

Economic and Social Integration of Mozambican Migrants in Durban

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
## Dedication

I wish to dedicate this work to my friend,  
Dr.Jaume Angilats Morató  
And all the people of goodwill.

### Declaration

This dissertation represents original work by the author and has not been submitted in any other form to another University. Where use has been made of the work of others, this has been duly acknowledged and referenced in the text.

Signature:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Simão', written over a horizontal dotted line.

Simão Manuel Nhambi

## Acronym

BI	Bilhete de Identidade (Identity Document)
CFLM	Caminhos de ferro de lourenco marques lourenco marques railways
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique ( Mozambique Liberation Front)
GDP	Growth Domestic Product
ID-	Identification Document
KZN	KwaZulu- Natal
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NUM	National Union of Mines
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional de Moçambique ( Mozambique National Resistance)
RNLA	Rand Native Labour Association
SA	South Africa
SADC	Southern African Development Community
TEBA	The Employment Bureau of Africa
UN	United Nations
WENELA	Witwatersrand Native Labour Association

## Abstract

Economic migration has become a global trend. The movement of people and goods within and beyond territorial boundaries is a phenomenon synonymous with the twentieth century. In the Southern African region, migratory processes were accelerated by the 19<sup>th</sup> century mineral discoveries in the Cape and Transvaal. Mozambique, particularly its southern regions, was drawn into the South African- dominated economy in a service capacity, as the supplier of migrant labour, principally for the Transvaal. The mineral wealth and the development it generated made South Africa the dominant economy in the region, drawing in migrant labour from surrounding states.

Today, mining activities and the Transvaal are no longer the main attraction for many Mozambicans who enter South Africa, as they have spread throughout the country since the ending of apartheid. This study is focused on Durban, where a combination of push and pull factors continues to impel Mozambicans to arrive in search of economic opportunities. The majority, who are from the rural areas of the southern provinces, without education and formal qualifications, enter South Africa illegally and without documentation.

Migrants use informal networks and the informal sector, as a means of overcoming the various obstacles to entry imposed by the states on both sides of the frontier, and their inability to compete for jobs in the formal sector. Economic and social integration of Mozambicans in Durban has evolved around informality and it can be argued that if the Mozambicans in this study have achieved a certain degree of integration, this has been due to successful mobilization of resources provided by informal networks and the informal sector. Linguistic affinities and geographical proximity also play a significant role in the process.

The study looks at various informal economic opportunities exploited by Mozambicans, including an expanding cross border- trade based on high mobility between the two countries. It focuses mainly on the varied ways Mozambicans in Durban achieve a degree of economic and social integration. Literature and debates on international migration and on informality lay a foundation for the approach to the study, which is based on an historical overview of migration between the two states and fieldwork in Durban and southern Mozambique.



## CHAPTER I

### 1. INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1. AIMS OF THE RESEARCH:

This research project focuses on the economic and social integration of migrants in South Africa with specific reference to Durban in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. I have used the term ‘migrants’ rather than the ‘immigrants’, because, as I shall show, Mozambicans in general who come to Durban do so without intending to settle there. Their purpose is to amass and remit earnings, and eventually to return to Mozambique. The fact that access to land in Mozambique remains relatively easy<sup>1</sup> means that many migrants, most of whom are male, are likely to have left families at home, and intend to return to them.

The survival strategies of migrants from outside the country have been relatively neglected in Mozambican literature; little research has been done on the links between the economies of Mozambique and South Africa at the level of illegal migrant workers.

The majority of Mozambican migrants are from the three southern provinces. Economic migration from Mozambique to South Africa, forced or voluntary, is a phenomenon that has a long history; economic motives continue today to be the strongest forces driving movement between the two countries. Migration from Mozambique to South Africa is almost entirely labour migration, a term which encompasses legal and illegal migration, and implies that the individuals involved will be work seekers. The mines of the Transvaal historically have attracted most Mozambican migrants to South Africa. In recent years, however, the demand for foreign labour in the mines has declined, particularly after the end of the apartheid regime. Since the abolition of entry visas for citizens of both countries in 2005, the number of people coming from Mozambique to Durban and other destinations within the country has increased.

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<sup>1</sup> My key informants and the households in Mozambique engaged in this research indicated that land for farming, grazing and housing in their rural communities is still relatively accessible.

Mozambican migrants in South Africa or elsewhere are likely to activate enabling mechanisms of economic and social integration. I have sought to explore how Mozambicans who live in Durban achieve economic and social integration into the life of the city. I have explored the social and political contexts which have led to migration, as well as the strategies adopted by Mozambicans to achieve their goals: and the informal networks and much smaller scale formal organizations which have been established recently to facilitate economic and social integration.

I have ‘mapped out’ the Mozambican presence in Durban and answered some important questions about the ‘community,’ such as whether factors such as geographical and cultural proximity are important in influencing the choice of Durban as a destination. What impact does the status of illegal migrants have on their process of integration? How have they overcome the legal and social forces which tend to exclude them in pursuit of economic and social integration? How have their low level of education and lack of formal qualifications influenced their level of economic and social integration?

These issues are explored within the context of post-apartheid South Africa, since the influx of foreigners from elsewhere in Africa has greatly increased since 1994. According to Rogerson (1997:4) “one of the most significant elements of the democratic transition in South Africa has been the increased flow of migrants into the country from surrounding southern African countries, other parts of Africa and beyond.” For Mozambicans, this means that the mining route traditionally taken by young men wishing to amass some capital has no longer been the only route, nor perhaps the preferred one. Durban, as I shall show, is nowadays a popular destination, and no study of Mozambican migrants in this city has been conducted.

I have examined the social and economic mechanisms which facilitate or prevent the integration of Mozambicans into the life of the city. Though the current economic migrants from Mozambique are from different parts of the country, the southern provinces of Inhambane, Gaza and Maputo are most strongly represented in Durban, largely as illegal migrants.

## 1.2. ISSUES TO BE INVESTIGATED

The processes of economic and social integration are complex, particularly because integration cannot be achieved through official policy and its implementation alone. While state policy may attempt to accommodate migrants, social behaviour and attitudes towards migrants may be important in the process of their economic and social integration. Inability to speak the language of the host country, lack of valid identity documents and the inability to offer proof of their skills are some of the problems that migrants need to overcome if they are to be economic and socially integrated. According to the United Nations Commission for Human Rights (Fact sheet No.24 the Rights of Migrant workers), inadequate housing, social discrimination and low incomes constitute some of the obstacles that migrant people have to face in a foreign community.

This research seeks to establish the extent to which Mozambicans living and working in Durban have overcome the economic and social challenges which confront them and have become integrated in local economic and social structures. The perceived role of the state in the process of economic and social integration may be linked with the issue of citizenship. Mozambicans in Durban are foreigners and for the most part have no right of residence or work permit. Neither the Mozambican nor the South African state plays a large role in the lives of Mozambican migrants in Durban.

I shall also explore how Mozambicans living and working in Durban have learnt to resist or overcome economic and social exclusions. Informal support networks among the Mozambicans themselves will be crucial.

The fact that no visa requirements exist for Mozambicans and South Africans moving across their shared borders allows citizens of both countries to move back and forth as long as their temporary period of stay is less than 30 days. I shall indicate the effects that this policy has had on Mozambicans in Durban. Mobility as a survival strategy will be considered in terms of the increase in cross border mobility between the two countries.

### 1.3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS

Initially I intended only to study economic and social integration as it involves Mozambicans who live in Durban. As the research progressed, however, the need to involve households in Mozambique who had relatives working and living South Africa, emerged. The project was initiated at the beginning of 2006 and since then has evolved in stages which included pilot fieldwork in Maputo and Gaza between 4 June and 3 July 2006. Preliminary results of the research in Durban revealed the need to expand the fieldwork to Inhambane since a significant number of those surveyed in Durban came from there. Interviews with senior members of households in Inhambane were therefore undertaken in addition to those in Maputo and Gaza.

My decision to involve households in Mozambique was motivated by the fact that most participants in my sample in Durban indicated that they continue to maintain links with their families in Mozambique. I found that it was important to investigate, at least to a limited extent, the economic impact that migrants from Mozambique have in those households, given the fact that most of them claimed their presence in Durban was economically motivated. Furthermore, as my research progressed I established also that many migrants tended to move back and forth between Durban and Mozambique, a process which influenced the process of economic and social integration in Durban.

My research is based on a survey of published material together with in-depth interviews with ten key informants, all of them resident in Durban for more than two years, and a survey sample of 50 migrants living and working in Durban. Additionally, 25 residents in households in Mozambique, in Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane provinces were interviewed, all of whom had relatives in South Africa, though not necessarily in Durban. 25 Mozambican cross-border traders in Durban markets were also interviewed. Due to time constraints, the focus group method of interview was used for the cross border traders. This allowed to obtain information concerning the group, as they expressed

themselves in the name of the group rather than as individuals. For all interviews, the participants were randomly chosen.

Information obtained includes biographical data on age, gender, education, mode of travel/entry to Durban; whether official or undocumented, reception in the city; housing; employment; networks and social organization; links with Mozambique and remittances.

During the search period, I was not able to collect all the official necessary data to supplement my findings. Despite all the efforts, I was not able to access information, in particular from the department of Home affairs, concerning the numbers of Mozambicans who have been granted the SADC exemption.

Interviews both in South Africa and Mozambique were slowed by the unwillingness to participate of certain people. However, this did not affect the research's objectives and goals.

Although there are also Mozambicans legally living and working in Durban, some of which with adequate qualifications and skills, these are outside of the scope of my study. This research, however, has been confined in the study of the processes Mozambicans in Durban use to achieve a degree of economic and social integration. No attempt has been made to research, deeply, the businesses of Mozambicans and whether they are legal or illegal because this is also a subject of another study.

#### 1.4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The concept of economic and social integration is a complex one to deal with, and its fruitful study requires the combination of a range of ideas drawn from different theories. Economic and social integration should be seen primarily as a process that leads to the equitable participation of people in economic and social activities. Ballassa (1961:1) has argued that "integration denotes the bringing together of parts into a whole." For him

economic integration is “a process which comprises measures that entail the suppression of forms of discrimination” (p2) and these measures involve the state and the society.

After the first democratic elections, the South African government granted, to long-term migrants from the region, the opportunity to acquire South African citizenship (De Vletter, 1998:5). This can be taken as step that aims to gradually integrate migrants who had lived excluded from formal socio-political and economic structures of the country for different reasons. The state has a fundamental role to play in creating the legal framework within which integration can happen, but not everyone chooses the route of formality.

One of the ways leading to economic and social integration is based on the activation of informal networks. These networks provide necessary resources to the respondents of this research, particularly that the majority of them are illegal migrants who have entered South Africa, largely undocumented. Within the frame of these networks, information about jobs and other economic opportunities is shared. However, the issue of economic and social integration entail more than access to jobs and economic opportunities.

Perlman’s (1976) work on slum settlements in Rio de Janeiro raises interesting questions about marginalization. Even migrants who were employed in the city could not be considered to be economically or socially integrated. The quality of jobs, poor housing, lack of access to public services, social benefits are some of the illustrations of marginality that the migrants face (Perlman, 1976:56). Pretorius and Williams (1998) have shown similar trends with non-citizens in South Africa. They indicated that foreign people are usually employed to do the least dignified and most dangerous jobs with long hours and unsafe conditions and low pay.

Substantial literature shows that economically and socially marginalized individuals or communities try to resist this marginality by engaging themselves with the informal sector. Ballard (2004:107) in eThekweni’s case, argues that the informal traders have a confrontational relationship with the police. This, according to Ballard (p104) happens despite the fact that “eThekweni’s policy on informal economy is a particularly advanced

and progressive one.” For Ballard, this is further perpetuated by the fact that the informal economy policy of the government, “fails to squarely confront the highly sensitive issue of migrant traders.” The lack of inclusive policy in the informal sector can be taken as another form of excluding the foreign informal traders from freely and actively participating in the local economic and social life.

Mozambicans continue to flow into the city, despite all the barriers placed in their way to slow the integration process.

In the following sections I will, firstly provide literature reviews to explain different causes and effect of migration from an international perspective. Secondly I will give an historical overview of the migration of Mozambicans to South Africa. Thirdly I will discuss how Mozambicans come to Durban and the mechanisms they use to overcome exclusion and their attempt to achieve economic and social integration. The last part of the dissertation will be the conclusions.

**CHAPTER II**  
**2. INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE OF MIGRATION**  
**LITERATURE SURVEY**

**2.1. INTRODUCTION**

This chapter seeks to explore the theoretical understanding of international migration, its causes and effects. Discussion will revolve around global and regional (southern African) historical accounts of migration. I shall show in this chapter that migration is not an isolated phenomenon and it has existed since time immemorial in almost all parts of the globe. Although migration is an international phenomenon, the causes and impacts differ in the different instances where it has occurred. The areas (from which and to which the migrations occur) and time periods are major factors. For example, while migration in Europe was stimulated by imperial expansion and two major world wars, migration in southern African countries has, according to Arrighi (1969) been galvanized by the legislation which forced wage labour on the indigenous peoples, which was associated with land dispossession and the absorption of the African people into the labour markets.

This chapter will also attend to the aspects of regional cross-border movements. Since international migration is vast and complex, discussion of this topic will focus mainly on labour migration in southern Africa from the 19<sup>th</sup> century onwards, and especially on the present day. The nineteenth century marked the commencement of mineral explorations in South Africa, together with the need to recruit enormous numbers of unskilled labourers. As a result, South Africa has since been the receiving country of the bulk of migrant workers from elsewhere in the southern African subcontinent (Crush, 2003). I shall attempt to establish the causes of migration and relate them to socioeconomic and political policies adopted by the former colonial administrations and explain the ways in which they influence current migration patterns in the region.



## 2.2 MIGRATION: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

According to Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouauci, Pellegrino and Taylor (1998:1) “a careful examination of virtually any historical era reveals a consistent propensity towards geographical mobility among men and women, who are driven to wander by diverse motives, but nearly always with some idea of material importance.” The early entry of Mozambicans seeking to work in the Natal sugar plantations around 1850<sup>2</sup>, is one of the experiences that explain cross border movements which are materially motivated (Newitt, 1995). Undoubtedly these movements were preceded by many other migrations which took place long before the establishment of the territorial borders. As Martin (2002:5) pointed out, “migration is as old as human wandering in search for food, but international migration is a relatively recent phenomenon.” Modern migration, however, can be divided into four periods namely the mercantile, culminating in the eighteenth century, industrial, beginning in the nineteenth, the First World War period (1914-18) and the post-industrial period, after the Second World War (Massey et al, 1998:1).

The mercantile migration period occurred between 1500 and 1800. This stage, characteristically, consisted of European migration to other continents (Massey et al, 1998:1). This phase was comprised mainly of “a relatively large number of agrarian settlers, a smaller number of administrators and artisans, an even smaller number of entrepreneurs who founded plantations to produce raw materials for Europe’s growing mercantilist economies, and in a very few cases, convict migrants sent to penal colonies overseas” (Massey et al:1998:1). In the same period the Portuguese sailed to Africa where they established and maintained a political and economic presence in Mozambique and other colonies.

Since the fifteenth century, European settlers have penetrated the Asian, African, Oceanic and American continents and established their political and economic dominion over the

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<sup>2</sup> According to the *Reader's Digest Illustrated History of South Africa* “As early as 1852 Shepstone had tried to ‘persuade’ Africans to work for planters ... the labour shortage continued, forcing planters to look further north for their labour, particularly in Mozambique” (1988: 176).

indigenous peoples (Massey et al: 1998:1). The European colonial presence in various continents increased the mobility of the indigenous people, particularly because in most cases they were forced either to abandon their traditional economic activities and enter the wage economy or were transported to other countries as slaves (Duffy,1967).

This last type of movement, the involuntary movement of enslaved peoples, was on a mighty scale. In the space of 300 years, ten million people from the African continent were transported, mainly to the American continents, and on a much lesser scale to the Cape of Good Hope, as slaves (Palmer, 1992 and Curtai, 1969 cited by Massey et al, 1998:1). Enormous and appalling though this enforced migration was, it is not my subject here. Nor do I intend to deal with the kind of movements of population known in the twentieth century as ‘ethnic cleansing’; although I shall make reference to disturbances of population resulting from war.

Mobility occurred in Portuguese colonies, including Mozambique, where the economy became dependent on indigenous people’s involvement in the colonial economy, either as slaves or unskilled and under-paid labour (Katzenellenbogen ,1982; Duffy,1967). The beginning of the twentieth century marked the second phase of international migration which came to be known as the industrial period of migration. This period, “begins early in the nineteenth century and stemmed from the economic development of Europe and the spread of industrialism to former colonies in the New World” (Massey et al, 1998:1). In the industrial period of migration many people from the European continent left the continent for America and Oceania in pursuit of a new life (Massey et al, 1998:1). It is estimated that “following 1820 about 50 million Europeans set sail for labour-scarce New World destinations, magnitudes big enough to be called ‘mass migrations’”(Hatton and Williamson, 1994:4).

Mass migration was halted by the outbreak of the First World War. This period is known as the period of limited migration and was to last for at least four decades (Massey, 1995 in Massey et al, 1998). Migration in this period was limited by a rise in recruitment of people into military service and in short-term growth in types of production. Accordingly

“at the onset of the first World War, many migrants returned home to participate in military service or munitions production (Castles and Miller, 1998: 62). The four decades of limited migration include the Second World War period in which international migration continued to decline. The only notable mobility was that of refugees and displaced people, in contrast to the previous period of migration, when migration was for the most part economically driven (Massey et al, 1998:2).

The fourth period of international migration is post-industrial migration. The post-industrial period marks the commencement of a truly global migration process. Unlike other periods of international migration which comprised mainly European migrants (85% of all international migrants originated from Europe), it involved people from many continents. Since the 1960s migration routes have been extremely diverse (Massey et al: 1998:2). This phase, therefore, becomes relevant to the present study because it gives insight into how industrial development in South Africa has influenced the migration processes in the region, particularly in Mozambique. Furthermore, the post-industrial migration stage can be seen as the period in which labour migration begins to be integrated into the global labour market. Contextually, the characteristically low-skills of the labour force from Mozambique made Mozambicans desirable employees in South African farming and mining industries, and this, though on a lesser scale, continues to be the case today.

### 2.3 THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

A multidisciplinary approach to international migration is necessary if it is to be understood. As Castles and Miller (1998:19) have indicated, migration can be explained in sociological, political, economical, judicial, psychological, demographical and geographical ways. Simply defined, migration is a movement of people from one place to another within the same territorial, or, where they exist, national boundaries or beyond. Some authorities have tried to distinguish between internal and international migration. According to Baines (1994:36) “it is usual to define migration across national borders as ‘emigration’ and movement within a national border as ‘internal migration.’ For the

purpose of this study, instead of 'emigration' as an equivalent term to cross border movement, international migration or simply migration will be used.

I acknowledge, nevertheless, that there may be a high degree of similarity between internal and international migration in terms of causes and effects. Yet within this study, discussion on internal migration will not be developed. There are at least four theories that aim at explaining the causes of migration, namely: the neo-classical economic equilibrium approach, the 'push- pull' theory, the historical-structural approach, and the migration systems theory.

#### 2.4 THE NEO-CLASSICAL APPROACH

The neo-classical economic equilibrium perspective claims that the movement of people from one country to another is a rational and individual decision. According to this theory, the superior economic opportunities available in other countries are the cause of migration. Thus individuals move from less developed to relatively highly developed countries (Castles & Miller, 1998:20-21). As Borjas (1989:461 cited by Castles & Miller, 1998:21) pointed out, "neo-classical theory assumes that individuals maximize utility: individuals 'search' for the country of residence that maximizes their well-being." Proponents of this theory would use South Africa, in the southern African region, to explain the continued influx of people from the region and beyond, since South Africa is considered to be the giant of the region. (see Sabelo, 2003:113).

Neo-classical theory also states that individuals make their decision to migrate by balancing the cost of migrating against that of remaining in their birthplace. When the cost of migrating is lower than that of remaining at the place of origin, people will move from one country to another. State emigration or immigration policies are perceived as "distortion[s] of the rational market, which should be removed" (Castles & Miller, 1998:20). This approach gives the state a minimal role to play and does not take cognisance of the other historical causes of movements of people from one place to another (Castles & Miller, 1998:23). It claims that the cost and benefits of migration are

the main elements which dictate whether people should migrate or not. Its principle is that “potential migrants estimate the cost and benefits of moving to where the expected discounted net returns are greatest over some time-horizon” (Borjas, 1989, 1990 in Massey et al: 1998:19).

Neo-classical theory has come under criticism because of its emphasis on economic factors as the main determinant factors of migration. Critics of this theory would label it as simplistic, since there are non-economic factors that may influence individual or group decisions to migrate. Political and psychological factors may be at the core of the decision as to whether people migrate or not. Reitzes suggests (2004:345) “that migration is not purely an economic phenomenon, and therefore cannot be understood solely in terms of rational models and theories of economic primacy, or addressed exclusively by economic-inspired policies.”

#### 2.5 THE HISTORICAL-STRUCTURAL APPROACH

The historical-structural approach is derived from Marxist political economics. This approach underlines the uneven distribution of economic resources as a root cause for migration. “Migration is seen mainly as a way of mobilizing cheap labour for capital” (Castles & Miller, 1998:23). The fact that capital accumulation is concentrated in the most highly industrialized countries supports the argument that human capital and other resources for the industries of the advanced countries will be drawn from less developed and therefore peripheral countries. This argument supports the Marxist idea advanced by Arrighi (1969) on capital. He understands capitalism as a system of production that induces people to join the labour market and sell their labour as a commodity. The owners of the means of production extract enormous profits at the expense of the labourers.

## 2.6. MIGRATION SYSTEMS THEORY

The processes of migration can also be explained by the migration systems theory. This theory, according to Castles & Miller (1998:23-4), “emphasizes international relations, political economy, collective action and institutional factors. A migration system is constituted by two or more countries which exchange migrants with each other.” In the present study, South Africa is shown to present herself as a focal point of bilateral and multilateral accords with the various governments on its periphery. For example, the South African and Mozambican governments have concluded various accords which created fixed conditions on which Mozambicans may come and work in the South African economy (Ferreira, 1963). Another important aspect of the migration systems theory is that besides acknowledging the role of the state, it also recognizes the role played by ordinary people from both the sending and receiving countries. It is likely, therefore, that the majority of Mozambicans now in Durban relied massively on ‘informal’ aid rendered to them by people outside officialdom. Castles’s argument leads to the conclusion that within, but independent of the state and its institutions, individuals on the basis of culture, traditions and other social capital constitute a significant element in the list of facilitators of migration.

Thus, as Fawcett and Arnold, (1987: 456-7; in Castles & Miller, 1998:23) have pointed out,

The migration systems approach means examining both ends of the flow and studying all linkages between the places concerned. These linkages can be categorized as ‘state-to-state’ relations and in comparison, mass culture connections and family and social networks.”

One of the examples of state-to-state agreements which influenced migration was the Mozambican convention of 1928 between the Union of South Africa and Portugal. “The Mozambican convention clearly stipulated that all Mozambican mine workers had to be repatriated after their period of service” (Breytenbach, 1979:9). However, despite the

state-to-state agreement, (the macro level of the study of migration) people were not deterred from clandestinely crossing the border (the micro level) to South Africa (Ferreira, 1963). It can be concluded therefore that migration system theory examines pertinent issues of migration at macro and micro levels. In other words the international migration process may be regulated by states in formal and institutional ways at the macro level; at the micro level, in an informal way, individual social and economic linkages are of importance. It is from this perspective that it is being argued that:

Migration systems theory suggests that migratory movements generally arise from the existence of prior links between the sending and receiving countries based on colonization, political influence, trade, investment or cultural ties. The migration systems approach implies that any migration movement can be seen as a result of interacting macro and micro structures. Macro-structures refer to large-scale institutional factors, while micro-structures embrace the networks, practices and beliefs of the migrants themselves. The macro-structures include the political economy of the world market, interstate relationships, and the laws, structures and practices established by the states of sending and receiving countries to control migration and settlement (Castles & Miller, 1998:23).

The role of the state in the migratory process is nevertheless crucial. The state continues in the twenty-first century to be the main role player and custodian of the political, social and economic interests. In other words, the cross border movement of people which is regulated by the state, which in its turn is likely to be strongly influenced by commercial interests, such as the mining or the agricultural industries. It can be posited that “the role of international relations and of the states of both sending and receiving areas in organizing or facilitating movements is also significant” (Dohse,1981; Bohning,1984; Cohen, 1987; Fawcett, 1 989; Mitchell, 1989; Manfrass, 1992 cited in Castles & Miller, 1998:25).

The countries involved in sending and receiving migrants may facilitate access to the information that their citizens would need to assist them in decision-making about migration. Information is of paramount importance: Baines (1994:36) has argued that:

There is an alternative formulation in which the migration decision depends on access to information about economic and social conditions in the place to which migrants might be able to go. The information could cover income, employment opportunities, housing conditions, etc. Obviously all migrants must depend on information, but in this formulation, information is an independent cause of migration. The implication is that the greater the amount of (relevant) information that is available, the greater migration there will be, holding income differences constant.

Though the state plays a pivotal role in the migration process, particularly in the context of international migration, it does not hold a monopoly of the information which helps people to decide either to stay or migrate. Information about the countries to which people intend to migrate to is available in the micro-structures of the communities. These micro-structures are the mechanisms or strategies that migrants devise for themselves in order to cope with the consequences of migration and settlement. In the words of Castles & Miller (1998:25), “the micro-structures are the informal social networks developed by the migrants themselves, in order to cope with migration and settlement.” It is within the informal social networks that information and other valuable resources are made available. This signifies that above and beyond the state and official structures there will be “various kinds of informal, unregulated, or clandestine movements across borders” (Crush, 2003) created within and supported by the networks.

In the case of Mozambicans, it is vital to acknowledge that the growth in numbers of clandestine migrants to South Africa after independence was stimulated by the civil war. The war situation, unavoidably, I believe, created networks amongst those who were affected by it, which they used it for various purposes, including migration to South Africa. It can be argued that informal networks are created as a survival strategy,



particularly when the state lacks capacity. When the state is weakened and fails to provide, its citizens may resist its attempts to regulate and resort to survival strategies, of which the informal sector is one of the primary sources (MacGaffy and Ganga, 2000:16). For instance, when the Mozambican economy collapsed in 1984 (Hanlon, 1984: 254), it left many Mozambican citizens with no option but to engage in informal and illegal activities as a way of survival.

## 2.7. PUSH AND PULL THEORY

International migration is also explained by the ‘push and pull’ theory. The situations that force people to leave their places of origin or which attract them to other places, either as transient or permanent migrants, are known as ‘push and pull’ factors. Martin refers to this as “demand-pull and supply-push” (Martin, 2002:5). For Castles & Miller (1998:20) ‘push and pull theory’ emphasizes the “tendencies of people to move from densely to sparsely populated areas or from low-to high income areas.”

Transnational migration is an individual or family decision supported or discouraged by the expected benefits in a certain country. “[I]nternational migration is usually a major individual or family decision that is carefully considered” (Martin, 2002:5). In the case of Mozambique, a continued migration from the southern provinces of Mozambique, Inhambane, Gaza and Maputo, to South Africa became not only a family decision, but a community culture, as young men felt the need to prove their manhood (and earn the money for *lobola*) by crossing to South Africa in search of jobs (Webster, 1977).

It is important to point out that the ‘push and pull’ factors, contrary to neo-classical theories, are not exclusively influenced by structural factors. There are people whose decision to migrate is primarily informed by economic reasons and others are primarily non-economic (Martin, 2002:5). When an individual is contracted to go and work abroad, independently of whether he/she was previously employed or not, for instance, this is an economically motivated migration and is considered to be a demand-pull type of migration (Martin, 2002:5). The historical presence of Mozambican workers in South

Africa is an authentic example of the pull factors, because most of them came to South Africa as contracted plantation or mine workers (Newitt 1995; Ferreira, 1963).

The demand-pull type of migration is not only economically motivated. As I mentioned earlier, there are factors other than economic ones that ‘pull’ people to a certain country. “One of the most important non-economic motivations for crossing national borders is family unification – a father working abroad wants to have his wife and children join him. In such cases, the anchor immigrant is a demand-pull factor for family chain migration” (Martin, 2002:7).

By way of contrast, unemployment of different kinds, ecological changes, which reduce productive potential, or civil war and political instability that threaten their lives, may compel people to move away from their place of origin. According to Martin, (2002:5) this type of migration is economically motivated and at the same time is supply-push migration because it comes as a result of shortage of sustaining means, such as jobs or land for agricultural activities. In the case of Mozambique in the late twentieth century, civil war, the subsequent collapse of the economy and the resultant unemployment can be regarded as pivotal to the presence of many people of Mozambican origin and citizenship in South Africa. Given the geographical proximity of South Africa and Mozambique, many Mozambicans found it easy to seek economic or political refuge in South Africa during the civil war (Steinberg 2005).

The following table, adapted from Martin (2002:6) is a summary of factors that compel an individual to migrate. Cross border movements may be influenced by two or three factors as shown in the table.

**Table 2.1 Determinants of Migration:  
Factors encouraging an individual to Migrate**

Type of migrant	Demand-pull	Supply-push	Network/other
Economic	Labour recruitment, e.g. guest workers; or transnational traders	Unemployment or underemployment, low wages e.g., farmers' crops fail; or ecological disaster occurs.	Job and wage information flows; e.g., sons following fathers
Noneconomic	Family unification; e.g. family member joins spouse	Escape from war or persecution e.g., displaced persons, refugees or asylum seekers	Communications; transport; assistance organizations; desire Search for new experience or adventure;

The intensity of migration is deemed to vary from time to time because the push and pull factors are constantly changing. This permutation not only affects the emigration numbers but also the age and gender groups (Crush, 2003).

As a result of the changes in the nature of migration and economic, social or political factors, in recent years the world has witnessed the increasing involvement of women in migration. "In the past, most labour migrations and many refugee movements were male dominated, and women were often dealt with under the category of family reunion" (Castles & Miller, 1998:9). In the context of cross-border movement of Mozambicans to South Africa, the current migration patterns present a new paradigm. In contrast with past cross border movements, which were male-dominated, today more Mozambican women enter South Africa (Crush, 2003).

The preceding paragraph shows how factors which prompt people to migrate are diverse and are changing constantly. The increase or scarcity of economic resources in the country of origin, change in demographic composition, the level of access to information about a country and the accessibility of transport are major factors that influence changes in migration patterns (Taylor, 1994; Hatton et al: 1994:9). Nevertheless, one aspect of the demand-pull and supply-push is that these factors are strong in the short run and weaker in the long-run. In the long-run “as the migration streams mature” social and economic networks become the strongest factors that explain the movement of people across national frontiers (Martin, 2002:7). It is for this reason that now attention is turned to the network theory.

## 2.8 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL NETWORKS

Economic and social networks created by migrants constitute factors which inform migration patterns. Through these networks the decision to migrate, is for the most part, though not exclusively, based. The reason for this is that economic and social networks constitute a central element of relations among migrant communities in the host countries. In terms of the arguments of Barnes and Lomnitz, Mozambicans living and working in Durban are likely to have networks which they use as means of social, economic, political or emotional support as they attempt to achieve integration into the South African economy. Barnes (in Lomnitz, 1977:131) has defined social network as “a field of relationships between individuals.” Lomnitz defines (1977:132) social networks as “the flow of reciprocal exchange of goods, services, and economically valuable information.”

It is from this stance that it is put forward that “migrant networks are sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community origins” (Massey et al, 1998:42). The argument would seem to indicate that Mozambicans living and working in Durban would more likely be prompted to explore elements of social capital, such as language, nationality, tribal lineage and others, as tools that can facilitate their economic

and social integration. The activation of economic and social networks by the migrants is, therefore, conceived as a way of overcoming or solving certain problems that may hinder their progress in a foreign land. According to Castles & Miller (1998:26) migrants employ networks as an indispensable element “of settlement and community formation in the immigration area.” The effective explorations of economic and social networks are prevalent when migrants devise economic and social strategies as the basis of their interaction, which often occurs within the frame of social capital.

As a result it can be argued that the directions taken by people to a certain country are rarely accidental movements, but a reflex of the information or activated networks that will assist them in the process of integration. As Massey et al, (1998:42) pointed out, “networks make international migration extremely attractive as a strategy for risk diversification or utility maximization.” This argument seeks to point out, in the context of the present research, that the subjects of this study are more likely to obtain information or any kind of assistance that helps them ‘for risk diversification or utility maximization.’ In some cases, according to Castles & Miller, (1998:26) “migrant groups develop their own social and economic infrastructures: places of worship, associations, shops, cafés, professionals like lawyers and doctors and other services” which can serve the migrant community, particularly when these kind of resources are unattainable outside the migration networks.

The migrants who are socially and economically integrated are obliged to help the new comers integrate and by doing so they give relevance to this social capital. So “when migrant networks are well developed, they put a destination job within easy reach of most community members and make emigration a reliable and secure source of income” (Massey et al, 1998:43).

It is important to note that networks created by migrants, are constructed outside the formal state apparatus and for this reason these networks are coined informal networks. However, the construction of informal networks plays a significant role in the life of migrant people because “informal networks bind ‘migrants and nonmigrants together in a

complex web of social roles and interpersonal relationships” ( Boyd, 1989:639; cited by Castles & Miller ;1998:25).

These bonds are double sided: they link migrants with non-migrants in their areas of origin, but also connect settlers with the receiving populations in relationships of cooperation, competition and conflict. Such networks are dynamic cultural responses, which encourage ethnic community formation and are conducive to the maintenance of transnational family and group ties (Castles & Miller; 1998:25).

Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992:119 in Massey et al: 1998:42) view these entire links, which may “include personal relationships, family and household patterns, friendships and community ties, and mutual help in economic and social matters” (Bourdieu et al, 1992:119; in Castles, 1998:25). They have defined social capital as “the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.” As can be seen, the nature of social networks rests, fundamentally on the construction of common values or interests from which they can operate.

Social capital therefore becomes a vital resource, particularly that “people gain access to social capital through membership in networks and social institutions and convert into other forms of capital to improve or maintain their position in society” (Bourdieu 1986; Coleman 1990, in Massey et al: 1998:42). The fact that social capital is created outside the state guided policy makes it possible for people of different backgrounds to explore it for their various economic and social needs. The discussion of economic and social networks seeks to illuminate the reader on alternative means that migrants, particularly the subject of this research, may use as an alternative way of economic and social integration which is not pioneered by the state. Furthermore, given the history of cross border movements between South Africa and Mozambique, which have been dominated by both legal and illegal migration to South Africa, the economic and social networks can

be rendered as extremely important in the process of economic and social migration, particularly for those Mozambicans who live and work in Durban illegally.

## 2.9. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION

The debate on social and economic integration is a complex one and requires careful scrutiny. The word integration is defined as “the act of combining or adding different parts to make a unified whole” (*Collins English Dictionary*, 1994). In relation to the study of economic and social integration this definition would seem to indicate that economic and social integration has to aim at eradicating divisive elements and creating unifying mechanisms which will make individuals of different economies and social backgrounds part of a single unified economic and social life. The economic and social integration of people who move from one country to another are elements which can hardly be separated. While a prime requirement for economic integration may be the insertion of the individual concerned into the host country’s labour market, social integration may require an acceptance and assimilation of the individual by the people and the culture in the host country.

Yet the possibility of migrants wishing to have one kind of integration, e.g. economic, and not another cannot be ruled out. De Vletter’s (1998:24) study on Mozambican mine workers in South Africa concluded that “only 4% of the respondents said they had other wives or dependents in South Africa.” These findings can be used as an argument to suggest that though economic and social integration are often studied together, in some cases they can be considered as separate variables. It can be argued, therefore, that given the fact that the most common reasons that compel Mozambicans to come to South Africa are economic, migrants may prioritise economic integration rather than social integration. On the contrary, throughout the history of the presence of Mozambicans in South Africa, the proximity of the two countries, and the degree to which they share a common culture, the possibility of social integration seems to be present.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to give a final answer to the question of the desirability, or even the possibility of migrants achieving economic and social integration, because it will depend on “what people regard as the necessities of good life” (Bohnke, 2004:12). Individual needs differ from person to person: people regard different things as indispensable. Though perceptions of the ‘good life’ differ from one society, or one individual to another, there is a general understanding of what is, rather than what ought to be social integration. Hamilton (2003:23) refers to these elements as vital needs. Bohnke (2004) while studying the perceptions of social integration and exclusion in European Union established the general and agreed norms of social integration. According to Allardt (1993, in Bohnke, 2004:13) there are three main elements to be considered as necessary for social integration, namely having, loving and being.

The first element – ‘having’ – entails access to resources and acceptable living conditions which are preconditioned by employment and income for their attainment. As has already been pointed out in this chapter, a significant number of Mozambicans come to South Africa in search of economic resources, and the element of ‘having’ would be one which most of them would embrace. The second element - ‘loving,’ – has to do with the ability to create networks which will constitute the basis for social and emotional support.. This second element is complementary to the argument which I have already advanced concerning economic and social networks. Its relevance for this research is that it suggests that migrants are likely to group themselves in groups related to kinship, family, nationality, religion or any form of social capital to which the element of ‘loving’ can be applied.

Finally the third element is ‘being.’ It has to do with the recognition that a person in a given society is given as an active participant in social life. A failure to recognize the role that people play in society may result in them feeling excluded from that society. The third element of social and economic integration does not only refer to migrants only, but also to the authorities and the people of the host country. It can be asked, for instance, whether Mozambican migrants feel recognized, and to what extent the local communities have accepted the presence and involvement of Mozambicans in activities.



The elements of social integration (having, loving and being) are unattainable without economic elements which are resources, such as jobs, accommodation and good education (Bohnke, 2004:13). This may represent a challenge for Mozambicans in Durban seeking economic and social integration, since those who migrated to South Africa, have come historically from rural communities and lack relevant skills and education in the urban context. As Martin (1999:8) has shown when discussing the economic integration of new immigrants entering the European labour market, the challenges they face are lack of relevant skills as a result of low education and the inability to communicate in the host language, which reduces their chances of integration into the labour market.

This argument complements Balassa's view of the definition of economic integration. Balassa (1961:1) defines economic integration as both a process and a state of affairs: "regarded as a process it encompasses measures designed to abolish discrimination between economic units belonging to different national states; viewed as a state of affairs, it can be represented by the absence of various forms of discrimination between national economies." Balassa's definition focuses on a macro or inter-state integration but can be used comprehensively to explain the trends of economic and social integration on the micro level. The fact that integration entails combining different parts into a whole and eliminating discrimination suggests that this definition offers a suitable framework from which economic and social integration can be studied.

It is essential, therefore, to understand the dynamics of economic and social integration and explain all the forms it takes. Economic and social integration, as the term 'integration' seems to suggest, can be understood as the assimilation of a minority group, such as Mozambicans in Durban, into the large one. Their acceptance should be measured in terms of their participation in economic, social and political activities. Unemployment, lack of adequate housing, lack of family support and networks can be translated as forms of exclusion. Exclusion is not always deliberate but the social and

economic structures may gradually occur to people, even when they are local, from participation.

It can be argued that individuals, even with relevant skills and the ability to communicate in a host country's language, may be excluded from the process of economic integration if they are not socially integrated. As Crush (2001:11) sought to explain in a South African case, the growing intolerance of individuals of foreign citizenship (xenophobia), accused of causing unemployment and perpetrating 'violent crime,' is an example of the factors that can hinder the process of both economic and social integration. This is particularly the case when xenophobia results in violent attacks on foreigners and their property (Reitzes 2004:349).

Besides the social challenges which may obstruct economic and social integration, the degree of participation by migrant people is also determined by their level of skills. It is difficult to integrate economically people of foreign origin who have no adequate skills, even though they may have been accepted by people of the host nation. However, this argument is contested by many writers on the grounds that migrant workers have, in some sectors of the economies of the host countries, become the preferred supply of labour, irrespective of whether they have relevant skills or not, primarily because they accept lower wages (Martin, 1998; Crush, 2001, Reitzes, 2004, Castells and Portes, 1989). Another argument that can be taken into account is related to social labeling and stigmatization. According to Massey et al (1998:48) "within receiving societies, once immigrants have been recruited into a particular occupation in significant numbers, those jobs become culturally labeled as 'immigrant jobs' and native workers are reluctant to fill them, reinforcing the structural demand for migrant workers." In such cases, this would mean that foreign workers will tend to be grouped in areas where specific jobs or commercial opportunities are available to them. Thus the process of economic and social integration becomes easier as jobs and co-workers who share a common culture and aspirations are readily available to the newcomers.

As it stands, integration is a multifaceted process which, for its attainment should take into account the participation of various stakeholders, which may include the state, civil society and individual action, because cross-border migration needs clear guidelines. According to Reitzes (2004:345) “migration becomes a challenge of political management for the range of stakeholders, including migrants, their countries of origin and destination; citizens of the host countries; and other sectors such as business, organized labour and NGOs.” I intend to show that the state remains the primary role player in the migratory processes.

#### 2.10. THE STATE AND THE TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATORY PROCESSES

The movement of people from one place to another, as already indicated, is not new. Nevertheless migration gained new shape with the formation of the nation-state which established territorial boundaries and authority over its space. In the early twentieth century, the territorial control of the state caused it to introduce passports and visas as controlling mechanisms for those who enter and exit a country (Martin, 2002:5). The control exercised by these limits on migration served as a “restriction of movement across national borders” (Martin, 2002:5).

Though it would be an arduous task to state exactly the number of people globally who are regarded as migrants, according to the UN development population data (in Martin 2002:3) “in 2000 there were about 185 million international migrants – persons outside their country of birth or citizenship for 12 months or more.” Since the motives for migration differ widely every circumstance which produces migration would need to be treated separately. In the case of Mozambicans who were displaced or forced to emigrate by war and economic difficulties, many who were in South Africa have since returned to their country of origin (Steinberg: 2005). However, because of trans-frontier permeability and the end of the racial restrictions which accompanied apartheid, many Mozambicans, motivated mainly by economic ambition, constitute part of the 185 million people who live away from their countries of birth or of citizenship.

Durban, in the sense of the greater Durban area now known as Ethekewini, is one major receiving area for Mozambican immigrants. My study, therefore, will focus on people and conditions in this area.

Since the establishment of nations, the state has played a significant political and social role, through its institutional arrangements and sovereign authority. According to Hamilton (2003:135) “the state is the only institutional structure that has the potential to achieve legitimately the goals of evaluating needs and transforming roles and institutions.” Seaton-Watson (1977:1; quoted in Castles & Miller. 1998:40) argues that “the state regulates political, economic and social relations in a bounded territory.” Thus the state has the capacity to mobilize resources and implement policies that may lead to integration or exclusion of non-citizens in any country because, according to Weissbrodt (1984:296) “there is no corresponding right to enter any country of which the individual is not a citizen.” The number of nation-states has continued to grow, from 43 in 1900 to 190 UN-recognized nation-states in 2000. All these states have a “system of passports to distinguish citizens from foreigners, border controls to inspect persons who want to enter and policies that affect the settlement and integration of non-citizens” (Martin, 2002:5). This suggests that the state has the autonomy as a sovereign entity, to enact laws which may regulate migratory processes (Weissbrodt, 1984:296).

Measures which seek to discourage or encourage emigration remain an internal affair of each individual country. For example, in France, as MacGaffey and Ganga, (2000:37) sought to illustrate, in order to reduce the number of illegal immigrants, the government introduced the ‘Loi Pasqua’ which restricted access to French nationality. Furthermore, the French government did not give social security benefits to illegal immigrants, but reserved this right restrictively to people with permanent residence or French citizenship.

In the Sub-Saharan region the influence of the state on migration is exemplified by the policies adopted by South Africa and its neighbouring countries. When extra labour was needed to supply the demand for labour in the mining industry, South Africa and the

peripheral states agreed on terms and conditions which regulated the labour flow into the country (Breytenbach, 1979; Newitt 1995; Katzenellenbogen 1982).

The acquisition of citizenship by migrant workers could be one of the means toward economic and social integration. It is the task of a state to grant and remove citizenship whenever it deems necessary. According to Castles & Miller (1998:42) “citizenship is the essential link between state and nation, and obtaining citizenship is of central importance for newcomers to a country.” Citizenship is important for newcomers because it is through citizenship that they are accorded rights like any other citizen (Castles & Miller, 1998:42).

Rights and duties may be attached to different levels of citizenship; and at any level the granting of citizenship will constitute a step towards integration for individuals who have entered a country where they were not citizens. Castles & Miller (1998) have distinguished four types of citizenships, which can be understood as follows: the imperial, the folk or ethnic, the republican and the multicultural models.

The imperial model of citizenship integrates “various people of multi-ethnic empires (the British, the Hungarian, the Ottoman) and is built around ideological principles. The former Soviet Union constitutes one of the more recent examples”. The folk or ethnic model entails bonding together individuals who share a common language, culture and have a common descent, and minority groups are not considered to be citizens. The other model presented by Castles & Miller (1998:43) is the republican model, based on “constitution, laws and citizenship.” The admission of foreigners as members of the state is conditional on their ability to “adhere to the political rules, and willingness to adopt the national culture.” Finally, Castles & Miller present the multicultural model. This model is similar to the republican one except that it has a room for cultural tolerance and acceptance of minority groups.

The state therefore has a huge role to play in the integration of non-citizens into the economic and social life of a country, which is attainable by employing its institutional

resources to determined goals. For example, some migrant workers may regard the attaining of citizenship as a step towards economic and social integration, and the state may either grant, refuse or revoke citizenship whenever it deems necessary. According to Castles & Miller (1998:42) “citizenship is the essential link between state and nation, and obtaining citizenship is of central importance for newcomers to a country.” Citizenship becomes important for newcomers because it is through citizenship that they are accorded rights like any other citizen (Castles & Miller, 1998:42). Many Mozambicans, particularly those who came to South Africa illegally, may see the granting of citizenship as a crucial achievement for their economic and social well-being. Economic and social integration of migrant workers is not, however, a clear cut process, which can never entirely be achieved by institutional means only, though the state remains a legitimate policymaker.

Though the state holds a monopoly in political decision making, not all its policies meet the needs of the people concerned. The legitimate decisions taken by the state do not always serve the interests of everyone, and some people may feel marginalized as a consequence. Where state power has declined or its policies have failed to meet social and economic expectations of people, people may resort to other means for survival.

Economic and social integration, therefore, can take different forms, some of which may reflect resistance to marginalization. Gema (2001:1) in his study of social and economic integration of the Ethiopian asylum-seekers in Durban concluded that Ethiopian refugees found alternative social and economic integration by being integrated into the informal networks of interaction and support among themselves. Thus informal networks have proven to be one of the forms that migrants employ in order to attain integration.

Lomnitz (1977:132), in her study of urban centres of Latin America, while discussing networks proposed that they be “defined by the flow of reciprocal exchange of goods, services and economically valuable information.” One distinctive aspect of the informal networks is that they are created within a certain circle of trust or *confianza* as Lomnitz calls it (1977:196). Access to information has been accorded particular importance in

some literature as central to networks and as a requirement for people before deciding to leave their places of origin (Hatton et al (1994:10). This view is shared by MacGaffy and Ganga (2000:16) who believe that “individuals activate linkages based on ties of kinship, ethnicity, friendship, and nationality as they need assistance and advice in establishing themselves in a new country.” These trends are further evidenced by Gema’s (2001) studies in which 65.2 percent of his respondents affirmed that they were able to obtain jobs through the assistance of friends and relatives from their home country.

The fact that the newcomers in a foreign country benefit from the assistance of long - established migrants is an indication that migrants retain links with their countries of origin. This is evidenced by Hatton et al (1994:9) when they indicated that 94.7 percent of Europeans who crossed to the United States of America in the period 1908-9 are said to have emigrated to join friends and relatives. The interaction between the people in the foreign country with individuals in the country of origin can be mutually beneficial. Informal networks create mechanisms to solve problems, and solutions are often attainable only within the network linkages.

Reciprocal exchange of this nature “is based on the principle of generosity, in contrast to market exchange, which is supposedly based on purely individualistic and rational maximization of profit”( Polinyi, quoted by Lomnitz, 1977:190). Migrant workers would tend to draw on this ‘generosity’ which gives them access to privileged economic information to establish themselves in a new country. “Reciprocity is sometimes attained through exchange of set equivalencies for the benefit of the partners who happen to be short of some kind of necessities” (Polinyi, in Lomnitz, 1977:190).

Economic integration as a process should not be defined simply in terms of employment or unemployment rates among migrant workers. Migrants may be employed and still be part of those who are not economically or socially integrated (Santos, 1979:92). Job opportunities, however, increase prospects of integration. Integration issues, however, must be considered cautiously since not every employment opportunity leads to integration. Among migrant workers, “many who want jobs cannot get them. Those who

do, get the least desirable jobs, with the least security, the least workers' compensation, and the lowest pay" (Perlman, 1976: 156).

The willingness of migrant workers to seize any job opportunity, even poorly paid or unsafe jobs (Santos, 1979:92) can be explained by various factors. According to Borja (2000:17) "at the time of entry, immigrants lack [...] specific skills that are rewarded in the labour market." Martin (1999:8) has argued that the level of education of immigrants, their skills or lack of them and their inadequate host-language ability complicates their search for employment. This is itself a difficult process and may keep them out of the labour market for too long.

Consequently, "for those who are often without work, any opportunity is seized, since 'a job is a job,'" (Ellion Liebow, in Santos, 1979:57). Given the complexity of the integration process, one factor, such as employment, is not a sufficient variable to determine integration. I believe that in order to measure the level of integration, questions such as what kind of work migrant workers do; what type of residences they have; where they live; how long they have been living and working in the country must be posed. All these questions can be used as indicative of the level of economic and social integration which in many cases has involved the informal economic sector.

#### 2.11. INFORMAL ECONOMY AND THE MIGRANTS

Another matter often drawn into the debate on economic and social integration of migrants is the informal economic sector. This sector has provided economic solutions, particularly for non-South African groups, who are excluded from active participation in the formal job market. The exclusion of non-South Africans, is decreed by state policies which give primacy to South African citizens, often to the extent of refusing work permits to non-South Africans. Illegal immigrants in particular are excluded from employment in the formal sector<sup>3</sup>. According to De Soto (1989:11) in his study of migration from rural villages of Peru to Lima, "the greatest hostility that migrants

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<sup>3</sup> Note relating to SA Immigration Law.



encountered was from the legal system. Up to then, the system was able to absorb or ignore the migrants because the small groups who came were hardly likely to upset the status quo.” Because of such exclusion from the system, migrants from elsewhere in Africa and even from the rural areas of this country devise means of resisting, and the informal economic sector has largely accommodated migrants. For this reason, “the informal economy evolves along the borders of social struggles, incorporating those too weak to defend themselves, rejecting those who become too conflictive, and propelling those with resources into surrogate entrepreneurship” (Castells et al, 1989:27).

Definitions of the informal economy often seek to explain the dynamics of the sector. The ILO PREALC has defined ‘informal economy’ as the economy which is “not directly regulated by the law of the market” (ILO PREALC, 1974a:9 in Lomnitz, 1977:130). To suggest that economic and social integration of the migrant people can be achieved through the informal sector may seem problematic because of the nature and ways in which the informal sector, in most cases, operates. Several studies like those of . MacGaffy, and Ganga, 2000; Soto, 1989; Perlman, 1976 suggest that the informal sector operates on the margin of the law and involves people who embrace it as a survival strategy, enforce a demeaning conception of the sector and make it an undesirable path towards economic and social integration. The informal sector in South Africa however has emerged as an alternative and in some cases as complementary to the formal sector of the economy. Castells et al (1989) argue that the informal economy has become an alternative means of earning a living, not only for the unskilled and marginalized or for migrants but also for those individuals in the formal sector who see it as a means of maximizing their gains.

The informal sector, therefore, has attracted people from different socio-economic and political classes who have often succeeded in rendering themselves economically viable despite the risk that the sector presents. It can be argued that “the relative success and satisfactory earnings derived from informal activities in various forms of self-employment and small family enterprises surpass[e]s, in some cases, the levels achieved by workers in the formal sector” (Fortuna and Prates, 2000:79). This suggests that apart

from the search for jobs in the formal sector which has explained much of European and American migration (Taylor, 1994; Hatton et al: 1994), the prospect of a 'productive' informal sector is one of the elements that stimulate cross border movements, particularly those of low skilled individuals because of its capacity to absorb them. This also, explains the fact that many migrants have sought 'refuge', in many cases successfully, in the informal sector of the economy.

Santos (1979:96) perceives the informal sector as the largest sector in terms of employment. The study conducted by Perlman (1976:153) on *favelados* concluded that "although more [*favelados*] are unskilled factory labourers and construction workers, most are employed in the service sector as street vendors, garbage men, bus fare collectors, doormen, watchmen, street cleaners, service station attendants, car washers, street repairmen, or janitors." Most, if not all of these jobs, may be in the informal sector.

As this description of its capacities suggests, the informal sector is flexible and includes itinerant and cross-border traders. According to research findings, Congolese and other African immigrants in France travelled to other parts of Europe to purchase goods which were later sold to other African migrants in France or sent to Africa, particularly to their home countries (MacGaffy and Ganga, 2000:82). This trade depended chiefly on the aptitude of the traders to create networks amongst themselves and with their home country (MacGaffy and Ganga 2000) and also on their ability to evade the cross-border commercial laws. Furthermore, because their trade is in breach of the laws, some traders do not have a fixed place in which they can buy and sell. They resort to itinerant trade as an alternative to a fixed commercial base. In other words "itinerant vending is carried out by people who purchase small quantities of trinkets, delicacies, or non-perishable foodstuffs and walk around the street trying to sell them to passersby"(Soto, 1989:63). These activities often collide with the law and because of this, people in the informal sector of the economy, "live within a gray area which has a long frontier with the legal world and in which individuals take refuge when the cost of obeying the law outweighs the benefits" (Soto, 1989:12). This is one of the reasons why migrants keep contact with their home villages and create networks for their present and future economic benefit.

They are however aware that their future is uncertain and that they live within a “gray area”- and tend to regard their families in their home countries as the security for the future which is not provided by informal employment.

The informal sector is nevertheless flexible and inclusive. As such, the “informal economic processes cut across the whole social structure” (Castells et al, 1989:27) and it has remained the major source of employment and income for migrants in the process of economic and social integration in a foreign economy, particularly in the developing world (Castells et al, 1989 Gema 2001) whose economies have been affected by structural reforms. This point has been discussed by Duffield (2002:1058), in his paper on the impact of economic transformation for developing countries. He emphasized the relevance of the informal economy and argued that:

The shadow economy that has developed in response to adjustments now constitutes the major part of the economy over much of the South. Extra legal trans-border trade represents a lifeline and, as such, a normal way of life for many people. It draws upon and adapts resources and networks based on locality, kinship, ethnicity, religion or creed. In turn these networks inscribe their own forms of legitimacy and regulatory codes upon shadow economies.

Cross border movements, therefore, will continue to exist and as the people involved will continue to adapt to new economic, social and political realities. The informal sector can be regarded as one of the elements that inform the migration processes. It can be argued that there are migrants who cross the borders with the main objective of engaging in the informal sector in the host country. Furthermore, the informal sector, apart from being vital for the integration of migrant people, has the potential to integrate economies, at least in part, the societies of different countries. According to Duffield (2002:1056) “the growth of non-territorial shadow economies has involved the emergence of innovative extra-legal local and global networks linking local resources and international markets.” The fact that this sector does not provide exclusively for people of low skills and those at

the margin makes it as competitive as the formal labour market. Yet the most interesting thing about the sector is that it is open to everyone who has labour or a skill to sell, and provides an alternative means of earning a living to many people. For migrants who are struggling towards economic and social integration, this sector may provide a solution, particularly if integration is sought outside the normal state structures.

The informal sector offers enormous economic opportunities that Mozambicans in Durban may explore. The fact that the sector does not require formal qualifications and involves people of all social and economic backgrounds renders it for the most part the sector through which Mozambicans in Durban may seek economic and social integration.

#### 2.12 SOUTHERN AFRICA MIGRATORY MOVEMENTS

Migratory movement within the southern African region dates back to the pre-colonial period, though it increased in scale under colonial administrations and even continued after decolonization of the continent. According to Breytenbach (1979:1) migration in southern Africa has three distinctive socio-economic and political phases, namely the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods. The mineral discoveries in South Africa played a significant role in stimulating the movements of people in the region (Adepoju, 1988). The discovery of gold and diamonds from the mid-nineteenth century speeded up migration in the southern African subcontinent, especially between what are now the SADC countries and South Africa.

The pre-colonial period will not be discussed in this study because it is unrelated to the modern economic activities that influence present-day migration processes. Some of the movements of people in the pre-colonial phase were associated with slavery and tribal warfare (Breytenbach, 1979:1).

The genesis of migration in the colonial phase was linked to the transformation by the colonial powers, or their failure to transform, the socio-political and economic structures of the whole region. The economic and political structures introduced into African

indigenous communities and the national units constructed by colonial powers may serve as explanations of the nature of recent, and even current migration movements. The introduction of wage labour is one aspect that dictated the movements of people within their territorial boundaries or beyond them. It can be argued therefore that the introduction of wage labour and other economic arrangements like hut and poll taxes, which forced people to work in the money economy, implied that subsistence farming which previously dominated in the indigenous communities of the region, was no longer adequate. Lobola was increasingly demanded in money, and these pressures were exacerbated, in some parts of the region, such as Zimbabwe, and South Africa, by processes of land dispossession or displacement of the indigenous people from fertile agricultural land by settlers (Moyo, 2000). In addition, ecological disasters like poor soil, rinderpest and drought from time to time made agricultural activities less productive. Portuguese labour legislation was also factors that motivated young men to migrate (Webster, 1977).

The prevailing economic situation forced the indigenous communities to sell their agricultural surplus and labour in order to earn cash (Arrighi: 1969: 181). However, in situations like those described above, the sale of agricultural surplus offered limited profits.

These phenomena affected the rural economy mainly, not only due to the fact that agricultural activities were less adequate to support families, but because many men in southern Africa left family farms to engage in wage labour (Reitzes, 2004). Wage labour had become the only alternative through which cash could be earned. Some of those whose land had been confiscated “were generally allowed to remain on their ancestral lands upon payments of rents or commitment to supply labour services” (Arrighi, 1969: 195). The situation in southern Mozambique was not identical to that envisaged by Arrighi, since settler agriculture there, was not particularly aggressive, but the pressure to earn wages was still strong.

It can be argued that the colonial power brought into the sub-continent a structure of laws which forced the African communities into paid labour. The formal economy grew and the demand for paid labour grew with it. The supply of labourers spontaneously offering themselves had to be transformed into a compulsory supply of workers, forced by economic circumstances to offer their services, since the demand for cheap indigenous labour force was growing (Breytenbach, 1979:1). As time passed communities in the region had become sufficiently aware of the new economic structures, and the need for paid work had become so common that people were even prepared to leave their places of origin and migrate to distant destinations in search of employment (See Webster, 1977: 257). Gould (1974:6; cited by Breytenbach, 1979:1) argues that “population movements that originated during the colonial period were dominated by the economic motives of workers living in less-favoured regions or areas remote from the main foci, and their desire to become part of the core areas of the twentieth century and economic opportunity.”

While the tempo of migration was gradually increasing, the new capitalism created an economic system which distinguished between rural or ‘undeveloped’ and urban or ‘developed’ economies. The colonial economic system created a dual economy which while integrating Africans into the European economic system kept the economies of the rural (peripheries) areas undeveloped and dependent (Breytenbach, 1979:1).

The situation in Mozambique as regards migrancy differed from that in South Africa, with which Breytenbach is primarily concerned. No large-scale source of employment, on the scale of the South African mines or on any scale comparable, was ever established there, and for most young male Mozambicans, wage labour and migrancy had to be synonymous (Harries, 1994).

Mineral discovery in South Africa did not only accelerate the pace of migration movements in the region but also brought about the consolidation of inter-state labour agreements between the South African government and peripheral states. In fact, “Southern Africa is the first region in Africa where early development in inter-territorial

labour arrangements and agreements took place in the colonial times” (Breytenbach, 1979:3). State involvement in the regulation of the migrant labour had a huge economic impact on the economy of all the countries concerned. As Adepoju (1988:46) pointed out, “the economic development of countries in the southern African sub-region – Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, [Mozambique] and Swaziland – has been intricately interwoven with the movement of people across national boundaries, whether as colonialists, refugees or migrant workers.” Wilson (1976:1) is also a proponent of this view, and points out that “the movement of people to, from, or within the sub-continent whether as colonists, slaves, refugees, indentured labourers, immigrants, or oscillating migrants is one of the most arresting features of our history.” Thus cross border movements in the region became systematized and most people in sub-Saharan Africa came to understand migration as being travel over extensive distances that stand between the work places and the homes of the people involved. As Wilson (1976:2) pointed out “in the context of southern Africa the term ‘migrant’ tends to be defined as meaning a worker who oscillates between his home and his place of work over a distance which is greater than can be traveled on a daily commuting basis.”

The migration of either legally recruited or illegal workers in the South African economy, apart from creating inevitable economic links with the sending country, formed strong social and cultural bonds which can justify inter-territorial migration in a post-colonial phase. This is shown by the fact that a significant number of people in the region have experience of labour migration to South Africa.

In the case of Lesotho, for example, 81 percent of the adult population has been to South Africa. As many as 83 percent have parents and 51 percent have grandparents who have worked in South Africa. The equivalent figures for Mozambique are 29 percent, 53 percent, and 32 percent, while for Zimbabwe the corresponding figures are 23 percent, 24 percent, and 23 percent. (Crush, 2003)

As a result, the sending countries in the region are interdependent in both social and economic matters, with South Africa. According to Crush et al (2001:15) in instances like Lesotho where at a certain point more than 30 % of its GDP was sourced from the income earned in South African economy, it becomes virtually impossible for the sending country to withdraw its labour force from the foreign economy. This is illustrated by the fact that 41 % of Basotho households had remittances as their main source of income (Crush, et al, 2001:15). It is likely therefore that migration of Basotho who have created this 'interdependence' will continue to exist, either legal or illegally even in the post-colonial era.

Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, South Africa and the former Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) are the countries which had massive migratory movements during the colonial era. Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were the receiving countries. South Africa played the most important role in the process of labour migration in the region. It accommodated a high number of migrant workers. These countries, however, were regarded as the economic heartlands of the region, while the rest of the countries supplied part of the labour force and were labeled as the sending countries (Wilson, 1976:3).

Two reasons explain the participation of migrant workers in the mining industry in South Africa. The most obvious was the shortage of labour supply in the mines, as the local labour force could not satisfy the labour requirements of the industry. The second concerns the cost of production and the profitability of the minerals. The mining industries incurred high costs in capital investment and the price of capital (for the most part from Europe) was beyond their control. As a result, labour as a factor of production was the only one which could be controlled, manipulated and exploited. The mining industries achieved their objectives through close co-operation with recruiting agencies. One of the methods employed by the recruiting agencies was to prescribe the terms and conditions of the contracts of the mine workers, which in case of foreign workers implied that they could not be part of any labour union. These agreements were reached with the governments of their home countries, whose negotiating position, because of their need



for income, was weak. Understandably, the National Union of Mines (NUM) argued that labour “sub-contracting is a deliberate tactic to cut production cost and undermine organized workers” (Crush et al, 2001: 29). This was early evidence of resentment against migrant workers on the grounds that they undercut wages offered to indigenous workers.

The flow of migrant workers to South Africa from sub-Saharan countries has continued even after the colonial period. The U.S. Committee for Refugees (1988:19- 20) made the following statement: “Despite its opposition to white-minority rule in Africa, the Frelimo government, since independence, has maintained the profitable migrant labour arrangement originally established with South Africa by the Portuguese colonial authority and migratory flows to South Africa have thus continued virtually uninterrupted for more than a century”. To attribute the current migration process to the colonial labour agreements alone, would be inaccurate: other factors, like war, ecological disasters, and globalization have created new justifications for both legal and illegal cross border movements. Late twentieth and twenty-first patterns of migration, unlike those of the past, show a strong female presence (Reitzes, 2004:355), a phenomenon which will be dealt with in detail in Chapter 4.

### 2.13. CONCLUSION

The foregoing chapter has discussed international migration from both theoretical and practical perspectives. The theoretical arguments are intended to help in the understanding of the migration processes and to lay a foundation for a comprehensive analysis of the broader contextual questions on economic and social integration of Mozambicans living and working in Durban. The practical discussion of international migration will allow for understanding of the patterns of cross border movements.

This chapter also establishes that types of international migration will vary from time to time and from place to place. The causes of migration influence the decisions of migrants as to their movements and the subsequent impact that outflows or influxes of migrants

have on sending or receiving countries. “Temporary and irregular labour migrations have become the most significant recent type of international migration” (Reitzes, 2004:347). This may be a result of global economic integration and increasing mobility of people, made possible by the rapid flow of information and the attempt by governments to integrate economies, as well as by the fact that borders, despite attempts to secure them, remain permeable.

This study will establish the pertinent aspects all these conditions as they affect Mozambicans seeking to cross the border into South Africa, and in particular to Durban.

## CHAPTER III

### 3. MOZAMBICAN LABOUR MIGRATION TO SOUTH AFRICA

#### 3.1. INTRODUCTION

Ever since the nineteenth century mineral discoveries in South Africa, the Mozambican economy has been entangled with that of South Africa. This was particularly true of the three southern provinces of Mozambique, Inhambane, Gaza and Maputo, which were regarded, both by the colonial regime in Mozambique as well as that of South Africa, as reservoirs of labour (Mamdani, 1996). The migrancy of contract labour from these provinces to the mines of South Africa from the 19<sup>th</sup> century on replaced early tribal movements and traditional migration from Mozambique to South Africa, in the process redefining relations between the two countries.

As was noted at the end of the previous chapter, the flow of Mozambicans to South Africa as migrant labour continued after the country's independence in 1975. The formal and legal process of migration, usually to the mines, as the needs of the mining companies and therefore the recruitment of miners lessened, has been to an extent replaced by illegal border crossings. These trends were speeded up by the social and economic disruptions related to the civil war (Steinberg: 2005).

In this chapter I shall supply the historical context of the migration processes of Mozambicans to South Africa.

#### 3.2. MOZAMBIQUE: LABOUR MIGRATION TO SOUTH AFRICA

Before the Durban convention of 1908 which was designed to ensure the implementation of the South Africa Act, South Africa did not have *de jure* existence. According to Rosa and Trigo (1986:49) the unification of the two British colonies, the Cape and Natal, with the two Boer Republics, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, two years after the convention, marked the birth of the Union of South Africa. The presence of southern

Mozambicans, however, residing and working in what is now known as South Africa, is an historical fact that can be traced back to the 1850s.

According to Newitt (1995:482) “the Tsonga of Delagoa Bay and its hinterland had always interacted with the highveldt communities with whom there were strong ties of culture and kinship.” In Harries’s view (1994:19), undocumented accounts of labour migration from Mozambique to South Africa suggest that the death of the Gaza King Soshangane (1858) and the reign of the chief of Maputo Nozingile marked the beginning of labour migration to South Africa. This interaction was increased by elephant hunting and ivory trading which stimulated the movement of peoples along the traditional trade routes as early as the 1850s (Newitt 1995:483).

The colonial occupation and subsequent demarcation of Africa defined territorial frontiers which at times intersected with the traditional trade routes. Slave trading and labour migration rendered these boundaries permeable by Mozambicans moving to places like Seychelles, Reunion and Mauritius, Madagascar, Natal and later on, Kimberly (Duffy: 1967:141). As indicated by Harries (1994:25) the “*prazo* slaves, taken from Quelimane hinterland, as well as indentured former slaves at Inhambane and Lourenço Marques (Maputo), called *libertos* (freed), were sent to Durban in 1878.” This is evidence that Mozambican migrant workers in South Africa came from different parts of Mozambique.

The southern districts (now provinces) Inhambane, Gaza and Lourenço Marques, were traditionally the sources of migrant labourers. According to First (1983:140), “southern Mozambique was turned into a service economy for South Africa and later and less importantly for Rhodesia.” Before the discovery and exploration of the diamond and gold mines in the Transvaal, agriculture dominated the economy. From the mid-nineteenth century, Natal was attempting to establish sugar cane farming and after 1862 it became a successful economic venture. The sugar industry in Natal was acutely short of labour which could not be adequately supplied by the local population (Newitt 1995:483).

According to Newitt (1995:483) the British colonial administration used freed slaves as wage labourers and in 1860 the planters started to import indentured Indian workers. Despite all this effort Natal could not recruit sufficient labourers to work in the sugar plantations because of their scarcity and the cost of their labour. The shortage of labour in the sugar cane fields motivated the planters to “redouble their demand for the government to force the black peasantry into the labour market” (Harries, 1994: 20).

Many Mozambicans left their homes to work in the agricultural sector in Natal following different inter-governmental agreements (Harries, 1994). The long distance that separated Mozambican migrants from their homes rendered them a more stable workforce, more willing to undertake extended contracts than the Zulu population, whose homes, with their attendant obligations, were closer at hand. As Harries writes:

Africans [Amatonga] coming from beyond the borders of the colony were geographically separated from their means of production and consequently were in the structural position of (temporary) proletariat or bachelors without families to support. This meant that, unlike the local blacks, their response to the pull of the labour market was not conditioned by the need to work their own land or by family responsibilities, and they were prepared to work for long periods from eighteen to twenty-four months. (1994:22)

In Covana’s words, (cited by Newitt, 1995:483) plantation owners soon realized that southern Mozambique was a fruitful area for the recruitment of workers.

Despite the fact that Amatonga were now working in sugar plantations, they were insufficient to satisfy the labour demand. The discovery of the diamond fields in Griqualand at the end of the 1860s increased the demand for labour in the Natal sugar cane plantations, since Pedi and Sotho migrant workers preferred to work for better pay on the diamond fields (Harries, 1994:19). Mineral discoveries brought, not only for Pedi and Sotho workers, but also for Mozambicans, new working opportunities and

competition for labour between the Natal plantations and the mineral industries and other economic sectors.

In order to coordinate the supply of labour, a Labour League was created by two hundred Natal planters in 1871. The League was probably created as a result of labour disputes between the British colony of Natal and Lourenço Marques which culminated in a temporary halt in the flow of workers to Natal, pending negotiations (Harries, 1994:20). The governments eventually reached an agreement which paved the way for recruitment of new labour. As a result, more than 1000 men were shipped from Delagoa Bay to Natal between October 1871 and September 1873 (Harries, 1994:21).

Besides the recruitment of Mozambicans, usually designated by chiefs and supplied to agents to work in the South African economic sector, taxes imposed by the Portuguese colonial regime (hut tax, poll tax and other, local taxes) drove others voluntarily to seek wage labour. According to Duffy (1967:155) “given the labour laws in the province, there was a greater disposition among African men to work voluntarily for higher wages on the Rand than to be coerced into a job with little or no pay at home.” The readiness of southern Mozambicans to migrate was further stimulated by what may be called a culture of migration, especially selective of young adult men wishing to marry and establish families.

The only available alternatives were to work in Mozambique in the urban areas or in South Africa (Webster, 1977). The economic and political structures built by colonial regimes and to some degree by indigenous leaders altered social practices. The practice of *lobola* in southern Mozambique can be taken as an example of these changes: *lobola* gradually became payable in money and moved away from the traditional practice of paying in cattle.

Paid jobs for unmarried young men became essential for those who wished to establish their own families. Webster claims that “over the years, migration has been rationalized by Tsonga-Chopi people to the extent that it is expected of all men to work in the mines”

(1977:257). The experience of going to the mines could be compared to male initiation rites, to the extent that no woman would marry a man who had never been in the mine. In order to be accepted, besides earning money for *lobola*, young men needed to prove themselves and convince the women of their manhood by going to the mines (Webster, 1977: 257). The impact of this unidirectional labour migration was felt in many productive sectors in Mozambique.

The exodus of able bodied men to the mines had consequences for the agricultural sector. Their absence was crucial, because agriculture was “the most viable alternative to migrancy” (Webster, 1977:263) in a country where most families lived on subsistence farming. (Webster, 1977; Newitt, 1995). Despite the emphasis on agriculture in the rural economy, there has been a serious shortage of young male labour. The neglect of this sector by the colonial authorities is patent: there was little infrastructure or investment in education, which might have made the sector more productive and sustainable (Webster, 1977:263).

Lack of adequate investment in infrastructure and education that could have eventually improved the agricultural sector has inevitably led to declining productivity of the soils. “The ecological conditions of poor soil and bad agricultural practices meant that the countryside cannot support large homesteads and dense population” (Webster, 1977:258). Furthermore, as young men left their rural homes in search for work elsewhere, a huge burden was placed on the women who had to look after their families. Yet the fact that women were, to an extent, able to fend for themselves through growing crops, influenced the decision taken by men to migrate in search for wage labour elsewhere (Webster, 1977:262).

The propensity for men to migrate is reinforced by the fact that in the rural areas of Mozambique almost every family has access to land on which it can depend for survival. This has led Webster to conclude that “access to land is the most important feature of social security and further encourages men to migrate” (1977:263) because even in the absence of men, rural women farm the land to sustain their households.

The migration of young men from the southern provinces of Mozambique to South African mines is also associated with social prestige and serves as an alternative means of survival. Webster (1977) Harries (1994) and Newitt (1995) indicate that working in the mine gave social status to an individual and helped young men to create their own wealth.

Migration, therefore, though it may be a short-term solution to declining agricultural production, perpetuates at the same time a lack of development in the sector. The shortage of manpower which could be employed in agriculture locally, the altered social practices and the need to earn money have created the need to migrate. According to Webster:

Migrant labour, therefore, reproduces itself; the absence of potentially progressive young[men] and the accompanying decline in agricultural productivity means that economic self-sufficiency slips further away, ensuring the necessity of further migration trips. Migrancy then contributes in no small measure to the ossification of existing (tribal) structures in Mozambique and impedes social, economic and political change. (1977:258)

There is no single, undisputed explanation of the causes of migration to South Africa. This is demonstrated by Newitt's argument that "workers were attracted by the easy availability of firearms in Kimberly, and many chiefs deliberately dispatched parties of young men to the mines so that they could buy guns" (1995:483)

Economic benefits that the migrants derived from their work at the South African mines and other sectors, did not only benefit the immediate families of the migrants, but also the authorities, who expected to receive gifts from the migrants. According to Covane (2001:98) migrant workers upon their return from the mines, adopted non-official forms of payment: \$100 (Portuguese escudo) was given to the chiefs, who also received voluntary gifts of washing soap, towels and blankets.



Covana (2001:100) also claims that besides the voluntary gifts that the chiefs expected from the returning workers, they received from the recruiting agents an amount of £1 for each recruited worker. The chiefs, therefore, preferred to see their men emigrate rather than having to work in Mozambique at a lower pay or at no pay at all. Indigenous chiefs and other individuals who participated in the recruiting process benefited considerably from the migrant workers and the rural communities. "These exactions, in effect, creamed off much of the surplus produced by the peasant communities" (Newitt, 1995:483).

It can therefore be said that "changes in economic structures – as among the Tsonga after [...] 1965, forced labour laws, restrictions on land use which made independent peasant production virtually impossible, as the more common hut tax- *imposto de palhota*- all contributed to the necessity to earn money" (Katzenellenbogen,1982:39). The southern Mozambicans, as I have already pointed out, saw South Africa as preferable to any other place where paid jobs could be obtained. "While this drained Mozambique of labour, it provided the government with a durable source of income" (Harries, 1994:170).

The table below is an illustration of revenues derived from the hut tax between 1897 and 1908.

**Table 3.1: Hut Tax from Southern Mozambique in Portuguese Escudos**

Year	Inhambane District	Gaza District	Lourenço Marques District	Total
1897-1898	34 290\$	29 147\$	292 106\$	360 543\$
1898-1899	38 526\$	77 674\$	278 193\$	394 393\$
1899-1900	57 136\$	95 150\$	300 361\$	452 647\$
1900-1901	28 054\$	44 760\$	184 016\$	256 830\$
1901-1902	66 953\$	7 734\$	196 921\$	271 608\$
1902-1903	68 937\$	1 329\$	286 327\$	356 593\$
1903-1904	77 577\$	100 232\$	344 238\$	522 057\$
1904-1905	176 066\$	117 280\$	368 586\$	661 932\$
1905-1906	143 206\$	190 932\$	355 560\$	689 698\$
1906-1907	161 297\$	308 622\$	373 638\$	843 557\$
1907-1908	168 744\$	433 856\$	644 919\$	1247 519\$

**Source: Harries (1994:171)**

The new economic structures imposed on natives rendered their traditional forms of production inadequate for their needs, and this, together with the need for social status, which was created on the process, induced them to work as wage labourers. The fact that those who had worked in South Africa, “at the end of their contracts, [...] returned home with savings of perhaps £15, out of which they were expected to pay a labour tax of about 30s to the chief, a hut tax of over 20s, and provide the gifts, beer and food required to confirm their new status” (Harries, 1994:175).

The participation of Mozambican workers in the South African economy was as important to South Africa as it was to the Portuguese colonial regime. Duffy (1967:143) notes that

“Mozambique profited from railway traffic and rates, from service charges on each worker leaving the colony, and from the constant influx of wages into the territory.” The extraction of income however from migrant workers by Mozambican authorities was threatened by the clandestine migration of workers. Thus the two governments had to make concessions to regulate the recruitment of the Mozambican indigenous labour force- *recrutamento de mão-de-obra indígena de Moçambique*.<sup>4</sup> The agreement was reached in 1896 between the colonial authorities of Portugal and the Transvaal Chamber of Mines.

As a result the Chamber of Mines, in order to ensure a constant inflow of labour, formed the Rand Native Labour Association (RNLA) in 1896 (First, 1983:16). It became evident that the RNLA’s principal objectives were attained, since eight years later labour recruitment to the mines had increased by 500 per cent. Furthermore, RNLA also succeeded in forcing down the wages of the African workers to the point where wages were lower than ten years earlier when the mining activities commenced (First, 1983:16).

Despite the existence of recruiting agents for the mines, companies continued to compete for African labour. It may have been this competition which stimulated the existence of private recruiting agents who brought about continual illegal recruitment and illegal labour migration from Mozambique. “In 1900 the industry approached the Transvaal government with the request that the recruitment of labour be a state enterprise, but the proposal was turned down” (First, 1983:16). At this point the RNLA became the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (Wenela) which was vested with a recruitment monopoly in Southern Mozambique (First 1983:16). Wenela gave new economic opportunities to the Portuguese colonial authorities since they were able to control most of the recruited workers. Most importunately, Wenela preserved the legacy left by the RNLA, as it continued it managed to force down the ‘workers wage rate’ and increased control it over the movement of migrant workers (Harries, 1994:179).

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<sup>4</sup> Portuguese term, which can be understood as ‘recruitment of low wage labourers’

Besides the fact that “Portugal as a colonial power derived major sources of her income from ‘invisible’ earnings and speculated on the sale of the labour power of its African working force” (First, 1983:14), its transport infrastructure was also a significant source of income. Portugal had invested in developing capital in rail and in port facilities which during the negotiation for labour recruitment in Mozambique were used in the bargaining process (First, 1983:18-19). New negotiations for Mozambican labour recruitment for the Transvaal mining industry emanated from the declining labour force in the mines as a result of the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) which disrupted labour supply (First, 1983:18).

At the end of the war in 1902 new strategies for economic recovery were designed and mineral, agricultural and transport industries were given particular attention. These projects could only succeed provided that the required labour force was deployed. In 1897, before the eruption of the Anglo-Boer war in 1899, there was an estimated 80 000 Mozambican workers. These had to be repatriated because of the conflict (Covana: 2001:103). The impact of the war was also felt by the Portuguese colonial authorities, not only because of the returned, and now unemployed mine workers but also because of the decline in revenues extracted from the Lourenço Marques’ port due to the traffic decline in the port.

Given the economic importance of the ports and railway facilities for Portugal, the governor of Lourenço Marques, “Rafael Gorjão insisted that before any recruitment could be permitted at all, the CFLM *caminhos de Ferro de Lourenço Marques* – (Lourenço Marques railways), had to carry at least some civil traffic under pre-war tariff arrangements” (Katzenellenbogen 1982:48). The Portuguese and British authorities reached a temporary agreement which was to have ten years duration, known as a *Modus Vivendi* (First, 1983:18). The *Modus Vivendi* was reached on 19 December 1901 (Rosa & Trigo, 1986:51-3). First argues that the British government in South Africa under Lord Milner was prepared to reinstate the pre-war agreements under this *Modus Vivendi*, making tariff and customs concessions to Portugal to avoid losing Mozambican workers (1983:18). After the *Modus Vivendi* was applied, the traffic from Lourenço Marques to the Transvaal increased from 166.902 tons in 1902 to 405.823 tons four years later. In the same period

(1902-1906) an average of 16 000 newcomers per year were recruited for the mines (Covana, 2001:103-4).

In the course of negotiations which culminated in the *Modus Vivendi* agreement, the governor of Lorenzo Marques, Gorjão was faced by enormous challenges, and had become aware of strong anti-British sentiment in Mozambique (Katzenellenbogen, 1982:46-7). However Gorjão continued to negotiate with Fritz H. E. Crowe, the British government representative in Mozambique, because “he wanted support for Mozambique’s internal administration, which was still unable to control ‘clandestine’ emigration encouraged by clandestine recruiting” (Katzenellenbogen, 1982:47). In Duffy’s words (1967:143) “Gorjão was particularly anxious to curb the action of foreign recruiting agents who had flooded the province.” As Covana puts it (2001:107) the Portuguese government did not have adequate police personnel to patrol the border. The *Modus Vivendi* provided monopoly rights for the recruiting agencies recognized by the Transvaal, to undertake recruitment of labour in places where the Portuguese authority was strong (Katzenellenbogen 1982:48). The Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (Wenela) was the major recruiting agency under the *Modus Vivendi* (Newitt, 1995:492).

Thus Wenela also enabled the Mozambican colonial authorities to extract economic benefits from the participation of Mozambican labour migrants in the South African economy. As Rosa et al (1986:67) pointed out, Wenela’s recruiting monopoly secured the legal importation of 100 000 workers, in the post-war period when the South African economy was booming. *Modus vivendi*, however, brought discontentment among recruiters whose recruiting privileges had been rescinded by Wenela as the sole recruiting agency. Katzenellenbogen (1982:52) explains that when Wenela began to operate “there was [...] an element of ‘sour grapes’ because the more lucrative aspects of recruiting had been taken out of the hands of the Portuguese merchants and petty officials who profited much from it in the past.” Measures to curb the illegal entry of Mozambicans seeking employment in South Africa were further fortified by the Curator.

The “Curator’s major task was to tax Mozambican workers and, by controlling their movements, to suppress clandestine and permanent emigration” (d’Andrade cited in Harries, 1994:179). Wenela’s success in preventing illegal recruitment in Mozambique, is demonstrated by the fact that the main employers of Mozambican workers were the mine owners. First (1983:16) argues that “in 1896 8.6 per cent of mine workers employed by the Chamber of Mines were Mozambicans. By 1906 the figure had risen to 65 per cent.” This result can be interpreted as a positive achievement for Wenela and the Portuguese colonial regime over illegal recruiting agents.

The prominence of Mozambican male migrant workers in different sectors of the South African economy was regarded as normal, given the role played by men in a patriarchal society. However, when labour migration from Mozambique to South Africa was numerically at its high point, Wenela began to recruit women and young boys to work in the mines. According to Ferreira (1963:113) there is no clear explanation for the recruitment of women for the mines. Women may have been recruited to supplement labour following a scarcity of workers; another speculation is that Wenela might have recruited women as a response to the needs of male mine workers who had for too long left their families. Nevertheless, whatever the reason for the recruitment of women might have been, the fact is that there were about 6 500 women of Mozambican origin working in the mines when the practice was discontinued 1928 (Ferreira, 1963:144).

Harries (1994: 201-2) gives an argument for the recruitment of young boys. He argues that this can be explained by the fact that,

It was not just the mine owners who created and perpetuated the employment of low-cost child labour. In the rural areas of southern Mozambique, work was considered an integral part of a child’s normal upbringing and gender socialization and boys were expected to contribute to the homestead economy from an early age. As migrant labour became a crucial aspect of family income, boys were pressed into wage work by their elders and, particularly

in years of famine, were frequently impersonated by older men when signing on with recruiters.

Wenela recruited workers from different parts of Africa, apart from Mozambique (Rosa et al,1986:53). Wenela continued to operate even after the independence of Mozambique in 1975. The preservation of institutions like Wenela is a clear indication of how important they were for both countries. The Mozambican government drew substantial financial benefits from the migratory processes of the labour force. In 1975 an average of 2000 men per week were recruited to work in the mines. The number declined significantly in 1978, when only 700 men were recruited. This number increased, however, by 100 men in the following year. Though the recruited labour force to South Africa had declined sharply by 1981, the government was still able to secure R52 752 054 (Rosa & Trigo, 1986:83).

Geographic proximity and differences between economic structures are main reasons that influence interaction between the people from the south of the Save River and South Africa (Covana 2001:107). He also believes that before independence, the conditions applied by Wenela before Mozambicans are accepted for labour in the mines, the high costs of legal immigration, the heavy hut tax, high unemployment at home and the relatively higher salaries paid in South Africa as compared to Mozambique, have been and continue to be the motivating forces for illegal migration to South Africa. Covana also argues that ecological disasters influence the migration of workers to South Africa. Covana (2001:103) claims that the bovine plague that affected the Gaza district between 1897 and 1898 increased the willingness of men in the Limpopo valley to migrate.

### 3.3. MOZAMBIQUE: CIVIL WAR AND ECONOMIC FAILURE

Mozambican national sovereignty was attained after years of armed struggle against Portuguese colonial rule. Independence was preceded by the Lusaka Accord which officially brought the ten year war to an end. Frelimo took over the national political and economic administration of the country. There were no democratic procedures such as

elections or a referendum to determine how and who should govern the country (Newitt, 1995:541).

The radical economic approach taken by the new government created dissatisfaction among many Portuguese settlers in Mozambique. As a result, many left the country. According to De Vletter (1998:7) about 90 per cent of the Portuguese settlers who had occupied skilled and semi-skilled positions left the country. Without exaggeration it can be said that the departure of the Portuguese professionals in particular contributed to the economic decline of the newly formed state.

The new Frelimo government, with minimal skills and managerial capacity, set itself the ambitious goal of socialist development and equality for all. This meant nationalization of many strategic or abandoned enterprises, a focus on big heavy industry projects and large state farms (De Vletter, 1998:7)

During the last decades of Portuguese colonial rule, the Mozambican economy had declined (Newitt, 1995:551). However the sudden change of economic policies and the outbreak of civil war soon after independence aggravated the situation. According to Chongono (1996:1) “the ten-year war which led to independence in 1975 was followed by undeclared war, which targeted economic installations, waged against Mozambique by the Rhodesian racist regime in retaliation of the former’s support of Zimbabwean guerrillas.” This situation was exacerbated by “a mass exodus of Portuguese settlers and skilled black and Indian workers and professionals, precipitated by the confusion and violence accompanying Frelimo’s take-over” (Newitt, 1995:551).

Though the aim of this section is not to give an account of the possible causes of the war in Mozambique, it is important to indicate that there are different schools of thought with opposing views on the issue. Chingono (1996:3) has identified two noticeable paradigms: “one that blames Frelimo or focuses on internal dynamics, and the other, its antithesis, that blames external forces.” The latter view is widely supported and among those who hold this belief is Hermele. He believes that the external causes of war were decisive, and



argues that “the country [Mozambique] has since independence been the victim of war of aggression conducted first by Rhodesia and subsequently by South Africa” (1990:5).

Whatever the causes of war in Mozambique, the consequences were the reduction of state capacity to carry out its political and economic mandate. One of the signs of this was, as Chingono (1996:9) points out, “manifested in [state] inability to translate policy into practice, and later, to defeat the rebels.” Undoubtedly, the erosion of the power of the Mozambican state brought about economic failure and the civil war generated a power vacuum, which was filled to a small extent by the non-state actors such as NGOs, social and religious movements (Chingono,1996:10).

The new national project which was based on a socialist approach did improve some sectors. The educational and health sectors are examples of this. Nevertheless, “although impressive advances were made in the provision of basic health and education services, the combination of centralized economic control and a destructive civil war, in which South Africa backed Renamo, led to virtual economic collapse” (De Vletter, 1998:7). The country’s economy, continued to deteriorate to the extent that the government could no longer service its external debts. According to Hanlon (1984:254) the Mozambican government “on 30 January 1984 it asked its creditors to reschedule its debts. Its total debts to banks, governments, and international organizations were more than £1000 million (\$1.4 billion).” The growth of the external debt reduced the state capacity to provide its citizens with basic necessities. This stimulated both internal and external migrations as people battled for survival amid the war and hunger.

The table below depicts the consequences of the military and economic aggression against Mozambique.

**Table 3.2: Some incidents of civil war in Mozambique**

Year	Incidents	Number	%
	<b>Military Warfare</b>		
1983-1987	Primary schools closed	2600	
1983-1987	Share of network destroyed		45
1982-1987	Health post closed	820	
1982-1987	Share of health post destroyed		31
1981-1988	Rural shops closed	3200	
1981-1988	Share of rural commercial network destroyed		50
	<b>Economic warfare</b>	number	%
1975-1987	Reduction of Mozambican migrant workers		67
1975-1983	Reduction of South African traffic through Maputo		80
1975-1987	Reduction in services earning from South Africa		93

Source: Hermele (1990:6)

The economic collapse and the political conflict between Renamo and Frelimo Government led to economic disaster. According to Steinberg (2005), as a result of the civil war in Mozambique, an estimate of 5.7 million people had been forced to abandon their homes between 1979 and 1992. Of those who fled their homes, “about 4 million were internally displaced. The remaining 1.7 million crossed Mozambique’s border and became international refugees” (Steinberg: 2005). Steinberg also noted that all the countries surrounding Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, shared the burden of receiving the Mozambican refugees.

The countries in which the Mozambicans displaced by civil war took refuge were for the most part consistent with the geographical proximity between their provinces in Mozambique and the receiving countries. This can be illustrated by the fact that out of 1.7 million Mozambicans who became international refugees, an estimated 250 000-350 000 sought refuge in South Africa, and the majority of Mozambican refugees in South Africa were from Gaza and Maputo, the two southern provinces of Mozambique (Steinberg, 2005). Mozambican refugees in Malawi were predominantly from Tete and those in Tanzania from Cabo Delgado province.

Though geographic proximity is an influence on the route of the refugee, cultural capital, such as language and traditional practices should not be ignored. Macgaffey and Ganga (2000) argued that the collapse of the state in Zaire resulted in its citizens fending for themselves in various ways, including itinerant trade. For those who decided to leave the country for overseas, France and other French-speaking countries like Belgium were common destinations. Similarly, out of 350 000 Mozambicans who sought refuge in South Africa, about 250 000 are believed to have stayed in Gazankulu and the remaining 100 000 went to Johannesburg and other places in South Africa (Steinberg, 2005). There is evidence that part of this influx of refugees came to Durban, but there has been little research into this community until the present study.

Among other possible explanations of these trends, the similarity of cultural practices and language between southern Mozambicans and the people of Gazankulu are elements that help to explain the concentration of Mozambicans in Gazankulu rather than elsewhere in South Africa. “The majority of South African Shangana-speakers trace their ancestry to groups of refugees who fled conflicts in what is today called Mozambique in the 1830s, and 1860s and 1890s” (Steinberg 2005). In Steinberg’s view, despite the restrictions on the entrance of migrants to South Africa, “the pertinence of citizenship and national boundaries was transcended by a deeper sense of loyalty, the pedigree of which preceded the colonial erection of national boundaries between South Africa and Mozambique.

The argument advanced by Steinberg (2005) helps to explain the importance of cultural capital, not only in the case of voluntary migration, but also in forced migration. Steinberg (2005) believes that “Mozambicans who crossed the border were refugees in a qualified sense and complicated sense.” He argues that though Mozambicans were forced to leave their country and seek refuge in a foreign land, they were not foreigners to the culture, languages and customs of other Shangana-speaking populations residing in South Africa. The Shangana-speaking people from Mozambique, “never left the invisible but no less powerful boundaries of their Shangana-speaking ethnos” (Steinberg, 2005)

#### 3.4 CONCLUSION

I have so far discussed the motivation of Mozambican migrants to South Africa. The interaction of people from South Africa and Mozambique precedes the colonial demarcation of the borders which gave eminence to the new African states. The change in economic and political structures introduced by colonial powers and the economic and industrial development in the Transvaal are factors that prompted migration.

In the words of Newitt (1995:271): “Mozambique today is tied to South Africa by a number of economic bonds which will be extremely difficult to break.” These bonds have been reinforced by the abolition of the travel visa between South Africa and Mozambique in 2006. The abolition of the visa requirement has undoubtedly increased cross-border traffic. Many Mozambicans today, for economic reasons come to South Africa. In the economic context, it becomes important to understand the processes of economic and social integration of Mozambicans who live and work in Durban.

## CHAPTER IV

### 4.1. MOZAMBICANS LIVING AND WORKING IN DURBAN

#### 4.1.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the findings of my research on the economic and social integration of Mozambicans living and working in Durban. The chapter consists of two sections: the first presents the 'background' of Mozambicans in Durban. As already outlined in the introductory chapter, the majority of Mozambicans in Durban are originally from the three southern provinces of Mozambique, Inhambane, Gaza and Maputo.

The aims of this section are to explore the push-pull factors which motivate Mozambicans to come to South Africa, particularly Durban. This section also explains the trajectories of Mozambicans as they try to cross the border to South Africa. The majority of Mozambicans who live and work in Durban are from rural areas and have migrated to South Africa to ensure the economic survival of their households in Mozambique.

Mechanisms adopted by Mozambicans for economic and social integration in Durban will be discussed. I shall attempt to explain how Mozambicans create survival strategies in a foreign land. Economic and social networks are important themes in this section. I shall offer an insight into how Mozambicans in Durban cope with life in a contested geographical space, given their lack of adequate documentation, lack of qualifications, professional skills and identity documents. Reference will be made to evidence supplied by households in Mozambique.

#### 4.1.2. MOZAMBICANS IN DURBAN

The majority of Mozambicans living and working in Durban originate from the rural areas of Inhambane, Gaza and Maputo. The Inhambane province may serve as an illustration: according to Fiege, et al (2002:37), 88% of its total area is rural.

People from other Mozambican provinces, albeit in small numbers, also choose Durban as their destination. People from other parts of Mozambique constitute 4% of the total participants in this study. The demographic distribution of Mozambicans in Durban by provinces of origin gives the three southern provinces historical dominance over other Mozambican provinces. Table 4.1 shows that 64% of the total number of Mozambicans who took part in this study come from Maputo province. The second most represented Mozambican province in Durban is Inhambane, with 24% of the total participants. Gaza province is the least represented among the three southern provinces, with less than 8% of the total participants in this research.

It might be expected that the majority of Mozambicans in Durban would come from Maputo province as it is the closest to Durban. The second best represented province in Durban is Inhambane and not Gaza, despite the latter being closer to Durban.

**4.1: PLACE OF ORIGIN IN MOZAMBIQUE**

Number	Provinces	Frequency	Percentage
1	Maputo	32	64
2	Gaza	4	8.0
3	Inhambane	12	24.0
4	Other	2	4.0
5	Total	50	100

The migration of Mozambicans to Durban is influenced by factors other than territorial proximities. This is supported by the fact that only 14% of the participants of this study cited territorial proximity as a factor that influenced their choice of Durban, and all of those who chose Durban because of close proximity are from either the urban or rural areas of Maputo.

In terms of gender representation, males constitute the predominant group. According to this study, Mozambican males living and working in Durban constitute 78 % of the total participants. These results reflect the trend pointed out by Crush et al (2005:14) “the primary reasons for migration in the region have been for labour” and males have

dominated the search for wage labour. Despite the fact that both internal and cross border migration in Southern Africa has been dominated by males, there is nowadays a growing tendency of women to migrate (Crush, et al 2005:14). The findings of this research show that 22% of the sample of Mozambicans living and working in Durban are women.

Unlike men whose main motives to enter South Africa are mostly job related, some of the main reasons Mozambican women come to South Africa are that they need to join husbands or relatives. They eventually become engaged in informal economic activities such as home beauty salons or the sale of Mozambican food products. Others work in Portuguese restaurants, shops or butcheries.

**TABLE 4.2: WOMEN MARITAL STATUS**

Number	Marital Status	Frequency	Percentage
1	Married	6	54.5
2	Single	3	27.3
3	Widows	1	9.1
4	Live with a partner	1	9.1
5	total	11	100.0

As reflected in Table 4.2 above, 54.5 % of Mozambican women living and/or working in Durban are married. These Mozambican women came to Durban either to join their relatives who were established in the city, or to be reunited with their husbands. Single women are the second best represented group among Mozambican women in Durban. They constitute 27.3% of the total participants. Among the female participants of this study, 9.1 % are widows who cited civil war as the main reason they entered Durban.

Women's involvement in all forms of cross border movement is constantly increasing, although there are impeding factors that deter them from migrating. In most cases when men migrate, women are left behind to look after the household and to secure land ownership in their home country. In other words, while the husband is away the women must find alternative means for survival, and since most of the participants in this research were from rural areas, agricultural land is the available means to ensure the

survival of the household in the absence of men. Another reason why Mozambican women are reluctant to migrate is that migration in rural Mozambique has traditionally been conceived to be something for men and the migration of single women is perceived negatively. This is reflected in the words of a rural woman in Ndlote, when she said:

“I don’t approve of women going to South Africa by themselves without their husbands. I cannot imagine any kind of work they do when they are there. We hear people saying that Mozambican single women going to South Africa alone, they are there to practice prostitution. So I don’t approve.” (Interview, 08/04/07)

These sentiments were echoed by some of the males who were interviewed in Durban. When asked if they would marry a Mozambican woman who lived and worked in Durban, their initial response was that they would never do so because women should be in Mozambique and not in South Africa. The negative images of female migration, the traditional beliefs that legitimate males as potential migrants, and the fact that women are left behind to look after the households explain the lesser propensity of women (22%) taking part in this research.

Almost 55 % of these women are married and live with their husbands. Family reunion is one of the approved reasons for female migration. Although single females have much more freedom of movement compared to married women, their numbers continue to be insignificant.

Mozambicans living and working in Durban tend to be young. The bulk of Mozambicans in Durban are people less than 60 years of age. 38% of Mozambicans are between 18 and 25 years, and 52 % are between 25 and 45 years of age. The total percentage of Mozambicans between 18 and 45 years is 90%. The fact that people between 18 and 45 years of age constitute 90% of the total participants in this study suggests that potential migrants are young people and that migrants tend to return to Mozambique in their later



years. Life expectancy in Mozambique is 44 for male and 47 for women (*Reader's Digest Illustrated Atlas of the World, 1997*).

**TABLE 4.3: AVERAGE AGE OF THE TOTAL SAMPLE**

NUMBER	AGE	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
1	18-25	19	38.0
2	25-45	26	52.0
3	45-60	3	6
4	60→	2	4
5	Total	50	100.0

Despite the fact that the majority of Mozambicans in Durban are relatively young, most of them did not complete primary and secondary education. According to Martin (1999) education is crucial for economic and social integration in a foreign country. Education is not only pertinent in the process of job seeking, but in many cases I believe that it broadens the opportunities that migrants can explore in pursuit of economic and social integration. This study reveals that Mozambicans who are educated are economically better off than those who are not. Those who have only completed primary education are less successful than those who completed their secondary education. Those with a tertiary education are better positioned economically and socially than the rest of the group. Mozambicans with primary education constitute 56% of the sample; only 32% of those involved have started or completed secondary education; only one person has tertiary education.<sup>5</sup>

The low levels of formal education amongst Mozambicans have always been characteristic of those who came to South Africa to work. According to one of the participants:

Since the colonial period education was not very important. The main thing black Mozambicans needed to know at school was how to write their names

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<sup>5</sup> There are many Mozambicans in different tertiary institutions in Durban. Given that the present study is intended to those who live and work in Durban, students remain as a subject of another research.

and to count. After that you could be able to go and work in the mines like I did without major problems. Nevertheless, most Mozambicans who came to South Africa did not even put a foot at school but they were able to work in the mines and other places because the job Mozambicans do does not require much education.(Interview, 12/02/07)

The above argument is validated by the fact that in most rural areas of Mozambique, particularly in Inhambane, Gaza and Maputo provinces, basic infrastructure such as schools, hospital, water, and health facilities are lacking. Since independence the Mozambican government has tried to improve the quality of the country's infrastructure, but has not yet been able to supply the needs of the people. For example, in Manhiça district, with specific reference to Ndlote, in order to access better hospital facilities and in order for pupils to attend secondary school, the majority of people have to travel between approximately 17 and 30 kms. As a result, many children from rural Mozambique do not proceed with their secondary education because of the traveling and accommodation expenses which are beyond their parents' and guardians' means.

**TABLE 4.4: EDUCATION LEVELS OF THE SAMPLE**

NUMBER	EDUCATION	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
1	Primary	28	56.0
2	Secondary	14	28.0
3	Tertiary	1	2.0
4	None	7	14.0
5	Total	50	100.0

Migration from Mozambique to South Africa is generally associated with low levels of education and is seen as an alternative means for economic survival for those who do not have professional skills and/or higher formal education. This was highlighted by various participants from the Inhambane (Quissico, Nyamajacala, Ramiro, Fondo and Xibember), Gaza (Fidel Castro, Inhamissa, Marian Ngouabi and Koka Mussava), and Maputo Provinces (Ndlote, Manhiça and Ilha Josina Machel) who revealed that they would prefer

their relatives to work in Mozambique. However, because they do not have an education or any professional skills they accepted that they work in South Africa.

Some Mozambicans prefer their relatives or spouses to work in South Africa because the economy can accommodate even unskilled labourers. Thus they are better off working in South Africa than in Mozambique. Others do so because it is 'cultural' practice. Almost every young man is expected to go and work in South Africa, like his father and grandfathers did. Economic and social evidence from the rural areas of Inhambane, Gaza and Maputo, where the majority of the sample comes from, shows that the new generation will continue to migrate to South Africa. For these and many other reasons in places like Inhambane there is continued migration of young men. Consequently, "there is a deficit of young men within the population group aged between 20 and 24, which is explained by migration to South Africa and Maputo" (Fiege, et al, 2002:31). This reality prevails in rural communities of the Gaza and Maputo provinces as well.

Another compelling factor for migration is that it is difficult for those who for many years have worked in South Africa to be integrated into the national economy after their return to their home country. As Adepoju (1988: 44) pointed out, "skills acquired abroad are often irrelevant in the home country context. Thus a mineworker or a farm labourer on a large plantation using machinery or picking fruits will need other skills to cope with the more limited resources on his family plot at home." According to one of the participants from Fondo (Inhambane Province), when the husband stopped working in South Africa, the household economic situation worsened and they decided to assist one of their sons to go and work in South Africa.

Mozambicans enter South Africa by different entry points, with different motives and migration status. Some arrived as contracted workers, and some as refugees. Others come to South Africa as individuals in search of better economic opportunities, as legal or illegal migrants. One significant aspect of the respondents of this research is that they place *saltar o arame or kufohla* (Portuguese and Ronga ways of describing the act of crossing the border illegally) as a first preference. They seek only to legalize their

immigration status after they have entered the country illegally, that is when they have become *mafohlane* or *manthlula guide*. “Many more Mozambicans emigrate for long spells to work in South Africa without documentation or with illegally obtained South African documents” (De Vletter, 1998:6). Of those who were originally contracted workers, some have become illegal after their work contracts have expired, and have failed to obtain the proper documentation to allow them to stay legally.

Those who went to South Africa as refugees, in accordance with the 1992 Rome Peace Accord between the Frelimo government and Renamo, have probably since returned home. Significant numbers have remained in South Africa and continue to maintain contact with their families, friends and relatives in Mozambique. These two groups, the ex-contracted workers and former refugees, continue to be an important asset for the recent migration current which enters the country in search of economic opportunities.

Though Durban is not a popular destination compared to the city of Johannesburg, it hosts a significant number of Mozambicans. The archives at the Mozambican Consulate in Durban show that since 1999 more than 3,502 Mozambicans have obtained consular registration.<sup>6</sup>

This number is insignificant compared to the Mozambicans who do not have contact with the Consulate. This was revealed by the fact that nearly 60% of my total sample indicated that they do not know where the consulate is, and showed no intention of trying to find it. If we were to make an educated guess concerning the number of Mozambicans in Durban based on the available data the following could be said: let 3,505 correspond to 40% of the total sample registered with the Mozambican Consulate and 60% correspond those who are not registered.

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<sup>6</sup> Consular registration is a document given to Mozambicans who live temporarily or permanently outside the country and is issued by Mozambican diplomatic representation in any given country. This document is used simply to enable the government to know the approximate number of Mozambicans who live in that particular country and does not replace the passport.

This would mean that 60% is equivalent to 5,257.5 and the total number of Mozambicans in Durban would be estimated at 8,759.5. This can be presented as follows:

*60%- unregistered Mozambicans*

*3.502- Registered Mozambicans (40%)*

$X \text{-----} 60\%$ $3,502 \text{-----} 40\%$ $X40\% = 60\% \cdot 3,502$ $X40\% = 210,120$	$X = 210,120/40\%$ $X = 5,253$ $\textit{Total} = 5,253 + 3,502 = \underline{\underline{8,755}}$
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It can be argued, therefore, that the official information regarding the number of Mozambicans in Durban falls far short of the actual number who live and work in Durban. Though the sample of this study is small, it can be said with some degree of confidence that the number of Mozambicans in Durban is likely to exceed twenty thousand. The fact that Mozambicans can be found in more than 20 different locations in Durban strengthens this claim, especially since the numbers of illegal migrants are likely to be unrepresented by the official data available in the consulate. The majority of Mozambicans are not involved with the official government institutions of either country. These findings validates the argument brought forward by Adepoju, which stated that “information on flows of international migration obtained from border control and registration, and stock data from field surveys, registration and censuses, is [...] inadequate” (1988:20).

Mozambicans in Durban, particularly those who took part in my study, have entered the city using different official and unofficial entry points. There are those who have come to Durban through Komatipoort, or the Kruger National Park. This entry point is commonly used by people who enter the country with the objective of working in Johannesburg. Some of them eventually leave Johannesburg and go elsewhere in South Africa, including Durban. As one of the interviewees from Gaza province pointed out:

When I came to South Africa in 1955 through TEBA I went to work in the mines. After a year in the mine I got to know a white man who had some business in Durban. When he wanted to leave Johannesburg he asked me to come along to Durban so that I could work with him. That is why in 1960 I came to Durban and worked in the construction industry. I have lived and worked here since, I never went back to Johannesburg.  
(Interview, 12/02/07)

Besides Komatipoort and the Kruger National Park, Mozambicans who come to Durban frequently use the Catuana/Ndumo, Tembe, Ponta do Ouro and the Lavumisa/Golela entry points. Those who enter South Africa using Catuana/Ndumo, Manhoca/Tembe and Ponta do Ouro/Farazela entry points usually find their way into South Africa by illegally crossing the frontier between Mozambique and South Africa. This exercise is described by Mozambicans as being made easy by the lack of adequate policing at both the Mozambican and South African borders. In cases where there are border policing and patrols, Mozambicans manage to cross the border with the covert assistance of the people working as border patrol officers and civilians, usually males who live along the borders. This was revealed by one of the interviewees who said that:

When we come to South Africa, we usually come with someone who knows the way. In order for us to get assistance we pay the person who showed us the way into South Africa. In some other cases, the person who is leading us to South Africa pays the police and we are able to enter South Africa.  
(Interview, 13/03/07)

Illegal migrants from Mozambique, who constitute 82% of the total sample, do not always find it easy to come to Durban, particularly on their first trips. The main obstacle they face is that most of them leave their country without a sufficient budget for the journey and to sustain themselves while looking for jobs. After illegally crossing the border, therefore, they are forced to look for jobs in areas near to their entry points. The search for jobs in these places is made easier because most of the communities

along the borders understand or speak the predominant languages of these migrants, particularly Shangana or Ronga and isiZulu. Another enabling factor is that the farm owners and other employers like employing illegal migrants because they are willing to do any kind of job at a lower wage than the local people would accept. Some groups of Mozambicans, therefore, while trying to get the money that can enable them to get to Durban, work temporarily on the farms nearer those entry points. The average time spent in those areas is usually three months. After getting the necessary amount of money they continue the journey to Durban.

A few remain on the farms and never reach Durban. Those who remain at the border zones serve as a future resource for those who illegally enter the country. Mozambicans who live in South African territory near the Mozambican border assist new and experienced illegal migrants to cross the border and to find temporary accommodation and employment. In return the illegal migrants pay their hosts in kind or cash.

After a period, usually of less than six months of work on the farms, Mozambicans who have managed to save some money, proceed with their journey towards Durban. Not everyone who manages to get the desired amount of money succeeds in reaching Durban. After leaving the entry points, some would-be migrants only make their ways as far as another small town on the road to Durban. That explains why many Mozambicans can be found in KwaZulu-Natal communities along the main roads, such as Manguzi, Josini, Mbazwana, Ntselene, Mkuzi, Hluhluwe, Mtubatuba, Empangeni, Richards Bay, Esikhawini, Stanger, and KwaDukuza which are on the route south to Durban.

Generally the demanding trip to Durban is endured by male migrants who do not have strong networks, and despite having friends or relatives already living and working in Durban, cannot obtain assistance from them. Those who do get some sort of financial support are able to cross the border and reach Durban more easily. Usually the assistance they get allows them to pay for transport and the fees of the persons who take them from Mozambique to South Africa (including the cross border taxi drivers –

Maputo/Durban/Maputo), or to bribe immigration officials. Female illegal migrants tend to enjoy a 'better' entry to Durban because the majority of them come to Durban to join their relatives or husbands who make the necessary arrangements to ease their journey and stay in Durban.

Accordingly, among those who came to Durban, generally illegally, 32% were assisted by friends, 40% by relatives (this includes those who came to join their husbands), and the remaining 28% claim to have come alone. Legal entries increased in volume after the South African and Mozambican governments in April 2005 waived the visa requirements for the citizens of both countries. This allows citizens of both countries to visit without having to apply for entry visas, as long as their temporary period of stay is intended to be less than 30 days. Many Mozambicans however use that opportunity to enter the country legally and become illegal after their period of stay has expired. In order to avoid evidence of expiry appearing on their passports, some go to the nearest border post, usually Golela, to renew their entry permit. This practice is common among the cross-border or itinerant traders, as one of them explains:

The products that we are selling here we bring them from Mozambique. Thus we need at least to go to Mozambique once a month to give our family money to buy food and to buy new products to resell them here. That is why we find it easy to renew our monthly temporary visas, (interview, 04/07 07)

In this way many Mozambicans in Durban seek to negotiate their legal stay in the country while at the same time, since legal entry does not imply a work permit, trading illegally on the streets of Durban. Street vendors, therefore, are more likely to be illegal traders than illegal entrants to South Africa.

In fact many migrants who entered South Africa as war refugees, and have since returned to Mozambique, maintain that they would be willing to go to South Africa in search of jobs. Even after the end of military hostilities in Mozambique, those who



remained in South Africa cited economic reasons as the factors that made them to stay semi-permanently in the country.<sup>7</sup>

The majority of Mozambicans who live and work in Durban do so for economic reasons. Poverty and unemployment were the main push factors that prevailed among them. Nearly 90% of the sample claimed that unemployment and poverty forced them to leave their homes to look for economic opportunities in South Africa, especially in Durban.

The majority of Mozambicans, like many other foreigners, came to Durban because they consider the city as a favorable place to live and work. Newcomers are generally informed about the socio-economic conditions of Durban, before they actually emigrate. (see Hunter & Skinner, 2001:12). 56% of the subjects of this research mentioned that it was the prospect of finding employment that led them to Durban. Relatives and friends however play a significant role in deciding the direction of Mozambican migrants. 60 % of the migrants that came to Durban did so because they had friends or relatives who already lived and worked in Durban.

Although the pull factors, such as employment and acquaintances, in the migrant's destination, Durban, were important, information concerning their safety as illegal migrants was of pivotal relevance. One respondent commented:

“I decided to come to Durban because my uncle lives and works in Durban. But the most important thing that made me decide on Durban is because I was told that here in Durban the police are not very vigorous on repatriation of illegal Mozambicans. Here we live and work without the South African IDs, something which you cannot do in Johannesburg”. (Interview, 03/03/07)

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<sup>7</sup> This refers to those Mozambicans who have remained in Durban even after the end of the civil war. Though they did not return to Mozambique, they did not cut links with their home country and an overwhelming consider Mozambique as their home and maintain contacts with their families, hence a term semi-permanently.

This was also a common response among the cross border traders from Mozambique, who indicated that Durban is a good place to do business. Furthermore, “the police here do not target specifically Mozambicans or foreigners. If they confiscate products they do so for everyone who sells without a proper permit, including South Africans,” commented one of the interviewees.

#### 4.1.3. CONCLUSION

This section has tried to give an overview of the local origins of Mozambicans and the influences behind their willingness to migrate. It has been shown that the majority of Mozambicans who live and work in Durban are from the rural areas, where migration has been conceived of as part of the culture. Lack of infrastructure, such as communication networks, roads, schools and hospitals are seen as economic components which perpetuate migration. Many rural villages do not have secondary education, which implies that after completing their primary education young men feel the need to look for jobs elsewhere, usually in South Africa. It has also been shown that the decision to migrate is not solely an individual one. Often the family takes a collective decision that a member of the family shall migrate. I have indicated that the majority of Mozambicans who enter South Africa, particularly Durban, do so illegally and many are without the economic resources which would allow them to travel and sustain themselves during the time when they are searching for employment. As a result Mozambicans can be found in many communities along the main route to Durban, where some eventually decide to stay. Those who have the means make it through to Durban without major obstacles.

The decision to migrate to Durban, for Mozambicans, has been influenced by a variety of pull and push factors. Economic reasons had always been influential in the migration process of Mozambicans to South Africa. The outbreak of the civil war in the post independent Mozambican state however stimulated migration patterns as many people entered South Africa as refugees. The war also changed the established norms of

migrations, in that many women and children made their way to South Africa as refugees. Though the migration process continues to evolve and to be less gender biased, the volume of female migration to Durban, particularly of Mozambican women, is small relative to that of men.

#### 4.2. SURVIVAL STRATEGIES OF MOZAMBIicans IN DURBAN

The previous section of this chapter has shown that the majority of the respondents in this research were motivated to leave their country by political instability and the scarcity of economic resources. Since the end of the armed conflict in Mozambique, however, the perceived abundance of economic opportunities in Durban is reckoned as a significant pull factor. Durban is seen as presenting better economic opportunities than Mozambique, but access is hampered by migrants' lack of necessary skills for jobs in the formal sector, as well as lack of adequate identity documents and work permits.

In order to minimize the 'cost' of overcoming the barriers which impede access to economic resources and to the social life of the city, Mozambican migrants create informal economic and social networks. The following section aims to present the survival practices adopted by the migrants who formed my sample.

Survival strategies constitute a fundamental part of economic and social integration in the host city. Migration should be seen as a survival strategy on its own, preceding the various survival mechanisms espoused by the respondents in this study. Migration becomes a survival tool when it is taken as a solution to prevailing economic and social problems faced by people in their home country. Civil war and the need to improve their economic condition, were the reasons for migration given by the sample of this study.

The respondents in this survey are largely economic migrants, and their primary objective in Durban is to seek ways in which they can overcome their economic problems by securing jobs and earning income to assist their families in Mozambique. Despite the fact that South Africa in general and KwaZulu-Natal in particular, present better economic

opportunities than their home country, the high unemployment rate here remains as an enormous challenge to both local and foreign job finders. According to the *2001 Economic Review of the Province of KZN*, unemployment under the expanded definition was rated at 46% (*KZN Economic Review*, 2001). In these circumstances where “the employment of illegal migrants is a contravention of immigration law” (Pretorius et al, 1998), the law restrains local employers from offering jobs to illegal migrants. Furthermore, in cases where undocumented Mozambicans are illegally employed, they are generally underpaid. Since the respondents in this study (of whom a large proportion are illegal entrants) are prevented from accessing economic opportunities in the formal sector, like many other migrants, they have found alternative ways of survival, which include the informal networks.

#### 4.3. INFORMAL SECTOR AND NETWORKS

The survival strategies adopted by members of the sample in this research are developed within social and economic networks. These are created on the basis of common citizenship, language and ethnicity and in some cases race. The importance of networks is manifest at the initial stage of migration when information about the destination country and its economic opportunities are needed by prospective migrants. Migration is usually an informed decision, and the majority of the respondents of this study aimed at a particular destination. The information that they obtained through these networks enabled them to integrate more easily in the host city. 88 % of the total sample was hosted by their compatriots.

In the opinions of the respondents in this research, networks created on the basis of kinship, language, ethnicity and culture are valuable social capital. More than half (56%) of the sample upon their arrival were hosted by their relatives, and 64% of the total sample was received by people of the same ethnicity. The relevance of ethnic links was shown by the fact that among Mozambicans there is a strong tendency to group

themselves ethnically.<sup>8</sup> The Xitsopi speaking group, from the Inhambane province, provides a valuable illustration of this practice. The majority of them stay in the same area and have similar jobs.

Furthermore, the majority (80%) of the total sample, besides being involved in similar economic activities, have indicated that they share accommodation with one or more people from their home district. For the participants of this study, sharing accommodation also means sharing the rental expenses of the rooms they live in, and it also means that they are able to help each other in many things. As pointed out by one of the respondents, “being closer to someone from your home country, you are much secured because if anything happens to you they are able to report home and if you need to send money home they are there to help.” (Interview, 05/02/07) Given these reasons, it was not surprising that only 15% of the total sample stated that they stayed with people of other nationalities, Zimbabweans, Congolese and Nigerians residing in Durban. People believe that their success depends chiefly on the mutual assistance they offer to each other.

These results reinforce the understanding that social and economic networks can be constructed through common citizenship, tribe, language, family bonds and to some extent ethnic group. This last is not very important, though Mozambicans of mixed race are known in Portuguese as, “*mulatos* or *mistos*” and have created their own networks. They reside either in the city centre or in former apartheid ‘Coloured’ designated areas, in close proximity to other “*mulatos*” from Mozambique.

The type of networking in which people of mixed race engage is revealed by the fact that most newcomers of mixed race do not form ethnic or language links. They look for Mozambicans of mixed race for help, particularly on issues concerning jobs and accommodation during their first days. One of the participants of mixed race, explained: “When I came, I was hosted by other *mulatos* from Mozambique. Since I have established myself here, I also follow the example of those *mulatos* who assisted me, by

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<sup>8</sup> Different ethnic groupings of Mozambicans in Durban can be found in Lindelane, predominantly from Catembe, and Folweni dominated by people from Manica. These groups have not been directly engaged in the study due to the fact that they fell outside the confine of this present research.

helping other *mulatos*” (Interview, 25/05/07) Nevertheless, though the *mulatos* have created their own networks, they are willing to help other Mozambicans who live and work in Durban on the basis of common citizenship. This is demonstrated by the fact that the respondents in this research share information about employment opportunities and offer emotional support (in cases of death, imprisonment, etc) regardless of race, tribe or language. More importantly, there are inter-racial marriages in the Mozambican community.

As might be expected, few Mozambicans in Durban are hosted by people of other nationalities. Only 10% of the total sample was hosted by South Africans, including naturalized Portuguese. Unlike other South Africans who host Mozambicans, the naturalized Portuguese host them and offer them jobs as a result of the contacts they make with them in Mozambique before they enter South Africa. One of the participants of this study pointed out that:

As a young man, like anyone else I had hoped one day to come to South Africa. For me that day came when my boss, a Portuguese, asked me if I would like to come to South Africa and continue to work as a chef. Without hesitation I said yes and I came to South Africa, in 1985. (Interview, 02/03/07)

The kind of relationship that is constructed between a foreign host and a guest is that of employer-employee. Religious networks remain very weak: only one person has claimed that he was hosted by a religious organisation.

The success of these informal networks is based on the existence of the long-stay Mozambicans. The long-stay Mozambicans constitute a significant source of support for the newcomers in the initial stage of their lives in Durban. In order to succeed, the newcomers have to build trust or *construir confiança* with other Mozambicans. This means that they have to expand their social and economic networks so as to be able to tap into the economic, social and emotional resources that exist within those networks.

The first six months are crucial for many Mozambicans who enter South Africa for the first time, particularly those who do so illegally. In this period, they must learn the local languages, isiZulu and English as well as *construir confiança* with other Mozambicans. This last may be earned by good behaviour and willingness to help without payment in any of the small private businesses owned by Mozambicans. An interviewee pointed out:

It feels good to help a Mozambican find a job because they will help their families and subsequently help the economy of our country grow. However, it feels even better if that Mozambican is well behaved and is a hard worker, because we know that our effort is not in vain. (Interview: 16/11/06)

Mozambicans believe that assisting in their compatriots' businesses gives them the means of learning about local people and of assimilating the language. This is relatively easy for most of them because it is close to the languages spoken in the southern provinces of Mozambique. Thus the results of this survey show that more than half (56%) of the sample speaks or understands English, and isiZulu is spoken almost by every (98%) participant of this study.


Economic and social networks constructed by Mozambicans include not only the people with whom they come in contact in the host country (South Africa/Durban). Generally these networks reflect some form of continuity of associations formed in their communities in Mozambique. Many Mozambicans who live and work in Durban already knew their hosts before arrival, either in person or through family mediation. 32% of the total sample entered South Africa with the assistance of friends and 40% were assisted by relatives who had established themselves in Durban.

Most importantly, friends and relatives of the newcomers serve as support structures, at the initial stage of life in the city, which makes it desirable that prospective migrants should activate these networks before they migrate. The networks assist the newcomers

to find economic opportunities in Durban. This is demonstrated by the fact that more than 90% of the total sample was able to find jobs through the assistance of their compatriots, relatives and friends.

The responses of majority of this sample show that the degree of mutual assistance amongst the subjects of this study is significant. Despite this willingness to help each other, the participants of this research claimed that they were faced with enormous challenges during the process of entering the labour market in Durban. The crucial problems that they face are the lack of skills or professional training and South African identification documents. The present research established that the respondents of this survey were largely employed in the informal sector of the economy, as it can be seen from the graph below.

GRAPH 4.1: LABOUR INDICATOR OF THE SAMPLE STUDY



As can be seen from the graph, 58% of the sample noted that they were self-employed; only 4% did not have a job. The remaining 38% indicated that they were employed. It should be noted that this research did not seek to establish whether those who are employed were in the formal or informal sector. It is likely that most of them are in the informal sector, given that employment in the formal sector requires legal documentation which the majority of them do not possess. The percentage of those who are unemployed consists mainly of women who live with their husbands. Even amongst employed



Mozambicans in this sample, a significant number are employed by other people in the informal sectors.

Long-stay Mozambicans are among the employers in the informal sector who accommodate some of the newcomers. Usually they employ only Mozambicans who have recently arrived. Though long-stay Mozambicans cited many reasons to justify their preference for employing their compatriots, security and hard work were the main ones. An interviewee who runs a carpentry workshop gives an explanation of this phenomenon:

We cannot employ South Africans in our workshops because when they see that you are now prospering, they will report us to the police for being an illegal immigrant so that after our deportation they will be left with the business. Another reason why we cannot employ South Africans is that unlike Mozambicans, the local people are not reliable and are not hard working people. ( Interview, 03/03/07)

Few Mozambicans are in the formal sector. The majority of the respondents of this research are involved in informal economic activities which include street trading, panel beating, motor mechanics, selling, taxi driving and ownership, restaurant work, domestic work, hairdressing and beauticians' shops, and herbalists' shops.

Mozambicans who employ others, usually do so when they have more than one informal business or where the nature of the business requires more than one person. The barber shops and panel beating workshops on the periphery of the city can serve as an illustration. Mozambican men, particularly those who have recently arrived in Durban, generally find their first employment in these small businesses owned by their country men, where patron/client relationships are established.

Long-stay Mozambicans in Durban are sources of economic, financial and emotional support for the newcomers. The majority of later arrivals place their hope of finding

employment or any form of support on those who have lived and worked in Durban for many years.

There is consensus among the Mozambicans who took part in this research on the need for mutual assistance. The fact that most of them are excluded from official economic and social benefits makes it even more necessary to build strong unity. According to one of the interviewees:

Anyone from Mozambique, now in Durban, is here because he is looking for a better life. Since none of us belongs to this country, we need to assist each other by sharing important information regarding economic opportunities here and at home. I personally share information with people who share it with me when they have some. If we fail to assist each other we will never get assistance from anyone. (Interview, 25/05/07)

The dynamics of economic and social networks which prevail within the sample of this research can be regarded as typical of migrant communities. Another example of the relevance of networks and long-stay migrants has been given by MacGaffey and Ganga (2000), in their study on Congolese migrants. Their studies, like the present research, show that the earlier Congolese migrants to France became a source of support and community which enabled the later comers to settle in more easily.

#### 4.4. ILLEGAL IDENTITY DOCUMENTS AS A SURVIVAL STRATEGY

The need to acquire ID books has presented itself as one of the most essential elements in attempts to integrate in the new country. As I have already mentioned, at the time of entry the majority (82%) of the sample entered South Africa illegally. Of those who entered South Africa legally, many became illegal when they continued to live and work in South Africa after their permits have expired. Though some have since acquired South African identity documents, many Mozambicans who took part in this survey continue to live and work in South Africa as undocumented migrants.

These respondents are automatically excluded from all official state processes and from formal participation in various political and economic spheres of the host city. The testimony of an interviewee can serve as an example:

If you are illegal, it means that even when you know who killed your husband, who steals cars, and does unacceptable things, you have no right to say a word and the authority cannot protect you. That is why most of us know criminals – but how do you tell the police if you are illegal? Instead of listening to you, they will question the legality of your migration status and deport you. That is why we do not report crime. (Interview, 10/02/07)

Table 4.5 below illustrates in percentages the status of the participants of this research. The majority of the respondents in this research are undocumented. In terms of the immigration laws this means that undocumented migrants are not unknown to the state. They are automatically excluded from the official benefits that the states and various non-state institutions offer to those who have relevant documentations.

**TABLE 4.5: RESIDENTIAL STATUS IN SOUTH AFRICA**

NUMBER	LEGAL STATUS	FREQUENCY	PERCENT
1	Documented	19	38.0
2	Undocumented	31	62.0
	TOTAL	50	100

The number of migrants who have since managed to obtain South Africa IDs is increasing. The increase in the number of people who have entered South Africa legally is evident because, according to this research, at the time of entry in South Africa only 18% of the subject of the study had necessary documentations. Table 4.3 shows that the number of those who have the necessary documentation has increased to 38%. Despite this increase the majority- (62%) - of the respondents still live and work in Durban as undocumented and illegal migrants.

There are two possible explanations, for the increase in the number of Mozambicans in Durban who have since obtained South African identification documents. Firstly, the official acquisition of the South African ID was for the most part achieved by many Mozambicans when the South African government offered Mozambican refugees and other African nationalities a SADC exemption in 1996. The exemption was aimed at assisting Mozambican refugees and other foreign nationals to legalize their status. Mozambicans who had entered South Africa between 1980 and 1992 were eligible for permanent residence in South Africa (Handmaker and Schneider, 2002).

Secondly, long before the inception of the SADC exemption program, many Mozambican migrants had already managed to acquire South African IDs fraudulently. The illegal attainment of South African IDs included, the bribing of Home Affairs officials, and, more often, the change of Mozambican names to commonly used South African ones (Handmaker and Schneider, 2002).

The change of names from Portuguese to South African commonly used names occurs because most Mozambicans do not want to be identified as such for fear of exclusion by the people of the host country or because they are using other people's ID books. This practice is explained by one of the respondents who argues that:

I stayed in Stanger almost a year, and in that year I was learning isiZulu so as to be able to embark on a new mission which was to look for a job. I then got a job as a shop assistant in Mandeni. I got a job there because I had a friend who was working there, so she spoke to the shop owner and I was employed. However, the shop owner wanted my ID, and at that time I did not have an ID. Since I did not want to lose the job, I contacted another Mozambican lady who had a South African ID and I asked her to lend me her ID. She did not hesitate because it was a habit that an ID could be used by more than one person [...]. All these efforts resulted in my having to change my name and I became

known by my friend's name who was Thokozile Lindiwe Hlatswayo<sup>9</sup>.  
(Interview, 25/0507)

The long-stay Mozambicans play a significant role in the illegal acquisition of South African documents. They are able to aid newcomers to obtain fraudulent South African IDs because they have managed to create necessary networks. Some of them have since been fully integrated into all facets of South African society. The following is a statement by one of the long-stay Mozambicans who has lived and worked in Johannesburg and in Durban since 1958 and 1960 respectively:

When I first came to Durban I was not hosted by Mozambicans. I was instead hosted by a Muslim family. As time went by, I hosted a lot of Mozambicans who came to Durban in search of jobs. Still today I host and help them obtain South African ID books. I have assisted over 250 Mozambicans in the process of obtaining ID books. I feel very happy whenever I can help fellow Mozambicans, because I know that if they get IDs and eventually a job they will be helping their families at home and by so doing helping our country Mozambique to grow.

As a member of a ward committee, I have the necessary political connections and for that reason I can help my fellow Mozambicans obtain IDs through my connections. However, Mozambicans, in order to be able to be helped, should not show that they are not South Africans. They need to pretend to be South Africans, by adopting South African names and speaking one or more local of languages.

In relation to names, Portuguese names like Fernando Simão are not appropriate for some one who needs an ID. Then I get them a mother or a father who are local to testify that the person is their son and they need him registered. The people with whom I work do not know about this,

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
<sup>9</sup> Fictitious name.

because I know it is illegal. So people will need to change names and their surnames.

My brother who came to South Africa in 1942 is an example of name and surname changes. He changed his surname from Cossa to Nkosa.  
(Interview, 16/11/06)

South African IDs for Mozambican migrants constitute a vital element in economic and social integration. 86% of the sample admitted that they wish to have South African IDs. Though the subject of this research overwhelmingly expressed the need to have South African IDs, 96% however indicated that they still regarded Mozambique as their home country and had no intention of settling in Durban permanently. This is further evidenced by the fact that 92% of participants claimed that their homes are in Mozambique. The need for South African IDs is to maximize their economic opportunities in the country, particularly employment. 40% of the sample said that they had been denied job opportunities because they did not have IDs.

The graph below reflects the percentage of the respondents who consider Mozambique or South Africa, Mozambique and South Africa as their home.



Besides the fact that the subjects of this research stated that their homes are in Mozambique, there are among the sample people (24%) all who have indicated that they have multiple households. This suggests that they have homes in both Mozambique and South Africa. Among the sample of those who have homes in both countries; most prioritize Mozambique as the place for their retirement. It can be concluded that the majority of the respondents of this study do not intend to spend the rest of their lives in South Africa. A respondent explained:

Though I am working and I and my life here is fine, it is time for me to go home and start my own business and enjoy life by helping other people in my country. You know I am not working for anybody, I am self employed. However, I am fully aware that this is not my country. This country belongs to other people, not me. (Interview, 12/02/07)

Though the majority of the respondents of this study do not regard South Africa as their home and will eventually return to Mozambique, they are reasonably content in Durban. Nearly 85% of the total sample said that Durban met their expectation mainly because they were able to work and financially assist their families in Mozambique. Another important reason why most respondents claimed to be content is because, compared to other major South African cities such as Johannesburg and Tswane, Durban has very few incidents in which illegal migrants are deported. Only 24% of the sample indicated that they had been arrested and deported to Mozambique for being illegal migrants. For the migrants who were respondents, 'arrest' does not only imply deportation but also the loss of belongings they hoped to take home. This relatively more 'secure' situation enables Mozambicans in Durban to concentrate on their work. Only a small portion (16%) of the sample complained of being unhappy in Durban. These cited police hostility (xenophobia), lack of job opportunities and low wages as the main reasons for their unhappiness.

Although the majority said that their expectations have been met in Durban, their living conditions, in terms of housing and access to basic sanitation were impoverished. The

findings of this research show that nearly 90% of the total sample lives in informal settlements on the periphery of the city; more than half live in houses without basic sanitation at an average monthly rental of R300. 14% of the sample did not have running water or electricity in their houses. In case of the nearly 60% who had running water and electricity, the contract for the supply of these services belonged to the landlord or their friends and only 28% of the sample had personal electricity and water accounts<sup>10</sup>. Despite these difficult living conditions, the respondents accept these degrading conditions because they see the present situation as temporary. They are willing to sacrifice today in order to achieve a better future in their home country.

#### 4.5. MOBILITY AS A SURVIVAL STRATEGY

The current flow of migrants is a repetition and continuation of a process initiated long before, and accelerated in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, following mineral discoveries in the Witwatersrand (Ferreira, 1963). The growing interaction between southern Mozambique and South Africa created economic interdependence between the two territories which is reflected on the integration of the economy of rural Mozambique with that of the South African multisectorial economy.

It can be argued, therefore, that “Mozambique today is tied to South Africa by a number of economic bonds which will be extremely difficult to break (Webster, 1977:271).” At the present the emergent economic realities in the region show that the migration of Mozambicans to South Africa is creating new destination areas to which migrants are attracted mainly by economic incentives which differ from those of the past (Crush, 2003). Jobs on the mines nowadays attract a lesser proportion of Mozambicans. Cross-border mobility as an important survival strategy is nowadays important to a growing number of migrants.

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<sup>10</sup> There is a correlation between the percentage of people who have since obtained South African ID and those who have their personal electricity account.



The ways in which the respondents to this survey exploit mobility as a survival strategy include the legal remittance of money and goods to Mozambique, the illegal cross-border trade between Durban and southern Mozambique. The relative easiness of cross-border movements permits a significant number of the respondents to access economic benefits in both countries.

The majority of the respondents in this research, as I have shown, did not show any intention of staying permanently in Durban. A significant 96% of the sample indicated that they remain in touch telephonically with their families in Mozambique. Nonetheless, the most important form of contact that 94% of the total sample has kept up is through the sending of money and goods to assist their families at home.

Most of the respondents in this research (60%) indicate that they commonly send their money and goods through friends (22%) travelling on trans-frontier mini-bus taxis (also know as *chapa*). The fact that the percentage of those who send goods through the *chapa* is higher than those who give them to friends to take indicates that the *chapa* cross the border more frequently than friends who are working in Durban. Sending money and goods through friends or by *chapa* is based purely on trust. As indicated by one of the interviewees: “When I send anything to Maputo, I give the cell number of the driver to the person who is going to receive. They keep in contact with the taxi driver until they meet and collect the parcels” (Interview, 13/03/07). This informal way of sending money and goods, is satisfactory to the greater majority (82%) of the total sample.

The respondents of this study also indicate that they send money and goods to Mozambique in a more formal and structured way by Pantera Azul Bus and Kawena Firm<sup>11</sup>. However, the proportion of the sample which uses formal ways of sending money and goods is small, because most of the recipients in Mozambique do not have *bilhete de*

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<sup>11</sup> Kawena is a service firm which sells and delivers various consumer and non-consumer goods such as building materials to the nearest collection place for the buyers. Most illegal migrants in Durban use this firm to buy and send their goods because it eases their transit at the border, particularly as they do not need to pay import duties and their trips are often uncertain, due to the lack of proper documentation

*identidade* (BI)<sup>12</sup> to identify them. Only 14% and 22% respectively of the sample use the bus or Kawena to send money and goods to Mozambique. The Pantera Azul bus operates mainly in Maputo, while Kawena services stretch over the rural areas of the southern provinces of Mozambique. The ability of Kawena to deliver high-bulk goods, such as furniture and agricultural tools, in the rural areas, from which most of the respondents originate, makes it a reliable service provider. Some Mozambicans who live and work in Durban have purchased and sent home products worth approximately R359.428.50 between January and February 2007<sup>13</sup>.

Sending money and goods from Durban to Mozambique is a common practice: nearly  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the sample send home an average of between R200.00 and R400.00 per month.<sup>14</sup> Many go home at Christmas with a wide range of goods, both food and consumer durables.

The majority of the respondents of this research (60%) send money and goods regularly to Mozambique, which suggests that most Mozambican households with family members who are migrants, particularly in the southern provinces, rely on economic assistance from their members working in South Africa. This was illustrated by one of the interviewee in Inhambane who said that “every man at home works in South Africa. My four brothers are all in South Africa. So our lives depend mostly on our brothers because our mealie-meal, *mandioca*<sup>15</sup> and sweet potatoes are not enough to keep us alive. It is for this reason that we find it difficult to survive if they fail to send us food or money from South Africa” (Interview, 04/04/07)

The most dynamic cross-border movements are those which involve the trans-frontier traders who trade various goods between Maputo and Durban. These traders are scattered in many places throughout Durban, of which the most important are the Beach Front,

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<sup>12</sup> Bilhete de Identidade, is a Mozambican identity document which is issued to people of Mozambican citizenship.

<sup>13</sup> See the Kawena archives in Durban

<sup>14</sup> Many migrants wait several months to amass a substantial amount to send home.

<sup>15</sup> Portuguese name for cassava

West Street, Smith Street, 'the night market' at Mansel Rd, the Flea Market<sup>16</sup> and Warwick Junction Market. Despite the fact that the cross-border traders, who participated in this research project, buy the most of their supplies in Mozambique, they sell them in Durban

Generally, those who source their stock from the local market are street vendors, also known in Portuguese as *vendedores ambulantes*. According to the vendors who took part in this survey, they sell sunglasses, belts, wallets, ladies' bags, and toys. They buy the stock from local Chinese shops at a discount price and resell them in Durban streets, particularly at the West Street, Smith Street, Beach Front and Sunday markets. This group sells mainly in Durban and few cross the border with their products for resale in Mozambique. They indicated that the weaker Mozambican currency makes them prefer to sell their products in Durban. However, they are forced to at least go once per month to Mozambique, due to their visa conditions which allow them to stay no more than 30 days in South Africa. Some of the street vendors explained, "the only time we have to go home is when we have to renew our visas at the border. We go to Maputo at least once per month just for few days and came back and continue with our business" (Interview, 04/07/07).

Traders who buy their stock in Mozambique cross the border weekly. I have identified three groups of traders who get their stock from Mozambique; two consist of women traders and one of traditional healers, also known as *medicos tradicionais*. One group of women sells three legged pots and another group sells Mozambican food stuffs. The three groups buy most of their stock in Mozambique and sell it in Durban. The women selling the three-legged pots do so at Mansel Rd. Those who sell typical Mozambican food stuffs do so at the Sunday market and at the residences of Mozambican families, particularly those who live on the periphery of the city; the *medicos tradicionais* sell mainly at the Warwick Junction market.

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<sup>16</sup> This market has been destroyed.

The three groups of cross-border traders sell their products to South Africans, Mozambicans, and other nationalities, but claim their own customers. Those who sell the three-legged pots sell them to South Africans from rural areas; Mozambican food stuffs like *mandioca*, *matapa*, fish, coconuts, *cacana*, and other types of vegetables, are sold mostly to Mozambicans in Durban and to some foreign nationals. The traditional healers who took part in this research indicated that they sell their medicines to everyone, irrespective of nationality, including the local *sangomas*<sup>17</sup>. However, they emphasised the fact that most Mozambicans, particularly those who cannot access the South African health services, rely on them for health treatment.

According to the respondents of this research, particularly the cross-border traders, almost all goods that cross the border for trade do so illegally because the traders do not have permits that would allow them to import and export. As a result, there is often conflict with border officials who demand import duties. According to the respondents, these duties are prohibitive: if they were to pay, no profit would be derived from the business.

The majority of traders who took part in this research indicated that in order to avoid paying for the imports they smuggle their stock – *contra bando* to the destination country with the help of the border officials or civilians who earn a living by helping people cross illegally with goods. This practice has earned the Mozambican women the name of *mukheristas* and smuggling across the border is known as *mukhero*. As a Mozambican woman working as a cross-border trader pointed out:

Every time, when we come from Mozambique to Durban with our products to sell here in Durban, we use the Manguzi border, particularly when we have a lot of stock. There we have policemen who assist us in getting in our products. We know that like us they are there to help their families, so after telling them what we have, we give them something like R50 and they let us cross the border. If you are lucky, the policemen

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<sup>17</sup> An isiZulu word for traditional healer

just say to you when you come back bring me some fish, and they let us cross the border with our products. If our business was a legal one we would not survive because that it would mean that we pay all kind of fees from Maputo to Durban.(Interview, 03/07/07 )

The fact that the Mozambican traders are able to negotiate their ‘free’ passage at the border posts makes their business sustainable and enables them to sustain their households. The permeability of the borders between Mozambique and South Africa does not only allow simple traders to bring their stock across, but also those who are involved in different kinds of trans-frontier crime, such as the trafficking in humans, the smuggling of vehicles<sup>18</sup> and drugs. It has been reported that “over 1,000 Mozambicans, including children, are trafficked to South Africa every year where they are forced into prostitution or to provide free or cheap labour” (Ayisi, 2007). Though the smuggling of children to South Africa is illegal, it emerges that most children, particularly females, are taken to South Africa with the consent of their parents who, because of poverty, do not have the means to sustain the household. These children usually are taken by Mozambican women who have small children for them to work as babysitters. Human smuggling, particularly of young girls, is common practice among Mozambican families. The presence of the babysitters allows the mothers to continue with their economic activities without needing to worry about their children. Babysitters are crucial for the economy of some Mozambican households in Durban.

The success of the cross-border trade among the respondents is based on mutual assistance. In cases where women traders go to Mozambique to buy their goods, those who remain in Durban rely on them for new stock; as just as the traders going to Mozambique will trust the remaining group to look after their products and other belongings for as long as they are away. The traders in three-legged pots explain, “when

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<sup>18</sup> The smuggling of illegal goods, particularly stolen cars, has made the South African Police Service believe that the border officials are paid by the car syndicates to facilitate the smuggling of stolen vehicles to Mozambique (Sunday Tribune, July 22 2007).

we have to go to Mozambique, usually for a week, we leave our pots as the responsibility of those who stay behind. When we come back they give us the money for the sold pots” (Interview, 03/07/07). Almost all the respondents rely for the most part on informal economic social and networks to advance their interests. The role of these informal economic and social networks is crucial for economic and social integration.

Cross-border traders, like the majority of respondents, do not have access to local services, including hospitals and banking. They have created their own ways of keeping the money and minimizing the risk of using it for unplanned purposes. According to the women traders of three-legged pots, after selling some of their pots, they give the money to other cross-border traders who want to buy goods in Durban to be sold in Mozambique and reclaim it when they go to Mozambique. Women traders in Durban give their money to other women who sell their goods in Mozambique, on condition that the money is returned in *Metical* (Mozambican currency) at an agreed rate of interest. These groups of traders transfer cash from one country to another in an informal way, and involve fellow women traders who know and trust each other.

88% of the sample has no access to the banking system in South Africa. More than half (54%) of the total sample, in order to save and be able eventually to buy goods or send money to their families in Mozambique, keep their money in their rooms in what they call *banco de casa*, which means ‘the home bank’. 46% of them are members of a *xitique* or *stockvel*. Some of the respondents who work as street vendors, when asked about the amount of their daily turnover, replied that:

It is not easy to say how much we take home at the end of the day. It is not easy because it depends on the products and on the time of the year and of the month, the weather and the Metro Police. One thing we can say is that we have to pay every day R100 and once a week R200 for *xitique* (*stockvel*) which involves four people and we are all Mozambicans. That is our guarantee money and that is how we save in order to help our family at home. Other money we use to buy stock whenever we need it. So we can

make for example R700 in a good day, but some money will be used to pay for new stock (Interview, 04/07/07).

Among the cross-border traders in this sample there is a high level of co-operation and mutual support. This is noticeable in the fact that all traders except the traditional healers, who are for the most part long-term residents in Durban, share accommodation with more than two of their compatriots in Durban.

A Mozambican who has spent many years in Durban and now moves between both countries presents an interesting case. After many years in South Africa he was able to legalize his status. He has now retired. When he is in Mozambique he is called Cristino Muianga; in South Africa he is known as Christian Langa<sup>19</sup>. He comes to South Africa at least once a month to receive his pension money and visit his other wife and children. He claims however that Mozambique is his home, because there he has land.

In this section I discuss different survival strategies adopted by Mozambicans living and working in Durban. I have shown that the lack of skills and documentation automatically excludes the respondents in this research from official participation in the social and economic life of their host city. Forced by the need for *sobrevivência* (survival) the majority of them are employed in the informal sector of the economy, and are largely self-employed. In this section I also indicate that informal economic and social networks constructed by Mozambicans are important enabling tools for securing jobs. Mozambicans who succeed in building economic and social networks and earn *confiança* are able to secure jobs through the assistance of long-stay Mozambicans. Though the majority of the respondents of this study have no access to formal social structures, they are able to live and work in Durban through the informal structures they create for themselves.

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<sup>19</sup> Not his real name.

#### 4.6. ASSOCIATIONS OF MUTUAL SUPPORT

For many migrant communities in Durban, like the DRC refugees, churches and other forms of voluntary associations constitute one of the main sources of mutual support (Muzaliwa, 2004). Historically among the Mozambican community in Durban there has not been any single coherent association. The absence of such associations is attributed to the fact that many Mozambicans who live and work in Durban can easily return to Mozambique when they are facing difficulties such as unemployment or illness. The majority of them rely on kinship, tribal and other informal networks, which may impede the creation of formal support organizations, since there is little sense of insecurity among Mozambicans in Durban. Another reason cited by the respondents is that since many of them lived in South Africa illegally during the apartheid period, when any kind of black organization tended to be sanctioned, they were unwilling to draw attention to themselves as undocumented migrants.

In recent years, there has been a growing tendency in the Mozambican community in Durban to form associations for mutual support. I have established that there are at least two associations, one in central Durban city and another on the periphery. The aim of these organizations is to render support to members and in case of death, to raise funds for the transport of the deceased's body for burial in Mozambique. The functioning of these associations is made possible by contribution from members: R100 p.m. each for those in the city centre and R10 p.m. for those on the periphery. Membership of this kind of funeral plan is still insignificant: only 16% of the sample indicated that they are members.

For many Mozambicans, Durban is a low risk destination: There have been few arrests of illegal migrants relative to Johannesburg, and the accessibility of transport to Mozambique enables them to cross the border when a need arises. Mozambicans in Durban usually are able to go home for medical treatment when they fall ill. In the past Mozambicans in Durban tried to ensure that those who die in Durban are transported to Mozambique, and it is likely that this will continue. As a result, few Mozambicans



working in Durban see the importance of an association. This attitude was confirmed by one of the respondents:

What can we do if someone from home has died? We cannot let them be buried in Durban because it is hard for us, we are not used to that. What are we going to tell their families at home? How is the village going to look at us? They will say so and so died and we did nothing to bring them home. They can even go as far as saying that we killed them. So if the village at home thinks like that about you, how do you think will live your life at home? It is impossible; you cannot be at peace with yourself.  
(Interview, 10/03/07)

Apart from funeral services provided by these associations, they also serve to adjudicate and solve problems related to crime, imprisonment and other social problems involving their members. However, as already indicated, these kind of associations are still weak. A significant number of the sample (58%) stated that they were members of religious organizations. Due to the nature of their jobs, however, most of them were not able to participate actively in the life of their churches.

#### 4.6.1. CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have discussed the ways in which Mozambican migrants integrate into the life of the city. The level of integration of Mozambicans is determined by the individual's level of education and his participation in the social and economic networks in the community. Though the majority of Mozambicans in the sample study indicated that they have jobs, this can not be taken as an indicator of economic integration, particularly as they do not have access to the banking system, government services, health facilities and appropriate housing. Mozambican migrants generally do not seek integration, since they continue regard Mozambique as their home and are in South Africa for economic reasons. The continued easy access to land in Mozambique is probably a factor here, but migrants tend to accept that the impossibility of legalizing their residence in South Africa makes permanent residence difficult or impossible. The

economic and social networks, however, among the Mozambican community ensure that those who come into Durban obtain the necessary assistance to overcome their marginality within the communities in which they live. They are also enabled to circumvent the laws that govern migration and labour related processes, and which might otherwise exclude them.

## CHAPTER V

### 5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.1. CONCLUSIONS

The present research reveals that Mozambicans living and working in Durban are relatively young. The majority of the participants are originally from rural areas in the southern provinces of Mozambique. Furthermore, almost all the respondents of this study entered Durban illegally and lack identity documents. The few who entered the country legally became illegal, since after their visas or work permits had expired they continued to live and work in South Africa. The majority of the respondents have only primary education, a function of their rural origin. Among the sample surveyed in this research, males from the three southern provinces of Mozambique are the majority in Durban. However, my study also indicates that there is a gradual increase in numbers of the people from other parts of Mozambique who enter Durban. Another interesting finding is that in contrast to past migration patterns, the migration of women to Durban is currently on the rise, despite the fact that there is a dominant stereotype in southern Mozambique that this form of migration tends to be associated with prostitution and drug dealing.

The findings of this research also show that the overwhelming majority of the sample are economic migrants. Poverty or unemployment and the prospect of better economic opportunities in Durban constitute the dominant push and pull factors. There are however, some people in the sample who originally came to Durban as war refugees. Among this group of people few have since returned to Mozambique and those who remain behind cite the economic opportunities in Durban as a compelling reason for them to stay. Nonetheless they continue to maintain strong links with their families and regard Mozambique as their home country. This is justified by the fact that more than 90% of the respondents indicated that they send goods and money to their home country. Relatives and friends, who form part of the networks of Mozambicans in Durban, generally are used as the 'conveyor belt' for these purposes.

As economic migrants, the respondents of this research provide economic support to their families in Mozambique. This assistance, however, has become a necessity, given that most households, particularly those in the rural areas, depend on remittances and goods sent by their relatives living and working in Durban. The money sent by the respondents of this research is earned in different ways. Nonetheless the majority of them are involved in the informal sector where they work as street vendors, cross-border traders, itinerant traders, beauticians, barbers, motor mechanics and builders.

Informal networks are used as economic and social resources where vital information and other kinds of support can be found. Within the structures of these networks, long-stay Mozambicans play a significant role in the process of integrating newcomers. The majority of respondents make use of the networks, which are based on social capital. Most of them, for example, on arrival were hosted and helped to find jobs by their compatriots, relatives or friends, whom they had known before coming to South Africa. Despite the fact that economic and social networks among the respondents of this research are highly developed, there is no evidence of strong formal organizations in the Mozambican community. In recent years, however, there has been an attempt to create associations with the aim of offering mutual assistance in overcoming the problems and challenges of living in a foreign country.

This research has also established that Mozambicans in this sample are unlikely to find equivalent employment in their home country. This is evidenced by the fact that low- or unskilled Mozambicans see South Africa as an alternative place where they are likely to find economic integration. The respondents of this study strongly believe that South Africa at present offers better economic opportunities because of the informal sector.

Despite all the challenges faced by the Mozambicans in this survey which range from those arising from their illegal status to their lack of formal qualifications, they achieve a degree of economic and social integration. The old economic and social bonds between the two countries create a firm conviction amongst migrants and prospective migrants that they will eventually succeed in different parts of the host country. Thus the

respondents in this research were willing to endure all kinds of hardship arising from unemployment, impoverished accommodation and the burdens stemming from their illegal status. The affinity between the African languages of southern Mozambique and isiZulu, however, allows them to live and work in KwaZulu-Natal without being resented and eases their integration into the dominant African community.

The Mozambicans in this study, characteristically, are marginalized in their home country through the lack of identity documents, low levels of education, and poverty. The fact that they are marginalized in their home country would reduce their chances of integration in Durban, if this were to be attempted on a formal basis. Although the study did not look directly at correlations between education and integration it is clear that education plays a pivotal role in determining at what level it takes place. As I have already shown, only one participant has tertiary education and is economically better off than those who had little or no education at all.

The majority of Mozambicans in Durban, as economic migrants, do not interact with the state. They circumvent the laws of both countries which may be seen as obstacle to their economic goals. This is exemplified by the illegal acquisition of South African identity documents, which they use to gain access to formal jobs, banking services, social grants and other economic resources available to South African citizens.

During the course of the research it became apparent that a further dimension of the question of integration could be found in the activities of cross-border migrants, a group whose activities were not directly considered when the study was framed. Cross-border movements form part of the survival strategies adopted by some of the respondents of this study. Generally they enter illegally with goods to sell in Durban. This process is facilitated by corrupt officials at the border posts or by getting access to either side of the border through dodging the controls of both states. This strongly suggests that the borders are extremely porous, equally allowing transit to traders seeking to earn an 'honest' living and members of criminal syndicates involved in a range of nefarious activities.

The research has established that there is a continued increase in the mobility of people and goods between South Africa and Mozambique. The fact that a fair proportion of this is illegal suggests that both states lack the capacity to control their borders. Neither state has a full count of the real volume of traffic either way. No attempt was made in this study to establish accurately the number of Mozambicans who entered Durban either legally or illegally, but it can be said with a degree of confidence that illegal migrants or those who live and work on the margins of the city, outnumber those who are there legally.

Although the respondents were largely illegally in the city, they were earning an honest living particularly in the informal economy where they are mainly active. Part of their earnings, as mentioned, is sent to assist their households which to a certain extent depend on them for economic survival. The same can be said about the cross-border traders who bring goods to sell in Durban. Though they cross the border illegally and smuggle goods to Durban, this is part of their survival strategies, as people living on the margins. The criminalization of these survivalist activities poses some critical policy problems.

## 5.2. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The informal sector, in which most of the participants of this study are engaged, makes an important contribution to the South African economy. In 1996, there were 20,000 informal traders in Durban Metropolitan area alone (Durban Informal Economic Policy: 2001). This number has since increased, due to the high mobility characteristic of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, and also because the formal sector has not catered for undocumented migrants. The number of Mozambicans who enter the city illegally as job seekers or as traders is likely to increase further because most of the people involved have no other alternatives. This research has shown that the respondents of this study opt for illegality because the cost of doing things legally is beyond their means.


Most traders, for instance, smuggle their goods to South Africa because if they were made to pay dues they would not be able to sustain their business. Viewed from a

regional economic integration perspective, policy makers should consider identifying a specified range of goods as duty-free that would serve to legalize the trade and incentivize trader compliance with transit regulations. Such actions would enable the states on both sides to invest resources to control and prevent the occurrence of serious cross-border crimes which currently characterize the frontier zones between Mozambique and KZN. It would also reduce the risk for traders of doing business and propel them towards devising more innovative ways of practicing their commercial activities.

Mozambicans in Durban are working in different economic sectors. Though the majority of the participants at the time of their entry lack adequate skills, along the way however, these are acquired. Nonetheless, many Mozambicans who are now equipped with competitive skills prefer to work in Durban rather than in their home country. It is demonstrable that they make a valuable economic contribution to the country.

By virtue of being illegal they are subjected to risky working conditions and deportations, losing their belongings in the process, and their skills remain underpaid. In order to capture these skills the South African government should continue to grant temporary residence to those who can demonstrate proficiency in the execution of their jobs. This would boost their earnings and productivity. On the other hand, the Mozambican government should create incentives which will make the country an attractive place to work for those who have since acquired skills.


Appendix 1: Some of the areas in Durban where Mozambicans can be found




Source: Cartography Centre, Howard college, University of KwaZulu-Natal



Appendix 2: Mother tongues spoken  
by Mozambicans in Durban



Appendix 3: Accommodation Indicators of Mozambicans in Durban



Appendix:

Questionnaire: Mozambicans living and working in Durban.

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1-	Gender	Female		Male
2-	Age			
a)	18-25	25 -45	45-60	60
3-	On which year did you come to South Africa? 19..... 200...			
4-	Education completed:			
	Primary			
	Secondary			
	Tertiary			
5-	Do you speak any South African languages?			
a)	Yes			
b)	No			
6-	If yes, which one/s?			
a)	English			
b)	Isizulu			
c)	Tsonga			
d)	Sotho			
7-	What is your mother tongue?			
a)	Tsonga/Shangana			
b)	Xitsopi			
c)	Bitonga			
d)	Portuguese			
e)	Other			
8-	Which part of Mozambique do you come from?			
a)	Maputo Province	urban	suburb	rural
b)	Gaza Province	urban	suburb	rural
c)	Inhambane	urban	suburb	rural
d)	Other	urban	suburb	rural
9-	How did you come to SA/Durban?			

- a) Officially/Visa
- b) 'Unofficially'

10- With whom did you come to South Africa?

- a) Friend
- b) Relative
- c) alone

11- Why did you come to Durban?

- Push factors**
- a) Poverty
  - b) Unemployment
  - c) Other- explain

- Pull factors**
- employment
  - Relatives
  - Territorial proximities

12- Where do you live here in Durban? Name of the area:

- Central
- Suburb
- Township
- Informal Settlement

13- How many bedrooms does your house have?

- 1      2      3      4      5

14- How do you pay your for accommodation?  
R.....

- a) Cash?      Value
- b) Kind/services?
- c) Own?

15- How many people do you live with?

- 1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9

16- What is/are the nationalities of the person/s you live with?

- a) South African
- b) Mozambican
- c) Zimbabwean
- d) Congolese
- e) Nigerian
- f) Others

17- Marital status?

- a) Officially married
- b) Traditionally married
- c) Live with a partner
- d) Single

18- If answered 'yes' to a, b, and c, where is your partner?

- a) South Africa
- b) Mozambique
- c) Other (specify).....

19- If you have a partner what is his/her nationality?

- a) South African
- b) Mozambican
- c) Other

20- How many children do you have?

1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9      10

21- Where do you children Stay?

- a) South Africa: \_\_\_\_\_
- b) Mozambique: \_\_\_\_\_

22- How many homes do you have?

1      2      3

23-Where are/is your homes located?

- a) Mozambique
- b) South Africa

24- How do you get news from Mozambique?

TV  
 RADIO  
 NEWSPAPERS  
 VISITORS  
 NO NEWS  
 CELL/TELEPHONES

25- Which channel do you often tune to or listen to?

- a) TV channel:.....
- b) Radio Channel.....

26- Do you have DSTV channels?

Yes No

27- Do you sometimes send goods from South Africa to Mozambique?

Yes No

28- If yes, how do you send them?

THROUGH KAWENA  
 THROUGH RELATIVE  
 PANTERA AZUL  
 FRIENDS  
 TAXIS

29- Who is the recipient of the goods?

WIFE  
 HUSBAND  
 PARENTS  
 CHILDREN  
 RELATIVES

30- Do you sometimes send money to Mozambique? If yes:

- a) How often?.....week.....month.....year.....
- b) How much? R.....'00
- c) How do you send?.....

31- Do you have any the following appliances?

- TV
- RADIO
- FRIDGE
- IRON
- STOVE

32- Do you have water and electricity in your house?  
Yes No

33- If you have, who holds the contract?

- a) Landlord
- b) Friend
- c) Personally

34- How much do you pay for electricity and water? R.....

35- Does Durban meet your expectation/s- Explain?  
Yes No

.....

36- Who hosted you when you first came to Durban?

- a) A Mozambican
- b) South African
- c) Other

37- What relationship exists between you and the person?

- a) Friend
- b) Relative
- c) Same tribe
- d) Same nationality

38- Employment: - are you:

- a) Employed
- b) Self-employed
- c) Unemployed

39- If unemployed, how do you earn your daily living?

.....

40- What kind of employment or self-employed, do you have?

- a) Street vendor
- b) Construction
- c) Mechanics
- d) Shop assistant
- e) Barber?
- f) Other (specify).....

41- Whom do you work for? a).....

42- What are the nationalities of the people you work with?

- a) Mainly South Africans
- b) Mainly Mozambicans
- c) Other ( specify)-----

43- How did you secure a job/business you have?  
-through a help of:

- a) Friend
- b) Relative
- c) Personally

44- Do you have any bank account?

Yes No

b) Where: Durban? Mozambique?

45- If you don't have a bank account how do you keep your money?

- a) Home
- b) Friend
- c) other

46- Are you a member of a "xitique" (stokvel)?

Yes No

Where: Durban? Mozambique

47- How often do you go to Mozambique?

- a) Year            1        2        3        4
- b) Months        1        2        3        4
- c) Never



- 48- How do you go to Mozambique?
- a) Taxi ----- b) Buss(PanteraAzul)----- c) Private.....
- 49- Why do you go to Mozambique?
- a) Visit  
b) Business  
c) Tourism  
d) Other (specify)
- 50- Are you intending to build or buy a house?  
Yes No
- a) In South Africa  
b) In Mozambique
- 51- What kind of transport do you often use?
- a) Public Transport- Durban Bus Corporation  
b) Public Transport - 'Taxis'  
c) Private
- 52- Do you have permanent residence in SA?  
Yes No
- 53- Do you wish to earn South African citizenship?  
Yes No
- 54- Which country do you consider to be your home?  
a) Mozambique b) South Africa
- 55- Are you a member of a political party?  
Yes No
- a. In Mozambique  
b. In South Africa
- 56- Do you vote in any elections in South Africa- or Mozambique? Which?  
Yes No
- 57- In Durban, do you belong to a:

- a) Church: specify
- b) Sport club: specify
- c) Other . Specify

58- Have you ever been expelled from South Africa?  
Yes No

59- Have you ever been denied any opportunity because of your identity in South Africa? Explain  
Yes No

60- Are you registered with the Mozambican Consulate in Durban? If not, why not?  
Yes No

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