

Ideology, Virtue, and Well-being: A Critical Examination of Francis Fukuyama's Notion of Liberal Democracy

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree **DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY** in the Faculty of Human Sciences of the **UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL, HOWARD COLLEGE CAMPUS, DURBAN (REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA)**

By

Rabson Wuriga

Supervisor: Prof. D. Herwitz, (University of Michigan, USA)

Co-supervisor: Dr. A. S. Gouws (University of KwaZulu-Natal, RSA)

DURBAN

2003

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my
late father Mushavhi Mr. Tafireyi Sahisa Wuriga and to
my mother Musonikadzi Mrs. Ndaizivei Wuriga

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Now that I have finished my training in Philosophy, it is time to thank all the people, specifically, and collectively, who contributed in my journey through academic thickets and jungles. So I would like to acknowledge the following people:

- Professor Daniel Herwitz (University of Michigan, USA) – supervisor and 2002 grant-holder for the National Research Foundation (NRF) (RSA), and co-supervisor Dr. Andries S. Gouws (University of KwaZulu-Natal (RSA) for their expertise in guiding the whole study process.
- Members of the Philosophy Programme at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Howard College Campus, Durban.
- Dr. Jack Zeller, the President of Kulanu (USA), for supporting this work in many ways – both financially and for his keeping up my morale. Dr. Gary Tobin President of the Institute for Jewish Community and Research, & Mrs. Diane Tobin, Associate Director of the Institute for Jewish Community and Research for making it possible for me to complete the remaining part of this research through financial support.
- Dr. G. R. R. Mathivha, Mrs T. M. Mathivha and family for their support in many ways.
- Mr. S. Leeder for contributing in kind towards this study.
- Most of all, my wife Eveline, my children, family members for their second-to-none support, relatives, and friends for their encouragement through the whole process.

DECLARATION

I declare that the work is my own unaided work except for the acknowledged assistance. It has not been submitted for any degree at any university. All works cited or referred to in this thesis are given due acknowledgement.

NAME: Rabson Wuriga



SIGNED

17/09/2004

DATE

ABSTRACT

This thesis is a critical examination of Fukuyama's "end of history" version of liberalism, in which he announces the triumphant emergence of liberal democracy as a universal form of governance. The thesis seeks to investigate Francis Fukuyama's notion of liberal democracy and his arguments for it, in order to assess the normative impact of market driven political and economic outcomes on the human context or life satisfaction, especially recognition. This is contrasted with Amartya Sen's notion of well-being in order to show that Fukuyama does not pay attention to some of the basic moral demands of human life.

The thesis is comprised of an introduction and six chapters. The contents of these chapters can be presented briefly as follows:

- The *first chapter* looks at how Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant use the theory of social contract to explain the genesis and justification of the state. Featuring prominently in all their versions of social contract are the values of freedom, equality, and independence of the individual, the process of consensus, the primacy of self-preservation and the necessity of the state. Together these laid the basis for a philosophically reasoned and progressive theory of politics. This chapter also looks at the theory of *laissez-faire*, which paved the way for a free market economy. This doctrine was developed in the thought of Adam Smith, Ricardo, Mill and Bentham. For Fukuyama these thinkers inaugurated a tradition of political thought that ultimately led to liberalism and democracy.
- The *second chapter* discusses the teleological view of history underlying the philosophical theories of history advanced by Kant, Hegel, and Marx. Each of these thinkers assumes that history is moving towards an end point or goal. It is from these philosophers that Fukuyama appropriates the idea of universality to envisage the universality of liberal democracy.
- The *third chapter* analyzes Fukuyama's "end of history" claim and his arguments for it. When communism finally collapsed, liberal democracy was the only remaining option, he claims. Drawing on Kant's idea of universal history, Hegel's notion of a universal and homogeneous state and Marx's materialist interpretation of history, Fukuyama envisages a global order that will be ushered in by the universal and homogeneous liberal state which is

- the ultimate goal of liberal democracy. It is the duty of the liberal state to ensure equal and mutual recognition and affirmation of its citizens' freedom.
- The *fourth chapter* stages a debate between Fukuyama and Sen in which the question of life satisfaction and its achievability is addressed. Fukuyama claims that human-beings desire recognition, and can best satisfy this desire through liberal democracy. Sen for his part claims that people need well-being, and can only achieve it through democracy, which he views as a universal value. The discussion shows that although Fukuyama and Sen may share similar political values they differ ideologically and in historical vision.
 - The *fifth chapter* deals with the critical evaluation of liberal democracy. Several issues present major problems for liberal democracy. These issues are liberal individualism as the central focus of liberalism and liberal democracy; the global trend against gender bias; the political and cultural homogenization of the world; the problem of parallel histories versus a single inclusive history; desire-satisfaction *versus* need-satisfaction, and the cultural preconditions of liberal democracy.
 - The *sixth chapter* recapitulates the preceding chapters and spells out the conclusion reached in the course of the thesis.

The findings on the notion of the “end of history” show that Fukuyama wishes the equal and mutual recognition of the freedom and dignity of all individuals as well as the affirmation of their individual rights. This concern for the individual is laudable. However, excessive individualism threatens the fabric of every society, and Fukuyama realizes that this threat is especially strong in liberal democracy. His suggested solution is to cultivate social capital in the form of trust. This thesis concludes that Fukuyama’s medicine is no match for the disease; the whole thrust of the intellectual tradition leading to liberal democracy – and of much else in Western culture since Hobbes – is in the direction of excessive individualism and the withering of community. Moreover, where Fukuyama sees *isothymia* – the desire for *equal* recognition, the psychological truth is probably that people desire to be recognized as *superior* – *megalothymia*, again making individualism intrinsically more threatening to a sense of community than Fukuyama seems to realize.

Fukuyama suggests that an international consensus in favour of liberal democracy is emerging. But it appears that such a consensus is unlikely to arise – nation-states fear disenfranchisement and assimilation and thus insist on their sovereignty, effectively blocking any shift from the nation-state to a homogeneous and universal liberal state. It is difficult to generate the consensus needed to receive it as a universal system, because not all people subscribe to its cultural preconditions. The satisfaction of human desire of any kind cannot be universalized since human existence is centrally characterized by diversity of context, culture, and perception. Any attempt to impose cultural or ideological homogeneity requires conquest – cultural or military imperialism.

The triumphant emergence of liberal democracy cannot be the ultimate end of the whole of human history. If this were the case, it would no longer be worth trying to increase human knowledge, since knowledge always points to an open future in terms of how it will be used for further advancement.

Due to its internal contradictions, such as the tension between excessive individualism and community, liberal democracy has unintended negative consequences. Liberal democracy is not yet the final ideology leading to human satisfaction at a global level for this generation and generations to come as long as human thought evolves. This will remain the case as long as Fukuyama's admission that liberal democracy only works where its cultural preconditions are met, remains true.

CONTENTS		
	Dedication	2
	Acknowledgements	3
	Declaration	4
	Abstract	5
	Introduction	12
CHAPTER 1	PHILOSOPHICAL ANTECEDENTS OF FUKUYAMA – PART I: LIBERAL CONCEPTIONS OF MORALITY AND POLITICS	22
1.1	Introduction	22
1.2	The Idea of a Social Contract	23
1.2.1	Hobbes: Absolute Sovereignty of the Leviathan State	25
1.2.1.1	The Idea of Self-Preservation	27
1.2.1.2	The Social Contract	31
1.2.1.3	The Sovereign	33
1.2.2	Locke: Majoritarian Democracy	35
1.2.2.1	The Social Contract	36
1.2.2.2	Property Rights	43
1.2.3	Rousseau: Representative Assembly	46
1.2.3.1	The Individual in the Pre-political Sphere	47
1.2.3.2	Popular Sovereignty	50
1.3	Theory of <i>Laissez-faire</i>	54
1.3.1	Classical Political Economy	55
1.3.2	Libertarianism	58
1.4	Summary and Conclusion	60
CHAPTER 2	PHILOSOPHICAL ANTECEDENTS OF FUKUYAMA – PART II: PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY	60
2.1	Introduction	63
2.2	Kant: The Idea of Universal History	65

2.2.1	Kant:'s Theory of a Universal Human History	66
2.2.2	The End of World History	68
2.3	Hegel: The Idealistic and Dialectical Conception of History	69
2.3.1	Hegel's Dialectic Method	70
2.3.2	The End of World History	73
2.3.2.1	The Struggle for Recognition	77
2.3.2.2	Freedom	82
2.3.2.3	Absolute Knowing	85
2.4	Marx: The Materialist and Dialectical Conception of History	87
2.4.1	Theory of History: Historical Materialism	87
2.4.2	The End of History: Classless Society	91
2.5	Conclusion	93
CHAPTER 3 "THE END OF HISTORY": AN ANALYSIS OF FUKUYAMA'S DECLARATION OF THE TRIUMPH OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY		
3.1	Introduction	95
3.1.1	Introducing Francis Fukuyama	97
3.1.2	Unity of Thought in the Projected Corpus	98
3.1.3	Method: Hegelian-Marxian Law of History	99
3.2	Fukuyama's empirical-metaphysical Conception of History	100
3.2.1	Directionality of History	102
3.2.2	The Conflict of Ideologies and the Triumph of Liberal Democracy	104
3.2.3	Can Liberal Democracy Overcome its Contradictions?	110
3.2.4	Resolving Contradictions: Rebuilding Social Order	121
3.2.4.1	Mechanism for Rebuilding Social Order: Social Capital	122
3.2.4.2	Sources of Social Order	133
3.2.4.3	Rebuilding Social Order	135
3.2.5	The Ultimate Goal of History: the Liberal State	138
3.3	Conflict of Ideologies or Clash of Civilizations?	141
3.4	Summary and Conclusion	146

CHAPTER 4	RECOGNITION OR WELL-BEING?: FUKUYAMA VERSUS SEN ON LIFE SATISFACTION IN A LIBERAL SOCIETY	149
4.1	Introduction	149
4.2	The Issue: Satisfaction of Desire for Recognition <i>versus</i> Satisfaction of Basic Human Need for Well-being	151
4.3	Discussion: Fukuyama vs Sen	152
4.3.1	Fukuyama: Liberal Democracy Satisfies Desire for Recognition	153
4.3.1.1	Point of Departure: Liberal Democracy	153
4.3.1.2	Human Beings Desire Recognition	155
4.3.2	Sen: "Democracy as a Universal" Satisfies the Desire for Well-being	167
4.3.2.1	The Primacy of Freedom	168
4.3.2.2	The Human Need for Well-being	171
4.4	Summary and Conclusion	184
CHAPTER 5	CRITICAL EVALUATION	187
5.1	Introduction	187
5.2	Critique: Francis Fukuyama vs Amartya Sen	187
5.2.1	Liberal Individualism	187
5.2.2	Global Trend of Gender Consideration	195
5.2.3	Cultural Diversity	197
5.2.4	Parallel Histories Within a History	202
5.2.5	Desire-Fulfilment vs Need Satisfaction	205
5.3	Conclusion	206
CHAPTER 6	CONCLUSIONS	209
6.1	Recapitulating the Main Ideas of the Study	209
6.2	Discussion of Findings	213

6.3	Concluding Remarks	221
	REFERENCES	222

INTRODUCTION

THE SUBJECT

The subject of the present research is reflected in the title of this thesis: *Ideology, Virtue, and Well-being: A Critical Examination of Francis Fukuyama's Notion of Liberal Democracy*. In terms of *scope*, this thesis does not intend to comprehensively cover all that has been written on the subject of ideology and its influence on life satisfaction. Rather, it will study one ideology – Fukuyama's version of liberalism at the end of history – to see how it promises satisfaction through the distribution of recognition to all citizens of society.

The main aim of this thesis is to investigate Francis Fukuyama's notion of liberal democracy and his arguments for it, and then contrast his ideas with those expressed by Amartya Sen. Fukuyama believes that liberalism produces satisfaction by offering all citizens mutual and equal recognition. This thesis especially focuses on a moral question about Fukuyama's liberal society and economy: does Fukuyama's liberalism in fact overcome the problem of unequal recognition? Does it distribute recognition equitably, and thus achieve justice?

Although I acknowledge that liberalism has contributed much to political and economic development, I shall contend that the triumph of liberalism¹ does not mean that there will be no other ideologies – either by revival or invention – in contest with it. I shall also maintain that the triumph of liberalism does not seem to resolve the ethical problem of inequality in the distribution of socio-political and economic goods in the era of Fukuyama's "end of history" – it neither encourages the equal distribution of wealth nor shows any concern with such equality. I shall also argue that either Fukuyama's end of history project lacks a theory of ethics or,

¹Fukuyama repeatedly refers to the expression two terms, namely "liberal democracy" and "neo-liberalism." According to Heywood (1997:43) neo-liberalism is an updated version of classical political economy that was developed in the writings of free-market economists such as Fredrick Hayek and Milton Friedman, and philosophers such as Robert Nozick. Its central pillars are the market and the individual, including his/her liberty (Heywood, 1997:47). The individual's liberty is expressed in negative terms - thus non-interference by the state or the absence of external constraints upon the individual. In economic liberalism, this position is based on a deep faith in the mechanism of the free market and the belief that the economy works best when left alone by the government. Although the expression liberal democracy and neo-liberalism will sometimes be used in this thesis, whenever and wherever the term 'liberalism' is used, it will refer to the merger of liberal democracy and neo-liberalism.

if it has one, that it is too superficial to cater for the inherent social problems of liberal societies.

The *justification* for my choice of topic for this thesis lies in the following: questions of morality and/or economic justice in globalisation are fundamental in many disciplines today, including philosophy. And yet a debate between Fukuyama and Sen has yet to take place in the field of philosophy. This debate crucially concerns how the rival notions "recognition" and "well-being" fare when it comes to offering life satisfaction, and whether justice in the distribution of life satisfaction can be better achieved by focusing on "recognition" à la Fukuyama or by focusing on "well-being" à la Sen. This thesis intends to contribute to this debate, which cuts to the core of issues concerning ideology, markets, economic justice and 'the human context.' Thus it will critically examine liberal democracy as expounded by Fukuyama in order to assess the normative impact of market driven political and economic outcomes on the human context of life satisfaction.

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

Background to Statement of the Problem

In many parts of the world, particularly in Europe before and during the Enlightenment, history has been understood in terms of the idea of progress towards some ideal end point. Thus understanding changes as progress becomes a fundamental norm for the development of societies. In many societies, especially Western societies, liberal ideas and institutions have been the vehicle of this 'belief in progress' or 'ideology of progress.' Liberalism embraced and promoted the following fundamental indicators of the ideology of progress: (1) "the absence of social controls over individual behaviour;" (2) "increased human power to control the environment in ways that provide conditions of greater ease, comfort and security for human life;" and (3) "a marketplace offering an ever increasing superabundance for the gratification of every human desire" (Fowler, 1995:104). In human societies where these liberal ideas of progress or change have flourished, this has mostly happened after traditional forms and values were weakened or corrupted, either as a result of natural waning, or as a result of deliberate destruction.

It was in the 17th century during the English revolution that the idea of liberalism clearly emerged in tandem with the dissolution of the feudal system and the emergence of a modern capitalist society. These liberal ideas spread to many places in the wake of the French and American revolutions (Eccleshall, 1984:28; Dahrendorf, 1987:173; Heywood, 1997:41).-- Consequently, the liberal wave entered into an inseparable merger with market capitalism and became a theory and practice that extolled the virtues of *laissez-faire* capitalism. This merger between liberalism and market capitalism was highly influential in the 18th and (especially) 19th century (Dahrendorf, 1987:173; Cf. also Heywood, 1997:41).

Liberalism has shown that it has consequences for socio-ethical, economic and political thought. Firstly, in its *socio-ethical* aspect, liberalism calls for the dissolution of cultural variations and for the reconstruction or even invention of new moral values and inter-human relations. Secondly, in its *economic* aspect, it gives a forum for 'equal access and participation,' but of divergent and competing interests governed by market forces (Dahrendorf, 1987:173). Thirdly, in its *political* aspect, it was instrumental in the promotion of the idea of democracy (Dahrendorf, 1987:173). Although the idea of democracy emerged in ancient Greece more than two millennia ago, Plato dismissed it as the most undisciplined form of governance. Despite its bad press from Plato, democracy later went on to become a historically highly influential idea.

In the later stages of its development, liberalism advanced and evolved into an ideology and a movement that assumed an influential role in attempting to understand, evaluate, and influence change in political and economic development, urbanization, scientific progress and cultural secularisation (Sheehan, 1982:1). When it assumed this role, liberalism developed its own set of ideas and set of institutions founded on the twin principle of the freedom and equality of individuals. These were necessary to counter existing rival ideologies, such as hereditary monarchism, fascism, and communism. At the natural death and/or deliberate overthrow of these rival ideologies, liberalism – then liberal democracy (in synergy with market economy) survived. And it is this lone triumphant survival of liberalism that Francis Fukuyama records as "the end of history," beginning with his article "The End of History," that first appeared in the *National Interest* in 1989. The theory expressed in the article was later expanded

into a book, *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992) (hereafter *The End of History*), which is central to this thesis.

According to Fukuyama (1992), after the fall of communism the only working ideology for governance and economic development was liberalism. Using the Hegelian-Marxian concept of history-as instrument to interpret the triumphant inevitability of liberalism over other ideologies, Fukuyama concludes that the fall of communism as an ideology means the gradual and ultimately triumphant emergence of liberal democracy. In *The End of History* Fukuyama reiterates the two basic arguments he presented in the article, "The End of History". Firstly, he argues that there is "a remarkable consensus concerning the legitimacy of liberal democracy as a system of government" that has "emerged throughout the world over" as the triumphant ideology that has vanquished its rivals: "hereditary monarchy, fascism, and most recently communism" (Fukuyama, 1992:xi). Secondly, Fukuyama (1992:xi) argues that "liberal democracy may constitute the 'end point of mankind's ideological evolution' and the 'final form of human government' and as such constitute the 'end of history,'" satisfying the immemorial human desire for recognition.

Fukuyama traces the conceptual development of liberalism and the factors that supported its successful emergence as an 'ultimately triumphant' system of governance and economic development. In *The End of History* (1992), Fukuyama shows that in contemporary life and in theory there is an inseparable convergence of liberal democracy as a form of justice and neo-liberalism as an economic system striving for free markets. He claims that this convergence satisfies both "rational desire" through the accumulation and distribution of wealth, and the thymotic desire, which expresses itself in the "struggle for recognition." This convergence has transformed inter-human relations fundamentally. Fukuyama's view is that the twin conditions of liberal democracy and neo-liberal economics have supported each other, occasioned each other, produced each other, and finally, linked together in a form of life that is fully satisfying to human beings (insofar as it is operative), and hence, fully supportive of equality as a qualitative aspect of human dignity. Behind this view of Fukuyama is a universalistic vision of what the equality of humanity entails, along with a rosy picture of the benign nature of neo-liberal economics. Fukuyama is convinced that the Western liberal idea (based on the twin principles of liberty and equality in political and economic life)

has triumphed over contending ideologies (e.g. fascism, and communism). The resulting universal consensus concerning the legitimacy of political and economic liberalism heralds the economic homogenization of the world. For Fukuyama global neo-liberalism promises us prosperity and peace, as well as a global economic and political entity. It will usher in a fair distribution of economic goods and allow the satisfaction of the human desire for recognition.

Fukuyama portrays the liberal project with modified libertarian motivation and tendencies – through neo-liberalism – as aiming to establish one and the same economic system across all human communities, regardless of any differences in culture or values they may exhibit. It displays its ethical shortcomings especially in the question of economic equality. It subscribes to the market ideal that is regarded by libertarians as the ideal form of economic integration and fair distribution for all people at all times, regardless of the values they endorse.

In his work *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (1995), Fukuyama focuses upon the economic performance of various cultural groupings after the "end of history." He argues that the difference in economic success of different cultures is partly a function of the shared moral horizons that bind people within a community into networks of trust, which constitute social capital. By social capital Fukuyama (1995:26) means the "capability that arises from the prevalence of trust in a society or in certain parts of it." It is from the stores of social capital that capitalism and liberal democracy draw their effective functioning (Warren, 1999:319). In *Trust* Fukuyama addresses inter-human relationships within the bounds of his "end of history" project. His view of human relations turns out to be market-oriented. This is because in the market money co-ordinates relationships between the market participants (Offe, 1999:42), and without money these relationships do not exist. Fukuyama believes that liberal democracy is conducive to interpersonal trust. Inglehart (1999:88) opposes this belief, arguing that "democratic institutions do not necessarily produce interpersonal trust." Inglehart is correct because political institutions are not the only sphere controlling society. There are other spheres of society at work such as family, business, the judiciary, religion, etc. In *The Great Disruption* (1999) Fukuyama argues that a new social order after the "end of history" is under construction that will see human beings, driven by new developments in the biological sciences, construct new moral values

and reason their way through to a new and spontaneous social arrangement under one ideology – liberal democracy. This means the destruction of existing forms of interpersonal trust and the creation of new moral values. The spontaneous reception (which Fukuyama interprets as the triumph) of liberal democracy, according to Fukuyama (1999), has also opened the door to new forms of trust in inter-human relations, as well as between the state and its citizens, a change that will impel humanity to invent new ethical concepts.

Like Fukuyama, Amartya Sen² (1999:3-5) holds that the idea of democracy has become a universal value and commitment. This claim to universality faces challenges from various ideological persuasions, both political and economic. Talking about the functions of democracy, Sen (1999:8-11) points out three important values promoted by democracy, namely,

- (1) *intrinsic value* - the importance of *politico-economic* "participation and freedom in human life";
- (2) *instrumental value* - people's expression and support of their political will in "keeping governments responsible and accountable"; and
- (3) *constructive value* - the "role of democracy in the formation of values and in the understanding of needs, rights, and duties."

Many neo-liberal scholars contend that the market economy is successful in terms of the democratic virtues listed above. According to Sen (1985:1) "it is natural to feel that an institution that is so crucial to our well-being must be valuable" – hence "the market's moral standing 'has to be' high." The market is a crucial institution to our well-being and we are dependent on it, yet this fact, Sen (1985:1) argues, "does not tell us much about the value of the market as an institution." The question is: how does one judge the value and moral standing of the market economy? For Sen (1985:17), the assessment of the moral standing of the market mechanism is related to its results, thus it is derivative and contingent. The outcomes of the market economy raise questions about distributive justice, related to a normative analysis of the problem of inequality based on interpersonal comparisons of human wellbeing.

In his extensive exploration of the question: "Equality of what?" Sen (1992:12-30) critically re-examines the issue of inequality by investigating the existence of

² Amartya K. Sen is an economist born in 1933 in India. He attended Presidency College, Calcutta where he obtained a B.A. degree in economics from Calcutta University. In 1955 he moved to Britain to study at Trinity College, Cambridge University, where he got a B.A. in economics, an M.A. and a PhD. He has written many books and articles. Two of his most relevant books to this thesis are *Inequality Re-examined* (1992) and *Development as Freedom* (1999).

interpersonal differences. For Sen what is fundamental in the first place is the substantive freedom to pursue well-being (See Chapter 5 of this thesis). According to Sen, Rawls overlooks the interpersonal differences in human existence when he holds that the distribution of primary goods should be equal among all the members of the community, regardless of their individual differences. Instead, Sen introduces the capability equality approach. He (Sen, 1987; 1992) defines a capability as the ability to achieve a certain "functioning", for example, literacy is a capability, and reading is a functioning. Consequently, Sen defines human well-being in terms of the functionings a person achieves. In contrast with Rawls' egalitarian conception of strict equality – the notion that primary goods should be distributed equally, Sen (1992:39-87) advocates for the unequal distribution of primary goods in pursuit of a different form equality: the equality of the "capabilities" of different persons to strive and achieve valuable functionings, and more generally their equality in their effective freedom to pursue their well-being. DeMartino (2000:108) comments that Sen's "principle of capabilities equality promotes extensive ... social experimentation" that involves "no necessary presumptions about the existence of one ideal set of institutional arrangements (such as neo-liberalism)." The principle encourages the vigilant interrogation of the exact performance of any existing economic system, with the intention of pressing for reform where there is failure to meet the demands of the principle of capability equality (DeMartino, 2000:108). The principle of capability equality rejects the idea of the "end of history" that anticipates the coming of some final state of an organizational entity. It is an open-ended view of society that leaves room for societies to enhance the capabilities of their citizens.

The Problem

Liberalism can contribute to the development of many aspects of the conditions of human existence, but its inherent concept of "absolute" freedom seen in a free market economy, as well as its policy of competition, have profound effects upon the social, environmental and temporal conditions of humankind. Furthermore, many critics claim, liberalism exacerbates such problems as poverty, environmental destruction, anti-democratic tendencies and even the inadequate functioning of financial markets. On the basis of this understanding of the phenomenon of economic liberalism, the problem to be addressed in this research

can be stated in the following terms. The *historico*-philosophical roots of economic liberalism expounded by Fukuyama show that its political and economic tendencies have moral shortcomings regarding issues of justice in the distribution of economic and political recognition. Human dignity remains unprotected and does not flourish. How can these concepts be amended or replaced by better ones, while respecting the fact that global markets are here to stay, whether we like it or not.

In addressing the problem of the best approach to justice for market-oriented societies, with regard to well-being, I have carefully considered the views of both Sen and Fukuyama, and conclude that Sen offers a better theory of justice within market-oriented societies with regard to human well-being. Hence I end up siding with Sen's views on this matter.

Some of the broad questions of my thesis are: Is liberal democracy the best alternative to ensure political and economic justice? Is Sen's theory of economic justice adequate as an alternative to Fukuyama? Does Sen's view take adequate cognisance of the broad problem of human dignity in the context of globalisation? To address these broad questions, the following more specific questions will need to be addressed:

- (1) What are the philosophical ideas underlying the purported rise and 'triumph' of liberal democracy expressed in Fukuyama?
- (2) Shall we enter the "end of history" with all the problems of unequal recognition?
- (3) Can human satisfaction be systematized or universalized through one system of thought from one cultural perspective – Western liberal democracy?

In a nutshell, this thesis critically examines two major theorists of modern political and economic thought - both concerned with issues of justice, but in disagreement with each other. In this thesis I will construe Sen's acute questioning of *laissez-faire* economics as in effect a critique of Fukuyama. I will seek to understand and discover the normative and descriptive adequacy of what is nevertheless of value in Fukuyama's claim of universal and mutual recognition. And finally I will examine Sen's concept of well-being.

DIVISION OF CHAPTERS

The thesis comprises of the following chapters:

Introduction

The introduction discusses the status of the subject matter (the scope, the focus, starting point and justification), the statement of the problem, and the whole set up of chapters.

Chapter 1: Philosophical Antecedents of Fukuyama – Part I: Liberal Notions of Morality and Political Economy

The aim of this chapter is to explore the philosophical ideas and assumptions that underlie Fukuyama's views on liberalism, especially the politico-economic aspect. This background is important for understanding Fukuyama's philosophy of the 'end of history' which he derives from Hegel-as-interpreted-by-Kojève.

Chapter 2: Philosophical Antecedents of Fukuyama – Part II: Philosophy of History

Chapter 2 traces some further philosophical antecedents of Fukuyama – this time regarding the theory of history. Kant's, Hegel's and Marx's ideas on history and related themes are discussed, especially the idea of the end of history.

Chapter 3: The “End of History”: An Analysis of Fukuyama's Argument for the Triumph of Liberal Democracy

The identified corpus of Fukuyama's writings is critically analyzed and evaluated in order to give a clear account of his views on “the end of history” as the triumph of liberal democracy.

Chapter 4: Recognition or Well-being?: Sen *versus* Fukuyama on Life Satisfaction in a Liberal Society

Fukuyama claims that life satisfaction is realized in the fulfilment of the desire for mutual recognition that is brought to a homogenized 'world society' through liberal democracy. The work of Amartya Sen gives an opposing view that attempts to show the moral limits of the ethics of liberal democracy in relation to life satisfaction. Sen's view relies on his concept of the primacy of the freedom to pursue well-being, which takes the notion of basic needs as its point of departure.

Chapter 5: Critical Evaluation of the Fukuyama *versus* Sen Debate

In the fifth chapter I critically evaluate the arguments presented by the two thinkers in relation to central issues such as individualism, difference or inequality, recognition, desire and need satisfaction.

Chapter 6: Recapitulation and Conclusion

This chapter presents my final conclusions.

CHAPTER 1
PHILOSOPHICAL ANTECEDENTS OF FUKUYAMA - PART I:
LIBERAL CONCEPTIONS OF MORALITY AND
POLITICAL ECONOMY

Seek ye first the Kingdom of pure practical reason and its justice, and your end (the blessing of perpetual peace) will come to you of itself. Thus it is, for example, a principle of moral politics that a people is to unite itself into a state in accordance with freedom and equality as the sole concepts of right, and this principle is not based upon prudence but upon duty.

– Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The long period between Socrates and Adam Smith saw the emergence of a variety of philosophical reflections concerning systems of governance, virtue and life satisfaction. Politics and economics are of particular philosophical interest as they raise moral questions concerning the justification of the formation of the state as well as obligations to the state, social welfare, distributive justice, freedom, and recognition. Above all, they raise questions about the equitable well-being of all individuals. These questions have led thinkers to dialectically and critically reflect on their contemporary situations by revisiting and reinterpreting ideas that dominated and shaped life in previous epochs of human history. Such dialectic reflection recurs in Fukuyama's interpretation of the fall of communism and the rise of liberal democracy as the end of history. Fukuyama (1992:288) believes that this dialectic reflection is important because

we need a trans-historical standard against which to measure democratic society, some concept of "man as *man*" that would allow us to see its potential defects. It was for that reason that we turned to the "first men" of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Hegel.

Fukuyama not only turned to Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Hegel, but also to Kant, Marx and, surprisingly, Nietzsche – whom many scholars regard as an enemy of democracy. I will not deal with Nietzsche in this study as one of Fukuyama's antecedents. So the next two chapters attempt to critically outline ideas that contributed to the shaping of Fukuyama's notion of liberal democracy as expressed in his idea of the end of history.

In this chapter, I will give a survey of the major liberal notions regarding humankind's desirable political arrangements, as well as the conception of economic needs during and after the European Enlightenment period. Politically, Fukuyama appropriates social contract theories (centring on ideas such as self-preservation, recognition, freedom, and equality) because they uphold the liberal ideas of consensus and toleration – recognizing the interest of the individual. As for economics: he endorses a *laissez-faire* theory. These theories serve as the central pillars supporting Fukuyama's claim of the end of history.

In the first part of this chapter attention will be paid to the social contract theories of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In the second part of the chapter I will concentrate on the theory of *laissez-faire* whose proponents are Adam Smith, Ricardo, Bentham, and Mill. I will also pay attention to libertarianism.

1.2 THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL CONTRACT

It is not clear whether the idea of *contract* co-emerged with the ideas of *sovereignty* and *natural law* or if they were subsequent to each other. Be this as it may, the three are politically and economically coherent or relational and contribute to the idea of what a just distribution of human satisfaction would be. In Bodin's (1962:102ff) sixteenth century philosophy that prefigured Hobbes, the state is defined as the embodiment of the presence of the sovereign. The sovereign's presence within the state is viewed as the source of law, although this same law does not bind the sovereign. This makes sovereignty indivisible, and inalienable, from the state. Families (natural associations) and their property are not, however, at the sovereign's unlimited disposal. According to Quinton (1994:313) this makes Bodin's doctrine of the sovereign less absolute. In a much more comprehensive way than Bodin, Hobbes used the ideas of contract and natural law to defend absolute sovereignty; however he was limited by the logical necessity of his contractarian form of unrestricted absolutism.

Contractarianism³ was discussed and defended in Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan*, John Locke's *Second Treatise of Government*, and Jean-Jacques

³ The term contractarianism refers to a family of moral and political theories that make use of the idea of a social contract (Burch, 1995:159). This idea views political relations as originating in

Rousseau's *Social Contract*. It gained acceptance among the utilitarians and libertarians. However, it was strongly criticised by David Hume in his essay, "Of the original contract," and by Hegel in his *Philosophy of Right*. The social contract was, however, considered in all these cases to be preferable to the ideology of hereditary-monarchical-rule. According to Flew (1979:328), the notion of social contract refers to

an agreement between individuals, or between individuals and a governing power, in which some personal liberties are freely surrendered in return for the advantages of having a well-organized society, or good government.

Hampton (1995:745) also defines social contract as "an agreement either between the people and their ruler, or among the people in the community." The idea of a social contract has been used in diverse arguments to either explain, or justify, both "the origin of the state, or of human society, or of particular social arrangements" (Flew, 1979:328; cf. also Hampton, 1995:745). Central to philosophers such as Plato (to a certain extent), Hobbes, Locke, and Kant, who all use the social contract theory, is the argument that human beings at first lived in a pre-political 'state of nature' before they were constituted as a political community (Rousseau's social contract theory does not fit this pattern). This 'state of nature' is so unbearable that they would soon enter into an agreement, either with one another, or with a prospective ruler, to install a political entity that each believed would secure his or her lot (Hampton, 1995:745).

There are many versions of the social contract, but I shall concentrate on the political and moral versions. Within these political and moral versions, Freeman (1998:659) usefully distinguishes two main social contract views, namely, *interest-based contract* views that stem from Hobbes; and *democratic contract* views which are derived from the natural rights theories of Locke who argued against royal absolutism, and after Locke, from Rousseau and Kant.

According to Freeman (1998:659), the common aim of interest-based contract theories is to account for justice as it relates to what best promotes each individual's enlightened interests. Interest-based contract theories are characterised by Freeman (1998:659) as follows:

contract or agreement (Freeman, 1998:657). Proponents include Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Rousseau, and Kant.

- (1) basic, self-regarding and individual-focused desires and interests that are fixed by their nature but definable without moral notions;
- (2) agreements based on rational compromise where each party is prepared to accept limitations on the pursuit of their interest on the condition that others are willing to do so;
- (3) agreement that all members must be made better than they would without it;
- (4) agreements that are historical in the sense that parties know their particular desires and circumstances.

Unlike interest-based contracts, democratic contracts centre on the primary democratic ideals of freedom and equality. The social contract theories of Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Rawls are all examples of democratic contracts. According to Freeman (1998:659), the basic idea embodied in democratic contract views is that if free individuals all reach consensus on something, from a suitable position of equality,

the standards they would endorse embody requirements of democratic justice applicable to all the parties as far as they aim to co-operate on terms of equal freedom and mutual respect and recognition.

These are central ideas that come out of the idea of social contract underpinning Fukuyama's "end of history" project. They form the basis of his argument for, and promise of, economic prosperity under liberalism. The intention of this section is to selectively trace the theory of social contract and its implications for Fukuyama's liberal ideas.

1.2.1 Hobbes: Absolute Sovereignty of the Leviathan State

Fukuyama (1992:144-145; 1995:284; 1999:165) regards Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau as the original sources of liberalism in Western political thought. Hobbes, according to Fukuyama, stands at the head of this liberal philosophical tradition. Many political philosophers object to this idea. Levine (2002:46) argues that Hobbes was plainly not a liberal, because in Hobbes, there is "a tenet of his theory of the sovereignty that the sovereign's power is necessarily unrestricted, that a sovereign can rightfully do anything." If Hobbes were a liberal, argues Levine

(2002:46), then he would have shown that there is "a principled limitation on the use of coercive force; restrictions on what sovereigns might rightfully do." Levine (2002:46) depicts Hobbes as "a forerunner of liberal political thought." This is simply because Hobbes introduces a shift from inherited monarchical rule to a consensual installation of a sovereign by a group of people.

Hobbes's philosophical enterprise emerges from the ethical and political culture of Renaissance humanism and moves towards the dawn of the Enlightenment. A closer look at Hobbes's moral and political philosophy⁴ shows that it converges on the idea of the supremacy of the individual, although he tries to propagate the idea of absolute sovereignty as the only stable alternative to anarchy.

The fundamental problem that Hobbes tries to address is that of creating a political order that would transform the tendencies of individual human passions, which Levine (2002:24) calls "the natural condition of mankind." Accordingly citizens of the state of nature would attempt to solve the problem by seeking ways that would leave each one of them in a mutually advantageous position. In order to do this they had to construct a sovereign power that would enforce their agreement to surrender some of their rights in return for a more peaceful condition.

In his introduction to *The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes*, Sorell (1996:6-7) shows that Hobbes allocates to moral philosophy the investigation of human passions and patterns of behaviour, and to political philosophy the theory of the institution of sovereignty as a response to the question of rulership and source of law. Although they are allocated different tasks, the two fields of thought both invariably converge on the individual. It is at this convergence of Hobbes's moral and political thought that we encounter liberal ideas such as equal rights, liberty, justice, and the justification of the state on the basis of consensus and toleration. These ideas have an inseparable relationship to the idea of self-preservation.

⁴ Hobbes defines Ethics or Moral philosophy as the science or knowledge of "consequences from the passions of men", and "what is *Good* and *Evil*, in the conversation, and Society of mankind. Good and Evil are names that signify our appetites, and aversions" (in the *Leviathan*, 1966c:72-73, 146), or that which has to do with "the passions, manners [mores] and the aims or purposes of men" (in *Anti-White*, (in Tuck (1996:179)). In distinction to Ethics, Hobbes (in *Anti-White*, (in Tuck (1996:179)) defines Politics (or Civil Philosophy) as that subject that "concerns human society and discusses civil laws, justice and all other virtues."

1.2.1.1 The Idea of Self-preservation

Hobbes (1966c: 110-123) presents the state of nature as a condition in which free and equal individuals find themselves in contact with each other in the absence of a superior authority (a state or civil society) that can lay down and enforce rules of order to control their behaviour toward each other. In the state of nature there is thus no governance by law, and no recognition of authority. Consequently individuals are a threat to each other and fall into the condition which Hobbes (1966c:115) calls "a war of all against all." The war of all against all is a result of a conflict of interests, each individual's rational pursuit of his intent, the urge to get anything in any way, including killing, so as to satisfy his desires. A central desire is that of self-preservation. This desire is supplemented by the desire for glory based on "competition of riches, honour, command, or other power," this desire "inclineth to contention, enmity, and war: because the way of one competitor, to the attaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repel the other" (Hobbes, 1966c:86). It is a condition based on self-interest, and its consequences are that human life becomes "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short" (Hobbes, 1966c:113). Self-interest provides the sole motivation for doing anything to fulfil one's desires, especially the desire for the achievement and promotion of self-preservation. Out of this condition Hobbes derives his principles of right and justice.

In attempting to propose an idea of good reasoning, Hobbes sets out from a comprehensive system of materialistic metaphysics⁵ in which all that exists is matter in motion⁶. This materialistic picture of humankind lays the foundation for

⁵ The most important and basic assumption of Hobbes's materialist metaphysics is that all that exists are bodies (matter) and all that is knowable is solely of bodies (matter). It follows that the concern of philosophy is to inquire into the causes and characteristics of these bodies (physical, human, and the body politic) (Hobbes, 1966a:2-12). All these bodies share a common characteristic, that of *materia prima* (i.e. *first matter*) (Hobbes, 1966a:117-118). Hobbes (1966a:119) defines *materia prima*, as "body in general, that is, body considered universally, not as having neither form nor any accident, but in which no form nor any other accident but quantity are at all considered, that is, they are not drawn into argumentation".

⁶ Equally important to the above mentioned assumption is the notion of *motion* (Hobbes, 1966a:113-116). Hobbes (1966a:204) defines *motion* as the continual privation (or relinquishing) of one place and acquiring of another. There are two types of motion. On the one hand, there is vital motion which refers to the process of birth, continues through life and includes such motions as the course of blood, pulse, nutrition, breathing, excretion, "to which motions there needs no help of imagination" (Hobbes, 1966a:38). On the other hand, there is voluntary motion (or animal motion) which refers to going, speaking, the deliberate movement of our limbs. There are first of all movements in our minds, "... because going, speaking, and the like voluntary motions, depend always upon a precedent thought of *whither, which way, and what*; it is evident, that the imagination is the first internal beginning [that is: cause – RW] of all voluntary motion" (Hobbes, 1966a:39).

his notion of self-preservation. It is from his materialist psychology that Hobbes (*Leviathan*, Chapter 6 and *De Homine*, Chapter 11) explains the origin and nature of various passions and emotions, including the supreme desire, or passion for self-preservation. The desire for self-preservation is very important to Hobbes's account of human warfare in the state of nature, and to his justification for absolute sovereignty (Hampton, 1986:14). Fukuyama (1992:156) even describes it as "the fundamental moral fact" for Hobbes – the concepts of justice and right are founded on the pursuit of the desire to preserve one's physical existence.

In trying to further establish the importance of the idea of self-preservation, one should ask whether self-preservation can be understood as intrinsic, or as only interactive and socially developed. In his book, *The Elements of Law Natural and Politic*, Hobbes (1928:71) argues that it is natural for human beings "to avoid that which is hurtful" and, most of all, "the terrible enemy of nature, death", that causes "both the loss of all power and also the greatest of all bodily pains in the losing..." In this argument, Hobbes emphasises the primacy of the desire for self-preservation over death, but in the *De Homine*, he (Hobbes, 1968:48-49) acknowledges that

though death is the greatest of all evils (especially when accompanied by torture), the pains of life can be so great that, unless their quick end is foreseen, they lead men to number death among the goods.

What comes out of Hobbes' argument is that the desire for self-preservation is clearly presented as being intrinsic on the grounds that we are naturally averse to anything that hinders our internal vital motions, especially death, which causes the complete cessation of vital motions. The choice for death is only made in a situation where life involves enormous pain.

A close look at the idea of self-preservation also shows that it has two aspects: the first has to do with the means to achieve one's preservation of physical existence - *laws of nature* (or natural law) (this will be discussed below under point 1.2.1.2). The second aspect has to do with *valuation* and *moral laws*. Concerning the first aspect, in *Leviathan*, Hobbes (1966c:116) describes the law of nature as

a precept or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved.

Furthermore, Hobbes (1966c:117) explains that this precept or general rule of reason implies

that every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of war.

In the *De Corpore Politico*, Hobbes (1966d:86-87) talks of the laws of nature as founded on reason. He (Hobbes, 1966d:86) argues that since no person is mighty enough to assure himself or herself prolonged self-preservation as long as he or she remains in the state of hostility and war, reason must dictate that every person in the state of nature seeks peace for his or her own good. Hobbes (1966d:87) here describes reason as the law of nature itself (Chapter II:1), and as a precept of natural law (Chapter II:2). These seemingly conflicting descriptions of the laws of nature raised a lot of questions among commentators regarding what Hobbes means, but not one of them seems to capture Hobbes' fundamental idea on this issue. It may be possible that Hobbes meant to say that reason carries with it two sides: one side makes reason function as the foundation – or law – of nature; the other side sees its function as a general rule of natural law that governs human behaviour.

Hampton (1986:89) points out that in *Leviathan* the laws of nature are characterised by Hobbes as theorems "designed to specify actions that will be means to one's self-preservation." But Tuck (1996:189) argues that Hobbes presents the laws of nature "as an implication of the principle of self-preservation..." One needs to ask what exactly these laws of nature entail. From scattered references one can assemble Hobbes' exposition of the laws of nature. Laws of nature include such things as seeking peace, defending ourselves, justice, equity, liberty, fidelity to covenants, modesty, mercy and gratitude (Hobbes, 1966c: 113-147). Thus the laws of nature appear to mean all activities that cause and govern our natural behaviour through the instrument of reason as we strive to preserve our physical existence.

The second aspect of the notion of self-preservation deals with *valuations* and *moral laws*. Hobbes' moral philosophy is sometimes viewed as both subjectivist in valuations and objectivist in moral laws.

- (1) Concerning valuations, Hobbes (1966c:41) defines that which is "Good" as whatsoever is the object of someone's desire, and that which is evil as the object of someone's hate and aversion. One can point out that underneath the Hobbesian ethic is the polarity of the greatest good, self-preservation (Hobbes, 1968:48), versus the greatest evil, death (Hobbes, 1928:71). That which is good cannot be defined as simply good, but it should be said to be relative to person, place, and time (Hobbes, 1928:47), leading Hampton (1986:29) to conclude that Hobbes' ethic "espouses a thoroughgoing ethical subjectivism."
- (2) Concerning moral laws, Jessop (1960:25) argues against those who label Hobbes' ethic as wholly political and relativist. According to Jessop this label is not strictly correct because Hobbes holds

that the moral laws are so contrary to our passions that we cannot bring ourselves to follow them except under fear of an external coercive power, and when we are sure that our neighbours are under the same reliable control. ...that the moral laws are objective, perpetually valid, and divine in origin, but can only become operative or effective in a State.

In other words, Jessop is arguing that moral laws can only be objective when they function under the sovereignty which Hobbes terms a reasoned institution. On the same note, but from a different angle, Sorell (1996:7) comments that

moral laws can be objective in the sense of commanding universal assent and leading to a condition (peace) that everyone will find subjectively preferable to its absence (war), without there being an independently existing rightness that they conform to.

Although it appears that way, it is not possible to say that this is Hobbes' idea concerning the moral laws. Social or civil life, for Hobbes, rotated around the sovereign whose authority permeated every aspect of life. The realisation of a

social contract by the installation of the sovereignty made any moral laws agreed upon, binding.

1.2.1.2 The Social Contract

Hobbes's argument in *Leviathan* is that there should be a *reasoned* and consensual institution of an absolute sovereignty (which Locke, in contrasting and unfavourable terms, equates with tyranny) rather than an inherited one, as was the tradition in the monarchical era. He attempts to show that *bad reasoning* plunged European societies into political chaos during the seventeenth century (Hampton, 1986:1). Hobbes's philosophy is obviously a response to events in his own country. England, in the first half of the sixteenth century experienced "the irascible despotism of Henry VIII" followed by "ecclesiastical oppression" (Quinton, 1994:314). Peters (1967:40) describes the political and moral situation of England during this time as verging on anarchy. In the seventeenth century, especially the years leading to the English Civil War, Quinton (1994:316) says, "resistance to royal encroachments - denial of customary rights, ruling without parliament - led to the bandying about of a phrase with a very important future: the 'life, liberty, and property'" of an individual.

In a bid to show that European 'bad reasoning' could be corrected, Hobbes addresses the question of the emergence of human civil society and the reasoned institution of the sovereign. His answer is presented in a hypothetical portrait of the state of nature.

The concept of human beings as individualistic and materialistic, with equal rights-liberties to do anything they desire and judge as good, leads Hobbes to conclude that by nature all human beings are equal in terms of physiological construction, strength and mental ability. Any qualitative or significant differences in ability are of no consequence. Stumpf (1982:223) argues that Hobbes' equality refers to the capability of hurting one's neighbour and seizing what one deems important for one's own survival. Be this as it may, Hobbes' assumption of human equality, as individuals with natural rights governed by the dictate of reason (natural law) for the sake of survival, makes his social contract theory more plausible. Hobbes' intention with the social contract theory is to rationalise political

obligation and to substitute an intelligible bargain for mystifying appeals to tradition and divine right (Peters, 1967:42).

It is the desire for self-preservation, based on the law of nature, expressed in the fear of death, that drives each man to seek peace and hope for economic prosperity (Hobbes, 1966c:116-117). Although the natural situation of man looks hopeless, Hobbes (1966c:117) argues that the fundamental law of nature compels man to seek peace and follow it, and also to defend himself if he is to preserve his existence. This adds some spark of hope. The road to peace lies in the way that these equal and free individuals mutually lay down their natural rights and renounce, or transfer, them to sign a contract with the commonwealth or sovereign who will be given absolute sovereign powers to arbitrate on all matters of life (Hobbes, 1966c:116-159); that is, to usher in justice⁷. The sovereign does not exist until there is a contract, for it is through a covenant or contract that mutual and voluntary renunciation of natural rights is brought into effect.

According to Hobbes (1966c:158) the social contract presumes that each free individual says to every other free man,

I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man or this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him and authorize all his actions in like manner.

Under such a presumption the social contract does not end in the mutual transferring of rights based on rational action under the impetus of fear, but rather, it brings many of those free and equal individuals into one people and marks the generation or the establishment of "that great LEVIATHAN, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that mortal god to which we owe under the immortal God, our peace and defence" (Hobbes, 1966c:158). Hobbes (1966c:158) defines this Leviathan or the commonwealth as,

one person of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves every one author to the end he may use the strength and means of them all as he shall think expedient for their peace and common defence.

⁷ Hobbes (1966c:187) distinguishes between justice of manners and justice of actions. When the former is attributed to man it means conformity or inconformity of manners to reason.

This person shall be called the sovereign because of the sovereign powers bestowed upon him, but the rest shall be subjects (Hobbes, 1966c:158).

People can break the covenants they have mutually made with each other to transfer their rights to the Leviathan on the occasion of their interest to do so (Hobbes, 1966c:121-127). However, to ensure sustenance of these breakable covenants Hobbes (1966c:154;162) adds that "covenants without the sword, are words, and of no strength to secure a man at all." That means someone with absolute authority was supposed to be bestowed with powers to see to it that law and order are maintained.

1.2.1.3 The Sovereign

Hobbes employed the ideas of natural law and social contract to defend the idea of a monarchical sovereignty who has absolute power, and uses it as the determinant of justice, morality and even legality. Without this sovereignty the governing norms of the community would not carry much weight. Hobbes is a radical contractarian who spells out and defends a radical view of individualism - human beings are individuals first, and social creatures on a contractual basis, second. Gray (1986:7) correctly points out that Hobbes voiced "an intransigent individualism" whose "consummate modernity marks a decisive break with the social philosophy bequeathed by Plato and Aristotle to medieval Christian thought." This is because Hobbes' (1966c:185-196) individualism is so radical that even the family and social ties are not natural to individuals, but only artificially forged and coerced contracts between a so-called inferior (e.g. child, wife, servant or slave) and a so-called superior (e.g. parent, husband, master). This is why, as already indicated above, the state of nature is a condition where equal and free individuals are at war with each other. It may be said that the Hobbesian moral and political view of human society is that men are predominantly animated by a self-interested desire for power and self-preservation. In their natural condition, where there is no sovereign power to constrain them, this leads to dire results. However, because each one of them wants to survive, these free and equal individuals decide on a contract.

The outcome of the contract is the emergence of the sovereign who fulfils the requirements of preserving order. The sovereign has all the power to protect the subjects and the subjects are obliged to obey the sovereign. The whole

purpose of the obligation to obedience by the subjects is to receive protection from the sovereign. Although Hobbes (1966c:202-203;289) gives the subjects some liberties, which he defines as "those things the subjects may justly refuse to do even though commanded by the sovereign", the powers of the sovereign are still imposing and no subject is allowed to breach the covenant. -

To recapitulate, it may be said that the liberty and equality of individuals under an absolute sovereign is central to Hobbes' moral and political philosophy. The development of the ideology of absolute monarchical sovereignty is based on the assumption that an individual's desire for self-preservation (under the natural right to life), without a sovereign authority to facilitate it, can only result in a situation of war of all against all. He uses the hypothetical portrait of the state of nature as a philosophical justification for the existence of a reasoned monarchical sovereignty, rather than an inherited monarchy (which he rejected).

The concept of a social contract derives the basis of political allegiance and moral compromise from a desire for self-preservation at all costs. Hence, the surrender of liberty and rights to the tyrannical LEVIATHAN in return for security. Furthermore, in his moral and political philosophy, Hobbes devotes the theory of social contract to the idea that morality is a human invention, or a human-made institution, at a given time and place, which is justified only to the extent that it effectively furthers an individual's interests in a mutually agreed situation. Bound by his radical individualism, Hobbes explains the existence of morality in any society by appealing to the convention that only relates to the desires of an individual. At the same time, Hobbes argues that whether morality can be justified in any human society depends upon how well its moral conventions serve individuals' desires or preferences.

As for the subsequent development of liberalism: Hobbes' ideas of individualism, self-preservation, liberty, equality, justice, and the rule of law were received, modified and critically evaluated in a whole tradition of liberal writing, culminating in Fukuyama. The radical modernity of Hobbesian uncompromising individualism presents the idea of the fundamental and inalienable right of self-preservation, which Fukuyama views as the source for a social contract. From this, natural laws, based on consensus and toleration are derived, in which justice and morality are rooted, and from which all other rights and obligations are derived.

1.2.2 Locke: Majoritarian Democracy

The political philosophy of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries supplied an ideological foundation for the age of absolutism, an age where absolute power was centred on kings and rulers. The political problem of internal order was largely presented in the language of national sovereignty (Lest, 1988:753). The eighteenth century, on the other hand, emerged as the age of democratic revolutions. Political problems were those of freedom, and the revolt against injustice. Political theories accordingly came to focus on the freedom and equality of citizens (cf. Locke, Rousseau, Kant, etc). These political theories were expressed in the idiom of natural and inalienable rights (Lest, 1988:753). That is to say, the conception of political power in the eighteenth century was that it could never be exercised apart from its ultimate goal - the common good. Men entered into a social contract in order to preserve their lives, liberty, and property in a justified way. Locke explains this idea in his *Second Treatise of Government*.

Locke's philosophy gave theoretical expression to the principles underlying the English revolution and his justification inspired the political thought of the French Enlightenment, as well as providing the intellectual foundation for the American Constitution. Liberalism in these societies was understood in Lockean liberal terms (Fukuyama, 1992:145). Locke's liberal philosophy is built on a theological-philosophical basis. Hence his basic thesis: that all human beings are born with the natural right to equal freedom, and a natural duty to God to preserve themselves and the rest of humankind. He believes that the knowledge of natural rights is written in the hearts of all people. He argues that any person in his right mind, and using common sense, can figure out that people have natural rights and what these rights entail (Anderson, 1992:xii).

Emerging from Locke's moral and political philosophy are two major ideas that are of importance to this chapter: (1) the idea of the social contract and (2) the idea of property rights. The former entails Locke's idea of natural law, natural right, and the theory of consent, while the latter is foundational to the whole realisation of the former.

1.2.2.1 Social Contract

Locke takes the idea of a social contract from Hobbes but adds to it the fundamental right to property. Fukuyama (1992:366) correctly points out that the Lockean right to property is derived from the right to self-preservation. Thus if a person has the right to life, he or she also has the right to the means of life (land, food, etc). In connection to this, Locke grasped the moral idea that the goal of economic and political power is to achieve the common good - based on fair distribution, so that each person can preserve him/herself as demanded by the fundamental law (which I will discuss below). This common good is achievable within the context of an agreed normative situation. This situation starts from realising the existence of natural law, and the natural rights endowed by God (as already indicated above that Locke's ideas are based on a *theologico-philosophical* basis), to every individual in the state of nature.

(a) State of Nature.

In Hobbes, the state of nature was portrayed negatively – a war of all against all. Locke, on the other hand, (1924:118-124[II:4-19])⁸ presents it positively, as a place of "men (*sic*) living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth with authority to judge between them." According to Locke, this should be seen as being "properly in the state of nature." Furthermore, Locke (1924:119[II:6]) argues that in the state of nature there is a possibility of knowing the moral law. If these laws are enacted through reason, they teach all humankind that no one *ought* to harm another's life, health, liberty, or property. The state of nature provides a moral code for political and economic life. This is typical of the Lockean empiricist approach to the process of knowledge acquisition. Locke's state of nature is thus social in character, it is a place of learning by interaction and reasoning, whereas in Hobbes the state of nature is characterised by absolute anarchy.

⁸ The square brackets contain the following: the Roman numeral stands for Book II, and the number following to it stands for the paragraph.

Of great importance to the Lockean state of nature are the ideas of natural law, natural rights and natural duty (or obligation). These ideas will be discussed below.

(i) Natural Law. Locke's view of human beings follows that of Aristotle. It pictures human beings as essentially social and rational. They are rational in that they can, at least, acknowledge the existence and the role of the law of nature in their social interaction. For Locke (1924:118-124[II:7-10]) the law of nature is the law of reason that prescribes how human conduct in the state of nature ought to occur universally (because it is applicable to all of humankind in all places and at all times). According to Locke (1924:119[II:6 – 7]) if consulted, the law of nature restrains people from violating each others' rights, or, enjoins them not to interfere with each other's "life, ... liberty, health, or possessions."

In his analytic commentary, Lloyd Thomas (1995:15-17) shows that there is a distinction between laws of nature and the fundamental law of nature. While the fundamental law of nature demands all humanity to be preserved (the right to life) (Locke, 1924:125-126 [II:16;134]), the laws of nature create access to the means of self-preservation. Thus according to Lloyd Thomas (1995:16-17) Locke's conception of the teleological character and the necessity of the laws of nature are rationally justified on the basis of the fundamental law of nature. All in all, what Locke is saying is that in the state of nature there is some form of control if people choose to reason together.

(ii) Natural Right. Locke's fundamental law of nature entails the *natural right* of all men to equal freedom by virtue of which no one may legitimately exercise political jurisdiction over another without their consent and a *natural duty* to God to preserve themselves and the rest of humanity. Lloyd Thomas (1995:18-19) describes Lockean natural rights as simply "rights conferred upon persons by laws of nature" but not by the fundamental law of nature itself. Collinson (1987:64) points out that in the *Two Treatises of Civil Government*, Locke argues against the divine right of kings. He maintains that all individuals are perfectly free and equal in the state of nature and possess certain rights - i.e. natural rights. It follows that even if a civil government is formed, natural rights are the area of human conduct that is immune from government interference. In discussing the major types of

natural rights Locke (1924:120-124; 129-141 [II:7-15; 14-51]) emphasises the right to ownership of property over other major types of rights (the right to life (or the right to self-preservation), the right to punish transgressions, the right to seek reparation).

(iii) Natural Duty (or Obligation). The concept of obligation comes with the relational concept of law. In this case, it is natural law that compels people to conform to the duty of maintaining harmony in a pre-political society. This makes it each individual's responsibility to enact the law of nature that binds them to preserve peace and refrain from harming one another.

The law of nature serves as a moral code of the state of nature - a normative law that concerns how people ought to act. Whenever enacted through reason by each individual, it dictates how people ought to behave in order not to infringe on each other's natural rights.

The Lockean state of nature is portrayed as a condition in which none of the institutions of the state exist, but individual members are free, equal and independent (Locke, 1924:118-119[4-7]). By freedom (or liberty in the state of nature), Locke (1924:125-128[II:17;22]) means being free from any constraint but the moral law of nature. Under a government, it means freedom from the arbitrary will of another man and from any human rule but the standing rule common to every individual of that society (Locke, 1924:127-128[II:21-22]). An individual's freedom is inseparable from his right of self-preservation which is, according to Locke (1924:125-126[II:125-126]), "the foundation of all the rest". Should any individual or institution desire or attempt to get another person under his or its absolute power, this creates a state of war against the other, and the would-be deprived person has the right to resist or rebel.

Locke (1924:125[II:17]) argues that he has reason to conclude that a person "who would get me into his power without my consent ... must necessarily be supposed ... to take away everything else". This is because everything that is involved in the formation of the commonwealth involves each and every individual's freedom, independence, and rights as well as private property. Therefore an individual's freedom and rights should not be compromised, or tampered with, by anybody or by any institution.

(b) Formation of the Body Politic and the Institution of Government

There is no doubt that there are some deficiencies or inconveniences in the state of nature (Locke, 1924:180[124-127]). Wolterstorff (1995:440) points to some of the deficiencies in the state of nature that the government is expected to correct, such as "the bad human tendency to transgress on other persons' properties, and the equally bad tendency to punish such transgressions more severely than the law of nature permits". In the event of some individuals failing to maintain peace and harmony in the state of nature, a civil government is formed. Locke (1924:164-165[II:95-99]) argues that all men in the state of nature are free, equal, independent and guided by the law of nature to consent to a contract with one another to institute a government; to eliminate deficiencies and then to obey that government, provided it does what they have contracted with one another. This body politic will uphold natural law and the natural rights to life, liberty and property, of the contractees. Lloyd Thomas (1995:22) holds that

Locke's reason for postulating the executive power of the law of nature is linked to his main strategy for showing how political authority can be legitimate ... therefore that there should be a single, common, known interpretation of the law of nature by reference to which disputes can be settled, and that there should be standard punishments for the violation of those common rules, impartially administered and enforced.

Hence Locke's (1924:118 [II:3]) definition of political power,

political power, then, I take to be a right of making laws with penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties, for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the commonwealth from foreign injury, and all this only for the public good.

Locke (1924:124[II:15]) maintains that all men are in a state of nature and remain so until, by their own consent, they make themselves members of some politic society so that they may achieve a public good. The Lockean proposal for the formation of a political community that will see the installation of an executive power (or authority) begins with a number of individuals uniting into one society, each of them transferring his "executive power of natural law" to the public, and

"there, and there only is a political, or civil society" formed (Locke, 1924:160[II:85]). Thus each individual consents with others to make one body politic under one government, and puts himself under the obligation to every one of that society to submit to the determination of the majority" (Locke, 1924:164-165[95-98]). That is to say, the Lockean idea of the emergence of a human political community or civil society is based on the theory of consent. Through his theory of consent, Locke presents one of the fundamental principles of the liberal tradition: that there can be no subjection to any power without consent (either expressed or tacit).

Lloyd Thomas (1995:25) describes Locke's idea of the formation of a political community as being a two-staged process, whereby a political (executive) power is established. In the first stage of the process, free and equal individuals make compacts (or contracts) with one another as an expression of their wish to quit the state of nature. Each person agrees to surrender the control of his executive power of the law of nature into the hands of the body politic (Locke, 1924:124; 164; 204-205[II:14, 95, 171]). It follows that the formed political community leads to the second stage of the process - that of instituting a government. It is the political community - under strict majority approval - that forms a government by placing, in the words of Lloyd Thomas (1995:31), "their pooled executive power of the law of nature in the hand of the government *on trust*" that it will attain the intended end - safety and security (or preservation) (Locke, 1924:164-5; 192[II:95-98; 149]). If the formed government neglects, acts contrary to, or opposes the intended end or if it fails to achieve it, Locke (1924:192[II:149]) states that

the trust must necessarily be forfeited, and the power devolve into the hands of those that gave it, who may place it anew where they shall think best for their safety and security.

The formation of a government means entrusting the rights of judging and executing the demands of the law to an individual or the group of individuals (Hampsher-Monk, 1992:98) through a process that is underpinned by the principles of majoritarian democracy⁹. Hampsher-Monk (1992:98) comments that

⁹ Locke has in many places and in many ways been misinterpreted as stipulating majoritarian democracy as the only legitimate form of government (Hampsher-Monk, 1992:98). Hampsher-Monk (1992:98) correctly argues that Locke does not talk of the constitutional form of government that

"government is thus a trust, not a simple contract"¹⁰ and the political society which is formed as a result of a contract is therefore the body that does the entrusting.

In connection with the idea of trust, Locke develops a theory of justifiable rebellion against the state if it acts contrary to the trust reposed in it by the political community. Locke advances a number of ideas as general grounds for justifying a rebellion should the government happen to act other than expected. *Firstly*, if a government fails to enforce the fundamental law of nature, it provides a fertile ground for a rebellion against it and/or its dissolution. The government is entrusted with executive power by the majoritarian approval of the political society to enforce the law of nature (Locke, 1924:181-182; 184[II:131;135]). During its life, it may happen that the government fails to enforce the fundamental law of nature, not as a result of perpetually ineffectual attempts to do so, but "as a matter of perverse intention" (Locke, 1924:227[II:219]; Lloyd Thomas, 1995:62). When it becomes evident that the government is failing to execute the administration of justice for the securing of people's rights, or anything assigned to it, it is natural that people will withdraw their trust in it. Consequently, it should be dissolved so that the people can be "at liberty to erect a new legislative" that will provide for their safety and common (or public) good (Locke, 1924:228[II:220]).

Secondly, rebellion or dissolution is justified if a government fails to further the common good, as it is obliged to function in securing people's property against the greedy and the self-interested, against partiality in judgment and negligence, and against destructive execution of justice (Locke, 1924:180[II:124-126]). In its function of opposing the above mentioned deficiencies of the state of nature, the government is expected never to act to "extend further than the common good" (that of effective enforcement of everyone's rights by preserving their property (Locke, 1924:180-1, 188, 204 [II:124, 131, 139, 171])). Thus, according to Locke (1924:184-5 [II:135]), the sole purpose of the government is to protect people's material possessions, including life. Any end other than preservation calls for its dissolution.

Thirdly, Locke (1924:228[II:221]) suggests that a government can be dissolved when it acts contrary to

should take place but of the process of how people's freedoms should be regulated in the formation of a government.

¹⁰ The idea of trust will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis in the context of Fukuyama's idea of 'trust'.

the trust reposed in them when they endeavour to invade the property of the subject, and to make themselves, or any part of the community master or arbitrary disposers of the lives, liberties, or fortunes of the people.

It has already been indicated in some of the above sections that it is the rational majority of the society that gives the government the executive power of the law of nature on the basis of trust. If the government acts contrary to this trust or "the attitudinal consent of the majority", as Lloyd Thomas (1995:64) puts it, it loses its justification and legitimacy.

Fourthly, if a government fails to function within the limitations of its powers. Locke (1924:184-5[II:135]) maintains that

nobody can transfer to another more power than he has in himself, and nobody has an absolute arbitrary power over himself. ... A man cannot subject himself to the arbitrary power of another ... but so much as the law of nature gave him for the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind, this is all he doth, or can give up to the commonwealth, and by it to the legislative power, so that the legislative can have no more than this. Their power in the utmost bounds of it is limited to the public good of the society.

What bears emphasizing here is that the degree of power the government claims over the majority of the individual members of the body politic is crucial to its legitimacy. The government cannot be arbitrary since under the law of nature the rights of individual members of the society are not autocratic and are given under consent based on majoritarian decision. Hampsher-Monk (1992:103) explains that if

the powers surrendered by the citizens are limited by the constraints on their own original rights, ...so must be the powers of the government if it is to remain legitimate.

At the core of these four conditions is the idea that, for the government to retain its legitimacy for continual governance, it must always act in such a way that it does not lose the consent of the people. For it is the people who put the government in power, and it is the people that will take it out of power

(c) Theory of Consent

Simmons (1998) suggests that by "consent" Locke seems to refer to "a blanket term covering all kinds of deliberate, voluntary alienations of rights and/or undertakings of obligations." Simmons (1998) chooses to use the term "alienation" to explain either the transferring or renouncement of rights – thus "the right simply stops to be possessed by the renouncing party without transferring to another". As already shown above, the Lockean account shows that there are two kinds of consent, namely, express and tacit. The former refers to "consent given by positive action of some direct and explicit sort whose sole conventional point is to give consent, such as an oral or written promise" (Simmons, 1998). It requires something like a public oath of allegiance (Locke, 1924:164[II:95]). By contrast, the latter is "consent given without 'expressions' of it; that is, consent given without verbal or otherwise direct and explicit positive acts" (Simmons, 1998). It requires merely having "any possession or enjoyment of any part of the dominions of any government ... whether his possession be of land to him and his heirs forever, or a lodging only for a week" (Locke, 1924:177[II:119]). Locke (1924:177[II:119]) further suggests that tacit consent is simply given by "travelling freely on the highway" or by just "being within the territories of that government." By introducing the above mentioned distinction of the two stages of his notion of consent, Locke becomes rather unclear and windy in his explanation, especially when discussing tacit consent. This has attracted much critical scrutiny of his theory of consent, which accordingly, as Jones (2002:50) puts it, is "regarded by political theorists and historians of political thought alike as problematic and unconvincing."

1.2.2.2 Property rights

To Hobbes' idea of self-preservation, Locke added the idea of property rights. By the term "property" Locke refers to a man's life and liberty as well as his or her possessions. Locke (1924:130[II:26]) develops the idea of *self-ownership* where he maintains that "every man has a 'property' in his own 'person'". Barry (1986:102) comments that Locke's conception of the natural right to property was derived from this idea of self-ownership.

Starting from a theological premise, Locke (1924:129[II:25]) claims that God granted the world from which we should draw our sustenance in common to Adam and Noah. It is on this common grant that an individual can discharge his obligation through labour to preserve himself and the rest of creation under the fundamental law of nature. For an individual to declare any part of God's common grant his own private property, he is required to meet certain conditions. Locke (1924:130-3[II:26-34]) lays down three basic conditions that control the human acquisition of property:

- (a) *Labour*. The labour that a person puts on the materials necessarily introduces and demarcates (or distinguishes) private possession from the common grant. Sometimes this is discussed under "the 'value-added' argument" and sometimes under the "the 'labour-mixing' argument" (Lloyd Thomas, 1995:97-114). With regards to the former argument, under the right of enclosure and appropriation, through mixing labour with material, an individual acquires either a piece of land or anything not owned by anybody and adds value to it - hence it becomes his/her private property. With regards to the latter, labour-mixing implies exclusion of others from making use of the value added capital resource (Hampsher-Monk, 1992:91).

- (b) *Leaving sufficient for others*. Since private property is derived from the common grant, and it is a divine mandate (or duty) to preserve both others and us, one must be prepared to appropriate only what is enough for personal use and leave the rest in common for others. Locke does not provide an answer to a question such as, "If the remaining land is not sufficient or/and is not good enough for usage, does it mean that "the *proviso* of the law of nature for legitimate appropriation of property" is offended?" (Hampsher-Monk, 1992:91). This question points to the issue of the shortage of land, probably due to the method of appropriation. If land is finite and the human population keeps on growing, 'enough' will soon not be left over for others.

- (c) *Non-spoilage*. Non-spoilage refers to idea that as people enclose and appropriate property, especially land, they must acquire what they can use from

the common grant (without consent from other commoners) without spoiling or wasteful use (Hampsher-Monk, 1992:89).

These conditions provoke a number of questions regarding Locke's theory of property rights. One of the most important questions has to do with employed labour. Hampsher-Monk (1992:89) points out that Locke is silent on an important area regarding the right to property. This lacuna can be expressed as follows "although labour is what individuates and so establishes a private right, Locke does not assume that the right will in all circumstances accrue to the labourer". Locke (1924:130-131[27-30]) does, however, assume that both employed labour and the employees' labour create property rights for the employer. He argues:

Thus, the grass my horse has bit, the turfs my servant has cut, and the ore I have digged in any place, where I have a right to them in common with others, become my property without the assignation or consent of anybody. The labour that was mine, removing them out of that common state they were in, hath fixed my property in them.

Since property acquisition is a state of nature event that is prior to the institution of government, one is compelled to ask 'Does the body politic and/or the state have a general jurisdiction over private properties within its territories?' Earlier on, under point (c), I discussed the relationship between property and the theory of consent. This discussion indicates that there is some form of legal authority over the citizen and his property since it is ownership of property that keeps him part of the territory. However Locke's concept of property is not clear because one's servant's labour does not make that with which he has mixed his labour the master's property. Perhaps Locke does not think that servants are fully human.

Hampsher-Monk (1992:82) makes an illuminating comparative evaluation of Hobbes's and Locke's state of nature theories:

Hobbes's fundamental postulate was an unlimited *right* of nature claimed by each individual on his own behalf, the state of nature is one of strife, whereas Locke's fundamental postulate is a natural *duty* of preservation which we owe to God as a result of his having created us. This duty does not lead to strife (if it is followed) because it requires not only our own preservation but that of all men, since even though we are all special to ourselves, we are all equal before God.

What appears here is the difference between Hobbesian radical individualism and Lockean systematic individualism. Although the two views share the idea of social contract, Lockean individualism has a social bearing built on radical Protestant theological doctrines; fleshed out in political terms, to explain the responsibility of all men before God. Locke is here trying 'to ground a principle of political equality' that accommodates community life. Hence his view of life in the state of nature is positive, whereas the Hobbesian view is expressed in negative terms - that of anarchy.

Locke's picture of the state of nature may have been positive, but his doctrine of rights bound to the state of nature is problematic, since it is difficult to have full knowledge of how rights existed before the institution of a civil society and a government system that grants and enforces them. A close examination of the whole idea shows that the Lockean idea of rights does not have a *descriptive* meaning, but implies a *prescriptive* claim that men *ought* to have these rights. Be that as it may, the Lockean doctrine of rights found favour in many constitutional institutions. The Lockean version of the social contract differed from that of Hobbes, in that it was predominantly democratic in character. Furthermore, according to Locke's version of the social contract ownership of land in the state of nature antedates the formation of the body politic, without there having been any territorial jurisdiction over owners and their possessions.

When the citizens come to form the body politic, they bring all that they possess to the political society for safety and security. But they do not surrender their rights, with the exception of the right to personally judge and punish offenders against the natural law. Therefore, it may be concluded that central to the Lockean version of the social contract is the theory of consent between individuals in the formation of a political society, and between the political body and the state. This theory of consent is seen as a way to safeguard freedoms and rights.

1.2.3 Rousseau's Social Contract

Rousseau's more radical political ideas were developed upon a Lockean foundation. For complex and subtle reasons, he rejected the Hobbesian picture of the state of nature which led to the creation of the Sovereign. The Hobbesian

sovereign government is not part of the social contract: "he thus avoids the necessity of submitting it to any obligation whatsoever, and leaves it absolute and irresponsible" (Cole, 1913:xx). That is to say, the absolute sovereign reports to no one and remains open to criticism as a politically and morally pathological condition. However, Rousseau received from Hobbes the idea that in the process leading to the formation of a social contract "the individual should be prepared to submit totally to the supreme authority of a collective entity," which Rousseau recasts in "the form of a community rather than Hobbes's unitary state" (Jones, 2002:25) where the absolute monarch is in charge of everything.

Cole (1913:xx) may be correct in pointing out that Locke's version of the social contract was largely aimed at justifying the English revolution of 1688. This is because Locke does not make the government depend simply on its institution, but always "on the consent of the governed, and regards all rulers as liable to be displaced if they govern tyrannically" (Cole, 1913:xx). Rousseau disagrees with his predecessors and advocates a different pathway. What is Rousseau's version of the social contract?

1.2.3.1 The Individual in the Pre-political Sphere

In *The Social Contract (or Principles of Political Right)* (1762) (henceforth, *The Social Contract*), Rousseau develops a theory of sovereignty and investigates its implications. In the opening statement of the first chapter of *The Social Contract*, Rousseau (1913:3) makes a declaration on human freedom *cum* or amid enslavement:

Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains. One thinks himself the master of others, and still remains a greater slave than they. How did this change come about? ... What can make it legitimate?

This statement indicates that Rousseau is centrally preoccupied with the theme of freedom and concurrently with fears of dependency. Hampsher-Monk (1992:173) identifies two types of restraints on freedom, namely,

(a) *conventional restraints* – where an individual may or can do anything he or she chooses, but there is always a threat or a physical limit to prevent one from

exercising ones freedom. Thus there is always some kind of restriction to any intention to exercise his/her freedom;

(b) *non-conventional restraints* – where an individual's own will might not be free,

either in the sense of being driven by conflicting and irreconcilable desires, or through being totally enervated by some debilitating belief or doctrine, or again by being directed at something that is in principle unattainable (Hampsher-Monk, 1992:173).

The first type of restraint shows us that the world of reality has bounds that cannot be expanded - meaning that where there are such bounds we have to learn to pursue the attainable and reject the unattainable. The second dimension shows us that the world of imagination is boundless, but it can be restricted either through belief or some other kind of coercion. That is to say, to be free is either to reject the unattainable or to realise necessity. In this case, the necessity is for an individual to reject being perpetually chained, and to strive for a common goal where he is forced to be free.

Connected to the idea of freedom (or natural liberty) is the idea of natural equality. Natural liberty forms one of the basic assumptions on which Rousseau's theory of social contract is premised. Based on the assumption of natural equality, many proponents of social contract have used the contract to create the idea of the possibility of virtual enslavement in the state of nature in order to solve the paradox of liberty and social subordination when they are brought into a civil society. These proponents claim that each individual has his freedom entitled to him, but that he surrenders it in the event of the formation of the political community. Rousseau, however, has a different explanation of how an individual loses his liberty and equality to his neighbour, or the body politic.

Within the realm of natural equality, Rousseau raises the question of inequality between individuals before the social contract. In *The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality Among Men* (1755) Rousseau (1913:160) asks "what is the origin of inequality among men, and is it authorized by natural law?" He distinguishes two kinds of inequality, viz: natural (or physical) inequality, and moral (or political) inequality (Rousseau, 1913:160). In other words, the natural condition of man comprises two distinct aspects - the physical and the moral aspects.

Rousseau (1913:199) argues that the loss of independence - dependency - is the fundamental source of inequality. He elaborates the argument in the following way:

So long as men ...undertook only what a single person could accomplish, and confined themselves to such arts as did not require the joint labour of several hands, they lived free, healthy, honest, and happy lives, so long as their nature allowed, and as they continued to enjoy the pleasures of mutual and independent intercourse. But from the moment one man began to stand in need of the help of another; from the moment it appeared advantageous to any one man to have enough provisions for two, equality disappeared, property was introduced, work became indispensable, and vast forests became smiling fields, which man had to water with the sweat of his brow, and where slavery and misery were seen to germinate and grow up with the crops (Rousseau, 1913:199).

Furthermore, Rousseau (1911:49) claims that "dependence on things" does not infringe upon one's freedom, and does not produce vices, as does dependence on men. It is the latter form of dependence that leads to the problem of inequality. This follows from Rousseau's (1913:214-215;221) survey of the progression of inequality:

there is hardly any inequality in the state of nature, all the inequality which now prevails owes its growth and strength to the development of our faculties and the advance of the human mind, and becomes at last permanent and legitimate by the establishment of property and laws.

That is, prior to the institution of the general will, individuals are free and equal, but they became unequal due to human intellectual, legal and economic development. Now since Rousseau rejected both the Hobbesian and Lockean versions of the human state of nature, one is compelled to ask the question: What argument can Rousseau give to an individual in a pre-political society to justify the individual leaving it, and joining a civil society? Rousseau introduces the idea of a sovereign community or popular sovereignty in which an individual gives up his self-interest for a communal interest. This is interpreted by Fukuyama as giving up the struggle for recognition for self-preservation.

1.2.3.2 Popular Sovereignty

According to Jones (2002:25) the theory of popular sovereignty (or sovereign community) was Rousseau's "radical response to the social conflicts, divisions and inequalities that characterised and disfigured European states and societies in the second half of the eighteenth century." Like his predecessors, Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau was caught up in the fight to resolve the "deep-seated and long-running problem" in the political theory of the West, namely, the tension between the yearning for individual freedom on the one hand and "need for social order and collective authority" on the other (Jones, 2002:25). Unlike his predecessors, Rousseau sought to "reconcile liberty with order by conferring sovereign authority on the community as a whole" rather than on the all-powerful Hobbesian Leviathan or the Lockean trustee representative assembly.

In *The Social Contract*, Rousseau (1913:12) states the fundamental problem that his book sets out to solve:

The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before.

In providing a purported solution to the problem, Rousseau (in contrast to Locke's systematic individualism) launched a defiant collectivism based on the fundamental category that man in the state of nature is not a "natural man", but a "citizen" of a civil society (Rousseau, 1913:3). A man is a citizen even in the most ancient and natural of all societies - the family (Rousseau, 1913:4). In this natural society, there is an attachment or bond between the father and the children whereby children need the father for their preservation and as a result they obey him (Rousseau, 1913:4). Once the need for preservation is over, there is common liberty for the father and the children - the former is released from the care he owed his children, while the latter are released from the obedience they owed the father, thus making both sides equally independent (Rousseau, 1913:4). Rousseau (1913:4) argues that any continued union within the family is no longer a natural bond, but a voluntary union maintained by convention and based on natural freedom and equality. Therefore, asserts Rousseau (1913:4), the family should be

seen as the first model of political arrangements – the ruler being likened to the father, and the people to the children.

Since, according to Rousseau, there is no conflict in the state of nature, how and why do people enter into a social arrangement? Rousseau (1913:11), in his argument, supposes that people might have reached a point at which the obstacles in the way of self-preservation in the state of nature are "greater than the resources at the disposal of each individual for his maintenance in that state." The only option at people's disposal is to unite and enter into a formation by aggregation (Rousseau, 1913:13). Faced with the fundamental antinomies of modern political thought (desire and reason, individual and society, freedom and necessity, etc) Rousseau was compelled to find a resolution to the problem of the future of an individual's natural liberty if he is to join the new collective social order. Rousseau (1913:12) argues that, on joining the new social order through the social contract, an individual is elevated to a moral being whose interest is in harmony with the interest of the community. In the constitution of such a political formation, the social contract demands

the total alienation of each associate, together with all his rights to the whole community; for in the first place, each gives himself absolutely, the conditions are the same for all; and, this being so, no one has any interest in making them burdensome to others.

Balibar (2000:106) comments that the clause, "the total alienation of each associate" means "total conversion of private individuality to social," meaning "political individuality." On a similar note, Ansell-Pearson (1991:80) comments that "the individual of the state of nature will not simply lose the independence he enjoyed in this state, but will gain another form of independence, the independence that is gained through dependence," by being a member of a moral community built on the twin principles of freedom and equality. The moral-collective body is absolutely sovereign with, at its disposal, the unlimited collective power to make law and to change it. In turn each individual citizen owes absolute obedience to the law (Rousseau, 1913:12-14, 24-25; Ansell-Pearson, 1991:80-81; Balibar, 2000:106-107). This contrasts with Hobbes' absolute monarchical

sovereign who is not part of the contract. He is the one who makes the laws and the subjects are obliged to obey him.

Rousseau (1913:13-24) uses the term "general will" to describe this political form of sovereignty in which the individual is identical to the body politic. The *general will* can be understood as a moral/political solution to the problem of individual freedoms and interest after the realisation of the social contract. This again contrasts with Hobbes' view. In the *Leviathan* the will of the individual is renounced, while in Rousseau it is realised and recognised. The general will may be interpreted as a claim on Rousseau's part that, as Ansell-Pearson (1991:81) puts it, "the plurality of particular wills create community in which exists an identity between the individual and the universal in a general will."

The notion of the general will is likened to Hobbes's and Locke's natural law. It is the source of the law (conditions of civil association) and the sovereignty (body politic) and the basis of political right (Rousseau, 1913:20-22;29-31). Based on the notion of general will, Rousseau builds his theory of sovereignty. Hence he (Rousseau, 1913:20) writes:

I hold then that Sovereignty, being nothing less than the exercise of the general will, can never be alienated, and that the Sovereign who is no less than a collective being, cannot be represented except by himself: the power indeed may be transmitted, but not the will.

Rousseau (1913:20-21) argues that sovereignty is inalienable and indivisible. Thus there is no division or distinction between civil society and the state as separate entities "fixed in a particular political relationship" as in Hobbes and Locke (Jones, 2002:26-27). Civic society in the Hobbesian and Lockean traditions is a human creation, i.e., it lies in a convention. Ansell-Pearson (1991:85) correctly concludes that, "the originality of Rousseau's political philosophy lies in his argument *contra* Hobbes and Locke, that sovereignty is inalienable." The question of the inalienability of the sovereignty marks the importance that Rousseau places on the problem of power in political thought. Ansell-Pearson (1991:85) points out that "the notion refers to the ultimate source of political authority and power." Sovereignty is the supreme power that is essentially the power to make laws, as already indicated above. It is the participation of the whole citizenship of the whole state in the making and implementing of the conditions of association.

In discussing the limits of sovereign power, Rousseau (1913:26) summarises and clarifies his argument concerning the sovereignty in the following way:

What then, strictly speaking, is an act of Sovereignty? It is not a convention between a superior and an inferior, but a convention between the body and each of its members. It is legitimate because based on the social contract, and equitable, because common to all; useful because it can have no other object than the general good, and stable, because guaranteed by the public force and the supreme power. So long as the subjects have to submit only to the conventions of this sort, they obey no one but their own will; and to ask how far the respective rights of the Sovereign and the citizens extend, is to ask up to what point the latter can enter into undertakings with themselves, each with all, and all with each.

As already indicated, sovereignty is inalienable and indivisible, meaning that the general will cannot be divided or alienated if the constituted laws are to serve the interests of the public and of the individual members of the public.

Rousseau indisputably brought some original and substantial ideas into Western moral and political thinking. In an attempt to differ with Hobbes, Rousseau, in effect, endorsed Hobbes's idea of the necessity of a state, which he (Rousseau) gave the status of a Sovereign. A further difference is shown in that the Hobbesian Sovereign is a person who is not part of the social contract while in Rousseau the Sovereign is the people themselves under a new form of association in which the will of the Sovereign "is the will of each person insofar as reason is in control" (Levine, 1987:33).

Lest (1988:753), in evaluating Locke and Rousseau, states that however much they may have differed, both exhibited the germ of all modern liberalism - "its faith in representative democracy, in civil liberties, and in the basic dignity of man". It has been demonstrated that Rousseau's notion of the general will exists on the basis of the general interest that is superior to the particular interest. The crux of Rousseau's political philosophy lies in the government's role of preserving the general interest "and allow[ing] it to prevail over particular interests" (Balibar, 2000:107). If allowed to cause scarcity of material goods, Rousseau's general will is likely to turn into a Hobbesian saga of all against all.

A closer look at some of the ideas emanating from the three political thinkers discussed above (Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau) shows that these ideas

inform Fukuyama's notion of liberal democracy (as he is one of the contemporary heirs of the liberal tradition). Central to Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau is the preservation of each individual by establishing a civil society through consensus¹¹ that allows toleration.¹² The idea of consensus features prominently in Fukuyama's notion of liberal democracy – especially when he talks of consensus-reception. Although Fukuyama (1992:156-157) finds it unacceptable that members of the state of nature forego their struggle for recognition (in Hobbes they give up the battle for prestige or glory to achieve self-preservation; in Locke they give up the battle for recognition for self-preservation and life-endowment with material comfort; and in Rousseau individuals give up self-interest for communal glory), he talks of the world (see the fourth chapter of this thesis), as having consensually given up other ideologies, and chosen liberal democracy – making it the ultimate ideology for political governance and economic prosperity, regardless of what part of the world you find yourself in. Thus he follows in the steps of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau in showing that in the creation of a liberal society there should be consensus first, and then toleration of diversity. Fukuyama uses the path blazed by these thinkers as both a trans-historical standard to measure difference in socio and political development and a method to explain what is taking place.

1.3 THEORY OF *Laissez-faire*

Having looked at Fukuyama's allegiance to the social contract tradition in political theory, we now turn to his allegiance to the *laissez-faire* tradition in economic thought. In the philosophical disputes over economic reforms of the 1770's and 1780's, philosophical enlightenment was intertwined with economic thought (Rothschild, 2001:21). This means there was participation of critical thought at that time in initiatives to establish a means of bettering human well-being in economic

¹¹ The concept of consensus refers to "agreement about fundamental or underlying principles" but permitting "disagreement on matters of emphasis or detail" (Heywood, 2000:18). In academic circles, particularly in political science, it consists of two aspects, namely *procedural* consensus and *substantive* consensus. The former refers to what Heywood (2000:18) calls "willing to make decisions through consultation and bargaining, either between political parties or between government and major interest;" and the latter as "an overlap in the ideological positions of two or more political parties reflected in agreement about fundamental policy."

¹² Toleration is one of the fundamental principles of liberalism and one of "the central values of liberal democracy," and guarantees "individual freedom and means of social enrichment" (Heywood, 2000:149). Locke defends toleration, especially when he deals with religious freedom. He bases his argument on a belief in human reason, which, he believes, can guide humankind if consulted.

terms. The dominant *politico*-economic view was that the entire system of freedom of commerce was to leave individuals free to do what they wanted. This was based on the presumption that each person is the best judge of his own situation. (Rothschild, 2001:21). This was *laissez-fairism* in the making. *Laissez-faire* is a theory based on the idea of an absolute minimum of governmental interference in the economic affairs of individuals and society. As a reformist move to counter the mercantilist¹³ economic doctrines of the French monarchy, the physiocrats¹⁴ – proposed *laissez-faire* policy. This policy suggested that the monarchical government should allow people freedom in their economic pursuits or activities (Lux, 1990:23).

In its classical stage, liberalism was frequently associated with the maxim of *laissez-faire* – there must be no interference or invasion of liberty by the state – thus advocating the theory of just entitlement to property, economic liberty or any other aspect of liberty.

With the coming of socialism and communism, there were many parts of the world in which classical liberalism ceased being influential. With the fall of communism, the maxims of *laissez-faire* were revived starting in the late 20th century. The idea of *laissez-faire* regained its dominance in Europe, America, and some other parts of the world.

1.3.1 Classical Political Economy

As already indicated above, at the end of the 18th century the contending schools of economic thought were mercantilism and physiocracy. The classical school succeeded the physiocratic school and called for a new approach to economics. Underlying the classical school of thought that stemmed from Adam Smith, was

¹³ The term, “mercantile system” was first coined by Adam Smith to describe an ideology for political economy that dominated European policy and economic thought from the sixteenth to the late eighteenth century whose aim was to bring about economic growth to the country by “restraining imports and encouraging exports” (LaHaye, 2002). In contrast to the physiocrats and *laissez-faire* movement, although it served the purpose of “building a wealthy and powerful state,” mercantile system “served the interest of the merchants and producers” LaHaye (2002).

¹⁴ According to Henderson (2002) Quesnay coined the term, “*laissez-faire, laissez-passer*” and was the leading figure of the physiocrats. Henderson (2002) explains that the name “Physiocrat” is derived from two Greek words, namely: “*phýsis*, meaning nature, and *krátos*, meaning power.” Physiocracy is generally considered to be the first school of economic thought whose economic view was that “an economy’s power is derived from its agricultural sector” (Henderson, 2002). The physiocrats wanted the government of Louis XV, the ruler of France from 1715 to 1774, “to deregulate and reduce taxes on French agriculture so that poor France could emulate wealthier Britain, which had a relatively *laissez-faire* policy” (Henderson, 2003).

the doctrine of *laissez-faire*. This doctrine was to dominate economic thought from the late 18th to the late 19th century.

Although impressed by the theory of *laissez-faire*, Smith did not use the term in his work, *The Wealth of Nations*. His work was however imbued with this spirit, and hence one finds references to "the simple secret of perfect liberty" and the usage of the label of economic liberty (Smith, 1976:687). It was in Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* that *laissez-faire* received its classical formulation. Smith (1976:687) argues "every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest in his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other man...." Furthermore, in defending his allocating mechanism, or theory of distribution, Smith (1976:687) argues that government has no strictly economic functions, rather it should be

discharged from a duty, in the attempting to perform which he must always be exposed to innumerable delusions, and for the proper performance of which no human wisdom or knowledge could ever be sufficient; the duty of superintending the industry of private people and of directing it towards the employment most suitable for the interest of the society.

Based on systems natural liberty, Smith (1976:687) maintains that instead of interfering with the day to day economic activities of individuals the sovereign should concern itself with its basic duties:

first, the duty of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies; secondly the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain publick (*sic*) works and certain publick (*sic*) institutions... (Smith, 1976:687).

Ricardo, following Adam Smith, supported the doctrines of *laissez-faire* liberalism as part of his broader political position. He presented capitalist economy "as if it were an eternal natural order" (Itoh, 1988:16-17). Ricardo had a more worked out view of liberalism than did Smith (Itoh, 1988:16). While Smith believed in an 'invisible hand', Ricardo attempted to demonstrate in a more explicit manner "how an economic law works to distribute annual production" among the three major

classes in society (landowners, capitalists, and labourers) (Itoh, 1988:16). Ricardo's doctrine of comparative advantage shows how much the theory of *laissez-faire* influenced his economic thinking – compare his use of the expression "perfect free commerce."

Jeremy Bentham also became an exponent of the new *laissez-faire* economics of Adam Smith and Ricardo (Bowler, 1985:997). Bowler (1985:997) writes that Bentham (in the *Essay on Government* (1828)) shows a "doctrinaire faith in a literate electorate as the means to good government" and in "*laissez-faire* economics as a means to social harmony." In *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789) Bentham develops his system of ethics – utilitarianism. Bentham's utilitarianism was a major force in the political and social thought of the 19th century. According to this doctrine actions of governments should be judged simply by the extent to which they promoted the "greatest happiness of the greatest number" (Clark, 1991:88; Cf. Bentham, 1970:12). Bentham (1970:11-36) elaborates a two-point criterion for making any choice of action, either by an individual or by society at large. He claimed that pain and pleasure were the sole criteria in our judgement of right and wrong in our choice and decision-making (Bentham, 1970:11:12; Cf. Clark, 1991:88). That is to say if any individual or any society is to make a choice as to the best course of action, is "when the tendency it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any it has to diminish..." – maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain (Bentham, 1970:12-13; Cf. Clark, 1991:88). West (1990:170) writes that for Bentham, any government intervention in an individual's knowledge of his own interests and skilful pursuit of his interest is viewed as coercion, therefore 'pain' and evil.

John Stuart Mill, having rigorously scrutinized Bentham's utilitarianism, modified it by introducing the idea of qualitative differences in happiness, ability to reason and conscious action. Closely following the ideas of Bentham, John Stuart Mill, in *Principles of Political Economy* (1848) treats *laissez-faire* as the obvious default political option, with every departure from it having to be argued for, and justified against, the background of a strong presumption in favour of non-interference in the freedom of an individual. In another of his works, *On Liberty*, Mill (1989:56-74) argues that the state should only interfere with individual freedom as a preventive measure, in order to ensure that citizens do not harm each other.

Otherwise a person must be left alone to express his or her individuality, because it is one of the elements of well-being. Mill acknowledges that individual actions have consequences that can harm others, and he is of the view that there should be political and community restraints or deterrents so that people do not harm each other.

Although Mill (1989:7-9; 230-237) acknowledges that democracy and capitalism were flawed political and economic systems, he held that they served fundamental functions in human daily life – as a result he defends economic competition and free exchange. Mill views individuality as one of the elements of human well-being. So when one participates in economic competition and has the freedom to exchange freely, he/she is expressing his/her individuality. Mill believes that capitalism was there to facilitate economic growth, with the goal of transforming and rationalising what Clark (1991:90) describes as “the menial drudgery of labour.” Capitalism permitted individuals “to focus on higher pleasures that accompany the development of personal capacities for intellectual and artistic expressiveness” (Clark, 1991:90).

Mill holds that democracy gives people the opportunity to participate in public decision-making processes. This participation would give people, as Clark (1991:90) puts it, “a sense of self-worth and dignity” – resulting in a desire for further satisfaction in life.

1.3.2 Libertarianism

Politically, libertarianism gives “strict priority” to individual freedom (understood as negative freedom) above other democratic values such as equality, and authority (Heywood, 1999:340). Thus it seeks to maximize individual freedom and to minimize the scope of state authority (Heywood, 1999:340). According to Haworth (1994:4), libertarianism claims ancestry, with some justification, from the philosophical ideas of John Locke and the classical economics of Adam Smith. Hence, freedom is a central value for libertarianism. According to Haworth (1994:4) libertarianism maintains a triadic main thesis, namely:

- that the market (or free market) is good;
- that the state – except in its minimal or ‘nightwatchman’ form is evil;
- that freedom is of supreme value.

It is the third part of the thesis that leads to the characterisation of libertarianism as an idea whose central theme is freedom. For the libertarians freedom "is the absence of coercion" by either the state or other individuals (Clark, 1991:49). This allows them to put extreme faith in the individual and freedom. Kymlicka (2002:152) comments that libertarians "invoke a non-moralized definition of freedom when arguing that the welfare state restricts the freedom of property-owners [but] ... shift to a moralized definition when arguing that capitalism does not restrict the freedom of non-owners." That leaves the libertarians with a definition that vacillates between a moral and non-moral notion of freedom.

At the centre of libertarian economics is the free market. It is the virtue that upholds the fundamental value of freedom and should not be interfered with by the state. The market is believed to be "the great respecter of individual freedom, more than any other conceivable system or sets of arrangements" (Harmoth, 1994:18). Hence libertarian economic theory emphasises the "self-regulating nature of the market mechanism" and dismiss governmental intervention "as always unnecessary and counter-productive" (Heywood, 1999:340).

Three prominent 20th century defences of libertarianism were given by Friedrich Hayek, Robert Nozick, and Murray Rothbard. Heywood (1999:341) holds that the most influential libertarian was Friedrich Hayek whom he describes as "a firm believer in individualism and market order and an implacable critic of socialism." Hayek holds that "the market is the sole means of ensuring economic efficiency," while viewing "government intervention as implicitly totalitarian" (Heywood, 1999:341). Central to Hayek's (cited in Haworth, 1994:116; Cf. Hayek, 1982) claim is the notion of the market as a "spontaneous order," a "self-organizing or self-generating system or pattern" whose fundamental virtues are: (1) it is the best allocative device (i.e. a functional virtue) that can accommodate human ignorance, and (2) it is the best device for survival through open competition. According to Haworth (1994:117) Hayek is convinced that "the cultural traditions embodied in liberalism and the market order have won the evolutionary competition against other, more closed and tribal arrangements." Furthermore, Hayek holds that "the relative success of Western civilization is closely connected with respect for open traditions" (Haworth, 1994:117). Fukuyama's conception of

the process of history *en route* to the "end of history" as he sees it is closely related to Hayek's view of liberalism and Western civilization.

In *Anarchy, State and Utopia* Robert Nozick (1974) displays a firm belief in individualism and the market order. At the same time he presents himself as an implacable critic of socialism, or any patterned distributive order opposed to a market conception of distribution (Heywood, 1999:341). His central argument is that freedom and patterned distribution are incompatible.(Nozick, 1974:150-166). At the centre of his economic idea is the theme of entitlement with its two-way structure: just acquisition and just transfer (Nozick, 1974:151). Situations where past injustices still exist (for example, the unjust acquisition of property) fall foul of Nozick's arguments for *laissez-faire* liberalism. In such situations he recommends state intervention so as to achieve "rectification" by redistribution. Nozick strongly defends *laissez-faire*, but he is committed to the rectification of past injustices; this "leads him to acknowledge the legitimacy of redistributive policies" (Clark, 1991:48).

Murray Rothbard combines a belief in an unrestricted system of *laissez-faire* capitalism with a "basic libertarian code of the inviolate right of person and property" and, on that basis, rejects the state as a "protection racket" (Heywood, 1999:341).

1.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau all agree that free and equal individuals living outside juridical coercion will fear the antagonism resulting in death and loss, and will therefore seek peace with each other by surrendering their rights to an organised society. This model, according to which individuals in a state of nature agree to unite and surrender individual rights, represents a liberal shift from a monarchical state to a representative assembly form of government.

In his explanation of the origin and justification of the state, Hobbes's point of departure is the state of nature where free and equal individuals do not have any contractual obligation to each other to be at peace – hence there exists a state of war of all against all. The severe threat to the fundamental right of self-preservation eventually compels these individuals to surrender their rights to the

Leviathan who is described as being above the law. Hobbes moves away from the idea of an inherited monarchy to an elected absolute monarchy – the Leviathan.

Self-preservation is the fundamental moral fact upon which Hobbes builds his concepts of justice and right. In a war of all against all in the state of nature, man, in fear of death, is forced to choose peace with others. This is the impetus behind people's change of heart in the state of nature. It leads to the end of human warfare and satisfies the desire for self-preservation. The whole process involves conflicting forces that are the motor behind the historical process.

The agreement to end warfare in the state of nature results in a social contract where individuals form a body politic under the sovereign who is given authority to govern the human community. Social or civil life, for Hobbes, rotates around the sovereignty whose authority permeates every facet of life. The realisation of the social contract by the installation of the sovereign means that any moral laws agreed upon are binding. This lays the foundation for Fukuyama's idea of a liberal state in which people come together to form a government. Fukuyama would not accept Hobbes' all-powerful state of the Leviathan, although he might accommodate the process of people coming together in the mood of civility – tolerance and co-existence. Being a liberal, Fukuyama is also against monarchy.

Locke also starts from an idea of the state of nature, but in opposition to Hobbes, Locke conceives the state of nature not as hypothetical, but as historical. Locke takes the idea of the right to self-preservation from Hobbes, but adds to it the fundamental right to property. Thus the right to life entails the right to the means to sustain life (land, food, etc). Although the fundamental law of nature demands that the whole of humanity be preserved, moral deficiencies are common in human behaviour. The tendency to dispute or provoke each other to the point of fighting is daily practice in the state of nature. Locke's fundamental law of nature entails the *natural right* of all men to equal freedom by virtue of which no one may legitimately exercise political jurisdiction over another without their consent and *natural duty* to each other. However, Locke states that each person chooses to surrender the control of his executive power of the law of nature into the hands of the body politic to prevent daily strife among free, equal, and independent individuals, in the absence of the judiciary.

Upon its installation the body politic upholds the natural law and the natural rights to life, liberty and property of the contractors. All individuals are in a state of

nature and remain so until, by their own consent, they become members of a politic society. The body politic cannot be arbitrary since the rights of individual members of the society under the law of nature are not autocratic and are given under consent based on majoritarian decision. As has already been stated, the Lockean view of a political society or civil society and its government is based on the theory of consent. Locke's view of social contract lays the foundation of a representative assembly government that plays the role of the trustee of the community.

Rousseau takes the foundation laid by Locke, and builds a more radical edifice on it. His point of departure is that the social contract is supposed to solve the problem of inequality between individual citizens. He introduces the idea of the "general will" to describe a political form of sovereignty in which the will of the individual is identical to the will of the body politic. Rousseau understands the *general will* as a moral/political solution to the problem of individual freedom and interest after the realisation of the social contract. He launches a defiant collectivism based on the fundamental idea that man in the state of nature is not a "natural man", but a "citizen" of a civil society. He rejects the Hobbesian hypothetical idea of the state of nature found in Hobbes, and used by him to justify the creation of the sovereign.

In Rousseau the notion of the general will replaces Hobbes's and Locke's natural law. The general will serves as the source of law (conditions of civil association) and sovereignty (body politic) and the basis of political right. Although he differs from Hobbes, Rousseau endorses Hobbes's idea of the necessity of a state, to which he (Rousseau) gives the status of a Sovereign. This idea is taken further in Fukuyama. He propounds a liberal state based on liberal democracy and a free market economy that will satisfy the human desire for mutual recognition.

The theory of *laissez-faire* calls for a situation of minimum government interference with market activities. Adam Smith is always referred to as the ancestor of the idea of non-interference since he warns against the danger of state interference in the economy, arguing that market forces will take care of things by themselves – compare his idea of the invisible hand in the economy. This doctrine remained popular and was reaffirmed in the thought of Ricardo, Mill, Bentham, and in the fundamental doctrines of capitalism. Libertarianism, with its emphasis on the value of liberty or freedom above everything, justifiably claims ancestry in Locke

and Adam Smith. As a result of that, libertarians view the market as a manifestation of human freedom.

The major thinkers covered in the above historical survey agree that the state is the creation of individuals who seek a juridical solution to their disputes. The state is there to protect the rights of every individual citizen. The representative form of government found in Locke and Rousseau is a central feature of Fukuyama's corpus. Social contract theory and *laissez-faire* economics provided Fukuyama with the ideological fundamentals to build his interpretation of liberal democracy, a system which he claims is a product of both liberalism and democracy.

The next chapter continues this survey of the major ideas from the history of philosophy that influenced Fukuyama – this time by focusing on the philosophical antecedents to his theory of history. This will require a close analysis of the theories of history found in the work of Immanuel Kant, Georg Hegel, and Karl Marx.

CHAPTER 2 PHILOSOPHICAL ANTECEDENTS OF FUKUYAMA - PART II: PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

The Law of Contradiction: everything is inherently contradictory. Contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality; it is only in so far as something has a contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge and activity.

– Georg W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic* (1989).

The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.

– Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (1967 [1848]).

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Fukuyama appropriates Hegel-as-interpreted-by-Kojève's philosophy of history, especially the ideas of the 'end of history' and 'struggle for recognition'. His central claim is that the triumph of liberal democracy marks the end of history and the realisation of mutual recognition. The idea of the end of history dates back to the early days of Judeo-Christian theology. It was graphically presented in eschatological terms as the realisation of the kingdom of God through the coming of a messianic era. The idea became secularised during and after the European enlightenment and was expressed in idealistic and socio-politico-economic terms that encouraged the emergence of various conflicting ideologies. The intention of each of these ideologies was to create some hope for a life of economic prosperity and happiness. This hope could be interpreted as the end of the 'now' and the realisation of the intended purpose of creation in a 'future epoch.'

The aim of this chapter is to critically discuss selected theories of history that preceded and underpin Fukuyama's philosophy of history. The reason for this is that Fukuyama relies upon philosophical writers to lay the foundation of his thesis of the end of history. This chapter will concentrate on the most important theories of history in Fukuyama's work, with particular focus on the theories of Kant, Hegel, and Marx as well as Kojève's interpretation of Hegel. All these writers appear to have contributed to Fukuyama's portrayal of history in terms of the triumphant arrival of liberal democracy. Attention will be paid to Kant's teleological view of human history and its ultimate end in a universal history. It is Kant's

concept of universal history that Fukuyama appropriates in his theory of history. As for Hegel's philosophy, attention will be paid to the ideas of struggle for recognition, freedom, and absolute knowing. I shall look closely at Hegel's dialectical method that pervades the ideas of recognition and freedom as envisaged in the context of the notion of the end of history. In this case Alexander Kojève's¹⁵ book *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel* (1969) will be of vital importance in understanding Hegel. Karl Marx's conception of history also helps in the interpretation of Hegel, especially his theory of history – historical materialism.

Philosophy poses three basic questions regarding history: Firstly, is history cyclical or repetitive? Secondly, is history directional? And finally, will there be an ultimate end to historical progress? The argument pursued in this chapter is that history does not end with the fall of communism as claimed by Fukuyama; rather it marks the decline of one era and the rise of another historical era.

2.2 KANT: THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSAL HISTORY

Kant's philosophy of history develops within the context of eighteenth century teleological thinking. Teleological thinking dates back at least as far as the philosophies of Plato (the Idea of the Good), Aristotle (all things aim at fulfilling some good), and Judeo-Christian theological thought (the idea of eternal freedom and happiness in the life to come). Teleological thinking is a frequent theme in Kant's writings, particularly in the *Critique of Judgment* (1790), where he dealt with teleological judgments at length. In his teleological writings, Kant wrestles with the idea of progress and with the notion of the development of the human race. In *On the Common Saying: That May be Correct in Theory but it is of no Use in Practice* (hereafter, *Theory and Practice*) Kant (1999a:306) assumes that the human race is constantly advancing in terms of culture and is also constantly improving in relation "to the moral end of its existence." It is possible that "this progress may at times be interrupted" but it will never be "broken off" (Kant, 1999:306). The fulcrum on which Kant rests his assumption of progress is the innate duty of every member of every

¹⁵ Kojève was a Russian immigrant who fled the Bolsheviks and found refuge in Paris, like many other Russians at the time. Alexandre Kojève (whose "real" name was Aleksandr Vladimirovich Kozhevnikov), in the years 1933-40 gave lectures on Hegel's *Phenomenology*, and introduced Hegelian philosophy to a new generation of French intellectuals, including Bataille and Lacan (Yar, 2001; Attias, 2002). Attias (2002) describes Kojève's reading of Hegel as being idiosyncratic. Kojève focused on the Master/Slave dialectic, and is highly influential in postmodern philosophy.

generation to see to it that posterity keeps on making constant progress in cultural matters (Kant, 1999:306). This is because "practical reason orders us to act on the hypothesis that the world as a whole is progressing" (Kant in Despland, 1973:39).

According to Despland (1973:17) teleological thinking carries with it the idea of constant progress in nature and history, "aiming-towards the realisation of a good goal or a desirable purpose." Its basic assumption is that "the world is progressing towards a greater perfection" in the sense of heading towards some end point (Despland, 1973:17). (This is not clearly true of Plato and Aristotle). In the *Critique of Judgment* Kant (1952:92-95[430-432]) maintains that the ultimate end (or purpose) of nature as a teleological system is culture – which is the whole vocation of humanity – and it is culture that gives man the aptitude for freedom. Consequently the ultimate end – culture – is "the production of our human capacity to set our own purposes and make ourselves moral beings independent of nature ... and ordering of all civil states into a cosmopolitan whole unified in a morally grounded system" (Makkreel, 1989-90:177). Makkreel agrees with Walsh (1967:321) that Kant proposes that a hidden plan – nature in history – may well be able to provide conditions for the progressive development of human capacities, so that men can move from barbarism to culture, thus converting "a social union originating in pathological needs into a moral whole." The movement from the state of lawlessness to the state of culture, where humankind embraces the culture of civil society through the signing of the original contract illustrates the Kantian theoretical explanation of the progression of human history.

2.2.1 Kant's Theory of a Universal Human History

Kant proposes that Universal Human History will progress towards an end point – the realization of human freedom – entrenched in a civic constitution. This universal history is propelled towards its end point through the mechanism of antagonism, caused by what Kant calls man's "asocial sociability."

The idea of an all-encompassing cosmopolitan¹⁶ world in Kant's critical philosophy first appears in his essay, *Idea for a Universal History from a*

¹⁶ The concept of a "cosmopolitan" world appears in the *Idea for a Universal History*. Kant (quoted in Caygill, 1995:137) describes it as "the matrix" within which "all the original capacities of the human race may develop". Caygill (1995:137-138) views it as "a necessary step towards achieving a civil society which can administer justice universally" and achieve universal political security.

Cosmopolitan Point of View (1784) (hereafter *IUH*) where human history is viewed as a teleological extension of natural history (Makkreel, 1989-90:177). In the *IUH* Kant (1993:250-251) argues that anything that fails "to fulfil its purpose is a contradiction in the teleological theory of nature." In effect, Kant is arguing for a teleological-hermeneutic starting-point in his theory of history. This will allow us to interpret and understand human history as having both meaning and purpose. Hence his first and third theses:

First thesis:

All the natural capacities of a creature are destined sooner or later to be developed completely and in conformity with their end (Kant, 1977a:42).

Third thesis:

Nature has willed that man should, himself, produce everything that goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence, and that he should partake of no other happiness or perfection than that which he himself, independently of instinct, has created by his own reason (Kant, 1977a:43).

It is then not surprising that in the *IUH* and in *Theory and Practice*, Kant (1993:254-260; 1999a:326) conjectures that human history will realise nature's plan to bring forth a "universal civic society" (or "a universal cosmopolitan existence") that will administer universal justice, and "a league of nations" in which all nations on earth will coexist in peaceful harmony. Central to his theory is the theme of the development of human innate capacities, contained and driven by reason. It may be concluded that Kant views the history of humankind as having general trends that point to a final end; he justifies his claim that history is a teleological process by appealing to both theoretical and practical reason. According to Walsh (1967:454) the explanation of these trends "must impute to the historical process a natural teleology, a purpose or end, which nature, or providence, develops through the rational agency of human beings." Thus through reason and the freedom given to him by nature, man must fulfil the highest purpose of nature – peaceful co-existence with others in a law-governed civil commonwealth (Kant, 1993:254-262).

Guyer (2000:372-373) points out that the nine propositions (or theses) Kant enumerates and expounds in the *IUH* state "the metaphysical presuppositions necessary to compose a scientific history of human activities on a global scale," and are both moral and political in nature. In other words, Kant, in the *IUH*, is dealing with "the philosophy of history from the standpoint of the idea of the historical development and progress of the human species, and the social and political conditions required for it" (Wood 1996:xx). He envisages the coming of a universal history based on the conditions of the possibility of a continual advancement of human freedom, rationality, morality and political development. In the *IUH*, Kant outlines a possible form of inquiry – a scientific or rational one – in which he anticipates the emergence of people intellectually equipped to compose a genuinely universal history (Walsh, 1967:454). This history will reveal the underlying rationale of the past (Walsh, 1967:454) and the ultimate plan of nature which is the constant advancement of human capacities towards the betterment of life, leading to happiness based on harmony – and moral progress.

2.2.2 The End of World History

Kant envisages the end of history, at some point in time, in universal terms. In the *Critique of Judgment*, section 23(84) where he discusses "[t]he final end of the existence of a world, that is, of creation itself," Kant (1952:98 [435]), defines "the final end" as "an end that does not require any other end as condition of its possibility." Thus human history has a final goal – a final universal purpose – which Kant views as the realisation of human freedom. This freedom, in the practical sphere, is presupposed by reason (Kant, 1952:58[400]), first in each individual, and then in a corporate will (after Rousseau's idea of will).

Kant (1952:118[550]) argues that it is through freedom that humanity, under the moral law, can set itself a final end; the achievement of the highest possible good in the world – happiness. Happiness is defined in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) as:

the state of a rational being in the world in the whole of whose existence everything goes according to his wish and will, and rests, therefore, on the harmony of nature with his whole end as well as with the essential determining ground of his will (Kant, 1999b:240).

Guyer (2000:13) comments that

the realization that our own freedom of choice and action is the fundamental object of morality itself makes a systematic realization of happiness the ultimate object of morality, because freedom is, essentially the capacity to set our own ends, and happiness is, essentially, the realization of our freely set ends.

In effect, Kant attempts to universalize a rational approach to the achievement of moral and political harmony in the making of a universal history of humanity. However, Kant (cited in Despland, 1973:41), in his essay, *The End of All Things* (1794) still conceives the possibility of a catastrophic end of history as a result of human stupidity, man's failure to reason well, or through human cultural and moral immaturity.

To summarize the central argument of Kant's philosophy of history: this argument follows a teleological process that begins with the cultural and moral immaturity of the human race under a self-incurred "bondage to instinct" and "showing a habituated, heteronomous unwillingness to come of age" and to think autonomously (Sullivan, 1989:237). It is then followed by a transition from this "animal-like state of nature" to the formation of a cosmopolitan society (Sullivan, 1989:237). This cosmopolitan world order is the inevitable end of universal history and reflects universal or cosmopolitan values that are categorical imperatives, not empirical possibilities. Sullivan (1989:237) states that "Kant's teleo-cosmos is a purely rational, moral version of the Christian redemptive history of the human race." It may be concluded that at the centre of Kant's view of the end of history is the universalization of an individual and his rights in a cosmopolitan world. It is a transition from cultural and moral immaturity to intellectual freedom. Kant's cosmopolitanism remains a legacy to the political world despite its abstract nature.

2.3 HEGEL: THE IDEALISTIC AND DIALECTICAL CONCEPTION OF HISTORY

In Germany and other parts of Europe, Kantian critical philosophy laid the ground for idealistic philosophy. In Germany, thinkers like Fichte and Schelling took the lead in transforming Kantian philosophy into metaphysical idealism (Stumpf, 1999:305). Hegel also participated in this movement to transform Kantian

philosophy into idealism – compare his claim that he had overcome the *aporias* of Kantianism by using the dialectic method. Marx (1977b) criticizes Hegel for remaining as abstract as Kant, because Hegel approaches history from the notion of self-consciousness, rather than in more materialist terms.

2.3.1 Hegel's Dialectic Method

Hegel views the whole of human history as a process leading to the realization of human freedom, embodied in political and social institutions such as the family, civil society and the state. Dialectic¹⁷ logic underpins and characterises Hegel's philosophy. He presents logic as progressing necessarily; each moment in the development of spirit gives rise to its own contradiction or opposite. These opposing moments are believed to shape and direct the movement of things even in the concrete world, and especially in the history of humankind.

Originally dialectics was the name of the method of philosophical inquiry “consciously and systematically used” and perfected by Socrates and Plato (Kojève, 1969:179; Flew, 1979:94). In Kant's philosophy, especially *The Critique of Pure Reason* (1787) the idea of dialectic appears in the section, “Transcendental Logic” devoted to an exposition of the categories of understanding. This section is divided into two parts, namely, “Transcendental Analytic” (Kant, 1929:176-296) and “Transcendental Dialectic” (Kant, 1929:297-570). By Transcendental Dialectic Kant refers to the use of concepts that are only applicable to the phenomenal world, to gain the illusion of knowledge of the things-in-themselves. Walsh (1967:311) draws our attention to the section on the dialectic where Kant attempts “to show that the faculty of theoretical reason as well as that of the understanding has its appropriate pure reason” in contradiction to the analytic part. The two sections are, however dominated by the terms “reason” and “understanding” in relation to the epistemological and metaphysical inquiry into reality. Understanding (*Verstand*) “is the faculty of concepts and judgments” and reason (*Vernunft*) is “that of inference” (Inwood, 1992:243). For Kant, the ultimate reality, the thing-in-itself, is unknowable. Reason allows us to *assume* certain things about the thing-in-itself but *knowledge* of the thing-in-itself is impossible, especially any attempt to apply

¹⁷ The word “dialectic” comes from the Greek, *dialegesthai* meaning ‘to converse’, ‘to discourse’, or ‘to go back and forth’ (Flew, 1979:94; Inwood, 1992:81; Pence, 2000:14).

phenomenal concepts to the thing-in-itself. It was this metaphysical-epistemological legacy of Kant's that Hegel reacted to by formulating and employing his dialectic method.

In his metaphysics, Hegel's use of the term "dialectic" is manifested in an inextricable combination of logical and historical progression in his philosophical argument against the legacy of Immanuel Kant. Hegel argued against the ideas of Kant on two major points: he rejected the notion of an unknowable thing-in-itself and argued that the nature of reality is thought and rationality, and that ultimate reality is the Absolute Idea. In doing so, Hegel believed that he had overcome the dilemma posed by the Kantian use of the terms, "reason" and "understanding" (Haddock, 1980:111). From this confrontation, Hegel's philosophy took the shape of an idealistic and monistic metaphysics based on his dialectic method.

Forster (1993:134) argues that the philosophical motivation for Hegel's dialectical method involves three functions, viz: *pedagogical* functions (these concern the fact that Hegel is teaching a modern audience) *epistemological* functions (these concern the justification of his philosophical system), and *scientific* functions (these refer to the standards that his philosophy should meet in order to be characterised as scientific). While the pedagogical functions and the epistemological functions are dominant in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (hereafter, *Phenomenology*) where pedagogical functions lead the individual from his uneducated standpoint to knowledge, the scientific functions are prominent in the *Encyclopaedia of Logic*, *Philosophy of Nature* and *Philosophy of Spirit* (Forster, 1993:134). These functions are intended to immunize Hegel's philosophical system against sceptical objection "about its instantiation of its concepts" and to make sure that the system is "provable for every other viewpoint" and not susceptible to sceptical problems (Forster, 1993:135). It all boils down to the point that Hegel wants to demonstrate that he is not working in a vacuum like Kant. Kant's concepts can give rise to doubt about whether they have instances in reality. Hegel, however, substantiates his concepts by referring to things like the French Revolution and Napoleon's Empire for instantiation.

In the *Encyclopaedia of Logic* Hegel (1991) presents the first part, entitled "Logic," as having three aspects, namely (1) the abstract or understandable, (2) the dialectical or negatively-rational aspect, and (3) the speculative or positive-rational aspect. Inwood (1992:81) analyses this dialectic framework, and attempts

to show how this triadic structure functions. The *first* stage – the stage of *understanding* – contains one or more concepts, or categories, which are “taken as fixed, sharply defined and distinct from each other” (Inwood, 1992:81). The *second* stage – the dialectic proper or negative *reason* – is the stage when we ponder on such concepts, and in the process, one or more contradictions emerge (Inwood, 1992:81). The *third* stage – *speculation* or positive reason – is the result of the dialectic proper that combines the earlier categories and resolves the contradiction that might have emerged in them to produce a new and higher category which Hegel calls a ‘unity of opposites’ (Inwood, 1992:81).

Hegel (1998:171[181]) describes dialectic as that aspect that is “often no more than a subjective seesaw of arguments that sway back and forth” displaying itself as the immanent transcending or negation of the “one-sidedness and restrictedness of the determinations of understanding.” For Hegel (1998:171), “dialectic constitutes the moving soul of scientific progression” as the only principle through which “*immanent coherence and necessity* enter into the content of science.” Dialectical thinking works through contradictions (or negations) which serve as its inner dynamic life-force. While the contradictions serve as the driving-force of Hegel’s dialectical thinking, its triadic structure functions as an organic form. According to Inwood (1983:293), the Hegelian triadic framework is “reminiscent of the pattern of unity-disunity-reconciliation” which is known as the *thesis-antithesis-synthesis*¹⁸ framework. To elaborate on the above description of the elements: the first element or step (depending on where the process is being applied) is rooted in the understanding (*Verstand*), while the other two elements are the functions of reason (*Vernunft*) (Inwood, 1983:294). In terms of their relationship, the second element is the negation of the first, and the third is the negation of the second – the negation of the negation (Inwood, 1983:295).

Hegel employs his dialectic in relation to social arrangements in the *Philosophy of Right* (1896:164-350), where he illustrates the process moving from the *family* to *civil society* and then to the *state*. Stumpf (1999:308) comments that in his dialectic logic, Hegel emphasised that “thought moves and that contradiction, rather than bringing knowledge to a halt acts as a positive moving force in human reason.” Kojève (1969:259) contends that

¹⁸ Many Hegelian commentators tend to ascribe this triadic as having originated from Hegel, but according to recent Hegelian experts, it is a schematisation not found in any of Hegel’s works.

Hegelian dialectic is not a method of research or of philosophical exposition, but the adequate description of the structure of Being, and of the realization and appearance of Being as well.

In Kojève's, often idiosyncratic, view of Hegel's dialectic, the central focus was on the master-slave dialectic. Kojève (1969:191) argues that "as a *philosophical* method, therefore, Dialectic is abandoned only at the moment when the *real* Dialectic of the active transformation of the given definitely stops" at the end of history.

2.3.2 The End of World History

Hegel ends history with the present (his present, that is). This seems incompatible with his teleological presuppositions. He views history as explaining the progression of events from the past towards a certain point in the future, and that future is the present. The present is described as the complete "realization of freedom and self-consciousness" (Inwood, 1992:119). In the *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction* (hereinafter, the *Lectures*), Hegel (1980:26, 28) argues that the sole aim of history "is to comprehend clearly what is and what has been, the events and deeds of the past ... by means of reason." This is because reason concerns itself with the absolute, not with particular or finite ends. This makes it a duty to think of world history in connection with its "ultimate end", for it is this intention that underlies the world. And this intention is the knowledge of the "Idea¹⁹ of human freedom" (Hegel, 1980:46). Haddock (1980:114) points out that it is in the *Lectures* that Hegel attempts to show that "while logic was concerned with the principle of reason, history represented the elaboration of its implications in a concrete form." Hence Hegel's (1980:28) argument that reason²⁰, as an ultimate design, governs world history, and that consequently, world history is "a rational process." This may imply that all historical

¹⁹ The Idea operates through the medium of the human spirit, and it assumes three forms: (1) reveals itself in its purest form – thought (reason), (2) expresses itself in the form of physical nature, and (3) takes the form of spirit in the Absolute sense (Hegel, 1980:28). Here Hegel secularises the Judeo-Christian doctrine concerning God to become the philosophical Idea.

²⁰ Hegel (1980:28) describes reason as being "self-sufficient" and containing "its end within itself." It is *sui creatio* and "carries itself into effect" (Hegel, 1980:28). The attributes of God as a person who is self-existent and ultimate are also ascribed to Reason. That is why he calls on his audience to put faith in reason in their approach to world history (Hegel, 1980:28).

events are predestined to usher in a new world order based on the philosophy of consciousness.

Yar (2001) points out that Kojève used “the twin lenses of Karl Marx’s materialism and Heidegger’s temporalised ontology of human being” to read Hegel’s philosophy of consciousness. In the process Kojève criticized Heidegger for “valorising the contemplative side of humanity”, preferring Hegel for stressing humanity’s active side, with his argument that the Hegelian subject makes history – it is active (Attias, 2002a). Although Kojève preferred Hegel to Heidegger, he adopted a materialist approach in his critique of Hegel (Attias, 2002a). Attias (2002a) identifies Kojève’s materialist critique as stemming from “an Isocratic²¹ conception of the role of the philosopher as a historical actor”. Kojève similarly wanted to see philosophy as a political enterprise that should be engaged “in changing the material world.” Arguing in the same vein, Gans (2002) is convinced that there is “no doubt Kojève had political reasons” for singling out the “Lordship and Bondage” section of *Phenomenology*, “which can be read as an ordinary analysis of the Marxist category of exploitation.” In pointing out this link, Attias compares Isocrates and Kojève. Isocrates was famous for his speech to the king because it symbolized “a particular theory of language as *action*” (Attias, 2002a). According to Attias (1990) Isocrates “wrote treatises as public speeches.” It was in this speech that he argued that every written speech to any “person(s) holding power in a state is a political theory.” Central to his treatise *To Nicocles* is the theme of the use of power (Attias, 1990). Unlike Plato, whose goal was to write a theory of the state (*The Republic*) that would influence the state apparatus later, Isocrates preferred to influence the state directly during his life-time – hence his letter (Attias, 2002a). That is to say, rather than writing something like the *Republic*, he wrote *To Nicocles* offering “a theory that enacted the state by direct intervention into the functions of the state apparatus” – revealing his commitment to a philosophy of praxis that aimed at bringing change to the state rather than speculating about it (Attias, 2002a).

²¹ Isocrates was a rhetorician at the time of Plato. He was a pupil of Socrates and Gorgias (Woodruff, 1995:385). He identified himself as a philosopher rather than a Sophist (and wrote *Against the Sophists*, and *On the Antidosis*), but he is known for his theories of rhetoric. He was far better known than Plato (who in comparison was considered a minor philosopher in his own time) (Stumpf, 1999:47).

It is under the preferred influence of Marx, that Kojève, in contrast to Hegel's armchair idealistic philosophy, advocated a practical and concrete philosophy that was relevant to the existing world. Although he does not offer philosophical advice to the ruling class, as Isocrates did, Kojève maintains that "the philosopher had to be a man of action" (Attias, 2002a), and he emphasizes "the element of work as the humanising factor for mankind" (Rauch, 1999:127). This leaves us at a paradoxical point, because Kojève (1969:90) simultaneously holds that a philosopher is always a person who only understands things after their eventuality. That means, as a standard of judgement, one cannot reliably evaluate a philosophy before the end of history – hence Hegel's comparison of the philosopher to Minerva's Owl²² that "takes its flight only when the shades of nights are gathering." (Attias, 2002a). Attias (2002a) interprets Kojève as arguing that philosopher is only able to see things clearly and explain them after the event; philosophers always arrive too late to say what should happen.

This explains the importance of Hegel's notion of the "end of history" – Absolute Knowledge is only achieved when history has reached its end (Attias, 2002a; Cf. Kojève, 1969:88-99). Attias (2002a) criticises the idea as "a self-referential, closed philosophical system, because whoever has the power to declare an end to history gets the power to judge history." That is to say, "by declaring history 'over' one legitimises a concept of "the inherent reasonableness of existing power relations" (Attias, 2002a).

According to Attias (2002a) Kojève (1969:185), in his reading of Hegel, seeks to address the main problem of historical judgement – viz. finding a criterion by which human beings can judge their actions in the progress of history. Kojève wants an anthropocentric criterion – for he held that human history must be judged from within human history, not from some external "suprahistorical space" outside the terrestrial world (Attias, 2002a).

In the *Lectures* the most important idea tackled by Hegel is the idea of the "end of history." What did he mean by this phrase? Philosophical commentators

²² Minerva was the daughter of the Greek god Zeus and the goddess of wisdom, war and crafts (Jones, 2002). Although in his preface to his book, *The Philosophy of Right*, Hegel (1896:xxx) writes about Minerva's owl he does not say much about the owl itself. However, the Owl of Minerva doctrine, according to Inwood (1983:108-109; cf. Kojève, 1969) holds that "philosophers *qua* philosophers should not attempt to change, or to prescribe changes in their own society, because they arrive on the scene too late" – making the doctrine contradictory to "action, prescription and prophecy" Hence the doctrine forbade Hegel to predict the future or "to recommend changes which have not already started to take place" (Inwood, 1983:509).

have wrestled with this question. Berthold-Bond (cited in Fritzman 2001:299) argues that Hegel's fulfilment of history falls into two alternatives:

That is, either Hegel's eschatological vision is of a completely final end, where progress-in-history or-knowledge is impossible, or it is an epochal conception, where the completion he speaks of is the fulfilment of an historical epoch, leaving the future open to progress.

This view is echoed by Fritzman (2001:295-320), who argues that in Hegel, the future "always is radically contingent, open-ended, and not-yet." Fritzman criticises Kojève and Fukuyama for claiming that for Hegel history is over. According to Kojève (1969:67) and Graham (1998:454) for Hegel the end of history is not the coming of the Kingdom of God, but the coming of absolute mind or spirit. Hegel cannot talk of history as a final end point in time due to his reliance on the dialectical method. If he did so, it would contradict his triadic framework that implies a continuous and unending cyclic process, an unending spiral that aims at reaching Absolute knowledge

Hegel, especially in the *Lectures* (1980), supposes that history does, at some time or other, come to a close. In the *Lectures* the clause – "the ultimate end of the world history" – refers to the mind's consciousness of its freedom (Hegel, 1980:41). It follows that history for Hegel ends with his era (which he often describes as the full realization of freedom and self-consciousness), and has little to do with the future, for the future does not concern the historian. In other words, we are already living in the end of history. Central to the end of history is the concept of freedom. Beiser (1993:295) concludes that Hegel, in viewing "the end of history as the self-awareness of freedom" and "as the recognition that all are free," made the French Revolution ideals of liberty and equality, "the very end of history itself", to such an extent that he saw them as falling under the law of necessity. In doing so, Hegel intends them to be goals that people "must strive for through the inherent laws of history itself" (Beiser, 1993:295). The notion of the end of history according to Hegel involves three fundamental virtues, namely recognition, freedom, and absolute knowledge. The realization of these three marks the end of human history.

2.3.2.1 The Struggle for Recognition

Hegel discusses the idea of recognition in many of his writings, but particularly in *Systems of Ethical Life* and *Phenomenology of the Spirit*. There is a conflict of views among scholars as to when – in terms of publication – Hegel first talked about reciprocal recognition. Honneth (1995) argues that the young Hegel developed his model of a ‘struggle for recognition’ by critically modifying the idea of ‘social struggle’ initially employed in the social and political philosophies of Machiavelli and Hobbes. Contrary to Machiavelli and Hobbes’s ‘struggle of all against all,’ Hegel’s idea of recognition takes the fundamental form of interpersonal recognition as its point of departure. According to Blunden (2003), the idea of recognition in Hegel begins in his work *Systems of Ethical Life* (1802-3), where it arises as property, emerging “from the social division of labour and the exchange of products.” If Blunden’s claim is correct, it is an idea that develops from the market context whereby the property owner’s rights are recognised. Honneth (1995:7-70) also traces the idea of struggle for recognition in Hegel’s works *Systems of Ethical Life*, *Realphilosophie*, and *Phenomenology of Spirit*. He points out that *Systems of Ethical Life* shows Hegel’s early “philosophical account with elementary forms of interpersonal recognition” (Honneth, 1995:18-19). In other words, *Systems of Ethical Life* gives an elementary and sketchy account with regard to the motivations that would lead to struggles for recognition. This counters Blunden’s claim that Hegel’s idea of mutual recognition began in the *System of Ethical Life*. According to Honneth (1995:26-29) Hegel had in *Systems of Ethical Life*, not yet established the “motives for initiating a conflict in the interior of the human spirit” that could lead to the struggle for recognition – hence he resorts to the philosophy of consciousness. Crime was a formative factor in the struggle for recognition that is resolved in reconciliation.

In the *Phenomenology* Hegel treats “the development of consciousness as the key to historical change” by tracing the “odyssey of consciousness” from sense-certainty to Absolute Knowing through a succession of forms (or shapes) which generate their own movement (Haddock, 1980:113; Cf. Rauch, 1999:76-86). The emergence of the idea of self-consciousness is illustrated in the account of the conflict of the master and the slave which Hegel uses to demonstrate the logic of the dialectic process (Hegel, 1977:111-119; Cf. Haddock, 1980:113). It is in the

discourse of self-consciousness that Hegel rejects all dichotomies, including the Platonic dualism of juxtaposing the intelligible and the sensible (Rauch, 1999:78), because at the end of time everything becomes one, or a spiritual whole.

Rauch (1999:55) asks a very important question: "How do we arrive at self-consciousness?" In normal circumstances it is rare to think about our thinking, unless there are "problematic aspects of our experience" that will lead us to do so (Rauch, 1999:55). In other words, it is easier to think about things outside us than to look inwards, but the act of looking inwards indicates some contradiction. The journey to arrive at self-consciousness requires a process that begins with thought (consciousness) thinking about itself as a result of our immediate experience – namely dialectical contradictions, or unrest, within us. The implication here is that to be certain of itself, self-consciousness must overcome or "supersede" the "otherness of itself" (Hegel, 1977:111[178-181]).

Hegel makes a distinction between human and animal desires. Human desire "involves not just the satisfaction of basic needs but also the desire for *recognition* from another human being" (Attias, 2002a) He maintains that "self-consciousness is Desire in general" that it gets fulfilled "only in another self-consciousness" through "struggle to death for recognition" (Hegel, 1977:104-105; 108-110). According to Hegel (cited in Kojève 1969:192),

Man is nothing but Desire for recognition ... and History is but the process of the progressive satisfaction of this Desire, which is fully satisfied in and by the universal and homogeneous State.

Kojève (1969:192-193) does not agree with Hegel that this State will definitely satisfy man's desire, because it is still in the making and is still far from having an "empirical existence." Although it is possible that this state can satisfy the desire of man, Kojève (1969:192-193) shows that there is a possibility that the very State is subject to negation someday by "a negating or creative Action ... other than the Action of Fighting and Work." Furthermore, Kojève (1969:193) argues that one can know about the satisfaction of man if and only if, one has "complete and perfect knowledge" about man. This "universally and definitively ... valid" knowledge – "the absolute truth about the satisfaction of man can be attained only at the end of History" (Kojève, 1969:193). Although Kojève talks about the end of history as an end point when full knowledge about humanity will be acquired, he (Kojève,

1969:193) raises a number of questions; who “is precisely to determine this end of History” and, who declares the end of history?

Kojève (1969:9-70) turns to the Hegelian master-slave dialectic, claiming that it is the key to understanding Hegel's philosophy of history and the motor for historical change. Attias (2002b) structures Kojève's presentation of the master-slave dialectic as follows: (a) *the bloody battle*, (b) *the reign of the master*, and (c) *the revolt and triumph of the slave* (Attias, 2002b).

(a) *The Bloody Battle*. Kojève's handling of the master/slave dialectic alludes to the possibility of the *social contract*. Attias (2002a) may be correct in arguing that implicit in the Hegelian master-slave battle for recognition is “a Hobbesian war of all against all – because humans want recognition from the other, but without giving reciprocal recognition.” This one-sided state of affairs is described by Kojève (1969:18-20, 45-59; cf. Hegel:1977:113-116[186-191]) as the “bloody battle” that involves two men engaged in “a life-or-death struggle that stops short of death” and whose end product is a one-sided and unequal recognition (Attias, 2000a). The condition of possibility for recognition of the would-be master emerges at the moment of the imminent death of the would-be slave, when he feels the intensity of terror exerted by his opponent, in this fierce battle for recognition. Kojève does not view this bloody battle as “a primordial condition or event but rather the motor of history” that works as his hermeneutical framework for interpreting and understanding historical progress and all historical change (Attias, 2002 a & b).

(b) *The Reign of the Master*. It is after the terrifying battle that the slave directs his desire for recognition into work for the master. Kojève (1969:24-25) contends that “work transforms the World ... civilizes, educates,” and forms the slave to transcend himself to the point of realising himself beyond an animal, objectively as man. Work liberates the slave by making him “a supernatural being that is conscious of its reality;” it allows him to liberate himself from “the terror that enslaved him to the Master (Kojève, 1969:25-27). With the passage of time the slave reaches a point where he will rationalise “his work by developing a *slave ideology*” which is Christian

ideology, “to reconcile the ideal of freedom with the fact of servitude” (Attias, 2002; Kojève, 1969:55-57). In this argument Kojève (1969) attempts to show that what motivates the Hegelian dialectic is the attempt to attain Mastery, and eventually Absolute Knowledge, based on the triadic movement (position-negation-sublimation, or *thesis-antithesis-synthesis*) towards perfection – an utopian classless society of total reciprocal recognition at the end of history.

(c) *The Revolt and Triumph of the Slave*. The rationalisation of his plight makes it possible for the slave to make a sober evaluation and estimation of his opponent – the master. This is the moment when the slave realises the master’s dependence upon his recognition, and there is, accordingly, a revolt against the master. (In Hegelian terms, it is a point of negation (*antithesis*)). Kojève (1969:53-70; cf. Hegel, 1977:123-138[197-230]) shows that it is during this time that the slave goes through a process of evaluating various ideologies:

(i) *Stoicism* – The slave attempts to persuade himself to accept that he is actually free, thus having an abstract idea of freedom. The slave drops this ideology because the intention of this invention is to render him inactive, and therefore unable to fight for his ideal – freedom.

(ii) *Nihilism* – Out of the boredom of inaction and a lack of negation, the slave chooses nihilism because it fulfils the Hegelian dictum: “the true being of man is his action” (Kojève, 1969:53-54). It is this nihilist ideology that makes the slave “eventually perceive the contradiction implied by his existence” (Kojève, 1969:54, cf. Hegel, 1977:126[206]). Kojève (1969:54) argues that it is the awareness of a contradiction that moves a man necessarily to want to remove the contradiction by transforming it through action (Kojève, 1969:54-55; cf. Hegel, 1977:126[206]).

(iii) *Unhappy Consciousness (or Christian) ideology* – No longer in denial about the “contradictory character of his existence,” the slave moves from the abstract meaning of freedom to “real freedom” realisable in the world beyond, where he seeks recognition by submitting to the absolute master – God (Kojève, 1969:57). This allows the slave to move further towards

overcoming the essentially slavish concepts of Christian theology and implies the idea of a synthesis of the Particular and the Universal that leads to Individuality (Kojève, 1969:59-61). To be recognised in his personal, particular existence, the slave should opt for recognition that is realisable, not in a future world to come, but in this world – which is already a present here and now (Kojève, 1969:59-67, 160n). Kojève (1969:67) argues that the slave must replace the Christian idea of the kingdom to come with the State – *vide* his detailed explanation:

Therefore, the human ideal can be realized only if it is such that it can be realized by a mortal Man who knows he is such. In other words, the Christian synthesis must be effected not in the Beyond, after death, but on earth, during man's life. And this means that the transcendent Universal (God), who recognizes the Particular, must be replaced by a Universal that is immanent in the World. And for Hegel this immanent Universal can only be the State. What is supposed to be realized by God in the Kingdom of Heaven must be realized in and by the State, in the earthly kingdom. And that is why Hegel says that the "absolute" State that he has in mind (Napoleon's Empire) is the realization of the Christian Kingdom of heaven.

After progressing through all these ideologies, the slave will then have to revolt against, and triumph over, the reign of the master in order to obtain recognition.

Attias (2002a) interprets Kojève as viewing the uprising by the slave as leading to the "formation of a classless society at the end of history." It is marked by the total satisfaction of the human desire for recognition. Given his Hegelian-Marxist materialist assumptions, Kojève (1969:158n-160n) thought that the end of history was to be a material fact in history. A utopian society, under a universal and homogeneous state, was "already the present, here and now" in Europe in the nineteen thirties. It was characterised by the cessation of Action – meaning the practical "disappearance of wars and bloody revolutions." Furthermore, in this *homogeneous* state, the "'specific-differences' ... of class, race, and so on, are 'overcome'" and as a result, the homogeneous state is directly related to a specific individual who is recognised as a citizen in his very particularity (Kojève, 1969:237). Any action that followed was an extension "in space of the universal revolutionary force actualised in France" and the rest of the world, either by societization (Russia), communisation (China), democratisation (imperial Germany

and North America), or by accession to independence (on the African continent) (Kojève, 1969:160n-162n). Unlike Hegel, who made racist remarks about Africa, Kojève was inclusive, if not comprehensive, in his interpretation of history.

Kojève (1969:163) finally identifies the end of history as marked by the total satisfaction of human desire under a classless society where the state will guarantee that each citizen's desire for recognition is satisfied. Here we clearly see the influence of Marxist ideas in Kojève's philosophy. It is at this end of history that the philosopher can commence his project of historical judgement.

Addressing the issue of recognition, Fukuyama (1992:161) argues in favour of Hegel and against Hobbes and Locke. He contends that

Hegel seeks to honor and preserve a certain moral dimension to human life that is entirely missing in the society conceived of by Hobbes and Locke. Hegel, in other words, understands man as a moral agent whose specific dignity is related to his inner freedom from physical or natural determination. It is this moral dimension, and the struggle to have it recognized, that is the motor driving the dialectical process of history.

Thus Fukuyama is saying that Hobbes and Locke did not go further than the empirical aspect – which is the material well-being of mankind. Hegel goes further, bringing in the metaphysical aspect of humanity – the desire for recognition. It is this aspect of human life, Fukuyama claims, that it is fulfilled by liberal democracy.

2.3.2.2 Freedom

Hegel maintains that human history, driven by dialectic forces, is moving toward an expected goal or purposive end – freedom. The idea of the will plays a central role in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* (1896). It exerts a comprehensive influence on Hegel's conception of the individual, the family, the state, and possibly, civil society. In the *Philosophy of Right* Hegel shows that there is an inseparable connection between the will and right. For Hegel (1896:212 [215]), "right concerns freedom, the worthiest and holiest thing in man, the thing which he must know in so far as he is answerable to it" – to the state. Smith (1998) points out that for Hegel the "idea of Right is inseparable from the realization of the concept of

Freedom". Based on free will, freedom constitutes the will's substance and destiny. This freedom must however have some preconditions for it to be actualisable.

In Hegel's view recognition is a precondition for freedom: one can only be free if one is recognized as such, and one can only be so recognized if recognition is given freely. Freedom depends on recognition by the other and constraint toward the Other. Pippin (1993:52-85) comments that these claims of Hegel's not only tell us that our freedom is self-determined, but also open up the whole discussion of the activities that occupy human life – particularly those surrounding work. Pelczynski (1984:64) describes Hegel's view of freedom as being 'contextual', in the sense that it is always conceived in a "social context" or in a "context of human interaction." Having followed Hegel's inquiry closely, Pelczynski (1984:64) identifies four major kinds of freedom with their respective contexts of human interactions, namely the natural, ethical, civil and political contexts. Pelczynski explains how these freedoms work:

- The notion of *natural freedom* refers to independent, egocentric, and impulse-driven individuals who find themselves in a shared physical space (Pelczynski, 1984:66; Cf. Hegel, 1896:22[11]). It is a freedom that is animalistic, without rational determination, as in Hobbes' state of nature.
- The notion of *ethical freedom* refers to a freedom peculiar to an ethics of obligation (Pelczynski, 1984:68). Hegel (1896:149) argues:

A duty or obligation appears as a limitation merely of undetermined subjectivity and abstract freedom or of the impulse of the natural will, or of the moral will which fixes upon its undetermined good capriciously. But in point of fact the individual finds in duty liberation. He is freed from subjection to mere natural impulse; he is freed from the dependence which he as subjective and particular felt towards moral permission and command; he is freed, also, from that indefinite subjectivity, which does not issue in the objective realization implied in action, but remains wrapped up in its own unreality. In duty the individual freely enters upon a liberty that is substantive. ... But duty is not a limitation of freedom, but only of the abstraction of freedom, that is to say, of servitude. In duty we reach the real essence, and gain positive freedom.

Ethical freedom is a life of rational fulfilment based on what is expected of each individual. According to Pelczynski (1984:69-70), freedom "pervades

all aspects of social life, all relations, institutions and communities” as an ethical substratum.

- *Civil freedom.* For Hegel, “freedom in common parlance” or civil freedom as applied in the context of a civil society implies the presence of various civil and economic rights, legal rights, and association rights. In *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel (1896:202-203[206]) writes:

But when subjective particularity is welcomed by objective order, and given its right and place, it becomes the animating principle of the civic community, stimulates thought and promotes merit and honour. The recognition of the claim that whatever in the civic community and the state is rationally necessary should occur through subjective free choice is a fuller definition of the popular idea of freedom.

Hegel seems to imply that as a self-conscious ethical agent the modern person accepts his obligation, but at the same time sacrifices his individuality in a common society.

- *Political freedom* appears to be the pinnacle of Hegel's idea of freedom. Pelczynski (1984:71) comments that the ultimate point of the development of an individual will be towards freedom in the political realm, that is, the sphere of the supreme public authority of the strictly political state. Political freedom is the ultimate teleological goal of Hegel's view of human history. As Stumpf (1999:315) puts it, in political freedom “the individual acts according to the universal, rational will of the whole society.”

In general, Hegel viewed freedom not just as a psychological phenomenon, but “as the essence of what should be understood as distinctively human” (Fukuyama, 1992:152). Haddock (1980:116) comments that for Hegel

men were always implicitly free; but by expressing their social and political relations in the form of a universal constitution they became aware of freedom as their essential attribute.

The emergence and constitution of the state concretely actualises this freedom (Hegel, 1952:160). And it is only when freedom has been given an institutional form that people become a relevant subject for world history. Hegel (1980:54) declares that “world history is the progress of the consciousness of freedom – a progress whose necessity it is our business to comprehend,” for freedom is the recognition of necessity. The progress of history points to the final end product of the dialectics of history – the establishment of the universal state. If Hegel is understood correctly, it is only after the concrete institutionalisation of freedom and the acceptance of institutions as “an expression of the character of a people” (Haddock, 1990:160) that perfect freedom can be experienced.

In *Lectures*, Hegel (1980:120) argues that “the state is the spiritual Idea internalised in the human will and its freedom.” The problem is that Hegel here leaves us with no answer as to whether he views history as cyclical or linear. First he talks of a dialectical history that will end in the emergence of a homogeneous or universal state that will satisfy the desire for recognition and freedom. Since dialectics is a continuous process, when will the final dialectic occur that will end in final sublimation? Hegel (1980:124-125) argues that the course of history shows that historical phenomena, “no matter how great their variety”, only show an “externally recurring cycle”, because in nature there is “nothing new under the sun.” It seems as if Hegel is trying to combine the two perspectives, leading one to interpret him as saying that some things in nature recur cyclically, while others, especially the human aspect of nature, advance in a linear fashion towards a projected goal – absolute knowledge. But a closer look shows that Hegel did not doubt that history came to an end. His sense of its pattern is that (1) whenever it would take place it must have the same form, and (2) its form is a cyclical movement that raises aspirations and world, over and over again until the end – thus removing the seeming conflict between his thesis that history is at an end (implying a linear view) and that it is cyclical in its movement.

2.3.2.3 Absolute Knowing

The idea of the Absolute in Hegel points to the completion of a process that is characterised by what Rauch and Sherman (1999:2) call “successive forms of consciousness”, generally referred to as the ‘succession of shapes’. Each form or

shape of consciousness reflects “the world view of a specific time period.” Hence, Hegel’s (1977:11[20]) assertion:

Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only in the *end* is it what it truly is; and that precisely in this consists its nature, viz to be actual, subject, the spontaneous becoming of itself.

Solomon (1983:635) comments that the concept of the “Absolute” in Hegel implies the ultimate product of a process. Propelled by the inherent motor of dialectical forces, conceptual development proceeds until “consciousness ascends to that state which Hegel calls ‘Absolute Knowing’” (Rauch & Sherman, 1999; cf. Hegel, 1977:478-493[788-808]). Due to the fact that Hegel rejected the subject-object separation model of knowledge acquisition, it is in absolute knowing that consciousness will recognise that “its knowledge of objects is ultimately self-knowledge, and that self-knowledge is always conditioned by some existing set of socio-historical categories” (Rauch & Sherman, 1999:2-3). This makes absolute knowing a context bound process driven by dialectic movement.

Absolute knowing appears simultaneously as the last shape of consciousness and the truth of “the revealed religion” (Hegel, 1977:480[789]). It is a process in which “intersubjective self-awareness in the community’s institutions and practices” takes place (Sembou, 2003:276). In other words, absolute knowing is a point of reflection and comprehension of all the shapes of consciousness – hence its enthronement above the historical struggle for recognition. For Sembou (2003:279), fundamental to ‘spirit’, or interpersonal relationships, is a struggle for recognition that gives shape to human life and is a driving force for change. Upon the realisation of this inherent driving force, humans are considered to have arrived at the point of absolute knowing (Sembou, 2003). It is only then that humans discover that they are responsible for defining “the beliefs and values of the society in which they live and that these beliefs and values in turn underlie social and political institutions, as well as governing all relationships among them” (Sembou 2003:279). They thus express their deep-seated and long-standing aspirations for freedom.

For Hegel, human history is a succession of shapes, a series of dialectical forms through which humans pose their deepest aspirations, and the world is seen as the expression of these aspirations. These aspirations, according to Kojève and

Fukuyama, are condensed in the notion of recognition. Gradually through the dialectic of shapes and aspirations, humans come to synthesise their aspirations, and to remake their worlds into better forms. When finally the world and aspiration do not conflict, these aspirations are fully realised, and it is at this moment that the nation-state appears. It is at this moment when aspirations are fully realised, in other words, when history is fully knowable, that history can be reviewed by philosophy. For Hegel the sole task of philosophy is therefore to know our history, to achieve absolute knowledge of the gradual unfolding of the Idea of human freedom. However, he leaves us wondering whether this end implies that there will be no further human experience, or any further need for knowing ourselves.

2.4 MARX: THE MATERIALIST AND DIALECTICAL CONCEPTION OF HISTORY

According to Leatt *et al* (1986:202), in Marx's philosophy, "man is the beginning, the centre, and the goal of all history." Man, as an individual, is described by Marx as the 'universal individual' whose unique trait, freedom, can never be sacrificed to the collectivity. This is despite the fact that man recapitulates mankind and all its potentiality (Leatt *et al*, 1986:202). For Marx the world is not constituted and governed by the universal acknowledgement of divine rule, but waits to be created by imaginative human endeavour, freed from the constraints of economic necessity (Graham, 1998:455). Up until now, however it has been a world created out of conflicting interests – as Marx (1967:79) asserts: "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles."

2.4.1 Theory of History: Historical Materialism

Marx developed his original ideas about the inner motion of capitalism (political economy) and historical or dialectical materialism under the influence of Hegel's dialectical philosophy, French utopian socialism, and Classical political economics (Adam Smith and Ricardo) (McBride, 1995:465; O'Hara, 2001:701; Marx & Engels, 1967:106-118). In *The Communist Manifesto* and other writings, Marx never

directly uses the terms 'dialectical materialism' or 'historical materialism'²³ to refer to his theory of history. However, Rohmann (1988:104) describes historical materialism as that theory of history that is derived from material (especially economic) conditions, which carries with it the idea that "history progresses according to dialectical laws." Although Marx did not use the term historical materialism, Engels used it to refer to his elaboration of Marx's theoretical concept that history is propelled by technological advancement and changes in social and economic organisation (Rohmann, 1988:104).

Marx's theory of history - historical materialism – attempts to deal with specific laws that govern the historical development of human society and to "demonstrate how the logic of capitalist production created the conditions for the emergence of a new order" (Haddock, 1980:131). The logic of capitalist production engendered, as Haddock (1980:131) puts it, "implacable hostility" or "class conflict" between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. According to Wood (1993:431-432) Marx's theory of history "sees the history of society fundamentally as a history of economic structures or 'modes of production' rather than a political constitution." Hence Marx's argument that the 'real basis' of social life is to be found in the "social relations of production" that people create and enter into in their co-operative production.

In *The German Ideology*, Marx (1977a:160-5) shows how the theory of historical materialism is based on materialist premises. *Firstly*, it is based on the premise that "men must be in a position to live in order to be able to 'make history'" – referring thus to "the existence of living human individuals" (Marx, 1977a:160-162, 165). This calls for the first historical act, the "fundamental condition of all history", namely, the production of the means to satisfy the basic material needs of shelter, food and clothing and also "the production of material life itself" (Marx, 1977a:165-166). For Marx, before (1977:164) the production of ideas, conceptions, and consciousness can become a separate activity, or metaphysical enterprise, it "is directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of

²³ There is a tendency to deal with the Marxist theory of history as expressed by the terms – dialectical materialism and historical materialism, interchangeably. The two terms might share common ancestry and context but their *differentia specifica* lies in their functions and meanings. Dialectical materialism is said to be a common metaphysical doctrine held by many Marxists – but not by Marx himself – that asserts the primacy of matter and lays down dialectical laws that govern the motion of development in all matter (Flew, 1979:94-95). Historical materialism is viewed as the Marxist theory of history that deals with more specific laws that govern "the development of human society and thought" (Flew, 1979:94).

men, the language of real life". This is what is referred to as the base or substructure. In this statement Marx openly and directly dismisses Hegel's dictum that all reality is rational – thus opposing materialism to idealism. Furthermore, human existence implies sustenance and hence production. People have to enter into social relations to meet the demands of the material conditions that determine their production (Marx, 1977b:161). These relations entail the division of labour and internal intercourse (associations or cooperatives).

Secondly, historical materialism is based on the premise that "definite individuals who are productively active in a definite way enter into ... definite social and political relations" (Marx, 1977b:164). Marx focuses his analysis on the material order and specifically on the manner in which human beings are "engaged in the act of production" (Stumpf, 1999:381). Marx emphasizes that the act of production takes place in a social environment – it is a social act where human beings struggle with nature as a community, or as societies, based on the interaction between individuals (Stumpf, 1999:381). The idea of production relations is the core of Marx's analysis of society and at its heart is the ownership of property (Marx, 1977:162-165; Stumpf, 1999:281)). To determine how individuals relate to each other, in the relations of production, one must understand their relations to property in terms of the historical epoch in which they lived.

Thirdly historical materialism gives its own account of the production of ideas, conceptions, and consciousness (Marx, 1977:164) – the superstructure. The first two premises discussed form part of the substructure which contains the dialectic forces that propel history. The superstructure, on the other hand, is merely the human reflective engagement with the basic and actual material reality or condition of "the historic period" (Stumpf, 1999:386). Marx (1977:164) argues that the mental intercourse of humans is influenced by their material order or existence. For Marx (1997:164) it follows that "consciousness can never be anything else other than of conscious existence and the existence of men in their actual life-process." Marx (1977:164-167) is attempting to account for the relationship between the material environment (the empirical aspect of human life) and its conceptualisation. Hence, in contrast to the German philosophical tradition he opposes, he maintains that "life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life" (Marx, 1977b:164). Ideas, conceptions, and consciousness

are, according to Marx, directly (even if sometimes also critically) related to the material order. Hence his assertion:

Consciousness is, therefore, from the very beginning a social product, and remains ... so long as men exist at all. Consciousness is at first, of course, merely consciousness concerning the immediate sensuous environment and consciousness of the limited connection with other persons and things outside the individual who is growing self-conscious (Marx, 1977:165).

Marx states that consciousness is grounded in economic reality. The conflict of ideas in society generally arises around the conceptualisation of needs (the action of satisfying them and instruments of satisfaction).

The conflict between the human conceptualisation of needs and their satisfaction leads to a succession of modes of production from tribal, to ancient communal and State, to feudal or estate, to capitalist, and, according to Marx's prediction, to socialist and then communist ownership of property. These shifts demonstrate stages of class conflict or struggle in human history. The most naked class-conflict according to Marx occurs under capitalism.

Marx points out that under capitalism, society has been reduced to two classes, namely, the ruling class, the *bourgeoisie* – who own and control the means of production (Marx, 1967:79; 1977:135,176, 186), and the *proletariat* – who are wage labourers without any means of production, and as a result are reduced to selling their labour for remuneration in order to live (Marx, 1967: 79; 1977:134-135). As owners of the means of production, the bourgeoisie have a corresponding political power over the proletariat. This state of affairs will ultimately give rise to the violent overthrow of the ruling class by the proletariat (Marx, 1967:90-94). The classes are fundamentally at odds with each other, because of the disproportionate distribution of economic goods – their contribution to the production of economic goods is not at all reflected in the share of those goods assigned to them in the capitalist system (Marx, 1977:178-9; Stumpf, 1999:382). This discrepancy exists due to the market forces of supply and demand that determine the wages for labour. According to Marx, the wages do not correspond to the value of the product when sold – (Marx's *theory of surplus*

*value*²⁴ is constituted around this contradiction in the capitalist system of economics and politics). The exploitation of labour would, according to Marx, lead to a proletarian uprising and finally a communist revolution.

Engels (in Adoratsky, 1943:186) speaks of this prospective proletarian revolution as “humanity’s leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom.” The completion of this transition marks the end of human history.

2.4.2 The End of History: Classless Society

Marx contends that history will end with the emergence of socialism and ultimately, the final shape of communism – the classless society. Kojève understands Hegel and Marx as locating the future in the present, because the homogeneous state has already been ushered in – the Napoleonic Empire and capitalist society, as prehistoric stages of human society, have come to a close. Inwood (1983:517), on the other hand, argues that for Marx the end of history is something that is still to take place in the future, due to the continuous conflict of classes.

Although there are important differences, Marx’s philosophy of history cannot be discussed without investigating its roots in Hegel’s philosophy. Marx’s theory of history aims to give an “account for history’s structure and direction by identifying a real causal process internal to human history, an *endogenous* process” that gives history “a determinate trajectory” that works without “countervailing *exogenous* causes” (Levine, 2002:252). In other words, Marx’s theory of history identifies contradictions in history that work to drive the natural movement of human history to an intended end point. The parallels with Hegel’s conception of historical development are unmistakable.

The dialectics of class struggle will eventually end when a classless society emerges from it. According to Graham (1998:453) Marx’s theory of history self-consciously abandons religious aspirations; it dismisses them as “products of false-consciousness and it seeks their replacement with purely material (most of it economic) alternatives.” Marx does not invoke divine intentions, but historical laws. These laws govern economic change from feudalism to capitalism and socialism, and finally to the Marxian ideal of a classless communist society. For Marx people

²⁴ Because “the product of labour could be sold for more than the cost of labor” (Stumpf, 1999:382), the capitalist can reap the difference (Marx, 1977:455-470), which Marx calls *surplus value*.

determine their history as they struggle to achieve their destiny, the defeat of feudalism by capitalism and the emergence of socialism, as the resolving synthesis, that leads to communism.

For Marx (cited in Love, 1986:73), "communism is the solution for the riddle of history." He describes communism as "not a state of affairs which is to be established, as ideal to which reality will have to adjust itself [but] the real movement which abolishes the present state of things," that is to say the supremacy of the bourgeoisie (Marx 1977b:171). Communism would abolish private property and bring about the "liberation of each single individual ... in the measure in which history becomes transformed into world history" (Marx, 1977b:171). This transformation links the proletariat with "world-historical existence." According to Marx (1977b:171), "world-historical existence of individuals means existence of individuals which is directly linked up with world history." This implies the internationalisation of the individual, or to put it in Fukuyama's terms, it is the recognition of the individual in a global perspective. Thus the recognition of the individual implies worldwide integration.

Marx and Engels (1967) distinguish communism from other ideologies of working-class, or proletariat struggle. Communists will identify and "bring to the front" the common interests of the international working-class, as they represent the interests of the movement world-wide (Marx & Engels, 1967:95-96). For Marx and Engels (1967:95-96) the distinguishing feature at the core of communism "is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property." The reason for abolishing bourgeois private property, according to Marx and Engels (1967:96) is that modern bourgeois private property had become the ultimate and fullest "expression of the system of producing and appropriating products that is based on class antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few." Marx and Engels (1967:97) reject the capitalist view that capital is purely personal; capital should rather be seen as a collective product, a social power that should therefore be "converted into common property;" in this way it loses its class character (Marx & Engels, 1967:97). Furthermore, if capital is not changed, it will maintain the status quo of bourgeois society where "capital is independent and has individuality while the living person is dependent and has no individuality" (Marx & Engels, 1967:97). Marx and Engels (1967:98) describe freedom under bourgeois relations of production as "free trade, free selling and free buying," a condition that

communism will abolish. "Abolition of private property" (Marx & Engels, 1967:96) – was thus one of the central points in the programme of the Communist Party. By calling for the abolition of private property, communism does not aim at depriving any person of

the power to appropriate the products of society; all that it does is to deprive him/her of the power to subjugate the labour of others by means of such appropriation (Marx and Engels (1967:99).

It appears that communism acts in contradiction to "past historical experience." In the resulting new era of a classless society everything will be in perfect and perpetual balance. One is led to the conclusion that there can be no further developments in history after the communist epoch. A condition without class conflict brings history to a halt.

2.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

What clearly emerges from the theories of history that I have discussed is their teleological nature. This teleological view of history assumes that history is moving towards an end point, or fulfilment of a purpose. In his teleological writings, Kant wrestles with the idea of progress, the notion of the development of human society, and the formation of the state. The all-encompassing cosmopolitanism in Kant's critical philosophy (where human history is viewed as a teleological extension of natural history on a global scale) envisages the coming of a universal history that is based on the possibility of a constant advancement of human freedom, rationality, morality and political development.

Due to his teleological view of history, Kant also suggests the end of history at some point in time. His teleo-cosmos is a completely rational and secularised moral version of Christian redemption. At the end of history, society will have matured rationally, and through good reasoning will unite under an original contract to form a civil society that will produce a just civic constitution that assumes a universal nature. This idea is most clearly demonstrated in Kant's idea of a League of Nations.

Underlying Hegel's philosophy of history is the law of contradictions that propels the dialectical movement of history towards its end. The dialectical process

of history is characterised by the human desire for recognition – especially worked out by Hegel in the “Lordship and Bondage” section of the *Phenomenology*. The struggle ends with mutual recognition between conflicting individuals and the realisation, and absolute knowledge, of freedom.

Marx appropriates Hegel’s law of contradiction in order to frame his theory of history – historical materialism. This leads him to claim that all human history is a history of class struggle. Marx sees the end of history as the overcoming of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat. This leads to the superseding of capitalism by socialism and the ultimate triumph of a classless society in communism.

A comparison of these three theorists indicates points of convergence and divergence. Central to Hegel and Marx (and Engels) is the idea that human history advances dialectically, through conflicts within the prevailing order. These conflicts are resolved through synthesis, resulting in the development from necessity to a perfect and perpetual freedom. Hegel legitimises the existence of the state and its institutions as a coming of age, but Marx destroys the state at the end of history, for a classless society. Both Kant and Hegel reach the stage of a state community and they call for a homogeneous state. Kant goes further in calling for a League of Nations. Central to all these theories of history are the elements of reason and the universalization of the individual right to freedom.

The discussion of the philosophical antecedents of Fukuyama’s theory of liberal democracy indicates that Fukuyama makes use of a number of philosophical ideas central to the writing of Kant, Hegel, and Marx. Most importantly, Fukuyama appropriates the idea of recognition, and the concept of a homogeneous, or universal state, in his declaration of the triumphant emergence and the global character of liberal democracy. The third chapter will deal in detail with Fukuyama’s concept of the end of history.

CHAPTER 3

“THE END OF HISTORY”: AN ANALYSIS OF FUKUYAMA'S DECLARATION OF THE TRIUMPH OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

A remarkable consensus concerning the legitimacy of liberal democracy as a system of government had emerged throughout the world over the past few years as it conquered rival ideologies like hereditary monarchism, fascism, and most recently communism. Liberal democracy may constitute the “end point of mankind's ideological evolution” and the “final form of human government,” and as such constituted (sic) the “end of history.”

– Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992).

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In the article “The End of History” (1989) and the book *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992), both written in the millennial spirit, Fukuyama argues that the fall of communism marks “the end of history” and the triumph of liberal democracy over other ideologies such as hereditary monarchism, fascism, and communism – as already indicated in the first chapter of this thesis. Hill (2002) comments that Fukuyama set off “an international intellectual furor that has not subsided yet,” when he argued “how and why he believes that liberal democracy will triumph – not only over fascism and communism – but also over its own internal weaknesses.” This is typical Hegelian-Marxian dialectic – talking about overcoming internal and external contradictions. Sanoff (1992) comments that “Fukuyama paints a picture of a nation whose fate is far from secure despite liberal democracy's triumph.”

Fukuyama (1989, 1992) argues that human history should be perceived as entailing a number of stages of evolutionary development marked by ideological conflicts. These conflicting ideologies drive the progressive movement of history and at the same time inspire scientific and technological advancements. Communism was considered an alternative ideology to liberalism; Fukuyama interprets its collapse as the “end of history.” In his project, Fukuyama avoids suggesting that the triumph of liberal democracy means that there will never emerge any other ideology whatsoever. What he suggests, instead, is that whatever ideology emerges, its continual marginalization as a result of the ever growing “remarkable consensus” in the worldwide reception of liberal democracy will render it insignificant.

Following Immanuel Kant on the universality of history, and Hegel-Marx on the dialectical homogenization of human history, Fukuyama revisits the idea of the end of history. The end of human history²⁵ has been realized in the triumphant emergence of liberal democracy and the free-market economy over all other systems, as the ultimate legitimate form of government and system of economic planning and distribution, consensually received worldwide in the establishment of liberal states, argues Fukuyama. His argument carries with it ideological connotations and ethical implications that have attracted a host of criticisms. These prompted Fukuyama to elaborate on a necessary condition for the success of liberal democracy *en route* to political stability – social trust and economic prosperity – and to warn against moral decadence due to radical individualism.

This chapter sets out to critically analyze the argument with which Fukuyama backs up his declaration of the triumph of liberal democracy and free-market economy as the ultimate forms of government and economic system, respectively, that will bring about equal and mutual recognition to humankind – hence prosperity and life satisfaction. This chapter attempts, simultaneously, to show how Fukuyama appropriates Hegel-as-interpreted-by-Kojève's philosophy. I will also look closely at how Fukuyama demonstrates and legitimizes the triumph of liberal democracy, and how he explains why social capital (and trust, its key by-product) is indispensable for a successful democracy. This involves an investigation into Fukuyama's views on the definition and origin of social capital and how its presence or absence affects democracy. I will next look at the question of whether the notion of trust as a key component of social capital is in fact useful for improving our understanding of political and economic behaviour, especially concerning Fukuyama's claim that liberal democracy will bring about mutual recognition at the end of history. I conclude the chapter with a close look at Huntington's alternative interpretation in terms of the clash of civilizations. This is a reference to the radical individual created by technological advancement and the

²⁵ Don Hill (1999) explains what Francis Fukuyama meant by declaring the end of history as the demise of communism and the triumph of liberalism. Hill (1999) claims that when Fukuyama declared that history had come to an end, he did not mean "history" in its common sense as "the chronicle of human events" rather he referred to the meaning that Hegel gave it. As already mentioned in the third chapter of this dissertation, by history Hegel meant a process by which humankind is dialectically evolving its moral and "political principles and ultimate form of government and economic organization" (Hill, 1999).

rationalization of economic activities that challenged the communal moral order and caused social disruption from the 1960s to the 1990s.

This is a good moment for a brief introduction to Francis Fukuyama – his academic development and published works central to this thesis.

3.1.1 Introducing Francis Fukuyama

Francis Fukuyama was born in Chicago in 1952. He graduated from Cornell University with a B.A. degree in classics, after which he studied at Harvard University, earning himself a Ph.D. in Political Science (Sanoff, 1992). In the wake of the Cold War, Fukuyama studied under Allan Bloom, who was in turn a follower of the political philosopher Leo Strauss (Yar, 2002; Herwitz, 2000:223). It was Strauss who introduced Bloom and his other students to Kojève's thought (Yar, 2002).

Fukuyama was a member of the Political Science Department of the RAND Corporation from 1979-1980, then again from 1983-89, and from 1995-96 (Kimball, 1992). In 1981-82 and in 1989 he was a member of the Policy Planning Staff of the US Department of State, the first time as a regular member specializing in Middle East affairs, and then as Deputy Director for European political-military affairs (Kimball, 1992). In 1981-82 he participated in the Egyptian-Israeli talks on Palestinian autonomy as a member of the US delegation.

As a scholar, Fukuyama has written widely on issues relating to questions concerning democratization and international political economy. His most important publications for the purpose of this thesis are as follows: (1) *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992) (hereafter *The End of History*), (2) *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (1995) (hereafter *Trust*), (3) *The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstruction of Social Order* (1999) (hereafter *The Great Disruption*).

At the writing of this thesis, Fukuyama had published the most recent of his works, which is not part of the projected corpus: *Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution* (published in April 2002). It is a follow-up on its predecessor, *The Great Disruption*. I am not going to include it in my study

3.1.2 Unity of Thought in the Projected Corpus

Fukuyama's (1992) approach in *The End of History* can be characterized as that of a social visionary who looks at the "end of all pervasive flux and turmoil of the human condition" by arguing that "'history' ends with liberal democracy but does not put this forth as a testable proposition, more as a trend in line with human nature" (Anonymous, 2002). He claims that the triumph of liberal democracy coupled with a free market economy, however imperfect it may be, is still the best form of social arrangement available for fulfilling the universal human desires for recognition and gain. This does not mean that Fukuyama brushes lightly over the problems of liberal democracy; indeed he discusses them at length – especially in *Trust* (1995) and *The Great Disruption* (1999), where he discusses the idea of social capital, which he (Fukuyama, 1999:16) defines as "a set of informal values or norms shared among members of a group that permits cooperation among them" In *The Great Disruption* Fukuyama illustrates how liberal democracy can deal with its internal contradiction of excessive individualism versus communalism. He shows that during times of social disorder, social capital is lacking, but it can be reconstituted after the period of disruption has come to an end. Fukuyama attempts to link the thirty-year period of social disruption in many Western countries with his claim that the triumph of liberal democracy marks the end of history (Fukuyama, 1992), but warns that without the social virtue of social capital, and its key-byproducts trust and a stable social order, liberal democracy is unrealizable. After giving a gloomy picture of the social context of the West, he offers some hope by concluding that a reconstruction of social order in the Western world is possible.

In *Trust*, Fukuyama (1995:23-41; 349-359) continues with the theme of the "end of history" and the triumph of liberal democracy by critically assessing the emerging global political and economic order "after History," and scrutinizing a variety of cultures around the world with the intention to discover hidden values that make for a peaceful and prosperous world – challenging the conventions of both extremes, the Left and Right. In *The End of History* and *Trust* he goes back and forth showing the link between the two themes – the end of history and social capital (including trust). He maintains that neoclassical economics is to a large extent correct, but that it ignores the role of social capital (that includes reciprocity,

moral obligation, duty toward community, and trust) in facilitating the "stability and prosperity of post-industrial societies" (Carroll, 2002). Comparatively so-called "high-trust societies" like Japan, Germany, and the United States develop the kind of flexible organizations that the global economy demands far more easily than do what he calls "low-trust societies" or "familistic" societies like China, France, Italy, and South Korea, which have difficulty in creating large economic institutions to enable the operation of business (Fukuyama, 1995:149-266).

In *The Great Disruption* Fukuyama (1999:4-7) warns that at the end of history society will be extremely "rights-centred," and intensely individualistic, especially because of the "information-based economy." He argues that because of freedom and equality, excessive individualism has the potential of weakening the "social and moral life" of American society for it has already "corroded all forms of authority and weakened bonds holding families, neighborhoods (*sic*), and nations together." The "Great Disruption" is Fukuyama's term for the seeming collapse of the American social fabric since the late 1950s.

In summary, under liberal democracy, each individual's rights are recognized. These individuals are said to be connected to each other through social capital that is lubricated by trust. The extreme emphasis on individual rights threatens to lead to radical individualism, and thereby to overshadow and destroy the relevance of social trust.

3.1.3 Method: Hegelian-Marxian Law of History

Fukuyama's methodological framework for interpreting history derives from Hegel's dialectical method and Marx's historical materialism through Kojève's creative interpretation of Hegel and application of Marx's materialistic approach to history. In *Trust* Fukuyama (1995:3) acknowledges his debt to Hegel and Marx when he reminds his readers that he follows the "Marxist-Hegelian sense of History as a broad evolution of human societies advancing toward a final goal." Fukuyama, as already indicated in the third chapter, tries to find out whether Kojève's view of the end of history from a materialist historical perception corresponds with the triumphant emergence of liberal democracy in the West and the collapse of communism in the East. From that angle, Fukuyama evaluates Kojève, asking

whether Kojève is correct or not, given the material events that took place at the end of the twentieth century. Fukuyama (1992:207) argues:

Kojève's claim that we are at the end of history therefore stands or falls on the strength of the assertion that the recognition provided by the contemporary liberal democratic state adequately satisfies the human desire for recognition.

Fukuyama (1992:207) also tries to ascertain whether Kojève's dialectic understanding of modern liberal democracy, which he (Kojève) believed was a successful synthesis of slave morality and master morality, "overcoming the distinction between them even as it preserves something of both forms of existence," will permanently satisfy its citizens by the mutual and equal recognition it offers them.

In the third chapter it was already shown that Kojève (1969:9-70) sees the Hegelian master-slave dialectic as the motor for historical change. In the *Phenomenology* (1977) and the *Lectures* (1980), (see my second chapter) Hegel expounds the ideas of the end of history, the struggle for recognition, and the idea of the homogeneous state. To motivate his preference for Hegel over some of his predecessors, Fukuyama (1992:144-161) compares the political ideas of Hobbes, Locke, and Hegel. He concludes that Hegel's concept of recognition introduces a moral dimension that is lacking in the political ideas of Hobbes and Locke (Hill, 1999; Cf. Fukuyama, 1992:145-148). This is because Hobbes and Locke gave "higher relative moral weight" to self-preservation and human passions than recognition" (Fukuyama, 1992:158-161). As a result, argues Fukuyama (1992:161), this led to the development of a society of individuals consumed with "immediate self-preservation and material well-being."

Fukuyama (1992:160-161) argues that "Hobbesian or Lockean liberalism provided no reason why society's best men should choose public service and statesmanship over a private life of moneymaking," while Hegelian liberalism is valued because it "seeks to honor and preserve a certain moral dimension to human life, ... and the struggle to have it [moral dimension] recognized, that is the motor driving the dialectical process of history." Consequently, Fukuyama adopts and adapts Hegel's idea of the struggle for recognition (discussed in the second chapter), contending that it plays a "central role in the affairs of human beings" (Hill, 1999). It was Hegel, in the *Phenomenology*, who first argued that the advent

of the end of history can only be realized when humans had achieved absolute knowledge of their freedom that enables them to fulfil their basic desires and that that end point shall be realized in the emergence of the liberal state (Fukuyama, 1992).

Half a century later Karl Marx, partly a follower and partly a critic of Hegel's philosophy, came along and "adopted the Hegelian view of directional, progressive, evolutionary history" (Hill, 2000) without however emphasizing the triadic framework in the dialectical development of history (Atkinson, 1988). Furthermore and contrary to Hegel, Marx "determined that the ultimate destination of history was communism," which will supersede or come as a synthesis of "all other forms of human economic and political Alliance," and which he views as necessary stages for the realization of communism (Hill, 2000; Cf. Marx & Engels, 1967). For Marx, the bourgeois "liberal state failed to resolve one fundamental contradiction, that of class conflict" with the result that the "struggle between the bourgeoisie and proletariat," continues and freedom is not universalized (Fukuyama 1992:65). Marx's argument was that through these class conflicts, at the end of history, the classless society of the "universal class," the proletariat, will emerge (Fukuyama, 1992:65). However, Fukuyama (1992:61-65) accuses Marx and (more especially) Engels of mystifying Hegel's dialectic method by trying to separate it from the whole system of Hegelian thought. Given Fukuyama's debt to Kojève, he possibly inherits some of the weakness of Kojève's framework.

3.2 FUKUYAMA'S EMPIRICAL–METAPHYSICAL DIALECTICAL CONCEPTION OF HISTORY

In his critical exploration of Fukuyama's end of history project, Herwitz (2000:222-223) argues convincingly that Fukuyama's end of history theory consists of an empirical aspect and a metaphysical aspect, although it is difficult to distinguish them. Thus Herwitz (2000:222-223) seeks to explore the oscillation of Fukuyama's argument regarding the end of history between "empirical description" and "philosophical conceptualization", with the intention of encouraging skepticism about their dialectic relationship. Regarding the empirical aspect of Fukuyama's claim, Herwitz (2000:223) shows that Fukuyama looks at certain developments occurring towards the end of the millennium – the collapse of communism and the

birth of Eastern European liberal democracies – and interprets them as heralding the coming of the end of history. Regarding the metaphysical aspect, Herwitz (2000:223) argues that Fukuyama's central claim is the following: liberal democracy "is an historically emergent shape finally expressive of human essence, of what humanity requires for its flourishing" – notably the satisfaction of the human desire for recognition as an individual by others, by the state, society, political and economic institutions and communities. According to Herwitz (2000:223), the "end of history" thesis is metaphysical in nature, and depends crucially on the philosophy of Hegel.

Below we will analyze Fukuyama's argument for the end history closely, with special attention to the directionality of history, the conflict of ideologies and the triumph of liberal democracy, the ability of liberal democracy to solve its contradictions, and the ultimate goal of history – the liberal state. These four headings cover the fundamental arguments put forward by Fukuyama to legitimize his vision of the triumph and consensus reception of liberal democracy. Within these stages, Fukuyama illustrates the empirical and metaphysical dialectic in American society by referring to the creation and depletion of social capital which, he argues, makes liberal democracy realizable by enabling mutual and reciprocal recognition. At the end of this chapter I compare Fukuyama's idea of a conflict of ideologies to Huntington's idea of the clash of civilizations.

3.2.1 Directionality of History

Fukuyama's (1992:71) argument starts with the question: "Is history directional, and is there reason to think that there will be a universal evolution in the direction of liberal democracy?" The question of the directionality of history is an old one, whose answer has generally oscillated between two main views, viz. the teleological (or directional) and the spiral (or cyclical). In the first place Fukuyama (1992:71) tries to show that no matter which direction history takes, it cannot exclude social change and this change is multi-faceted, however it is centrally of political and economic nature. Fukuyama (1992:72-74) contends that it is "the logic of modern natural science" and "the struggle for recognition" that drives the direction of human history. That is to say, scientific achievements in the form of technological developments driven by competition lead to a dynamic economy in

which humans concentrate on satisfying their desires, while the search for respect, recognition, and dignity inflames passions and, consequently puts history in continual motion. The question of the directionality of history was resolved by the discovery of scientific method that “created a fundamental, non-cyclical division of historical time periods before and after” (Fukuyama 1992:73). This discovery has also shown that “the progressive and continuous unfolding of modern natural science has provided a directional mechanism for explaining many aspects of subsequent historical developments” (Fukuyama, 1992:73). Featuring prominently in these developments is the conquest motif, that takes various shapes or forms depending on the dialectical forces involved.

Fukuyama (1992:73-81) attempts to show that the logic of modern natural scientific achievements produces historical change that is both directional and universal – directional in the sense that it is moving towards a certain end and universal in the sense that its outcomes are universally accepted and unify mankind. He shows it in two ways: (1) military competition, and (2) the progressive conquest of nature for the purpose of fulfilling human desires – economic development through industrialization. Concerning military competition, Fukuyama (1992:73) argues that because of the perpetuation of war and conflict in the international sphere, natural science “confers a decisive military advantage on those societies that can develop, produce, and deploy technology” in an effective way in defence of their political autonomy and sovereignty. Each state is under pressure to acquire and deploy technology that will either match or outdo its opponent’s technology as a deterrent. History shows many cases of this logic at work, such as the colonial conquest of Africa by European nationals and the Napoleonic conquests. With reference to the progressive conquest of nature for satisfying human desires, Fukuyama (1992:76-78) points out that it involves not only the intense application of technology but also the application of human reason to problems of social arrangement and the rationalization of the division of labour – hence labour markets, and the resulting mobility of labour. According to Fukuyama it was through modern natural science that military competition ended up with the option of liberal democracy as a form of polity, and it is also through science that the need to satisfy desires led to the creation of the market – the two central features of the progressive movement in history.

Because scientific discoveries and inventions cannot be undone, history moves irreversibly towards an end point. Fukuyama (1992:82-88) asks rhetorically if it is possible for humankind as a whole “to reverse the directionality of history through the rejection or loss of scientific method,” that has brought about technological gains and rationalized society. In the midst of responding to his rhetorical question, Fukuyama (1992:85-88) acknowledges the horrors, both of a moral and a physical nature, inflicted by science. However, Fukuyama (1992:88) argues that we can think of cyclical history only if we postulate the “possibility that a given civilization can vanish entirely without leaving any imprint on those that follow.” Furthermore, Fukuyama (1992:88) maintains that

if the grip of a progressive ... natural science is irreversible, then a directional history and all of the other variegated economic, social, and political consequences that flow from it are also not reversible in any fundamental sense.

It follows that if science is so powerful and irreversible then history cannot, in Fukuyama's words (1992:89) “even under the most extreme circumstances” become cyclical rather than linear. Therefore, history is moving towards some end point (Fukuyama, 1992:89). This end point can only be understood in terms of the evolutionary emergence of liberal democracy following the dictates of modern natural science in its contemporary familiar forms of technological innovation and rational arrangements of labour (i.e. labour markets). Therefore, the core of Fukuyama's claim is the thesis that natural science rather than economics as in Marx, or a Victorian or Protestant religious ethic as expounded by Weber, is the central “regulator or mechanism” of modern history's directionality, whose central motif was to satisfy the desire for recognition – hence the conflict of ideologies.

3.2.2 The Conflict of Ideologies and the Triumph of Liberal Democracy

Following Hegel's dialectical analysis of historical change and Marx's dialectical analysis of society (in both cases via Kojève's interpretation) Fukuyama critically reviews the competition between various ideologies in human history. He begins with the empirical aspect by looking at what happened in the history of ideological development. Fukuyama sides more with the Hegelian conceptualization of history than the Marxian one. Although Fukuyama (1992) follows the driving motor of the

dialectic framework – conflicting systems – he recognizes hereditary monarchical rule as an organized form of government that existed in many different societies in Europe and other parts of the world. Fukuyama (1992:74) points out that monarchical absolutism in the French society had a “levelling effect” that reduced “aristocratic privileges,” leading to the emergence of new social structures that would later contribute to the French revolution. According to the Marxian law of history and analysis of society, there were always and constantly two or more conflicting classes: “freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman,” in short, “the oppressor and the oppressed” (Marx & Engels, 1967:79-80). The emergence of a new ideology is understood as being intrinsically bound up with class conflict. For example in the case of monarchical state societies, the two conflicting classes are the kings and their judges (considered as the ruling or oppressing class) on the one hand; the dispossessed and slaves (considered as the ruled or oppressed class) on the other hand (Taylor, 1967:7-45). When the opposing forces of the society get into conflict and the community gets destroyed a new system emerges out of the destroyed society.

According to Marx and Engels (1967), from the struggle between the opposing classes of the monarchical state, especially in European society (France, Germany, Britain, Spain, etc), emerged the feudal system of society. The feudal system (Fukuyama, 1992:218) was destroyed when the monarchy was centralized and modernized. This left behind a strong state power, on which its citizens were so dependent that they failed to organize themselves in private associations so as to take charge of their own lives. In its origins and functioning as a political ideology, absolute monarchism (in the Hobbesian sense) only managed to provide an individual with the natural right to self-preservation but failed to establish reciprocal recognition. Monarchical state societies began to crumble down and left strong states. These strong states oscillated in their allegiance between liberalism and socialism, leaving an ideological vacuum that was filled in by fascism. Sutton (1937:258) argues that the two factors that gave birth to fascism “are the decay of Liberal-Democracy and the rise of Marxism.” Fukuyama is not explicit as to the factors influencing the rise of fascism but indicates that it was one of the contending ideologies.

In its emergence, fascism showed its inherent propensity to militarism and definition of governance in terms of racial superiority. Similar inherent inclinations

were revealed in Mussolini's Italian fascism, Hitler's German Nazism, Franco's Spanish fascism, and the aggressive, elitist nationalism in Stalin's Soviet Union (Quinton, 1994:358-360). Sutton (1937:257) points out that fascism did not achieve international recognition as a political creed that could be "forced down the throat of every nation" as it was in the case of liberalism and communism. Fukuyama (1992:16-17) believes that fascism did not, like liberalism and communism, achieve universality as a political doctrine because "it denied the existence of a common humanity or equality of human rights" and also due to its principle that "the ultimate source of legitimacy was race or nation, specifically, the right of 'master races' like the Germans to rule other people." At the centre of this principle is the idea of the will to power over the voice of reason or equality that saw military confrontation or war for overcoming other nations or cultures as a "normal rather than pathological condition" (Fukuyama, 1992:16). Hence the idea, "a healthy nation is always mobilized for war" (Quinton, 1994:359). For Mussolini (1932:254-257),

Political doctrines pass; nations remain. ... The key-stone of Fascist doctrine is its conception of the State, of its essence, its functions, and its aims. For Fascism the State is absolute, individuals and group relative. Individuals and groups are admissible in so far as they come within the State. ... The State, as conceived and realized by Fascism, is a spiritual and ethical entity for securing the political, juridical, and economic organization of the nation, an organization which in its origin and growth is a manifestation of the spirit.

Quinton (1994:358) confirms that the primary element of fascism is the supremacy of the nation (or state) and control over all the aspects of the social life of each individual citizen, as well as control over other nations. As for the nation-state's power, well-being, and effectiveness, it takes "absolute precedence over the wants and needs of the individuals who compose it," and it must possess "the unity of will" embodied in a charismatic leader, backed by a committed elite – hence the highest and greatest duty of its citizens is to serve it even to the point of death (Quinton, 1994:358-359). Citizens were not allowed to dissent from the party's beliefs, if they did, this usually resulted in imprisonment or execution.

Mussolini (1932:248-251) shows that fascism was a considered ideology that derived its philosophical foundations from Sorel and other sources that were

very influential at the time. The philosophical ideas that underpinned fascism include

Fichte's idea of the special national mission of Germany; Nietzsche's idea of the superman, who casts aside Christian humility and philanthropy for an ethic of heroic self-affirmation; Sorel's notion of readiness for violence as an index of spiritual health; widespread repudiation of rationality and objective truth in favour of intuition; and finally the idea of struggle as an end in itself (Quinton 1994:359).

As can be expected, none of the thinkers cited above as sources of fascism was a proponent of democratic liberalism – compare Mussolini's (1932:251-254) statement that fascism negates socialism, democracy and liberalism. Fukuyama (1992:17) argues that when fascism put its inherent militarism into practice, this led to war and consequently to a "self-destructive conflict with the international systems" – resulting in Hitler's defeat. That inherent militarism is what Fukuyama (1992:17) points out as the major factor that eliminated fascism as a serious competitor to liberal democracy.

Although Hobsbawm (1999a:130; Cf. Parker, 1999:153, 166) describes communists as "the best anti-fascists," some of the traits of fascism overlapped and linked it with the then advancing communist order – for instance the assumption of absolute authoritarian and totalitarian governance, of which the then Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China were major examples. These two world powers functioned under the socialist-communist ideology. Hobsbawm (1999:3) argues that the victory of the Bolsheviks in October 1917 was the "first proletarian revolution" and the "first regime in history to set about the construction of the socialist order." For Hobsbawm (1999:3), this proves both the "profundity of the contradictions of capitalism, which produced wars [and] slumps;" and the possibility of the success of the worldwide socialist revolution. Parker (1999:166) adds that the rise of fascism in the West between the two world wars made it easier for the Soviet Union to spread socialism.

In contrast to Hobsbawm's view Fukuyama (1992:24) argues that after seizing power in the 1917 coup, the Bolshevik regime systematically attacked and eliminated "all potential competing sources of authority in Russian society," such as "opposition political parties, the press, trade unions, private enterprises" and religious organizations. According to Fukuyama (1992:24) the communists

advanced socialism by targeting the human relations – family, language, religion, and historical memory – that underpinned the social fabric of Russian society; systematically and methodically atomizing society and dispossessing individuals of their close relations by imposing other relations on them. Fukuyama (1992:24) argues that the Soviet communists not only deprived the individual of his freedom but made him “fear his freedom in favour (*sic*) of security, and ... affirm the goodness of chains even in the absence of coercion.” Fukuyama may have a point, but overlooks socialism’s attempt to create an egalitarian society, while in liberalism it is only the market that distributes the common good – redistribution is not present.

In his article, “The study of the nature and justification of coercive institutions” Sterba (1995:629) argues that contrary to liberalism²⁶ and communitarianism, “socialism takes equality to be the basic ideal and justifies coercive institutions insofar as they promote equality.” In a capitalist context

where the means of production are owned and controlled by a relatively small number of people and used primarily for their benefit, socialists favor taking control of the means of production and redirecting their use to the general welfare (Sterba, 1995:629).

That is to say, socialism views the capitalist context as a situation where redistribution is not possible due to the principle of the free market whose operation is blamed for causing economic and political inequality. Fukuyama (1992:289-299) reacts to this critique by acknowledging the existence of inequality, saying that it “will continue to preoccupy the liberal societies.” He argues that inequality should be explained by understanding that human beings are not biologically the same. To avoid the inequalities engendered by the market, socialism uses coercive institutions. Coercive institutions were expected to become unnecessary once equality was achieved and the means of production were in the hands of the workers. But the the revolutions inspired by Marx’s ideas (or anybody else claiming even-handed equality) in practice never realized the egalitarian ideal in name of which they were made in the first place. To borrow Al-Braizat’s (2001:169) expression, such egalitarian expectations do “not hold up to

²⁶ Liberalism justifies coercive institutions as long as they promote liberty – either as positive acts (i.e. acts of commission) or negative acts (i.e. acts of omission) (Sterba, 1995:628).

empirical testing” – there will always be an elite group that will be unequal to others.

Fukuyama shows how the worldwide collapse of communism paved the way for the triumph of liberal democracy. The 1990 amendment to the Union of Soviet-Socialist Republics' Constitution which revoked 'Article Six', which made the Communist Party the sole legitimate representative government of the people, heralded the eventual fall of communism. After this, the independent Russian Republic elected Boris Yeltsin as President. Yeltsin and some of his supporters advocated the “restoration of private property and markets” (Fukuyama, 1992:27) – which are the essential components of liberal democracy. Informed by the European philosophies of universal history (especially those of Kant, Hegel, Marx and Kojève's interpretation of Hegel), Fukuyama concludes that the shocking collapse of communism truly was the end of history, in that the ideological conflict between communism and liberalism is now a thing of the past. For Fukuyama, the fall of communism eliminated liberal democracy's last competitor for the role of the true ultimate destination of evolutionary history. According to Fukuyama (1992:xvi-xxiii; 199-208) the advent of liberal democracy means that Hegel's “struggle for recognition” and “tyranny, imperialism and the desire to dominate” cease being the perennial problems they were throughout the whole of human history. This implies that all the older ideologies failed to solve these problems, and that now liberal democracy has triumphed over other ideologies and has managed to bring reciprocal and equal recognition, and political and economic progress, to all people.

Parker (1999:176) characterizes Fukuyama's conclusion as “renewed liberal progressivism.” By this Parker (1999:176) means Fukuyama's postulation that economic growth brought about “through integration in the world free-market economy would progressively wean off ideologically inspired interventionism at home and military adventures abroad.” It follows that, because of the consensual adoption of the principles of liberal democracy by many nations (including former communist nations), as a natural consequence of their liberal economics, nations would be able to secure peace through negotiated settlement in moments of disputes “within the rules of the international market” (Parker, 1999:176). This favoured outcome can only be secured if liberal democracy is globally

acknowledged as the only reliable ideological framework, with no rivals to challenge it.

The problem with Fukuyama's liberal state is that it has not yet reached its ultimate goal, since history is still in the making and liberal democracy first has to deal with its internal contradictions. Fukuyama argues that having superseded its ideological opponents, liberal democracy in its final stage has to deal with its internal contradictions such as that of the individual in conflict with communal ethics – for it not to be superseded in turn.

3.2.3 Can Liberal Democracy Overcome its Contradictions?

Hegel's (1969:439) law of contradiction holds that "everything is inherently contradictory" and that "contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality." Without contradiction within it, a thing or system, or notion cannot move or have an urge or activity (Hegel, 1969:439). For Hegel (1969:438-439), contradictions can be distinguished as either subjective (contradictions in thought) or objective (contradictions in things). Inwood (1992:65) explains the distinction between objective contradictions and subjective contradictions as follows:

Objective contradictions are, for the most part, inner conflicts produced by a thing's entanglements with other things. Subjective contradictions are often the result of an attempt to keep distinct concepts, such as those of cause and effect, that are conceptually interdependent.

According to Inwood (1992:64), Hegel's law of contradiction "is a law of thoughts" that tells us that contradictions are thinkable and can happen in the world. It should be borne in mind that for Hegel one cannot distinguish between thought and the world since all reality turns into spirit – "thoughts and concepts are embedded in the world" (Inwood, 1992:65). When these contradictions occur they should be overcome, since according to Hegel's view anything that is contradictory is untrue (Hegel, 1969; Kojève, 1969; Inwood, 1992).

The idea of the overcoming or sublimation of contradictory situations, or notions, is illustrated in the Master-Slave account of Kojève's interpretation of Hegel. The situation portrays the slave fighting to overcome his bondage to the master (an external contradiction). Although the slave accepts the "contradictory

character of his existence,” he justifies it by arguing that “all existence necessarily, inevitably, implies a contradiction” (Kojève, 1969:55). Kojève (1969:54-55) points out that to become aware of a contradiction “is what moves human, historical evolution [and] is necessarily to want to remove it.”

As said above, Fukuyama adopts a Hegelian-Marxist dialectic as his method for interpreting history. The dialectic method shows us that there is a clash of desires and conflict of political ideologies that collapse as a result of their own internal contradictions, after which they are superseded by those with less contradictions. Since liberal democracy triumphed over (or superseded) its competitors such as communism, it has less internal contradictions than them.

Fukuyama implicitly concedes that liberal democracy has internal contradictions, like its predecessors or any other political system. He portrays contemporary liberal democracy as that political form of governance that is free from the “grave defects and irrationalities” that led to the collapse of its competitors – hence “liberal democracy was arguably free from such fundamental internal contradictions” (Fukuyama, 1992:xi). Liberal democracy is also “free of contradictions” because it is said to have satisfied the twin pillars of “rational (economic) desire and rational (personal) recognition” upon which the historical process rests (Fukuyama, 1992:139; 1995:358, 359). Possibly aware of his critics, Fukuyama (1992:136) asks:

Are there any 'contradictions' in our contemporary liberal democratic social order that would lead us to expect that the historical process will continue and produce a new, higher order?

If liberal democracy has internal contradictions, how will it overcome them so as to avoid being succeeded by a new ideology in turn? Fukuyama (1992:136) argues that there is no contradiction in the present liberal democratic system that can be “a source of social discontent sufficiently radical to eventually cause the downfall of the liberal societies.” In other words, liberal democracy simply has *problems*, not *contradictions*. He writes:

A “problem” does not become a “contradiction” unless it is so serious that it not only cannot be solved within the system, but corrodes the legitimacy of the system itself such that the latter collapses under its own weight (Fukuyama, 1992:136).

Fukuyama seems to deliberately overlook the seriousness of the inherent contradictions of liberal democracy. As Fukuyama (1992:136) well knows, the internal contradictions of liberal democracy are responsible for such serious problems as drugs, homelessness, the rise of crime, environmental destruction (especially by corporate activities) and consumerism.

According to Fukuyama, without a stable social order liberal democracy can collapse. He puts the spotlight on a time when the American social order was not stable. He describes a world of peace, followed by the disruption of this peaceful social order, and then a possible way out in the form of a communal triumph over excessive individualism, through social capital. Fukuyama thinks that the contradictions (or weaknesses) of liberal democracy can be overcome in this way. In this section I will pay attention to two basic contradictions that are commonly ascribed to capitalist liberal democracy: the disruption of social order as a result of excessive individualism, and inequality. These are serious problems that can destroy the social fabric in newly instituted democracies, and even in older, apparently well-established ones.

(a) On the Disruption of Social Order.

Fukuyama holds that although liberal democracy has fulfilled the long standing desire of humankind for political and economic recognition, it requires a stable social and/or communal order to sustain this recognition. This double barrel satisfaction of human desire cannot last long without the social virtue of social capital, with its by-product trust. The danger is that satisfied persons become so radically individuated that the communal moral order that sustains liberal democracy is overthrown. Fukuyama's (1999:27-46) thesis in *The Great Disruption* (1999) is that between the 1960s and the early 1990s, most western countries experienced a disruption of social order that took the form of rampant crime, a decline in interpersonal trust and the breakdown of the family. Fukuyama sees this disruption as the cause of high rates of illegitimacy and divorce. Leigh (1999) acknowledges that there is indeed a correlation between crimes, decline in interpersonal trust and the breakdown of the family, but difficulties arise when one tries to establish, like Fukuyama, a causal relationship between the three

phenomena – we cannot for instance simply assume that children from a divorced family are the ones likely to commit crime.

In *The Great Disruption*, Fukuyama closely examines empirical evidence of the social changes that took place during the modernization of industrial societies after World War II, to argue that a long-term decline in social conditions has taken and to some extent still is taking place, thereby depleting social capital. Dobell (2000) notes that Fukuyama makes a “slightly contrived attempt to introduce an image of a social upheaval parallel to the Great Depression” that spread to all post-industrial countries of the West. Gordon (1999) does not think Fukuyama’s thesis is true, and accuses Fukuyama of not addressing the problem of the uneven distribution of social capital. Fukuyama recognizes that it is a “serious problem” even to use “social dysfunction data as a negative measure for social capital.” For Gordon (1999) identifying “increases in crime, drug use, family break-ups ... may not show a general downturn in trust,” for people from different cultural and political backgrounds can still do business together based on mutual trust; the social pathological trio (rampant crime, a decline in interpersonal trust and the breakdown of the family) is thus not the indicator of the Great Disruption as Fukuyama takes it to be.

The free and independent individual is at the centre of Fukuyama’s whole argument of the end of history that began in *The End of History*, was extended in *Trust* (where we encounter Fukuyama declaring the triumph of liberal democracy and market economies), and continued into *The Great Disruption* where Fukuyama cautions that “this triumph is not necessarily accompanied by corresponding moral and social development ... [rather] there is a tendency for liberal democracies ‘to fall prey to excessive individualism’” (North, 1999). In Fukuyama’s (1999:91) own words: “the essence of the shift in values that is at the center (*sic*) of the Great Disruption is ... the rise of moral individualism and the consequent miniaturization of community.” This is an indirect consequence of the technological mechanization and rationalization of labour that brought the substitution of physical labour by mental labour, resulting in women flooding the labour market, thereby undermining family traditions. In turn, these social changes led to social disruption.

Fukuyama (1999:4) asserts that in a modern democracy, freedom and equality are two of the most highly valued goods and indicators of an information driven society. There was a technologically driven transition from a hierarchical

and bureaucratic society (that characterized the industrial age in both political and economic (corporate) spheres) where everything was under control through "rules, regulation and coercion", to an information society. This transition empowered individuals and gave "them access to information" that led to political and economic participation for all (Fukuyama, 1999:4, 6). He notes that the transition was so dramatic that the decline of moral values and the breakdown of social order became the central themes of social discourse (Fukuyama, 1999:5). This decline was not just something that people were subjectively convinced of, it was also reflected in hard statistical data on the rampancy of crime, illegitimacy, poor educational results, job opportunities and distrust (Fukuyama, 1999:5).

As the Great Disruption manifested itself, people sought to establish and understand its cause. At least four arguments were proposed regarding which phenomena caused it:

- *Increasing poverty and/or income inequality.* The first argument is that "the Great Disruption was caused by poverty and inequality" (Fukuyama, 1999:64-68). Fukuyama rejects this argument. He (Fukuyama, 1999:64-65) points out that the debate on "the direction of causality between economic and cultural factors" is "ideologized" by those on both the Right and the Left. The Left's argument, according to Fukuyama (1999:64-65), is that "crime, family breakdown, and distrust are caused by lack of jobs, opportunity, education, and economic inequality more generally," – hence social dysfunction. On the other hand, the Right sees the welfare state as the cause of family breakdown (Fukuyama, 1999:65). Fukuyama (1999:65-68) acknowledges that there is some linkage or correlation between poverty-inequality and each of the three indicators, viz. crime, family breakdown, and distrust, but still maintains that they do not have a causal relationship. Poverty and inequality cannot be a cause of family breakdown in Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development countries because even though they "have extensive welfare state protection," this has not "solved the underlying social problem," argues Fukuyama (1999:65). Furthermore, he rejects the notion that "poverty and inequality beget crime," dismissing it as a "commonplace among politicians and voters in democratic societies who seek reasons for justifying welfare and poverty programs"

(Fukuyama, 1999:67). His counter-argument is that although income inequality rose in United States during the Great Disruption, crime remained rampant in Western countries that are more egalitarian, such as Sweden (Fukuyama, 1999:67).

- *Growing wealth and security.* Opposed to the poverty-inequality argument as an attempt to explain the cause of the Great Disruption, is the general explanation in terms of growing wealth and security made by Daniel Yankelovich, who surveyed the shift from communal values to individualistic values in the 1950s (Fukuyama, 1999:68-70). The argument is that if income rises “the bonds of interdependence” that tie together family members and community members “will weaken, because they are now better able to get along without each other” (Fukuyama, 1999:69). That is to say greater economic prosperity results in increasing individualism and social disorder. For Fukuyama, this is a more plausible argument than the first one.
- *Modern government policies.* This argument contends that the Great Disruption is a “product of the welfare state”, created through its “perverse incentives” (Fukuyama, 1999:63). It refers to the welfare programme which the United States government developed and operated during the Great Depression – during both the downturn in output between 1929 and 1933, and the recovery between 1934 and 1939 – code named Aid to Families with Dependent Children (Fukuyama, 1999:70). The program provided welfare help to single mothers but penalized those who married the fathers of their children (Fukuyama, 1999:71). In a way it appeared to the conservatives as if the government policies were a “moral hazard” (Fukuyama, 1999:71-72), encouraging single-motherhood, illegitimacy, divorce and cohabitation in place of marriage among the middle and upper class individuals in the Western world. Fukuyama (1999:72) rejects this conservative argument, and holds that “illegitimacy is ... primarily associated with poverty in the United States and most countries.”

- *A broad cultural shift.* This argument maintains that the broad cultural shift that caused the Great Disruption in the West was shown in the growing individualism and the weakening of communal social controls that had “a huge impact on family life, sexual behaviour, and the willingness of people to obey the law” (Fukuyama, 1999:72). The broad cultural shift that saw the undermining of Victorian moral control in the West was influenced by Western rationalism, popular culture (promulgated through literature and media) and actual behaviour (abstract or popularized ideas put into practice by large groups of people) (Fukuyama, 1999:73-74). Fukuyama dismisses the broad cultural shift and the antecedent arguments as cause of the Great Disruption, arguing that these cannot be satisfactory explanations applicable universally; rather there should be a better explanation.

Contrary to these general explanations of the Great Disruption, Fukuyama (1992:55-97; 1999:4-7; 12-14) contends that the whole social disruption was initiated by the widespread introduction and usage of technology in the areas of information and medicine from the 1960s to the 1990s, leading to phenomena such as the sexual revolution or the feminist movements, that “sought to free individuals from the constraints of traditional social norms and moral rules”.

On the question of rising crime, Fukuyama attempts to show that there is a close antithetical relationship between social capital and crime. Social capital, according to Fukuyama (1999:27-36), is a “cooperative norm that has become embedded in the relationship among groups of people.” It contrasts with crime in that crime “*ipso facto* represents the absence of social capital because it is a violation of a community norm.” In an attempt to explain why crime rose between the 1960s and 1980s and declined in the years that followed, Fukuyama (1999:77-80) gives four answers from various sources, ranging from “male propensity to violence”, through the influence of modernization and related factors such as “urbanization, population density and opportunities for crime,” through the idea of crime concentration among social or ethnic minorities (social heterogeneity), to the idea of the deterioration of family life. According to Fukuyama (1999:80-82), it is in family life that a person in the early years of life learns “out of habit” to obey the law and learns a “basic level of self-control” – leaving the rest who failed to learn that during their early childhood as likely to become repeated law offenders.

Concerning the question of the *family*, the broad social disruption caused a shift in social norms which relate "to reproduction, the family, and relations between the sexes" (Fukuyama, 1999b:36); family life underwent major upheavals that were fuelled by the sexual revolution and the emergence of feminism that sought to see the liberation of women and change of gender roles in all spheres of life (Fukuyama, 1999:36-46, 92-94). Fukuyama's (1999:36-38) point is that the family as the most fundamental social unit where initial cooperation, forged through biological ties, is practiced, has lost ground in many countries of the Western world, and has been replaced by impersonal social ties that are market oriented. The decline in fertility due to the birth control pill, decrease in marriage stability, increase in divorce, increase in childbearing out-of-wedlock, and movement of women into the paid labour force – all impacting negatively on social capital – led to the loss of the value of the family (Fukuyama, 1999:36-46, 92-111). Because of the pill, women were able to control their own reproductive cycles – enabling them to take up positions in the labour force. Family unity suffered variegated blows that shattered many families, promoting what Fukuyama calls a "miniaturization of community;" that causes a displacement of affiliation, and the creation of a "smaller radius of trust" (Murray, 1999).

Consequently the disruptive transition transformed the workplace from a man's world into a women's world. Instead of women staying at home, cooking, bearing and nursing children as used to be the tradition, they took up executive and technical positions in workplaces that used to be the centre and source of male hegemony. Postrel (1999) argues that by suggesting the mid-1960s as "a good starting date for the beginning of the Great Disruption," Fukuyama implies that "the emancipation of women ... is at the root of social disorder." In the same vein Dobell (2000) says that Fukuyama stops just short of arguing that "it was feminism and the pill that led to social disorder." In the process Fukuyama corrects himself and redirects his focus to the question of "re-establishing male responsibility in the continuing ties which can support essential investment in early childhood development" (Dobell, 2000).

Fukuyama (1995) describes trust as a key by-product of the social virtue of social capital. He (Fukuyama, 1999:47-49) argues that there is increasing individualism in democratic societies, where people exercise excessive freedom of choice to associate with any persons they wish to, but fail to make "moral

commitments,” connecting them to other people. This results in “moral miniaturization,” that in turn undermines group authority, while increasing individualism. The net result is that there is a decline in public trust, especially in the United States – indicating a shift from the Victorian morality that used to dominate life, to an era of social disorder.

Fukuyama (1999:85-87) gives two basic reasons why there has been a broad-based decline in trust, both in public institutions and in other individuals. Fukuyama (1999:85), agreeing with Robert Putnam that the decline of trust is “associated with the rise of television watching whose programmes are dominated with sex and violence”, firstly points out that individuals spend long hours in front of the television, resulting in a lack of opportunities for social interaction. Secondly, in the light of the National Opinion Research Centre’s analysis of data from a survey carried out by Tom Smith, Fukuyama (1999:86) claims that

distrust is correlated with low socioeconomic status, minority status, traumatic life events, fundamentalism, failure to attend a mainline church, and age cohort [as well as] traumatic life events affecting trust [that] include, not surprisingly, being a victim of crime and being in poor health.

In our individualistic society, people feel they cannot count on each other or on institutions, because so many people do not fulfill their commitments, fail to honour norms of reciprocity, or choose opportunistic behaviour (Fukuyama, 1999:49). To summarize Fukuyama’s ideas on this point: the Great Disruption was the result of a broad cultural shift that included the decline of religion, the disruption of the communal moral order and the promotion of individualistic self-gratification over obligation to the community, all of which led to the collapse of what had been fundamental to Western virtue. This disruption of social order also breeds inequality. However, Fukuyama does not leave it at this pessimistic conclusion; he tries to show that social hope can be generated through a reconstruction of the social order.

(b) On Inequality

In this thesis I do not address the problem of inequality in its full breadth; I rather restrict myself to those aspects of it that are relevant to the context of Fukuyama,

especially in the area of socio-political and economic inequality in liberal democracy. Fukuyama (1992:289) acknowledges that the problem of political and economic inequality "will continue to preoccupy liberal societies for generations to come because they are, in a certain sense, unresolvable (*sic*) within the context of liberalism."

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1913) points out that most philosophical investigations into the foundations of society could not avoid the question of inequality because of its importance in all human spheres of life, especially the natural (physical), political and economic spheres. He (Rousseau, 1913:160) distinguishes two kinds of inequality, namely "natural or physical" and "moral or political." The former consists of such things as "age, health, bodily strength, and the qualities of the mind or of the soul," while the latter is the result of the social conditions and circumstances of humankind. Rousseau (1913) argues that dependency on any human authority that infringes on one's freedom leads to inequality. Rousseau's argument can be understood by looking at its converse: that equality requires that nothing infringes on one's freedom, unless there is consensual agreement on deliberate infringement. Hence, his call for a popular sovereignty that will give every individual the power to see to it that all things are handled in an equitable manner. The problem is that usually the model does not match the *de facto* historical record – meaning that there will always be a human propensity to elitism.

For Hegel it seems there is a co-existence between inequality and equality – one is empirical and the other is metaphysical, respectively. In the empirical aspect of human life – one's earning of a livelihood from universal and permanent resources – Hegel (1998:366[199]) maintains that there is some unavoidable inherent inequality:

The possibility of sharing in the universal resources – i.e. of holding particular resources – is, however, conditional upon one's own immediate basic assets (i.e. capital) on the one hand, upon one's skill on the other; the latter in turn is itself conditioned by the former, but also by contingent circumstances whose variety gives rise to differences in the development of natural physical and mental (*geistigen*) aptitudes which are already unequal in themselves (*für sich*). In this sphere of particularity, these differences manifest themselves in every direction and at every

level, and, in conjunction with other contingent and arbitrary circumstances, necessarily result in inequalities in the resources and skills of individuals.

As to the metaphysical side of human life, Hegel (1977:111-119[178-196]) in the "Lordship and Bondage" section of the *Phenomenology* implies that inequality is caused by lack of mutual recognition. He argues that prior to the process of recognition,

self-consciousness ... [a]t first ... will exhibit the side of the inequality of the two, or the splitting-up of the middle term into the extremes which, as extremes, are opposed to one another, one being only recognized, the other only recognizing (Hegel, 1977:112[185]).

For Hegel, equality takes place where there is mutual and equal recognition of individuals. In the "Lordship and Bondage" section of the *Phenomenology*, Hegel shows that in the initial encounter of a master with the slave, there is no equal recognition. At a later stage this gives rise to a bloody war of freedom and equality – thus for independence and recognition.

Fukuyama cites two basic criticisms of liberal society from the Left and Right. From the Left the argument is that the promise of universal, reciprocal recognition continues to be fundamentally unfulfilled due to economic inequality as a result of liberal societies' adoption of capitalism, where distribution of recognition remains unequal (Fukuyama, 1992:289; Cf. Fisk, 2003). Critics from the Right argue that "the goal of equal recognition itself" is not achievable. In response Fukuyama (1992:289) argues that "human beings are inherently unequal", and any attempt to treat them equally denies them their humanity. In defence of unequal treatment of human beings and based on categories of human conventions and natural necessity in affirming human differences, he holds that there are natural barriers to equality such as the "unequal distribution of natural abilities or attributes within a population" Fukuyama (1992:290). This agrees with the idea of Hegel. He claims, however, that in principle liberal societies are dedicated to the eradication of conventional sources of inequality.

If inequality is an inherent feature and drawback of liberal democracy, then that raises doubts as to whether it is the ultimate form of government that the whole world will embrace without coercion. Fukuyama has not yet supplied any

solution to this contradiction or weakness of liberal democracy. Failing such a solution, liberal democracy cannot accomplish its mission to be a universal and valid form of governance that fulfils its promises of equal and mutual recognition and prosperity.

The harmful effects of inequality compel one to seek some form of remedy – obviously – some way to achieve greater equality. In most cases where conceptualization of equality takes place, it has fallen prey to the idea of thinking equality in terms of even-handedness. The central question with regards to equality is about its desirability. Why should equality be desirable or needed? Locke's "formal egalitarianism," underpinned by natural rights, accepts a high level of social and economic inequality that ends up dominating social and political life. For Bentham equality should be understood not in terms of natural rights, to borrow Jones' (2002:153) formulation,

but rather in terms of the notion that all human beings were equally experiencing pleasure and pain ... each person... should therefore be considered equally as an individual capable of maximizing his or her happiness or well-being [and] everybody should thus 'count as one, and nobody as more than one.'

Mill, who opted for equality of civil and political rights and opportunity, rejected the idea of equality based on natural rights. The danger of equality of opportunity is that it assumes the concept of meritocracy – that one gets an opportunity because he/she deserves it – and as a result perpetuates inequality. Equality is desirable in order to facilitate an individual's rights and freedom to pursue life sustenance and satisfaction.

3.2.4 Resolving Contradictions: Rebuilding Social Order

Fukuyama (1999:10-12) asserts that while social order is indispensable for the future of liberal democracy, the greatest question is whether "modern information age democracies" (that always fall prey to excessive individualism, and chronic inequality) are able to maintain social order in the face of the onslaught of technological and economic development, which always bring social disorder in their wake. In an attempt to figure out possible answers, in the second part of *The Great Disruption* Fukuyama adopts Nietzsche's 'genealogical' method so as to

“question the basic nature, purpose, and means of creation of social order” (Dobell, 2000), at the same time discussing the social virtue of social capital and social cohesion as a source of social hope for a society traumatized by the Great Disruption. If social order is to be rebuilt, then the question is: What foundation and with which tools should be used?

Fukuyama holds that mutual and equal recognition is a social link between politics and economic life that can only come with the advent of liberal democracy. Its longevity depends on the level of social capital that is in turn maintained by social trust as a lubricant. Fukuyama does not forget the idea of virtue. As a result, the central thesis in *Trust* (1995) is that intra-family loyalty is detrimental to political and economic development, especially the growth of large scale business, and that inter-(beyond)family trust has become the basis for political and economic cooperation and the prosperity that results from it. Encapsulated in the concept of social capital is the idea of trust that appears as its key component, although in *Trust* Fukuyama (1995) discusses the two concepts as being distinct but inescapably intertwined. To establish a clear and inclusive account of the notion of trust, we must first analyze the notion of social capital.²⁷

3.2.4.1 The Mechanism for Rebuilding Social Order: Social Capital

The concept of social capital relates closely to what the French aristocrat and traveller Alexis de Tocqueville (1945:111-119) in Volume II of his book, *Democracy in America*, called the “art of association.” By the art of association, de Tocqueville meant the norms that allow citizens of a particular democratic arrangement – in this case the USA – the freedom to continually exercise their right of association as the practice of cooperation in their civil, political or economic activities. According to Fukuyama (1999a:19), while the term ‘social capital’ was first used by Hanifan to describe rural school community centres, it was James Coleman “who was responsible for bringing the term social capital into a wider use in recent years.” (Fukuyama, 1999a:19). Coleman, in “Social Capital and the Creation of Human Capital” (1988), and in *Foundations of Social Theory*, (1990) formally introduces and illustrates the concept of “social capital” to describe a resource of individuals

²⁷ Coleman (1990:303-304) distinguishes social capital from natural capital, human capital, physical capital, and financial capital.

that emerges from their "social ties." The notion of social capital "describe[s] the social norms and expectations that underwrite economic activity, but which could not be accounted for from a strictly economic perspective." Coleman argued that "social capital was a public good and therefore would be produced by private agents-interacting-in-markets" (Fukuyama 1999a:19). The concept was further developed by Pierre Bourdieu, who used it to refer to the advantages and opportunities accruing to people through membership in certain "communities." In the passage of time, the term arguably "expanded beyond its economic genesis" to designate such formations or arrangements as networks, associations, and "shared habits that enable individuals to act collectively" (Warren, 1999:9).

Borrowing from Coleman and others, Robert Putnam (1993:167), in his book, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* describes social capital as the "features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions." In this connection Putnam (1993:167) remarks that "like love, kindness, and understanding, social capital increases with use and atrophies or dwindles into depleted stock unless it is used." Putnam (1993:170) remarks that "like all public goods, social capital tends to be undervalued and undersupplied by private agents." Echoing Coleman, Putnam (1993:175-176) subsequently argues that various networked groups from all walks of life (ranging across sports groups, civic associations, cultural groups, cooperatives and, non-governmental organizations) have a great impact on the function of political and economic institutions. In a later publication, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, Putnam-(2000:19) introduces the concept of social capital as follows:

Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital refers to the properties of individuals, social capital refers to connections among individuals - social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them. In that sense social capital is closely related to what some have called "civic virtue". The difference is that "social capital" calls attention to the fact that civic virtue is most powerful when embedded in a network of reciprocal social relations. A society of many virtuous but isolated individuals is not necessarily rich in social capital.

For Putnam, and unlike Fukuyama, social capital in the final analysis amounts to nothing other than human relations to each other with reciprocal expectations. In this case, social capital is not used as a tool to judge cultural competence to trust outsiders so as to enhance economic prosperity.

For Fukuyama, social capital is not only critical to civil society, which is in turn a requirement of modern democracy; it is also critically important as the basis for economic activity. Fukuyama argues that the way in which trust or social capital is *embodied* or *instantiated* is crucial. Fukuyama (1995:26) defines social capital as “a capability that arises from the prevalence of trust in a society or in certain parts of it” that can “*be embodied* [my italics – RW] in the smallest and most basic group, the family, as well as the largest of all groups, the nation” and other groups. In *The Great Disruption* and his article, “Social Capital and Civil Society and Solidarity,” Fukuyama (1999a:16; 1999b) revisits his definition of social capital – redefining it as follows: “informal values and norms that promote cooperation between two or more individuals.” The norms that constitute it “can range from a norm of reciprocity between two friends, all the way up to complex and elaborately articulated doctrines” such as those in religions like Christianity or Confucianism.

The idea of instantiation links back to Hegel and Kojève. By instantiation Fukuyama (1999b) means that social capital must become a fact in an actual human relationship. The “norm of reciprocity exists in *potentia*” in one’s dealings with all people, but is actualized only in the dealings he/she has with his group or social network. By this definition, Fukuyama (1999b) tries to show that trust, networks, civil society, and many other factors which have been associated with social capital are “all-epiphenomenal, arising as a result of social capital but not constituting social capital itself.” It follows that not any instantiated norms constitute social capital, but only those that produce cooperation in communities – such as those related to traditional virtues like the keeping of commitments, “honesty, meeting of obligations, and reciprocity” (Fukuyama, 1999a:16-17; 1999b). Cooperation has the potential to spread beyond the immediate social group that shares the instantiated norms.

The phenomenon of cooperation spreading outside the immediate group in turn raises the question of whether social capital is a social good or not. Fukuyama (1999b) argues that it is less obviously a social good than physical or human capital, for “it tends to produce more in the way of negative externalities than either

of the other two forms." As his reason, Fukuyama (1999b) asserts that "solidarity in human communities is often purchased at the price of hostility towards out-group members," arguing:

— There appears to be a natural human proclivity for dividing the world into friends and enemies that is the basis of all politics. It is thus very important when measuring social capital to consider its true utility net of its externalities.

In this connection, Fukuyama (1999b) suggests that the concept of "radius of trust" can be used to establish how far cooperation has spread. All groups embodying social capital possess some kind of a "circle of people among whom cooperative norms are operative" (Fukuyama, 1999b). This bears on the question of the origin or source of social capital. Fukuyama (1999a) asserts that trust is "frequently a by-product of religion, tradition, shared historical experience, and other factors that lie outside the control of any government." At the centre of all these phenomena is some form of cooperation.

(a) Functions of Social Capital

Coleman (1988:198) points out that the notion of social capital is usually employed as part of a general theoretical strategy that accepts rational action (especially rational economic action) as a point of departure but rejects the extreme, individualistic premises that usually accompany it. This is reflected in Fukuyama's works where he discusses the idea in detail. Fukuyama (1999b) explains the function of social capital in a free-market liberal democracy as that which sustains the success of a liberal democratic state. In an economic context social capital "reduces the transaction costs associated with formal coordination mechanisms like contracts, hierarchies, bureaucratic rules, and the like" (Fukuyama, 1999b). Although he acknowledges that it is possible to get coordinated action within a group of people without social capital, Fukuyama (1999b) presumes that that action has to entail extra "transaction costs of monitoring, negotiating, litigating, and enforcing formal agreements." He argues that no contract can foresee all the specifics that can occur between the parties; contracts generally rather "presuppose a certain amount of goodwill that prevents the parties from taking advantage of unforeseen loopholes" (Fukuyama 1999b).

Detailed contracts "that do seek to try to specify all contingencies ... end up being very inflexible and costly to enforce" (Fukuyama 1999b). There were times in history when there was no formal law or organizations, so that social capital was the sole *modus operandi* for achieving "coordinated action" (Fukuyama 1999b). Fukuyama's (1999b) point is that no matter how technologically sophisticated economic activities become, coordinated action "based on informal norms" (i.e. social capital) continues to play a significant role in modern economies, both "high-tech" and "non-hi-tech," as a convenient and practical way to reduce costs in terms of both time and money.

With regards to the political function of social capital, Fukuyama (1999b) describes Alexis de Tocqueville's "art of association" as the best elucidation of social capital at work in a modern democracy. According to Tocqueville (1945:100-101) in France from the "outset of democracy," individual citizens were left free and equal but without a strong bond of association, due to the fact that the Revolution overthrew the Church and the central power – the French aristocratic regime. In *The Ancient Regime and the French Revolution*, Tocqueville (1955:50) claims that the purpose of the French Revolution, as a movement of political and social reform that underpins modern democracy, was to replace feudal institutions with a "new social and political order, at once simple and more uniform, based on the concept of the equality of all men." Fukuyama (1999b) comments that modern democracy "tends to wipe away most forms of social class or inherited status that bind people together in aristocratic societies," as indicated in Tocqueville. As already noted, Fukuyama's (1999b) critique of modern democracy identifies its vice as promoting "excessive individualism" whereby one is preoccupied "with one's private life and family," and there is "an unwillingness to engage in public affairs." Tocqueville (1945:102-103, 115 121-127) commends American society for combating the tendency towards excessive individualism by having "free institutions" such as voluntary associations that embody the right of association. Fukuyama (1999b) remarks that the installation of these voluntary associations contrasts with the situation in Tocqueville's native France, where individualism was more extreme than in America. Such extreme individualism could only be tamed under civil associations that served as either a direct channel to participation in political life or "as 'schools of citizenship' where individuals learned the habits of cooperation that

would eventually carry over into public life" (Fukuyama, 1999b; Cf. Tocqueville, 1945, & 1955).

For Fukuyama it is through the "radius of trust" that we can measure how extensive and effective the social groups are within which an individual is able to trust others, since "some societies limit trust to family or tribe" which has highly deleterious social consequences (Fukuyama, 1999b). However there are large social groups in which the extent of trust extends beyond the level of tribe or family, such as "business associates, religious congregations, associations, political parties, civic groups [and] educational institutions" (Fukuyama, 1999b). "[S]uch large radii of trust enable the development of civic society"²⁸ (Fukuyama 1999a) which he views as the foundation of liberal democracy.

(b) The Idea of Trust

Fukuyama's (1992:42,90-91) credo is that liberal democracy has remained a fundamental ideological framework of "potentially universal validity" for governance in modern societies, and that its inseparable alliance with capitalism (or market economy) has also remained as the most viable economic system ever. However neither liberal democracy nor capitalism is self-sustaining. Both depend on irrational factors such as religion, cultural traditions, nationalism, and the maintaining of standards (Fukuyama, 1992:234). Fukuyama (1992:216,233) acknowledges the long-standing influence of cultural traditions when he states that "capitalism depends in some measure on survival of pre-modern traditions" that have remained influential right up to our era. Fukuyama (1995:5) reluctantly acknowledges Huntington's argument that "cultural differences will necessarily be the source of conflict," criticizing it for being "less [than] convincing." However, according to Fukuyama (1992:233) the consensus reception of liberalism (political or economic) by many nations will not resolve the problem of cultural differences. In examining the impact of culture on economic life, society, and competition in the new global economic order, Fukuyama (1992) concludes that culture pervades

²⁸ Fukuyama (1995:4-5) describes civil society as that "complex mixture of intermediate institutions, including businesses, voluntary associations, educational institutions, clubs, unions, media, charities, and churches, which build, in turn, on the family, the primary instrument by which people are socialized into their culture and given the skills that allow them to live in broader society and through which values and knowledge of that society are transmitted across the generations." It is within this kind of framework that members associate.

that culture pervades economic life, just as it does political life and all spheres of life in human society. Culture is then highly pervasive, and thus influences a nation's prosperity by stimulating cooperation on the basis of shared norms – hence economic life, pervaded by culture, depends “on moral bonds of social trust” (Fukuyama, 1992). In her book review of *Trust*, Carroll (1995) claims that

[i]n the global struggle for economic predominance that is now upon us – a struggle in which cultural differences will become the chief determinant of national success – the social capital represented by trust will be as important as physical capital.

One of Fukuyama's (1995:4) central theses in *Trust* is that, after discovering that what social engineering seems to have promised the world did not materialize, it was abandoned, and it follows that “virtually all serious observers understand that liberal political and economic institutions depend on a healthy and dynamic civil society for their vitality.” It is through these communities that members of the public are able to associate with each other. Fukuyama (1995:25) points out that the ability to associate in any community rests solely on the measure to which people share norms and values and are able to put aside their self-interests in favour of those of the community. It is out of such shared norms and values that trust develops.

The “aggregate of behavioural norms,” “social networks (horizontal and vertical)” and trust make up a fundamental cluster of components that form or create social capital (Streeten, 2002:42-43). It links with Putman's (2000) (cited in Streeten, 2002:43) argument that the origin of social trust in modern social arrangements “can arise from two related sources – norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement” in intra-group or inter-group relations. But what is trust? Fukuyama (1995:26, 336) defines trust as

the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of the community ... [It] ...is the product of pre-existing communities of shared moral norms or values.

Other scholars have identified problems in Fukuyama's conception of trust. According to Koehn (1996) it can be generally agreed that Fukuyama is correct to

assert “cultural traits, precisely because they are by definition pervasive, affect the way in which religion, law and business are practised;” however it is more dubious to claim that trust “is the major determinant of economic performance and the social virtue *par excellence*.” He also worries that Fukuyama’s definition has a propensity for “cronyism” whereby we trust only members of the community who share exactly the same norms and values as we do. This destroys the whole idea of equal and mutual recognition that is supposed to characterize the end of history. Koehn (1996) argues that trust should not be based on the idea that people should subscribe to precisely the same norms or values; diversity of norms and values should not be seen as a hindrance to trusting the other person. It is good for people to recognize that there is value in diversity and that we can trust a person with different norms and values, without this trust being disappointed by subsequent experience.

In contrast to Fukuyama, Offe (1999:45-55), in trying to establish what determines the supply of trust as a cognitive and moral resource that motivates cooperation, defines trust as “the cognitive premise with which individual or collective/corporate actors enter into interaction with other actors.” Thus he sees trust as a cognitive premise that “relates to the behavioural preferences and inclinations of others in terms of their preparedness to contribute, to cooperate, and to refrain from selfish opportunistic and hostile courses of action” (Offe, 1999:45). Apart from being a cognitive premise, Offe (1999:46-47) also describes trust as a “belief concerning the action that is to be expected from others,” a belief that they will “contribute to my/our well-being and refrain from inflicting damage upon me/us.”

(i) Value of Trust and its Application

Fukuyama’s view of trust raises several issues. One of them concerns the value of trust and how it is applied outside the limits of familiarity. Fukuyama (1995:26-27) contends that social capital cannot be acquired on an individual basis; rather “it requires habituation to the moral norms of a community and, in its context” can only be acquired through trust. Fukuyama maintains that trust is a social virtue that plays a key role in the creation of social capital by permitting individuals to create social relationships. Koehn (1996) disagrees, contending that “even if we accept

that trust creates social capital, this does not make it a virtue." This is because "the shared norm that forms the basis of trust might be a mutual dislike of outsiders or of some other racial group" resulting in distrust (Koehn, 1999). As already indicated above, Fukuyama restricts the value of trust and its application to people sharing the same social norms and values. For trust to be applicable outside the bounds of familiarity, Fukuyama (1995:27) introduces the term, "spontaneous sociability," which he describes as constituting a "subset of social capital" that includes "a wide range of intermediate communities distinct from the family or those deliberately established by governments." Spontaneous sociability goes beyond family lines into the formation of large-scale business corporations that are governed by professional business leaders (Koehn, 1996). In *Trust* Fukuyama (1995:61-268) distinguishes three types of society, namely, high-trust, low-trust and no-trust societies:

- *High-trust* societies are countries (like Germany, the United States, and Japan) that have developed large economic institutions and community groups "above the family and below the government" (Cox, 2002; Cf. Fukuyama, 1995:63, 149-266). Voluntary associations that emerge from high-trust societies result in economic associations, which in turn lead to economic development (Cox, 2002).
- *Low-trust* societies are countries (like China, Italy, France, and Korea) that lack strong civil societies, where trust is limited to the family (hence strong family unity) and "universal organizations like state religion or government" (Cox, 2002; Fukuyama, 1995:65-145). In these societies, large-scale economic institutions or businesses are established and managed by the state, for example the French state owned and managed company that manufactures aircraft – the Airbus (Fukuyama, 1995:113; Cox, 2002). Fukuyama's (1995) categorization of China as part a low-trust society is disputed by Inglehart (1999:93), who argues Fukuyama was mistaken because according to both the 1990 and 1996 World Values Surveys, "China shows about the same level of interpersonal trust as Japan," which Fukuyama characterizes as a high-trust society (Inglehart, 1999:93; Cf. Fukuyama, 1995:65-145).

- *No-trust* societies are countries (like Russia, Central Africa, and Southern Italy) where there is even lack of strong family unity and "government is either totalitarian or corrupt" (Cox, 2002; Cf. Fukuyama, 1999:30-31 and *passim*). Cox (2002) points out that the only intermediate level associations available in these societies are organized crime.

Fukuyama (1995:62-64) maintains that business in high-trust societies that is "organized around large corporations" thrives, while business in low-trust societies is organized around and owned by families. Koehn (1996) comments that while in high-trust businesses outsiders are trusted and professional managers are appointed to govern economic institutions, in family-owned businesses outsiders are not trusted and family members are appointed to run the business.

(ii) The Trustor and the Trustee.

Fukuyama (1995:26, 27) holds that the only persons or institutions to be trusted are the ones with whom one shares common norms and values. The ontological structure of participation has two sides, the trustor and the trustee. Koehn (1996) critically argues that Fukuyama's view of trust leaves us with a concern that centres on "how we identify who qualifies as a trustor, trustee or object of trust and how we determine when we are justified in saying that someone is or is not "trusting." According to him (Koehn, 1996) the question of the "identification of the trustor, the trustee and the object of trust is highly theory-dependent," something Fukuyama does not seem to acknowledge.

Koehn (1996) criticizes Fukuyama for having "a largely monocausal theory of human relations", for holding that trust is the key to successful economies and "worker cooperation" and for concluding that any nation with labour discords must have "low-trust agents." Fukuyama (1995:113-125) discusses French political and economic developments at length, especially the issues surrounding management and labour. He tries to understand why labour seeks help from the state ministries to solve its disputes with management rather than engaging management itself. Koehn (1996) argues that the example does not prove that the French lack trust, rather it shows that the French trust persons in the ministry, not their local management. That is to say, instead of concentrating on intra-group trust, they

exploit out-group trust. The same applies to African-American communities, which Fukuyama criticizes as having looked up to political authority "instead of economic associations to promote their economic interests." This restricts the meaning and exercise of trust to circles of business without applying it to other social spheres of life, for life is not limited to the economic sphere. Koehn (1996) launches a corrective argument against Fukuyama's view about African Americans.

Concerning their seeking of political power to solve their socio-economic problems: African-Americans historically attempted "to form alliances with whites but their efforts have been rebuffed" (Koehn, 1996). In a bid to deal with the conditions they found themselves in, African-Americans "associate with one another in substantial numbers," but when they do that "they are frequently viewed with suspicion" (Koehn, 1996). Apropos of Fukuyama, he warns against confusing the "question of whether persons are trusting with the issue of who or what they choose to trust" (Koehn, 1996).

If Fukuyama is correct to view trust as "a capitalistic social virtue," then voluntary associations should all revolve around competition since those relations are based on the market idea (Koehn, 1996). Viewing or measuring economic success or failure on the basis of trust is then problematic. Fukuyama presents Japan as a high-trust society, while simultaneously claiming that the Japanese "did not move away from tight, family businesses until after WWII." This happened only after "the intervention by the United States to destroy the *zaibatsu*" (a large family owned industrial conglomerates), before which business in Japan was owned by "huge family ... conglomerates ... that dominated Japanese industry before World War II" (Fukuyama, 1995). For Koehn (1996);

Instead of economic and social conditions being a function of trust, it appears that the supposed high trust of the Japanese emerged only after the United States' intervention changed the Japanese social structure for them (Koehn, 1996).

In other words, had it not been for the intervention of the United States, Japan would have continued on the same path as before, and would not have been as successful as they are now. In a way this confirms the critique of Kurtz that Fukuyama believes that the US should go out there, indoctrinate and enforce liberal democracy irrespective of cultural preconditions. This leaves us with one

civilization dominating the rest of the world without recognition of the importance of the other.

3.2.4.2 Sources of Social Order

Fukuyama (1999a:137) asks a number of questions regarding the depletion of social capital: (1) "How can we rebuild social capital in the future?" (2) "Does this mean, then, that contemporary liberal societies are fated to descend into increasing levels of moral decline and social anarchy, until they somehow implode?" In response, Fukuyama (1999a:137) claims that understanding our situation is not as hopeless a task as it may appear; what is needed is "to study social order *per se* at an abstract level." Using the Nietzschean theoretical framework of the genealogy of morals, Fukuyama (1999a) draws from a large pool of literature and synthesizes ideas from various academic disciplines: anthropology, biology, sociology, political science, and economics – arguing that these disciplines give us insight into the broad sources of social order, namely, human nature and spontaneous processes of self-organization.

The central point in Fukuyama's (1999a:5-7) analysis of a modernized and information-driven society is the power of a self-organizing, self-generating, non-hierarchical social order that helps to create moral rules that bind citizens of a liberal society as a community. Social order emerged, "not as the result of a top-down mandate by hierarchical authority, whether political or religious, but as the result of self-organization on the part of decentralized individuals" (Fukuyama, 1999a:6). In his study, Fukuyama (1999a:138) discovers that social order and social capital come from two broad sources:

The first is biological, and it emerges from human nature itself. There have been important recent advances in the life sciences, which have the cumulative effect of re-establishing the classical view that human nature exists and that their nature makes humans social and political creatures with great capabilities for establishing social rules. The second basis of support for social order is human reason, and reason's ability to spontaneously generate solutions to problems of social cooperation.

This view contains echoes of classical Greek philosophy, both in content and method, especially Aristotle who views humankind as a political animal. Johnson (1999) in his review article of *The Great Disruption* argues that Fukuyama's methods are not different from Aristotle's in that he (Fukuyama) observes and interprets the empirical world, then seeks metaphysical explanation:

Tracing human nature and social order through the annals of anthropology, sociology, evolutionary biology, and economics, Fukuyama (1999a:155-156) looks at the concept of cultural relativism which he describes as

the belief that cultural rules are arbitrary, socially constructed artefacts of different societies ... and that there are no universal standards of morality and no way by which we can judge the norms and rules of other cultures.

Its roots date back to modern philosophers such as Nietzsche (Fukuyama, 1999a:156). What it means is that the moral laws of the past were constructed, and that it is possible to do the same today. This supports Fukuyama's view that the Great Disruption can be remedied by developing new rules that suit the contemporary contexts of various communities – creating some hope for the despondent human family. In an attempt to unify the sources for rebuilding social order, Fukuyama (1999a:155-162) tries to establish common lines between various disciplines by appealing to the old concept of the transferability of method, especially when he talks of "methodological borrowing" between evolutionary biology and economics, indicating that some factors from either discipline undermine the other or support the other. For instance, evolutionary game theory, developed by economists as a framework "to explain the behavior of markets," was borrowed by biologists as a mathematical model for explaining "how certain altruistic behavioral characteristics could be selected and spread within populations of competing individuals" (Fukuyama, 1999a: 161).

Fukuyama (1999a:161) points out that evolutionary biologists and economists accept "methodological individualism." They then seek to explain group behaviour in terms of the interests of the individual, but not vice versa. In the past, social observation and/or philosophizing "assumed that the primary human unit was the group and that nature prepared individuals to sacrifice their own interests for the sake of larger groups" (Fukuyama, 1999a:161). As already indicated above, all classical models of liberalism have a common problem to deal

with, namely, individualism. This continuous and excessive individualism creates an internal contradiction within liberal democracy. It is a contradiction because in liberal society the spirit of civility is supposed to prevail. Each individual will be fighting for personal recognition while the community demands submission to its moral norms. As a result there will be a conflict between the individual and the community.

In an attempt to show that liberal democracy can overcome its internal contradictions, Fukuyama (1999a), following evolutionary anthropology and biology, points out that individuated human beings have a propensity to socialization, cooperation, and self-organization into political communities. Concerning cooperation, Fukuyama (1999a:168-169) argues that kin selection and reciprocity, upon which individual interests are based, lead to social cooperation. Thus as people repeatedly interact they will come to know each other and reciprocally trust one another.

3.2.4.3 Rebuilding Social Order

Fukuyama (1999:137) argues that we as human beings "are by nature designed to create moral rules and social order for ourselves." He presents a hopeful vision of a future in which there is a reconstruction of the social order that was once disrupted (Fukuyama, 1999:247-282). Fukuyama (1999:263-282) documents both the blessings from a more technologically sophisticated and information-based economy and the moral decay triggered by the same technology, resulting in the disruption of social order, as indicated by such social pathologies as crime levels, declining fertility, increasing births out of wedlock, decreasing levels of trust, and the dismantling of family structures. Fukuyama (1999:263-282) claims that there has been a reverse of all these social pathologies since the 1990s. This makes the Great Disruption, as North (1999) puts it, "just a temporary interruption on the way to an ever better future." Furthermore, Fukuyama (1999a) is stuck with the problem of increasing individualism, which he describes as having fuelled innovation and prosperity but at the same time as also having "corroded virtually all forms of authority and weakened the bonds holding families, neighbourhoods, and nations together." The situation raises the question of how social order is going to be rebuilt.

Reconciling theory with empirical data concerning the past and present disrupted condition of the Western world, and closely focusing on the effects of a free market economy and technology on social order, Fukuyama (1999a:262,282) asserts that “[o]ur only reason for hope is the very powerful innate human capacities for reconstituting social order.” This links with Kant’s teleological vision that at the end of history the plan of nature is to see development to maturity of human innate capacities, contained and driven by reason to build a global social order that will respect the freedom, equality, and independence of individuals. Fukuyama does not offer any guarantee that our human propensity to socialization can reverse the ongoing social disruptive human creativity that has effectively destroyed the social infrastructure of a communal moral order. Nevertheless, he believes in the innate self-organizing, self-generating human power to create a non-hierarchical social order. This brings about social hope, “not the victory or the triumph of outright libertarian individualism, but a victory of the community and acceptance of the modest degree of authority necessary to social order over excessive individualism” (Dobell, 1999). However Huntington (1996:71-72) correctly asserts that individualism remains a central and distinguishing mark of Western civilization. The individual’s struggle for recognition and the liberal democratic promise of equal and reciprocal recognition between individuals seems to be the impetus behind the individualistic zeal for identity, respect, dignity and gain (or self-interest) – hence the locus of American politics, as Fukuyama argues, has shifted from economic issues to the realm of the thymotic – linking Fukuyama with classical Greek ideas.

Critically examining conservative religion as an alternative basis for resolving the problem of moral decline in order to build social hope, Fukuyama (1999a:278) argues that it will create a conflict of religious expectations and practices due to the fact that there are different versions of orthodoxy in modern diversified communities. Any such attempt is bound to raise the question: whose version of orthodoxy should prevail as a standard doctrine for preserving the communal moral order? In addition, he argues:

[a]ny true orthodoxy is likely to be seen as a threat to large and important groups in the society, and hence would neither get very far, nor serve as a basis for a widening radius of trust. Rather than integrating society, a conservative religious revival might in fact accelerate the movement toward fragmentation and moral

miniaturization: the various varieties of Protestant fundamentalism would argue among themselves over doctrine; orthodox Jews would become more orthodox; Muslims and Hindus might start to organize themselves as political-religious communities, and the like (Fukuyama, 1999:178).

So it is difficult, if not impossible, to rebuild social order on a religious foundation, especially in a diversified context. However Fukuyama anticipates that a burning desire for belonging to a community and ritual fulfilment will compel people to return to religion and form faith-based associations.

Fukuyama claims crucially that society will re-normalize. It will re-normalize through market exchange, which he claims provides the habit of reciprocity and "the best hope for securing norms of integrity, tolerance, and self-control necessary for expanding our circle of trust and undergirding general social cooperation" (MacGraw, 1999; Cf. Fukuyama, 1999:259-262). But this position is not without problems, of which Fukuyama (1999:281-282) acknowledges two:

- "[S]ocial and moral order do not necessarily follow in the wake of political order and economic development..." This is because, firstly, liberal societies achieve political order on the basis of "moral consensus," and secondly, liberal societies only give moral guidelines that relate to "universal obligations for tolerance and mutual respect" (Fukuyama (1999a:281), without promoting practical practices in which these guidelines are made concrete.
- The second problem is the threat posed by technological changes to liberal societies' own cultural bases. Technological change often dictates the supply and depletion of social capital as family units disband and/or reunite, such as happened prior to, during and after the American and European industrial revolutions (Fukuyama, 1999a:282).

These two problems lead Fukuyama (1999:282) to think that there are two processes at work in history:

In the political and economic sphere history appears to be progressive and directional, [this] ... has culminated in liberal democracy as the only viable choice

for technologically advanced societies. In the social and moral sphere, however, history appears to be cyclical, with social order ebbing and flowing over the course of generations.

For Fukuyama liberal democracy has come to stay and will never be moved or changed, for the process leading to it is linear. It is the social and moral order that will change due to the influence of technology and other phenomena: social life is cyclical in that norms can be redefined in order to curb social disruption and to rebuild social order. While Fukuyama upholds capitalist liberal democracy as “the apotheosis of politics and economics”, Leigh (2000) contends that it is but one kind of many Great Disruptions that will therefore inevitably be followed by a “Great Reconstruction.” This ‘Great Reconstruction’ will lead to the realization of the ultimate goal of history – the liberal state.

3.2.5 The Ultimate Goal of History: the Liberal State

Liberal democracy has triumphed, but it has not reached its ultimate goal of establishing a global (or universal) order through the universal and homogeneous liberal state that will end social conflicts and usher in peace and prosperity – thereby satisfying the desire for recognition. It is only when liberal democracy has overcome its internal contradictions that its ultimate goal of a universal liberal state will be achieved and there will be a political order that will bring about universal recognition. Fukuyama (1999a:280) argues:

Only a political order based on the universal recognition of human dignity – of the essential equality of all human beings based on their capacity for moral choice – could avoid these irrationalities and lead to a peaceful domestic and international order.

Citing Kant’s republican form of government with its principle of rights and Hegel’s universal and homogeneous state with its principle of universal recognition, Fukuyama (1999a:280) attempts to show that these aspects are enshrined in virtually all contemporary liberal democratic societies, for instance as a Bill of Rights (a prescription for every democratic state) and in the Universal Declaration of Rights.

The Hegelian idea of a universal human history whose processional movement subjects all schisms to reconciliation, resulting in the end of history that marks a universal society of equal and mutual recognition of individual citizens, underpins Fukuyama's conception of the ultimate goal of history – the liberal state. This equal and mutual recognition of individuals will remove the motive for war and struggle, and therefore bring about peace. At this historical endpoint a political age of a global (or universal) order is reached in which dualisms such as that between master and slave has been overcome. This universal order is a society of free people who will reciprocally recognize each other's rights and freedom. For Hegel, this universal order is a political community that will formulate law which confers universal recognition upon each individual citizen, culminating in satisfying the desire of each individual for affirmation as an equal among others. For Fukuyama, this global (or universal) political community can only be brought about at the end of history when liberal democracy has become the sole framework of governance and gain.

Fukuyama has already argued that previous ideological alternatives failed humanity. A recapitulation of what I have discussed in the first chapter shows that Hobbes rejected a monarchical state based on the divine right of kings to rulership, or the natural superiority of those who win the fight over the weak in the state of nature, in favour of the Leviathan. The Leviathan stems from the agreement among the governed to escape the brutish, cruel, and death-wielding situation of the state of nature in an attempt to secure peace and self-preservation by willingly surrendering their rights to the state in signing the social contract. The Leviathan's rule permeates all spheres of the citizens' lives, earning itself the description of absolute monarchical sovereignty. The shift from accepting the divine right of the monarchical state to advocating a government established by the people can be interpreted as a move to liberalizing the state. It is because of this move that Fukuyama (1992:200) describes Hobbes as the "foundationhead of modern liberalism." We saw in the second chapter of this thesis that Jones (2002) argues against seeing Hobbes as a liberal. Hobbes' "liberal" state under the absolute monarchical sovereignty did not go down well with Locke who viewed it as tyrannical and worthy of facing a rebellion to replace it with a liberal state based on the twin principles of freedom (or liberty) and equality, and private property ownership. In such a liberal society citizens have a "reciprocal and equal

agreement” to respect each other’s lives and property (Fukuyama,1992:200). Hegel gives a new twist to the Hobbesian legacy by viewing liberal society as “a reciprocal and equal agreement among citizens to mutually recognize each other” (Fukuyama, 1992:200).

Comparing and contrasting Hobbesian-Lockean liberalism with Hegelian liberalism, Fukuyama (1992:200) notes that the former can be interpreted “as the pursuit of rational self-interest” and the latter as the pursuit of rational and universal recognition, where each person’s dignity “as a free and autonomous human being is recognized by all.” Fukuyama (1992:200), picking up from Hegel, asserts that “the liberal democratic state values us at our own sense of self-worth” satisfying all aspects of needs, with happiness as result. Reconciling the two distinct views (that of Hobbes and Locke), Fukuyama (1992:201-202) contends that

[t]he liberal state, on the other hand, is rational because it reconciles these competing demands for recognition on the only mutually acceptable basis possible, that is, on the basis of the individual's identity as a human being. The liberal state must be universal, that is, grant recognition to all citizens because they are human beings, and not because they are members of some particular national, ethnic, or racial groups. And it must be *homogeneous* insofar as it creates a classless society based on the abolition of the distinction between masters and slaves.

Furthermore, Fukuyama (1992:202) holds that the rationality of this “universal and homogenous state” is based on principles developed through public debate in which citizens agree how they want the state to be and to function. The idea of the universal and homogeneous state comes from Kojève (1969:158n-180nff; Cf. Chapter 2 of this thesis) who asserted that history had ended because the state had totally satisfied the human desire for recognition by replacing the split structure of society of master and slave with the recognition of all the citizens. According to Fukuyama (1992:xxi, 203) this refers to liberal democracy, which he says solved the problem of recognition by “replacing the relationship of lordship and bondage” with recognition for each citizen. I disagree with Fukuyama because this and empirically false claim in that not all individual citizen of in the world have the same recognition and affirmation of their rights.

3.3 CONFLICT OF IDEOLOGIES OR CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS?

Fukuyama (1992:45, 211-212) claims that there is a remarkable and general consensual reception of liberal democracy as the only valid ideology that has "survived intact to the end of the twentieth-century ... with pretensions to universality, [and] ...claims [on being] the most rational form of government." Nevertheless Fukuyama (1992:42) maintains that in the worldwide revolution of liberalism, the fall

of authoritarianism and socialist central planning have left only one competitor standing in the ring as an ideology of potentially universal validity: liberal democracy, the doctrine of individual freedom and popular sovereignty.

In arguing this way, Fukuyama is not turning a blind eye to the existence of Islam, of whose strength to challenge liberal democracy Huntington (1997) warns the Western world. In *The End of History*, Fukuyama (1992:45) acknowledges that Islam as a "systematic and coherent ideology ... with its own code of morality and doctrine of political and social justice" still gives liberal democracy quite a challenge, even defeating liberal democracy in some parts of the world. In a way, he agrees with Huntington who argues that Islam still stands as a big challenge to Western liberal democracy. Like any other ideology, Islam's appeal has the potential to reach out to other places, even to places where it is not politically in control. Fukuyama's (1992:45) critique of Islam as an ideology is that it neither has much "appeal outside those cultures that were not Islamic," nor is a factor in those countries where Islam does not take a fundamentalist form. Fukuyama misses out on the fact that liberal democracy is often only accepted if military and economic advantages are dangled in front of the government in question – as in the case of developing nations through transnational companies, the World Bank and the IMF's Economic Structural Adjustment Programs (Kurtz, 2002; Cf. Carbo & Fischer, 1995:2846-2924; Huntington, 1996:183-186; Chang, 1998: and Martin, 1999:253-278). The best example is the case of Pakistan's military leader Musharaf, concerning whom Kurtz (2002) says that in the run-up to the US attack on Afghanistan to oust the Taliban government, US President George Bush held out exactly such enticements to attract him to the Western camp. Kurtz (2002) is correct to conclude that ultimately, Fukuyama's "scientific-economic mechanism of

modernization" attracting other nations to the market economy, became fact in that it "enabled the United States to pry Pakistan loose from its erstwhile Islamist allies."

Kurtz (2002), comparing and contrasting Fukuyama and Huntington, shows that the fundamental difference between the two is that their viewpoints translate into radically contrasting ideas about the goals of American foreign policy. Fukuyama wants to see America actively involved in promoting democracy abroad, while Huntington "warns about the potentially disastrous effects of an arrogant and naïve democratic policy." For Huntington democracy and capitalism can only be suitable in a Western cultural arrangement. He would prefer the West "to defend its democratic traditions as a specifically Western cultural heritage, not as magical solutions to the problems of the world" (Kurtz 2002). In his essay for the Atlantic Council of the United States, entitled "After the Fall: U.S.–Russian Relations in the Next Stage of Post-Soviet History" Stravakis (1998:viii) comments that both Fukuyama and Huntington

miss the central point demonstrated by Russia's recent experience: the spread of official corruption and its subversion of the liberal state may substitute power of the clan for state power in the next century.

He argues that after "the great ideological conflicts that have risen from the dynamics of political history" were overcome, "leaving the ideas of Western liberal democracy within the grasp of all societies," American foreign policy "has operated as if economic and political reform would change the nature of Russian culture," (Stravakis, 1998:viii, 2). Stravakis thus does not see the fall of communism as a simple shift that will see the triumph of liberal democracy in Russia and most other parts of the world.

For Fukuyama (1992:212) the reason why liberal democracy has not yet become a universal ideology is that the correspondence between the realm of peoples and the realm of states is incomplete. The realm of peoples or communities, which Fukuyama (1992:213) refers to as "sub-political," is "the domain of culture and of society," where peoples have common moral beliefs originating from a shared traditional background. With the realm of states Fukuyama (1992:213) refers to "the realm of the political, the sphere of self-conscious choice about the proper mode of governance." The former realm can

affect the establishment and sustaining of political liberalism and can disable the working of economic liberalism (Fukuyama, 1992:233), while the latter can enhance liberal democracy. Although he differs from Fukuyama to some extent, and although he warned his readers in the early parts of his essay that he is not up to allocating blame, Stravakis (1998:2) argues that if Russia did not reform as “the US had hoped, the problems lie not in the goals of liberal democracy but in obstacles of Russian politics and society that impede an outcome.”

Be this as it may, Fukuyama (1992:243-244) believes that the world is becoming increasingly homogenized through modern economics and technology, which will ultimately lead to the broad triumph of capitalism and liberal democracy, resulting in the broad consensual reception of liberalism. Fukuyama does not dare to spell out whether this broad consensus will be a deliberate decision by those nations or will involve coercion of some sort. Let us not forget that social change only occurs if powerful social forces drive it.

Fukuyama (1991:19) argues against the geopolitical practice of the 19th century when nations could plausibly solve economic problems through territorial conquest. He would rather opt for the modern approach of creating wealth based on peace and legitimacy. He insists on a ‘New World Order’ to come that “will not be built on abstract principles of international law, but upon the common principles of liberal democracy and market economy” (Fukuyama, 1991:19). Making a political prediction, Fukuyama (1991:19) maintains that geopolitically, the Gulf is changing into a “growing part of the world that is democratic and capitalist” – transforming the Persian Gulf into a region we as a human race “will ultimately have to make our home.”

Norris (1991:12), commenting on Fukuyama’s 1989 article “The End of History,” lists Fukuyama among those intellectuals he describes as having drifted

towards a conformist way of thinking – or rationalizations of the ideological status quo – among well-placed commentators on the intellectual scene whose views have understandably received wide coverage in the US and British media.

Norris’ (1991:12) point of departure is that Fukuyama’s article was written under the auspices of a US State Department think-tank, and was greeted as a major contribution to former President George Bush’s (Senior) “New World Order,” making the article “perhaps the most notable recent instance of the feedback

mechanism at work." He asks whether Fukuyama is arguing that history should now be written from the stand-point of the victors. Norris (1991:34-36) criticizes Fukuyama's failure to grasp the facts behind the Gulf War that include the coming to power of the (now deposed) Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath Party through a CIA-supported *coup*. Furthermore, Norris (1991:36) points out that what is not clear about Fukuyama's account is

the extent to which recalcitrant local populations might need to be persuaded, induced or coerced to accept this vision as their own best interests or to give up those archaic habits of thought (the geopolitics of the 19th century) which so far held out against the manifest logic of the equation liberal democracy + market capitalism = qualification for entry to the New World Order.

The September 11, 2002 attack on the twin towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington (USA) by *al-Qaida* emerged as an alien event that moved the focus from Fukuyama to Huntington. It was at this point that Fukuyama's claim of a consensus reception of liberal democracy was put to the test. Stanley Kurtz (2003), in his article, "The Future of 'History'" compares and contrasts Fukuyama's concept of the end of history and Huntington's concept of the clash of civilizations.

After September 11, Huntington's ideas were seen in the intellectual world as the ideas of the moment, for it was the fulfilment of his prediction that "the dangerous clashes of the future are likely to arise from the interaction of Western arrogance, Islamic intolerance, and Sinic assertiveness" (Huntington, 1996:185). Prior to the publication of *The Clash of Civilizations*, Huntington published an article entitled, "The Clash of Civilizations? The Next Pattern of Conflict" (1993). In the article Huntington (1993) puts forward his hypothesis that the "fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily economic" or political as Fukuyama argues, but due to "the great divisions among humankind ... the dominating source of conflict will be cultural."

In *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Huntington (1991:15) defines a

wave of democratization ... [as] ... a group of transitions from non-democratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period.

The disintegration of the communist bloc falls in the third wave, which he dates as occurring from 1974 (overthrow of Portugal's dictatorial regime) till 1989 (the fall of the Berlin wall and the disintegration of Eastern and Central European communist regimes). According to Huntington the world's period of democratization is over; what the world is faced with now are new conflicts based on cultural differences. In contrast to Fukuyama, Huntington, in *The Clash of Civilizations* (1996:31, 183-186) argues that the central problem that separates the West from the rest is "the discordance" between the West's efforts to universalize Western culture and "its declining ability to do so." It follows that the fall of communism worsened "this discordance by reinforcing in the West the view that its ideology of democratic liberalism had triumphed globally and hence was universally valid" (Huntington, 1996:183; Cf. Fukuyama, 1992).

While Fukuyama thinks that the conflict between the West and the rest of the world is ideological, Huntington argues that it has nothing to do with ideology but it has to do with difference of civilizations. Huntington (1996:193) argues that the West is generally Christian and that democratization in many cases was consensually received in countries that were Christian and where Western influence was strong. In places like the Islamic countries of Asia and Africa, where these two conditions did hold, and where democratization was imposed on the people, it led to conflict. In addition, Huntington (1996:209) argues that

the ideological conflict between liberal democracy and Marxist-Leninism is only a fleeting and superficial historical phenomenon as compared to the continuing and deeply conflictual relation between Islam and Christianity.

For Huntington (1996:217) to understand the conflict between Islam and the West we must understand how they perceive each other: on the one hand, the West perceives Islamic fundamentalism not as the principle problem, rather "a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power." On the other hand, the basic problem of Islam is neither the CIA nor the US Department of State, but the West,

a different civilization whose people are convinced of the universality of their culture and believe that their superior, if declining, power imposes on them the obligation to extend that culture throughout the world (Huntington, 1996:217-218).

Huntington (1996:301) correctly points out that as the universal state of a civilization emerges, its adherents "become blinded" by what Toynbee (quoted in Huntington, 1996:301) calls "the 'mirage of immortality'." This convinces its adherents that their civilization "is the final form of human society." Such was the trend with many empires of the world that have fallen, such as the Roman Empire or Napoleon's empire. Hence when any society assumes the end of its history, this shows that that society in question is about to decline (Huntington, 1996:301) – the West being no exception. The applicability of this claim to Fukuyama is obvious.

Yar (2002) sees *The End of History* as "nothing else than a triumphal vindication of Kojève's supposedly prescient thesis that history has found its end in the global triumph of capitalism and liberal democracy." With the final fall of Soviet communism, and the global hegemony of capitalism and the world reaching "a homogenized state in which the combination of capitalism and liberalism will reign supreme," Fukuyama's claim of the end of history seems to have become fact (Yar, 2002; Cf. Kojève, 1969, Fukuyama, 1989, 1992). Contrary to this kind of thinking, Huntington (1996:301) argues that "history ends at least once and occasionally more often in the history of every civilization."

Fukuyama's interpretation of history seems to imply that human thinking in terms of political and economic ideology has come to an end and there will never again be an opposing framework of thought. To be fair to him, his position is subtler than this: his claim is that any new ideology opposing liberal democracy will not supersede it, but will either fail, or blend with it.

3.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Fukuyama appropriates the method of Hegel-as-interpreted-by-Kojève – the dialectic – to interpret historical events at the close of the 20th century. Ironically, he also follows Marx in holding that where there is a conflict of systems, the system with less contradiction in its institutions will remain standing, while the rest will collapse because of their internal contradictions. While for Marx it is communism that will remain standing, for Fukuyama it is liberal democracy.

Fukuyama's conception of history has an empirical aspect and a metaphysical aspect. He looks at the development of historical events empirically, and then gives them a metaphysical interpretation. In his historical overview of the last few centuries he concludes that there has been an ongoing conflict of ideologies driven by 'the logic of modern-natural science' and 'the struggle for recognition.' Furthermore, the political and economic events in Eastern Europe and the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that led to the collapse of communism, marked the triumph of liberal democracy and capitalism, which thanks to Fukuyama has become as the end of history. Fukuyama's claim is that in the course of history, capitalist liberal democracy has triumphed in the conflict of ideologies that included monarchism, aristocracy, fascism, and communism.

Fukuyama also addresses the question of whether democracy will be able to overcome its internal contradictions, namely the conflict between the individual and the community, and inequality. He believes that liberal democracy requires the social virtue of social capital and a stable social order. His argument is that through human nature and spontaneous self-organization, human beings have the potential to cooperate and solve these contradictions. But to us it seems implausible that liberal democracy can resolve these long-standing contradictions. The unequal distribution of goods through the distributive mechanism of the market has not been resolved up to now.

Drawing on Hegel's notion of a universal and homogeneous state, Fukuyama envisages a global order that will be ushered in by the universal and homogeneous liberal state, which is the ultimate goal of liberal democracy. He even argues that the Universal Declaration of Rights and the basic human rights enumerated in the legal systems of virtually all contemporary liberal democracies in the world today enshrine the Hegelian principle of universal recognition of the rights of individuals. So it is the duty of the liberal state to ensure equal and mutual recognition and affirmation of each other's freedom.

Fukuyama's claim of the end of history can be contrasted with a different approach to developments in the international political and economic scene – that of Huntington. Huntington's counter-claim is that what is at stake here is not a conflict of ideologies but a clash of civilizations. While Fukuyama thinks that the West should missionize liberal democracy to the world, Huntington disagrees, arguing that democracy can only work in countries that are Christian. The debate

between the two scholars gives us two opposing views of the same thing. On the one hand, history has ended with liberal democratic capitalism as a victor (Fukuyama), and on the other hand every end to history is at best provisional (Huntington).

Fukuyama claims that the two fundamental forces shaping and propelling the course of human history are science and the desire for recognition. Will science stop progressing and unfolding? Will liberal democracy definitely bring mutual and reciprocal recognition and prosperity, and thereby human happiness? A marked danger of Fukuyama's declaration of the end of history is that it limits the progress of scientific development which it claims to espouse. If history ends here, then it means that the end of scientific search, for the search for the meaning of nature has then been accomplished. Ideology must also be understood as a framework in which scientific research channels its efforts. It is to the realization of ideological demands that education, industry, political, technology and military are accordingly designed, rather than to the achievement of human satisfaction.

It is unlikely that democracy will be consensually received everywhere, the case in point being the Islamic countries and some socialist or communist countries. If democracy is built on the pre-existing conditions and traditions of Western culture, how will it work in other cultures? Like any other culture, Western culture is neither perfect nor objective. Huntington's claim that democracy only works in those places where Christianity has been a dominating religion may initially sound plausible, but it does not cater for countries such as Israel, Japan, Turkey, South Korea, and India where Christianity is not dominating.

Be this as it may, I am largely convinced by Fukuyama's argument that liberal democracy satisfies the human desire for recognition much better than all previous ideological alternatives. This leads us to the fifth chapter's central question: Is recognition all humanity yearns for? In an attempt to discuss this question and its subsidiary ones, I will engage Fukuyama in a debate with Amartya Sen.

CHAPTER 4

RECOGNITION OR WELL-BEING?: FUKUYAMA VERSUS SEN ON LIFE SATISFACTION IN A LIBERAL SOCIETY

There are some who think that justice is nothing more or less than reciprocity. But reciprocity cannot be squared either with distributive or corrective justice.

– Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1953

Right by its very nature can consist only in the application of an equal standard; but unequal individuals ... are measurable only by an equal standard in so far as they are brought under an equal point of view. Only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners: from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.

– Karl Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme* 1977 [1875]

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Both Fukuyama and Sen have faith in free market, liberal rights, freedom, and criticize the existing order, but they do it in different ways by different means. Fukuyama focuses on liberal democracy as having satisfied the human desire for recognition. Sen on the other hand, endorses democracy as a universal value that has the potential to satisfy the need for well-being – hence the freedom for being and doing.

Fukuyama criticises the Anglo-Saxon liberalism of Hobbes and Locke that accords moral primacy to self-preservation, arguing that it misses out on the satisfaction of the human desire for recognition. As already indicated in the previous chapters, he contends that human history is driven by the human search for satisfaction of the desire for recognition:

Every human being seeks to have his or her dignity recognized (i.e. evaluated at its proper worth) by other human beings. Indeed this drive is so deep and fundamental that it is one of the chief motors of the entire human historical process. In earlier periods, this desire for recognition played itself out in the military arena as kings and princes fought bloody battles with one another for primacy. In modern times this struggle for recognition has shifted from the military to the economic realm, where it has the socially beneficial effect of creating rather than destroying wealth. Beyond subsistence levels, economic activity is frequently undertaken for the sake of recognition rather than merely as a means of satisfying natural material needs (Fukuyama, 1995:6-7).

In addition to that and based on Hegel's idea of "struggle for recognition" Fukuyama (1992:89-97, 1995:358-359) claims that there are two major forces at play in the process of human history, namely, rational desire and the desire for recognition. The former has to do with the satisfaction of human "material needs through accumulation of wealth," while the latter has to do with the desire of all human beings "to have their essence as free, moral beings recognized by other human beings" (Fukuyama, 1995:358). For Fukuyama only a homogeneous liberal state can fulfil the desire of each citizen for reciprocal recognition. Thus Fukuyama like Hegel anticipates the creation of a state at a global scale – universal statism.

In contrast, Sen holds that democracy is a universal value that enjoins all national states to bring substantial freedom and equality of opportunity to their citizens. For Sen the importance of democracy lies in its role of bringing about the primary value of freedom into each individual's endeavour to achieve well-being. Unlike Fukuyama's homogeneous state, democracy is not viewed in terms of instituting any specific social arrangements, nor in changing cultural values to align with the cultural values that underpin a Western conception of liberal democracy. Sen argues that human beings need well-being; for it is well-being in its totality that brings life satisfaction. Furthermore, for Sen, democracy, if adopted, will create the conditions for each individual to do and be what he/she values most. While Fukuyama uses historical events to substantiate his claim that recognition is the main human desire, Sen uses capabilities and functionings as the substances of rights and freedoms to achieve well-being. Sen convincingly argues that all individuals need well-being, whether they choose it or not. Freedom, recognition, rights, and other values are part of well-being. In order to satisfy the need of well-being Sen further argues for a space of equal access to opportunities for all which he advocates through his capability approach. According to DeMartino (2000:107) the capabilities equality approach is resolutely resistant to "end of history' narratives that anticipate the achievement of some final state of social organization," such as the narrative in Fukuyama, because "the principle of capabilities equality promotes extensive (indeed perpetual) social experimentation." This makes Sen's position concerning life satisfaction favourable to me and justified for contending against that of Fukuyama.

This chapter introduces a debate on human satisfaction within liberal society. Its aim is to show that Fukuyama's claim is not shared by all who

subscribe to liberal democracy, such as Sen whom I regard as belonging to the camp of the 'left'. The central questions are: Can human happiness be systematised or universalised as Fukuyama tries to argue? How can we integrate well-being and recognition? Or is there any reason to separate them?

The discussion below will focus on issues such as the influence of ideology on moral conception and judgment, the dilemma of difference, the problem of even-handedness and some ideas that relate to global justice in the distribution of economic goods at the end of history. It will also recognise and stress the conditions that underpin the ethics of liberalism. In this way the question of socio-economic inequality that shapes human well-being, will be analysed in an attempt to clarify it.

4.2. THE ISSUE: SATISFACTION OF HUMAN DESIRE FOR RECOGNITION VERSUS SATISFACTION OF HUMAN NEED FOR WELL-BEING

According to Deigh (1995:243) there are two approaches to the question of what ends ought to be pursued for life satisfaction. The first approach looks at questions concerning "the components of a good life," while the second looks at "what sorts of things are good in themselves" (Deigh, 1995:243). A person naturally seeks a good life, consequently, "one can determine what ends we ought to pursue;" or one can assume that "whatever is good in itself is worth choosing or pursuing" (Deigh, 1995:243). Deigh (1995:245) holds that the first approach leads to the concept of human happiness where one would seek the good life; while the second leads to the theory of intrinsic value – things that are good in themselves – where one seeks that which he/she has reason to value as good in itself. The first approach emerged from the ancient ethics of *eudaimonia* (Greek for happiness), while the latter is rooted in Socrates' conception of virtue and Plato's theory of forms.

At the centre of Socrates' moral thought are the concepts of knowledge and virtue. He viewed them as inseparable – arguing that "if virtue has to do with making the soul as good as possible, it is first necessary to know what makes the soul good" – thus requiring knowledge "to be able to distinguish between what *appears* to give happiness and what *really* does" (Stumpf, 1999:40). Socrates understood virtue as the proper knowledge of one's circumstances. One chooses

the correct course of action in each situation, as it would be impossible to do otherwise. This is further expanded in Plato's ethics of virtue and goodness and acquires the meaning of inner harmony, well-being, and happiness (Stumpf, 1999:64). Harmony occurs when all parts of the soul function together without interfering with each other. This places a person in a harmonious state and brings about a feeling of well-being. Aristotle distinguished between Socratic-Platonic intellectual (*dianoetic*) virtue and moral virtue, or between abstract wisdom (*sophia*) that contemplates universal principles and practical wisdom (*phronesis*) that directs good conduct (Rohmann, 2000:421; Cf. Stumpf, 1999:92-96). For Aristotle, the key to achieving moral virtue was to observe the mean between extremes. This mean he called *eudaimonia* – generally translated as happiness or satisfaction.

The question of how to find this mean – satisfaction – continues to be debated and recurs in various forms. The process of resolving issues surrounding the theory of life satisfaction soon split into two views, namely, hedonism and perfectionism. The most famous exponent of hedonism was Epicurus. He taught that “excelling at things worth doing,” especially the use of intellectual power and moral virtue is the true way to satisfy human desire (Deigh, 1995:245). The ancient followers of hedonism were Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics (Deigh, 1995:245). They were followed by the modern defenders of classical hedonism and perfectionism: John Stewart Mill and Friedrich Nietzsche respectively. The idea of happiness finds its way into contemporary thinking as the ultimate confirmation or indication of the fulfilment or satisfaction of human desires (preferred by Fukuyama) – seeking for that which is good in life, or needs (preferred by Sen) – seeking for that which one has reason to value as good in itself.

4.3 DISCUSSION: SEN VS FUKUYAMA

In this section I aim to show that the views of the two theorists diverge even though they share a common ideological framework – liberal democracy. As already indicated above, Fukuyama claims that the advent of liberal democracy and the free market economy satisfied the human desire for recognition and gain – thereby bringing about happiness. For Sen, democracy, if adopted, has the potential to bring freedom for one to conceptualise his/her economic and political needs, and

the opportunity for fulfilling one's capabilities, above all it has the potential to bring about human well-being – resulting in life satisfaction.

4.3.1 Fukuyama: Liberal Democracy Satisfies the Human Desire for Recognition

Drawing on Plato's theory of *thymos* and later on Hegel's idea of the struggle for recognition Fukuyama is adamant that the human desire for recognition has finally been fulfilled in the emergence of liberal democracy. He sees life, especially American life, both economically and politically, as having moved from material accumulation to a thymotic level – meaning that they have passed the struggle for material satisfaction and they are now concerned with satisfaction of their desires such as recognition. This development fulfils the desire to be recognised as free and equal participants in the activities surrounding daily life.

4.3.1.1 Point of Departure: Liberal Democracy

Fukuyama declares that liberal democracy is a triumphant ideology that has brought a miracle to the whole world. It has made it possible at last for the human race to satisfy the desire for recognition and thereby to achieve happiness. A closer look at his view of liberal democracy shows that Fukuyama (1992:42-44), following Sutton (1937:258) separates liberalism from democracy, arguing that the two are theoretically different concepts although closely related. According to Sutton (1937:258), it was only later that these two concepts were combined to form "liberal democracy" – which he views as a special product of the French Revolution. Fukuyama (1992:44-45) appears to agree with this view, as he argues that it is possible for a country to be democratic without being liberal. This is because formal democracy alone does not guarantee equal participation and the protection of minority rights by the rule of law. In this regard, Fukuyama (1992:44) quotes the cases of eighteenth century Britain and the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the time of the Shah.

Fukuyama (1992:43-45) appears to understand liberalism as having two aspects: political and economic. Politically, liberalism is seen as "the rule of law that recognizes certain individual rights or freedoms from government control"

(Fukuyama, 1992:42). Economically, liberalism is seen as “the recognition of the right of free economic activity and economic exchange based on private property and markets” (Fukuyama, 1992:44). By democracy he means “the right held universally by all citizens to have a share of political power, that is, the right of all citizens to vote and participate in politics” (Fukuyama, 1992:43). According to Fukuyama (1992:43) a country is considered democratic if it gives its citizens the right to elect their own government “through periodic, secret-ballot, multi-party elections, on the basis of universal and equal adult suffrage.” Of course, Fukuyama (1992:43) acknowledges that formal democracy does not guarantee that there will be equal participation by the citizens and respect of citizens’ rights. This is because democratic principles can be manipulated by elites, so that government seems to be a true reflection of the will of the people, while in fact not being that at all. This has resulted in the distinction between “formal” democracy and “substantive” democracy. The former refers to the provision of “real institutional safeguards against dictatorship,” while the latter refers to the justification of democratic practice by a political party or government in the name of the people – resulting in party dictatorship – a case in point is Lenin and the Bolshevik party in the then Soviet Union.

Emerging from the intellectual, political and economic debates on the general idea of liberalism are the inseparable coupling of two distinguishable ideas: liberal democracy (political liberalism – polity) and neo-liberalism (economic liberalism – market economy). This also holds for Fukuyama’s conception of liberalism. Neo-liberalism is characterized by economization. This means that everything is subjected to the laws of the market, whose most prominent law is that of free competition.

There is a synergy between liberal democracy and neo-liberalism (capitalism) – they both need each other. Fukuyama (1995:11) explains this synergy based on the view that “the liberal democracy that emerges at the end of history is therefore not entirely ‘modern,’” rather it is that kind of democracy which should coexist and function properly with capitalism. This is because, according to his (Fukuyama, 1995:353) argument: “Liberal democracy and capitalism remain the essential, indeed the only framework for the political and economic organization of modern societies.” For the two to function properly, the institutions of liberal democracy and capitalism “must coexist with certain premodern cultural

habits that ensure their proper functioning” (Fukuyama, 1995:11). These cultural habits entail law, contract, and economic rationality that are in turn “leavened with reciprocity, moral obligation, duty toward community and trust” (Fukuyama, 1995:11).

According to Fukuyama (1995:38), the American, (and/or Western) “preference for liberal democracy and free markets” is a matter of ideology rather than culture; although there is a cultural attribute at the root of liberal democracy. By culture Fukuyama (1995:38) refers to an “ethical or moral habit” that might have begun as a “rational choice”. For instance the preference for “democracy and free markets” by Americans is a ‘rational choice’ that has become one of their cultural roots for their “general upbringing” (Fukuyama, 1995:38). This is mostly characterized by individualism.

4.3.1.2 Human Beings Desire Recognition

Fukuyama (1992, 1995, 1999) claims that there is a part of the human soul²⁹ called *thymos*³⁰ that has been known to Western thought since time immemorial. *Thymos* strives for recognition, just as reason strives for knowledge and the appetites strive for the satisfaction of animal desires. Claiming to follow Hegel, Fukuyama argues that this craving for recognition emanating from *thymos* is the “driving force of history.” Fukuyama (1992:162) argues that Hegel did not invent the concept underpinning the idea of recognition. It originated in the Western mind a very long time ago and has been known by many different terms. He writes:

Over the millennia, there has been no consistent word used to refer to the psychological phenomenon of the “desire for recognition”: Plato spoke of *thymos*, or “spiritedness”, Machiavelli of man's desire for glory, Hobbes of his pride or vainglory, Rousseau of his *amour-propre*, Alexander Hamilton of the love of fame and James Madison of ambition, Hegel of recognition, and Nietzsche of man as the “beast with red cheeks”. All of these terms refer to that part of man which feels the need to place *value* on things — himself in the first instance, but on the people,

²⁹ Fukuyama draws on the Socratic-Platonic tripartite conception of the soul – reason, spiritedness (emotion), and appetites (or desires) – that is expounded in Plato's *Republic* (Book IV). In the *Republic* the three parts of the soul strive for various things: reason strives for knowledge, the spirited strives for honour and prestige, and the appetite (or desire) strives for satisfaction of the desires or things of the body.

³⁰ According to Fukuyama (1992:162-163), the Greek term *thymos* means “spiritedness.” It is part of the Socratic-Platonic tripartite conception of the soul.

actions, or things around him as well. It is the part of the personality which is the fundamental source of the emotions of pride, anger, and shame, and is not reducible to desire, on the one hand, or reason on the other. The drive for recognition is the most specifically political part of the human personality because it is what drives men to want to assert themselves over other men and thereby into Kant's condition of "asocial sociability" (Fukuyama, 1992:162-163):

Singling out "Hegel-as-interpreted-by-Kojève" whose method of interpreting history he follows, Fukuyama (1992:165) argues that Plato's *thymos* forms the psychological basis of Hegel's idea of the human desire for recognition. It is important to analyse the concept of *thymos*. In the first place, Fukuyama distinguishes *thymos* from recognition. He writes:

Thymos and the "desire for recognition" differ somewhat insofar as the former refers to a part of the soul that invests objects with value, whereas the latter is an activity of *thymos* that demands that another consciousness share the same valuation. It is possible for one to feel thymotic pride in oneself without demanding recognition. But esteem is not a "thing" like an apple or a Porsche: it is a state of consciousness, and to have subjective certainty about one's own sense of worth, it must be recognised by another consciousness. Thus *thymos* typically, but not inevitably, drives men to seek recognition." (Fukuyama, 1992:165-166).

Furthermore, desire for recognition emerges from *thymos* as a "deeply paradoxical phenomenon": it is the psychological basis for "justice and selflessness while at the same time being closely related to selfishness" (Fukuyama, 1992:172). A further distinction is that

The thymotic self demands recognition for its *own* sense of the worthiness of things both of itself and of other people. The desire for recognition remains a form of self-assertion, a projection of one's own values on the outside world, and gives rise to feelings of anger when those values are not recognized by other people.

Thymos as an evaluation of one's self-worthiness leads one to demand recognition. If this fails to happen, life is characterised by constant disagreements, arguments and increasing anger that can overwhelm all possible relationships. In *The Great Disruption*, Fukuyama (1999:228) argues that the quest for due status is inbuilt. He writes:

The desire for recognition – of one's own status and the status of one's gods, country, ethnicity, nationality, ideas, and so forth – is the central driving force behind political life. The feeling of pride occurs when one is recognized as having the appropriate status, while anger results from inadequate recognition. These emotions are inherently social: when one feels anger at a lack of recognition, one does not want a material object outside the body; rather, one wants evidence of a mental state – recognition – on the part of another subjective consciousness (Fukuyama, 1999:228).

It follows that a thymotic person displays the passion of anger, leading them to get into a vicious circle of “fighting wars over the recognition of national or religious identity ... engaging in retaliatory spirals of violence ...” (Fukuyama, 1999:228; Cf. Fukuyama, 1992:181-182). The thymotic desire for recognition thus becomes a source of human conflict (Fukuyama, 1992:182). Inherent in the thymotic tendency is each individual's expectation to be more highly evaluated than others. Fukuyama (1992:182) calls it *megalothymia*. He describes it as “a highly problematic passion for political life” in which recognition of one's superiority by others leads to the demand for further recognition or universal recognition leading to the desire for glory (Fukuyama, 1992:182-183). This can result in a tyrannical intention, displayed in the ambition to achieve universal recognition through conquest or oppression.

The opposite of *megalothymia* is *isothymia*. Fukuyama (1992:190) describes *isothymia* as an “all-pervasive ... desire to be recognized as the equal of other people.” These three concepts seem to form a triadic framework: *thymos-megalothymia-isothymia*. Fukuyama suggests that *isothymia* can only function in a situation that places mutuality at the centre – thus mutual respect, or mutual recognition. Such a situation demands a framework of governance that is conducive to a good political order; for Fukuyama, as we have seen liberal democracy is the best candidate.

However Fukuyama (1992:314-318) warns that although liberal democracy can, in time, purge *megalothymia*, unbridled *megalothymia* or *isothymia* can internally subvert liberal democracy. Whilst *megalothymia* is “a necessary precondition of life” to initiate recognition, as a “morally ambiguous phenomenon” of good and bad composition, its excess leads to domination and inequality. These

excesses can bring about an end to democracy, although it is important to remember that *megalothymia* also plays a central role in capitalism. Fukuyama (1992:314-315) also points out that excessive *isothymia*, leads to a “fanatical desire for equal recognition” that seeks to eliminate any manifestation of unequal recognition – undercutting the basis of modern economic life, competition.

For Fukuyama, the idea of the desire for recognition originates from the “Lordship and Bondage” section of Hegel’s *Phenomenology* (Compare Chapter 3 of this thesis above). Unequal recognition occurs when the master desires recognition from the slave. In the process the slave reacts by risking his life to fight back for the master to recognize his (the slave’s) values such as freedom and thereby recognition.

Blunden (2003), criticizing Fukuyama’s view of recognition, claims that the idea of recognition in Hegel’s philosophy is not political in nature. He revisits Hegel’s early publications, such as *System of Ethical Life* (1802/3), *Realpolitik*, and the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in order to show that Fukuyama’s interpretation of Hegel is flawed.

In an overview of Hegel’s early publications Blunden (2003) concludes that the struggle for recognition in Hegel begins as a market idea and relates to property ownership. There is no “part of the soul” in Hegel’s philosophy that houses the “desire for recognition.” Recognition initially emerges in the second level in Hegel’s *Systems of Ethical Life* – especially the philosophy of “Absolute Ethical Life” with “property rights” – and also manifests itself in the discourse of “the rule of law.” It does not emerge from the “Lordship and Bondage” section of Hegel’s *Phenomenology*. In attempting to prove Fukuyama wrong, Blunden (2003) cites a passage in the *Systems of Ethical Life* that refers to the theme of “Lordship and Bondage.” He argues that the idea of recognition does not arise from some innate drive to dominate others. The passage he quotes is the following:

At this level a living individual confronts a living individual, but their power of life is unequal. Thus one is might or power over the other. One is in indifference, while the other is fixed in difference. So the former is related to the latter as cause; indifferent itself, it is the latter’s life and soul or spirit. The greater strength or weakness is nothing but the fact that one of them is caught up in difference, fixed and determined in some way in which the other is not, but is free. The indifference of the one not free is his inner being, his formal aspect, not something that has

become explicit and that annihilates his difference. Yet this indifference must be there for him; it is his concealed inner life and on this account he intuits it as its opposite, namely, as something external, and the identity is a relative one, not an absolute one or a reconciliation of internal and external. This relation in which the indifferent and free has power over the different is the relation of *lordship and bondage*. This relation is immediately and absolutely established along with the inequality of the power of life. At this point there is no question of any right or any necessary equality. Equality is nothing but an abstraction — it is the formal thought of life, of the first level, and this thought is purely ideal and without reality. In reality, on the other hand, it is the inequality of life which is established, and therefore the relation of lordship and bondage (Blunden, 2003; Hegel, 1979, Cf. Hegel, 1977:113-119).

Blunden argues that the section that Fukuyama chose to be the source of the idea of recognition, "Lordship and Bondage" arises as a result of *inequality* which is a necessary product of the action of the market." He continues,

The market *first* establishes the recognition of individuals through the universal exchange of labour, giving people *potential freedom*, but *then*, through inequality of wealth, introduces the division between the rich and the poor (Blunden, 2003).

Blunden (2003) maintains that "people's animal nature is ever-present but human traits such as the desire for recognition, a sense of honour and justice, arise out of specific social conditions and are manifested in and through ethical life." He takes the "Lordship and Bondage" passage as Hegel's attempt to address fundamental philosophical and ethical problems by describing "necessary and actual forms of social life." This is because social life and government are manifestations of human spirit in which Hegel participates (Blunden, 2003). So contrary to Fukuyama's view of recognition, Blunden (2003) contends:

Recognition is above all *property rights*. The "struggle for recognition" associated with "Lordship and Bondage" is a passing, negative phase, following the breakdown of the natural order before the establishment of the rule of law in which property is protected by law and constitutes "abstract right". It is sublated, and remains as a moment of modern ethical life in the functions of policing, education and military training, and the virtues of justice, honour and courage, i.e., the on-going need to stave off havoc.

However, Blunden (2003) concedes that “insofar as havoc reigns, recognition is a real, material need, for without recognition of one’s basic rights, every threat is potentially absolute.” Hegel (1979) argues that people who feel that they are not recognized may gain their recognition through war or colonialism. Defence of one’s honour is the fear of potential loss of everything. Hence for Hegel, “the struggle for recognition and honour are phenomena characterising the denial of rights in modernity” (Blunden, 2003).

Blunden (2003) argues that “it is undeniable that in the modern human being, the desire for recognition goes way beyond the need to have their property rights defended by the rule of law.” Furthermore, the idea of the desire for recognition “has been *cultivated* by the conditions of modern life, [it is] not an innate, primeval *drive*” as claimed by Fukuyama (Blunden, 2003). People are closely connected with nature through labour, thereby developing property ownership as a pressing need for the preservation of life. Ownership without recognition of property rights renders one vulnerable to actual or potential loss of everything accumulated. Consequently, there is a need for protecting these property relations – hence the establishment of government and state for the rule of law. Blunden (2003) argues that it is these property relations that Fukuyama misinterpreted and mistook for egotism.

According to Blunden (2003) it is precisely after realising that “the struggle for recognition is threatening the very fabric of society,” that Fukuyama switches over to trust, the other side of the Hegelian legacy, to moderate the adverse effects of recognition. The way Fukuyama presents the struggle for recognition carries with it the connotation that it has gone too far and is undermining trust. Blunden (2003) identifies an “internal contradiction” built into the Constitution of the Republic of the United States of America by the “Founding Fathers” – “rights were only meant for the protection of property, but non-property owners are now demanding recognition.”

The crucial question that Blunden (2003) asks is: “What is the relationship between Trust and Recognition?” Blunden takes us back to Hegel to search for some answers. He believes that Fukuyama led us to misunderstand the significance of the term recognition. As for trust, Blunden (2003) discusses Hegel’s critique of Rousseau’s and Hobbes’ conception of the state. Hegel dismisses Hobbes’ state as a complete stranger to society, “standing above it as the

universal policeman." Rousseau's social contract is just as fictitious – "at best a metaphor." This is because an individuals' fundamental need – his or her own will – is not recognised in society and in the state. Such recognition can only be attained via mediation, and "mediation is Trust." This creates a triangular relationship – apart from you and me "there must be a we" (Blunden, 2003). This triadic framework of relationships can only be realised through a system of participation in voluntary organisations that mediate between citizen and state. In that way, trust becomes the means by which recognition is achieved, and vice versa – creating the basis on which "universal self-consciousness" or rationality is founded (Blunden, 2003).

(b) Mutual Recognition in Fukuyama's Liberal State

Mutual recognition was an important step on the way to Hegel's teleological goal – "a political community of Right characterized by the existence of the absolute Idea" (which is a complete "individuated conception of the life of the *volk* community") (Decker, 2001:301-302). Decker (2001:301) comments that the involvement of free and equal individuals in a struggle for honour

is what makes recognition a desirable goal in Hegel's system and what underpins the normativity of absolute ethical life qua political community as a preferable end-state.

Reciprocal recognition takes place when there is mutuality among individuals. Relations of recognition are the key to the development of a political community – making it the core of Hegel's political philosophy.

For Sembou (2003:262) the concept "struggle for recognition" refers to the striving of individuals to achieve recognition of their identity from other free individuals "through self-assertion, self-negation, and redefinition of oneself in relation to any other" – thus making it an inter-subjective state. In the same vein, Honneth (1995:5) views the Hegelian idea of a struggle for recognition as "a struggle among subjects for the mutual recognition of their identity." It is a process that generates inner-societal pressure toward the pragmatic and political "establishment of institutions that would guarantee freedom" (Honneth, 1995:5). Like Blunden, Honneth (1995:17) argues that it is in the *Systems of Ethical Life*

that Hegel "modified the concept of the social struggle" which he appropriated from Fichte's theory of recognition that signifies relations by "the dialectical movement of the self."

The idea of a political community in which individuals recognize each other's rights and practically experience tolerance of coexistence is the idea that encapsulates the whole of Fukuyama's philosophy of history. This community must be achieved at the end of history. The whole vision of a 'folk community' leads to a number of problems that are often encountered in discussions on liberal democracy, with Fukuyama being no exception. I will just discuss the basic three:

- The *first* problem emerges from Fukuyama's central claim that mutual recognition was satisfied by the triumphant emergence of liberal democracy. The first is contradicted by the systematic failure of liberalism to satisfy the human desire for mutual and reciprocal recognition. This is manifested in social inequalities that continue to exist, where one group hates and humiliates the other – like in the cases of the Spanish and French citizens against the Moroccans, Algerians and other Francophone citizens. It seems there is nothing in liberal democracy that guarantees the reduction of such longstanding social inequalities. Fukuyama himself declares that liberal democracy does not work where its cultural preconditions have not been met – this will be discussed further in the following chapter. According to *The Columbia Encyclopaedia* (2001),

In Great Britain and the United States the classic liberal program, including the principles of representative government, the protection of civil liberties, and laissez-faire economics, had been more or less effected by the mid-19th cent. The growth of industrial society, however, soon produced great inequalities in wealth and power, which led many persons, especially workers, to question the liberal creed. It was in reaction to the failure of liberalism to provide a good life for everyone that workers' movements and Marxism rose. Because liberalism is concerned with liberating the individual, however, its doctrines changed with the change in historical realities.

The co-existence of many value systems led to the advent of multiculturalism. Consequently liberalism cannot advance any moral

argument, because there is no common moral perspective about how things should be. Economic liberalism as a result has nothing to do with ethics.

- The *second* problem is that neo-liberalism, instead of bettering life for the poor and the economically dispossessed in developing countries, has widened the gap between the rich and the poor by creating competition for scarce resources which the ordinary person cannot afford. Since there is no room for state intervention the market conditions of operation will in most cases favour the rich. Fukuyama is correct to notice that classical economics – which is the basis of neoliberalism – did not have room for ethics. Many countries of the developing regions of the world that have embraced liberal democracy have been experiencing economic hardships. It is common knowledge that in the 19th century European socialism emerged as a critique of the prevailing politico-economic system of the day – causing people to perceive liberalism to have failed to live up to its promise to achieve welfare services for all. As a result, the gap between the rich and the poor also widened; socialists blamed this on the free-market economy. It has also become common knowledge that in the developing world similar events are taking place, with the state elite leading their citizens into embracing liberal democracy. In most cases it is implemented with the promise that if the national government deregulates its national markets, investors in the form of transnational corporate groups will come to invest. If it happens that the investors come, in most cases it benefits the elites who negotiate with the transnational corporate groups. The transnational companies that come to invest will in most cases not intend to get business opportunities on easy terms – hence they favour liberal economic policies. Fukuyama does not give this problem any serious attention.
- The *third* problem is that liberal democracy has promoted a kind of war between the individual and the community. The individual, in fighting for recognition, has to rebel against the moral codes of the community. Like any ideological framework, liberal democracy is rooted in certain cultural habits such as respect for the rights of individuals, the rule of law, and free market exchange. Its emergence brings with it excessive individualism, that seeks demands acceptance by the community. But Fukuyama forgets that

there are other communities where the individual is highly connected to his community and can only be understood within that context.

Fukuyama's adoption of Nietzsche's idea of the "last man," leads us to ask: "Will 'the last man' be satisfied with universal and mutual recognition, since he fights to overcome communal life and its slavish morality?" This question implies that there is a side to the person that remains unfulfilled by what Fukuyama (1992:xxii-xxiii) calls the "peace and prosperity of contemporary liberal democracy." "Could Fukuyama perhaps accept a communitarian way out of this problem?" asks Fisk (2003). In *The Great Disruption* Fukuyama indicates that the community will triumph over excessive individualism through liberal democracy.

Cox (2003) concedes that Fukuyama makes a good point when he argues that "Liberal democracy becomes a means for the world peace" that will bring us to a point of universal recognition. However, Cox (2003) argues:

if a Liberal Democracy cannot govern itself through mutual trust, it cannot last. If Liberal Democracy is 'The End of History', it must be accompanied by a moral code for it to succeed. Otherwise, the state will have to provide one for society. Then it ceases to be a Liberal Democracy.

The question of trust is a thorny one and very difficult to answer in terms of practice. Parties to the deal of reciprocal recognition do not always negotiate with good faith but with suspicion and the fear of being cheated. One party often ends up under the control of the other – resulting in cultural and moral impositions. The question of a moral code leads to the question: Whose moral code? Liberal democracy is deeply indebted to the ideas and cultural habits of the European Enlightenment which involved reducing cultural variations in an attempt to create a common European political and economic culture. It has already been shown in the previous chapters of this thesis that Fukuyama's claim could not have survived without the cultural foundation provided by his philosophical antecedents in seventeenth and nineteenth century European ideas. This is because the European Enlightenment period laid the foundation for the liberal democratic conceptualization of political needs characterized by the principles of consensus, freedom, equality, and toleration. Fukuyama's idea of recognition in a liberal

society involves the issue of the distribution of recognition – hence the question: Is recognition equitably distributable?

(c) Recognition and Distribution

In *Trust* Fukuyama (1995:358) argues that rational desire was fulfilled in human history when “human beings sought to satisfy their material needs through the accumulation of wealth.” However we should understand that because economic life is pursued not simply for the sake of accumulating wealth, “but also for the sake of recognition,” thereby forging an inescapable interdependence of capitalism and liberal democracy (Fukuyama, 1995:359). If the goal of liberal democracy is to fulfil the desire for recognition, the question is, how does liberalism equally distribute recognition – resulting in mutual or reciprocal recognition?

From another angle, but still dealing with the idea of recognition, Fraser (2002:22) sees the world of progressive politics as split into two camps, the proponents of redistribution on one side, and the proponents of recognition on the other. The former camp draws from egalitarian, labour and socialist traditions, while the latter draws from the “new visions of a ‘difference-friendly’ society” (Fraser, 2002:22). At the same time Fraser (2002) tries to link recognition, which comes from the context of Hegelian community ethics, to distributive justice which comes from the context of Kantian deontological morality. The latter has to do with judgments concerning justice as fairness that “seek to eliminate unjustified disparities between the life-chances of social actors”, while the former deals with “the value of various practices, traits and identities” – creating the question of identity versus status (Fraser, 2002). Attempting to integrate recognition and distribution is difficult: given the divide by which political philosophy is generally characterized, distribution is confined to the morality side of the divide while recognition is on the other side. Fraser (2002) points out that in terms of “the standard identity model” it is group-specific cultural identity that demands recognition. She (Fraser, 2002:24) rejects the identity model of recognition because of its reification of culture as an “authentic, self-affirming and self-generated collective identity” that exerts moral pressure on an individual “to confirm to group culture.”

In contrast to the proponents of the identity model, Fraser (2002) approaches recognition as an issue of “social status.” She argues that “what requires recognition is not group-specific identity but rather the status of group members as full partners in social interaction” – whereby misrecognized members of the community are accorded full membership of society and recognised as “capable of participating on a par with other members” (Fraser, 2002:24). What Fraser tries to do is integrate recognition and equitable distribution. She writes:

To view recognition as a matter of status is to examine institutionalized patterns of cultural value for their effects on the relative standing of social actors. If and when such patterns constitute actors as peers, capable of participating on a par with one another in social life, then we can speak of reciprocal recognition and status equality. When, in contrast, institutionalized patterns of cultural value constitute some actors as inferior, excluded, wholly other or simply invisible, hence as less than full partners in social interaction, then we should speak of misrecognition and status subordination (Fraser, 2002:24).

What Fraser (2002) is advocating here is that the theory of justice should extend “beyond the distribution of rights and goods to examine institutionalized patterns of cultural value” and proceed to conceive of recognition as “a matter of status equality, defined in turn as participatory parity” – giving a deontological explanation of recognition. In other words, the distribution of recognition should be a reciprocal act based on an individual obligation to maintain others’ dignity, according due respect to their humanity. In this way Fraser tries to integrate the egalitarian politics of redistribution and the politics of recognition in order to overcome philosophical schizophrenia or what she calls “unending dichotomies.” To contextualise this in terms of Fukuyama’s thesis, recognition should be a matter of justice for all, and not the promotion of cronyism, which some see as implied in his concepts of social capital and trust. It has been shown in the previous chapter that trust networks happen within groups of people who have common ties.

Honneth (2002:43) argues that there is a “guiding principle of a normative theory of the political order” based on the imperative that “any form of social or economic inequality that cannot be justified on rational grounds” should be removed. Eradication of social or economic inequality implies distributive justice. Unlike Fraser who distinguishes between recognition (Hegelian ethics) and

distribution (Kantian deontological morality) Honneth (2002:44) makes a distinction between the concept of recognition (Hegelian ethics) and the concept of respect (Kantian morality) which he however views as complementary. The former refers to one's need to be understood in his singularity as a particular subject (Lash & Featherstone, 2002:4). The latter has to do with dignity. One wants to be treated like any other subject; that is as an autonomous individual and as having certain universal rights.

Fukuyama claims that this consciousness of one's dignity and the desire to be respected are fulfilled by liberal democracy. But Fukuyama does not say how the distribution of recognition is going to take place. He seems to presuppose that the arrival of liberal democracy will automatically ushering in of equality in all aspects of life.

4.3.2 Sen: "Democracy as a Universal Value" Satisfies the Desire for Well-being

It is not clear whether Sen's view of democracy agrees with that of Fukuyama. Fukuyama talks of "liberal democracy" while Sen talks about "democracy" and never refers directly to 'liberal democracy.' According to Heywood (2000) liberal democracy is a form or system of government while democracy is a political value. Sen does not give any reason why he chooses not to refer to liberal democracy. However, in essence his idea of democracy seems to agree with that of Fukuyama. Hence his assertion that democracy's "gradual and ultimate triumphant emergence as a working system of governance" has made itself relevant and applicable to any nation, whether in Africa, Asia, Europe, or America (Sen, 1999a:4). Jorgenson (2000) concludes that the substantial freedom, propounded by Sen, "is an integrated part of a liberal democracy in the sense that substantial freedom can be seen as the opportunities and the fulfilment of expectations of the citizens, i.e. the political culture of a liberal democracy."

Sen concedes that as a universal political commitment, democracy "is quite new, and it is quintessentially a product of the twentieth century" (Sen, 1999a:4). Like Fukuyama, Sen (1999a:4) becomes teleological when he claims that "we have at last reached the point of recognizing that the coverage of universality, like the quality of mercy, is not strained." Furthermore, Sen (1999a:5) does not

overlook or deny the existence of “challenges to democracy’s claim to universality.” Sen (1999a:5) disassociates himself from nineteenth century theorists of democracy who find it “quite natural to discuss whether one country or another was ‘fit for democracy.’” He also dismisses the question of determining which country should be democratic, arguing that “a country does not have to be deemed fit for democracy, rather it has to become fit *through* democracy” (Sen, 1999a:4). In a “Round table” discussion hosted by *Asiaweek* (1999) Sen is quoted as arguing that the rise and establishment of democracy as a “‘normal’ form of government to which any nation is entitled” should be granted without establishing afresh whether the nation is “ready for democracy.”

Sen (1999b) points out that there is an implicit tendency in America and Europe to assume that the primacy of political freedom and democracy is a fundamental and ancient feature of Western culture – one not to be found anywhere else in the world. This is magnified in the Western arrogance of trying to determine whether or not a country deserves the title ‘fit or ready for being democratic.’ Furthermore, he criticises those who ‘promote the spread of democracy’ in non-Western countries for often seeing themselves “as bringing Occidental values to Asia and Africa” (Sen, 1999b:232). As a result the non-Western world is invited to be part of the “Western democracy club” and “to admire and endorse traditional Western values” (Sen, 1999b:233). Fukuyama (1992) claims the universality of Western traditional values through liberal democracy – especially the virtue of tolerance, but Sen (1999b:244-248) disputes this by indicating that the virtue of tolerance existed in Asian cultures before the arrival of Christianity. Instead Sen argues for valuing the primacy of freedom.

4.3.2.1 The Primacy of Freedom

Sen (1987) argues that freedom is the fundamental, dominant and ultimate value for judging the satisfaction of human need – not, as Fukuyama would have it, the human desire for well-being. He argues that freedom is primary, and that well-being is built on the basis of freedom (Sen, 1989). For Sen (1992) satisfaction is inseparable from freedom because it underpins the realisation of the elements of well-being – in terms of its functions and capabilities.

In *Development as Freedom* Sen (1999b) asserts that freedom plays three basic roles in human life, namely, a constitutive role, a constructive role, and an instrumental role. Sen (1999b:6-7, 17) holds that freedom plays a *constitutive* role in the political and civil engagements in all human life activities. Furthermore, Sen (1999b:17) says that freedom “involves both the *processes* that allow freedom of actions and decisions, and the actual *opportunities* that people have, given their personal and social circumstance.” Freedom fundamentally underpins our sense of security in political and economic participation, and civil rights. A major argument “in favour of political freedom ... lies in the opportunity it gives citizens to discuss and debate – and to participate in the selection of – values in the choice of priorities” (Sen, 1999b:30). To Jorgensen (2000) the distinction between opportunity and participation is worth mentioning because “participation requires knowledge and basic educational skills.” That is to say, to deny any person or group in society the opportunity of schooling directly contradicts participatory freedom (Jorgensen, 2000; Cf. Sen, 1999b:32).

Concerning its *constructive role*, freedom helps people to conceptualise and comprehend their economic needs (i.e. their content and their force) through open discussion, debate, criticism and dissent. This exchange enhances “the process of generating informed and reflected choices” (Sen, 1999b:148, 153). According to Sen (1999b) this process is crucial to the formulation of values and priorities. Underpinning the constructive role of freedom is the idea of tolerance that carries with it the possibility of dialogue and the exchange of ideas with an intention to assess political and economic problems.

In its *instrumental role*, Sen (1999b:38-53) asserts that freedom includes distinct, interconnected, and complementary components such as economic facilities, political freedoms, social opportunities, transparency guarantees and protective security. Sen (1999b:38-53) discusses how these components work when they are applied to the general capability of a person:

- *Political freedoms* refer to the opportunities that people have to choose who should govern them on the basis of some principles that will allow them “to scrutinize and criticize the authorities” as an expression of their political freedoms and entitlements that are associated with the broad meaning of democracy.

- The *economic facilities* component refers to common economic goods available for people to use for consumption, production or exchange.
- *Social opportunities* are the arrangements put in place by a society to provide services in education, health, etc.
- *Transparency guarantees* include the presumption that society should operate on the basis of trust, so that people can expect openness – that is “the freedom to deal with one another under guarantees of disclosure and lucidity” (Sen, 1999b:39-40)

What this means is that inasmuch as freedom plays an instrumental role, it blocks the human inclination to “corruption, financial irresponsibility and underhand dealings” (Sen, 1999b:40).

However, at the “Roundtable” discussion on an agenda for change in Asia, recorded in *Asiaweek* (1999), Sen’s position did not go unchallenged. The former Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro warned in response to Sen, against too radical “a swing toward freedom” (*Asiaweek*, 1999). The ex-Prime Minister is quoted as saying, “Overemphasis on democracy has the danger of causing disorder ... and overemphasis on market economy may destroy a nation’s culture while stressing efficiency” (*Asiaweek*, 1999). Sen shared Yasuhiro’s concern regarding “over profit-oriented free enterprise with no sense of social responsibility” (*Asiaweek*, 1999). The ex-Prime Minister agreed that “greater freedom and openness is the direction Asia is headed, even in countries where strong government has worked” (*Asiaweek*, 1999). He added that “once development is accomplished, democracy should replace authoritarianism” (*Asiaweek*, 1999). The ex-Prime Minister illustrated his argument by pointing to the economic and political history of South Korea and Taiwan “where middle-class citizens played main roles in leading the shift” (*Asiaweek*, 1999).

For Sen democracy as a universal value helps all nations to fulfil their potential by conceptualising political and economic needs that hinder their well-being by not being met. Sen’s view of democracy is instrumental, as *Asiaweek* (1999) puts it: “political and civil rights give people the opportunity to draw attention forcefully to general needs and demand public action” for them to achieve well-being.

4.3.2.2 The Human Need for Well-being

Sen rejects the idea of equating well-being with desire-fulfilment as does Fukuyama. Fukuyama equates well-being with the satisfaction of the desire for recognition. In contrast to Fukuyama's position, Sen concentrates on the satisfaction of the human need for well-being rather than on the human desire for recognition. This does not mean that Sen has nothing to say about recognition and Fukuyama nothing to say about well-being. The difference is that Fukuyama thinks that if recognition and affirmation of one's rights and freedom are fulfilled, then a person's total well-being is achieved. On the other side, Sen holds that complete well-being is achieved only when one has the freedom to choose what one values and the freedom to pursue what one values.

I will argue that Sen conceives of well-being in terms of the fulfilment of economic needs and the realization of political freedoms. In the next section we will examine Sen's theory of basic needs and compare it in passing with the desire theory (which is a frequent feature in most discussions on the concept of well-being). Some scholars are in favour of a third theory, based on the idea of interest. We will not discuss it separately here as it seems to be part of the desire theory.

(a) The Concept of Well-being

Sen conceives well-being as being and doing. One's well-being "is seen in terms of the quality (or 'well-ness') of a person's being" (which is viewed as worth pursuing) (Sen, 1992:38). To achieve well-being demands a context of freedom. It is a measure of the actual and potential quality of existence that encompasses both the achievements of an individual and "opportunities in the context of his or her personal advantage" (choices that he or she enjoys) (Sen, 1987:58-59).

According to Griffin (1986:40), the application of the concept of well-being in moral theory implies the notion of need³¹ more than desire theory.³² The notion of

³¹ The notion of basic need falls in the category of objective theories (or accounts) of well-being – a view that basic needs are "needs for the all-purpose means to whatever ends different individuals may choose ..." and it connects with "ends that we do not choose" (Griffin, 1986:40-55; Cf. Sumner, 1999:53-60).

³² According to Crisp (2001) desire theory mainly consists of three versions, namely, *present desire* theory, *comprehensive desire* theory, and *informed desire* theory. The present desire version refers to the idea that one "is made better off to the extent that his current desires are fulfilled" (Crisp, 2001). The *comprehensive desire theory* carries the idea that what matters most to a person's well-

basic needs focuses on “the vital interests, the basic needs, and the central human concerns that create obligations” (Griffin, 1986:40). It is on the basis of the obligatory aspect of the notion of basic needs that Griffin (1986:42) defines well-being or “at least that conception of it to be used as the interpersonal measure for moral judgment, as the level to which basic needs are met.” The notion of basic needs characterises the conditions of human existence and context.

Griffin (1986:41) argues that “needs are not a sub-class of desires” but rather to some extent, vice versa. His lexical distinction of the two notions shows that the term “need” is not an intentional verb – it is not attached to subjects of experience (Griffin, 1986:41; Cf. Sumner, 1999:53). The term “desire” is intentional and is attached to subjects of experience (Griffin, 1986:41; cf. Sumner, 1999:53).

However, Griffin (1986:41-42) distinguishes between two categories of needs: on the one hand there are instrumental needs – needs that we have because of what we choose; on the other hand there are basic needs – needs we have by virtue of our existence. These are the needs corresponding to Sen’s basic needs that lead to well-being. Our conditions of human existence dictate basic needs such as food, shelter and clothing for us to survive. He further distinguishes the two by claiming that instrumental needs do not have moral weight, while basic needs by virtue of their being fundamental, are normative. The normative weight of a basic need strongly links it to some obligation – one’s suffering makes a claim on others. Basic needs tend to be interdependent. This also marks a big difference between basic needs and Fukuyama’s desire for recognition. Desire for recognition mostly relates to one’s personal context – hence emphasizing this desire will foster individualism more strongly than emphasizing basic needs.

Sumner (1999:123) argues that unlike the notion of basic needs in “which the sources of our well-being are dictated by unalterable aspects of our nature, the desire theory offers us the more flattering picture of ourselves as shapers of our own destinies, determiners of our own good.” This makes the desire theory in tune with the spirit of liberal democracy’s “virtues of self-direction and self-determination” that centre on liberal individualism (Sumner, 1999:123). It follows

being is the overall level of desire-satisfaction in a person’s life as a whole – summatively “the more the desire-fulfilment in life the better” (Crisp, 2001). The *informed desire* refers to the notion that the best life is that one would desire if one was “fully informed about all the (non-evaluative) facts” (Crisp, 2001). Fukuyama’s desire for recognition fits in the comprehensive desire theory because once there is mutual recognition in society, the central human expectation – satisfaction – is achieved.

that many political liberals advocate the desire theory. However, Sumner (1999:132) indicates that the properties of desire – intentionality and prospectivity – open a logical gap between desire-satisfaction and well-being, rendering desire-satisfaction neither logically sufficient nor logically necessary for well-being. Because desire is future-directed (it focuses on “anticipation of benefits”), it can be frustrated (Sumner, 1999:124,132). The desire for recognition in Fukuyama would be frustrated if liberal democracy were to be superseded by another ideology or if liberal democracy fails to meet its promises. Sen (1987:46) argues against the sufficiency of desire-fulfilment as a criterion for judging a person’s well-being. While well-being is ultimately a matter of valuation, happiness and desire-fulfilment may indeed be of value to well-being but according to Sen (1985:188-189; 1987:46), “they cannot ... adequately reflect the value of well-being.” This is because they are mental states and they “ignore other aspects of a person’s well-being” (Sen, 1985:188-189).

The rejection of desire theory as a criterion for judging well-being allows the notion of basic needs to remain as a possible approach to well-being, for it can fill in the gap and explain why such things like food, shelter and clothing are cardinal ingredients of our well-being. Sen invokes the theory of basic needs in his conception of well-being. However he holds that the notion of basic needs can only be adequate in a democratic situation where an individual has the political freedom to exercise his economic rights that enable him to identify and conceptualise his material needs. In addition to the rejection of desire-satisfaction as a criterion in judging a person’s well-being, Sen (1985:187-192; 1987:40-60) discards the idea of equating well-being with utility, or of equating well-being with the possession of commodities. He argues that to think of well-being simply in terms of the commodities that a person possesses is misleading, since it ignores the capability that an individual has to use those commodities to his own advantage (Nussbaum & Sen, 1993). Sen thus advocates a middle-of-the-road position that mediates between the two camps of the Right and Left. All that he does is to argue that need has a priority over desire. This is because one can arguably live without the satisfaction of desires, but life is not possible without fulfilling basic needs such as those for shelter, food, and clothing.

In Sen’s (1985:186-187; 1987:40-41) conception of well-being, that there is “an essential and irreducible duality” in the way we perceive a person in his/her

existence – well-being and agency. He argues that “the conception of ‘persons’ in moral analysis cannot be so reduced as to attach no intrinsic importance to this agency role, seeing them ultimately only in terms of their well-being” (Sen, 1985:186). In terms of agency, it is recognising and respecting a person’s own life, “ability to form goals, commitments, and values” (Sen, 1985:186; 1987:41). In terms of well-being we recognise a person’s ability to achieve well-being and “opportunities in the context of his or her personal advantage” (Sen, 1987:58-59). Thus a person’s well-being is inseparably connected with his agency.

Well-being leads to a distinct and necessary concept of freedom (Sen, 1985). According to Sen (1985:203), this particular type of freedom centres on a person’s “capability to have various functioning vectors and to enjoy the corresponding well-being achievements.” It must be distinguished from the general concept of freedom that relates to the agency aspect of a person. Sen (1985:203-204; Cf. 1992:56-57) distinguishes the two in the following manner:

A person’s “agency freedom” refers to what the person is free to do and achieve in pursuit of whatever goals or values he or she regards as important. A person’s agency cannot be understood without taking note of his or her aims, objectives, allegiances, obligations, and – in a broad sense – the person’s conception of the good. Whereas well-being freedom is freedom to achieve something in particular, viz, well-being, the idea of agency freedom is more general, since it is not tied to any one type of aim. Agency freedom is freedom to achieve whatever the person as a responsible agent decides he or she should achieve.”

The “*open conditionality*” which is central to the idea of agency freedom distinguishes it from well-being freedom (Sen, 1985). Sen cautions that the open conditionality of agency freedom does not imply a Hobbesian state of nature where individuals are free to fulfil their own desires rather it implies the necessity of a disciplined, responsible and rational agent. Agency freedom stands for a general type of freedom that allows one person to achieve any objective, even beyond the pursuit of well-being, such as the independence of one’s country or poverty alleviation (Sen, 1992:40n, 61-62). Due to its all-inclusive nature, agency freedom also encompasses *inter alia* well-being freedom (Sen, 1985; 1992).

Apart from the inseparable connection between agency and well-being, Sen (1987; 1992) places the notion of functioning at the centre of his account of well-

being. He defines functioning as anything that an individual can be or do or achieve – making a functioning the basic feature of well-being (Sen, 1987:59). Closely linked to functionings is the notion of capability. According to Sen (1992:40), a capability is “a set of vectors of functionings, reflecting the person’s freedom to lead one type of life or another [or] a person’s freedom to choose from possible livings.” In other words, Sen is saying a capability is a freedom or opportunity to achieve a functioning – e.g. the ability to choose to eat well or the ability to choose any kind of work that earns one a salary. It may therefore be pointed out that functionings and capabilities determine a person’s level of well-being.

When Sen (1999b) introduces the concept of well-being in the development context by noting that the quality of a person’s existence encompasses “being” and doing (functionings) from an available set of choices (capabilities) – meaning that people are entitled to a practical implementation and an expansion of their actual freedom. This demands the eradication of all forms of unfreedom, poverty, social and political deprivations, and all forms of intolerance and repressions (Sen, 1999a & 1999b:15-17). The replacement of these socio-politico-economic pathologies enhances the actual and potential quality of existence that includes both the achievements of an individual and the rational choices available to him or her.

Sen (1985; 1992) maintains that based on the virtues of democracy such as tolerance, civility, and respect, individuals in pursuit of their well-being, as rational and responsible agents, will be able to recognise the freedoms of others. They will be able, under the rule of law, to tolerate the diversity of people and see them as equals who deserve the freedom and opportunity to pursue their well-being. Knowing the natural tendency of human beings to always seek what serves their interest, and thereby to interfere with their fellow citizens’ freedom in the process of pursuing well-being – Sen nevertheless believes in some form of limited intervention by a constitutional nation state. Unless there is some form of institutional intervention there will be social disorder. There is need for the government to make sure that there are no violations to others’ rights. Thus, well-being is achievable in a democratic political environment that gives one political and civil freedom to pursue one’s well-being. Pursuit of well-being implies a distributive mechanism of opportunities – in this case it is the market. Is the market

as a distributive mechanism and process able to provide an opportunity for all to pursue their well-being?

(b) The Pursuit of Well-being

Sen (1985; 1992) holds that well-being has intrinsic importance in human life, and hence is worthy of being pursued. The pursuit of well-being implies competitive interaction among individuals for limited resources. This leads to the need for a mechanism for distribution. According to Sen (1992) the issue then becomes the mechanism and fairness of distribution. Underlying Sen's distributive principle is his philosophical approach – capabilities equality approach which we shall discuss below. In the following section the focus will be on the pursuit of well-being and its distribution as well as well-being and recognition. In this section we briefly discuss the market as a distribution mechanism, together with the notion of equality and inequality. Prior to these, I will examine Sen's capability equality approach

(i) Capability Equality Approach

According to Sen (1993:32) the capability approach "is concerned primarily with the identification of value-objects, and sees the evaluative space in terms of functionings and capabilities to function." Sen (1982) describes the capability approach as focusing "on meeting the need of self-respect rather than ... the pleasure from having self-respect." Rawls (quoted in Sen, 1982) calls this need "the social basis of self-respect." Furthermore, Sen (1982:164, 167), explains:

What the capability approach does is to make that basis explicit and then it goes on to acknowledge the enormous variability that exists in the commodity requirements of capability fulfilment. In this sense, the capability approach can be seen as one possible extension of the Rawlsian perspective. ... [It] shares with John Rawls the rejection of the utilitarian obsession with one type of mental reaction, but differs from Rawls' concentration on primary goods by focusing on capabilities of human beings rather than characteristics of goods they possess

The focus on human capabilities to achieve specific functionings makes Sen's approach a step further from Rawls' social basis of self-respect.

Sen's capability approach combines functionings and freedom. As already explained above, functionings are beings and doings; such as being fed, or being educated, or participating in building a house – making functionings constitutive of a person's whole being. Freedom, in the capability approach is concerned with "real opportunity that we have to accomplish what we value" (Sen, 1992:31). In terms of a person's advantage (which is referred to by Sen as well-being freedom), according to Sen (1993:30), the capability approach is "concerned with evaluating it in terms of his actual ability to achieve various valuable functionings as a part of living." Thus an individual's achieved functionings in his/her daily living are those exact functionings he or she has the opportunity to successfully pursue and realize. So it may be concluded that Sen's capability approach works as an evaluative framework for an individual's ability to achieve certain functionings as per freedom of choice and access to opportunities available. In this case it helps to evaluate the distribution of well-being as well as its relation to recognition.

Sen's capability approach should also be understood as a proposition to evaluate social arrangements using the extent to which freedom is given to people for them to achieve certain functionings and to evaluate equality of access to opportunities. For Sen, if equal access to opportunities in social arrangements is to be required in any space, it should be required in the space of capabilities. Thus people should be given freedom to choose what they want to be and they want to do in order for them to achieve well-being.

Although Sen argues against desire-fulfilment theories, particularly utilitarianism accusing them of, as Hamilton (2003:92) puts it, "guilty of both 'physical-condition neglect' and 'valuation neglect,'" his (Sen's) capability approach also sends waves of assuming some form of trans-positional objectivity that, if not curbed, transforms into 'objective illusion' (Hamilton, 2003:99) – which he accuses other theorists of having committed. In my opinion is that Sen's capability approach is helpful in engaging both proponents of the empirical and metaphysical aspects of the social discussion on improving "the human condition" to enhance life satisfaction.

(ii) Well-being and Distribution

Sen was deeply influenced by and sympathetic to Rawls' position of equal distribution of primary goods (Sen, 1992:9; Cf. DeMartino, 2000:107). However Sen (1992:41n) ends up being more inclined to Marx's needs-based distributive principle, a position that focuses on the basic value of freedom, namely that a person in a free society has the freedom to do one thing today and another, tomorrow. Sen (1992) argues that Rawls' account of justice as fairness does not satisfactorily address the existence of interpersonal differences.³³ Rather he over-emphasizes equality, leaving us with the problem of conceiving equality as 'even-handedness' in the distributions of the common good, based on the notion of the veil of ignorance.

Sen (1992:17-18) argues that if an ethical argument on social matters is ever to be advanced, there must be a consideration of some form of basic equality – a demand inescapable “in presenting a political or ethical theory of social arrangements.” For as Erikson (1994:49) puts it, “it is difficult to see how any theory of justness could be morally convincing if men are not regarded as equals in some fundamental space.” Sen (1992:21-23; 1999b:74) chooses “substantive freedoms” (the capabilities) as his own fundamental space “to choose a life one has reason to value.” The choice of freedom (‘individual freedom to choose’ and ‘freedom to transact’) as the primary basis of well-being (including agency), reflects Sen's (1992) recognition of human diversity as fundamental. Given this, the crucial issues for the ethical analysis of equality according to him are: “Why equality?” and “Equality of what?” For Sen, the latter question implies the former, because if one satisfactorily answers “Equality of what?” then it will be possible to answer the question “Why should we be in favour of equality?” The answer to the former question is equality of substantial freedom. In that way, Sen, *inter alia* sets out to address interpersonal differences, or to borrow Minow's term “the dilemma of difference”³⁴ and the problem of even-handedness that Rawls propagates and that

³³ Rawls' (1999:65-66) Difference Principle is an egalitarian concept that holds that “unless there is a distribution that makes both better off ... an equal distribution is preferred.” As a maximum criterion and principle of justice it is a procedure that focuses on producing “the greatest benefit for the least advantaged, with advantage being judged by the holding of ‘primary goods’” (Sen, 1992:75) – of which the chief ones are “rights, liberties, and opportunities, and income and wealth” (Rawls, 1999:54,65-73).

³⁴ Martha Minow (cited in Koggel, 2000) uses the term “dilemma of difference” to describe the dilemma created in a liberal framework in relation to equality where there are two policy options:

Fukuyama tends to overlook in his claim that there is mutual and equal recognition for all human beings under the homogeneous liberal state. Rawls (1999:83-84) tends to think that if people were to start all over again on an equal basis in which inequality is only accepted if it is to “the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society,” there will be no irresponsible social or economic inequality. He (Rawls’ Tanner Lectures quoted in Sen, 1992:75) argues thus:

Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions. First, they must be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged member of society.

So for Rawls the “fair equality of opportunity” must be available to all people equally such that no member of society should lack the primary goods. Fukuyama does not risk trying to solve this problem; he seems to hope to that some miracle will take place as soon as there is a universal and homogeneous liberal state. It may be possible that he chooses to keep quiet on the issue because he has nothing new to tell us.

Sen (1992:71) argues that well-being is important in dealing with such issues as “social security, poverty alleviation, removal of gross economic inequality and in general, in the pursuit of social justice.” The pursuit of well-being implies distribution – which in turn in a liberal society implies the free market mechanism. In principle, a perfectly competitive market is put in place as an economic institution that serves the purpose of distribution. According to Clark (1991:6), following the ‘Pareto optimal’ theorem is the principle of a competitive market: to “ensure an efficient economy in which no person can be made better without making someone else worse off” (thus at zero opportunity cost). It follows that the market fulfils its task by “coordinating vast numbers of transactions with minimal political supervision” and allowing individuals to exercise their freedom to transact

“the formal equality option of equal or same treatment and the substantive equality option of different or ‘special’ treatment.” Minow (cited in Koggel, 2000) contends that in any case the framework causes a dilemma because choosing either option “risks creating or perpetuating further disadvantages for members of oppressed groups.” In other words Minow is arguing that on the one hand, treating people differently sometimes emphasizes their differences and hinders them from achievements, and on the other hand treating people equally leads “to the insensitivity of their difference and likely to hinder them on *that* basis” (Koggel, 2000) hence the dilemma of difference. In the case of this thesis, the dilemma of difference may refer to the notion that while equal distribution is a noble thing, it is also good to understand inequality in terms of human diversity on the basis of capability and environmental differences.

in order to achieve the maximum feasible level of well-being (Clark, 1991:6-7). This conception of the market as the central arena for the individual pursuit of well-being and as a mechanism for distribution has been criticized for its failures, especially in the realm of social efficiency. A market is said to have failed in a situation where the market mechanism is unsuccessful in allocating resources efficiently. There are a number of market failures such as technical efficiency, productive efficiency, and allocative efficiency (generally referred to as the Pareto optimality – discussed above), of important to pay attention to is social efficiency. According to Hale et al (2000:83):

Social efficiency refers to a situation where the benefits to those that gain from the reallocation of resources are greater than the losses incurred by those who are made worse off, such that the gainers could compensate the losers and still be better off.

If the gainers do not compensate the losers then there is inequality. According to O'Neill (2002:81) markets do not have a rule against inequality, "[r]ather, markets encode inequalities as competitive differences that optimize social efficiency." The idea here is that the market has become socially inefficient because of human greed. This must not be understood as meaning that social efficiency is bought at the price of inequality.

Despite this, Sen argues (1999b:110), that "the virtues of the market mechanism are now standardly assumed to be so pervasive that qualifications seem unimportant." Pointing to any defects of the market is regarded in most intellectual circles as not moving with the time or being contrary to 'the global culture.' However Sen (1999b:110) believes it is worthwhile to critically scrutinise "the standard preconceptions and political-economic attitudes" in favour of the market, which he argues have never been stronger. He begins by acknowledging the merits of the market. It is indispensable for human well-being, especially because of the centrality of freedom in the operation of the market. Hicks (2002) points out that in Sen "the market system is often touted for the instrumental freedoms it provides for people – that is, the market helps people to meet basic needs like having adequate nutrition and shelter." This is a reason why society cannot deny the relevance of the market; Sen (1999:112-116) shows that there is a need for freedom of transactions be that for selling, for buying or for seeking

employment. The question remains: Is the market *sufficient* to enable people to achieve well-being equally?

Hicks (2002) points out that there are widespread concerns about the increasing role played by the market as an economic and political institution, "but at the same time the virtues of the market are widely touted and hard to deny." As long as liberal democracy remains the ideological framework for our polity and gain, there seems to be no other alternative in which we can "enjoy the benefits of a market system without allowing it to dominate our lives" (Hicks, 2002). I am of the opinion that the market should not be taken as a divinely given or sanctioned mechanism that cannot be transformed or changed. It should be recognized as something that has the potential to lead to forms of 'unfreedom.' So it is our duty to organise it in such a way that it functions according to rules that makes it morally accountable. The questions that one may ask from this model are: Is an equal distribution of primary goods possible, and how do we address the problem of difference?

Sen (1999b:119) acknowledges the problem of inequality in the area of income and in the area of "the distribution of substantive freedom and capabilities." He also acknowledges that even-handed equality in the distribution of primary goods is impossible, simply due to the diversity of human existence and physical contexts that influence the potential of each individual's achievement (Sen, 1992:85-87). These differences include individual differences in physical and mental capability, differences in the physical climates in which people live, and institutional structures that govern different societies. Sen (1992) argues that these differences affect the ability of each individual, in the words of DeMartino (2000:207) "to transform primary goods into the actual achievements that they have reason to value." In an attempt to address the problems of difference and even-handedness, Sen (cited in DeMartino, 2000:108) takes as his point of departure that the "'focal variable' that should be equalised in an ideal society is not primary goods *per se*, but human capabilities."

DeMartino (2000:107-108) points out that Sen's ideal society acknowledges the difference principle; so that the notion of equality does not involve that all people must achieve the same level of well-being. However, because the necessary means, namely the freedom to live one's life must be provided by society; Sen emphasizes the duty of society. It is not enough that opportunities or

advantages be available to individuals; they must be distributed even-handedly. According to DeMartino (2000:107), Sen's principle of capability equality does not presume the existence of a single "ideal set of institutional arrangements" such as advocated by neo-liberalism, communism, or other ideologies. Furthermore, DeMartino (2000:108) maintains that the capability approach inspires us "to interrogate vigilantly the actual performance of the actually existing economic systems" that emerge and to press for improvement as a way of determining whether they are able to meet the standard requirements of capabilities equality. In that way it accommodates both some form of basic equality and the possibility of difference in the achievement of well-being

(iii) Well-being and Recognition

Earlier I indicated that Sen acknowledges the basic diversity of human existence. He asserts that "equality in one space frequently leads to inequality in other spaces" (Sen, 1992). This diversity includes class, gender and other groups that are created in our societies. Looking closely at gender as one aspect of diversity, Sen (1992) argues that "there are systematic disparities in the freedoms that men and women enjoy" in the area of income distribution, resource-use and even the freedom to transform "the used resources into the capability to function."

Sen (1999b) argues that the current consensus favours a participatory democracy that promotes the primacy of freedom in the daily life of every member of society. It is generally held that democratic social arrangements extend freedom to all their members. For Sen (1999b) this expansion of freedom is held as "both the primary end and as the principal means of development." Due to many unfreedoms (to borrow Sen's term) the world we live in is also a world of "deprivation, destitution and oppression" that is fuelled by new problems such as the

persistence of poverty and unfulfilled elementary needs, occurrence of famines and widespread hunger, violation of elementary political freedoms as well as of basic liberties, extensive neglect of the interests and agency of women, and worsening threats to our environment and to the sustainability of our economic and social lives (Sen, 1999b).

To solve these problems, the recognition of various freedoms is crucial. Taking top priority is the freedom of the individual to pursue his or her well-being. As has already been indicated, Sen's concept of freedom consists of two related, but separable aspects – “agency” and “well-being.” Well-being can only be achieved if there is sufficient freedom to deploy agency. According to Sen (1999b) the possibility of our freedom of agency “is inescapably qualified and constrained by the social, political and economic opportunities that are available to us.” Individual freedom should be viewed as a “social commitment.” It is the role of the political and economic institutional frameworks that are in place to go beyond the basic recognition of human freedom by making this freedom realizable.³⁵ The aim is for social arrangements to remove all unfreedoms hindering the distribution of freedom to access the common good, as part of one's pursuit of well-being.

The process of removing all unfreedoms, is wholly assigned to development which is viewed as expanding freedom to reach each individual member of Sen's (1999b) ideal society. The removal of unfreedoms will lead to the recognition of all people as equals and with rights to access opportunities to exercise “their agency by making choices to realize their ends; whatever they are” (Steele, 2001). Robeyns (cited in Steele, 2001) argues that in the process of removing the unfreedoms, “certain cultural and social patterns, like gender roles and gender hierarchies, which now constrain individuals in their [agency] freedom” must be transformed so that they do not block the recognition of individuals as equals. The realisation of development as freedom includes “expanding real opportunities of women to make choices” regarding the achievement of their well-being (Sen, 1999a).

Above, we reviewed the three basic features of the capability approach namely, the concept of advantage (which is referred to by Sen as well-being freedom), the conversion of primary goods into well-being, and agency freedom (Steele, 2001). Certainly if these conditions are fulfilled, in Sen's ideal society, it could be referred to as recognition of a person or member of society. It may also be said that recognition is possible when each and every individual is given the

³⁵ Here Sen pleads for the necessity of “simultaneous recognition.” Simultaneous recognition refers to the idea that there is a complementary relationship between “individual agency and social arrangements” in that individual freedom takes the centre stage and that there must be social influences on the realization of individual freedom (Sen, 1999b).

opportunity to conceptualise his or her needs and has the freedom to fulfil his or her capability to function (to do or to be).

Steele (2001) indicates that “Sen’s conceptual approach is explicitly pluralistic.” Consequently it gives “intrinsic value to agency and well-being freedom” in that each person, regardless of gender or ideological conceptions has substantive freedoms and opportunities to choose “a life one has reason to value” (Sen, 1999b:74). The pluralistic nature of Sen’s capability equality approach has implications for gender equity. It raises an issue that appeared in the third chapter of this thesis – that of women working outside home, for instance working in industry. Fukuyama sees this as one of the causes of “the great disruption” of social order in the West. Sen (1999b:115) rather focuses on societies in which women are deprived of the freedom to work outside home. He (Sen, 1999b:115) argues that a continuous and systematic denial of women’s freedom to work is “a serious violation of women’s liberty and gender equity.” It follows that “the absence of this freedom militates against the economic empowerment of women and adds momentum to accumulation for further violations of women’s rights (Sen, 1999b:115). This is totally opposed to the thrust of Fukuyama’s argument.

According to Steele (2001), the intrinsic value of agency freedom “speaks to the autonomy and personal liberty of people.” In Sen’s view, democracy as a universal value can be adopted by every nation without subjecting the nation concerned to scrutiny as to whether it is ready or fit for democracy. He emphasizes freedom as the substratum of human existence. Substantial freedom implies recognition of individuals as having equal freedom and rights.

4.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Fukuyama shows that the liberal societies of Hobbes and Locke only satisfied material well-being, without looking further into the human desire for recognition, as highlighted by Hegel. At the end of history, Hobbesian-Lockean-like communism left people unsatisfied and it collapsed – hence Fukuyama opted for liberal democracy, arguing that it satisfies the desire for recognition. The upshot of the above discussion is to accept Fukuyama’s claim that there will only be harmony in global interaction when there is a homogeneous and universal liberal state in place. For Fukuyama, liberalism as an ideology, and democracy as a

political value are instrumental and constitutive in the creation and justification of a liberal state. This is because the two are indispensable to the state's facilitation of the recognition of every individual's freedom and its affirmation of every individual's rights. The study has also shown that the idea of the end of history, characterized by the emergence of liberal democracy as the universal and homogeneous state that oversees the transition into a new world order, has its own problems. Although people will be attracted to the freedom and affirmation of rights that liberal democracy offers, there are outstanding issues such as the problem of social, political, and economic inequalities. And another problem is that liberal democracy work only with those cultures that agree with its cultural pre-conditions.

Sen holds that democracy as a universal value instrumentally brings freedom for people to pursue their need for well-being. Although Sen and Fukuyama start from the same ideological framework, democracy, Sen argues that democracy, as a universal value, is no longer something that is new to the world, rather it is taken for granted that each sovereign nation will follow it as an ideological framework. Sen prefers to talk about the twin pillars of democracy, freedom and equality, with an emphasis on freedom. Freedom becomes the fundamental basis for the achievement of well-being. It plays three basic roles in human life, namely: a constitutive role, a constructive role, and an instrumental role. The instrumental role features prominently in that it helps the individual or a community to conceptualise its needs. Therefore one of Sen's main arguments for democratic freedom is that it is instrumental to the satisfaction of needs.

Sen prefers to make well-being rather than recognition the central concept of his political and economic thought. I am of the opinion that if Sen's requirements are met, this *de facto* involves the sort of recognition Fukuyama is at such pains to safeguard. That is if one is granted one's freedoms to pursue all things one has reason to value, and one's rights are affirmed, then one's existence is *eo ipso* recognized. Sen conceives well-being as being and doing. In my own view, that includes material well-being and recognition, to categorize it in Fukuyama's terms. In developing his notion of well-being Sen resorts to his basic needs theory rather than a desire theory such as the one followed by Fukuyama. Sen rejects Fukuyama's idea of equating well-being with desire-fulfilment. Implicitly, it is as if Sen is re-interpreting Marx by invoking well-being as the freedom to fulfil basic needs. Central to Sen's notion of well-being are two important ideas, namely,

functioning and capability. The idea of agency also appears to be inseparable from the idea of well-being.

It has emerged that the notion of well-being implies the idea of distribution. Sen argues that if distribution is to be addressed as an ethical matter then there must be some form of equality, and he chooses freedom as his space of equality. Freedom will enable individuals to pursue well-being and it is through a market mechanism that this freedom will become realized in economic life, and through choice of leadership during elections that one's rights and freedom are recognized.

My observation is that the two theorists' reasoning starts from different points and proceeds in different directions, but in the middle they share a common ground – the freedom and rights of the individual in a liberal society. On the one hand, Fukuyama moves from the empirical (people have fulfilled the desire for material well-being through other political, social, and economic alternatives) to the metaphysical (desire-satisfaction in a universal and homogeneous liberal state). On the other hand, Sen moves from the metaphysical (freedom for basic need-satisfaction in a liberal society) to the empirical (development as an expansion and practical fulfilment of freedom). All in all, each of them wants every individual to experience freedom and every individual to have his or her rights affirmed so that he or she can do the things he or she has reason to value.

CHAPTER 5

CRITICAL EVALUATION

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Fukuyama advances a lucid, cogent, and learned argument in support of his view about the end of history – by which he means the worldwide triumph of liberal democracy over other contending ideologies, last but not least of which was communism. This chapter sets out to critically evaluate Fukuyama's arguments on a number of issues that arise from his end of history project. As already indicated in the introduction and in many parts of this piece of study that I seek to critically examine Fukuyama's notion of liberal democracy who declares its emergence as the ultimate end to the human evolutionary search for a political system of governance that will satisfy human desire for recognition. Certainly liberal democracy has achieved much, making it worth emulating in cultural contexts similar to those in which it arose, and has worked well. But nevertheless many aspects of it need to be criticized.

5.2 CRITIQUE: FRANCIS FUKUYAMA VS AMARTYA SEN

5.2.1 Liberal Individualism

The idea of individualism runs through all of Fukuyama's antecedents discussed in the first, second, third and fourth chapters. It takes different forms as the humanity wrestles with the issues that concern it in its continually changing contexts. In the first chapter individuals in a state of nature reach consensus to form a government. In Hobbes, the individual is a consensual participant in the formation of the absolute monarchy; in Locke it is also the individual who consensually agrees with other individuals to form a constitutional monarchy with a representative government; and in Rousseau it is again the individual who participates in the formation of a popular sovereignty (or representative government). From Kant onwards, the individual's rights, dignity and independence are accorded respect. In Adam Smith and the other classical political economists, the individual's self-interest is emphasized. In all these theorists, the individual participates in order to seek security, self-preservation or material well-being.

Fukuyama's claim is that previous systems of governance did not satisfy the individual's desire for recognition. Hobbes' absolute monarchy only accorded the individual with the satisfaction of the desire for material well-being when individuals in the state of nature managed to secure peace and exercise the fundamental right of self-preservation. Locke's constitutional monarchy and representative government only created the continuous pursuit of the accumulation of wealth. Rousseau accorded the individual with a representative government (or the popular sovereignty), which had the potential of not being sensitive to the needs of the individual – leaving a conflict between the desire for individual freedom and the demand for submission from the collective authority. There was no balance struck between the two. In the human endeavour, to come up with a system that will meet both the empirical and metaphysical needs of the individual, various systems of governance emerged.

According to Vincent (1995:129) the idea of the individual keeps on featuring so prominently, beginning with Hobbes, because of the common view that “the individual is prior to society” – hence “society is understood to be built out of such atomic individuals.” But according to Fukuyama, the individual features so consistently and prominently in the philosophies of his antecedents because his or her desire for recognition is never fully satisfied. Fukuyama (1992:42) claims that as the worldwide revolution of liberalism progresses, at the end of the millennium

the twin crises of authoritarianism and socialist central planning have left only one competitor standing in the ring as an ideology of potentially universal validity: liberal democracy, the doctrine of individual freedom and popular sovereignty.

This makes individualism the basis of and goal for liberal democracy. It is liberal democracy that satisfies the individual's desire for respect of dignity. Fukuyama (1992:42) defines liberalism as “the rule of law that recognizes certain individual rights or freedoms from the government.” For a broader and comparative understanding of the term, Heywood (200:60) defines liberalism as:

a political ideology whose central theme is a commitment to the individual and to the construction of a society in which individuals satisfy their interests or achieve fulfilment.

And for Waldron (1998:598) as well,

liberal political philosophy ... explores the foundations of the principles most commonly associated with liberal politics: freedom; toleration; individual rights; constitutional democracy and the rule of law.

What all these definitions share is a high level of commitment to the individual; according to Heywood (2000:60) this is because of the belief that "human beings are first and foremost individuals endowed with reason." The supremacy of the individual in Fukuyama's end of history project has its good side and its bad side. The good side is that the emergence of liberal democracy has brought recognition and realization of the aspirations of individuals. Each individual aspires to make sure that his or her political freedom and rights are protected by the government of the day, and that he or she has the freedom to do and to be what he or she has reason to value.

Fukuyama (1999b:48) views individualism as on the one hand the "bedrock virtue of modern societies," and on the other something that

begins to shade over from the proud self-sufficiency of free people into a kind of closed selfishness, where maximizing personal freedom without regard for responsibilities to others becomes an end in itself.

If it does not put the individual centre stage, liberal democracy fails to meet its goal. However, if it does, the resulting individualism becomes dangerous, even to the point of undoing liberal democracy's positive achievements.

Fukuyama points out that even though Americans were able to celebrate their individualism, community diversity, and spontaneous sociability

[t]he balance between individualism and community has shifted dramatically in the United States over the last fifty years. The moral communities that made up American civil society at midcentury, from family to neighbourhoods to churches and workplaces, have been under assault, and a number of indicators suggest that the degree of general sociability has declined. The most noticeable deterioration in community life is the breakdown of the family, with the steady rise of the rates of divorce and single-parent families since the late 1960s. This trend has had clear-cut

economic consequences: a sharp rise in poverty associated with single motherhood (Fukuyama, 1995: 308, 309).

This shift also has serious political consequences, notably social disorder or disruption, which is inimical to the flourishing of liberal democracy. In *The Great Disruption* Fukuyama (1999:281) warns that the triumph of liberal democracy and the free market economy does not necessarily entail the corresponding moral and social order. This is because there can be no political order without moral consensus. The consequences of the lack of moral consensus are serious, because in any moral deal that may be achieved a compromise between the different ideas and practices of the various parties will have to be reached so as to accommodate everybody. Fukuyama further warns that

[t]he tendency of contemporary liberal democracies to fall prey to excessive individualism is perhaps their greatest long-term vulnerability, and particularly visible in the most individualistic of all democracies, the United States (Fukuyama, 1999:10).

To be successful, liberal democracy needs social order. But excessive individualism has the capacity to miniaturize the community and loosen family bonds. When this happens, because of a lack of coercive control, the future of liberal democracy will be in danger.

Despite Fukuyama's warnings concerning individualism, it is exactly an individualistic bias that some critics accuse him of: Blunden (2003) describes Fukuyama's book, *The End of History* as "a thoroughly despicable, triumphalist eulogy to liberal individualism," and especially objects to Fukuyama's use of Nietzsche's expression: "the Last Man."³⁶ Blunden's view is echoed by Fisk (2003), who argues that Fukuyama's entire "end of history" approach is flawed by assuming individualism, and because, despite Fukuyama's equation of recognition and *isothymia*, the fact is that "satisfaction can only come through recognition of individual superiority." Fisk (2003) claims that

Fukuyama cannot challenge this assumption since his historical dialectic of recognition traces recognition back to the individual male warrior's urge to defeat

³⁶ The last man to Fukuyama refers to a citizen of a liberal state under capitalist democracy where equality is in principle fully realized.

and subdue anyone posing as an equal. Even outside its warlike context, this urge will reappear in the form of an urge to be recognized by free persons as superior. Mutual recognition, which leads to democracy, becomes a compromise that doesn't eradicate the primal urge for superiority.

Individualism pervades Western philosophy and it remains a distinguishing characteristic of Western civilization (Huntington, 1997:71-72). According to Huntington (1997:71), "a sense of individualism and a tradition of individual rights and liberties" emerged in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Since the seventeenth century, individualism prevailed in the form of "the right of individual choice" and the claim of equal rights for all individuals (Huntington, 1997:71-72).

It is difficult to strike a balance in the relationship between the individual and the community. Excessive control over individuals results in oppression, the violation of rights and the loss of opportunities to express one's individuality. In the article, "Why It Can Happen Again: the Fundamental Cause of the Holocaust is the Anti-Individualist Morality of Self-Sacrifice," Tranciski (2003), analyzing Nazism, simultaneously defines the ethics of individualism. He shows how the Nazi German state destroyed the individual in the name of the community (or state). Adolf Hitler (quoted in Tranciki 2003) explicates the moral foundations of Nazism that governed the decision to rob an individual of his rights:

It is ... necessary that the individual should finally come to realize that his own ego is of no importance. . . . This state of mind, which subordinates the interests of the ego to the conservation of the community, is really the first premise for every truly human culture. . . . The basic attitude from which such activity arises, we call—to distinguish it from egoism and selfishness—idealism. By this we understand only the individual's capacity to make sacrifices for the community, for his fellow men.

Tranciki (2003) states that historians tend to dismiss Hitler's words as empty talk. However, Hitler's statements became fact in the concentration camps. According to concentration camp survivor Bruno Bettelheim (cited in Tranciki, 2003) the central goal of the concentration camp was "to break the prisoners as individuals, and to change them into a docile mass." For Tranciki (2003) central to the philosophy of National Socialism "was the relentless sacrifice of the individual: the sacrifice of his mind, his independence, and ultimately his person." Concurring with Fukuyama's claim, Tranciki (2003) argues that a liberal country is "based on

precisely the opposite principle” to that of Nazism. The Founding Fathers of America “upheld the individual's right to ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness’” in order to protect him or her against the “tyranny of the majority” (Tranciki, 2003).

The individual's right to life, freedom, and the pursuit of happiness is at the centre of the *ethics of individualism* — “the view that the individual is not subordinate to the collective, that he has a moral right to his own interests, and that all rational people benefit under such a system” (Tranciki 2003). Furthermore, liberal individualism's *biocentric* conception of ethics is that “the good consists of actions that sustain or enhance one's life”: any actions that destroy or undermine one's life are invariably regarded as evil (Anonymous, 2003). According to the *ethics of individualism* the purpose of an individual's life is to pursue the fulfilment of his desires (to achieve his own *happiness*) – which is his own rational self-interest (Anonymous, 2003) – an idea that echoes Adam Smith's idea of self-interest. This is achievable “through a constant, conscious process of self-evaluation (introspection) and a consistent adherence to reason in pursuing values” (Anonymous, 2003) – with the fundamental value to be pursued being democracy, which gives an individual the opportunity to pursue recognition, in Fukuyama's sense, or well-being, as Sen puts it.

Central to the ethics of individualism is the idea of independence that is based on the primary virtue of “*respecting individuality*” – first and foremost, one's own individuality, and secondly the individuality of those one interacts with. (The Kantian resonances in all this are unmistakable). Reflection on this version of the ethics of individualism suggests that this independence, if not brought under the rule of law, could turn into a ‘state of nature.’ This is because individuals, in extreme cases of independence, “do not follow social groups, social authorities, or social conventions, [rather] they follow only their own minds and proudly exist as sovereign, autonomous, rational entities” (Anonymous 2003), as if condemned, à la Sartre, to freedom. In extreme cases of individualism individuals tend to interact only with those whom they think are a “source of value, or a potential source of value” (Anonymous, 2003). This idea promotes the practice of segregation and separatism. If such individuals group together and form an extremist ‘hate group,’ they can end up causing social disruption because they will not acknowledge the rule of law. In its extreme state this type of individualism only exists in a state of nature. But with the evolution of human reason to maturity, individuals came to

seek respect and recognition. Hence there was appreciation of interdependency, and concomitantly a greater concern for the common good, so that the value of individual autonomy no longer had to lead to excessive individualism. If liberal society is to enjoy freedom and equality, there must be a balance between individualism and community, based on the acknowledgement of interdependency.

The approach known as *moral ecology*, inspired by the environmental sciences, can help us become more aware of interdependency in human interaction, especially between the individual and the community. In his article, "The Theory of Moral Ecology," Hertzke (1998) describes *moral ecology* as "a philosophical, empirical and practical construct" that frequently applies environmental thought – particularly insights from Garrett Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons"³⁷ – to the moral and cultural realm in an attempt to present, or explain, the dynamics of human relations as it relates to the distribution of the commons and the relationships between individuals. Hertzke (1998) sees the "tragedy of the commons" as a powerful metaphor for theory construction and empirical research. Hardin's metaphor continues to haunt liberal thinking because "the practice of individual freedom" which all of us desire can, "under certain circumstances, undermine the very basis of life itself, or certainly of the good life" (Hertzke, 1998). Hertzke (1998) argues that there is mounting evidence suggesting that the "tragedy of the commons" can operate in the moral realm of society. This notion helps us to understand how "the delicate interdependent relationships ... and civility that constitute a healthy society" function. Hertzke (1998) indicates that some individuals "can be viewed as practising their liberal freedom in ways that contaminate [the] moral ecosystem, undermining its ability to sustain healthy lives." Hertzke (1998) concludes, therefore, that the concept of moral ecology is of great

³⁷ The expression "tragedy of the commons" comes from Garrett Hardin's (1968) article, "The Tragedy of Commons." The term, "commons" refers to "any resource which is shared by a group of people", such as "the air we breathe and the water we drink" or the delicate ecosystems that sustain life (Harding, 1997; Hardin, 1968). The idea of the commons is an ancient cultural and economic organizing principle that asserts that natural resources are rightfully and pragmatically best owned by the people – thus each individual owns an equal share of the value of land, air, water, minerals, etc (Harding, 1997). However by acting rationally in their use of the commons "individuals tragically destroy it because of untrammelled individual freedom itself" (Harding, 1997). The tragedy lies "in the solemnity of the remorseless working of things" whereby the futility of escape can be made evident by the behaviour of individuals as they pursue their individual economic interests, in which "left to their own devices, people would abuse, pollute, or overpopulate the earth" (Hardin, 1998).

value in our striving “to balance individual freedom with the broader health of society.”

Greenberg & Greene (1999) for their part define moral ecology as the patterns of culturally-informed understandings and practices that entail moral economy³⁸. It includes concepts such as equity, justice and entitlement, according to which people organise their economic activities and the use of local resources that “underpin the human appropriation of resources and structure of relationship” between members of human communities. Thus it is a fabric of customs, philosophical ideas, and empirical theories that lay the foundation for civilising social relations among humans as they conceptualise their economic needs and how goods should be distributed among them.

According to Hertzke (1999) some thinkers from the communitarian camp express concern, arguing that the “cultural crisis resulting from an aggressive capitalist ethos” will seep into communities and family life and as a result degrade their “sustaining norms.” Radical individualism threatens the ties of trust, civility, and cooperation that hold human communities together. This concern dovetails with Fukuyama’s (1995; 1999) claim that “social capital,” so vital to well-functioning societies, is mysteriously declining. Hertzke points out that the philosophical and policy implications of moral ecology, in turn, highlight a poignant Tocquevillian dilemma: “How can liberal societies, which leave individuals largely free in the moral arena, shield themselves from cumulative moral depredation, let alone economic inequality?”

A follow-up question would be: Is it not time to create or formulate a new moral ecology that will see us laying down fundamental politico-economic values that are not a threat but an inspiration to the interdependency between the individual and the community? Moral ecology argues that liberal democracy does not guarantee this collective moral perception. So it is worthwhile incorporating a moral element that sees a heightened awareness of interdependency functioning as a way to curb excessive individualism. This brings to mind again Sartre’s saying that we are all condemned to freedom, which in effect depicts the individual as vulnerable to unrestrained freedom.

³⁸ Moral economy is an “interpretive framework for social justice and equity issues within the socio-economic system,” particularly in the Indian context. Greenberg and Greene (1999) trace the term to Amartya Sen (1981) and others who did groundbreaking research on “how the distribution of India’s economic resources reflected an implicit social hierarchy and a legitimisation of economic inequality.”

Hertzke (1999) notes that "both environmental analysts and cultural critics identify unrestrained individual freedom as a major source of disruption." Fukuyama shares this view but his model of understanding and dealing with the problem of excessive individualism does not seem to be of much help. He tries to solve the problem firstly through the idea of social capital (which, as we saw above, can promote cronyism), and secondly by hoping for the triumph of the community over excessive individualism. As long as freedom, one of the twin pillars of liberal democracy (the other being equality), continues to be promoted in defence of the individual at the expense of the community, the problem will continue.

As for Sen, there is both independence and interdependence in a society where democracy is embraced as a universal value. The mere fact that Sen talks about democracy as a universal value, and about the primacy of freedom in pursuing the need for well-being, implies the idea of individualism. Sen (1992:41) argues that "a good society ... is ... a society of freedom" where an individual is free to achieve well-being. For Sen, individualism is defined within a social setting where one has the freedom to participate in debates on issues that affect one's daily life, to influence political decision-making in one's society, and to conceptualize one's needs. His capability equality approach is individualistic in nature and intent. Thus he talks of a capability as representing "a person's [an individual's] freedom to achieve well-being" (Sen, 1992:43). Sen does not talk about excessive individualism (perhaps partly because this is not yet a major problem in developing countries).

Sen acknowledges the diversity of human existence, but emphasizes the need for some form or space for equality – equality in the freedom to pursue well-being.

5.2.2 Global Trends Regarding Gender

From a feminist point of view Fukuyama can be faulted for overlooking the global trend in the direction of gender equality. Throughout the book *The End of History and the Last Man* (as in its title), one charge goes, Fukuyama consistently focuses on men at the expense of women. He is thus accused of basing his understanding of personhood on manhood. For instance when he discusses "equality" in *The End*

of *History*, the concept is discussed with reference to "men," not persons or human beings – thus he writes:

The Roman Empire ultimately collapsed because it established the universal equality of all men, but without recognizing their rights and inner human dignity (Fukuyama, 1992:61).

When he talks about the coming of freedom, Fukuyama's reference is similarly masculine:

Human freedom emerges only when man is able to transcend his natural, animal existence, and to create a new self for himself. The emblematic starting point for this process of self-creation is the struggle to the death for pure prestige (Fukuyama, 1992:61; 152).

In *The Great Disruption* Fukuyama stops just short of saying women were the cause of the "Great Disruption," given the way in which he discusses them at length in connection with the invention and distribution of the contraceptive pill, the baby boom, and female participation in industry. These are but a few example of a general trend in Fukuyama. However, I think Fukuyama's frequent reference to the male gender can be read in many different ways – it could be, for instance, partly because he discusses humanity during the modern era, when family life was based on patrilineality (see Tiger's "Fukuyama's Follies: So What if Women Ruled the World?" in Ehrenreich, Pollitt *et al* (1999)). Maybe Fukuyama is just trying to argue within the philosophical and ideological traditions of his antecedents. It could be also that he takes the word, 'man' to refer to both genders – male and female. But the major problem is that Fukuyama does not propose any primeval urge for superiority among women, which he emphasizes among men as the cause for struggle for recognition. This might be interpreted as meaning that issues of recognition do not matter to women.

To exacerbate the matter Fukuyama (in his article, "Women and the Evolution of World Politics," 1998) seems overly reliant on the stereotype of men being violent, men liking to start war, and men fighting for prestige (as in *The End of History*). Ehrenreich, Pollitt *et al* (1999) argue that if women were in power, they would act in the same manner men currently do, because making war is not a one-

man thing, rather, it is a collective effort. There is a track record of women involved in violence as members of the military and as members of revolutionary movements or terrorist organizations (Ehrenreich, Pollitt *et al*, 1999) – and also, more generally, of women making decisions leading to violent consequences.

Although the accusation of a sexist bias may ring true, other passages suggest that Fukuyama conceives of personhood without gender prejudice. (For instance in his discussion on “The Universal and Homogeneous State,” Fukuyama (1992:201-203) refers to “all people,” “citizens,” “all human beings”).

Since time immemorial, inequality between the two genders has been a fact of life. Fukuyama’s philosophical antecedents lived in a time when men were in control and women were not regarded as equals. However, the end of history is supposed to mean the coming of liberal democracy – a final form of government that will bring reciprocal and equal recognition and affirmation to all individuals. If men and women are not recognized as equals, the whole end of history project will be a failure.

Sen’s (1999b:115-116) idea of freedom and his capability equality approach are gender-friendly, as well befits a conception acknowledging the diversity of human existence. While Fukuyama sees the participation of women in industry as one of the causes of “the great disruption” of social order in the West, Sen (1999b:115) bemoans the fact that women in India and other developing countries are deprived of the freedom of working outside home. Sen (1999b:115) argues that a continuous and systematic denial of the freedom of women to work is “a serious violation of women’s liberty and gender equity.” It follows that “the absence of this freedom militates against the economic empowerment of women” and allows momentum for the further violation of women’s rights to accumulate (Sen, 1999b:115). We see that when it comes to gender issues, there is a major difference of emphasis between Fukuyama and Sen.

5.2.3 Cultural Diversity and Homogenization

By the 1990’s, Fukuyama (1999:10-91) argues, there was a return to the cultural preconditions of liberal democracy such as trust, the authority of moral values – especially the central liberal virtue of tolerance – and a vibrant civil society. Accompanying these historical factors are two supratemporal sources of social

order, viz.: "human nature and the spontaneous process of self-organization," that will help revive social order and sustain liberal democracy (Fukuyama, 1999:139). The aim of this section is to look into the cultural preconditions of liberal democracy, which Fukuyama uses as a touchstone for a country's fitness to attain to democracy and be homogenized into the club of liberal democracies. I will also look at cultural diversity and how it relates to homogenization.

(a) The Cultural Preconditions of Liberal Democracy

Fukuyama's antecedents serve as sources of ideas regarding which cultural preconditions must be met for liberal democracy to succeed. Culture pervades human life. According to Fukuyama (1999:10-12), the cultural preconditions for liberal democracy are individualism, pluralism, tolerance (which he sees as the cardinal virtue), moral consensus, and the rule of law (which include a democratic constitution, and the free functioning of civil society). All these cultural preconditions characterize Western civilization, giving better prospects for the success of liberal democracy.

As we have already seen in the third chapter of this thesis, Huntington (1996:28-29) argues that liberal democracy can only succeed in those countries that have a Christian heritage, especially those in the West. This is debatable because there are other places which are democracies without being Christian. After September 11, Fukuyama (2001) echoes Huntington's assertions, arguing that

Modernity has a cultural basis. Liberal democracy and free markets do not work everywhere. They work best in societies with certain values whose origins may not be entirely rational. It is not an accident that modern liberal democracy emerged first in the Christian west, since the universalism of democratic rights can be seen as a secular form of Christian universalism. The central question raised by Huntington is whether institutions of modernity will work only in the west, or whether there is something broader in their appeal that will allow them to make headway elsewhere. I believe there is. The proof lies in the progress that democracy and free markets have made in regions such as east Asia, Latin America, orthodox Europe, south Asia and even Africa. Proof lies also in the millions of developing world immigrants who vote with their feet every year to live in western societies. The flow of people moving in the opposite direction, and the number who want to blow up what they

can of the west, is by contrast negligible. ... But there does seem to be something about Islam, or at least the fundamentalist versions of Islam that have been dominant in recent years, that makes Muslim societies particularly resistant to modernity. Of all contemporary cultural systems, the Islamic world has the fewest democracies (Turkey alone qualifies), and contains no countries that have made the transition to developed nation status in the manner of South Korea or Singapore.--

The above quotation contradicts what Fukuyama has been preaching all along – that liberal democracy is the only remaining universal framework of human government that humanity has reason to embrace. Now he seems to be arguing that liberal democracy and market economy “do not work everywhere.” The quotation also shows that all forms of social life and/or organization are highly influenced by the free market and liberal democracy, the fundamental driving components of modernity today. According to Fukuyama, in the case of Islam there is no collaboration between modernity and tradition, because modernity does away with tradition by putting it under constant critical scrutiny. I think Fukuyama is wrong, because the fact that there are so many versions of Islam in the world today (fundamentalists, conservatives, liberals, etc). tells us that modernity is having an influence. Muslims are taking an inward and critical look into themselves. The reflexivity of modern life involves a continuous examination and rapid reform of social and cultural practices, in the light of a constant stream of information about the actual effects of these practices. This changes these practices, fragments the social order, and individuates communal life. If Fukuyama’s desire that all the cultures of the world become compatible with modernity is fulfilled, then the wish of many cultural groups to hand down their traditions intact will have to be disregarded. It may be true that Islam cannot accept modernity without a critical scrutiny of its intentions, but signs of compatibility between Islam and modernity abound. (Think of elections in a whole variety of Islamic nations, such as Turkey, Iran, and Indonesia).

So in some parts of Asia, Islam, in a bid to protect its tradition, does not welcome liberal democracy, because it is based on Western culture. Should Fukuyama not just admit that he wants all cultures to submit to American culture in the name of liberal democracy? What Huntington interprets as a clash of civilizations, for Fukuyama is the incompatibility of liberal democracy and Islam (Al-Braizat, 2002:269) because of their cultural differences. Fukuyama (1992:45)

points out that "Islam constitutes a systematic and coherent ideology, just like liberalism and communism, with its own code of morality and doctrine of political and social justice." Thus, Islam is seen as a threat to liberal democracy because it cannot accommodate modernity (Al-Braizat, 2002:272).

Al-Braizat (2002:272) accuses Fukuyama of cultural essentialism and oversimplification by "equating universalism of democratic right to Christian universalism." He (Al-Braizat, 2002:272) argues that the cultural precondition for democracy cannot be a religion or the culture of a particular country, in this case the United States of America. He writes:

For all democratic states today are more or less secular. Moreover, the introduction of Christianity to Africa did not bring about Liberal democracies. Further, if one equates the universalism of democratic rights to Christian universalism, why did Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and Latin America not develop liberal democracies and capitalist free-market economy [sic] simultaneously with Western Europe? Instead they developed systems of an opposite nature: political authoritarianism and economic communism as opposed to democracy and free markets. Fukuyama's cultural yardstick of "Christian universalism" does not account for Japan's (Confucian) democracy and free market. Catholic Christian societies are different from the protestant Christian societies. They have different patterns of development and have experienced similar circumstances to some Islamic, Buddhist, Orthodox Christian, and Confucian societies. The fortunes of democracy in many of these societies explicitly indicate that there is more to the story than religion and cultural tradition (Al-Braizat, 2002:272).

Fukuyama can thus be accused of falling prey to cultural essentialism and disregarding the diversity of human existence.

The liberal society that Fukuyama envisages is a society that he claims will be homogeneous both politically and culturally. It thus links up with the traditional thrust of the Enlightenment – the dissolution of cultural variations through reason. If Heywood (2000:598) is correct to argue that "liberalism rejects both the view that cultures, communities and states are ends in themselves and the view that social and political organizations should aim to reform or perfect human nature," then Fukuyama's liberal democracy will find it hard to penetrate communities like the Islamic ones that value their cultural identity.

Sen is not caught up in the problem of the incompatibility with modernity that has characterized and endangered Fukuyama's engagement with the Muslim world. He (Sen, 1999a:3) rejects the approach of the 19th century theorists of democracy who "found it quite natural to discuss whether one country or another was 'fit for democracy.'" Sen (1999a:3) argues that "[a] country does not have to be deemed fit for democracy, rather, it has to become fit through democracy," whether it is culturally compatible with liberal democracy or not. Although he argues strongly in favour of democracy, Sen does not tell us which ideological tradition he follows, telling us which political values he prefers instead: democracy, freedom, and equality. He (Sen, 1999a:5) sees "democracy as a universal value" because it has become "a dominant belief in the contemporary world." But he does not choose liberalism or any other ideology as his starting point. He takes it for granted that democracy is conducive to freedom.

(b) Cultural Diversity

There is an over-emphasis on universalism in Fukuyama's declaration of the triumph of liberal democracy. He tries to see liberal democracy as something that is naturally emerging and that can be accepted as something given and fixed. According to him, any other ideological system of polity and gain that may emerge will be overcome by liberal democracy. This compels Fukuyama to revisit Kant's idea of a universal history, Hegel-as-interpreted-by-Kojève's notion of the end of history and Marx's idea of history as driven by class conflict. In so doing, Fukuyama sets human history in motion under the thrust of the European Enlightenment in order to create a homogeneous liberal state with a single culture. It is well known that liberal democracy is a Western cultural product that always displays Western values. If taken as such it aims at reaching an ideological homogenisation that will see the creation of a liberal state whereby the satisfaction of human desire is systematized and universalised. Fukuyama paints a picture of the liberal project – through liberal democracy – that aims at establishing one specific kind of political and economic system across all human communities, regardless of whatever differences in culture or values they may exhibit. This project displays its ethical shortcomings especially in the question of economic equality. In it we find the commitment to the ontological presuppositions of moral

objectivism based on assumptions of rationality and the scarcity of resources which are taken to be universal propositions (DeMartino, 2000).

Sen, on the other hand, makes much of diversities in human existence and values. Ignoring these diversities and trying to make human existence the same everywhere is extremely dangerous. Being conscious of this, Sen also argues that any social ethics must allow a dimension of freedom for people to co-exist, to pursue well-being in their own way. Sen's conception of diversity does not imply anarchy. On the contrary, he expects the individual citizens of his ideal society to act responsibly and not to violate each other's rights. This is unlikely to simply follow from the free acts of individual citizens; Sen thus has strong views regarding the necessity of state intervention.

5.2.4 Parallel Histories within a History

Like Marx, Fukuyama appropriates Hegel's dialectical method, but unlike Marx, he takes it to a metaphysical level in the way he adopts Hegel's ideas of the struggle for recognition. Hence he writes:

Life in a liberal democracy is potentially the road to great material abundance, but it also shows us the way to the completely non-material end of recognition of our freedom. The liberal democratic state values us at our own sense of self-worth. Thus both the desiring and thymotic parts of our souls find satisfaction.

In an attempt to illustrate the universality of the twin human desires for material accumulation and recognition, Fukuyama transforms this empirical-metaphysical conception of history into two parallel histories. The first history, economic history, is driven by scientific endeavour, whereby nations acquire military technologies as a means to defend their independence and sovereignty. This leads nations into a race of continuous accumulation of wealth leading to the necessity of creating markets for their products, so that in the end everything is channelled into the economic framework of capitalism. Fukuyama argues that the success of capitalism will attract those nations currently still outside the free market economy. This will make them abandon the other alternatives they have been embracing, so that they join the free market economy. Finally, capitalism will be the last economic ideology at the end of economic history. The second history, parallel to economic

history, is driven by the human desire for recognition. Humankind will shift its passion from material accumulation to the satisfaction of the thymotic urge and the desire for recognition. Desire for recognition becomes the force driving human history in the direction of world democratization, and hence the universalization of human satisfaction. One can accuse Fukuyama of dividing human history into two parallel rails rather than viewing it as a single, integrated human history that sees humanity simultaneously pursuing both material well-being and recognition, which would allow the synergy between liberal democracy and capitalism to be seen in a holistic way. Fukuyama's declaration of the triumph of liberalism rests on far reaching suppositions, most crucially that of a progressive, coherent, and directional "Universal History," an idea which he appropriates from Immanuel Kant. The combination of liberalism and a progressive Universal History tells of a goal to be achieved at the end of history, when liberal democracy ushers in a new world order of political peace and global economic prosperity.

In *Trust*, Fukuyama (1995:xiii) turns to what he thinks will make the world economy successful after history, when the universal liberal state has become a reality. He (Fukuyama, 1995:xiii) turns to economics because he believes that "economics is almost inevitable," as "virtually all political questions today revolve around economic ones." If the end of history is to take place, which Fukuyama believes is irreversible, because history is directional and goal-oriented, then the global economy under global capitalism must be consensually accepted for it to bring about economic prosperity in the universal liberal society after history. Fukuyama tries to identify what hindrances there are to achieving such prosperity and concludes that the major one is a lack of social trust. (He sees social trust as a by-product of social capital). Thus people wanting to do business successfully must be able to socialize with, and trust, those falling outside their family or religious circle. Fukuyama (1995) claims that societies with strong family bonds of trust like China, have low social trust and low social capital, which hinders them from building successful businesses beyond the confines of the family. On the other hand societies with weak family bonds, such as the United States, Japan and most Protestant countries, have high social trust and high social capital, and were thus able to establish big and successful businesses – often transnational companies.

Fukuyama (1995:356) claims that it is social capital that keeps “capitalism and democracy so closely related.” To maintain “a healthy capitalist economy,” there must “be sufficient social capital in the underlying society to permit businesses, corporations, networks, and the like to be self-organizing” (Fukuyama, 1995:356).

As Fukuyama warns us on the possible hindrances to the success of the development of global capitalism, so he also tries to warn us of the hindrances to the development of a global political order after history. His argument in *The Great Disruption* is that the future of liberal democracy is threatened by increasing conflict between individualism and community morals (See 5.2.1 above).

As he concludes *The Great Disruption*, Fukuyama returns to the arguments in *The End of History*. He (Fukuyama, 1999:280-282) claims that “since contemporary liberal democracies today enshrine this principle of universal recognition,” they are the best vehicles for facilitating productive sociability and promoting moral consensus under the guidelines of “universal obligations for tolerance and mutual respect.” We can therefore look forward to “a long-term progressive evolution of human political institutions in the direction of liberal democracy” (Fukuyama, 1999:281).

Sen (1999b:147), like Fukuyama, is also confronted with the problem of the dichotomy of political freedom (political history) and economic needs (economic history), which he puts in question form: “What should come first – removing poverty and misery, or guaranteeing political liberty and civil rights, for which poor people have little use anyway?” There is a general tendency for people to “undermine the relevance of political freedoms because the economic needs are so urgent” or vice versa (Sen, 1999b:147). Sen (1999b:147) rejects such an approach to solving problems because he believes that there are “extensive interconnections between political freedoms and the understanding and fulfilment of economic needs.” He does not separate the confluence of economics and politics. For him it is wrong to think in terms of a parallel movement of two histories. The complete human condition of existence needs *both* democratic politics so that people have the freedom to function and choose the opportunities they want, *and* market economics for satisfying people’s material needs. Thus both politics and economics play a very important role in the individual’s pursuit of well-being.

Sen (1999b) points out that for many years, theorists thought that development revolves around the hub of industrialization and juridical institutions (to protect property and arbitrate in civil disputes). This proved too narrow as a framework, because it completely neglected freedom. But now, argues Sen, development has a broader aim, that of increasing the opportunity for all individuals to achieve those things that they have reason to value. For Sen, the new, broader goal of development is the substantial freedom that is brought about when countries embrace democracy. Industrialization alone does not assure well-being – health, longevity, proper education, the capability to participate in political processes that affect people’s lives. The democratization of political communities is a necessary precondition for development, because it enables citizens to express their dissent and to contribute to the political process in their country on an ongoing basis. For Sen, to fail to democratize is to support the *status quo*, which means to support the continuation of “unfreedoms.”

5.2.5 Desire-satisfaction *Versus* Need-satisfaction

According to various social contract theories (see Chapter 1) members of the state of nature agreed to form a government to arbitrate their disputes. This was a move for securing a chance for self-preservation. For Fukuyama material well-being was all that was at the stake in this move. In the state of nature, members of society were not concerned with recognition. According to Fukuyama, it is only in Hegel’s *Phenomenology* where humankind is claimed to have reached maturity by moving away from the desire for material well-being to the desire for recognition. This matured human desire, having remained unsatisfied for a long time, is satisfied in Hegel with the coming of the homogeneous state, which Kojève interprets as liberalism. With the fall of Communism, Fukuyama sees liberal democracy as coming to the rescue of humankind, satisfying its desire for respect and dignity by way of the recognition and affirmation of individual rights. While Fukuyama focuses on the need for material well-being and the desire for recognition, Sen focuses on the general lack most people experience of everything that is constitutive to well-being and fundamental to freedom. For Sen need-satisfaction refers to dealing with the basic fulfilment of the need for well-being. It must be borne in mind that a desire gets fulfilled or satisfied “just in case its object comes to exist” (Sumner,

1996:149). If the object satisfying the desire for recognition does not exist, then Fukuyama's claim that liberal democracy ultimately fulfils this desire becomes empty.

Fukuyama's tone in the end of history project suggests that the universality and objectivity of liberal democracy have become a fact. Fukuyama tends to equate desire fulfilment with well-being – which is rather subjective. In his capability approach to need-satisfaction, Sen makes well-being independent of our actual or possible desires.

It is my opinion that before one talks about desires, one should talk about the basic needs of people. I think Sen is being realistic in making us, to borrow Hicks' (2000) words, "think society not economy" by placing economic life within the "wider context of personal and societal well-being," whereby an ideal society works to "convert as efficiently as possible, economic wealth into human capabilities." This kind of thinking changes the whole conceptualisation and purpose of economic development. In the past it used to be concerned with the massive production of commodities, or the over-accumulation of wealth, but Sen shows that it can be used to expand people's freedoms or capabilities to function and achieve well-being in their diverse communities. Hicks (2000) correctly argues that it is relevant (following Sen's line of thought) to ask "Are people well nourished? Are they able to obtain a good education? Can they appear in public without shame?" This would be in contrast to Fukuyama's focus, which seems to suggest that people, at some point in life, stop needing food, shelter, and water, and then switch to the search for recognition. The over-emphasis on the satisfaction of the desire for recognition dominates Fukuyama's ideology, and while it pays attention to both the individual and the community, the former is privileged over the latter.

5.3 CONCLUSION

Liberal individualism is the central focus of liberalism, and today, of liberal democracy – suggesting that every individual is fully satisfied. However, it is unlikely that every individual can be satisfied, since the primeval urge for superiority and self-interest (gain) continues to push the individual to satisfy his ego at others' expense. I maintain that liberal democracy has not yet overcome

this problem; in fact the problem has increased as individuals become less satisfied either as a result of scarce resources and the increase of the population, or of ever increasing aspirations. Think of the influence of advertising, for instance.

The recognition of the individual as a person should be understood in terms of gender equity. Fukuyama erred in this respect and caused a furore among feminists. His book *The End of History* seems to suggest that the primeval urge that pushes men to struggle for recognition does not affect women. One may be compelled to think that women have nothing to do with democracy because they do not need freedom to achieve well-being, but of course they too yearn for their individual freedom to pursue all that they value most. Cultural diversity must also be recognized, so that there is no imposition of the cultural preconditions of one group over another in the name of fulfilling the objective conditions for the success of liberal democracy. If liberal democracy cannot work with all cultures, then it cannot be a universal and homogeneous form of government unless it happens under colonialism or some form of domination – which would make it cease being liberal democracy. We saw for instance that it clashes with Islam, because Islam cannot accept the cultural preconditions of liberal democracy.

Fukuyama acknowledges both the need for material well-being and the desire for recognition. Because the former has largely been met in the West, his emphasis is on the latter – to such an extent that the need for material well-being, which is still largely unsatisfied in the developing world, ends up being sorely neglected. While Fukuyama trumpets liberal democracy as satisfying the desire for recognition, he also shows that excessive individualism in liberal democracies inhibits reciprocal recognition.

Fukuyama gives this panoramic and utopian view of liberal democracy against the backdrop of the fall of socialism. One is compelled to ask: Is Fukuyama not overhasty in writing, to borrow Siegel's (1993) words, "the premature obituary of socialism" before it is completely dead? Is it true that socialism has collapsed for good? Can it not be that, in the succession of shapes, socialism has moved into another shape, which Fukuyama and the rest of us do not see or understand at the moment? Socialism is perhaps just temporarily defeated, not dead. This implies that it has the potential of coming back, just as liberalism has made a comeback in the triumph of liberal democracy.

If liberal democracy is incompatible with Islam and other cultures, that suggests that it is something for a particular community, not for the whole world. It seems to have cultural preconditions that are specifically western, not African or Asian. If so, the obvious reaction to Fukuyama's offer of liberal democracy will be rejection. The danger is that to beat the incompatibility problem liberal democrats will go around various countries in Africa, Asia or other parts of the world, campaigning for a 'regime change,' crusading to dethrone those governments that do not agree with liberal democracy. Whether this is done through military might, through the financial clout of the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank, or by the threat of withdrawing aid is immaterial. Fukuyama does not leave room for the possible failure of liberal democracy, for he is convinced that it is a success, yet he has not demonstrated convincingly that it is the best of all possible systems of governance.

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS

6. 1 RECAPITULATION: THE MAIN IDEAS OF THE STUDY

In this section I discuss the main findings obtained from the study undertaken in the previous chapters.

The *first chapter* looks at how Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant use the theory of social contract to explain the genesis and justification of the state. Featuring prominently in all their versions of social contract are ideas of free, equal, and independent individuals, the process of consensus, the primacy of self-preservation and the necessity of the state. Hobbes' point of departure is the hypothetical state of nature where we encounter free and equal individuals without a government to arbitrate their disputes, for it is natural in the state of nature to fight for anything needed to satisfy one's desires – for instance, the desire for glory. The drastic modernity of Hobbesian inflexible individualism, underlying his social contract, presents the idea of the basic and inalienable right of self-preservation. This brings in the reason to have a juridical authority – Hobbes's absolute monarchy, which replaces inherited monarchy. Though Hobbes was not a liberal, shaking off inherited monarchy was a bold move, which laid the basis for a philosophically reasoned and progressive theory of politics. Thus, according to Fukuyama, it was a first step of political thought in the direction of liberalism and democracy. Because it was also *only* a first step, it does not offer a good foundation on which to build democracy.

While Hobbes' version of the state of nature is negative – the war of all against all – Locke's is presented in positive terms – people living together without having a common political authority over them, but under the guidance of natural law – reason, as applied to morals. Locke's social contract also differs from that of Hobbes, in being against absolute sovereignty, and in being mainly democratic in nature; for he argues for limited political authority over the individual – hence the function of the constitutional monarchy and the representative government is basically to respect and protect the natural rights of the individual. When citizens consensually institute the body politic, they bring all that they possess into the body politic for safety and security, but the state does not have territorial

jurisdiction over the owners and their possessions. The idea of consent in the formation of the state is what legitimizes the state's political authority and power – citizens consent so as to have their freedom and rights safeguarded. This – the value of consensus and representative government – takes Locke a step further towards liberalism than Hobbes. However, Locke also falls short of being a liberal democrat because his theory lacks the aspect of political parties, and especially, opposition parties.

Rousseau rejects Hobbes' hypothetical state of nature. Instead, he pursues a defiant idea of collectivism that progresses unto the realization of the social contract. For Rousseau the social contract is supposed to solve the problem of inequality between individual citizens by instituting a sovereign assembly. The *general will* works as the source of the law (conditions of civil association) and sovereignty (body politic), as well as the basis of political right. In spite of the criticism that his *general will* erodes particular (or individual) interest, Rousseau, like Locke, propagates a radical and innovative idea of a representative democracy that gives freedom and equality to the entire citizen body and safeguards the basic dignity of humankind. Rousseau is not a liberal, because for him individual interests are not a priority; the sovereign assembly takes precedence and there is no mechanism of checks and balances to limit the coercive authority of the popular sovereignty.

The theory of *laissez-faire* calls for non-interference, thereby laying the foundation for a free market economy. This doctrine was reaffirmed in the thought of Adam Smith, Ricardo, Mill and Bentham. Because of their emphasis on the value of freedom above everything, they deserve the epithet of "libertarians." With the fall of communism in the late 20th century, the maxims of *laissez-faire* are revived, and the idea of *laissez-faire* regains its dominance in Europe, America, and some other parts of the world.

The *second chapter* discusses the teleological view of history underlying the philosophical theories of history propagated by Kant, Hegel, and Marx – each of these thinkers assumes that history is moving towards an end point or the fulfilment of a purpose. Kant's universal cosmopolitanism introduces the idea of a universal history that is based on the possibility of a constant advancement of human freedom, rationality, morality and political development. Kant's teleocosmos suggests the end of history at some point in time as human history

progresses. At the end of history, humanity will have matured rationally, and through good reasoning will unite under an original contract to form a civil society that will produce a just civic constitution that assumes a universal nature – hence the idea of the League of Nations.

Fundamental to Hegel's philosophy of history is the law of contradiction that propels the dialectical movement of history towards its end. This dialectical process of history is characterized by the human desire for recognition. The struggle for recognition ends with mutual recognition between conflicting individuals as well as the realization, and absolute knowledge, of freedom. Marx adopts Hegel's law of contradiction in order to frame his theory of history – historical materialism. His claim is that all human history is a history of class struggle. Marx sees the end of history as the overcoming of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat. This leads to the superseding of capitalism by socialism and the ultimate triumph of a classless society in communism. In this chapter it was concluded that at the centre of the three philosophies is the belief that history has an end point, and that at its end point it will have attained universality. This is an idea that Fukuyama appropriates to envisage the universality of liberal democracy.

The *third chapter* surveys the many forms of government that, true to the method of Hegelian dialectic and the law of contradiction, have competed with each other over the centuries, the one sometimes superseding the other. These are Hobbes' absolute monarchy, Locke's constitutional monarchy and representative government, Rousseau's sovereign representative assembly, Hitler's Nazism and Mussolini's fascism. Last but not least we had the ideology of socialism as a prelude to communism. Fukuyama argues that systems of government that have fewer contradictions tend to supersede systems that have more contradictions. After the fall of fascism and Nazism, only two ideological contenders were left, namely socialism-to-be-followed-by-communism and liberal democracy. When communism finally also collapsed, liberal democracy was the only remaining option. Drawing on Kant's idea of universal history, Hegel's notion of a universal and homogeneous state and Marx's materialist interpretation of history, Fukuyama envisages a global order that will be ushered in by the universal and homogeneous liberal state which is the ultimate goal of liberal democracy. So it is the duty of the liberal state to ensure equal and mutual recognition and affirmation of its citizens' freedom.

In his argument, Fukuyama distinguishes between two parallel histories in an attempt to illustrate the universality of the human desires for material accumulation and recognition. The first, economic history, is in our time driven by scientific endeavour, which impacts enormously on how well nations fare in the arms race, and are thus able to defend their independence and sovereignty. As some of these competing nations perfect their technology, in the process they produce more than they need, and thus can sell the surplus to others. This leads to the creation of markets for their products and also the creation of labour markets for those who want to seek new technological knowledge or expertise in order to sell their labour to the highest bidder. Everything is consequently channelled into the economic framework of capitalism and the free market economy. The second history is driven by the human desire for recognition. What is at stake here is not the passion for material accumulation, but the thymotic urge, the desire for recognition. The desire for recognition becomes the driving force of human history in the direction of world democratization, which brings with it the universalization of human satisfaction.

Fukuyama claims that social capital is what links capitalism to liberal democracy. A well functioning capitalist economy depends on the presence of sufficient social capital in society to allow businesses, corporations, networks, and the like to be self-organizing. As he warns us on the possible obstacles to the successful development of global capitalism, he also warns us of the obstacles to the development of a global political order after history. In *The Great Disruption* Fukuyama argues that the future of liberal democracy is threatened by an increasing conflict between individualism and community morals. This will result in social disruption, posing a severe threat to liberal democracy, which needs a stable social order to succeed.

Fukuyama's claim of the end of history was challenged after the September 11 attack, when public thinking shifted from Fukuyama's claim to Huntington's counter-claim that what is at stake is not a conflict of ideologies but a clash of civilizations.

The *fourth chapter* stages a debate between Fukuyama and Sen in which the question of life satisfaction and its achievability is addressed. Fukuyama claims that human beings desire recognition, and can best satisfy this desire through liberal democracy. Sen for his part, claims that people need well-being, and can

only achieve it through democracy, which he views as a universal value. The discussion shows that although Fukuyama and Sen may share similar political values they differ ideologically and in historical vision.

The *fifth chapter* deals with the critical evaluation of liberal democracy. Several issues present major problems for liberal democracy. These issues are liberal individualism as the central focus of liberalism and liberal democracy; the global trend against gender bias; the political and cultural homogenization of the world; the problem of parallel histories versus a single inclusive history; desire-satisfaction *versus* need-satisfaction, and the cultural preconditions of liberal democracy. Fukuyama concedes that culture pervades all forms of government and maintains that liberal democracy will only work if implemented within its cultural preconditions. It is this last issue that destroys all hope that liberal democracy will work in places other than America and Europe. Liberal democracy will not be adopted where these cultural preconditions are not appreciated or have not been cultivated. Liberal democracy cannot be imposed successfully under such conditions, either.

6.2 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

The End of History

According to Fukuyama's idiosyncratic use of the notion of 'end of history,' history is goal-oriented, directional, and progressive. Its goal is for humankind to realize absolute knowledge of their freedom. He argues that humankind has tried many other forms of government, in the hope of having individual freedoms recognized and protected against the whims of government, but none of them delivered the goods they had promised.

The "end of history" view also depicts a situation in which humankind has reached an end point in their endeavour to find a satisfactory political and economic framework for organizing society. At the end of history liberal democracy remains as the only ideology that enables humankind to have a government that recognizes their freedom and affirms their rights. Fukuyama is persuasive in presenting his argument. He has carefully chosen his examples to illustrate the ideological conflicts that took place between the time of Hobbes' absolute

monarchism and the time of communism. Everything seems to fit beautifully into his Hegelian-Marxian dialectic method. However, what works (or seems to work) in theory need not do so in practice, as becomes evident when one looks for empirical counterexamples.

If humankind has indeed found the ultimate system of governance, this would stop them from further experimenting. But the human mind is still as inquisitive as ever, so this is unlikely to occur. If despite these objections, one still believes in an end to history, one can view this in a very different way than Fukuyama does. For socialists the end of history could for example mean that we are in an era where the workers of the world are facing hard times under liberal governments. Such anti-globalization socialists, united in their protest at the World Trade Organization conference in Seattle, could draw courage from such an alternative view of the end of history.

I maintain that until such demonstrations like the Seattle one and many others to come have stopped, and all people have accepted without coercion liberal democracy as the ultimate form of governance, we will not have reached the end of history envisaged by Fukuyama.

Individualism

My view is that the whole of Fukuyama's "end of history" work referred to in this thesis puts the individual above the community. As a result it appears that liberal democracy leads to miniaturization of community and the emergence of excessive individualization – a situation that worries Fukuyama himself. Even if Fukuyama does attempt to address these drawbacks, they will still feature, because liberal democracy is built on cultural preconditions that develop from a tradition that has been fighting for, to borrow Cohen's (1999:233) words, "an ideal that emphasizes personal happiness over all other concerns," undermining the individual's "capacity for exhibiting civic virtue or social solidarity, both of which require commitment and self-restraint."

Fukuyama champions the cause of the recognition of the freedom of the individual and the affirmation of the individual's rights. By so doing Fukuyama is showing the worthiness of every individual in society. The problem with Fukuyama's notion of recognition is that it continues to give absolute priority to the

rights of the individual, as already found in Hobbes and Locke, and to care less about the duty of the individual to communal life. Fukuyama is highly aware that individualism is strong enough to destroy social order – hence his warning that many liberal democracies have fallen prey to it. The conclusion Fukuyama should have drawn is that the very individualism he warns against is an intrinsic part, or perhaps essential by-product, of the very ideal he espouses, liberal democracy. One shudders at the thought of a globalization of the individualism found in what Fukuyama (1995:303) himself has described as “the black underclass of America,” where individuals are unwilling to make any provision for each other’s inclinations, resulting in the depletion of social capital and the disintegration of society. One also wonders why Fukuyama wishes the world to inherit a tradition where there is no balance between the individual and the community.

Individualism conceives of the individual as an absolute or fixed unit, instead of a being only gaining substance in a social context. This absoluteness or completeness of the individual is described in terms of freedom, rights, and independence. Instead of individualism, I would accept individuality. Individuality refers to the uniqueness of a person without turning the person into an absolute entity without social inclinations. The idea of individuality gives room to one’s uniqueness while at the same time recognizing one’s social being. Thus one is a free and independent being who cherishes the same rights as others do, but with a strong social consciousness that makes one aware of one’s responsibility to communal life. This means that one takes responsibility for ensuring that communal life gives due respect to the individual’s dignity.

Fukuyama shows the importance of recognizing every individual by affording him or her freedom, rights, and independence. He wishes a society of *isothymia* – equal recognition. However he runs into the problems of *megalothymia* - the desire for superiority of the individual, that tends to subvert existing social institutions such as families and a communal moral authority by miniaturizing the community, and thus causing *community disenfranchisement*. He thinks that the dangers of excessive individualism can be averted by invoking social capital. The major problem with Fukuyama’s idea of social capital is that it produces market-oriented relationships and thus does not address the threat to communal relations in other spheres than business and the market.

A sense of duty to communal life encourages a sense of interdependency, while an overemphasis on rights encourages the individualistic atomization of society. In my view, the individual's rights should be promoted sufficiently to protect his or her right to life and dignity and all that comes with it. In addition the individual should be encouraged equally strongly to acknowledge and fulfil his or her duties to society, as a way of maintaining a closely knit community. This will fulfil the desire for freedom and equality as a human being recognized by other members of the community.

Freedom and Equality

Regarding freedom and equality Fukuyama picks up where his predecessors left off. For them freedom was needed just to be able to pursue material well-being – self-preservation. For Fukuyama we need to be free in order to be able to recognize each other's freedom. Fukuyama argues convincingly that liberal democracy has brought freedom to the people. He goes a step further when he claims that it is the best of all possible political forms of governance and that it has brought freedom to humankind – freedom of the individual to pursue both material and thymotic desires.

In my opinion, some of the values of liberal democracy, such as freedom and equality (foundational or formal equality, and equality of opportunity or outcome), embody ideals worthy of universal acceptance. These twin values stress that humankind is capable of reflection, able to make rational choices, is creative, can engage in communal solidarity, has rights, and can lead a virtuous life. As such they have inescapable political and economic implications, because the social world in which an individual lives demands political and economic institutions. On the one hand these institutions encourage and protect one's freedom to be creative, one's right to participate in the process of political decision making, and to cultivate rational choices; on the other hand, these institutions exert pressure to discourage the human greed and self-centredness that can lead to the violation of other people's rights.

Fukuyama is wrong to claim that liberal democracy, having succeeded in bringing freedom to all people in the West, has definitely vanquished all its contenders, past and future, so that no other form of government will ever be able

to supersede it. This contradicts the whole idea of the directionality of history under the regulatory mechanism of scientific endeavour, because scientific endeavour evolves ever onwards, without ever reaching a teleological goal. Human thinking and inquiry into the human context does not just end because liberal democracy has brought freedom today. It is possible that some socialist or other form of government is in the making that will be as good or better than liberal democracy, that is, have less internal contradictions than liberal democracy.

Desire for Recognition

Fukuyama attempts to do justice to human history by looking back at the various inclinations of humankind. Out of the whole collection of human needs he chooses to focus on only certain desires or appetites. His focus is biased towards the West that has already achieved material well-being. But what about those communities where the basic need for material well-being is still unfulfilled? Everybody knows that in many parts of the developing world, people still need shelter, clothing, and food. We cannot talk of a desire for recognition as something separate from one's basic needs. To me Fukuyama is wrong to think that the whole world shares the same desire – the yearning to have the desire for recognition satisfied. Thus one cannot universalize desire and its fulfilment. It is true that television advertisements and the internet reach many parts of the world, and many people seem to admire Western consumerism and the desires it is geared at. The problem here is that there are many entrenched interests that welcome and foster a drive towards consumerism – even of political “products” – while even the most basic needs have not been met. If an individual is offered the freedom to pursue his or her needs, or to participate significantly in the political process – for instance participation in the general elections of his or her country – then that to me is recognition. The central thing that should be sought by every member of the community is the freedom to do the things he or she values most, and to be the kind of person he or she has reason to value.

Universal History

According to Fukuyama, the spread of liberal democracy and the realization of every individual's freedom in many parts of the world unlocks a pattern of a universal history in the-making, as people anticipate an end point of history. Fukuyama alerts the world that there are a set of principles at work underlying human history that can be uncovered by a philosophy of history drawing on Kant, Hegel, and Marx. These underlying principles relate to the individual's place in the dialectical movement of a goal oriented history that has to culminate in the recognition of every individual's freedom.

Though Fukuyama's attempt to show how everything fits in a Hegelian-Marxian dialectical philosophy of history is impressive, it is still possible that there could be another understanding of the universality of history not yet discovered, rather than thinking that it only unfolds when the world consensually receives liberal democracy and every individual is able to have full knowledge of his freedom and rights. Of course this would be a good thing if it were possible to achieve. Fukuyama's implication, however, is that individuals are only able to realize their freedoms and rights in the event of a homogeneous liberal state. It is not possible for liberal democracy to be a universal ideological framework and system of governance for all human communities of the world – firstly, because of the fact of cultural diversity; secondly, because of liberal democracy's ingrained tendency to flatten cultural diversity by imposing Western cultural values and practices upon other cultures. The tendency of its practitioners to overlook cultural variety impedes its reception as the sole and valid framework for governance and distribution, and frequently leads to its outright rejection.

The synthesis of Kant's idea of a universal history, Hegel's homogeneous state, and Marx's internationalization of the labour market, makes Fukuyama's view of history, freedom and recognition a rich one.

What upsets Fukuyama's apple cart is his belief that there are parts of the world that are still in history, while others are beyond history because for them it has ended with the arrival of liberal democracy. This introduces a fundamental unclarity into Fukuyama's "end of history" project. World history becomes something like the eclipse of the sun, that does not cover the whole world.

Trust

Trust occupies a central place in Fukuyama's discussion of social capital, because he tries to prove that trust within family circles does not help in the development of the type of big business on which large economies depend. Fukuyama is correct to argue that trust builds up social capital, which in turn contributes to economic growth. However, Fukuyama makes a mistake similar to the one Hegel made in giving an overview of world history, when Hegel claims that Africa does not have history. This happens when Fukuyama divides the world into countries with high trust and countries with low trust, implying that countries with low trust are never compatible with large-scale business. However countries that are high trust are also extremely individualistic, so that their citizens can be expected to mistrust other individuals, the family and the institutions of the state – none of which is in the least conducive to interpersonal interaction nor, by the same token, to business. Fukuyama himself shows that in America there are situations where people are so over-individualized that they cannot do anything together.

I think that economic development depends far more on people's freedom to do what they themselves think can help the community achieve economic growth. Certainly trust is a crucial component for economic development and prosperity, but it should assume more of a social character and be less market oriented than it is Fukuyama. For if social capital is to be built on market terms, there is always a catch – that of social disruption because a moral dimension is absent.

The other problem is that Fukuyama thinks that trust is only crucial in democratic societies. This is not true at all. Trust also plays a central role in non-democratic societies, such as Gaddafi's Libya, or Hitler's Germany. So we should not think of trust only in terms of economic benefits, but also in terms of its moral significance for communal development.

Sovereignty

Fukuyama's notion of the "end of history" should be seen against the backdrop of the 'new world order.' As already shown in the first chapter, the human striving for a new world order that guarantees peace and stability has historical roots that go

back very far. Up until the Cold War, there was a '*multi-polar* world order' – like in the Hobbesian state of nature – characterized by colonial wars, wars of greed, wars of ambition and gain, and all the other forms of instability that led to World War I and World War II. This *multi-polar* world order proved to be dangerous, and offered insufficient guarantees of peace and stability to afford well-being. After the first and second World Wars there was a renewed attempt to create a "new world order" to secure peace and stability. But of course out of this process a 'new *bi-polar* world order' emerged with the two superpowers – the United States and the Soviet Union – at each other's throat, in what is commonly known as the Cold War. At the demise of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, a "new *uni-polar* world order" emerged with the United States as the only remaining superpower. It is to this *uni-polar* world order that Fukuyama attaches the label of the end of history, suggesting that there is an international consensus in favour of liberal democracy.

Fukuyama takes the social contract idea of *consensus* and uses it, as he expects people worldwide to agree with the claims of liberal democracy and consensually receive it as the sole, universal and valid form of government. He tries to show us that liberal democracy works with substantive consensus on fundamental issues that benefit every individual. Hence, some day there will be consensual reception of liberal democracy by all of humanity and consequently a liberal state will be established. The major problem with this is that there is a tendency for liberal societies to undervalue other societies and overlook their uniqueness. This is the reason why liberal democracy is unlikely to succeed in the Islamic world – barring the use of military means, their desire to maintain their traditions is invincible. Such a consensus is unlikely to arise because the insistence by nation-states on their sovereignty does not allow any shift from the nation-state to a homogeneous and universal liberal state, characterized by a market economy and liberal democracy, as espoused by Fukuyama. This is because these nation-states fear disenfranchisement and assimilation.

Cultural Preconditions

Although accused by his critics of being a cultural essentialist, I think Fukuyama is right to show that liberal democracy has a cultural foundation. Thus liberal democracy can only work under cultural preconditions emanating from a long

Western tradition. All proponents of liberal democracy must bear in mind that liberal democracy may fail in societies lacking these Western cultural preconditions. Every ideological framework has a cultural basis. That basis must be maintained for it to succeed. Despite Fukuyama's claim that liberal democracy is the sole valid system of governance with universal pretensions, there will never be sufficient consensus to receive it as a universal system, because not all people subscribe to its cultural preconditions. The other thing is that at the moment the world cannot have a common culture unless one is made up, as a way to come up with cultural habits that are compatible with liberal democracy. I maintain that liberal democracy will always get a mixed reception because there will never be sufficient consensus regarding its desirability.

6.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS

Due to its internal contradictions, such as the tension between excessive individualism and community, liberal democracy has unintended negative consequences. I thus conclude that liberal democracy is not yet the final ideology leading to human satisfaction at a global level for this generation and generations to come. This will remain the case as long as scientific development continues, as long as rational thought does not come to an end and as long as Fukuyama's admission that liberal democracy only works where its cultural preconditions are met, remains true.

REFERENCES

- ADORATSKY, V.** (ed). 1943. *Marx, K. and Engels, F.: Selected Works*, 2 Volumes. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- AL-BRAIZAT, F.** 2002. Muslims and Democracy: An Empirical Critique of Fukuyama's Culturalist Approach. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, Volume 43(3-5): 269-299.
- ANONYMOUS.** 1993. Laissez-faire (*In:* R. McHenry (ed). *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica* (Micropædia Ready Reference), Volume 7. London: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc pp. 105-106).
- ANONYMOUS.** 2002. Review of Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man* [<http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Ithaca/history.htm>] [Date of Access: February 8, 2003].
- ANONYMOUS.** 2003. Francis Fukuyama. [Website: <http://www.sais-jhu.edu/faculty/fukuyama/biograph.htm>] [Date of Access: April 30, 2003].
- ANONYMOUS.** 2003. Individualist Philosophy: The Foundation of Independent Living. [Website: <http://www.individualistvoice.com/philo.htm>]. [Date of Access: October 8, 2003].
- ANONYMOUS.** 2003. Liberalism (*In:* P. Legassé (ed). *The Columbia Encyclopaedia (Sixth Edition)*). Columbia: Columbia University Press. [Website: <http://www.bartleby.com/65/li/liberali.htm>] [Date of Access: February 2, 2004].
- ANSELL-PEARSON, K.** 1991. *Nietzsche contra Rousseau: A Study of Nietzsche's Moral and Political Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- ARNESON, R. J.** 1992. Introduction (*In:* R. J. Arneson (ed). *Liberalism Volume 1*. Brookfield: Edward Elgar. pp. xi-xxiv).

- ASIAWEEK.** 1999. Democracy and Crisis: Openness, Participation and Accountability can become the new "Asian Values." [Website: <http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/99/0409/cs1.html>] [Date of Access: September 2, 2003].
- ATKINSON, R. F.** 1988. Philosophy of History (*in:* G. H. R. Parkinson, (ed). *An Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. London: Routledge. pp. 807-830.).
- ATTIAS, B.** 2002a. A Prehistory of Postmodernism: Hegel, Kojève, Mauss, Bataille [<http://www.vcsun.org/~battias/class/633/20021022.Bataille.lec.pdf>] [Date of Access: February 8, 2003].
- ATTIAS, B.** 2002b. After History, *Quoi?* In the End was the Word. [Website: <http://www.vcsun.org/~battias/class/600/ex/Kojève.pdf>] [Date of Access: February 8, 2003].
- AYERS, M.** 1998. Locke, John (*in:* E. Craig (ed). *Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Volume 5*. London: Routledge. pp. 665-687.)
- BALIBAR, E.** 2000. What Makes a People a People? Rousseau and Kant. (*Transl.* by E. Post) (*in:* M. Hill & W. Montag (eds). *Masses, Classes, and the Public Sphere*. London: Verso. pp. 106-131).
- BARRY, N. P.** 1986. *On Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism*. London: Macmillan.
- BEISER, F. C.** 1993. Hegel's Historicism (*in:* F. C. Beiser (ed). *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 270 – 300).
- BELL, D.** 1996. *Kant* (*in:* N. Bunnin & E. P. Tsui-James, (eds). *Blackwell Companion to Philosophy*. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 589-615).
- BENTHAM, J.** 1970. *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (Edited by J. H. Burns & H. L. A. Hart). London: University of London – The Athlone Press. [Originally published in 1789, 1828].

BERNSTEIN, J. M. 1984. From self-consciousness to community: act and recognition in the master-slave relationship (*ln:* Z. A. Pelczynski (ed). *The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel's Political Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 14-39).

BERTHOLD-BOND, D. 1988. Hegel's Eschatological Vision: Does History Have a Future?" *History and Theory* 27:14.

BLOOM, A. 1969. Editor's Introduction (*ln:* A. Kojève. *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel* (Translated by J. H. Nichols). New York: Basic Books. pp. vii-xii).

BLUNDEN, A. 2003. Fukuyama on Trust and Recognition. [Website: <http://home.mira.net/~andy/works/fukuyama.htm>] [Date of Access: September 2, 2003].

BODIN, J. 1962. *The Six Books of a Commonweale*. (Transl. by R. Knolles, & edited by K. D. McRae). Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

BOURDIEU, P. 1986. The Forms of Capital (*ln:* J. G. Richardson, (ed). *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*. New York: Greenwood Press. pp. 241-58).

BOWLE, J. E. 1985. The History of Political Philosophy (*ln:* R. McHenry (ed). 1993. *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Volume 25*. London: Encyclopaedia Britannica. pp. 991-1003.)

BRENNER, R. 1998. Feudalism (*ln:* J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, P. Newman (eds). *The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, Volume 2*. New York: Palgrave Publishers pp. 309-314).

BRINTON, C. 1967. Enlightenment (*ln:* P. Edwards (ed). *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Volume One*. New York: Macmillan. pp. 519 -525.).

BROMLEY, D. W. 2001. Markets (*In:* P. A. O'Hara (ed). *Encyclopaedia of Political Economy*. London & New York: Routledge. pp. 691-694).

BROWN, D. E. 2002. Book Review: "The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of the Social Order" by Francis Fukuyama. *The Human Nature Review*, Volume 2: 274-276. [Website: <http://human-nature.com/nibbs/02/brown.html>.] [Date of Access: December 14, 2002].

BURCH, R. W. 1995. Contractarianism (*In:* R. Audi (ed). *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 159-160).

CARBO, V. & FISCHER, S. 1995. Structural Adjustment, Stabilisation and Policy Reform: Domestic and International Finance (*In:* J. Behrman & T. N. Srinivasan *Handbook of Development Economics*, Volume 3B, Amsterdam: Elsevier.

CARROLL, M. 1995. Book Review: *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* by Francis Fukuyama. [Website: http://hallinternet.com/wired_culture/607.shtml] [Date of Access: June 9, 2003].

CARROLL, M. 2002. Book Review: Fukuyama, F. 1992. "The End of History and the Last Man." *American Library Association*. [Website: <http://www.ez2www.com/go.php3?site=book2&go=subst/partners/marketingbooklist.html>] [Date of Access: February 12, 2003].

CAYGILL, H. 1995. *A Kant Dictionary*. London: Blackwell.

CHANG, H. J. 1998. Globalization, Transnational Corporations, and Economic Development Can the Developing Countries Pursue Strategic Industrial Policy in a Globalizing World Economy? (*In:* D. Baker, G. Epstein, & R. Pollin (eds). *Globalization and Progressive Economic Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge. pp. 97-115).

CLARK, B. 1991. *Political Economy: A Comparative Approach*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger.

COHEN, J. 1999. Trust, Voluntary Association and Workable Democracy (*In:* M. E. Warren (ed). *Democracy and Trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press pp. 208-248).

COLE, G. D. H. 1913. Introduction. (*In:* J. J. Rousseau. *The Social Contract and Discourses*. London: Dent & Sons. pp. v-xlii.)

COLEMAN, J. S. 1988. Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital. *American Journal of Sociology Supplement*, 94: 95-120

COLEMAN, J. S. 1990. *Foundations of Social Theory*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

COLLINSON, D. 1987. *Fifty Major Philosophers: A Reference Guide*. London: Croon Helm.

COX, P. 2002. Reviews of: *The End of History and The Last Man* and *Trust* by Francis Fukuyama [Website: <http://home.att.net/~xocxoc/philosophy/fukuyama.htm>] [Date of Access: May 23, 2003].

CRISP, R. 2001. Well-being (*In:* E. N. Zalta (ed). *Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* [Website: <http://www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/well-being>]. [Date of Access: November 18, 2003]).

DAHRENDORF, R. 1987. Liberalism. (*In:* J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, & P. Newman (ed). *The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, Volume 3*. London: Macmillan. pp. 173 - 175).

DECKER, K. S. 2001. Right and Recognition: Criminal Action and Intersubjectivity in Hegel's early Ethics. *History of Political Thought*, Volume XXII(2): 300-316.

DEIGH, J. 1995. Ethics (*In:* R. Audi (ed). *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 244-249).

DESPLAND, M. 1973. *Kant on History and Religion*. Montreal: McGill - Queen's University Press.

DEVINE, J. 2000. The Positive Political Economy of Individualism and Collectivism: Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. *Politics & Society, Volume, 28* (2):265-305. [Web Address: <http://www.ehostvgw3e...5&booleanTerm=locke%2c%20john&fuzzyTerm=wysiwyg://bodyframe9>] [Date of Access: November 3, 2001].

DOBELL, R. 2000. Francis Fukuyama, *The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order*. *ISUMA, Volume 1* (1). [Website: <http://www.isuma.net/cgi-bin/toggle-shtml.pl>] [Date of Access: February 14, 2003].

DODSON, K. E. 1997. Autonomy and Authority in Kant's *Rechtslehre*. *Political Theory, Volume 25*(1):93-102. [Website: <http://ehostvgw2.epnet.com/fulltext.asp?resultSetId=R00000006&hitNum=1&boolean>] [Date of Access: June 19, 2002].

ECCLESHALL, R. 1984. Liberalism (*In*: R. Eccleshall, V. Geoghegan, R. Jay, M. Kenny, I. MacKenzie, and R. Wilford (eds). *Political Ideologies: An Introduction* (Second Edition). London: Routledge. pp. 28 - 59.)

EHRENREICH, B., POLLITT, K., FERGUSON, R. B., TIGER, L., JAQUETTE, J. S. 1999. Fukuyama's Follies: So What if Women Ruled the World? *Foreign Affairs* [Website: <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19990101faresponse956/barbara-ehrenreich-katha-pollitt/fukuyama-s-follies-so-what-if-women-ruled-the-world.html>] [Date of Access: February 10, 2004].

ELIOT, T. S. 1999. Fukuyama's Position in the End of History. *Weekly: The Telegraph*. [Website: <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishweekly/telegraph/2000/may/may17/international.htm>] [Date of Access: February 1, 2004].

ERIKSON, R. 1992. Reviews: *Inequality Rexamined*, by A. Sen. *Journal Storage*. [Website: <http://www.jstor.org>] [Date of Access: June 20, 2003].

FISK, M. 2003. End of History? [Website: <http://www.nathanneuman.org/EDIN/mags/cross/42/42art/fukuyam.html>] [Date of Access: August 20, 2003].

FLEW, A. (ed). 1979. *A Dictionary of Philosophy*. London: Pan Books.

FORSTER, M. 1993. Hegel's Dialectical Method (*In:* F. C. Beiser (*ed*). *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 130-170.)

FRANKLIN, J. H. 1996. Allegiance and Jurisdiction in Locke's Doctrine of Tacit Consent. *Political Theory*, Volume 24(3):407-423.

FRASER, N. 2002. Recognition without Ethics (*In:* S. Lash & M. Featherstone (*eds*). *Recognition and Difference*. London: SAGE Publications. pp. 21-42).

FREEMAN, S. 1998. Contractarianism (*In:* E. Craig (*ed*). *Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Volume 2*. New York: Routledge. pp. 657-665).

FRITZMAN, J. M. 2001. Return to Hegel. *Continental Philosophy Review*, 34:287-320.

FUKUYAMA, F. 1998. Women and the Evolution of World Politics. *Foreign Affairs* [Website: <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19980901faessay1415/francis-fukuyama/women-and-the-evolution-of-world-politics.html>.] [Date of Access: February 10, 2004].

FUKUYAMA, F. 1991. Changed Days for Ruritania's Dictator. *The Guardian*: 19, April 18.

FUKUYAMA, F. 1992. *The End of History and the Last Man*. London: Hamish Hamilton.

FUKUYAMA, F. 1995. *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*. New York: Free Press.

FUKUYAMA, F. 1999a. Social-Capital and Civil Society and Solidarity. Paper presented at the IMF Conference of Second Generation. [Website: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/1999/reforms/fukuyama.htm>] [Date of Access: 12/12/2002].

FUKUYAMA, F. 1999b. *The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order*. London: Profile Books.

FUKUYAMA, F. 2001. The West Has Won: Radical Islam Can't Beat Democracy and Capitalism. *The Guardian*, October 11 [Website: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4274753,00.html>] [Date of Access: February 9, 2004].

GANS, E. 2002. Hegel's Master and Slave. *Chronicle* #273. [Website: <http://www.anthropoetics.ucla.edu/scripts/vfbexp.cfm?chno>] [Date of Access: 2003/02/12].

GORDON, D. 1999. A Manifesto Without Evidence. *The Mises Review*. Winter. [Website: <http://www.mises.org/fellows.asp?control=5>] [Date of Access: December 14, 2002].

GOUGH, J. W. 1936. *The Social Contract: A Critical Study of its Development*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

GRAHAM, G. 1998. Philosophy of History. (*In:* E. Craig (ed). *The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. London: Routledge. pp. 453-458.)

GREENBERG, B. & GREENE, M. E. 1999. Demography's Ecological Frontier: Rethinking the Nature of the Household and Community. Prepared for the Seminar on Social Categories in Population Health organised by the Committee on Anthropological Demography of the International Union for the Scientific Study of

Population, 15-18 September, 1999. Cairo, Egypt. [Website: <http://www.iussp.org/members/restricted/publications/Cairo99/cairo-06.pdf>]. [Date of Access: February 12, 2003].

GREGOR, M. 1998. Translator's Footnotes (*In:* I. Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Moral* (Transl. & edited by M. Gregor). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

GUYER, P. 2000. *Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

HADDOCK, B. A. 1980. *An Introduction to Historical Thought*. London: Edward Arnold.

HALE, J., COHEN, D., LUDBROOK, A., PHILLIPS., DUFFY, M., & PARRY-LANGDON, N. 2000. Moving from Evaluation into Economic Evaluation: a Health Economics Manual for Programmes to Improve Health and Well-being. [Website: <http://www.hpw.wales.gov.uk/English/topics/health%20economics%20manual/manual.pdf>] [Date of Access: February 3, 2004].

HAMILTON, L. A. 2003. *The Political Philosophy of Needs*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

HAMPSHER-MONK, I. 1992. *A History of Modern Political Thought: Major Political Thinkers from Hobbes to Marx*. Oxford: Blackwell.

HAMPTON, J. 1986. *Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

HAMPTON, J. 1995. Social Contract (*In:* R. Audi (ed). *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 745-746.)

HARDIN, G. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons, *Science* 162: 1243-48. [Website: <http://web11.epnet.com/citation.asp?>] [Date of Access: March 11, 2002].

HARDING, G. W. 1997. The Commons [Website: <http://members.aol.com/trajcom/private/commons.htm>] [Date of Access: March 11, 2002].

HAUSMAN, D. 1998. Philosophy of Economics (*In:* E. Craig (ed). *Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, Volume 3. London: Routledge. pp. 211-222.)

HAWORTH, A. 1994. *Anti-Libertarianism: Markets, Philosophy and Myth*. London & New York: Routledge.

HAYEK, F. A. 1982. *Law, Legislation, and Liberty* (One Volume Edition). London: Routledge.

HEGEL, G. W. F. 1896. *The Philosophy of Right* (Transl. by S. W. Dyde). London: Georg Bell & Sons.

HEGEL, G. W. F. 1969. *Hegel's Science of Logic*. (Translated by A.V. Miller). Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.

HEGEL, G. W. F. 1977. *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (Translated by A.V. Miller with analysis of the text and foreword by J.N. Findlay) Oxford: Clarendon Press.

HEGEL, G. W. F. 1979. *Systems of Ethical Life* (Edited and Translated by T. M. Knox). Albany: State University of New York. [Originally published in 1802/3]. [Transcribed by A. Blunden] [Website: <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/>] [Date of Access: September 2, 2003].

HEGEL, G. W. F. 1980. *The Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction: Reason in History* (Translated by H. B. Nisbet). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

HEGEL, G. W. F. 1991. *The Encyclopaedia of Logic* (*In:* S. Houlgate (ed). *The Hegel Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 133-174).

- HEGEL, G. W.F.** 1998. Philosophy of Right: Ethical Life (*In:* S. Houlgate (ed). *The Hegel Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 357-399 [142-347]).
- HENRY, J. F.** 1999. John Locke, Property Rights, and Economic Theory. *Journal of Economic Issues*, Volume 33(3): 609-625.
- HERWITZ, D.** 2000. Francis Fukuyama and the End of History. *Southern African Journal of Philosophy*, Volume 19(3): 222-234.
- HETZKE, A. D.** 1998. The Theory of Moral Ecology. *Review of Politics*, Volume 60 (4): 629-631.
- HEYWOOD, A.** 1999. *Political Theory: An Introduction* (2nd ed). London: Macmillan.
- HEYWOOD, A.** 2000. *Key Concepts in Politics*. London: Macmillan.
- HICKS, D. A.** 2001. Making Moral Sense of the Market. [Website: http://www.religion-online.org/cgi-bin/researchd.dll/showarticle?item_id=2143] [Date of Access: February 7, 2003].
- HILL, D.** 1999. World: Voices of the Millenium – Fall of Communism Marked the End of History. [Website: http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1999/07/F.RU.990727_1307278.html] [Date of Access: March 25, 2003].
- HILL, T.** 1980. Humanity as an End in Itself. *Ethics*, 91: 81 - 90.
- HOBBS, T.** 1928: *The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic* (Edited by F. Tonnies. London: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published 1640).
- HOBBS, T.** 1966a. *Elements of Philosophy* (*In:* W. Molesworth (ed). *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury*, Volume I. Aalen: Scientia).

HOBBS, T. 1966c. *Leviathan*. (In: W. Molesworth (ed). *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury*, Volume III. Aalen: Scientia) (Originally published 1651).

HOBBS, T. 1966d. *De Corpore Politico: or the Elements of Law, Moral and Politic*. (In W. Molesworth (ed). *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury*, Volume IV. Aalen: Scientia. pp. 77-228.)

HOBBS, T. 1968. *Man and Citizen: Thomas Hobbes's "De Homine" and "De Cive"* (Edited by B. Gert,). Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press. (*De Cive* - originally published 1642, *De Homine* - originally published 1658).

HOBBS, E. 1999. *Revolutionaries*. London: Abacus.

HONNETH, A. 1995. *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts* (Transl. by Joel Anderson). Cambridge: Polity Press.

HONNETH, A. 2002. Recognition or Redistribution? Changing Perspectives on the Moral Order of Society (In: S. Lash & M. Featherstone (eds). *Recognition & Difference: Politics, Identity, Multiculture*, London: SAGE Publications pp. 42-55).

HOOVER, C. B. 1968. Capitalism (In: D. L. Sills (ed). *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Volume 2. New York: The Macmillan & The Free Press. pp. 294-302.)

HUNTINGTON, S. P. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

HUNTINGTON, S. P. 1993. The Clash of Civilization? The Next Pattern of Conflict. *Foreign Affairs*. [Website: <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/199330601faessay5188/samuel-p-huntington/the-clash-of-civilization.html>] [Date of Access: March 18, 2003].

- HUNTINGTON, S. P.** 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Touchstone.
- INGLEHART, R.** 1999. Trust, Well-being and Democracy (*In:* M. E. Warren (ed). *Democracy & Trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 88-120).
- INWOOD, M.** 1992. *A Hegel Dictionary*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- ITOH, M.** 1988. *The Basic Theory of Capitalism: The Forms and Substance of the Capitalist Economy*. London: Macmillan.
- JESSOP, T. E.** 1960. *Thomas Hobbes*. London: Longmans, Green & Co.
- JOHNSON, P. E.** 1999. Aristotle Rediscovered. (Review). *National Review* [Website: http://www.findarticles.com/cf_o/m1282/10_51/54618897/print.html] [Date of Access: June 11, 2002].
- JONES, C. J.** 2002. Gathering Blackberries. [Website Address: <http://www.softopia.demon.co.uk/2.2/digital-diary-02.08.22.html>] [Date of Access: 26 February, 2003].
- JONES, T.** 2002. *Modern Political Thinkers and Ideas: An Historical Introduction*. London & New York: Routledge.
- JØRGENSEN, M. B.** 2000. A Theoretical Interpretation of Democracy in a Development Perspective. *Approaches to Development*. [Website: <http://www.ulandslaere.au.dk/Opgavestof/2000/EndeligeOpgaver2000/EndOpgPDFMartinBakJoergensen.prn.pdf>] [Date of Access: February 12, 2003].
- JOSEPH, J. A.** 2000. The Changing Role of Ethics in Public Life. Hart Distinguished Speakers Series Lecture, Terry Sanford Institute, Duke University. [Website: <http://www.utexas.edu/ibj/research/leadership/publications/conference1/LeadershipchangingRoleofEthics.html>] [Date of Access: June 9, 2003].

KANT, I. 1929. *Critique of Pure Reason* (Transl. by Norman Kemp Smith). London: Macmillan. (Originally published 1787).

KANT, I. 1952. *The Critique of Judgement* (Transl. by James Creed Meredith) Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Originally published 1790).

KANT, I. 1977. Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose (*In:* H. Reiss (ed). *Kant's Political Writings* (Transl. H. B. Nisbet,) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 41-53.). (Originally published 1784)

KANT, I. 1993. Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point (*In:* E. Behler (ed). *Immanuel Kant: Philosophical Writings* (Transl. by L. W. Beck) New York: Continuum. pp. 249-269.) (Originally published 1784).³⁹

KANT, I. 1999a. On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice. (*In:* M. J. Gregor, (Transl & ed). *Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 273 - 309) (Originally published 1793).

KANT, I. 1999b. *Critique of Practical Reason*. (*In:* M. J. Gregor (Transl. & Ed) *Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy*.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 133 - 271. (Originally published 1788).

KIMBALL, R. 1992. Francis Fukuyama & the End of History. *The New Criterion*. [Website: <http://www.newcriterion.com/archieve/10/feb/92/fukuyama.htm>] [Date of Access: May 12, 2002].

KOEHN, D. 1996. A Review of: *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* by Francis Fukuyama. [Website: <http://www.stthom.edu/cbes/oje/articles/dkbrtrust.html>] [Date of Access: June 10, 2003].

³⁹ The inclusion of the two translation versions of Kant's article in the list of references is because they were all used in the thesis.

KOGGEL, C. 2000. Care and Justice: Re-examined and Revised. *Paideia*. [Website: <http://www.bu.edu/wcpPapers/MainPoli.PoliKogg.htm>] [Date of Access: February, 12, 2003].

KOJÈVE, A. 1969. *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel* (Edited by A. Bloom, & Translated by J. H. Nichols). London: Basic Books.

KURTZ, S. 2002. The Future of "History." *Policy Review*, No. 113 [Website: http://www.policyreview.org/JUN02/kurtz_print.html] [Date of Access: April 24, 2003].

LASH, S. & FEATHERSTONE, M. (eds) 2002. *Recognition and Difference: Politics, Identity, Multiculture*. London: SAGE Publications.

LEATT, J., KNEIFEL, T., & NURNBERGER., K. (eds). 1986. *Contending Ideologies in South Africa*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.

LEIGH, A. 2000. Review of Francis Fukuyama: "The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order." *Australian Journal of Political Science* 35(2):366 [Website: [http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~leighan.students.ksg/Subpages/pdfs/Fukuyama\(AJPS\).pdf](http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~leighan.students.ksg/Subpages/pdfs/Fukuyama(AJPS).pdf)] [Date of Access: December 14, 2002].

LEST, A. W. 1988. The History of Western Philosophy. (*In:* McHenry, R. *ed.* 1993. *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Volume 25*. London: Encyclopaedia Britannica. pp. 733 - 760.).

LEST, A. W. 1988. The History of Western Philosophy. (*In:* R. McHenry, (*ed.*) 1993. *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Volume 25*. London: Encyclopaedia Britannica. pp. 733 - 760.)

LEVINE, A. 1987. *The End of the State*. London: Verso.

LEVINE, A. 2002. *Engaging Political Philosophy: From Hobbes to Rawls*. Oxford: Blackwell.

LLOYD THOMAS, D. A. 1995. *Locke on Government*. London: Routledge.

LOCKE, J. 1949. *Two Treatises of Civil Government*. London: Dent. (Originally published 1690):

LOVE, N. S. 1986. *Marx, Nietzsche, and Modernity*. New York: Columbia University Press.

LUX, K. 1990. *Adam Smith's Mistake: How a Moral Philosopher Invented Economics and Ended Morality*. London: Shambhala.

MACGRAW, B. 1999. Reconstruction or Confusion? *The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstruction of Social Order*, by Francis Fukuyama. [Website: <http://www.regenerator.com /5.4/reconstruction.html>] [Date of Access: August 5, 2003].

MACPHERSON, C. B. 1962. *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

MAKKREEL, R. A. 1989-90. Kant and the Interpretation of Nature and History. *The Philosophical Forum* XXI(1-2, Fall-Winter): 169 - 181.

MARTIN, R. 1999. Stateless Monies, Global Financial Integration and National Economic Autonomy: the end of Geography? (*In:* S. Corbridge, R. Martin, & N. Thrift, (eds). *Money, Power and Space*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. pp. 253-278)

MARX, K. H. & ENGELS, F. 1967. *The Communist Manifesto* (Introduction by A. J. P. Taylor). England: Penguin Books. Originally published in 1848.

MARX, K. H. 1977a. The Holy Family (*In:* D. McLellan (ed). *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 131-158). [Originally published in 1845].

MARX, K. H. 1977b. The Germany Ideology (*In:* D. McLellan (ed). *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 157-191). [Originally published in 1844].

MARX, K. H. 1977c. Theories of Surplus-Value (*In:* D. McLellan, (ed). *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 393-419). [Originally published in 1862-3].

MARX, K. H. 1977d. Capital (*In:* D. McLellan (ed). *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 415-507). [Originally published in 1864].

MCBRIDE, W. L. 1995. Marx, Karl (*In:* R. Audi (ed). *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 465).

MILL, J. S. 1989. *On Liberty* [Originally published in 1859] and *Other Writings* (Edited by S. Collini). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

MINOW, M. 1990. *Making all the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

MURRAY, C. 1999. *The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstruction of Social Order*. (Review). *Commentary Magazine*. [Website: http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m1061/1108/55127731/print.html] [Date of Access: June 11, 2002].

MUSSOLINI, B. 1932. The Ideology of the Twentieth Century (*In:* R. Griffin, (ed). 1998. *International Fascism: Theories, Causes and the New Consensus*. London: Arnold. pp. 248-257).

NORRIS, C. 1991. The "End of Ideology" Revisited: the Gulf War, Postmodernism and *Realpolitik*. *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, Volume 17(1):1-36.

NORTH, D. C. 1999. Orders of the Day (Reviews)/(Book Review). [Website: http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m1568/6_31/56750035/print.html] [Date of Access: June 11, 2002].

NUSSBAUM, M. & SEN, A. 1993. *The Quality of Life*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

O'NEILL, J. 2002. Oh, My Others! There is no Other: Capital Culture, Class and Other-Wiseness (*In:* S. Lash, & M. Featherstone, ed. *Recognition & Difference: Politics, Identity, Multiculture*. London: SAGE Publications. pp. 77-90).

OFFE, C. 1999. How Can We Trust our Fellow Citizen (*In:* M. E. Warren, (ed). *Democracy & Trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 42-87).

PARKER, N. 1999. *Revolutions and History*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

PELCZYNSKI, Z. A. 1984. Political Community and Individual Freedom in Hegel's Philosophy of State (*In:* Z. A. Pelczynski (ed). *The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel's Political Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 55-76)

PENCE, G. 2000. *A Dictionary of Common Philosophical Terms*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

PINKARD, T. 1996. *Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

PIPPIN, R. 1993. 'You Can't Get There from Here': Transition Problems in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (*In:* F. C. Beiser, (ed). *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 52-85).

POSTREL, V. 1999. The Big One: *The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order*; By Francis Fukuyama. *Reason Magazine* [Website: <http://reason.com/opeds/vp061399.html>] [Date of Access: August 1, 2003].

PROVOST, W. 1998. *God, Science and Reason*. [Website: <http://n4bz.org/BIB1.htm#Provost6>] [Date of Access: September 21, 2003].

PRZEWORSKI, A. 1995. *Sustainable Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

PUTNAM, R. D. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

PUTNAM, R. D. 1995: Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital. *The Journal of Democracy* 6(1): 65-78.

PUTNAM, R. D. 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York, Simon and Schuster.

QUINTON, A. 1994. Political Philosophy (*In*: A. Kenny (ed). *The Oxford Illustrated History of Western Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 274-362.)

RAUCH, L. & SHERMAN, D. 1999. *Hegel's Phenomenology of Self-Consciousness: Text and Commentary*. New York: State University of New York Press. pp. 13-160).

RAWLS, J. 1999. *A Theory of Justice* (Revised Edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

ROHMANN, C. 2000. *The Dictionary of Important Ideas and Thinkers*. London: Hutchinson.

ROTHSCHILD, E. 2001. *Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet and the Enlightenment*. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

ROUSSEAU, J. J. 1911. *Emile* (Translated by B. Foxley). London.

ROUSSEAU, J. J. 1913. *The Social Contract and Discourses* (Translated by G. D. H. Cole). London: Dent & Sons. (Originally published - *Inequality* 1755, *The Social Contract* 1762).

RYAN, A. 1996. Hobbes's Political Philosophy. (In T. Sorell (ed): *The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes*. New York: Cambridge University Press pp. 208-245.)

SANOFF, A. P. 1992. After the End of History, What Next? *U.S News & World Report*, Volume 112 (2) [Website: <http://ehostvgw2.epnet.com/fulltext.asp?ResultSetId=R00000002&hitNum=8&boolean>] [Date of Access: June 6, 2002].

SCHNEIDER, V. & TENBUECKEN, M. 2000. Business and the State: Mapping the Theoretical Landscape. [Website: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/download/_political_science/londonVSMT_fin.pdf] [Date of Access: February 12, 2003].

SEMBOU, E. 2003. Hegel's Idea of a "Struggle for Recognition": The Phenomenology of Spirit. *History of Political Thought*, Volume XXIV(2): 262-281.

SEN, A. 1983. Poor, Relatively Speaking. *Oxford Economic*, Volume 35:153-169. [Website: <http://www.jstor.org/view/00307653/di015356/01p03052/0> or http://www.fordham.edu/economics/mcleod/Sen_PoorRelatively3.pdf.] [Date of Access: December 23, 2003].

SEN, A. 1985. Well-being, Agency and Freedom. *The Journal of Philosophy*, Volume LXXXII (1): 169-221.

SEN, A. 1992. *Inequality Reexamined*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

SEN, A. 1993. Capability and Well-being (In Nussbaum, M. & Sen, A. (ed). *The Quality of Life*. Oxford: Clarendon. pp. 30-53).

SEN, A. 1994. "Freedoms and Needs." *The New Republic*. January 10 & 17, 1994: 31-38.

- SEN, A.** 1999a. "Democracy as a Universal Value". *Journal of Democracy*. 10: 3-17.
- SEN, A.** 1999b. *Development as Freedom*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- SHERMAN, D.** 1999. Introduction. (*In:* L. Rauch & D. Sherman, *Hegel's Phenomenology of Self-Consciousness: Text and Commentary*. New York: State University of New York Press. p. 1-12).
- SIMMONS, A. J.** 1993. *On the Edge of Anarchy: Locke, Consent, and the Limits of Society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- SIMMONS, A. J.** 1998. 'Denisons' and 'Aliens': Locke's Problem of Political Consent. *Social Theory & Practice*, Volume 24(2):161-183. [Web: <http://www.EBSCOhost>]. [Date of Access: 2002/04/].
- SOLOMON, R. C.** 1983. *In the Spirit of Hegel: A Study of GWF Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- SORELL, T.** 1996. Introduction. (*In:* T. Sorell, (ed). *The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes*. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-12.)
- STEELE, S.** 2001. Agency and Well-being in Feminist Economics: Using Sen's Approach to Analyze the Ends and Means of Feminist Economics. *Feminist Economics*. [Website: <http://perth.uwlax.edu/ba/eco/MIAFFE/STEELE.PDF>.] [Date of Access: November 20, 2003].
- STEINBERGER, P.** 2001. Hegel's Philosophy of Freedom (Review). *American Political Science Review*. [Website: <http://www.findarticles.com>] [Date of Access: 2002-06-12].
- STERBA, J. P.** 1995. Political Philosophy (*In:* R. Audi (ed). *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press pp. 628-630).

- STRAVRAKIS, P.** 1998. After the Fall: U.S.-Russian Relations in the Next Stage of Post-Soviet History. [Website: http://www.acus.org/publications/occasional_papers/EastWest/stravrakis.pdf] [Date of Access: May 20, 2003].
- STREETEN, P.** 2002. Reflections on Social and Antisocial Capital (*In: J. Isham, T. Kelly, & S. Ramaswamy (ed). Social Capital and Economic Development: Well-Being in Developing Countries.* Chaltenham: Edward Elgar. pp. 40-57).
- STUMPF, S. E.** 1999. *Socrates to Sartre: A History of Philosophy* (Sixth Edition). New York: McGraw-Hill.
- SULLIVAN, R. J.** 1989. *Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- SUMNER, L. W.** 1999. *Welfare Happiness & Ethics.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- SUTTON, C.** 1937. The Third Alternative (*In: R. Griffin (ed). 1998. International Fascism: Theories, Causes and the New Consensus.* London: Arnold. pp. 257-264).
- TAYLOR, A. J. P.** 1967. Introduction (*In: K. Marx & F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto.* England: Penguin Books).
- TAYLOR, P. A. S.** 1966. *A New Dictionary of Economics.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- TOCQUEVILLE, A de.** 1945. *Democracy in America, Volumes I & II.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- TOCQUEVILLE, A de.** 1955. *The Ancient Regime and the French Revolution.* London: Anchor.
- TRACINSKI, R.** 2003. Why It Can Happen Again: The Fundamental Cause of the Holocaust Is the Anti-Individualist Morality of Self-Sacrifice. *Medialink.* [Website:

<http://www.aynrand.org/medialink/holocaustday.shtml>] [Date of Access: October 8, 2003].

TUCK, R. 1996. Hobbes's Political Philosophy (*in* Sorell, T. (ed). *The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes*. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 175-207.)

VINCENT, A. 1995. The Ontology of Individualism. *Theoria*, Number 85: 127-149.

WALDRON, J. 1998. Liberalism (*in*: E. Craig (ed). *Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, Volume 5. London & New York: Routledge pp. 598 – 605).

WALSH, W. H. 1967. Kant, Immanuel (*in*: P. Edwards (ed). *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, Volume 4. New York: The Macmillan Co. & The Free Press. pp. 305-324).

WARREN, M. E. 1999a. Introduction (*in*: M. E. Warren (ed). *Democracy & Trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1 – 21).

WARREN, M. E. 1999b. Democratic Theory and Trust (*in*: M. E. Warren (ed). *Democracy & Trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 310-345).

WEST, E. G. 1990. *Adam Smith and Modern Economics: From Market Behaviour to Public Choice*. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.

WOLTERSTORFF, N. P. 1995. Locke, John (*in*: R. Audi (ed). *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 437-440.).

WOOD, A. 1993. Hegel and Marxism (*in*: F. C. Beiser (ed). *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 414 – 444.)

WOOD, A. 1999. General Introduction (*in*: M. J. Gregor, *Transl* & *ed*: *Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. xiii - xxxiii).

WOODS, E. M. 1999. *The Origins of Capitalism*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

WRIGHT, W. K. 1941. *A History of Modern Philosophy*. New York: The Macmillan Company.

XING, L. 2001. The Market-Democracy Conundrum. *Journal of Political Ideologies* 6(1): 75-94

YAR, M. 2001. Alexander Kojève (1902-1968) (*in:* J. Fieser (ed). *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. [Website: <http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/k/Kojève.htm>] [Date of Access: June 19, 2002]).

YAR, M. 2002. Recognition and the Politics of Human(e) (*in:* S. Lash & M. Featherstone (eds). *Recognition & Difference: Politics, Identity, Multiculture*, London: SAGE Publications pp. 57-76).