The Role of Development Partnerships in Mozambique

University of Natal
2000
Daren Trudeau
991239870
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Masters of Social Science in the School of Development Studies University of Natal, Durban, 2000.

Declaration
This dissertation represents original work by the author and has not been previously submitted in any other form to any university. Where use has been made of the work of others, this has been duly acknowledged and referenced in the text.
"The real political task... is to criticize the working of institutions that appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticize them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked so that one can fight them."

Michel Foucault, 1974

"If you give me a fish, you have fed me for a day. If you teach me to fish, then you have fed me until the river is contaminated or the shore line seized for development. But if you teach me to organize, then whatever the challenge I can join together with my peers and we will fashion our own solution."

Ricardo Levins Morales
Table of Contents

LIST OF ABREVIATIONS 7

CHAPTER ONE 8

INTRODUCTION 8
KEY THEORETICAL CONCEPTS 8
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 12
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 13
RESEARCH METHOD 13
RESEARCHER BIAS 16
CHAPTER OUTLINE 16

CHAPTER 2 18

NEW POLICY AGENDA 18
NGOs, DONORS AND PARTNERSHIP 20
TERMS OF DEVELOPMENT 24
CAPACITY BUILDING/ EMPOWERMENT 27
PARTICIPATION 31
ACCOUNTABILITY 37

CHAPTER 3 42

CASE 1 42
INTRODUCTION 42
ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY 43
RE ACTIVITIES ON ILHA JOSINA MACHEL 44
RESEARCH 45
PERSONNEL 46
PROJECT DESCRIPTION 46
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 47
PARTNERSHIP 48
CAPACITY BUILDING 49
PARTICIPATION 50
ACCOUNTABILITY 52
PROJECT ANALYSIS 53
PSYCHOTHERAPY 53
LIVELIHOOD SUPPORT COMPONENT 54
ANALYSIS 55

CHAPTER 4 59
Acknowledgments

First and foremost I would like to thank my parents Claude and Sheila Trudeau for their support and advice during my life. Without them I would not have been able to be where I am today.

Secondly, I would like to thank my fellow students, especially Kevin, Leila, Terry, Jerome and Jane for hours of lively discussion and debate. Many thanks to my South African colleagues for providing fundamental insight into those great gaps in my knowledge of this continent's history. A special thanks to Moabi for relating that history which has yet to reach the textbooks of the North.

Last but certainly not least I would like to thank my dissertation advisor, Dr. Lisa Bornstein, for her advice and insight into my work and for making funds available for my research.
List of Abbreviations

NGO: Non-Governmental Organization
SNGO: Southern Non-Governmental Organization
NNGO: Northern Non-Governmental Organization
NPVO: Northern Private Voluntary Organizations
IPVO: International Private Voluntary Organization
PVO: Private Voluntary Organization
GRO: Grass Roots Organization
SAP: Structural Adjustment Programme
IFI: International Financial Institutions (i.e. World Bank and IMF)
MI: Médico Internacional (Medicine International)
RE: Reconstruindo a Esperança (Rebuilding Hope)
UNOMOZ: United Nations Operation in Mozambique
RB: Redd Barna
RBN: Redd Barna Norway
RBM: Redd Barna Mozambique
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
The concept of partnerships between donors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and communities has long been advanced as a method to increase the effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of development aid. While many development related organizations have listed partnerships as one of their main strategies to ensure project success, their ability and desire to create genuine partnerships has been disputed.

Although there are many who advocate the promotion of 'partnerships' as a way to raise the effectiveness of development aid there are also those who question it. In an effort to determine how partnerships affect developmental outcomes, this dissertation will explore different concepts, understandings and outcomes of partnership, participation, accountability and capacity building/learning. Although this dissertation is primarily concerned with partnership between northern non-governmental organisations (NNGOs) and southern non-governmental organisations (SNGOs), where possible it will also look at partnerships between SNGOs and community groups.

Since the cessation of hostilities and the signing of an internationally brokered peace agreement in 1992, Mozambique has been the recipient of high levels of development aid. In 1996, aid accounted for 40% of the GDP and made up 48% of the government's budget (Hanlon, 1997). The high level of donor involvement in Mozambique makes it a practical place to study the effect of donor money on developing countries. Dependency of this kind on international donors eliminates any doubt that donors and NNGOs are significantly influencing Mozambique's development path. What is not clear is the degree to which Mozambicans are able to direct the creation and implementation of development projects and programmes.

Key Theoretical Concepts
In response to calls for improved aid effectiveness donors and northern non-governmental organizations (NNGOs) have sought to involve civil society and, in some cases, government more closely in the development process. Development partnerships have been promoted as a way to improve the effectiveness of development aid through the increased involvement of civil society (World Bank, 1999). Civil society organizations, such as NGOs and grassroot organizations (GROs), are most often made up of dedicated people who strive to promote change within their societies but they generally lack the capability, resources and financial support necessary to drive
widespread change (Edwards and Hulme, 1995). Partnerships with international organizations are perceived to be an effective way to develop local capacity, improve participation and raise accountability of local NGOs while at the same time improving the living conditions of local people.

Language is fluid and therefore open to interpretation. While many use the terms of development in a manner which suggests that all have a similar understanding of what is being said, the language is shrouded in a history of competing meanings and uses. Terms are often used by development organizations to convey their acceptance of fashionable development ideas. While many organizations genuinely attempt to understand, use and promote these ideas there are others that manipulate the terms with the aim of promoting their own ends.

There is power in the competing understandings of language. The outcome of development projects and programmes is affected by the way participants, both northern and southern, understand this language. It is undeniable that donors influence development through their control of resources but it is unclear how they use this influence to determine the direction of development. Donors and NGOs have used terms such as partnership, capacity building, participation and accountability to describe and define their interaction and relationships with local actors and, in doing so, attempted to influence the outcome of projects and programmes. Their understanding and definition of these terms could influence the overall effectiveness of development aid.

**Partnerships (Power and Commitment)**

The partnership concept evolved from donor distress over how little development aid has achieved over the past 20 years. Current discourse perceives partnerships as a way to improve the effectiveness of development aid by encouraging participation and assuring a more equal relationship (Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1998). The World Bank writes that to improve the effectiveness of aid, partnerships should be entered into with the specific aim of improving local 'ownership'. Although donors have recognized partnership as a necessary factor to promote effectiveness, they have largely failed to move the concept from the present discourse to substance (Fowler, 1998).

Many times power and money are synonymous. In most cases donors control the resources allocated to development projects and programmes, determine the areas, programmes and projects that receive resources. Donors and northern development agencies have historically
believed that they could 'develop' 'underdeveloped' countries through the infusion of resources and technical capabilities. Over time this approach was proven to be unrealistic. Donors are now saying that development projects will not be successful until local 'ownership' of projects is increased (World Bank, 1999). In theory, because local partners do not have the same capability to control resources as donors, local NGOs and communities should be progressively involved in the development and implementation of larger projects. The objective of such activity is to build local management and technical capacity so that eventually communities take ownership of their own development (CCIC, 1999). This requires that many levels of power and control be reassessed by donors, and devolved to the local partners allowing them to take on the project as their own. It also requires that the donor engage the local partner in trusting and open relationships. However, while this approach may seem to appear to offer promising alternatives, what is not clear is how different practice is from theory. How has donor behavior changed since the time when development meant an almost unilateral effort by countries of the north to 'develop' countries in the south? Do donors see their roles as facilitators for the transfer of power, and resource control, to local actors or as agents attempting to increase the effectiveness of development aid projects and programmes by encouraging local 'ownership' of programmes designed in the North?

Many NGOs undertake partnerships with the implicit goal of empowering organizations. Capacity building is a development term that is often promoted as the mechanism to advance empowerment (CCIC, 1999). It is widely assumed that increased capacity will promote empowerment but are these two terms synonymous? What type of capacity building are donors promoting? Is the aim to enable local partners to question and query development goals or is it nothing more than training them on the 'how to' aspect while ignoring the why? How does raising capacity encourage equality?

While the rhetoric of partnership and equal relationships is strong in the development community, donors can maintain control of development by selecting the types of partners with whom they engage. How does this alter the effectiveness of development aid? What types of partnerships are donors looking for? Are donors truly attempting to form equitable relationships based on mutual respect and trust? Will there be a senior and a junior partner, both making contributions to the project but one always dominating the relationship?
Lack of commitment impedes genuine partnerships. Development aid has increasingly been directed away from long-term programmes towards short-term, quantifiable projects. This has allocated the majority of funding to short-term projects, which is in direct contrast to the requirements for building successful partnerships (Atack, 1999).

**Participation**

Participation, in this sense, means the involvement of individuals or groups in a process. Participation is a crucial element in the development and maintenance of partnerships. NGOs and communities are capable of participating at different levels but their involvement is usually dependent on donors. Donors and NNGOs often control the level of an NGO’s participation through the time and intensity of their involvement in a project or programme.

However while there are different ways for NGOs to participate, genuine participation occurs when community and SNGOs are involved in shaping development projects at all stages. Both donors and NGOs must learn that each can make important contributions to the others development, each, in turn, acting as both teacher and student. (Gopalan, 1997) In this dissertation I argue that increased NGO participation in the programming, planning and implementation of projects and programmes increases the effectiveness of development aid and also contributes to both partners’ organizational learning.

**Accountability**

Accountabilities are another important factor in the development of functional partnerships. There are multiple ways to perceive accountabilities. Functional accountabilities refer to the resources and finances used during the project cycle and are easily quantifiable (Edwards and Hulme, 1995). Consequently this type of accountability is relied upon heavily by donors to determine a project’s progression towards stated goals. Strategic accountabilities depend less on objective measures and rely more on subjectively defined factors such as a consensus of accomplishment (Edwards and Hulme, 1995).

Donors readily promote and require NGOs to show both types of accountabilities but they very rarely reciprocate with any form of accountability to the NGO. This pattern of one-sided accountability is not conducive to the development of sustainable and equitable partnerships. Setting clearly defined roles for both NGO and donor and encouraging the monitoring and evaluation of progress, further ensures accountability. However, although monitoring and
evaluation is usually a project objective, most organizations have little experience and capacity in this area.

Furthermore, in the face of a more powerful partner, NGO autonomy may be jeopardized. Accountabilities to more than one donor may offset possible control by a more dominant partner (Smillie, 1997).

**Capacity Building**

When donors or NGOs use the term capacity building these organizations are usually referring to the capacity of target communities. An area that is sometimes overlooked, but just as crucial, is SNGO capacity building. Some donors presume that SNGOs are fully capable of undertaking a project or programme on their own without additional capacity building. Other donors attempt to standardize process-oriented capacity building to promote efficiency and the effectiveness of projects/programmes. By favouring SNGOs who most closely follow donor requirements donors alter the individual development of SNGOs and in turn the sector as a whole. While this may not be interpreted as detrimental to NGO development, it may force them to follow policies and practices that conflict with their own or the communities’ aims and goals.

Some interpret capacity building as a means (Bebbinton and Mitlin, 1996) while others see it as an end in itself (Eade, 1997). Different interpretations of capacity building by donors affect the type of impact that it has on the NGO. It also affects how the NNGOs interact with SNGOs and how these organizations learn from their actions in the developing country.

**Theoretical Framework**

Various understandings of partnership were examined and the Plan International Indian Partnership Study was selected as a basis for the research. The typology developed to unpack the partnership concept entails exploring the use and understanding of terms such as accountability, participation and capacity building. In brief, Brown’s six partnership models are used to highlight the relationships between the case study partners and development terms are considered within these parameters. Chapter two fully explores these concepts as well as the use of the typology development by Brown. Chapter five compares two of the models against the case studies to help explain each partnership.
Research Questions

The central question addressed by the research is: How do development partnerships between northern and southern NGOs influence the effectiveness of development aid? The literature and theoretical framework adopted suggest that one way to approach the issue is through a detailed study of the understanding of partnerships, the systems and resource flows that this entails, and the practices adopted as a means to outline power dynamics and development outcomes arising from the partnership.

Key questions raised by the literature and addressed by the research include the following:

1. Aid effectiveness: Who determines what form of aid is effective? Is aid only effective when it accomplishes proscribed objectives or can it be effective despite its inability to reach those goals? Who determines the programmes that outline the goals to be achieved that eventually determine the effectiveness of aid? Are those who determine programmes and projects informed enough to be realistic in forming appropriate objectives? Have donors attempted to fund longer term programmes? Do they continue to direct monies towards shorter term but highly quantifiable projects? How do short-term projects affect development outcomes?

2. Local ownership and accountability: Is capacity building aimed at increasing local ownership? Are donors including what those living in the area want and are these people able to voice their concerns? Are actors accountable to each other?


Research Method

After an extensive literature search on partnerships and the related topics of capacity building, participation and accountability, a qualitative approach was selected for the primary research. This research approach was decided upon so as to take into consideration the various understandings of the terms and not force respondents, through the use of a quantitative questionnaire, into placing their understanding of the concepts into rigidly defined categories. A qualitative study was undertaken because the researcher wanted to study the process of participation and this tool was best suited for his purposes.
The aim of the literature review was to identify the origins of the partnership concept and define various understandings of its role within the development agenda. By exploring the theoretical underpinnings of partnership and some of its more specific outcomes a perspective surrounding the various understandings of partnership was formed and used to evaluate the findings of the primary research.

The limited scope of the dissertation restricted the inquiry to two case studies. The two organizations that responded to the researcher’s requests for access provided project/programme documentation and agreed to interviews with key personnel. Both organizations also facilitated contact with partner organizations and access to the field operations and personnel. The organizations in the study have allowed access to the researcher because they hope to gain a better understanding of their own activities and relationship with their partners and will receive a copy of the completed dissertation.

The first case study looked at a Mozambican NGO Reconstruindo a Esperança (RE) and its work with child soldiers on Ilha Josina Machel in Maputo Province, Mozambique. RE and its partner Médico Internacional, a German NGO, undertook to help former child soldiers deal with the traumatic events experienced during the war through a psycho-social programme. The project used psychotherapy and traditional medicine rehabilitation techniques in coordination with a socio-economic component to reintegrate the children and young adults into their communities and reduce the poverty experienced by them. The project ran from June 1997 to October 1999, a total of 30 months.

The second case looked at the work of Redd Barna, a NNGO working to increase child rights in Sofala province. Redd Barna is partnered with the Social Action department within the provincial government. Their aim is to increase awareness of child rights as outlined in the international declaration on the rights of the child. This phase of Redd Barna’s involvement in Mozambique is outlined in detail in its Estratégia Nacional de Programa (National Programme Strategy) 1998-2001.

The directors of RE and Redd Barna identified personnel to be interviewed by the researcher. The names and positions of interviewees and dates of interviews are listed in appendix A. Interviews were conducted in Portuguese, Spanish or English. The interviews attempted to elicit factual information about project outcomes.
Open ended questions were the chosen interviewing method. The first interviews were conducted in Maputo and on Josina Machel Island. After undertaking a baseline interview with the director of Reconstruindo a Esperança the researcher traveled with two of the NGO’s field workers to Josina Machel Island, which is located 120 km northwest of Maputo. This provided the researcher with the opportunity to not only observe the project location but to experience the isolation of the community and the logistical problems of operating in such a remote area.

During the dry season the island must be accessed with four-wheel drive vehicles. After heavy rains, the island can only be accessed by boat. Due to the extremely poor conditions of the roads on the island, transportation is limited to two tractors. Otherwise access is by boat and foot. The community does not have access to electricity but water can be drawn from shallow wells or the river. There is one small health post on the island, which is staffed by a nurse and an aid. The health post is the only facility available to the 14 000 residents of the island. Subsistence agriculture is the main economic activity.

Interviews were conducted with field workers and two heads of the community. In addition, the researcher had many informal conversations with a number of residents. These included a long conversation with the health post nurse who was not a direct participant in the project but was nevertheless very well informed about the project and its effects. All interviewees were told that their answers were to form the basis of a research paper and said that they could be quoted. It was also explained to each interviewee that the researcher was conducting a study for a university dissertation and, as a student, did not have any access to or influence over sources of funding. This was done because the NGO, at the time of the interview, was seeking other sources of funding and members of the community were well aware of this.

The second case study was based in Beira and Dondo in Sofala province, Central Mozambique. Redd Barna offices for this province are based in Dondo, which is situated adjacent to Beira, Mozambique’s second largest city. After interviewing the director of operations in Dondo the researcher then interviewed two field officers working from Dondo but responsible for their own respective regions. Both field officers were interviewed at the same time, forming what could be seen as a small focus group. The researcher then interviewed the person in charge of operations for the Dondo area.
In addition to Redd Barna personnel, one interview was held with the representative for Accção Social in Dondo. A small focus group was also conducted with three of Accção Social's key personnel in their head office in Beira.

**Researcher Bias**

It is impossible to remove a researcher's influence on the surrounding environment when conducting interviews. Not only will a researcher's presence influence the answers of the interviewee but the researcher also has a bias that must be recognized as having an effect on observations and interviews.

The researcher was a white male, a foreigner who had limited experience with rural communities. The researcher was sufficiently able to communicate in one of the area's predominant languages however this, not being his mother tongue, heightened the possibility of misinterpretations. His experiences, influence and way of introduction, by the director of the organization, all acted to influence the attitude and responses given by respondents. These conditions represent but a few of the many factors that may have influenced the outcome of the interviews.

In addition to the researchers bias, the complexities of the Island society and the intricate associations between the NGO, community and government made it difficult for the researcher to come away with anything more than an overview of the society and project.

**Chapter Outline**

The dissertation is organized in five chapters. This chapter laid out the research problem, key theoretical concepts, research questions and the method employed in the field research. Chapter two situates the question within a wider theoretical context and explores more thoroughly the underpinnings of the partnership concept and the theoretical background of participation, capacity building and accountability. It also explores the rise of the NGO as the principal development delivery mechanism. Chapter three introduces the Rebuilding Hope (RE) and Médico Internacional partnership as the first case study. A brief account of RE's organizational history and description of their project funded by Médico Internacional is followed by an examination of the project to orient the findings in terms of the theory of chapter two. Chapter four describes the Redd Barna (RB) and Acção Social's case and explores the relationship between the two partners. An account of Redd Barna's organizational history is followed by an examination of four elements of their partnership,
namely partnership, participation, capacity, and accountability. Chapter five provides a detailed analysis of the partnerships by comparing models based on Brown’s Indian Partnership Study literature against case study findings. In chapter six I conclude by arguing that although partnerships have been touted as a way of improving the effectiveness of development aid, partnerships are understood and implemented by organizations in different ways. I also argue that while some donors and NGOs attempt to form open and equitable partnerships at the project level, there is still a long way to go before they allow their Southern partners an equitable say in programme selection and design.
CHAPTER 2

In this chapter I critically review the literature on the relationship between donors and recipients of development assistance. Specifically I argue that by examining four possible components of development projects/programmes-capacity building, empowerment, participation and accountability- we can study how different types of donor-recipient partnerships affect developmental outcomes.

New Policy Agenda

Aid and development policy has become dominated by what has been termed the 'New Policy Agenda'. This new agenda is organized around neo-liberal economics and liberal democratic theory.

In an attempt to realign the economies of developing countries, structural adjustment policies (SAP) were introduced to support market friendly conditions. Promoted by international financial institutions and First World countries these policies were prescribed to developing nations in an effort to reduce the size and power of government, and lower inflation and interest rates while at the same time promoting the dominance of 'the market'. Considerable debate surrounds the effectiveness of these policies with proponents such as the World Bank and IMF declaring that they create favourable conditions to begin reducing poverty, while opponents such as Hanlon (1996) and Killick (1997) point out that SAPs in their present form have only increased poverty.

Some, such as Kayizzi Mugerwa (1998, 220), suggest that African leaders had no other choice but to sign agreements they could not realistically keep. Donors, thinking that conditionalities would correct the difficulties with the economic system, continued to push and adapt SAPs. Such programmes were too complex to be carried out by bureaucracies many times labeled as corrupt and incompetent. Furthermore, since many countries were not meeting the signed conditionalities their performance records with international financial organizations suffered and the region gained a bad reputation on policy commitment. A poor standing with international donors not only adversely affected a country's ability to free itself of the conditionalities but also discouraged foreign investment.
Now, realizing the shortcomings of conditionalities, donors are attempting to offset their failure by encouraging the state to act in a supportive role to the market. Good governance, combined with market friendly policies, is the new donor blueprint for successful development.

**Good Governance**

Liberal democratic theory focuses on the importance of 'democratization' and 'good governance'. An increased involvement of civil society is regarded as an essential factor to democratization. NGOs are promoted as the means to encourage the involvement of civil society. Greater recognition of NGOs by donors not only increases the effectiveness of NGOs and Grass Roots Organizations (GROs) as checks and balances against government, but also assists in the promotion of economic objectives (Edwards and Hulme, 1995).

In the new policy agenda, good governance is an essential component for successful economies and the efficient and effective use of development aid. Two key components of good governance are good policies and good institutions. The Canadian Council for International Cooperation defines 'good policies' as "...market friendly policies (open, privatized and stable economies) and pro-poor government expenditures." Similarly, 'good institutions' are understood as "... pro-reform bureaucracies and technocracies, able to create the political and social structures required to support markets." (CCIC, 1999) Since many developing countries have not built 'suitable' institutions on their own, donors and NGOs have decided to help, often via partnerships.

However, while donors speak of development partnership there are serious questions concerning the NGO/donor relationship. Development partnerships are created within the overall context in which development aid is used. The position developed here is that the availability of donor money, the focus of the programme and donor coordination act to direct and determine the path that donor funds take. These three components of the aid puzzle ultimately influence how donors, NGOs and recipients interact with one another and may influence the power relationships between them. This will significantly affect how the partnerships unfold.

As I argue, the new agenda defines the characteristics of the relationship; it sets the policies of good governance and neo-liberalism as the parameters within which actors may interact. Donors promote the development of aid partnerships within these parameters.
NGOs, Donors and Partnership

Neo-liberal economics focuses on leaving 'more efficient' markets and private initiative to provide most services to most people. Since government involvement is circumscribed to a supportive role for the market leaving more efficient mechanisms to fill demand, NGOs are increasingly the preferred method of delivering welfare services. NGOs have a 'comparative advantage' in reaching the poorest sections of society where market failures are experienced. Although welfare services have always been to some extent provided by NGOs "...they are seen as the preferred channel for service provision in deliberate substitution for the state." (Edwards and Hulme, 1995: 4).

Growth of NGOs

The increased use of NGOs in development over the last decade is a well-documented trend. The 1994 Human Development Report estimates that there were approximately 50,000 local NGOs operating in the South. The Yearbook of International Associations set the number of international NGOs at 16,000. The OECD has estimated that in 1980 US$2.8 billion was channelled through NGOs; in 1994 it grew to over US$6 billion. Increasingly, social development is being undertaken by NGOs. This represents a significant shift in what has traditionally been a key domain of the state (Fernando and Heston, 1997). The reason for this shift has been attributed to the perception by donors that NGOs have a comparative advantage "...over large foreign donors, public sector organizations, and state interventions." (Streeten, 1997: 196).

Fernando and Heston (1997) maintain that NGOs increased legitimacy in the development field stems out of general, wide ranging criticisms of the state and to a lesser extent, the private sector. NGO's are better placed to meet the challenges of development.

Similarly, Smillie (1997) and Sanyal (1997) see the increased use of NGOs as related to a recognition by Official Development Assistance agencies of their own shortcomings and the perception that NGOs have the ability to effectively reach and use aid efficiently.

However, the ability of NGOs to undertake successful social development projects and programmes should not be over emphasised. Smillie (1997) raises important questions about possible consequences of relying on NGOs for policy, planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation. With increasing numbers of NGOs entering the development market, competition
for private donor funds has increased. At the same time governments have shifted responsibility
for the social sector onto domestic groups which has compounded fund-raising problems. A
significant consequence of the increased competition between international NGOs has been a
weakening in coordination between competing NGOs. Increased competition has also decreased
NGO independence in the face of strong donors who determine work sectors, target groups and
work locations. Competition may help local NGOs develop stronger institutional bases and
increase their influence with donors, but it could also negatively affect community solidarity by
introducing profit-seeking behavior through market controlled activities (Smillie, 1997).

Streeten (1997) points out that although many advocate the merits of NGOs, these organizations
are not always as successful as they appear to be. NGOs are not always in the best position to
accurately identify the poor, use participatory approaches, empower local populations or be
innovative because NGOs are themselves made up of society’s elite. Furthermore, the nature of
many community groups and NGOs depend on one person or many volunteers for their survival.
Without these key players many projects would collapse. This raises serious questions about the
durability of NGO and community groups.

Atack (1999) cautions that official funding has been increasingly directed towards emergency relief
operations. The concentration of funding towards these areas has promoted relief type activity
work “at the expense of other areas of work, from support to capacity building or long-term
development programmes through to campaigning or lobbying on global justice issues. It can also
undermine NGO autonomy and their ability to act as independent and sometimes controversial

Although NGOs have many times proven to be dependable mechanisms for development, the
variability in type and access to resources also make them dependent on donors for access to
funds. This dependence coupled with a short institutional history makes many of them vulnerable
to intended and unintended attempts at control by external forces.

The New Agenda has given NGOs the opportunity to make themselves heard within the
development community. It has increased their numbers and allowed them to become a more
integral part of the development process. Although the New Agenda has provided NGOs with the
power to make themselves heard, it may also have decreased their autonomy in the face of more
dominant actors. Moreover, it is believed that NGOs have become increasingly dependent on, and
subject to, certain restraints set by their funders. Their previously independent social base has
been eroded by the interests of more powerful donors which could negatively impact the very
organizational culture and strategy that make them effective (Edwards and Hulme, 1995).

Partnership
The World Bank, recognizing the need for the involvement of civil society and other relatively
marginalized actors in the development process, has begun to promote partnerships "...among
governments, donors, civil society, the private sector and other development actors." (World Bank,
1999a).

But what are partnerships? The word partnership can be interpreted in many different ways. The
Dictionary of Development (1990: 818) defines partnership as involving "sharing of power, open
communication, and mutual accountability between participants in a joint project." Lansberg and
Kemba write that the Swedish partnership approach proposes to "establish a new relationship
between Sweden and Africa based on mutual commitment, not supplication...". Partnerships are
based on a 'new contractual relationship' which centers itself around, "real change of attitude to
partnership on the basis of sharing values and sincerity." (Landsberg and Kabemba, 1997:10).

When we speak of partnerships many automatically conceptualize a business relationship.
Development partnerships are, from the start, very different from business partnerships because
they are inherently unequal. The Western interpretation of partnership, according to Kajese (1987:
80), is coloured by their control of resources and power. "I strongly suspect that, for the
international NGOs, the nature of the partnership is, at its most benevolent, that of a 'junior/senior'
partner or at its most malevolent that of 'horse and rider'." 1 The power relationship between actors
is unbalanced because one partner controls the resources and technical skill while the other has
comparatively limited resources to bargain with. The dominant actor controls the partnership
unless it wishes to cede part of its power to the other actor. A total transfer of power to the
subordinate actor will not happen unless the dominant partner is sure that the dependent partner
will use the resources in a certain way or to achieve goals that correspond to the dominant
partner's beliefs'.

1 A colonial politician once described the relationship of partnership between Blacks and whites in Zimbabwe
(Rhodesia in those days as) "that perfect relationship existing between the rider and the horse." (Kajese, 1987: 80).
Collaboration between two or more actors in any type of project or programme is a difficult task. Each of the actors has different reasons for entering into such agreements and over time these reasons may change for one or both of these actors. The overall aim of forming a partnership is to accomplish certain goals, which could not otherwise be accomplished using the same effort. Generally speaking when two actors enter into a partnership they agree on common objectives and define the range, roles and responsibilities and communication structures for each partner (Brown, 1994).

Partnerships with donors can result in at least two outcomes. On one hand, partnerships can potentially yield a donor/NGO/recipient relationship which places actors on a level playing field, facilitating the transfer of decision making and control to players previously subordinate to more dominant actors. Under this train of thought, greater participation, if undertaken earnestly, would relinquish a portion of control from donor to NGO and recipient communities. This would enable NGOs, which have a better idea of the day-to-day workings of the recipient community, to have a greater say in the development of effective projects and programmes. It would also allow NGOs and recipients to better develop their management capacity and improve accountability. More control by regional and local actors over the design, management and implementation of projects and programmes could potentially improve the success rate of development aid by encouraging project/programme sustainability.

On the other hand, partnerships may not mean that donors cede control but instead that they involve partners more closely in their own programme selection, development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. This would incorporate NGO opinions (or at least make it look that way) but decrease their autonomy, allowing donors to set the parameters of NGO activity and remain in control of the development process.

The position developed here is that the form of partnership is a significant determinant to the outcome of development. By looking at the different power relationships in a partnership, and how they affect the actors and outcome of the development process, we can determine what approaches are the most successful. In other words, does a controlling role by a donor over an NGO result in a favourable outcome to all parties? Is a partnership where all actors have an equal say in the development process the preferred route? Is it even possible to generalize this last point considering that development is undertaken across so many different environments and is such a complex process?
To understand what effect the type of partnership has on the outcome of a development programme, we must first determine the character and the level of partnership. Once this is understood, we can then establish how the degree of cooperation affects the outcome of the deliverables, capacity, accountability, and the ability and autonomy of different actors to effectively participate in the development process.

Models
Ron Jones points out that the growing tendency towards development partnerships has arisen from three broad areas:

1. Traditional Northern dominated, 'top down' assistance has failed to provide sustainable improvements in the lives of the poor...

2. The interdependent nature of complex problems demands collaborative problem-solving approaches...and can be understood only with the benefit of insight from many vantage points.

3. The South's right and ability to control its own development is forcing Northern Private Voluntary Organizations (NPVOs) to change their role.... Recognizing the South's growing leadership capacity, the international donor community is beginning to look to Southern NGOs for program initiatives. By funding these programs directly, donors bypass NPVOs in their traditional role of controlling intermediary. (Jones, 1993).

Terms of Development
Various interpretations of partnership, capacity building, participation, and accountability are explored in the following section. Attempts to define and place these terms in the context of development partnerships are also made. More specifically, the author’s understandings of these terms is looked at in an effort to better determine how the degree of cooperation affects the outcome of the case studies of chapter three and four.

Many donors have opted for a more inclusive response that will involve Southerners in the fundamental decisions affecting development aid. Partnerships are the means to the end of 'effective' development. The World Bank, one of the largest and most influential donors, states
that, "Perhaps most important, the country is in the driver's seat, both "owning" and directing the developing agenda, with the Bank and the country's other partners each defining their support in their respective business plans." (World Bank, 1999a). The partnership concept, as defined here, is offered as a means to allow countries ownership over their own development.

Similarly, the Canadian Council for International Cooperation suggests that the partnership concept was taken on to address:

the lack of local ownership of policies and programmes perceived as the key to good management; inappropriate donor behaviour, including aid coordination and the ineffectiveness of conditionally as a surveillance and quality control mechanism; and the underlying environment, including the nature of policies, institutions and political system. (CCIC, 1999: 2).

Paolo Martella and Javier Schunk (1997) perceive partnerships as different levels of NGO participation. At the most basic level they see 'partnership as a resource'. Donors can save money and create local job opportunities through partnerships. The local partner's main responsibility is to fulfill a junior role of project implementation. The donor, on the other hand, designs, funds and manages the project. Conceiving the donor / NGO relationship in this way reduces one partner's role to a contractor position with all significant decisions being made by the donor without any consultation with the local partner.

Their second concept of partnership focuses on developing the Southern partners' capability and promoting sustainability, while continuously working to increase their autonomy. The North provides resources and training and both partners are involved in the management, planning, monitoring and evaluation of the project or programme.

Thirdly, they envision partnership as a reciprocal relationship where the Northern partner acts as a consultant providing advice and resources to its Southern partner while "...encouraging local managers to take on an increasing level of responsibility." (Martella and Schunk, 1997: 285). This type of partnership enables the recipient to control the use of funds and develop its capacity for project planning and management. Because the project is controlled and managed by the Southern partner it ensures that the project becomes embedded in the 'social and cultural landscape of the southern partner.' (Martella and Schunk, 1997: 285).
Brown's Indian Partnership Study (Brown et al., 1994) noted that because the word partnership had been used to describe so many different types of relationships it was consequently open to numerous interpretations and no longer has a clear meaning:

It (partnership) has been used indiscriminately to describe relationships between organizations which are a) highly mutual in many respects, and also those in which huge imbalances in power and decision making exist, and b) from many different sectors. (Brown, 1994: 6)

The authors opted for six definitions describing International Private Voluntary Organisation (IPVO)-NGO levels of collaboration. Each definition describes a different type of partnership. The definition itself dissects the various responsibilities and power relationships that make up the collaborative efforts of each relationship they investigated. The most basic model of partnership is represented by a 'contracting' collaboration. The most complex relationship, in terms of partnership, is described as 'mutual governance'.

The six models are outlined below:

1. Contracting: NNGO defines, finances and controls most of the conditions while the SNGO implements them. NGOs are project implementers while IPVOs establish and manage the conditions of the relationship

2. Dependent Franchise: NNGO defines and finances projects while the SNGO acts as a field office.

3. Spin-off NGO: Originally functioning as a dependent franchise the SNGO gradually gains greater autonomy from the NNGO, developing its own financial resources.

4. Visionary Patronage: NNGO and SNGO enter into a partnership based on a shared vision of development. Both actors jointly determine levels of responsibility and participation, usually finding that the SNGO implements programmes while the NNGO provides financial resources and training.
5. Collaborative Operations: NNGO acts as a consultant to SNGO. Both participate in planning, implementation while the NGO implements projects with funding from the NNGO.

6. Mutual Governance: Complete shared governance between NNGO and SNGO. Both have mutual influence over policies, practices at organisational and programme levels. (Brown, 1994: 9)

The above is simply a summary of their definitions. In their study, Brown lists the advantages and disadvantages for both partners. In doing so they analyse how each actor’s different level of participation (from policy making to implementation), capacity building, accountability, cost, autonomy, and monitoring and evaluation affect the outcome of the project, its sustainability, the partnership, and each others organisations. While there are elements which may be common to many partnerships it is necessary to not only look at how each partner defines their relationship, but also their level of involvement and influence over different aspects of the relationship. The position developed here is that to gain a better understanding of how to measure different types of partnership the concepts of capacity building/empowerment, participation and accountability need to be explored.

**Capacity Building/ Empowerment**

Much like the term partnership, capacity building and empowerment are sometimes used to describe very different perspectives. This section will explore various ways in which different actors interpret the terms.

Korten (1987: 147) writes that private voluntary organisations (NGO) have undergone their own type of development as their “sophistication regarding the nature of development and the potentials for their own roles...” changes. By first understanding the evolution of NGOs we may be better able to understand how this affects the empowerment and capacity building of civil society.

He divides NGO evolution into three areas of programming strategy. The first, relief and welfare, is characterised by those international and national organisations that are focused on natural disasters and refugee situations. Their work centers on providing immediate relief to the affected, which creates a temporary dependency link to the NGO and its resources.
Korten (1987) goes on to say that as the emergency situation subsides, emergency relief procedures do little to aid the poor in developing strategies to meet their own needs on a sustainable basis. Wanting to create sustainable projects, NGOs undertake development strategies, which stress local self-reliance. The second generation of NGO development sometimes progresses from the first and focuses on small-scale self-reliant local development in areas such as health, education, farming, and infrastructure. Although these areas usually fall under the domain of government, as Korten explains, NGO activities "...are usually defended on the grounds that government services are inadequate in the villages in which the NGO works." (1987: 148) The main function of second-generation development strategies is not to question the reason for the inadequate service or infrastructure but to attempt to fill an area where traditional providers have failed.

The third generation of NGO development emphasises sustainability. Having worked at the community level attempting to increase project sustainability, NGOs have realised two impediments to a wider sustainable impact:

(1) Acting on their own they can never hope to benefit more than a few favored localities; and (2) self-reliant village development initiatives are likely to be sustained only to the extent that local public and private organizations are linked into a supportive national development system. (Korten, 1987: 149)

Recognising these limitations NNGOs have focused on encouraging sustainable change in regional and national structures. This means that NNGOs will find themselves, "working in a catalytic, foundation like role rather than an operational service delivery role — directing its attention to facilitating development by other organizations, both public and private, of the capacities to address designated needs on a sustained basis." (1987: 149) Moving into this level of development requires that an NGO diversifies its capabilities so as to influence and also offer policy alternatives.

Capacity building by NGOs rarely occurs at Korten's first level of capabilities. This is because emergency situations require rapid deployment of personnel and resources, which leaves little time, resources or energy to develop local capacities.
Due to their more permanent nature, second and third generation development strategies are more conducive to capacity building. As Korten reveals, the transition from first to second generation strategies is a difficult process for NGOs because these organizations are forced to re-organise and acquire the capabilities necessary to promote small-scale and self-reliant local development. While acquiring second generation capabilities may be a traumatic experience for many NGOs, Korten believes that developing the skills for third generation activities could prove to be even more difficult. (1987: 154)

Implicit in the evolution from one generation to the next is for NGOs to obtain new capabilities. If the transition is natural, the effects on the NGO, while sometimes difficult, are manageable. Conversely, if an NGO finds itself forced to change at too quick a pace or without proper external support, the stress could prompt organizational crisis.

The use of NGOs in development presupposes that these organizations are efficient and effective in meeting the needs of the poor (Atack, 860). Some NGOs who move from one generation to the next have not managed to develop the necessary capabilities and subsequently are inefficient and ineffective in their work. One solution to this problem has been for donors, NNGOs and some well-established SNGOs to work alongside SNGOs, GROs or government departments in an attempt to impart the capabilities necessary for not only project success but also to promote a wider impact. This way NNGOs work as catalysts (third generation NGOs) to second generation NGOs.

Edwards and Hulme (1992: 24) maintain that:

the main emphasis for NGOs involved in such efforts is usually held to be the ‘process’ involved in supporting local initiatives—awareness raising, conscientisation, group formation, leadership, training and management skills—rather than the ‘content’ of the programmes and activities which local organisations pursue. (Edwards and Hulme, 1992: 24)

Some donors and NNGOs promote process oriented capacitating to encourage the empowerment of local organisations. In doing so, donors and NNGOs also promote the professionalization of SNGOs and NGOs with the aim of increasing effectiveness and efficiency. Although the standardization of some management techniques may be necessary to raise the effectiveness of some NGOs, the process may in fact alter the core of the NGO. Through the process of
professionalisation, the roots of NGOs change from their original base of an altruistic desire to contribute towards a better world to one which Chambers labels ‘normal’ professional development.

According to Chambers (1986) this process favours industry over agriculture, control over uncontrol, urban over rural, rich over poor, powerful over weak, blueprints over adaptive learning, technology over traditional, market-oriented over traditional, large-scale over small-scale, quantitative over qualitative and standardisation over diversity. As pressure from the donor forces NGOs to follow professionalisation by favouring those NGOs who adapt to this trend, donors and NNGOs change the basic make up of the NGO.

Similarly, Eade writes that:

..as NGOs are increasingly used as channels for official assistance tensions are created around the relationship on a variety of issues: rapid or poorly managed expansion, in response to the priorities of donors; the need to become more professional even at the expense of voluntary ethos; the adoption of systems for planning, appraisal, and reporting that may conflict with more flexible, informal or participatory approaches; and an emphasis on cost effectiveness, efficiency, and measurable impact, which reduces local consultation and involvement in shaping the programme. (Eade, 1997: 9)

In their attempt to develop new capabilities, the professionalisation of NGOs may force them away from their community foundations.

Eade (1997) distinguishes between various interpretations of capacity depending on whether the function of capacity building is undertaken as a means, process or end in itself.

As a means, Eade (1997) sees capacity building in the NGO as an attempt to strengthen organisations to perform specified activities that may or may not build capacity among stakeholders. Among civil society, capacity as a means acts to strengthen primary stakeholders in their ability to implement an NNGO’s defined set of activities. An example of this would be an NGO training NGO employees on how to dig a foundation for a school. The training is a means to building schools.
Although many donors have used capacity building as a term in their development discourse with NGOs, many see this as a means of ensuring that their present activities are continued, rather than understanding it as an end in itself (Bebbinton and Mitlin, 1996).

Capacity building as a process for NGOs is a reflection, inspiration, adaptation and search for greater coherence between an NGO's mission, structure and activities. In civil society, the process fosters communication, debate, relationship building, conflict resolution, and improved ability of society to deal with its differences (Eade, 1997). An example of this would be an NNGO training a NGO in management techniques, which would allow it to first determine if a school was needed then undertake the most efficient way to accomplish those goals.

As an end, capacity building provides the means for an NGO to survive and fulfill the mission it has defined for itself. In civil society, capacity building strengthens the ability of primary stakeholders in the political and socio-economic arenas according to their own objectives (Eade, 1997). An example of this would be an NNGO supporting an NGO to determine its needs while at the same time ensuring that it has the ability to continue to make decisions concerning its own 'best' development path.

Empowerment and capacity building, like many other development terms, are elusive and open to different interpretation. The literature review reveals that capacity building is understood by some as a process where knowledge is acquired through growth and change. However, because donors are directing the process of knowledge acquisition they may be forcing NGOs and communities to adapt systems that may not be compatible with traditional ones. The way donors perceive capacity building as a means, process or end may offset how they affect the growth and change of the NGO or community. I argue that supporting capacity building at Korten's third level and treating it as an end rather than a means or process would better prepare NGOs to meet their own needs on their own terms instead of those of the donor.

Participation

The term participation connotes very different things to different groups. Business may use it to describe profit-sharing, political groups to describe voting practices, and NGOs to explain the involvement of donors, target groups or communities in projects. (Streeten, 1997). Participation is a word that is manipulated to convey an understanding of people's involvement in a process. Most processes are controlled by one or more persons who allow the participation of others. Those who
control the process usually control the level of participation. But what kind of participation is desirable or even possible in development? Who participates and how?

The 1997 World Development Report writes that by promoting voice and participation in society states can improve capability in three ways. First, participation gives voice to populations allowing them to "...express their opinions, formally or informally, and press their demands publicly within the framework of the law". Additionally it helps "...states acquire some of the credibility they need to govern well." (World Development Report, 1997: 116). Second, because markets are usually absent in the provision of public goods, community participation can "reduce information problems and lower transaction costs." (1997: 116). Third, it is highly unlikely that state officials can "...anticipate all the public goods and services that citizens desire." (1997: 116). Participation provides communities with different channels to involve themselves in voicing opinions and to function within the market.

Streiten questions NGO and donor understanding of the term by writing:

Participation and decentralization are sometimes used more as slogans than as a thought out strategy. What is the purpose of participation? Is it personal satisfaction, work enrichment, greater efficiency, lower costs in constructing or maintaining a project, or sharing of these costs, or greater effectiveness in achieving desired results, community development or the promotion of solidarity, the capacity to make decisions, or change the distribution of power of economic and social benefits? (Streiten, 1997: 200)

Different groups in different places understand participation in different ways. The degree to which one group allows another to participate is dependent upon how closely it understands the process and believes in its outcome. The position developed here is that donors, for example, generally provide money to governments and NGOs who most closely match their vision. Similarly, donors and NGOs allow communities to participate at various levels. Some organizations perceive participation as the involvement of the community in specific areas of project implementation while others understand it in a wider sense involving communities in the entire project cycle. Still others see participation as involving beneficiaries in every aspect from project formulation to an equal say in NGO policy and mission. The level of participation by different actors alters the outcome of the project or programme.
Edwards and Hulme (1992) maintain that NGOs that promote genuine participation in the planning, design and implementation of their projects would be more likely to be successful than those who did not. They found that NGOs who held similar views with beneficiaries and who constantly consulted them during the implementation had much more successful projects than those who lacked participation. Sustainability was also increased when beneficiaries were active participants in projects.

Many donors and Northern NGOs may not appreciate that, "participation does not mean being present and cooperating in working on something when thinking and ideas have originated from outside of them and their situation." (Kajese, 1987: 81). At this level, the donor controls the process and the recipient is encouraged to participate in the movement towards a goal, which is developed by outsiders. Participation at the grassroots level is understood as containing "peoples authentic and original ideas, relevant to their situation." (Kajese, 1987: 81). The ideas must be put into effect by local organisational structures and development should be able to access outside assistance "for their self determined development." (Kajese, 1987: 81).

In his discussion of participation, Ronald Dore (1981) explains that there are several ways of conceiving people's participation. He points out that if projects meet the perceived needs of a certain group, they will be more willing to cooperate because they can see the immediate benefits. Commitment to and participation in a project will be enhanced if participants are actively involved in decisions surrounding the project. Project control should be encouraged from below to avoid self-interested groups from taking control of the project. NGOs and communities should promote values such as independence, self-reliance, autonomy, and a critical approach to authority.

Techniques such as Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) and Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) attempt to involve communities in the selection of developmental goals. In other words it attempts to devolve some control of the process to the community. It is also felt that this is an important method to correct the top down approaches of the past.

Streeten (1997) among others, questions which needs are the right needs and which needs need to be created. This begs the question how much should communities participate in decisions surrounding their own fate and how much do NGOs (especially Northern ones) or governments know what is 'best' for them? During most peoples' lives there are many instances where decisions are made which directly affect their lives but which they do not participate in making (ie.
buying and selling of military equipment). Certain limits to participation are set and many, if not the majority, are excluded for efficiency's sake. Although there are many reasons for excluding the direct participation of people in many aspects of their lives, Streeten (1997) believes that it is highly desirable to involve development project beneficiaries in decision making for three reasons. The first, participation is an end in itself, to help express citizen autonomy. Secondly, it allows projects and policies to better respond to recipient needs. Thirdly, it reduces fixed and recurrent project costs (Streeten, 1997).

Effective Participation
Although many organizations view the participation of beneficiaries in projects or programmes as important, it is not always easily reached. The World Development Report writes that:

...public agencies often must invest considerable time and energy in building ties with communities, in building commitment among their own staff, and in ensuring that minimum standards of quality and equity are maintained." (World Development Report, 1997: 119)

Participation, as described here, is between government and communities and is used as a method to increase the accountability of government to the beneficiary. In other circumstances, participation could be understood as a way of improving the probability of success and project sustainability by involving, and convincing, the community that the aims of the project/programme are important. This increases the accountability of the community to the NGO by ensuring their acceptance of, and involvement in, the project. Participation in this sense is about changing how a community acts so that 'better' outcomes can be achieved.

NGOs, governments, or both, act as a force to encourage community participation so as to affect change towards a desired goal, whether social, economic or political. Participation at this level requires considerable investments of resources, energy and most importantly time. This is a difficult task considering the present aid environment and the promotion, by most donors, of quantifiable and relatively short-term projects.

Effective participation means identifying and encouraging the involvement of those who will be affected by projects or policies to determine the most suitable approach to change. It is generally accepted that recipients should participate to some degree in projects that directly affect their
lives. But to what degree does participation promote success and to what degree does participation impede the developmental process?

Gopalan sees the:
"participatory process as firmly embedded in the mutuality of teaching and learning that exist between agents and communities." Even though each agent is influenced by the other and undergoes some degree of change "...it is often the agent's teachings that are validated, while the community's attempt to teach is seen as resistance and rejection - in a word - non-participation." (Gopalan, 1997:179)

For participatory approaches to be genuine and successful, it is not only necessary for agents to empower or allow communities to be involved, but they must also be able to teach and learn from each other. Agents in turn must be able to not only listen to what communities are saying but also understand it.

A basic requirement for successful "mutuality of teaching and learning" (Gopalan, 1997) is trust. Without it there is not any chance of forming the open channels of communication that allows information to be exchanged. As Gopalan (1997:179) states, "Participation in socio-economic programs can be enforced, but involuntary participation may not result in the practices being learned or internalized in sustainable ways."

One of the possible outcomes of participation is sustainable change. For this to happen, agents must not only know what needs to be changed and how to accomplish it but also to understand what cannot be changed and adjust their programmes accordingly. Each community, and agent, is different and thus require different parameters to work in. Once those parameters are determined and communities see that the agent adjusts to change (enabling the community to become the educator) trust is reinforced. Over time members of the community will "...slowly come to accept the agent as a well-intentioned party and accommodate his or her activities in their routines..." adapting their learning styles to the needs of the programme (Gopalan, 1997:179).

According to Gopalan (1997), sustainable change does not occur in a vacuum. Agents must also try to take into consideration what future effects the change will have and build capacity for communities to anticipate and deal with possible problems. Once a relationship based on mutual trust is formed communities and agents can identify those things which can be changed and build
programmes accordingly. If obstacles are identified, programmes can be constructed around them and when conditions become favourable, changes to those obstacles can occur (1997:179).

Participation based on trust is not only essential for successful NGO and community relationships but should also form part of donor, Northern and Southern NGO relationships. Kajese (1997: 81) questions the logic that local NGOs are required to include the views of grass root organizations (GROs) while their Northern funders hide behind the mask of "technical competence, accountability, level of management ability, impact measurement, evaluation and all sorts of other legitimate concerns." He goes on to say that these are used to limit participation and maintain control over key components of the process. Kajese (1987: 82) asks, "How long will it be before it is standard practice for representatives of indigenous NGOs to sit on the boards of international NGOs and participate in the decision making process, policies and strategies?" Donor and Northern NGOs failure to promote the participation of Southern NGOs in policy and programme formation raises serious questions about the authenticity of their commitment to participation and the level of genuine trust between actors.

Chris Dolan (1992: 205) suggests that participation may be more a "...homegrown psychology of motivation to enhance operational effectiveness than a development goal in its own right." If this is the case then participation can be regarded as only a new conditionality, promoted by Northern agencies to ensure that their ideas of what development means are promoted within local communities. If, on the other hand, NGOs are determined to refocus efforts to emphasize genuine community participation and "...empower the poor, the weak, and the marginalized, to encourage people to take decisions for themselves, to become agents..." (Streeten, 1997: 199) then participation results in sustainable outcomes because recipients control the process.

As it stands now many donors, and Northern and Southern NGOs encourage communities to participate in the projects and programmes that affect them. Projects and programmes are overwhelmingly run from the North with Northern ideas forming the greatest contributor to the direction and content of development. Of those players involved in the development process it is those who have the least to do with the community who have the greatest influence on the project or programme. Donors and NNGOs promote effective participation so that those affected by the development process will be involved and support the policies or projects developed. Genuine participation also involves the beneficiaries in the process but instead there is an effort on both parts to understand each other's goals, capacities and limitations. The most important player in
the development process should be, I argue, local communities who are represented by grass root organizations. The GROs, according to Hoyer (1994), "... should be the most important of the three partners, holding their junior partners, the NGOs and funding agencies accountable for their actions." (Hoyer, 1994).

Accountability

Although most organizations strive for one or another form of accountability there is no one understanding of the term. Edwards and Hulme (1995: 9) affirm that "accountability is generally interpreted as the means by which individuals and organizations report to a recognized authority, or authorities, and are held responsible for their actions." They continue by writing that although most organizations want to be perceived as accountable, it is "...a misnomer to think that some organizations are accountable. Organizations tend to avoid accountability as much as possible." (Edwards and Hulme, 1995: 9).

Edwards and Hulme (1995) sketch what they see as multiple levels of possible accountability. *Functional accountability*, refers to the responsibility for, and use of, resources and the consequent impact of those resources. Success or failure of a project or programme depends on how closely the outcome resembles a project/programmes stated goals (Formal Accountability).

*Strategic Accountability* consists of accounting for the impacts that an NGO's actions have on other organizations and the wider environment in general. A project/programme's resource use is seen as secondary to the long-term relationship and progress towards an agreed vision. Measurement of this type of accountability is subjective and a project/programme's success is dependent on how actors perceive the project's progression rather than accounting for the use of finances (Ibid,1995).

Effective Accountability

Edwards and Hulme write that:

> Effective accountability requires a statement of goals (whether in adherence to certain rules or achievement of identified performance levels), transparency of decision-making and relationships, honest reporting of what resources have been used and what has been achieved, an appraisal process for the overseeing of authority (ies) to judge whether results
are satisfactory and concrete mechanisms for holding to account (i.e. rewarding or penalising) those responsible for performance. (Edwards and Hulme, 1995:9)

Within the development community there has been a trend towards relying on functional accountabilities to monitor and evaluate projects and programmes. Functional accountabilities are used more readily because they are easily quantifiable. Many development projects are undertaken within a short period of time, with relatively limited resources in what many times are highly volatile areas. These conditions not only inhibit the progress of projects but also reverse advances in certain areas. Multiple external forces acting on a project inhibit accountability by diluting it (Edwards and Hulme, 1995).

Organizations in business or government have easily quantifiable objectives of making a profit or being reelected. NGOs on the other hand do not have "...a 'bottom line' against which progress can be measured." (Ibid, 1995: 11). The objective of many NGOs is to attempt to change behaviour in society, the success or failure of which is open to much interpretation. While the functional accountability of an NGO’s work is usually easily accounted for, the strategic accountability of subjective goals makes accountability difficult. Tandon (1995) suggests that although there is a great deal of talk about different accountabilities, the reality, in most situations, is that it all comes down to finances because they are easily quantifiable.

One important aspect of NGO accountability that is often overshadowed by a financial focus is accountability to its own governance. An NGO’s governance system revolves around its vision, mission and strategy, which determine how it relates internally and to the outside world. Governance determines the rules and boundaries which form the basis of its accountability and guide the approach to development, the use of resources and aims of the organization. (Tandon, 1995).

While an NGO’s governance decides the parameters which define its role and potential impact within the community, accountability to civil society demands that the "...norms, rules and styles of functioning that match standards of being a good civic institution" are pursued (Tandon 1995: 48). NGOs should ensure that their primary accountability is to the community and should attempt to minimize conflict between the NGO’s desires, the desires of the donor and those of the community. Many times though, accountability to the community, to the NGO’s mission and to the donor mission, fall into discord with one another.
Accountability is ensured when NGOs practice good governance which:

... ensures that programmes follow the requirements of the NGO mission; promotes a performance orientation and accountability in the institution; and requires that the values (integrity, participation, professionalism, quality and commitment), statutes (reporting and legal standard procedures) and norms of socially concerned civic institutions are articulated, practiced and promoted. An effective structure and process of governance in an NGO is absolutely critical for ensuring accountability in a wider sense. (Tandon, 1995: 48).

Transparency of mission, goals, processes and use of resources makes it easier for communities to hold NGOs accountable for their predetermined work but for projects and programmes to be truly successful, NGOs must involve communities in determining the work to be carried out.

Many times a disjuncture between what is best for the donor or NNGO and what is best for the community happens outside of the community. People sitting on executive boards in developed countries make most of the important decisions surrounding donor or NNGO policy and programming. These boards act as gatekeepers helping to determine what is, and what is not, in the best interest of the NGO. Boards keep the NGO on track as defined in their vision statement but fail to consider those who are the most dependent and have the most to lose.

Smillie contends that:

They are accountable to their boards and members. This accountability may be weak or strong, as it can be in the private sector. They are accountable to their staff. They are accountable to their donors both small and large. Failure to please will mean a reduction in income. They are accountable to the media, upon which they rely for much of their publicity...They are accountable - perhaps in most cases more in aim than in deed--to their beneficiaries. They are accountable to their peers, an accountability sometimes expressed as a code of conduct. (Smillie, 1997: 575)

Upward Downward Accountability

Edwards and Hulme (1995) write that NGOs and GROs can be answerable both upwards and downwards. Downward accountability is generally to staff, partners, and supporters. Upward accountability is to trustees, donors and government.
Accountability is ensured when NGOs practice good governance which:

... ensures that programmes follow the requirements of the NGO mission; promotes a performance orientation and accountability in the institution; and requires that the values (integrity, participation, professionalism, quality and commitment), statutes (reporting and legal standard procedures) and norms of socially concerned civic institutions are articulated, practiced and promoted. An effective structure and process of governance in an NGO is absolutely critical for ensuring accountability in a wider sense. (Tandon, 1995: 48).

Transparency of mission, goals, processes and use of resources makes it easier for communities to hold NGOs accountable for their predetermined work but for projects and programmes to be truly successful, NGOs must involve communities in determining the work to be carried out.

Many times a disjuncture between what is best for the donor or NNGO and what is best for the community happens outside of the community. People sitting on executive boards in developed countries make most of the important decisions surrounding donor or NNGO policy and programming. These boards act as gatekeepers helping to determine what is, and what is not, in the best interest of the NGO. Boards keep the NGO on track as defined in their vision statement but fail to consider those who are the most dependent and have the most to lose.

Smillie contends that:

They are accountable to their boards and members. This accountability may be weak or strong, as it can be in the private sector. They are accountable to their staff. They are accountable to their donors both small and large. Failure to please will mean a reduction in income. They are accountable to the media, upon which they rely for much of their publicity...They are accountable - perhaps in most cases more in aim than in deed--to their beneficiaries. They are accountable to their peers, an accountability sometimes expressed as a code of conduct. (Smillie, 1997: 575)

Upward Downward Accountability
Edwards and Hulme (1995) write that NGOs and GROs can be answerable both upwards and downwards. Downward accountability is generally to staff, partners, and supporters. Upward accountability is to trustees, donors and government.
Although NGOs should be responsible to their own mandates and their communities, increasing competition for donor funds may force NGOs upward, and away from community accountability. In a drive to please donors, NGOs have increasingly used performance measurement tools which may:

...distort accountability by overemphasizing short-term quantitative targets, standardizing indicators, focusing attention exclusively on individual projects or organizations, and favouring hierarchical management structures - a tendency to 'accountancy' rather than 'accountability'; audit rather than learning. (Edwards and Hulme, 1995: 13).

Many NGOs are required to use performance measurement tools because donors pressure them to show results in short periods of time. Upward accountability threatens transparency by focusing attention on accomplishments rather than mistakes, which is where the greatest amount of learning is done. Although performance measurement tools are effective at measuring how closely pre-planned projects are followed, they fail when it comes to understanding the long-term impact or success of development projects and programmes.

In an effort to mediate the effects of upward accountability, Commonwealth governments, donors and NGOs formulated an NGO code of conduct. The code was established in 1995 to outline guidelines for good policy and practice. Its principal purpose was to ensure that NGOs remained accountable to their communities. Although the code could have been a useful tool for NGOs to mediate upwards accountability, it found limited success because as soon as the document had been endorsed by the Commonwealth heads of government it was violated by Canada (Smillie, 1997). This raises important questions about the reciprocity of accountability and the power of donors to evade accountability. NGOs are many times required to be accountable to their donors, and to some extent their recipient communities but neither Southern NGOs nor recipient community have the power to enforce accountability on their donors or Northern NGOs.

Multiple Accountabilities
As stated earlier, on their own, individual accountabilities are weak and ineffective. As Smillie contends, NGOs are many times perceived as not being accountable to anyone but in fact have multiple accountabilities. Together accountabilities are a strong influence on the conditions surrounding the functioning of an NGO. When accountabilities are in balance organizations can
juggle various influences on their work or environment. Multiple accountabilities can have a
positive influence on the NGO allowing it to manage the concerns of different actors (1997: 575). Dangers can arise when the balance is offset by one accountability taking precedence over others. Such imbalances could arise out of donor requirements or conditions taking precedence over community interests. Such a move would place into question the independence of the NGO and could have negative effects on the community.

In an era of increased interaction between various groups and increased influence by actors outside of the NGO, the degree of autonomy is directly related to, or influenced by, its ability to maintain control over the direction of its programme. As interactions between donors, governments, recipient communities and other NGOs increase, the networks, whether large or small, act as an influence on one another. The larger the network the more limited an NGO’s accountability to one actor and the greater an NGO’s ability to pick and choose players it wishes to involve itself with (Edwards and Hulme: 1992). Therefore, one possible answer to upward accountability may be found in promoting multiple accountabilities which could act to offset more powerful actors.

Many times the environment surrounding development projects and programmes is highly volatile and not especially conducive to forms of accountability outside of financial areas. Unpredictable project and programme outcomes mean that donors and NGOs tend to avoid most forms of accountability. Generally, the form of accountability most sought after is ‘functional accountability’. Strategic accountability is often avoided. Donors and NGOs need to be constantly aware of how accountabilities are affecting project and programme development. If NGOs place too great an emphasis on upwards accountability then these organizations may lose sight of the needs of the target group. Increasing competition between NGOs or a heavy dependence on one donor may force NGOs towards upward accountability. To counter the effects of upward accountabilities, multiple accountabilities may dilute the effect by spreading out reliance and dominance of any one actor. It could also allow weak actors to form alliances against stronger powers.
CHAPTER 3
CASE 1

Introduction

I begin this chapter by giving a brief explanation of the effect of war on Mozambican children. Rebuilding Hope’s organizational history is then recounted and a description of the main components of their project on Ilha Josina Machel is presented. I subsequently report on interview findings and conclude by examining RE’s project practices - specifically participation, capacity building, accountability and partnership - against the theory as explored in the previous chapter.

The war in Mozambique had a devastating effect on children. Some estimates place the number of child deaths under the age of 15 at 1 million or 45% of the total deaths during the conflict. A recent report on the use of child soldiers in Southern Africa states, “In a situation of total vulnerability, many Mozambican children became victims and instruments of acts of war. Young children were forced to fight, and became targets and preferred victims of kidnappings, torture, abuse, rape and forced labour, in war zones as well as in areas of dislocated populations, and even in refugee camps.” (Bennet et al., 1999: 125). It is not known how many children were used in the conflict. Estimates by UNOMOZ (post 1992) place the number of soldiers under the age of 18 at 25,498. But as Miguel Mausse indicates (1999) this number should be significantly higher because after the peace accord of 1992 many children on RENAMO and FRELIMO bases fled and either returned to their homes or were integrated into one of the reunification programmes. They were therefore not accounted for in the UNOMOZ statistics.

The effect of more than two decades of violence on children has had serious consequences. Exposure to single or repeated acts of violence forces a child into a traumatized state. Symptoms include nightmares, bed-wetting, withdrawal, fear, and depression. In Western language these children suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). While an in-depth study of the different types and treatment of such disorders is outside of the parameters of this paper, it may be useful to mention that there are many different understandings and approaches, both Western and African, to confront these disorders.
Organizational History

Since 1993, Rebuilding Hope (RE) functioned under the umbrella of the Mozambican Association of Public Health (AMOSAPU). Their main travail at this time was to treat refugees who were suffering psychological disturbances. In September of 1993 the director of RE, Ephraim Junior, organized the second congress on "Children, War and Persecution" held in Hamburg, Germany. Following the congress he traveled around Germany and presented lectures on Mozambique’s situation in an attempt to secure funding for RE’s work. Unsuccessful, he returned to Mozambique and continued his work with people traumatized by the war.

When, in 1994, refugees started returning to the rural areas, RE, in consultation with Save the Children, the Red Cross and UNICEF, decided to relocate part of their project to lilia Josina Machel, an area where over 200 children had been forced to become soldiers. RE’s goal was to help former child soldiers reintegrate into their island community. After a number of preliminary visits to the island RE realized that there was already a network of traditional and religious healers and village elders who were working with and supporting the former child soldiers. RE initiated discussions with community members already working with the children in an attempt to understand and offer additional psychological help to the youth.

The first few years of work brought with it great frustration on the part of RE because the community did not recognize the psychologists as having the capacity to solve the children’s psychological problems. They believed that traditional healers were the experts in this field and RE could use its resources more efficiently by providing material support to the community. Although RE recognized significant deficiencies in infrastructure and economic opportunities on the island, they did not have sufficient resources to redress them.

In an attempt to aid the paucity of economic opportunities available to the residents and gain the trust and support of the community, RE attempted to create youth self-help groups. The NGO had no previous experience in this area and had considerable trouble forming the appropriate structures to accommodate these groups. RE continued its activities on the
island using the limited resources at its disposal, and at the same time, continued its search for additional funding.

In 1994, Bread for the World became RE's first major donor contributing in the area of 30,000 USD a year. In combination with soft donors, Bread for the World's support allowed RE to slowly expand its psychotherapy and material support activities. Bread for the World provided training in project impact management and made consultants available for project consultations and institutional planning. As the project progressed RE's activities gained increasing media exposure in Germany.

**RE Activities on Ilha Josina Machel**

In 1996, Médico Internacional, a German NGO, approached Rebuilding Hope with the aim of funding their activities on the island. After meetings with RE and the community on Ilha Josina Machel, Médico Internacional wrote a proposal for a 29 month project, which included funding from the German Ministry of Cooperation (BMZ). The proposal was titled 'An integrated Psycho-Social Assistance and Rehabilitation Approach to Traumatized Youth on Ilha Josina Machel in Maputo Province, Mozambique.'

The project identified four principal components to be undertaken:

A. The development of an integrated psycho-social and psychotherapeutic approach, placing a high importance on cooperation between psychologists, local health workers, religious leaders and traditional healers.

B. Improvement of primary education through the construction of schools and training of teachers in the recognition of post-traumatic stress disorder in children.

C. Creation of socio-economic opportunities targeted at youth so as to increase their self-esteem and provide basic training in agricultural and fishing techniques.

D. The promotion and strengthening of the national partner (RE) in its advocacy activities and in the fulfillment of the project objectives. (Médico Internacional, 1997)

Activities were to be carried out by the national partner (RE), the community and suitably competent Mozambican entities with support from Médico Internacional.

Increased funding allowed RE to scale up its operations. In 1994 RE personnel consisted of four individuals, falling to three in 1996. As the project gained speed with the infusion of
funding from Médico Internacional, the NGO grew and by 1998 employed 16 people. In addition to the NGO's new staff, twenty-three activists were also managed by the NGO.

The project was divided into the provision of material elements and psycho-social therapy. The livelihood support component was to complement psycho-social activities.

The role of the activists was to help train the youth in traditional farming and fishing techniques. Many of the activists were prominent members of the community i.e. the bishop and teachers. It was thought that money made from the sale of crops and fish would provide both activists and youth with a sustainable income. A monthly stipend was awarded to the activists until such time as their daily work became economically viable. The idea was that as the project progressed their activities would become self-sufficient providing both youth and activists with an income.

In addition to the youth being trained by the activists the project also called for:

- Individual and group psychotherapy sessions
- Training in cement block-making and sewing
- Art therapy/art education activities
- Weekly visits to affected children and their families
- The construction of seven school rooms
- Provision of livestock to four teachers so as to help them become economically self-sufficient
- Training youth in livestock rearing techniques as well as use and maintenance of the tractor
- Inform and educate the population about the problems faced by children traumatized by war and attempt to gain influence in areas regarding the use of children in conflicts. (Medico International, 1997).

Research

Most of the following information was gathered during very frank and open interviews with the management and staff of Rebuilding Hope. Their frankness is directly related to their desire to understand both their success and failures. Any discussion of contentious issues surrounding Médico Internacional or RE should not be misinterpreted as a condemnation
but as an effort to learn from their mistakes and develop better institutional capacity and partnership abilities.

The focus of this research involved interviewing RE personnel in Maputo and on the Island of Josina Machel. The researcher also conducted interviews with the community leader and the Bishop (who was also an activista). Additional informal interviews were conducted during the researcher’s two-day visit to the Island. Various attempts were made to contact Médico Internacional personnel in Germany but after an agreement had been made to conduct a phone interview and interview questions were sent to the organization no further contact occurred. The researcher attempted 3 further emails and one phone call without response from the organization. The questions sent to the NNGO are included in appendix B.

**Personnel**

The director of the project recruited and trained seven people to act as psychologists. Due to a lack of qualified personnel in Mozambique candidates with a background in psychopedagogics were used. Six people were employed to manage and work on the material side of operations while an additional three others worked in administration from Maputo.

Three of the six people working on the material side worked in the areas of agriculture and fishing while another two were drivers. The third was a logistician. As previously mentioned 23 community based activistas were used to train the youth in traditional farming and fishing techniques.

**Project Description**

Partnership with Médico Internacional provided Rebuilding Hope with a significant increase in funding enabling them to reach a larger section of the community and increase their access to material resources. It allowed the organization to expand from three people in 1996 to 16 people in 1998. To meet the objectives as outlined in the project, RE had to train six new psychologists and integrate nine other new personnel on the island. They also increased the number of activistas from 14 to 23.
Due to the unique combination of therapeutic and economic activities with traumatized youth, the project was categorized by Médico Internacional as a pilot project. The proposal called for the intensive internal documentation of project activities. Médico international conducted monthly and yearly financial audits, ensuring that funds were being used efficiently and for project purposes. Although RE had received training in Project Impact Management (PIM) from Bread for the World, neither Médico Internacional nor the NGO placed any focus on project impact assessment or monitoring. Two external evaluations were to be completed by an external agency after 12 and 24 months respectively.

In conjunction with RE and the project beneficiaries, Médico Internacional planned the 29 month project. General objectives focused on providing psychological assistance and community rehabilitation to former child soldiers and other children affected by the conflict. Documents outline an integrated approach combining both components to progressively rebuild the cultural, social and economic structures to reintegrate the former child soldiers back into their community. As the principal implementers, RE’s task was to manage and carry out both components of the project.

The project stated on the 1st of June 1997 and continued until October 1999, a total of 29 months

**Project Implementation**

In describing project evolution RE explained that before Médico Internacional became their major donor, Bread for the World was providing training and funding for their operations. Once Médico Internacional became interested in RE, "a kind of bidding war" (Junior, 2000) erupted between the donors. Eventually Médico Internacional was able to secure 900 000 USD to fund the project. These funds were made up from Médico Internacional, the German government and European Community. Efraim Junior believes that Bread for the World was disappointed with RE because, "we were kind of selling ourselves because there was more money..." and that "...we were not really building a partnership with Bread for the World which was based on trust and time.." (Junior, 2000). RE explained that it was under increasing pressure from the community to increase access to material resources and partnering with Médico provided the financial backing to acquire them. The project’s main funder became Médico Internacional.
According to Efraim Junior, Bread for the World argued that the project was theirs because the NNGO had supported it since 1993. Efraim Junior went on to say that during the negotiation process “…it became clear that Médico was trying to give more than Bread for the World and in a way trying to push Bread for the World out.” He attributed Médico Internacional’s actions to two factors. The first was the difficulty to present a project to the German government while parts were still funded by other donors. Efraim Junior believed that Médico Internacional did not want to co-fund a project. Secondly, as Efraim Junior stated during an initial interview:

I really want to believe that donors do projects and give money for projects because they think that the projects are good at helping the people and so on, but in a way I think there is a sort of market where donors compete for the best projects. (Junior, 2000)

Efraim Junior was alluding to the international AID market where trends sometimes force NGOs to compete for donor monies. Interesting or unique projects bring media attention and money to the donor. Efraim Junior believes that Médico Internacional recognized a lack of international attention to issues related to child soldiers and wanted to fill this void. Junior stated that Médico Internacional knew that:

Handicap Internacional was working with physically handicapped people and CARE with refugees and no major organization was working with war traumatized people giving psychological help and so on and I think that Médico saw in us in our work in Mozambique the possibility for Médico to specialize, to present themselves and develop some expertise working with traumatized soldiers… (Junior, 2000).

This expertise would allow Médico to help a section of the population with a real need but it would also give them a comparative advantage over other aid organizations enabling them to find a certain niche in the market.

Partnership

While project documents do mention Médico Internacional’s local ‘partner’ as being AMOSAPU (later known as RE) and outline RE’s responsibilities, it does not detail Médico
Internacional’s involvement other than mentioning that they are the provider of ‘institutional support’ (Médico Internacional, 1997).

The following section looks at RE and Médico Internacional’s relationship by describing their involvement throughout different aspects of the project.

*Capacity Building*

During the early stages of the project there were many indications that suggested that RE was weakly situated to successfully undertake this size and type of project. The NGO was a small organization in terms of funding and personnel. It had a specific, highly specialized expertise working within a limited sector of society in one on one or small group situations. Although being an expert in his field, the director’s poor management training and lack of previous experience with development projects limited his ability to manage and create a well-functioning team. Due to a scarcity of skilled development professionals or psychotherapists, the majority of RE’s new employees had limited training and experience in development work. The lack of any expertise working with subsistence agriculture, farming or construction projects was another significant sign of their capabilities.

Even though the NGO did not have the capabilities to fulfill the objectives as outlined in the project proposal, it was confident that it would be able to either develop a new capacity or contract the required personnel. The proposal stated that Médico Internacional would guarantee that only adequately qualified personnel would be used in the project and that, where possible, there would be a South-South exchange with other similar professional organizations to develop new capacities.

The NGO’s attitude was that it had secured a significant amount of finances from a donor and it was going to make the project work. RE perceived the increased funding as an opportunity to diversify its activities while at the same time improving its capacity. Rebuilding Hope was in effect at the second stage of Korten’s NGO evolution (Korten, 1987). As the NGO attempted to increase the former child soldiers’ and communities’ life strategies, RE focused on small scale and self-reliant development approach. Before the arrival of Médico Internacional’s funding RE was focusing on small scale, and more or less, self-reliant activities. The money RE was managing from Bread for the World was appropriate for the organization’s capabilities at that time. Increased funding through
Médico Internacional forced RE to rapidly reorganize without first building capacity to manage or implement larger scale projects.

Despite many setbacks, RE was able to train and contract personnel to undertake different aspects of the project. RE was not able to create a management capacity either within the project or community. Despite providing direction on financial aspects of the project, Médico Internacional did not contribute any significant project management expertise. Médico Internacional had to account for the financial aspects of the project to its donors, therefore they built RE’s capacity to account for these funds. After being asked if RE had developed a better organizational capacity, one of the project managers replied that “we now have a better capacity because we have fewer people to manage.” (Vango, 2000). In this instance, capacity building could be interpreted as a ‘means’ where training acts to strengthen the NGO in an attempt to implement a defined set of activities.

**Participation**

As discussed in chapter two, the level of genuine participation in project planning, design and implementation has been found to contribute to a project’s success. Genuine participation requires that considerable time and energy be invested not only in the project and community but also in the development of NGO staff. It also requires that community and NGO agree on goals and the methods to reach these goals. Once community members are actively involved in decisions surrounding the project they will be more committed to its outcome.

Although members of RE, Médico Internacional, and *activistas* participated to varying levels during project planning and design there was a noted lack of understanding about overall project goals. RE was primarily interested in the psycho-social components while the *activistas* and youth were more interested in material elements.

**Community Participation**

The *activistas* participated in project planning through initial Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) type meetings to define problems but overall project design was decided by Médico Internacional and RE. The project was implemented by RE, and although the *activistas* and youth worked on different aspects of the project, they were never involved in higher-up decisions concerning implementation.
The *activistas* and youth were expected to develop economic opportunities through the use of resources made available to them. However, no effort was made to develop a capacity within these groups to participate in the management of material resources. Project management was handled primarily by the NGO.

A ten dollar stipend was allocated to the *activistas* and youth in order to help them make ends meet during the initial phase of work on the project. As the agricultural and fishing project created financial returns, the stipend was progressively reduced. As the stipend decreased, the fishing and agricultural projects did not produce the expected economic returns. The youth had difficulty understanding that the money was a stipend and not a salary and as the stipend decreased, so did their effort. They never took ownership of the project and saw it more as an employer-employee relationship. Efraim Junior stated that many former child soldiers and *activistas* saw the material wealth of RE’s employees (watches, glasses, shoes, ability to move back and forth from Maputo, etc.) and continuously tried to persuade the NGO to provide more and more material support and wages.

Increased pressure from the *activistas* and community to focus on material elements took energy away from the psychological component of the project. In the initial phases of the project psychological work was done alongside of the youth in their agro-fishery work but as time went on it was evident that the former child soldiers, understanding their relationship with RE as employer and employee, encumbered RE’s therapeutic activities. The community also never understood what the psychologists were attempting to do. When one community leader was asked who resolved the youth’s psychological problems she answered that the traditional healers and the Bishop did. Although attempts were made to involve traditional healers in the psycho-social aspects of the project, it is not clear to what extent they participated.

**NGO participation**

The majority of the project was implemented directly by the NGO. Both livelihood support and psychological elements of the project were managed by the NGO. The ability of the NGO staff to encourage the participation of the *activistas* and youth in the project was restricted by their own limited experience and time as members of RE’s staff. Most had just
recently been trained and contracted to work for the NGO. Furthermore, the extensive
growth in the NGO’s staff, in such a short time, limited their own capacity to participate in
the management of the project. This made it difficult for the NGO to form a strategy, and
commitment by the staff, to encourage community participation. Even though the project
team was new there were, for example, almost no regular meetings with the director of the
project which further limited staff participation.

NNGO participation
Meanwhile NNGO participation by Médico Internacional was confined to providing finances,
the development and design of project plans and monitoring of NGO finances. Overall,
project participation was encumbered by a lack of an understanding on common objectives
between NGO and community and the capacity of the NGO to reach those objectives. RE’s
ability to meet its goal was impaired by its inability to create an organizational identity which
would have allowed its staff to participate more fully in its activities. As a result of Médico
Internacional’s circumscribed participation, sustainable change within the community was
inhibited.

Accountability
Financial accountability is an important aspect of any project. It ensures that funds are
being used efficiently and effectively. Responsibility between RE and Médico Internacional
was limited to what Edward and Hulme (1995) have termed functional accountability. While
Médico Internacional was interested in the financial management of the funds, RE was not
held accountable for other activities.

The argument could be made that the accountability between RE and Médico Internacional
was not effective because neither party made any effort to explore the progression of the
project as described in the plan. Transparency between the organizations was limited to
financial aspects and prompted by Médico Internacional’s interest in reporting expenses.
Other levels of transparency may have been possible had both organizations formed a
closer relationship. But there was little evidence of a trusting relationship during interviews
with RE. The two project evaluations, as outlined in the proposal, were never conducted by
Médico Internacional.
In this case Edwards and Hulme's (1995, 9) statement that “organisations tend to avoid accountability” holds true. As long as RE was accounting for spending in a reasonable manner and Médico Internacional was providing finances, both avoided further accountability. It may have been that the complex nature of the project was not conducive to any quantifiable measurements but we cannot know this because of the lack of project monitoring and evaluation.

In conclusion there was little effort made by RE to hold Médico accountable or by Médico to hold RE accountable other than in financial areas.

**Project Analysis**

The focus of RE’s project had two objectives. The first was to help former child soldiers reintegrate into their communities through psychological and traditional healing techniques. The second objective was to support the former child soldiers in diversifying their survival strategies.

**Psychotherapy**

In the initial stages of the project RE attempted to integrate both the psychotherapy and (social) livelihood support strategies. This proved to be counter-productive and the two areas were separated. While working with the children and *activistas* it became apparent to RE that the beneficiaries wanted the project to focus more on the livelihood support component.

According to the director of RE, the community never fully understood or believed in what the psychologists were trying to accomplish. Upon their return to the island community, the former child soldiers underwent cleansing rituals with traditional and religious leaders. For the most part, the rituals seemed to have a positive effect on the children and they were welcomed back into the community. However, those children who demonstrated signs of post-traumatic stress disorder after the cleansing ritual had been performed were included in RE’s psycho-social therapy.

Community members believe in the healing powers of traditional and religious leaders and have no real understanding of western concepts of psychology and psychotherapy. As stated earlier when asked who resolved the youth’s psychological problems a community
leader answered that the traditional healers and the Bishop did. Although RE may have gained valuable experience from interactions with former child soldiers, it is still not clear what impact their psycho-social work had on the children. The subjective nature of the work and lack of data makes a quantifiable evaluation of the findings difficult. Furthermore, the training for staff responsible for the psycho-social component was not realistic. Although project documents allocated 3 months to train psychologists, it took over a year for them to competently undertake their work. This left 18 months, out of the 29-month period, during which psychologists could work with the children on the Island. However, that being said, the mere fact that RE was present in the area and was perceived by youth as offering support may have represented a significant advantage to the community.

Livelihood Support Component

Opinions vary as to the success of the livelihood support component of the project. Documents reveal little as reporting was done on a yearly basis and focused primarily on the financial aspect of the project. Since there was little review of project content or impact it is difficult to determine the impact of RE’s work.

Activistas trained youth in traditional fishing and farming techniques. An agricultural specialist was hired to review planting and plan an irrigation system. Twenty-seven head of livestock were also purchased to be used in the fields. Classrooms were planned but were only partially built by February of 2000. Results of these activities were not well-documented and, according to project personnel, have not produced sustainable outcomes.

The director of the project and the logistics manager both thought that the project had helped Island residents but that their work was fraught with problems related to the NGO’s lack of capacity. In hindsight, both questioned RE’s ability to manage a project of this magnitude. The director also recognized that the psycho-social segment of the project played a smaller role than he had originally planned. He partially attributed this to material support and training taking precedence over other aspects of the project.

RE acknowledged that their activities neither created adequate management structures nor proper working relationships with the community before, or while, providing physical resources. RE also saw the provision of a stipend as a negative influence on the project. Both NGO interviewees believe that the project participants never understood the purpose
of the stipend, interpreting it as a salary. The *activistas* and youth were never encouraged to take the economic support side of the project on as their own and this resulted in a project which was not sustainable.

It was difficult to determine the actual sustainability of the project because of the confusion over how many children were still receiving sustenance from the project. One leader reported 15 youth while another reported over 150. When queried about this discrepancy, the NGO employee in charge of logistics replied that it was not clear how many youth were still being helped but he thought it was much less than the highest figure given. Through conversations and field observations it was clear that materials were not being adequately managed or used by the community.

Both the community leader and bishop agree that the project was a success because RE had provided a stipend, tractor, pumps, irrigation equipment, block-making machines, livestock and various other goods to support the youth. Community leaders also thought that it was a good idea that there was someone helping the youth with economic activities. When asked what the community felt now that the project was over, community leaders replied that there was a great sadness because the children were no longer being helped.

**Analysis**

While the increased funding expanded RE’s activities, it also created a great strain on the NGO. The short 29-month time frame and limited organizational capacity created a rush atmosphere in the NGO. RE’s drive to train six new psychologists and manage nine other new personnel was too much for the original team to handle. Having to select, train and manage individuals lacking either rural or psycho-social work experience while at the same time managing a development project was a difficult task.

The local health centre nurse, who was not involved in the project, said that a management capacity should have been created before the money was introduced in such large quantities. For many international organizations 900 000 USD is a relatively small amount but as the community nurse explains, “The money for western people is not a lot, but for an extremely poor community it is more than they can handle in such a short period of time” (Ilionor, Community Nurse). Although the community never directly managed the money,
the effects of such a significant infusion of resources into such a poor community, was noticeable.

The director of RE now realizes that the team should have been ready before project funding commenced. Building a team while organizing, planning and implementing a joint psycho-social and development project was too much. Without access to the appropriate management experience or support, RE did not have the ability to successfully manage this level of organizational change. Instead of progressively developing towards the project objectives the team was forced to continuously manage crisis.

By not creating management structures within the community, RE failed to make the project self-sustainable. A management committee constituted of community members was only formed by RE in August of 1999, two months before the end of the project. Community members state that the project ended because RE left. To have avoided this dependence on RE as a provider and implementer, movement towards self-management should have been made from the beginning of the project.

Because RE had continuously dealt with the project in a crisis manner the NGO never had the chance to consolidate its experience into organizational knowledge. RE had intensive contact with the donor but this always pertained to financial aspects of the project. RE was lax in its reporting of the project’s progress which could have provided useful insight into its own activities. Furthermore, as pressure to advance the material aspects of the project grew, RE worried that if it did not fulfill the donor’s expectations its funding would be pulled. Therefore they rushed to complete the material component as outlined in the project.

The termination of the project was clearly outlined in project documents but RE was disappointed and in some ways surprised that it ended. In many ways RE expected the project to continue. “In a way I think that to all of us it becomes a kind of collective amnesia, that they didn’t want to believe that the project was going to be over after the 30 months and the colleagues themselves didn’t want to believe that the project was going to be over because they were going to lose their jobs.” (Efraim Junior, 2000) Whether or not the NNGO encouraged the RE to believe that they were going to receive additional funding after the 29 month period ended is not clear. RE believes that the donor had not adequately
prepared them, just as RE had not adequately prepared the community for the transition towards the conclusion of the project.

The end of the project and termination of Médico Internacional funding threw RE into organizational crisis. Financial constraints forced the NGO to cut staff by half, falling from a high of 16 to 8 people. Organizational crisis was prompted by at least three factors. Moving from a budget of USD 30,000 to over USD 300,000 a year was a complex task for RE. The organization lacked the experience and the capacity to manage this sum of money in such a short period of time. Secondly, their exponential organizational growth was not properly planned nor managed and this, coupled with a lack of support and training from their northern partner, made the accomplishment of their proposed goals extremely difficult. Thirdly, RE’s expertise was primarily in psychological work having a limited capability and experience to undertake community development related activities.

RE now realizes that, although existing staff were experienced and had the capability to undertake the psychological component of the project, they did not possess sufficient capabilities or expertise to provide material goods. To meet their objectives and deadlines RE was required to hire new employees many of whom did not have the skills required to adequately complete the task required of them. This left the NGO to manage a project with significant psychological and material components without first employing a competent staff, building the capabilities or expertise to accomplish their goals.

Secondly, neither RE nor Médico Internacional created an atmosphere or structures to encourage sustainable community participation. RE’s ineffective use of a stipend, top-down management style and inexperienced team inhibited the involvement of the beneficiaries. The NNGO’s focus on financial accountability and lack of significant participation in other areas, limited their ability to influence the outcome of the project.

Thirdly, NGO accountability was restricted to financial areas. No effort was made by the NNGO to perform a mid-term and end of project evaluation. NGO accountability to the community was not structured. Community members would pressure the NGO and the NGO would attempt to meet their demands.
When asked what he thought was the overall impact of the project, the director of the NGO replied:

We cannot replicate what we have done because we have not worked on a systematic base, and so a lot of this information has been lost. Many of the colleagues involved during that time are out of the organization. We wanted to help people solve not only psycho-social problems but also their material problems. With regard to meeting the material deficiency, I think it was a failure. The project didn’t bring the impact we wanted it to. All the projects we had are not continued. The water pumps are in our offices and not being used and a lot of activities that we started are not being continued on their own. We have learned more on how to incorporate networks of traditional and church leaders into a project. We have more information than other organizations that are doing this. We are still completing the schools and the children will no longer have to have classes under the trees. (Efraim Junior, 2000).

CONCLUSION

Médico Internacional and RE’s fundamental problem was that they did not undertake a realistic pre-evaluation of their potential to develop a project of this scope in the limited time available to them. Médico Internacional did not identify potential weaknesses in RE’s ability to deliver, nor did they outline the areas which Médico Internacional would support. The NNGO did not develop sufficient means of monitoring the impact the project was having on the target population and the wider community in general. Both organizations were unable to form the institutions necessary to guarantee sustainability. Finally, their lack of communication in areas other than financial accountability was weak and obstructed a trusting relationship.

As a result of the NGO’s lack of capability and trust in their Northern partner, the communities’ inability to participate and the NNGO’s neglect of any form of accountability outside of financial areas, the formation of a functional partnership was inhibited. Although project documents mentioned partnership, the level of interaction and cooperation between the NGO and NNGO did not even meet the standards of what will later be referred to a contracting partnership model. The ultimate result was an ineffective use of project funds.
CHAPTER 4
CASE 2

Introduction

In this chapter I examine the relationship between Redd Barna and Acção Social. After briefly describing the organizational history of both RB and Acção Social, I draw out the components of capacity building, participation and accountability in an attempt to explore their partnership. I then analyze the period surrounding the shift in programming precipitated by Redd Barna Mozambique’s (RBM) strategic planning process and compare both partners perception of that shift.

Save the Children was founded in 1919 as a result of the famine conditions in Europe immediately following the First World War. It is a non-governmental organization, independent of political party or religion, working for the rights of the child. Redd Barna Norway’s (RBN) vision “....is a world in which children's rights are fully respected and met in accordance with the United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of the Child, and in which children's opportunities to contribute towards the creation of a good society are acknowledged.” (RBN Web).

Redd Barna’s (Save the Children-Norway) primary areas of activity are: developing knowledge about children’s conditions and needs; sponsoring practical development and support programmes and disseminating the experience gained; influencing public opinion and decision-makers (SCF Web).

As a member of the Save the Children Alliance, Redd Barna Mozambique (RBM) has been working in Mozambique since 1986. The RBM mission revolves around the following three elements:

- To have all Mozambican children receive the services that their rights guarantee.
- To improve Mozambicans knowledge and promote their active participation in the recognition and support of child rights as outlined in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.
- Improve children’s participation and ability to make decisions on issues which affect their lives.
The principal strategy to achieve this mission is to work with and through institutions and organizations, both governmental and non-governmental that have compatible values and missions.

Redd Barna states that the organization "recognizes that it cannot achieve its objectives without the interest and participation of other interested groups pursuing the issue of increased quality of life for marginalized and deprived children." (Redd Barna, 1996: 3). This sets out from the start Redd Barna’s dedication to developing long-lasting partnerships based on the values of equality, transparency, openness, mutual respect and trust, negotiation and mutual accountability.

History

In 1986, recognizing the need for humanitarian assistance due to the continuing hostilities between RENAMO rebel forces and FRELIMO government troops, Redd Barna began emergency operations in Mozambique through its offices in Zimbabwe. Attempting to better address the increasing need for support, Redd Barna Mozambique (RBM) was formed.

As the country continued to stabilize, following the peace agreement of 1992 and general elections in 1994, RBM undertook a child-centered community-based project which attempted to improve economic, educational and health situations for children in difficult situations.

In 1996, RBM launched a strategic planning process, in consultation with present and potential partners, to determine the future direction of their activities in Mozambique. The outcome of the planning process was a programme document that outlined the areas that Redd Barna would lend its support from 1998-2001. The basis for the programme was the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child signed by Mozambique on the 26th April, 1994. RBM’s new plan represented a shift in its previous emergency and development activities in Mozambique.

The strategic plan detailed areas where RBM (1996) has agreed to lend its support.

- The psycho-social rehabilitation of children in emergency situations
- Basic education
- Promotion of child rights
- Improved children health (Redd Barna Mozambique, 1996)

RBM has committed itself to assist, through organizational and institutional support, organizations with a similar vision. RBM maintains that it will achieve its vision through the provision of technical and managerial capabilities and resources to its partners.

Similarly, the Mozambican government 1995-1999 programme announced their dedication to the promotion of the rights of the child as a 'fundamental priority' and outlined various areas of activity which included:

- The improved access and participation of 'children in difficult situation' in schools.
- The encouragement of community-based child-centered programmes with the intention of promoting and protecting child development.
- The strengthening of government and community capacity with respect to the rights of the child as defined in the UN convention. "Particular emphasis should be paid to the healthy and harmonious development of the child in the family. The government also recognizes that household poverty is one of the key factors in the destabilization of family life" (Translated from Redd Barna National Strategy, 1998-2001: 5).

After analyzing the specific competencies, strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and risks of both RBM and their potential partners, alternative strategies were outlined and agreed upon by the organizations represented at the strategic planning process.

Policies set out by the strategic plan allow RBM and its partners to develop specific projects within the programme parameters. RBM actively consults with the provincial government to avoid project overlap. Once specific project proposals are submitted to RBM, project leaders review proposals to ensure that they follow RBN's mission, then send the proposal to the National office for review and finally to Norway for approval. Once Norway approves the project, RBM sets out a monthly budget and writes out an agreement that states the responsibilities of each partner.
RBM Activities in Sofala Province

RBM has programmes in both the Manica and Sofala provinces of Mozambique. In 1998, RBM's office in the town of Dondo (see map) and their partner Acção Social Sofala, a department of provincial government, began implementing a portion of the National Strategic Programme 1998-2001.

The agreement focuses on a four-year plan of cooperation between RBM and Acção Social and outlines the responsibilities of each partner. These include, but are not limited to, the objective of the accord, activities and resources, RBM obligations, Provincial Government of Sofala (GPS) obligations, and complementary accords (which establish financial, technical, administrative and legal responsibilities, mechanisms and forms of implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of each of the signatory partners). Like any legal document the agreement also states the terms of engagement, duration and venues/method for dispute negotiation.

Each project operates under the umbrella of the Strategic Plan and must detail the responsibilities of each partner and outline the problem, target group, location, objectives, and expected results.

RBM asserts that while they undertake to accompany their partners in the development of project activities, RBM gradually encourages them, as their capacity increases, to assume the lead and take full ownership of the programme.

Research

Most of the following information was gathered during open-ended interviews with the management and staff of Redd Barna -Dondo and Acção Social personnel in both Dondo and their head office in Beira. Their frankness is directly related to their desire to understand both their successes and failures. Any discussion of contentious issues surrounding Redd Barna or Acção Social should not be misinterpreted as a condemnation but as an effort to learn from their mistakes and develop better institutional capacity and better partnership abilities.

The country representative in Chimoio provided the researcher with contact information for the project manager in Sofala province. After traveling to RBM-Sofala offices in Dondo, the
researcher interviewed the project manager, two field researchers and an Acção Social representative. Interviews were then conducted with three Acção Social personnel at the provincial office in Beira.

**Personnel**

RBM-Dondo project and field officers are Mozambicans who have worked with RBM for a number of years. These RB employees have received training in programme management and implementation, logistics, financial and programme planning. At first RBM worked directly with the community. It has slowly withdrawn from this area, however, and now focuses on supporting their partners in their work. RBM now only visit community projects after advising their partners.

RBM provides funding, capacity building and support for their programmes, while Acção Social, a new government department, works in association with RBM to plan and implement projects. RBM shares technical capacities, ways of working, and organizational experiences with Acção Social. Acção Social provides local expertise and knowledge. The partnership, as one employee of Acção Social told me, "...is an evolution, a combination of efforts and different experiences to resolve different problems." (Combane, 2000).

**Programme Description**

Redd Barna and Acção Social partnership evolved during Redd Barna's long time involvement in the Beira-Chimoio corridor which crosses through the provinces of Manica and Sofala. Redd Barna's activities in the area have progressed from emergency response, to community development, to its present involvement in advocacy and awareness raising. The organization's evolution closely follows Korten's (1987) three stages of organizational development.

Although the emergency and community development phase of RBM activities were significant periods in its history, this analysis will only examine its more recent activities.

**Implementation**

RBM's earliest activities were decided by the flow of the emergency situation. Over time, these activities evolved into community-centered projects. From 1994 to 1998 RBM worked on community development projects but changed directions with the strategic plan of 1998-
2001. Strategic planning was employed by RBM to realign activities to be more in sequence with Redd Barna Norway’s international mandate. This was the first time that RBM employed strategic management techniques to determine and plan a programme.

Redd Barna Norway supports programmes surrounding children in armed conflict, children and poverty, children and education, sexually abused children, the UN Convention for the Rights of the Child, and structural causes for violation of children’s rights. Through the strategic planning process, RBM analyzed its capacity to support various projects and determined that they should focus on projects in the areas of psycho-social rehabilitation, basic education, the promotion of the UN convention on the rights of the child, and improved child health. RBM-Dondo decided to support programmes surrounding child advocacy and basic education. Under those categories, projects involving child abuse, child sexual abuse, child advocacy and child labour were eligible for support.

At the outset, the change in direction brought about by the strategic planning process was a challenge for both RBM-Dondo and their partner. Prior to the 1998-2001 plan RBM personnel had been directly involved in project implementation. RBM’s new approach was to encourage its local partner to take the lead in project development, allowing them to develop their own capacity with technical backing and financial support from RBM. At first the strategy met resistance when RBM’s partner organization thought that RBM was using them to do its work. Acção Social saw RBM employees as better paid and trained and concluded that RBM was better equipped to manage the project activities. RBM-Dondo project leaders explain that because they were an international organization it was unrealistic for them to undertake direct activities because RBM could eventually withdraw from the area and leave the partner on its own. Project sustainability, it was argued, was better guaranteed if the local partner managed activities with RBM’s support. The partner agreed to assume project responsibility.

**Partnership**

Redd Barna has made significant efforts to define and explain its understanding of partnership to potential partners. It has developed guidelines and criteria for selecting partners. Once an arrangement has been reached, an agreement outlining the various responsibilities of each actor is signed.
In a document titled *A Guide for Partnership*, Redd Barna has outlined what it sees as the essential components of a partnership:

- Partnership is an approach to work which is an expression of the partner institution's desire to work according to a set of values.
- A partnership should be an equitable, collaborative working relationship voluntarily entered into by two or more institutions (partners) which is characterized by mutual trust, respect, participation, commitment, learning, reciprocity, transparency and voluntaristic, negotiated decision-making. Partners should only ask of the other institution what they are prepared to do themselves.
- All partnerships should, therefore, be established through negotiation of the respective roles and contributions of each partner. This negotiated agreement should always be written down and should form part of the "contract" between the partners.
- Partnership should be viewed as a dynamic relationship which can change over time. The early stages of a partnership may be more of a commitment to work according to agreed values. As the relationship develops these values must be reflected in the way the institutions work together. Partnership relationships should be regularly reviewed by the partner institutions to avoid the development of dependency. (Redd Barna Partnership, 1996: 3)

Redd Barna aims at providing a 'comprehensive partnership' which means they supply professional as well as financial support.

**Capacity Building**

Capacity building is undertaken with the explicit objective of making the partner independent. Since Acção Social was a relatively new department there was a significant need to increase their employee skills base. RBM trained government staff in project planning, the planning cycle, accounting processes, drafting contracts, price analysis, invoicing, and problem analysis. On the project content side of the project, Acção Social staff were trained in a child rights package, which was based on the United Nations convention on the Rights of the Child. The training package was developed from meetings between UNICEF, Redd Barna and ministerial level Mozambican government officials.
During project implementation there was a conscious effort on the part of RBM to progressively relinquish the project's development to Acção Social. By continuously allowing its partner control over the project, RBM has encouraged the government department's evolution. As the project progressed RBM and Acção Social determined training needs by identifying weak areas and RB provided its partner with the necessary instruction.

Both RBM and Acção Social are evolving much in the way which Korten (1987) describes. RBM has moved from emergency, to small-scale development, to third generation sustainable systems of development. Acção Social has progressed much in the same manner but with RBM acting as a catalyst in its development.

**Participation**

Within the parameters set out by the 1998-2001 Strategic Plan both RBM and its partners participate in the planning, programming and implementation of the programme. RBM has encouraged Acção Social to take the lead in project decision-making and implementation. Acção Social sometimes attempts to work in areas beyond RBM's mission, which creates friction between the partners, but their detailed agreement and contract enforces goals and encourages transparency. RBM attempts to foster open communication, which enables potential conflict to be resolved through discussion.

Acção Social promotes community participation through the formation and training of 'nucleus groups'. Acção Social supervises nucleus groups to ensure that work is progressing according to plan. There are also groups formed within the schools to work on child rights. Each of these community groups interact with Acção Social to voice problems and opinions.

During discussions with Acção Social personnel in Dondo and Beira, it was apparent that there was a very open and frank relationship with RBM. Projects were developed jointly and although there was at times friction between the two groups, open communication resolved these obstacles. It was also visibly apparent that there was a great deal of trust between the partners.
Accountability

The programme’s financial accountability is promoted by training Acção Social personnel in monitoring and accounting procedures. Although RBM personnel had not received any formal monitoring training they do track projects informally through on-site visits.

Transparency and accountability are guaranteed through the disclosure of the budget and the management of funds according to agreements. During the initial phases of the partnership friction arose between the partners over the monitoring of finances. As RBM allocated funds it also wanted to monitor Acção Social’s spending. Acção Social complained that RBM was acting like policemen, micro-managing their activities. RBM justified its actions by explaining that RBM had a mandate to account for all funds and sometimes needed to act as controller and other times as facilitators.

A close working relationship, open communication and trust also act to foster project accountability. Redd Barna is accountable to Acção Social through not only their contractual relationship but also the trusting relationship which has developed through years of interaction within the province. Each party knows and understands the parameters of the relationship and their respective responsibilities. Redd Barna co-operates with Acção Social and gears capacity building and participation to facilitate accountability.

Programme Analysis

Outlining its concept of partnership gives Redd Barna the flexibility to support various types of relationships. The basic component that Redd Barna looks for in its partner organizations is that they share the same vision and values. RBM has been able to build capacity and encourage participation in its projects while at the same time fostering project accountability.

While the projects themselves seem to encourage participation, capacity building and accountability and seems to represent a partnership approach, it is not clear to what degree the Strategic Planning Process, which determined the programme focus, did the same.

Acção Social has worked with Redd Barna since 1994. Both NGO and government department have been able to develop a relationship based on the goal of improving the situation of children in Mozambique. The current child rights programme attempts to
address their goal in a significantly different way than the previous programme. The strategic plan allows Acção Social to build additional capabilities and encourages project participation and accountability but important questions have been raised concerning the programme focus and how well this is suited to the Mozambican reality.

Prior to RBM adopting the strategic planning process, Redd Barna Norway (RBN) used it to aid in determining its international objectives. RBN’s international mission attempts to address children’s situation in many different contexts throughout the world. Its vision, mission and values reflect the diversity of challenges facing children around the world. RBM adopted RBN’s international vision and, in consultation with its international partners, designed appropriate responses to local situations.

As already mentioned, RBM’s strategic planning process resulted in the evaluation of options open to RBM and its partners. RBM’s team considered their own abilities and evaluated their capacity to provide support within their financial and operational limitations. The team consulted communities (including children), current and potential partners, and their own personnel. RBM looked at the structure of organizations within its area of expertise and determined the best areas of support.

Some at Acção Social have begun to question Redd Barna’s programme focus on the basis of the country’s present economic and social reality. Although the government voiced a desire to support child rights, in a climate where 70% of the population is living below absolute poverty (RBM National Programme Strategy, 1996:4), the support of child rights through advocacy activities may not be the most appropriate use of development aid. The areas which Redd Barna had formerly supported i.e. health, agriculture, education, infant development, credit and income management, may, in this economic climate, have been a better use of limited resources.

Although government departments were consulted during the Strategic Planning Process there was a perception that RBN had decided on its own, “from one minute to the next” (Dixon, 2000), to change directions in its programme focus. This shift occurred as Acção Social was attempting to secure additional funding for new health programmes. Government personnel working on the previous programme were apparently told by RBM that information was received from Oslo and that the current programme would end (Dixon,
2000). Some Acção Social personnel believe that the previous programme better addressed the 'root of the problem' more efficiently by directly aiding the entire family and child through an economic support project. Acção Social does not disagree that the child rights programme is necessary but believe that it is better to address the area of child's survival first.

One could justify Redd Barna's programme focus on the commitment that the government entered into by signing the international agreement on the rights of the child. But then again, in 1994, the government entered into a plethora of international agreements that it does not have the resources or capability to honour. It could also be that after the strategic planning process concluded, RBM decided that it did not have sufficient resources to continue or expand an economic support-type programme. It would have been extremely costly to expand these types of activities outside of the Beira corridor to other, more remote, areas. This would have presumably required an increase in RBM funding.

Conversely, Redd Barna's programme is not only helping the government respect and support the international agreement through the promotion of child rights but is also providing its government partners with much needed training and financial/technical support. In addition, it allows the government to develop a capacity to later elaborate its own programmes.

Acção Social is aware that RBM has priorities and is accountable to its own donors. It perceives that RBM is having difficulty securing funding for economic types of programmes. Redd Barna is able to function as an aid organization and can guarantee its existence in the international arena because it is working in an area which hard and soft donors regard as worthy of their support. Child Rights is an important topic in the West and financial support for programmes and projects is forthcoming. Some at Acção Social, believe that when war subsides in developing nations, people in developed countries have problems understanding that although the conflict is over there is still a real need to address the day-to-day struggles of a country in development. It is difficult to raise funds for a country that is not experiencing immediate problems and people think, "...there's no war in Mozambique so its OK!" (Dixon, 2000).
Since 1994, RBM and Acção Social have developed a relationship through open communication between the people working on the ground. In 1998, RBM went through a process of strategic planning and changed its area of activity away from economic support to child rights advocacy. According to RBM the shift was done in an inclusive manner and incorporated various actors' opinions. Some Acção Social personnel believe that although child advocacy is necessary, they see the shift in programme focus as prompted by outside forces who may not adequately understand the root of Mozambique’s problem. They see RBM struggling to secure funding for programmes in non-conflict areas and attribute the shift to these conditions.

Conclusion

Most agree that the partnership between Redd Barna and Acção Social has benefited both organizations. Acção Social has increased its capacity through the training and guidance provided by RBM. Project participation of both the community and Acção Social has been promoted to such an extent that RBM is working towards the explicit goal of ceding project control to the government department. RBM has maintained a high degree of accountability by following the structure and details of the agreement. Having an office in the area also allowed RBM to maintain a high degree of accountability by following the structure and details of the agreement. Although some disagreements have occurred between the two organizations, they have been resolved through open communication and flexibility of the parties. It is very evident that a trusting relationship has been formed between the partners.

Although partnership at the project level has proved to be highly successful, there has been some debate of its success in programme areas. In 1997, RBM changed the direction of its activities after undergoing a strategic planning process. RBM undertook this process after RBN had done the same for its activities at the international level. RBM did this to ensure that its activities were more inline with RBN. In doing so, RBM changed its focus away from a child-centered family economic support programme, to the support of child rights centered projects. Some, at the Mozambican government level, question the viability of this approach considering the high and extensive poverty levels in the area.
CHAPTER 5
Partnership Analysis
This chapter attempts to analyze partnerships by examining various components of both cases against predetermined partnership models. The structure of this analysis will follow Brown's 1994 study and will extract the advantages and disadvantages of entering into a partnership with other actors. The analysis will use partnership models and compare them against what was found in the researcher's case studies.

As we saw in chapter two, there are many reasons for NNGO and NGO partnerships. The most obvious practical reasons include cost effectiveness, rapid project start up, operation in countries where direct action is restricted, access to local NGO expertise and existing relationships and channels, and improved legitimacy (Brown, 1994).

Other reasons for partnership are primarily grounded on the preference for NGOs or civil society over NNGOs. These include increased involvement of local actors in decisions and control of development, improvement of local capacity through greater participation, improved sustainability and accountability, and increased mutual learning (Brown, 1994).

Defining the parameters of the partnership is usually undertaken by one or both actors and is usually dependent on the level of shared governance between partners. The Indian Partnership Study examined the degree of partnership between actors and focused on the level of influence that each partner had in selecting strategy, goals and systems (Brown, 1994).

As mentioned in chapter two, Brown defined six broad models of development. This study will select different aspects most closely resembling the Mozambican case studies and attempt to analyze various features of each relationship against the Brown models. In doing so, it must be noted that each model represents a project or programme undertaken under very different circumstances and this is not an attempt to pass judgement on these organizations or on their efforts but to explore their partnership experience.

The following model and case outlines principal features of each relationship, the advantages and disadvantages for both NNGO and NGO, and the features of the relationship.
Model 1

Rebuilding Hope and Médico Internacional’s partnership was based on a project of a fixed duration. After both NNGO and NGO agreed on the goals, Médico Internacional wrote up the project proposal. The NNGO provided the agreed funds and RE implemented the project. Médico Internacional did not have any experience in psycho-social work and relied on RE for its expertise in this area. If compared to the Brown International study, case one would most closely resemble Brown’s ‘contracting model’ (see table A: p81)

The main feature of this model is the transfers of money to the NGO for a certain ‘package of services’ . The goals and strategies which determine the services are usually predetermined by the NNGO without a large amount of input from the NGO. Frequently, NNGOs contract NGOs to deliver products and services or to provide their expertise in areas in which NNGOs have had no previous experience.

The advantages for the NNGO are in reduced cost and increased speed of service delivery. Many times NGOs have the experience and networks to deliver specific services, efficiently and effectively, in a shorter period of time at cost savings. A contracting model is useful to an NNGO which has not previously worked in the area and lacks the required expertise to perform on its own. NNGOs following this type of model generally have a limited presence in the field; this can act to preserve the NGO’s autonomy. The contracting model also offers definite lines of authority and time frames (Brown, 1994).

Disadvantages of such a model are found when the NNGO miscalculates the problem or solution and failures are not discovered until after implementation is well underway. The model also inhibits mutual learning between the two partners. Contracting models can also create significant power imbalances when the contract represents a significant portion of the NGOs budget. Power imbalances can force NGOs to change their strategies and ‘distort communication’ while at the same time suppressing important information. Moreover it can “result in inappropriate models of development being instituted without a challenge.” (Brown, 1994: 34).

Although Brown maintains that this type of partnership is useful for disaster relief, it may not be the most appropriate method to develop local capacity (Brown, 1994).
Case 1

Médico Internacional and RE’s partnership resembled Brown’s contracting model (see table B: p81). The following is a description of the advantages and disadvantages encountered by both Médico Internacional and RE during their project.

**Advantages and Disadvantages for Médico Internacional**

The relationship created several advantages for Médico Internacional. It allowed the NNGO to enter into a previously unknown area at a reduced cost. Médico was also able to work in a field in which it lacked knowledge and experience. Disadvantages for the NNGO were few. There was little interaction between Médico Internacional and RE other than monitoring the use of funds. This created a situation where, because the NNGO was not involved in all aspects of the project, the NNGO was not able to help identify and improve project implementation. By not involving itself more closely with RE, Médico Internacional lost many learning opportunities particularly in psycho-social rehabilitation work.

**Advantages and Disadvantages for Rebuilding Hope**

Partnership with Médico Internacional allowed Rebuilding Hope to widen its activities in the area of psycho-social work and opened the possibility of developing new capabilities in areas in which it did not have any significant experience. RE was able to increase the number of people they assisted, with notable results. Greater funding also enabled RE to gain international visibility for its psycho-social work with child soldiers which resulted in being awarded the Human Rights Watch Award in 1999. RE stated that because of its interactions with Médico Internacional it was able to improve financial and accounting capacity.

Disadvantages were found not so much in an unequal relationship but in the inability of Médico Internacional and RE to form any sort of meaningful partnership outside of financial areas. RE personnel had a feeling of dissatisfaction with the results of the project. RE had initially perceived the project as primarily addressing psycho-social issues and community development as a secondary and manageable project component. They expected a closer relationship and greater involvement from their partner. RE also thought that the partnership would continue after the 29-month project ended.
To obtain funding from Médico Internacional, RE changed its mission strategy to include areas in which it had little experience. This, in addition to its rapid growth and infusion of large amounts of money, drastically changed the NGO. Good communication between partners was never created, resulting in an NGO continuously attempting to trouble-shoot problems and meet objectives on its own.

RE felt a great deal of pressure from both the NNGO and the community to carry out and expand the community development portion of the project. Having to infuse a large number of people and resources into a community development project, when its primary expertise and mission was in psychological work, and at the same time manage the complex logistical problems associated with working on a remote island, threatened the NGO’s identity.

Due to an almost total lack of participation by Médico Internacional, many opportunities to redress project problems were lost. RE’s lack of capabilities in community development, management, project planning and human resource development could have been improved through capacity building and training by its partner. RE now says that Médico Internacional’s lack of participation in project implementation was a significant disadvantage.

While financial accountability was strictly carried out, both NGOs avoided all other levels of accountability. Project reporting by RE, and appraisal by Médico Internacional, was either not done or ignored. Effective accountability was never attained because goals were not adequately defined; transparent relationships and honest reporting were not fostered by either organization; and an appraisal process was never instituted nor implemented. Edwards and Hulme’s criteria would seem to have not applied in this case. (Edwards and Hulme, 1995)

The lack of a stable, open and trusting relationship inhibited RE from insisting on additional help from Médico Internacional. RE felt that it was in danger of losing its funding if it could not complete all aspects of the project. The scarcity of time and foresight hindered the use of RE’s previous Project Impact Management (PIM) training. RE could also have made use of its association with LINK, a Maputo based NGO that organizes a variety of training courses for NGOs but for unknown reasons it did not.
RE and Médico Internacional’s understanding of the project appeared to be very different. Although initially conceived as following a contracting type of partnership, where Médico Internacional would provide funds for a ‘package of services’ offered by RE, a portion of project design focused on services which RE was not capable of delivering. The lack of capacity for the implementation of a significant portion of the project necessitated that Médico Internacional either participate in developing RE’s capability to undertake that portion of the project or, at the very least, monitor the progress and evaluate outcomes. Since part of the project did not meet the financial, nor technical/managerial capabilities of the NGO, and the NNGO never properly monitored nor evaluated the progress of the project, the effectiveness of that portion of the project was compromised. Moreover, since a great deal of time and energy was focused on solving community development problems, the psychological component of the project was jeopardized. The result was poorly documented and unsustainable project of questionable benefit to the community.

The partnership model, therefore, was not suitable for either the organizations or the type of project. Funds could have been used more effectively if the skills base of the NGO had been better evaluated and the project designed accordingly. An alternate approach could have had Médico Internacional participate in the development of RE’s livelihood support project, helping to increase RE’s capability in this area.

Although partnership was mentioned in project documents, RE and Médico Internacional’s relationship showed little signs of working towards this goal.
Table A-- Indian Partnership Contracting Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Features of the Model</th>
<th>Advantages and Disadvantages for NNGO</th>
<th>Advantages and Disadvantages for NGO</th>
<th>Features of the Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fee for service exchange</td>
<td>+ Often faster and less costly than direct operations</td>
<td>+ NGO identity preserved if power imbalances not big</td>
<td>Mostly formal interactions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals, strategies, systems mostly set by IPVO</td>
<td>+ NGO provides local knowledge and contacts</td>
<td>+ Clear definition of decision-making authority</td>
<td>Periodic reports by NGO to NNGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No expectation of ongoing relationship</td>
<td>- Minimal NNGO learning</td>
<td>- Little institutional strengthening of NGO</td>
<td>Minimal NNGO presence in field.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common in charity work and disaster relief: not institution building</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Power Imbalance may undermine NGO identity and distort communication</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indian Partnership Study Sept. 1994

Table B -- MODEL OF PARTNERSHIP REBUILDING HOPE and MEDICO INTERNATIONAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Features of the Model</th>
<th>Advantages and Disadvantages for NNGO</th>
<th>Advantages and Disadvantages for NGO</th>
<th>Features of the Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NNGO provides funds</td>
<td>+ NGO provides local knowledge and facts</td>
<td>+ NNGO provides increased funding</td>
<td>Minimal NNGO presence in field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNGO and NGO agree on goals</td>
<td>- Minimal NNGO learning</td>
<td>- Short term funding</td>
<td>Periodic reports by NGO to NNGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNGO with input from NGO designs project</td>
<td>+ Allows NNGO to work where few NGOs exists</td>
<td>- NGO not clear about identity or capacity</td>
<td>Mostly formal interactions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO implements project</td>
<td>+ NGO has local legitimacy and some international recognition</td>
<td>- Little institutional strengthening of NGO</td>
<td>No training, evaluation or monitoring of project evolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should be no expectation of long-term relationship</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Crisis produces threat to NGO identity, culture and strategy</td>
<td>Monitoring of finances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- No project accountability</td>
<td>NNGO not involved in implementation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indian Partnership Study Sept. 1994.

76
Model 2

RBM and Acção Social’s relationship had time to progress over a number of years before they became partners. This allowed both organizations to become familiar with each other’s work and vision of development. Prior to the 1998 programme, the NNGO and government department had been collaborating on emergency and community development projects. After entering into the partnership, Redd Barna provided funding, technical help, material resources and training to their partner. At the outset, Acção Social worked closely with Redd Barna to achieve common objectives then, as control of the programme was progressively ceded to Acção Social, Redd Barna assumed a secondary, supportive role. When compared to Brown’s International partnership models, RBM and Acção Social relationship most closely resembles the ‘collaborative operations’ model. (See table C: p88)

The main feature of the collaborative operations model is that both NNGO and NGO share project governance, while implementation is carried out by the NGO. This model requires a close agreement on goals and vision since decisions are jointly made by NGO and NNGO. Decision making at this level requires that a high degree of trust exists between partners. There is also usually an expectation that the partnership will continue for some time (Brown, 1994). Accountability is promoted through a close interaction between partners and a preexisting trusting relationship.

Advantages for the NNGO include: lower overhead and staff costs, increased efficiency and effectiveness which are a result of preexisting NGO linkages and local knowledge, NNGO legitimacy, and better country knowledge for the NNGO (Brown, 1994).

NGO’s using this model have the advantage of long-term financial support, access to NNGO experience and expertise (both management and technical), greater legitimacy due to their association with an NNGO, and a better understanding of donor operations (Brown, 1994).
Collaborative operations frequently help both NNGO and NGO to improve their administrative, technical and programmatic capacities. However, while there are many advantages to the model, NGOs must guard against losing their distinctiveness against more powerful NNGOs. NNGOs in this model have a great deal of influence over programs and financial issues and should take care not to overstep the fine line between working collaboratively and interference.

Case 2

Redd Barna and Acção Social's partnership resembles Brown's collaborative operations model. The following is an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages encountered by both RBM and Acção Social during their programme. A table outlining the attributes of the Brown model and the attributes found in RBM and Acção Social partnership is included following the analysis.

Advantages and Disadvantages for Redd Barna

Redd Barna's partnership with Acção Social brings with it several advantages for the NNGO. First and foremost it helps implement its mission at the local and provincial scale. The partnership allows Redd Barna to lower its staff and overhead costs and strengthen national and international solidarity networks. By actively involving departments of the Mozambican provincial government, partnership increases Redd Barna's legitimacy. Working through a government department allows Redd Barna to reach a greater number of people for a longer period of time. The NNGO initially kept close contact with Acção Social by way of both financial and project reports, site visits, and an open environment, which encouraged communication and frequent exchanges of information. Through programme co-operation and co-funding with government departments, Redd Barna has access to a much wider network of potential partners and is better able to select those organizations which best match its development vision.

One disadvantage to Redd Barna can also be viewed as an advantage. Although decreased control and access to the project restricts NNGO learning, increased programme control by the local partner allows Redd Barna to explore and move into other areas of operation.
Advantages and Disadvantages for Acção Social

Partnership with Redd Barna creates numerous advantages for Acção Social. First of all, the relationship provided the resources for the creation of a new ministry. Before their partnership, the department did not have any financing and it was only with Redd Barna’s help that Acção Social could undertake activities. Second, Acção Social benefits from Redd Barna’s management and technical expertise. Third, partnership helps Acção Social develop planning and financial capacities through training. Fourth, affiliation with the NNGO increases the government’s legitimacy both in the international community and region. Fifth, the detailed programme description and Acção Social’s involvement in project elaboration gives structure and value to the relationship and acts as a guide to operations and activities. Acção Social now plans and implements its own projects with funding from Redd Barna. This is a capability that Acção Social did not fully possess before the programme was initiated.

Disadvantages for Acção Social were not found so much with the projects or relationship with Redd Barna Mozambique but with the focus of the programme itself. As outlined in the strategic plan, the programme concentrates on specific areas and activities. RBM agreed to undertake activities along the Beira corridor and the town of Gorongoza. As mentioned previously, these activities centre on the promotion of child rights. Acção Social personnel understand that activities and areas are partially determined by Redd Barna’s objectives, organizational vision and head office in Norway but they question Redd Barna’s understanding of Mozambican problems.

Acção Social recognizes that Redd Barna is an international non-governmental organization working in association with similar organizations and various countries to implement important aspects of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. While this is a meaningful and necessary area of work, some Acção Social personnel question the use of resources for the promotion of child rights when Mozambican government policy, which is directed at combating absolute poverty (including child poverty), is in need of significant assistance.

While the Beira corridor is the primary zone of activity, Acção Social has identified other areas, which have a greater need and should have higher priority. The sectors of
Machanga, Maringue, Chemba, and Marromeu are extremely remote, posing difficult logistical problems during the rainy season, but none-the-less have a great need for community development programmes. There is some frustration on the part of Accção Social which believes that resources could make a more significant impact if reprioritized to these areas. It has approached Redd Barna but has been told that the programme must remain in the Beira corridor and perhaps be expanded to other areas later.

A disjuncture has occurred between Accção Social's perception of the most important areas to be addressed and Redd Barna's view. As one Accação Social employee states, "I think that Redd Barna sees the problem starting from the international convention while we see it starting from our reality." (Dixon, 2000) The programmes previously funded by Redd Barna focused on starting fields, animal husbandry and family income generation and were aimed at aiding entire families and consequently children's lives. These approaches, according to Accção Social personnel, better addressed the 'root' of the problem, which is helping "the family where the child lives." (Ibid, 2000) The 1998-2001 strategy is based on the improvement of child rights which is an undeniably important endeavour but "...when the basic (living) conditions are not met and they (children) don't have the ability to respond to these rights it is likely that these children will not develop them." (Ibid, 2000).

When queried what could make the partnership work better Accção Social personnel replied:

... you could adjust the programmes to suit the agenda of Mozambique. Get personnel to resolve the problems according to the reality and not according to international conventions. They are important but we must address the problems which are particular to Mozambique. (Dixon, 2000).

Strategic Planning allowed Redd Barna Mozambique to consult its partners on the areas of programmatic operation. The parameters, both physical and programmatic, established by Red Barna Norway, and in their turn by RBM, led to the prioritization of some goals over others. As one RBM employee said, "Internationally Redd Barna is supporting programmes such as child labour, child abuse, child advocacy, child education, some economic problems and macro economic issues. In Mozambique, we analyzed our capacity in terms of implementing a project and we decided to support basic education and child
advocacy.....we didn’t want to go into other areas because we have matched our capacity and worked through our strategy.” (Bero, 2000).

Although partners were consulted in the strategic planning process at the national level they did not participate in some of the most important areas surrounding Redd Barna Norway’s policy formulation. Moreover, RBM first determined its own capacity within existing levels of funding and policy objectives of the strategic plan, then allowed Acção Social to participate within that defined area. As RBM’s Antonio Feniasse Bero states, “Our partner does not always see our vision. Sometimes they (Acção Social) want things to go beyond our vision/mission but we cannot accept this because our head office would not accept it. So we explain (to them) that our strategic plan determines what we do and the areas that we are involved in.” (Bero, 2000). Partner participation in decisions surrounding programme focus are limited to areas within guidelines set by Redd Barna Norway.

It is undeniable that partnership with Redd Barna has increased Acção Social’s capacity, encouraged participation in project planning and development, and improved accountability. Redd Barna has promoted a trusting relationship which encourages open communication between partners. Their strategic programme has promoted child rights and improved their partner’s capacity for effective, independent project work. Their activities in the province have promoted local ownership of projects surrounding the implementation of the international convention of child rights in Mozambique. However, there are questions surrounding the level of participation involved when programming.

Redd Barna’s activities prior to the strategic plan were focused on developing family coping strategies and at the same time aided the child. Strategic planning refocused Redd Barna’s activities so that RBM policies were more in line with RBN. Although this rationalizes RBN’s operations it may not be the most appropriate area of activity for RBM and its partner.

Partnership for RBM meant that it would allow Acção Social to work with, and have influence over, projects within the parameters of RBM strategic plan. Although the strategic planning process did involve outside actors during its formulation, its aim was to align RMB goals to match those of RBN, and involve Acção Social more closely in the implementation of these goals.
### Table C - Collaborative Operations Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Features of the Model</th>
<th>Advantages and Disadvantages for NGO</th>
<th>Advantages and Disadvantages for NGO</th>
<th>Features of the Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NNGO and NGO share vision of development</td>
<td>+ Lower staff and overhead costs</td>
<td>+ Management and technical help during start up</td>
<td>Frequent NNGO and Government interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ Access contacts, local knowledge and expertise of NGO</td>
<td>+ NNGO affiliation increases legitimacy</td>
<td>Joint committees make policy and implementation decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNGO and NGO share decision-making on implementation strategy/policy</td>
<td>+ Helps NNGO legitimacy</td>
<td>- Possible threat to NGO identity, culture and strategy</td>
<td>Requires very high levels of interpersonal trust and respect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint projects implemented by NGO</td>
<td>- Decreased control and access during transition to independence</td>
<td>- Slower decision making than in NGOs own programs</td>
<td>Strong expectation of continued joint work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Growth limited by NGO capacity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- NGO gets credit for program impact</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Slower decision making than in direct operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table D - Model of Partnership between REDD Barna and Accion Social

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Features of the Model</th>
<th>Advantages and Disadvantages for NGO</th>
<th>Advantages and Disadvantages for NGO</th>
<th>Features of the Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government department begins as NGO franchise</td>
<td>Vision implementation</td>
<td>+ Management and technical help during start up</td>
<td>NNGO staff evaluates programme and finances; not involved in implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expect that government department becomes independent</td>
<td>+ Lower staff and overhead costs</td>
<td>+ Eventual autonomy</td>
<td>Frequent NNGO and Government interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government makes decisions with NNGO</td>
<td>+ Strengthens international network and solidarity</td>
<td>+ Funding</td>
<td>Joint decision making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared vision of development</td>
<td>+ Helps NNGO legitimacy</td>
<td>+ NNGO affiliation increases legitimacy</td>
<td>Requires a high trust relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreed goals and outcomes</td>
<td>- Decreased control and access during transition to independence</td>
<td>+ Detailed programme and plan gives structure to relationship</td>
<td>Programme monitoring via reports and site visits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Eventual loss of funding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This model is based on Brown’s Indian Partnership Study Sept 1994.
Conclusion

The ineffectiveness of development aid in improving the economic and social conditions of people living in developing countries has become a central concern of international donors. In an effort to increase the effectiveness of aid, donors have turned to local development organizations and community groups to carry out development projects. Since these groups often lack the resources and capability to carry out development objectives independently, and donors have discovered that they cannot implement successful programmes without local support, donors have promoted 'development partnerships' as a way of improving aid effectiveness. Donors now believe that the success of project and programmes will be improved through increased participation and local ownership.

The literature review demonstrated that although there was widespread use of terms such as partnership, participation, capacity building, empowerment, and accountability, their meanings, when applied in a development context, are interpreted in many distinct ways.

Since the term partnership was open to many different interpretations and was found to lack a clear definition, the researcher employed 'partnership models' based on Brown's International's Indian partnership study. Similarly, the terms of capacity building, empowerment, participation and accountability are understood differently by different groups and had to be clarified. Furthermore, the context provided by the Brown partnership models helped to better define the terms.

The case studies provided interesting examples of how different patterns of partnership are used in development. It was also possible to extract the advantages and disadvantages of each partner and compare them against Brown's models, which helped to situate the cases within a larger context.

The RE/Médico Internacional partnership, as described by the project documents, most closely matched Brown's 'contracting model'. In theory, Médico was to fund and evaluate RE as it implemented the project. However, in practice the project was compromised because RE assumed responsibilities outside of its capabilities. The misjudgment of RE's
capacity to handle a significant increase in funding in such a short time and the overestimation of RE's capabilities resulted in a largely ineffective project and partnership.

Médico Internacional's lack of monitoring and project evaluation outside of financial areas meant that project deficiencies were not realized until the project was well underway. The overall result of the partnership was a poorly documented, unsustainable and largely unaccountable project of questionable benefit to the community. However, while the project may not have been a great success, RE has come away with valuable lessons and experiences.

RBM and Acção Social's partnership evolved after a number of years of contact between the two organizations. This facilitated the development of a partnership which closely resembled the 'collaborative model'.

The partnership itself proved to be a significant benefit to both partners. RBM was able to implement part of its mission at both local and provincial scale. It allowed the NNGO to reach a large section of the population for a longer period of time than it could have on its own.

For Acção Social, the partnership provided resources to assist in the development of a new ministry. Acção Social acquired new skills and management capabilities from RBM. The partnership increased Acção Social's capacity, encouraged NGO participation in project development and improved accountability.

A solid partnership was encouraged by the trusting relationship between the two organizations. It was apparent during interviews that both organizations respected each other and worked towards the completion of their programme goals. All interviewees saw their partnership as instrumental towards sustainability and increased effectiveness. As the Acção Social representative in Dondo stated their relationship was a true partnership, "We are talking to them, they are talking to us to see how we can work together. There is not one above the other. We know what is happening between us." (Combane, 2000) However, when the representative was asked why Acção Social and Redd Barna were partners she said, "They are our partners because they give us money and we implement the work they want done. We help each other." (Ibid, 2000) Although there is collaboration and control by
Acção Social on one level, this last statement raises important questions about the depth of the partnership.

Projects, which are now basically planned and implemented by Acção Social, have taken place within the parameters principally set by Redd Barna. Although Acção Social now develops and controls projects, it does not participate to the same level in decisions surrounding programme focus.

The central aim of this dissertation was to determine if partnerships affected development outcomes and if so, how? The research found that different interpretations of partnership affected the developmental outcomes in different ways. Many factors influence the development of a partnership. The understandings of concepts, roles and communication between partners affect project outcomes as much as the training and allocation of resources.

Although donors such as the World Bank have touted partnership as a way of placing Southerners firmly in the "...drivers seat, both owning and directing the development agenda, with the Bank and other partner's each defining their support in their respective business plans" the lack of southern influence over programmes which are coordinated in Northern countries is an area which needs further exploration.

How different are development partnerships from Kajese's description of junior/senior partner when no matter how clever the junior partner, their massive poverty forces them to undertake programmes devised from an international perspective? Donors must focus their efforts on what the recipient country sees as the most relevant issues. Important programmes with an international focus can be implemented within a particular country context and reality.

RE's partnership with Médico Internacional allowed it to control the development process but its limited management capacity and inexperience in the delivery of certain aspects of the project overburdened the NGO. The model of partnership entered into in this case did not improve aid effectiveness, in fact it may have made it more ineffective by providing too many resources without proper support.
Redd Barna’s partnership with Acção Social was structured in such a way that it increased Acção Social’s capacity, participation and accountability at the project level but raised questions as to the depth of partnership. The partnership may have raised the effectiveness of aid by increasing ownership and placing Acção Social in the ‘drivers seat’ but ultimately the seat was fastened tightly into a car made in the North.

Perhaps programmes designed in the North guarantee that the parameters of neoliberalism and good governance are inculcated within the development of Southern economies and societies. If so, the North’s interpretation of raising effectiveness though partnership means nothing more than a new way of encouraging the South to take on the ideas of their Northern donors.

Development is fraught with problems originating from both the South and North. Many factors, political, social, cultural and economic influence the effectiveness of aid and, while the concept of partnership is a step towards allowing Southern peoples more control of their own development, it is still couched in the language and ideas of the North.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Harare Declaration Conference (1999) "Challenging Relationships: Redressing the power imbalances between Northern and Southern NGOs" Harare, Zimbabwe 27-29th July. Contact mailto:grahamthom@aol.com grahamthom@aol.com


Mausse, Miguel, (1999). [Source to be added.]


Redd Barna online. www.reddbarna.no


UNOMOZ, (1992). [Source to be added.]


Appendix A: List of Interviews

Reconstruindo a Esperança (RE) Interviewees ---

Efraim Junior Boia  Director of RE – 14 January, 2000 ---11:00 -13:50

Tulio Vango – Logistics person RE – 20 January, 2000 – 14:00 - 16:00

Tulio Vango – Logistics person RE – 18 January, 2000 – 18:00

Community Leaders

Maria – Head of community on Ilha Josina Machel – 19 January, 2000 – 11:00

David – Bishop on Ilha Josina Machel – 19 January, 2000 – 10:00

Elionor -- Community Nurse Ilha Josina Machel – 18 January, 2000

Redd Barna Mozambique Interviewees —

Antonio Fenaisse Bero, Project Manager Child Advocacy RBM Dondo – 24, January 2000 – 10:00 am

Maria da Paixa Nota, Field Researcher, Child Advocacy and Education Gorongoza – 24, January 2000 – 15:00

Simão Molinho, Field Researcher, Child Advocacy in Dondo – 24, January 2000 -- 15:00

Accão Social Dondo Interviewee –

Juega Cafula Combane, Acção Social Representative in Dondo -- 24, January 2000 – 14:00

Accão Social Beira Interviewees –

José Dixon, Department Head, Provincial Directorate for the Coordination of Acção Social Sofala – 26 January, 2000-- 9:00 am

Jorge Lucas, Chief of Programmes, Provincial Directorate for the Coordination of Acção Social Sofala – 26 January, 2000 -- 9:00 am

Farage Felix, Chief of Planning, 26 January, 2000 -- 9:00 am
Appendix B: Last email correspondence to Médico Internacional Re: Interview

Dear Mr. Muller,

Thank you for responding to my email. I realize that you are very busy with the crisis in Mozambique and I am available to conduct the interview at your convenience. My work is attempting to look at ‘development partnerships’ between Northern NGOs and Southern NGOs. I have included (in the text of this message) the questions which I would like to ask you. If it is more convenient for you to answer the questions by email and have a follow up telephone interview to clarify some information, that is fine with me. Otherwise please indicate the best time for a telephone interview.

Thanks for your time.
Best Regards,
Daren Trudeau

Research Questions:
1. Briefly explain what the project attempted to achieve and how this was to be done.
2. What were the respective responsibilities of both Reintegration a Esperança (RE) and Médico Internacional?
3. What level of participation did RE have in the design and planning of the project? What level did the community participate?
4. Were all objectives reached? (if no) Why not?
5. In the project documents there is mention of ‘local partner’ what is understood by this? What kind of partnership did Médico have with RE?
6. Was there good communication, transparency and a sense of trust between RE and Médico Internacional?
7. What new capacities did Médico help RE develop during the project?
8. When the initial proposal was being formulated, what made Médico Internacional think that RE had the capacity to manage and implement this project?
9. How was RE accountable to Médico? Was Médico accountable to RE?
10. Was the project successful? Would you work with RE again?
11. The project was funded by both Médico Internacional and the German government. Did the government or Médico require that certain aspect of the project be included before funding was approved? In other words were there certain conditions on the provision of funds?
12. Why did Médico Internacional decide to form a partnership with RE?
13. Was Médico Internacional able to develop an expertise in the area of child soldier rehabilitation? If no, why not?
14. What type of project monitoring and evaluation were conducted by Médico? What type was conducted by RE?
15. What were Médico’s overall impression of the project and what was learned by them?
16. Anything to add?