

Title

Managing Public Policy implementation: A critical review of the implementation of the Child Support Grant in South Africa between 2000 and 2004

By

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
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ABSTRACT

Policy implementation is an important aspect of service delivery. It is a process that requires all the involved parties to work together. In addition, the policy to be implemented has to be preceded by extensive planning and capacity to ensure effective implementation. According to Parsons (1995:465), "effective implementation requires a good chain of command and a capacity to co-ordinate and control...".

The Child Support Grant (CSG) is one of the social security grants created by the South African Government to offer financial support to children in need. The CSG is the one that is widely accessed by children. This grant has reached millions of children in South Africa since its initial implementation; however a large number of children still do not receive this grant due to administration problems (Skweyiya 2005:2).

This research project provides a critical analysis of the implementation of CSG between the years 2000 and 2004. A conceptual analysis (content analysis) of secondary studies on the implementation of the Child Support Grant is the scope of this investigation. The study analysed the manner in which the CSG had been implemented by the Department of Social Development (DSD) between the years 2000 and 2004. The findings show that there were many problems that related to the administration of the CSG. The problems ranged from lack of capacity (human as well as organizational) by government officials, to the mode (top-down) of implementation, the employment of bureaucratic methods of implementing policy, lack of system upgrade, street level bureaucrats methods of implementing policies and insufficient monitoring and evaluation by the National Department of Social Development .

The DSD neglected to provide infrastructural support to facilitate the additional number of beneficiaries that resulted from the extension of the CSG to children under 14 years old.

These organizational capacity development problems manifested in the lack of sufficient equipment in welfare offices. Many welfare offices did not have essential equipment (such as chairs, working computers and working telephones) needed to perform their duties. Technical resources such as working computers and telephones are an essential part of implementation. Lack of proper monitoring and evaluation of the administration of the Grant has created loopholes in the system that have cost the Department about R1.5 billion each year from 2000 to 2004.

Another problem was that there were staff shortages in most areas. In areas where staff was available they lacked the capacity to administer the Grant. As a result, wrong information was disseminated to the public concerning the eligibility for the CSG. The data capturing system the Department uses, Social Pension System (SOCPEN) , had not been upgraded to handle greater numbers of applicants. This has led to applicants not being processed, thus affecting service delivery.

The study has shown the impacts these problems can have on policy. Due to the manner in which policy was implemented the DSD ended up losing money, which was intended for beneficiaries, through fraud and maladministration. In addition to money lost, potential beneficiaries could not access the Grant due to obstacles created by government officials as their way of implementing policy effectively. According to Lipsky (1980:149), low ranking street level bureaucrats create ways of coping with their duties through simplifying their authority. This enables them to utilise their authority and impose their job restrictions for reasons of lack of service delivery on their clients .

Due to the scope of “allowed” discretion that street level bureaucrats can exercise, fragmentation of policy is most often experienced during implementation.

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DEDICATION

To the most wonderful woman of substance, my mother, Ms Adelaide Nokwazi Mtshali, the wind beneath my wings. My reason for living, my only son Ntoyonke, this is for the time you were away from your mother I love you both.

ACRONYMS

CSG	CHILD SUPPORT GRANT
SMG	STATE MAINTENANCE GRANT
DSD	DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
IDASA	INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA
CBO	COMMUNITY BASED ORGANIZATIONS
PTA	PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION OF TRANSVAAL
SA	SOUTH AFRICA
SLB	STREET LEVEL BUREAUCRATS
SAA	SOCIAL ASSISTANCE ACT
NCOP	NATIONAL COUNCIL OF PROVINCES
DHA	DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS
KZN	KWAZULU-NATAL
NW	NORTH WEST
EC	EASTERN CAPE
WC	WESTERN CAPE
LP	LIMPOPO PROVINCE
NC	NORTHERN CAPE
MP	MPUMALANGA PROVINCE
NG	NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
PG	PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT
LG	LOCAL GOVERNMENT
PCG	PRIMARY CARE GIVER
MT	MEANS TEST

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The introduction of the Child Support Grant (CSG) is part of the democratic government of South Africa's (SA) initiative to reduce poverty and enable all poor children up to the age of 14 years to have access to financial assistance in the form of a social grant.

As per amended legislation (Social Assistance Act of 1992), the SA government, since 1994, was obliged to provide social assistance to children in need. The provision of social security also serves as a means of addressing childhood poverty in SA. This social security grant was first introduced in 1998. The initial roll-out was implemented in late 1999. In 2001 an estimated 59% of children aged between 0 and 17 lived in poverty in SA (Cassiem & Streak 2001:120). The Department of Social Development stressed that poverty reduction remained the Department of Social Development's priority (Department of Social Development 2002:12).

The CSG benefits children who live below the poverty line. This grant has reached millions of these and other needy children in SA. However, a large number of children still do not receive the grant (Department of Social Development 2005:3). The obstacles to receipt of the grant have ranged from poor or maladministration of the CSG by government officials to lack of efficient monitoring by the national Department of Social Development and to lack of capacity organization (Skweyiya 2005:2).

This grant was to assist in boosting the financial status of a child and a child's household. This monetary assistance is to be utilised for the child's well-being and to create a good environment suitable for the proper nurturing of the child (Department of Social Development 2002:12). Eligibility for recipients is through a means test.

The implementation of the CSG has not proceeded in the manner anticipated by

the Department of Social Development. Various problems have emerged in many aspects of the implementation process. The theme of this thesis is a critical analysis of the administration of the CSG, as reported in secondary sources.

More specifically, the study critically analyses the implementation of the CSG through policy theory and concepts. Some of questions used to interrogate the secondary studies were;

1. What were the problems that have emerged in the administration of the CSG?
2. Do these problems relate to a specific mode of implementation as described in policy theory?
3. Were these problems also related to:
 - › Street level bureaucrats' discretionary powers
 - › Lack of organizational development
 - › Constraining bureaucratic processes
 - › A lack of backward mapping
 - › A lack of sufficient monitoring and evaluation

Chapter 2: Policy Context

2.1. Children's Grant during the apartheid era

The welfare system in South Africa was created in the 1930s to assist white families who could not afford to take care of themselves and needed assistance from the state. One of the services that the welfare state of South Africa provided was monetary assistance to children who were in situations where they were struggling to survive because of poverty (Department of Welfare 1995:7).

The welfare system during the apartheid era focused mainly on taking care of the needs of the poor white people and other needy groups by giving whites, coloureds and Indians state support in terms of state maintenance grants (Department of Social Welfare 1999:3). The welfare system had in place an administration process which was very complex and not easily accessible to black people. It had in place 14 different departments that were responsible for the administration of the welfare system for the different population groups. This led to an inefficient and ineffective service delivery by the Department of Welfare (Department of Social Development 1997:6).

The system had no citizen or stakeholder participation and therefore did not have any welfare legitimacy. The poorest of the poor of the population of South Africa were excluded from the system. Furthermore, the Department of Welfare lacked sustainable financing, because the South African welfare system did not view social needs as important (Department of Social Development 1997:6-7). Even though there were organizations offering social assistance to people who needed it (organizations such as other social work agencies and Churches) these systems were not recognized and did not receive the government's support (Patel 1999:11).

With regard to the grants for children, the Department of Welfare under the apartheid regime offered assistance to children separately from their parents.

Assistance to mothers and children was offered in a form of a State Maintenance Grant (SMG). The SMG was a form of state support that was given by the state if the state was not able to locate or get maintenance from the child's father¹ due to unavailability through death, imprisonment or disability (Department of Social Welfare 1999:15). This grant was given to single mothers and their children. This was given to a child from birth to the age of 18 years. In 1996 mothers were paid R430 per month and children R122 per month per child up to two children (Lund 2002a:20).

2.2. Children's Grants during the Post-apartheid Era

The reforming of the state is a process that is continuous and is mostly expected when a regime changes. In implementing reform the government attempts to redress the imbalances, inefficient economies, corruption and unresponsiveness of previous regimes (Grindle 1997:77).

When the African National Congress (ANC) government came to power in 1994, there was a need for the welfare system to be reformed, because of the racial imbalances that existed in service delivery. The reformation of the welfare system allowed for the inclusion of black people into the system. However, from 1994 to 1998 the new government was still operating under the old welfare system and still used the SMG as a form of state support for children in need (Department of Social Development 1997:23). This was to enable the transition to proceed smoothly, without cutting the supply of welfare services to the public.

During this time, the new government embarked on a process of finding a more equitable welfare system. This was because, even though blacks were included in the system, people living in rural areas were still not included. This process was in the form of the Lund Committee and it made recommendations to the government (Lund 2002a:2). In 2000, the Department of Social Welfare became

¹ The state had a system of making fathers who leave their partners with children to pay for their upbringing, until the age of 18.

the Department of Social Development.

Unlike the apartheid regime, the ANC government viewed the welfare system as important in bringing about social development in South Africa. As a way of creating an efficient system, one National Department, and several Provincial and Local welfare departments, were created. Non-Governmental Organizations, as well as other stakeholders' and partnerships became important mechanisms in the implementation of the social welfare policy (Department of Social Development, 2002:4).

The Child Support Grant Policy was introduced in 1998 to replace the SMG and was created to redress racial imbalances, also to address the issue of child poverty in South Africa (Cassiem & Streak, 2001:24). The CSG started operating in late 1999 under the new Department of Social Development. This Grant is not restricted to single mothers but can be given to primary care-giver(s) of the child². Eligibility for the Grant is through a means test.

The strategic plans of the Department of Social Development concerning CSG were to ensure the registration and payment of grants to all eligible applicants. They planned to do this by increasing the reach of CSG. The Department's target was to reach three million children by 2003. In 2004 the target was 3.2 million and for 2005-2006 the target is six million children (Department of Social Development, 2005:4-5). Initially the Child Support Grant was to be given to children between birth to seven years of age and the amount was set at R110 per month.

Due to the fact that the CSG was not reaching enough children and many vulnerable children between the ages of eight and eighteen were still not covered by this grant, the Department had to extend the age of eligibility for the CSG. In

4. A primary care-giver can be a parent, grandparent, or anyone who is mainly responsible for looking after the child.

2003 the first extension was from seven to nine years old and the amount was increased from R110 to R160. Since then each year the amount has increased. It is now (2005) R180 per month and the age has been extended to 14 years (Hunter, 2003:20).

2.3. Policy Framework

The CSG has been implemented through a top-down mode of implementation. The Department of Social Development has one national and several provincial and local departments. These three spheres are supposed to function in a holistic manner, where the national department provides funding to the Provinces to implement. Local authorities have to do the actual administration of the Grant (Department of Social Development 1997:6-7).

The National Department of Social Development is responsible for allocating the budgets to the provincial departments. This provision of financial resources is to ensure that implementation takes place. However, they are also mandated by the Welfare Policy Guidelines to offer administrative support to the Provincial Department on projects and policy implementation (Department of Social Development 1997:20-23)

Provincial Departments are tasked with the planning, implementing and co-ordination of the CSG, according to the national standards. This entails ensuring uniform implementation of the Grant in all provinces, to formulate, co-ordinate, review and administer social welfare within the framework of the national policy. The provincial departments then delegate this function of implementation to the District Offices (Department of Social Development 1997:15).

Local government (District level) is responsible for performing those welfare functions that have been decentralized to them by the provincial office. What this means is that the provincial department has authority to delegate welfare functions, especially with regards to service delivery to local welfare offices

(Department of Social Development 1997:25).

The CSG is awarded to applicants who are eligible. Their eligibility is evaluated using different qualifying criteria. These criteria are used as a means for government officials to determine the intended target population for the Grant.

2.4. Grant Administration

Before money or resources is awarded to applicants, officials have to assess the applicants' status, to verify their eligibility. The applicant's eligibility is judged using the guidelines specified in a grant. The officials are expected to be efficient in the administration of social security, because social security has been created to help those in need. Therefore the process should not take too much time; because people are in need of the grants (Gerbers 2001:217). When there are changes in the processes they need to be well communicated, to ensure that the payment to beneficiaries continues as planned (Gerbers 2001:217).

As a means of ensuring that the CSG reaches the eligible child, the grant is given to a primary care-giver. The CSG is payable through a means test which tests the eligibility of the applicant. This means test requires for people living in rural areas not to earn above R1 100 per month or R13 200 per year. If the applicant stays in an urban area, but lives in an informal settlement, they should not earn more than R1 100 per month or R13 200 per year (Department of Social Department 2004:2-5).

The means test serves as a basis for the Department of Social Development's officials to judge the applicant's eligibility for receiving the grant. Apart from income, there are other factors that government officials have to consider in terms of eligibility. The age of the child applying for the Grant has to be verified beforehand. Before the extension of the CSG to children up to the age of 14 years, the age restriction was up to the age of seven years (Department of Social Development 2004:3). In 2002, children under the age of nine years qualified for

the CSG. From 2004, children below the age of 11 years also became eligible for the Grant. As of 2005 children below the age of 14 years became eligible for the CSG (Department of Social Development 2004:2).

Another requirement is that an applicant should be a South African citizen and should reside in South Africa. The care-giver should be in possession of a 13 digit, bar-coded Identity document and the child should have a bar-coded birth certificate which is obtainable from Home Affairs offices. However, as from 2004, as a result of a Constitutional ruling, permanent residents are also eligible for the Grant (Leatt 2001:7).

A care-giver cannot apply for more than six non-biological children. A child will not receive the CSG if the care-giver is not South African, or if they receive child maintenance (from the father) for the child or children concerned. This means that anyone who gives birth while in South Africa is not eligible for the Grant if they don't fit the requirements. The administration of this Grant has to proceed in a prescribed manner, as per requirement of the policy (Department of Social Development 2004:3).

The CSG has to be awarded in compliance with the guidelines to eligibility. Government officials are not expected to process any application that falls outside the prescribed requirements. The specification of age serves as means by government to create boundaries for the target group. The target population is specified through geographical criteria (only South African citizens in 2000-2004), age (no children above 11 years) and income levels (through a means test). However, in 2005 people with permanent residence in South Africa were also eligible for the grant.

The implementation of the CSG plays a critical role in ensuring that the intended target population is able to access the grant. Therefore, using the eligibility criteria is an important way to administer the CSG. Stipulated guidelines spell out

the process that the officials responsible for administering the CSG need to follow. These guidelines are a means through which government ensures the uniform implementation of the Grant throughout South Africa.

2.4.1. Department of Social Development Application Process

In the policy process the target population can be reached through the implementation of the policy or programme and the manner in which the policy is implemented can determine whether the target population would be reached or not. The policy has to design an appropriate delivery system to ensure for the effective and efficient delivery of the program or policy at hand (Rossi & Freeman 1989:139).

During policy or programme implementation the implementers have to ensure uniform delivery in all the relevant areas. A uniform delivery system ensures that there is no variation in implementation which might compromise the policy and lead to the target population not being reached. The context might be different, but the services provided have to be uniform for all the areas, to ensure that the intervention addresses the problem it is meant to address, in areas of need (Rossi & Freeman 1989:139).

As a means of administering the CSG, the Department of Social Development outlined a process to be followed by officials when implementing the Child Support Grant. All social security grants have to be implemented uniformly; there is a set procedure that has to be followed. Specifications for administration differ according to the grants (Gerbers 2001:214) .The registration process for the Child Support Grant are:

- Local welfare offices handle applications for the CSG. This enables services to be brought closer to people.
- In instances where a primary care-giver is not well, or too old, another family member or friend can apply on their behalf.

- Home Affairs officials should assist the applicants in filling out the application form.
- A receipt has to be issued to the applicant as proof of application; this is used for paybacks, where necessary.
- The receipt must be kept, as it serves as an applicant's only proof of application.
- Government officials should not ask for money for CSG application.
- If the application is not approved by the Welfare Office, applicants must be informed in writing about the reasons their application was not approved (Department of Social Development, 2004).

These guidelines specify the uniformity that has to be employed in the administration process, which every official involved in the process of the Child Support Grant needs to follow. Since this is a national intervention, all applicants should receive the same intervention, throughout.

Gerbers (2001:215) states that registration is influenced by the scope of coverage of that scheme. This means that if the extent of coverage is wide, the administration process needs to be capacitated to be able to handle a bigger coverage. The bigger the scope of coverage the more reason it has to be controlled and monitored strictly, to prevent possible irregularities.

The registration of applicants is undertaken to provide the DSD with records and information on the applicants and also to assist in verifying eligibility. In order for the target population to be reached, they have to be registered or rather be aware of such intervention which is accessible through registration (Gerbers 2001:215). There are different modes in which a Grant can be accessed and methods of payment differ.

The system that the DSD uses for capturing information of applicants is called Social Pension System (SOCPEN). This system was initially used to administer

pensions, and further adapted to include the children's grant. The SOCPEN pension administration system was developed, implemented and maintained by the former Provincial Administration of Transvaal (PTA) in 1987 (Yako 2001:7). The system administered and paid pensions only for a specific population group. It was in 1994 that all the Provincial Welfare Departments decided to amalgamate the 14 pension payment and administration systems into one system. It was decided to make use of the SOCPEN system. The process of using SOCPEN started in 1994 and was completed in 1996 (Yako 2001:5).

The functionality on SOCPEN thus had to be changed to accommodate the different payment methods and also accommodate contracts such as the Post Office, CPS and All Pay. This system enables the Department to record the age of the child, the information of the primary care giver, the date of the first application, results of the application and all the information about the applicant. This information has to be updated regularly, to ensure that proper implementation takes place (Hunter 2003:14).

2.4.2. Methods of receipt of the CSG

Grants are paid out through cash payments by private contractors appointed by the government, through bank deposits, post offices and institutions. According to the intergovernmental fiscal review, it costs the government about R30.14 per person to administer any grant (in KZN); this is regardless of the value of the grant (Hunter 2003:5). Even though there are different modes of payment of the grant, most recipients still use the cash payment method; this is so because beneficiaries try to avoid bank or other charges (Department of Social Development 2005:7). The target population has to be identified in order to ensure that the intervention reaches the people targeted.

Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework

3.1. Policy

Policy is better known as the course of action utilized and followed by a government, party or ruler. This course of action can either be an advantageous or measurable course of action (Hill 1997:6). In his definition Friend (1974:40) defines policy as essentially a stance which one articulates, that contributes to the context within which a succession of future decisions would be made. A policy allows for goals and objectives on social issues to be concentrated on. These goals and objectives are backed up by legislation.

Helco (1972:85) defines policy as a course of action or inaction, rather than specific decisions or actions; policy is not only about making decisions but also about indecision by a government, party or ruler. In his definition he stresses that indecision also forms part of policy. This legitimizes the government's choice of non-decision as a decision in itself, thus concluding that indecision is tantamount to decision-making, because this reflects a stance taken.

In essence, policy involves a course of action or a web of decisions, rather than one. Hill (1997:7), however, in his definition differs and argues that policy often develops around the implementation phase rather than the policy-making phase in the policy process. This is because the implementation phase determines the feasibility of the policy goals to be attained. Implementation also informs decision-making for policy formulation (Hill 1997:7).

Public policy can be defined as a relationship between governmental unit(s) and its environmental setting. Howlett & Ramesh (1995:4) view this as a description of what the government intends to do and not to do. Most often, public policies

are developed by government bodies and officials. They are designed to accomplish specific goals and results that are needed by their environment. These have a course of action that the government intends to take over a period of time. James & Anderson (1997:10) agree with Hill (1997:7) that a policy does not only include the decision to adopt the law or make the rule on issues but influences decisions with regards to the implementation of the law (James & Anderson 1997:10). The nature and dynamics of policy implementation therefore needs to be explored.

3.2. Implementing Public Policy

The manner in which a policy is implemented plays an important role in determining whether such policy has a chance of success or not. Pressman & Wildavsky (1973, in Hill & Hupe 2002:45), define policy implementation as “a process of interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared to achieving them”. A policy contains goals and ways of achieving them. The implementation process is a tool used to achieve the desired goals by the policy, through practice. According to Pressman & Wildavsky (1973 in Hill & Hupe 2002:45), policy implementation depends on a number of links involved in the implementation “chain”. These links vary from financial support, constituency building and the interpretation of the policy by the implementers.

Pressman & Wildavsky (1973 in Hill & Hupe 2002:45) argue that in order to achieve favourable outcomes from the policy, certain conditions need to be met, for instance clear objectives have to be established, commitment of adequate resources, clear channels of communication and personnel responsible for managing resources need to be clarified. Once all this is determined, then the policy stands a chance of being implemented properly.

It is crucial to note that a series of logical steps followed does not guarantee the

achievement of the desired outcome of the implementation. Policy implementation does not progress from intention, through decision, to action (Barrett & Fudge 1981:10). However, actions should remain at the centre throughout the policy process. Most often, new policies are created and fitted into the old system. This system is then expected to implement the policy in a manner in which the new government operates and plans need to be put in place for it to be implemented. This is better understood as organizational structure modification, which entails fitting a new policy into the old organizational structure or if necessary creating a new one. This ensures a better suited environment for the policy's success, when implemented (Hill & Hupe 2002:60-80).

This is a complex but important task, because government officials (street-level bureaucrats) can refuse to implement the new policy. Their refusal can be overt or covert. They can use delaying tactics to indirectly delay the implementation of the policy at hand. Sometimes they can direct their problems to their superiors, namely about the policy being unsuitable for their work environment. Their refusal could be for different reasons. One reason might be because the loyalty they had to the old system or because the new policy will confuse or destroy the routine they had established. Consequently, street-level bureaucrats usually create their own routines to manage their work better; therefore these rules become "new policy" (are treated as policy) as a means devised for their coping mechanisms (Hill & Hupe 2002:60-80).

The final task in policy implementation is monitoring policy impact; if the policy is successful its impact should be visible one way or the other. This means that the impact can either be positive or negative. However, because the policy reforms are usually long-term the impact of the policy might sometimes not be immediately clearly visible (Brinkerhoff & Crosby 2002:45-60). Monitoring is continuously done throughout and, as the implementation continues, street-level bureaucrats reformulate policies to better suit the environment and the

reformulation can only be done if monitoring of policy takes place consistently throughout the implementation process or period (Exworthy & Powell 2004:34-50). Weimer and Vining (2005:275) state that there are certain factors that affect success or failure of policy implementation. They include logic of the policy, assembly of the policy and the availability of “fixers” to manage assembly.

Logic of the policy

This aspect looks at the theory that underlies the link between the policy and intended outcomes. The characteristics of the policy and circumstances around its adoption will influence whether the policy succeeds or not. The theory underlying the policy must be examined to see if it is suitable to be used for the policy concerned. More often a policy is formulated under the assumption of a theory that works in one context but will not automatically work in another context. This affects the logic of the policy, because contextual aspects affect the implementation of policy (Weimer & Vining 2005:275).

Assembly of the policy

In the implementation process, essential elements have to be assembled. One of these essential elements is resources. The securing of resources can sometimes become a political issue. Those that are more likely to gain enough resources usually have political influence. This is why it is important during constituency building to involve those people with political influence in the constituencies (Weimer & Vining 2005:276).

Availability of “fixers” to manage assembly

The fixers are those people who intervene in the policy implementation process during the assembly phase. They help implementers to gain needed resources that have been withheld due to politics surrounding a particular policy. Fixers can be people from an interest group who are in favour of the policy, or local

administrators. Fixers have political or personal connections with the people withholding resources. Due to their political advantage their involvement can determine if the policy will gather adequate resources needed for its implementation (Weimer & Vining 2005:278-279). Once the above have been established, monitoring and evaluation helps to direct the “fixers” to the roots of the problem.

3.3. Modes of Implementation

Policy implementation can take a top-down or a bottom-up approach. These two different modes of implementation Hill & Hupe (2002:48) views as the ultimate methods in which policies are implemented in the public sphere.

3.3.1. Top-down Approach

The top-down approach is a form of authoritative policy decision-making, which imposes the implementation of policy on subordinates. It focuses on power and at policy being implemented by the top level of government (Hill & Hupe 2002:48). Their implementation, however, does not involve actual work, but transfer of authority and functions to the subordinates for grassroot implementation. The top-down approach is, in essence, an implementation strategy which is characterized by government officials making and implementing policy that affects citizens. It does not consider the participation or involvement of the citizens in the policy-making or implementation process.

The top-down approach involves a transfer of instructions to the lower levels without authority to change or take decisions on implementation (Anderson 1994: 215-216). This model is mostly involved in planning, control and hierarchical transfer of instructions to subordinates (often these are street level bureaucrats). The planning the “top downers” are involved in relates to the method of implementation to be used. What is involved here is finding out possible methods

that best suits the policy at hand and then comparing it with other similar implemented policies. Once the policy implementation method is created, it is tested to verify its competency to the policy at hand; this is mostly employed using a forward mapping model (Hill & Hupe 2002:175).

Forward mapping

This is a way *top-downers*, as Hill & Hupe (2002:176) call them, utilize to ensure that the implementation process is properly planned. Forward mapping looks at the specification of the chain of behaviours that link policy to a desired outcome. This involves specifying what must be done and by whom, in order to reach the intended outcome (Weimer & Vining 2005:281).

In forward mapping a person planning and designing an implementation should consider how policy implementers will behave and how their behaviour can be influenced. In this way the policy implementer has to predict what could go wrong and formulate means to counteract that (Weimer & Vining 2005:282). With regards to control, the top downers exert control over the policy and procedures involved in policy implementation. They dictate measures to be undertaken and they expect the policy implementers to follow instructions specified in the policy (Hill & Hupe 1994:175).

Hierarchical discipline in the top-down approach is important. The hierarchical way gives no authority for lower-level personnel on decision-making, even when it concerns their functions. The lower level personnel are expected to report using the ladder for all the problems and difficulties they are faced with regarding implementation. These could include problems related to the processes to be followed (Anderson 1994:216). However, as might be expected, this approach is synonymous with time delays and red tape, because of its rigidity which leads to unnecessary obstacles to service delivery.

The top-down approach to implementation has other shortcomings. The top-down mode of implementation is said to view implementation as nothing more than assembling actions in support of orders and intentions of political leaders(Hill & Hupe 2002:174).

The top-down approach is also concerned with supporting the regime and allowing consistent decisions on implementation to be made by political leaders (Hill & Hupe 2002:174). This restricts the emergence of policy contributions of actors far from the political leaders (Hill & Hupe 2002:174). The regime and the ideologies of the political leaders can be viewed as more important than the issues on the grounds that arise from implementation. Furthermore, the hierarchical structure may result in inefficient service provision or limit the potential number of users of the service. This can be done by prolonging processes which discourage applicants from accessing the system, because of time spent trying to gain access.

3.3.2. Bottom-up Approach

This approach focuses on how the policy implementers carry out the policy, compared with simply focusing on the instructions they must follow. It is based on the lower level and concerns activities of street level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980:14-20). The bottom-up approach is more flexible and it focuses more on the output than the input. This mode of implementing policy is more concerned with the outcome. The flexibility is a result of the manner in which street-level bureaucrats conduct their responsibilities (Hill 1997:140). According to Lipsky (1980:14-20), street-level bureaucrats are bottom-uppers, they are involved in policy implementation and the outcome depends on the procedures in place to implement policy.

Backward mapping

Backward mapping complements the bottom-up approach. Backward mapping assists the bottom-up approach model to focus on the behaviour and intervention that will lead to change. The best intervention that could alter behaviour is then chosen. In the bottom-up approach the people affected by a situation are involved in decision-making and they at least get to influence the policy-making process (Weimer & Vining 2005:283). With backward mapping one is able to start at the end (with the street-level bureaucrats) and trace what led to such actions. Backward mapping allows for planners to come up with a number of alternatives to choose from in arriving at an outcome. Backward mapping, according to Hill & Hupe (2002:56), ensures that street-level bureaucrats' methods of implementing policy can change policy. This is why the implementation has to be closely monitored.

3.3.3. Street-level Bureaucrats

Hill & Hupe (2002:49-50) argue that street-level bureaucrats shape and formulate policies, making them conducive to the environment they are dealing with (Hill & Hupe 2002:49-50). Street-level bureaucrats work at the lower level of the bureaucracy, as delivery-point officials, who interact with their customers or clients on a daily basis. They are responsible for implementing policies given to them by their superiors. Street-level bureaucrats (SLBs) face two sets of constraints: from their senior managers who may demand conformity to rule and from the clients or customers (the public that benefits from the policy's results and demand adequate service). SLBs may have to use their discretion at times, to achieve results. As a result of such pressures they create their own routines to cope. These routines are, however, not reflected in the policy document but should be considered as policy (Lipsky 1980:14-20, 83).

As a result of such pressures and also a lack of water-tight policy documents

(that spell out every action and step taken), street-level bureaucrats tend to create their own patterns of practice that help fill in the gaps and/or use the available resources to maximize their efficiency. Since SLBs regularly interact with clients they can obtain their clients' compliance over the new procedures and contingency plans (Lipsky 1980:83). The manner in which policies are implemented by SLBs assist in ensuring that policies are properly implemented and thus assist in ensuring good governance and consolidation of democracy in South Africa.

3.4. Good Governance

Good governance involves among other functions, encouraging public participation and to making government more responsive to its electorate (Diamond 1999:120). Diamond argues that decentralization helps to consolidate democracy. Decentralization is said to achieve this through developing the democratic values of citizens, increasing accountability of government, providing channels of communication, enhancing checks and balances and allowing for parties to exercise their power over government (Diamond 1999:122). Therefore, as means of consolidating and developing good governance, decentralization of administrative functions to local level is vital.

3.4.1. Administrative Decentralisation

Administrative decentralisation is defined as "...the transfer of responsibility for planning, management, and the raising and allocation of resources from the central government's agencies to subordinate units or level of governments..." (Peters 2001:24).

The decentralisation of administrative duties has largely been adopted by Third World countries, especially those that gained freedom/ independence in the late 1980s (Peters 2001:23). Decentralisation, in this instance, involves the devolution of power by the central office to local offices that are seen to be

'closer' to the people or situation that is being addressed. The purpose of decentralisation of functions is to facilitate a more efficient and effective provision of public goods and services. However, decentralisation also serves the political motives of legitimising the regime in power through increased participation (this also serves to deepen democracy, since the opposition is also involved, to some extent, in government and in decision-making) (Peters 2001:24). As means of cultivating a culture of good governance it is important for organizations to learn skills that will help them solve current as well as future problems. According to James (2001:15), organizational development forms part of capacity-building for organizations, to equip them to be more strategic in the attainment of the organization's goals.

3.4.2. Organizational Development

Capacity-building encompasses different strategies that are focused on increasing the efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness of government's performance (Grindle 1997:5). Efficiency in this context relates to the time and resources required to produce a given outcome. Effectiveness refers to the appropriateness of efforts undertaken to the production of desired outcomes and responsiveness relates to the link between the communication of needs and the capacity to address them (Grindle 1997:5).

To build capacity, gaps in the system need to be identified, so that capacity building initiatives are aimed at the areas where problems are observed. When referring to capacity-building in an organizational context the emphasis is on making human resources better equipped, thereby making the organization better equipped. Capacity-building can focus on contextual constraints and/or dynamic processes. These two allow for human resource development, organizational strengthening and institutional reform to be examined (Grindle 1997:10).

Grindle (1997:12) stresses that it is important for organizations to look into capacity strengthening, other than development. She argues that this is so because organization capacity-building is used as means of strengthening the organization. Most often organizations are faced with needs for capacity development. These include human resource and technical development, technical.

Human resource development

Human resource development involves the supply of professional and technical personnel. The development of human resources is an attempt to increase the individual's or team's capacity to perform their duties better. Training of personnel, increased remuneration and motivating staff tend to lead to better performance. The increasing of remuneration is aimed at attracting skilled workers and retaining them in the public sector (Grindle 1997:13). However, Grindle (1997:65) argues that retaining workers in an organization should not be the focus of capacity strengthening.

Organizational strengthening

Organizational strengthening forms part of capacity development. Peters (2001:85) states that organizations need to be capacitated to ensure that they continue to function effectively and efficiently. Strengthening organizations takes place through directing resources towards an area of the organization that lacks capacity. This includes the purchasing of equipment that assist in better performance and creating strategies that work better for the policy or programme at hand. Peters (2001:75) emphasizes that most organizations need to have capacity to enable them to be more flexible in their functioning (Peters 2001:89).

3.5. Monitoring and Evaluation

Evaluation is viewed as a systematic assessment of a programme or policy, to determine the successes and progress of such programme or policy. Evaluation can be conducted systematically or informally. Systematic evaluation enables the “evaluation to be conducted employing social science research techniques”. This allows for carefully found outcomes that adjudicate for a thorough and more precise way of improving the programme or policy (Weiss, 1998:4). However, even though specific rules and procedures are followed in systematic evaluation, the subjectivity of the evaluator can shape the outcome of the evaluation (Palumbo & Hallet, 1993:11).

Informal evaluation is usually conducted carelessly and more often leads to improper judgement and incorrect decision-making. This is a result of unfounded procedures, which are employed as the process of evaluation unfolds. This can be explained as groping along, which is also explained as learning the process as the policy is implemented (Bardach 1998:42). The informal evaluation method is not granted legitimacy because there are no formal procedures followed. However Worthan & Fitzpatrick (1997:7) point out that this type of evaluation does not occur in a vacuum, that there are organizations that do not always evaluate their programmes through formal procedures, but still make legitimate and sound judgements (Worthan & Fitzpatrick 1997:6).

The core concept of evaluation is judgement, using certain measurements to give merit to the programme's success rate or its failure and giving possible reasons for the outcome. Monitoring allows the organization to redirect the intervention in order to achieve intended goals. When evaluating, one reviews the goals and objectives of that particular programme or policy and sees if they have been achieved and, if not, find reasons for this (Weiss 1998:7).

Rossi & Freeman (1989:139) argue that specified goals in policy assist in directing the evaluation process. This ensures that capacity development or strengthening is directed at the actual problem area. They stress that it is important for the problem's targets to be clearly identified, to ensure that the policy or programme is addressing the target population it is aimed at. By clearly specifying the target boundaries this can help in determining who is to be included or excluded by the policy or programme. Specifying the target population in detail helps create this boundary of reach and prevents a blurred and broad population to be included (Rossi & Freeman 1989: 97).

Monitoring is very important in the implementation of the policy, because it allows for the problems to be addressed before it is too late. Monitoring forms building blocks of evaluation, but some writers use the term interchangeably. Rossi & Freeman (1989:98) point out that, when monitoring is properly done, it assists in redirecting the intervention towards the intended outcome. This is because the outcome of the monitoring usually reflects the picture of what is happening with the implementation of the policy.

According to Worthan, Sanders & Fitzpatrick (1997:15), with proper monitoring it is possible for policy-developers to create a solution that would counteract the problems resulting from the implementation. As Barrette & Fudge (1981:9) states every implementation has its accompanying problems. However with proper diagnosis of these problems during the evaluation process, they can be easily resolved before they become unmanageable.

In order to employ such theoretical tools in analyzing secondary studies, the methodology used to do this is always important, because it can determine the success of properly extracting information from the text.

Chapter 4: Methodology

4.1. Research method

This study will use qualitative content analysis of secondary data. Qualitative method is the method of study that displays, analyzes, summarizes and interprets words and images based on the information (Neuman 2000:87).

This is an inductive approach of study that put emphasis on insights and generalization of data collected. This method of study collects soft type data in the form of words and impressions (Neuman 2000:122).

4.2. Content analysis

Content analysis is defined as a technique used to gather and analyze the content of the text. It is used as a research tool that concentrates on the actual content and internal features of media or publications. Content analysis is used to establish the presence of certain words, concepts, themes, phrases, characters or sentences within texts or sets of texts and to quantify this presence in an objective manner(Neuman 2000:292).

These texts take different forms, from books, book chapters, research papers, interviews, discussions, newspaper headlines and articles, historical documents, speeches, conversations, advertising, theatre (documentations), informal conversation or any type of communication on the subject researched (Neuman 2000:292). To conduct a content analysis on a text, the text is coded, or broken down into manageable categories on a variety of levels; word sense, phrase, sentence or theme. It is then analyzed using either a conceptual or a relational method of analysis (Berelson 1974:1-7).

Content analysis enables the researcher to interpret the content in any source of communication such as books and articles. "Content analysis allows for studying beliefs, organizations, attitudes and human relations" (Neuman 2000:293).

The present study used content analysis on the findings of other studies to

discover the types of problem encountered by government officials when implementing the CSG. More specifically, the study coded the problems thematically (from the secondary studies) and critically analysed them, using implementation theory.

The investigation focused on selected secondary studies which dealt with the problems of implementation of the CSG in South Africa between the years 2000 and 2004. The scope of the study included all nine provinces. The following are examples of the secondary sources which were analysed.

Government /Policy Documents

1. Department of Social Development. 2002. Strategic Plan 2002/2003-2004/2005. Pretoria. Government Printer.
2. Department of Social Development. 1997. White Paper for Social Welfare: Pretoria. Government Printer.
3. Department of Public Administration. 2000. Batho Pele: A Better Life for All South Africans *Putting People First*. <http://www.dpsa.gov.za/batho-pele/about.html> (Accessed on 25 November 2005).
4. South Africa. Social Assistance Act no 59, 1992.
5. Department of Social Development. 2004. Progress Report on Implementation Looking at Problems Encountered by the Department and the solutions made. Pretoria. Government Printer.
6. Department of Social Development, 2003. Fact Sheet: Social Grants Beneficiaries. Pretoria. Government Printer.
7. Department of Social Development. 2003. Service Delivery-Grants-children. http://www.socdev.ecprov.gov.za/services_service_delivery/grants/children.html (Accessed on December 2005).

Media Releases

1. Department of Social Development. 2004. Media Statement by Minister for Social Development, Dr Zola Skweyiya, to announce the anti-fraud, anti corruption and maladministration campaign, including a call to those not eligible but receiving social grants, to come out and be considered for indemnity. Pretoria. South Africa.
<http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2004/04121316151007.htm> (Accessed on 18 July 2005).
2. Department of Social Development. 2003. Statement by the Minister of Social Development, Dr Zola Skweyiya, at press conference on the 3 million children registered for the Child Support Grant. Pretoria South Africa. <http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2003/03071812461001.htm> (Accessed on 20 July 2005).

Published studies

1. Goldblatt, B. 2004. Gender and Social Security Seminar: The Rights to Social Assistance and Gender: A Study of Implementation of the Child Support Grant. Heinrich Boll Foundation. Johannesburg. South Africa.
2. Hunter, N. 2004. Welfare Grant Administration in KwaZulu-Natal: Looking at the Child Support Grant. Durban. School of Development Studies. <http://www.ukzn.ac.za/csds/Publications/rr62.pdf> (Accessed on 15 June 2005).
3. Leatt, A. 2003. Reaching out to Children: An Analysis of the First Six Months of the Extension of the Child Support Grant in South Africa. Children's Institute. Cape Town.
4. Mvulane, Z. & Rosa, S. 2003. Delays are Causing Costly Confusion. Children First. Journal. Vol.7 (49): pp6-7. Durban.
5. Ngwenya, N.G. 2003. An Evaluation of the Implementation of the Child Support Grant Programme in Mpumalanga Province: A Case Study of the Daggakraal Community. (Unpublished thesis).
6. Rosa, S. & Meintjies, H. 2004. The Case for Universal Support. Children

First. Journal. Vol 8 (58): pp57-59. Durban.

7. Rosa S. & Mpokotho, C. 2004. Extension of the Child Support Grant to Children under 14 years; Monitoring Report, Alliance for Children Entitlement to Social Security (ACCESS). Plumstead.

Chapter 5: Findings and Analysis

Introduction

According to Exworthy and Powell (2004:246) an ideal implementation is said to be a product of unitary organizations, with clear lines of authority, like that of an army. They agree with Pressman & Wildavsky's idea (1973 in Barrett & Fudge 1981:254) of implementation involving a chain of command and that the links are imperative to ensure proper implementation. This means that, in a chain, if one linkage is not performing well, it impacts on the implementation process.

With regards to the CSG, this policy is implemented following the top-down mode, as conceptualized by Hill & Hupe (2002:254). The findings illustrate that the manner in which this policy is implemented creates numerous problems, which has resulted in ineffective and inefficient implementation which is related to the use of this top-down approach.

The policy was later extended to children up to the age of 14 years. However, this extension was not coupled with increased capacity, to ensure that the system could efficiently deliver. This was mainly due to a lack of organizational capacity development.

The importance of continuous monitoring and evaluation of the Grant was overlooked. This created problems of maladministration, loopholes in the system and improper practice, all of which impinged on access to the Grant by beneficiaries. Empirical evidence of all these problems is found in the secondary studies and they reveal the dangers of the Government using the top-down mode of implementation.

5.1. Top-down Implementation

According to Hill & Hupe (2002:48), the top-down approach is a form of

authoritative policy decision-making, which imposes the implementation of policy on subordinates. It concentrates power at the top and at policy being implemented by the top level of government. In South Africa there is a delegation of functions with regards to policy on social grants from national to provincial and by provincial government to local government (Department of Social Development 1997). It is argued that, among other benefits, this delegation helps to empower local communities. However, it has also been pointed out that legislation by itself is insufficient to address social problems.

Grootboom stated that "mere legislation is not enough. The state is obliged to act to achieve the intended result and the legislative measures will inevitably have to be supported by appropriate, well directed policies and programmes implemented by executive" (Rosa & Mphokotho 2004:8).

This allocation of authority by national government does not specify the type of authority that is given to the local authorities with regards to decision-making when encountering problems. This lack of dissemination of real authority and information to local level leads to problems of incorrect interpretation of the information, which affects effective implementation. In examining the chain of command of the CSG, the problems of the top-down mode were evident.

5.1. 2. Chain of Command

Pressman & Wildavsky (in Hill & Hupe 2002:89), argue that implementation has to occur in a manner where all links in the chain work together. The chain of command refers to the links involved in the implementation process. According to Lipsky (1980:14-20), street-level bureaucrats are people who work at the lower level of the organization; they interact with their customers or clients on a daily basis. They are responsible for implementing policies given to them by their superiors. Government structures in South Africa operate in a manner that enables all three spheres (national, provincial and local) to work as one entity. Each sphere is granted different responsibilities and authority to fulfil their

functions. The main objective for these different spheres of government is to meet the national objectives; this means that anything that is not in line with the national goals is not to be implemented (Department of Social Development 1997:23).

The National Department of Social Development gives a mandate to the provincial departments to perform functions that are in line with the goals of the National Department. The provinces then disseminate instructions to regional offices, who inform district offices on the processes to be followed (Department of Social Development 1997:15).

The White Paper for Social Welfare (Department of Social Development 1997:23) states that *"The National Department is responsible for national norms and standards for rendering services and for ensuring uniformity in the application of particular functions is maintained"* and, according to the Department's reports, *"The Department is responsible for: the drafting of policies and legislation to achieve the strategic goals set by the Minister for social development sector"* (Department of Social Development 2004:1).

This delegation of authority enables the provincial government to delegate some of its functions to the local level (district offices) for implementation. The main function of the provincial government is to work in conjunction with the national government in policy planning, development and implementation.

According to the White Paper the Provincial Government is responsible *"...concurrently with the National Department, for planning, development and rendering services"*
"...to determine and review policy and to conduct integrated welfare and development planning which will be implemented interprovincially, intersectorally and in collaboration with the RDP (Redistributive Development Programmes)" (Department of Social Development 1997:23).

This delegation of functions to the provincial government leaves the local government with the functions of offering support to the implementation process that is by bringing “government³” to the people. The reason for the formation of such structures was to empower the public by bringing (as part of consolidating democracy) government to them (Department of Social Development 1997:23). It has been stated by the government that:

“The Government is committed to the decentralization of the social welfare services delivery system” and that

“The Department of Welfare will develop a strategy for the delivery of services at local government level in consultation with the stakeholders” (Department of Social Development 1997:24).

This means that the local government (district level) is responsible for performing those welfare functions such as service delivery that have been decentralized to them by the regional office. The provincial department has authority to delegate welfare (implementation) functions, especially with regards to service delivery to local welfare offices (Department of Social Development 1997:25).

The delegation of different functions to different levels has led to problems in the implementation of the CSG. These problems were mostly experienced at the provincial and local (district) level of governance.

In a 2004 study on CSG in Gauteng and the North West Provinces by Goldblatt it was found that government officials in the district offices asked the applicants applying for CSG to provide documents that were not required by law, such as clinic cards. According to Social Development’s requirements, these clinic cards no longer form part of requirements but a 13 digit bar-coded birth certificate does.

³Government meaning all the services they need and interacting with the government institution at the local level, in their districts, municipalities, towns, without having to go to a national office.

As a result, many people, especially farm workers in the North West Province, could not access the grant because they had no access to clinics (Goldblatt 2004:47).

In her study, Goldblatt (2004:43) reported that *“Clinic cards are no longer the requirement for a grant application yet officials believe that they are essential”* *“Applicants are often sent, unnecessarily to police station to swear to affidavits...”*

The dissemination of incorrect information to applicants could be a consequence of the long chain of command, as any amendment to the procedures to be followed needs to be communicated to provincial then district offices. At times these changes are not properly understood or communicated. The district personnel then exercise their own discretion, or include additional information or requirements that are not required by law. This changing of procedures is a result of incorrect information disseminated to district offices, leading to the fragmentation of the policy (Lipsky 1980:75). According to Lipsky (1980:75), the manner in which policy is implemented using a chain of command can lead to policy fragmentation. This results from the changes that occur at the lower levels of the organizations in pursuit of a response to unclear commands.

Another obstacle noted in the present study was that CSG applicants were required to produce a letter of proof of residence. In rural areas in the North West a person had to go to local Chiefs to ask for such a letter and if they owed the Chief payments for taxes or other contributions this letter was withheld from them. Such procedures prevented people from accessing the CSG. Proof of residence is not a requirement for accessing the CSG (Goldblatt 2004:48).

In the Gauteng Province applicants were asked to provide a letter as proof that they had attempted to gain maintenance from the father but failed. This is however not a prerequisite for receiving the CSG but government officials still require such documents before completing an application.

Goldblatt (2004:49) reported that *"In Gauteng the officials asked for applicants to produce proof that they had attempted to get maintenance from the father of the child before they could apply for the Child Support Grant. This referral meant money had to be paid for private maintenance claims, and this process is time consuming. The referral procedure showed the lack of coordination between government departments involved in the Child Support Grant application"* (Goldblatt 2004:49).

At times these delaying tactics are utilised by District offices to buy time to enable them to confirm procedures. In research in provinces such as Mpumalanga, Limpopo, Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, conducted by Mvulane & Rosa in 2003, children who were eight but under the age of nine were turned away. The information provided to applicants was that only children under the age of 8 qualified for the grant in 2003 (Mvulane & Rosa 2003:6)

Rosa & Mvulane (2003:6) reported that *"An eight years-four-months old Sibusiso Mahlangu qualifies for the Child Support Grant as amended this year (2003), however Sibusiso's mother has been turned away several times by officials in Odi in the Mabopane, who say he will only qualify for the Child Support Grant in 1 April 2004"* (Mvulane & Rosa 2003:6).

Lipsky (1980:83) argues that this interpretation and formation of different rules that are not consistent with the national protocol of administration is a way created by street-level bureaucrats to cope with the pressures they are faced with (Lipsky 1980:83). The misinterpretation is due to lack of understanding of information by street-level bureaucrats and as a result they formulate their own rules.

Another problem which results from the long chain of command is that there is often duplication of functions by the national and provincial governments. This

leads to confusion by the public about who has correct information and who to report to when a problem related to implementation arises. Sometimes local authorities who are given instructions to follow are faced with the problem of interpretation or confirming what must be done. In the case of the age criterion, the Minister of Social Development announced in 2003 that children under nine would qualify for the Grant. However, when it came to implementation some Provincial officials only accepted children under eight years old.

As Mvulane & Rosa (2003:6) reported, *"the Minister of Social Development, Dr Zola Skweyiya... in March[2003]...made a firm commitment that as from the 1st of April (2003) children under 9 years of age, who are eligible in terms of the regulations, will be registered to receive the Child Support Grant until their 14th birthday"* (Mvulane & Rosa 2003:6).

Rosa & Mpokotho (2003:20) stated that *"despite the fact that the new regulations were clear and directives issued in provinces to apply the new law-according to the National Department- certain provinces continued to issue information that stated that only children under eight years qualified for the CSG"* (Rosa & Mpokotho 2003:20) and that *"the confusion around the implementation of the extension of the CSG was also fuelled by misinformation supplied by some Provincial Departments of Social Development..."* (Rosa & Mpokotho 2004:20).

The situation in reality has been that these chains of command (from national to provincial to local level) are not as effective as they are supposed to be, because the manner in which the structures function is not holistic. The local level is usually left out of the decision making process. According to Barrette & Fudge (1981:3), government seems to be adept at making statements of intent, without proper implementation of the actual situation. This means that they are unable to put their plans into action.

The creation of a chain of a command has been used to establish a theoretical

framework for government. This process, however, often undermines the attempt by government, because it leads to inefficient and ineffective policy implementation. Barrette & Fudge (1981:4) argue that government through its operation attempts to influence control more than it has the means to do so.

The holistic (all three spheres working as one towards the same objectives) manner in which the government tries to accomplish its chain of command is not clear, if it exists at all. These problems affect the sphere that, most of the time, does not have answers to the problems they face when implementing the CSG. Street-level bureaucrats can also act contrary to the attempts by the South African government to ensure good governance for its citizens.

5.1.3. Street-level bureaucrats

The term "Street level bureaucrats" refers to the professionals who work at the lowest level of an organization. They are responsible for the implementation of policies (Lipsky 1980:3). Lipsky (1980:13) points out that street-level bureaucrats can formulate policies through their use of routines to simplify their work. With regards to the CSG, the problems that made accessing the CSG difficult for applicants included lack of information about grants, inability to access birth certificates and ID documents from the Department of Home Affairs and inefficient and corrupt welfare officials (Goldblatt 2004:47).

The Minister of Department of Social Development reported that *"...we are now aware of that there are indeed thousands of people who are not eligible in terms of age in receiving the grant but are doing so"* (Department of Social Development 2005:3).

Research carried out by Hunter in 2004 in KwaZulu-Natal revealed that, in the Inanda area, government officials had reserved certain days in the week for grant application because of the increased number of applicants for the CSG. This led to applicants being turned away on the days that the officials in this area had not

allocated for CSG applications. However, the procedures set out in the policy state that the officials are required to administer the Grant every day of the week (Hunter 2004:16).

The Minister of Social Development, Dr. Zola Skweyiya, acknowledged that there is uncontrollable maladministration by government officials in relation to the CSG (Department of Social Development 2005:4). He stated that in some areas (government) welfare officials engage in improper implementation of the CSG. This maladministration of the Grant has also taken the form of fraud and corruption.

Hunter (2004:19) reported that *"...in rural areas in KwaZulu-Natal ...at some welfare district offices where the applicants have to pay a cut of their grant to welfare officials once received,...community leaders who write letters or affidavits for grant application also demand payments for doing so"* (Hunter 2004:19).

In her study in the Daggaskraal in Mpumalanga Province in 2003 a member of the pension committee reported that *"I was shocked when the representative from the centre told me that applicants have to pay for application forms"*. *"People... complain that they are unable to apply for the grant because they have to pay money to the committee or the officials before they could have their application processed"* (F7- pension committee member in Ngwenya 2003:51).

The Department of Social Development's guidelines clearly specify that applications for the Grant are free. Requesting money from applicants thus constitutes improper conduct on the part of government officials. The only requirement is a 13 digit bar-coded identity document and a birth certificate for the child (Department of Social Development 2004:3).

Another problem experienced by applicants related to the prejudice of officials. In the study by Goldblatt (2004:47), it was found that one official said he could

not assist younger applicants because he believed that they got pregnant deliberately to receive the Grant. There are many other beliefs held by government officials that serve as an obstacle to effective target participation.

Goldblatt (2004:47) reported that government officials *“only assisted old women to access certain documents needed for applying, but not young women, because they wasted the Child Support Grant”* (Goldblatt 2004:47).

Street-level bureaucrats thus implement policies in a manner that they think is suitable and will help them cope with their workload. Street-level bureaucrats create routines and gain their clients' compliance and this is why they introduce new rules and regulations (Lipsky 1980:84-87).

In trying to cope with the complexity of their work, street-level bureaucrats create routines and simplify their work, which they do in order to develop responses to the information that they have received and processed. These routines are created to make tasks manageable and these end up being the organization's policy (Lipsky, 1980:84-87).

The CSG was implemented to assist in reducing poverty in South Africa as a whole. The target of the DSD is national; the policy has to be implemented in the same way from the Western Cape to Gauteng Province. However, in practice, the contrary has been experienced. Each province has altered the manner in which the policy is implemented. This means that the policy is fragmented and the intervention received no longer resembles the intended one. According to Hill & Hupe (2002:49-50), street-level bureaucrats shape and formulate policies, making them suitable for the environment they are supposed to be implemented in. This changing of policy fragments the initial policy. This fragmentation can become a tool to eliminate some people who are part of the target population, thus affecting the impact intended by the policy.

In the Gauteng province it was found that the Gauteng Provincial government had instituted a requirement that applicants had to bring their children with them to the offices, when applying for the CSG. This change was initiated in 2003, after years of the grant being implemented without asking applicants to bring their children. The interesting factor here is that presenting the child at the offices does not necessarily prove that that child is yours. The “baby borrowing” problem then arose (Goldblatt 2003:52). (This “baby- borrowing” is done through changing the outfits of the child and using different care-givers.)

Mbambo (2005) reported that *“one woman comes with her baby and rents her baby for a couple of hours, to people who are around....”*. *“ She charges them money upfront, and the outfits are for changing the sex of the baby for different mothers or caregivers”* (Mbambo 2005:35).

Provisions of a legislative framework are to prevent such misconduct. This gaining of compliance is not as abstract as it sounds. It is enforced through creating rules and procedures that applicants are required to abide by, in order to gain assistance. Applicants do not have a say as to whether they agree or not, but they have to oblige if they need assistance (Lipsky 1980:25).

As a result, SLB’s (street-level bureaucrats’) clients agree to adhere to such requirements. By doing this the officials create ways of coping with the load of people accessing the CSG. Such conduct is improper policy implementation, which often leads to ineffective and inefficient officials (Lipsky 1980:84-87).

The critical issue, however, is what happens to the policy as a result of successive refinement and translation. This changing of rules and gaining compliance, while implementing different procedures to those stipulated changes the policy and the extent to which details of legislative, administration procedural processes reflect or relate to the original intentions.

The question of what is being implemented becomes an area of concern. If what is implemented is different to the intentions of the original policy, is that good or bad? Sometimes changing the implementation model to show the flexibility of the policy, in order for the policy to fit local circumstances is bad. This is because the original policy goals have been distorted in the process (Barrett & Fudge 1981:18).

To ensure that street-level bureaucrats do not fragment policy, monitoring and evaluation can be done, to ensure effectiveness and efficiency in implementation.

5. 2. Good Governance

According to Grindle (1997:7) creating good governance and co-operative government is what many countries strive to achieve. This includes being democratic, responsive to the public's needs and, most importantly, delivering services to the public as efficiently and effectively as possible. Even though the South African Government has created programmes and projects to ensure that its citizens enjoy the benefits of good governance, the system is still faced with various problems. These problems usually result in poor policy implementation and accountability.

Poor implementation does not only result in the fragmentation of legislation, but also creates more problems that affect the uptake of the CSG. The consequences of this chain of command go beyond governmental lines. It affects the very same people that the intervention is formulated to assist.

Local government in South Africa plays an important role in the implementation of CSG policy. Local government is directly involved in putting policy into practice. The National Department has had limited communication with local government. This limited interaction leaves the local government with little or no power to participate in the reformulation of the policy. Local government is often given instructions about the changes made to the policy but not how these

decisions were made (Mvulane 2003:6-7).

According to Cohen & Peterson (1999:21), decentralisation of functions with authority allows for all spheres of government to work together effectively. This means that Local Government gets involved in the decision-making process; they are not only tasked with implementation. This then limits misinterpretation of instructions, thus leading to proper execution of instructions. In order to ensure that local government does not reject the changes in policy, they need to be granted some authority to be able to contribute to policy reformation. There is a danger in excluding local government from decision-making, because local government can affect the manner in which policy is implemented (Diamond 1999:161).

Government's policies are frequently implemented through the top-down mode of implementation. This, according to Pressman and Wildavsky (1973:58), involves a decision by top officials on the way implementation will take place and the issuing of instructions to the subordinates to implement policy.

The Social Development guideline for service delivery reported that *"the grant is managed by Social Security Officials in the employment of the Government"* (Department of Social Development 2005:1)

The subordinates are expected to follow a hierarchical method of implementing policy. They are given specific instructions to follow; when a problem arises they have to complain to their superiors, who take the matter upwards until it reaches the top level. However, the top-down model does not allow for the implementers to make give suggestions or recommendations on solving the problems arising from implementation (Hill & Hupe 2002:174).

According to the ICESCR (International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), *"it is therefore very critical that gaps and shortcomings are*

identified in order to fulfill the constitutional obligation of delivering services that are stipulated by law” (Rosa & Mpokotho 2004:9).

Hill & Hupe (2002:178) cautioned that it is presumptuous of government officials to take decisions on matters that they are detached from. As a result of their position, policy planners rely mostly on research, learn about their target population. The people who are closely associated with, or located near, the target population are not granted enough powers to contribute to decision-making. The control by the top level, which is not even aware of the conditions and processes involved in the local communities, opens gaps for inefficiency in implementation planning. Knowledge of the target population, their values and their beliefs is important for a proper intervention to be made (Hill & Hupe 2002:176).

The national and provincial components can sometimes be useful because they can be objective in their decisions. This limits rushed decisions based on a few cases only a combination of top-down and bottom-up approach is therefore necessary for more efficient policy implementation. These two models complement each other, especially in cases like this one that requires both (Hill & Hupe 2002:178).

5.2.1. Bureaucratic Processes

Social Development officials have experienced difficulties with the system when implementing the Child Support Grant. The problems relate to the long procedures for processing the CSG. The administration process, in a nutshell, entails filling out application forms at the welfare offices. When the application is completed, with the assistance of a welfare official, it is handed to the administrator to be checked and entered into the database. The applicant is then issued with a receipt as proof of application. This allows for paybacks (where necessary) caused by bureaucratic delays. With red tape and procedures to be followed the application process takes longer than it should (Hunter 2003:65).

This long process was described in a study by Hunter (2004): *"an applicant's file has to follow the applicant and the capturing process for this application cannot proceed until the applicant's file is received from this other welfare office- a process which can take from two to three months"* (Hunter 2003:20)

Hunter (2003:21) reported further that *"after the application is completed it is verified by a second attesting officer,...in most offices this happens days after the application date,...the application has to be batched together with other applicants' files and sent to the regional office for approval, and the time in which is to be approved is 14 days from the date of application"* (Hunter 2003:21).

This bureaucratic process prevents flexibility and efficient service delivery. When the applicant leaves, the welfare offices are under the assumption that their application is queued up for processing. However, this is not always the case. The process is long and the tasks could be completed by a few officials, to avoid the extended duration the application process takes. The long process makes it difficult and creates a backlog in service delivery (Hill 1997:199).

It is in this context that it is strongly argued that *"there also needs to be a simplification and reduction in the bureaucracy associated with administration of grants"* (De Swardt 2003 in Hunter 2003:9). Leatt (2004:7) states *"sometimes the application takes months before the applicant gets a response to their application"* (Leatt 2004:7).

The time spent on processing applications before approval contributes to the inefficiency in the administration of the CSG, thus affecting the implementation thereof. Many applicants reach the cut-off age while they await approval; this then decreases the number of eligible applicants (like Siphon who was eight years old in 2003 and was turned away) (Rosa & Mpokotho 2003: 18). Siphon's sister reported that *"my mother tried to register Siphon for the children's grant early this*

year. But she was told he (Sipho) does not qualify" (Access 2003:3).


The Grant application process is then viewed as a futile exercise for government officials because they file applications that are more likely to be rejected, because of the prolonged process. This, in turn, discourages the officials from taking applicants who fall within a certain age group, which is what leads to mal-administration. However, new processes assist the government officials to cope better with the application process (Mvulane 2003:6).

In one study an applicant stated that *"I explained to the officials that on the radio they said [Sara] qualifies for the grant. But they [the social worker] insisted that she will only qualify next year [2004]"* (Mphokotho & Rosa 2003:18).

Government officials from several offices were found to be practising the same "rules". These "rules" were created as means of avoiding processing applications that had a chance of being rejected, because of the time consumed by the top-down process of implementation. Such rules endeavour to ensure efficiency and remove the blame or burden of having to explain to applicants why their applications were rejected. According to Lipsky (1980:156) street-level bureaucrats create new rules to help them cope with their workload, but these rules create obstacles to service delivery.

These rules are communicated through notices *"In the office of social services there is a sign stating" "only children under eight"*
"Many children who were born in 1994 were turned away in 2003 in many offices..." (Rosa & Mpokotho 2004:24).

Peterson (Peterson in Grindle 1997:161) states that bureaucratic processes are mostly utilized in large organizations: government utilizes them to implement its policies. The bureaucratic way of implementing policies ensures that there are clear line functions. This is then used to bring about order and adherence to



processes and rules by government officials (Peterson in Grindle 1997:161). With regards to the implementation of the CSG, however, this does not work.

The bureaucratic process has created additional problems (such as poor service delivery) to the ones existing in CSG implementation. This (bureaucratic) system is not transparent, instructions from the top are different to those at the local level and therefore service delivery is affected (Peterson in Grindle 1997:161).

According to Peterson (Peterson in Grindle 1997:162) bureaucratic processes more often become an obstacle to service delivery, because of their inflexible nature and the red tape involved. He argues that if government is to effectively implement its policies it should work on trying to make the bureaucratic process more flexible. Flexibility will allow for focus and prioritizing service delivery rather than a number of people performing a task that could be completed by a few people (Peterson in Grindle 1997:162). Apart from the bureaucratic process, which remains unchanged and inflexible, there other methods which policy-formulators should use to counteract the unfriendliness of the system. Weimer & Vining (2005:283) state that, in order to have an impact with implementation, it is important to first think about the behaviour one wishes to change and find suitable intervention to alter behaviour. This is what is called backward mapping.

5.2.2. Backward Mapping

Backward mapping is a method mostly utilized by policy-makers to find alternative solutions to a problem at hand (Weimer & Vining 2005:283).

Backward mapping enables the policy-writers to back-track their steps, through assessing the behaviour of the public and know where they went wrong, when designing an intervention. Most often this insight to the problem can be attained through finding out what the problem is and what the needs are, according to the target population (Weimer & Vining 2005:284).

The public's perspectives on the problems concerning the administration of CSG were mostly concerned with the process involved in the application process.

Information concerning the problems encountered by beneficiaries or target populations were gathered by the Children's Institute Call Centre (Rosa & Mphokotho 2004:4-6). This Call Centre was operated by the Children's Institute (CI). Most of the reports in 2003-2004 included complaints about the extension of the Child Support Grant to nine year old children (Rosa & Mphokotho 2004:4-6). The complaints ranged from the long process and the complicated nature of the phasing-in process, to a lack of understanding of new criteria for the target population by both government officials and the public. Through the cases reported by officials as well as the public it was evident that there was some degree of confusion concerning the process.

Rosa & Mpokotho (2004:19) reported that *"children aged nine... were denied the CSG due to the prolonged application process..."* *"Ms Nkosi applied for the CSG for her twin daughters at Indwe [EC] mobile office, which only visits the area once a month. Ms Nkosi applied for the CSG on the 26th of May 2003; the twins are born on 17th of September 1994, were thus aged eight at the time of application"* (Rosa & Mpokotho 2004:19).

Applications of this nature were mostly rejected because, by the time the responses came back, or rather when the processing took place, children no longer qualified.

Several examples illustrated this problem: many applicants like Mrs Shisi were denied access *"Mrs. Deneo Shishi from KwaNdebele in Mpumalanga was also sent away on the basis that her eight year eight months old daughter did not qualify, who was born on 25th August 1994, would only qualify after the 1st of April 2004"* (Rosa & Mpokotho 2004:19).

Mrs Mahlangu stated that *"after looking at my son's birth certificate, the official told me that a child born in 1994 does not qualify for the Child Support Grant. He also added that they were only registering children who were born in 1995"* (Rosa & Mpokotho 2004:19).

The lengthy period used to process applications in the regional offices has had an effect on service delivery. According to the “Batho Pele” principles (these stipulate the guidelines for service delivery), which all government departments are supposed to adhere to when dealing with the public (service delivery conduct), “people should come first”; the prolonging of the process therefore affects this (Department of Public Service and Administration 2000:1).

Thus the backward mapping method has been found to be more useful because actual issues are attended to and this assists in ensuring that the views of the public are heard (Weimer & Vining 2005:284). In order for an organization to be able to use such modes of ensuring proper implementation, it has to have sufficient capacity to be able to utilise its resources and expertise more effectively.

5.3. Organizational Development

According to CDRA (CDRA 1995:26 in James 2000:15) organizational development can be defined as “the discipline of creating and applying processes aimed at developing the capacity of organizations, where capacity is seen as their increase in organizational awareness and consciousness such that the organization is better able to take control of its own functions and future in a responsible manner”. The ability of an organization to build capacity and be able to solve future problems is viewed as key in ensuring effective and efficient attainment of goals (James 2000:15).

Sufficient resources are required, especially for new policy to be effectively implemented (Brinkerhoff & Crosby 2002:35). The accumulation of resources is done by constituencies⁴. These constituencies are tasked to assist the policy-formulators in acquiring adequate resources to ensure that the policy would be

⁴ Constituencies consist of people with political legitimacy, and power that can influence the allocation of resources to see through the implementation of the policy.

implemented. Resources include financial, human, technical and material resources (Brinkerhoff & Crosby 2002:35). Due to the extension of the CSG, more applicants were added to the system. However, there has not been any provision of extra mobile units.

There have been numerous organizational problems that the Department of Social Development has encountered when implementing the CSG. These have ranged from shortages of materials, improper buildings used to house the DSD, lack of capacity of staff, staff shortages and lack of capacity of the system used to capture data (SOCPEN). These problems have been mostly experienced in provincial and local welfare offices. The welfare offices are supposed to be housed in permanent premises, with sufficient equipment and space to provide an effective working environment.

This lack of additional infrastructure, or upgrading thereof, led to the Department experiencing what Pressman & Wildavsky (1973:76 in Hill & Hupe 2002:44) define as the "implementation deficit". Implementation deficit can be understood as the increase in the number of shortfalls created by the small cumulative number of the links involved in an implementation chain.

This deficit can cripple the implementation process and hinders the meeting of goals stipulated by the Department. Policy-makers frequently overlook the impact that the different aspects needed for implementation has on the outcome.

The lack of proper infrastructure contributes to the inefficient administration of the CSG. All these infrastructural-related problems prevent the Grant reaching the beneficiaries. The strengthening of an organization hinges on the capacity of the management to use trained staff. Grindle (1997:15) stresses that restructuring and upgrading of physical resources, among other initiatives, is essential for strengthening the organization.

5.3.1. Material Development

In KwaZulu-Natal Province in Ulundi, Pietermaritzburg, Midlands and Durban regions some of the welfare offices were housed in old buildings and others in new buildings. Of those that were housed in older buildings the infrastructure did not allow for the proper administration of the Grant (Hunter 2004:11).

In the Daggaskraal study a member of the pension committee reported that *“councillors and social development officials in Mpumalanga Province in Daggaskraal community who are responsible for the CSG roll out reported difficulty as a result of insufficient infrastructure. Government officials and councillors reported that the increase in the administration load of the CSG applicants was not backed by proper infrastructure and adequate resources”* (F7 pension committee member in Ngwenya 2003:75). A further concern raised was that *“we wish as we have two pay points to have one pay point is not enough especially registration of a densely populated area like Sinqobile”* (F7 in Ngwenya 2003:75). Further, *“The infrastructure problems lead to delays in registrations. The implementation in Mpumalanga Province (Daggaskraal) has also not proceeded well because of infrastructure problems”* (F1 a beneficiary in Ngwenya 2003:69).

This is also confirmed in Hunter’s study in *“older buildings tended not to be able to facilitate the large number of applicants who could be seen waiting in corridors or along verandas”* (Hunter 2004:11).

With the extension of the CSG the applicants had doubled and therefore required increased physical capacity to administer the Grant.

Infrastructural problems are the ones related to the lack of technical resources, like telephones, computers, desks, chairs, etc. The personnel officer in most offices in KwaZulu-Natal had access to the telephone while other office members

had no access to telephones in their offices. This then means that when the personnel officer is not available no one would have access to telephone since not all welfare officials have telephones in their offices (Hunter 2004:12).

Hunter also reported that *"in most of these buildings there has been a power cut which interferes with the functioning of the offices"* (Hunter 2004:12).

Shortages of functional computers have also been the problem experienced by most offices in the provincial and local level. This problem affects the implementation of the Grant, because computers are essential in their administration as they are required to enter the data into the system (Department of Social Development 2004:3).

Hunter reported that *"In one office one of the computers is used for typing only"* (Hunter 2004:12). Further, *"Apart from shortages of computers, another problem is that most of the computers in use are relatively old and slow. In one office one of the three computers was described as being; "always out of order"* (Hunter 2004:12).

According to James (2000:11) organizational capacity incorporates the ability of an organization to mobilize, organize, and use organizational infrastructure to ensure that all individuals are working towards a common goal. Other means of ensuring great participation of and organization is the development human resources. In addition to human resource development, systems used by organizations in their job performance should always be upgraded when essential to ensure effective and efficient policy implementation.

5.3.2. Systems Development

The administration system used by DSD for the administration of the CSG is known as SOCPEN. SOCPEN refers to a Social Pension system, this is used as a daily recording system of applicants, who receives the grant, and applicant's

whose application was rejected. This data recording system has been inefficient, and could not be upgraded to better suit the increased target population coverage (Yako 1998:7-8).

SOCPEN had had its problems even before it was used to administer the children's grant. It could not complete the processing and updating of payment information timeously, SOCPEN introduced cut- off dates for payments in the provinces, to allow sufficient time for SOCPEN to process data. However, this arrangement has negative implications on service delivery for the provincial governments, the beneficiaries and to limit the number of beneficiaries to 1000 per day per pay point the contractor has to deploy more equipment and resources which is only used for half the month (Yako 1998:7-8).

Due to the fact that SOCPEN does not have real time access to Home Affairs database on the deceased, those beneficiaries who are deceased remain on the payment system for a period before SOCPEN is updated for DSD. This leads to the payment of non-existent beneficiaries (Yako 1998:7).

In his study Yako (1998:7) reported that "in short the SOCPEN system could not handle the data processing which is required by all the users. It is more than 10 years old and is a system which has been patched to such an extent that it could fall over in the future" (Yako 1998:7).

These were the reports on the system in 1998. This is an indication that the system has to be upgraded or better equipped to avoid bringing these problems into the new system.

In Rosa & Mpokotho's (2004:24) study they indicated that *"one of the reasons given for the fact that qualifying children were not allowed to apply for the CSG in social services offices in some provinces, was that there were problems with the SOCPEN system itself"*(Rosa & Mphokotho 2004:24)

One government official commented that *"the SOCPEN has not been upgraded and it is difficult for the system to accept applications for children who are above the age of seven years. These problems with the system also prevented us from making payments to children who turned nine years by the time their application has been approved"* (Rosa & Mpokotho 2004:24)

The administrative system forms the core of the implementation of the CSG; if it is not upgraded accordingly it thus contributes to ineffective and inefficient service delivery. The DSD acknowledges such problems with the system, however does not come out with means in which such problems could be dealt with while they upgrade or create a stronger system (Hunter 2004:19).

In his speech to the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) in June 2001, the Minister of Social Development, Dr Skweyiya did not dispute the reports by government officials of SOCPEN not being capacitated to carry more loads. He confirmed that the DSD is aware of the problem with the system and looking into ways of changing this.

The Minister also agreed that *"our grants payment system, SOCPEN, is neither appropriate for nor up to the task of providing the kinds of management information required to ensure the effective delivery of social assistance"* (Skweyiya 2001:2).


"The Council of Social Development Ministers has agreed to replace the antiquated SOCPEN system within two years" (Department of Social Development 2001:3)

Another illustration of the lack of capacity is with regards to the inability of the SOCPEN system to carry over applicants already in the system, to the extended years once they reached the previous cut off age. The system still categorises beneficiaries as new applicants, re-applicants and continued applications (Rosa & Mphokotho 2003:16).

“This last upsurge is consistent with the fact that, in the last two months of this phase of the extension, there were 24,000 children whose grants lapsed ...”

“In February and March 2004 there were only 13 and three such cases respectively” (Rosa & Mphokotho 2003:16)

Figure 1: Trends in application types for CSG in 2003



Source: Leatt (2003) using SOCPEN R01 April-September 2003

Figure 1 above shows the incidents of the different types of registrations due to the inability of the system to carry over applicants. The number of re-applications that occurred throughout 2003, during the first extension competes with the number of continued recipients. In July the number of re-application exceeded the number of continued recipients greatly. This means that government officials throughout SA were presented mostly with cases they could have not repeated if the system was efficient. This cumbersome administrative system hampers the proper implementation of the CSG to its target population (Leatt 2003:17).

This inability of the system to carry over applicants (having applicants carried over to next extension phase without being removed from the system, if they are

still under 14 years) leads to the prevention of access for some applicants as a result of the long unfriendly processes. Some applicants especially those in rural areas find it difficult to start the application process from the start and try to gain access to the system. As for government officials this means double work. This also adds to the confusion, because some of the children have to wait a while before they can be recognised as beneficiaries, even though they were already in the system (Leatt 2004:7).

3.3. Human resource development

Human resource development refers to the ability of the organization not only to acquire but also to be able to effectively utilise available human resources to attain optimum results (James 2000:9). James argues that if an organization lacks human resources, especially organizations focusing on dealing with clients as customers, it is faced with high chances of inefficiency.

In the Eastern and Western Cape Provinces, in Mount Frere, Ceres and Khayelitsha welfare offices were faced with difficulties related to administrative infrastructure. Under resourced financial and human capital, has led to conflict with the needs of the people in rural areas (Leatt 2003:6).

The infrastructure had not changed in 2004 (with increased targets); if nothing is done the third phasing of the CSG would be more disastrous, when children from 12-14 years are entered into the system (Leatt 2003:6-7).

Table 1 Number of Child Beneficiaries (CSG) March 2000-2004

Provinces	Mar-2000	Sept-2001	Feb-2002	Feb-2003	Mar-2004
<i>Western Cape</i>	10951	89268	122483	501148	264329
<i>Eastern Cape</i>	55717	206394	244537	1036667	718461
<i>Northern Cape</i>	12805	24824	29694	134353	69451
<i>Free State</i>	13753	71240	91779	356998	241416
<i>KwaZulu-Natal</i>	66836	352630	403301	1286929	1051787
<i>North West</i>	31792	125176	179685	451096	341070
<i>Gauteng</i>	47910	149843	177632	682801	527454
<i>Mpumalanga</i>	28327	102327	119349	387069	353591
<i>Limpopo(earlier Northern Province)</i>	53815	159989	238105	784699	715086

Source: National Department of Social Development

Table 1 above illustrates the increased number of CSG beneficiaries from 2000 to 2004. With such increased numbers of children accessing the system, the infrastructure surely needed upgrading to cater for such numbers.

According to the budget review by IDASA for 2002/3. The government allocated enough financial resources to enable the extension of the CSG.

“Budget 2002 projects R265.2 billion in revenue for 2002/3. To this we should add the R15.2 billion in tax relief and the almost R8.5 billion gained from the increased deficit. Thus treasury had a total of R288.9 billion to work with at the start of the budget process. This is R40.5 billion more than the R248.5 billion available in 2001. Of this R40.5 billion ...62.6% went to social development

expenditures..."

However, financial resources increased to allow for an increase in target population, without concomitant infrastructural reform.

Human resource is the essential part of implementation, especially when it comes to service delivery. This provision is not only in terms of available human resources but skilled and well equipped to handle tasks allocated to them efficiently and effectively. The Department however did not consider that skilled personnel are employed for the administration of the Child Support Grant. There have been reports from different Provinces regarding the lack of capacity, and unskilled and unaccountable welfare staff. This problem has increased with the extension of the CSG (Rosa & Mphokotho 2004:23).

The lack of staff with capacity to deal with the increased number of applicants entering the system has been raised among other issues as a concern (Rosa & Mphokotho 2004:4-6). In Provinces like the Eastern Cape, the North West and Limpopo, areas where services is provided through mobile units. These mobile units are reported to only come once a month. This means that a number of applicants are left waiting for a time of the month where welfare officials are available for applications (Rosa & Mphokotho 2004:23). In most cases welfare officials did not understand the regulations on the extension of the grant.

It was reported that *"In some provinces officials were either confused... or not informed of the implementation of the phasing in process..."* (Mphokotho & Rosa 2004:24)

Another problem was the ability of the staff to utilize the skills they have acquired through training or otherwise for effective management and performance of their tasks. In most Provincial offices Government staff lacked capacity to use the acquired skills (registration) to better implement the CSG (Rosa & Mpokotho

2004:24).

Rosa & Mpokotho (2004:24) found that *“through our interaction with various government officials, it was apparent that they even did not understand the new regulations on the extension of the CSG”* (Rosa & Mpokotho 2004:24)

Grindle (1997:53) emphasises that the issue of human resource is not always lack of skills, but another crucial issue is the provision of incentives like better pay, work restructuring, opening decision making process and managing authority relationships in the workplace (Grindle 1997:53).

Another issue with regards to government officials was there was not enough staff allocated for CSG administration. In many welfare offices the situation was that the number of applicants has been larger compared to the staff available to process applications. The staff shortages have been observed as resulting from the extension of the Child Support Grant. (Hunter 2003:15).

In the Daggaskraal study one of the Grant managers explained that *“Daggaskraal is densely populated area with so many applicants, which makes it difficult for us to work effectively with a quiet small number of officials that we have”* (O2 grant manager in Ngwenya 2003:72).

“If we are five we register almost 79 applicants because, we have to duplicate as well and this contribute to the slow process of registration” (O2 grant manager in Ngwenya 2003:72).

“Another problem is that we are short-staffed and that is why we have trained volunteers to assist” (O1 grant manager in Ngwenya 2003:72).

According to Hunter (2004:13) the shortages of staff has been evident from the first phasing (extension to children under 9), second phasing as well as third phasing (extension to children under the age of 14 years). With these increased numbers the number of staff administrating the grant has not increased. This

leads to staff members performing the tasks of other unavailable personnel, in areas where they are not trained. In KwaZulu-Natal some offices did not have a head of administration. This means that the administrative staff had no monitoring or support services offered to them, to help them cope with their jobs (Hunter 2003:13).

Hunter reported that *"Normally an administrative clerk is responsible for taking grant applications, completing and verifying information, capturing the information onto the computer. However as a result of staff shortages the task of an administrative clerk is sometimes performed by help desk officer"* (Hunter 2004:13).

It is not proper conduct to fill in the duties of other personnel especially when a person has no training relevant to the duty they perform. In her study Hunter (2004:14) reported that a help desk officer is not trained to deal with applications, as much as they can be aware of processes the administrative clerk does when administering the grant, but they are not trained for that thus they lack capacity. They also will not perform the job as the administrative clerk would (Hunter 2004:14). It is therefore important to ensure that a person receives proper training before they undertake additional duties.

According to Ngwenya (2003:22) officials in Mpumalanga Province (Draggaskraal area) were overworked as a result of staff shortages, and low pay which led to officials taking bribes from the applicants if they wanted their applications to be processed quickly (Ngwenya 2003:22). This engaging in improper conduct by government's administrative staff, can be attributed to the lack of support by the superiors.

In Ngwenya's study a non-beneficiary reported that *"one day I saw a mother that we started applying with carrying a chicken, when I asked her what she was doing with the chicken she said; no I am tired now there is something that I am*

going to do with this chicken. The next thing she had her application processed" (F1 a beneficiary in Ngwenya 2003:68)

"If you don't have money you could bring a chicken as well" (F4 a non-beneficiary in Ngwenya 2003:68).

The Department of Social Development's norms specify that an administrative clerk should not take less than 20 applicants per day. However as a result of staff shortages many administrative workers exceed this number or do lesser depending on the applicants available (Hunter 2003:14). The consequences of this are that these administrative officers, are overworked, and the accuracy in completing their jobs cannot be guaranteed.

Hunter reported that *"...in Ndwedwe office contract workers are expected to see 15 applicants per day"* (Hunter 2004:14).

According to Grindle (1997:53) the problem with human resource capacity in organizations is that the personnel is not well prepared for their task, and the manner in which they utilize the skills they have is usually lost through lack of motivation. In addition to motivation continuous monitoring of the policy ensures that issues like lack of motivation and others related to the implementation are addressed.

5.4. Monitoring and Evaluation

Evaluation is viewed as a systematic assessment of a policy, to determine the successes and progress of such policy. Evaluation can be conducted systematically or informally. Systematic evaluation enables for the evaluation to be conducted employing social science research techniques. This allows for carefully found outcomes that adjudicate for a thorough and more precise way of improving the program or policy (Weiss 1998:4). With regards to the administration of the CSG, there were many loopholes which opened the door for many problems. These loopholes have led to the culture of fraud and corruption.

Rosa & Mphokotho (2004:22) reported that *"the problems experienced by our callers in accessing the extended CSG demonstrate a lack of monitoring measures and a lack of means of enforcing compliance with the law by the National Department of Social Development"* (Rosa & Mpokotho 2004:22).

These loop holes in the system have created irresponsible citizens and public servants; this is because the officials are sometimes aware of such acts but don't report them, thus contribute to corruption. Mbambo (2005:35) reported that a lack of essential monitoring mechanisms, and control on the issuing of birth certificates by government officials contributes to fraud.

Most often once the policy is passed and measures for implementation put in place, and implementation had initiated the assumptions is that the outcome will be the intended one. Policy monitoring and evaluation is essential to give a picture as to the outcome of the policy. Dye (1981:366) argues that lack of monitoring and evaluation has been found to be the cause for many policy failures in public policy field.

The guiding principles for service delivery are usually disregarded by government officials. These principles are created to serve as a guiding instrument for service delivery, also to inform the public of their rights these are issues of; equity, non-discrimination, human rights, quality services (Mbambo 2005:35). As a result of the lack of such principles there is no way that the clients or government officials can monitor their performance regarding service delivery. However many applicants have reported ill-treatment by government officials, when they went to apply for the Grant.

In her study Ngwenya found that *"Officials mistreat us, for example they said that I am too old to have small children like these knowing exactly that they are my grandchildren. I am suffering and abused for example a volunteer (home based*

care) said to me in 2000 that we steal children so that we can get a grant” (F4 non-beneficiary in Ngwenya 2003:75)

The mistreating of clients goes unnoticed most of the time, because it happens in private and they are reluctant to report the perpetrators because they are afraid for their lives. With such ill treatment people are more likely not to go and apply for the Grant, because they are afraid they might be victims; this then affects the target population coverage (F4 a non-beneficiary in Ngwenya 2003:75).

Worthan, Sanders & Fitzpatrick (1997:10) argued that lack of consistent monitoring and evaluation of the policy implemented can lead to improper implementation of the policy. They argue that it is also important not to conduct poor monitoring, because this has even more impact than no monitoring at all. This leads to what is called pseudoevaluation (Worthan, Sanders & Fitzpatrick 1997:10). According to reports since the year 2000, about 1.5 billion has been lost each year until 2004 on fraud. This means that there are multiple beneficiaries that claim money from the system, which then gives a misleading picture that the target population is widely reached (Department of Social Development 2004:3).

The Minister of DSD Zola Skweyiya confirmed that *“as I said in 2002, the grant administration system has over the years been afflicted by continuing serious problems of fraud, corruption and mal-administration”* (Department of Social Development 2004:2)

“Over 100 government officials have also been prosecuted.” “... a significant number of those who were not eligible to receive grants have been removed from the system”

A non-beneficiary in Ngwenya’s study (2003:79) reported that *“there is a problem that happened to my cousin and I was with her that pay day. She was told that*

she has already received her money and she was turned away. She called the office in Standerton and she was told that her money is with Empilweni contractor. She went back to the officials to ask for money but she was told the same thing again that there is no money for her. This thing happened last month and we do not know if she will receive her money this month" (F4 a non-beneficiary in Ngwenya 2003:79).

Figure 2: Number of beneficiaries for CSG from 2000-2004




Figure 2 above illustrates beneficiaries of the CSG from 2000-2004. This information is the information that the Department uses to guide them towards their targets; however about 1.5 billion is lost each year through fraud this means that over the years about 42 million people from the beneficiaries have been non-existent people.

According to the DSD's system about 36, 904 care givers were reported dead by March 2004. This number does not capture the number of children in receipt of the grant who have also been reported dead and those numbers of unreported

deaths. The verification of applicant's status then becomes inefficient, because besides the number of deaths that are not reported to the DHA, a loop hole to the system is created (Leatt 2003:15). As a result of the lack of constant monitoring of the implementation of the CSG, many corrupt habits have found their way into the system.

The DSD reported that *"the Department of Home Affairs has also informed us that there are over 14 400 cases of children who according to the records of the Department of Home Affairs indicated as deceased, but people continue to collect the Child Support grant"* (Department of Social Development 2005:2).

This information then leads to a conclusion that there is a lack of verification of the applicants, between the Department of Social Development and Department of Home Affairs. These then poses a question as to whether the partnership is effective in proper implementation of the Child Support Grant. Also this suggests that the administrative clerks nation wide are not properly performing their duties, as explained the duties of administrative clerks include verifying the applicant's status.

Constant monitoring assists in addressing issues at hand based on the existing policy issue. This then ensures that there are no continuous problems in the system (Parsons 1995:222). Parsons also argues that each and every monitoring done should be original in each phase to ensure that each time possible or actual problems are detected and solutions created.

Therefore, monitoring not only assist in tracing the steps of service delivery but also prevents any unethical and improper service delivery (Weiss, 1998:15).

The purpose for constant monitoring is also to form basis of information. This means that if the DSD would want to evaluate how the implementation of CSG has unfolded, there have to have information of the process and progress, also problems encountered and how they were resolved.

5.6. Consequences of Poor Implementation

The Child Support Grant has had a positive impact on the lives of children in South Africa. It is estimated that over 6 million children receive the CSG in South Africa at present (Department of Social Development 2005:3). This number could have however been increased. The way in which the Grant has been implemented of this Grant has prevented some potential beneficiaries from accessing the grant.

Problems ranged from bureaucratic process which prolong the application process, to street level bureaucrats that practice their own discretion, to human resource development, organization restructuring. The Department of Social Development underestimated, or overlooked the impact that the extension of the CSG would have to the administration of the CSG.

The Department neglected many essential aspects of implementation. According to Brinkerhoff & Crosby (2002:90) resources need to be accumulated, and mobilized to ensure effective implementation. Fixers have to be available to ensure that they direct the implementation towards a right direction. Street level bureaucrats need to be dealt with first especially if there is a policy change. Lipsky (1980:8) argued that the consultation of the SLBs is crucial to the manner in which the policy would be implemented. He also argued that because they use discretion with regards to their duties and try to simplify their tasks as possible, this dilutes policy objectives.

Many of the experienced problems have been in the field of administration of the CSG. Since 2002 the DSD has been losing about 1, 5 billion per annum through fraud and maladministration. Such problems have been crippling the system and preventing proper implementation of the CSG (Department of Social Development 2005:4).

In addition the DSD did not provide for any additional resources to accommodate the increased target population. The shortage of resources is mostly for; human; infrastructural and technical resources. Financial resources in terms of the increase in the social security budget, especially for the CSG provision have however shown an increase (Department of Social Development 2005:2).

The number of beneficiaries has increased over the years, (Figure 2). However, there are complaints about the inadequacy in the registration of applicants for the grant. The Department of Social Development is aware that the administrative system is not efficient and effective for administering the CSG. This has been asserted by the Minister (Dr Zola Skweyiya) announcement of the anti-fraud, corruption and mal-administration campaign in December 2004 (Department of Social Development 2005:2).

"As I said in 2002, the grant administration system has over the years been afflicted by continuing serious problems..."

Even though there have been several changes made to the amount and reach of the CSG, the administration of the grant is still problematic. Some of the prevailing problems encountered by the Department of Social Development are; poor infrastructure in provinces leading to poor uptake of the applicants for Child Support Grant in as far as achieving the CSG's targets.

Dissemination of inaccurate information by provincial heads to the local officials, which has led to provinces giving and implementing wrong procedures.

Lack of human resource capacity in Provinces where many officials are not properly trained to administer the grants and this has led to mal-administration and fraud.

Gaps in the administration process, like accessing of birth certificates have led to

fraud and corruption by officials. This has cost the government about 1.5 billion per annum (Department of Social Development 2002:16-17).

The DSD issued out a 3 year strategic plan in 2002, this was for the year 2002/2003 to 2004/2005. In this report the DSD has what it called "*ten point plan*". This "*ten point plan*" was to serve as the focus of the department for the three year period. These plans were as follows, in order of priority.

- Rebuilding of family , community and social relations
- creating an integrated poverty eradication strategy
- To develop a comprehensive social security system
- To respond to violence against women and children, older persons and other vulnerable groups of people.
- To include HIV/AIDS community based care and support services.
- To develop a national strategy for youth development to reduce the number of youth in conflict with the law.
- To increase the accessibility of social welfare services especially for people living in rural areas.
- To redesign services to people with disabilities in order to promote human rights and economic development.
- To train, educate, redeploy a new category of workers in social development (this was to include re-orientation of social service workers to meet the global and regional demands) (Department of Social Development 2002).

In the three year plan the DSD had prioritized children's issues through; ensuring that eligible children access social assistance and other issues (Department of Social Development 2004:14). In order to ensure that children access social assistance one of them of which is the CSG, issues that inhibit this access had to be addressed as this is an administration process.

The discussion has shown that this problem has existed and continues to exist over the years despite the governments attempts. This study outlines these administrative problems and makes links to the extent of their impact on the implementation of CSG.

Bureaucratic way of implementing policy, organizational capacity strengthening, human resource development, systems development, street level bureaucrats' discretionary powers and lack of sufficient monitoring and evaluations are the problems that inhibit efficient and effective implementation of CSG. The Department of Social Development, has an obligation to provide social services (social security specifically), and since the administrative process form an important part of policy implementation, it is crucial that problems that inhibit this are addressed.

Conclusion

The Child Support Grant (CSG) has been created as one of the means for poverty reduction, particularly childhood poverty in South Africa. This Grant has been utilized by many families as the income basis for a household. This grant was initially given to children under 7 years old (Cassiem & Streak 2001:56). Due to the pressures from different stakeholders, and non- governmental institutions this Grant was then extended to the children under the age of 14. However, with each implementation phase numerous problems resulted.

This study has critically analysed the implementation of the child support grant, focusing on administrative problems that have resulted through the way in which this grant has been implemented. The study analysed findings of the previous studies (making use of content analysis) focusing on problems of implementation which were experienced by administrators and beneficiaries of the CSG in South Africa.

When the CSG was implemented it experienced problems. However, additional problems resulted with the extension of the Grant to children under 14 years. The findings showed that these problems resulted from lack of capacity (organizational, material and human resource) development. With the added numbers of beneficiaries the system required upgrading to ensure that there is sufficient capacity for proper implementation. According to James (2000:13) capacity development "is an intergral part of the work and life of an organization" this means that capacity development is a long continuous process that begins when the organization is developed throughout its existence. James (2000:14) argues that this process focuses at deepening the organizations current capacity and equips them for future situations.

Further, Grindle (1997:250) argues that for effective achievement of results with new policies, government should reconsider building a new system for implementation. Another alternative to a new system could be reforming the

organization to ensure that the environment is more suitable. With regards to the extension of CSG to cover more children (up to 14 years) the Department of Social Development neglected to; upgrade its system, employ more efficient staff, create ways of ensuring that decisions are taken with concrete information of the situation thus insufficient monitoring and evaluation existed. The gathering of concrete information can be achieved through monitoring and evaluation of the implementation process. According to Weiss (1998:15) the main purpose of evaluation and monitoring is to assess the conditions that would exist without the intervention. Therefore any problems resulting from the intervention which prevent the proper implementation of the policy are detected and the solutions are sought.

Another important issue is the lines of communication the organization used. The CSG was implemented through top down mode of implementation. This mode on its own does not allow for flexibility or any inputs from the lower levels of the organizations (street level bureaucrats) (Hill & Hupe 2002:89). As a result street level bureaucrats create rules which simplify their work and functions, thus affecting the outcome of the policy (Lipsky 1980:257). The disseminating of incorrect instructions compromises the policies intended goals. According to Parsons (1995:465), communication is an essential part in achieving perfect implementation. The Department of Social Development has not been able to accomplish this within its bureaucratic system. Government officials of the respective Department have not been able to understand and translate instruction to enable successful implementation. This ineffective communication has led to confusion as to what procedures to follow.

The major fall out with this Grant was initially that change was initiated from the outside (stakeholders); it was not part of the government's goals. As a result of the pressures from different stakeholders and other non-governmental organizations the idea of extending the grant was adopted. The hesitation to cover all children at once was an indication of the load that the extension of the

grant had on the existing system. The system was also still new, even though most of the characteristics were borrowed from the old system. This new system with new policies did not have enough capacity to expand to the extent it was pushed to expand to. The carrying on of the system to carry more load than it already had meant carrying over the problems experienced in the initial implementation to the extension phases.

Therefore the DSD's indecision on capacity development and proper managing of the implementation through consistent monitoring and evaluation by the Department has led to ineffective and inefficient implementation of the CSG.

Recommendations

- The Department of Social Development should ensure that proper planning is put and research on the current situation, also consider possible problems that would be brought by the new intervention
- When implementing Social Security government officials should adhere to procedures as specified in the policy to avoid confusions and disseminating wrong information to the public.
- The Department should take each implementation problems carefully.
- There should be constant monitoring of the implementation, quarterly to ensure that the problems are dealt with as they arise.
- Street Level bureaucrats' jobs should have performance measuring tools, to ensure effectiveness, efficiency and accountability.

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thus, only collusion can bypass this important control feature. Examples of items that should be under dual control are: vault cash, negotiable collateral, investment securities, reserve supply of checks, unissued travelers' checks, credit cards and money orders, the night depository, mail receipts, ATM cash, dormant savings accounts, and spare keys to cashier drawers.

7. Protection of Assets – A principal method of safeguarding assets is to limit access to authorized personnel only. Protection of assets can be accomplished by:
 - Developing operating policies and procedures for cash control;
 - Establishing dual control over cash;
 - Conducting periodic physical inventories of credit union assets;
 - Protecting assets by purchasing adequate insurance;
 - Requiring the use of passwords to access the computer system and changing passwords no less than quarterly; and
 - Limiting physical access to cash and the computer system.
8. Zero Tolerance – The credit union should have a culture that supports internal controls and does not tolerate excessive errors or fraud. These values can be promoted by establishing:
 - Severe consequences for fraud that are written, conveyed verbally, and strictly followed. All fraudulent acts should be met with swift and permanent action;
 - Clear negative consequences for staff with excessive error rates;
 - A performance based incentive system that rewards high productivity and low error rates;
 - Competitive salaries that reduce the motivation to commit fraud; and
 - Training that explains the reasons behind internal controls and emphasizes how fraud and errors hurt the institution and its members.
9. Personnel Policies – Personnel policies should specifically state the consequences for fraudulent acts and excessive errors so each employee understands the ramifications of such actions. Employees should be familiar with the personnel policy; a review of this policy should be part of each employee's initial training. The policy at a minimum should:
 - Require management to check references of prospective employees;
 - Include written position descriptions that define the duties, responsibilities, and performance standards for each position; and
 - Require written performance appraisals of all employees annually.
10. Rotation of Personnel – From time to time, employee job functions should be rotated unannounced. The rotation should be of sufficient duration to discover any fraud. Besides being an effective internal check, rotation of personnel is a valuable aid in the credit union's overall training program as employees learn how to perform other jobs. The cross-trained employee can substitute when other employees take vacations, are absent, or are rotated.