationalism had resulted in the Afrikaners' evolution of the policy of racial separation as the basis of accommodating African aspirations.
Negotiation implies a willingness to compromise and, therefore, room for accommodation, while non-negotiation has the potential for confrontation. Results from cross tabulations demonstrated the following pattern:

COMPARISONS ON SPECIFIC ASPECTS.

I. TOWNSHIP ELECTIONS: With regard to participation in township elections, 83% of the businessmen in the sample, 83% of the school inspectors, principals of schools, and matrons of hospitals, 57% of the students and 40% of the civil servants participated. On the other hand, no member of the independent professionals, that is, doctors and laywers, or the trade union officials took part in the same elections; while only 10% of the executives in the private sector, i.e. personnel executives, bankers and research officers; 27% of the non-executives in the private sector, and 20% of community workers participated in the same elections.

II. HOMELAND POLITICS: Participation in homeland politics drew an even bleaker picture, where 50% of businessmen, 40% of the civil servants, and 33% of the inspectors, principals and matrons participated. The same pattern which obtained in township politics was demonstrated in homeland politics when none of the categories of independent professionals, executives in the private sector and trade union officials participated. Only 9% of the non-executives in the private sector, 18% of the teachers and nurses, 20% of the ministers of Religion took part. The issue of participation in Separate Development institutions illustrates a relationship between the degree of alienation from and opposition to the status quo and the perception, by individuals, of their occupational positions vis-a-vis the benefits or non-benefits which accrue from the practice of Separate Development.
III. The reaction to Separate Development Institutions raised a parallel to participation. On the question of whether Separate Development institutions should be accepted as a platform from which African aspirations can be furthered, or be rejected completely, responses ranged as follows:

(a) **PLATFORM STRATEGY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Accepted</th>
<th>Rejected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministers of Religion and Journalists</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Servants</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspectors, Principals, Matrons</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers and Nurses</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Workers</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executives in the Private Sector</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Executives in the Private Sector</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Professionals</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Union Officials</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above tables demonstrate the close relationship between the strength of acceptance or rejection of Separate Development institutions and the perception of one's position in relation to the benefits or non-benefits accruing from them. It is evident that the intensity of alienation forms a continuum with the sectors that have benefitted from separation, demonstrating less alienation and a willingness to negotiate, while the independent sectors, who perceive no personal benefits from separation, are strongly alienated from the status quo. Ministers of Religion occupied an invidious position with regard to this issue, since by vocational inclination, they have to pursue a pacifist course and the no compromise strategy negates the central tenets of Christianity.
IV. A relationship between the readership patterns and the direction of alienation was demonstrated when papers which tend to be more critical of the status quo were preferred by sectors who displayed a stronger degree of alienation than others. This author asserted earlier that elites preferred to read certain papers because of their reporting slants, differentiating between conservative and progressive newspapers. "The Rand Daily Mail" and "The Daily News" were singled out as "better" papers than "The Mercury" and "Ilanga", which is a vernacular newspaper and is published twice a week. "The Sunday Post" was popular among the independent professionals, students and non-executives in the private sector, while it drew no support from Ministers of Religion, businessmen and the most dependent professions - school inspectors, principals and matrons of hospitals. Ilanga had an advantage in that it publishes vacancy advertisements specifically for Africans and executives in the private sector use it to advertise African positions for within their concerns. This specific interest is evident from the sectors that patronise the paper, and, in particular, respondents were specific on this issue. Besides this point, it fared badly when one considers that it is a local newspaper which is circulated largely in the townships. The table on the following page demonstrates percentages, by sector, that read particular papers:
A comparison between "The Daily News" and "The Natal Mercury" clearly demonstrates a preference for the Daily News over the Natal Mercury. While it may be argued that evening newspapers tend to attract more readership than the morning ones, "The Rand Daily Mail" is a Johannesburg morning paper, yet it is ahead of "The Natal Mercury" in popularity. Similarly, "The Sunday Times" is ahead of "The Sunday Tribune" although both are Sunday papers and "The Sunday Tribune" is published in Durban. The relationship between preferences of certain papers by particular occupational sectors reinforces the hypothesis as stated earlier.
V. PERCEIVED STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE: A majority of respondents from all sectors thought that South Africa would eventually evolve to a non-racial democracy. It was in the strategies or means to bring about change that occupational interests came to the fore. 40% of the independent professionals thought that both internal and external pressures would compel South Africa to change. Moral international disapproval of Apartheid, sporadic outbreaks of unrest such as the 1976 riots, would undermine international confidence in the country as well as internal White morale. Eventually, the regime would be forced to grant further concessions leading to a non-racial society. Another significant contributory to change, as perceived by this class, was an intensification of guerilla warfare on the country's borders, together with an increase in urban terrorism (71%).

On the other hand, a sizeable percentage of executives in the private sector, school inspectors and principals, as well as matrons of hospitals (50%), saw change through an evolution in White attitudes, another reflection of the situational experience. These sectors mix with Whites as equals in the professional sphere where personal contact has deepened mutual understanding, thus contributing to a healthy relationship. The influence of economic factors was apparent in 30% of the executives in the private sector, who perceived change through economic pressures both externally and internally. Non-executives in the private sector (18%) thought economic integration would lead to political integration.

The only groups which thought change would come about from consultation with Blacks were businessmen (50%), and school
Inspectors, principals and matrons (30%). Both groups demonstrated a tendency to perceive change from regulated political activity rather than from confrontation. When it came to interpreting the Rhodesian internal settlement, a significant portion from both groups perceived the Smith/Muzorewa settlement as fulfilling African aspirations, (30%) from each group. On the contrary, 54% of non-executives in the private sector, 100% of independent professionals, 60% civil servants, 50% of Ministers of religion and 40% of community workers, thought it was a pseudo-settlement in which Whites were still in control with Muzorewa as only a front.

VI. ATTITUDES TO CONFRONTATION: The only issue on which almost all sectors were in agreement were the township riots of 1976. The predominant interpretation was that the riots manifested Black political anger and ushered a phase of political awakening among the Black masses. Some respondents stated that the riots highlighted one significant truth in South African politics, that the 22 years of Bantu Education had not confirmed the intentions for which the system was designed. According to them, Bantu Education was intended to produce a brainwashed African student population that would swallow all official directives without any question. On the contrary, Bantu Education had failed to create a normative acceptance of the status quo. On the sector basis, 86% of independent professionals, 68% of businessmen, 57% of students, 55% of non-executives in the private sector, 50% of inspectors, principals and matrons and 40% each of the civil servants and executives in the private sector, thought along these lines.
On Mozambique and Angola, almost all sectors tended to agree that independence realised after a protracted struggle was both genuine and desirable. However, a few among the Ministers of Religion (25%), and school inspectors, principals, and matrons of hospitals (33%), were unhappy about the bloodshed and the subsequent fighting, particularly in Angola. This was understandable, especially from the Ministers of Religion - but even among the inspector, principal and matron class, destruction resulting from fighting causes sufficient damage to leave irreparable scares in administration and the maintenance of order in which this class has a vested interest.

VII. ATTITUDES TO CERTAIN ORGANISATIONS AND LEADERS: There was a substantial support for the A.N.C. from all sectors (70%). Only students (36%) and the sector of school inspectors, principals and matrons of hospitals (33%), gave it a minority support. Perhaps on the side of students, the A.N.C. has only a symbolic history as they have no personal experience of the organisation's significance since it was banned 30 years ago. Lack of support for the A.N.C. from school inspectors, principals and matrons could be ascribed to its association, by the South African authorities, with violence and destruction. This is a sector which tends to favour an all-groups conference strategy. However, students demonstrated more support for S.A.S.O. and B.P.C. (45%), than they did for Inkatha (21%), while the class of inspectors, principals and matrons favoured Inkatha (30%), P.B.C. and S.A.S.O. (17%). Support for B.P.C. and S.A.S.O. was substantial among the independent professionals (43%), executives in the private
sector (40%), trade union officials (100%), and civil servants (40%), while Inkatha drew no support (0%), from the four groups. Also non-executives in the private sector supported S.A.S.O. and B.P.C. (36%), more than Inkatha (18%), while Ministers of Religion preferred Inkatha (50%), to S.A.S.O. and B.P.C. (25%). Support for S.A.S.O. and P.B.C. demonstrates a preference for a non-compromise strategy as both organisations were against any form of participation in the institutions created by the state in order to accommodate African aspirations. On the other hand, Inkatha operates within the framework of Separate Development and is perceived by a substantial number of elites as collaborationist in its approach to South African politics.
The first observation made in this research was the absence among Black respondents of a fully articulated alternative ideology to that of Separate Development, either in the political or economic sense. Separate Development as a political solution was heavily rejected by respondents, but no fully articulated political ideology was offered as a substitute, besides vaguely defined and generalised support for integration. But, without going into academic definitions of the concepts, a broadly neo-socialist trend could be detected in the answers of the respondents. This took the form of what can be called communalism, or socialist humanism, which are attempts to strike a balance between capitalist free enterprise and a popular socialist ideology.

Presently, throughout Africa, African intellectuals are occupied with the concept of socialist humanism or communalism. It is a reaction to partial assimilation, in which a sector of the population has been allowed sufficient development to achieve the universally accepted standards of a western middle class society, but is prevented by political structures and by legislative enactment from day to day enjoyment of their achieved status. This results in status incongruity and consequent disillusionment with the very system that has brought about the development. In South Africa, as respondents felt, it is also a reaction to the state's overplanning for Africans especially because the majority of Africans, except to a limited extent, those who are involved in government-created bodies like homeland legislatures and community councils, have no say in the planning of their amenities.
Perhaps another reason for the neo-socialist trend could be found in the marginal position of African elites. Dickie Clark defines the marginal situation in terms of hierarchy. He states "what makes an hierarchical situation marginal in character is any inconsistency in the ranking of the individual or collectivity in any manner regulated by the hierarchical structure." The African elites, in this sample, found themselves in this inconsistent hierarchically-arranged situation. They believed that there was a White upper class and a Black lower class. By achievement they found themselves in a position of leadership and influence among the Black masses, but by policy and legislation, they were subservient to the White upper class. This inconsistency in the ranking of elites as individuals and as a class, resulted in what is called rank disequilibrium and consequently, even to cognitive dissonance. Members thus tended to pursue stances beneficial to both positions. They sought to retain their elitist status, but at the same time, acted as champions of mass liberty. They turned to speak the language acceptable to the masses, and by so doing, ensured the maintenance of their position of leadership.

As a class, and as Black people, they found refuge in African communalism, an ideology which still finds acceptance among Africans emotionally by identification with the independent African North, and traditionally with age-old humanistic practices within the clan or tribe. But to leave this discussion at that would be falling short of the relevant theoretical explanations. Rationally, African communalism permits enough self fulfilment to accommodate an aggressive individualism, while at the same time, catering for the poor and the lowly. This is the basis of the humanistic concept or "ubuntu".

The above belief has rendered most gradualist efforts of reform, as seen by White officialdom, suspect in African eyes. This goes for such measures as the New President's Council, and Dr. Koornhoff's (Minister of Co-operation and Development) Proposed New Bills. These new moves are interpreted as efforts by Afrikaner Nationalism to incorporate certain elements of the Black population in decision-making. Any attempts at rule by co-optation were seen by respondents as devices to fragment opposition to the government's policy and thus perpetuating the dictum of divide et impera. The second problem which faces this proposition is that of raising a middle class in a ghetto. Once people enjoy a measure of emancipation, their appetites grow with their eating. Once a middle class emerges, it develops universal expectations. Economic emancipation without corresponding political expression can only heighten relative deprivation. People do not only need the means to live well, but they also need a corresponding status to enjoy, and if this is not forthcoming, frustrations rise. This was the case in the French Revolution, economic reforms of mercantilism made it possible for a strong middle class to develop, but the same middle class lacked the social titles and privileges enjoyed by the nobility.

Similarly, an African middle class without a true political expression may turn to be the worst enemy of the system which created it, the discriminatory political system. Leadership in most resistance movements in Black Africa, has seldom been drawn from outside the educated middle class ranks for this very reason.

Respondents in this sample demonstrated both alienation from and a militant antagonism towards the official government policy. A minority
of respondents demonstrated alienation in the Berger and Luckmann or Durkheims sense, or, better still, in the sense that Mills uses the concept.* They displayed apathy and resignation, and felt that the state was too powerful for any form of opposition, be it organised or not. They did not approve of the socio-political status quo but, simultaneously, were loath to offer any suggestions necessary to effect the desired change. Mason's assertions that the myth of the rulers has worked is almost applicable to this group. They demonstrated an element of apathetic acceptance and yet fell short of attributing divine pre-ordination to the existing socio-political order.

The second group of respondents comprised a group that adopted what Etzioni would have termed a calculative response to power based on remunerative rewards. They were alienated to the extent that Separate Development was an externally opposed and unpleasant policy, but at the same time, they could use it as a tool with which they could further their people's aspirations. They had a complete lack of identification with the philosophy and policy of separation, and had no sense of belonging to the South African political system. Yet, for what they considered to be the progress of the masses, they felt a modus vivendi could be established with the "monster", albeit uncomfortably. This group took an active interest in homeland and township politics, in the hope that by working within the system, they could eventually contribute to its destruction. This is the group which possessed some elements of the Marxist version of alienation, except that differences lay in the means to attaining the desired end. They believed in a negotiated settlement and disapproved of any forms of violence. Perhaps, a more appropriate tag would be to call them "pragmatists" and from this point of view they fall in line more with

* Refer to the Theoretical Framework on the above theories.
Adam's theory of a pragmatic oligarchy, save that instead of being manipulated by the rulers, they believed that they could rationally manipulate the rulers at their own game. This group rejected any form of homeland independence as an act of balkanisation and a device to divide Africans into small, powerless sub-units.

The third group of respondents made up the majority view of over 60%. They consisted of intellectual militants who completely rejected Separate Development together with any institutions associated with it. They were the ideological purists, and perpetual skeptics who read attempts at manipulating Blacks in any move that the government considered enlightened. Yet there was, and still is, something tragic about this group. In Gurr's theory, this would be the group which, because of relative deprivation, would be driven to violence. One would be tempted to label them "alienated" in the sense of them perceiving a large gulf of conflict between themselves and the system - that is, to the extent that they would actively participate in the overthrow of the existing social order, but, national and self interest would prevent them from doing so.

The absence of a specific programme of action by this group, underlies an existential helplessness and despair. On the other hand, the existence of an ideological and theoretical militancy has given legitimation to the protest movement, and has given moral rationalisation to the sporadic outbreaks of violence and confrontation. In this context, the existence of this group has sustained the periodic emergence of organised mass mobilisation movements which are opposed to the official government policy and programme. By their legitimation of opposition politics by Blacks, this group has undermined both the philosophy and policy of Separate Development such that no matter how widespread the practice is as enforced by authorities, it is undermined by the absence of legitimacy necessary for a solid foundation.
What has clearly come out from this survey is that all sectors of
the African elite population in Durban, as represented in this
sample, are unwilling to play a subordinate role in the decision-
making process of the country. Even those African elites who
are involved in the government's programme in one way or another,
reject their inferior status. Mason's theory of dominance,
apparently, is not applicable in as far as African elites in
Durban are concerned, nor do the theories of Durkheim, Mills
and Berger and Luckmann in as far as the majority of respondents
in this sample are concerned. Most respondents demonstrated
a militant opposition to the status quo, and perhaps when the
number of elites who have been detained, banned, and those who
have fled the country is taken into consideration, the position
becomes clear. However, to believe that a revolutionary situation
based on extreme relative deprivation exists, would, according to
views expressed by respondents in this survey, be going too far.
Adam's theory of a pragmatic racial oligarchy would explain
part of the situation, a western ethic has helped bring about a
distinct class of people who are perceived in their society (i.e. the
Black society), as "respectable", and to revoke that ethic, the elites
would be challenging their own position. The result of this situation,
so far, has been for the elites to resort to stances acceptable
to the masses, such as leading organised protest movements, mobilising
support for "liberation" organisations and providing such movements and
organisations with an articulate vocabulary and programmes.

Finally, to apply Adam's theory even further, the absence of an agreed
strategy by the elites has helped sustain the system which, according
to views expressed by respondents here, they hate so much. The elite
cadres have been fragmented by the existence of safety values such as
titles in the homeland and council systems. Although many respondents
feel they are opposed to Separate Development, there is no consensus
on the means to opposing it. The result is that this absence of a
united opposition has strengthened the position of the government,
and until the elites reconcile their strategic differences, their
opposition will lack the relevant impact.
So far this author has concentrated on the elites as the probable agents of change. The reason is that in most of Black Africa, it is the elites who have directed the change, although the masses have given it momentum. The reason for this is that traditional systems in Africa have, in many cases, been authoritarian. What colonial powers have done in most instances, has been to substitute a rational authoritarian system for a traditional authoritarian one. The position is the same in South Africa and this may partly explain the success of the government's programme in the homelands. Once the elites have been co-opted into the system, the masses have been easy to deal with. This view further strengthens Adam's theory of a pragmatic racial oligarchy. However, the emergence of new structures such as Black Trade Unions and militant organisations such as the Student's Protest Movements might alter the position, especially that the younger generation is predisposed to militancy as respondents in this survey have demonstrated.
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PUBLICATIONS AND THE PRESS

Social Review
The Financial Mail
The Rand Daily Mail
The Daily News
The Natal Mercury
The Sunday Times
The Sunday Tribune
The Sunday Post
APPENDIX A. QUESTIONNAIRE

SOCIO-POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF THE URBAN AFRICAN ELITES IN DURBAN

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Over the past 6 months or so, what items in the news media, ie. newspapers, magazines, radio and television, have featured as highly significant in your opinion?

________________________________________________________________________
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2. (i) What are your favourite newspapers?

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

(ii) What are your favourite radio programmes?

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

(iii) What are your favourite TV programmes (if you have a TV set)?

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

(page 2/..)
3. Do you vote or participate in:

(i) Township elections?

(ii) Homeland politics?

(iii) Any other social organisation?

4. What feelings do you think the following events had on the minds of Africans like you?

(i) Transkei and Bophutatswana independence?

(ii) Mozambique and Angolan independence?
(iii) Township riots in 1976?

(iv) The Rhodesian internal settlement?

(v) The 1973 Labour strikes?

(vi) SWA/Namibia Developments?
5. (i) When do you expect that there will be a real change in the position of Blacks in South Africa, if at all?

(ii) And what do you think will bring about such a change?

6. Comparing the present position say to 10 years ago - have any changes occurred, or not. Can you explain?

7. In your opinion what aspects of life in general are Africans dissatisfied with? Probe.
Which ones can you say that they are satisfied with? Probe.

8. There is much talk about the departure from apartheid in social matters such as the new sports policies, hotels and restaurants etc.. Do you think these moves will benefit Africans or not? How?

9. Just pretend for a moment that you were a Rhodesian African - what would you advocate as a political solution to that country?

10. What recent incident in your life made you feel particularly that you are a Black man? This of the past few months.
11. (i) What do you feel is the ideal society that Blacks, like you wish for?

(ii) From your answer, what would be the most ideal:

(a) Political situation.

(b) Economic position and policy.

(c) Residential position.
12. If you were given the following four alternative reactions to separate development institutions, what would you opt for?

(i) Accept them on grounds that there are no alternatives and use the opportunity for development they offer.

(ii) Use them as platforms on which to express African aspirations.

(iii) Take them over and use them in the Black man's own way, not as the government wishes.

(iv) Reject them completely and have nothing to do with them? Can you explain your choice?

(page 8/..)
13. Even though it may not be your ideal, which of the following would you be prepared to accept?

(i) a Black majority government.

(ii) A non-racial majority government.

(iii) An African majority government.

(iv) A government based on equal representation for each racial group.

(v) A government based on equal representation between Black and White.

Can you explain your choice?
14. We have spoken about wishes, what we like, but what do you think will probably happen regarding the future government in South Africa? Probe.

15. (i) If you expect changes, how do you think this future government will come about?

(ii) If you do not expect change, why do you feel there will be no change?

16. Say a change in the present socio-political dispensation occurred, what do you expect is likely to happen?

(i) A unitary state & define the terms.

(ii) A federal state.

(iii) Partition of the country on racial lines.

(iv) A confederation of regional states.
17. What do you expect the future of homelands to be? Probe.

18. In your own opinion and feeling - who are the Blacks in South Africa and what is it that characterises them?

19. Do you feel that there are bonds uniting Blacks, i.e. Africans, Coloureds and Indians, or are there cleavages separating them?
20. Who do you feel Africans, like you, regard as their true leaders and authentic representatives? Why?

______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________

21. Of the various socio-cultural and politico-cultural organisations in the past and the present, which one do people, like you, feel best represents the African point of view? Probe.

______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________

22. I shall present to you a spectrum of Africans who are always in the news. For each can you tell me if they are highly admired, admired or not admired by people like you - and why?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highly Admired</th>
<th>Admired</th>
<th>Not Admired</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Bishop Desmon Tutu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Chief Kaizer Matanzima</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Bishop Abel Muzorewa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Dr Manus Buthelezi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. President Samora Machel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Mr Robert Mugabe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. President Kenneth Kaunda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. President Julius Nyerere</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Dr Ntato Motlana</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Is there any other African I have not mentioned who is highly regarded. Probe.
PERSONAL PARTICULARS

1. Length of residence in town: .................................................

2. Age: ....................

3. Educational Qualifications: ..................................................

4. Income. (Estimate p.a.): .....................................................

5. Sex: ......................

6. Business or other connections with a Homeland: ....................

7. Occupation: .................................................................

8. What voluntary organisation or club do you belong to?

.................................................................
APPENDIX B

FREQUENCIES OF RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS IN THE QUESTIONNAIRE*

QUESTION 1

INFORMATION FROM THE NEWS MEDIA

Politics on the South African borders 51%
National South African politics 80%
International politics 19%
Homeland politics 19%
Economic and labour issues 42%
Sport 13%
Political trials 5%
Politics within independent African states 10%

QUESTION 2

SOURCES OF INFORMATION - (a) THE PRESS

The Daily News 74%
The Natal Mercury 39%
The Rand Daily Mail 61%
The Sunday Post 23%
Ilanga 39%
The Sunday Times 45%
The Sunday Tribune 39%
Periodicals and Magazines 10%
Other 11%

* Throughout the Questionnaire, responses need not add to 100% all the time as respondents could give more than one answer to a question or give no answers at all.
(b) **RADIO LISTENING**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>English News</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>English Plays and Serials</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vernacular News</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vernacular Plays and Serials</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sport</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Music</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radio stations from Black Africa</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) **TELEVISION VIEWING**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>English News</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sport</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>English plays and serials</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No sets</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**QUESTION 3**

(a) **PARTICIPATION IN TOWNSHIP ELECTIONS**

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participate</td>
<td></td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not participate</td>
<td></td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(i) **REASONS FOR PARTICIPATION**

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General coercion</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To help in the general welfare of the community</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ii) **REASONS FOR NON-PARTICIPATION**

<p>| | | |</p>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A useless futile exercise</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opposed to in principle</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No faith in candidates</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) **PARTICIPATION IN HOMELAND POLITICS**

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participate</td>
<td></td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not participate</td>
<td></td>
<td>80%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(i) **REASONS FOR PARTICIPATION**

<p>| | | |</p>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feared for the loss of job</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It gives us power</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To identify with the people</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Did so but now disillusioned</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(ii) REASONS FOR NON-PARTICIPATION
Indifferent 5%
Opposed to in principle 16%
Futile exercise, can't change status quo from within 20%
No faith, there are no political parties 6%

(c) VOTING IN ANY SOCIAL ORGANISATION
No answers 35%
No organisations 8%
Sporting bodies 11%
Church organisations 10%
Welfare organisations 17%
YMCA/YWCA 7%
Professional Organisations 14%
Inkatha 11%
Inkatha (indirectly coerced) 5%
Business Organisations 21%

QUESTION 4

4.1 - ATTITUDES TO HOMELAND INDEPENDENCE
Accept independence concept 1%
Reject independence concept 94%

(i) REASONS FOR ACCEPTANCE
Fulfilling aspirations for self government 3%

(ii) REASONS FOR REJECTION
Not independent, still dependent on S. Africa 48%
Deprives Africans of birthright 16%
It was a legitimization of fragmentation 13%
A sell-out of the African cause 19%
Internationally not recognised 16%
Promoted selfish mercenary interests of the few 19%
Opposed to ethnic principle 9%
Land consolidation insufficient 3%
V.11 - MOZAMBIQUE ANGOLA
Recognised internationally 9%
Realised after a struggle - true and genuine 48%
Africans have full political control 18%
A morale booster to African hopes in S. Africa 26%
A logical historical act of fate 10%
Underdeveloped know-how lacking 14%
Unhappy about bloodshed and in fighting 13%

V.111 - TOWNSHIP RIOTS 1976
Resulted in socio-political reform 15%
Resulted in educational improvements 10%
Manifested Black youth political anger, frustrations and an awakening 49%
Exposed governments' brutality and high handedness 19%
Attracted international attention to South Africa 10%
Promoted Black solidarity and expression especially the youth 36%
Regretted loss of lives 13%
Suicidal - self-inflicted destruction 1%
Forced electorate to consider change 23%

4.4 - RHODESIAN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT
Pseudo settlement, Whites still in control 40%
Might encourage Black civil war 4%
Without the Patriotic Front, there can be no settlement 23%
An attempt to deny the P.F. the deserved victory 3%
Belated, also no unity on the part of the parties 15%
A good settlement, African aspirations realised 14%
A moderate government has been set up only regret is White influence 6%
A colonialist bid to sow chaos 3%

4.5 - DURBAN INDUSTRIAL STRIKES
Manifestations of economic frustrations and discrimination 53%
Demonstrate effectiveness of Black collective effort 34%
Focused international attention of the Black labour scene 6%
Brought financial gains 20%
Change in attitude, lessons to employers and government 18%
Opened opportunities to Blacks 28%
No improvement, no change 10%
4. VI - SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA

S.A. trying to set up a puppet regime  40%
No solution without SWAPO  19%
A hope - the U.N. has a role  10%
A recognition of guerilla power  4%
SWAPO - a drawback  4%
Communism a detrimental influence there  3%
Hope for change  8%

QUESTION-5

5.1 - PERCEPTION OF CHANGE IN S.A. - TIME SPAN

No change conceivable  11%
Change within five years  19%
Change within ten years  23%
There is already psychological change in progress  10%
Change far off in the future  11%
No time limit set  35%

5.11 - REASONS FOR CHANGE/NON CHANGE

Bloodshed or violence  20%
External economic, political and moral pressure  28%
Internal pressure from Blacks  19%
Economic integration leading to political integration  4%
Consultation and negotiation with Blacks  15%
Border developments up North to force change within  19%
Manipulation of masses by Black pressure groups  8%

QUESTION-6

PERCEPTION OF PROGRESS/NON-PROGRESS MADE IN LAST TEN YEARS

A shift in White attitudes e.g. social mixing in sport and restaurants  33%
Improved employment opportunities for Blacks, relaxation in job reservation  24%
No change - only window dressing  35%
Improved Black salaries and wages  14%
Basically there is no change  25%
Blacks have become more educated  4%
Increasing African political awareness and pressure  13%
Whites have withdrawn into the laager  6%
Improved housing - 99 year lease  11%
QUESTION 7

7.1 - ASPECTS OF GENERAL DISSATISFACTION

Economic, i.e. wages and discrimination in employment 67%
Education - quality poor 45%
Pass levels and influx control 26%
Political - Africans have no franchise 39%
Legal, social and political discrimination 45%
Poor housing and recreation 21%
No security of tenure 5%
No effective police protection in townships 3%

7.11 - ASPECTS OF GENERAL SATISFACTION

None 100%

QUESTION 8

8.1 - POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATE STYLE - MIXING IN SPORT AND OPENING OF SOCIAL AMENITIES

Improve Blacks' self image and esteem 9%
Sport and social integration to lead to other forms of integration 5%
Will promote interracial understanding 13%
Opening of doors to Africans 6%

8.11 - NEGATIVE PERCEPTIONS

Cosmetic, temporary window dressing 36%
Benefits only a few, may drive wedges among the oppressed 35%
Benefits Whites only, may make them accepted internationally 14%
There can be no non-racial sport in a racist society 6%
One can't enjoy amenities without the means 13%
Too much red tape in so called relaxations 3%
QUESTION 9

PERCEIVED SOLUTION TO ZIMBABWE RHODESIA

Bring in the PF and the exiled to a round table conference 31%
Get the U.N. to conduct elections 8%
Scrap the Smith minority safeguards 3%
Hand the country over to the P.F. 31%
Continue with present settlement 4%
Bring in all parties and set up a non-racial government 29%
Intensify guerilla warfare 6%
Set up a proportional government on racial lines 1%

QUESTION 10

PLEASANT OR UNPLEASANT INCIDENT IN ONES LIFE

Humiliation and social discrimination 30%
Offended by official government statements 3%
Lack of amenities for Blacks 9%
Offended by Whites at work 3%
None 14%
Legal and statutory discrimination 21%
One is always aware of everyday incidents 19%

QUESTION 11

11.1 - IDEAL SOCIETY

Non-racial society 59%
Non-restrictive society 34%
A racially segregated but equal society 5%
A communalistic society 1%

11.11 - CHOICE OF POLITICAL SYSTEM

Voting based on merit 54%
One man one vote 26%
Federation on ethnic bases 3%
Proportional representation on racial lines 6%
Non-racial African socialist system 5%
11.11 - CHOICE OF ECONOMIC SYSTEM

Freedom from business restriction 11%
Equal opportunities for advancement, equal pay for equal work 56%
Free capitalist society for all 14%
Scrap influx laws 3%
Socialist but not communist system 10%

11.1v - RESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE

Right to own land anywhere 11%
Right to live in area of own choice 80%
Scrap Curfew Laws 1%
A racially segregated society 4%

QUESTION 12

POLITICAL STRATEGIES:

12.1 - ACCEPTANCE OF SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONS

Accepted 8%

(i) REASONS FOR ACCEPTANCE

The only available platform 6%
Gives us a free hand 3%

12.11 - PLATFORM STRATEGY

Accepted 39%

(i) REASONS FOR ACCEPTANCE

Can be subtly used against government 4%
Can be used for mass conscientisation 8%
Because Chief Buthelezi uses it 5%
Can express one's views without fear of reprisals 14%
As an expedient only 9%

12.111 - NO COMPROMISE STRATEGY

Accepted 46%

(i) REASONS FOR ACCEPTANCE

One does not become a government pawn 16%
Disagree with Separate Development in principle 19%
Accepting Separate Development means selling-out, it's a divide and rule tactic 11%
One can't say anything new within the structures 15%
Once one accepts government's programme, there is no retreat 14%
QUESTION 13

CHOICE OF ALTERNATIVES

13.1 - BLACK MAJORITY RULE
REASONS. Blacks are the majority after all
Black Africa runs that way
We have been oppressed for too long

13.11 - NON RACIAL MAJORITY GOVERNMENT
Merit and ability are recognised
Principle of equality is upheld
The emphasis is on government not ethnicity
It avoids a racial situation

13.111 - EQUAL REPRESENTATION FOR EACH RACIAL GROUP
Individual races will feel represented
We may all share
Caters for a plural society

13.1IV - EQUAL BLACK/WHITE REPRESENTATION
Only as a transition to allay fears and suspicions

QUESTION 14

PREDICTED ALTERNATIVES

Evolutionary change to a non-racial government
Destruction of present system leading to majority rule
Uncertain
Equivocal
A federation to emerge
Whites will emigrate and Nats will lose power
There will be a Black dominated socialist government
QUESTION 15

PREDICTED STRATEGIES

Negotiations over a conference table 25%
Sport and economic integration to lead to other forms 4%
Uncertain 6%
Intensification of guerilla warfare on the borders 30%
Intensification of internal pressures like Soweto 18%
External economic and moral pressure to force internal change 23%
Homeland leaders will aid government, no change 4%

QUESTION 16

PREDICTED FORM OF GOVERNMENT

Unitary State 53%
Federal State 19%
Partition of country of racial lines 8%
Confederation of regional states 16%

QUESTION 17

PERCEIVED FUTURE OF HOMELANDS

Obliterated in the creation of one South Africa 39%
Will continue as administrative agencies 14%
Will align themselves with government against forces of liberation 5%
Will continue as miserable entities, no going back now 13%
Doomed to failure, can't bring meaningful change 43%

QUESTION 18

PERCEPTIONS OF BLACKNESS

Africans as the most oppressed, Coloureds and Indians are given preferential treatment 10%
Africans and Indians - Black skins 4%
Africans, Coloureds and Indians, all share in being discriminated against - all are oppressed 49%
Africans only, they are the aborigines 35%
QUESTION 19

19.1 - PERCEPTION OF BONDS OR CLEAVAGES AMONG BLACKS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bonds</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleavages</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both bonds and cleavages</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19.11 - REASONS FOR PERCEIVING BONDS/CLEAVAGES

- Exploited, discriminated against and there is no Immorality Law among Blacks: 21%
- Free mixing, politically aware groups have closed ranks: 8%
- All have no say in running of the country: 1%
- Degree of discrimination not the same: 16%
- Coloureds and Indians can even own property in town, Africans can not: 18%
- Whites play one against the other: 20%
- Indians and Coloureds are in the S.A. Navy: 4%
- Indians and Coloureds have a sitting on the fence attitude: 4%

QUESTION 20

20.1 - CHOICE OF LEADERSHIP

- The ANC Leadership: 14%
- Leadership of the Black Consciousness Organisations: 19%
- The exiled, banned and imprisoned: 24%
- Nelson Mandela: 28%
- Chief Gatsha Buthelezi: 28%
- Homeland leaders other than Chief Buthelezi: 4%
- The P.A.C. leadership: 5%
- No leadership: 10%

20.11 - REASONS FOR CHOICE OF LEADERSHIP

- Upheld the principle of non-racialism: 18%
- They were prepared to suffer for their deeds: 19%
- Good organisers, have a following: 18%
- Imposed leaders by the government: 4%
- Represent Black aspirations: 21%
### QUESTION 21

**CHOICE OF ORGANISATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC, PAC</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASO, BPC</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INKATHA</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHERS</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### QUESTION 22

22. I - BLACK LEADERS HIGHLY ADMIRE, ADMIRE, AND NOT ADMIRE

Refer to page 137 in the main text.

22. II - OTHER ADMIRE LEADERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black Consciousness</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exiled, imprisoned or deceased</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders from Independent Africa</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GENERAL DEMOGRAPHICS** - See next page
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESIDENCE IN TOWN</th>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>EDUCATION</th>
<th>INCOME IN RANDS PA.</th>
<th>SEX</th>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1. Under 5 years</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1.2. 5 - 10 years</td>
<td>41</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.3. Over 10 years</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2.1. 18 - 22 years</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.2. 23 - 27 years</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.3. 28 - 32 years</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.4. 33 - 37 years</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.5. 38 - 42 years</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2.6. 43 - 47 years</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>2.7. 48 - 52 years</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.8. 53+ years</td>
<td>5</td>
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ORGANISATIONAL MEMBERSHIP - on following page
ORGANISATIONAL MEMBERSHIP

Sport --------------------- 13%
Inkatha ----------------------- 15%
Professional Organisations ---- 14%
Welfare Organisations -------- 14%
YMCA/YWCA --------------------- 9%