The Role Of Moral Residue In Determining The Reality Of Genuine Moral Dilemmas

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Abstract

The debate surrounding whether genuine moral dilemmas exist or is a longstanding one. Proponents of the existence of genuine moral dilemmas like Ruth Barcan Marcus and Bernard Williams have appealed to the moral residue argument as a means of proving that moral dilemmas exist. Opponents like Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Patricia Greenspan, and Terence McConnell, however, have denied its efficacy on the basis that the moral residue argument begs the question on two counts: Firstly, by assuming that rationally irresolvable conflicts of commitments exist, and secondly, by assuming that agents who experience moral residue have necessarily done something wrong.

I argue in this thesis that there is a way that the moral residue argument can be salvaged and provide a more precise account of appropriate moral residue – an account that simultaneously overcomes the objections. Specifically, I argue that the moral residue argument, when interpreted in terms of the independent standard of integrity, can provide an account of appropriate moral residue that can explain what the agent has done wrong, and that is neither too strict nor overlooks the fact of the agent’s harsh self-assessment and moral residue.

In so doing I show how the specific accounts of appropriate moral residue assumed in the objections are flawed and miss the force of the point about moral residue. By examining two case studies – Williams Styron’s Sophie’s Choice, and Euripides’ Iphigenia at Aulis – I show that it can be established independently that both Sophie and Agamemnon do something wrong and would do something wrong no matter how they acted in their respective situations. Through Lynn McFall’s conception of integrity I show that Sophie and Agamemnon would undermine their integrity regardless of which of their alternative they chose to act on. In so doing I establish that their moral residue is appropriate and would be appropriate had they acted on their other alternative.

By this means I demonstrate how – when interpreted in terms of the independent standard of integrity – the moral residue argument can support the existence of genuine moral dilemmas.
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Introduction

"It is notable that insofar as it is features of our moral experience that draw us towards ideas of objectivity of ethics, the experience of moral conflict is precisely one that conveys most strongly such an idea. That there is nothing one decently, honourably, or adequately can do seems a kind of truth as firmly independent of the will and inclination as anything in morality. Indeed it is independent of the will and inclination, but it does not follow that it is independent of what one is, nor that these impressions represent an order of things independent of oneself."¹

"In such cases² we see a wrong action committed without any direct physical compulsion and in full knowledge of its nature, by a person whose ethical character or commitments would otherwise dispose him to reject the act. The constraint comes from the presence of circumstances that prevent the adequate fulfilment of two ethical claims. Tragedy...treats them as real cases of wrongdoing that are of relevance for an assessment of the agent's ethical life."³

The above passages express the ideas that I am concerned with in this thesis. The idea that there can be cases in an agent's life where she faces a rationally irresolvable conflict of commitments and inevitable wrongdoing is central to my discussions. The possibility that there are cases where (despite the agent's will and inclination to act in accordance with her commitments) there is nothing she can do to prevent wrongdoing, means that the conception that all moral conflicts can be rationally resolved has less weight than we may want it to have. If it is true that there are cases where an agent cannot but undermine a commitment or do something wrong, even if she is deliberating as rationally as possible, then it means that being good/doing the right thing is not solely a matter of rational self-control.

The reality of moral dilemmas is a matter of philosophical debate.⁴ On one side of the debate are those who argue that moral dilemmas are real and that there are cases where an agent faces a genuine dilemma between two or more conflicting commitments. This side of the debate claims that the agent is thus ultimately condemned to moral failure in that whatever she chooses she will have done something wrong. On the other side of the debate are those who argue that moral

¹ Williams, Moral Luck, 1981, page 75
² Cases of what Nussbaum calls 'tragic conflict' – a notion I discuss in due course.
³ Nussbaum, 2001, page 25
⁴ I do not distinguish between dilemmas and moral dilemmas in this section – exactly what counts, as a moral dilemma will become clear at a later stage.
dilemmas are only apparent as one of the agent’s requirements will always override the other and thus there is no inevitable moral failure: no dilemma.

The implications of the debate are that if genuine moral dilemmas exist, then some of moral theory as it stands will need to be revised. An important view in moral theory is that being good is a matter of the agent’s rational control: that the agent herself is responsible for her moral goodness. If genuine moral dilemmas exist, however, then morality includes a degree of moral luck in the sense that not all moral conflicts are rationally resolvable. The agent is thus not completely in control of whether she is good or not, or whether she can act morally or not. If goodness involves a degree of moral luck, then moral and ethical theory has to revise the conception that all moral conflicts are rationally resolvable.

Certain contemporary moral theories – and opponents of the genuine moral dilemma debate – assume that values can be ranked hierarchically. The implication is that practical rationality and deliberation can thus bring order and coherence, and ensure that the agent can find a way to act morally provided she deliberates correctly. Affirming the reality of moral dilemmas, however, threatens the power of moral deliberation and the possibilities for coherence in moral philosophy. If genuine moral dilemmas exist, then the implications are that goodness is fragile and is not solely a matter of the agent’s rational control. The existence of genuine moral dilemmas also suggests a hierarchical ranking of values is not always possible and thus that values are plural.

In this thesis, I argue that the moral residue argument, interpreted in terms of the independent standard of integrity, can support the existence of genuine moral dilemmas. Briefly, the moral residue argument defends the claim that emotions of self-assessment like remorse, guilt, and shame - when felt appropriately - are evidence that genuine moral dilemmas exist. If it can be shown that the moral residue argument has merit, then it follows that moral psychology has a role to play in ethical theory. That is, the harsh self-judgment involved in emotions like shame, guilt, and remorse, has a story to tell about moral decisions and the moral character of an agent.

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5 By “moral luck” I mean that being good and doing the right thing is not up to the agent entirely, as it is partly dependent on the circumstances that she finds herself in. In this way – whether she can act morally and stay true to her commitments – is a matter of “luck” or “chance,” depending on the situation she is faced with.


7 I elaborate on this later.
I start by giving an account of the debate between those who argue that genuine moral dilemmas exist, and those who deny their existence. In so doing I discuss what conditions genuine moral dilemmas would have to satisfy were they to exist, thus drawing a contrast with apparent dilemmas. After I have given an account of the conditions that genuine moral dilemmas would have to meet were they to exist, I discuss the available candidate cases for genuine moral dilemmas.

After establishing what a genuine moral dilemma would be, I discuss what the moral residue argument is. I refer to Bernard Williams and Ruth Barcan Marcus who both defend the moral residue argument as an argument supporting the existence of genuine moral dilemmas, and I discuss in detail how the moral residue argument works. I also briefly consider the emotions involved in the moral residue argument. I consider how those emotions differ from each other, and affect the agent. Thereafter I discuss two of the (arguably) most important objections levelled against proponents of the moral residue argument. In so doing I consider the arguments against the existence of genuine moral dilemmas and the efficacy of the moral residue argument put forward by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Terence McConnell, and Patricia Greenspan.

The moral residue argument, as it stands, cannot hold up against these two objections, as the objections show the argument to be fundamentally flawed. It is my claim, however, that the moral residue argument interpreted in terms of integrity, provides a superior and more precise conception of the notion of appropriate moral residue, and can overcome the objections. I thus provide a detailed account of integrity and the necessary and sufficient conditions thereof.

My discussions involve a number of thought experiments and case studies. I use both a classical and a literary example. In so doing I show that in cases where there is evidence of the agent's moral residue, we can appeal to integrity and a revised conception of appropriate moral residue to discern whether the agent actually finds herself in a situation that satisfies the sufficient conditions of a genuine moral dilemma. I thus use Williams Styron's *Sophie's Choice* and Euripides' *Iphigenia at Aulis* as case studies to show how the moral residue argument - when interpreted in terms of the independent standard of integrity - works to support the existence of genuine moral dilemmas.

Literature – and tragedies in particular – are valuable to ethical questions and the question of whether the moral residue argument can be used to support the
existence of moral dilemmas or not. Literary and classical examples allow us to immerse ourselves in the plight of characters like Sophie and Agamemnon. We can experience their feelings of guilt, shame, and remorse, and judge whether the situations in which they respectively find themselves are situations that necessitate wrongdoing or not. As is clear in the extract I cited from Martha Nussbaum above, tragedies in particular treat moral conflicts, as real cases of wrongdoing. Tragedies can thus be used as a means of assessing an agent’s ethical life and character.

By examining the case studies I investigate the idea that our commitments cannot be limited and ranked in the way that opponents of genuine moral dilemmas may want them to be or think that they are. Human experience does not seem to be such that an agent committed to numerous things is either incoherent or able to order her commitments in such a way as to avoid conflict and wrongdoing. Furthermore, it does not seem implausible that an agent will commit herself to a range of principles in her life, and the more wide that range of commitments is, the more likely she is to experience a conflict of commitments.⁸

Given the possibility of genuine moral conflicts where the agent cannot rationally resolve her commitments - and the implication that such a possibility has for the debate surrounding the existence of genuine moral dilemmas - in what follows I argue for a particular conception of the moral residue argument in support of the existence of genuine moral dilemmas.

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⁸ Williams, 1981, Page 73
Chapter 1

What is a moral dilemma?

In this section, I argue that genuine moral dilemmas would have to satisfy the necessary conditions of 1) conflict, 2) loss, and 3) a situation imposed on the agent by the world in which she is condemned to moral failure in some way. Although these conditions are closely linked - and so may better be described as “aspects” of genuine moral dilemmas - I call them “conditions” for the sake of argument, although they are somewhat artificially separated. In what follows, I thus give an account of what conditions moral dilemmas would have to satisfy were they to exist. At times it may appear that I am assuming that genuine dilemmas exist. I, however, am only giving an account of what they would be like if they did exist.

The first condition is that the agent must experience a genuine conflict of commitments: a conflict that cannot be rationally resolved. This is because the nature of the conflict must be such that the agent is committed to doing at least two actions, but she cannot do both. By “committed” I mean that she is in some sense required to do both actions. By that I mean that she feels the force of both alternatives and is torn between them. The agent can thus only do one of the two actions as to opt out would mean that she undermines both of her commitments. This would essentially be worse for her since she will have failed on two counts as opposed to just one. I call this the conflict condition.

In this thesis, I concentrate on personal conflicts specifically – although interpersonal conflicts also come into the debate. An example of a conflict of commitments is if, for example, an agent makes a commitment to meet his wife at the hospital while she is in labour with their first child. On the way to the hospital, he sees an elderly woman who has been mugged and hurt. In such a case he has a conflict of commitments (the commitment he made to his wife to be there with her during the birth and his commitment to help those in need) and has to choose between the two. For a conflict to be a genuine dilemma, it must be true that the conflict between the agent’s commitments cannot rationally be resolved.
To say that a genuine moral dilemma is one where the conflict of commitments cannot be rationally resolved, means that if an agent has a commitment to do A and a commitment to do B, and her commitment to do each is equally weighted so that both A and B are equally important for her to do (and she cannot do both), then there is no rational way of resolving the tension between those two commitments. The agent thus, when faced with a genuine dilemma, cannot just deliberate to enable her to decide that A overrides B, or vice versa. This is because if the agent can rationally resolve the conflict, then it follows that there is no genuine conflict as one of her commitments will be seen to override the other – in which case the dilemma would have been apparent, not genuine. Apparent dilemmas are unlike genuine moral dilemmas in that they can be rationally resolved. This is because, if the agent can rationally work out that A is a more important and pressing commitment than B, then it necessarily follows that A overrides B and the conflict is eradicated. Thus, if the dilemma is genuine, it must be true that the agent cannot deliberate to alleviate the conflict. In this way, a genuine dilemma is the opposite of a conflict that can be rationally resolved. One of the necessary conditions of a genuine moral dilemma therefore, is that it involves a difficult decision between conflicting commitments: a decision that is not rationally soluble.

Expanding on the conflict condition and discussing the implications involved in the type of conflict required for a genuine moral dilemma to exist, brings me to the second condition: the condition that if a genuine moral dilemma exists, then it has to satisfy the condition of loss. This shows how the conflict condition is related to the loss condition. Given that the agent cannot do both actions, whichever action she chooses, it must be true to say that she has failed to live up to her own commitments. By this, I mean that the agent has to undermine at least one of her commitments in eventually choosing how to act. It follows that in a situation where the agent faces a genuine moral dilemma, she will inevitably end up doing something wrong and may also end up losing some of her integrity by not being able to act on both, or all, of her commitments.

For it to be a genuine moral dilemma, the agent would thus have to compromise her commitments and experience loss. That the agent will – in cases of

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9 A concept I discuss in more detail in due course.
10 By "integrity" I loosely mean being true to your central commitments – although I discuss the concept of integrity in more detail.
genuine moral conflict (and thus, genuine moral dilemma) – inevitably end up doing something wrong or contrary to her commitments\textsuperscript{11}, means that the second condition for the existence of genuine moral dilemmas is that they involve loss. This loss manifests itself in the form of negative emotions of self-assessment\textsuperscript{12} like shame, guilt, and remorse.

For a genuine moral dilemma to exist, therefore, it has to involve a combination of conflict and loss. The conflict is a rationally irresolvable conflict between commitments, and the loss is a loss of commitment and thus – in some cases at least – of integrity. Some proponents of genuine moral dilemmas argue that the loss involved in cases of genuine moral dilemmas is suggested by the fact that genuine dilemmas cannot be resolved without moral residue. However, I only discuss the notion of moral residue in the next section. At this point, it is useful to consider what the conflict and loss conditions tell us about what differences there would have to be between apparent and genuine moral dilemmas.

Given the conflict and loss conditions, a genuine moral dilemma would involve much uncertainty for the agent. The nature of a dilemma would be such that it involves a conflict of commitments and that the agent would be uncertain as to which commitment she should act on and which commitment she should choose to ignore or undermine. I understand genuine moral dilemmas to be such that they cannot be rationally resolved, and they cannot be resolved without moral residue or some adverse affect\textsuperscript{13} on the agent. Thus, as I have said, if genuine moral dilemmas exist then they necessitate loss for the agent. In this way, genuine moral dilemmas could not be resolved by the agent appealing to any ethical theory, hierarchical system of ranking values and commitments, or higher-order principles. This is because such systems and theories are based on the powers and possibilities of rational

\textsuperscript{11} These “commitments” can be crucial to the agent and her identity – a notion I expand on.

\textsuperscript{12} The idea of “negative emotions of self-assessment” is taken from Williams’ paper “Ethical Consistency” in Problems of the Self. (1982). I later discuss this in more detail as the experience of moral residue.

\textsuperscript{13} By that, I mean that the agent is condemned to moral failure. This means that there will be an adverse affect on the agent’s commitments and possibly her integrity, and that she will probably experience loss and feelings of moral residue.
deliberation\textsuperscript{14} and yet, were a genuine moral dilemma to exist, it could not (by
definition) be rationally resolved by deliberation.\textsuperscript{15}

In what follows I explore the notion of a rationally irresolvable conflict of
commitments in more detail, and discuss the third condition concerning the type of
situation that it is necessary for an agent to be in if she can be said to be facing a
genuine moral dilemma.

\textbf{Rationally irresolvable conflicts of commitments}

In his book, \textit{Practical Reasoning about Final Ends}, Henry Richardson distinguishes
between tragic situations and tragic choices. He argues that although the former
involve severe loss, the latter is what is at stake with genuine moral dilemmas as the
agent faces a situation in which she has to choose between important, conflicting
commitments, and where she faces inevitable loss. The conflict and the choice are
tragic because there is no way that the agent can "arrive at a complacent decision by
commensurating the losses involved in terms of an adequately representative measure.
The agent faced with a tragic choice cannot hide behind the banner of maximising the
good or minimising the losses.\textsuperscript{16} That is, the agent cannot resolve her conflict by
appealing to any hierarchical system of values,\textsuperscript{17} as a tragic choice just is a genuine
moral dilemma.

Given Richardson's claim, in a situation that satisfies the conflict and loss
conditions, it is at least necessary for the agent to recognise (or to be able to
recognise) the validity of each of her clashing claims, and each of the values that pulls
her in opposite directions.\textsuperscript{18} The agent thus has to hold equally important
commitments, and recognise them as equally valuable to her. It remains, however,
that a rationally irresolvable conflict of commitments and inevitable loss is not
sufficient for genuine moral dilemmas to exist. For it to be a genuine moral dilemma,
it cannot be the case that the agent herself caused the rationally irresolvable conflict of commitments by committing herself to incoherent principles.\textsuperscript{19}

Consequently, for it to count as a genuine moral dilemma it has to be the case that the agent finds herself in a situation in which she cannot control or change the fact that she will have to choose between two equally important, conflicting commitments. This is the third condition: what I call the situation condition. Briefly, I mean that for a conflict to be a genuine moral dilemma it has to be the case that the agent faces conflict, and loss, and that she does so because she finds herself in a situation that has been imposed on her by the world and there is thus a degree of moral luck.\textsuperscript{20}

As discussed, if genuine moral dilemmas exist, then – in such cases - the agent cannot alleviate her conflicting commitments or avoid facing loss by appealing to systems that argue that commitments and values can always be ranked, or arranged in order of importance. For a conflict to constitute a genuine moral dilemma, it would not be possible to appeal to a system that, say, valued promise keeping over truth telling or vice versa. The conflict condition (that the agent’s commitments are equally important and cannot be rationally resolved) can be explained in terms of the situation condition. In what follows I illustrate the situation condition\textsuperscript{21} by way of example.

Consider the following hypothetical case that would seem to satisfy my conditions. Let us call the agent Z. Z’s brother-in-law was her best friend for years before Z met and married his brother – her husband. Z’s brother-in-law is having an affair with his wife’s best friend. Although Z’s husband does not know, Z does know about the affair, and has confronted her brother in law about it. Z is friendly with both her brother in law, and his wife. However, when she first finds out about the affair, the brother-in-law implores her to promise to keep his secret. As Z is his best friend and her husband’s brother, Z agrees, and – in so doing - commits herself to keeping her word and her brother in law’s secret.

\textsuperscript{19} I discuss the notion of incoherent commitments in the section on integrity. In brief, an agent’s commitments are incoherent if she commits herself to things that naturally conflict, or commits herself to things for reasons other than the fact that she thinks a certain principle is important, wants to commit herself to that, and upholds her commitments in the face of challenge because she deems them important and wants to uphold them.

\textsuperscript{20} I discuss what I mean by “imposed on the agent by the world” and expand on my understanding of “moral luck” in due course.

\textsuperscript{21} I expand on the situation condition at a later stage. It is however important to bear in mind that the conditions I am presenting overlap significantly.
It is important to stress that in this case, Z cares for both her brother-in-law and his wife. Although, when she first agrees to keep her brother-in-law’s secret, she does so because she thinks that it would be for the best and cause the least unhappiness. As the years of keeping her brother-in-law’s secret go by, Z becomes increasingly aware of the wife’s heightened unhappiness, confusion, and stress about her estranged husband and his suspiciously close relationship with her best friend. After fifteen years of secrecy, Z is increasingly concerned about his wife, who is driven to distraction by suspicion, questions, jealousy, and confusion.

As it happens, the wife writes to Z and says that she has no one else to ask for confirmation of her suspicions about her husband’s infidelity, and is distraught with suspicion. The wife admits that she has suspected her husband’s affair with her best friend for years. However, every time she experiences doubt about her husband’s relationship with her best friend, she is guilt-stricken and feels bad for suspecting the worst of the two people closest to her. The wife tells Z that she has come to a stage where she does not know what to believe. She also tells Z that she is so confused that she no longer knows whether she is being paranoid and unfair, or whether she is being blind and naive by denying that they are obviously having an affair. She pleads with Z to tell her the truth so that she may have peace of mind, and may get on with her life if they are in love.

In this case, Z has made a promise to her closest friend and brother-in-law: she is committed to keeping his secret. She is also, however, committed to telling the truth (especially in a situation where she can see that the truth would benefit the wife by putting her mind at ease and allowing her to free herself from a life of suspicion, concern, and unjustified guilt). Z thus faces a conflict between her promise to her brother-in-law (and closest friend), and her commitment to tell the truth to his desperate wife: Z’s sister-in-law. Z has to choose between a) her commitment to her brother-in-law (in which case she would undermine her commitment to tell the truth to her sister-in-law) and, b) her commitment to tell the truth to her sister-in-law (in which case she would undermine her commitment to her brother-in-law and her commitment to keep her word).

Z cannot appeal to a system that ranks values, because her values and commitments are both equally weighted – although they are to different people. Both of her options are based in some way on a commitment to remain true to herself. If she fails to keep her promise then she is not being true to her word – and thus –
herself. If she fails to tell her sister-in-law the truth (especially when she can see that she would not only be lying, but would worsen her sister-in-law’s constitution by failing to relieve her from her suspicion, confusion, and concern) then she is not being true to her sister-in-law, and thus, herself.

In Z’s case, it does not seem that a hierarchical system or any value-ranking system could help her resolve her conflict, as there is no way to rank her commitments unless she does so arbitrarily. It does not make sense to rank her commitment to keep her promise to protect her brother-in-law, and her commitment to tell the truth and to help others in need. This is because both commitments are equally important to Z. The conflict is thus specific to Z, and so appealing to a general system of rules will not eradicate it. I discuss why hierarchical systems of value would be arbitrary and why it is that – if genuine moral dilemmas exist – then Z’s conflicting commitments are rationally irresolvable.

In the aforementioned example, Z faces a conflict between two different commitments. Given that the commitments are different, it would seem that appealing to a hierarchical system of values could enable Z to resolve the conflict rationally. In the example, Z is faced with a conflict between remaining true to the promise she makes her brother-in-law, and remaining true to her commitment to tell the truth to her sister-in-law. Let us consider how it would help resolve the conflict if Z appeals to a ranking system to help her resolve her conflict. Suppose she appeals to a system that ranks promise keeping above truth telling. Opponents of genuine moral dilemmas would argue that such a system would resolve the apparent dilemma and could support the claim that genuine moral dilemmas do not exist. This is because they would argue that as Z could appeal to the system and thereafter choose her commitment to keep her brother-in-law’s promise over her commitment to telling the truth to her sister-in-law, she would be able to resolve the conflict (and would thus only have faced an apparent dilemma). The fact remains, however, that no matter which option Z chooses, she will lose something: either her brother-in-law’s trust, or her commitment to tell the truth to her sister-in-law.

Furthermore, if both commitments are equally important to Z, then it does not follow that just because some ethical system ranks promise keeping above truth telling, Z will necessarily be able to conform her sense of commitment to that system.

22 By “arbitrary” in this context, I mean the opposite of a choice that can be rationally resolved.

23 Sinnott-Armstrong, 1988, Page 72
Her knowledge that a certain system ranks promise keeping above truth telling will not necessarily change the fact that promise keeping and truth telling are, on the face of it, equally important to her - especially when she has to choose between her commitments to two people she loves very much and would not ideally want to undermine her commitments to. It thus seems that even in cases where hierarchical systems can be appealed to, it does not necessarily follow that they will be useful, or that they will help an agent resolve her conflict. 24

It must thus be true that genuine moral dilemmas involve insoluble conflict and ultimate loss, and are not just cases of the agent being uncertain as to how to act. In such cases, that the agent eventually has to choose between her commitments does not detract from the fact that she faced a genuine moral dilemma, or suggest that her ability to choose points to the fact that one obligation overrides the other. For example in the aforementioned case, it seems that whatever Z chooses; she will lose something 25 as she will be forced to undermine one of her conflicting commitments. That Z experiences conflict (and will inevitably experience a loss of commitment) means that she has no way of rationally choosing between her commitments. Consequently, whatever act Z eventually chooses will be arbitrary as the nature of the situation and her commitments is such that she cannot rationally resolve the dilemma.

Apparent dilemmas, on the other hand, are by definition resolvable (although deciding which commitment to act on may be difficult for the agent, as she may be plagued by uncertainty). This is made clear by the frequently cited example in Plato's Republic where the agent has to choose between his commitment to return the weapon that he borrowed from his friend, and his commitment to prevent his friend (who he knows is not in his right mind, and who may want to do himself - and possibly others - harm with the weapon) from harming himself. In such an instance it seems clear that the agent's commitment to prevent his friend from harming himself overrides his commitment to return borrowed goods.

In an apparent dilemma, therefore, it is the case that what may seem to be an irresolvable conflict, is in fact not. This is because, with enough thought and correct

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24 That is not to say that hierarchical systems cannot help to resolve cases where the agent's commitments conflict, it is rather to say that in cases where something like a hierarchical system can be appealed to and can successfully enable the agent to resolve her conflict, it is a case of an apparent - and not a genuine - dilemma. This is because if genuine moral dilemmas exist, then they have to be such that the conflict between the commitments cannot rationally be resolved.

25 Either by breaking her commitment to remain true to the promise she made her sister, or her commitment to always tell the truth to her mother.
deliberation, the agent will realise that one obligation or commitment overrides the other, and she can thus act on that commitment. In cases of apparent dilemmas, the agent can appeal to a hierarchical system of values to determine which commitment outweighs the other. For example in Plato’s case of returning a borrowed weapon to a friend, the agent could perhaps appeal to a Utilitarian principle and argue that preventing her friend from harm will ultimately bring about the most happiness. She could similarly work on the assumption that the preservation of human life is more important than a commitment to return borrowed goods, and could rationally resolve her conflicting commitments in that manner.

It is however less clear how to resolve such a conflict if we consider again the example of the man is committed to being with his wife during her labour, who is similarly committed to helping the elderly lady who is hurt. Although unclear, it could be argued that such an example would also be an apparent dilemma, as the agent could rationally resolve the conflict no matter how difficult his decision may be. For example, the man could reason that his commitment to his wife is stronger as she is his wife, and that – as the elderly woman is a stranger - it is sufficient just to phone the police on his way to the hospital. My point is that whereas an apparent dilemma is a question of a difficult decision, a genuine moral dilemma would be a question of a rationally irresolvable decision.

If we revise the previously discussed example, then the difference between apparent and genuine moral dilemmas can be illustrated. Assume that the man is driving the woman to the hospital, but that she is a stranger whose water breaks when she is getting petrol at the same petrol station as the man. As she cannot drive herself the man offers to take her to the hospital thus committing himself to helping her in her time of need. On the way to the hospital the man stops at a traffic intersection and similarly sees an elderly lady who has been mugged and hurt. He similarly feels the same sense of commitment as in the previous example to help the elderly lady in her time of need. The man now has two conflicting commitments: one to the woman in labour, one to the elderly lady. In the situation in which he finds himself, he cannot help both women. He also cannot mediate between those commitments by appealing to his personal connection to the two ladies, as they are both strangers.

26 It remains, however, that it may be difficult to determine that an apparent dilemma is apparent as opposed to genuine.
If he leaves the woman in the car to help the elderly lady, her position may be worsened. If he leaves the elderly lady and decides to drive the woman to the hospital, then – to the same extent – the elderly lady’s position may be worsened. In such a case, it seems that the man faces a genuine moral dilemma, and there seems to be no way of rationally resolving the conflict between the two commitments. This case appears to satisfy the conflict condition. This is because it does not seem that he can appeal to a higher order principle, or a hierarchical order of value, as the strength of his commitment is the same and based on the same principle of wanting to help those in need. It seems that any decision the man makes will be arbitrary. This case also meets the loss condition, as no matter which action he chooses, he will either undermine his commitment to help the old lady, or undermine his commitment to help the woman in labour – as the situation is such that he cannot remain true to both commitments.

As Bas C Van Fraassen argues, if two equally sacred commitments conflict, then only “an exercise of the will can settle the conflict, but not a calculation of values.”27 Thus, when an agent is faced with a dilemma and eventually makes her decision, if the dilemma is genuine then she does so not because she can rationally arrive at a decision by calculating her values and resolving the conflict, but because she has to make a decision or else face the worse option of not acting.28

Opponents of genuine moral dilemmas, however, argue against their reality by denying that the conditions I have argued for could ever be met. To illustrate this I briefly consider Kant, Utilitarianism, and W.D. Ross as examples of this side of the debate. My discussion is brief and is merely to illustrate how opponents argue that dilemmas are only apparent, since they are in principle rationally resolvable.

Kant, for example, would argue that obligations and duties can fit into a system of rules and imperatives in such a way that an action is either right or wrong, and there can be no such thing as a rationally irresolvable conflict of commitments. This is because an agent has certain perfect obligations and duties that override other commitments, and certain rules to adhere to that must govern her actions. Kant would argue that in any given situation there could only be one necessary duty or obligation. He thinks that we should act to universalise the maxim of our actions. By that, he

27 Van Frassen, 1987, Page 142
means that we are obliged to act in such a way that our actions can be universalised so that if everyone acted in the same way then the maxim would still hold.

For example, if we acted on the maxim of promise keeping, then, if everyone similarly kept their promises, we would presumably have a society in which everyone kept their promises. Conversely, if we acted on the maxim of making promises and not keeping them, we could not universalise that without undermining the institution of promise keeping. This is because if people acted on the latter maxim, then the institution of promise keeping would collapse because everyone would make lying promises and no one could trust anyone else when they made promises. Consequently, Kant might argue that in the example of the man on his way to the hospital – if the man had promised to take the stranger in labour to the hospital – then that duty would be categorical and would thus necessarily override his duty to help the elderly lady in need. As Marcus says, “Kant seems to claim that they (genuine moral dilemmas) don’t really arise, and we are provided no moral grounds for their resolution.”

Utilitarianism would argue that there is a single, utilitarian principle of good which directly or indirectly determines how to act and which means that all moral conflicts are resolvable and thus, apparent. A Utilitarian could furthermore maintain that there are first and secondary moral principles, and that no genuine moral conflict or dilemma can exist as there are always primary and secondary types of principles involved in apparent conflicts, and that thus the former will override the latter and the conflict will be resolved. For example in cases where we have conflicting secondary commitments like a commitment to help a woman in labour and a commitment to help a hurt, elderly lady, we need to appeal to something like the primary utilitarian principle of maximising overall happiness. The agent could thus reason in such a case that helping the woman in labour would maximise overall happiness as it would make her, her unborn child, and her family happy, whereas helping the elderly lady would only help the elderly lady and would thus result in less “overall” happiness than if he helped the woman in labour.

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28 Not acting would be a worse option as, in cases of genuine moral dilemmas (if they exist), you face losing something no matter which option you choose, so if you choose neither, then you end up doing wrong on two counts.
29 Marcus, 1980, Page 125-126
30 Mill in Gowans, 1987, Page 54
31 Ibid. 1987, Page 54-55
Ross similarly ascribes to the idea of “perfect” commitments,\textsuperscript{32} but argues that we also have \textit{prima facie} commitments, and that, when faced with them, we have to weigh up which type of commitment overrides the other.\textsuperscript{33} It follows that he similarly seems to ascribe to the idea that most (if not all) cases of moral conflict are apparent dilemmas that can be rationally resolved by weighing up our prima facie duties, and that with sufficient consideration the agent will realise that one commitment overrides the other in the sense that the agent has to act on one commitment. Ross argues that although the agent may not know what to do, she can know what prima facie duties or commitments are present in each case.

In the case of the agent faced with a commitment to keep her promise to her brother-in-law, and her commitment to tell her sister-in-law the truth, Ross is likely to argue that with sufficient contemplation and deliberation Z could arrive at a decision as to which commitment was “more incumbent” on her than the other.\textsuperscript{34} She could thus argue that although promise-keeping may ordinarily outweigh truth-telling, the fact that she’s keeping a promise to hide her brother-in-law’s infidelity, makes her commitment to promise-keeping less binding than her commitment to tell the truth to her sister-in-law. This is because the agent could reason that her brother-in-law was in the wrong to have an affair with his wife’s best friend. She could also reason that because she made the promise to her brother-in-law on the assumption that his wife would not ask about her husband’s infidelity, her commitment to her brother-in-law is less important than her commitment to tell the truth to her sister-in-law when she asks whether her husband is being unfaithful with her best friend.

Ross thus thinks that the agent needs to take all the factors and circumstances of the specific situation that she is faced with into account, and that all conflicts can be resolved with deliberation – no matter how irresolvable the agent’s conflicting commitments may appear. He would thus deny that genuine moral dilemmas exist on the basis that all moral dilemmas can be rationally resolved by deliberation even in cases where what the agent ought to do remains unclear.

Opponents\textsuperscript{35} of genuine dilemmas would furthermore argue that as all “genuine moral dilemmas,” are in fact apparent dilemmas,\textsuperscript{36} the agent may seem to be faced

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Those commitments that naturally override other commitments, as they are – by nature – more important.
\item Ross in Gowans, 1987, Page 86
\item Ibid. 1897, Page 86.
\item Sinnott-Armstrong, 1988, Page 72
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
with a genuine dilemma because she is, for example, limited in her capacity for rational deliberation, and does not always have the ability to be able to see which commitment overrides the other. They also claim that as all dilemmas ultimately end with the agent deciding to act on one of her commitments, that she was not actually faced with a genuine dilemma. They base this claim on the assumption that the fact that the agent eventually chooses commitment A over commitment B or vice versa, simply means that one commitment naturally overrode the other (and that the dilemma was thus only apparent after the fact, the mere fact, that the agent did make a choice shows that there was no dilemma).37

At this stage of the argument it is important to point out that the conflict and loss conditions alone are insufficient for a genuine moral dilemma to exist. This is because opponents of genuine moral dilemmas could argue that although the necessary conditions of conflict and loss are satisfied, it remains that (as mentioned earlier) the fault lies with the agent. If the agent found herself in a situation that satisfied the conditions of conflict and loss, but it was her own fault, then her dilemma would be apparent, and not genuine. It follows that the situation condition is needed to ensure that the agent actually would face a genuine moral dilemma, and that the fault of her situation lies with the world.

Opponents of genuine moral dilemmas, however, might deny that the situation condition could ever in truth be met. I now turn to this condition and its relation to the concept of moral luck. Again, this discussion is hypothetical – a discussion of what the world would have to be like, were genuine moral dilemmas to exist.

**The situation condition**

Bernard Williams suggests that what is wrong in cases of conflicting commitments is a combination of the principles that an agent commits herself to, and the situation in which she finds herself. It is thus the fact that an agent has numerous commitments, coupled with the fact that she could find herself in a situation where those commitments conflict, that can result in a genuine moral dilemma. This links to the conception of “moral luck,” because given that the situation affects the agent as much

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36 Ibid. 1988 Page 95
37 I think that all these points from the opponents can be overcome. This will become clear in the later chapters.
as her diverse commitments may - it follows that she may be faced with a situation in
which she cannot avoid irresolvable conflicting commitments. That is, with a range
or combination of commitments and a situation imposed on the agent by the world
(forcing her to choose between two equally important, conflicting commitments), she
will confront a genuine moral dilemma.

As Williams says, “That there is nothing that one decently, honourably, or
adequately can do seems a kind of truth as firmly independent of the will and
inclination as anything in morality.”38 The suggestion is that no matter what the agent
may ideally want, or be inclined to do, and no matter how adept she is at rationally
deliberating, it remains that it is possible (if not likely) that she will find herself in a
situation with militating circumstances that condemn her to a conflict of commitments
and inevitable wrongdoing.

In this way, although the conflict and loss conditions are necessary conditions
of a genuine moral dilemma, they are not sufficient. If they were sufficient, then
opponents could simply argue that such conditions are – objectively speaking –
rationally resolvable. For genuine moral dilemmas to be real, therefore, we have to
include the situation condition and it has to be true that they involve a degree of moral
luck and mitigating39 circumstances that are such that the agent cannot systematically
avoid conflict and loss.40

One of the consequences of the conflict condition is that the agent inevitably
ends up doing something wrong. That she inevitably ends up doing something wrong
is caused by the situation condition. According to the situation condition, if genuine
moral dilemmas exist, then they include a situation with militating circumstances that
place the agent in a situation that she does not have complete control over and in
which she is forced to make decisions that she may not ordinarily have to. It must thus
be a feature of genuine moral dilemmas that they tend to be imposed on the agent by
the world,41 and that it is not solely the agent’s fault if she finds herself faced with an
irresolvable conflict of commitments.

By “imposed on the agent by the world” I mean that there seems to be a
degree of moral luck in cases of genuine dilemmas. This is because of the situation

38 Williams, 1981, Page 75
39 By “mitigating circumstance” I mean a circumstance that is not completely in the agent’s control,
and that bears some responsibility for the choice she faces.
40 Williams in Gowans, 1987, page 177
41 Williams, 1981, Page 169
that the agent finds herself in – and her commitments – give rise to the conflict. The agent thus does not have complete control over the situation, because she finds herself faced with choices that are dictated by the type of situation or circumstances in which she finds herself. Consequently, given the situation condition, opponents cannot argue that genuine moral dilemmas could not exist on the basis that the agent is solely responsible for getting herself into situations in which her commitments conflict.

According to the situation condition, the agent is forced – by the nature of the situation in which she finds herself - to act in such a way that she will inevitably do something wrong. This contrasts with a case in which the conflict and loss conditions are satisfied, but the situation condition is not. In such a case opponents could argue that the agent and her commitments is responsible for the situation she finds herself in, and that consequently her conflict is rationally resolvable and she thus does not face a genuine moral dilemma. I now illustrate an instance that would meet the situation condition and the idea that the agent is not always solely responsible for circumstances in which she faces an irresolvable conflict of commitments with the following hypothetical example: the Hostage case.

Imagine that a madman is holding a group of hostages. The madman picks out one person and demands that she choose someone to be shot so that the police take the madman seriously and give him what he wants. The madman stipulates that if she does not choose somebody, then everyone will be shot, and she will have to watch her fellow hostages being killed and then be shot herself. In such a case, the agent has no rational way of resolving the conflict between the commitments, as she has an equally weighted commitment to preserve each of the lives of the strangers before her. She is in a situation in which – no matter which of her fellow hostages she chooses to be shot – she will have done wrong by that person and by herself. The agent has not chosen or caused her current situation. Her circumstances thus meet the situation condition in that the situation she finds herself in is imposed on her by the world and is caused by circumstances out of her direct control. She has no control over the madman, his plans, or the fact that chance was such that she is in the same place as the madman at the time as he decides to hold a group of people hostages. As Simon Blackburn remarks, “it is going to be hellish” whatever the agent does, or however she chooses to act.42

42 Blackburn in Mason, 1996, page 137
In such a case, the decision that the agent has to make is thus based on factors outside of her control. That is, she would ideally want to be in a situation in which she did not face having to choose someone to be shot, and in which her own life was not in danger or in the hands of a madman. It remains, however, that she is in an extreme situation, and she has to make a choice: this is the situation condition. The situation condition thus renders the agent’s conflict rationally irresolvable. As Marcus argues, in situations of genuine moral dilemmas, it must be true that “your are damned if you do and you are damned if you don’t.”43 The situation must therefore be such that the agent has no option that will enable her to avoid doing wrong and undermining one of her commitments. According to the situation condition, the world lands the agent in a hellish situation. Now I have discussed what the three conditions are that a genuine moral dilemma would have to meet were it to exist, I go on to discuss the conditions together.

All three conditions together are sufficient for a genuine moral dilemma to exist. These conditions together show that if genuine moral dilemmas exist, then they are such that the agent cannot “act for the best”, as there is no “best” option available. If there were a “best” option, then the agent would not be facing a genuine moral dilemma in the first place. Furthermore, the very notion of the existence of a “best” option presupposes that there is a way of rationally resolving the conflicting commitments. It would only make sense to talk of a “best” option if the available options could be ordered hierarchically into categories like “poor,” “good,” “better,” and “best.” It remains, however, that in cases of genuine moral dilemmas, it must be true that the nature of the conflicting commitments involved is such that they are equally strong and can neither be hierarchically ordered and thus nor rationally resolved.

If the three conditions were satisfied, it would similarly not make sense to talk of making an “all things considered” decision. No matter how much the agent considers her options and weighs up the strength of her conflicting commitments, for it to constitute a genuine moral dilemma, it must be true to say that she will come no closer to being able to make her decision. As Williams argues, in cases that appear to meet the situation condition, it is often the case that “the more one concentrates on the dilemma, the more pressing the claims of each side become.”44 Although the agent

43 Marcus in Gowans, Page 127
44 Williams, 1982, Page 172
will eventually have to make a choice (given the situation condition), that choice will be essentially arbitrary, and making it will affect her adversely. I say that because she will be forced to undermine at least one of her commitments, and will thus be forced to lose something. As Greenspan argues, a genuine moral dilemma is a case in which all of the agent’s alternatives, through no fault of her own, turn out to be wrong.

My hypothetical hostage case illustrates the conditions of conflict, loss, and situation working together. The choice has been imposed on her by the situation (the fact of having to make such a choice at all). Second, the choice of who will be shot will be arbitrary, as the woman knows nothing about the people with whom she is kept hostage, and cannot rationally work out which person it would be “best” to choose to be shot. Third, no matter who the agent chooses, she will be forced to ignore her commitment to prevent doing harm to others, and to preserve human life. Consequently, no matter how she acts, she will be doing wrong and there will be a loss of some kind. It follows that genuine moral dilemmas, are cases “where overall wrongdoing is inevitable.”

Candidates for genuine moral dilemmas

Proponents argue that a number of different cases count as genuine moral dilemmas. Although dilemmas can involve a conflict between more than two commitments, for the sake of argument I concentrate solely on situations in which the agent faces a conflict between two important commitments.

According to my analysis, the candidates for genuine moral dilemmas that I outline in what follows must fulfil the conditions of conflict, loss and situation. My route to defending the existence of genuine moral dilemmas is not, however, to show how each of these cases fulfil the required conditions, at least not yet, since I wish to argue that an analysis of moral residue can reveal whether or not these conditions can be met in particular cases. I focus exclusively on personal, rather than interpersonal,

45 Opponents – as I mentioned – would deny that any choice was arbitrary and that genuine moral dilemmas exist, and would argue that in making a choice the agent shows that the case they were facing was not a genuine, but an apparent, dilemma.
46 Greenspan, 1995, Page 9
47 I spell out the loss condition in the course of the section on integrity.
48 Zimmerman, 1996, Page 208
dilemmas. That is to say, the cases of conflict I consider involve only a single agent. I shall not be considering cases of multi-person conflict.

It seems, however, that within this group, the cases that proponents take to be genuine dilemmas can be loosely divided into types – or candidates. In this section, I give a brief account of these types to indicate the variety of candidates for genuine moral dilemmas. 49

The first type of genuine moral conflict that I discuss is the difference between epistemic and ontological dilemmas. Epistemic conflicts include cases where an agent is faced with two conflicting, different commitments, and she cannot discern which commitment is more binding in her current situation. An example of this would be Plato’s agent with the weapon and the choice between returning that weapon to his volatile friend who may harm himself, and undermining his commitment to return the borrowed weapon to his friend. Such an example is an apparent dilemma, as the agent may only be unsure of which commitment takes precedence, and is not in a situation where both of his commitments are necessarily rationally irresolvable. An ontological conflict, on the other hand, would be a conflict where the agent faces a situation in which she cannot rationally resolve her commitments, and in which she is faced with a conflict of two commitments – neither of which overrides the other. An example of this would be the Hostages case, where the agent has an equal commitment to preserve the lives of all of her fellow hostages.

Tragic dilemmas are a type of genuine moral conflict. In cases where the agent is faced with a tragic moral conflict, no matter what action the agent chooses, her decision will essentially have tragic consequences. Tragic moral dilemmas are the worst types of genuine moral conflict in that their consequences are the most severe. This is because “tragic” usually implies a fatality, disaster or calamity of some sorts – and thus the effects of the agent’s decision are bound to be grievous in some way. Tragic moral conflicts are consequently the most distressing for the agent, as her actions ultimately result in serious consequences. The aforementioned Hostages case is an example of a genuine moral conflict involving a tragic dilemma or situation, as

49 Although I refer to the candidates as “dilemmas” I do not assume that genuine moral dilemmas exist in so doing – I am rather just representing possible candidates that could meet the sufficient conditions of a genuine moral dilemma.
is the example in William Styron’s *Sophie’s Choice*\(^{50}\) where Sophie is forced to choose between which of her two children will be killed.

Another candidate for genuine moral conflicts includes cases where the agent faces similar conflicting commitments that have less dire consequences. For the sake of argument, I call these mild dilemmas.\(^{51}\) An example of a mild dilemma would be if, for example, the agent is a policeman and his brother becomes a drug addict because their family life was abusive. If the policeman comes across his brother during a raid on a local club, he will have conflicting commitments. The first is his commitment as a policeman to arrest his brother for being under the influence of drugs, the second is his commitment as a loving brother who relates to his brother’s plight and understands his drug abuse despite the fact that he may not condone it. Another example would be an agent’s commitment as a witness under oath to tell the truth, and her commitment to remain loyal to a loved one that has committed a crime.

The aforementioned examples are also cases of obligation dilemmas, as the agent faces a conflict between two actions that she is committed to doing, although she cannot do both. In this way, obligation dilemmas are another candidate of genuine moral conflicts.

Prohibition dilemmas are also candidates for genuine moral conflicts. They include cases like that in *Sophie’s Choice*, and the hostage case: cases where the agent is faced with a choice between two actions that she would ideally not want to do, or that she feels she should not do in the sense that she is prohibited from doing it as it opposes her commitments. Prohibition dilemmas are thus such that the options available to the agent directly oppose her commitments. They are genuine moral conflicts because the agent is forced to choose one of the actions that she does not want to do, because of the militating circumstances of the situation in which she finds herself.

It is important to clarify that not all mild dilemmas are obligation dilemmas, nor are all tragic dilemmas prohibition dilemmas. Various types of situation seem to fit the conditions of a genuine moral conflict. That is not to say that genuine moral dilemmas necessarily exist, but that, if they did then they would have to fulfil the three aforementioned conditions, and could do so in the ways outlined by the artificial

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\(^{50}\) I discuss this case in detail in my final section.

\(^{51}\) Although it is contentious whether any dilemma could be “mild” for the agent concerned, I mean only that – unlike tragic dilemmas – mild dilemmas do not involve fatalities.
types I am discussing. I now discuss the types of genuine moral dilemmas to which proponents allude.

Some proponents of genuine moral dilemmas distinguish between obligation and prohibition dilemmas (the former being such that more than one action is obligatory and the agent cannot do both, the latter being such that all actions available to the agent are forbidden although the agent has to choose one action) and argue that either one or the other are genuine moral dilemmas. It remains, however, that the importance of a moral dilemma is that it involves tragic choice. It also forces the agent to choose between conflicting commitments that are not rationally resolvable. The choice the agent faces is tragic because she necessarily faces undermining her commitments and, in some cases, compromising her integrity. In obligation dilemmas, the agent has to undermine one of her commitments in order to act on one of her conflicting obligations. In prohibition dilemmas, the agent is similarly forced to undermine her commitments, as no matter which action she chooses it will be contrary to how she would want to act, or how she feels committed to act. In cases of genuine moral conflict, therefore, the agent will necessarily be forced to undermine her commitments and – in so doing – face compromising her integrity. I now discuss another type of moral dilemma to which Williams and E. J. Lemmon refer.

Williams and Lemmon discuss a conception of dilemmas as cases where the agent both ought – and ought not - to do the same thing. That is, the agent is committed to doing a certain action for some reason, and is yet similarly committed not to do the same action in respect of other reasons. I call these single alternative dilemmas, or, symmetrical dilemmas. Such dilemmas are made apparent in classical tragedies where, for example in Aeschylus' Oresteia, Orestes is committed to avenging his father who was killed by his mother, and yet is simultaneously committed to refraining from murdering his mother Clytemnestra. To take another example, a husband whose wife is raped and murdered by robbers may feel committed to avenging his wife and harming her attackers. He may similarly be committed to avoiding inflicting harm on others or committed to refraining from acting on vengeance.

52 And not both.
53 A notion I discuss in more detail in the next section of my paper.
54 Lemmon in Gowans, 1987, Page 105
55 Williams, 1982, Page 171
To summarise, if genuine moral dilemmas exist, then they have to fulfil three primary conditions. Firstly, it has to be true that the agent is faced with a situation in which she has to choose between conflicting commitments that are not rationally resolvable. Secondly, it has to be true that no matter what course of action the agent takes, she will necessarily undermine at least one of her commitments and – in so doing – face a loss of that commitment and possibly of her integrity as well. Thirdly, it has to be true that the situation condition is met. That is, the agent has to be faced with a situation that she did not choose to be in, over which she has no control, and in which she is forced (by the militating circumstances) to choose between two equally important, conflicting commitments that cannot rationally be resolved.

Among the candidate cases for genuine moral dilemmas, I have identified a number of different types: tragic dilemmas, mild dilemmas, prohibition dilemmas, and obligation dilemmas. Opponents, however, claim that these would be examples of apparent dilemmas as the conflict is always rationally resolvable, as discussed above. In the following chapter, I go on to discuss the moral residue argument as a way of attempting to overcome this claim.
Chapter 2

In this chapter, my objectives are twofold. First, after a brief account of the concept of moral residue, and a more detailed look at what kinds of emotions are included in moral residue, I examine the moral residue argument for the existence of genuine moral dilemmas. Ruth Marcus, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, and Bernard Williams are prominent among those who interpret the moral residue argument as supporting the fact that irresolvable conflicts of moral commitments are possible. As it stands, this argument is open to at least two damaging objections. Outlining these objections made by Patricia Greenspan, Terence McConnell, and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, forms the second objective of this chapter. In chapter three, I outline Lynn McFall’s conception of integrity, and set up my argument that the moral residue argument can be salvaged despite the objections. In the final chapter, I make a case for the existence of genuine moral dilemmas, by interpreting the moral residue argument in terms of the independent standard of integrity.

What is moral residue?

Proponents of genuine moral dilemmas sometimes appeal to the agent’s experience of “moral residue.” Moral residue is the term given to the negative emotions an agent experiences after a choice has been made and/or an action performed. Moral residue includes negative emotions of self-assessment like guilt, shame, and remorse, and can manifest itself in the form of apologies, attempts at compensation, and attempts to make up to people.

Moral residue includes all cases of negative emotions of self-assessment. It is caused by cases where the agent has acted or made a decision that she thinks is wrong or something that violates her commitments in some way. That is, the agent will experience moral residue in cases where she thinks that she has done something morally reprehensible or something that opposes the way that she would ideally like to act, or the way that she thinks others would expect her to act. For example if an agent (like the aforementioned case of agent Z) prides herself on being honest and she ends up lying for some reason or another – even if she only tells a white lie, she may experience moral residue as she sees herself as having done something in direct
opposition to the very thing she prides herself on being: honest. Such an agent may experience guilt or shame or remorse, for violating something she deems important and has committed herself to being. She may also attempt to make up to the person that she lied to, and may end up admitting her falsehood in order to alleviate some of the guilt, shame, or remorse that she felt at having lied in the first place.

Thus, moral residue is not only a question of the negative emotions because the agent thinks that she has done something wrong, but is also caused by some type of conflict. In order for the agent to judge herself as having done something wrong she would have to recognise a tension between what she did and what she thought she ought to do. For example, an agent who prides herself on being honest would experience a tension between her commitment to being honest and the temptation that she experiences to tell a white lie. Similarly, an agent who commits adultery and experiences moral residue — although she may not have been committed to fidelity as such — would experience the residue on account of the fact that committing adultery is in conflict with what she thinks she ought to do, or how she would ideally like to act.

Moral residue thus includes any case where an agent experiences a conflict between what she ought to do and what she did do, and the negative emotions of self-assessment like guilt, shame, and remorse that occur as a result of her having done something that she thinks is wrong. I consider these three emotions specifically, because the notion of residue implies that the emotion stays with the agent and plagues her, and the nature of guilt, shame, and remorse is that they are lingering emotions that serve as a reminder to the agent that she did wrong.

It follows that moral residue is just the negative emotions an agent experiences after having made a bad choice or after having done something immoral or contrary to her ideals or commitments. It is thus caused by the agent’s actions or decisions in cases where she violates a commitment to herself or others. Consequently, the agent need not be in a situation of genuine moral dilemma in order to experience moral residue. It just needs to be the case that she undermines her personal ideals and commitments, or acts in a way that she recognises as wrong, or morally reprehensible.

57 The implication is that in violating a commitment she would have faced some sort of conflict as discussed above.
Furthermore, moral residue can be felt appropriately and inappropriately.\textsuperscript{58} It seems to be appropriate when the agent has actually violated a commitment and done something wrong, and it appears to be inappropriate if the agent experiences emotions like guilt, shame, and remorse in response to something that she did and did not violate a commitment. Although I discuss the concept of appropriate and inappropriate moral residue at a later stage, at this point I merely want to indicate that there is a difference between them. While the latter occurs when the agent has done nothing wrong, the former is when the agent actually does something wrong and experiences shame, guilt, or remorse because of that.\textsuperscript{59}

Moral residue is thus just the negative emotions of self-assessment that an agent experiences when she undermines or violates a commitment, and does something wrong. In order to demonstrate the nature of moral residue, I give a brief account of the emotions of shame, guilt, and remorse. Thereafter I discuss how the moral residue argument works, and how it can be used to support the existence of genuine moral dilemmas. I then discuss the two primary objections levelled against the efficacy of the moral residue argument.

\textbf{The emotions of moral residue}

The emotions involved in moral residue are all negative emotions of self-assessment. In this section, I discuss the three primary emotions of moral residue: guilt, shame and remorse.\textsuperscript{60} In so doing I consider the similarities and differences between these emotions and give examples of cases where such emotions can arguably be experienced appropriately and inappropriately. I also begin to examine how the emotions an agent experiences can reflect on the agent herself and on the nature of the situation in which she finds herself.

Our common sense conception of the emotions of moral residue is that emotions like shame, guilt, and remorse, are negative and sometimes punitive. When we feel remorse, we tend to want to make up for what we did wrong and we feel bad

\textsuperscript{58} What conditions appropriate moral residue would have to meet is a matter of debate. For the present purposes of my discussion I merely represent the moral residue argument as it stands. I however spell out how proponents and opponents have understood the notion of appropriately experienced moral residue in due course.

\textsuperscript{59} I give an account of what constitutes doing something wrong at a later stage.
for doing something that we perhaps think we ought not to have done. Shame, on the other hand, is something we tend to feel when we are embarrassed about our conduct, and want to hide what we did from others. Guilt, on the other hand, is something we tend to feel when we have done something wrong and we hate ourselves for that. In what follows I discuss the nature of these emotions in more detail.

Remorse is a negative feeling that the agent experiences when she has done something wrong, and recognises that she has done something wrong. It is thus only inappropriate when it is based on ignorance or mistake. This is based on the assumption that an agent can only experience remorse if she has consciously chosen to undermine her commitments for whatever reason. The conflict arises because the agent has chosen to act in a way that is in opposition with how she thinks she ought to act, or how she would ideally like to act. For example, it seems appropriate for an agent committed to fidelity to experience remorse if she has wittingly seduced a married man to whom she is very attracted, while it would be inappropriate for an agent to experience remorse if the agent were attracted to a married man and seduced him, but the man had recently proposed to her and promised her that he was not married and wanted to marry her. In the latter case, the woman would have been ignorant that she was undermining her commitment to fidelity, because she herself was single, and was under the impression that the man was too.

Sinnott-Armstrong argues that remorse has to be experienced in response to violating a commitment, because such a requirement would generate the idea that an agent “should” feel remorse for a certain act or decision she has done or made. The agent thus has to be causally or morally responsible in order to experience an emotion of moral residue like remorse. That is to say that the agent has to have done something wrong, and has to be responsible in the sense that she actually did something wrong or wronged someone. Consider the example of a conservationist (in a bad, reckless, mood) who flicks her cigarette into the bush and burns an ecosystem. Committed as she is to conservation, the remorse she experiences after having destroyed an ecosystem is appropriate.

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60 That is not to say that there are not other negative emotions of self-assessment that could similarly be categorised as moral residue. To the same extent, things like apologies and attempts at compensation are also regarded as moral residue – although I limit my focus to guilt, shame, and remorse specifically.

61 A single agent who is committed to being faithful herself (although that does not directly apply as she is single) and who is committed to refraining from breaking up other people’s relationships or tempting married men to stray from their wives. She is thus committed to fidelity in general, and
It follows that although remorse is a negative emotion of self-assessment, it can be experienced appropriately or inappropriately. As Sinnott-Armstrong argues, “remorse implies a belief that a moral requirement was violated,” and thus it is felt appropriately when a moral requirement or a commitment actually was violated or undermined. I now go on to discuss shame and guilt as the other two examples of moral residue. In so doing I contrast their differences and similarities, and consider them in relation to remorse.

Williams, claims that both shame and guilt are similarly negative emotions of self-assessment – emotions of “remainder.” Shame and guilt are thus such that they are concerned with the agent’s perception of herself. If an agent has done something wrong or violated a commitment, then she will experience shame, guilt, or remorse, because she judges herself negatively as having done something wrong.

Such emotions require what Williams refers to as an internal observer “normative self-conception.” All three emotions involve self-assessment and the agent judging herself for how she acts, and how she decides to act in any given situation according to her normative self-conception. For example, if an agent thinks that being civil to strangers is important, then in the likelihood that she is harassed one day and she is uncivil or rude to a stranger, she may experience moral residue after having judged herself as acting in a way that opposes how she would ideally want to act, and how she thinks she should act. She will experience the residue because she thinks that being uncivil is unnecessary and wrong, and because rudeness is a trait that she disparages in others. It is thus plausible to say that her internal observer judges rudeness as a reprehensible trait that the agent herself would not like to possess.

Unlike remorse and guilt, shame differs slightly as the internal observer involved in shame depends not only on the agent’s conception of herself, but on her conception of how others would judge her. Although shame, like guilt and remorse, is involved in the agent’s conception of herself, it also requires an audience and is involved in others’ conception of the agent. Shame is thus connected to the agent’s social situation: her internal observer is the product of the society in which she finds herself, and the people that she judges therein.

would feel that she had done wrong if she was either an accomplice in adultery and – say - broke up a marriage, or if she was unfaithful herself.

Sinnott-Armstrong, 1988, Page 47

Williams, 1993, Page 84

Nehamas, 1996, Page 6
Williams sees shame as a combination of the relation between an individual’s successes and failures, and the standards of the community.\textsuperscript{65} Shame is thus a question of the agent’s perceptions of herself, her perceptions of others, her perceptions of what others think of her, and her being judged for doing things contrary to what she would like to do.\textsuperscript{66} To illustrate how an emotion like shame works, consider the hypothetical example of an agent who thinks that stealing is wrong, and who witnesses someone who steals cutlery from restaurants. Not only does the agent consider stealing morally reprehensible (and so she commits herself to refraining from stealing) but her father owns a restaurant and has to deal with the effects of people who steal cutlery from restaurants. The agent will thus know that people who steal cutlery from restaurants make the restaurant owner’s life very difficult and expensive as he is always having to replace the stolen pieces of cutlery and thus has difficulty making ends meet.

In such a case, the agent is likely to perceive that stealing cutlery from restaurants is wrong, and that people who steal cutlery from restaurants are thoughtless, dishonest people. The agent will thus experience shame if she ever slips a Spur steak knife into her bag because – for example - she was dared to by her friends, or because she does not want to spend her allowance on buying her own steak knives. To the same extent, the agent may reason that because she judges people who steal cutlery from restaurants (or who steal in general) as bad, thoughtless people, that when she steals the steak knife from Spur that other people may judge her as a bad, thoughtless, dishonest person. She will thus feel shame at such an action because a) she judges stealing as wrong, b) she has seen the effects of stealing cutlery from restaurants on people who own restaurants, c) (because of b) she has judged people who steal cutlery from restaurants as bad, dishonest, thoughtless people, and d) she assumes (because of c) that others will judge her as a dishonest, bad, thoughtless person.

Williams’ notion of the internalised other thus includes social expectations such as the agent’s conception of how she should live, and how her actions affect the world and others therein. It also includes the principles to which she is committed.

\textsuperscript{65} Williams, 1993, Page 81

\textsuperscript{66} Although this could include being judged by others, within the context of my discussion about the emotions of moral residue, I focus on the agent being judged by her “internalised observer” and the way her “internalised observer” thinks others would judge her for her actions, as opposed to how others actually judge her for her actions.
Although all three emotions are negative emotions of self-assessment, shame is a narcissistic emotion in that it is focused on the agent. Given that, the agent in the Hostages case would feel shame if she chose a fellow hostage to be shot, because she would judge herself as having done something shameful, and she would think that those around her would similarly judge her for having done something wrong. She would also look to those she admires and respects, and see that they are not the type of people who would choose one of their fellow hostages to be shot, and would experience shame as a result of failing the hostage that she eventually chose to be shot, and for having violated her commitments and ideals. It follows that shame (like guilt and remorse) draws on self-criticism and derision for the agent’s inability to live up to her personal ideals and commitments.

Unlike shame, guilt is less narcissistic as it is more focussed on what the agent has done to others, and less focussed on the agent herself, and what she thinks that others will think of her and how she acts. Consequently, indignation, reparation, and forgiveness tend to be associated with guilt as the agent tries to make up for the wrong that she did to others. This is because guilt is the product of the agent’s attitude to herself, and to what she sees herself as having done to others. If we consider the agent committed to fidelity who wittingly seduces a married man, if that agent destroys his marriage, she may experience guilt for the damage that she caused his family and the hurt and disillusionment she caused his wife and children. The internalised version of guilt differs from the internalised other of shame, as the latter is an observer or “watcher,” while the former is a “victim” or “enforcer.” Guilt is thus a more punitive emotion than shame, and although both emotions linger with the agent, guilt serves to remind her constantly of the wrong she did to others.

Given that guilt is related to feelings of anger, the focus of guilt is on the agent’s victim. For example, if the agent in the Hostages case felt guilt, it would be because she had chosen one of her fellow hostages to be shot. It is plausible that the agent’s guilt would be the result of her hating herself for a) being chosen by the Madman to choose a fellow hostage, b) for harming the person that she chose, c) for choosing that person, and d) for the wrong she would have done to his family and friends by choosing him over another person. The agent may also experience guilt, as

67 Williams, 1993, Page 81.
68 Williams, 1993, page 91
69 Ibid. 1993, Page 219
she was angry with herself for being unable to convince the Madman that no one needed to be shot. It follows that if the agent experienced guilt as opposed to shame, she would be plagued with anger with herself for her action and for the wrong that she caused her fellow hostage. If we consider the case of the agent who steals the Spur steak knife, then she would experience guilt if she came to realise the wrong that her action caused the restaurant owner, the difficult position that it put him in financially and practically,\textsuperscript{70} and if she resented herself for putting him in such a difficult position.

Guilt is thus "rooted in hearing, the sound in oneself of the voice of judgement,\textsuperscript{71}" and is an awareness that the agent has done something wrong and failed to live up to her commitments in some way – thus making her angry with herself for failing to live up to those commitments and doing wrong to others in the process. As Gibbard argues, guilt is the "first-person counterpart of anger,\textsuperscript{72}" as the agent realises that she is to blame for undermining her commitments and acting in a way that she ideally would not want to. It follows that "to feel guilty is to suffer.\textsuperscript{73}"

It remains, however, that all emotions of moral residue involve a degree of suffering for the agent. Whereas guilt and remorse can be experienced in response to the agent violating her respect for others by undermining some commitment or doing something wrong, shame can be experienced when the agent violates her own self-respect by undermining a commitment or doing something wrong. Thus, the agent who feels guilt or remorse suffers because she has wronged someone else, while the agent who experiences shame, suffers because she has wronged herself and let herself down in some way.

The emotions of moral residue are all emotions involved in the agent's conception that she has done wrong and undermined or violated a commitment in some way. They are furthermore such that an agent cannot experience them unless she sees herself as connected with the action that she does or the decision that she makes, in such a way that it reflects poorly on her.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{70} By that I mean the extra money he would have to make to afford to replace the steak knives, and the extra effort that he would have to go to order extra knives, and find the right make etc.
\textsuperscript{71} Williams, 1993, Page 89
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid. 1993, Page 89
\textsuperscript{73} Sinnott-Armstrong, 1988, Page 50
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid. 1988, Page 30
Now that I have given a brief account of the types of emotions involved in moral residue, and have outlined what moral residue is, I go on to discuss the moral residue argument, how it works, and what the main objections to it are.

The Moral Residue Argument

In this section, I start with a brief outline of the moral residue argument. I then provide a thought experiment: the Sadistic Hijackers case, in order to illustrate what moral residue is, and how the moral residue argument works. In so doing I discuss what I take to be the main aspects of the moral residue argument, and draw on the account of moral residue given by Sinnott-Armstrong, Williams, and Marcus.

The moral residue argument turns on the assumption that we can learn from reflection on our moral experience and is based on the reasoning that the emotional reaction of appropriate moral residue in response to either alternative that an agent may face, is evidence that she faced a genuine moral dilemma. This is based on the understanding that the agent’s residue would not make sense if she had not faced a genuine moral conflict in which both of her commitments were rationally irresolvable. By that I mean that in a situation where an agent faces a choice between A and B, (where if she chooses A she will experience appropriate moral residue for undermining B, and if she chooses B she will experience appropriate moral residue for undermining A) it shows that neither of her commitments overrode each other and that she thus faced a rationally irresolvable conflict of commitments.

In order to discuss the moral residue argument in detail, I discuss the four points that Terence McConnell argues have to be true of the moral residue argument if it is to work. After discussing the Sadistic Hijackers case, I link the aspects of the moral residue argument to the conditions that a genuine moral dilemma would have to meet were it to exist. This explains how the moral residue argument is used as evidence to support the existence of genuine moral dilemmas.

McConnell argues that proponents must show the following four things to be true for the moral residue argument to support the existence of genuine moral dilemmas: 1) when the agent acts, she experiences remorse, shame or guilt, 2) that she experiences these emotions is appropriate, 3) had she acted on the other alternative, she would also have experienced remorse, shame, or guilt, and 4) in the latter case

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75 Gowans in Mason, 1996, Page 203
these emotions would have been equally appropriate. Given that the moral residue would be appropriate no matter which alternative the agent chooses, it follows that the agent would necessarily do wrong no matter how she acts. That the agent’s residue would be appropriate, and that she would necessarily do wrong, supports the existence of genuine moral dilemmas. This is because only a situation that meets the sufficient conditions of a genuine moral dilemma could account for the fact that the agent experiences appropriate moral residue and would necessarily do wrong no matter which option she chooses.

If the agent would necessarily do wrong no matter which alternative she chooses or how she acts, then she would be in a situation in which she faces a choice between (at least) two equally important, conflicting commitments that cannot be rationally resolved. The moral residue argument thus turns on the claim that there are some situations of conflict where an agent will appropriately feel negative emotions of moral residue no matter which alternative she chooses in a situation where she is faced with conflicting commitments. That the agent cannot resolve the conflict without “remainder” to use Williams’s phrase, shows that she is committed to both actions in such a way that she cannot rationally resolve the conflict and is condemned to moral failure. The moral residue argument thus seems to work on the assumption that moral residue is appropriate if it occurs after the agent has violated or undermined a commitment. It is also known as the “phenomenological argument” as it appeals to the feelings, emotions and responses the agent experiences after she is faced with conflicting commitments where one does not necessarily override the other in a situation where the agent is forced to act on one of the two conflicting commitments.

In order to show how the moral residue argument can be seen to support the reality of genuine moral dilemmas, I discuss moral residue in terms of the aforementioned conditions that a genuine moral dilemma would have to meet were it to exist.

**The Sadistic Hijackers case**

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76 McConnell in Mason, 1996, Page 36-37
77 Ibid. 1996.
78 Williams, 1982, Page 179
79 Sinnott-Armstrong, 1988, Page 44
80 Marcus, 1980, Page 122
Imagine a case where a mother and her two young daughters are hijacked. The hijackers steal the vehicle with the mother and children in it and drive it to their workshop in a township far away. On the drive, the daughters scream in terror and confusion. This irritates the hijackers immensely. The result is that by the time they get the car back to their workshop to be stripped of all its expensive parts, they have had enough of the noise and panic of the daughters, and they want the mother to suffer for failing to quiet them. The hijackers thus give the mother an ultimatum. She has to choose either action A or action B.

Action A is choosing one daughter (daughter A) to be sold as a child prostitute. Action B is choosing the other daughter (daughter B) to be sold as a child prostitute. If the mother refuses to choose a daughter then she will be forced to return home and both of her daughters will be sold by the hijackers to be child prostitutes. If she makes a choice between actions A and B, then she will escape unharmed with the other daughter. No matter what happens the mother will be set free and has the opportunity to escape the awful situation with only one of her daughters. The mother thus has the following choices:

i) Choose action A/daughter A to be sold – protect daughter B – and escape unscathed with daughter B.

ii) Choose action B/daughter B to be sold – protect daughter A – and escape unscathed with daughter A.

iii) Choose neither action A nor action B, have both daughter A and daughter B be sold as child prostitutes, and escape with the fate of both of her daughters on her conscience.81

In such a case, the mother has two commitments. The first is a commitment to daughter A. The second is a commitment to daughter B. As a loving mother, she is committed to caring for, and protecting her daughters. In the hijacking situation, however, her ultimatum is such that no matter which alternative she chooses she will

81 I take it as given that option iii) is not a plausible option and – in the context of this example – the mother would not consider taking it as I assume that her instinct would be to save at least one child – and so the mother really does face an ultimatum and an irresolvable conflict of commitments.
have the fate of one of her daughters on her conscience, and will have undermined her commitment to either daughter A or daughter B to protect and care for them.

No matter which alternative the mother chooses (action A or action B) she will experience moral residue. By that, I mean that regardless of which action she chooses she will experience a sense of loss for one of her daughter’s and their life ahead as a child prostitute. It is plausible to think that she will experience a sense of responsibility for ultimately having to choose one of them to be a child prostitute, and will thus feel a sense of guilt, remorse, or shame, (possibly all three) for her inability to protect both of her daughters.

As discussed, the moral residue argument works on the assumption that the emotions an agent like the mother experiences – if appropriate – support the reality of genuine moral dilemmas as they point to the fact that she faces an irresolvable conflict of commitments. If we consider the Sadistic Hijackers case, the argument for moral residue would be as follows:

1) It is appropriate for the agent to experience residue after choosing daughter A to become a child prostitute.
2) It is appropriate for the agent to experience residue after choosing daughter B to become a child prostitute.
3) There is no adequate reason for the agent to feel residue after either choice unless she has violated some commitment (in this case her commitment to protect daughter A and daughter B respectively).
4) If it is appropriate to experience residue, but there is no adequate reason for remorse except that a commitment was violated, then a commitment was violated.
5) Thus, the agent has a commitment not to choose daughter A to be sold as a child prostitute, and a commitment not to choose daughter B to be sold as a child prostitute.
6) The agent cannot prevent the fate as a child prostitute of both daughter A and daughter B, and yet, she has to choose one of them to be sold as a child prostitute.
7) Thus, the agent is in a rationally irresolvable commitment conflict: a genuine moral dilemma.

82 By this I mean that daughter’s fate as a child prostitute.
The first 3 premises, and premise 6, are dictated to by the situation in which the agent finds herself. This can be traced back to the situation condition in the first chapter on the conditions that a genuine moral dilemma would have to meet were it to exist. The situation condition is such that for a genuine moral dilemma to exist it has to be true that the agent finds herself in a situation in which she is forced by militating circumstances and factors outside of her control to choose between two rationally irresolvable conflicting commitments.

In the Sadistic Hijackers case, the agent finds herself in a situation that has been imposed on her by the world in the sense that: i) she does not choose to be hijacked by sadistic hijackers, ii) she does not choose for her children to make a noise on the drive, iii) she has no control over her children’s noise and panic, and iv) she similarly has no way of controlling or preventing the hijackers reactions to the noise. In this way it is the nature of the situation that places the agent in a position where she has to choose between which of her daughters will be sold, when she is committed to protecting both of them and would ideally not want either to become child prostitutes or to be sold as child prostitutes by the sadistic hijackers. It follows that it is not the result of the agent’s incoherent or inconsistent commitments that causes her to be forced to undermine her commitment to either daughter A or daughter B – it is rather the situation that forces her to undermine her commitments. 83

Proponents of the moral residue argument would argue that the agent in the Sadistic Hijackers case faces a genuine moral conflict, or a situation that meets the requirements of a prohibition dilemma. They would thus argue that it follows that the situation the agent faces in that case meets the requirements of the situation condition. That is, the agent faces a situation that has been imposed on her by the world where she ought not to do either of the acts that she has to choose between, but where she also has to choose a daughter to be sold if she wants to protect the other daughter. According to the moral residue argument, if moral residue is appropriate in response to both action A and action B, then the situation condition is met. I say that because of McConnell’s point that for the moral residue argument to work it has to be true that the residue experienced in response to either alternative available in a given situation

83 I discuss at a later stage the notion of coherency and the difference between the agent’s commitments being inconsistent (and thus causing her to face a conflict of commitments) and the agent being in a
to the agent is appropriate. That is to say that if the moral residue is appropriate, then the situation condition is met (as no other situation could explain the fact that the agent will necessarily do something morally reprehensible no matter which option she chooses), and that thus the moral residue argument can support the existence of a situation that meets the situation condition. The agent’s residue is appropriate only if she does something wrong or undermines a commitment no matter which option she chooses.

In this way, proponents attempt to use the moral residue argument to show that there are some situations where moral residue is justified after either choice that an agent faces in a given conflict situation. The justification for that residue is the fact that the agent violates a moral requirement or has to undermine her commitments. Consequently, the moral residue is treated as evidence that the agent is faced with a situation in which all of her alternatives involved violating a moral requirement or undermining at least one of her important commitments. According to the moral residue argument, therefore, all proponents of genuine moral dilemmas need to do is to prove that the feelings of moral residue are justified (or appropriate) after each alternative to prove that the agent faced an irresolvable conflict.

For example, consider the agent (Z) whose brother in law is having an affair with his wife’s best friend. Proponents of genuine moral dilemmas need only show that Z is justified in experiencing moral residue in both cases: after lying to her sister in law when she asks about the affair, and after failing to keep her promise to her brother in law, to show that she does face an irresolvable conflict — and thus — a genuine moral dilemma. That is, proponents need only show that Z experiences moral residue appropriately to support the existence of cases that meet the conditions of genuine moral dilemmas.

Williams talks in terms of the agent experiencing moral residue after acting in cases like the Sadistic Hijackers case, and argues that the agony (the moral residue) is not so much the result of the agent’s doubt that she chose the right option, but rather that there was no “right” or “best” option available. That an agent’s desire to act
on the commitment that she eventually could not act on prevails - manifests itself in 
the form of moral residue. That is, because the agent still thought that she ought to 
act on the commitment that she did not, and because she ideally wanted to act on both 
commitments, but could not, she will experience a sense of loss and residue. For 
example, the mother’s residue in the Sadistic Hijackers case would be because she 
feels remorse, or guilt, because she wrongs the daughter that she eventually chooses 
to be sold as a child prostitute. In the example of the unfaithful brother-in-law, Z 
would ideally have wanted a situation in which she could tell the truth and keep her 
promise, and would have experienced moral residue as a result of the commitment 
that she violated.89

Marcus argues that genuine moral dilemmas are not resolvable without 
residue, and cannot be rationally resolved by appealing to hierarchical systems or 
theories that advocate a single, independent source of value above all other values.90 
Her argument thus also suggests that moral residue supports the existence of cases 
that could meet the situation condition. As she argues, in such situations it is absurd 
to assume that "we could arrive at a complete set of rules, priorities, or qualifications 
that would, in every possible case, unequivocally mandate a single course of 
action."91

It follows that the moral residue argument works in such a way that from the 
fact that the agent will experience appropriate moral residue whether she does action 
A or action B, it follows that she cannot avoid moral residue or doing wrong. This is 
because the agent ideally wants to do both action A and action B (or neither action A 
or action B), and yet no matter which option she chooses she is forced to undermine 
or violate a commitment. Now that I have discussed how the moral residue argument 
is meant to work, I discuss a further aspect of moral residue: the fact that it can also 
reflect the agent’s commitments and values.

As moral residue is appropriate when it is experienced in response to a 
situation where an agent undermines or violates her commitments, it follows that it is 
evidence for the agent’s commitments. Consider again the agent in the Sadistic

88 This also points to a case that meets the situation condition in the sense that if there is no best option 
available, then it would seem to suggest that the agent was in a situation in which she could not prevent 
doing wrong regardless of which alternative she chose to act on.
89 In this way the moral residue argument focuses on the commitment that the agent violated, and the 
impact of that on her.
90 Marcus, 1980, Page 124
91 Marcus, Page 124
Hijackers case: her moral residue reflects her commitment to loving and wanting to protect her daughters. This links to the idea that emotions can be appropriate: they can fit an agent’s decisions and actions appropriately. Whether an agent experiences moral residue or not, is determined by what she is committed to and by how she acts when faced with a conflict between her commitments.

It can also be argued that moral residue is a reassuring sign that the agent took her commitments seriously i.e. that she was really committed to them. For example, in the Sadistic Hijackers case, it would be more disturbing had the mother chosen a daughter to be shot and not experienced feelings of remorse, guilt, and shame. If the mother had made her decision happily, or indifferently, we would deem her a bad mother, and a questionable moral agent who was not committed to protecting her daughters. We can thus understand Williams’ notion that emotions reflect on whether an agent is an “admirable human being or not,” or whether she is a “decent human being.” We could furthermore assume that the mother did not love her daughters, nor did she care for their safety. It therefore seems that “at least some remorse is appropriate” in response to both of the mother’s alternatives - and that the remorse is evidence that she really was committed to preventing both of her daughters from being sold as child prostitutes.

In cases of appropriate moral residue that seem to meet the sufficient conditions of a genuine moral dilemma, it is not only a question of what can be done, but of what fails to be done. Such situations – if they exist – involve what it is in the agent’s power to do, and what she will inevitably fail to do. The agent is thus damned no matter how she eventually chooses to act. If the agent does not experience residue, it suggests that the course of action she eventually chose eliminated the conflict. If that were the case, then the agent would not have experienced a situation that could meet the conditions of a genuine moral dilemma, as one of her conflicting commitments overrode the other.

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92 A concept I pay more attention to in my discussions concerning remorse.
93 Williams, 1982, Page 175
94 Ibid. 1982, Page 166
95 Ibid. 1982, Page 173
96 Sinnott-Armstrong, 1988, Page 45
97 Ibid. 1988, Page 45
98 Marcus, 1980, Page 127
According to proponents of the moral residue argument, however, “to insist that there is in every case a solution without residue is false to the moral facts”\textsuperscript{99} This is because they argue that in cases where moral residue is appropriate in response to both of the agent’s alternatives, it can support the existence of genuine moral dilemmas.

**Objections to the Moral Residue argument**

In this section I discuss the two arguably most important objections to the moral residue argument. The first is that the moral residue argument begs the question by assuming the agent who experiences moral residue faced a genuine conflict of commitments that could not rationally be resolved. The second is the claim that the notion of experiencing moral residue “appropriately” does no useful work, as there are cases where it is not inappropriate for the agent to experience moral residue although she has done nothing wrong. After examining the objections, I discuss how these opponents understand the notion of appropriate moral residue. I argue that both objections seem to turn on particular understandings of appropriateness.

The first objection is based on the claim that appealing to the fact that an agent experiences appropriate moral residue in response to an apparent dilemma - in order to show that she could not but undermine one of her commitments - presupposes that she could not but undermine one of her commitments. It thus presupposes that she faced a genuine dilemma. This presupposition is required, the objection runs, for proponents to make sense of the moral residue being appropriate.

According to the first objection, proponents of genuine moral dilemmas are begging the question that, for example, the remorse the agent experiences is not inappropriate.\textsuperscript{100} That is, proponents are presupposing that the agent faces a genuine conflict of commitments where the conflict cannot rationally be resolved, and where she is forced to do something wrong. It is however, the very question of whether the agent does something wrong and whether her moral residue actually is appropriate that is in question in determining whether the moral residue argument works.

Claiming that the moral residue is appropriate\textsuperscript{101} presupposes that the commitment

\textsuperscript{99} Marcus, 1980, Page 132
\textsuperscript{100} Sinnott-Armstrong, 1988, Page 47
\textsuperscript{101} A key premise in the moral residue argument.
acted on does not override the commitment not acted on. That is, it presupposes an irresolvable conflict of commitments (and thus, a situation that could meet the conditions of a genuine moral dilemma).

For example, in the Sadistic Hijackers case the agent would have felt remorse, guilt, or shame, because she judged herself as having done something wrong. The question is thus whether emotions of moral residue are appropriate in the sense that they reflect the fact that the agent was in a genuine moral dilemma that met the conditions of irresolvable conflict, loss, and a situation in which she could not but undermine one of her commitments and face inevitable wrongdoing. It remains, however, that the moral residue argument rests on the assumption that the emotions the agent experiences are appropriate and that they thus support the existence of genuine moral dilemmas. It is furthermore based on the assumption that the agent violated or undermined a commitment and would no matter which option she chose to act on. Again, however, that is the very thing in question. As Sinnott-Armstrong says, “since the argument from remorse is supposed to show that there are conflicting moral requirements, the argument begs the question.”

The idea at work here is that feelings like guilt, shame, and remorse are emotions of negative self-assessment that are experienced appropriately when the agent has violated a commitment or done something wrong. McConnell claims that the moral residue argument works on the assumption that agents typically respond to situations of irresolvable conflict with moral residue – an assumption that begs the question. McConnell thinks that as the emotions of moral residue are all negative emotions of self-assessment, they automatically contain a negative value judgement that the agent actually has done something wrong, and yet, that is the very thing that the moral residue argument needs to prove: the fact that the agent could not avoid doing wrong no matter which option she chose to act on. It follows that the emotions of moral residue cannot be used to support the existence of genuine moral dilemmas. All that the presence of such emotions indicate, is that the agent has judged herself as having done something wrong, or that she believes that she has done something wrong. In so doing, McConnell contrasts regret and remorse, and argues that

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102 Sinnott-Armstrong, 1988, Page 47
101 Ibid. 1988
104 Ibid. 1988, Page 50
105 McConnell in Mason, 1996, Page 39
106 Ibid. 1996, Page 38

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while an agent can experience the former in response to something that she had nothing to do with - or that she did not cause - by feeling an emotion like remorse, the agent presupposes that she, herself, has done something wrong.

McConnell is objecting to the problematic nature of moral residue itself. That is, he is objecting to the fact that because moral residue relies on emotions that necessarily entail the judgment that the agent has done something wrong, it cannot but presuppose that if the agent experiences moral residue in response to both alternatives in a given situation, then situations that seem to meet the sufficient conditions of genuine moral dilemmas do exist. The efficacy of the moral residue argument thus depends on the assumption that there is a real irresolvable conflict of commitments. As McConnell argues, however, the presence of moral residue only shows that the agent has judged herself as having done something wrong, and is not evidence that the agent really did do something wrong or that she would necessarily have felt moral residue appropriately in response to both alternatives. McConnell thus thinks that the appeal to moral residue “does not establish the reality or the possibility of moral dilemmas.”

Greenspan raises a similar objection as she recognises that the emotions of moral residue like remorse, guilt, and shame, “involve negative evaluations focussed more or less explicitly on the self.” Greenspan suggests that when an agent experiences guilt, remorse, or shame, she is judging herself as having done something wrong — as such emotions require the judgement that she actually is guilty. This links into the second objection, as, not only do the emotions appealed to in the moral residue argument presuppose that the agent has done wrong — they also work on the assumption that such emotions are appropriate and are evidence that the agent faced an irresolvable conflict of commitments: a genuine moral dilemma. It remains, however, that an agent can experience emotions of moral residue appropriately in response to situations where she did not do wrong.

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107 Despite the contrast that he makes, regret is not an emotion of moral residue, as the agent does not have to be causally connected to the act to experience regret. That is, she can experience regret for things that she herself did not do. For example, an agent can regret the death of her friend’s husband. In this way regret is not an emotion of moral residue. I say that because it is not a negative emotion of self-assessment, as the agent has done nothing wrong in cases where she experiences regret, and thus she cannot assess herself as having undermined a commitment or done something wrong.
108 McConnell in Mason, 1996, Page 38
109 Greenspan, 1995, Page 135
110 Ibid. 1995, Page 151
The second objection is thus that the existence of appropriate moral residue can neither be used as evidence that genuine moral dilemmas exist, nor can it be used to show that there are situations where the agent faces inevitable wrongdoing. Greenspan’s point is that as it is not inappropriate to experience moral residue even in cases where the agent has done nothing wrong, there is no necessary connection between negative self-assessment and actual wrongdoing. That is, appropriateness has nothing to do with moral responsibility, and thus even if proponents are able to show that an agent’s moral residue is appropriate, it cannot be used as evidence that the agent in question necessarily did anything wrong. Consequently, according to the second objection, the notion of appropriate moral residue is insignificant and cannot support the existence of genuine moral dilemmas.

Greenspan defends what she refers to as a “nonjudgementalist view of guilt” as an agent can arguably feel subjectively guilty, even when she is aware that she is not necessarily morally responsible. In this way Greenspan’s account does not depend on the assumption that emotions involve evaluative beliefs, because although an emotion like guilt involves the agent’s assessment of herself as morally responsible, it need not always involve the corresponding belief that she actually is morally responsible. Consequently, Greenspan allows for cases where the agent is guilty, but not morally blameworthy, and she thus objects to the moral residue argument on the basis that it begs the question by assuming that to feel guilty means that the agent actually is guilty. Such reasoning begs the question on the basis that there are cases of guilt without fault.

Opponents appealing to the second objection can argue that the moral residue argument does not work because it relies on the fact that if an agent experiences appropriate moral residue in response to both alternatives in a given situation, then she will necessarily have to do something wrong and undermine her commitments. That an agent can experience moral residue appropriately in instances where she has done nothing wrong, undermines the moral residue argument, because it means that the appeal to appropriate moral residue cannot show that the agent will necessarily have to do something wrong, or that she necessarily faces a genuine moral dilemma.

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111 McConnell in Mason, 1996, Page 38
112 Ibid., 1995, Page 151
113 Ibid. 1995, Page 165
According to the second objection, opponents could argue that, for example, an agent committed to conservation can experience guilt, remorse, and shame for accidentally standing on a lame field mouse that she did not see when she was walking through thick bush. In such a case opponents would argue that although her moral residue is appropriate, the agent has done nothing wrong in the sense that she is not morally blameworthy. It follows that the emotions appealed to by proponents of genuine moral dilemmas in the moral residue argument are appropriate in cases where the agent does not face a genuine moral dilemma. The implication is that the moral residue argument fails and cannot support the existence of genuine moral dilemmas.

It remains, however, that the moral residue argument relies on the assumption that emotions like guilt, shame, and remorse are appropriate and point to the fact that the agent was in a situation in which she was forced to undermined her commitments and that necessitated wrongdoing. Nonetheless, both Greenspan and McConnell make reference to cases where the agent experiences moral residue in response to cases where she has done nothing wrong and yet her moral residue appears to be both warranted and appropriate. According to the second objection, that an agent is causally responsible is not evidence that she is morally responsible. Consequently, moral residue is not evidence for the existence of genuine moral dilemmas or situations in which the agent could not but have done something wrong.

For example, imagine that the agent is in her car, and is about to reverse. In the car parked beside her is a mother and her child. The child is holding a handful of marbles, and the mother is busy nattering on her telephone – completely oblivious of the neighbouring cars and her son in relation to them. The woman reversing checks all around before she reverses, is a competent driver, and is aware of the woman and her son. However, just as the agent finishes checking her surroundings, the child drops his favourite marble and runs behind the agent’s car as she reverses. The agent runs over the child and kills him in front of his mother.

In this case, although the agent is causally responsible in the sense that she ran over the child, she is – according to the second objection – not morally responsible in the sense that she checked before reversing and could not have accounted for the child dropping his favourite marble and running behind her car at

\[114\] Ibid. 1995, Page 154
\[115\] Sinnott-Armstrong, 1988, Page 48
\[116\] Greenspan, 1995, Page 154

46
the last minute. It remains, however, that her awareness of the fact that she did not mean to run the child over and did check thoroughly before reversing would not eradicate her feelings of moral residue.\textsuperscript{118} No matter how much she is able to reason that she has done nothing wrong in the sense that she was not morally responsible, and that – for instance – the mother was as much to blame for not watching the boy or holding his hand, it remains that she was driving and she ran him over.

Consequently, the agent is still likely to experience guilt for having run the child over, despite her recognition that it was not strictly her fault. Furthermore, the agent is likely to mull over the event and wonder how things could have been different had she checked her mirrors again, or paid more attention to the fact that the mother was not concentrating on her child and that he was likely to run out at the last minute. The agent would thus - like the agent in the Sadistic Hijackers case – be plagued with remorse and guilt, and would in some sense be unable to live with herself.\textsuperscript{119} It remains, however, that her apparently appropriate moral residue does not point to her having done anything wrong. For appropriate moral residue to support the existence of genuine moral dilemmas there must be a necessary connection between appropriate moral residue and doing wrong.

McConnell furthermore argues that it is hard for an agent to be able to be objective in such a case. Although the agent may reason that she was not responsible, that she could not have foreseen the accident, and although she took all the precautions she could, it remains that it is natural and appropriate for her to wonder if things could have been different, and to experience guilt, remorse, and shame in response for her actions.\textsuperscript{120} As McConnell says, "human beings are not so fine tuned emotionally that when they have been causally responsible for harm, they can easily turn remorse on or off depending on their degree of moral responsibility."\textsuperscript{121} He thus thinks that because there are cases where an agent’s remorse is not inappropriate even though we think that she is not warranted in believing that she has done something wrong (like the agent who ran over the little boy), it shows that the moral residue argument is flawed. It follows that if the moral residue argument cannot serve as

\textsuperscript{117} McConnell in Mason, 1996, Page 38
\textsuperscript{118} And, if it did, we may find her a morally reprehensible agent as we would the mother in the Sadistic Hijackers case had she reacted indifferently or happily to choosing one of her daughters to be sold as a child prostitute.
\textsuperscript{119} By that I mean that she would be guilt-stricken and would despair at the fact that she is not the type of person that runs over a child or kills children.
\textsuperscript{120} McConnell in Mason, 1996, Page 39
evidence that the agent has done something wrong, then it cannot support the reality of situations where the agent was condemned to moral failure: situations that seem to meet the requirements of genuine moral dilemmas.

Now that I have explained how the two main objections to the moral residue argument work, I pay some attention to how opponents understand the notion of experiencing moral residue ‘appropriately’. The understanding of what it means to experience moral residue appropriately is central to the moral residue argument. It is also central to the efficacy of the previously discussed objections to it.

Opponents of genuine moral dilemmas seem to understand proponents as arguing that an agent can only experience moral residue appropriately if she has done something wrong. The two objections discussed, however, deny that this is the case. McConnell suggests that the presence of negative emotions of self-assessment like shame, guilt, or remorse, are insufficient to establish that the agent has done anything wrong. He claims that for proponents to maintain that moral residue is appropriate and does prove that the agent has done something wrong, they have to assume that the agent faced a genuine moral dilemma/a rationally irresolvable conflict of commitments and inevitable wrongdoing. The first objection thus relies on a conception of appropriateness that is such that an agent’s moral residue is appropriate iff she faced a rationally irresolvable conflict of commitments.

Greenspan, however, argues that it is appropriate for an agent to experience moral residue even in cases where she has done nothing wrong in the sense that she is not morally responsible.122 The implication is that in cases where the agent did something morally reprehensible by accident or out of ignorance, she cannot be said to experience moral residue appropriately. That is, although she will have done something she ought not to have, she cannot be said to have done anything wrong, as cases like that in which she ran over the child are accidental and she cannot be said to be morally blameworthy. The second objection thus denies the link between experiencing appropriate moral residue and doing wrong. The implication of the objection is that while appropriate moral residue is a broad term and need not entail doing wrong, doing wrong is a narrow term confined to cases where the agent is morally blameworthy.

121 Ibid. 1996, Page 39
122 Like the agent who ran over the little boy who chased after his favourite marble.
Proponents, however, argue that moral residue is inappropriate in cases where one commitment overrode the other, or where the agent believed that she acted for the best. Williams argues that genuine moral conflicts are not “soluble without remainder,” and seems to base his argument on the understanding that in a genuine moral conflict the agent will necessarily have to undermine one of her commitments and will thus inevitably face moral failure. For example, proponents would argue that the agent in the Sadistic Hijackers case would experience appropriate moral residue for choosing one of her daughters to be sold as a child prostitute. Proponents thus seem to have a different understanding of what constitutes appropriate moral residue than opponents do.

While opponents like McConnell are of the opinion that the agent has done nothing wrong if she acts out of ignorance or by accident, proponents make no such distinction between whether the agent is causally or morally responsible. Rather, proponents seem to work on the understanding that an agent can only experience moral residue and negative feelings of self-assessment if she is aware that she has done something wrong or violated a commitment. The understanding is that the agent can only experience moral residue appropriately if she is conscious of a conflict between what she ought to do and what she did so, and if how she eventually acted opposed what she ought to do or how she would ideally have wanted to act.

Consequently, proponents would interpret the case of the woman who accidentally ran over the little boy differently to how opponents did. That is, proponents would argue that the agent experiences moral residue appropriately because she had done something wrong: something that conflicted with what she thought she ought to have done. It thus seems that for the moral residue argument to withstand the objections, it is necessary to find an independent way of determining that when an agent experiences moral residue appropriately, it is because she actually has done something wrong.

Now that I have discussed what the moral residue argument is, and how it works, and have discussed the emotions involved in the moral residue argument and the objections levelled against it, I go on to discuss Lynn McFall’s conception of integrity. In so doing I intend to rework the moral residue argument in terms of

123 Williams, 1982, Page 179
integrity and, by this means, to show the merits of the moral residue argument despite the aforementioned objections. Integrity provides a way of understanding the moral residue argument that is better than the other notions of appropriate moral residue and in a way that overcomes the objections.

124 That is, how she acted by running the boy over would have conflicted with how she ideally would have wanted to act. This is based on the understanding that she would not have wanted to run him over.
Chapter 3

According to Sinnott-Armstrong, in order to avoid the objections levelled against the moral residue argument it is necessary to give an independent argument that the moral residue an agent experiences is not inappropriate. In this section I defend the existence of moral dilemmas by using Lynn McFall’s conception of integrity as an independent way of showing how the moral residue argument can work. By interpreting the notion of appropriate moral residue in terms of integrity, I address the aforementioned objections that the moral residue argument begs the question, and that moral residue can be felt appropriately in situations where the agent did not face inevitable wrongdoing.

In order to do this I go on to use two case studies to show that there are instances where an agent experiences appropriate moral residue in response to both alternatives in a given situation, and that can be used as evidence that there are cases where the situation, conflict, and loss conditions can be met. These are cases extracted from William Styron’s Sophie’s Choice, and Euripides’ Iphigenia at Aulis.

In what follows I discuss what integrity is in terms of McFall’s conception of the necessary and sufficient conditions of integrity. In so doing I discuss the different types of commitments that an agent has. I also discuss how they can determine whether she is an admirable agent or not, and how – even when coherent commitments can conflict in a way that compromises the agent’s integrity and can point to the reality of situations that meet the conditions of a genuine moral dilemma.

What is Integrity?

A common, and, on the face of it, plausible view of integrity is that it involves being true to one’s personal commitments. An agent has integrity if she remains true to the principles and commitments that she holds. Consider the example of the agent, Z, whose brother-in-law is having an affair. Z is committed to keeping the promise that she made to her brother-in-law, and to telling the truth to his desperate wife. Z will thus have integrity if she remains true to those commitments and does not undermine or ignore them – even in cases where it may be difficult to do so. Integrity thus

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125 Sinnott-Armstrong, 1988, Page 47
involves responsibility, as the agent has to uphold the commitments to which she chooses to commit herself.

In her paper, *Integrity*, McFall discusses what she takes integrity to be. Her conception can be divided into the following necessary conditions:

1) That the agent is committed to certain principles

2) That the commitments are such that they can conflict with her desires,\(^{126}\)

3) That she upholds those principles in the face of temptation or challenge,\(^{127}\)

4) That (given 1), 2), and 3)) she faces the possibility of losing her integrity by undermining her commitments, and

5) That she has an authentic relation to her principles

All the necessary conditions of integrity are closely linked, and although each condition is necessary, the five conditions together are sufficient for integrity.

The first condition (that a person of integrity must be committed to certain principles) includes a sub-condition that places constraints on the content of the agent’s commitments. It also stipulates that only identity-conferring commitments are the type of commitments that apply to integrity. The fifth condition similarly has a sub-condition: the condition that the agent’s commitments have to be coherent for it to count as integrity. Although I discuss the sub-conditions in more detail in due course, I now use an example to illustrate how the basic necessary conditions work and what a person of integrity would be like.

Consider the hypothetical case of Bunny Hugger Bob. Bob meets the first condition of integrity because he is committed to animal anti-cruelty and thus works for the RSPCA.\(^{128}\) Although Bob was a qualified lawyer, he was so disturbed by the amount of animal cruelty in the world that he decided not to follow his career as a lawyer and decided to commit himself to preventing cruelty to animals. His decision made his friends and family both confused and disparaging, as (although they cared for animals and had the odd pet) they neither shared nor understood Bob’s active commitment to animal anti-cruelty.

Bob’s commitment to animal anti-cruelty meets the second necessary condition as it has the potential to conflict with his desires. I say that because the chances are high that Bob may desire to be in a job where he works a predictable

\(^{126}\) McFall, 1987, Page 9-10

\(^{127}\) Ibid. 1987, Page 9
eight-hour day. He may also desire to escape having to deal with the emotional stress of, say, rescuing and witnessing suffering animals on a daily basis. Bob may also desire to make more money than he does at the RSPCA and may — at times — secretly resent his commitment to animal anti-cruelty and his work at the RSPCA, as he could be doing something more lucrative.

To have integrity, Bob would have to meet the third necessary condition and uphold his commitment in the face of temptation or challenge. Bob would thus have to uphold his commitment although he may be at the RSPCA on a sweltering day cleaning out cat litter and fur balls, and may want to be working in a plush office with air conditioner. He would similarly have to uphold his commitment to animal anti-cruelty if he were challenged by, say, an especially vicious dog that savaged his hand.

An example that could be considered both a temptation and a challenge would be if Bob were offered a high-paid job at a prestigious law firm. In such a case Bob would be tempted to take the job and it would be a challenge for him to stick to his commitment at the RSPCA, because the prospective job would be more pleasurable and more financially rewarding.

That Bob is committed to something that can conflict with his desires, and that he has to work to uphold his commitment, means that he meets the fourth condition of integrity: he faces loss. This is because in taking the job, or kicking the scared dog that savaged his hand, Bob would have suffered from some type of weakness of will, as he would have undermined his commitment and compromised his integrity. If Bob undermined his commitment to animal anti-cruelty by beating the dog or accepting the job offer at the law firm, he would lose a part of himself in

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128 That's not to say that animal anti-cruelty is the only thing that Bob is committed to, it is just to say that amongst the things that Bob is committed to, one of them is animal anti-cruelty.
129 Like his desire to go to a friend's or read a book during his free time.
130 In such a case Bob may want to beat the dog or kick the dog — even though Bob may realise that the dog is scared and has been made so vicious because his previous owners beat him repeatedly. If Bob did beat or kick the dog, then he would undermine his commitment to animal anti-cruelty.
131 In the likelihood that Bob accepted the job offer, he would gain the approval of his friends and family, make more money, and have a far more comfortable job in the sense that he would not have to do menial work or have the emotional turmoil of seeing so many desperate animals.
132 Bob would suffer weakness of will because he undermined or violated his commitment to animal anti-cruelty by taking the job or kicking the dog and was thus too weak to uphold his commitment. He may also suffer from self-deception if he failed to uphold his commitment and did not admit that he had experienced weakness of will.
133 I discuss the notion of losing a part of himself in terms of identity-conferring commitments in due course.
that he would no longer be Bunny Hugger Bob. He would no longer be the man committed to animal anti-cruelty above other things.

The example also illustrates the sub-condition of the first necessary condition of integrity: that the agent has to have important, identity-conferring commitments for it to count as integrity. As seen in the case of Bob, an agent with integrity cannot be committed to things like pleasure, approval, or wealth. The content of those commitments is such that they will not satisfy the third and fourth necessary conditions, as such commitments would not conflict with the types of challenges and temptations that a reasonable person would face. By this I mean that being committed to things like wealth, or pleasure, means that an agent will not have to uphold her commitments. This is because wealth, pleasure, desires, and approval, are the very things that tempt the agent to undermine or violate her commitments. To the same extent, the nature of integrity is that it precludes “expediency, artificiality, or shallowness of any kind,” and thus precludes things like commitments to pleasure, wealth, etc.

Furthermore, “personal integrity requires identity-conferring commitments.” McFall distinguishes between defeasible commitments and identity-conferring commitments. In brief, defeasible commitments are important, personal commitments that can be sacrificed without remorse, and can be overridden by other important, unconditional commitments. Bob’s professional success as a lawyer in a well-paid prestigious job would be an example of a defeasible commitment for him.

Identity-conferring commitments, however, are unconditional commitments, are fundamental to the agent as they reflect what she takes to be the most important things in her life, and thus determine her moral identity to a large extent. This is because identity-conferring commitments are “conditions of continuing as ourselves.”

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135 The conditions that Bob’s commitments must have the potential to conflict with his desires, and must be such that Bob faces the possibility of loss.
136 McFall, 1987, Page 11
137 Ibid. 1987, Page 11
138 Ibid. 1987, Page 16
139 Ibid. 1987, Page 12
140 I only mention defeasible commitments as a contrast to identity-conferring commitments, as the latter are crucial to integrity, and apply to the moral residue argument, whereas defeasible commitments are not.
141 McFall, 1987, Page 13
142 McFall, 1987, Page 12
them then she cannot “live” with herself in the sense that she is no longer the person that she thought she was, or that she ideally wants to be. For example, Bob could not live with himself if he ever ran over a dog. To the same extent, if Bob ever kicked a cat in a fit of rage and irritation on a sweltering day spent cleaning out cat litter and fur balls, he would similarly be unable to live with himself once he realised what he had done and saw the hurt, stricken cat.

Identity-conferring commitments are thus also what McFall refers to as “core” commitments. They determine what sort of person an agent is, and they cannot be “justified by reference to other values, because they are the most fundamental commitments we have; they determine what, for us, is to count as a reason.”\(^\text{143}\) That an agent with integrity holds important, identity-conferring commitments makes the fourth necessary condition of integrity possible, as, “where there is no possibility of loss, integrity cannot exist.”\(^\text{144}\) This is because only important, unconditional commitments with the potential to conflict with the agent’s desires make it possible that an agent could (like Bob when he kicks the cat or accepts the prestigious job at the law firm) lose a part of himself by undermining his commitments.

Given McFall’s understanding of integrity, it follows that all morality is essentially a personal morality.\(^\text{145, 146}\) This brings us to the fifth condition — that for it to count as integrity, the agent has to have an authentic relation to the principles to which she commits herself. By that I mean that the agent has to 1) recognise those commitments as important and valuable, ii) must want to uphold those commitments because she recognises them as important and valuable, and iii) her commitments must be coherent.\(^\text{147}\)

To return to Bob, he could be said to have an authentic relation to his principles in the likelihood that he would have been appalled by cruelty to animals, and recognised that committing himself to animal anti-cruelty was important to him and valuable to the animals. Furthermore, that Bob wanted to help at the RSPCA and

\(^\text{143}\) Ibid. 1987, Page 13
\(^\text{144}\) Ibid. 1987, Page 9
\(^\text{145}\) Ibid. 1987, Page 20
\(^\text{146}\) By saying that all morality is a personal morality I am not prejudging whether morality is objective or not. All I am claiming is that regardless of whether morality is objective, it is personal in the sense that the agent has to ascribe to principles of morality and make them her own. In this way whether there is an objective moral standard that dictates that say, “killing is wrong”, or whether the agent just chooses to believe that “killing is wrong”, does not detract from the fact that the conception that something like “killing is wrong” has to belong to the agent and is a personal morality for her in the sense that she believes it, deems it important, and commits herself to refraining from killing.
\(^\text{147}\) I discuss the notion of coherence in due course.
help animals, and that he sacrificed his profession as a lawyer in order to commit himself to animal anti-cruelty and the RSPCA, similarly means that he would have met the fifth necessary condition of integrity. For an agent to have integrity she must thus make her commitments and principles — conventional or otherwise — her own.\textsuperscript{148}

This brings us to the sub-condition of the fifth necessary condition of integrity — the agent’s commitments have to be coherent. This sub-condition is possibly the most important condition for my discussions on the efficacy of the moral residue argument.\textsuperscript{149} For an agent’s commitments to be coherent, it has to be the case that her principles and her commitments are consistent.\textsuperscript{150} There also has to be coherence between her commitments and her actions, so that she upholds her commitments even when she is tempted to undermine or ignore them. She must also do the right things for the right reasons. Bob’s commitments would be coherent, as his commitment to the principle of animal anti-cruelty is consistent with his commitment to working at the RSPCA. Bob’s actions would be consistent with his principles and would reflect his commitment to animal anti-cruelty, as he sacrificed his job as a lawyer, helps the animals, rescues them from abusive homes, and cleans out their cages etc. Bob similarly does the right things for the right reasons, as he helps animals because he thinks that cruelty to animals is abhorrent and thinks that it is important and valuable to help hurt, abused animals. In this way, Bob would have integrity and coherence as long as he upholds his commitments and does not undermine them in the face of challenge or temptation.

The notion of coherence is crucial in determining whether or not the moral residue argument can work. I say that because, if the agent’s commitments are incoherent, then it follows that her experience of moral residue cannot be used as evidence to support the existence of genuine moral dilemmas. If her commitments are incoherent, then it means that she committed herself to principles that will necessarily conflict. It follows that in the likelihood that she is faced with a rationally irresolvable conflict of commitments, it will be her own fault. Thus, it cannot be used as evidence that she is in a world-imposed situation that necessitates wrongdoing (and thus supports the existence of genuine moral dilemmas). If the agent’s moral residue does not point to a world-imposed situation that meets the requirements of the

\textsuperscript{148} McFall, 1987, Page 6
\textsuperscript{149} I discuss why after I have given an account of coherence.
\textsuperscript{150} McFall, 1987, Page 7
situation condition, then her experience of appropriate moral residue cannot be used to support the existence of genuine moral dilemmas.

If we modify the example of Bob, this can be made clearer. Consider a case where Modified Bob commits himself to animal anti-cruelty and working for the RSPCA, and similarly commits himself to a religious group. The religious group advocates that at each religious festival or holiday, one of the members of the congregation will be chosen to sacrifice a goat to appease their God. Imagine that Modified Bob is chosen at the religious festival to be the honoured member to sacrifice the goat. In that case, Modified Bob faces an apparently irresolvable conflict of commitments. On the one hand, Modified Bob is committed to animal anti-cruelty; on the other hand, Modified Bob is committed to the religion. Just as part of Modified Bob’s commitment to animal anti-cruelty involves his work at the RSPCA, so part of his commitment to the religion involves the possibility of having to sacrifice a goat at festivals.

Both commitments are identity-conferring commitments for Modified Bob. That Modified Bob would experience moral residue in response to both alternatives, however, cannot be used to support the existence of a genuine moral dilemma. This is because the fact that Modified Bob would have done wrong no matter which option he chose does not support the existence of a situation that meets the requirements of the situation condition. This is because the conflict Modified Bob faces and the fact that he will inevitably do wrong, is his fault, and not something caused by the situation in which he finds himself: a situation imposed on him by the world. It is his fault, because he committed himself to two principles that were incoherent.

Thus, for integrity to work as an independent way of discerning whether an agent’s moral residue is appropriate or not, it is necessary that the agent’s commitments are coherent. This brings us to a different interpretation of appropriateness: an agent can be said to experience appropriate moral residue if her commitments are coherent and yet she still compromises her integrity no matter which option she chooses. The implication being that an agent who compromises her integrity is doing something wrong.

\[151\] That is, sacrificing the goat (an option that would have undermined his commitment to animal anti-cruelty) or refusing to sacrifice the goat (an option that would have undermined his commitment to the religion).
Such an interpretation of appropriateness can avoid the objections levelled against the moral residue argument: It cannot be said to beg the question, and assume that an agent is doing wrong just because she experiences negative emotions of self-assessment or moral residue.

To the same extent, if we interpret appropriate moral residue in terms of integrity, then opponents of genuine moral dilemmas cannot argue that the moral residue argument is flawed because there are cases where an agent experiences appropriate moral residue\(^{152}\) and yet, has done nothing wrong. If appropriate moral residue is a question of integrity, then Greenspan’s understanding of doing something wrong as being morally responsible no longer holds.

By understanding appropriate moral residue in terms of integrity, the notion of doing wrong is less narrow. This is because – in terms of integrity - doing wrong is a question of the agent undermining or violating her identity-conferring commitments. In this way, if Bob accidentally ran over a dog\(^{153}\) and experienced remorse, guilt, or shame, those emotions would be appropriate as Bob would have done something wrong - he would have undermined his commitment to animal anti-cruelty.

I now go on to discuss my two case studies in terms of integrity. In so doing I use the notion of appropriate moral residue in terms of integrity to show how the moral residue argument can work to prove the existence of situations that meet the conditions of a genuine moral dilemma.

\(^{152}\) An example would be the agent who ran over the little boy who dropped his favourite marble in the parking lot. Although her residue is appropriate, she did not do anything wrong.
Chapter 4

Defending the moral residue argument: case studies - Sophie's Choice and Iphigenia at Aulis

In this chapter, I make my case that the moral residue argument can be salvaged. In so doing I examine two cases, two protagonists: Sophie and Agamemnon. I then argue that the moral residue argument can be used to show the existence of a genuine moral dilemma in each case. I start with a brief outline of the cases, and then discuss what moves I make in the rest of the paper.

In William Styron's Sophie's Choice, we witness Sophie, a Polish woman who survives the Nazi concentration camps. On her arrival at Auschwitz, the drunk, sadistic German Dr. Jemand von Niemand forces Sophie to choose between the lives of her two children - Jan and Eva. She has to choose which child will stand a chance of survival and go with her into the concentration camp, and which child will be killed in the gas chamber straight away. She is given this ultimatum and pressurised to make a fast decision or else face losing them both to the gas chamber.

In Euripides' Iphigenia at Aulis, we witness Agamemnon, both a loving father and husband, and ruler and leader in the war against Troy. The seer Kalchas tells Agamemnon that the winds will blow and his army will sail to defeat Troy if Agamemnon sacrifices Iphigenia, his daughter. Agamemnon thus has to choose between sacrificing his daughter to appease the Gods and enable his restless troops to sail to war, and saving her and thus losing the chance for his troops to sail to war.

In order to illustrate the efficacy of the moral residue argument, I first establish that there is sufficient evidence in both Sophie's Choice and Iphigenia at Aulis to support the fact that both Sophie and Agamemnon experience moral residue. Thereafter, I discern whether the moral residue that both Sophie and Agamemnon experience after making their respective choices, is appropriate. I thus argue that both Sophie and Agamemnon compromise their integrity no matter which alternative they choose to act on. By that I mean that regardless of which alternative they choose to act on.

153 For example, like the aforementioned agent who accidentally ran over the little boy.
154 Styron, 2000, Page 594
155 Blondell, 1999, Page 331
156 In this section the use of "they" or "their" will refer to Sophie and Agamemnon.
choose to act on, they will do something wrong in the sense that in acting they will violate, compromise, or undermine their integrity.

I then argue that the presence of appropriate moral residue understood in terms of integrity shows that the conflict, loss, and situation conditions for the existence of a genuine moral dilemma can be satisfied in both Sophie and Agamemnon’s cases. Moreover, in showing how my account overcomes the objections to the moral residue argument, I argue that this understanding of appropriate moral residue in terms of integrity is a significant advance on the conceptions of appropriate moral residue assumed in the objections.

**Evidence of Sophie’s moral residue**

Throughout the novel, evidence of Sophie’s moral residue is seen in her reticence to disclose all the details of her experiences at Auschwitz and Birkenau. From early on in the book the reader is made aware that although Sophie has told her boyfriend Nathan and friend Stingo the outline of her experiences in the concentration camps, a sense remains that she leaves certain crucial details out - namely, her horrifying choice.\(^{157}\) That she leaves such information out is evidence of her moral residue: the shame and guilt that she experiences.

I say that because shame and guilt are negative emotions of self-assessment and Sophie’s reticence to be completely honest shows that she blames and hates herself for choosing her daughter Eva to go to the gas chambers. It is plausible to say that Sophie experiences guilt and anger towards herself for doing wrong to Eva, and she feels shame because in choosing Eva to be gassed she directly betrays her love for her daughter in a way she deems morally abhorrent. Sophie’s moral residue can thus be seen as the result of her internal observer judging what she did as wrong.\(^{158}\) It seems that her reluctance to disclose her choice shows her fear that others will judge her in the same way.

The reader gleans an understanding of Sophie’s moral residue through Stingo, the narrator, who provides an insight into her thoughts and feelings. For example, when wondering why Sophie gives an incomplete version of her experiences in the concentration camps, he remarks

\(^{157}\) Styron, 2000, Page 176

\(^{158}\) I discuss whether what Sophie did was actually wrong or not at a later stage.
"The word ‘guilt,’ I noticed that summer, was often dominant in her vocabulary, and it is now clear to me that a hideous sense of guilt always chiefly governed reassessments she was forced to make of her past. I also came to see that she viewed her own recent self-history through a filter of self-loathing – apparently not a rare phenomenon among those who had undergone her particular ordeal."  

That Sophie’s guilt is “hideous” and “always governing” is evidence that it plagues her and preys on her mind. The idea that Sophie’s moral residue “forces” her to make reassessments of her past, is evidence that she mulls over her choice wondering if she chose the right child, and wondering how things would have been different had she chosen Jan instead of Eva to be gassed. That Sophie assesses, doubts, and loathes herself is consistent with the aforementioned idea that the emotions of moral residue are all negative emotions of self-assessment, and that guilt and shame, specifically, require an internal observer.

Sophie’s sense of “self-loathing” similarly shows that her residue is not only negative, but also punitive. Sophie’s guilt can thus be seen as her way of punishing herself for her inability to protect her children and for choosing Eva to be gassed. This is supported by Stingo’s observation that Sophie’s moral residue and secrecy parallels Simon Weil’s interpretation of the type of suffering that is like an affliction that plagues her with scorn, disgust, self-hatred and a corrosive sense of guilt.

Sophie’s evasion of the truth and her incomplete accounts of the occurrences in the concentration camps is a recurring theme in the novel. Later, Stingo reflects on one of Sophie’s past fabrications as “another fantasy served up to provide a frail barrier, a hopeless and crumbly line of defence between those she cared for, like myself, and her smothering guilt.” This extract shows that Sophie’s “smothering guilt” and her punitive, negative assessment of herself, makes her believe that those she cares for, namely, Stingo and Nathan, will find her loathsome and possibly even shun her, for choosing Eva to be gassed. Stingo thus refers to her lies as a “necessity,” as they (like her evasions) are a way of protecting herself from being judged by others in the same, negative way that she judges herself.

159 Styron. 2000, Page 176  
160 I say that because Sophie’s internal observer would have judged her as doing something wrong and something in opposition to how she thinks she ought to act as a loving mother. It follows that she would have been angry at, and ashamed of, herself.  
161 Styron. 2000, Page 176  
162 Ibid. 2000, Page 288
Sophie’s moral residue is not only evident in her blatant self-loathing, but also in the evidence of her desire to commit suicide. In one interaction with Stingo she pours out her feelings of guilt and anger and says, “Oh, Stingo, I just can’t stand living with these things!” Sophie’s moral residue is similarly evident by the fact that she drinks increasingly excessive amounts of alcohol, and, in one instance, tries to drown herself by swimming into the sea drunk and fighting Stingo as he tries to save her.\(^{63}\) Once Stingo rescues Sophie and takes her safely to shore she pleads with him and chastises him for saving her, saying, “Why didn’t you let me die? Why didn’t you let me drown? I’ve been so bad – I’ve been so awful bad!”\(^{64}\)

Sophie’s insistence that she is “bad” and her apparent need to escape from herself and her own guilt culminates at the end of the novel when she eventually commits suicide. Sophie’s extreme self-loathing, guilt, and self-directed anger, is evidence that she literally cannot live with herself.

Sophie’s remorse and her desire to make up for what she does to Eva by trying to help Jan and prevent him from dying in the Children’s Camp also illustrates her moral residue. There is a sense that if Sophie can protect Jan and find him after the war or influence Höss to include Jan in the Lebensborn programme,\(^{65}\) then she can alleviate some of her guilt by taking solace in the fact that she only wrongs one child, and not both. As she says to Stingo after she finds the courage to tell him about her choice, “If I found Jan, I might be oh – rescued from all these terrible feelings I still have, this desire I have had and still have to be... finished with my life.”\(^{66}\) Sophie also says that being able to help Jan and protect him from harm might even save her from some of her guilt.

That (as discussed) Sophie was in such shock in response to her ultimatum, and that she tried to make up to Jan even though she did not choose to send him to the gas chamber, is evidence that she would have experienced moral residue had she chosen him to be gassed instead of Eva. To the same extent, that Sophie did not chose Jan is evidence that she knew she would similarly experience extreme self-loathing, guilt, shame, and remorse had she chosen him to be gassed. It follows that the evidence in the novel shows that although Sophie experienced moral residue in

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\(^{63}\) Styron, 2000, Page 444

\(^{64}\) Ibid. 2000.

\(^{65}\) Ibid. 2000, Page 503

\(^{66}\) Ibid. 2000, Page 604
response to chose Eva to be gassed, she would have experienced moral residue regardless of which alternative she chose to act on.

Evidence of Agamemnon’s moral residue

Briefly, Agamemnon is waiting at Aulis with his troops to sail to Troy and avenge Paris who stole Menelaos’ wife, Helen (Agamemnon’s sister-in-law). Agamemnon is stuck at Aulis as the winds will not blow and his troops are thus stranded and impatient, waiting for favourable weather. The seer Kalchas tells Agamemnon that if he sacrifices his daughter Iphigenia to the goddess Artemis, “the launch...and the Trojan’s destruction,” will happen and Agamemnon and his troops will be able to return home. If however, Agamemnon fails to sacrifice Iphigenia, then the troops will remain at Aulis, the war will not end, and the attack on Troy will be abandoned.

At the beginning of the play Agamemnon has just changed his decision to sacrifice Iphigenia as the guilt and shame as her father were too much for him to bear. Consequently, from the beginning of the play there is evidence of Agamemnon’s guilt and shame at his choice to sacrifice his daughter, and his remorse as he tries to word a letter intercepting her arrival and tries to make up for his initial choice to sacrifice her. Agamemnon is stressed, “dashing” around outside his tent, frantically summoning the Old Man to send the letter, and struggling to write the letter to intercept Iphigenia’s arrival. He has “every sign of going mad,” and is visibly “struggling” with something. We discover that Agamemnon is in distress because he has deceived his wife Clytemnestra into bringing their daughter to him under the pretext that she is to be married to Achilles.

In response to his choice, Agamemnon goes through a number of responses: indecision, evasion, deception, madness, and crying – all of which are evidence of his guilt, shame, and remorse. Evidence of Agamemnon’s indecision is clear in his distress at attempting to compose a letter to prevent Iphigenia from joining him at Aulis. That he writes the letter after first choosing not to sacrifice Iphigenia, and then

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167 Blondell. 1999. Page 331
168 Ibid. 1999, Page 331
169 Ibid. 1999, Page 329
170 Ibid. 1999, Page 330
171 Agamemnon first declares that he could not sacrifice Iphigenia. He then sends for her under the false pretext of marriage, then he intercepts her arrival, and then he finally decides to sacrifice her.
172 As I go on to discuss.
choosing to sacrifice her, is evidence of his indecision. That Agamemnon then decides to intercept Iphigenia’s arrival is evidence that deceiving and choosing to sacrifice her is a choice that he initially cannot live with. His indecision and evasion is evident in the following extract,

“I used these lies on my wife, concocting a fake marriage/
In exchange for my daughter./ the only Greeks who know the truth are Kalchas, Odysseus, and Menelaos. But then I realised/ how wrong this was! I made it right,/ took back my word, wrote it over again, in this tablet.”

This extract shows that Agamemnon is ashamed of his decision to lure Iphigenia to him so that he can sacrifice her and win the war. He feels guilty and ashamed about his choice, as in making the choice he is in a sense appointing himself as Iphigenia’s murderer. That he writes the letter intercepting her arrival is similarly evidence of his remorse as it is a means of reparation – a way of correcting the wrong that he chooses to do to her.

Not only is Agamemnon indecisive but he is also evasive. As illustrated in the extract cited above, he tells so few people about Kalchas’ prophecies, and initially deceives his family and the troops. Just as Sophie’s evasion is evidence that she despises herself and her choice, so Agamemnon’s evasion shows that he too feels guilty and ashamed. On the one hand, Agamemnon feels guilty for entertaining the thought of sacrificing his own daughter, and thus wronging her and his family. On the other hand, he feels guilty for thinking of protecting her and sacrificing Greek success on the other, as then he will be wronging his troops and his country.

Evidence of Agamemnon’s guilt, shame, and remorse about choosing to sacrifice Iphigenia is seen when he decides that luring Iphigenia to him to be sacrificed is “wrong” and he wants to make it “right,” and when he exclaims, “Oh God! I was out of my mind! Aaaah!” This exclamation shows that he feels remorse. His outcry shows that he judges himself as being mad or mindless to choose to sacrifice his own daughter, and that he should make up for what he chooses to do. It is also evidence that he experiences shame and guilt as he is tormented nearly to the point of madness by the prospect of murdering Iphigenia and having that choice on his conscience.

173 Blondell, 1999, Page 332
174 That is, his choice to sacrifice her and the trickery he used to bring her to Aulis to be sacrificed.
175 Blondell, 1999, Page 332
When Agamemnon says, “Oh God! Poor me, what shall I say? Where shall I begin?”

lamenting his highborn position and the fact that he is required to be composed and not do such “crude” things as dissolve in to tears, it shows that his moral residue in response to choosing to sacrifice Iphigenia is almost unbearable for him. He is a leader and by nature a composed man, and yet, his decision to sacrifice Iphigenia for Greek success makes him feel so guilty and ashamed that it reduces him to tears.

When Clytemnestra arrives with Iphigenia at Aulis, Agamemnon fears that her arrival will destroy him, as she will find him out as the “criminal” he is. This is evidence that he judges himself as guilty: a morally reprehensible agent and father for choosing to sacrifice his daughter. He also fears that his wife will judge him similarly.

His moral residue is furthermore evident when he torments himself thinking of how it will be to tell Iphigenia that he intends to sacrifice her as a “bride of Death,” how she will plead with him saying “will you kill me Daddy?” and how his son Orestes will hate him. Agamemnon then breaks down and weeps, and his grief at his decision to kill Iphigenia is so great that even Menelaos changes his mind and takes pity on the crying man, admitting that it is not right for Agamemnon to be in so much “agony.” Agamemnon’s severe guilt, remorse, and shame are therefore even evident to his brother.

Despite his grief and his initial horror at the prospect of choosing to sacrifice Iphigenia, Agamemnon revises his decision and says, “I’ve reached a point of inevitability/ I have to shed my daughter’s blood – to murder her.” The use of the word “murder,” coupled with the fact that he earlier refers to himself as a “criminal” is evidence that he loathes himself: he experiences crippling moral residue.

Agamemnon’s moral residue becomes clear when he starts crying again when faced with Iphigenia’s excitement to see him and confusion at his reactions and

176 Ibid. 1999, Page 344
177 Ibid. 1999.
178 That is, Agamemnon knows that his choice will mean wronging Iphigenia and losing her.
179 Blondell, 1999, Page 344
180 Ibid. 1999.
181 That Orestes will hate him is significant as, in Aeschylus’ Oresteia, Clytemnestra kills Agamemnon, and Orestes is left to avenge his father and thus gets embroiled in the curse of the House of Atreus because of his parent’s actions.
182 Blondell, 1999, Page 345
183 Ibid. 1999, Page 346
184 Ibid. 1999, Page 344
comments. Iphigenia is so willing to please that it hurts Agamemnon, and he gets more emotional as the irony of her lack of understanding and his intentions unfold. He says things like “sudden tears come into my eyes when I touch you,” to Iphigenia, and later says to Clytemnestra, “I became too overwhelmed with sorrow, since I am going to give my daughter away.”

The most compelling evidence that Agamemnon experiences moral residue in response to his choice to sacrifice Iphigenia is seen in the following extract from the Chorus when Iphigenia is just about to be sacrificed,

“When Lord Agamemnon saw the girl/ walking in the grove toward the slaughter/ he groaned, and running hid head away/ he shed tears, holding his cloak in front of/ his eyes.”

This shows that Agamemnon is literally guilt-stricken and can barely live with his decision to sacrifice Iphigenia. His attempt to hide himself is evidence of his guilt and shame, as is his crying and groaning in despair. This is because the nature of guilt is such that the agent is plagued by anger at herself for the wrong that she causes others, and the result is that she, like Agamemnon, endeavours to hide herself.

Despite the discussed evidence of Agamemnon’s moral residue in response to choosing to sacrifice Iphigenia, his indecision, and evasion is also evidence of the moral residue he experiences in response to choosing to save Iphigenia and prevent his troops from sailing to victory. That he was so indecisive shows that his commitment to protecting Greece was important to him and implies that he would have experienced moral residue had he chosen to undermine that commitment as opposed to his commitment to protect Iphigenia. To the same extent, that he was evasive is evidence that he was ashamed of entertaining the possibility of protecting his daughter’s life over Greek success, and he did not want his troops to know that he did not necessarily intend to do all that he could to enable Greek success. Concrete evidence that Agamemnon would have experienced moral residue in response to undermining his commitment to Greece is seen in the fact that he eventually chooses Greek success over protecting Iphigenia’s life, even though the prospect of sacrificing her is like torture to him.

185 Ibid. 1999, Page 350-351
186 Ibid. 1999, Page 352
187 The dramatic irony of the latter comment is that while Clytemnestra would interpret what Agamemnon says as his sadness to give his daughter away in marriage, the audience and Agamemnon would know that he is alluding to his intention to sacrifice Iphigenia.
It follows that it is plausible to argue that regardless of which alternative Agamemnon chose to act on he would have experienced moral residue.

**Prima facie case for the moral residue argument in the case studies**

In what follows I briefly discuss how Sophie and Agamemnon’s cases can, on the face of it, be used as evidence for how the moral residue argument works to support the existence of genuine moral dilemmas.

Sophie’s corrosive moral residue suggests that her commitment to Jan does not override her commitment to Eva. Prima facie, it seems plausible to claim that if she chose to save Eva instead of Jan she would experience similar residue. Thus, it is not the case that her commitment to Eva overrides her commitment to Jan. She consequently faces an irresolvable conflict of commitments: a genuine moral dilemma.

Prima facie, that Agamemnon would experience appropriate moral residue no matter how he chooses to act, is evidence that he faces a rationally irresolvable conflict of commitments: a genuine moral dilemma. This is based on the assumption that because – like Sophie - Agamemnon could not resolve his choice either way without experiencing moral residue, the conflict must have been rationally irresolvable and he must have faced a genuine moral dilemma.

As they stand, these prima facie cases are prey to the objections discussed above.

**Objections**

In what follows I discuss how McConnell and Greenspan would respond to this prima facie case for the moral residue argument. I then discuss how their objections hinge on particular conceptions of appropriate moral residue. I argue that these conceptions are flawed and should be replaced with an account of appropriate moral residue understood in terms of integrity. Once moral residue is understood in this way, the objections no longer hold.

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188 Blondell, 1999, Page 386
According to the first objection, to suppose that Sophie and Agamemnon’s moral residue is appropriate and that they have done something wrong would be begging the question. The fact that Sophie and Agamemnon experience moral residue only shows that they have respectively judged themselves as having done something wrong, and it does not prove that they actually have done anything wrong. For the moral residue argument to work to prove that Sophie and Agamemnon have done something wrong thus requires assuming that both of them face a choice between two equally obligatory commitments, i.e. that they each face a genuine moral dilemma. In this way, according to the first objection, the moral residue argument begs the question and thus cannot show that genuine moral dilemmas exist.

The first objection understands the moral residue argument as being based on the assumption that the way to establish appropriateness is to assume wrongdoing and that in order to assume wrongdoing, it is necessary to assume that the agent faces a genuine moral dilemma where one commitment does not override the other. In other words, this objection works by implying that there is no independent way to establish wrongdoing. In what follows I argue that it is not necessary to assume a genuine moral dilemma to establish appropriate moral residue in order for the argument to work. First, it is my claim that the account of appropriateness implicit in this first objection misses the point about what “appropriateness” and “wrongness” has to consist in.

The “badness” or the “appropriateness” of the moral residue must consist in the relation that the agent stands to that action i.e. her doing it. There is a prima facie case that Sophie sending Eva to be gassed was a bad and wrong thing to do. This is based on Sophie’s own negative self-assessment. Assuming the existence of a genuine moral dilemma, however, fails to provide a way of evaluating whether or not such a judgments is accurate or justified. To determine whether an agent’s assessment that she has done wrong is justified must be assessed by looking precisely at what has been judged. That is, we need to consider agents like Sophie and Agamemnon’s negative self-assessment of shame, guilt, or remorse in relation (to use Williams’ phrase in Ethical Consistency) to the particular action that they did. We can imagine many different situations and factors that might possibly (if not plausibly) lead to Sophie sending Eva to be gassed. For example, had Sophie chosen Eva to be gassed in

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189 Sinnott-Armstrong, 1988, Page 47
a fit of blind rage when Eva was irritating her so much that Sophie was temporarily mindless, in the event that she experiences moral residue after her choice, it would be appropriate. This is because Sophie would be doing something wrong.

There will still be a prima facie case that the action is bad or wrong. Why she did it (because of an apparent dilemma or blind rage) might be relevant to the degree to which to hold her responsible or blameworthy. It remains, however, that in evaluating and explaining her negative self-assessment and deciding whether it is justified or appropriate, we need to look precisely at what she did. To look only at why she did it is to miss the force of the point about moral residue – what it is about her standing in this relation to this action that might be judged bad or wrong.

The first objection thus leaves out the possibility that if an agent has not faced a dilemma and still undermines a commitment, she will similarly have done something wrong and will experience appropriate moral residue. Consequently, the first objection is flawed, as, in the discussed example of Sophie in a fit of blind rage, Sophie’s moral residue is appropriate even though it is caused by a choice that she makes for reasons other than a rationally irresolvable conflict of commitments. To the same extent, if Agamemnon chooses to sacrifice Iphigenia just because, for example, he thinks that it might be a good idea and might gain him increased happiness in his afterlife, if he experiences moral residue appropriately it would be because of his choice to sacrifice her, and not because he necessarily faces a rationally irresolvable conflict of commitments.190

The second objection is that it is not inappropriate to experience moral residue, even in cases where the agent has done nothing wrong. Thus, Sophie and Agamemnon’s moral residue cannot point to their having done something wrong. This is a problem because if proponents are to use an agent’s191 moral residue to prove the existence of genuine moral dilemmas, then they have to be able to show that she has done something wrong. This is because the notion of appropriate moral residue depends on the agent having done something wrong. The implication of the second objection, however, is that even if proponents can show that the moral residue is appropriate, it does not show anything and thus it cannot be used as evidence that

190 Although I go on to discuss exactly why the objection is flawed in more detail in due course, I now go on to outline the second objection and how that works.
191 Like Sophie and Agamemnon.
the agents have done anything wrong. Thus, there is no evidence that one commitment did not override the other.

For example, although Sophie chooses Eva to be gassed, she has no malicious intent and does not want to choose either of her children to be gassed. Agamemnon likewise does not ideally want to have to choose between sacrificing Iphigenia and sacrificing the success of his war against Paris. Such cases are on a par with the woman who runs the little boy over when he drops his favourite marble behind her car: although her moral residue is appropriate, according to the second objection, it is plausible to say that she has done nothing wrong, in the sense that she is not morally blameworthy.

Greenspan allows for guilt without moral responsibility and thus a subjective definition of dilemmas would only seem to imply the prima facie wrongness of either alternative.\textsuperscript{192} It follows that according to the second objection, what an agent like Sophie or Agamemnon does in a dilemma, or how they chose to act in a dilemma, might not necessarily count as wrong all things considered under the circumstances.\textsuperscript{193} This is because the second objection is based on the conception that emotions of moral residue like guilt, need not involve the corresponding evaluative judgment, and thus an agent like Sophie can feel guilty, although it is plausible to argue that she does nothing wrong.

As Greenspan argues, “Guilt is sometimes appropriate, in contrast to blame, when we do not have adequate warrant for the corresponding judgment.”\textsuperscript{194} It follows that for the moral residue argument to work, the agent has to be morally responsible for her action, as only then will she have done something wrong, and only then can appropriate moral residue support the existence of genuine moral dilemmas. The presence of moral residue, however, is not itself evidence that the agent has done something wrong in the relevant sense (i.e. something that she is morally blameworthy for having done). The reasoning is as follows:

1) Appropriate moral residue needs to show that the agent has done something wrong for it to prove that there are cases that satisfy the conditions of a genuine moral dilemma.

\textsuperscript{192} Greenspan, 1995, Page 152
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid. 1995, Page 177
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid. 1995, Page 152

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2) According to the first objection, the moral residue argument begs the question as it assumes that genuine moral conflicts exist and necessitate that the agent does wrong no matter how she acts.

3) According to the second objection, the moral residue argument begs the question as it assumes that if an agent experiences moral residue she has necessarily done something wrong i.e. for which she is morally blameworthy - and yet - there are cases where it is not inappropriate to experience moral residue even when the agent has done nothing wrong.

4) Given 3), there are cases where an agent’s appropriate moral residue does not prove that she has done something wrong.

5) Given 3), and 4), 1) does not hold.

6) Thus, given 2) and 5), the moral residue argument does not hold.

In terms of the second objection, even if Sophie and Agamemnon’s moral residue is appropriate, it does not tell us whether agents like them are morally blameworthy and it is thus not evidence of their wrongdoing. It remains, however, that like the first objection, the second objection’s conception of appropriate moral residue is flawed.

Although somewhat elusive, the notion of appropriate moral residue is crucial to the efficacy of the moral residue argument. The interpretations of appropriate moral residue assumed in the objections, however, both seem to be flawed.

The first objection assumes a conception of moral residue that neither considers nor explains precisely what is wrong, if anything, with the agent choosing the particular action that she does. For example in Sophie’s case, to assume that the ultimatum Dr von Niemand gives her is the reason that her moral residue is appropriate, fails to show that in choosing Eva to be gassed she does something wrong. Similarly, in Agamemnon’s case, to argue that his choice is evidence that his moral residue is appropriate, fails to show that in sacrificing his daughter he likewise does something wrong.

The understanding of appropriate assumed in the first objection thus misses the strength of the point about moral residue. The choice or the ultimatum that the agent faces is only an indirect cause of moral residue. The direct cause is the fact that the agent chooses to do something that is wrong (namely, choosing Eva to be gassed or 195 The objectively appropriate response may be regret and not remorse, as remorse involves the agent having caused or done something wrong, whereas regret can be experienced even in cases where the agent is not causally responsible in any way.
Iphigenia to be sacrificed). The objection fails to consider or explain what, if anything; the “wrongness” of the agent performing that particular action might consist in. According to the first objection, the moral residue argument can thus only explain the difficult choice, as opposed to explaining that choices like sacrificing a daughter, sacrificing military success as a leader, or choosing a daughter to be gassed are wrong and cause an agent to feel guilt, remorse, and shame. As it stands, therefore, the conception of appropriateness on which the first objection hinges, fails to explain precisely what is wrong, if anything, about the agent’s choice and action: it looks in the wrong place for what “wrongness” consists in.

As with the first objection, the account of appropriateness assumed in the second objection is similarly problematic. Firstly, because it is indiscriminate and fails to explain precisely what it is about being causally or morally responsible for that action that merits the severe self-judgement of moral residue. For example, if we allow Greenspan that Sophie may not necessarily have done anything morally blameworthy in choosing Eva to be gassed, how can Sophie’s crippling feelings of guilt, shame and remorse be explained? Secondly, Greenspan’s account of appropriateness relies on too strict an understanding of doing wrong i.e. that an agent who does wrong is morally blameworthy. Such a conception, however, does not adequately explain the appropriateness of moral residue in cases where the agent experiences moral residue for doing something that is wrong, but for which she is not morally blameworthy.196

It follows that the conception of appropriate moral residue that Greenspan assumes similarly misses the point of moral residue as it fails to consider precisely what is wrong, if anything, with the agent performing the particular action that she does. I say that because it limits wrongdoing to choices for which the agent is morally responsible – and yet it remains that agent’s like Sophie and Agamemnon seem to have done something wrong in choosing to act as they do, and thus Greenspan’s account is flawed because it cannot a) say what they do wrong, or b) explain why they experience moral residue if they do nothing wrong.

196 For example, while Sophie has done something wrong and something that she feels bad about, it is plausible to argue that she is not morally blameworthy on the basis that she did not want Eva to be gassed, in the same way that the woman who ran over the little boy did something wrong and yet neither meant to nor wanted to.
In this way neither conception captures or considers exactly what it is that makes moral residue appropriate or inappropriate, because both conceptions of doing wrong and the notion of appropriate moral residue are flawed.

**An adequate understanding of appropriate moral residue via integrity**

In what follows I offer an interpretation of doing something wrong and appropriate moral residue in terms of integrity - an account that provides a more precise explanation of the agent doing wrong in these cases. My account considers and captures precisely what it is about an agent doing a certain action that makes moral residue appropriate if it is present and inappropriate if it is not. That is, my account considers more closely than either of the objections, where the negative self-assessment has to come from if it is to be appropriate. Moreover, in establishing appropriate moral residue my account makes use of the independent standard of integrity that the first objection implied was not available.

In order to show why my account of appropriate moral residue is better than the accounts assumed in the objections, I demonstrate how my interpretation of appropriate moral residue can show exactly what is going on when agents like Sophie and Agamemnon make negative self-assessments and experience moral residue (a loss of integrity). I can thus evaluate whether that loss is real or apparent. This can be done by determining whether there is a loss of integrity and whether the moral residue is appropriate or not. This argument does not miss the force of moral residue, nor is it too indiscriminate an account of appropriate or too strict an account of doing wrong.\(^{197}\)

I thus reply to the objections with the claim that moral residue is appropriate if the agent has undermined, violated, or compromised her integrity in some way. In order to establish whether Sophie and Agamemnon's shame, guilt, and remorse satisfy my account of appropriateness, I establish whether or not they have integrity. Thereafter I show how both cases of moral residue can be used to satisfy the sufficient conditions of a genuine moral dilemma.

In order to discern whether Sophie and Agamemnon have integrity I establish whether they satisfy the conditions established in the previous section. These

\(^{197}\) Like the second objection.
conditions are 1) That Sophie and Agamemnon are committed to certain principles, 2) That the commitments are such that they can conflict with their desires, 3) That they uphold those commitments in the face of temptation or challenge, 4) That they can thus both face the possibility of losing their integrity by undermining their commitments, and 5) That they have an authentic relation to their principles, and thus, that they have coherence.

**Integrity in case 1: Sophie**

It is evident that Sophie is somehow committed to protecting and caring for both Jan and Eva and that she is committed to protect them from being sent to the gas chamber. It is at least clear that Sophie’s moral residue in response to choosing Eva shows that Sophie’s commitment to protect Eva could not be a defeasible commitment. Were it a defeasible commitment, Sophie would undermine it without experiencing remorse, and yet her moral residue – as discussed – shows that this is not the case. There is also evidence to support the fact that Sophie’s commitment to Jan is similarly not a defeasible commitment. For example, when faced with her choice Sophie screams, “I can’t choose! I can’t choose!” feels faint, is in total, “deranged” disbelief, and begins to scream hysterically. That Sophie is in a physical state of shock, and given that she declares her inability to choose, shows that she cannot sacrifice her commitment to protect either child without remorse.

If Sophie’s commitment to Jan were a defeasible commitment, then her commitment to Eva would override her commitment to Jan. Furthermore, were either of her commitments defeasible, she would choose to undermine that defeasible commitment and she would not feel remorse, guilt, or shame in doing so. It remains, however, that she does experience moral residue, and she does undermine an identity-conferring commitment to protect Eva from being gassed. It follows that both of her commitments must be identity-conferring. My reasoning is as follows:

1) Commitments are either defeasible commitments or identity-conferring commitments.

2) By definition, defeasible commitments cannot be sacrificed without moral residue and can thus be overridden by identity-conferring commitments.

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198 Styron, 2000, Page 594
199 McFall, 1987, Page 12
3) There is evidence that Sophie experiences moral residue in response to undermining her commitment to protect Eva.

4) Thus, Sophie does not have a defeasible commitment to protect Eva, but rather has an identity-conferring commitment to protect Eva.

5) Given 2) and 4), was Sophie’s commitment to Jan a defeasible commitment, she would sacrifice Jan as opposed to Eva.

6) Sophie does not sacrifice Jan.

7) Therefore, both of Sophie’s commitments to her children must be identity-conferring commitments.

Given the definition of identity-conferring commitments as important, unconditional commitments that determine the agent’s identity to a large extent, it follows that a part of Sophie’s identity is as a mother unable to choose either of her children to be gassed, on the basis that part of who she is, is determined by her commitment to protect both of her children from harm. This case is further strengthened by her subsequent loss of identity and her inability to live with herself once she chooses Eva to be gassed.

Sophie thus meets the first necessary condition of integrity as she has identity-conferring commitments to protect both Jan and Eva from harm. This can be seen from the argument above and the afore-discussed evidence of her moral residue.

The second necessary condition of integrity is also met. I say that because Sophie’s commitments to Jan and Eva are important commitments that can potentially conflict with her desires. For example, her commitment to protect both of her children from harm has the potential to conflict with things like her commitment to protect herself from harm. An example is when she risks her own life and throws herself at the mercy of Höss in an attempt to help Jan. Although I discuss this instance again in due course, my point at this stage of the argument is that an agent like Sophie who makes identity-conferring commitments to protect both of her children...
children from harm, makes commitments that can conflict with her own personal interests or desires.

Sophie’s situation meets the third necessary condition of integrity as, before her choice, she upholds her commitments to protect each of her children from harm in the face of temptation or challenge. That Sophie’s commitments meet the first three necessary conditions of integrity can be seen in the account of one of Sophie’s discussions with Wanda. Wanda is a revolutionary friend of Sophie’s, and during the discussion, Sophie refuses to help the Home Army because it would jeopardise Jan and Eva’s safety.203 It remains, however, that in such a case, Sophie may be tempted to help the Home Army and Wanda.

This is because Wanda is her friend, and Sophie herself may want to help her fellow countrymen and may want to feel that she is contributing in the fight for freedom. Wanda can also be seen as a challenge to Sophie’s commitments, as Wanda tries to coerce Sophie by accusing her of being unlike other women - women prepared to help the Home Army. Sophie, however, upholds her commitments to each of her children in the face of challenge and temptation. As she says, “I’m myself!204 I have to act according to my conscience. You don’t have children. It’s easy for you to talk like this. I cannot jeopardise the lives of my children. They’re having a hard enough time of it as it is.”205

This extract shows that Sophie places her commitments to protect her children from harm and stress before her commitment to her friends, her opposition to anti-Semitism, and herself.206 The fact that Sophie’s situation meets the first three necessary conditions of integrity implies that the fourth necessary condition is also met and that Sophie faced the possibility of loss.207

Sophie’s case also meets the fifth necessary condition of integrity as she has an authentic relation to the principles to which she commits herself. Sophie’s commitments are coherent in the sense that her principles, commitments, and actions are consistent, and she is committed to protecting her children from harm for the right reasons. As a loving mother, Sophie recognises that protecting her children from

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203 This conversation takes place before they were taken to the concentration camp.
204 As opposed to other women prepared to help in the Home Army.
205 Styron, 2000, Page 453
206 This can be seen as further evidence that her commitments were not defeasible. I say that because her commitments to protect Jan and Eva overrode her other commitments as opposed to the other way around.
harm is important, commits herself to that, and acts in accordance with that commitment. Sophie is committed to protect her children for the right reasons because she is a loving mother who recognises that her children’s lives are important and valuable, and she thus wants to protect them from harm.

Evidence that Sophie has an authentic relation to her commitments and coherence can be seen in her selflessness, and the sacrifices that she makes for her children. If she did not want to protect her children from harm, then she would not sacrifice her dignity (as she did when she grovels at Höss’s feet and pleads with him to include Jan in the Lebensborn programme\textsuperscript{208}). She would similarly not sacrifice her ideals (as she does when she keeps her father’s pamphlet promoting anti-Semitism as a possible bargaining card to help her children\textsuperscript{209}), nor would she sacrifice her commitments to friends like Wanda and socio-moral causes\textsuperscript{210} like helping the Home Army.

That there is evidence that Sophie has identity-conferring commitments, coupled with the fact that her situation meets the sufficient conditions of integrity, means that, in making her choice, Sophie violates an identity-conferring commitment. This is because appropriate moral residue is a question of the agent a) having integrity and b) the choice that caused the agent’s moral residue is a choice that involves the agent undermining, compromising, or violating her integrity. According to my argument, these two things can be established independently of the dilemmic situation and the moral residue it causes.

By my account, Sophie’s moral residue is therefore appropriate\textsuperscript{211}. This is because Sophie has integrity (as I established independently of her moral residue), and her integrity is tied to her identity-conferring commitments to her children (also established independently). Thus, her moral residue is evidence of a real loss of integrity and is thus appropriate as Sophie does something wrong by making a choice that compromises her integrity.

\textsuperscript{207} Although moral residue just is evidence of loss, I go on to discuss how Sophie experienced loss as a result of her commitments to her children in more detail in due course.
\textsuperscript{208} Styron, 2000, Page 349
\textsuperscript{209} Ibid. 2000, Page 572
\textsuperscript{210} These were causes she seemed to believe in, as there is evidence that she questioned whether she was doing the right thing in not helping the Home Army.
Integrity in case 2: Agamemnon

Like Sophie, Agamemnon’s choice can similarly be interpreted in terms of the independent standard of integrity. In the likelihood that both of his choices would involve a violation of his integrity, it is plausible to argue that he would do something wrong no matter how he chooses to act.

In order to establish whether Agamemnon has integrity, it is necessary to discern whether he has identity-conferring commitments to both Iphigenia and Greece. On the face of it his commitments are as follows:

1) He has a public commitment as a leader and general in the war to avenge Menelaos and Greece.
2) Thus, he has a commitment to sacrifice Iphigenia to enable his troops to sail to Troy and defeat Paris.
3) He also has a private commitment as a loving father and husband to protect his daughter Iphigenia.
4) Thus, he has a commitment not to sacrifice Iphigenia and to prevent his troops from sailing to Troy to defeat Paris.

It remains; however, that Agamemnon’s commitments are more complicated than they seem. His commitment to Iphigenia involves a commitment to his wife to be a good husband and protect their children, and it also involves a commitment as a loving father and provider to protect his family from harm. On the other hand, his commitment to Greece and – as a leader – ensuring Greek success at all costs, involves defending his brother’s honour, and involves preventing his troops from staying at Aulis and away from their families any longer. Given his choice, Agamemnon faces a terrible burden in his double role as father and leader of the expedition. He must choose between his role as leader of the Greeks and his role as head of his family, between his public responsibilities and the obligations of head of the family.\(^{212}\)

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\(^{211}\) That is, appropriate moral residue in the sense that the agent has undermined, violated, or compromised her integrity in some way.

\(^{212}\) Blondell, 1999, Page 311
It is evident that Agamemnon has an identity-conferring commitment to Iphigenia, because he admits that killing her fills him with horror, \(^{213}\) is unstable, changes his mind constantly, frequently gives in to tears, and at times seems on the verge of madness. \(^ {214}\) The evidence of his moral residue shows that he cannot undermine his commitment to protect Iphigenia without experiencing remorse, guilt, and shame. It follows that although he eventually chooses to sacrifice her, his commitment to Greece does not override his commitment to Iphigenia, as in choosing to sacrifice her he feels substantial moral residue, regards himself as a “criminal” and a “murderer,” and is at times so guilt-stricken that he changes his mind and chooses to save her at the expense of winning the war and maintaining Greek pride. For example, he admits that his “earlier intention” to sacrifice Iphigenia for his troops was “wrong,” \(^ {215}\) and he maintains that he will conduct his affairs in the “right way.” As he says,

“I will not kill my children. It would be unjust.../ I’ll be worn out every night, every day, with tears,/ because I committed unjust crimes against my child.” \(^ {216}\)

This extract shows that Agamemnon’s commitment as a father to protect Iphigenia, is an identity-conferring commitment that cannot be sacrificed without remorse and that is not overridden by other commitments. The extract shows that he can barely conceive of sacrificing his daughter, and because he knows that – if he does – he will be overcome with negative emotions of self-assessment: moral residue.

It is plausible to claim that Agamemnon also has an identity-conferring commitment to Greece. He appoints himself general in the war against Troy, and because he eventually chooses to sacrifice his daughter for Greek success, both of which are evidence that he commits himself to Greece because he wants to and he recognises it as an important commitment. \(^ {217}\) That he has identity-conferring commitment to both Iphigenia and Greece is evident when he says, “I am ashamed to shed tears \(^ {218}\) - / but just as ashamed as if I don’t weep, / faced with such a catastrophe.” \(^ {219}\) This extract shows that Agamemnon does not know what to do, and although he is ashamed to cry about his choice to sacrifice Iphigenia as – in so doing

\(^ {213}\) Ibid. 1999, Page 375  
\(^ {214}\) Ibid. 1999, Page 314  
\(^ {215}\) Ibid. 1999, Page 341  
\(^ {216}\) Ibid. 1999, Page 342  
\(^ {217}\) I discuss this in more detail in due course.  
\(^ {218}\) That is, tears at the prospect of Iphigenia’s sacrifice.  
\(^ {219}\) Blondell, 1999, Page 344
he undermines his commitment as a leader to be composed and do whatever it takes to honour Greece and makes Greece successful – he is also ashamed not to cry for Iphigenia, as, in so doing, he undermines his commitment as a father to protect her.

In this way, just as Sophie’s commitment to Jan could not have been a defeasible commitment, so Agamemnon’s commitment to Greece could not be a defeasible commitment. My reasoning is as follows:

1) Commitments are either defeasible or identity-conferring.
2) By definition, defeasible commitments can be sacrificed without moral residue and can thus be overridden by identity-conferring commitments.
3) There is evidence that Agamemnon experiences moral residue in response to undermining his commitment to protect Iphigenia.
4) Thus, Agamemnon does not have a defeasible commitment to protect Iphigenia, but rather has an identity-conferring commitment to protect Iphigenia.
5) Given 2) and 4), had Agamemnon’s commitment to Greece been a defeasible commitment, he would have sacrificed his success in the war against Troy as opposed to sacrificing Iphigenia.
6) Agamemnon did not sacrifice his success in the war against Troy.
7) Therefore, both of Agamemnon’s commitments to Iphigenia and Greece respectively must have been identity-conferring commitments.

That his commitment to Greece could not have been a defeasible commitment is furthermore evident in the fact that despite the moral residue he experiences in response to choosing Iphigenia to be sacrifice, he still chooses to sacrifice her at the end. His indecision is similarly evidence that his commitment to Greece was not a defeasible commitment. If it were a defeasible commitment, he would sacrifice it easily and without remorse, he would make his decision quickly, and he would not choose to sacrifice his daughter in the knowledge that he probably could not forgive himself for doing that as he did.

Given the definition of identity-conferring commitments as important, unconditional commitments that determine the agent’s identity to a large extent, it follows that a part of Agamemnon’s identity was both 1) as a father being unable to sacrifice his own daughter, and 2) as a leader and general in the war unable to sacrifice the success of his expedition to Troy. This can be seen in the moral residue
he experiences in response to his respective choices. Agamemnon thus meets the first necessary condition of integrity as he has identity-conferring commitments to both Iphigenia and Greece.

Agamemnon also meets the second necessary condition of integrity as his respective commitments have the potential to conflict. This is clear because his commitment as a father to protect Iphigenia conflicts with his commitment as a leader to win the war and protect Greek honour at all costs. Furthermore, his commitment to protect Iphigenia conflicts with his desire to avenge Menelaos’ honour, to be a good leader, and to do what is right by his troops and his country. Similarly, his commitment to Greece conflicts with his desire to be a good father and husband, to protect Iphigenia, and to send her home and shield her from the fate that awaits her.

Agamemnon also meets the third necessary condition of integrity as he upholds his commitments in the face of challenge. For example, he upholds his commitment to protect Iphigenia when he intercepts the message and tries to prevent her from coming to Aulis. In such a case, the temptation is that he should put his emotions and instincts as a father aside and concentrate on his position as military general and Greek leader. 220 There is similarly evidence that he upholds his commitment to Greece, because he appoints himself general in the war against Troy and mobilises the troops at Aulis to defeat Paris (despite the temptation to leave Menelaos to fight his own battles). Furthermore, he sacrifices Iphigenia despite the personal cost to him as her father and the temptation to act on his emotions and his responsibilities as a father.

He also satisfies the fourth necessary condition of integrity as he faces the possibility of loss. That is, he faces the possibility of losing his daughter and his identity as a loving father on the one hand, and similarly faces the possibility of losing the war and his identity as a reputable leader on the other.

Agamemnon furthermore satisfies the fifth – and last – necessary condition. There is evidence that he has an authentic relation to his principles: that his principles and commitments are consistent, that his commitments and his actions are consistent, and that he is committed to the right things for the right reasons. In terms of his commitment to Iphigenia, Agamemnon is committed to her because he is her father.

220 Although he admittedly decides to sacrifice Iphigenia at the end of the play, it remains that in the context of that section of the play he upholds his commitment as a father to protect Iphigenia and tries to prevent her from arriving at Aulis.
He (like Sophie) recognises that the principle of being a loving parent is an important one and he commits himself to that. Furthermore, his actions reflect this: 1) he initially states that he cannot sacrifice his daughter, 2) he later tries to intercept Iphigenia’s arrival, 3) he embraces Iphigenia and talks fondly to her on her arrival, and 4) he sobs and cries repeatedly at the prospect of sacrificing her — all of which show that he loves Iphigenia, tries to protect her, and is committed to that. His commitment to Iphigenia is also coherent as he commits himself to her because he recognises it as important for a father to protect and care for his daughter. Thus he, like Sophie, wants to protect and care for his child (hence his distress at the prospect of sacrificing her).

On the other hand, there is evidence to show that Agamemnon similarly has an authentic relation to his commitment as a leader: 1) he is committed to being a leader because he recognises the principle of maintaining Greek honour and pride, 2) his actions reflect his commitments as he chooses to mobilise the troops and lead the war against Troy and Paris, and 3) because he eventually chooses to sacrifice Iphigenia. Furthermore, he is committed to leading Greece and the expedition against Paris because he recognises that it is important for Menelaos’s honour (and his wife) to be restored, and he commits himself to that because, as a leader, he wants to defend Greece and Greek honour.221

It follows that Agamemnon has an authentic relation to his commitment to protect Iphigenia, and to his commitment to protect Greece, and that he thus has coherence.

Given the evidence that Agamemnon has identity-conferring commitments to both Iphigenia and Greece, and given that his situation meets the necessary conditions of integrity, means that no matter which option Agamemnon chooses to act on, he would compromise his integrity.

That Agamemnon has integrity can be established independently, just as the fact that Agamemnon has identity-conferring commitments to both Iphigenia and Greece can be established independently. By independently I mean it can be established without assuming a) that his guilt is necessarily evidence that he does something wrong in the sense that he can be held morally blameworthy, or b) that his

221 If Agamemnon did not want to defend Greek honour and be a reputable leader, then he would not have volunteered to lead the expedition against Troy, would not be a general in the war, and would not have prevented mutiny and the possibility of abandoning the expedition, by sacrificing Iphigenia.
moral residue is necessarily evidence that he faces a rationally irresolvable conflict of commitments and thus, a genuine moral dilemma. Agamemnon’s moral residue is therefore evidence of a loss of integrity, and, is thus appropriate.

The moral residue argument revisited

As discussed in the second chapter Terence McConnell argues that the moral residue argument has to show the following: 1) when the agent acts she experiences moral residue, 2) that she experiences moral residue is appropriate, 3) had she acted on the other alternative she would also have experienced moral residue, and 4) in the latter case these emotions would have been equally appropriate.\(^{222}\)

In terms of my interpretation of appropriate moral residue, both Sophie and Agamemnon satisfy McConnell’s conditions. Sophie’s situation meets the first condition because she experiences moral residue after choosing Eva to be gassed, and Agamemnon meets the first condition because he experiences moral residue after choosing to sacrifice Iphigenia. Sophie similarly meets McConnell’s second condition because her moral residue is appropriate. This is because she has an identity-conferring commitment to protect Eva from harm, and in choosing her to be gassed, Sophie undermines that commitment and, thus, her integrity. To the same extent, Agamemnon has an identity-conferring commitment to Iphigenia, and in choosing her to be sacrificed, he undermines that commitment, and thus, his integrity. It follows that both Sophie and Agamemnon’s moral residue is appropriate, and that they both meet McConnell’s first two conditions.

Given that Sophie similarly has an identity-conferring commitment to protect Jan from harm, had she chosen the other alternative - for Jan to be gassed - she would also experience appropriate moral residue. As Agamemnon’s commitment to Greece is similarly an identity-conferring commitment, it follows that if he had chosen to sacrifice his commitment to Greece and save Iphigenia from being sacrificed, he would have experienced appropriate moral residue. Therefore, both Sophie and Agamemnon satisfy the four conditions that McConnell argues should be true for the moral residue argument to work.

\(^{222}\) McConnell in Mason, 1996, Pages 36-37
I am now in a position to show how it follows from the existence of Sophie and Agamemnon's appropriate moral residue that the necessary and sufficient conditions for a genuine moral dilemma are met.

I have already independently established that Sophie and Agamemnon have integrity and thus that their moral residue is appropriate, because their respective choices involve undermining their integrity. Given that they both have integrity means that while Sophie has identity-conferring commitments to protect both Jan and Eva, Agamemnon has identity-conferring commitments to protect both Iphigenia and Greece. It follows that in having to choose between their identity-conferring commitments, both Sophie and Agamemnon face a conflict.

That their moral residue is appropriate shows that both of their conflicts are rationally irresolvable. By nature, identity-conferring commitments cannot be overridden, and thus Sophie and Agamemnon cannot sacrifice either of their commitments without experiencing appropriate moral reside and thus a loss of integrity. That they both face a rationally irresolvable conflict of commitments means that they both satisfy the first necessary condition of a genuine moral dilemma.

That both Sophie and Agamemnon's moral residue is appropriate is similarly evidence that both of their choices satisfy the second necessary condition of a genuine moral dilemma. Both of their commitments are identity-conferring, thus the fact that they would both experience appropriate moral residue no matter which alternative they choose to act on is proof that they will inevitably compromise their integrity and face loss.

I say that for two reasons. First, as my discussion of appropriate moral residue shows, no matter how they act they will compromise their integrity, thus it follows that they both face an inevitable loss of integrity. Second, given that integrity depends on identity-conferring commitments, no matter how Sophie and Agamemnon choose to act, they will similarly compromise their identity and thus lose a part of their identity. Regardless of which child Sophie chooses to be gassed, she will betray her conception of herself as a mother committed to protecting both of her children from harm. Likewise, whether Agamemnon chooses to sacrifice Iphigenia or sacrifice his expedition to Troy, he will similarly betray his conception of himself as a father committed to protecting his daughter, or as a leader committed to protecting Greek honour.
Consequently, their appropriate moral residue understood in terms of integrity, is evidence that whatever choice either of them makes will be "a suicide of a sort," as either action would destroy them and their integrity, and would be wrong. Both Sophie and Agamemnon thus satisfy the first two necessary conditions of a genuine moral dilemma: a rationally irresolvable conflict of commitments and loss.

**Objection: incoherence and apparent dilemmas**

As we saw in chapter 1, that these two conditions can be met is not sufficient to establish that a genuine moral dilemma exists. Opponents could argue that although appropriate moral residue understood in terms of integrity can satisfy the conflict and loss conditions - it still fails to support the existence of genuine moral dilemmas. This is because the situation condition is not satisfied. Opponents could thus argue that Sophie and Agamemnon’s commitments are incoherent, and thus a) that they only face an apparently irresolvable conflict of commitments and b) that the situation in which they find themselves’ is caused by their own irrationality, and does not point to the reality of genuine moral dilemmas. In other words, that Sophie and Agamemnon face rationally irresolvable conflicts is a result of their holding incoherent commitments. If they were to be rational then they would not face the apparent dilemma.

If Sophie and Agamemnon’s commitments were incoherent, then the dilemma would be their fault, and not the fault of the world. It would thus be the case that their appropriate moral residue could not be used to support the existence of genuine moral dilemmas. Opponents could argue that on the basis that Sophie and Agamemnon’s cases - although they satisfy the conditions of conflict and loss - do not satisfy the condition that their situations are imposed on them by the world. In this way, if their commitments are incoherent, it follows that their dilemmas are only apparent.

If Sophie and Agamemnon’s commitments are incoherent, then their commitments cannot both be identity-conferring. This is because of the definition of integrity and the nature of identity-conferring commitments. By that I mean that if one (or neither) of their commitments are identity-conferring, then at least one

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223 McFall, 1987, Page 13-14
commitment must be defeasible. If at least one of Sophie and Agamemnon’s commitments are defeasible then they can sacrifice that defeasible commitment without experiencing appropriate moral residue. The implication if their commitments are incoherent is threefold. Firstly, they will not necessarily undermine their integrity. Secondly, their moral residue will not necessarily be appropriate, and thirdly, neither of them will necessarily face a choice that meets the sufficient conditions of a genuine moral dilemma.

There is an easy way to overcome this objection: I have argued that whether or not moral residue is appropriate depends on whether a) the agent has integrity and b) whether the choice resulting in moral residue undermines the agent’s integrity. Sophie and Agamemnon meet both a) and b) and thus their moral residue is appropriate. The fact that their moral residue is appropriate means that the situation condition is met. I say that because if Sophie and Agamemnon have integrity then they necessarily have an authentic relation to their commitments and thus: coherence. It follows from the presence of appropriate moral residue that the situation condition is met. If a) Sophie and Agamemnon have integrity (that involves coherence) and b) the choice that causes that moral residue compromises their integrity, then moral residue is appropriate. Thus, part of establishing appropriate moral residue is establishing their coherence. Consequently, the argument for appropriate moral residue is at the same time an argument that the situation condition can be met.

It remains, however, to argue that the claim that Sophie’s commitments to protect both Jan and Eva are incoherent, is implausible. If opponents were to argue that her commitments are incoherent, then they would have to argue that—likewise—all mothers who have identity-conferring commitments to both (or all) of their children are incoherent. Such an argument, however, seems both trivial and unacceptable. This is because it would allow some sort of ranking system that would run contrary to human experience and common conceptions of what an admirable human being and a good mother is.

If it were the case that mothers who have identity-conferring commitments to protect both of their children from harm are incoherent, then it would mean that mothers with more than one child will have to rank their commitments to, say, protect their children from harm. For example, a mother could rank her commitments to her

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224 In the sense explained in chapter 1.
children in terms of their capabilities and potential for success and could thus have an identity-conferring commitment to protect child A because he is highly intelligent and may one day become a doctor, an important, defeasible commitment to protect child B because she is good at ballet and may one day become a prima ballerina, and a defeasible commitment to protect child C who is not particularly good at anything.

However, we would judge Sophie more severely, deem her a morally reprehensible agent, (and mother) if she did not have equally important, identity-conferring commitments to both of her children. This is supported by Williams’s aforementioned claim that moral residue can be used to determine whether a person is an admirable moral agent or not.\textsuperscript{225}

According to Williams’ argument, Sophie’s moral residue is evidence that she is an admirable moral agent. If Sophie willingly chooses Eva over Ian - and neither hates herself for making such a choice, nor experiences negative emotions of self-assessment or a “simple, but passionately motivated reticence”\textsuperscript{226} to disclose her choice – we would judge her to be callous and a morally questionable agent and mother. That Sophie is pressurised into making the choice that she does, and is wracked with guilt after her decision, is evidence that she is an admirable moral agent committed to protecting both of her children from harm.

To the same extent, to argue that Agamemnon’s commitments are incoherent would entail the claim that all agents who make both public and private commitments are incoherent, or that all leaders who commit themselves to protecting family members are incoherent. It seems, however, that agents will necessarily commit themselves to more than one type of commitment and to more than one principle, and that – as Williams maintains - if an agent is committed to certain principles and values, she will experience conflicting values or commitments\textsuperscript{227}. That such conflict is inevitable in some sense is owing to the fact that an agent will commit herself to a number of different values and principles in her life - principles that she adopts from various social sources and to various people.

To argue that the likes of Agamemnon or Sophie are incoherent would mean that all agents with dual responsibilities to say, their family members or friends, and their careers or civic duties, are incoherent. That would mean that all agents who

\textsuperscript{225} Williams, 1982, Page 173
\textsuperscript{226} Styron, 2000, Page 176
\textsuperscript{227} Williams, 1981, Page 72
serve in the army, police force, government, or any career, could be deemed incoherent in the event that they are committed to protect individuals close to them at the same time that they are committed to their respective careers. Such a conception, however, is both trivial and (like the conception that mothers should only have an identity-conferring commitment to one child and not both) contrary to human experience.

Opponents, however, may argue that the fact that Sophie chooses Eva to be gassed and that Agamemnon chooses to sacrifice Iphigenia is evidence that their commitments can be ranked as the commitment they eventually act on must override the other commitment. It remains, that the extracts I have cited, and the evidence of Sophie and Agamemnon’s moral residue, is sufficient to show that just as neither of Sophie’s commitments override each other, so neither of Agamemnon’s commitments override each other. This is because they both have identity-conferring commitments, and because both of them have integrity. Thus, both Sophie and Agamemnon’s commitments are coherent, and, in the situations in which they both find themselves, they would inevitably undermine their integrity and would thus inevitably do wrong.

It follows that both Sophie and Agamemnon’s appropriate moral residue satisfies the situation condition. As their moral residue is appropriate, their commitments are thus both identity-conferring, and necessarily coherent. Given that their commitments are coherent means that the rationally irresolvable conflict and the inevitable loss of integrity that they face is not their own fault. I say that because their commitments are coherent and yet they still face a rationally irresolvable conflict of commitments.

That Sophie is unable to rationally resolve her conflict and choose between Jan and Eva without experiencing appropriate moral residue, coupled with the fact that her commitments are coherent, proves that she is faced with a situation that meets the third necessary condition of a genuine moral dilemma: the situation condition. That Agamemnon is unable to rationally resolve his conflict and choose between sacrificing Iphigenia or Greece without experiencing appropriate moral residue, coupled with the fact that his commitments are coherent, proves that he faces a situation that satisfies the situation condition. That their appropriate moral residue is evidence that their situations were imposed on them by the world, is based on the claim that appropriate moral residue is moral residue experienced because the agent undermined her integrity. However, for an agent to undermine her integrity it is
necessary that she had integrity in the first place. Having integrity implies being coherent. Thus, if the agent is coherent and has integrity then the situation in which she finds herself is not her own fault and must therefore be a situation imposed on her by the world.

Just as Sophie’s appropriate moral residue is thus evidence that her choice is “beyond” her “control,” so Agamemnon falls in to an “unavoidable trap,” forced on him by the Gods, that is likewise beyond his control. As he says, “Poor me - / thanks to the gods I’ve got no way out of this situation!” “I can’t have what I want; that’s why I’m in/ pain.” They are both in situations that involve a degree of moral luck and militating circumstances that necessitate loss and wrongdoing.

It follows that both Sophie and Agamemnon’s moral residue, when interpreted in terms of integrity, can be used to support the existence of genuine moral dilemmas. By using the independent standard of integrity it is possible to escape the objections while also supplying what their interpretations of appropriate moral residue lack, and arrive at a way of determining that moral residue is appropriate without begging the question or assuming that the agent has done something for which she is morally responsible. My interpretation of appropriate moral residue supplies an independent way of determining that an agent has done something wrong and that her moral residue is appropriate without assuming that genuine moral conflicts or dilemmas exist, and without assuming that agents like Sophie and Agamemnon can only experience appropriate moral residue when they are morally blameworthy.

Thus, the moral residue argument supplemented with this account of appropriate moral residue understood in terms of integrity can support the existence of genuine moral dilemmas.

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228 Styron, 2000, Page 604
229 Blondell, 1999, Page 344
230 Ibid. 1999, Page 347
Conclusion

My discussion has shown how it is possible to save the moral residue argument. In so doing, I outlined the conditions that a genuine moral dilemma would have to meet were it to exist. I also discussed the debate between opponents and proponents of genuine moral dilemmas. Were a genuine moral dilemma to exist it would have to satisfy the conditions of a rationally irresolvable conflict of commitments, inevitable loss, and a situation imposed on the agent by the world. I discussed proponents of the existence of genuine moral dilemmas like Williams and Marcus, while outlining a number of candidates that satisfy the sufficient conditions of a genuine moral dilemma.

After discussing the debate concerning the existence of moral dilemmas I spelt out the moral residue argument and the negative emotions of self-assessment involved therein. McConnell, Sinnott-Armstrong, and Greenspan provide two compelling objections to the efficacy of the moral residue argument, arguing that it is flawed on two counts as it begs the question and fails to acknowledge that there are cases where it is not inappropriate to experience moral residue even when the agent has done nothing wrong. These objections, however, depend on specific conceptions of appropriate moral residue that neither explain what the agent has done wrong, nor provide an account of why the agent feels the harsh self-judgement of guilt, shame, or remorse that she does. In response to the flawed conceptions of appropriate moral residue assumed in the objections I proposed that the independent standard of integrity would both overcome the objections and provide a more precise conception of appropriate moral residue. That is, a conception of moral residue that can tell a story about why the agent experiences negative emotions of self-assessment, and explain what it is that makes the residue appropriate i.e what constitutes doing wrong in cases of dilemmas.

I based my analysis of integrity on McFall’s conception of integrity. After establishing the conditions of integrity and how a better conception of appropriate moral residue is one when the agent has compromised her integrity and thus done something wrong, I showed how integrity can be used as an independent standard of
proving that agents like Sophie and Agamemnon did something wrong. This I did by showing that there is evidence in both Sophie's Choice and Iphigenia at Aulis of both Sophie and Agamemnon's moral residue, and the fact that they would have experienced moral residue regardless of how they had acted.

Both Sophie and Agamemnon's respective commitments satisfied the conditions for integrity laid out in the third section. Consequently, in making their respective choices they both violated an identity-conferring commitment, and thus, undermined their integrity. Had either Sophie or Agamemnon acted on their other commitment they would similarly have compromised their integrity and done something wrong. It follows that they both would have undermined their integrity and thus done something wrong no matter how they had acted. Given that both Sophie and Agamemnon had coherent commitments, they were not responsible for the inevitable wrongdoing of the choice that faced them. Thus, they both faced a situation that satisfies the sufficient conditions of a genuine moral dilemma outlined in the first section. In showing that Sophie and Agamemnon both experienced appropriate moral residue and both would have done something wrong regardless of how they acted, and by showing how their situations meet the criteria of an irresolvable conflict of commitments, inevitable loss, and a situation imposed on them by the world, I proved that genuine moral dilemmas exist and that the moral residue argument can be salvaged and can support that fact.

The implications of my discussion are that much of moral theory as it stands will have to be revised. The likes of Kant, Ross, and followers of utilitarianism and other rule-based ethical theories will have to revise their general conceptions that a conflict of commitments is rationally resolvable, and allow for the possibility that genuine moral dilemmas exist and that not all conflicts are rationally resolvable by appealing to some rule-based ethical theory or hierarchical system of ranking values and commitments.

That the moral residue argument can be salvaged points to the fact that moral psychology can tell us much about whether a person is an admirable moral agent or not. It can also shed light on whether the agent has actually done something wrong or not. My discussions similarly highlight the importance of personal integrity in making moral decisions and acting morally, and – again – in discerning whether an agent actually has done something wrong that it is contrary to her personal commitments.
It is important to look at moral dilemmas, moral residue, and integrity, because of the further implications for moral theory and moral decisions. Given that an agent’s emotions of negative self-assessment can be used as evidence that she has violated her integrity, it follows that moral residue and integrity are a central part of an agent’s moral decisions. Furthermore, the fact that moral dilemmas exist, and violating integrity means that an agent has done something wrong, is evidence that all morality is essentially a personal morality in the sense that an agent with integrity makes a range of commitments, and it is essentially up to her to decide what she commits herself to, and to ensure that she does not undermine or violate those commitments. Although agents should ideally aim to reduce the conflict between their personal commitments, as shown - there are cases where that is not possible and cannot necessarily be foreseen, means that much of moral theory as it stands needs to be enhanced to account for the degree of moral luck involved in being moral and making moral decisions. It thus seems that goodness is fragile, and that the emotions of moral residue and the moral residue argument interpreted in terms of the independent standard of integrity, have a role to play in supporting the existence of genuine moral dilemmas.

232 Williams, 1981, Page 72
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