

Youth Engagement in the eThekweni Municipality:

***Perceptions, Attitudes, and Behaviours
of Youth Acting Civically***

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To my family, who taught me to love unconditionally, believe in the impossible, value community, and demand justice.

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To the young people and community members of Abahlali baseMjondolo, in solidarity. I am forever grateful for your friendship, sharing, and teaching. You are an inspiration to us all. Qina Bahlali! Qina!

To the youthful generations of yesterday, today, and tomorrow who teach us to believe in the power of youth.

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Short List of Abbreviations

Abahlali (Abahlali baseMjondolo)

ANC (African National Congress)

ASGISA (Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa)

ANCYL (ANC Youth League)

COHRE (Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions)

DA (Democratic Alliance)

GEAR (Growth, Employment, And Redistribution)

IPF (Inkatha Freedom Party)

NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations)

NYC (National Youth Commission)

RDP (Reconstruction and Development Programme)

Interact (Rotary Interact Clubs)

SACP (South African Communist Party)

UDF (United Democratic Front)

UKZN (University of KwaZulu-Natal)

UYF (Umsobomvu Youth Fund)

YCL (Young Communist League)

YFC (Youth for Christ)

Preface (Author's Note)

I came to Durban, South Africa to work among its young people and study their civic attitudes, perceptions, and behaviours. I majored in history while a university student. I had focused my undergraduate study on localized moments of social change because I believe it is important that we find and tell the untold stories of individuals and communities. My experience professionally propelled an interest in politics. My work with youth and communities in the United States demonstrated the urgent need for the meaningful inclusion and empowerment of young people and groups that have been traditionally marginalized. The participatory mandate of democratic South Africa and its history of youth activism encouraged me to seek opportunities to travel to South Africa to study its youth citizen experience.

I wanted to learn directly from young South Africans, while also contributing to community and youth development efforts in Durban; therefore, I intended that a large part of my 'learning' occur in the context of my own participation. I taught life skills courses and facilitated a support group for students at Dumahlezi High School in Ntuzuma with Phakama, a youth development and gender empowerment program. I provided general support to Abahlali baseMjondolo, a grassroots movement of shack dwellers fighting for land and housing. Additionally, I conducted interviews with youth leaders, delivered presentations to youth groups, collected over five hundred youth surveys.

One day, as I left an Abahlali event to go on to the Phakama office, Mnikelo, one of the Bahlali youth turned to me and jokingly said, "Ally, what are you? Activist? Academic? Youth Worker? Soccer Player?!" Indeed, as participant, observer, and researcher, it was often a delicate balancing act to negotiate roles.

In order to appropriately contextualize youth civic engagement, I sought understanding that extended beyond the individuals and organizations with whom I interacted. Balancing micro and macro and theoretical and practical discussions, however, proved challenging. Broad and prominent democracy theories themselves did not adequately explain South African democratic structures. Theoretical and practical conceptualizations of democratic participation and development, the effect of broad theories on national policy, and the impact of national policy on opportunities for democratic engagement also required study. I found theoretical approaches to youth study scarce; therefore, I drew mostly upon a more generalized understanding in interpreting youth engagement but rooted that understanding in historical youth context and a youth development approach. In this study, I hoped to demonstrate sensitivity toward individual and subgroup differences while seeking some generalizability.

The literature review likewise balanced a wide selection of material ranging from pop culture commentary to sophisticated academic analysis and included local and national focus.

Overwhelmingly, my research suggests that rather than rejecting politics in youthful indulgence or self-motive, young people care deeply about their communities and have rejected politics because of their frustration with increasing divides between rich and poor, empty political promises, and the seeming disregard of politicians and governmental officials for youth concerns or empowerment. In this master's thesis, I hope to tell the stories of young people making change and operating civically within their communities so that communities and state bodies might better support their young people.

Introduction

From the vantage point of Fairvale Secondary School in Wentworth, KwaZulu-Natal the Engen factory looms large, an audible hum of factory activity sounds, and, periodically, smoke pours upward from its tall stacks. Communities in Wentworth, who have long been complaining, have mobilized in the last several years to address the health hazards caused by their unfriendly neighbour. Despite such community efforts, the factory continues unabated. Positioned adjacent to an active and frustrated community of flat dwellers and a secondary school, the smoke stacks seems to send a warning signal about the state of the new South Africa inviting broader society to look inward and ask of itself:

- Do the processes and associated values of capitalist economic policy and liberal state politics support or supplant community and truly participatory notions of democratic society?
- How is today's generation of youth fairing as it negotiates its role in the new South Africa?



Engen Factory Seen From Fairvale Secondary School. Wentworth, Durban.

Turning right to ascend the hill leading away from the Fairvale Secondary School and the factory, a wall adorned by colourful graffiti aligns the road. One section of the wall portrays a politician in a suit at a podium. The podium is labelled “SAP,” perhaps suggesting affiliation between the politician and the South African Police. The politician is clearly ageing, depicted with white hair and a balding head. He is addressing a crowd, exuberantly holding out his hands and extending the peace symbol. However, his message is a seeming unlikely one, “Vote for yourself.” What prompted the young artist to assemble and display a political scene with the message “Vote for yourself”? Does the message confirm societal assumptions about its young people and demonstrate a general apathy and selfish orientation among the current youth generation? Or does it portray a more complicated relationship between young South Africans and the new democracy?



“Vote for Yourself” Graffiti Art. Wentworth, Durban.

The visual in Wentworth demonstrated frustration, cynicism and disconnect from political processes, which are perceived as increasingly connected to government function, in the new

state. For young South Africans, the promises of political leaders and the actions of state bodies and elected officials did not align. Young people did not believe the South African state was doing enough for its young people or communities, and as a result, they were turning away from political involvement. Total disengagement of South African young people, however, paints an inadequate portrayal of youth civic activity. The message “Vote for Yourself” may not have been an expression of individualist retreat but of collective rejection of state-sponsored forms of political participation. The complicated relationship between democratic society and its youth element needs further exploration. Specifically, this study has attempted to answer the following questions:

- What characterizes youth forms of civic engagement? Besides direct political involvement, what avenues of engagement do young people seek?
- What attitudes and perceptions do youth possess concerning different avenues of civic engagement?
- What do youth, who actively participate civically, tell us about the extent and ways youth are engaged in civil society?
- What recommendations can be made based on research findings?

A mixed model approach was adopted in order to attain both micro and macro level understanding of youth civic engagement. To this end, research was gathered through participant-observation, surveys, and interviews. Participant-observation occurred among a youth development organization and social justice movement of shack dwellers. A survey was administered to a purposive sample of high school students and actively engaged youth. Interviews were conducted with youth leaders selected purposively. “Youth” were defined as 13-29 year olds living in eThekwinini who were involved civically, enrolled in school, or both. Though this study’s findings may be useful in informing initiatives affecting a broader population of South African urban youth, actual representivity does not extend beyond eThekwinini. Additional studies should seek to understand the attitudes and behaviours of youth in other regions and geographic locations and among those least engaged. This research hopes

to close gaps between perceptions of youth and active youth practice through a nuanced exploration of youth civic engagement in eThekweni. Direct youth experience and insight rather than abstract assumptions informed analysis.

Theoretical approaches, however, were helpful in understanding the contexts and spaces available for participation. Chapter 1 reviews a wide range of approaches that include broad and prolific democracy and localized democratic participation theories as they relate to the emergence and development of the democratic state in South Africa. Civic engagement must be understood both locally and theoretically and in both state-sanctioned and state-opposed spaces for participation. Because theories for understanding youth participation in particular were limited, historical approaches and youth development theory were introduced to provide youth-specific context.

Chapter 2 furnishes an expansive literature review that is divided into two parts. Part 1 discusses contemporary national and local demographic trends and statistics, national and local policy relevant to such trends, and discussion of local social movements in eThekweni. Part 2 describes contemporary social perceptions and trends among South African young people, the history of the concept of youth in South Africa, relevant youth development policy and practice, and examples of youth engagement. Chapter 3 reviews the mixed model methodology adopted for this research study. Chapter 4 reports findings and analysis in three parts that explore youth interpretations and trends of civic engagement, discuss the impact of civic engagement on youth actively involved, and make recommendations about youth participation based upon the input from civically active youth.

Young people are participating civically in democratic South Africa, but on their own terms of engagement.

Chapter 1: Theory

In seeking to answer the following questions, it was necessary to search for theoretical grounding in multiple arenas of thought.

- What characterizes youth forms of civic engagement? Besides direct political involvement, what avenues of engagement do young people seek?
- What attitudes and perceptions do youth possess concerning different avenues of civic engagement?
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- What recommendations can be made based on research findings?

Broad democratic theories fell short in explaining localized forms and understandings of participation; however, they provided essential insight to state conceptualizations of democracy and participation on local levels. Democratic theory laid the groundwork for understanding the spaces, institutions, and contexts sanctioned by the South African state for participation, as well as how society and the state defined democracy and democratic participation. In local and practical contexts, the definition of participation was a source of great contention. Many argued that state-sanctioned public participation had lost its meaning in the wake of an increasingly electoral and technocratic approach to democracy. Such analysts pointed to a rise in social movements, as indicative of contestation for more meaningful and broader avenues for democratic participation. Some social movement theory, therefore, was useful in contextualizing forms of engagement occurring outside of official structures. Youth and youth development theories explained both the societal expectations imposed on young people as well as the alternative approaches that challenged status quo understanding. To understand youth civic engagement in democratic South Africa, therefore, a multi-faceted and integrated approach was necessary. Theories shaping the understanding of South African democracy, young people, and democratic participation were useful only if they based understanding of engagement in local

forms. Discernment of youth civic engagement, therefore, occurred not through the vantage point of the democratic forms available but through youth forms and interpretations themselves.

1 Democracy Theories and the South African State

Democracy theories vary wildly in their approach to measuring the democratic health of nations. On the one hand, the Schumpeter school suggests that democracies be measured by their institutions and the process by which political leaders compete for votes. In Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Schumpeter rejects the notion that democracy produces universal ideals. He defines democracy, rather, as a “political method, a certain type of institutional arrangement for arriving at political, legislative and administrative decisions” (Schumpeter 1947, 242) whereby “individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (269). Within a democracy, he posits, the “role of the people is to produce a government” (269). Therefore, according to Schumpeter, democracy is a ‘method’ best measured by the presence or absence of civil liberties and electoral institutions.

Laswell, on the other hand, suggests that democracy be measured through its individual and group values. Harold Laswell and Abraham Kaplan, in Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry claim that a set of universal values can be attributed to democratic states. For Laswell, individual preferences and values affect all aspects of the shaping and sharing of power. Groups of individuals in society, he argues, mimic patterns of individuals in making decisions based on such goals and preferences. For example, demands for attention, interest, and loyalty motivate decisions of individuals and groups. Forces of power, too, can be understood through the value(s) on which they are based (Laswell and Kaplan 1952). Laswell posits that a set of universal values can be attributed and used to measure a democracy, however he neither names this set of values nor makes distinctions between value sets among differently formed democratic nations.

Macpherson does not provide a universal value set but instead distinguishes between democratic forms as they relate to systems of economy (Macpherson 1966). Macpherson

describes the western liberal model developed and attached to a market society, the non-liberal form based on a post-revolutionary class concept, and the non-liberal form then emerging in nations in Africa and Asia after revolution that applied mixed models. Because western liberal democracies value accumulation of wealth and material consumption, often over human relationships, Macpherson argued a half century ago, such nations were at risk for losing moral standing. The liberties inherent in western democracy would be both its advantage and liability as long as they were linked to an attachment for accumulation and its resulting inequality (66).

Rather than collective values inherent to particular democratic states, Robert Dahl argues that individual values influence the degree of democratization a state achieves. In Polyarchy Participation and Opposition (1971), Dahl describes the necessary conditions for democracy to include opposition, rivalry, or competition in elections and the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens. No nation is fully democratic and inequality persists, however, Dahl argues because of a lack of impetus among citizenry to continue to assert demands when sub-cultural rights are afforded and limited demands are met (114-119). In After the Revolution? Authority in a Good Society (1990), Dahl elaborates on the impact of values on preventing full democratization. Dahl suggests that individuals are motivated in private and public decision-making by degrees of choice, competence, and economy. Potentially limiting democratic participation, for example, the economy condition requires that the number of associations one participates in is few. Similarly, Dahl asserts that an individual's sense of efficacy decreases as distance is placed between her and decision-making, making the remoteness of national government problematic in democratic states (116). Dahl provides multiple models for democratic decision-making and concludes that the smallest association possible makes the best choice because of the proximity and enhanced sense of economy, choice, and competence afforded the citizen (53). To enhance fuller versions of democracy, therefore, public participation must be encouraged in smaller more accessible units. Dahl's approach while

illuminating, proves limited, however, as long as the biases of the western liberal state that value representative and electoral notions of democracy define the public arena for participation.

Contrary to Dahl's theories, Frederic Shaffer attempts to connect values and institutions while providing the means for understanding democratic institutions in non-western societies. Shaffer believes that Dahl failed to incorporate individuals' understandings of their actions. In Democracy in Translation :Understanding Politics in An Unfamiliar Culture (1998), Shaffer suggests rather that analysis begin with the institutions and investigate the ideals to which they might be orientated through a language-centred approach to conceptual analysis (9). According to Shaffer, democratic institutions must be understood by the associated meanings. His research in Senegal, for instance, found that the word for democracy in Wolof had a different meaning to the French word used by the political elite. Within the popular context, democracy meant both individual choice and group consensus, seemingly contradictory concepts in the elections and rights-based version of democracy (54). In explaining institutions through culturally relevant and popular understanding, however, Shaffer fails to consider the multi-directional flow of influence: democratic understanding emerges not only from indigenous cultural interpretations but also as product of direct experience occurring outside of state frameworks.

Franz Fanon, libratory theorist of colonial Africa, as early as the middle of the last century, sought to build and interpret locally relevant forms of democracy in Africa according to "third world" principles of humanity, development, and participation. In "Come, then, Comrades, Red," Fanon condemns the European model of states and institutions and writes

Humanity is waiting for something other from us than such an imitation...if we want to turn Africa into a new Europe, and America into a new Europe, then let us leave the destiny of our countries to Europeans. They will know how to do it better than the most gifted among us. But if we want humanity to advance a step farther, if we want to bring it up to a different level than that which Europe has shown it, then we must invent and we must make discoveries. (Fanon 1965)

Hussein Adam, in Nigel Gibson's Rethinking Fanon: The Continuing Dialogue (1999), interprets Fanon as a democratic theorist, envisioning democracy based on developmental ideals. For Fanon, democracy is a process and an end in which individuals cooperate as free and equal participants in demanding and realizing the task of development and self-rule. Fanon's theory of democratized development emphasizes decentralization and participation, with a democratic conceptualization of leadership that rejects the 'cult of leaders' typical of post-revolutionary states in Africa. Fanon advocated for fully participatory forms of democratic involvement. As Fanon stated, "in an under-developed country, experience proves that the important thing is not that 300 people form a plan and decide upon carrying it out, but that the whole people plan and decide even if it takes twice or three times as long" (Fanon 1968). Fanon emphasized the role horizontal participatory institutions might play in ensuring that the party would not be the only political bureau. Such institutions might also fit the small unit requirement of Dahl's thinking. According to Fanon, horizontal participatory institutions would enable democratic consultations, education, and persuasions in ushering in social and economic equality within the new democracy.

In The Eye of the Needle (Turner 1980), lectures delivered during apartheid, Richard Turner envisioned a future version of democracy in South Africa that would fundamentally redistribute wealth and power. Full participatory democracy in South Africa, Turner argued, would be based upon popular participation, workers' control, and political freedoms for all people. Democratization would include large-scale investment in schooling, housing and public health, a redressing of racial imbalance in property ownership, and universal suffrage (77). Additionally, Turner urged, South African democracy would ensure its participatory nature through intermediary institutions between government and individuals and decentralization of real power to local and provincial authorities (81-83). "The citizens should be adequately

integrated into the political system.” Otherwise, Turner feared, as with other new democratic states,

the very political parties established to provide for mass political participation will become such oligarchies...Once this happens, individuals faced with steamroller political vote-collecting machines over which they have no control, become even further alienated from the political process (79).

South African democracy, therefore Turner argued, required both popular economic empowerment and participation.

Immediately prior to and following the emergence of the South African democratic state, a democracy inclusive of wealth redistribution, small unit participatory forms, and localized understandings later urged by Schaffer seemed eminent. As Lodge describes in Politics in South Africa from Mandela to Mbeki (Lodge 2000), the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) represented a bargain that incorporated the mass and earlier revolutionary disposition for public ownership and wealth redistribution with the influence of the private sector and international development politics. The RDP balanced ‘growth through redistribution’ policies (22). The RDP also promised to integrate a people-driven process, structured consultation processes, and empowerment of ordinary citizens in the delivery of development goals and basic services (22; 25). By 1996, however, in a closed-door decision made and released by the ANC elite, the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy represented a shift in balance towards the growth aspect of RDP rather than redistribution (25). Likewise, by 1997, the RDP had ceased to be understood as a ‘people-driven’ process (69) and instead development goals were pursued from the top-down (28). As Lodge describes, the South African democratic state’s “commitment to people-driven development seems to have been fluctuating and ambivalent” (168-169). Associational life and the South African concept of *ubuntu*, Lodge posits, if encouraged and supported may provide the foundations for advancement of participatory and development notions of democracy in South Africa, however (231). Though

South Africa seems to have moved toward a liberal state approach to democracy, that approach has not been universally accepted. Alternate forms of participation may indeed succeed in bringing South African democracy closer to the participatory and development model.

2 Conceptualizing Participation

Okoth-Ogendo links good democratic governance to the “creative interactions designed to promote full and effective participation by the citizenry in public affairs” and maintaining a “continuous state-society and intra-society nexus” (Camay and Gordon 2002). Despite the very real potential of civil society to enhance participation in democratic South Africa, many theorists have concluded that within the new democracy and within the global development context, the concept of “participation” has become an empty slogan, bereft of meaning. Verba and Nye define participation as “those activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take” and “where a few take part in decisions there is little democracy; the more participation there is in decisions, the more democracy there is.” (Verba and Nye in Mafunisa and Maphunye 2005) There have been many attempts to define and classify different forms of participation, distinguishing between meaningful and token forms of participation. Such researchers argue that as participation as a concept has become politically and economically attractive in the donor world and institutionalized civil society has placed distance between state and society actors, tokenism has increased (Chambers 2002; Hogan 2002; Inglis 1997; Mafunisa and Maphunye 2005; White 2000).

Within South Africa, the professionalizing of civil society and state pressures have limited the ability of civil society to enable meaningful participation. With professionalism, Rahnema argues, NGOs began to promote state-sanctioned development agendas rather than people-driven processes (Rahnema 1993, 116-127). Likewise, the number of civic actors and the degree of access was also restricted (Benjamin 2005). Where professionalism has not done so, the ANC has acted to limit the role of the civic in fostering democratic participation. Lodge describes the marginalization of the civic by the ANC as extreme (206-207). Gumede names public dialogue as prerequisite to democratic participation and decries the silencing of public

dialogue, dissent, and protest by the ANC (Gumede 2005). Richard Pithouse agrees and argues that despite contrary national and local trends, democracy should be understood "to include the right to express dissent outside of electoral participation." (Pithouse "A Second Democracy for the Second Economy" 2006) In light of the highly politicized appropriation of the democratic concept of "participation," the author has purposefully framed her research questions around issues of "engagement," implying a broader sense of democratic interactions inclusive of electoral, political, civic, and social forms of participation existing in both state-defined and external and individualized loci. In the wake of civic exclusion, social movements have emerged among local communities to contend for the right to participate and define participation in South Africa.

3 Social Movement Theories

A rise in social movements in South Africa occurred in the first five years of the twenty-first century to contest the existing frameworks of democratic participation. In Voices of Protest (2006), Richard Ballard, Adam Habib and Imraan Valodia define social movements as “political and/or socially directed collectives often involving multiple organizations and networks, focused on changing one or more elements of the social, political, and economic system within which they are located” (2). In approaching social movements theoretically, the authors describe a three-pronged approach that analyzes political opportunities that limit or expand opportunities for movement, mobilizing structures, and framing processes. They suggest, however, a new emphasis on processes that connect these elements, urging a dynamic framework for understanding social movements (8). Emerging social movements, as they radicalize, appropriate non-politicized sites, activate boundaries, and transmit ideas, become the site of praxis. In Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1972), Paulo Freire writes about the process of struggle and humanization and argues that through praxis, reflection and action upon the world, oppressed and marginalized people critically perceive of the world, commit to acting toward transformation, and expel the myths of the old order with teaching for permanent change. Social movements in South Africa, therefore, potentially inform the process of engagement and transformation of the state that other marginalized groups (e.g. young people) might seek.

Within South Africa, individuals engaged in popular movements and local communities conceived of participation as contrary to forms encouraged by the increasingly unresponsive state. Fatima Meer concludes that the nation and world are in a crisis of values in which South African democracy “does not work for the people” but it “evades the people” (Meer 2006). Through social movements and other means, South Africans have sought to expose this reality and work towards transformation. S'bu Zikode, President of Abahlali baseMjondolo, a Durban-

based social movement, describes the emergence of new, more democratic forms of political participation found within social movements. “There is Abahlali politics, the politics of the people, and then there is party politics. The political parties have their own culture, where you find...more talking and no action” (Ngiam 2006, 32). “Our politics is a traditional home politics which is understood very well by all the old mamas and gogos” (S’bu Zikode, “The Greatest Threat,” 2006). Pithouse describes the democratizing process that occurs when grassroots movements commit to running autonomously and democratically and open to innovation from below. This democratizing politics is what Abahlali president, S’bu Zikode has characterized as “The politics of the strong poor” (Richard Pithouse, “Rethinking Public Participation,” 2006).

Social movements are creating alternative forms and understandings of democratic participation in response to both the disempowering practice and unfulfilled development promises of political parties. A youth member of Abahlali baseMjondolo, M’du Hlongwa, provides Abahlali’s critique of state interactions with the public:

They may say, at the top they may call a press conference and say we are working for Kennedy Road, we are building maybe 1000 houses on Kennedy Road. Only to find they haven’t come to the people to ask, how many houses are needed in that area of Kennedy Road? How many families are here? They may say we built 100 houses for Kennedy only to find that maybe 4000 houses are needed for Kennedy...Only if they come and ask the people and talk to the people, then they have the exact number of house needed. That’s what we want from the government. Come and ask the people. Don’t say ‘we built a tuck-shop in Kennedy.’ What if people don’t need a tuck-shop? (Ngiam 2006, 35)

The failure to deliver basic services and encourage consultation and popular decision-making, some argue, points to an incomplete democratic transformation. Rita Braahmsen in Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa (2000) concludes that in sub-Saharan Africa, electoral democracy contains substantial limitations and the region requires that democracy also address socio-economic rights. Braahmsen suggests that concept of the political be expanded to include all relationships based on power; therefore, a state’s retreat from addressing socio-economic issues would be viewed as undemocratic.

As social movements have struggled to assert the popular right to participate, dissent has risen. On the one hand, the very notion of 'community' has become contested terrain for different practices of power trying to define the movement through its priorities, goals and strategies. Because social movements have emerged outside the locale of the tripartite alliance, unions and the ANC have felt threatened (Barchiesi 2004). On the other hand, movements seek control over conceptualization of their struggle. Ballard cautions that the media and academics did not always acknowledge social movements in the context of ordinary people and community struggles as they defined them. Ashraf Cassiem, a member of the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign, at a conference at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, stated, "'Social movements' is a name we got from people like you." Cassiem insisted that his organization and others like it were autonomous bodies of ordinary people fighting daily battles (Richard Ballard et al. 2005). Issues of autonomy and control over the very ideas of participation are highly relevant to those faced by young people engaging civically.

4 Youth and Youth Development Theories

As poor and local communities battle for their right to 'participate' on their own terms, the debate concerning youth participation is relatively silent. Outside of generic youth development theory, there is a narrow range of existing research on youth participation and huge gaps remain. In Heroes or Villains? Youth Politics in the 1980s (1993), Jeremy Seekings seeks to understand youth in the context of their role in resistance and violence of apartheid. According to Seekings, the term 'youth' took on heightened use and meaning between 1976 and 1985, shifting from being used to mark the process of maturation to marking attitudes and the process of political change. During the eighties and nineties, Seekings asserts, two extreme stereotypes emerged. Society began considering youth on the one hand as violent and apocalyptic and on the other as broadly sympathetic and libraty. According to Monique Marks, who studied the Diepkloof community in an attempt to understand youth politics in the 1980's and 1990's, the majority of young people operated between the extremes of the two stereotypes. Most youth self-identified as 'bearers of the future,' but within Diepkloof, at least, multiple layers of activism existed within the context of struggle and violence. Multiple layers of violence also occurred: youth experienced violence as revolutionaries, as victims of state violence, as discipline within youth organizations, and as gangsterism (Marks 2001).

Despite gradations of participation in struggle and violence, by the 1990's a concept of youth emerged that was "understood to mean that there is a generation of young people who are somehow 'lost' " whose experiences with unemployment, education gaps, and violence can be combined into the overall "problem of the youth." (Marks 2001, 100) Both Seekings and Marks, caution against treatment of young people as a monolithic entity. However, in contemporary South Africa, despite a new generation of South Africans born into or raised in a democratic society, the concept of 'the problem of the youth' persisted.

Youth development theory provides an alternative and more suitable approach toward understanding youth participation. Like notions of “participation” in general, youth development theory suggests different gradients. On the one hand of the youth participation continuum, youth are viewed and treated as objects or recipients. ‘Youth’ in this instance takes historically and societally imposed meaning that assumes both helplessness and aggression, the sum ‘problem of the youth.’ Contemporary interpretations of ‘the problem of the youth’ will be reviewed in the following chapter. On the other end of the youth participation continuum, young people are viewed and treated as resources or partners. Youth development theory employs several different approaches:

- 1) youth centrality and leadership approach based on the principle that “young people should be partners in their own development.” The Youth Development Network acknowledges, however, that it is often challenging for those working with youth to relinquish their power in order to allow young people to ‘have a voice’ and requires a paradigm shift in the way the youth are seen and embraced.
- 2) an asset-based approach which seeks to identify the strengths of young people and use these as a base from which to engage with their needs and challenges
- 3) youth community development approach which recognizes the role communities play in developing its young people as well as the role young people play in developing their communities
- 4) learner-centred approach (Youth Development Network, 10-12)

A youth development approach would understand meaningful youth participation as a transformative opportunity not only beneficial to young people but to the broader society. Further, youth development practitioners and theorists recognize that although young people possess a range of similar needs, they are not a homogenous group (Youth Development Network).¹ Conceptualization of youth participation, therefore, requires that democratic participatory theory be grounded in a youth development approach.

¹ Young people in South Africa can be divided into several subgroups: women/men; disabled; unemployed/employed; in school/out of school; in prison; rural/urban/suburban; and age cohorts (6).

5 An Adapted Theoretical Approach

Because no singular theoretical approach adequately addressed youth civic engagement, the author applied several principles to her analysis:

- 1) Local conceptualizations of democracy and participation are required to understand the civic participation of a particular population or society.
- 2) Both African developmental and participatory notions of democracy and Western liberal democracy theories shaped the formation and practice of the South African democratic state.
- 3) Participation exists within both state-sanctioned and contested spaces.
- 4) Young people do not form a monolithic subgroup but do share similarities in development needs and interactions with state actors.
- 5) Young people should be viewed as partners in their development and the development of communities.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

South Africa, the South African Constitution, and South African citizens stand as beacons of hope and promise to democracies and nations across the world. However, South Africans have bemoaned the democratic decline of its young people, classifying low voter turnout as part of a broader 'problem of the youth.' In a poll taken to assess the health of South African democracy, half of South Africans thought that young people had forgotten the struggle against apartheid that resulted in South African democracy (Paper for Public Opinion Research 2004). Evidence for youth voter turnout warrants attention. In 2004, though 75% of total eligible voters had registered to vote, only 53% of eligible youth ages 18-25 had done so. ("Young Tell ANC" 2004, 22) The eThekweni municipality² is seated in KwaZulu-Natal, the last stronghold of colonialism, the birthplace of the African National Congress, the site of the youth-on-youth political violence of the eighties and nineties, and the continued exception to ANC hegemony. Youth comprise the largest subgroup of the diverse urban area (over 40%) (Statistics South Africa 2001). EThekweni, therefore, provides a vibrant locus for the study of democratic participation of youth citizens. In this study, 'youth' are defined as young people between the ages of 13 and 29 living in eThekweni civically engaged and/or enrolled in school. Particular emphasis has been placed on poor black urban youth. In attempting to investigate current trends of civic and political engagement of eThekweni youth, I aimed to answer the following questions:

- What characterizes youth forms of civic engagement? Besides direct political involvement, what avenues of engagement do young people seek?

² Over 3 million people reside in the eThekweni municipality, which includes the surrounding areas and the city of Durban, the 2nd most populous city in South Africa and largest city in KwaZulu-Natal ("Durban," Wikipedia 2007). Of its 3 million people, 68% are Black African, 20% Indian, 9% White and 3% Coloured. 53% of its population are female whereas 47% are male (eThekweni Municipality 2005). EThekweni residents are religious. 68% of eThekweni residents are Christian, 11% are Hindu, 3% are Muslim, and only 16% have no religion. ("Durban" Wikipedia 2007) Young people form the largest subgroup of the population. Children and youth between the ages of 5 and 24, alone, constitute 40% of the general population (Statistics South Africa 2001). Young people in eThekweni comprise a vital part of a diverse urban society.

- What attitudes and perceptions do youth possess concerning different avenues of civic engagement?
- What do youth, who actively participate civically, tell us about the extent and ways youth are engaged in civil society?
- What recommendations can be made based on research findings?

In order to better address this study's main questions of youth engagement in eThekweni, I conducted an expansive literature review of material that examines and discusses demographic, political, social, historical, policy, and youth contexts. As discussed in Chapter 1, material specific to contemporary youth participation is limited in quantity and breadth, and therefore, has been drawn from a wide range of literature including pop culture commentary, news articles, history, and serious political science analyses discussing both national and local and general population and youth specific trends. This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part discusses political and policy contexts and trends affecting the general population both nationwide and locally. The second part will focus on youth-specific content including policy, social perceptions, historical interpretations, and contemporary issues and examples of engagement.

1: General Literature Review

1.1 Political Context

Nationwide, South Africans supported their democracy but grew increasingly critical of the ruling party. On average, citizens expressed positive outlooks about South African democracy. Following the 2004 national election, Archbishop Desmond Tutu concluded: "We are getting to be experts at this...It is often said that the first election after freedom is the last one, because most countries degenerate into dictatorships. We are disproving that" ("South Africans Flock to Polls" 2004). In a survey conducted by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) in 2004, 67% of respondents were fairly to very satisfied (IDASA "Polling the Nations" 2004). In another survey conducted in 2004, 70% of South Africans reported that "considering everything" they were optimistic rather than pessimistic about South Africa's future. 68% said that the ability of ordinary people to influence government was better now than under apartheid (Paper for Public Opinion Research 2004). Development gains had been made. Those not attending an educational institution because of no money for fees, for example, decreased from 2002 to 2005. Likewise, the percentage of households living in informal structures, and the percentage of households where an adult went hungry declined. The percentage of households that had a cell phone available for use grew rapidly from 35% in 2002 to 60% in 2005 (Statistics South Africa 2005).

However, citizens viewed democratic gains as limited. In one survey, only 31% found that South Africa was a "full democracy," while 56% found it to be a democracy with major or minor problems. Over two thirds (67%) reported legal inequality: that some people were treated better than others by the legal system (Paper for Public Opinion Research 2004). Citizens may be disengaging from political organizations and processes as a result of increasing dissatisfaction. COSATU workers reported a decline in the belief that the party they intended to

vote for had workers' interest at heart with 91% positively reporting in 1994 and only 76% in 2004 (Buhlungu, COSATU Workers' Political Attitudes in South Africa, 205). Though 80% of the Voting Age population voted in 1999, only 74% voted in 2004 (Centre for Contemporary Conflict 2004).

Some analysts denied the connection between voter decline and citizen satisfaction levels (Centre for Contemporary Conflict 2004). Proponents of the "normalization" theory, argued that the decline in voting rates reflected the 'normalization' process of South African democracy. The National Youth Commission, for example, concluded that the decline in youth participation "shows that we are becoming a normal democracy" (Everatt 2000).

Others, however, viewed voter decline as part of a significant disengagement trend resulting from citizen concerns about service delivery and governance. Rita Abrahamsen (2000) claimed that theorists use the 'normalisation' argument to justify leaders and ignore citizen dissatisfaction. Boyte suggested that South African democracy should be measured not by its voter rates, but by its practice of community-based and society-centred forms of democracy (Boyte 2004). In contemporary South Africa, elections and local elections in particular created meaningful spaces for community participation only if they enabled debate on community levels that directly impacted government actions (Williams 2007, 15).

As voting rates decreased, participation in civil society organizations increased. In the late 1990's, this trend was noted by the Human Research Council which discovered an increase in participation in women's, youth, and other civil society organizations (Muthien 1999). Civil society and social movement theorists, indeed, concluded that the rise in social movements and participation in civil society and the simultaneous decline in voter turnout indicated not blind disengagement but increasing dissatisfaction with the democratic state (Ballard, Habib, and Valodia 2006, Pithouse 2006, Barchiesi 2004, et al.).

1.2 Policy Context: Service Delivery and Public Participation

Though in the initial years of South African democracy the ANC promised service delivery through a people-driven process, national policies shifted emphasis to a privatized top-down growth model (See Chapter 1). Public criticism mounted over the government's economic policies, and many expressed discontent over slow service delivery, which they perceived as the government's rejection of development goals for a privatized and free-market approach to governance. In his 2006 State of the Nation Address, President Thabo Mbeki renewed his administration's continued commitment to the growth-based capitalist model for governance (Mbeki 2006). Among other initiatives, he posited the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) as the solution to challenges of unemployment and poverty. Some believe the heightened popularity of Jacob Zuma to have represented popular dissatisfaction with Mbeki's intimate relationship to the private sector and belief that Zuma as the country's next president would better represent working and poor people (Ngonyama 2006).

eThekweni's residents were increasingly dissatisfied with service delivery and persistent inequality. Two-thirds of citizens surveyed in the Quality of Life study felt men and women didn't have same work opportunities (eThekweni Municipality 2005, 12). Satisfaction regarding prepaid electricity declined 22 percentage points (22). Notably, general satisfaction, itself, also declined. In eThekweni, 43% of citizens reported satisfaction in 1998 but only 39% in 2004 (11). The majority of residents in eThekweni continued to grapple with poverty, and many still did not have access to basic services. In considering all persons aged 15 to 65 in eThekweni, 66% (2.04 million) reported no income (Statistics South Africa 2001). Of its entire population, 61% made less than R427 per month (eThekweni Municipality 2005, 15). 15% of all households in eThekweni were informal. 18% of its citizenry still did not have access to safe drinking water and 21% did not have electricity (7). As part of the national social development agenda to address basic needs, Area Based Management areas were established to coordinate and integrate

development. Inanda, Ntuzuma, and KwaMashu or the INK area in eThekweni is the second largest grouping of poor neighbourhoods in the nation. 30 km north of Durban city centre, INK includes residential townships and informal settlements and a mixture of developed and undeveloped areas home to approximately 510,000 residents. In INK, despite development efforts, high levels of “unemployment, social dislocation, poverty and crime, [are] exacerbated by inadequate physical infrastructure and severe degradation” (eThekweni Municipality 2007). The persistence of inadequate housing and services in INK was not unique to INK but was experienced in many parts of eThekweni. Satisfaction levels seemed to reflect such experience.

Even members of the tripartite alliance, COSATU, SACP, and ANC, had become increasingly critical of national development and participation positions. Zwelinzima Vavi, head of COSATU, in unfolding its plan to flood ANC ranks with leftist politicians, described the directive as originating from union ranks with “a massive anger exploding” regarding the accumulation project of Mbeki’s presidency (Tabne 2007). Jeremy Cronin, South African Communist Party Deputy General Secretary, characterized Mbeki’s presidency as creating the conditions for a capitalist growth plan driven first by macro-economic policy embodied in its GEAR policies, next privatization, and finally and most recently by state capitalism. Cronin asserted that these approaches had been accompanied by a persistent inability of the government to address development challenges, an increase in corruption and careerism, and the destruction of the ANC’s organizational capacity. Cronin took issue not just with the economic policies of the current administration, but also its methods. According to Cronin, the ‘Mbeki project’ had led to the establishment of “representational vanguardism” that attempted to claim “righteous vanguardism.” Cronin asserted that this new form of governing had not only failed to balance growth initiatives with development goals but had abandoned participatory forms and approaches to democracy in its acceptance of the liberal model (See Chapter 1). Cronin asked, “What can we say about the vision of popular participation in self-government?” (Cronin 2005).

The government has been slow to deliver despite the popular and legal directives for both meaningful participation and adequate service provision.

Public participation has a strong mandate from constitutional, national, and local law. Constitution Section 152 (1) contains two objectives for local government: the democratic and accountable governance of communities and the encouragement of the involvement of such communities (Piper 2006). The Local Government Transition Act (LGTA ACT No 209 of 1993) conceived of local government as the “local sphere of government with the constitutional mandate to carry out a number of developmental duties.” The *White Paper* (1997) on local government established the basis for a new developmental local government system committed to working with citizens and community groups to meet the needs of the communities (Mathekga and Buccus 2006, 13-14). The *White Paper* highlighted four modes of citizen participation: voting, policy processes, service users, and partners. The Municipal Structures Act (1998) Section 19 provided for development mechanisms to consult the community, review the needs and involve the community in municipal processes including the details for ward committees. Section 16 of the Municipal Structures Act required that a “culture of governance that compliments formal representative government with a system of participatory government” be established, including public involvement in the IDP preparation, establishment and review of Performance Management targets, preparation of the budget and strategic decision-making related to service delivery (Piper 2006). The Local Government Municipal Systems Act (32 of 2000) provided core principles, mechanisms, and the process necessary to enable municipalities to move progressively toward the upliftment of local communities, defining the most important functions of the municipalities as service delivery with community participation as the means for bringing about service delivery (Mathekga and Buccus 2006, 14). The Local Government Municipal Systems Act (2000) established a culture of governance as power sharing, albeit mostly focused on deliberation and public consultation (Piper 2006).

Recent policy documents attempted to expand the notions of participation beyond public consultation and deliberation. A ten-paged brief, the National Public Policy Framework for Participation (2005), called for the legitimization of ward committees and a new phase of partnership with the public where communities share rights and responsibilities (Piper 2006). In KwaZulu-Natal, specifically, the Local Government TA Community Participation Framework (2006) tried to make the national framework practical. The framework called for the inclusion of other modes of citizen participation in addition to ward committees and suggested statutory obligations (Piper 2006). National and regional policy and law include local communities in definitions of local governance. The impact of the lofty efforts of policy-makers, however, seems to have been slow to reach grassroots levels.

In eThekweni and KwaZulu Natal, meaningful forms of public participation were limited. The city planner for Durban claimed that eThekweni valued popular participation in service delivery, quoting the municipality's purpose statement, "the active involvement of citizens is fundamental to achieving our outcome of improving people's quality of life" (Moodley 2007, 4). The "eThekweni approach" to participation, however, was narrow. The approach focused primarily on consultation, the "utilization of stakeholder workshopping at the geographic...and the sectoral level(s)" (Moodley 2007, 4-6). As Piper noted, participation through consultation does not directly connect citizens to power (Piper 2006). Further reflecting limitation, even in seeking consultation, eThekweni grappled with representivity, targeting only leadership and intermediary bodies in stakeholder workshops. (Moodley 2007, 4-6).

Other efforts in eThekweni demonstrated ineffective and almost token commitment to participation. Towards public consultation in the renaming of Durban streets and roads, advertisements were placed in the newspapers calling for name suggestions within a 30-day period. The city compiled a list and then gave the public 21 days to respond with specific concerns (Kockott 2007). Alarm was raised about inconsistency regarding selections for the list

presented to the public, and despite large numbers of complaints and even protest actions, only 257 specific suggestions were accepted by the city. Participation in eThekweni seemed nominal in practice. Fakir points, in part, to a ‘transformation fatigue’ among public officials on both local and provincial levels of government that has meant inadequate commitment to truly meaningful popular participation (Fakir 2006).

In KwaZulu-Natal, research conducted in 2001 and 2002 found that public participation in the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Legislature was “still at a rudimentary stage.” Limitations included ambiguity concerning which government body was responsible for public participation, inadequate information available to the public, lack of focus in increasing participation, and inaccessibility of public hearings. As a result, the KZN Legislature drafted a public participation programme for 2004-2009 with a programme of action, but its impact is still unclear (in Mafunisa and Maphunye 2005). “Ward committees have been identified as the most important structure through which to involve communities in local government in South Africa” (Piper and Chanza 2006, 18), but their effectiveness in encouraging popular participation in KwaZulu-Natal had also been questioned. In 2004, only 42% of KwaZulu-Natal residents reported some knowledge of ward committees (Hemson 2007, 10). Traditionally marginalized groups seemed the least included in ward committee processes. Piper and Chanza found that in Msunduzi, the second largest municipality in KwaZulu-Natal after eThekweni, young people were under-represented and under-participated in ward committees. As a result, youth issues remained mostly ignored (Piper and Chanza 2006, 18). Even for those included, ward committees did not provide opportunities for meaningful participation. The Centre for Public Participation, in a study associated with HSRC and the University of KwaZulu-Natal, found that ward committees lacked resources and required structural empowerment (Buccus et al. 2007). As the result of growing frustration, distrust rose. Where ward committees were known, from 2004 to 2005,

trust decreased 9 percentage points and distrust increased 14 percentage points (Hemsen 2007, 12).

As distrust for official structures increased, some considered NGOs as potential intermediaries between government and the public in providing service delivery and space for participation. Ndlela conducted research on two NGOs in eThekweni and found that they succeeded in enhancing participatory democracy (Ndlela 2005). Smith, on the other hand, found that NGOs were unable to serve as effective intermediaries because of capacity and funding limitations and pressures from state entities that detracted from relationships with communities (Smith 2001). As discussed in Chapter 1, others were even more critical and pointed instead to locally-based social movements as the greatest potential democratizing agent in South Africa.

1.3 Social Movements in eThekweni: The Politics of Contestation

As increased numbers of citizens rejected state forms of participation, social movements likewise increased. According to Gumede, social movements provided a needed forum for deliberation, helped citizens form opinions, and gave public officials insight into popular concerns (Gumede 2005). Benjamin supported Gumede's claims, arguing that in providing alternative spaces for deliberation and action, social movements contested the existing frameworks for engagement with the state (Benjamin 2005). This contestation was evident in eThekweni.

Reflecting concerns of the broader public, members of social movements spoke of their frustration over the failed promises of government for service delivery and meaningful engagement. Abahlali baseMjondolo, a Durban-based movement of shack dwellers had mobilized in over 30 communities for land and housing. According to M'du Hlongwa, a youth

member and former Secretary of Abahlali, a university student, and an active volunteer in his community,

The constitution says that everyone must have adequate shelter. We don't have adequate shelter and the situation is not getting better. Now the city is trying to evict us and is leaving people homeless on the side of the road. How many lives will be destroyed before our voices are heard? How many children will drown in rivers on the way to school because 'there is no budget' to build bridges while casinos, and airports and theme parks have huge budgets? Who will do something about the fact that the police who are supposed to protect the people are always abusing us? Is it right that they come into our houses and ill-treat us, insulting us, stealing from us and hitting us? Who will do something about the fact that even when our youth finish grade 12 they just sit at home because there is no work and because our parents can't afford to send us to university? Who will turn our economy from something that lets the rich get richer off the suffering of the poor into something that lets all the people make a better life?

M'du was frustrated not only by the increasing divide between rich and poor South Africans but also by the politics of the democratic state. His interactions with elected officials had not been participatory or partnering but parasitic:

The politicians have shown that they are not the answer to our suffering. The poor are just ... the ladders of the politicians. The politician is an animal that hibernates. They always come out in the election season to make empty promises and then they disappear...their power comes because they say that they will speak for us (Hlongwa 2007).

Rejecting representative democracy in its current manifestation, Abahlali members asserted their right to speak for themselves and their communities.

That is why in Abahlali we started to say 'Speak to us and not for us' and why we vote in our own elections for people who will live and work with us in our communities and without any hopes for making our suffering into a nice job. (Hlongwa 2007)

They asserted their right to meaningful voice by withholding participation in official structures.

Leading up to the 2006 municipal elections, Abahlali ran a very successful "No Land, No House, No Vote" campaign. M'du hoped Abahlali would run a similar campaign for the Presidential election in 2009:

Let us keep our votes. Let us speak for ourselves where we live and work. Let us keep our power for ourselves. The poor are many. We have shown that together

we can be very strong. Abahlali has now won many victories. Other organizations are working hard too. Let us continue to work to make ourselves the strong poor. Let us vote for ourselves every day. (Hlongwa 2007)

Abahlali baseMjondolo, in rejection of state-defined spaces for and definitions of participation, had defined its own grassroots politics of movement. According to S'bu Zikode:

The politics of the strong poor is an anti-party politics. Our politics is not to put someone in an office. Our politics is to put people above that office...Our politics is also not a politics of a few people...[it] is a traditional home politics which is understood very well by all the old mamas and gogos because it affects their lives (Zikode, "Greatest Threat," 2006).

For many involved in Abahlali and other social movements nationwide, the very act of disengaging from party politics was political. As they rejected state political forms as undemocratic, within internal structures and spaces, members of Abahlali defined and adhered to their own democratizing "home politics." According to a youth member, Mnikelo Ndabankulu, the Abahlali Annual General Election held in November 2006 embodied "real democracy" (Ndabankulu 2006).

Social movements of varied form claimed democratic authority. In 2004, the Centre for Civil Society and the School of Development Studies at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in Durban brought varied scholars and activists together for a Social Movement's Conference. Over seventeen movements were discussed in conference proceedings (Dwyer 2004, Pillay 2004, Rustimjee 2004, Greenbert 2004, and Schmidt, *The President from the Sky*, 2004). Conference proceedings urged the unanimous recognition of social movements as "ultra-democrats" rather than "anti-democrats." (Schmidt 2004) In practice, too, social movements apply principled democratic action. Coloured communities living in Wentworth, in addition to fighting for flat maintenance and upgrades, also waged an environmental campaign against the health problems caused by the emissions of the nearby Engen plant when the city refused to address the health issues itself (ka-Manzi, 2006). The Bayview Flat Dwellers, in their fight for basic services and housing actively resisted cut-offs, evictions, and the installation of pre-paid meters. In February

2007, the group blocked municipal contractors from installing pre-paid meters. When the city retaliated by cutting off power from residents who had already paid, the group marched to the local councillor's house, chanting, "This is what democracy looks like." The flat dwellers refused to leave until the power had been restored (Walsh 2007).

Abahlali baseMjondolo demanded strict adherence to a democratic participatory model from members and partners alike. In late 2006, a dispute emerged concerning the Social Movement Indaba (SMI). The SMI was conceived at the 2002 World Summit for Sustainable Development in Johannesburg as an umbrella body for left-wing organisations such as the Anti-Privatisation Forum, Jubilee South Africa and the Landless People's Movement. In 2006, Abahlali baseMjondolo leadership participated in SMI planning processes for a national meeting to occur in Durban in December 2006; however, Bahlali withdrew its participation over concerns about process within the planning committee. On December 3, 2006, Abahlali and the Western Cape's Anti-Eviction Campaign interrupted conference proceedings to voice their grievances against the lack of transparency, poor budget decisions, and low levels of democratic decision-making within the SMI (Cassiem 2006). SMI members accused Abahlali as operating 'tsotsi' politics to hijack the meeting and attributed such behaviour to the influence of white middle class academics (Tolsi, *On the Far Side of the Left*, 2006; Naidoo 2006). Abahlali asserted the autonomy of social movements and their right to protest, denying 'tsotsi politics' accusations and describing allied academics as "servants not masters" (Tolsi, *On the Far Side of the Left*, 2006; Cassiem 2006).

Indeed, the contestation for its right to define participation outside of official structures and NGOs has led many to accuse Abahlali of anti-democratic behaviour and attribute its activism to the so-called "third force."³ Lennox Maboso and Harry Metiuna accused Abahlali of

³ The term "third force" was used originally to refer to apartheid regime and vigilante agents acting to fuel the IFP-ANC political violence of the 1980's and 1990's in order to discredit and divide black leadership and subvert democratic negotiation processes.

being under the sway of “an agent provocateur” (Maboso and Metiuna 2006). Others called Abahlali baseMjondolo, itself, a “third force,” alleging that it sought to derail democratic processes. The President of Abahlali, S’bu Zikode, appropriated the term, however, in his now famous “Third Force” pronouncement that the New York Times published in December 2005. Zikode refuted the accusations and wrote,

We need to get things clear. There definitely is a Third Force. The question is what is it and who is part of the Third Force? Well, I am Third Force myself. The Third Force is all the pain and the suffering that the poor are subjected to every second in our lives. The shack dwellers have many things to say about the Third Force. It is time for us to speak out and to say this is who we are, this is where we are and this how we live. [W]ho will speak about the genuine issues that affect the people every day – water, electricity, education, land, housing?

We discovered that our municipality does not listen to us when we speak to them in Zulu. We tried English. Now we realise that they won’t understand Xhosa or Sotho either. The only language that they understand is when we put thousands of people on the street. ... [The movement] will finish its job when land and housing, electricity and basic services have been won and poverty eliminated.

We are driven by the Third Force, the suffering of the poor. Our betrayers are the Second Force. The First Force was our struggle against apartheid. The Third Force will stop when the Fourth Force comes. The Fourth Force is land, housing, water, electricity, health care, education and work. (Zikode, *The Third Force*, 2006)

Abahlali baseMjondolo’s struggle for land, housing and basic services, though relatively new, was rich and multi-layered. The movement, which began in 2005 and continues to-date, had been marked with effective and widespread mobilization, defining moments of struggle, democratic experience within the movement, and negative encounters with the state. Academia, the media, and activists within Abahlali baseMjondolo themselves chronicled and analyzed their experience. In the first edition of its self-published newspaper, *Izwi Labampofu (The Voice of the Poor)*, Abahlali members described the movement’s development from its first protest organized in the Kennedy Road Settlement in March 2005 to then representing over 34 shack settlements across Durban and as far away as Pietermaritzburg. The first protest in Kennedy

Road was organized when the municipality began developing land that had been promised to shack dwellers for other purposes and immediately following the failure of the municipality to collect refuse gathered in the Kennedy Road Settlement. When the state responded to protestors with teargas, arrests, and violence, the community declared that “We are on our own now.” Other settlements joined Abahlali baseMjondolo, and a series of legal marches and banned marches occurred. Since then, Abahlali

democratized the governance of settlements, stopped evictions, won access to local schools, won some victories around services like water, toilets and refuse removal, [attained] legal support, won a number of victories in court, [initiated a successful ‘No Land. No House. No Vote.’ boycott of the March 2006 municipal elections], made the voice of shack dwellers very strong in the media, set up crèches, a sewing cooperative, and vegetable gardens, and seriously challenged the city’s slum clearance project (Abahlali Bayanda, 1).

Other articles in *Izwi Labampofu* covered more recent struggles in resisting illegal evictions in Juba Place and Motala Heights Settlements. (“Victory for the people of Motala Heights” 2006; Hlongwa 2006; “Juba Place Evictions” 2006)

Several scholars conducted first-hand interviews and participant-observation in attempts to understand the meaning of the events of protest for shack dwellers participating in the movement. Xin Wei Ngiam concluded that the movement grew from a feeling of betrayal over the dissonance between political practice and democratic ideals (Ngiam 2006). Raj Patel placed Abahlali baseMjondolo’s politics in the context of Alan Badiou’s theory of ‘real politics,’ as the result of radicalizing events that produced people who decided to relate from the perspective of the event and where the driving force is internal and autonomous from the state (Patel 2005). Jacob Bryant described this process and how the sense of betrayal of Bahlali was transformed into a sense of empowerment (Bryant 2005). Richard Pithouse provided extensive analysis and comment on the events and development of Abahlali baseMjondolo. In his 2006 report entitled, “Our Struggle is Though On the Ground, Running. The University of Abahlali baseMjondolo,” Pithouse provided a thorough account of Abahlali baseMjondolo’s foundation, history, successes,

and challenges and described in detail the illegal and violent behaviour of the state, which has been belligerent and repressive throughout Abahlali's struggle (Pithouse 2006).

State responses to Abahlali's battle for services and the right to meaningfully participate often assumed an anti-democratic nature. The Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI) accused the national government in the *Mail and Guardian* last year of illegally restricting citizens from their right to protest. FXI experts named state interactions with Abahlali as an example and concluded, "There is a widespread violation of the right to demonstrate in South Africa. Demonstrators are denied their constitutional rights to freedom of expression and assembly (FXI 2006)." FXI further urged investigation into behaviour of police during and after protest gatherings. Police treatment of Abahlali baseMjondolo members was indeed suspect.

Zikode issued a statement on behalf of Abahlali demanding an end to the illegal harassment by the police of shack dwellers (Zikode 2007). Abahlali and associated group members were frequent victims of police harassment and staged arrests. System Cele provided a first-hand account of the police attack in the March 2005 protest that resulted in her losing her front tooth (Cele 2006). The Vice President of Abahlali baseMjondolo, Philani Zungu described numerous examples of police brutality, including his own unprovoked arrest and police attack that resulted in his loss of consciousness in September 2006 (Zungu 2006). This incident gained national coverage (Tolsi "I was punched, beaten," 2006). Abahlali are commonly known as the *izikipa ezimbomvu* ("the red shirts"), and one of the arresting police officers was quoted to have said, "there will be no more red shirts here" as the Abahlali leaders were thrown into the police van. In December 2006, an umhlali was pepper sprayed by municipal forces as he attempted to present a legal letter concerning the illegality of demolition occurring in the Motala Heights settlement (Abahlali Bayanda 2006, 1).

Information was also a source of contestation. In March 2007, despite previous assertions that slum housing would be eliminated by 2010, the eThekweni municipality admitted

that such a goal was “far fetched” and would “require a miracle” (Goldstone 2007). In October 2007, however, when Abahlali had requested information from the city concerning slum clearance plans and progress in accordance with the Promotion of Access of Information Act (PAIA), the city delayed its response and provided outdated and limited information. Abahlali published a critique of the plans in its first ever newspaper, flipping the undemocratic behaviour of the state in order to democratize knowledge (“We are Still Waiting for Answers” 2006). Abahlali members described their decision to use knowledge of the law and self-education as “the second tier of our strategy to liberate our people. We have protested and we now believe that we can use the Constitution not just as a shield but as a sword too” (Tolsi “Abahlali Demand Information,” 2006). Members were encouraged by Abahlali leadership to exercise acquired knowledge of constitutional and legal rights to move the struggle forward (Zikode, “Presidential Message,” 2006).

In his editorial in the Mail and Guardian, “What Future for SA politics?” Richard Calland asked about the future of South African politics when real politics increasingly occurred “separate from the formal operation of the government” in the hands of “an active citizenry that refuse[d] despite material deprivation to succumb to a culture of victimhood.” (Callands 2006) If social movements seeking service delivery and meaningful participation in the South African democratic fabric model real politics, then youth participation, too, must be understood in this context. South African young people, as they face significant social and economic challenges, have also turned away from official forms and concepts of participation in favour of self-defined alternatives.

2 Youth Literature Review

2.1 Social Context: 'The Problem of the Youth'

Low voter rates plagued South African young people. Though 74% of the voting age population voted in 2004 (Centre for Contemporary Conflict. 2004), only 53% of South Africans aged 18-25 had even registered to vote ("Young tell ANC" 2004, 22). For many young South Africans, low voting rates seemed to be an issue of access or preference rather than indifference. Levels of civic awareness, for example, were to be relatively high among young people. In one study, 4 in 10 young people had seen a copy of the constitution, which was higher than any other age cohort (Everatt 2000). Young people in particular, however, lacked access to official political and electoral processes. In a study of the 1999 election, of those who did not have a form of ID, 70% were in the age group 17-21. Of those who had no identification, 20% had applied but more than half of those had been waiting for more than 12 weeks (Muthien 1999). In 2004, an IEC-commissioned study conducted focus groups with 16-21 year olds in KwaZulu-Natal. Young people indicated that they faced significant challenges in political participation including difficulty attaining identity documents and poorly managed voters' rolls. The youth also reported frustration with a lack of service delivery and development for young people in particular (Strategy and Tactics 2004). Low voter turnout among young people might also represent a political statement about a perceived lack in service delivery. As one young person described it, 'I'm not going to vote,' said Beauty Mogwe, 26. "I grew up hungry and I'm still hungry. I grew up in apartheid and life is still the same... We're still poor, so why should we vote?" ("Young tell ANC" 2004, 22).

The particularly low voting rates of South African young people have inaccurately been interpreted as reflecting a broader 'problem of the youth.' In a recent UN report, "World Youth Report 2005," the UN argued that the current generation of young people faced even more

complex challenges than the previous including “social prejudice based in age and on stereotypes about their abilities” (Piper and Chanza 2006). Indeed, youth in contemporary South Africa were problematized in three ways: as ‘sell-outs’ who had rejected the legacy of the revolution for materialism; as too inexperienced and immature to participate; and as problems to be characterized by their violence, lack of respect and sexual restraint, and poverty.

South African youth were accused of acquiescing to a consumerist, market-driven ethos at the cost of some of the achievement of the preceding decades of struggle. Some believe that as the national government shifted its policy from a development approach to a free-market model, South African youth withdrew from activism in favour of capitalist consumption. David Everatt, for example, compiled popular evidence. One journalist characterized the modern youth as one who “feeds off a diet of MTV, Nikes, AIDS consciousness, shopping malls, environmental awareness, and a generous spirit of nihilism: It burps attitude without the idealism of its more politically earnest forebears.” YFM radio station declared, “Black youth are unpolitical and extremely materialistic” (Everatt 2000).

Gavin Steingo wrote about Kwaito music in the context of youth consumerism (Steingo 2005). Today’s youth, or the “Kwaito generation,” he posited, had embraced a consumerist culture as an equation for hoping for something better. Steingo found that like the youth they appeal to, Kwaito artists had abandoned their post as social commentators for the allure of capitalist gain. McGregor, in her account of the life of DJ and AIDS victim Khabazela, wrote about kwaito as emblematic of its time and found in much of its lyricism, a “yearning for a better life” (McGregor 87). Steingo examined the use of gold as a symbol both in the new ethic of consumption as well as the old system of oppression that forced Africans to move from their homes to work in the gold mines. He remarked that the “new generation of South Africans has embraced the system that once enslaved them.”

The President of South Africa also voiced his concern about a growing materialism. President Mbeki warned against the 'distraction of kwaito' (McGregor 86) and described a new understanding of freedom based on the quest for wealth and material. In the 2006 *Nelson Mandela Memorial Lecture*, President Thabo Mbeki blasted the growing culture of accumulation plaguing South African society and its young people, traced its roots to colonial oppression, and concluded that,

the meaning of freedom has come to be defined not by the seemingly ethereal and therefore intangible gift of liberty, but by the designer labels on the clothes we wear, the cars we drive, the spaciousness of our houses and our yards, their geographic location, the company we keep, and what we do as part of that company.

He argued that whatever the individual benefits explicit in capitalist economic models, South Africans "share[d] a fundamental objective to defeat the tendency in our society toward the deification of personal wealth as the distinguishing feature of the new citizen of the new South Africa." (Mbeki, Nelson Mandela Memorial Lecture, 2006).

Even engaged youth were attacked as having corroded the gains of the revolution in their consumerist pursuits. The Media Limited Board of the Mail and Guardian recently vilified the ANC Youth League in an editorial in which they accused the "young Quirks" of undermining the democratic structures established by their predecessors. After young politicians "went 'bling,'" the Media Limited Board insisted:

They started chasing flashy cars and big bucks, selling the soul of the organization...instead of charting a way forward for the mass of South Africa's young people, who have yet to taste the fruits of freedom...[T]he league should be grooming a new set of leaders capable of confronting growing inequality, runaway crime and South Africa's biggest challenge, HIV/AIDS. It has signally failed to so.

The editors characterized recent moves to repress internal dissent by the ANCYL as fallout from the League's 'selling the soul of the organization' (Mail and Guardian Media Limited Board 2007). The ANCYL and Young Communists, indeed, gained much notoriety for their

unwavering support of Jacob Zuma and the silencing of dissent regarding the Zuma issue (“ANCYL must defend our democracy” 2006; “Zuma Should Be President” 2006; Ndamase 2006). As a result of disputes over Zuma, the ANCYL dissolved provincial structures in all but two provinces (Mgibisa and Majova 2007, 2).

Despite societal perceptions, materialism was not universally accepted among young politicians. The Young Communist League (YCL) expressed repeated concern over the capitalist influence on young people and the growth strategy of the national government. In April 2006, the YCL responded to the State of the Nation Address that touted ASGISA as the solution to development issues. The YCL stated, “As the YCL, we utterly reject ASGISA.” The IFP Youth Brigade, on the other hand, expressed support for ASGISA (IFP Youth Brigade, “IFP Youth Brigade Supports ASGISA” 2006). The president of the ANC Youth League attacked the “culture of greed and wealth exhibition” among South African young people and his own party (“The Face of the Next Generation” 2004). The YCL also vocalized concern over the culture of accumulation affecting young people in general and youth politicians specifically, accusing the ANC Youth League of having become the “ANC of Capital” and urging young people in general to pronounce “that Capitalism has failed the youth and South Africa” (YCL, National Secretary Political Notes, 2006). On two separate occasions, the YCL warned against the anti-democratic influence of materialism among young people. During the 30th anniversary of the Soweto youth uprising, the YCL expressed its worry of the “excessive worship of money among young people” warning that “crass materialism has become the order of the day” (YCL, YCL June 16 Message, 2006). The National Secretary likewise stated that an individual “is unfree alone.” Harkening to broad theoretical approaches to democracy discussed in Chapter 1, the Secretary emphasized the collective nature of South African democracy over the individualist approach of the rights-based liberal model (Manamela 2006). Young people, themselves, therefore, rather than having

unconditionally gone 'bling,' debated economic policies and bemoaned the culture of accumulation as its influence grew among South African youth.

If those youth who did participate in public processes were not labelled as materialistic sell-outs, they were marginalized and dismissed as immature. As reviewed in Part 1 of this chapter, in the ward committees of the Msunduzi municipality, youth were underrepresented, under-participated, and were side-lined or marginalized within committee meetings. Youth representatives sitting on ward committees were usually given sports or recreation portfolios, for instance. Councillors from uMsunduzi viewed youth as too immature to participate in governance. One councillor concluded, "We should let the youth be the youth. When they are mature enough, they can join then." Another felt that youth participation would be detrimental to the greater community:

Young people are not matured enough to involve them in government structures. They should not be a part of the process while still raw. We're talking about the lives of people here... Sometimes young people take this as a plaything and sometimes there is all that carelessness." (Piper and Chanza 2006)

The National Youth Commission, itself, responded to criticism of the Commission by the Young Communist League by labelling the Young Communists as "irrelevant, yet immature young activists" (Galane 2003). The roles afforded to youth sitting on the Durban Youth Council, launched in July 2007, likewise seemed nominal. According to Ken Mchunu, writing for the municipality, young people from across the city assumed the role "of councillor from various political parties *for a day*" (emphasis added). As Mchunu reported, "there was a general feeling," though no guarantee, that the youth should convene quarterly (Mchunu 2007). In the broader political spectrum, youth were afforded minimal opportunities for participation.

Tired of the dismissive attitudes found within official structures, in May 2005, the Young Independent Democrats (Y-ID) launched their national campaign in Durban. Three hundred youth members attended the launch where the Chairperson of KwaZulu-Natal Y-ID announced,

“We have finally found a proper political party that says young people must do for themselves”(Sapr-pr-young 2005). The IFP, ANC Youth League and Young Communists all expressed concern over the marginalization of youth issues and young people. All three groups requested the amalgamation of national youth structures. Both the ANCYL and YCL called for the integration of the Umsobomvu Youth Fund, Provincial Youth Commissions, and the National Youth Commission into one body (Mbalula 2006; ANC 2006; Verbatim 2007; YCL “Young Communist League June 16 Message to Young People” 2006). In KwaZulu-Natal, a gathering of mostly ANC-affiliated and some IFP and independent youth called for the formation of a youth ministry (Kumalo 2006). In 2006, the IFP Youth Brigade demanded that the IFP recognize the youth role by appointing youth as district and local mayors (IFP Youth Brigade, IFPYB Calls Upon IFP, 2006). Youth who were afforded the opportunity for meaningful participation demonstrated increased levels of engagement. For example, in one study, high school and college students who participated in civic education programming experienced an 18% increase in local participation and a significant increase in their sense of political efficacy (USAID 2002).

Contrary to evidence of positive youth engagement, most commentary on contemporary youth trends tended to focus on the problems young people faced: increasing or persisting high rates of incomplete schooling, teen pregnancy, disease, drug use, unemployment, and violence. Though attention placed disproportionate weight on negative behaviour, young people did face significant socio-economic issues. Of children and youth in eThekwinini between the ages five and twenty-four, 59% attended school, but only 3% attended university or technikon and 33% did not attend school (Statistics South Africa 2001). Many of those who did not attend an educational institution did not attend because they lacked money for fees (Statistics South Africa, 2005).

Teen pregnancy had increased among South African young women and girls. According to the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA), 28, 327 mothers under age eighteen were registered for the child support grant at the end of 2006 as compared to only 15, 599 in 2003. In KwaZulu-Natal, a similar increase was noted in a survey conducted in 120 schools throughout the province (Sosibo 2007). The government vehemently denied any link between teen pregnancy and the child support grant; however, anecdotal reports of young girls having children in order to become recipients of the grant existed (Research Department Social Development 2007). Government officials took a relatively hands-off approach to teen pregnancy. Responding to a report about the increase in teen mothers, an education minister said, “It is not our problem and now we are being accused as if we were directly responsible for impregnating these learners” (Verbatim” March 9 to 15 2007).

Rather than emphasizing a need for education efforts and service provision, some blamed the increase on reckless sexual behaviour. Legislators even attempted to regulate sexual activity. In 2006, legislative efforts sought to change the distinctions between gay and heterosexual activity and forbid sexual activity between children ages 12-15 (Boyle 2006). Youth did appear to be taking risks sexually. In one survey, only half of youth between the ages 15 and 19 reported using condoms during their last sexual encounter (Sosibo 2007). Their behaviour seemed tied to a lack in education and knowledge. In the same survey, over one-third of youth between ages 15 and 24 felt that they were not at risk of contracting HIV (Sosibo 2007).

Unemployment and poverty also plagued increasing numbers of young South Africans. Between 1997 and 2002, the number of unemployed young people grew from 1.7 to 3.5 million. According to the Umsobomvu Youth Fund’s report on the state of youth, “unemployment has become predominantly a problem of the young, “and its effect has had a particular impact on black youth (Morrow, Panday, and Richter 2005, 8). 60% of all economically active youth were unemployed and one third had never had full or part-time employment (Youth Development

Network 2007). Young people under the age of 35 comprised 74 percent of all unemployment (Mlaba 2005). 41 percent of 18-24 year olds and 29 percent of 25-35 year olds lived in poverty. Of those living in poverty, half were living in extreme poverty (Morrow, Panday and Richter 2005, 10).

Some youth turned to crime and employed gangsterism and drug structures as the means to acquire wealth in face of otherwise limited opportunities (Dissel 1997). In 2006, juvenile delinquency was reportedly on the rise (Du Plessis 2006) and more than half of the prison population was considered youth (Young Communist League 2006). In 2007, concern over the high levels of crime in the nation heightened. The Mail and Guardian began including a special section to its weekly reporting entitled "The Call Against Crime" (Tutu 2007). Individuals, communities and businesses wrote commentaries and staged protests against a lack of government intervention (Verbatim, March 9 to 15, 2007). Mbeki answered calls of concern in his 2007 State of the Nation Address (Mbeki 2007). That crime, unemployment and poverty were problems affecting South Africans in general and young people in particular was undeniable. However, the thinking that grouped young people generically as a "problem" was inherently flawed.

Issues of poverty and unemployment were not relevant to all South African youth. Race and class were important distinctions. Though some theorists argued that the transformation of the new South Africa substantially eroded the correlation between race and class, Erasmus concluded that race and class was still linked (Erasmus 2005). In 2006, the white minority still controlled 60% of South Africa's wealth ("Fears over exodus" 2006). Equity politics have had a limited effect, serving mostly to benefit a black elite. The ANC-sponsored "Black Economic Empowerment," or BEE as it is commonly known, created a massive transfer of wealth to a small but growing black elite. In 2004, Archbishop Tutu asked, "What's black empowerment when it seems to benefit not the vast majority but a small elite that tends to be recycled?"

(Freedberg 2006). According to the Mayor of Durban, eThekweni's business procurement practice had done little to uplift its traditionally marginalized. In 2005, 74% of procurement funds went to historically white businesses and only 2% went to African owned businesses (Mlaba 2005). Race, Erasmus argued, has been used as armour for both white and black elite to protect white privilege on the one hand (the 'race is best forgotten' attitude) and, on the other, to deflect criticism and dictate voting patterns by the ruling political elite (Erasmus 2005).

Some white South Africans argued that they had been unduly discriminated against in the new South Africa to the cost of the nation. One commentator railed in 2006 against the "cleaning out of white expertise...hugely contributing to the skills crisis" (Freedberg 2006). Such individuals blamed BEE and affirmative action policies for the so-called "brain drain" of educated young professionals ("Fears over South Africa's Exodus" 2006). The affect of affirmative action on white youth opportunity may be exaggerated. In 2005, of youth arriving on the labour market, less than one-third of blacks but fully three-fourths of whites could expect to attain employment (Morrow, Panday and Richter 2005, 18). Particularly high numbers of white South Africans, however, did seem to have left South Africa to seek employment overseas. From 1995 to 2005, though all other populations increased, whites fell by 16 percent ("Fears over South African Exodus" 2006). Regardless of the reasons for emigration, the exodus of South African young professionals has been of particular concern to the nation as it pertains to the fields of health and education ("South African hit by brain drain" 2002 and "Fears over South Africa's Exodus" 2006).

There remained in South Africa, however, a significant number of white young people who grappled with their identity in the new South Africa. Young white Afrikaners, in particular, drew media attention in early 2007. The extreme popularity of Bok van Blerk's folk song, "De La Rey," brought attention to this particular subsection of South African youth. Though Krog insisted that the popularity of the song represented the struggling of young Afrikaners with

apartheid history and unexpressed guilt (Krog 2007), others believed that the popularity reflected an attempt of the youth to extricate themselves from sharing apartheid guilt and assert claims on their place in the new South Africa. The contemporary generation of Afrikaner young people, Eloff asserted, were generally liberal-minded and had embraced the new South Africa, but they had also rejected politics because of a “*gatvol* (fed up) attitude” regarding perceived attacks on Afrikaans as a medium, race card playing in politics, and affirmative action policies. Eloff concluded that “De la Rey” served as a symbol for these young South Africans who were proud of their culture and believed that they “have shed the apartheid guilt” (Eloff 2007).

Though perhaps it is not possible to interpret any subsection of South African young people universally, young South Africans in general were struggling to understand their role in the new nation. Society insisted on universally grouping young people together and characterizing them by the problems they faced whether by materialism, inexperience, poverty, racial politics, or a socially imposed identity. Youth were understood as the generic “problem of the youth,” in part, because of the persisting legacy of the approach to youth that emerged during the political violence of the 1980s and 1990s.

2.2 Historical Context

Because of their prominent role in the fight against apartheid and the violence of the 1980s and 1990s, much of the research on South African youth has focused on providing background and context for understanding youth mobilization and youth violence. Dlamini provided an extensive history of KwaZulu-Natal as it pertains to resistance and violence. KwaZulu-Natal held out longest in southern Africa against colonial forces, provided the locus for a series of subsequent uprisings, served as the birthplace of the ANC, and its debate helped articulate differences between black resistance groups (Dlamini 2005). Joshua Gumede supplied a history of youth politics from 1953 until 1983, characterizing 1963-1967 as a time of political

passivity, guided by the ‘paper politics’ of student bodies dominated by a white liberals and 1967-1975 as the emergence of university Christian movements, black consciousness, and the South African Student Organization (SASO) and the re-emergence of group bannings. Dlamini likewise characterized 1960-1975 as a period of suppressed resistance and the implementation of apartheid structures (Dlamini 2005). Nokomo concentrated on African institutions of higher education, concluding that in addition to black consciousness movements and external power conflict, the apartheid design for higher education itself produced inadvertently a distinct student culture of resistance among black African students (Nokomo 1984). Harrus and other contemporaries attempted to document the prevalence of violence against young people by the apartheid regime in the 1970s and ‘80s (Harrus et al 1987). Gumede further described 1975-1983 as the onset and escalation of violence (Gumede 1990).

Many focused their research on the black-on-black violence of the 1980s and 1990s. From the mid-eighties to the mid-nineties, violence took the “ferocity of an undeclared civil war.” Over 25, 000 were injured, 200-500,000 fled and 11, 600 died in KwaZulu-Natal alone (Jeffrey 1997, 1-2). The South African Institute of Race Relations produced The Natal Story: Sixteen Years of Conflict in an attempt to understand the violence from both UDF/ANC and IFP standpoints (Jeffrey 1997). The large and nuanced volume chronicled ‘The Natal Story’ over sixteen years beginning in 1980. Dr. Ran Greenstein compiled a collection of chapters about the violence of the 1980s and 90s, with multiple chapters focusing specifically on the politically inspired violence between the IFP and ANC in KwaZulu-Natal (Greenstein 2003). Aitchison gave a chronological account of the violence in KwaZulu-Natal leading up to the 1994 election (Aitchison 2003).

Chief Buthelezi and his Zulu cultural group, Inkatha, gained extreme popularity with its policy of cultural liberation and support of worker strikes in the 1970s (Aitchison 2003). By 1979 (four years after its founding as a cultural organization under Buthelezi), Inkatha had 500

branches in now Kwa-Zulu-Natal and between 300,000-350,000 members (Jeffrey 1997, 24). In 1980, the participation of young people in school boycotts, a move that had been opposed by Inkatha, set the context for the first outbreak of violence (Jeffrey 1997). In 1983, the ANC-affiliated United Democratic Front emerged from trade union, women's, youth, and community movements and organizations to coordinate the domestic opposition to apartheid (Thompson 2001, 228). During the eighties, Inkatha and UDF supporters would repeatedly clash over the UDF's policy of ungovernability. "No-go" zones were formed throughout KwaZulu-Natal by both sides. Until 1985, the townships of KwaMashu and Umlazi had been quiescent.⁴ Following the school boycotts of the early 1980's, they too became the site of no-go areas in the violent interplay between UDF and IFP and security forces (32-63).

By the late 1980's, the UDF fought two fronts in then Natal: the security forces and Inkatha (Aitchison 2003). The "third force," comprised of police and vigilante security forces, provided weapons to IFP, committed acts of political assassination and sabotage, and generally fuelled the conflict's intensity. In 1990, Inkatha was launched as a political party, the Inkatha Freedom Party. Together, the IFP, the apartheid state, and covert groups engaged in what the ANC described as a 'low intensity war' with the ANC. The formation of self-defence units, the return of MK soldiers, and political assassinations carried out by the UDF in Ntuzuma and other townships likewise propelled the war (Jeffrey 1997, 290-295). In the lead up to the first democratic election, violence intensified yet again as the ANC attempted to make inroads in rural areas and Inkatha lost control of township areas. During this time, fifty or sixty deaths occurred per month (Aitchison 2003).

Some analysts explored the intersection between youth politics and youth violence of the 1980s and 1990s. Seekings sought to close some of the gaps in the 'narrow range' of research

⁴ Permanent areas were slow to develop in Durban, and until the 1950s, immigrant black workers lived in slum tenements or by squatting in back yard properties. KwaMashu and Umlazi were formed in an attempt to address the "black problem" by forcing the migration of the largest informal settlement, Cato Manor (Dlamini 60-63).

on youth politics (Seekings 1993, xi). After the Soweto uprising, Seekings asserted, the term 'youth' took on heightened use, marking attitudes and the process of political change (xiv). During the ensuing political violence, youth came to be cast as one of two extreme stereotypes: 'hostile, violent, and apocalyptic' on the one hand or 'broadly sympathetic [and] libratory' on the other (3-6). According to Seekings, young people participated in violence for a variety of reasons. Some were inspired by the militarized subculture inspired by Umkhonto we Sizwe (64). Others may not have been psychologically able to return to mundane lifestyles after the waves of activism of the seventies and early eighties (Straker in Seekings 1993, 90-92). Others, to quote an ANC youth leader, 'were steeped in the politics of opposition that excluded debate with their enemy' (ANC Youth League in Seekings 1993, 89). Writing just prior to the first democratic election, Seekings warned against continuing to consider youth as a single body defined by their experiences with violence, unemployment, and a lack of schooling, the general conception of the "the problem of the youth" that as aforementioned has persisted in contemporary form (100).

Monique Marks, in Young Warriors. Youth Politics, Identity and Violence in South Africa (2001), considered the Diepkloof community in her attempt to further explore youth politics and the violence of the 1980s and 1990s. Like Seekings, Marks concluded that the majority of youth operated in between extremes during the eighties and nineties and that neither youth politics nor youth violence could be understood in indiscriminate terms. Schools, where students experienced violence inflicted by the state and where they initiated their own 'unbanning' and ungovernability campaign, were a locus for both violence and activism. In an attempt to render the civil government inoperable, the campaign of ungovernability created multiple 'layers' of leadership and activism. Violence, too, was multi-layered and manifested in four distinct ways: the ungovernability campaign against the state, the state's repression against the youth, discipline within youth organizations, and gangsterism largely fuelled by police agents. The multiple and unclear layers of leadership, types of violence, and role of youth in

both leadership and violence meant that negotiating the youth role immediately prior to and following the first democratic election would prove difficult.

Nombuso Dlamini described the identity formation of youth in response to the polarized political situation of KwaZulu-Natal in the early 1990's (Dlamini 2005). Dlamini illustrated sophisticated and active youth practice in pursuit of democracy that escaped the narrowly defined boundaries of culture and politics fuelling ANC and IFP youth violence. She explained how youth pursued alternatives that enriched their lives, navigated the violence of township, and negotiated labels imposed on them (12-13).

According to Dlamini, even as Inkatha consolidated its support in the townships and violence escalated, ANC-affiliated students continued UDF activities. Intimidation and violence pervaded. In KwaMashu, residents feared a group known as *amasinyora*, originally a soccer group who claimed politics but who operated as *tsotsis* (73), and, in Umlazi, Inkatha suppressed all social groups except soccer. UDF/ANC-affiliated youth, however, went to Lamontville to carry out political activities. Dlamini further described how generational divides and cultural expectations formed prevailing notions of Zulu young people. Many older Zulu men and women insisted that their youth had lost respect for their culture, and they categorized youth political activity, in particular the campaign for ungovernability, as exemplifying this rejection. 'The Fathers say that they are fighting against a takeover of black townships by teenagers who do not follow the African tradition of respect for elders' (World Press Review 1986 in Dlamini 2001, 78). The concept of youth in KwaZulu-Natal, therefore, was steeped in an assumption that youth political activity meant a rejection of traditional values and culture.

Despite the many pressures, Dlamini asserted, a variety of groups and youth formed outside of culturally and politically-charged distinctions. Black consciousness revival groups, church groups, loosely affiliated social groups, and soccer groups operating outside of political arenas all emerged during the early 1990's. These groups defied the prevailing notions of group

formation. Though many cultural and social-activist groups defined their practices through their Zulu identity and history, they affiliated with UDF politically. The soccer groups served as symbols of freedom even as other soccer teams were co-opted for political activities throughout the region.

In 1994, Nelson Mandela voted in Durban at Ohlange High School in Inanda (where John Dube was buried) during the first free election, closing the circle of resistance that had had its earliest formations in the region, but the election did not bring an end to political violence. Nationwide, some youth found release in giant open admission township parties (McGregor 2005, 85). Others continued to resort to violence of a political and gangster nature. As late as 1999 KwaZulu-Natal remained a hotspot with 300 people killed in five months. By April 2004, however, a routine electoral process was reported (Centre for Contemporary Conflict 2004). Dlamini argued that though many youth successfully navigated fiercely-enforced cultural-political divisions during the late 1980s and 1990s, in the succeeding years both older and new generations of young people lacked the strategies to deal with an increasingly mediated democracy (Dlamini 197). Implementation of national youth development policy meant to support young people in their negotiations with the new state, indeed, has been limited.

2.3 Policy Context: Youth Development

David Everatt asserts that in the decade after apartheid South African society asked “What’s wrong with the youth?” without acknowledging, “every youth-centred initiative since 1990 ha[d] collapsed” (Everatt 2000). Everatt provided a rough periodisation from 1990-2000 as follows: 1990-1993, optimism and organization; 1994-1996, disillusionment and missed opportunities, and 1997-2000, institutionalisation, policy formation and drift. Though the South African Catholics Bishops’ Conference and the South African Council of Churches successfully put the youth sector on the democratic agenda resulting in the formation of the National Youth

Development Forum (NYDF) in 1993, the NYDF failed to intervene in the negotiations process to represent the youth sector. Instead of a Youth Ministry, the new government devoted only 6 paragraphs to youth under the 'Arts and Culture' section in a 147-page document outlining the Reconstruction and Development Programme. When the National Youth Commission was established in 1996, Everatt posits, appointments were based on a political awards system rather than youth development expertise.

During the institutionalization phase, the South African Youth Council failed to translate its activity into programs to benefit large numbers of youth (Everatt 2000). In 1999, Parliament formed a Portfolio Committee on youth, women, and the disabled, but the diversity of responsibilities made this committee less effective than it might have been (Morrow, Panday and Richter 2005, 3). The Further Education and Training Act of 1998 set an agenda for addressing past imbalances, made higher education to be more responsive to training needs of young people, and reduced colleges in number from 150 to 50. The National Youth Development Policy Framework (2000-2007) that emerged following the mostly ineffective policy initiatives of the nineties, emphasized the importance of integrated youth development with social policy and established a clear set of ideals. Analysts questioned, however, whether such ideals and framework had translated into viable programming. (Morrow, Panday and Richter 2005, 3).

Many national programs sought to contribute to the positive development of South African young people. In 2006, IDASA reviewed the contemporary state of national youth development. Though it had failed to translate into programmes, the South African Youth Council operated as an independent council to evaluate youth programmes and services. The government's ASGISA (Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa) called for the establishment of 100 youth advisory centers, registering 10,000 youth in the National Youth Service Initiative, expanding business support systems, and intensifying the youth cooperative programme. The National Youth Commission, established in 1996, pioneered the mainstreaming

of youth issues in government services. As part of its 2006 initiatives, the NYC called for Youth Units within all municipalities (IDASA 2006). In 2006, the Chairperson of the NYC concluded that the NYC had made significant strides towards delivery and listed among its accomplishments the development of a National Youth Development policy, the establishment of the Umsobomvu Youth Fund, the establishment of the National Youth Service programme, and lobbying for an increase in access to higher education (Gauteng Provincial Government 2006, 6). National youth programmes only moderately impacted grassroots levels.

In “Young People in South African 2005 Where We’re At and Where We’re Going,” an overview of young people in South Africa commissioned by the Umsobomvu Youth Fund, the authors made mixed reports about the state of youth and a call to action was urged (Morrow, Panday and Richter 2005). The report found that educational opportunity had been expanded massively, young people valued education, and the more education a person had the more likely that he or she would gain employment, but problems existed regarding inadequate life skills training, the quality of education, repetitions and drop-outs, and the effects low levels of education have on youth employability (15). The numbers of those aged 25-35 who had completed matric increased among all racial groupings except white, demonstrating the enormous expansion of educational opportunities. However, among this age group, as well as their younger counterparts, there still existed racial disparity. Whereas the percent of young South Africans aged 18-24 years who achieved Matric increased from 16% in 1995 to 24% in 2002 among Africans and 26% to 31% among Coloureds, such matriculation rates were disproportionately low compared with the 69% of Indians and 61% of Whites to matriculate in 2002 (16). Among youth in general, due to dropouts and repeats, the average years needed to reach Grade 12 was 60 percent higher than the minimum required (16). The researchers urged schools to consider themselves important *loci* for youth development, especially given the large

numbers of young people who still attended school in their twenties (19). Young people, however, perceived school environments as unsafe and lacking quality teaching (16). As measured in 2004, an estimated 826,000 youth arrived on the labour market each year having completed Grade 12 or having dropped out of education. Of the new entrants, only 29% of Africans would get jobs, 50% of coloured, 70% of Indian and 75% of white (18).

The high levels of unemployment affecting young South Africans warranted serious attention, but youth business development efforts faced challenges in implementation. Incomplete schooling and inexperience among young people and inadequate funding posed significant challenges, in particular. Programmes operated under the Small Enterprise Development Agency (SEDA), for example, were ill equipped to support youth entrepreneurship. The UYF, itself, was limited in practice by funding and inadequate orientation towards young people among its lenders (12-13). The Skills Development Act (1998) and the Skills Development and Levies Act (1999) established Sector Education and Training Authorities, but these too had inadequate focus on youth (20). Learnerships, on the other hand, had positive impact on youth. In 2005, more than two-thirds of those who participated in learnerships reported securing employment (20).

The social integration of young people was likewise reportedly mixed. Youth awareness levels were relatively high. Over 67%, for example, reported watching the news on TV at least a few times a week (31). Young people demonstrated creativity and skill in using modern technology to gain access to information through the use of cell phones as a crucial mode of networking and communications (33). However, wide variations and a general low level of participation were reported for organized activities. 66% of youth reported never having participated in a community sports team and 75% had never been involved in a community society or club (30). Differences of access and advantage were apparent between sub-groups.

Use of community facilities such as youth centres, parks, and sports facilities, for example, had the lowest rates among rural areas because of inadequate provision (32).

Young people had withdrawn from traditional forms of engagement, but their participation in issue-based activism had increased. Issues like HIV/AIDs have to some extent replaced party allegiance (30). Young people were targeted as potential advocates in environmental campaigns (“Environmentalists” 2006). Others took stands on gay rights (“Gay and Lesbian Youth Speak Out” 2006). On college campuses, student organizations not necessarily affiliated with the tripartite alliance (outside of SASCO, the Student Representative Council, and the ANC Youth League) battled the issue of university fees. At the University of KwaZulu-Natal-Westville campus, for instance, the Socialist Student Movement mobilized students to call for debt cancellation (A. Naidoo 2006). Reports also described a high level of religious activity among South African young people (Morrow, Panday and Richter 2005, 33). Since national policy had inadequately addressed equity issues among South African young people, young people themselves had altered the terrain available for participation by seeking engagement in a variety of non-traditional and unofficial forms.

Chapter 3: Methodology

In their democratic South Africa, young people witnessed a shift in policy away from development and participatory models of democracy towards western liberal forms. Official structures had little success in enabling meaningful forms of popular participation. Significant change occurred in the democratic nation, but change was slow to resolve the wide array of social and economic challenges facing the majority of young people. Some young South Africans grappled with identity in the new nation. Despite significant challenges, South African young people engaged civically but decreasingly availed themselves of official structures. This study aimed to understand the youth civic practice and attitudes of young people ages 13-29 living in eThekweni.

1 Mixed Model Approach

1.1 Introduction to Mixed Model Research

In designing my research model, I adopted the mixed method approach in order to gain a more rich understanding of youth civic engagement in eThekweni. The debate over qualitative and quantitative research has long divided researchers into two opposing camps. Many have championed quantitative research as the more objective of the two, though others have argued total objectivity is unattainable in social and political science research. Specifically, approaches have varied in how they value objectivity, whether there can be a framework for understanding our world free from human bias, and subjectivity, the meanings people give to their environment (May 2001). A third group of researchers exists, however, that opposes the 'incompatibility thesis' that holds that quantitative and qualitative research cannot be mixed. These researchers urge a synthesized approach. According to Miles and Huberman, for example, researchers

should “be open to an ecumenical blend of epistemologies and procedures” (Miles and Huberman, 1984). The mixed methods approach collects multiple data using different strategies and methods so that the resulting mixture results in complementary strengths and non-overlapping weaknesses (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004, 18). Mixed method research, therefore, can use the strengths of one method to overcome the weaknesses of another, provide stronger evidence for a conclusion throughout, add insights, and increase generalizability.

Because qualitative research allows the researcher to investigate complex and sensitive issues in detail and quantitative research allows the summarizing of large amounts of data and the reaching of generalizations based on statistical projections (Trochim “Qualitative Measures” 2006), a mixed approach was ideal for the study of youth civic engagement. This study of youth civic engagement employed three modes of research:

- **Participation-observation:** through direct participation and observation, I gained insight to the civic engagement demonstrated by young people participating in Phakama, a youth development and gender empowerment organization part of Youth for Christ (KZN) and Abahlali baseMjondolo, a collective of local shack dwellers’ mobilizing for land and housing.
- **Survey:** I developed a survey tool designed to measure perceptions, attitudes and behaviours of youth pertaining to seven indicators of civic engagement (political voice and awareness, community engagement, community problem-solving, justice orientation, electoral involvement, efficacy in individual and community contexts, and trust). 554 young people completed the survey tool.
- **Semi-formal Interviews:** Employing a semi-formal format, I interviewed 22 youth leaders from Phakama, Abahlali, Interact service clubs, and several key informants from various youth and student groups.

1.2 Issues in Mixed Method Research

Though the mixed method model is generally accepted, some have raised concerns about the validity of mixed approaches. Miles and Huberman argued against such critics, however, suggesting that their main objection related to the relative lack in methodology then available

(Miles and Huberman 1984, 22). Increasingly, researchers have developed method techniques for the synthesis of qualitative and quantitative data (Woods et al. 2005). Miles and Huberman, themselves, provided a framework for understanding mixed methods. They divided analysis into three concurrent actions: data reduction, data display, and conclusion-drawing and verification (Miles and Huberman 1984, 23). During the data reduction phase, research questions are posed, sampling and instrumentation are determined and employed, and data is collected and coded. Data display helps consolidate data and makes analysis easier by placing data into matrices and charts. In her conclusion phase, a researcher clusters data into single conceptualizations by noting patterns, clustering, and relationships between variables. During verification, the researcher checks for representivity, triangulates across data sources, and weights evidence (20-50).

Others expressed concern about the conclusion and verification phases of mixed method research. According to Massey, mixed method researchers often make misleading and invalid claims (Massey 1999). In particular, Massey objected to the term triangulation, itself, because it implied a degree of certainty attainable by physical surveyors but not social scientists. Triangulation refers to the process used to corroborate one set of findings with another, based on the claim that once a proposition has been confirmed by two or more independent measurement processes, the uncertainty of its interpretation is greatly reduced. Though the process of corroborating findings between different data sets is a useful one, there are potential pitfalls. Comparing the results of two samples, as if they belong to the same population, for example, is particularly misleading (Massey 1999).

Additional researchers argued that the criteria used to judge quantitative research should not be used to verify qualitative research. Issues of validity, reliability, and objectivity (strength of conclusions, consistency of measurement, and whether it can be proved free from bias) may

not be appropriate for judging qualitative analysis. Gula and Lincoln developed a list of analogous criteria more appropriate for qualitative analysis. Issues of credibility and transferability were provided (whether the results are credible from the perspective of the participant and the degree to which the results can be transferred to other contexts) as the equivalent forms for validity measurement. The authors further recognized that in reality the same thing could not be measured twice, therefore, they replaced the notion of reliability with dependability. Dependability emphasized the need for the researcher to describe changes in the setting and how the changes affect the way research approached the study. Lastly, confirmability referred to the degree to which others could corroborate results (Gula and Lincoln in Trochim “Qualitative Measures” 2006).

This study addressed each of the aforementioned research issues. Different data sets were used to corroborate data among similarly drawn purpose samples. For example, data gathered from interview samples (which included actively engaged youth only) and survey samples (which included actively engaged and general high school youth) were used for corroboration of findings about actively engaged youth. Data collected in participant-observation (which studied poor black actively engaged youth) was used to supplement general findings but to confirm subset specific findings only. Interviews helped confirm credibility as it related to observations and survey results. The wide range of subgroups included in the purposive sample population helped ensure transferability. Participant observation and interviews addressed the issue of dependability. Attitudes and behaviours were noted across a variety of contexts in participant observation and interviews were administered in a wide variety of circumstances. Few differences in findings were observed across the different settings. Confirmability was more difficult to measure because of the lack of youth civic and political research available. Specific actions taken during data reduction and data display phases of

research are discussed in the following three sections describing each model of research employed in this study.

2 A Mixed Model for Measuring Youth Civic Engagement in eThekweni

2.1 Participant Observation

The ethnographic approach to research emphasizes study of entire cultures of a people, groups, or organizations (May 2001, 147). The most common approach to ethnographic research is participant observation, which helps derive an “authentic” understanding. In participant-observation, the researcher becomes immersed as an active participant and records extensive field notes (Trochim, “Qualitative Measures,” 2006). Proponents believe that participation leads to empathetic understanding (Bell 1993; May 2001, 151). Researchers acknowledge that the location, values, and interests of the people they study shape their research, and suggest that this influence, “reflexivity,” is positive (May 2001, 163).

My research as participant and observer took place over the course of several months in a variety of contexts as I gained insight to the civic engagement demonstrated by young people participating in Phakama, a youth development and gender empowerment organization part of Youth for Christ (KZN) and Abahlali baseMjondolo, a collective of local shack dwellers’ movements.

As participant-observer with Abahlali baseMjondolo, I attended meetings, rallies, site visits and other events formal and informal from September 2006 through March 2007. Abahlali members represent over 30 informal settlements, with its most active membership from over 10 sites throughout the eThekweni municipality. I spent most of my time with members from Joe Slovo Settlement in Mobeni Heights, Kennedy Road and Foreman Settlement in Sydenham,

Motala Heights in Pinetown, and Jadhu Place near Overport. Though most observations occurred at general meetings held in the Kennedy Road Settlement, events took place in a variety of locations. The heaviest concentration of observation occurred from September through December 2006. In addition to attendance and participation in general discussions, I took part in the planning and organizing of a housing, education policy, and legal rights workshop, logistical operations, and the creation of several press statements. I took notes at all events, noting numbers of participants, number of youth participants, emergent themes, events, and discussions that had occurred. All notes were placed into a database. In more informal situations, I recorded observations to the central document after the events took place. Discussions often took place in isiZulu with English translation provided, but when translation did not occur, I later asked for a review of conversations. All direct quotes have been taken from observed conversations that occurred in English or were translated into English by Abahlali members.

As participant-observer of Phakama, I supported programming in Dumahlezi High School in Ntuzuma from August 2006 until February 2007. During this period, I co-facilitated standard eight and nine life skills classes and assisted in the facilitation of the peer educators' group. I collected observations from August through October 2006 from Peer Educators' leader meetings, Peer Educator group meetings, Peer Educator events, school events, and life skills curriculum implementation. All events and observations occurred at Dumahlezi High School. I focused my attention on learners participating in the peer educators' support groups. In addition to facilitation and observation, I created a democratic framework and evaluation tool to supplement Phakama curriculum and programming in the 2007 school year. All conversations took place in a mix of isiZulu and English with a heavy concentration on isiZulu. When I could not interpret events on my own, my co-worker provided full explanations of discussions and events. Following data collection for both Abahlali and Phakama, observation notes in the

central database were coded according to themes and themes were extracted into a concept map. This map was later interfaced with concept maps from interviews and survey data.

There are several issues important to quality in conducting participant observation research. Extended duration, intimacy, variety of circumstance, and social consensus should be ensured (May 2001, 163). Perhaps the most debated and interesting issue, however, is that of reflexivity. Spending months with particular individuals and organizations, building friendships and trust, and contributing toward the mission of the organizations has meaningful impact on the research itself. In this study, the influence of the researched subject on the researcher and research was multifaceted. Insight otherwise unavailable was gained.⁵ Other conclusions were verified or strengthened.⁶ Commitment to the broader organizations and individual relationships has the potential to distort results; however, in this study, it led to a deepened dedication to accurate analysis.⁷ This study further impacted the researcher herself.⁸ Reflexivity, however, rather than distorting results, enhanced understanding this study of youth civic engagement in eThekweni.

2.2 Survey

My survey tool (see Appendix) was comprised of:

- 4 identification questions about age, location, employment status, and education including 1 filter question

⁵ For example, I observed the positive effect on school morale of a school assembly that had been organized by Phakama Peer leaders. Morale is not something measured or reported but observed first hand.

⁶ For example, my view that Abahlali politics as experienced and practiced by its youth was deeply democratic was enhanced by experiencing the practice first-hand when I planned a workshop for land and housing and again when I served as youth committee chair.

⁷ The rigorous demand of Bahlali individuals and Abahlali collectively that their right to autonomy be honoured caused me to strive intently in my analysis and writing to avoid inaccurate interpretations of member voices and actions. Likewise, I embraced the commitment among Phakama staff to honouring the leadership potential of all young people and in particular those youth involved in peer leading. My commitment to depicting accurately youth interpretations of democratic involvement was increased because of my commitment to the leadership potential of the young people with whom I worked.

⁸ The democratic experience found with Abahlali baseMjondolo was the most profound I have ever encountered. Their approach to democracy and change as taught to me by Bahlali friends, as encountered firsthand, and as included in their fight for land and housing influenced my approach to understanding democratic participation more than any social or political theory. The influence reaches not only this study, but also extends to broader societal and life goals for how I envision change and my future work. Though, to the suspecting reader, this pronouncement sends warning signals of bias and tainted perspective, I have at this point only to offer my first-hand encounters and their congruence with survey and interview research. I have represented events and my experience accurately.

- 33 scaled statements of agreement and disagreement concerning civic indicators (25 questions), future orientation (3 questions), societal perceptions of youth (2 questions), and youth perceptions of society (3 questions)
- 14 “Yes” or “No” response questions about current and recent past participation
- 2 open-ended questions asking respondents to define active citizenship and problems facing youth.

All survey items were coded and/or categorized by response. For the 33 statements concerning civic indicators, future orientation, societal perceptions of youth, and youth perceptions of society, items were scaled according to a Likert scale with “1” indicating strong disagreement, “2” indicating disagreement, “3” indicating neither agreement or disagreement, “4” indicating agreement and “5” indicating strong agreement. The 8 statements pertaining to societal perceptions of youth and youth perceptions of society were considered independently. The majority of the statements (25 of 33) were further categorized according to seven civic indicators.

In measuring civic attitudes and behaviours, I hoped to design a survey tool that would measure multiple aspects of engagement without becoming overburdensome. I consulted a variety of survey tools and indexes. The Centre for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement’s civic engagement quiz measures general civic behaviour with four indexes: civic activities, electoral activities, political voice activities and attentiveness (Andolina et al. 2003). Joel Westheimer makes distinctions between personally responsible, participatory, and justice-oriented engagement. He notes that justice-oriented engagement is often neglected in measuring or teaching civic engagement (Westheimer and Kahne 2004). I also explored the Civics Assessment Database of youth specific surveys (Tourney-Purta 2007). The content was vast and varied; however, no existing tool satisfied the needs of this study. Specifically, other tools lacked cultural relevance to South African notions of participatory democracy and

community, localized examples of civic behaviour,⁹ and equal weighting across indicator sets. Bias towards electoral processes was found in many surveys that grouped community engagement, justice orientation, and community problem-solving into one category while electoral indication maintained singular consideration. Though I wanted to account for this western liberal bias by developing my own set of indicators and corresponding statements, from the existing tools, I gained ideas about the range of questions to seek and the ways to distinguish civic indicators appropriately.

The seven civic indicator sets selected included Community Engagement¹⁰, Justice-Orientation¹¹, Community Problem-solving¹², Political Voice and Awareness¹³, Trust¹⁴, Electoral Politics¹⁵, and Efficacy.¹⁶ Average mean scores for each indicator were calculated from responses included in each indicator set. Indicator scores range 1-5, with 5 indicating the strongest level of indication for that civic orientation and 4 suggesting general indication.

Those questions that did not employ the Likert scale were assigned numerical values. For the fourteen statements concerning recent-past and present civic behaviour, yes and no responses were numerically coded so that “1” signified participation and “0” signified lack of participation. The two-open ended questions asked young people to identify the biggest problems facing their generation and to define active citizenship. Definitions of active citizenship were grouped and coded according to 15 categories determined from youth responses that were not unique.¹⁷

⁹ For example, stokvel associations are not listed among literature originating in the United States.

¹⁰ Mean scores were determined from two survey statements and measure feelings of connectedness and involvement in the community.

¹¹ Mean scores were determined from two survey statements and measure inclination towards getting involved, activism, or protesting.

¹² Mean scores were determined from one statement and measure inclination towards working to address social problems.

¹³ Mean scores were determined from three statements including one three-part statement and measure attention paid to social and political issues and affairs and inclination towards raising concerns to party or government officials.

¹⁴ Mean scores were determined from two statements including one four-part and one five-part statements and measure overall trust for civic actors including government, political parties, trade unions, religious groups, schools, and community groups.

¹⁵ Mean scores were determined from three statements and measure inclination towards participating through political parties and elections.

¹⁶ Mean scores were determined from three statements and measure sense of individual, collective, and youth abilities to effect social and political reality.

¹⁷ Live in a democracy or be free; love or feel proud of your country; care for or help others; participate or take part in the community or community events; vote or participate in politics; possess knowledge and awareness of issues facing the nation or

Identified youth problems, likewise, were grouped and coded according to 19 distinct categories based on responses that were not unique.¹⁸

In survey design, I paid particular attention to question wording and content. In selecting statement and questions, I attempted to ensure simple language, relevant and appropriate content, proper specificity and neutral tone (May 2001, 106-107). In order to prevent bias towards agreement, I included two “reversal items” in which strength of agreement indicated a lack of civic indication towards valuing voting and discussing social and political issues (Trochim, “Scaling,” 2001). To determine if the respondents were qualified to answer, I included a “filter or contingency question” (Trochim, “Survey Research,” 2006) about age. After survey completion, I tested the questionnaire. As qualified youth workers, Phakama staff reviewed statements according their clarity, importance, appropriateness, and cultural relevance. Based upon staff recommendations, I made significant changes to wording, question order, and format. Next, I provided the survey to a high school student at Northwood Boys High School for his review. He made suggestions but found typographical errors only. Finally, I provided the survey in a pilot administration to Youth for Christ interns. After completion, suggestions were solicited, however again only minor changes in wording were made. The survey was then translated into isiZulu

After survey design was secured, I administered the survey to the sample population. IsiZulu versions were administered to Dumahlezi High School students and Phakama Peer Leaders and made available at each other administration of the survey. 554 young people

community; influence or educate others as a role model; positively develop oneself by advancing through education and temperance; voice opinions and criticism; work towards solving social problems; develop grow, or build the country or your community for the better or to make a difference; protect or know your rights or the rights of others; fight against injustice; be a Jacob Zuma supporter; “I don't know”; it doesn't mean anything or means something negative; play sports

¹⁸ Drugs, tobacco, and alcohol abuse; negative attitudes or a lack of respect and self-control; HIV/AIDS and disease; materialism; peer pressure; jobs, unemployment and money; general education concerns; access and cost of tertiary education; teenage pregnancy and premature sex; poverty; crime and violence; Jacob Zuma or other politicians; depression; environment; stress from expectations at school; Black Economic Empowerment; negative perceptions of youth; racism; abuse or rape

completed the survey. Additionally, 7 surveys were discounted because of age disqualification and 8 surveys were disregarded because of inadequate completion. Survey completion was assumed if the majority of statements and questions were completed on each page of the survey. The response rate, therefore, was 99%. The high rate of successful survey completion can be attributed to school and project staff and leadership who helped facilitate survey administration and ensured access to a captive audience. When all surveys had been collected, data was entered into an excel spreadsheet and imported into SPSS software. Using SPSS programming for data reduction and display, correlations, independent t-tests of means, basic cross-tabulations and frequencies were tabulated among the entire population, between leaders and non-leaders, and according to location, age, and group identification. Finally, key themes from survey results were extracted into a concept map that I later interfaced with concept maps from participant-observation and interviews.

2.3 Interviews

For the purposes of this study, I conducted semi-structured interviews so that I could categorize responses with more uniformity than unstructured forms but allow individuals to respond on their own terms. In the semi-structured interview, questions are normally specified, but the interviewer is free to probe beyond the answers to seek clarification and elaboration. “These types of interviews are said to allow people to answer more on their own terms than the standardized interview permits, but still provide a greater structure for comparability over that of the focused interview” (May 2001, 123).

My semi-structured interview (see Appendix) included twelve questions regarding civic attitudes, opinions, and behaviours of young people. Question wording was vetted among Phakama staff. I conducted twenty-two interviews over the course of several months. At the outset of each interview, I briefly introduced the study and assured anonymity if desired. During each interview, I asked follow-up and probing questions and provided space for elaboration

where appropriate. The interviews of Phakama peer leaders were conducted in isiZulu with translation provided by Phakama staff. All other interviews were conducted in English. For two groups of Phakama peer leaders, interviews were group-administered to accommodate student schedules and translation needs. Interviews were recorded through note taking and tape-recording. For those for whom tape recording would be inhibiting, I took shorthand notes and recorded them electronically after each interview. For all others, I recorded proceedings and on tape and transcribed each interview. Following electronic copying and transcription, I placed interviews into a central matrix. Trochim suggests that qualitative data may be interpreted through coding (Trochim "Qualitative Measures" 2006). Interviews were, indeed, coded by theme and themes were drawn into a concept map. Interview, participant-observation and survey concept maps were then interfaced in order to make generalizable conclusions.

3 Sample

One of the most important issues in research design is sampling. Though random selection produces samples that are statistically representative, as was the case in this study, random selection is not always feasible. Non-probability sampling provides a suitable alternative. In purpose sampling, the researcher has one or more specifically predefined groups that she seeks (Trochim "Nonprobability Sampling" 2006). I wanted the scope of this study to include the young people from a variety of backgrounds living in eThekweni with a weighted focus on young leaders actively participating civically in a wide variety of behaviours including religious, service, peer education, direct politics, and activism. This study excluded extremely marginalized youth, including only those young people who met at least one of the following conditions: school enrolment, employment, or group membership (active civic engagement). Further efforts should be taken to better address the civic behaviour and attitudes of young people not engaged through school, employment, or civic activity. This study was designed to be gender-blind; therefore additional gender-sensitive research should also be undertaken.¹⁹

In selecting the population to be surveyed, I employed purposive sampling. The sample population for survey administration was selected to include poor black, Indian, coloured,²⁰ and materially-privileged white, black and Indian racial and economic categories. Categories were identified according to school profiles where geographic location was used to aid in determining predominant economic standing.²¹ The survey was administered randomly in four high schools selected to represent eThekweni young people generally:

¹⁹ Though general gender balance was sought in selecting population samples, gender identification was not incorporated into analysis. Gender likely impacts the civic behaviour of South African young people, however, such analysis was outside of the scope of this study.

²⁰ To reflect population characteristics of Durban, this study de-emphasized coloured youth. Future research should undertake to study coloured youth in particular.

²¹ For this study, township and informal settlements are associated with predominately poor economic standing. Suburban affiliation is equated with materially privileged status. Urban environments were associated with poor economic status unless

Name of High School	Number	Predominant Population Descriptors
Dumahlezi	118	Black African township
Meadowlands	97	Indian township
Northwood Boys	34	Mixed Suburban

In addition to general youth whose civic behaviour was unknown and assumed representative of general youth behaviour,²² samples were drawn from youth identified as members in groups identified for civic activity.²³ Racial and economic categories were garnered according to group profiles. The survey was administered to participants in groups engaged in student leadership, service, political, and religious activity with a de-emphasis on political involvement. Groups were selected to achieve representivity as it pertained to civic activity as well as racial and economic categorization. The sample population was heavily weighted towards service and community activity in part to counteract societal imbalances weighted towards understanding youth engagement through electoral and political activity. Justice-orientated activity was not included in the survey population, but was over-emphasized in the sample selected for interviews. The survey was administered to youth participants active in the following groups:

Name of Group	No.	Type of group	Predominant Population Descriptors
Phakama Peer Leaders	32	Christian influenced peer education service club	Black township and informal settlements
Fairvale Interact Club	25	service club	Coloured and Indian poor urban and township
Our Lady of Fatima Interact Club	49	service club	Suburban white girls
Durban Girls Interact Club	56	service club	Black, Indian and white materially privileged urban girls
Northwood Boys Interact	12	service club	Black, Indian and white suburban boys
Youth for Christ Interns	8	Christian community development internship for out-of-work recent matrics	Black African township
Durban Youth Council	81	Appointed citywide student leadership council	Mixed
VN Naik School for the Deaf Interact, Prefects, and RCL Leaders ²⁴	39	Service club and student leaders	Black and Indian Township
University of KwaZulu-Natal ANC, SACP or SASCO members	5	Political affiliates of ANC or ANC affiliated campus organizations	Black African mixed economic standing

otherwise informed by known group and school profiles. Group and school profiles, as reported by school officials and observed, helped confirm assumptions.

²² Hereafter, "non-leader" will be used to refer to this portion of the population. This term is meant only to signify membership to the general body of youth surveyed who were not identified for civic activity. The term indicates a lack of *known* leadership and active participation.

²³ Hereafter, the term "leader" will be used to refer to this portion of the sample population.

²⁴ The inclusion of the VS Naik School for the Deaf further adds to this sample's representivity, inclusive of young people grappling with physical disability.

Survey respondents included 306 leaders and 248 non-leaders. In addition to identification through group characteristics, survey analysis divided respondents by geographic residence. Of all youth respondents, 23% were urban (mixed income), 4% informal settlement, 33% township, and 36% suburban. Correlations were drawn between mostly materially privileged (suburban) and mostly materially poor (township) young people. The decision to base comparisons upon interpreted economic status rather than race was in part to preserve the integrity of individual responses.²⁵ In emphasizing the impact of socio-economic status on civic interpretations and behaviours of young people, this study did not aim to discount the effect of race. As discussed in Chapter 2, in contemporary South African society, economic status continues to be linked to race. A future exploration of civic engagement might aim to ascertain more nuanced understanding of racial and class categories. Purpose sampling does not ensure the precise representivity guaranteed by random selections.

In focusing on racial, economic, and civic representivity, other variables were distorted. For example, though meant to measure the civic behaviour of young people aged 13-29, the survey was heavily biased towards young people aged 13-17 (77% of the responses). Likewise, as aforementioned, political activity was intentionally de-emphasized, but justice-oriented behaviour was not adequately represented in the survey sample. Of religious youth, a heavy influence was placed among Christian youth. Though survey results themselves may contain this bias, other research methods employed helped preserve the representivity of this study in general.

To probe further among groups already selected and address gaps in the population completing the survey tool, a purposive sample was drawn for semi-formal interviews. All young people interviewed were particularly active participants or leaders involved civically.

²⁵ The decision to omit a direct question regarding racial classification was made in order to promote honest survey response among individuals who might otherwise have based responses on the desire to conform or avoid conforming to racial categories.

Interviewees were selected to represent racial, age, and economic groups according to individual involvement in religious, political, justice-oriented, and community activities. Efforts were made to include more young people involved in justice-orientated, political and non-Christian and Christian religious activity. Among the twenty-two young people interviewed, seven participated in social movements, two held leadership positions in Muslim student groups, ten led Christian-based peer education, one held leadership positions in direct politics, and two held leadership positions in youth service groups. In actuality, most young people interviewed participated in more than one civic activity.

Intentionally, the interview sample strongly represented poor black youth (17/22) who comprised the majority of eThekweni's youth population. Materially privileged black (1), white (1), Indian (2), and mixed race young (1) people were also represented. Though this sample more adequately represented different ages within the target population than the survey, it still contained bias toward younger youth. Nine 13-17 year olds, ten 18-24 year olds, and three 25-29 year olds were interviewed. The majority of young people interviewed at the time of their interview attended high school (13), but four attended university, and five were neither employed nor attended any schooling. This particular subset of the youth population, out-of-school and unemployed youth who were actively engaging civically, if afforded the opportunity for greater input in further studies, might have valuable insight about how to best meet the needs of the great numbers of youth facing the same challenges but who have disengaged civically.

Though this study is not free from bias, general representivity of youth civically engaged and/or attending school or university and particularly those young people actively engaged in civic behaviour in eThekweni can be assumed.²⁶

²⁶ From hereafter, "youth" or "young people" will refer to young people living in eThekweni aged 13-29, who were actively engaged civically and/or attending school or university, with an emphasis on youth ages 13-24.

Chapter 4: Analysis and Findings

Part 1: eThekweni Youth Democratic Interpretations and Engagement

Travelling with sixteen undergraduate students to attend the South African Student Sports Union (SASSU) national soccer tournament in East London, a ripple of excitement wove through the bus as we passed Nelson Mandela's birthplace. For a moment, the boisterous chatter and house music took backstage as all eyes searched for Mandela's home. Muntu²⁷ was the first to spot the former president, political prisoner and activist's homestead. Eagerly peering out the window, almost to herself she commented, "My family was very political. I'm not that political. I'm not sure why..." ("Muntu." 2006. *Observation*. 3 December.)

At least in part, young people avoided political involvement because of their frustration with governmental policy and politics. Generally, youth did not believe the government or political parties worked adequately to support them or solve social problems. As discussed in Chapter 2, young people faced significant challenges, and social pressures and a culture of accumulation added complexity to the realities they negotiated. In response, they had formed their own definitions of participation in the democratic state and drifted away from direct politics in favour of community-based participation. Young people South Africans were participating civically, but on their own terms of their engagement.


1.1: Perceptions of Government and Politics-Not Enough

1.1.i. Youth faced significant social challenges.

Serious significant pressures confronted young people.

²⁷ For those desirous of anonymity and for all youth under the age of 18, aliases were assigned. See Appendix for interview, observations, and other key informant lists.

Top Ten "Most Pressing" Problems Facing Youth



On the surface, race did not seem to preoccupy the attention of today's young people as much as the growing divides between rich and poor South Africans. Race did not factor into the top ten most listed problems. Less than 1% of young respondents listed race or racism as the most pressing issue affecting today's young people. No respondents from either townships or informal settlements listed race as the most pressing issue. Munhara claimed that "[As young people], we are able to connect and get along better with each other." Within the Socialist Student Movement, financial exclusions impacted white and black students alike. As Thabo described, "I don't see any [racial] barriers. We have poor Indian students. Poor white students." If probed, however, many white, black, and other young people acknowledged that race was still an issue that often lay under the surface of other issues. The divide between rich

and poor South Africans was perceived along racial lines. “There aren’t a lot of sports centres you can go to for free, especially in black communities” (Mapule 2006).

Racist attitudes and clashes also persisted. According to Star,

Since 1994, people are free, but people, especially black people, are still suffering. The police have been beating us. ...I heard the conversation of some black policeman in Sydenham, and they said the reason some other policemen do this to us is because they knew black people were not well educated and they didn’t know their rights very well. They knew there was nothing they would do against them. That’s still racist.

Glen acknowledged that “Race is a big factor. There are still a lot of problems, and [as a student leader] I deal with it every day on a day to day level.” He further described an incident that had taken place on the day of his interview. A group of white students had thrown banana peels at two black students, which prompted a fight between large numbers of students. According to Glen, “We try to combat it.” Like other suburban and urban counterparts, Glen blamed affirmative action policies like BEE for the continuation of racial tension. “If we ignore race and just let the best win, I believe racism will die and we’ll have a happy country.” The issue of affirmative action has been an increased source of contention for young white South Africans (see Chapter 2).

Surveyed young people unanimously agreed, however, that the biggest problems facing young people were drugs (29% listed as the most pressing issue), HIV/AIDS (23%); teen pregnancy and premature sex (16%), peer pressure (14%), and crime and violence (11%). Drugs, HIV/AIDs, teen pregnancy and crime and violence were listed universally in the top five most listed responses across all age, leadership status, and location. Among those interviewed, seventeen of the twenty-two young people including university students, out-of-school youth, and high school youth from both wealthy and poor schools described a significant portion of young people as engaging in reckless sexual behaviour or substance abuse.

To a certain extent, young people blamed youth attitudes and culture for the high prevalence of disease, pregnancy, crime, and joblessness plaguing young people in general. Mbali described the situation, “Many young people take themselves as adults.” Among surveyed youth, a loss of respect or negative attitudes ranked sixth.

Most Pressing Youth Problem	Overall (%)	Leaders (%)	Non-Leaders (%)	Township (%)	Sub-urban (%)	13-17 (%)	18-23 (%)	24-29 (%)
Drugs or Alcohol Abuse	29	24	35	26	32	31	24	25
HIV/AIDS or Disease	23	28	18	25	26	22	26	50
Teen Pregnancy and Premature Relationships	16	20	12	18	13	17	12	50
Loss of Respect or Control	6	7	6	6	7	7	3	
Peer Pressure	14	20	7	6	17	17	3	
Crime and Violence	11	12	9	10	9	9	17	
Materialism	3	4	2	3	3	3	2	
Education	3	5	1	0.5	5	4	2	
Jobs and Unemployment	6	9	2	3	7	5	7	50
Abuse	2	3	1	2	4	2	2	25

Equal numbers of suburban youth considered a loss of respect and unemployment as the most pressing issues. More township youth considered loss of respect the most pressing issue (6% as compared with 3%). Sihle described what he perceived as the changed youth attitude, “Each and everyone we’re not respecting ourselves. We’re not respecting our parents. It means we’re not respecting anybody.”


Young people worried in particular about the negative influence of peer pressure in contributing to decline in respect and risk-taking among young people. Peer pressure ranked fourth overall as the most pressing youth issue and impacted youth from a wide range of socio-economic backgrounds.²⁸ Younger South Africans were more concerned than older

²⁸ Peer pressure ranked third for suburban youth and fifth for township youth.

counterparts.²⁹ Mpho, from Ntuzuma, explained, “Friends say ‘It’s cool,’” therefore, young people believe that “living about today is fun and not hard work” despite the fact that “thinking about the future is hard work.” Glen described the culture of peer pressure at Glenwood Boys High School, “All of these guys are sheep...the biggest problem with teenagers is that they haven’t been brought up with enough self morals to make them unique and willing to stand up for what they believe in.” Though willing to hold their peer group accountable, young people also attributed the wide range of social challenges to inadequate government intervention.

1.1.ii. Young people lacked trust for political and government bodies.

Young people possessed low levels of civic trust and viewed political parties with wariness. Only 10% of survey respondents indicated general trust.³⁰ Levels of trust for almost all civic actors were low.



²⁹ Peer pressure ranked third among 13-17 year olds but sixth among youth aged 18-23.

³⁰ For all indicators (trust, electoral, efficacy, political voice and awareness, community engagement, community problem-solving, and justice orientation), average mean scores were determined from indicator set statements. Scores greater than or equal to 4 suggest indication.

Levels of trust were particularly low in relationship to government officials and political parties. Only 36% believed the government was working to solve problems in the community.

Young people perceived politics as vacuous and full only of empty promises, posturing, and careerism. Glen described his perception of politics and political leaders: “Politics is not really the answer. My answer would be to get ...role models to start leading the way...rather than the deputy president walking into a hospital and hugging a baby.” Surveyed young people did not believe that the government or political parties worked adequately to solve problems in the community. Asked whether government parties, trade unions, religious organizations, community services, and political parties were working to solve problems in the community:

- 57% agreed that unions were working to solve problems
- 52% agreed that religious groups were working to solve problems
- 36% agreed that the government was working to solve problems
- 29% that political parties were working to solve problems.³¹

but only

Rather than service to the community, young people believed politicians sought career advancement. According to Thabo, students on the University of KwaZulu-Natal-Westville campus “no longer trust their student leaders. They know that they are just there for themselves or to polish [their] cv for a job in a government department. That’s why [students are] dealing with their problems on their own.” Khurshid similarly described youth politics on campus. “The ANCYL on this campus and generally in South Africa has become [a place for] people seeking a ‘political springboard.’” “We’ve sacrificed our values.” According to Khurshid, an accumulation culture could be observed among student politicians by the expensive brands they wore at ANCYL meetings on campus. “People shout viva this viva that,” he asserted, but the actions of student politicians did not align with their sloganeering.

³¹ Strikingly, more people disagreed (33%) than agreed (29%) that political parties were working to solve problems in the community.

Youth perceived these trends as indicative of the broader political arena, which had fallen short in the provision of services and creation of meaningful democratic spaces for participation. As truly participatory and development concepts of democracy lost currency in both local and national political contexts (see Chapter 2), basic services in eThekweni failed to reach the majority of residents.

1.1.iii. Young people were frustrated by a lack of services and supports.

Young people were frustrated by a lack of service delivery and believed that not enough had been done for youth in South Africa. Only 35% surveyed agreed or strongly agreed that political parties cared about youth issues. Of the twenty-two youth leaders interviewed, nineteen (86%) said that the government was not doing enough. According to Khurshid, the ANC took for granted their position of power, “They don’t really need to deliver.”

Youth reported a need for safe spaces, education and opportunities for growth and development. Some youth criticized government for a lack of effective prevention efforts. Several youth perceived the child grant as aggravating the problem of teen pregnancy among poor youth desperate for any source of income. (Mpho 2006; S’bu 2006) Others argued that the government should do more regarding drugs and drug dealers in the schools (Mwali 2006). Glen attributed the disengagement of young people to the lack of government intervention. “Some of us don’t know what to do on a Saturday afternoon and if they could motivate us that would be something. The government is just into politics and advancing careers.” According to Mapule, “The Government doesn’t have enough support mechanisms for youth-a place to go if a person feels like talking to someone- the youth centres. There aren’t a lot of sports centres you can go to for free-especially in poor communities.”

A lack of youth development opportunities seemed to disproportionately impact poor young people. Thabo decried the ANC policies he attributed to the increasing disparity, “The

ANC has betrayed the youth of the country. Especially poor communities.” From the perspective of the youth from the Abahlali baseMjondolo movement for land and housing, in regards to basic services to its poorest citizens, eThekweni had made only empty promises. A deep sense of betrayal and frustration with a lack of delivery permeated all interviews with Bahlali³² youth:

I was born in Ntuzuma and my family came to stay here in Kennedy Road in 1987 so from 1987 I grew up here... The municipality promised that they would build houses here... [T]he Urban Foundation, came and built a hall and these toilets, and they said that there was progress here and that we were not going anywhere. ... Later on, they changed. They said this space was unstable. The land is moving and if you build a house, it will crack. They saw that we didn't understand that and after a while they said no, there are gases in the air here because you live near the dump. The gases are dangerous to you and you and your children you will have to move away. We asked them why all of a sudden... we hadn't seen anyone here but they said no they had sent people to do the research. But we didn't see anyone doing the research. (System 2006)

There were so many problems in Joe Slovo. They promised us housing. I think in 2003, one man came in my house and he said “You've got free housing.” Then he came back and said “You can't have the house because we've lost your form” but they said that “next year you will get the house”. Okay, so I wait and I wait and I wait. (Ayanda 2006)

Other young people described the impact of income disparity on education. “Orphaned and vulnerable young people are unable to pay the school fees and sometimes a person can't go to the next class because she hasn't paid the school fees” (Lindiwe 2006). In some areas, children who didn't pay their fees didn't receive their reports (System 2006). Regarding the financial exclusions of students on campuses and education disparity in general, Thabo declared “It's a betrayal of the struggle... Access should not be based on how much you have.”

A lack of education and access to basic services aggravated other social ills. Ayanda, a 15-year-old from Joe Slovo Settlement, described the situation in his informal settlement, “here in Joe Slovo we just have to sit in the house and do nothing all day. Some young people go and

³² Literally, “Bahlali” means “residents” and “Umhlali” means “resident” (baseMjondolo “of the shacks”) but in reference to Abahlali baseMjondolo, “Bahlali” and “Umhlali” refers to activist(s) within Abahlali movement for land and housing.

do crime because they don't know what to do. [There is] no grounds. No house. What else do they have to do? Go for crime. Go for drugs." System, who finished grade 11 but did not complete her matric, asked, "I'm over 18. So what must I do? There are no jobs. So the youth just turn to drugs. Go stealing." Star also linked the lack of job opportunities to participation in negative behaviours. "There are no jobs here. Young people are still suffering. Some are involved in drugs, crime. Nothing seems to be going their way."

Young people blamed government for failing to address the rise in unemployment and continued lack of job opportunities plaguing young people in general and poor young people in particular. As discussed in Chapter 2, unemployment has taken a youth face in South Africa with young people comprising 74% of the unemployed (Mlaba 2005). Of surveyed youth, both suburban and township youth were concerned about jobs (ranked seventh and eight respectively). Youth who had entered or were about to enter the job market were especially concerned. Overall, among surveyed youth, jobs and unemployment was listed seventh as the most pressing issue facing young people, but fifth among young people aged 18-23 years old and first among 24-29 year-olds. Of the nine people interviewed who studied at the tertiary level or who were out-of-school, seven (78%) highlighted jobs as a major problem.

Youth development programs designed to uplift the economic status of young people fell short of intended goals (See Chapter 2). Young people believed national economic policies like Black Economic Empowerment benefited a small elite. According to Sihle, who lived in Joe Slovo, an informal settlement, for most of his life, the national youth entrepreneurship program, Umsobomvu Youth Fund, for example, was not accessible to the average young person finishing matric. "You need huge [amounts of] money but they know exactly that we don't have money." Poor young people struggled to gain experience and skills necessary to compete in the job market. "Now, when you want a job they want the license and the computer skills and everything they're supposed to give us in our schools but they don't give us in our

schools. They give everything to the private schools, which are for the rich.” (Sihle 2006)

Mandla, from Ntuzuma, summarized the experience of many youth from his community, “When you finish matric, you don't have money to go to tertiary. And posters for jobs show that you need experience and you don't have experience, so you're stuck.” According to poor South African young people, in particular, therefore, government forms of youth intervention only accentuated disparities inherent in the capitalist growth model adopted by the state. “In other words, when you're rich you get richer. When you're poor, you're very poor.” (Sihle 2006)

1.1.iv. Young people were frustrated by a lack of meaningful spaces for popular participation

As discussed in Chapter 2, in addition to service delivery, local municipalities were required to enable public participation. Despite the constitutional mandate, however, young people described interactions with government and municipal forces as ineffectual and distant at best and violent at worst. The politics of the ruling party, as experienced on the local level, did not only fail to effectively deliver needed supports, but afforded little room for meaningful participation.

In some instances, the government seemed hesitant to engage with community partners in addressing social needs. A young peer leader from INK described the refusal of local government to partner or support local efforts. “I belong to the group helping in the community and the government is doing less to help the community. There is no sponsorship of those in the community helping the community. For example, there was a shortage of gloves. The [government] clinics refused to provide when they asked for gloves” (M'du 2006).

Several young people commented on a perceived lack of respect of public officials for their constituents. Zodwa smiled as she told the story of the court case won against the

municipality reversing the city's decision to ban an Abahlali protest. Asked why she was smiling, she answered

Because no one had ever thought that people from shacks can take the municipality, recognized as the biggest municipality for the whole country, to the courts and win the case. It's a victory. Because people from the shacks are the lower classes so the people in the municipality don't treat them as South African citizens. Maybe because we are living in shacks. I don't know because we are the voters but if you're living in the shacks, people don't take you seriously. (Zodwa 2006)

Several surveyed leaders (2%) listed negative youth perceptions as the most pressing issue facing South African young people. One survey respondent problematized "the fact that the adults recognize us as a 'lost generation'" (Durban Youth Council Surveys 2006). As discussed in depth in Chapter 2, the concept of youth as a problem remained pervasive in South African society and affected the way in which public officials interacted with the youth citizenry. One teacher at a high school in INK interrupted the facilitators of the class to publicly reprimand a student. Leaving, he turned to the facilitators and exclaimed, "Are *they* giving you any trouble?" Later, the same teacher commented in private, "The youth! They are a problem!" (Phakama Observations 1/9/2006) Youth described how contemporary attitudes and politics affected their struggle for development. "It was better [during apartheid] to be blocked with a board, because we could fight to demolish that board, but now when it's concrete and it's not easy to fight and break that concrete. Why I say that is because the people that have power won't respect the lower people."

Mapule described the top-down approach of ruling-party governance as it impacted young people, "The Government assumes it knows what young people want. They don't actually know." Likewise, one youth member of Abahlali, M'du Hlongwa, problematized the city's behind closed doors practice of decision-making:

They may say, at the top, they may call a press conference and say we are working for Kennedy Road, we are building maybe 1000 houses on Kennedy

Road. Only to find they haven't come to the people to ask, how many houses are needed in that area of Kennedy Road? How many families are here? They may say we built 100 houses for Kennedy only to find that maybe 4000 houses are needed for Kennedy...Only if they come and ask the people and talk to the people, then they have the exact number of house needed. That's what we want from the government. Come and ask the people. Don't say 'we built a tuck-shop in Kennedy.' What if people don't need a tuck-shop?' (Ngiam 2006)

Decisions about housing and development were consistently made without the participation of the affected communities and to the detriment of those communities.

Star described the negative impact of the municipality's lack of public consultation as it pertained to housing:

They haven't told us anything; they just told us, "We're relocating you. We're not upgrading there" - [the land] where they had promised us [houses]. But actually, most people are working around this area, so it would be difficult for them to move there [to the new site]. It's a rural area. There's no hospital. There's no police station, so if the people move from here to there, they're actually going to struggle more. And they will lose their jobs. There are no jobs there...that's why we're still unhappy with the municipality and Abahlali will take it forward.

Politics on the local level meant not only top-down policy implementation, but the promising, withholding, and awarding of services according to an emergent system of patronage. Young people were dismayed by the politics of delivery and participation they experienced. As Ayanda described, RDP homes originally promised to his family and neighbours in his informal settlement were allocated as political favours to individuals not from the community (Ayanda 2006). Youth believed that their ability to connect with government officials depended upon political affiliation. Several youth voted or expressed their intention to vote for a particular party because they believed government officials tracked voting records (System 2006 and Lindiwe 2006). Others expressed exasperation because even within the system of patronage their party affiliation had not translated into fulfilled service delivery:

- We're fighting for land and housing. Councillor Baig came to Foreman at the time that he was campaigning for votes, and he told us, together with the mayor, "If the ANC wins, there's land there. If you vote for the ANC we will definitely build

houses there.” But ever since the ANC won, they have been ignoring us. (Star 2006)

- When I vote for him, he says “Okay, I was staying with you but now I’m adopting the stage of the other people.” Then, they come to tell us to vote [again] after they’ve ignored us. They come back and say, “I’m a candidate and I’ll do this and this and this,” and they just promise everything. (Sihle 2006)
- The Chairman (of the Ward Committee) told us we were getting houses. Each and every month we were paying money for the ANC membership and SANCO membership cards but even now we didn’t get the houses. I have met many people who have spent many years there, more than 15 years, and are still looking for development. Right now, we still haven’t gotten it.... We are sick and tired of the promises.” (Vuyi 2006)

Local government used its control over services to intimidate and silence those voicing opposition. Youth activists within Abahlali’s fight for land and housing were denied political access because of their activism. Sihle described what happened in Joe Slovo after residents joined Abahlali,

They said you must move. This place is for the municipality or this place is for somebody else. So now, it’s hard to communicate. ...Now the councillors they won’t help us with anything that we want. Some of our mothers they want the stamps for the grants. When they go to the councillor the councillor says, ‘I don’t know you. (2006)

In Pinetown, when the municipality illegally evicted residents of the Motala Heights informal settlement, remaining residents gathered in protest and some began to rebuild homes. Officials attempted to coerce those who remained behind into compliance. Some were told that if they didn’t leave, the city would turn off their water. Others heard that they could purchase government homes only with thousands of Rands. Security forces threatened violent retribution to still others (Abahlali baseMjondolo Observations 11/2006).

The municipality, indeed, employed force to quell protest. System, a 27 year-old activist in Abahlali baseMjondolo lost her tooth at once such instance. She discussed what

happened when the Kennedy Road community attempted to employ self-directed action rather than official channels. At first, local government officials failed to respond:

We started a project called a Cleaning Campaign with the PDI. The PDI gave us green bags to sort the rubbish. When we were cleaning, the rubbish was down by the hall and the municipality wouldn't come to pick up the rubbish because they said the plastics were the green ones, and they didn't take the green ones- they take only the yellow. So after that we started to march because the rubbish was full down by the hall. We tried to contact our councillor, and our councillor didn't even attend our meetings... (2006)

Next, community members initiated action against the unresponsive municipality, who responded violently:

[The councillor] didn't come so that was the day we decided to march. We picked up the rubbish and put it in Kennedy Road so that the councillor would come and talk to us. He didn't come because he didn't recognize us. We went down to M19. We burned tires there. Then, the police asked why are we angry. We told the police the whole story. Then they tried to phone our councillor. The councillor said I don't know those people. They're just criminals so just arrest them. So the police started shooting rubber bullets. They beat 14 comrades including two young teenagers who were supposed to write their exams. They took them to the police station. We tried to march to the police station but the police blocked us there. So they took them to Westville Prison and we were thinking those Bahlali were Nelson Mandela because they were arrested for the people. (System 2006)

The pattern of failed service delivery, community action and critique, government dismissiveness, and violent police repression was not unique to Kennedy Road. Three Umlazi activists, including one twenty-five year old woman, were reportedly murdered for opposing a local councillor in the 2006 municipal elections by his bodyguards (Concerned Residents and Organizations 2006). In October 2006, as they prepared to appear on a local radio station in order to criticize local housing policies, two leaders of Abahlali were arrested on invented charges by the local police. Arresting officers uttered racial slurs and beat one leader unconscious (Tolsi 2006).

Among community activists, municipal security forces were notorious. In Motala Heights, Pinetown, in October and November 2006, Abahlali members faced almost daily

harassment. On October 28, metro security forces arrived unannounced with labourers who proceeded to illegally evict shack dwellers and demolish their homes, leaving at least 19 people including several children and young people homeless. When the municipality's forces returned days later to tear down shacks that had been rebuilt, shots were fired when community members gathered in protest. When a local Abahlali member produced a letter from a lawyer urging that the forces desist demolition, that member was pepper-sprayed. The local police turned him away when he went to lodge a complaint. The next day, security forces threatened him with further violence. As children played in the site of their former homes, security forces swung their automatic weapons and hurled insults. Multiple attempts were made to contact the municipality, and when an official was eventually reached, she stated that the city did not know of the evictions occurring in Motala Heights, further demonstrating the deliberately unresponsive and undemocratic nature of certain local government practice (Abahlali baseMjondolo Observations 2006).

In November 2006, several Bahlali met with local community members in Motala Heights. Mnikelo, a young activist and then Community PRO of Abahlali spoke with the residents. Passionately, he declared, "We Abahlali are for all umhlali. We are going. We have force... "The Constitution is not Govendor's³³ or the government's. It's ours. We have the right to basic services." In a moment of transformation, Mnikelo flipped the undemocratic action of the state on the state and reclaimed democracy on behalf of the people, "The Constitution; It's ours." He further defined Abahlali's participation in democratic South Africa: "We are going. We have force." When a court edict was finally won in December 2006, local police came to protect community members of Motala Heights from what would have otherwise been further demolitions, the community celebrated its victory (Abahlali

³³ Mr. Govendor is a local landowner owning land adjacent to and portions of the Motala Heights Settlement. He pressured residents and city officials alike to clear the entire Motala Heights Settlement for his development plans.


baseMjondolo Observations 2006). Motata Heights residents and Abahlali activists had claimed the law as their own and protected their community.

Analysts linked the emergence of social movements in South Africa to a heightened dissatisfaction regarding service delivery and the politics of participation (see Chapter 2). Though only a minority of young people included in this study reported taking part in social movements (26% of those surveyed and 31% of those interviewed) or indicated interactions with municipal forces as violent as those experienced by bahlali, the majority's interactions with broader society, too, reflected the decreasingly participatory practice of the ruling elite. As the ANC adopted a western liberal model of governance, its commitment to social development and participatory democracy waned on local levels in particular. In light of the narrowed confines for development and participation, young people have responded to the political context by accepting the elements of choice and autonomy inherent in western liberal democracy on the one hand, but demanding community-based and participatory understanding and practice on the other.

1.2: Defining Relationships to Materialism and Democratic Participation

As reviewed in Chapter 2, South African youth have been accused of rejecting political participation for a culture of material accumulation. Young people's relationship with materialism, however, was complex and mimicked the national political context. As democratic South Africa adopted a liberal definition of democracy inclusive of free-market and growth strategies, many young people embraced the accompanying ethic of consumption that inundated mass media. This ethic, however, did not wholly reject civic participation and, in fact, was viewed by some young people as the means for participation. Choice and freedom of choice mattered to today's young people; however, young people expressed concern about material indulgence at the cost of community development.


To a certain extent, young people embraced materialism, but not universally. 65% of those surveyed agreed or strongly agreed that youth were materialistic. As one university leader found, “When I look here at the environment [at the University of KwaZulu-Natal], when we were organizing elections, basically we were told ‘we don’t have issues. We want entertainment’” (Mapule 2006). “Generations have changed,” Thabo agreed, “People want to accumulate wealth. [They care about] what kind of vehicle they want to drive at the end of the day. They care about their family, but they forget that they’ve grown up in the community.” The degree to which young people valued material goods should not be over-generalized, however.



Though 65% of youth leaders from Our Lady of Fatima Interact students and 57% of students from Meadowlands strongly agreed, only one quarter of Northwood Boys Interact students and just over one-third (34%) of Dumahlezi high school students strongly agreed that they wanted

to buy jewellery and clothes in the next three years. One quarter of Youth for Christ interns strongly disagreed. Young people had not entirely made up their minds about the worth of material goods. As Mpho from INK described, “Young people have a lot of brains. Without them there would be nothing in the world. Some of us want to focus on worldly things. Some of us want to focus on education.” Glen agreed that “[t]o a degree, I guess everyone is materialistic,” but disagreed that young people cared only about material gain. “I believe in looking out for other people more than looking out for myself. We’re sometimes driven by outside motives, but I’m not driven by that. Here [at Glenwood Boys High School] everyone looks out for each other. I’ve learned to do everything for my team.”

Nor had young people accepted materialism unconditionally. More young people agreed or strongly agreed that young people were leaders of the nation (76%) than those who thought young people were materialistic (65%). Young people were also more interested in pursuing their education than acquiring material goods.



In regards to future orientation, more youth (72%) agreed or strongly agreed that in the next three years they wanted to buy jewellery or clothes than work to solve a social problem (59%), but many more (90%) agreed or strongly agreed that they wanted to further their education and the same number (72%) wanted to find a job.

Social pressure in the new democracy, however, connected status and success with material acquisition. Young people from a variety of backgrounds reported experiencing such pressure. “We feel that by having material stuff we can be happy...it’s peer pressure to get the material stuff.” (Mapule 2006) Zodwa, an umhlali, agreed, “We want to have money, to have capitalistic things. Because we feel that in order to be recognized, you must have something material.” In the new society, peer pressure enforced notions that equated happiness and social status. As discussed in section 1 of this chapter, young people expressed deep concern for the effect of peer pressure on their generation. As Aadila described it, “In order to be cool you have to wear the right clothes and go to the right places... Kids today worry about ‘Am I going to get the right outfit from YED?’ ...I think it’s the same across the board. All races and classes except a very few.” Glen identified a culture where “richest is the coolest.” Kuku from INK explained, “They are obsessed with material things because if you don’t have such things you don’t seem to be cool.” M’du agreed, “The time we’re living in is different from olden times. You need things in order impress” as did Thando, “Some seek things that make you able to get a cell phone just because a friend has a cell phone.” Media influence added to pressures experienced by many young South Africans. “TV and magazines play such a huge influence.... A lot has to do with society. Fashion TV, for example, never says look at what’s happening in Sudan. It places a huge amount of pressure on young people.” (Aadila 2007)

Young people interpreted materialism not only in light of social pressures but also as part of the new South African society itself. If South African democracy was defined according to a liberal rights-based definition, the freedom and ability to choose as a consumer would be

included in one's democratic rights. Aadila found that "in some respects teenagers are selfish" but within democratic society "they have every right to be selfish." She cautioned, however, that "there's a point where you have to stop being self indulgent and pay attention to people around you." For some poor young people, especially, economic security and consumer choice was equated with freedom, itself. Star described such a phenomenon.

Now, it's a new generation. Young people need to be happy with their lives....By getting all the phones, it's a new freedom for them. They have to express themselves. That's why others are saying 'they're selfish or what what.' They have to do what they want. They need to express themselves. (2006)

For the new generation, material acquisition was also the means to join the technologically advanced global order. Philani explained, "Modern people are not obsessed about the rural things. They do things the modern way," which includes accessing modern technology. Mapule characterized her generation as "more technologically-based." Cell phones and material items had real functional value in providing access to the broader society for young people who would not otherwise be able. Ayanda denied partaking in material acquisition for frivolous pursuits but stated, "I carry the cell phone for personal things. I don't carry this cell phone for fun." Cell phones are the means towards communicating with one another and participating in the broader society. According to System, cell phones and other material items enabled poor South African youth access otherwise unavailable:

"The reason that some of the youth focus on the cell phones and all that stuff is because it is the only thing that they can do to keep themselves busy. There are no free computer centres or studies. Nothing. The youth love technology and the computer is a part of it. You can find data, there's the Internet, all that stuff. If there were computer studies for free, the youth would focus on the computer.

To a certain extent, therefore, material acquisition could be interpreted as action taken to fill gaps of access and opportunity for young South Africans.

A youth culture of individual choice and material acquisition had emerged. Lindiwe linked the increase in independent decision-making to a lack of support, "The reason young

Many youth, however, had begun to feel uneasy about the influence of materialism and free choice on South African young people and society. Poor youth, in particular, were concerned about the impact of unfettered choice and materialism.

Most Pressing Youth Problem	Informal Settlement (%)	Township (%)	Suburban (%)
Drugs or Alcohol Abuse	26	26	32
HIV/AIDS or Disease	30	25	26
Teen Pregnancy and Premature Relationships	17	18	13
Loss of Respect or Control	9	6	7
Peer Pressure	0	6	17
Crime and Violence	13	10	9
Materialism	9	3	3
Education	0	0.5	5
Jobs and Unemployment	0	3	7
Abuse	0	2	4

Township and informal settlement youth reflected relatively greater concern about the perceived culture of materialism than suburban and urban counterparts. Among those surveyed, the sixth and seventh highest number of township and informal settlement young people listed materialism as the most pressing issue facing South African young people, whereas materialism ranked eleventh among suburban youth. Youth critical of materialism viewed the freedoms inherent in democracy and emphasized in western liberal democracy as having opened the way for a sense of reckless individual entitlement. According to Sihle, youth “want things easy. [For example,] when I want Raymond’s cell phone, I take the knife and I point it at him because I want his cell phone.”

Young people likewise warned that individualistic materialism posed a potential threat to traditional values for collectivism. Religious youth in particular bemoaned the moral decline of the capitalist society. Munhara blamed the “fast pace of life” on the fact that “people have become so wrapped up in this life and themselves that they don’t care about other people or how their actions affect other people.” Khurshid summarized the critical youth perspective,

"With democracy has come an openness...[and] its brought us social and moral vices." Sihle described how the new culture detracted from the ethos of community, "Life has become selfish because we think for us. We don't think for our parents or our nation." In battling financial exclusions at the University of KwaZulu-Natal on Westville campus, Thabo described how the new culture impacted student mobilisation efforts,

It was the township youth who used to be in the forefront [of activist struggles]. But today it is quite surprising because they are not interested anymore. It has become a stigma. They don't want to say 'I don't have money to register.' People they don't talk anymore. It's like 'I have to deal with my problem.' Or 'you have to deal with your problem.' Everyone's on their own. (2006)

Young people rejected total emphasis on individual freedoms, which some felt distorted democracy, itself.


- Democracy [has been] used unnecessarily because some people don't understand the way democracy works...In a democracy everybody has a right to do whatever, so some people don't care. 'As long as I know I have rights, my life doesn't affect your life.' They're over doing it. If I slap you, I say 'It's my right that if you make me angry that I slap you.' But actually it's your right not to be slapped. (System 2006)

Youth interpretations of democracy required both personal freedom and collective well-being. The attention span of young people affirmed their emphasis on community. Though more youth paid attention to popular culture (54%) than to local or national politics, even greater numbers of youth (69%) paid attention to what was going on in their community. Vuyi defined Abahlali baseMjondolo as democratic because of its commitment to both individual autonomy and respect for the broader community: "We [in Abahlali] respect one another. It's a democracy because there's no one who tells us what to do." As they have negotiated the ethos of materialism that permeated South African youth culture and embraced both individualism and collectivism, young people defined democratic participation in community development contexts and engaged in complementary ways.

1.3: Defining Democratic Engagement

Young people were fairly united in how they defined democratic involvement.

Surveyed youth were asked an open-ended question about what it meant to be an active citizen in South Africa.³⁴ In general, young people defined participation in people-based and community-oriented contexts.



The three highest responses included developing, growing or building the country or community for the better (17%), caring or helping others (17%), and taking part in the community or community events (13%). Young people from a wide range of backgrounds incorporated helping others and developing the broader community into their definitions.³⁵

Those who defined democratic involvement as developing, growing, or building the country or community, generally described the process as an active and joint effort. “*Kusho ukubamisana nabanye abantu owakehlene nabo*” or “It means to come together with other

³⁴ Responses were grouped into 15 categories determined from youth responses that were not unique.

³⁵ Three of the ten interviewees who defined active citizenship listed helping others in their definitions. Both 13-17 year-olds and 18-23 year-olds and township and suburban youth listed developing the community in their top-three responses. All subgroups except UKZN student leaders ranked “helping others” in their top three responses.

people and to build with them” (Dumahlezi Surveys 2006). Participation was part of a process of improvement for the greater whole, “to work to better and improve our country” (Fairvale Interact Surveys 2006). Helping others, too, meant actively contributing to the broader society. Active citizenship meant not only that “ [y]ou care about your community and its people” (Durban Youth Council Surveys 2006) but also required physical involvement in addressing the needs of others:

Kuletha izidingo abantu abazifunayo (To bring the needs to the people who are wanting) (Dumahlezi Surveys 2006)

Kusho ukuzikhandla nokukhatazeka ngabanye abantu (It means to exert oneself and to worry about other people) (Dumahlezi Surveys 2006)

You must try to help people around you. (Meadowlands Surveys 2007)

Taking an interest in your community and the people around you. Physically getting involved. (Aadila 2007)

Finally, active citizenship required long-term commitment. To Munhara, participation meant “not only showing concern about the plight of others, but you’re doing something about it on a continuous basis. You make it part of your lifestyle.” One survey respondent described the future-orientation necessary, “It means helping to achieve a better South Africa for our future leaders” (Meadowlands Surveys 2007).

The next highest number of youth also defined active citizenship in community contexts, but not necessarily orientated towards the betterment of community. Active citizenship meant “to take part and be involved in your country” (Our Lady of Fatima Interact Surveys 2006) or “getting involved with the community” (VS Naik Leaders Surveys 2007). Some youth defined participation merely as taking part in the country, community and community activities. Citizenship simply meant “tak[ing] part in any activities occurring around your area” (Northwood Boys Surveys 2006). Others, however, placed involvement in community development contexts. For these young people, citizenship activity would include “forming

part of youth organizations and community development projects,” UZKN leaders (Surveys 2007).

Many defined active citizenship as multi-layered and inclusive of multiple categories of participation. Forty percent of survey respondents who attempted to define active citizenship included more than one category of participation. For example, respondents defined active citizenship as both taking part and helping others, “being involved in the community and helping your fellow South African citizens” (Durban Girls Interact Surveys 2006). A handful of young people defined citizenship in light of positive self-development and personal responsibility, but this too was portrayed as contributing to the broader development of the nation. This form of active citizenship meant that “you are doing things to make South Africa a better country. These can be big things including donations or simply small things like studying well so you can get a job, and well, this does make the country a better place, I think.” (Durban Girls Interact Surveys 2006). “In the process of earning well” and seeking personal development, Munhara concluded, “you’re empowering others.”

Others extended the meaning of active citizenship beyond general contribution to the community and included educating and organizing others. Interviewed leaders in particular suggested that community-based action should include community education and empowerment. For Star, “To be active, is where you can actually help the people who really need your help. To help the people to understand what they want, issues, proper channels to follow rather than just to sit down and not do anything” (Star 2006). Three percent of survey respondents included mentoring in their definitions of active citizenship.

Several respondents from varied socio-economic backgrounds indicated cynicism concerning citizenship. Eleven surveyed respondents from Dumahlezi High School, Meadowlands High School, Northwood Boys High School, Durban Girls Interact, Phakama Peer Leaders, and VS Naik leaders responded that active citizenship meant not much or nothing

at all. Such responses vented frustration with service delivery and opportunities for participation (see section 1.1 in this chapter):

Akusho lutho lokhu-ubandlululo alwaka pheli SA kukho izindawo esingakwazi ukuzingena ezikhetha izinhlanga. (It doesn't mean anything – they still haven't built houses in SA and there are places in which we can't enter to vote.)
(Dumahlezi Surveys 2006)

They felt stymied from participating meaningfully. Citizenship “does not mean a lot...because our opinions are not heard but rather rejected.” To a student from Meadowlands, being a citizen in democratic South Africa, “does not mean a lot. The government does not care.”

(Meadowlands Surveys 2006)

A significant portion of young people did not attempt to define active citizenship. Over one-third (37%) failed to complete the open-ended survey question. The high omission rate might appear to reflect survey fatigue. More likely, however, omission indicated a lack of familiarity or a discomfort among young people in addressing the topic. Many more people completed the responses to the open-ended question asking youth to identify pressing youth issues (only 16% omitted) that also fell at the end of the survey. Significant numbers of youth might have felt unprepared to interpret democratic engagement.

Young leaders, however, felt more equipped than general youth.

Definition	Leaders (%)	Non-Leaders (%)	Township (%)	Suburban (%)	13-17 (%)	18-23 (%)
develop the community	22	11	7	28	19	9
care or help others	21	12	11	21	19	8
participate in the community	17	9	7	18	17	2
voice critical opinions	10	1	<1	12	8	0
vote or participate politically	6	1	<1	6	4	<1
work to solve social problems	6	3	1	5	5	3
it means nothing or something negative		3	2	2		3
protect rights	3	<1	0	4	2	0
love or take pride in the country	4	5	6	3	3	9
live in a democracy/freedom	2	2	2	2	2	<1
knowledgeable about issues facing community	6	2	2		4	3
positive self-development	4	2	2	4	4	2
I don't know	1	2	2	1	1	2
serve as role model	3	2	3	3	3	<1

Whereas one in two non-leaders (48%) did not attempt to define active citizenship, four in five young leaders (81%) responded.

Whether a young person actively engaged influenced the ways in which he or she defined citizenship. Leaders were not just more comfortable defining citizenship but also more likely to define citizenship as the exercise of critical voice.³⁶ For one Durban Youth Council member, “An active citizen is someone who would express their opinion freely and without offence but with courage and not be afraid of being laughed at or ostracized” (Durban Youth Council Surveys 2006). Leaders from political or activist backgrounds seemed particularly inclined to define active citizenship through the expression of critical and independently formed opinions. Mapule explained that as an active citizen,

You have to fight for what you want. You have to be outspoken. Speak for the people. Criticize people. Provide a way forward. You need to stand for what you believe in... Basically, you need to make a lot of noise. (2006)

To Mapule, participation was partially representative- active citizens “speak for the people,” especially “those people scared to speak for themselves- for other young people,” but for others they did not envision the vanguard as their spokesmen. Rather, they insisted that autonomy of voice be included in democratic understanding. Vuyi, an umhlali, insisted on independence of voice and action, “To be an active South African citizen, means that we’re doing everything that needs to be done. There’s no one who can tell us what to do. We’re independent.”

Other differences were also observed. Suburban youth were more inclined than township youth to voice criticism (12% versus <1%). Township youth were much more inclined to include national pride in their definitions than suburban youth. Pride ranked sixth among township youth and ranked first among informal settlement youth, but only tenth among suburban youth. Leadership imbalance between surveyed suburban and township populations

³⁶ Critical voice ranked fourth among leaders defining active citizenship, but eleventh among non-leaders.

might account from some differences in democratic understandings.³⁷ The highest numbers of both non-leaders of Dumahlezi and Phakama Peer Leaders (from INK), however, defined active citizenship as possessing pride for the nation suggesting that leadership differences did not fully account for subgroup variation. Instead, differences between suburban and township youth might have reflected historical and political contexts unique to poor black areas.

Young black people likely have felt a genuine sense of obligation to support the new nation that had replaced the apartheid state and ended white rule. The black political and economic elite used racial identity to encourage affiliation that would maintain its rule (Erasmus 2005). Fear, too, might also account for some of the differences between suburban and township youth. National ANC executive practice touted party allegiance as its model for citizenship, acting to silence internal dissent. Likewise, the patronage and retribution practices of local politics in poor areas in particular (see section 1.1 of this chapter) demonstrated intolerance for dissidence. Finally, the fear-driven legacy of the violence that divided eThekweni's townships into no-go zones until the late 1990's (see Chapter 2) might also have made more township youth uncomfortable from speaking out critically.

Unwillingness to speak out critically did not reflect approbation. Young people unanimously rejected politics as practiced in favour of community-based definitions of participation. Only two surveyed non-leaders defined citizenship through voting or participating in direct politics. This is fewer than the number (three) of young people who defined active citizenship as playing sports. According to one university leader, "People don't want to hear about Marx, but are worried about human rights." "More value is placed on values as opposed to politics." "People don't want to hear 'comrades.'" (Khurshid) Young people defined democratic participation at local and community levels based upon principled action.


³⁷ Leaders were more heavily represented among suburban youth than among township youth (71% versus 27%). Differences between cohorts might have been exaggerated by differences in leadership status.³⁷

As young people took part in their communities, they rejected official forms of participation for multi-tiered and varied forms grounded in community.

1.4: Youth Disengagement


At a gospel concert at the Durban University of Technology attended by over seventy young people, the minister bellowed, “The government doesn’t provide scholarships,” and leaving room for suspenseful anticipation, explained that it was a higher power from which the audience should seek solutions. Students responded with “Alleluias” and “Amen’s” (Other Observations and Key Informants 2006). Young people had withdrawn from political and electoral structures, but disengagement trends and attitudes revealed a sophisticated reasoning critical of government and political practice.

As discussed in Chapter 2 and earlier this chapter, young people perceived government to have failed in the realm of youth and community development. Likewise, they felt repelled by political practice at the local level. Levels of trust for civic actors were low in general, but particularly low in relationship to government officials and political parties. Few young people believed political parties (29%) and government officials (36%) were working to solve problems in their communities. Even fewer (16%) reported trust for political party leaders despite a majority who trusted school (59%) and religious (53%) leaders. As a result of plummeting feelings of trust and inadequate spaces for engagement, young people withdrew from state-sanctioned forms of participation in favour of other forms of engagement.




Though young people sought other forms of participation, they were little inclined to engage politically and electorally. One quarter of young people indicated political voice and awareness, demonstrating a small likelihood that they would contact public officials, follow politics, or employ official channels for participation. Similarly, less than one-third (31%) of young people indicated electoral indication.

Young people tended to avoid participation in directly political organizations. The lowest levels on the whole reported membership in burial associations, trade unions, and political parties.




Though low levels of participation in trade unions and burial associations might be explained by class and age specificity, political parties broadly catered to the youth generation. Major political parties in eThekweni incorporated youth bodies into broader structures.³⁸ Still, only 8% of young people reported current active membership in a political party.

The withdrawal of young people from political activity was demonstrated across demographic groups.



Extremely low numbers of youth reported current political participation across a wide variety of survey groups. Likewise, past behaviour also revealed evidence for political disengagement.

³⁸ The ANCYL and IFP Youth Brigade each reported significant presence in KwaZulu-Natal, but the Democratic Alliance Youth's strongest bodies appeared more active in the Western Cape (Democratic Alliance 2007).



On the whole, only 9% of respondents indicated that they had contacted a public official in the last year. Low levels of past political participation were reported across all survey groupings except those identified for their political affiliation.

In the last year...	Contacted public official (%)	Marched (%)	Volunteered or Interned (%)	Worked to solve social problem (%)	Belonged to a group (%)
Dumahlezi High School	11	19	24	30	37
Northwood Boys High School	6	9	41	32	74
Meadowlands High School	7	10	38	33	67
Phakama Peer Leaders	9	9	22	34	53
Northwood Boys Interact	0	8	83	58	92
Durban Girls Interact	4	4	73	53	95
Durban Youth Council	12	21	86	72	96
Fairvale Interact	0	8	88	68	100
Our Lady of Fatima Interact	4	8	80	35	100
VS Naik leaders	10	18	44	38	62
Youth for Christ Interns	13	50	75	88	88
UKZN political leaders	80	100	60	100	100

As compared with other recent past behaviour (marching, addressing social problems, participating with community development groups, and belonging to a group), the fewest

numbers reported contacting a public official in each surveyed group, except for UKZN political leaders.

Electoral behaviour was difficult to assess given that large numbers of young people surveyed and interviewed fell under the voting age. Descriptions of intended electoral behaviour, however, were revealing. Some youth did not think voting mattered. Glen, for example, did not intend to vote because he expressed, "I don't think it makes a difference." The majority of young people, however, valued their right to vote. 73% of young people surveyed agreed that voting mattered. "Voting is a very prestigious event. I will vote because even one vote of millions is still something. It's *your* vote" (Munhara 2007). A young person from INK passionately responded to the question about whether she would vote, "If I don't vote, I won't make my opinion heard to important people so they can do things about drugs and violence. If I don't vote, how will the world be a better place?" (Mpho 2006) Others echoed the same sentiment and viewed voting as a privilege inherited from those who struggled to topple the apartheid state. According to Ayanda, "I'll vote because they say if you are a South African citizen you have to vote." As Thabo described it, "I do vote because our past leaders, our forefathers, they fought just to vote and they fought against the exclusion of the black majority of people from not participating in the national elections so I think its very important to take part in the elections."

For many young people, voting exercised ownership of the democratic state. In sophisticated practice of engagement, young people viewed voting *and* not voting as the means towards exercising individual autonomy over the state. As Zodwa described it, "I vote because it's my democracy. I vote to make democracy work." However, precisely because of her deep sense of ownership for the democracy, refusing to vote was also the means to take back ownership from the state. Zodwa further described her decision not to vote in local elections, however. "I didn't vote because I feel that by voting for a person who I don't believe in, I'm

just giving that person power, power to oppress us.” In the last election, Thabo also asked, “how do you express your dissatisfaction with those parties?” and concluded that the best way was through spoiling the ballot paper.

I went there and in the booth, I spoiled the ballot paper. I wrote what we wanted. Free education. Free housing. Free water. Access to basic needs. Let’s say 2000 people were to do that, I think it could have an impact on the government. Then, they’d have to ask themselves why people are writing all these things. And maybe one day they’d realize people are angry. (2006)

Members of Abahlali baseMjondolo agreed in the 2006 municipal election to withhold their votes in the “No House No Land No Vote” campaign. Vuyi described the decision,

I did not make my vote because we are sick and tired of voting and never getting the promises. We told the government we would hold our votes because he didn’t give us our basic needs (especially housing). No one in Jadhu Place voted because all the people staying here are Abahlali.” (2006)

A frustration over a lack of service delivery and empty promises of political leaders motivated decisions to withhold votes. The No House No Land Campaign deliberately confronted the patronage politics of the ANC as practiced in eThekweni.

Voting was viewed by youth both as the means for the state and politicians to wield power over individuals and for individuals to wield power over the state. Some youth voted because they knew that the state kept track of voting rolls and believed that councillors used such rolls to deny requests for services based on your voting record.

I will vote in order to get basic needs for the community because if I don’t vote even if I report my needs to the community leaders, they will not provide for them if I haven’t voted.” (Lindiwe 2006)

I voted in hope because they promised and promised. I know since 1994, when our parents voted, they didn’t fulfil their promises, but ... you know when you vote they put a mark on your id. Some say, “eh if you don’t vote, there will come a time when you have no say because you didn’t vote.” That is a reason that makes me really go to vote. Because they say if you don’t vote, there will come a time when they will check whether you did vote or not.” But really, really, I can’t see anything that we are voting for.” (System 2006)

Just as politicians had attempted to manipulate voters through promises of service delivery and by withholding access when citizens had broken from party ranks, however, young citizens used their vote as a negotiation tool. Sible described how he changed from interpreting his vote as an exercise in freedom to viewing it as a tool in negotiating with the state.

I was voting because ...[the] old people said “Eh, you know what, apartheid was doing this and this and this. Now it’s better to vote and vote for your colour in order to break from the chains that they wore before.” That’s why I would vote.... [But] at the moment, it’s hard to say I’m not voting or I’m voting. [The politicians are] starting to come to us and tell us everything. I want to see the progress of what they’re doing. After I see that they’re doing what they say, that I can vote for. (2006)

Many young people indicated that they would vote only if political leaders will provided the services they had promised to the citizenry. “If the councillor can make change, then I will vote.” (Zodwa 2006) According to Star, describing the Abahlali campaigns, he was willing to vote if conditions of living change, “It was ‘No Land No House No Vote’ and then ‘House First, Man Behind’. If you give me a house now, then let me be sure I will have to vote for you.” Until promises of service delivery were fulfilled, however, Star and other young people planned to continue refuse their vote in order to assert autonomy.

If it continues like this, I won’t vote because I have to vote for something that has changed my life. At the moment, there is nothing that has changed my life so why would I vote? To vote would mean that I would be wasting my vote. I would be putting a person on top of me, on top of my head. I would be his tool, just working for him while he doesn’t give me anything. (2006)

Resisting political processes, therefore, for many young people, embodied an active and engaged stance against state policies and leaders. Young people valued democratic processes but sought to practice participatory democracy that contributed toward community development. Contemporary social perceptions (discussed in Chapter 2) erroneously cast youth disengagement from political processes as part of a broader problem of the youth. Instead, in withdrawing

politically, individuals reflected informed decision-making. Young people rejected state-sanctioned forms of participation in order to participate on their own terms of engagement.

1.5: Correlations between Youth Perspectives and Practice³⁹

Statistical calculations from survey data strengthened evidence linking the rejection of political and electoral participation to youth attitudes and trust for political processes. Youth attitudes towards political parties, leaders, and electoral processes significantly correlated with behaviours and perspectives on political processes. Perceived effectiveness was connected to trust.

	Sig. Noted at or below .01 level
Voting matters correlated with	
I talk about social and political issues with my friends or family (inverted scale from I do not talk about...)	0.002924
Political parties are working to solve problems in our communities.	0.001725
Trade unions are working to solve problems in our communities.	9.88E-05
Community services are working to solve problems in our communities.	0.000735
Religious groups are working to solve problems in our community.	0.00075
In the last year have you worked with another person or people to try to address a social problem	0.005462
Trust Indication	0.00963

Whether a young person felt voting mattered significantly correlated with whether he or she indicated trust for civic actors in general. In particular, the weight placed on voting correlated with whether he or she believed that political parties worked to solve problems in the community. Young people's perceptions of the intentions of political parties and leaders likewise affected their willingness to participate politically.

³⁹ Using SPSS software, 2-tailed significance of correlations was determined. Significance was noted at or below the .01 level. Though correlations do not account for other variables and, therefore, do not confirm causality or the nature of the relationship, they do suggest some level of interdependency. Throughout this study, including but not limited to this section and part, references to correlation suggest significant relationship determined by this process. A complete table of correlations (including significant and non-significant calculations) is included in the Appendix.

"I trust political party leaders" correlated with	Sig. noted at or below .01 level
I pay attention to what's going on in local politics.	5.03E-05
I pay attention to what's going on in national politics.	0.004621
Since 1994, the lives of South Africans have improved.	4.84E-07
The government is working to solve problems in our communities.	5.37E-15
Political parties are working to solve problems in our communities.	1.07E-15
Trade unions are working to solve problems in our communities.	2.13E-10
Political parties care about youth issues.	9.52E-21
In the next three years, I want to help out a political party or candidate.	0.000363
In the next three years, I want to find a job.	0.002689
I trust school officials and teachers.	1.37E-07
I trust community leaders.	3.68E-26
South Africans think young people are important.	1.39E-12
Contacting a party official is an effective way to make your voice heard.	4.14E-07
In the last year have you volunteered or interned with a religious, youth/children's, health or social service organization	0.008065
In the last year have you belonged to any group	0.000987
currently an active member-political	0.003778
currently an active member-trade union	0.000776
Trust Indication	2.23E-12

Whether a young person trusted political party leaders significantly correlated with whether she considered contacting public officials effective in making her voice heard and whether she paid attention to local and national politics. Further correlation between trust for political party leaders and government officials suggested that young people perceived the line between politics and government officials as blurred. Given that only 16% of young people trusted political party leaders, the patronage politics of local governance during election cycles did little to encourage a reversal in the youth trend for political disengagement.

As part of their withdrawal, young people believed that youth issues received little currency in political arenas.

"Political parties care about youth issues" correlated with	Sig. noted at or below .01 level
I pay attention to what's going on in national politics.	0.007702
Since 1994, the lives of South Africans have improved.	8.94E-07
The government is working to solve problems in our communities.	1.57E-11
Political parties are working to solve problems in our communities.	1.17E-13
Trade unions are working to solve problems in our communities.	6.82E-13
Community services are working to solve problems in our communities.	4.40E-05
In the next three years, I want to help out a political party or candidate.	0.000438
I trust political party leaders.	9.52E-21
I trust school officials and teachers.	0.00711
I trust community leaders.	1.29E-11
South Africans think young people are important.	7.49E-17
Contacting a party official is an effective way to make your voice heard.	2.14E-06
Trust Indication	4.42E-05

Whether a young person believed political parties cared about youth issues correlated with a wide range of civic attitudes and behaviours related generally to trust and specifically to electoral and political participation. Young people who did not believe politics prioritized youth issues (Only 35% believed political parties cared about youth issues) were seemingly inclined to mistrust politicians or political structures (only 16% trusted political party leaders). However, as corresponding cycles of political disengagement emerged, withdrawal did not mean total disengagement.


1.6: Youth Engagement

Despite having rejected political forms of participation, young people possessed positive outlooks on youth abilities and roles in the civic sphere and demonstrated high levels of engagement.

Young people almost unanimously reported wanting to further their education. Ninety percent of surveyed youth agreed that they wanted to further their education in the next three

years. Likewise, among interviewees, out-of-school youth, too, hoped to further education and skill sets. System, who did not have her matric, expressed a desire to attain it but an inability to afford to pay. “If I was in charge that the youth have free education and [the chance] to pick up their skills in every area that they need.” (2006)

Young people valued community and believed that they had a significant role to play in developing the community.




An overwhelming majority felt able to effect positive change in their community especially if collective action was taken. Seventy-five percent of young people felt they had an ability to make a difference and eighty-one percent felt that people working together could make a difference in their community. Young people did not only consider themselves potential contributors but present day leaders. Over three-fourths felt that young people were the leaders of the nation. These statistics portrayed a positive youth outlook. Supporting correlations also concurred. Personal efficacy, in particular, may positively impact a wide range of civic behaviours and indicators.⁴⁰ The high prevalence of personal efficacy among young people

⁴⁰ Personal efficacy (whether individuals felt that they had the ability to impact the community) correlated significantly with indication including but not limited to community engagement (and a belief in the importance of getting involved), political voice and awareness, electoral inclination (and whether young people thought politics mattered to their community), community problem-solving, justice-orientation (and whether young people believed protesting effectively made their voices heard); and trust.


(75%), therefore, suggested a huge potential for the broad civic engagement of eThekweni youth.

Indeed, young people were significantly engaged in their communities. They possessed nuanced interpretations of the wide array of social issues facing their generation.



Over half (57%) reported talking about social and political issues with friends and family. High numbers of eThekweni youth paid attention to community affairs (69%). Only half followed politics (41%), however, further indicating their withdrawal from political processes in favour of community-based participation.

Young people performed well in non-political civic indexes.




Young people were strongly inclined to working to solve problems within their communities. 59% of youth surveyed demonstrated community problem-solving indication. Young people were also oriented towards justice-building activity. Under half (47%), however, felt connected and involved in the community. Lower community engagement levels might suggest ambivalent understanding or feelings among youth regarding their relationships to support networks and communities, especially those related to government and political processes. Aforementioned low levels of general trust likely meant lower feelings of connectivity.


Despite potential feelings of disconnect, young people participated willingly in their communities. Equipped with a positive sense of personal and collective ability and inclination towards community problem-solving in particular, high numbers engaged civically. More specifically,

- 88% of surveyed youth indicated current active membership in at least one group or organization.
- 50% indicated current active membership in 3 or more.
- 34% indicated current active membership in 5 or more.

Youth participated most heavily in religious, student, sports, and service organizations.



They also reported recent past participation in a wide range of civic activity.




Nearly three-quarters (72%) reported group membership in the last year. A significant portion of young people sought to contribute specifically toward the development of their communities. Over half (53%) reported having volunteered with a religious, children's, health, or social services organization and nearly half (44%) reported having worked on a social problem in the

past year. Surprisingly, despite justice-orientation, youth involvement in social movements was relatively low. Only 14% reported having taken part in a march, demonstration, or protest in the past year.⁴¹ One possible explanation could have been a lack of knowledge or exposure necessary to organize or join social protests.

1.7: Demographic Differences⁴²

Though young people on the whole rejected political participation for community-based forms, demographic differences affected civic engagement patterns among subgroups. Differences between age groups might have reflected an increasing trend of political disengagement among youth generations.⁴³



In comparing 13-17 year olds and 18-23 year olds from Phakama Peer Leaders and Dumahlezi High School, young people from the older cohort were more inclined to trust and participate in directly political processes.


⁴¹ Higher numbers (26% of respondents) reported current active membership in social movements suggesting either a flaw in question wording or more fluid youth interpretations of the term social movements that extended beyond protest activity.

⁴² Only statistically significant differences will be discussed in this study (with the exception of differences concerning open-ended responses and other models of research). Significance was determined using SPSS software to calculate independent t-tests of means.

⁴³ Respondents were grouped into three age cohorts: 13-17 year olds, 18-23 year olds, and 24-29 year olds. Because of the extremely small sample of 24-29 year olds (n. 4), comparisons did not address this portion of the population. Dumahlezi youth and Phakama Peer leaders accounted for 64% of all 18-23 year olds, therefore additional measures were taken to control for sample biases (An independent t-test of means was conducted to test for age differences between 13-17 year olds (n. 72) and 18-23 year olds (n. 75) from Dumahlezi and Phakama Peer Leaders only.)

Socio-economic environment also affected youth participation.⁴⁴ Young people from different socio-economic backgrounds did not differ significantly in indication for trust, community engagement, community problem solving, electoral, justice orientation, and political voice and awareness. Township and suburban youth, however, did differ in levels of efficacy and types of civic participation.

Though equal numbers of township and suburban youth leaders engaged civically, they demonstrated different forms of engagement.



Township youth leaders were more involved than their suburban counterparts in traditional membership organizations including trade unions, burial societies and stokvel associations. Suburban youth leaders, on the other hand, reported significantly greater participation in structured youth forms or community services. Higher numbers of suburban youth had

⁴⁴ Because of the relative scarcity of respondents indicating rural residence (n. 14), this study did not seek to make any major comparisons between rural youth and other counterparts. T-tests of independent means were calculated between all other categories. No significant differences were found among responses of young people from urban and suburban environments. Likewise, the only significant difference between young people from informal settlements and townships occurred between trust for religious leaders. Significant differences were noted between township and suburban responses. However, suburban youth more heavily represented leaders than township youth (71% versus 27%); therefore, to account for this bias, additional independent t-tests of means, comparing township leaders (n. 49) and suburban youth leaders (n. 140) only, were calculated.

belonged to a group and volunteered or interned with a religious, children's, health or community organization.

Differences in modes of engagement were likely due to issues of access. Organized to contribute to the economic support network of working class and poor South Africans, stokvels, trade unions, and burial associations were much more prevalent in township communities than suburban ones. Structured service groups and groups in general, in contrast, might have been more prevalent in suburban communities. Organizations more prevalent in townships did not seem to have accounted for all disparity as related to group membership and structured social services. Though only four percent of suburban youth did so, thirty-seven percent of township youth did not report group membership. Differences in resources likely impacted the available opportunity for structured membership.

Perhaps because of disproportionate engagement opportunity, suburban youth leaders demonstrated a greater sense of efficacy than township leaders.

Differences Between Township and Suburban Young People (Leaders Only)		
	Township (Average Mean)	Suburban (Average Mean)
I think people working together can make a difference in the community	3.92	4.64
Efficacy Indication	3.95	4.34

Given the high correlation of efficacy with other civic factors (see footnote 41), this disparity is of particular concern and a potential threat to other aspects of engagement.⁴⁵ Efforts to support increased opportunities for engagement for youth living in townships and informal settlements should be made by those interested in enhancing the civic engagement and addressing persistent issues of equity among eThekweni youth.

⁴⁵ Correlations between efficacy of youth leaders and other civic indexes resembled those calculated for youth in general.

1.8: Conclusions and Ambiguities Concerning General Youth Engagement

Young people in eThekweni described patterns of engagement that reflected a distrustful and distant relationship with political and governmental persons and processes, but their position was not irreversible. Youth expressed significant ambiguity.

% Who Neither Agreed nor Disagreed	
Politics matters to my community	34
Political parties care about youth issues	31

Significant numbers of youth were uncertain about the relevance of politics to their lives. For example, one-third neither agreed nor disagreed that politics mattered to their communities. Neither had they entirely made up their minds about whether to engage in political processes.

% Who Showed Neither Positive nor Negative Indication⁴⁶	
Trust Indication	89
Political Voice and Awareness Indication	72

72% provided neither negative nor positive indication for political voice and awareness.

Though young people almost unanimously agreed that the government was not doing enough for young people, there was a sense that though “they’re not doing enough...they are doing some” (Mapule 2006). “They’re subtly trying” (Munhara 2007). The government “is trying...He is trying but he is still one step behind” (Star 2006).

Young people indicated that should the government better address youth issues and fulfil the promise of local politics for meaningful engagement and service delivery, more young people would engage politically. In the interim, young people planned to engage on their own terms, employing official channels for participation when complementary to their version of democratic engagement. At a general body meeting to plan a protest of a housing conference (that would be attended mostly by local and national government officials and NGOs and held

⁴⁶ Indication, as already mentioned, was reflected in average mean scores of 4 or greater for each indicator set. Likewise, strong lack of indication was marked at 2 or below. Those who showed neither positive nor negative indication possessed average mean scores per indicator of greater than 2 and less than 4.

without significant popular inclusion), members of Abahlali and other local movements debated the merits of sending participants to the conference. They concluded that the value of the information available to insiders at the conference warranted limited participation. On the day of the conference, a handful of Bahlali attended, and hundreds of Bahlali stood outside the conference centre picketing in protest. Despite the visual presence, no official came out to address the crowd in person (Abahlali baseMjondolo Observations 9/2006). As long as public officials resisted consequential forms of interaction between the state and its citizenry, young people intended to limit their engagement with official structures.

Part 2: How Civic Experiences Shaped Youth Leaders

System spoke passionately about her involvement in the Abahlali baseMjondolo social movement for land and housing, emphasizing the autonomous decision-making, voice, and action influencing her participation, “I’m not fighting for anyone. I’m fighting for myself. Whenever I do anything to pick up the struggle, I’m not telling myself I’m doing it for our President S’bu, or for other comrades or just to show off. I’m fighting for my children. I’m fighting for my life.” (System 2006)

Young people who engaged civically exercised independent voice and decision-making. Young leaders were self-directed in how they choose to participate civically, and their civic activity likewise affected how they further considered and acted civically. Active youth were more engaged, connected, and autonomous and gained enhanced skills, exposure, and feelings of trust and personal efficacy.⁴⁷ This chapter will explore the impact of civic experience on active engaged youth and how young leaders themselves shaped their experience.

2.1 Increased Efficacy


Young leaders had a deepened sense of personal efficacy. System, an Umhlali, described how her involvement in Abahlali baseMjondolo increased her sense of personal power.

I feel like a hero because everywhere people are talking about the red t-shirts. Even if I’m not wearing a red t-shirt, I can hear some people in the community “Hey these people Abahlali, eh they’re very strong.”...I’m proud of it. And the other day I heard the people saying “Eh, those are the ones who marched and one lady was beaten by the police and they broke her tooth. Hey I wish to see that lady.” I didn’t say, “Here I am.” I just listened to them talk and talk and talk. And other people said “It’s a shame because these people were not fighting, they just needed service delivery.” “They’re not against ANC.” So I can hear some

⁴⁷ As point of reminder, only statistically significant differences among survey respondents will be discussed. For a complete list of significant differences between non-leaders and leaders calculated using independent t-tests of means, see the Appendix.

people debating about us. Eh, I feel like a hero. I say, Abahlali are too powerful and I feel like a powerful lady. I am powerful.” (2006)

Leaders demonstrated significantly higher indication of efficacy than non-leaders.



Leaders indicated efficacy whereas non-leaders did not.⁴⁸ More specifically, young leaders were more inclined than non-leaders to feel that they could make a difference in their community.

Personal Efficacy	% Who Agreed
Civic Groups	
Northwood Boys Interact	92
Durban Youth Council	100
Phakama Peer Leaders	78
Non-leader Youth	
Dumahlezi High School	63
Northwood Boys High School	64
Meadowlands High School	64

Comparisons between civically active and non-leader groups of young people likewise demonstrated differences in feelings of individual ability. Munhara’s civic experience highlighted the positive impact of active engagement on efficacy. Acting civically “makes you feel like you have greater purpose.”

⁴⁸ As acknowledged earlier in this chapter, indication is measured by scores greater than or equal to 4.

Not only did civic activity improve feelings of efficacy, but also positive feelings of efficacy enhanced other civic behaviours and future inclination. “If a young person can achieve this much, then when you’re older, you think you can achieve even more” (Munhara 2007).

Efficacy Indication (Among Leaders) Correlated with	Sig. (2-tailed)
Electoral Indication	0.000
Community Engagement Indication	0.000
Political Voice and Awareness Indication	0.000
Trust Indication	0.000
Justice Orientation Indication	0.000
Community Problem-Solving Indication	0.000
In the next three years, I want to further my education.	0.000
In the next three years, I want to work towards solving social problems.	0.000
In the last year have you volunteered or interned with a religious, youth/children’s, health or social service organization	0.000
In the last year have you worked with another person or people to try to address a social problem	0.000
In the last year have you belonged to any group	0.000

An individual’s sense of collective and personal ability affected all aspects of civic life. A leader’s indication of efficacy significantly correlated with all civic indicators, past behaviour and intentions for future participation in community problem-solving in particular.

Opportunities for meaningful engagement, in improving efficacy, helped strengthen youth commitments toward acting civically to benefit their communities.

2.2 Increased Skills

A young person’s sense of efficacy might have been partly enhanced because of the knowledge and skills gained through participation. According to Mbali, by serving as peer leader, “I have learned the information about how to behave, HIV and teen pregnancy. I can be a leader.” Star described how participation in Abahlali baseMjondolo enhanced his understanding.

At the beginning we didn’t understand the struggle. And that’s where Abahlali came...[and] taught us that being in the struggle is like this and you have to know your rights and you have to follow the proper channels. Now, we really

understand. At the beginning, when Abahlali were not here, we used to be treated so badly by the politicians and the police. They used to come where we live in the settlement, Foreman Road. They used to beat us. They'd not even ask but just come to us and then they'd beat us. But now if the police came, we'll ask the police "Under which act?" ...Hawu! It's something that we know now that the police won't take advantage of us. Abahlali has helped us a lot because we know the things we didn't know at the beginning. It's so good to be in Abahlali. (2006)

Knowledge gained from civic experience provided both theoretical and practical benefits. Zodwa described one aspect of this process, "Abahlali taught us about the law. We didn't know how to exercise our rights but since I've been Abahlali I know how to exercise my rights." Young people eagerly sought knowledge about the democratic channels open to them and rights protecting them. At an Abahlali meeting to plan a two-day housing conference co-hosted by COHRE, excited discussion occurred when questions intended for guest speakers and lawyers about rights were posed. The mood was hopeful as those in attendance looked forward to the knowledge and access to experts they would gain in hosting the conference (Abahlali baseMjondolo Observations 11/2006). Following the conference, S'bu Zikode spoke about "the wealth of knowledge that has come from this room" (Abahlali baseMjondolo Observations 12/2006). With increased knowledge and exposure, youth leaders in general were better prepared to interpret and define their roles in the broader society. Surveyed leaders, for example, were more comfortable than non-leaders in defining active citizenship.⁴⁹ Thabo's experience as a student activist helped him "to differentiate and to understand what's happening around the country and [and that it] is not a given thing. It's not written on stone. It can be changed, you see." Indeed, new knowledge and skill sets seemed to have equipped young people to better negotiate their role in democratic South Africa.

⁴⁹ See Part I. Though only 52% of non-leaders defined active citizenship, an overwhelming majority (81%) of leaders so did.

2.3 Increased Exposure

Participation also enabled access to resources, individuals, and experiences not otherwise available. According to Glen, his leadership experience gave him “a much wider perspective on life.” Zodwa described her experience in a women’s conference she attended in Cape Town, “I feel empowered and proud to be a woman. It inspired me to see those women. It made me want to be like them. If they can be like that in that position why not me? What can stop me to be like them?” Exposure to other people and experiences also led to a greater sense of connection with those people and experiences. For Vuyi, her involvement in Abahlali meant “getting more experience” and

Communicating with more people from different provinces and different countries...when I went to Cape Town, I experienced different things. To be a member of Abahlali, you experience different provinces. I feel connected to young people and women and to struggles of other people as well. (2006)

Civic experience, therefore, filled some of the vacancies created by persistent inequality and societal division.

2.4 Increased Connectedness

Young leaders felt connected and supported within their communities. For some youth, connection to community values drove their decision to engage civically. “I feel a part of the community because I show respect. With other boys from around the community, we like to clean the yards of the grannies because we don’t want any property that is unclean around the community” (S’bu 2006). For others, civic activity inspired feelings of increased connectedness. M’du from INK indicated that he felt connected because of his civic activity.

I feel connected to my community because I’m involved with a team of youth who go to the houses where there are people who are sick and who are HIV positive. We clean the houses and pick up in the yard and the women do the wash. I’m also involved in the cleaning of the schools around the community. (2006)

Young leaders felt more connected to their community than non-leaders.

I feel connected to others	Average Mean Agreement
Leaders	3.95
Non-leaders	3.62

Significant difference was noted between young leaders and non-leaders in the degree to which they reported feeling connected.

For many young people, civic activity filled a void, providing needed community networks. Aadila, who is of mixed parentage, did not feel part of any particular racial or ethnic grouping, but instead defined her community by her experience. “In some sense, I think of Rotary as a community.” For 15 year-old Ayanda, participation in Abahlali formed his social groups,


You don't see Abahlali fighting. There in Abahlali, I make friends. Here in Joe Slovo, even in school, I don't have any friends. I just sit alone. But when I met Abahlali, I met people like M'du and Philani, so I have friends. I even met you. That's how I connect with Abahlali. When I go to Abahlali, I feel happy, you see, because when I'm here in Joe Slovo, I just sit sad. I can only come to Sihle but when Sihle's not here I just sit alone... Whenever I'm with Abahlali, I think it's home. (2006)

Glen also indicated the social importance of his activity, “It also has a social level. Meeting lots of new people not just at school but around Durban.” System likewise agreed that her civic activity provided important social connections, “It's great because Abahlali has an active youth. Whenever there's something to be done, the youth are there. So it's fun. It's like we are a family, one big family.”

2.5 Increased Trust for Community

As a result of positive interactions and meaningful engagement in the community, leaders were significantly more inclined to trust civic actors than non-leaders.

In particular, leaders more strongly indicated trust for community leaders.



Leaders were in more agreement than non-leaders that community service groups were working to solve problems in the community (3.77 average mean versus 3.17).


Likewise, leaders demonstrated greater trust for community leaders (3.27 average mean versus 2.89 average mean) and greater trust in general. Trust indication for young people in general significantly correlated with all other civic indexes and impacted current civic attitudes and practice in particular.

Trust Indication (General Youth) correlated with	Sig. noted at or below .01 level
Voting matters (inverted scale from Voting doesn't matter original statement)	0.00963
I feel that I have the ability to make a difference in the community	0.001166
I pay attention to what's going on in my community.	0.001926
I feel connected to others.	0.000319
Young people are leaders of the nation.	0.001289
In the last year have you volunteered or interned with a religious, youth/children's, health or social service organization	0.005295
currently an active member-religious	0.001882
currently an active member-community services centre	0.007875
currently an active member-political	0.006884
Electoral Indication	1.58E-16
Community Engagement Indication	2.04E-17
Political Voice and Awareness Indication	1.6E-12
Efficacy Indication	9.95E-12
Justice Orientation Indication	2.53E-05
Community Problem-Solving Indication	2.4E-07
Total participation	0.001237

Correlations suggested a profound connection between trust and patterns of civic behaviour, perceptions, attention, and indication among young people. Because of the enhanced levels of trust afforded by their experience, their engagement levels and inclination towards engagement might have been further increased.


2.6 Increased Engagement

Young leaders were much more involved and inclined to be involved in their communities than non-leaders.



Higher numbers reported discussing social and political issues. Engaged in the issues, active youth valued community involvement and demonstrated greater orientation towards community involvement and problem solving. Leaders showed significantly stronger agreement than non-leaders, for example, that they intended to solve problems in their community (3.81 average mean versus 3.47 average mean).

The civic practice of young leaders reflected their orientation towards community involvement and problem solving.



Significantly higher numbers of youth leaders participated in religious groups, student organizations, stokvel associations, social movements and community service centres. Over three times the number of youth leaders reported membership in community service centres than non-leaders. Leaders, therefore, demonstrated greater involvement in general and increased community development activity in particular.

Community-orientated engagement influenced many other aspects of engagement. Social problem solving enhanced feelings of connectedness and levels of attention towards

community affairs.⁵⁰ Enhanced levels of community engagement contributed to the strong feelings of efficacy among youth leaders (see 2.1). Whether a leader indicated community engagement, significantly correlated with whether he or she felt personal efficacy. Belonging enhanced feelings of ability. Individuals confirmed the connection. According to one umhlali, through her experience she learned that,

[U]nity is powerful. You can't fight alone. For example, if you collect some wood, one piece, you can just break it, but if you make a pile, you can't break that pile because there are too many pieces now. So I think we are strong. To be united, is powerful. No one will defeat us. (System 2006)

Further, community engagement correlated with higher rates of involvement in community-based forms of engagement (religious groups, community-service groups, and social movements) but not officially structured modes for participation (trade union, stokvel, political, burial, school, and sports groups). This interesting distinction points to the cyclical impact of civic practice on civic understanding and vice versa. Just as indication for community engagement may have influenced the types of engagement sought by young people, the forms themselves influenced how young people defined the terrain for community engagement.

2.7 The Connection between Defining and Doing

For actively engaged young people, the relationship between civic activity and civic understanding was, indeed, multi-directional. Not only did civic indication affect civic behaviour and practice, but also the nature of civic involvement shaped youth leaders' understanding of engagement.

The experience and civic understanding of Phakama Peer Leaders illustrated this effect. Young peer leaders facilitated support processes within peer groups and served as role models in their schools and communities. In 2006, peer leaders at Dumahlezi High School organized a

⁵⁰ Community Problem Solving indication significantly correlated with a wide range of behaviours for all young people including but not limited to whether young people felt connected to others, had worked to solve a social problem, had paid attention to community affairs (See Appendix for all correlations).

school-wide event. Concerned about the high rates of teen pregnancy and HIV/AIDS among their peers, peer leaders gained permission from their principle to host a full assembly about the issues and to invite other youth leaders to attend. Over three hundred young people from three schools in INK sat in unusual captive attention as young leaders gave motivational speeches, recited poetry, and performed skits. In near tears, a young leader admitted to her classmates about the fact that she was a teen mother, spoke eloquently about the difficulty parenthood posed in young life, and urged her classmates to practice safe sex. When asked about whether the event was a success, young learners from Dumahlezi overwhelmingly agreed because they said peer leaders had changed the minds of other learners and now those learners too could teach others. Peer leaders, therefore, defined involvement according to their experience as role models and educators. Among surveyed youth groups, Phakama Peer Leaders were unique in the emphasis they placed on acting as role model in defining active citizenship.⁵¹ As one peer leader wrote, active citizenship meant “that I try to encourage others by speaking to them” (*“Kusho ukuthi ngiyazama ukqugquzela abanye nabo babe nje ngathi”*) (Phakama Peer Leaders Surveys 2006). Not only peer leaders based civic perceptions on participatory experience.

Definitions for active citizenship among interviewees also mirrored experience. The ten interviewees asked to define active citizenship included social movement activists, service club leaders, religious leaders, and one campus politician. Young people who had participated in service activity defined active citizenship as getting involved to help others. Service club leader Aadila, defined active citizenship as “taking an interest in your community and the people around you...[and] physically getting involved.” Interact Club leader, Glen, too, explained, “Do your bit...to do something other than for yourself or your immediate family.” Glen further articulated how his service activity had influenced him, teaching him that “To help others you

⁵¹ For Phakama Peer Leaders, serving as a role model was tied for highest ranking with pride in one’s country.

too one day maybe are helped.” Religious youth leaders who were engaged in service activity as also defined participation as getting involved to help others. Munhara equated active citizenship with “doing something on a continuous basis” to help address “the plight of others.” Khurshid’s definition too included helping the broader society, but in an explicitly religious undertone. Active citizenship meant, “Muslim activism” and “religious work towards a moral rejuvenation of South African society.”

As discussed in Chapter 2, social movements in eThekweni structured their engagement as independent from political processes, in opposition to particular political politics and persons, and towards the realization of societal change. Appropriately, of those interviewees who participated in social movements, three of the five youth leaders defined active citizenship as fighting to making change using weighted phrases like ‘confront management’ and ‘challenge these people’ (Thabo 2006; Star 2006). Two defined active citizenship as exercising autonomous voice in the fight to make change. According to Vuyi, “To be an active citizen means that we’re doing everything that needs to be done. There’s no one who can tell us what to do. We’re independent.” For System, it meant, “I am a strong lady. I can stand on my feet and fight for myself...I can fight for myself not waiting for anyone to talk for me. I talk for myself because I’m the one who’s suffering.” The emphasis on independent voice reflected the direct experience of Abahlali baseMjondolo which has struggled for forms of meaningful and independent participation in addition to its goals of land and housing (see Chapter 2).

The directly participatory interpretation of democratic engagement expressed by social movement participants differed from the view expressed by the campus student representative. Though the student politician also defined active citizenship as exercising autonomous voice and fighting for change, “You have to fight for what you want. You have to be outspoken,” she based her definition on a representational model, “You need to be a people’s person, and speak for those people scared to speak for themselves.” As direct political processes have

increasingly relied upon representative governance of the ruling elite, forms of political vanguardism and patronage politics have been enforced (see Chapter 2 and Part 1 of this chapter). Their implementation seems to have impacted how those participating in direct political processes, in particular, conceived of democratic participation. For young people, however, the influence did not fully supplant fuller notions of participation. The youth politician, though accepting a representational model for participation, did not endorse national party politics but thought youth politicians should stand independently on the issues. Young leaders exercised independent action and thought in how they conceived of democratic engagement.

2.8 Increased Voice and Autonomy

Young leaders valued autonomous action when engaging civically. Actively engaged youth were significantly less inclined to rely on others to represent their views. For example, leaders were less inclined than non-leaders to believe that speaking to public officials was effective.⁵² Very few young leaders (15%), reported approaching state officials to voice their concerns, but instead chose other forms of expression. Speaking out or critically expressing one's opinions was the fourth most listed definition of active citizenship among leaders but ranked only 12th among non-leaders. Young leaders sought to express themselves directly. Vuyi described what it meant to be a part of Abahlali baseMjondolo:

There is no one standing in front of us. We are talking for ourselves. No one can tell us what can be done because we are sick and tired of staying in the shacks. We are going straight to the municipality to make meetings with them, to march. We mobilize people to go straight to the community and say "Tell us what you want from the municipality." They express their feelings and their suffering...I needed to speak to the official government myself, and talk to him face to face. Some people are telling us they talk to him for us. I'm sick and tired of talking to someone because there are only promises. That's why I joined Abahlali because we're speaking ourselves. (2006)

⁵² Non-leaders scored an average mean of 3.32 and leaders 3.05.

Though frustration with political practice was nearly unanimous among all young people, contestation in the democratic terrain had less impact on leaders than non-leaders. Those actively involved seemed more secure in their civic actions and interpretations than non-leaders. Negative attitudes, political withdrawal, and low levels of trust for political processes among leaders did not stymie other forms of participation. A lack of trust for political leaders and their intentions correlated less with other civic factors for young leaders than for non-leaders.

2-tailed significance (at or below .01) of correlation		
I trust political party leaders	Among Non-Leaders	Among Leaders
Electoral Indication	0.004	0.584
Community Engagement Indication	0.063	0.541
Political Voice and Awareness Indication	0.118	0.281
I feel connected to others.	0.059	0.899
Political Parties care about youth issues	Among Non-Leaders	Among Leaders
Electoral Indication	0.000	0.962
Community Engagement Indication	0.010	0.800
Political Voice and Awareness Indication	0.082	0.861
I feel connected to others.	0.025	0.263

Trust for political parties, for example, did not correlate with electoral inclination among leaders though significant correlation was noted for non-leaders. Actively engaged youth, therefore, seemed more likely to have exercised their own civic politics in their decisions concerning electoral behaviour (see 1.1 of this chapter). Likewise, the negative consequences of poor trust on civic engagement were muted for leaders. Whether a young non-leader thought political parties cared about youth issues significantly correlated with community engagement indication but did not do so for leaders. Indeed, the withdrawal of young people from political and electoral processes seemed to impact non-leaders and leaders differently. Leaders did not

demonstrate a significant relationship between electoral indication and their indication for community-engagement and justice-orientation, unlike non-leaders, for whom electoral indication correlated with all civic indexes. Because of their civic activity, therefore, the community and justice-oriented practice and perspectives were more secure for leaders than for non-leaders. For those youth participating outside of the political and electoral arenas that most young people had rejected, civic understanding and practice was deeply rooted and reinforced by their experience. Justice-oriented youth, in particular, formed a politics of opposition that was grounded in a fiercely participatory understanding of democracy.

2.9 Out-of-Order Politics

The experience of youth within the Abahlali baseMjondolo movement illustrated the politics of opposition that had emerged in South Africa's contested democratic terrain. Within Abahlali baseMjondolo, as reviewed in Chapter 2, a profoundly democratic and participatory practise challenged status quo politics:

The politics of the strong poor is an anti-party politics. Our politics is not to put someone in an office. Our politics is to put people above that office...Our politics is also not a politics of a few people...[it] is a traditional home politics which is understood very well by all the old mamas and gogos because it affects their lives. (Zikode "Greatest Threat" 2006)

This 'home politics' had a profound impact on young people participating in Abahlali.

Youth participants were provided significant roles and responsibilities within Abahlali, and they accepted the responsibility placed upon them:

They always put the responsibility on me and they say, "You still have the potential to go there, but us we are old now, there's not too much energy. You are still young . You are still active. You have to go. You have to challenge these people in order for our things to be done properly. (Star 2006)

They make sure that the youth are doing the most so that they can learn how to do things. (System 2006)

Young people were always present at Abahlali baseMjondolo meetings and visits. During six general meetings from 23 September 2006 to 25 November 2006, between 33 and 40 percent of Bahlali in attendance were young people. Youth members were selected to become trained and conduct research in conjunction with the Human Science Research Council. Young people also served in leadership capacities. In 2006, youth members held two of the four top executive positions. As System described it, "Abahlali has an active youth. Whenever there's something to be done, the youth are there." In one instance, following the dismissal of charges fabricated by the police against two Abahlali leaders, an impromptu celebration at Blue Lagoon was hosted. When rain poured down on the gathering, after being reminded of their role, young bahlali not only ushered older bahlali to shelter but also organized a plan for attaining transport home (Abahlali baseMjondolo Observations 17/10/2006).

Young bahlali owned the democratic politics of the movement. They seemed to uphold principles of participatory democracy in community decision-making. As System explained,

Abahlali is democratic. Whenever we're having meetings, or maybe we have an invitation, we don't just say "Go, S'bu because you are the leader." No, they open it to everybody to choose. If I say "Ally" and someone says "No, System," we must use democracy and vote to see how many are saying Ally and how many saying System. Our leaders don't make the decisions. We are the ones who make the decisions. We act to [encourage the expression of] the different views of Bahlali so that we can come to one decision. (2006)

At all meetings attended, agendas were put to a vote, and in every decision taken, gender balance and geographic representivity was sought and usually attained. In the formation of an eight-person committee to work with church leaders, for example, care was taken to ensure that representatives from each major informal settlement and four women and four men were selected. The process for selection, itself, was democratic. Members nominated individuals, discussed their merits, and then voted. One youth member in attendance, Mnikelo, praised what he called the "democratic way" (Abahlali baseMjondolo Observations 23/9/2006). During that same meeting in September, attendees debated an invitation to attend a large YCL event. The

invitation had been extended to a limit of two Bahlali. Because members insisted, “Abahlali is a mass movement” and “people must see that Abahlali isn’t just about Kennedy Road, but is a broader and even national movement,” the general body told its leadership to seek additional seats. In November, Abahlali held its annual general election of leadership. Not only did young leaders help organize and marshal the election, but also Mnikelo, who had stood for re-election for Community PRO and lost, wrote an article praising the election as ‘real democracy.’ He compared the election to the municipal elections of 2006. Unlike in the municipal elections, delegates sent by each informal settlement,

They were voting for real leaders, leaders who work for the people, leaders who work to make the strong poor even stronger. They were not voting for breyani councillors who work for the rich and throw some crumbs to the poor. No signal individual or area asked for by-elections. This was real democracy. Now we say “Vote for Land and Housing.” (Ndabankulu 2006)

Individuals, too, were assured of their democratic right to participate within Abahlali. One youth member described what it meant to be Abahlali by providing an example: one person might want to march, another one might want to pray and neither idea should be discouraged (Abahlali baseMjondolo Observations 10/3/2007). Open space was provided at the end of each general meeting for individuals to voice concerns or raise issues.

In 2007, Abahlali baseMjondolo democratically approved two coordinators to form a youth committee.⁵³ Youth committee members modelled proceedings after those of the broader movement. Within the youth committee, again, representivity was sought. The committee likewise made decisions collectively. Many of the people who had volunteered and been approved as representatives to the committee had not been active members of Abahlali. In the initial stages of the youth committee launch, new youth leaders were hesitant to voice opinions or challenge suggestions made by coordinators or more seasoned youth leaders. Youth members became more willing to speak out as their civic experience shaped them. The

⁵³ Sihle and I volunteered and were approved to act as youth committee coordinators.

commitment to democratic action seemed firm. When the need emerged to appoint a replacement coordinator emerged, Sihle rejected the suggestion that a particular individual be approached without group decision-making and instead the opening was brought back to the general body for appointment and approval.⁵⁴

The movement demanded that its leadership and members be responsive to the broader movement, and young bahlali accordingly adhered to principles of discipline and accountability. When a meeting began late because of the two youth members of the executive, the general body criticized the individuals. With some friction and chagrin, the youth leaders apologized sufficiently to proceed with the meeting (Abahlali baseMjondolo Observations 23/9/2006). In another instance, young leaders (as well as non-youth leaders) faced the ire of the general populace regarding a big decision that had been made without general body consensus. Members were justifiably angry about a perceived lack of accountability and meaningful process. In that moment of heated and tense frustration, criticism was not only received but also encouraged by the leadership (Abahlali baseMjondolo Observations 4/11/2006). In a separate occurrence, members expressed concern and annoyance over the disruptive behaviour of youth members at an overnight meeting. The only young person in attendance, Ayanda, accepted responsibility and promised to hold himself and other young people accountable at the next overnight camp (Abahlali baseMjondolo Observations 27/1/2007).

As young Bahlali learned to adhere to Abahlali's politics internally, they simultaneously sought to assert its rigor externally on other bodies and politics. In order to enforce its 'home politics' in other arenas, bahlali asserted an 'out-of-order' politics that demanded democratic procedure, consultation, and representation. Abahlali's 'out-of-order' politics was most evident in its 2006 'No House No Land No Vote' campaign, but it had been practiced elsewhere, too. The decision taken by Abahlali to picket a housing conference in Durban (see

⁵⁴ The vacancy opened because of my impending departure.

Part 1), occurred in response to a perceived lack of consultation and inclusion of the communities impacted most by the housing issue (Observations Abahlali baseMjondolo 11/9/2006). For both Abahlali and external players, the red t-shirts Bahlali wore became associated with the movement that refused to back down from its demands for land and housing and participatory democracy. Many of the shirts displayed the slogan “Talk to us. Not about us.” According to youth member, Mnikelo, decisions for ‘out of order’ politics arose only if procedures were “like red and not red” (Observations Abahlali baseMjondolo 23/9/2006). If proceedings claimed democracy but did not practice it, Abahlali members were committed to asserting out-of-order politics. As discussed in Chapter 2, Abahlali’s decision to boycott the Social Movement Indaba (SMI) arose because Bahlali viewed the process and procedures within the SMI as undemocratic. The spark that prompted Abahlali to reject the SMI occurred at an SMI planning meeting in late 2006 when Abahlali requested a vote to put a sensitive issue on the agenda and the vote was denied. When that happened, Mnikelo reported, “We decided to be out-of order” (Observations Abahlali baseMjondolo 23/9/2006).

Young people within Abahlali accepted and celebrated ‘out-of-order’ politics as autonomous and effective action. Explaining how change should be achieved, Vuyi chronicled, “We pressure them. We go to them and tell them what we want. They see the crowd.” Though the ‘red shirts’ have been targeted by police forces for their activism, System asserted, “I’m wearing it [the red t-shirt] whenever I feel like it. I’m proud of being uMhlali.” When Zodwa described the concluding events at the SMI conference that both Bahlali and Western Cape Anti-Eviction members interrupted in protest (see Chapter 2), she smiled broadly at what she and the other Bahlali perceived as a victory and demonstration of democracy in action. Abahlali had voted to attend and disrupt the event, and the action had stopped the procedures of the conference and brought attention to Abahlali’s grievances. When bahlali perceived politics or

proceedings to have failed democracy, they attempted to put the democracy back into the proceedings through 'out-of-order' action.

The experience of youth within Abahlali baseMjondolo was certainly unique, though not irrelevant to the broader youth one. More so than their average counterparts, youth within Abahlali were committed to participatory democratic practice, oriented towards 'out-of-order' politics, and empowered within the broader movement. Abahlali exposed its youth members to participatory democracy principles and practice that were integrated into the larger movement's strategies and actions. The experience made a lasting impression on youthful members that encouraged not only increased understanding and civic engagement, but also a deepened commitment to democratic principles themselves. Participatory forms of engagement, therefore, significantly enhanced youth commitment to democratic practice. Should more lasting commitments and impressions be desired of the broader youth generation, it seems, participatory democratic engagement ensuring meaningful youth roles, direct democratic decision-making, and accountability should be encouraged.

Part 3: Recommendations by Youth Leaders About Youth and Governmental Roles

As we walk out of the interview, staring off into the distance, Khurshid utters some last words, almost as an after thought: “It’s like everyone’s searching for something.”

Young people, indeed, were searching for solutions, support, and meaningful involvement in the democratic fabric. Young leaders had a lot to say about why and how the state and society in general should be improved. This part captures suggestions by young leaders about youth roles, models for change, and recommended forms of government intervention. Young leaders believed that they had a significant role to play in positively shaping South African society. They placed responsibility for development on state institutions, communities, and individuals, alike, and hoped to employ both social and political avenues for community and youth development. This study and young leaders, themselves, suggest that towards the benefit of young people and society alike, youth should be meaningfully employed in working to solve problems for their communities.

3.1 Summary of Youth Recommendations

As will be explored in detail in the remaining sections of this chapter, young leaders suggested several key principles to consider in the development of South African young people:

1. Youth leaders expressed a healthy and robust perception about the potential youth role in positively affecting change in South Africa. They considered themselves responsible for individual and collective action towards positive personal and community development, but young leaders felt untapped and under-utilized.
2. Negative perceptions of the youth role detracted from the civic inclination of young people and, therefore, should be modified.
3. To promote positive youth development and engagement in both informal and formal structures of the democratic state, the government and political parties must work to repair the perceptions of careerism and insincerity, reprioritize by demonstrating commitment to youth issues and community development, and foster participatory forms of democratic involvement.
4. The government should help close the gap between rich and poor and support positive youth development by providing basic services (including free education, housing, water, and electricity), opportunities for positive youth development, job and skills development

opportunities, and meaningful spaces for youth interaction with decision-makers and decision-making.

5. The state, communities, and individuals should all work to improve society through a mixed model of political and social change.
6. Youth should be consulted and consultation should directly inform policy-making and community development schemes.
7. Communities, civic bodies, government officials, and state institutions should engage young people in solving social problems.

3.2 Youth Roles: "A Bull Comes From the Calf"

The perceived value society placed on youth influenced their sense of trust, connection, and leadership potential.

"South Africans think young people are important."	
correlated with (among others)	(2-Tailed Sig. at or below .01)
Community services are working to solve problems in our communities.	2.57E-05
Political parties are working to solve problems in our communities.	3.58E-05
The government is working to solve problems in our communities.	2.22E-11
Trade unions are working to solve problems in our communities.	7.38E-05
Political parties care about youth issues.	7.49E-17
I trust community leaders.	3.36E-15
I trust political party leaders.	1.39E-12
I trust school officials and teachers.	1.33E-05
Trust Indication	0.001216
I feel connected to others.	3.11E-05
I pay attention to what's going on in my community.	0.00111
In the next three years, I want to work towards solving social problems.	2.19E-06
Young people are leaders of the nation.	1.77E-16

Whether young people believed South Africans placed importance on the youth role correlated significantly with a series of trust statements, whether young people believed they would work to solve social problems in the future, and how they viewed their generation. Societal prejudice as explored in Chapter 2, therefore, has potentially dangerous ramifications. The ripple effect of low trust indication was explored in Part 1 of this chapter. The value South Africans placed on young people, because of its connection to whether young people considered themselves leaders of the nation, further influenced factors important to community engagement, efficacy, and community problem-solving.

Young people are leaders of the nation	
correlated with (among others)	(2-Tailed Sig. at or below .01)
Community Engagement Indication	4.054E-05
Community Problem-Solving Indication	0.0002422
Efficacy Indication	1.856E-23
Total current participation	0.008113
I feel connected to others.	8.999E-06
I feel that I have the ability to make a difference in the community	3.183E-05
I pay attention to what's going on in my community.	1.162E-07
I think people working together can make a difference in the community.	0.0002022
In the last year have you volunteered or interned with a religious, youth/children's, health or social service organization	0.0035356
In the last year have you worked with another person or people to try to address a social problem	1.008E-05
In the next three years, I want to work towards solving social problems.	1.884E-06
Justice Orientation Indication	0.0005126
Political Voice and Awareness Indication	7.006E-05
Trust Indication	0.0012894
Electoral Indication	0.0059512

Whether a young person possessed a strong sense of the youth rule significantly correlated with all current, past and future participation and all civic indexes. The direct and indirect connections between youth perceptions of societal views and civic indication, therefore, suggest that public officials, educators, and the media should confront bias and adopt positive youth development approaches.

Young leaders, whose involvement likely enforced positive messaging, expressed a healthy and robust perception about the potential of youth to effect positive change in South Africa. Young leaders believed that they were custodians of the future. As Mbali stated, “I have the information to guide youth to the future.” Moreover, young leaders believed that they were contemporary societal players, “We hear that youth are the future leaders of tomorrow but that’s not true. We’re the future leaders of today” (Munhara 2007). Three quarters (76%) of all youth surveyed believed that young people were the leaders of the nation. Civically active youth believed that as young people, they possessed energy, creativity and innovation that many adults lacked. “Youth must come together and do political things because they are the hope of

adults now” (Kuku 2006). Their energy and insight would help propel the country forward. “Young people are leaders because without young people, the country will stop. Without young people, there’s nothing that will be going on. Young people come fresh-minded. As young people, we are still growing this country” (Star 2006). Young leaders also attributed a critical mind to youthful talents and leadership. “We know where things went wrong, what we need to do, what channels we need to set in order for things to be right.” (Star 2006)

Active youth hoped that their generation would come together to fight for a changed society. “Young people, their role is to fight for everybody...get involved...be active...and make people aware that you’re...a person part of a bigger world” (Mapule 2006). Youth leaders criticized disorganization and internal divisions among their peers and urged collective mobilization around youth issues.

Their role is to organize themselves. The problem with the youth is that they are not organized...they don’t view themselves as a whole...some will meet their degrees and will join the bourgeoisie and some will join the working class. We are not sure of our destination. But that’s the problem. We have to organize ourselves. We have to make our voices heard by the government. We have to be involved in policy making.” (Thabo 2006)

Despite positive views on the youth potential, active youth asserted that on the whole, they were untapped and under-utilized by the broader society. Official forms for participation did not effectively include youth leaders. Munhara complained that most of the ANC Youth League leaders were in their thirties and that the body did not adequately connect to the majority of young people. “The ANC Youth Leagues is quite influential and vocal but I emailed them and never got a response.” Young leaders believed that the failure to include young people in decision-making and to support their leadership potential detracted from national well-being. “I can tell you there is a future for the youth if the government can focus on the youth. The youth have a lot of energy. A lot of spirit. They can make anything possible.”

(System 2006) System explained that if she were in charge she would implement policy according to the saying, “*Inkunzi isemitholeni*”:

In English, it says “a bull comes from a calf” which means to be an adult you started from a child. The child is very important. To be an adult, you come from the child and the child has a fresh mind. [If I were in charge I would] focus on the youth because the youth has important inputs. They have skills. They have energy. They are so clever. So I would make sure if I was in charge that the youth have free education and [the chance] to pick up their skills in every area that they need. (2006)

Young leaders asserted that they were capable and willing participants in developing the nation and communities, if provided with proper opportunities and supports. Proving their untapped potential, young leaders offered sophisticated suggestions for how to develop South African communities for the better. Responses are discussed in the following section.

3.3: Change Requires Multiple Strategies

Youth leaders adopted a multiple-approach method to change that employed political and social strategies and allocated responsibility to state, community, and individual entities. Influenced in part by their experience, young leaders varied in the degree of responsibility they assigned to the various bodies.

On the whole, young leaders urged personal responsibility in addressing societal ills. Young people in general, they suggested, should seek to further their education and promote positive self-development, “The role of young people in South Africa is to be educated. If we’re not educated, we’ll end up on a lower level. When we’re educated you’re on the right track: you can start a business.” (Vuyi 2006) Young leaders urged their peers to resist negative influences including over-indulgence in the culture of accumulation. “It’s our duty as South African youth as people who have developed so much from this motherland not to let greed and moral degradation take over. Not to let the fruits of our democracy block our eyes out” (Khurshid 2006). They also warned against risk-taking behaviour. The youth role in changing the nation

“is to stop early pregnancy and using drugs” (Mbali 2006). Lindiwe agreed, “one thing young people can do is stop early relationships and going to parties.” Many young leaders, indeed, called for a moral rejuvenation among their generation. Glen echoed his youth contemporaries when he proclaimed, “Teenagers, we need to get our morals straight. That’s where it starts. If the young people are the ones smoking, having underage sex, drugs, then where’s the country going to go? We need to pull finger and start being more responsible.” Young leaders believed that change at the individual level would extend to the broader society, but broad change required societal and political involvement too.

Youth directly involved in politics expressed the greatest support for political methods. According to Mapule, “Politics is the most effective way.” Other youth reluctantly placed the onus on official structures despite frustration with politics on the ground. “Even if there are a lot of political parties, ANC IFP, etc, and they do have some conflicts,” “it can be one thing that solves everything” (Thando 2006). There was an overwhelming sense that the government’s function was to serve the people. Mpho passionately declared, “The government should be the first to make change to make the world a better place.” However, young leaders acknowledged that there were other avenues for change. Mapule suggested alternatives, “Even if you’re not in politics, there’re a lot of avenues to get involved. Another effective way is to get involved in charity organizations or NGOs or community structures.”

Youth involved in justice-oriented activity placed the heaviest emphasis on popular social movements as the means for positive change. “We need the mass of people.” “It’s a struggle and the struggle continues...[P]eople should continue with the struggle, with the marches and all the activism...especially for the basic needs of the people” (Thabo 2006). Vuyi described how change would occur through mass mobilization. “[W]e pressure [the government officials]. We go to them and tell them what we want. They see the crowd.” At one Abahlali meeting, Ayanda urged mass action within Abahlali and asked, “When did we last

have a march?” (Abahlali baseMjondolo Observations 10/3/2007) Even youth activists, included political avenues in their solution, however. Social movements aimed to force the state to engage positively. Star elaborated on the need for a mixed model approach that took the politics of the masses to the politics of government. To make change, South Africa needed:

Social organizations organizing. Maybe we have to make marches against them so that they can listen to us because if we're just sitting there like that nothing will happen. You can raise your voice but no one will hear you, but once you start putting people in the street, it's when the government will really understand, "Hey these people, they really need this thing." And [secondly], politics. Politics is where government is. Actually, if we don't talk politics, there's nothing that will happen. Government will just ignore you. It means, "Oh, everything in the country is going well. People are not complaining. (2006)

For activist youth, therefore, change required both large-scale popular mobilization and the navigation of official structures. In November 2006, Bahlali debated whether to march in response to the cancellation of a scheduled meeting with the mayor's office. On the one hand, people urged mass action, but on the other, people suggested "Now, we're exercising our democratic right when we go to the court." "Before we go to the street, we must ask our lawyers' advice." As S'bu Zikode mediated, he described Abahlali's mixed model approach. "This is a political war. We use the law. We use mass action. We use whatever it takes" (Abahlali baseMjondolo Observations 25/11/2006).

Youth active in service and religious bodies envisioned change through a combination of individual service, value shifts, and political activity. To make change, "You either aim to get into a very important political position so you can help eradicate social problems or you can become a community worker...it's getting the balance of the two" (Munhara 2007). Likewise, however, "people's attitudes need to change" (Aadila 2007). Glen advocated using mass media to encourage service, "My answer would be to get celebrities and role models to start leading the way." Values-based service activity should not only occur in religious or community

contexts, but should be brought to political and justice-oriented spheres as well. Khurshid argued,

We need activism but maybe activism needs to be...focused on our common ground. Religious youth and politicized youth should come together to work toward a moral rejuvenation of South African society... We've relinquished our responsibility of safe guarding South African society to the ANC. (2006)

Direction and control, therefore, needed to include communities and young people themselves. For change to occur, youth warned, the government needed to encourage meaningful forms of participation.

3.4: Change Requires Government Intervention

Young leaders called local government to live up to its mandate and promise for participatory practice in wide-scale service delivery. They overwhelmingly agreed that the divide between rich and poor South Africans should be narrowed through the provision of adequate services and by investing in skills development of poor and young people. Young leaders advocated for a policy shift that would address disparities. "The government must change its policy. These policies are the ones that are causing the country to be like this because these policies are making the rich richer and the poor poorer. If the government can change its policies, maybe it would be a better place" (Zodwa 2006).

If in charge, many young leaders said they would focus on developing poor areas. Munhara would "try to develop the townships. Grow good homes for them. Why build a house that will fall apart in two years? Build quality homes. Start building schools. Develop industry. Improve education." Ayanda declared, "I'd say, "Build a house for everyone. Give him water. Give him electricity." Thando agreed that to make South Africa a better place, the government should provide "housing because many people are homeless and those homeless people break into the homes."

Development efforts also required access to free education and opportunities for positive youth development. Vuyi suggested that “The government can give the youth bursaries and events for the youth from grade 8 and lower...we need free education because we are poor people.” Aadila complained about the priorities of the national government that lacked emphasis on education. “The Government forgets that the youth of today are going to run our country tomorrow. And instead [of educational investment] they’re investing in 2010 and foreign investment.” Youth leaders desired a reversal of national policy trends that would favour community development rather than private growth and international globalization (see Chapter 2). Vuyi suggested that “for the youth, we’ll make a grounds, a hall, a library and work as well.” Poor people lacked access to safe and positive spaces for development like recreational grounds and libraries. System described the impact of resource inequity, “[I]f the youth are doing nothing, no sports, nothing, that’s what makes the youth go stealing because they are lonely. There’s nothing they can do. They go to do other things because there’s nothing to keep them busy.” Ayanda agreed, “Every youth must have something to do-some fun, because we don’t have a place to play.” Philani thought every school should have a peer education program to help support young people in meeting socio-economic challenges (Philani 2006).

Young leaders insisted that in addition to recreational and social development outlets, older and out-of-school youth required skill development and employment opportunities. Job development would help bridge the divide between rich and poor. Mapule urged, “Bridge the gap between the poor and the rich. Take businesses and invest in small business in the townships and create jobs for the poor and give them skills, job training. Invest in poor people and the youth.” Mandla agreed, “The government must give more job opportunities.”

Some young leaders provided direct advice about job and skills development schemes for young people. S’bu’s plan would employ and train young people in police services, thereby

tackling youth crime and unemployment simultaneously (S'bu 2006). Zodwa thought the government should provide job training. "Youth need to acquire some skills so they will be able to find a job. ...Whenever you look for a job they only ask 'Do you have any experience?' Where can you get experience because you are young and you are coming from school?" In her plan, the government would increase its youth hiring in order to give young people necessary experience for subsequent hire in the private sector. M'du described a scheme that would allow youth to acquire the needed experience while also helping poor communities. M'du's plan "involved young people in the community. The scheme should be compulsory and at the end of the year, they should be credited for their work. Two or three years down the line, they should be able to produce a certificate of their experience when they look for a job."

Young leaders offered suggestions about how to close the divide between young people and formal political processes. Youth plans required space for direct interaction with decision-makers and opportunities for decision-making. Star urged,

Politicians [should realize that] it feels bad to be ignored, as we are the poor from the poorest. I don't know where it will end because they are the ones ...came to us saying vote for me and I will do this: I will build houses for you; I will make it so you don't have to pay at school; I will give you jobs." Then what happened to their promises? We've been neglected now. (2006)

Youth leaders demanded an end to sloganeering and patronage politics to be replaced by participatory development practice. "You can't expect a child to be active in the community if you aren't." To get a young person involved, you "need to show them how it actually affects them. You need to show them that those worlds are interrelated" (Munhara 2006). Rather than top-down politics as usual (see Chapter 2), local officials should "communicate; spend more time with [the youth]; don't just tell them what to do" (Philani 2006). Community actors too should employ participatory practice in development efforts. Young people responded positively to interactions that provided opportunities for actual decision-making in Phakama life skills classes. One day in October 2006 at Dumahlezi High School, the majority of classes had

self-dismissed because of a major school event taking place for only the upper grades. Rather than ignoring the disruption outside or submitting to it, Phakama facilitators asked each class whether they agreed to participate before proceeding with the lesson. Because young people themselves agreed to continue, they remained focused despite loud and constant disruption from the school event (Phakama Observations 5/10/2006).

Young people should also be consulted about relevant and important issues. Whether a young person talked about social and political issues correlated with whether that young person thought getting involved was important, felt personal efficacy, and paid attention to politics. Young people were eager to discuss important hot-topic issues. As Thando described, “When they can talk about certain topics, like teen pregnancy, they get interested.” Star suggested a scheme that would enable youth participation and allow youth discussions to directly inform policy-makers.

I would try to put an organization [together], which would be driven by youth. This organization will be based on youth culture and will involve youth and ask them what they want, how they feel, what needs to be done, what the government should do for you So that they can participate and the government can really understand that they are the future of the country. “

The youth model for meaningful engagement, therefore, called for cultural and generational relevance, the direct involvement of young people in development efforts, adequate supports and resources, and the reliance on young leaders to inform policy-making and implementation.

3.5: Youth Engagement Benefits Communities: What the Individuals and Statistics Suggest

As discussed in Chapter 2, youth development theory assumes that civic engagement benefits both individual young people and communities. Both youth profiles and group statistics supported such claims.

Individuals interviewed and observed within participation-observation demonstrated incredible commitment to developing the broader society, even in their demands for improved youth and community support. The twenty-two youth leaders interviewed were involved in a wide range of civic forms including religious, sports, school, political, and community activity. All participated formally and informally to benefit their communities. None were paid for their involvement, but whether through political means, social protest, moral rejuvenation, mentoring, education, or service, each believed that his or her involvement would make a difference to others. In the wide variety of workshops held after survey completion with leaders, groups deliberated about youth problems and their solutions and expressed intent on working towards such solutions within their own lives and communities. Peers at Dumahlezi respected young people involved in Phakama Peer Education, whom they believed supported others. Likewise, Abahlali youth not only worked toward the completion of organization goals, but also were active members in their informal settlements providing services to elderly members, caring for HIV/AIDs patients, and mentoring younger residents.

The complimentary relationship between the engagement of young people and community development was further illustrated through correlations found within survey data.

"I am involved in my community"	
Correlated with (among others)	(2-Tailed Sig. at or below .01)
Efficacy Indication	0.001852
I feel that I have the ability to make a difference in the community	2.19E-05
I pay attention to what's going on in my community.	9.02E-06
currently an active member-community services centre	5.17E-10
currently an active member-social movement	0.005369
Total current participation	9.02E-06
In the last year have you belonged to any group	0.004533
In the last year have you volunteered or interned with a religious, youth/children's, health or social service organization	4.94E-06
In the last year have you worked with another person or people to try to address a social problem	5.62E-07
Political parties are working to solve problems in our communities.	0.000581
Religious groups are working to solve problems in our community.	3.98E-10
Community services are working to solve problems in our communities.	3.65E-08
Trade unions are working to solve problems in our communities.	0.003745
I trust community leaders.	0.001195

Not only did community involvement correlate with efficacy and trust for community actors (see Part 2 for efficacy and trust correlations), but it also correlated with civic forms meant to better communities. Whether a young person reported being involved in the community correlated with whether he had worked with social service organizations or to solve social problems. By inspiring participation in community problem-solving, civic involvement further enhanced other community-based forms of engagement and future inclination towards development efforts. Whether a young person had worked to solve a social problem in the last year correlated significantly with a wide range of civic indicators.

Working with another person or people to try to address a social problem (in the last year)	(2-Tailed Sig. at or below .01)
correlated with (among others)	
Efficacy Indication	5.306E-07
I feel that I have the ability to make a difference in the community	1.922E-05
I think people working together can make a difference in the community.	0.0089334
Community Engagement Indication	2.582E-06
Community Problem-Solving Indication	0.0002182
Getting involved in my community is important	0.0044681
I am involved in my community.	5.619E-07
currently an active member-community services centre	4.954E-14
currently an active member-political	0.0037076
currently an active member-religious	0.0002627
currently an active member-social movement	1.393E-09
currently an active member-sports team or athletics club	0.0001222
currently an active member-student organization	2.386E-07
Total current participation	1.141E-15
In the last year have you belonged to any group	1.092E-09
In the last year have you contacted or visited a government official about a concern	1.141E-06
In the last year have you taken part in a protest, march or demonstration	4.063E-05
In the last year have you volunteered or interned with a religious, youth/children's, health or social service organization	4.784E-14
In the next three years, I want to work towards solving social problems.	6.791E-06
Voting matters (inverted scale from Voting doesn't matter original statement)	0.0054621
Young people are leaders of the nation.	1.008E-05

Recent past participation in community problem-solving enhanced participation in almost all civic forms (religious, political, student, sports, justice, and community service), strengthened the value for community involvement, and secured indication and future inclination towards community problem-solving.

As statistically and individually reflected, young South Africans engaged in community problem-solving in eThekweni demonstrated thoughtfulness, creativity, commitment, and

diligence in addressing community issues. Their contribution to the broader society will only continue and increase as they too continue to grow.

Conclusion and Afterward

At an impassioned Abahlali meeting, bahlali gathered in support of the two leaders who had been illegally arrested and beaten up by the Sydenham police. The mood was angry, defiant, and determined as over forty people crammed into one room for the general meeting. Mnikelo, a young person at the time Community PRO, described what had happened to him as the other two were thrown into the police van. At the arrest, "that red shirt, they tore it off me as I stood there, but Abahlali is strong." Participants took turns speaking, "I'll fight until our goals are achieved." Another said members of the ANC were degrading the party. Applause erupted when the president, and one of the arrested spoke, "Abahlali is strong." Shouts of "Qina. Qina," "Viva Abahlali Viva," and "Siphambili" reverberated. As the chanting quieted, the two small children playing outside adjacent to the Kennedy Road Hall shouted in eager child voices, "Viva!" "Viva!" (16/9/2007)

The scene described above- children, in the midst of play, shouting "Viva," and surrounded by alienated but engaged community members- reveals a lot about the state of youth civic engagement in eThekweni. Young people have been accused of forsaking the revolution, however, young people rather have been forsaken.

Young people learned about engagement from their surrounding political environment. National and local political and governmental spheres addressed youth unilaterally and insufficiently. The implementation of development and participation policies had thus far failed to fulfil constitutional mandates for service delivery and public participation. On local levels, an emergent system of patronage had threatened some and protected others while enforcing notions of careerism and insincerity increasingly associated with government and party officials. A shift away from participatory practice on the local level accompanied by policy shifts and party politics on the national level. The ruling elite muted fully participatory notions of democracy

and development and, instead, adopted a western liberal standpoint that that emphasized top-down and representational governance on the one hand, and capitalist economics on the other. As a culture of accumulation flooded the marketplace, young people sought to exercise individual freedom and advancement in the new society but not at the cost of their community orientation.

Young people angrily rejected the politics of the democratic state in favour of their own versions of democratic participation. The youthful politics of engagement sought to correct where state politics had gone wrong. Young people engaged civically and considered democratic participation in community contexts centred in social and personal development schemes. Though united by democratic understanding, democratic practice varied among subgroups of young people who were still facing significant challenges of racial and economic inequality. Young leaders across demographic groups, however, were determined to make meaningful contributions on their own terms. If provided opportunities for meaningful engagement that empowered youth with decision-making, leadership building, skill enhancement, and network building opportunity, young leaders became even more involved and inclined towards community development. Accepting personal responsibility, young leaders insisted that the advancement of South African communities required the full participation of individuals, communities, and political and state entities.

Through the graffiti art in Wentworth, Durban, this study introduced the question of youth apathy in the democratic South Africa (see Introduction). If characterizing the civic engagement of eThekweni youth, however, the painted words, "Vote for Yourself," should be interpreted by youth terms of engagement. Young people trusted versions of democracy that encouraged participation and sought community development. They intended to 'vote' for themselves and their notions of democratic engagement because they perceived official structures to fall outside of their demands for participatory and development practice. When Star

had described why he would vote in Abahlali's general elections in spite of withholding his vote in municipal elections, he had passionately declared, "Because it's Abahlali. It's Abahlali: it's not something that's promised. Abahlali is a social organization that is trying to help poor people with what the political parties have promised us. It's something that's totally different. I have to vote for Abahlali."

Young South Africans felt compelled to act in ways that promoted participatory democracy, enabled effective and responsive leaders, and supported individual and community development. Should political parties and state institutions act to promote positive youth development and participatory democracy, young people likewise would expand notions of participation to include political processes. Until South African governance, however, more adequately wrestles with questions of community development, dissent, and popular participation, young South Africans will likely continue to resist formal participation and "vote" for their own community-based notions of engagement. As long as popular participation remains the exception rather than the rule for official democratic practice, young South Africans living in eThekweni will continue to engage in the political periphery. Whether shouting "Viva Abahlali" in the shacks of Durban, spoiling ballot papers, assisting elderly neighbours, withdrawing from politics in favour of community work and service, or spray painting "Vote for Yourself" on city walls, young people of eThekweni were steeped in a politics of engagement that rejected official structures in favour of community forms.

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Appendices

i. Survey Tool

Thank you for filling out this survey. Please relax as you fill in your responses as completely as possible.

Please CIRCLE only one for each of the following questions.

1. Are you between the ages of 13 and 29? YES (Y) / (NO) N
 If so, how old are you? a. 13-17 b. 18-23 c. 24-29

2. Which response best describes where you are currently living?
 a. Urban b. Rural c. Township d. Suburb e. Informal Settlement

3. Which response best describes the highest level of education you have completed?
 a. Grade 8 or below b. Grade 9 c. Grade 10 d. Grade 11 e. Grade 12 (Matric)
 f. some tertiary g. tertiary degree h. honor's degree i. master's degree or beyond

4. Which best describes your employment status? a. Fully-employed
 b. Partially-employed or internship c. Self-employed d. Unemployed and looking for a job e. Unemployed and not looking for a job f. Full-time student

For each of the following statements please indicate your level of agreement.

CIRCLE the appropriate number indicating your level of agreement.	1=strongly disagree	2=disagree	3=neither agree nor disagree	4= agree	5=strongly agree.
Voting doesn't matter.	1	2	3	4	5
Getting involved in the community is important.	1	2	3	4	5
I feel that I have the ability to make a difference in the community.	1	2	3	4	5
I do not talk about social and political issues with my friends or family.	1	2	3	4	5
I pay attention to what's going on in local politics.	1	2	3	4	5
I pay attention to what's going on in national politics.	1	2	3	4	5
I pay attention to what's going on in my community.	1	2	3	4	5
I pay attention to popular culture. (lockh' tion culture)	1	2	3	4	5
Politics matters to my community.	1	2	3	4	5
Since 1994, the lives of South Africans have improved.	1	2	3	4	5
I feel connected to others.	1	2	3	4	5
The government is working to solve problems in our communities.	1	2	3	4	5
Political parties are working to solve problems in our communities.	1	2	3	4	5
Trade unions are working to solve problems in our communities.	1	2	3	4	5
Community services are working to solve problems in our communities.	1	2	3	4	5
Religious groups are working to solve problems in our community.	1	2	3	4	5
I am involved in my community.	1	2	3	4	5
I think people working together can make a difference in the community.	1	2	3	4	5
Political parties care about youth issues.	1	2	3	4	5
In the next three years, I want to buy nice clothes and jewelry.	1	2	3	4	5
In the next three years, I want to further my education.	1	2	3	4	5
In the next three years, I want to help out a political party or candidate.	1	2	3	4	5

In the next three years, I want to work towards solving social problems.	1	2	3	4	5
In the next three years, I want to find a job.	1	2	3	4	5
I trust political party leaders.	1	2	3	4	5
I trust school officials and teachers.	1	2	3	4	5
I trust community leaders.	1	2	3	4	5
I trust religious leaders.	1	2	3	4	5
South Africans think young people are important.	1	2	3	4	5
Contacting a party official is an effective way to make your voice heard.	1	2	3	4	5
Marching or protesting is an effective way to make your voice heard.	1	2	3	4	5
Young people are materialistic.	1	2	3	4	5
Young people are leaders of the nation.	1	2	3	4	5

Please answer the following YES (Y) or NO (N) questions...

In the last year,

1. have you taken part in a protest, march or demonstration?.....Y / N
2. have you contacted or visited a government official about a concern?Y / N
3. have you volunteered or interned with a religious, youth/children's, health or social service organization?Y / N
4. have you worked with another person or people to try to address a social problem?.....Y / N
5. have you belonged to any group such as a youth group, community services organization, trade union, a political group, a burial society, a sports team, a religious group or any other kind?.....Y / N

Indicate which organizations in which you are currently an active member (attend some meetings and events)...

- Religious.....Y / N
- Community services center.....Y / N
- Political.....Y / N
- Trade union.....Y / N
- Sports team or athletics club.....Y / N
- Student organization.....Y / N
- Burial association.....Y / N
- Stokvel association.....Y / N
- Social movement.....Y / N

Another group not mentioned here (please list the group(s)): _____

Please complete the following short answer questions.

1. What is the most pressing issue facing young people today?

2. In your opinion, what does it mean to be an active citizen in today's South Africa?

Dear Student,

Thank you for filling out this survey. As you know, participation in this survey is voluntary. All responses will be kept completely anonymous. Surveys will not be graded or connected to student performance in any way. Research gathered from this survey will be used towards completion of a master's of arts degree in political science. You should also know that this research is not linked to any governmental body, political party, or other third party. The research findings could potentially inform decision-makers, youth workers, or other public officials about youth concerns, opinions, and perspectives.

Should you have any concerns or wish to find out more about research findings, you may contact me at 073-670-7141.

Thanks very much again.

Sincerely,

Ally Brundige

Please initial the following to signify that you agree to the terms of research listed above

_____.

ii. Interview Questions

- People say “young people today just don’t care” or “young people are selfish”---do you agree or disagree. Why?
- Other people say the kwaito generation is only about diamonds and gold. Do you think today’s youth generation is more materialistic than previous ones? Why or why not?
- What do young people care about today?/What issues are most relevant to youth in South Africa today?
- What gets young people interested in an issue or topic? What doesn’t?
- Do you feel connected to your community? Why or why not?
- Do you feel connected to other young people from different townships, municipalities, or nations? Why or why not?
- Is the government doing enough for young people? If not, what should they be doing?
- Do you plan on voting/do you vote? Why or why not?
- In your opinion, what does it mean to be an active citizen in today’s South Africa?
- Do you think politics is an effective avenue for solving social problems?
- What other ways are out there?
- What types of groups, organizations, or movements do you currently participate in?
- How have these shaped your life or your views? Please expand.
- In your opinion, what needs to happen to make South Africa (and Durban) a better place for the future?
- What will be the role of young people in shaping the future?

iii. List of Interviews

Name or "Alias"	Civic Activity for which Identified	Age	Socio-economic	Racial	Gender	Education/Employment Status	Date of Interview
"Khurshid"	Muslim Student Association (UKZN) Chair	21	Materially privileged	Indian	M	Enrolled-university	2006/09/21
"Mpho"	Phakama Peer Leader-Zimphambeleni High School	13	Township or informal settlement	Black African	F	Enrolled-high school	2006/04/10
"Mbali"	Phakama Peer Leader-Zimphambeleni High School	13	Township or informal settlement	Black African	F	Enrolled-high school	2006/04/10
"S'bu"	Phakama Peer Leader-Zimphambeleni High School	15	Township or informal settlement	Black African	M	Enrolled-high school	2006/04/10
"M'du"	Phakama Peer Leader-Zimphambeleni High School	17	Township or informal settlement	Black African	M	Enrolled-high school	2006/04/10
"Philan"	Phakama Peer Leader-Dumahlezi High School	19	Township or informal settlement	Black African	M	Enrolled-high school	2006/05/10
"Mnikelo"	Phakama Peer Leader-Dumahlezi High School	20	Township or informal settlement	Black African	M	Enrolled-high school	2006/05/10
"Kuku"	Phakama Peer Leader-Dumahlezi High School	19	Township or informal settlement	Black African	F	Enrolled-high school	2006/05/10
"Mendla"	Phakama Peer Leader-Dumahlezi High School	19	Township or informal settlement	Black African	M	Enrolled-high school	2006/05/10
"Thando"	Phakama Peer Leader-Comprehensive High School	14	Township or informal settlement	Black African	F	Enrolled-high school	2006/06/10
"Lindiwe"	Phakama Peer Leader-Comprehensive High School	14	Township or informal settlement	Black African	F	Enrolled-high school	2006/06/10
Mapule	ANC Youth League and SRC Leadership	21	Materially privileged	Black African	F	Enrolled-university	20/10/2006
Thabo	Socialist Student Movement (UKZN)	24	Township or informal settlement	Black African	M	Enrolled-university	21/11/2006
"Glen"	Glenwood Boys School Interact Club President	17	Materially privileged	White Afrikaans	M	Enrolled-high school	2007/06/02
Aadila	Rotact President	21	Materially privileged	Indian/White	F	Enrolled-university	2007/07/02
"Munhara"	coordinator World Assembly of Muslim Youth	17	Materially privileged	Other	F	Enrolled-high school	2007/10/02
Vuyi	Abahlali baseMjondolo social movement	27	Informal Settlement	Black African	F	completed/unemployed and unenrolled	2006/06/11
"Star"	Abahlali baseMjondolo social movement	20	Informal Settlement	Black African	M	completed/unemployed and unenrolled	2006/09/11
"Ayanda"	Abahlali baseMjondolo social movement	15	Informal Settlement	Black African	M	Enrolled-high school	2006/08/11
Sihle	Abahlali baseMjondolo social movement	26	Informal Settlement	Black African	M	incomplete/unemployed and unenrolled	2006/08/11
System	Abahlali baseMjondolo social movement	28	Informal Settlement	Black African	F	incomplete/unemployed and unenrolled	17/11/2006
Zodwa	Abahlali baseMjondolo social movement	22	Informal Settlement	Black African	F	completed/unemployed and unenrolled	20/11/2006

iv. Phakama Observations

30	Phakama Peer Educators-Dumahlezi High School	mixed	township/informal settlement	Black African	mixed	Enrolled-high school	2006/11/08
74	Dumahlezi High School-Yizini (Life Skills Classroom)	mixed	township/informal settlement	Black African	mixed	Enrolled-high school	17/8/2006
139	Dumahlezi High School-Yizini (Life Skills Classroom)	mixed	township/informal settlement	Black African	mixed	Enrolled-high school	24/8/2006
300+	Peer Educators Awareness Program	mixed	township/informal settlement	Black African	mixed	Enrolled-high school	24/8/2006
62	Dumahlezi High School-Yizini (Life Skills Classroom)	mixed	township/informal settlement	Black African	mixed	Enrolled-high school	2006/01/09
200+	Dumahlezi High School Beauty Pageant	mixed	township/informal settlement	Black African	mixed	Enrolled-high school	1/9/2006
136	Dumahlezi High School-Yizini (Life Skills Classroom)	mixed	township/informal settlement	Black African	mixed	Enrolled-high school	2006/08/09
34	Leadership Workshop (Phakama Peer Educators - All)	mixed	township/informal settlement	Black African	mixed	Enrolled-high school	??
41	Dumahlezi High School-Yizini (Life Skills Classroom)	mixed	township/informal settlement	Black African	mixed	Enrolled-high school	2006/05/10
5	Phakama Peer Educators-Dumahlezi High School	mixed	township/informal settlement	Black African	mixed	Enrolled-high school	2006/05/10

v. Abahlali baseMjondolo Observations

45+	Meeting to plan picket	mixed	informal settlement	Black African	mixed	mixed	2006/09/09
100+	Picket @ ICC for its conference on housing	mixed	informal settlement	Black African	mixed	mixed	2006/11/09
30+	Meeting	mixed	informal settlement	Black African	mixed	mixed	16/9/2006
4 (2 youth)	Police Station to open case against police brutality	mixed	informal settlement	Black African	M	mixed	16/9/2006
24+ (10 youth)	Meeting	mixed	informal settlement	Black African	mixed	mixed	23/9/2006
100+	Rally	mixed	informal settlement	Black African	mixed	mixed	17/10/2006
20 (7+ youth)	Camp	mixed	informal settlement	Black African	mixed	mixed	14/10/2006
25 (8 youth)	meeting	mixed	informal settlement	Black African	mixed	mixed	28/10/2006
N/A	Site Visit Motalla Heights	mixed	informal settlement	Black African	mixed	mixed	2006/01/11
21 (8 youth)	meeting	mixed	informal settlement	Black African	mixed	mixed	2006/04/11
N/A	Site Visit Motalla Heights	mixed	informal settlement	Black African	mixed	mixed	2006/08/11
2006/11/19	meeting	mixed	informal settlement	Black African	mixed	mixed	19/11/2006
2006/11/25	meeting to plan Annual General Election	mixed	informal settlement	Black African	mixed	mixed	25/11/2006
12/3-12/4	Housing, education, and street trading rights workshop (COHRE)	mixed	informal settlement	Black African	mixed	mixed	2006/02/12
11 (3 youth)	meeting	mixed	informal settlement	Black African	mixed	mixed	27/11/2007
26 (10 youth)	meeting	mixed	informal settlement	Black African	mixed	mixed	2007/10/03
12 youth	Youth Committee meeting	mixed	informal settlement	Black African	mixed	mixed	17/3/2007
9 youth	Youth Committee meeting	mixed	informal settlement	Black African	mixed	mixed	31/3/2007

vi. Other Key Informants and Observations

75 university students	DUT-Steve Biko Campus Gospel concert	mixed	mixed	Black African	mixed	Enrolled-university	2006/02/09
67 high school leaders	Rotary Youth Leadership Workshop	mixed	mixed	mixed	mixed	Enrolled-high school	26/9/2006
"Munlu"	University of KwaZulu-Natal Ladies Soccer Team	20	unknown	Black African	F	Enrolled-university	2006/03/12
12	Northwood Boys Interact-Leadership Workshop	mixed		mixed	M	Enrolled-high school	21/8/2006
25	Fairvale Interact Club-Leadership Workshop	mixed		Coloured (and Black African)	mixed	Enrolled-high school	2006/11/10
49	Our Lady of Fatima-Leadership Presentaton	mixed		White (and mixed)	F	Enrolled-high school	13/10/2006
56	Durban Girls Interact Club-Leadership Presentation	mixed		mixed	F	Enrolled-high school	17/10/2006
40+	Glenwood Boys Interact Leadership Presentation	mixed		mixed	M	Enrolled-high school	30/10/2006
39	VS Naik School for the Deaf Leadership Workshop	mixed		Black African and Indian	Mixed	Enrolled-high school	28/2/2007

vii. Significant Differences* Between Leaders and Non-Leaders
(page 1 / 2)

Response or Indicator		N	Mean		Significance** (2-tailed)	Mean Difference
currently an active member-religious	non-leader	248	0.53	Equal variances assumed	0.0002	-0.20
	leader	304	0.73	Equal variances not assumed	0.0001	-0.20
currently an active member-community services center	non-leader	248	0.13	Equal variances assumed	0.0000	-0.31
	leader	306	0.43	Equal variances not assumed	0.0000	-0.31
currently an active member-student organization	non-leader	248	0.44	Equal variances assumed	0.0000	-0.28
	leader	306	0.71	Equal variances not assumed	0.0000	-0.28
currently an active member-stokvel association	non-leader	248	0.17	Equal variances assumed	0.0006	0.09
	leader	306	0.08	Equal variances not assumed	0.0010	0.09
currently an active member-social movement	non-leader	248	0.15	Equal variances assumed	0.0000	-0.19
	leader	306	0.34	Equal variances not assumed	0.0000	-0.19
In the last year have you volunteered or interned with a religious, youth/children's, health or social service organization	non-leader	248	0.32	Equal variances assumed	0.0000	-0.38
	leader	306	0.70	Equal variances not assumed	0.0000	-0.38
In the last year have you worked with another person or people to try to address a social problem	non-leader	248	0.31	Equal variances assumed	0.0000	-0.23
	leader	306	0.54	Equal variances not assumed	0.0000	-0.23
In the last year have you belonged to any group	non-leader	248	0.54	Equal variances assumed	0.0000	-0.34
	leader	306	0.88	Equal variances not assumed	0.0000	-0.34
Community Engagement Indicators	non-leader	246	3.27	Equal variances assumed	0.0000	-0.52
	leader	305	3.79	Equal variances not assumed	0.0000	-0.52
Trust Indicators	non-leader	248	3.01	Equal variances assumed	0.0000	-0.24
	leader	306	3.24	Equal variances not assumed	0.0000	-0.24
Efficacy Indicators	non-leader	248	3.93	Equal variances assumed	0.0000	-0.28
	leader	306	4.21	Equal variances not assumed	0.0000	-0.28
Community Problem Solving Indicator	non-leader	247	3.46	Equal variances assumed	0.0025	-0.29
	leader	305	3.74	Equal variances not assumed	0.0026	-0.29
I feel that I have the ability to make a difference in the community	non-leader	247	3.72	Equal variances assumed	0.0000	-0.41
	leader	305	4.13	Equal variances not assumed	0.0000	-0.41
In the next three years, I want to further my education.	non-leader	244	4.45	Equal variances assumed	0.0017	-0.23
	leader	304	4.68	Equal variances not assumed	0.0020	-0.23
In the next three years, I want to work towards solving social problems.	non-leader	245	3.47	Equal variances assumed	0.0043	-0.34
	leader	305	3.81	Equal variances not assumed	0.0031	-0.34

**Significant Differences* Between Leaders and Non-Leaders
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Response or Indicator		N	Mean		Significance** (2-tailed)	Mean Difference
In the next three years, I want to find a job.	non-leader	246	4.41	Equal variances assumed	0.0025	0.50
	leader	299	3.91	Equal variances not assumed	0.0038	0.50
I trust community leaders.	non-leader	241	2.89	Equal variances assumed	0.0001	-0.38
	leader	298	3.27	Equal variances not assumed	0.0001	-0.38
I am involved in my community.	non-leader	243	2.91	Equal variances assumed	0.0000	-0.87
	leader	302	3.77	Equal variances not assumed	0.0000	-0.87
Contacting a party official is an effective way to make your voice heard.	non-leader	244	3.32	Equal variances assumed	0.0053	0.27
	leader	303	3.05	Equal variances not assumed	0.0051	0.27
I feel connected to others.	non-leader	245	3.62	Equal variances assumed	0.0001	-0.34
	leader	297	3.96	Equal variances not assumed	0.0001	-0.34
I talk about social and political issues with my friends or family (inverted scale from I do not talk about...)	non-leader	245	3.24	Equal variances assumed	0.0000	-0.50
	leader	304	3.74	Equal variances not assumed	0.0000	-0.50
Getting involved in my community is important	non-leader	246	4.00	Equal variances assumed	0.0000	-0.34
	leader	306	4.34	Equal variances not assumed	0.0000	-0.34
Community services are working to solve problems in our communities	non-leader	243	3.17	Equal variances assumed	0.0000	-0.60
	leader	303	3.77	Equal variances not assumed	0.0000	-0.60
Religious groups are working to solve problems in our community.	non-leader	245	3.22	Equal variances assumed	0.0050	-0.28
	leader	304	3.50	Equal variances not assumed	0.0058	-0.28

* Independent Samples Tests calculated significant difference between leaders and nonleaders. Specifically, a t-test for Equality of Means determined significant difference between average mean scores

**Significant if at or below .01 level

		I feel that I have the ability to make a difference in the community	Electoral Indicators	Community Engagement Indicators	Political Voice and Awareness Indicators	Trust Indicators	Efficacy Indicators	Justice Orientation Indicators	Community Problem Solving Indicators	I feel connected to others	I am involved in my community	I think people working together can make a difference in the community	Political parties care about youth issues	In the next three years, I want to buy nice clothes and jewelry	In the next three years, I want to further my education	In the next three years, I want to help out a political party or candidate	In the next three years, I want to work towards solving social problems	In the next three years, I want to find a job	I trust political party leaders	I trust school officials and teachers	I trust community leaders	I trust religious leaders	Young people are materialistic	Young people are leaders of the nation	In the last year have you taken part in a protest, march or demonstration	In the last year have you contacted or visited a government official about a concern	year have you volunteered or interned with a religious, youth/children's, or people to try to address a social	year have you worked with another person or people to try to address a social	In the last year have you belonged to any group		
Non-Leader	I feel that I have the ability to make a difference in the community	Pearson Corr	1.000	0.067	0.118	0.252	0.126	0.315	0.165	0.200	0.181	0.095	0.114	0.089	0.099	0.221	0.068	0.190	0.053	0.131	0.099	0.070	0.048	0.085	0.040	-0.016	0.115	0.111	0.054	0.084	
247.000	Electoral Indicators	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.175	0.064	0.000	0.049	0.000	0.009	0.002	0.004	0.139	0.075	0.164	0.127	0.001	0.171	0.003	0.417	0.042	0.123	0.282	0.454	0.184	0.535	0.804	0.071	0.082	0.395	0.187		
	Community Encasement Indicators	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.087	0.165	0.220	0.399	0.120	0.154	0.191	0.070	0.062	0.040	0.228	0.079	0.096	0.179	0.186	0.081	0.121	0.016	0.066	0.051	0.055	-0.026	-0.017	0.093	-0.040	0.293	-0.040		
	Political Voice and Awareness Indicators	Pearson Corr	0.118	0.165	1.000	0.295	0.380	0.207	0.118	0.216	0.453	0.374	-0.102	0.165	0.151	0.109	-0.111	0.208	0.025	0.121	0.169	0.151	0.113	0.068	0.186	0.151	0.068	0.128	0.143	-0.030	
	Trust Indicators	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
	Efficacy Indicators	Pearson Corr	0.252	0.220	0.295	1.000	0.331	0.338	0.273	0.349	0.195	0.206	0.085	0.111	0.029	0.181	0.063	0.234	0.048	0.101	-0.014	0.023	0.121	0.060	0.148	0.089	0.142	0.005	0.129	-0.016	
	Justice Orientation Indicators	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
	Community Problem Solving Indicator	Pearson Corr	0.067	0.165	0.220	0.399	0.120	0.154	0.191	0.070	0.062	0.040	0.228	0.079	0.096	0.179	0.186	0.081	0.121	0.016	0.066	0.051	0.055	-0.026	-0.017	0.093	-0.040	0.293	-0.040		
	I feel connected to others	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.009	0.015	0.064	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
	I am involved in my community	Pearson Corr	0.200	0.191	0.216	0.349	0.203	0.160	0.107	1.000	0.212	0.091	0.046	0.116	-0.038	0.081	0.124	0.477	-0.030	0.044	0.012	0.038	-0.044	0.067	0.143	0.083	0.075	-0.078	-0.021	0.026	
	I think people working together can make a difference in the community	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.002	0.003	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.012	0.092	0.001	0.159	0.077	0.051	0.206	0.053	0.000	0.646	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Political parties care about youth issues	Pearson Corr	0.181	0.070	0.453	0.135	0.193	0.121	0.093	0.212	1.000	0.108	-0.058	0.144	0.121	0.257	-0.069	0.195	0.078	0.123	0.108	0.138	0.076	0.088	0.178	-0.008	-0.035	0.079	0.059	-0.105	
	In the next three years, I want to buy nice clothes and jewelry	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.004	0.278	0.000	0.035	0.002	0.058	0.148	0.001	0.093	0.063	0.371	0.025	0.059	0.000	0.269	0.002	0.223	0.059	0.092	0.033	0.237	0.172	0.006	0.905	0.587	0.226	0.121	0.101	
	In the next three years, I want to further my education	Pearson Corr	0.095	0.062	0.374	0.206	0.255	0.103	0.000	0.091	1.000	0.108	0.077	0.171	-0.008	0.054	0.106	0.117	0.078	0.137	0.003	0.186	0.223	0.047	0.071	0.118	0.180	0.140	0.292	0.030	
	In the next three years, I want to help out a political party or candidate	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.139	0.333	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.111	0.998	0.159	0.093	0.235	0.008	0.899	0.409	0.103	0.070	0.240	0.036	0.958	0.004	0.000	0.471	0.275	0.066	0.005	0.030	0.000	0.645		
	I trust political party leaders	Pearson Corr	0.114	-0.040	-0.102	0.085	0.078	0.121	0.063	0.046	-0.058	0.077	1.000	0.089	0.128	0.129	0.842	-0.033	-0.006	-0.003	0.002	0.010	0.092	0.110	0.104	-0.039	0.236	0.114	0.080	0.129	
	I trust school officials and teachers	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.075	0.537	0.112	0.183	0.232	0.058	0.326	0.477	0.371	0.235	0.186	0.050	0.045	0.000	0.613	0.923	0.983	0.970	0.880	0.153	0.085	0.107	0.542	0.000	0.047	0.211	0.044		
	I trust community leaders	Pearson Corr	0.099	0.228	0.165	0.111	0.262	0.019	-0.015	0.116	0.144	0.171	-0.089	1.000	0.058	0.080	0.207	0.093	0.006	0.440	0.105	0.361	0.175	0.170	0.188	-0.010	-0.019	0.007	0.108	-0.036	
	I trust religious leaders	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.154	0.000	0.010	0.082	0.000	0.767	0.818	0.070	0.025	0.088	0.196	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
	Young people are materialistic	Pearson Corr	0.099	0.079	0.151	0.029	0.109	0.193	0.157	-0.038	0.121	-0.008	0.126	0.058	1.000	0.283	0.047	0.032	0.230	0.026	-0.045	0.067	0.069	0.130	0.135	0.089	-0.023	0.090	0.078	0.127	
	Young people are leaders of the nation	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.121	0.219	0.018	0.648	0.086	0.002	0.014	0.551	0.059	0.899	0.050	0.369	0.000	0.465	0.615	0.000	0.694	0.480	0.344	0.284	0.043	0.036	0.163	0.721	0.159	0.237	0.047		
	In the last year have you taken part in a protest, march or demonstration	Pearson Corr	0.221	-0.096	0.109	0.181	0.061	0.205	0.277	0.081	0.257	0.054	0.129	0.080	0.283	1.000	0.055	0.073	0.197	0.005	0.085	0.052	0.160	0.194	0.275	0.015	0.041	0.207	0.076	-0.019	
	In the last year have you contacted or visited a government official about a concern	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.001	0.136	0.591	0.005	0.344	0.001	0.000	0.206	0.000	0.409	0.045	0.217	0.000	0.354	0.261	0.002	0.934	0.189	0.421	0.013	0.002	0.000	0.817	0.525	0.001	0.240	0.772		
	Year have you volunteered or interned with a religious, youth/children's, or people to try to address a social	Pearson Corr	0.068	0.739	-0.111	0.083	0.090	-0.023	0.019	0.124	-0.099	0.106	0.842	0.207	0.047	0.085	1.000	0.997	-0.049	0.177	0.022	0.992	0.062	0.994	0.057	0.025	0.266	0.074	0.096	0.031	
	Year have you worked with another person or people to try to address a social	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.170	0.005	0.085	0.199	0.162	0.719	0.767	0.053	0.286	0.103	-0.000	0.001	0.465	0.384	0.136	0.446	0.006	0.733	0.157	0.339	0.146	0.380	0.694	0.001	0.253	0.135	0.629		
	In the last year have you belonged to any group	Pearson Corr	0.156	0.208	0.234	0.032	0.204	0.141	0.477	0.195	0.117	-0.033	0.093	0.032	0.073	0.097	1.000	0.052	0.168	0.094	0.178	0.096	0.122	0.158	0.131	0.054	0.021	0.016	-0.033		
	In the last year have you volunteered or interned with a religious, youth/children's, or people to try to address a social	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.003	0.014	0.001	0.000	0.816	0.010	0.028	0.000	0.002	0.070	0.613	0.151	0.615	0.281	0.136	0.400	0.009	0.142	0.006	0.136	0.056	0.014	0.040	0.404	0.749	0.798	0.604		
	In the last year have you worked with another person or people to try to address a social	Pearson Corr	0.053	0.007	0.025	0.048	0.060	0.107	-0.030	0.078	0.078	-0.006	0.006	0.230	0.197	-0.049	0.052	1.000	0.109	-0.082	-0.115	0.054	0.099	0.048	-0.008	0.157	0.017	0.028	-0.018		
	In the last year have you volunteered or interned with a religious, youth/children's, or people to try to address a social	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.412	0.911	0.702	0.483	0.348	0.994	0.115	0.646	0.223	0.240	0.923	0.920	0.002	0.446	0.420	0.993	0.302	0.077	0.398	0.123	0.457	0.932	0.014	0.787	0.680	0.780			
	In the last year have you belonged to any group	Pearson Corr	0.131	0.186	0.121	0.101	0.381	0.051	0.006	0.044	0.123	0.137	-0.003	0.440	0.006	-0.005	0.177	1.000	1.992	0.000	0.000	0.180	0.158	0.099	-0.021	0.051	-1.106	-0.530	-0.142		
	In the last year have you belonged to any group	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.042	0.004	0.063	0.118	0.000	0.431	0.923	0.502	0.059	0.036	-0.963	0.000	0.694	0.934	0.006	0.009	0.093	0.000	0.000	0.013	0.016	0.127	0.748	0.428	0.102	0.648	0.027		
	In the last year have you belonged to any group	Pearson Corr	0.099	-0.031	0.169	-0.014	0.115	-0.051	-0.114	0.012	0.108	-0.003	0.002	0.105	-0.045	0.085	-0.022	0.094	-0.082	0.198	1.000	0.219	0.158	0.091	0.122	0.165	0.007	0.016	0.027	0.040	
	In the last year have you belonged to any group	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.123	0.034	0.008	0.825	0.071	0.427	0.074	0.854	0.092	0.959	0.976	0.103	0.490	0.189	0.733	0.142	0.202	0.002	0.019	0.219	1.000	0.216	0.070	0.991	0.039	-0.531	-0.062	0.035	
	In the last year have you belonged to any group	Pearson Corr	0.070	0.121	0.151	0.023	0.237	-0.005	0.002	0.038	0.138	0.186	-0.010	0.361	0.061	0.052	0.092	0.178	-0.115	0.481	0.219	0.000	0.216	0.070	0.991	0.039	-0.531	-0.062	0.035		
	In the last year have you belonged to any group	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.282	0.060	0.020	0.719	0.000	0.944	0.980	0.554	0.033	0.004	0.890	0.000	0.344	0.421	0.157	0.006	0.077	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.277	0.213	0.546	0.833	0				

		I feel that I have the ability to make a difference in the community	Electoral Indicators	Community Engagement Indicators	Political Voice and Awareness Indicators	Trust Indicators	Efficacy Indicators	Justice Orientation Indicators	Community Problem Solving Indicators	I feel connected to others	I am involved in my community	I think people working together can make a difference in the community	Political parties care about youth issues	In the next three years, I want to buy new clothes and jewelry	In the next three years, I want to further my education	In the next three years, I want to help out political party or candidate	In the next three years, I want to work towards solving social problems	In the next three years, I want to find a job	I trust political party leaders	I trust school officials and teachers	I trust community leaders	I trust religious leaders	Young people are materialistic	Young people are leaders of the nation	In the last year have you taken part in a protest, march or demonstration	In the last year have you contacted or visited with a religious, youth/child or other organization	year have you volunteered or interned with a religious, youth/child or other organization	year have you worked with another person or people to address a social issue	In the last year have you belonged to any group	
Leader	I feel that I have the ability to make a difference in the community	Pearson Corrs	1.000	0.229	0.336	0.161	0.079	0.421	0.124	0.249	0.280	0.182	0.297	-0.024	0.017	0.178	-0.096	0.191	0.032	-0.061	0.034	0.050	0.163	0.036	0.122	0.078	0.059	0.214	0.058	
	305 000	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.169	0.000	0.031	0.000	0.000	0.007	0.000	0.677	0.765	0.002	0.097	0.001	0.582	0.165	0.561	0.391	0.672	0.004	0.033	0.173	0.303	0.000	0.312		
	Electoral Indicators	Pearson Corrs	0.229	1.000	0.131	0.275	0.263	0.255	0.126	0.335	0.029	-0.242	0.123	-0.003	-0.008	0.171	0.123	0.022	-0.003	0.032	0.028	0.011	0.077	0.149	0.172	0.120	0.047	0.089	0.118	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.022	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.027	0.000	0.014	0.466	0.032	0.662	0.687	0.003	0.032	0.700	0.956	0.564	0.621	0.851	0.191	0.010	0.020	0.036	0.406	0.236	0.122	0.040		
	Community Engagement Indicators	Pearson Corrs	0.336	1.000	0.131	0.291	0.243	0.488	0.194	0.251	0.351	0.062	0.147	-0.015	-0.095	0.063	-0.189	0.137	-0.006	-0.036	0.059	0.065	0.025	-0.008	0.199	0.158	0.108	0.136	0.071	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.022	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.281	0.010	0.800	0.099	0.151	0.003	0.017	0.918	0.541	0.304	0.266	0.668	0.869	0.000	0.006	0.060	0.102	0.218	
	Political Voice and Awareness Indicators	Pearson Corrs	0.161	0.275	0.291	1.000	0.257	0.301	0.230	0.242	0.114	-0.077	0.074	0.010	-0.079	0.032	-0.048	0.015	0.091	0.083	0.073	0.080	0.043	0.072	0.187	0.118	0.046	-0.012	0.044	-0.020
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.005	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.049	0.184	0.196	0.253	0.404	0.062	0.299	0.462	0.209	0.170	0.462	0.212	0.001	0.040	0.426	0.330	0.000	0.000	
	Trust Indicators	Pearson Corrs	0.079	0.283	0.243	0.257	1.000	0.233	0.098	0.197	0.052	-0.037	0.010	0.115	-0.089	0.046	0.057	0.000	0.064	0.242	0.292	0.311	0.185	-0.032	0.179	0.096	0.019	0.129	-0.013	0.031
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.169	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.125	0.001	0.371	0.525	0.858	0.046	0.120	0.423	0.319	0.988	0.273	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.574	0.002	0.092	0.740	0.024	0.815	0.587
	Efficacy Indicators	Pearson Corrs	0.421	0.255	0.488	0.301	1.000	0.233	0.100	0.261	0.362	0.119	0.101	-0.062	0.090	0.314	-0.037	0.239	0.121	-0.109	0.063	0.140	0.095	0.178	0.507	0.062	0.037	0.222	0.216	0.266
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.041	0.081	0.000	0.287	0.116	0.000	0.519	0.000	0.037	0.068	0.279	0.015	0.106	0.002	0.000	0.153	0.520	0.000	0.000
	Justice Orientation Indicators	Pearson Corrs	0.124	0.126	0.194	0.230	0.068	0.361	1.000	0.144	0.030	0.024	0.173	-0.018	0.071	0.146	-0.003	0.065	0.069	-0.014	0.039	0.052	0.029	0.168	0.141	0.117	0.014	0.133	0.067	0.075
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.031	0.027	0.001	0.000	0.125	0.000	0.012	0.000	0.012	0.608	0.680	0.003	0.752	0.215	0.011	0.961	0.259	0.000	0.046	0.369	0.623	0.003	0.014	0.040	0.812	0.020	0.241	0.190	
	Community Problem Solving Indicator	Pearson Corrs	0.249	0.335	0.251	0.242	0.197	0.362	1.000	0.159	-0.025	0.163	-0.015	-0.022	0.180	0.029	0.326	-0.005	-0.041	-0.026	0.060	0.081	0.102	0.174	0.115	0.072	0.124	0.252	0.116	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.012	0.000	0.006	0.669	0.004	0.794	0.707	0.002	0.612	0.000	0.929	0.478	0.655	0.303	0.169	0.078	0.002	0.044	0.210	0.031	0.000	0.044	
	I feel connected to others	Pearson Corrs	0.260	0.029	0.351	0.114	0.052	0.119	0.030	0.159	1.000	0.067	0.176	0.006	-0.041	0.099	-0.070	0.062	-0.052	0.007	0.014	0.089	0.021	0.057	0.220	0.042	0.015	0.010	0.009	-0.006
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.003	0.614	0.000	0.049	0.371	0.941	0.606	0.006	0.255	0.002	0.263	0.483	0.090	0.230	0.285	0.381	0.899	0.806	0.129	0.728	0.330	0.000	0.467	0.791	0.868	0.881	0.913		
	I am involved in my community	Pearson Corrs	0.182	-0.042	0.062	-0.077	-0.037	0.101	0.024	-0.025	0.067	1.000	0.148	-0.010	-0.004	0.109	-0.085	0.060	0.053	0.099	0.128	0.090	0.041	-0.067	0.119	0.063	0.056	0.133	0.140	0.071
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.001	0.466	0.281	0.184	0.525	0.081	0.660	0.669	0.255	0.010	0.870	0.105	0.059	0.144	0.303	0.359	0.081	0.027	0.125	0.490	0.246	0.039	0.152	0.330	0.221	0.015	0.021		
	I think people working together can make a difference in the community	Pearson Corrs	0.297	0.123	0.147	0.074	0.010	0.421	0.173	0.163	0.176	1.000	0.058	0.149	0.461	-0.002	0.248	0.064	-0.029	0.089	0.152	0.053	0.169	0.397	0.024	-0.046	0.233	0.196	0.166	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.032	0.010	0.196	0.858	0.000	0.003	0.004	0.002	0.010	0.318	0.010	0.000	0.969	0.000	0.149	0.615	0.124	0.009	0.370	0.003	0.000	0.678	0.420	0.000	0.001	0.004		
	Political parties care about youth issues	Pearson Corrs	-0.024	-0.003	-0.015	0.010	0.115	-0.062	-0.018	-0.015	0.066	-0.010	-0.058	1.000	0.016	0.048	0.999	0.006	0.026	0.331	0.173	0.251	0.068	-0.019	0.012	0.119	0.091	-0.046	-0.052	-0.110
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.677	0.952	0.800	0.861	0.046	0.287	0.752	0.794	0.283	0.870	0.318	0.000	0.778	0.404	0.099	0.912	0.997	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.248	0.738	0.834	0.039	0.114	0.425	0.365	0.056	
	In the next three years, I want to buy new clothes and jewelry	Pearson Corrs	0.017	-0.008	-0.095	-0.079	-0.089	0.090	0.071	-0.022	-0.041	-0.004	0.149	0.016	1.000	0.219	0.056	0.009	0.169	0.014	-0.084	0.015	0.042	0.202	0.139	-0.024	-0.065	0.087	0.020	-0.008
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.765	0.887	0.099	0.169	0.120	0.116	0.215	0.707	0.483	1.055	0.010	0.778	0.000	0.000	0.337	0.890	0.004	0.816	0.146	0.804	0.476	0.000	0.016	0.882	0.258	0.131	0.734	0.889	
	In the next three years, I want to further my education	Pearson Corrs	0.178	0.171	0.083	0.032	0.046	0.314	0.146	0.180	0.099	0.109	0.461	0.048	0.219	1.000	0.000	0.352	0.243	0.197	-0.027	0.128	0.206	0.099	0.190	0.361	0.066	0.049	0.229	0.146
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.002	0.003	0.151	0.573	0.423	0.000	0.011	0.002	0.090	0.059	0.000	0.404	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.640	0.026	0.000	0.091	0.001	0.000	0.136	0.397	0.000	0.009	0.000		
	In the next three years, I want to help out political party or candidate	Pearson Corrs	-0.066	0.123	-0.168	-0.048	0.067	-0.037	-0.003	0.029	-0.070	-0.085	-0.002	0.096	0.056	-0.062	0.100	0.099	0.022	0.134	0.066	0.060	0.007	-0.025	0.005	-0.021	0.027	-0.079	0.008	-0.142
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.097	0.032	0.003	0.404	0.319	0.519	0.987	0.612	0.230	0.144	0.969	0.099	0.337	0.370	0.000	0.124	0.000	0.000	0.124	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
	In the next three years, I want to work towards solving social problems	Pearson Corrs	0.191	0.022	0.137	0.015	0.000	0.239	0.065	0.326	0.062	0.060	0.248	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.078	0.011	0.136	0.005	0.080	0.238	0.087	0.068	0.129	0.253	0.178	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.001	0.700	0.017	0.794	0.998	0.000	0.258	0.000	0.285	0.303	0.000	0.012	0.880	0.000	0.124	0.000	0.000	0.178	0.856	0.040	0.019	0.927	0.163	0.000	0.129	0.236	0.025	0.000	
	In the next three years, I want to find a job	Pearson Corrs	0.032	-0.003	0.006	0.091	0.064	0.121	0.089	-0.005	-0.052	0.053	0.094	0.025	0.168	0.197	0.022	0.078	1.000	0.459	0.147	0.039	0.017	0.176	0.012	0.010	0.051	0.041	0.020	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.561	0.627	0.304	0.208	0.000	0.279	0.498	0.655	0.806	0.027	0.124	0.003	0.146	0.026	0.258	0.040	0.012	0.000	0.000	0.138	0.046	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
	I trust community leaders	Pearson Corrs	0.050	0.011	0.065	0.080	0.311	0.140	0.052	0.060	0.089	0.090	0.152	0.251	0.015	0.206	0.090	0.136	0.147	0.419	0.467	1.000	0.394	-0.039	0.296	0.065	-0.032	0.055	-0.041	-0.047
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.391	0.851	0.266	0.170	0.090	0.015	0.369	0.353	0.129	0.125	0.039	0.894	0.000	0.327	0.019	0.012	0.000	0											

All Young People		Voting matters (inverted scale from original statement)	Getting involved in my community is important	I feel that have the ability to make a difference in the community	about social and political issues with my friends or family (inverted scale from original statement)	I pay attention to what's going on in local politics	I pay attention to what's going on in national politics	I pay attention to what's going on in my community	I pay attention to what's going on in my community (lock/unlock)	Politics matters to my community	Since 1994, the lives of South Africans have improved	I feel connected to others	The government is working to solve problems in our communities	Political parties are working to solve problems in our communities	Trade unions are working to solve problems in our communities	Community services are working to solve problems in our communities	Religious groups are working to solve problems in our communities	I am involved in my community	I think people working together can make a difference in the community	Political parties care about youth issues	In the next three years, I want to buy nice clothes and jewelry	In the next three years, I want to further my education	In the next three years, I want to help out a political party or candidate	In the next three years, I want to work towards solving social problems	In the next three years, I want to find a job	I trust political party leaders	I trust school officials and teachers	I trust community leaders	I trust religious leaders
552.0	Voting matters (inverted scale from original statement)	Pearson Corr	1.000	0.106	0.107	0.127	0.073	0.016	0.039	0.034	0.026	0.104	0.081	0.049	0.133	0.165	0.144	0.144	0.071	0.060	0.098	0.037	0.098	-0.038	-0.030	0.096	0.032	0.084	0.083
	Getting involved in my community is important	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.013	0.012	0.003	0.086	0.731	0.372	0.429	0.552	0.014	0.059	0.249	0.002	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.099	0.245	0.022	0.389	0.022	0.496	0.376	0.486	0.196	0.458	0.052
	I feel that have the ability to make a difference in the community	Pearson Corr	0.106	1.000	0.352	0.123	0.186	0.186	0.307	0.131	0.134	0.137	0.223	0.062	0.135	0.042	0.141	0.096	0.126	0.020	0.063	0.245	-0.231	0.137	0.055	-0.009	0.113	0.153	0.062
	about social and political issues with my friends or family (inverted scale from original statement)	Sig. (2-tailed)			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.001	0.000	0.014	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.025	0.003	0.644	0.144	0.001	0.477	0.001	0.201	0.037	0.008	0.000
	I pay attention to what's going on in local politics	Pearson Corr	0.107	0.352	1.000	0.214	0.183	0.215	0.296	0.135	0.134	0.092	0.246	0.008	0.083	0.088	0.205	0.168	0.181	0.156	0.015	0.047	0.223	-0.001	0.205	0.013	0.014	0.084	0.096
	I pay attention to what's going on in national politics	Sig. (2-tailed)				0.012	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.002	0.032	0.000	0.850	0.051	0.038	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.734	0.276	0.000	0.977	0.000	0.977	0.000	0.742	0.049
	I pay attention to what's going on in my community	Pearson Corr	0.127	0.123	0.214	1.000	0.097	0.180	0.039	0.074	0.021	-0.016	0.097	0.054	0.037	0.050	0.118	0.004	0.072	0.034	0.017	-0.042	0.148	-0.060	0.095	-0.006	0.005	0.026	0.022
	I pay attention to what's going on in my community (lock/unlock)	Sig. (2-tailed)					0.003	0.004	0.000	0.003	0.363	0.088	0.634	0.702	0.025	0.208	0.392	0.239	0.006	0.930	0.097	0.423	0.899	0.331	0.001	0.164	0.028	0.888	0.912
	Politics matters to my community	Pearson Corr	0.073	0.186	0.183	0.097	1.000	0.601	0.293	0.151	0.128	0.147	0.097	0.134	0.213	0.183	0.096	0.051	0.048	0.096	0.103	-0.052	0.077	0.068	0.060	0.045	0.175	0.069	0.139
	Since 1994, the lives of South Africans have improved	Sig. (2-tailed)						0.000	0.000	0.003	0.001	0.025	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.025	0.237	0.286	0.025	0.017	0.226	0.074	0.117	0.161	0.298	0.000	0.108	0.001	
	I feel connected to others	Pearson Corr	0.086	0.000	0.000	0.023	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	The government is working to solve problems in our communities	Sig. (2-tailed)							0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.118	0.009	0.389	0.002	0.287	0.775	0.514	0.174	0.096	0.008	0.138	0.536	0.233	0.033	0.553	0.005	
	Political parties are working to solve problems in our communities	Pearson Corr	0.039	0.307	0.296	0.039	0.293	1.000	0.286	0.193	0.142	0.214	0.044	0.205	0.106	0.172	0.175	0.191	0.146	0.072	0.092	0.135	0.056	0.191	0.075	0.054	0.102	0.173	0.054
	Trade unions are working to solve problems in our communities	Sig. (2-tailed)							0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.095	0.034	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	Community services are working to solve problems in our communities	Pearson Corr	0.034	0.131	0.135	0.074	0.151	0.180	0.286	1.000	0.234	0.106	0.162	0.049	0.157	0.104	0.053	0.101	0.047	0.034	0.063	0.039	0.054	0.070	0.155	0.061	0.033	0.078	0.088
	Religious groups are working to solve problems in our communities	Sig. (2-tailed)								0.000	0.014	0.000	0.262	0.000	0.016	0.223	0.019	0.284	0.429	0.057	0.368	0.209	0.107	0.000	0.163	0.453	0.070	0.043	
	I am involved in my community	Pearson Corr	0.028	0.134	0.134	0.021	0.128	0.203	0.193	0.234	1.000	0.081	0.019	0.043	0.201	0.103	0.111	0.192	0.062	0.138	0.047	0.055	0.164	0.080	0.046	0.067	-0.045	0.008	0.071
	I think people working together can make a difference in the community	Sig. (2-tailed)									0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.017	0.010	0.000	0.154	0.001	0.342	0.303	0.000	0.096	0.267	0.123	0.300	0.854	
	Political parties care about youth issues	Pearson Corr	0.104	0.137	0.092	-0.016	0.147	0.072	0.142	0.106	0.081	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	In the next three years, I want to buy nice clothes and jewelry	Sig. (2-tailed)									0.184	0.100	0.184	0.155	0.108	0.165	0.055	0.106	0.006	0.062	0.028	0.006	-0.067	0.133	0.007	0.055	0.084	0.141	
	In the next three years, I want to further my education	Pearson Corr	0.059	0.000	0.000	0.025	0.009	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.655	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.014	0.850	0.034	0.519	0.000	0.119	0.002	0.677	0.206	0.051	0.001	
	In the next three years, I want to help out a political party or candidate	Sig. (2-tailed)									0.286	0.193	0.142	0.000	0.443	0.333	0.184	1.000	0.443	0.333	0.205	0.031	0.041	-0.017	0.284	-0.342	0.025	0.054	
	In the next three years, I want to work towards solving social problems	Pearson Corr	0.249	0.144	0.650	0.209	0.025	0.389	0.314	0.262	0.321	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
	In the next three years, I want to find a job	Sig. (2-tailed)									0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
	I trust political party leaders	Pearson Corr	0.133	0.135	0.083	0.037	0.213	0.140	0.205	0.157	0.201	0.280	0.155	0.443	1.000	0.550	0.397	0.167	0.147	0.100	0.311	-0.016	0.067	0.165	0.022	-0.072	0.336	0.101	
	I trust school officials and teachers	Sig. (2-tailed)									0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.019	0.000	0.716	0.023	0.000	0.614	0.094	0.000	0.018	0.000	
	I trust community leaders	Pearson Corr	0.002	0.002	0.051	0.392	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
	I trust religious leaders	Sig. (2-tailed)									0.165	0.034	0.068	0.050	0.183	0.049	0.106	0.104	0.103	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
	South Africans think young people are the future	Pearson Corr	0.049	0.062	0.036	0.054	0.134	0.039	0.044	0.049	0.043	0.332	0.184	1.000	0.443	0.333	0.205	0.031	0.041	-0.017	0.284	-0.342	0.025	0.054	0.039	-0.019	0.329	0.175	
	South Africans think young people are the future	Sig. (2-tailed)									0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000		

x. All Youth Correlations (page 1/4)
 (Significance assessed by 2-tailed calculations at or below .01 level)

All Young People	Voting matters (inverted scale from Voting doesn't matter original statement)	Getting involved in my community is important	I feel that have the ability to make a difference in the community	about social and political issues with my friends or family (inverted scale from I do not)	I pay attention to what's going on in local politics	I pay attention to what's going on in national politics	I pay attention to what's going on in my community	I pay attention to popular culture (locky/rational culture)	Politics matters to my community	Since 1994, the lives of South Africans have improved	I feel connected to others	The government is working to solve problems in our communities	Political parties are working to solve problems in our communities	Trade unions are working to solve problems in our communities	Community services are working to solve problems in our communities	Religious groups are working to solve problems in our communities	I am involved in my community	I think people working together can make a difference in the community	Political parties care about youth issues	In the next three years, I want to buy nice clothes and jewelry	In the next three years, I want to further my education	In the next three years, I want to help out a political party or candidate	In the next three years, I want to work towards solving social problems	In the next three years, I want to find a job	I trust political party leaders	I trust school officials and teachers	I trust community leaders	I trust religious leaders		
Contacting a party official is an effective way to get my views heard	Pearson Correlation: -0.001	0.047	0.055	-0.067	0.065	0.068	0.230	0.156	0.046	0.108	0.052	0.131	0.141	0.122	0.121	0.061	0.057	0.019	0.203	0.066	0.048	0.062	0.184	0.086	0.217	0.074	0.129	0.207	0.033	
Marching or protesting is an effective way to get my views heard	Sig. (2-tailed): 0.977	0.272	0.202	0.121	0.130	0.140	0.000	0.000	0.292	0.011	0.226	0.002	0.001	0.004	0.005	0.159	0.190	0.661	0.000	0.125	0.261	0.058	0.000	0.046	0.000	0.087	0.003	0.389	0.008	
Young people are materialistic	Pearson Correlation: 0.009	0.123	0.122	0.013	0.046	0.028	0.142	0.154	0.000	0.199	0.052	-0.025	0.009	0.035	0.122	0.111	0.023	0.099	0.023	0.123	0.152	0.033	0.051	0.056	-0.014	0.033	0.042	0.008	0.821	
Young people are leaders of the nation	Sig. (2-tailed): 0.104	0.118	0.121	0.042	0.009	-0.026	0.093	0.154	0.091	0.059	0.071	0.005	0.048	0.015	0.103	0.099	-0.032	0.110	0.076	0.171	0.169	0.031	0.095	0.062	0.022	0.100	0.015	0.127	0.003	
In the last year have you taken part in	Sig. (2-tailed): 0.015	0.006	0.005	0.325	0.843	0.564	0.031	0.000	0.035	0.171	0.097	0.191	0.285	0.719	0.017	0.021	0.451	0.010	0.076	0.000	0.474	0.000	0.027	0.147	0.070	0.174	0.074	0.003	0.000	
In the last year have you contacted	Pearson Correlation: 0.141	0.203	0.176	0.013	0.080	0.064	0.226	0.162	0.104	0.141	0.190	0.021	0.103	0.080	0.232	0.159	0.093	0.158	0.099	0.137	0.314	0.028	0.202	0.104	0.067	0.129	0.187	0.128	0.000	
In the last year have you volunteered	Sig. (2-tailed): 0.001	0.000	0.000	0.763	0.060	0.161	0.000	0.000	0.016	0.001	0.000	0.629	0.016	0.063	0.000	0.000	0.030	0.000	0.021	0.001	0.000	0.509	0.000	0.015	0.120	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.003	
In the last year have you worked with	Pearson Correlation: -0.028	0.048	0.055	0.024	0.106	0.157	0.085	0.077	0.038	0.024	0.017	0.046	0.039	0.019	0.080	0.038	0.087	-0.018	0.055	0.022	0.254	0.000	0.102	0.000	-0.003	0.107	0.053	-0.010	0.000	
In the last year have you belonged to	Sig. (2-tailed): 0.507	0.258	0.194	0.587	0.012	0.001	0.049	0.699	0.376	0.581	0.688	0.281	0.354	0.662	0.062	0.405	0.044	0.673	0.201	0.604	0.204	0.992	0.017	0.994	0.952	0.012	0.220	0.823	0.000	
currently an active member-religious	Pearson Correlation: -0.076	0.096	0.092	-0.018	0.134	0.062	0.122	0.087	0.085	-0.029	-0.011	0.068	0.146	0.085	0.078	0.038	0.084	0.139	0.041	-0.047	0.044	0.112	0.061	0.091	0.012	-0.011	-0.033	-0.040	0.000	
currently an active member-political	Sig. (2-tailed): 0.075	0.021	0.030	0.717	0.002	0.073	0.005	0.044	0.048	0.490	0.806	0.020	0.001	0.046	0.070	0.373	0.049	0.007	0.337	0.271	0.300	0.009	0.151	0.034	0.780	0.788	0.442	0.357	0.000	
currently an active member-trade union	Pearson Correlation: 0.063	0.204	0.159	0.097	0.049	0.086	0.060	-0.227	0.070	0.016	0.105	-0.004	0.016	-0.021	0.213	0.215	0.194	0.147	-0.060	0.074	0.261	-0.005	0.126	-0.021	-0.114	0.041	0.070	0.150	0.000	
currently an active member-sports	Sig. (2-tailed): 0.142	0.000	0.000	0.022	0.250	0.147	0.163	0.525	0.102	0.713	0.014	0.922	0.715	0.623	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.163	0.083	0.000	0.913	0.003	0.621	0.006	0.336	0.106	0.001	0.000	0.000	
currently an active member-student	Pearson Correlation: 0.005	0.004	0.000	0.024	0.113	0.029	0.020	0.876	0.185	0.743	0.037	0.352	0.247	0.023	0.000	0.017	0.000	0.009	0.950	0.398	0.001	0.367	0.000	0.966	0.178	0.393	0.064	0.099	0.000	
currently an active member-another	Sig. (2-tailed): 0.091	0.173	0.149	0.027	0.050	0.027	0.052	-0.020	0.143	0.029	0.004	-0.150	-0.025	-0.029	0.169	0.233	0.121	0.149	-0.096	0.047	0.116	-0.038	0.114	-0.054	-0.142	0.065	0.064	0.099	0.000	
currently an active member-social media	Pearson Correlation: -0.033	0.000	0.000	0.012	0.243	0.590	0.225	0.650	0.001	0.488	0.918	0.000	0.553	0.504	0.000	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.025	0.275	0.006	0.371	0.007	0.210	0.001	0.127	0.135	0.022	0.000	
currently an active member-family	Sig. (2-tailed): 0.067	0.112	0.099	0.042	-0.003	0.033	0.062	0.011	0.095	0.040	0.089	0.033	-0.046	0.080	0.028	0.137	0.224	0.098	-0.056	0.052	0.098	0.025	0.049	0.009	-0.062	0.054	0.040	0.135	0.000	
currently an active member-community	Sig. (2-tailed): 0.115	0.008	0.020	0.324	0.944	0.471	0.056	0.801	0.028	0.352	0.446	0.286	0.159	0.508	0.001	0.000	0.023	0.037	0.189	0.226	0.022	0.568	0.235	0.834	0.150	0.209	0.353	0.002	0.000	
currently an active member-political	Pearson Correlation: 0.032	0.144	0.184	0.091	0.016	0.089	0.014	0.063	0.108	0.014	0.035	0.027	0.042	0.006	0.203	0.180	0.262	0.038	-0.002	0.184	-0.025	0.187	0.037	0.053	0.006	0.058	0.058	0.000	0.000	
currently an active member-trade union	Sig. (2-tailed): 0.459	0.001	0.000	0.032	0.706	0.051	0.009	0.142	0.012	0.736	0.421	0.525	0.328	0.884	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.379	0.169	0.963	0.000	0.564	0.000	0.395	0.218	0.848	0.176	0.050	0.000	
currently an active member-student	Pearson Correlation: 0.012	0.045	0.049	0.029	0.080	0.088	0.016	-0.020	0.034	0.016	0.031	0.095	0.119	0.078	0.087	0.009	0.075	0.060	0.067	-0.053	0.022	0.061	0.009	0.027	0.125	0.038	0.069	-0.019	0.000	
currently an active member-sports	Sig. (2-tailed): 0.783	0.299	0.253	0.503	0.063	0.055	0.707	0.638	0.431	0.711	0.470	0.028	0.006	0.070	0.044	0.831	0.062	0.161	0.122	0.216	0.609	0.156	0.842	0.530	0.004	0.376	0.112	0.967	0.000	
currently an active member-another	Pearson Correlation: -0.051	-0.017	-0.008	-0.038	0.013	0.016	0.055	-0.010	0.018	-0.009	-0.028	-0.010	-0.018	0.042	-0.004	0.033	0.025	-0.058	-0.007	-0.024	0.034	-0.002	0.003	0.034	0.146	0.020	0.062	-0.021	0.000	
currently an active member-political	Sig. (2-tailed): 0.241	0.695	0.854	0.412	0.761	0.725	0.207	0.825	0.680	0.837	0.524	0.814	0.678	0.333	0.927	0.443	0.572	0.199	0.881	0.578	0.428	0.961	0.949	0.437	0.001	0.644	0.154	0.830	0.000	
currently an active member-student	Pearson Correlation: 0.037	0.036	0.014	0.031	0.051	0.029	-0.059	-0.054	0.013	0.034	-0.059	-0.067	-0.014	-0.010	-0.011	0.041	0.048	-0.024	0.002	-0.024	0.048	-0.073	0.046	-0.047	-0.065	0.021	0.062	-0.007	0.000	
currently an active member-sports	Sig. (2-tailed): 0.379	0.369	0.744	0.463	0.233	0.324	0.174	0.214	0.770	0.453	0.169	0.119	0.736	0.815	0.805	0.339	0.261	0.575	0.964	0.582	0.257	0.086	0.281	0.271	0.129	0.616	0.227	0.867	0.000	
currently an active member-political	Pearson Correlation: 0.056	0.142	0.124	0.095	0.033	0.019	0.060	0.066	0.041	0.009	0.051	0.067	0.079	0.008	0.104	0.096	0.084	0.255	-0.038	0.037	0.138	0.058	0.074	-0.069	-0.029	0.029	0.091	0.060	0.000	
currently an active member-family	Sig. (2-tailed): 0.189	0.001	0.003	0.025	0.438	0.725	0.168	0.126	0.338	0.838	0.239	0.116	0.063	0.858	0.015	0.024	0.051	0.195	0.405	0.864	0.001	0.182	0.083	0.107	0.503	0.505	0.034	0.167	0.000	
currently an active member-community	Pearson Correlation: -0.004	0.013	-0.015	0.008	-0.004	-0.030	0.002	0.018	-0.041	-0.039	0.005	0.069	-0.029	0.030	0.025	-0.027	0.053	-0.062	0.074	0.050	-0.071	-0.021	0.022	0.006	-0.006	0.007	-0.012	-0.031	0.000	
currently an active member-political	Sig. (2-tailed): 0.916	0.757	0.720	0.860	0.926	0.515	0.959	0.678	0.344	0.916	0.120	0.503	0.486	0.563	0.521	0.216	0.145	0.085	0.240	0.608	0.620	0.096	0.620	0.608	0.893	0.815	0.877	0.785	0.475	0.000
currently an active member-trade union	Pearson Correlation: -0.061	0.015	-0.045	-0.017	0.062	0.046	0.049	0.047	0.013	-0.043	-0.058	0.051	0.013	-0.036	-0.097	-0.070	0.002	-0.069	0.086	-0.068	-0.031	-0.015	0.011	-0.038	0.025	-0.062	-0.032	-0.049	0.000	
currently an active member-student	Sig. (2-tailed): 0.233	0.719	0.290	0.684	0.146	0.330	0.262	0.329	0.768	0.316	0.181	0.237	0.761	0.400	0.024	0.103	0.963	0.104	-0.045	0.113	0.468	0.724	0.793	0.370	0.562	0.054	0.452	0.256	0.000	
currently an active member-family	Pearson Correlation: 0.000	0.006	0.000	0.063	0.062	0.000	0.007	0.000	0.000	0.013	0.202	0.079	0.000	0.003	0.014	0.045	0.957	0.184	0.011	0.529	0.277	0.000	0.077	0.866	0.018	0.862	0.104	0.174	0.000	
currently an active member-political	Sig. (2-tailed): 0.038	0.133	0.274	0.103	0.063	0.135	0.194	0.093	0.056	0.091	0.432	0.084	0.072	0.112	0.254	0.133	0.201	-0.012	0.046	0.005	0.132	0.132	0.190	-0.029	0.020	0.136	0.053	0.077	0.000	
currently an active member-community	Pearson Correlation: 0.412	0.002	0.000	0.016	0.144	0.003	0.000	0.031	0.194	0.059	0.00																			

All Young People		South Africans think young people are important.	Contacting a party official is an effective way to make your voice heard.	Marching or protesting is an effective way to make your voice heard.	Young people are materialistic.	Young people are leaders of the nation.	In the last year you have taken part in a protest, march or demonstration.	In the last year you have contacted or visited a government official about a concern.	In the last year you have volunteered or returned with a religious, youth/child person or people to try to address a social problem.	In the last year have you belonged to any group.	currently an active member-religious.	currently an active member-community services center.	currently an active member-political.	currently an active member-trade union.	currently an active member-sports team or athletics club.	currently an active member-student organization.	currently an active member-burial association.	currently an active member-stokvel association.	currently an active member-social movement.	currently an active member-another group.	Electoral Indicators	Community Engagement Indicators	Political Voice and Awareness Indicators	Trust Indicators	Efficacy Indicators	Justice Orientation Indicators	Community Problem Solving Indicator		
652.0	Voting matters. (inverted scale from	Pearson Corr	0.034	-0.001	0.009	0.104	0.141	-0.028	-0.076	0.063	0.118	0.091	0.067	0.032	0.012	-0.051	0.037	0.056	-0.004	-0.051	-0.063	-0.880	0.340	0.335	0.078	0.110	0.094	0.032	0.084
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.424	0.977	0.831	0.015	0.001	0.507	0.075	0.142	0.005	0.033	0.115	0.459	0.783	0.241	0.379	0.189	0.916	0.233	0.213	0.009	0.000	0.412	0.069	0.010	0.027	0.448	0.048
	Getting involved in my community is	Pearson Corr	0.081	0.047	0.123	0.116	0.203	0.046	0.068	0.204	0.121	0.173	0.112	0.144	0.045	-0.017	0.038	0.142	0.013	0.015	0.113	0.766	0.096	0.133	0.094	0.071	0.269	0.382	0.079
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.056	0.272	0.004	0.006	0.000	0.258	0.021	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.001	0.289	0.686	0.369	0.001	0.757	0.719	0.006	0.045	0.026	0.002	0.027	0.056	0.000	0.000	0.056	0.244
	I feel that I have the ability to make a	Pearson Corr	-0.027	0.055	0.122	0.121	0.176	0.055	0.092	0.159	0.181	0.149	0.099	0.184	0.049	-0.008	0.014	0.124	-0.015	-0.045	0.027	-0.258	0.162	0.274	0.208	0.138	0.395	0.157	0.344
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.522	0.202	0.004	0.005	0.000	0.194	0.030	0.000	0.000	0.020	0.000	0.253	0.854	0.744	0.003	0.720	0.280	0.519	0.576	0.090	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	I talk about social and political issues	Pearson Corr	0.037	-0.057	0.012	0.042	0.013	0.023	-0.016	0.097	0.096	0.107	0.042	0.091	0.029	-0.036	0.031	0.095	0.008	-0.017	0.109	-0.175	0.079	0.103	0.200	0.059	0.140	0.079	0.102
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.383	0.121	0.778	0.326	0.763	0.587	0.717	0.032	0.024	0.012	0.324	0.032	0.503	0.412	0.463	0.925	0.860	0.684	0.010	0.707	0.063	0.016	0.000	0.021	0.001	0.067	0.117
	I pay attention to what's going on in	Pearson Corr	0.077	0.065	0.046	0.009	0.080	0.136	0.134	0.049	0.068	0.050	-0.003	0.016	0.060	0.013	0.051	0.033	-0.004	0.062	0.085	-0.036	0.080	0.063	0.325	0.099	0.122	0.126	0.119
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.074	0.130	0.286	0.843	0.060	0.012	0.022	0.250	0.113	0.243	0.944	0.706	0.063	0.761	0.233	0.438	0.926	0.146	0.045	0.940	0.062	0.144	0.000	0.020	0.004	0.003	0.006
	I pay attention to what's going on in	Pearson Corr	0.045	0.068	0.028	-0.026	0.064	0.157	0.062	0.086	0.100	0.027	0.033	0.069	0.068	0.018	0.029	0.016	-0.030	0.045	0.027	0.070	0.160	0.135	0.344	0.107	0.052	0.098	0.148
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.332	0.140	0.546	0.564	0.161	0.001	0.073	0.147	0.028	0.550	0.471	0.051	0.055	0.725	0.524	0.725	0.515	0.330	0.561	0.881	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.019	0.252	0.031	0.001
	I pay attention to what's going on in	Pearson Corr	0.141	0.230	0.142	0.093	0.226	0.095	0.122	0.060	0.100	0.052	0.062	0.113	0.016	0.055	-0.059	0.060	0.002	0.048	0.104	-0.149	0.116	0.194	0.270	0.133	0.232	0.187	0.147
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.001	0.000	0.001	0.031	0.000	0.049	0.005	0.163	0.020	0.225	0.056	0.009	0.707	0.207	0.174	0.168	0.959	0.262	0.016	0.751	0.007	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.001
	I pay attention to popular culture. (in)	Pearson Corr	0.141	0.156	0.154	0.154	0.162	0.017	0.087	-0.027	0.020	0.011	0.063	-0.020	-0.010	-0.054	0.069	0.018	0.042	0.052	-0.533	0.172	0.093	0.168	0.132	0.158	0.121	0.095	
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.899	0.044	0.555	0.876	0.850	0.801	0.142	0.638	0.825	0.214	0.726	0.329	0.226	0.218	0.000	0.031	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.005	0.027	0.000	
	Politics matters to my community.	Pearson Corr	0.017	0.046	0.165	0.091	0.104	0.038	0.065	0.070	0.067	0.143	0.095	0.108	0.034	0.018	0.013	0.041	-0.041	0.013	0.084	-0.179	0.330	0.056	0.081	0.036	0.152	0.117	0.081
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.695	0.282	0.000	0.039	0.016	0.378	0.048	0.102	0.185	0.001	0.028	0.012	0.431	0.680	0.770	0.339	0.344	0.769	0.091	0.702	0.000	0.194	0.042	0.406	0.000	0.007	0.060
	Since 1994, the lives of South Africa	Pearson Corr	0.267	0.108	0.055	0.059	0.141	0.024	-0.029	0.016	0.014	0.029	0.040	0.014	-0.009	0.034	0.009	-0.039	-0.043	-0.020	0.766	0.106	0.081	0.049	0.180	0.066	0.163	0.058	
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.000	0.011	0.199	0.171	0.001	0.581	0.490	0.713	0.743	0.498	0.352	0.711	0.837	0.423	0.838	0.365	0.316	0.642	0.045	0.013	0.059	0.252	0.000	0.121	0.000	0.172	
	I feel connected to others.	Pearson Corr	0.179	0.052	0.052	0.071	0.190	0.017	-0.011	0.105	0.090	0.004	0.033	0.035	0.031	-0.028	-0.059	0.051	0.005	-0.058	0.077	0.331	0.055	0.432	0.129	0.154	0.149	0.075	0.204
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.000	0.226	0.232	0.067	0.000	0.668	0.806	0.114	0.037	0.918	0.446	0.421	0.470	0.524	0.169	0.239	0.916	0.181	0.273	0.465	0.202	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	The government is working to solve	Pearson Corr	0.282	0.131	-0.025	0.005	0.021	0.046	0.059	-0.004	0.040	-0.150	-0.046	0.027	0.095	-0.010	-0.067	0.067	0.066	0.051	0.037	0.354	0.075	0.064	0.094	0.277	0.002	0.030	0.031
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.000	0.002	0.552	0.911	0.629	0.281	0.020	0.922	0.352	0.000	0.286	0.525	0.026	0.814	0.119	0.116	0.120	0.237	0.389	0.437	0.079	0.050	0.028	0.000	0.962	0.478	0.463
	Political parties are working to solve	Pearson Corr	0.176	0.141	0.069	0.048	0.103	0.039	0.146	0.016	0.049	-0.025	0.060	0.042	0.119	-0.018	-0.014	0.079	-0.029	0.013	0.092	0.417	0.189	0.072	0.053	0.346	0.078	0.077	0.069
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.000	0.001	0.106	0.265	0.016	0.364	0.001	0.715	0.247	0.553	0.159	0.328	0.006	0.678	0.736	0.063	0.503	0.761	0.031	0.352	0.000	0.060	0.213	0.000	0.066	0.070	0.108
	Trade unions are working to solve	Pearson Corr	0.169	0.122	0.035	0.015	0.060	0.019	0.065	-0.021	0.097	-0.029	0.028	0.006	0.078	0.042	-0.010	0.008	0.030	-0.036	0.052	-0.167	0.126	0.112	0.103	0.289	0.064	0.040	0.079
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.000	0.004	0.408	0.719	0.063	0.662	0.046	0.623	0.023	0.504	0.508	0.484	0.070	0.333	0.615	0.858	0.486	0.400	0.225	0.721	0.063	0.008	0.015	0.000	0.133	0.350	0.065
	Community services are working to	Pearson Corr	0.180	0.121	0.122	0.103	0.232	0.080	0.078	0.213	0.185	0.169	0.137	0.203	0.087	-0.004	-0.011	0.104	0.029	-0.097	0.189	-0.548	0.106	0.254	0.098	0.294	0.275	0.094	0.175
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.000	0.005	0.004	0.017	0.000	0.062	0.070	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.044	0.927	0.805	0.015	0.563	0.024	0.000	0.203	0.014	0.000	0.022	0.000	0.000	0.028	0.000
	Religious groups are working to sol	Pearson Corr	0.069	0.061	0.111	0.099	0.159	0.036	0.038	0.215	0.102	0.233	0.224	0.180	0.009	0.033	0.041	0.096	-0.027	-0.070	0.109	0.258	0.085	0.133	0.041	0.257	0.232	0.123	0.091
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.107	0.199	0.010	0.021	0.000	0.426	0.373	0.000	0.017	0.000	0.000	0.831	0.443	0.339	0.024	0.521	0.103	0.010	0.578	0.345	0.002	0.332	0.000	0.000	0.004	0.034	
	I am involved in my community.	Pearson Corr	0.028	0.057	0.023	-0.032	0.093	0.067	0.064	0.194	0.212	0.121	0.099	0.262	0.075	0.025	0.048	0.064	0.053	0.002	0.119	0.167	-0.002	0.201	0.012	0.087	0.133	0.027	0.035
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.518	0.190	0.587	0.451	0.030	0.044	0.049	0.000	0.000	0.005	0.023	0.000	0.052	0.572	0.261	0.051	0.216	0.963	0.005	0.721	0.957	0.000	0.777	0.043	0.002	0.532	0.410
	I think people working together can	Pearson Corr	0.098	0.019	0.099	0.110	0.158	-0.018	0.139	0.147	0.111	0.149	0.089	0.038	0.060	-0.056	-0.024	0.055	-0.062	-0.069	0.001	0.420	0.057	-0.012	0.074	0.068	0.188	0.098	0.076
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.022	0.661	0.021	0.010	0.000	0.673	0.001	0.001	0.009	0.000	0.037	0.379	0.161	0.199	0.575	0.195	0.145	0.104	0.976	0.348	0.184	0.778	0.081	0.114	0.000	0.044	0.075
	Political parties care about youth is	Pearson Corr	0.348	0.203	0.023	0.076	0.059	0.055	0.041	-0.060	0.003	-0.096	-0.056	-0.059	0.067	-0.007													

All Young People		South Africans think young people are important	Contacting a party official is an effective way to make your voice heard	Marching or protesting is an effective way to make your voice heard	Young people are materialistic	Young people are leaders of the nation	In the last year have you taken part in a protest, march or demonstration	In the last year have you contacted or visited a government official about a concern	In the last year have you volunteered or interned with a religious, youth/children's, health or social service organization	In the last year have you worked with another person or people to address a social problem	In the last year have you belonged to any group	currently an active member-religious	currently an active member-community services center	currently an active member-political	currently an active member-trade union	currently an active member-sports team or athletics club	currently an active member-student organization	currently an active member-burial association	currently an active member-social association	currently an active member-movement	currently an active member-another group	Electoral Indicators	Community Engagement Indicators	Political Voice and Awareness Indicators	Trust Indicators	Efficacy Indicators	Justice Orientation Indicators	Community Problem Solving Indicator	
I trust political party leaders.	Pearson Corr	0.305	0.217	-0.014	0.022	0.067	-0.003	0.012	-0.114	-0.058	-0.142	-0.062	-0.053	0.125	0.146	-0.065	-0.029	-0.005	0.025	-0.014	-0.333	0.102	0.020	0.078	0.296	-0.045	-0.008	-0.009	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.000	0.754	0.814	0.120	0.962	0.780	0.008	0.178	0.091	0.020	0.216	0.024	0.001	0.129	0.503	0.915	0.562	0.745	0.018	0.842	0.069	0.000	0.297	0.850	0.835		
I trust school officials and teachers.	Pearson Corr	0.166	0.074	0.033	0.070	0.129	0.107	-0.011	0.041	-0.037	0.085	0.054	0.008	0.038	0.020	0.021	0.029	0.007	-0.082	0.050	-0.333	-0.007	0.136	0.017	0.170	0.001	-0.061	0.006	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.087	0.446	0.103	0.003	0.012	0.788	0.336	0.393	0.127	0.209	0.848	0.618	0.604	0.618	0.506	0.877	0.054	0.243	0.519	0.862	0.001	0.693	0.000	0.981	0.156	0.897	
I trust community leaders.	Pearson Corr	0.332	0.129	0.042	0.015	0.187	0.053	-0.033	0.070	-0.012	0.064	0.040	0.058	0.069	0.062	0.052	0.091	-0.012	-0.032	0.109	0.000	0.070	0.153	0.058	0.294	0.102	0.037	0.070	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.003	0.337	0.724	0.000	0.220	0.442	0.196	0.786	0.135	0.353	0.176	0.112	0.154	0.227	0.034	0.785	0.452	0.011	0.000	0.104	0.000	0.177	0.000	0.016	0.388	0.105	
I trust religious leaders.	Pearson Corr	0.062	0.037	0.008	0.247	0.126	-0.010	-0.040	0.150	0.090	0.135	0.085	-0.019	-0.021	-0.007	0.060	-0.031	-0.049	0.108	0.728	0.059	0.077	0.063	0.161	0.113	0.049	0.055		
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.059	0.389	0.857	0.003	0.003	0.823	0.357	0.001	0.487	0.222	0.002	0.050	0.667	0.830	0.867	0.167	0.475	0.256	0.011	0.151	0.174	0.075	0.146	0.000	0.009	0.258	0.207	
South Africans think young people are important	Pearson Corr	1.000	0.336	0.160	0.221	0.343	0.093	0.039	-0.043	0.100	0.002	-0.016	0.011	0.040	0.083	0.014	-0.016	0.110	0.091	0.000	0.894	0.011	0.061	0.107	0.138	0.104	0.079	0.029	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	6.37E-16	0.000181	1.86E-07	1.77E-16	0.029999	0.365323	0.31444	0.82187	0.967343	0.715183	0.801565	0.350456	0.054036	0.136373	0.706201	0.010271	0.032882	0.993769	0.01613	0.79234	0.01254	0.001216	0.049264	0.014391	0.064624	0.499264		
Contacting a party official is an effective way to make your voice heard	Pearson Corr	0.338	1.000	0.185	0.107	0.219	-0.021	0.048	-0.022	0.036	-0.018	0.008	0.075	-0.195	-0.058	-0.017	-0.002	-0.060	0.240	0.085	-0.036	0.237	0.095	0.094	0.127	0.112			
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.000	0.013	0.000	0.018	0.254	0.012	0.959	0.403	0.875	0.880	0.082	0.014	0.173	0.688	0.968	0.159	0.604	0.047	0.397	0.000	0.028	0.027	0.003	0.000			
Marching or protesting is an effective way to make your voice heard	Pearson Corr	0.160	0.185	1.000	0.202	0.166	0.150	0.059	0.033	-0.011	0.059	0.020	0.038	0.051	0.033	0.016	0.007	0.042	0.096	-0.022	0.132	0.065	0.007	0.110	0.217	0.117	0.428	0.078	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.165	0.439	0.789	0.110	0.644	0.372	0.234	0.450	0.708	0.867	0.321	0.044	0.603	0.777	0.046	0.854	0.010	0.697	0.006	0.000	0.069	
Young people are materialistic	Pearson Corr	0.221	0.107	0.202	1.000	0.306	0.034	0.050	0.055	0.029	0.045	0.019	0.044	-0.005	0.050	-0.047	0.057	0.025	0.008	-0.025	0.008	-0.025	0.167	0.110	0.028	0.067	0.015	0.118	0.094
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.013	0.000	0.000	0.030	0.430	0.040	0.197	0.492	0.297	0.656	0.299	0.914	0.243	0.272	0.181	0.559	0.858	0.560	0.721	0.010	0.518	0.119	0.721	0.000	0.010	0.027	
Young people are leaders of the nation	Pearson Corr	0.343	0.219	0.186	0.306	1.000	0.081	0.053	0.014	0.012	0.081	0.105	0.126	0.035	-0.026	0.021	0.075	0.010	0.017	0.063	0.113	0.117	0.174	0.168	0.137	0.407	0.147	0.156	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.057	0.216	0.904	0.000	0.032	0.014	0.003	0.901	0.551	0.630	0.078	0.814	0.095	0.138	0.809	0.006	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	
In the last year have you taken part in a protest, march or demonstration	Pearson Corr	0.093	-0.021	0.150	0.034	0.081	1.000	0.275	0.120	0.173	0.081	0.146	0.182	0.242	0.112	0.081	0.135	0.248	0.131	0.123	0.167	0.091	0.149	0.105	0.073	0.031	0.053	0.101	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.030	0.618	0.000	0.430	0.057	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.055	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.009	0.056	0.001	0.000	0.002	0.004	0.721	0.032	0.000	0.013	0.066	0.473	0.215	0.018		
In the last year have you contacted or visited a government official about a concern	Pearson Corr	0.048	0.059	0.050	0.053	0.275	1.000	0.085	0.205	0.061	0.034	0.136	0.173	0.124	-0.017	0.062	0.116	0.142	0.113	-0.091	0.013	0.062	0.069	0.042	0.054	0.009	0.072		
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.365	0.264	0.165	0.240	0.216	0.000	0.151	0.200	0.351	0.427	0.001	0.030	0.044	0.683	0.485	0.606	0.001	0.068	0.846	0.753	0.225	0.298	0.328	0.206	0.839	0.091		
In the last year have you volunteered or interned with a religious, youth/children's, health or social service organization	Pearson Corr	-0.043	-0.108	0.033	0.055	0.124	0.120	0.085	1.000	0.313	0.404	0.287	0.338	0.090	-0.045	0.165	0.281	-0.060	-0.022	0.223	0.340	0.009	0.116	0.126	0.112	0.009	0.112	0.077	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.314	0.011	0.439	0.197	0.004	0.005	0.045	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.036	0.299	0.000	0.000	0.061	0.526	0.000	0.062	0.311	0.000	0.624	0.005	0.000	0.008	0.008	0.071		
In the last year have you worked with another person or people to address a social problem	Pearson Corr	0.010	-0.022	-0.011	0.029	0.187	0.173	0.205	0.313	1.000	0.256	0.155	0.313	0.124	0.004	0.162	0.217	0.056	-0.006	0.254	0.730	0.096	0.189	0.087	0.081	0.211	0.045	0.157	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.827	0.612	0.789	0.492	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.004	0.924	0.000	0.000	0.202	0.894	0.000	0.062	0.023	0.000	0.041	0.031	0.000	0.290	0.000		
In the last year have you belonged to any group	Pearson Corr	0.002	0.002	0.059	0.046	0.091	0.081	0.061	0.404	0.255	1.000	0.253	0.177	0.043	-0.021	0.232	0.164	-0.019	-0.130	0.178	0.091	0.020	0.127	-0.003	0.076	0.285	0.124	0.108	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.967	0.959	0.170	0.297	0.032	0.055	0.151	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.310	0.000	0.310	0.000	0.469	0.002	0.000	0.846	0.632	0.903	0.848	0.703	0.000	0.003	0.001	0.011		
currently an active member-religious	Pearson Corr	-0.016	-0.036	0.020	0.109	0.105	0.146	0.034	0.297	0.155	0.253	1.000	0.157	0.563	-0.003	0.146	0.189	-0.011	-0.037	0.153	0.091	0.083	0.117	0.045	0.132	0.133	0.030	0.055	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.715	0.403	0.644	0.056	0.014	0.001	0.427	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.846	0.001	0.000	0.804	0.380	0.000	0.846	0.051	0.006	0.291	0.002	0.002	0.464	0.199		
currently an active member-community services center	Pearson Corr	0.011	-0.018	0.038	0.044	0.126	0.182	0.136	0.338	0.313	0.217	0.152	1.000	0.090	0.038	0.093	0.224	0.068	0.049	0.250	0.730	0.025	0.243	0.019	0.113	0.171	0.062	0.098	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.802	0.675	0.371	0.299	0.033	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.036	0.379	0.028	0.000	0.112	0.250	0.000	0.062	0.563	0.000	0.652	0.008	0.000	0.145	0.022		
currently an active member-political	Pearson Corr	0.040	0.008	0.061	-0.005	0.005	0.242	0.173	0.090	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.350	0.860	0.234	0.914	0.901	0.000	0.000	0.035	0.004	0.313	0.000	0.030	0.090	0.015	0.434	0.193	0.440	0.144	0.000	0.721	0.215	0.022	0.118	0.007	0.614	0.127	0.243	
currently an active member-trade union	Pearson Corr	0.083	0.075	0.033	0.050	-0.026	0.112	0.124	-0.045	0.004	-0.021	-0.003	0.038	0.106	1.000	0.023	0.012	0.151	0.116	0.106	-0.091	-0.024	0.002	0.042	0.020	-0.063	-0.001	-0.063	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.054	0.062	0.450	0.243	0.551	0.009	0.004	0.298	0.924	0.821	0.948	0.379	0.015	0.000	0.587	0.784	0.000	0.007	0.014	0.846	0.578	0.956	0.330	0.638	0.146	0.975	0.144	
currently an active member-sports team or athletics club	Pearson Corr	0.014	-0.105	0.016	-0.047	0.021	0.081	-0.017	0.155	0.162	0.232	0.146	0.983	0.034	0.023	1.000	0.174	0.049	0.039	0.138	0.417	-0.075	-0.011	-0.031	-0.011	-0.003	-0.054	0	