The perceptions of private security officer behaviour on the preliminary investigation of housebreaking crime scenes in Berea, Durban

by

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
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Acknowledgements

Abstract

The severity of the crime pandemic in South Africa is demonstrated by the above-average prevalence of private policing companies that operate alongside state police. The involvement of the private security industry in the combating of crime has great potential for neutralising the plague of crime, particularly in countries where the levels of crime have reached immense concern, in South Africa in particular. It has become common practice in South Africa to employ the services of armed response officials who are able to swiftly respond to premises where suspicious activity or crimes have taken place. As typical first responders to crime scenes of housebreaking, the question is raised whether security personnel possess adequate knowledge regarding crime scene management and evidence preservation. The research sought to gain a better understanding of private security activity, responsibility and training concerned with first response to an alleged crime scene. The research was restricted to events of housebreaking, because this type of crime forms the bulk of armed response requirements. The findings indicated that the services performed by private security first responders were deemed satisfactory by members of the SAPS. According to the results, crime scene contamination quite rarely occurs at the hands of large, well-known private security companies, but may rather be expected from smaller, lesser-trained officers of private security businesses. Based on the findings, recommendations are offered that mainly involve private security training programme advancements as well as industry regulatory improvements.

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List of Acronyms

CCTV: Closed-Circuit Television

CJS: Criminal Justice System

CSI: Crime Scene Investigator

CSVR: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation

PS: Private security

SAPS: South African Police Service

VCS: Victims of Crime Survey

Chapter 1

General Orientation

1.1   Introduction

Because the global crime epidemic has amplified over the past several years, not only in terms of occurrence but also regarding its severity, nature, motives, methods, and gravity, it has become progressively crucial to address it. It has been claimed that South Africa is listed as one of the countries with the highest crime rates worldwide, in accordance to its population ratio (CSVR, 2007; Du Plessis & Louw, 2005 cited in Kruger & Landman, 2008). The relative stability of the reported crime rates between the years 2005 and 2015, as released by the South African Police Service (SAPS), indicates the ineffectiveness of current national crime prevention measures (SAPS, 2015b).

With specific reference to housebreaking, which is the focus of this research, reported cases peaked between April 2012 and March 2013, with a total of 45,404 reported cases of housebreaking in the province of KwaZulu-Natal alone (SAPS, 2015b). Moreover, according to the Victims of Crime Survey 2014/2015 (Statistics South Africa, 2015), the majority of the respondents reported housebreaking/burglary as the most predominant and feared crime in their area of residence.

Naturally, all South Africans as members of society play a role in protecting themselves against crime as well as in attempting to prevent it. Thus, more and more South Africans make use of alarm systems and electric fencing, and employ private security measures to protect themselves from being victimised and to feel a sense of security (Baker, 2002; Kruger & Landman, 2008; Mahlutshana, 2014; van Zyl, 2002:22).

Over the past several years, the employment of private security services has become a popular trend among all infrastructures. With specific reference to private property and residences, the implementation of these measures plays an immense role in preventing crime. As will be explored in the literature, a large advantage of employing private security services is the rapid armed reaction to the property where a housebreaking occurred. The question then arises whether or not the behaviour of responding personnel – particularly 'first responders' who arrive at the alleged crime scene first - impact the crime scene investigation process that is performed by members of the South African Police Service (SAPS).

Despite the immense growth of private security services worldwide, this industry, along with its practices and cultures, has been neglected as an area of research compared to the attention given to public policing bodies (Singh & Kempa, 2007; van Steden & Sarre, 2010).

1.2   Main research objectives

The objective of this research was to gain an in-depth understanding of the specific actions private security personnel perform when responding to premises where housebreakings were reported. Two aims of the study were: (1) to explore the perceptions of police officers and private security personnel regarding the actions performed by first responders at crime scenes of housebreakings, and (2) to obtain their opinions regarding potential crime scene contamination. The research offers recommendations in response to the findings.

1.3   Contextualisation

This section outlines the definitions of the key concepts that framed the research.

Protection is defined as "*controlling risks involving those things we value, such as our bodies, our families, public peace, integrity, traffic safety and flow, personal belongings, state security, and so on*" (Swanton, 1993 cited in Schneider, 2013:104).

The term *security* denotes "*[t]he condition of being protected against hazards, threats, risks, or loss*" (ASIS, 2013 cited in Schneider, 2013:104).

Private security broadly refers to "*the protection of individuals, their property (assets) and related interests against multiple risks… by means of utilising people and equipment*" (Steenkamp & Potgieter, 2004:71).

A *private security company* therefore denotes a privately owned business or establishment that provides *private security* services.

Security officers are defined by van Steden & Sarre (2010:4) as "*those persons who are employed or sponsored by a commercial enterprise on a contract or 'in-house' basis, using public or private funds, to*

engage in tasks (other than vigilante-style action) where the principal component is a security or regulatory function."

Essentially, the term *private security officer* refers to an agent who is employed by a private security company and who has been trained for and is in authority of providing the service of private security as defined above.

Housebreaking/burglary is briefly defined as "*the unlawful entry of a structure, with or without force, with intent to commit a felony or theft*" (Bartol & Bartol, 2011:411). A discussion regarding the various definitions of housebreaking is provided in Chapter 2 along with its South African legal definition.

The *crime scene* is the location at which the criminal event took place.

The *first responding officer* refers to the agent who is the first professional individual(s) (i.e., a person or persons employed by a private security company or by the South African Police Service) to arrive at the premises where the crime was reported.

Criminal investigation is defined by Little (2011:2) as "*a systematic search for the truth in order to find a positive solution of the crime by gathering objective or subjective clues.*"

According to Gilbert (2010:52), *evidence* is "*anything properly admissible in a court that will aid the function of a criminal proceeding in establishing guilt or innocence.*"

Crime scene contamination means "*unwanted transfer of material between items of evidence*" (Houck, 2009:169).

1.4   Theoretical approach

The theoretical approach of the research was not framed by a single theory, but rather by the integration of two main theories: (1) criminal law theory and (2) Locard's exchange theory.

Let us first consider the origin of the traditional criminal law theory. From the most fundamental viewpoint, the role of criminal and social justice should be considered in terms of political and moral philosophy. According to Larmore (2014:2), moral philosophy "*ha[s] to do… with the shape our social life should have as a whole.*" In other words, it refers to what we conceive as right or wrong, and how this governs our decision making, behaviour and overall social functioning. 'Moral rights' share a meaning with ethics, which Willis (2009:523) defines as "*the principles or assumptions underpinning claims about how individuals… ought to conduct themselves.*"

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For example, members of a small settlement or community will be able to abide by a set of rules created by like-minded people; however, this proves to be more difficult in a heterogeneous society (Net Industries, 2016).

This is where political philosophy inevitably comes in to play – in the argument that the societal structure needs to be governed by a set of rules, for the purpose of regulation.

> "*People disagree and their disagreements extend from their material and status interests to their very ideas of the right and the good, so that society is possible only through the establishment of authoritative rules, binding on all and backed by the threat or use of force*" (Larmore, 2014:3).

The concept is linked with that of social control, which is referred to by Reiner (2010:4) as "*everything that contributes to the reproduction of social order*". The author further cites Cohen (1985 in Reiner, 2010:4) who defines social control as "*the organised ways in which society responds to behaviour and the people it regards as deviant, problematic, worrying, threatening, troublesome, or undesirable.*" It thus follows that the state is responsible for sanctioning laws; in this case, specifically criminal laws, to oppose those who breach these sets of rules to commit 'moral wrongs'. From this the principle of punishment by the state has been developed, implying that punishment will follow for those who break the 'rules'. The justification for punishment may stem from retributive or utilitarian approaches.

Enacting these laws or regulations is where the police step in:

> "*Policing implies the set of activities aimed at preserving the security of a particular social order… [and] the creation of systems of surveillance coupled with the threat of sanctions for discovered deviance*" (Reiner, 2010:5).

Before punishment is imposed on the alleged offender or 'deviant', his/her guilt must be proved by the state. In the South African context, an alleged offender will be presumed by the state as innocent until he/she is proven guilty. The 'burden of proof', according to Gilbert (2010:55), "*involves…a proving of each element of a crime, against the accused.*" The burden of proof lies on the state, and thus before an alleged offender can be apprehended, the state must first prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt (Zeffertt, Paizes & Skeen, 2003:173). In order to achieve this, it is the duty of the state and of the police, as representatives of the state, to collect the relevant evidence necessary to prove the individual's guilt of the crime in question.

The relationship between science and law can be considered through the concept of criminalistics, which was developed by Hans Gross, who described "*how physics, chemistry, fingerprinting and many other natural and applied sciences could be utilised to solve crime*" (Pyrek, 2007 cited in Visser, 2013:24).

Next, one can consider the Locard exchange principle pertaining to physical evidence found at crime scenes. This theory posits that "*every contact leaves a trace*" (Willis, 2009:525). It can be illustrated as follows: when an intruder enters and operates within the crime scene, he brings something new (a trace) to the scene, and when he leaves he takes something with him from the scene (Gilbert, 2010:82). With regard to DNA evidence which is unique to every individual, Murphy (2008 cited in de Wet, Oosthuizen & Visser 2011:174) posits that the Locard principle, together with DNA evidence analyses, can prove an individual's "*involve[ment] in a crime or [that he is] connected to a crime scene*", or it can disprove his/her involvement at a crime scene. The task of first responding crime scene investigators is therefore to identify and collect relevant potential evidence. More particularly, DNA evidence found at the scene can be used to potentially identify any offender(s) (de Wet, et al., 2011:179).

It is said that crime scene investigation "*is the meeting point of science, logic, and law*" (Stevens, 2011:172). Stevens (2011:172-173) explains the process as follows:

> "*Crime scene investigators create a hypothesis based on physical evidence of the actions of the victim(s) and suspect(s) before, during, and after a criminal event. Hopefully, the material (evidence) that was collected and evaluated will support an investigator's hypothesis, eliminate innocent persons, guide the detective toward a person of interest (i.e., a possible suspect), and aid in obtaining a recorded legal confession.*"

Following these processes, the proven offender will be subjected to the relevant punishment according to the law.

The importance of the crime scene and the value of properties encountered at it throughout the investigation process are thus highlighted.

1.5   Research methodology

This research was qualitative in nature as it sought to explore individuals' perceptions on a particular subject, or phenomenon (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010). It is for this reason that the research adopted a survey format and that data were collected from the participants by means of questionnaires and interviews. The research may also be classified as descriptive, as I attempted to gain in-depth insight regarding the

attitudes and opinions of two distinct population groups, namely those of private security and SAPS officers.

In the selection of the research participants, a purposive sampling method was employed, as Leedy and Ormrod (2010:105) explain as "*select[ing] those individuals or objects that will yield the most information about the topic under investigation.*" I therefore involved only SAPS and a private security company's personnel as respondents in order to address the exclusive concepts around which the research question was centred.

My analysis of the research data took the form of content analysis, whereby the scripts containing the data were carefully examined for the purpose of identifying common characteristics or patterns. This process is corroborated by various authors (Bryman, 2004; Jupp, 2006; Leedy & Ormrod, 2010)

1.6   Research questions

The research intended to provide in-depth understanding of the actions of private security officers who arrive as 'first responders' at reported scenes of housebreaking, and to identify and evaluate potential problems, if any, that may arise from their engagement with the crime investigation process.

Two main research questions therefore guided the current research:

- What are the perceptions of SAPS detectives and private security personnel's' perceptions regarding the impact of private security officer behaviour on the preliminary investigation of housebreaking crime scenes in Berea, Durban?

- What are the perceptions of SAPS detectives and private security personnel regarding the responsibilities and actions of first responders to housebreaking crimes scenes in Berea, Durban?

The exploration of the answers to these questions enabled the researcher to:

- determine if private security officers that attend housebreaking crime scenes effectively and efficiently manage these crime scenes in terms of first responder behaviour and protocol;

- obtain an estimate of the level of contamination that private security officers leave at the crime scenes of housebreaking as first responders to the scene; and to

- suggest measures that may be implemented to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of private security officer behaviour at housebreaking crime scenes.

The questions asked in the questionnaire schedule were thus formulated in such a manner to gain an in-depth understanding of the duties private security officers perform as first responders. Because the behaviour of the first responder/s at crime scenes is a vital determinant of the success of the investigative process, it is important to explore their behaviour on a local level.

1.7   Outline of chapters

The second chapter (Chapter 2) provides some context and indication of the severity of the crime of housebreaking in South Africa in conjunction with relevant criminological theories that offer explanations to these crimes, specifically those applicable to the South African society. It additionally outlines the extent of this particular crime in South Africa and illuminates its typical characteristics.

Chapter 3 provides a brief outline of the South African Police Services and the Criminal Justice System. Concepts regarding the responsibilities and challenges faced by each within the current context are discussed.

The fourth chapter (Chapter 4) is centred on the private security industry in general, investigating its brief history and background, its recent development and growth - internationally and locally - as well as the various challenges faced by the industry. An overview of the South African context of the industry is the main focus. The principles and challenges regarding industry regulation are also explored.

Chapter 5 focuses on the process of crime scene investigation, starting with a general overview and then moving on to aspects related specifically to the investigation of housebreaking. Attention is given to the value held by physical evidence in terms of investigation as well as the issue of crime scene contamination.

Chapter 6 concentrates on the study's specific methodology. The research process is described in terms of the epistemological background, the research approach and design, the research instruments that were implemented, and the sample population of the study. Problems encountered throughout the research process are outlined and discussed and the research limitations are highlighted.

Chapter 7 delineates the research findings based on the data that were collected by means of a questionnaire and interview schedules. The individual responses by the research participants are observed, followed by an elucidation of the common themes that emerged from the responses. These

themes were developed through the use of a content analysis process. The categorised findings are compared and discussed.

The last chapter, Chapter 8, briefly summarises the main research results, followed by recommendations based on the findings. The chapter is concluded with a summarising conclusion that consolidates the research project.

Chapter 2

Housebreaking in South Africa

2.1   Introduction

The extent of crime, with specific reference to South Africa, has over the years become so overwhelming that employing private security contractors has likely become a necessity in some, if not most, populations nation-wide. As with many categories of crime, the definition, extent, nature, and causal factors of housebreaking are dependent on the context in which it occurs. The literature review on the subject of housebreaking is thus mostly limited to the South African context. A large proportion of the national statistics regarding housebreaking are sourced by the national Victims of Crime Survey(s) (VCS). The statistics contained in these reports are generally more reliable than the crime statistics released by the SAPS, and it additionally provides insight to the nature of housebreakings on a local level.

2.2   Defining housebreaking

Housebreaking, or residential burglary, is classified by the SAPS (2014a:online) as "*a property crime which also includes theft of and from motor vehicles and motorcycles, and non-residential burglary.*"

A commonly used legal definition of housebreaking is provided by Snyman (n.d. cited in Milton, 1996:792):

> "*Housebreaking with intent to commit a crime consists in unlawfully breaking and entering some building or structure with intent to commit some crime in it.*"

A more thorough definition is provided by Geldenhuys (1992 cited in van Zyl, 2002:16):

> "*Housebreaking is committed by a person who unlawfully and intentionally breaks into a building or similar structure, and enters or penetrates it with a part of his body or with an instrument with which he intends to control something on the premises, with the intention to commit a crime on the premises.*"

One distinction to be made is that of theft. A legal definition of theft is as follows: "*Theft consists in an unlawful 'contractatio' with intent to steal a thing capable of being stolen*" (Milton, 1996:579). However, this definition is somewhat troublesome to comprehend, and thus the definition of theft provided by the SAPS is preferred: "*Theft consists of the unlawful appropriation of moveable corporeal property belonging*

to another with intent to deprive the owner permanently of the property" (SAPS, 2014b:online). It is noteworthy that theft is different from housebreaking as it does not have to occur on the victim's premises, or involve trespassing or any other form of breaking and entering. From the definitions it is clear that housebreaking is an illegal, punishable act, even if nothing was stolen from the premises.

Some sources maintain use of the term 'burglary'; however, the term 'housebreaking' is preferred as it is the term used in South African criminal law. Nevertheless, the terms 'burglary' and 'housebreaking' are used synonymously throughout the dissertation.

Housebreaking/burglary is clearly distinctive from robbery. In terms of categorisation, housebreaking/burglary is classified as a property crime, mainly because it consists of the damage and/or theft of material objects and does not involve physical contact with the victim (Bartol & Bartol, 2011:410). Robbery on the other hand typically involves aggravating circumstances, use of threat, and force by the perpetrator/s in order to gain control over the victim/s (Bartol & Bartol, 2011). Due to its dangerous and aggressive nature, robbery is classed as a violent crime.

2.3   Causes of Housebreaking in the South African context

Various theories exist for explaining the crime of housebreaking. Criminological theories most applicable to the South African context include 'general strain theory' and 'differential association theory', both of which focus on the social and environmental factors that play a role in criminal behaviour, as well as on the 'geography of crime' theory.

The *general strain theory*, as the name suggests, proposes that individuals are at greater risk of committing a crime when they experience strain, stress, or frustration and that such crimes are generally committed "*as a product of failed aspirations*" (Brown, Esbensen & Geis, 2007:281). Brown et al. (2007:281) outline that this theory is most applicable in explaining lower-class crimes when strain is commonly experienced due to financial stress. It has furthermore been stipulated that "*social conditions place pressures on people…and people react individually to these conditions*", referring specifically to financial pressures (Brown, et al., 2007:285). Essentially, an individual may resort to illegitimate means of obtaining money if acceptable means are not available. In the South African context, there clearly exists a high rate of unemployment and poverty. Van Zyl, Wilson and Pretorius (2003:107) claim that unemployment and poverty can be directly linked to residential burglary.

A different approach was proposed by the theorist Sutherland, which is referred to as the 'differential association theory' (Curran & Renzetti, 1994:184). According to this theory, criminal behaviour is learnt,

much like any other behaviour, through association and communication with criminals, although particularly between familiar social groups (Curran & Renzetti, 1994:184). One can apply this theory to crime in South Africa in view of the high crime rate in general. A culture of violence is recognised within the country, and considering the large occurrence of crime and therefore the large population involved in committing crime, it is likely that criminal behaviour can diffuse further into society through association and communication between individuals.

Unlike socio-economic and behavioural explanations of crime, one can consider the 'geography of crime', also called 'environmental criminology' (van Zyl, et al., 2003:109). Pioneers in the field of environmental criminology are Brantingham and Brantingham (1981a cited in van Zyl et al., 2003:109), who focus more on the disposition existing in humans to commit crime and who propose an exploration of "*when, where and how crimes occur*". Furthermore, the emphasis of this approach is placed on "*locations of crime, the characteristics of those locations, [and] the movement paths that bring offenders and victims together at those locations*" (van Zyl, 2002; van Zyl et al., 2003:109). According to Jones (n.d.:2), crime is dependent on the environment in which it occurs; thus, by manipulating the direct environment and the 'pattern' of crime, crime in high crime areas can be reduced. Common strategies in this regard would be providing more lighting in the area, installing visible CCTV cameras on buildings, and ensuring limited access to areas via certain roads (e.g., gated communities).

2.3.1   Additional causes of housebreaking

Just as macro-level socio-economical and political transitions and developments were and still are shaped and influenced by South Africa's unique history, so does it play a role in the growing cycle of crime and its proposed explanations.

> "*The proliferation of crime is partly sustained as a result of the fact that practices that sustain crime, and people who are involved in crime, are socially accepted in many communities… This forms part of a culture that also condones other illegal practices, such as the purchase of stolen goods, illegal reconnections, and corruption…*" (CSVR, 2007:163).

In communities such as poverty stricken neighbourhoods and townships, the youth may be socialised into a culture of crime and violence. This results in association with and acceptance of individuals involved in criminal activities and, as a consequence, criminal behaviour is not challenged, within relative terms.

Another reason for the reluctance to object to offenders is that the market for stolen goods is rife. "*The availability of stolen goods is one way of 'making do' in this environment of uncertainty. As a result, people*

develop reciprocal relationships with those involved in crime" (CSVR, 2007:163-164). 'Making do' isn't the sole purpose for purchasing stolen goods, however. The offenders who obtained the items will likely be reluctant to keep them in their possession (van Zyl et al., 2003) and may therefore offer a marginal selling price. The cycle provides lower-class individuals with access to luxury items at a low cost, and burglars with a sufficient method of 'earning' a living. A situation is created where opportunities for theft are advocated.

According to the CSVR (2007:164), political transformation is "*associated with a complex range of cultural shifts that have weakened older concepts and systems of authority, and [has] brought to the fore a concept of the individual as free and autonomous.*" It has thus promoted the lifestyle of individualism sanctioned by the western world over the means of collectivism exercised by older, more traditional cultures that encouraged the selfless principle of acting 'for the good of the community'. The result is that society has adopted an attitude of 'each for his own', which is a philosophy that contributes to a reluctance to consider the personal well-being of others.

During the time of abolition of the apartheid rule, South African cities experienced an influx of eager migrants, labourers and general citizens seeking newly accessible work opportunities (CSVR, 2007; Taljaard, 2008). The economic strain placed on both the newly arrived and existing families rendered a large proportion of affected communities 'dysfunctional':

> "*While many South African families are nevertheless successful in nurturing emotionally well-rounded children, others are characterised by domestic violence or alcoholism, and these in turn have a negative impact on children and tend to be associated with other problems such as inconsistent or uncaring parenting, neglect or other abuse... It is not true that all perpetrators of violence necessarily come from families of this kind. But the prevalence of these types of problems is definitely linked to the degree to which young people in a society grow up with anti-social or violent tendencies, often linked to certain types of mental or emotional dispositions or pathologies that are often a product of, or reinforced by, the parenting and family environments from which they emerged*" (CSVR, 2007:165-166).

Moreover, the degree of inequality in the South African society creates a high degree of "relational distance" between people in this country (CSVR, 2007). This reinforces perceptions partly derived from the apartheid period in terms of which poorer people find it difficult to see themselves as being worthy of respect from others, and in which people more generally find it difficult to see themselves as part of a common citizenry (CSVR, 2007:166). These perceptions feed into attitudes and dispositions, such as the

disposition to see people poorer or richer than themselves, or from another race, as "other" (CSVR, 2007:166).

The unfortunate reality is that the severity of crime in South Africa has reached the point "*where it seems to [people] that their ability to obtain acceptance and respect from others will depend on whether they are able to display, or provide as gifts, the right type of consumer goods*" (CSVR, 2007:167). Apart from promoting robbery and burglary for the purpose of theft, it leaves South Africans adopting a lifestyle governed by fear:

> "*The dynamics of situations where people injure or kill others for items of property, whether big or small, are also reflected in other situations in our society where people use their own material interests as a justification for treating others with indifference, and seem unconcerned about the consequences of their actions for others*" (CSVR, 2007:166).

In light of the above, property crime may therefore be predominantly motivated by a true need on the part of those who are unable to find work and who, for instance, have families who are living in poverty.

2.4 The extent of housebreaking in South Africa

Crime statistics provided by the SAPS reveal that, in the period April 2014 to March 2015, reported cases of residential housebreaking and theft in fact decreased by 2.3%. This means that, based on the number of reported incidents, six hundred and ninety five (695) households on average were burgled each day in the reported period (Africa Check, 2015).

The SAPS crime statistics also reveal that housebreaking has been the most common reported crime, below miscellaneous theft, for the past several years. Furthermore, it is clear that this extreme figure is felt by society, as the Victims of Crime Survey (VCS) revealed that about 66% of households "*perceived housebreaking/burglary as the most common types of crime*" and that 63.6% of households reported housebreakings as "*the most feared crimes*" (Statistics South Africa, 2015:7-8).

The following graph (Figure 2.1) presents the number of reported housebreakings on a national level over the reported years. The data were sourced from the official SAPS crime statistics data base:

Figure 2.1: Number of nationally reported housebreakings over a period of 10 years. Source: SAPS (2015b).

It is noteworthy that the number of housebreakings reported during these time periods is far from an accurate reflection of the situation. This troublesome state of affairs is discussed in more detail in section 2.5 below.

2.5 Trends and characteristics of housebreaking in South Africa

The local government research agency, Statistics South Africa, utilised the statistics gathered by the series of VCSs together with the SAPS crime statistics to produce a single, and more reliable, interpretation of the combined data. The results were published in a report containing the detailed contexts and trends surrounding the crime of housebreaking in South Africa. This document is entitled *Exploration of the extent and circumstances surrounding housebreaking and home robbery in South Africa based on the Victims of Crime Survey (VCS) data: In-depth analysis of Victims of Crime data: 2010–2011*. Its findings are the most reliable and the most applicable of its kind because this report is the most recent source of data concerning the detailed nature of housebreaking in South Africa. The data produced in this report enable a more accurate reflection of the national housebreaking situation. This is because the data additionally account for events of housebreaking that were not necessarily reported to the SAPS.

By means of analysis and interpretation of crime statistics collected by SAPS and government research agencies, it is possible to generate certain patterns or generalisations of the context in which specific crimes occur. Essentially, specific types of crime committed within the same geographical area tend to, at least to some extent, share particular characteristics or have certain facets in common. The SAPS naturally holds the responsibility for capturing and assessing the crime statistics of South Africa. Needless to say, these statistics are rarely an accurate reflection of the true crime situation in the country. Underreporting of crime, faulty case reporting, incorrect capturing and calculation of data, and concealment of high crime rates, to name a few examples, are some of the reasons why published crime statistics are usually unreliable (Statistics South Africa, 2014).

2.5.1   Locality

In terms of location, it is interesting to note that the crime of housebreaking in South Africa can mostly be localised to middle and high-class areas, compared to lower class communities and townships where violent crimes are more prevalent (Louw & Shaw, 1997 cited in Kaldine, 2012:306). Kaldine (2012:306) adds that the wealthy are more vulnerable to property crimes compared to lower class communities that are more susceptible to contact crime and violence. This does not imply that the poor are excluded as victims of crime (van Zyl, et al., 2003:107), although the steer towards higher class residences seems logical when considering the motive of financial gain.

Research has revealed that residential burglars typically commit housebreakings in surprisingly close proximity to their own homes (Bartol & Bartol, 2011; Ratcliffe, 2003). It is believed that travelling long distances is an undesirable process for residential burglars and that "*travelling in unfamiliar territory is generally avoided*" (Bartol & Bartol, 2011; Ratcliffe, 2003:2).

In terms of access to targeted areas, van Zyl et al. (2003) elaborate on the environmental vulnerabilities of suitable targets for housebreakings:

> "*Good access roads provide the burglars with the opportunity to gain easy access to and exit from the target area. Residences next to or near open fields, green zones, rivers or parks may have added vulnerability, because the burglars can move more freely and unnoticed in these areas. These areas not only provide shelter to the burglars, but can also serve as places to hide the stolen goods*" (p. 110).

2.5.2 Time

Gilbert (2010:182) reports that the majority of burglaries in the United States (US) occur "*during the summer months*" and infers that this is due to "*vacations, open windows and doors for ventilation, and greater numbers of people walking through the neighbourhood*". It is generally held that the majority of housebreakings take place during the day time (Bartol & Bartol, 2011; Gilbert, 2010). A typical reasoning for this inference is that perpetrators of housebreaking are, according to the VCS (Statistics South Africa, 2015:17), "*rational in their approach towards targeting their potential victim(s)*" and will therefore carefully predetermine a target associated with low risk, as opposed to behaving impulsively. As a result, day time hours are determined as the preferable time period during which to commit a housebreaking due to homeowners typically attending to their daily occupations and habitual activities (Bartol & Bartol, 2011). It is claimed that, because burglary is a passive crime, "*the offender selects times and places that will minimize the possibility of an encounter with victims*" (Bartol & Bartol, 2011:412; Statistics South Africa, 2015).

According to the latest VCS information (Statistics South Africa, 2015:17), housebreakings are seldom committed in early evening hours, as this time period is associated with "*higher levels of activity*" and therefore is more typical to crimes of robbery. It is indicated that more than half of the VCS respondents reported the housebreakings to have occurred during late night hours (Statistics South Africa, 2015). There exists a discrepancy between sources about the typical times housebreakings are more likely to occur; day time hours and late night hours. The conclusion able to be drawn from this is whether late night or day time, late afternoon and evening hours are considered unlikely for housebreakings.

2.5.3 Personal characteristics

Bartol and Bartol (2011) indicate that crimes of housebreaking are characteristically limited to the male population and to young adults or youths. Research conducted by Ratcliffe (2001 cited in Ratcliffe, 2003) revealed that half of the burglars in Canberra, Australia, were younger than 18 years and, in rare cases, they were even younger than 16 years.

According to Bartol and Bartol (2011), it is common for perpetrators of housebreaking to operate in groups of more than one, but fewer than four individuals. The authors additionally indicate a pattern of drug use by burglars, claiming that it "*increases alertness*" as well as aiding them to adopt attitudes of determination and bravery (Bartol & Bartol, 2011:416).

Burglars are believed to have a common preference for small items of high value, particularly jewellery and electronics (Bartol & Bartol, 2011). The desirability of items targeted during a housebreaking largely depends on size and ease of removal and travel, as well as its potential to be sold (Bartol & Bartol, 2011; Statistics South Africa, 2014).

Bartol and Bartol (2011) provide an interesting motivation for the rule of victim-contact avoidance by burglars. The authors explain that the lack of personal, social contact between the offender and the victim prevents the offender from experiencing the victim's/victims' distress. The "*victim's absence… allow[s] the offender to repress, deny, or justify the crime more easily*" (Bartol & Bartol, 2011:410).

2.6   Targets of housebreaking

As the literature indicates, events of housebreaking are seldom spontaneous crimes, but are rather premeditated and planned long in advance. Targets of housebreaking are carefully chosen according to the level of adherence to several situational factors. The choice to commit a housebreaking is a rational one, as offenders seek out opportunities with the lowest possible personal risk (Bartol & Bartol, 2011).

According to van Zyl et al. (2003:113), "*residents who are away from home at regular intervals are more vulnerable to housebreakings than those with irregular time schedules*." Other target vulnerabilities include wealthy/luxury lifestyles, ignorant/inattentive demeanour, and negligence of security measures, whereas attractive qualities of houses/buildings include "*concealed entrances, easily removable windows, as well as a lack of surveillance*" (van Zyl et al., 2003:113).

The presence of "*access control, fences with spikes, electrified fences, entry phones, burglar alarms, burglar-proofing at windows and doors, locks, security guards, armed response, security lights and dogs*" are some unsuitable characteristics for housebreaking (van Zyl et al., 2003:113).

In terms of methods of entry, the VCS (Statistics South Africa, 2014:74) found the following:

> "*More households responded that the door was smashed (42,1%) as a way of entry into their house than any other reason, while a little over one in three households said that burglars managed to gain entry to their houses through the window (34,0%).*"

2.6.1 Repeat victimisation

A distinction is drawn between repeat victimisation (i.e., experiencing the same type of crime within a short time period) and multiple victimisation (i.e., experiencing victimisation of different types of crime within a short time period) (Statistics South Africa, 2014).

It may happen that victims of housebreaking are reluctant to improve their security following the criminal event as they may suppose that the chances of another burglary occurring are very slim. Paradoxically, it is the neglect of increased security measures that increases the likelihood of revictimisation.

One causal factor of repeat victimisation is illustrated by Gilbert (2010:185): "*Human methods of operation are additionally reinforced if a given action is repeatedly successful in achieving its goal.*" The VCS 2014/2015 (Statistics South Africa, 2015) similarly indicated that, compared to events of robbery, "*victims of housebreaking/burglary tended to be more likely to be victimised repeatedly*" (p. 15). From a logical standpoint, it makes sense that burglars may return to a specific residence where success was easily achieved on a previous occasion. However, the more likely explanation for repeat victimisation of housebreaking relates to neighbourhood factors. Based on an analysis of the 2010/2011 VCS (Statistics South Africa, 2014), environmental cues such as unrestricted entry/exit roads and dense plants/bushes make a residence a suitable target to all burglars, thus repeat victimisation is not necessarily committed by the same offenders.

2.7   Reports of housebreaking

The latest VCS report (Statistics South Africa, 2015) reveals that data gathered since the year 2008 have depicted "*a noticeable increase in the percentage of households who felt that the level of property crime increased*" (p. 5). One explanation for this is proposed by Mashele (2009:xiv), who explains that impact crimes such as robbery, car hijacking and burglary have in fact not decreased - on the contrary, they have increased - and that these crimes "*impact disproportionately on public perception because of the terror and insecurity they inspire*". The public disbelief of declining crime statistics may also arguably be increased by individuals who have increasingly been personal victims of crime.

As mentioned earlier, reported cases of crime to the SAPS are not a reliable indication of the actual quantity of crimes being committed. This phenomenon is known as the 'dark figure of crime' (UP, 2012:4). The phenomenon can essentially be pictured as an iceberg; the visible part is a representation of all crimes that are reported to the police, whereas the larger unseen section under the water reflects the number of crimes that genuinely occur (UP, 2012). According to the VCS (Statistics South Africa,

2015:64), the crimes of murder and car theft are almost all reported to the SAPS (i.e., 90100%), but that only half of the total housebreakings/burglaries that take place are reported to the SAPS. Consider the shocking extent of the underreporting of crime (specifically of housebreakings) as exposed by the analysis report of the VCS, as reflected in Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2: Graphic comparison of housebreakings/robbery reported to the SAPS and VCS. Source: (Statistics South Africa, 2014:12).

It should additionally be borne in mind that the 'missing' reports of housebreaking rates that were gathered by the VCS of course only add to the data collected by the sample of study, which means that the *actual* rate of housebreakings is probably far greater than the number indicated by the report above.

2.7.1   Reasons for underreporting

The following reasons were given for not reporting a crime to the police, according to the VCS analysis (Statistics South Africa, 2014):

Police issues: The victims either believed that the police would fail to solve the crime, or that some police were corrupt or inaccessible, or that police behaviour was sometimes inappropriate.

Perpetrator issues: Some victims did not report a crime to the police because they could not identify the perpetrator/s, while others feared reprisals from the perpetrator/s.

The former statement presents a problematic dilemma, because if citizens believe that they cannot identify the perpetrators themselves, neither can the police. This is an indication of the lack of faith in the abilities of the SAPS on the one hand, and the impossible task that the police often face on the other hand. This dilemma directly points to the need for efficient and proper crime scene investigation, which goes to the heart of this investigation.

Crime related issues: Some victims did not report a crime because they felt that it was "not serious enough"; others did not report it because items stolen were old or not valuable, while others claimed that they had solved the crime themselves.

This statement implies that citizens feel personal retribution is good enough, and thus there is no need to involve the police. This leads us to believe that victims are willing to look past the loss of old or invaluable possessions and that, for them, justice is almost irrelevant. However, the comment that citizens "had solved the crime themselves" raises a red flag, as this may imply that citizens tend to take the law into their own hands. This trend exposes the potential for a serious cycle of crime that may spiral out of control if it remains unchecked.

Self-blame issues: Such issues included fear of being blamed, belief that it was partly the victim's own fault, and fear of being exposed or embarrassed (Statistics South Africa, 2015).

Lack of faith: Research by Baker (2002:44) revealed that victims were reluctant to report a crime because they expected that the police would not even answer the phone call and, if they were to answer the call, the police would take ages to respond to the site, if they responded at all. Additionally, it was mentioned that citizens' belief in the lack of police response motivated them to have their belongings insured (Baker, 2002; Mahlutshana, 2014).

Secondary victimisation: The regular occurrence of secondary victimisation may also play a role in the non-reporting of crime in general, and is directly related to the above mentioned 'police issues'. Kaldine (2012) regards secondary victimisation simply as the receipt of general poor service delivery from government agencies, whether it is experienced by departments of the criminal justice system or the welfare and health agencies. To repeat the quote, the author raises the following argument:

> "*The degree to which victims of crime recover from the loss, and the physical and emotional trauma related to the crime, are greatly influenced by the manner in which the relevant authorities respond to the criminal case*" (Kaldine, 2012:308).

Although the scope and focus of the study did not explore victim mistreatment by these agencies, this argument provides an explanation as to why some victims choose not to report crimes to the authorities.

A common reasoning among South Africans in particular is that the process through which the authorities address the crime is not worth enduring.

Kaldine (2012:309) also explains that a phenomenon has occurred where our society has essentially become tolerant of the crime situation and has therefore become negligent in the reporting of crime. This, it is argued, in turn propagates the 'crime problem' in the country. The result is that one bad tendency strengthens the next, as is diagrammatically illustrated in Figure 2.3 below.

Figure 2.3: Cycle illustrating the consequences of the non-reporting of crime.

2.8   Conclusion

From the review of the literature, it appeared that social and environmental factors play a prominent part in elucidating criminal behaviour within the South African context. For housebreaking specifically, it may be a combination of these influences paired with suitable geographical characteristics which amplify the opportunities for this crime to exist so prevalently.

The discussion outlining the prospective characteristics of housebreaking in the local context including typical locality, time frame, methods of execution, suitable targets, etc. indirectly serve as a guideline for the recommended housebreaking avoidance strategies.

The truthful statistics regarding the underreporting of crime is especially a dilemma in need of focus by the CJS. In order to achieve this rectification, the numerous reasons for underreporting need to be addressed, particularly those rooted in national policing services such as secondary victimisation and lack of faith in the police.

Chapter 3

The South African Police Service and the Criminal Justice System

3.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a brief outline of the overview of the SAPS, including the approaches of crime combatting employed by the service. The CJS as a whole is faced with numerous challenges regarding their service delivery to the public. These are individually explored. The protocol of SAPS reaction services to crime scenes is also examined.

3.2 Overview of the South African Police Service

The South African Police Service (SAPS) has about 194 000 employees nation-wide, resulting in a police to population ratio of 1:358 (SAPS, 2015a:34). By rough estimation, the ratio of private security guards to police personnel in the year 2007 was approximately 10:1 (Minnaar 2007). Wilkinson (2015) refers to a study conducted in 2011 which indicated the deceleration of the growth of the industry, reporting that the private security officer ratio to the public police was 3:1.

The increasing resources possessed by the private security industry, as opposed to the SAPS, is possibly another reason for its growing preference in South Africa (Pillay, 2006). The latter author adds that "*an army of armed and unarmed security guards… seems to be filling in the gaps left by the overstretched police force*" (Pillay, 2006:96). Acknowledging the annual growth of the public police force, Mashele (2009:xvi) reminds us that an increase in SAPS membership will not necessarily increase the "specialised skills" they hold.

3.3 Law enforcement *versus* crime prevention

The SAPS have thus far employed two major approaches for combating crime, namely crime prevention and law enforcement (du Plessis & Louw, 2005). The crime prevention approach is centred on the principle of addressing the multiple factors that cause crime and criminal behaviour in the first place, whereas the law enforcement approach entails the punishment and/or incarceration of offenders.

Du Plessis and Louw (2005) refer to the 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy prevention framework, which was developed due to the rapidly increasing crime rate during that time. The authors explain that despite the potential of the policy, its long-term programmes were shut down by governmental and societal critiques, in favour of short-term, 'fast result' solutions to the rising crime problem (du Plessis & Louw, 2005). To address the desperate need for a better, faster crime combating framework, the 2000 National Crime Combating Strategy was released by the SAPS, which consisted of two essential strategies: (1) to physically assign more resources to high crime areas, and (2) to increase the number and improve the quality of investigations into white-collar and organized crimes (du Plessis & Louw, 2005:431). General surveys at the time revealed a more positive public perception of this crime fighting system (du Plessis & Louw, 2005). It is probable that the immediate results yielded from the programme created the image of crime finally being physically opposed, but it must be borne in mind that programmes such as these are not necessarily 'preventative', but rather 'law enforcing' in nature.

According to du Plessis and Louw (2005:439), it is hardly surprising that crime prevention endeavours fall short of the priorities of the SAPS, as the state police are "*neither trained nor inclined to operate programmes aimed at enhancing South Africa's social environment*" (which largely involves youth intervention). As Matthews (2009) notes, crime prevention in South Africa will require addressing the levels of poverty, inequality, illiteracy, and other social factors.

Ultimately, there needs to be an increased focus on preventative crime measures as opposed to a focus on offences that have already occurred. Some prevention strategies have thus far been formulated by the state, but du Plessis and Louw (2005) offer a critique in this regard:

> "*With a few exceptions, the key challenge is no longer changing the way the criminal justice system operates or developing new approaches and laws, but simply making the system work*" (p. 435).

Crime prevention is further discussed in Section 4.3 of Chapter 4.

3.4   Private and public policing partnerships

During the latter years of the 90s, the public progressively played larger roles in crime prevention strategies in an attempt to assist the SAPS with combating crime; to such an extent that the majority of these programmes were privately funded (du Plessis & Louw, 2005). The authors reflect on the evolving non-governmental systems:

> "*This has led to the formation of many useful partnerships at national, provincial, and local levels. These partnerships have been especially important for sustaining work in the areas of reintegration of offenders, diversion, victim empowerment, community policing, school safety, and most importantly, responding to rape and domestic violence and providing child protection and welfare services*" (du Plessis & Louw, 2005:434).

The public favours the services of private security officials because they possess the resources to respond almost immediately to reported cases of housebreaking (Mahlutshana, 2014). This quick response is something that the SAPS lack. However, private security officials do not have the authority to investigate the crime at hand, but they have to wait for the police to respond to the case. It therefore seems logical that the most beneficial arrangement would be for the two industries to form a mutual working relationship.

Schneider (2013:103) describes public-private cooperation as "*an important emerging trend*" and highlights the improvement of crime reduction as a result of this working relationship, whenever it occurs. Berg (2004) refers to a project initiated in the Western Cape province of South Africa, which is referred to as the City Improvement District (CID). She cites Davis and Dadush (2000) who provide the following definition of the CID:

> "*[It is] a non-profit private-public corporation established when property owners within a defined geographical area agree to levy an additional assessment on their property... members generate a supplemental pool of money that is then used to promote business and economic development*" (Berg, 2004:110).

A vital proposition of the CID initiative is to promote security in the area, and private security services have therefore been contracted by the managers (Berg, 2004). In her study, Berg (2004:111) found that "*[t]he SAPS and the private security companies have been obligated to co-operate in the CID areas*". She explains that this working relationship is contrary to the relationship which normally exists between the two industries, as revealed through interviews with SAPS members (Berg, 2004).

Marks, Shearing and Wood (2009) explain that policing partnerships were encouraged through the introduction of the 1997 Community Policing Policy Framework and Guidelines. These guidelines propose a community policing framework that recognises that the public police services need to collaborate "*with other government organizations, structures of civil society, and the private sector to perform optimally*" (Marks et al., 2009:146). However, the latter authors highlight that there is "presently no real support for "*lateral partnerships*", and that there still exist "*disagreements about turf, strategy, knowledge flow, and lines of accountability*" (Marks et al., 2009:147).

Successful coordination between the two industries, also referred to as "*private-public partnerships*", according to Minnaar (2004:9), has the potential to benefit crime investigations in terms of the following:

- responding jointly to crimes in progress;
- improving the investigation of crimes;
- sharing of crime intelligence;
- sharing of expert knowledge;
- accessing and supplying of official crime information;
- assisting with training; and
- providing crime prevention advice.

Notwithstanding the reports of fair cooperation between the industries, Prenzler (2007 cited in Schneider, 2013:108) is of the opinion that an optimal collaborative system between the two will require a "*co-regulation*" framework of standards.

3.5   The SAPS reaction service

Certain distinctions that can be made in terms of the SAPS emergency response services to a reported crime scene are: the availability of 10111 call centres, the SAPS flying squad, and 'typical' police officers. The South African society has been familiarised with the digits 10111 as the standard emergency phone number for the national police. This is similar to the emergency call number 911 in the USA.

Burger (2009:48) mentions in his report that "*[t]he relationship between the 10111 centres and flying squads and their respective functions is poorly understood by the general public.*" This is attributed to misunderstandings caused by negative or unrealistic depictions of the services in the media and on television shows.

The 10111 call centre is described by Burger (2009:44) as the "*first line*" of contact between the police and the victim, and is responsible for dispatching the complaint on the radio systems of both emergency and non-emergency police vehicles. It is therefore essential that the personnel answering the 10111 phone call is fully equipped and competent to react swiftly to the call (Burger, 2009). Burger (2009:44) also notes that the flying squad, in contrast to the typically stationed police officers, "*are responsible for attending to priority crimes or complaints in progress*".

The SAPS Annual Report 2014/2015 (SAPS, 2015a:142) provides a brief description of the flying squad:

> "*The Flying Squad is a force multiplier in support of all police stations and ensures an effective response to priority or serious and violent crimes in progress, which require immediate response and police conduct, as well as less serious crimes/complaints, if no other response vehicle is available. It also provides backup if a police station requires assistance during life-threatening situations. There are currently 29 Flying Squad Units countrywide.*"

A central feature of the two structures is that the 10111 call centre does not exercise any authority over the flying squad, and *vice versa*, apart from its duty to request a dispatch unit to the reported case (Burger, 2009). Similarly, "*[t]he only control exercised by 10111 centres regarding vehicles attached to police stations, is to dispatch them in response to emergencies or calls for assistance when a flying squad vehicle is not readily available, or if the situation otherwise justifies such a dispatch*" (Burger, 2009:49).

Generally, after a legitimate emergency call has been made to the 10111 centre, a flying squad vehicle will be dispatched to attend to the report. However, Burger (2009:55) adds that this is not an automatic response because, depending on "*the seriousness of the call or complaint, the 10111 centre may decide to dispatch an ordinary police station vehicle from one of the police stations within its jurisdiction*". This will be the case when a crime such as housebreaking and theft is reported. Mahlutshana (2014) refers to cases of housebreaking where the home owners waited between an hour and an hour and a half for police to arrive at their homes after the report. This poor response time is corroborated by Lancaster's (2013) interpretation of the 2012 VCS, because she states that less than half (48%) of the victims of housebreaking/burglary were satisfied with the service of the first responding police officers at their homes.

Distinguishing between 'serious' and 'less serious' crimes can be troublesome, although the SAPS rank the reaction priority as follows:

- *Alpha complaints* - crimes in progress and all serious crimes that require immediate police response/action;

- *Bravo complaints* - crimes that have already taken place, with no immediate threat to the caller/complainant or other person/s or property, e.g. housebreaking that has already occurred;

- *Charlie complaints* - crimes or offences of a less serious nature, e.g. drunkenness, loitering and trespassing (SAPS, 2015a:152).

Statistics in the SAPS Annual Report 2014/2015 regarding the average national reaction time to housebreaking reports (Bravo) reveal a relatively standard reaction time over recent years.

Table 3.1: Average reaction time by the SAPS to housebreakings

	2012/2013	2013/2014	2014/2015
Average reaction time (in minutes)	22:28	23:50	23:13

Source: adapted from SAPS (2015a:153).

However efficient as the 10111 system seems on the surface, inconsistencies are ever present, and this hinders its maximum potential. Burger (2009) refers to a performance audit in 2009 that revealed the system's poor service delivery:

> "*The audit found (among other things) cases where the minimum time required to respond to calls was not adhered to. Some call centres were not properly equipped, and there was a shortage of trained personnel*" (p. 48).

This idea is supported by (Omar, 2009), who in fact indicates that it is rare for SAPS personnel to respond to housebreaking crime scenes within a fair amount of time due to the lack of staff and resources, and because housebreakings are not considered as a priority crime.

3.6   Challenges faced by the CJS

The CJS in South Africa comprises numerous interlinked state departments and divisions, all of which play vital roles in the criminal law process. Of course, as with most large intertwining systems, inconsistencies and setbacks are bound to be encountered. The CJS is endlessly confronted with multiple, old and new challenges in the attempt to gain the upper hand of this threatening crime situation. Several of the dilemmas are worth discussing:

3.6.1   Work-flooded departments

A great deterrent in the measures aimed to control and deal with criminal events is essentially that they do not stop crime from reoccurring in the future. In fact, when the SAPS increases their manpower with the reasonable goal of identifying, reporting, and apprehending more offenders (which did ultimately prevail), it resulted in the remainder of the CJS taking even more strain than before. This is because, despite the good news of ridding society of more criminals, it resulted in increased case reports requiring processing, an excess of court cases, and of course the flooding of already overpopulated prisons (Matthews, 2009).

3.6.2   Punishment is not a deterrent

In relation to the first challenge, a large number of people are actually apprehended and prosecuted every year, and many thousands are imprisoned. While imprisonment serves a temporary incapacitating function, most of those who are imprisoned spend relatively short periods in prison, one reason being the overpopulation of South African prisons, among others (Matthews, 2009). Whether they are merely arrested or are imprisoned, the interactions offenders have with the criminal justice system often have little impact on discouraging reoffending (Matthews, 2009). Matthews (2009:201) in fact states that for some individuals, imprisonment has become "*an expected future of life*".

It is common knowledge in the South African context that prisons are largely overpopulated. This dilemma gives rise to further challenges that are by no means easy to address. It is indicated by Matthews (2009) that a large number of prisoners were released in 2005 for the sole purpose of relieving the overpopulated institutions. He further argues that the overpopulation of prisons has resulted in offenders' jail sentences being shortened (Matthews, 2009).

Ironically, the imprisonment situation in South Africa offers little deterrence to crime as the nation, particularly those with criminal tendencies, is aware of the system's shortcomings and vulnerabilities.

3.6.3 Management

Cartwright and Shearing (2009) argue that the public police, as one building block of the CJS, have their own external sub-structures (e.g., municipal and traffic police, Community Police Forums, private security companies, and neighbourhood watches), but as with all systems, including the CJS itself, success lies in optimal management and the integration of all parts; something which has not yet entirely been achieved.

3.6.4 Public perceptions

Being confronted by constant scrutiny and portrayed as worrisome by the media naturally puts the CJS in an uneasy position, from which it has to operate. It would be troublesome for state organisations to improve their efforts and performance whilst experiencing the public's lack of faith in their ability to control the crime situation. Du Plessis and Louw (2005:436) explain the position in a nutshell:

> "*Undoubtedly, the achievements of the police and courts will make little difference to ordinary South Africans while feelings of safety continue to decline.*"

Society is dependent on the state to keep the streets clear of crime, which puts the CJS under the microscope for scrutiny by the entire nation. Du Plessis and Louw (2005) also rightfully mention that the infamous accusations of corruption within sectors of the government, of necessity, largely contribute to the negative public image of the CJS. Research on public perceptions by Baker (2002:44) in fact revealed that the public's opinions regarding the performance of the SAPS in terms of responding to reported burglaries were worse than expected:

> "*Whatever the truth of these perceptions, they were widely held and were sufficient for everyone interviewed to shrug off worries about the training, practices and accountability of security firm guards.*"

Chapter 4

The Private Security Industry in South Africa

4.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the current situation and context regarding the PS industry in South Africa. As will be discussed, the industry has a unique local history in terms of its establishment, expansion, and recent functioning. Emphasis is mostly placed upon the residential security sector. The regulation of the industry by the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA), is explored. The chapter additionally outlines the crime fighting approach taken by the industry as well as the goals envisaged. This is followed by an investigation into the theories for explaining the concept of private security applicable to the South African context.

4.2 Emergence of the private security industry in South Africa

Since historical eras, the security of the citizens of any given society/community has been the responsibility of the ruling class, the state, or the government agency of that society. A broad definition of policing is provided by Baker (2002:29):

> "*Policing…is normally associated with an array of functions, including regulating society and maintaining order, preventing crime, responding to crime and restoring order, and the use if necessary of instruments of coercion to assist in any of those roles*."

Needless to add, it ought to be the responsibility of the state of any given society to govern policing activities to ensure the control and regulation of a stable society by means of a single system. Conceivably, for reasons such as increased threat and outsourced organisations, operations and companies have been founded to assist and/or supplement the security services provided by the state. These independent security undertakings date back even to Roman times. Given the assumption that policing actions should be governed by a single authority, it is surprising that these organisations have existed for so long, and continue to expand to this day (Baker, 2002:29).

With the focus on more recent times, these endeavours to support the state's public security services have expanded immensely and cover a wide range of functions. Taljaard (2008:78) lists examples of private services, such as:

- guarding services (industrial, commercial, cash-in-transit)
- personal body guards
- armed reaction/response
- venue/crowd control
- the manufacturing of security equipment
- private investigators
- training of security personnel
- security equipment installation
- locksmiths
- security control rooms
- car guards
- crime prevention/intelligence ▯ military support.

A prominent example of military backing is provided by Schneider (2013:104), who highlights the role of private security providers in countries with frequent incidents of conflict and violence, particularly Iraq and Afghanistan. The employment of private contractors in the military services in South Africa is not unheard of, but is certainly much more distinguished in countries currently involved in war or experiencing conflict.

The private security industry, although experiencing a world-wide expansion, has a rather unique history in South Africa. In terms of the pre-apartheid years, researchers (Mistry & Minnaar, 1999 cited in Pillay, 2006:96; Singh, 2008:4; Singh & Kempa, 2007:302) note that the large-scale growth of the private security industry "*occurred during the mid-1970s [and lasted to] the mid-1980s, [which was] at the height of political resistance to the apartheid regime*". As the intensity of opposition and uncertainty grew, naturally so did the perceived need for protection, notably that of "*[w]hite residents and the commercial world*" (Pillay, 2006:97; Singh & Kempa, 2007). This need consequently lead to the employment of private security services for further personal protection; and this increased reliance in turn contributed to the industry's rapid expansion.

Aside from the apartheid foundation of the private security industry, Grant (1989 cited in Berg, 2004:107-108) attributes the rise of the industry to:

> "*…the withdrawing of the then South African Police (SAP) from its normal duties… to focus on maintaining state security and political control; and the passing of the National Key Points Act in 1980. The National Key Points Act permitted the granting of police powers, such as powers of arrest and search and seizure, to those security personnel responsible for guarding strategic facilities as defined by the Act.*"

The Act further stated that the proprietor of the Key Point was responsible for providing its security. In this context, Berg (2004:108) asserts that the State "*inadvertently created a market for security*".

According to Berg (2004), the growth of the private security industry in South Africa, although supposedly founded on an apartheid background, can also be explained in light of postmodernism, when considering its transition. She explains that South Africa shares characteristics of a postmodern society which, according to Newburn (2001 cited in Berg, 2004:106) and Pillay (2006:96), include "*privatisation of public space and increase in mass private property; the development of 'zones of private governance', and therefore also crime prevention strategies and the decrease of civil society.*" South Africa is therefore described as a postmodern society, as the threat and fear of crime have led to the "*commercialisation and commodification of security*" (Bayley & Shearing, 2001; Jones & Newburn, 1998 cited in Berg, 2004:107). Essentially, the rise of private security can be viewed in terms of its "*responsiveness to consumer demand[s]*" (Pillay, 2006:95).

Despite the unique historical contributions, the growth in the private security industry can be attributed to a variety of additional reasons, including the high crime rate, the fear of crime, and the perception of the incompetency of the police (Mahlutshana, 2014; Pillay, 2006:95; Singh & Kempa, 2007). Minnaar (2004:1) adds to this list by noting that the public police in South Africa have been constantly "*understaffed, under-resourced, and overworked*". The increased – and still increasing – crime rate has left the limited resources of the public police being spread thinly across the nation for more ground coverage, resulting in still higher demands for increased personal security (Taljaard, 2008). Essentially, it is owing to the peaking crime rates and the culture of violence that has developed in South Africa that the demand for increased personal security has escalated.

According to Baker (2002:30), the development of the industry was also partly a result of the public's dissatisfaction with the performance of the public police:

> "*Non-state policing, whatever its form, is shaped, not by the national public agenda, but largely by its clients, who individually or communally provide the financial and/or social support for the groups to operate on their behalf.*"

4.3 Growth of the private security industry in South Africa

Prompted by the vastly increasing crime rates over the past several years and the growing culture of violence in today's society, efforts for implementing personal security measures have become normality in most parts of the world.

The demand for private security services has resulted in these organisations now outweighing the public police by a great proportion. While the growth in the industry is certainly a global occurrence, it is said that South Africa has the largest private security industry worldwide, with about 9 000 functioning private security companies operating in the country (Eastwood, 2013; Ministry of Police, 2012). As Minister of Police at the time, Nathi Mthethwa (Ministry of Police, 2012:para. 3) explained:

> "*According to the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) Annual Report, 2010/11, there were 8 828 private security businesses registered as security service providers (which is an 18.35% increase compared to the number of companies registered for the previous financial year). The number of private security guards registered was under 1.7 million.*"

Indeed, the number of security guards is still on the increase, as Mahlutshana (2014) reports that in early 2014 there were above 1.9 million registered security guards.

The numerical growth in the industry is a popular theme with researchers in the field of private policing. Swanepoel (2014) takes it further by comparing the growth of the private policing industry with that of the SAPS, reporting that between 1997 and 2013 the private industry grew by a total of 330 076 guarding officials, whereas the SAPS grew by a mere 46 682 members. It once more emphasizes the extent to which the private industry outnumbers the state police. Statistics of recent years furthermore reveal that the industry in South Africa has "*become three times larger than the police*" (Schneider, 2013:103). In previous years, the growth in the industry in terms of the number of registered guards occurred somewhat more steadily.

Badenhorst (2007 cited in Minnaar, 2007:129) describes the private security industry as "*one of the fastest growing industries in South Africa*". This does not come as a surprise when considering the annual value increase of the industry:

> "*In 1990, the private security industry in South Africa was valued at R1.2 billion; by 1997 this figure was put at R6 billion (Reynolds, 2003), and by 1999, including vehicle security and tracking and in-house security (e.g., at large mining houses, banks and insurance*

companies), the value of the private security industry was estimated to be R9 billion. In January 2004, this value was estimated to be more than R14 billion" (Minnaar, 2007:129).

According to Mahlutshana (2014), a recent value of the industry stood at R55 billion.

However, decreases in the growth of the industry in terms of companies closing down and security personnel deregistering or becoming inactive - an occurrence Minnaar (2007:130) attributes to "*oversupply of lower-end security officers, poor working conditions and low wages*" - should not be overlooked. Despite the vast number of current registered guards mentioned earlier, it must be borne in mind that the number of registered security guards and/or companies does not reflect the true size of the operational security industry in South Africa. Minnaar (2007:130) notes that in March of 2007, "*approximately 900 000 persons registered with PSIRA, of which only 301 584 were termed as 'active' security officers*".

A few of the largest private security companies (as in 2008) in South African are listed by Taljaard (2008:73):

- Fidelity Corporate Services
- Securior (South Africa)
- ADT Security Guarding
- Magnum-Shield Security Services
- Group 4 Falck
- Coin Security Group.

4.4   Goals of the private security industry

Private security services in South Africa are appointed in a variety of different settings, including contracts to secure and patrol private buildings and to provide armed response services in urban and residential areas. They are also tasked to monitor and assist at public events. A recent trend in South Africa, especially in high and middle class neighbourhoods, is that of 'gated communities' where a specific residential area is fenced off, allowing for only a few points of access (Kruger & Landman, 2008; Singh & Kempa, 2007). Representatives of such communities assign fixed private security personnel at the access gates, as well as patrolling officers. The largest expansion in the industry, according to Singh and Kempa (2007), involves neighbourhood patrol agencies and armed reaction services (also known as 'armed response').

In previous years, private security in the form of patrolling guards was labelled by researchers as "*loss prevention strategies through risk management*" (Singh & Kempa, 2007:304). Singh and Kempa (2007:304) note, however, that the more recent punitive approach adopted by private security transforms this assumption:

> "*[I]n South Africa, private police organisations are now increasingly involved in preventing and responding to property and violent crime through applications of the law and coercive technologies.*"

Crucial advantages of the private security industry are provided by Pillay (2006:97) and Taljaard (2008:80), who state that it…

- is an additional and crucial resource in the fight against crime;
- is possibly more efficient than the SAPS;
- has access to superior equipment;
- is a source of foreign direct investment; and ⬚ alleviates poverty as an employer.

The common goal of 'protection' between private security and public police bodies may at first seem congruent; however, the important distinction between the two organisations stems from the motive of their functions. Whereas public police entities focus on "*apprehending and punishing those who violate the law*", private security is recognised for "*preventing and reducing loss at private sites*" and "*promoting the client's interest*" (Singh & Kempa, 2007:299). This subject is further discussed in Section 4.6.

4.5 Regulation of the private security industry in South Africa

Due to the expansion of the industry, the Private Security Industry Regulation Act (No. 56 of 2001) rendered it a requirement for all companies to register with a board, which was then called the Security Industry Regulatory Authority (SIRA) (Berg, 2004). The current Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) is responsible for regulating security companies with regard to registration and minimum standards.

The legislation that supports the PSIRA framework is indeed far-reaching, to say the least, and includes the following":

- Regulations made under the Private Security Industry Regulation Act 2001 (Act 56 of 2001)
- Regulations relating to Appeals and Applications for Exemptions, 2003

- Amendments to regulations made under the Security Officers Act 1987 (Act 92 of 1987)

- Code of Conduct for Security Service Providers, 2003

- Improper Conduct Enquiries Regulations, 2003

- Training regulations

- Basic Conditions of Employment Act (Act 75 of 1997)

- Other documentation and requirements as determined by the sectoral regulator from time to time (Taljaard 2008:84).

A regulatory scale was developed by Schneider (2005:37). This scale (found on the next page) enables the measurement of the extent to which a particular private security industry conforms to relevant standards.

Table 4.1: Schneider's regulatory scale for private security industries.

REGULATORY OPTIONS	CRITERIA
Regulated	• Industry accepted minimum competency standards • Industry supervision and regulation by oversight body • CPOs must re-register with the regulatory body within a given period (e.g. once every three years)
Partially regulated	• There may be regulation but not specifically for the CP industry (usually regulated within the security industry as a whole)
Non-regulated	• No accepted industry standards • No set regulatory bodies

Source: Schneider (2005:37).

Schneider (2013:115-119) reflects on the scale when applied to South Africa:

"*At first glance, South Africa appears to meet the requirements of a regulated industry (utilising the regulatory model outlined earlier in the present work). It has a clearly defined security licensing body as well as a training regulatory body. The licensing and oversight body in South Africa is the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA)....*

[T]raining standards are enforced by the Safety and Security Sector Education and Training Authority (SASSETA). The SASSETA was appointed by the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) on 1 July, 2005…

The South African industry, whilst appearing to be fully regulated, is in reality only partially regulated, due partly to the limited capability of legislative enforcement. The latter involves staffing, registration, and financial constraints at PSIRA (see Minnaar, 2007a, 2007b & 2007c), which has led to high levels of non-compliance. A further reason for this noncompliance is the fact that there are currently no requirements for re-certification and skills refresher training in the South African industry".

Schneider (2013:107) further explains that most countries with a rapidly expanding private security industry have put forward official regulatory standards to which companies must adhere, but that "*lack of oversight and reporting or non-reporting of misconduct*" remains a critical limitation.

With the immense expansion of the private security industry, however, the Ministry of Police (2012:para. 4) explains that "*not all companies and private security guards register with PSIRA as required by law. Many companies and security guards attempt to operate under the radar and unlawfully*."

Annual operational reports released by PSIRA reveal statistics regarding private security company compliance to regulations. The statistics used were from data accumulated from businesses inspected in the various provinces, namely Gauteng, Mpumalanga, Limpopo, North West, Free State, Northern Cape, Western Cape, Eastern Cape, and KwaZulu-Natal. Figure 4.1 presents a graph that illustrates the deployment of untrained and unregistered security staff over a four-year period:

Figure 4.1: Graphic presentation of percentage of national private security businesses deploying untrained and unregistered staff. Source: PSIRA Annual Reports (2011/2012 – 2014/2015).

If security guards are not registered, it is also likely that they did not receive the required training for that position. If this is the case, then these officers will not know how to adequately behave at a crime scene, which will increase the potential for hampering the investigation process.

With reference to the increase in crime levels, Minnaar (2004) explains that the private security industry has become increasingly involved in crime prevention strategies that were originally performed by public policing agencies, and therefore a great concern for regulation authorities is the delimiting of powers permitted to the private security agencies. He argues that this is a troublesome task, as the private security industry seldom submits to these regulations and displays "*considerable resistance or reluctance to abide by them*" (Minnaar, 2004:2).

4.6   The overlapping of SAPS and private security functions

The leading purpose of both private security and public police are to protect citizens from crime. However, one distinction should be borne in mind. Whereas the public police service is held accountable to protect the general public, private security is only held responsible for protecting their clients, due to their "profit motive" (Irish, 1999:5; Schneider, 2013). A further distinction involves private security operating *"through an emphasis on preventing and reducing loss at private sites rather than prosecuting and punishing offenders"* (Garland, 2000, in Singh, 2008:38). This is contrary to the SAPS, whose "*current focus… is*

more on law enforcement than on crime prevention or the protection of individual properties" (van Zyl et al., 2003:107).

Noticeably, the distinct differences between the two industries are rooted in their client base (i.e., private clients *vs.* the public as a whole) and in their motivation/philosophy (i.e., proactive *vs.* reactive). Albeit the distinctions, Strom et al. (2010 cited in Schneider, 2013:108) remark that "*their missions are not in conflict but are instead complementary and are often closely related*". However, as fair as this statement goes, the close relatedness of private-public duties has in fact resulted in blurred lines separating their specific allocated actions, with the most prominent example being first response activities. This issue is explored in more depth in Chapter 7.

In terms of the different roles of the police and security officers, Irish (1999:5) points out that "it is understandable that the public is confused about the different roles of the police and the private security industry". According to her, this confusion is largely attributed to the increase of the private security industry, because these officials become increasingly involved in the fighting of crime and in performing more duties originally reserved for the police (Irish, 1999; Bayley & Shearing, 1996 cited in Singh, 2008; Hollemans, 2005 cited in Pillay, 2006:95; van Steden & Sarre, 2010). Researchers such as Singh and Kempa (2007), as well as van Steden and Sarre (2010), state that there are few functions that are not performed by both the public police and by private security officials

4.7   Theories for explaining private security

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the crime fighting strategy incorporated by the public police follows a reactive approach to crime (or law enforcement), whereas the private security sector follows a proactive strategy (i.e., crime prevention). Crime prevention strategies imply addressing those cues that make crime possible. In this context, the argument by van Zyl et al. (2003:119) should be emphasised:

> "*To implement burglary prevention initiatives at the local level implies that an assessment should be made of the vulnerabilities attached to a specific location.*"

The strategy of private security officers, in residential areas specifically, follows 'primary prevention' methods. The concept is illustrated by Lab (2010:49):

> "*Primary prevention deals with eliminating influences in the physical and social environment that engender deviant behavior [sic]. Such programs do not target individuals who are*

already criminal or prone to criminal behavior, except in a most indirect sense. Instead,
primary prevention programs work with general physical and societal factors that provide
the opportunity for deviance to occur."

The practical manipulation of environmental factors by private security companies to prevent crime most prominently includes surveillance in the form of neighbourhood surveillance cameras, neighbourhood watches, and vehicle patrolling. One well-known primary crime prevention initiative is known as Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) (Lab, 2010; Steenkamp & Potgieter, 2004; Van Zyl et al., 2003). The motivation for this strategy involves the following description provided by (Lab 2010):

"*The idea behind CPTED is making crime harder to commit and making residents feel more*
secure in their surroundings. This is accomplished by altering the physical environment.
Increased lighting, improved locks, stronger doors, use of surveillance equipment, and other
physical changes are intended to bring about greater social cohesion, citizen concern and
involvement and, ultimately, reduced crime and fear of crime" (p. 49).

Baker (2002) points out, however, that private policing endeavours in fact have both deterrent/preventative and responsive qualities: their presence deters criminal behaviour and they are rapid responders.

Some criminological theories that explain private security are briefly outlined.

According to the routine activities theory put forth by theorists Cohen and Felson, three things must be present in order for a crime to occur: a motivated offender, a suitable target, and the absence of a capable guardian (Winfree & Abadinsky, 2003). Møller (2005:273) states that people "*have control only over the target and guardianship*", and therefore these are the two factors to be manipulated in an attempt to prevent criminal behaviour. Therefore, the presence of private security officers in community security programs, as well as their hasty response to a site, eliminates the absence of a guardian. If potential offenders are aware that security officers are in close range, it will deter them from committing the housebreaking – which is precisely the officers' purpose.

The same concept applies using the rational choice theory of crime. This theory claims that offenders weigh the costs and benefits of committing the crime at a particular site; if the benefits outweigh the costs, then committing the crime will be worthwhile, and *vice versa* (Siegel, 2005). Therefore, if the offender is aware of vigilant security officers in the area, he/she will refrain from committing the crime, because the risk of being apprehended is too great. Singh and Kempa (2007:306) illustrate this point: "*Coercive*

interventions, for example armed guards (stationary and mobile) and perimeter security devices (electric fencing), aim to control behaviour by increasing the physical difficulty and risk associated with criminal activity." This is a similar approach to environmental criminology interventions.

Chapter 5

Crime Scene Investigation

5.1 Introduction

Remarkable research endeavours and advances in the field of natural sciences in recent decades have undoubtedly provided the field of crime scene investigation and analysis a helping hand in their role in the criminal justice system. However, Wyatt (2013) points to an apparent lack of research regarding the everyday duties performed by crime scene investigators (CSIs), despite the vast popularity they have attracted from media and television programs. According to the latter author, the majority of research in this field has fallen under the themes of either "*perceptions of the CSI role*", or "*key attributes of top CSI*", or "*the contribution forensic science makes in the investigation of crime*" (Wyatt, 2013:2), which implies that the groundwork performed by crime scene investigators has received limited attention.

5.2 First responder duties in South Africa

According to Omar (2009:63), the first official of authority to arrive at a crime scene is termed the 'first member', and it is his/her responsibility to "*assess the situation, make arrests if required, remove unauthorised persons from the scene, and begin compiling a report*".

However, the precise responsibilities of and duties performed by private security/armed response officers at crime scenes (i.e., their duties relating to crime scene management) vary among companies and personnel. To gain a better understanding of the practical tasks typically performed by security officers, this theme is specifically included as a research question, which is explored in Chapter 7.

5.3 Preliminary crime scene investigation

Preliminary investigation is the first phase of the lengthy investigation process. Once the crime has been reported to and received by persons of authority, the management of the crime scene ought to start instantly. Crime scene management is defined by Omar (2009:59) as "*the process of ensuring the orderly, accurate and effective collection and preservation of physical evidence so that the evidence can be used to take legal action.*" In the South African context, *"[t]he procedure for the management of all*

crime scenes – irrespective of the scale and nature of the crime – is set out in SAPS Policy 2 of 2005"
(Omar, 2009:60).

According to Omar (2009:60), the SAPS use the following ten-step system as a guideline to manage
crime scenes. This implies that, in accordance with the policy, these steps should apply to all reported
crimes committed at a physical crime scene:

1. Reporting and activation
2. Responding
3. Controlling
4. Handing over
5. Planning
6. Investigating and processing
7. Debriefing
8. Restoring
9. Releasing
10. Evaluating

In the South African context, steps 1 to 4 above are categorised as the pre-investigative phase of the
crime scene, denoting the time period preceding the arrival of a crime scene investigator (Little, 2011).
The process is initiated right after the crime has been reported to the authority figures (whether it is the
SAPS or a private security company) and action has been taken by them to respond to the crime scene
(Omar, 2009). Upon arrival at the premises, the officials start with determining "*a preliminary identification
of the situation by means of reports by witnesses and people directly involved…*" (Marais & van Rooyen,
1990 cited in Little, 2011:22).

Protection of the crime scene is of utmost importance and should be attended to swiftly. This exercise is
the responsibility once more of the 'first member' and is achieved by using "*physical barriers, such as
SAPS-identifying tape*" (Omar, 2009:63). The protection of the crime scene serves a single vital purpose:
to maintain the integrity/value of any physical evidence present. The core objective is to prevent the scene
from being exposed to external disruptions or influences that may cause contamination of the crime
scene, including the physical evidence within it. Commonly, the protection of the crime scene involves
two layers: a broad area restriction surrounding the crime scene, followed by the closure of the "*exact
location where the crime has been perpetrated*" (Little, 2011:23; Omar, 2009).

Once control has been taken over the situation by authority figures, the scene is carefully monitored until the arrival of a crime scene manager, defined by the SAPS as a "*specifically trained member of the relevant investigation unit who manages the crime scene team at the crime scene*" (Omar, 2009:64). This process is termed the 'hand-over' phase. An operational definition of a crime scene manager is "*[t]he individual responsible for controlling the scene of an incident, coordinating forensic investigative activities, and subsequent submission of items for examination to a forensic science laboratory*" (Fraser & Williams, 2009:627).

Following the hand-over, the investigator/s is/are tasked with "*orientation and reconstruction*" of the event (Little, 2011:23). The planning of the investigation process is initiated, whereby the priority of the case can simultaneously be determined (Omar, 2009). Gilbert (2010:41) explains that "*the large volume of cases assigned to the detective division, the limited number of investigators, and the relative seriousness of each offense make a priority ranking necessary.*" This is especially applicable in the South African context where the SAPS remain under-resourced and under-staffed. Naturally, criminal events of a violent nature are given highest priority. Property crimes fall under the category of less serious crimes and therefore their investigation is given lower priority (Gilbert, 2010).

Preparations for evidence collection are the responsibility of a crime scene technician, who will also supply the resources to do so (Omar, 2009). Additionally, prior to collection, the crime scene technician must do the following:

- "Ensure that the crime scene is photographed before it is altered and that the physical evidence is in its original position.
- Coordinate the processing of the scene for physical evidence, including ensuring that all evidence has been logged and handled according to the directives for the collection of exhibits. The continuity of possession and integrity of the evidence must also be ensured.
- The Locard principle is applied when searching for physical evidence. According to this principle, some clue is usually left behind when two objects or persons come into contact with each other.
- Investigators may therefore assume that there will always be physical evidence at the scene of the crime – they must simply search for it.
- Evidence collected must be preserved in evidence collection kits and forwarded to the forensic science laboratory for analysis" (Omar, 2009:66).

Preparation for evidence collection qualifies as part of the pre-investigative phase. The second stage, namely the investigative phase, involves detailed searches and inspections of the crime scene. The investigative phase, according to Little (2011:24), comprises the determination of three actualities:

1. "*Corpus delicti* information, representative of the juridical criteria for the crime;

2. *Modus operandi* information, as a typical operational method employed by the criminal;

3. The identity of the offender and his part in the crime."

Because the focus of this research study was concerned with the actions performed during the responding time period, the scope of the literature review will exclude a discussion of the investigative and post-investigative phases (see for example Gilbert, 2010:61-63).

5.4   The value of evidence

Gilbert (2010) identifies three types of evidence:

> "*Direct evidence…can prove a fact without support. Such evidence has been obtained from the physiological senses of the individual, giving direct personal knowledge of what is being testified to. Circumstantial evidence does not directly prove a fact at issue but may establish a strong inference as to the truth of the fact…. Physical evidence…can be any kind of object associated with the investigation, but it must be a physical, tangible item…*" (p. 52-53).

Gilbert (2010:201) outlines that since the perpetrators "*are present inside the structure… tracing clues are often transferred from burglar to scene and, conversely, from scene to burglar*", as illustrated by the Locard principle.

'Trace' or 'trace evidence' generally refers to a variety of materials such as "*glass fragments and fibres, but also bloodstains and fingerprints*" (Wyatt, 2013:2). Moreover, Wyatt (2013:2) argues that the two trace materials 'fingerprints' and 'DNA samples' are most valuable in police investigations and court proceedings due to their capability of individualisation, or "*being able to give a name*". Essentially, DNA samples and fingerprints allow CSIs to directly link an individual to a crime scene, allowing for swift identification of potential suspects of the crime. The DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) contained in the bodily cells of each individual human being is unique, allowing each of us to be distinguished from one another on a molecular level. (For a detailed explanation of the biochemistry of DNA, see de Wet et al., 2011:172-174)). Logically then, DNA profiling is a direct function of this chemical phenomenon.

A recent development in local forensic legislation included in the Criminal Law (Forensic Procedure) Amendment Act (ACT No 37 of 2013) is quoted from the SAPS Annual Report 2014/2015 (SAPS, 2015a):

> "*On the 27th January 2014, South Africa became the 57th country to assent to legislation that provides a framework to obtain DNA samples from arrested persons and offenders and*

store their DNA profiles in a National Forensic DNA Database (NF-DNA-D) of South Africa. The Act became operational on the 31st January 2015.

Furthermore the legislation requires that detectives take DNA buccal samples from sentenced and remanded persons in the facilities of the Department of Correctional Services from the date the Act becomes operational. The Act further allows for DNA sampling to assist in the investigations of missing and unidentified persons" (p. 230).

If DNA samples such as bodily fluids or tissue are to be collected as evidence, this action is to be performed strictly by medical examiners or police officers specifically trained to perform such duties (de Wet et al., 2011). Such cases, however, will rarely occur at crime scenes of housebreaking as they are generally limited to violent and/or interpersonal crimes.

In England and Wales, it is the sole duty of the CSI of the public police forces "*who selects, collects and records relevant trace items…*" (Wyatt, 2013:2). In South Africa, the investigative detective is required to summon a crime scene technician who will collect the physical evidence (Omar, 2009).

Allegedly some local private security companies possess the authority to collect and record relevant evidence, including trace evidence, from crime scenes if the public police are not present at the scene. All collected evidence is then handed over to the police once the crime scene has been processed. However, this claim is inconsistent among sources and is thus further investigated in Chapter 7.

5.5   Witnesses

The next task for investigators is to become familiar with witnesses, victims, and suspects in order to get a clear depiction of what happened, from all perspectives (Bayley, 2005). If the perpetrator is known to the victim or witnesses, or was clearly seen, interviewing these persons is the easiest and fastest way of identifying the perpetrator. Bayley (2005:145) explains that two factors in particular determine whether a case will receive extended investigation: "*First, whether a credible perpetrator has been fairly clearly identified and, second, whether the crime is especially serious or repugnant.*" According to the author, crimes are seldom further investigated if these two aspects are not met and admits that this occurs mostly in cases of burglary or robbery (Bayley, 2005).

Bayley (2005:145) notes that if a crime cannot be solved more or less at the scene of the crime, the case will probably be closed.   This is not to say that this is a regular occurrence, but in terms of housebreaking/burglary crime scenes where the perpetrator is rarely encountered by anyone else (that

means that a physical description is almost impossible), the elimination of witness reports as evidence heightens the value of physical and trace evidence even further.

Because identifying the perpetrator seems to be a necessity for guaranteeing an investigation, it is worth exploring whether armed response officers play a role in identifying the perpetrator (such as by interviewing witnesses, victims, and suspects). Greenwood, Chaiken and Petersilia (2005:251) exacerbate this position by stating that "*the contribution of victims, witnesses and patrol officers is most important to the identification and apprehension of criminal offenders.*" Thus the importance of the role played by armed response officers at the crime scene is further emphasised.

5.6   Recordings

Lundrigan (2001) highlights the importance of detailed records of the crime scene, such as notes and photographs. She explains that there are certain time constraints involved in the initial investigation of the first responders, because "*the quality and quantity of evidence will decline as greater numbers of people access the scene*" (Lundrigan, 2001:39).   Apart from contamination by people, influences from the elements should also be considered. In cases of housebreaking/burglary, physical traces outdoors such as footprints may deteriorate after some time if neglected.

A mutual work environment between the police and the private security industry was suggested earlier. It can be noted that the first arriving armed response officers have the potential to aid in the investigative process if they take notes of their observations, especially when evidence is encountered outdoors. By bestowing this responsibility on them, it can ensure the recording of critical evidence (which has the potential of deteriorating), particularly if the police arrive at the scene only after a long period of time.

Van Zyl et al. (2003:107) refer to a study by Coupe and Griffiths (1998) in the United Kingdom who found that cases of residential burglaries were seldom solved, and attributed this to the lack of evidence found during the primary investigations. Gilbert (2010:34) mentions that "*the physical condition of the scene of the crime*", among other factors, "*has a direct bearing on the completeness of the investigation.*" This serves as an indication of the incredible value of the evidence found at the crime scene, and what detrimental consequences any influence or damage to it may lead to. Van Zyl et al. (2003) additionally cite Oppler (1998), who made a similar finding in South Africa. A remarkably small proportion of burglaries that occur are actually detected, and of those that are, only a very few reach court proceedings due to a lack of evidence (van Zyl et al., 2003:107). The importance of the appropriate behaviour and actions of

first responding officers at a crime scene is thus highlighted once again, as initial actions have the potential to interfere with crucial crime scene evidence if not well performed.

5.7   Evidence integrity

In terms of crime scene investigation, Chisum and Turvey (2007:161) coined the term 'evidence dynamics', which refers to "*any influence that adds, changes, relocates, obscures, contaminates, or obliterates physical evidence, regardless of intent.*" In light of this, the authors state that "…*all forms of physical evidence are at the mercy of environmental change, activity, and time*" (Chisum & Turvey, 2007:162).

It was mentioned earlier that protection of the crime scene is of vital importance in order to preserve physical evidence that may be present and is yet to be collected. In this context, Chisum and Turvey (2007:162) explain the concept of the "*assumption of integrity*" which refers to the false belief that the manner in which evidence is found at a crime scene is 100% reliable, or that cordoning off the scene, as the authors put it, "*somehow ensures the integrity of the evidence found within*". These authors provide the following examples of how evidence can be altered:

- Transference or creation at the scene.

- Changes due to time (e.g., blood and semen dry and dead bodies decompose, stiffen, and equalize with room temperature).

- Changes due to the environment. (i.e., elements such as rain, heat, cold, and wind).

- Alteration/destruction/interference by individuals involved in their duties. Such persons may be first officer(s) at the scene, paramedics, and other law enforcement or related personnel.

- Recognition or discovery of objects that can be used as evidence. Sometimes this occurs only after someone has stepped on/in it (Chisum & Turvey, 2007:162).

Victims' actions may also influence the integrity of evidence, for example closing windows/doors where entry was gained by burglars.

5.8   Crime scene contamination

Gilbert (2010:82) defines crime scene contamination as when "*evidence is altered, removed, or destroyed in any manner*".   A different definition is offered by Houck (2009:169), stating that crime scene contamination is "*unwanted transfer of material between items of evidence*".

Evidence contamination can mean the difference between a successful and failed investigation.   The concept is illustrated by Gilbert (2010:82) as follows: "[o]*nly items that have been demonstrated to be free from contamination will be allowed to be entered as evidence during a trial.*"   Consider once again the Locard principle of exchange.   Material transfer via contact between two items means an increased possibility of the offender leaving behind a trace of any sort.   However, it also increases the possibility of trace being left behind from officers inspecting the scene or moving around within it.

It is claimed that crime scene contamination occurs most readily when the scene is overcrowded by officials (Lundrigan, 2001; Schiro, 1999).   Thus, care must be taken to restrict unnecessary entry. Lundrigan (2001) furthermore outlines that when contamination occurs through this manner, it is often required that all officers' fingerprints be taken in order to eliminate them from the prints found at the scene or on any evidence found – this is of course an undesirable process. Lundrigan (2001:38) further explains that preservation and protection of the scene are of utmost importance, because "[i]f primary facts (solid evidence collected at the scene) become contaminated, secondary facts (an expert's opinion on the evidence) become useless".

5.9   Crime scene contamination by the SAPS

In 2013, the DNA project and the SA Banking Risk Information Centre (SABRIC) proposed that all police officers ought to get training with regard to the handling of crime scenes (Mkhwanazi, 2013).   Experts explained the importance of DNA evidence found at crime scenes in court trials.   There have been numerous reports of police officials who contaminated crime scenes or neglected their duties in some way. According to Mkhwanazi (2013), the CEO of SABRIC referred to a specific offender who committed 40 bank robberies before he was apprehended, because police officers neglected gathering DNA evidence at each scene.

In the recent media-crazed trial of Oscar Pistorius, it has become apparent that former investigating officer Hilton Botha himself contaminated the crime scene and failed to secure critical evidence (A shameful day for policing in SA, 2013).   This has naturally drawn much negative attention to the quality and standard of crime investigation by public police.   Included in the article is the following upfront comment: "*It has*

shown that the lead detective on what might turn out to be South Africa's highest profile murder case… *is not capable of doing the basics, such as covering his shoes prior to entering a crime scene*" (A shameful day for policing in SA, 2013:4). An important conclusion from these statements is that crime scene contamination does not necessarily emanate from young, naïve, or inexperienced police officers, but even from supposedly professional and experienced investigating officers. The disappointing result is the shameful portrayal of the SAPS to the national *and* international public through the media.

Similarly, the defence team in the highly publicised murders of the Steenkamp family in 2013 blamed the SAPS for contaminating the crime scene and disrupting crucial evidence at the time of the investigation (Hoo, 2013). The article revealed that a bloody jacket and a bloody mat found at the scene were burnt, instead of collected (Hoo, 2013). The investigating officer, Col Dirk de Waal, stated later that "*the preservation and securing of the crime scene was not followed according to instructions*" (Hoo, 2013:para. 13).

According to Adams (2005), the Safety and Security minister at the time, Charles Nqukula, pointed out that private investigators also possibly contaminate crime scenes when they are the first to respond to the sites. He stated that it is "*a worrying factor that private security companies have an investigating capacity and an intelligence capacity*" (Adams, 2005:para. 11). Boyane Tshehla, head of the Crime and Justice Program at the ISS at the time, stated in the same article that private security officials do not have the authority to enter crime scenes without first gaining approval of the police, and that "unscrupulous" private investigators gather evidence at crime scenes unlawfully (Adams, 2005:para. 14). However, if it is the case that private security guards do not have the authority to enter crime scenes, why is it such a common occurrence? This discussion continues in Chapter 7.

The above comments based on the literature give rise to a worthy argument, which is that the police appear to have double standards in this regard. Moreover, Nqukula stated that private security officials possibly contaminated crime scenes, yet reported trial cases had revealed that the police – experienced officers to boot - contaminated crime scenes more consistently than private security officials did. This argument seems debatable, yet it is clear that contamination occurrences involving the SAPS reach the newspapers and media more frequently than information regarding incidences involving private security companies does.

Crime scene evidence is collected and sent to the forensic services for in-depth investigation. The Forensic Services of the SAPS are highly valued and equipped. The SAPS Annual Report 2014/2015 (SAPS, 2015a) acknowledges the importance and potential of the crime scene as a tool for solving crime. Crime scene investigators should therefore continuously strive for optimization of the service in an attempt

to reach the goal of "*improving the capacity, core competencies, capabilities… [and] effectiveness*" of the SAPS.

5.10 Investigating housebreaking and the challenges thereof in South Africa

A common characteristic of a successful burglary investigation, according to Gilbert (2010:190), is that "*convicting evidence is obtained from the point of entry*". He continues to explain that perpetrators of burglary are often sloppy in their attempt to gain forceful entry due to the limited time available to them, and this carelessness results in the likelihood of the discovery of incriminating physical evidence (Gilbert, 2010). Therefore, caution must be taken when determining the point of exit of a housebreaking. According to Gilbert (2010), officers tend to hastily assume that the point of entry and exit are the same, without first examining other doors and windows.

As with many regulatory systems, there exist severe challenges for the lawful protocol of criminal investigation. As with many structures, the main challenge in addressing any shortcomings within the operation of the system does not lie in the creation of policies and standards, but rather in the actual implementation of existing policies. According to Omar (2009), the SAPS Policy 2 of 2005 that contains the protocol of *all* criminal investigations is flawed. He argues this point as follows:

> "*[this policy] has two serious shortcomings. Firstly, it is intended for very serious crimes and does not make realistic suggestions about dealing with less serious crimes. Secondly, it does not accommodate the realities of daily police work. For example, the policy requires a designated and separate crime scene manager, whereas in fact it is more likely that an individual police member will fulfil the function of two or more of the role-players laid down in the policy. Human resource constraints within [the] SAPS, along with the high number of violent crimes in the country, means that in reality not all the functions envisaged in the policy are fulfilled. In fact, it is rare for South African crime scenes to be processed in complete adherence to policy requirements…*" (p. 74-75).

Gilbert (2010:201) proposes one reason why burglary scenes are notorious for receiving poor, or no crime scene investigations: "*Being the most commonly reported felony…policing agencies are incapable to assign investigators and resources to every case, especially since it is a low priority crime.*"

5.11   Conclusion

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (South Africa, 1996) states that only the SAPS have the authority to investigate criminal activity and collect relevant evidence. However, this seems to be inconsistent with reports claiming that private investigators allegedly contaminate scenes while investigating the scene and collecting evidence (as mentioned previously). It is therefore necessary to differentiate between the two agencies' lawful duties in order to identify cases of private security intrusion of police duties. During the research process, the question whether or not private security officials are in fact authorised to investigate crime scenes and collect evidence provided contradictory answers due to conflicting reports. This predicament is further explored in Chapter 7.

Chapter 6

Methodology

6.1   Introduction

Throughout the literature review for the study, several specific questions arose which remained either unanswered or were unclearly and ambiguously addressed in the numerous research articles and reports that I perused. Another regular encounter throughout the literature search was the conflict between reported information and the conclusions drawn by various researchers. This encouraged me to explore the problem of housebreaking crime scene investigations, and particularly the alleged discrepancies between SAPS and security company officer crime scene strategies, in more depth at local level.

This chapter outlines the methodology that I utilised for the research as well as the nature of the research, the paradigms that framed the study, and the conceptualisation of the research data.

6.2   Methodology

The research followed a descriptive/interpretive paradigm, as is often encountered within the context of the social sciences, in that the aim of the research was to explore and gain a detailed understanding of the participants' experiences and attitudes about a given subject (Bryman, 2004; Leedy & Ormrod 2010).

The researcher employed a survey format as well as the non-experimental 'ex post facto' design. The latter design was chosen as the research questions would not involve the manipulation of variables. No hypotheses exist for this study as the objective of the research was not to determine relationships between variables, but rather to discover truths and thus to develop a better understanding and social meaning of the context being studied. Neuman (2007:185) explains that within a qualitative format, "*a researcher often places the data into a context of the larger flow of events and behaviours*", which enables the researcher to share meaning of a situation with those even unfamiliar to the research subject. Leedy and Ormrod (2010) explain that most social science researchers seldom obey the law of maintaining objectivity in research studies such as the belief of determining the single truth about a phenomenon. In fact, they believe that "*there may be multiple perspectives held by different individuals, with each of these perspectives having equal validity, or truth*" (Guba & Lincoln, 1988 cited in Leedy & Ormrod, 2010:93).

The data collected for the research were mainly qualitative. The qualitative approach was adopted because the research can be classified as interpretive. The data were collected in the form of written scripts (i.e., a questionnaire that was administered to respondents) and verbal conversations in the form of semi-structured interviews. According to Neuman (2007:180), this type of research data (i.e., works of literature or expression) can be categorised as "soft data".

As this was a qualitative study, my goal was to identify generalizable patterns and themes within the data that I collected in order to "capture and discover" truths about the topic and to answer any questions that arose (Neuman, 2007:183).

Table 6.1: List of data sources incorporated in the study

Primary data	Secondary data
Questionnaires	SAPS Annual Reports 2010-2015
Interviews	Victims of Crime Survey (2014-2015)
	SAPS official crime statistics (2010-2015)
	PSIRA Annual Report (2011-2014)

The primary data collection process involved interviews with and questionnaires disseminated to various respondents, whereas the secondary data collection process primarily involved document analysis and a perusal of various printed sources such as books, journal articles, and media reports. An in-depth perusal of various official SAPS documents also formed part of the secondary data collection process (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010).

6.3 Methods of data collection

The chosen methods of primary data collection were (1) questionnaires and (2) semi-structured interviews.

The paper-and-pencil questionnaire was the appropriate method of data collection, mainly because it allows for data collection from several respondents in a short period of time. The questionnaire schedule contained only nine (9) questions, as keeping the questions few and short would increase the willingness of the participants to complete it. The first page of the questionnaire provided the respondent with

information regarding the purpose and goals of the research, the anonymity of their participation, guidelines for answering the questions, as well as the researcher's contact details. The questions in the schedule were open-ended to allow the respondents to be descriptive in their answers and to elaborate if they had additional information to share.

One drawback of giving participants a questionnaire to complete is that their responses may reflect poor reading and writing skills and, perhaps, their misinterpretation of one or more questions, which may impact the findings (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010:129)

The second instrument employed for data collection was the semi-structured interview. In this study, interviews were dedicated to two individuals: a private security company reaction manager and an SAPS detective commander. The motivation for this decision was that information gathered from these individuals would be most valuable and would thus deserve more detailed attention than just having them complete the questionnaire. By conducting a face-to-face interview with these individuals, I could pick up on behavioural cues and personal attitudes about a question asked. Because interviewees can not necessarily prepare for the questions asked, they cannot think too long about the question. This could be considered an advantage of the interview method, because responses that come to mind first when asked a question are normally more reliable than when the respondent has time to formulate an answer (Bryman, 2004).

6.4   Population and sampling

To address the aim and research questions, I incorporated the non-probability sampling design of purposive sampling. This was done because the research was aimed at two specific population groups: (1) detectives working in the service of the SAPS, and (2) security officers employed by a large locallyoperating private security company. Purposive sampling was employed as the objectives of the research were to gain the perceptions of the topic from two predetermined groups of individuals.

The private security company that was selected for the research is one of the largest of its kind operating in the greater Durban area. Although the company is Durban-based, it provides services in about 94 suburbs across KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), making it one of the largest security companies in the province. The police station that I selected was chosen for its easy accessibility and its notoriously active investigation of various crimes, with housebreaking/burglary often being a specific focus.

In terms of sample size, the detective branch of the selected police station employed approximately fifteen (15) detectives. Ten (10) of these officers would mostly be based at the station simultaneously, or they

would report at the station on the same day. Getting in touch with all 15 detectives would be quite a challenge due to their time and work schedules, and also because some of them were out of town for a lengthy period of time. For this reason, the research sample of detectives consisted of a maximum of ten (10) individuals. All the targeted SAPS members completed and returned the questionnaire for my evaluation.

Although the selected PS company utilizes a large number of active security officers, a research sample size of approximately ten (10) officers was chosen in order to correlate with the ten (10) detectives. Fifteen (15) questionnaires were distributed to the PS officers to allow for non-responders; however, all fifteen (15) questionnaires were completed and returned, thus all of them were incorporated in the data findings to increase the reliability of the results.

The two groups received the same questionnaire schedule, to allow for comparison.

In terms of the semi-structured interviews, the training manager of the private security company was interviewed in order to determine what type of training first responding officers receive in terms of crime scene management and protection. The detective commander at the chosen police station was interviewed to learn from his experiences and knowledge on the topic. These two individuals were elected as interviewees due to their professional knowledge and experience. By conducting these interviews, I was able to probe these individuals for more detailed information where necessary. They were also prompted to elaborate on unclear or ambiguous points, which is not possible through the use of questionnaires.

The research sample therefore consisted of ten (10) SAPS detectives, fifteen (15) first responding PS officers, and two (2) interviewees - an SAPS detective commander and a PS training manager.

6.5   Data collection procedure

The data collection procedure commenced once I had been granted written permission for conducting the research at the chosen locations. To maintain the anonymity of the participants, and the police station and company they represented respectively, excerpts of these consent letters are attached as Annexure 1 and Annexure 2. The complete letters are in possession of the researcher.

The first step in the process was to familiarise myself with the relevant personnel/gatekeepers of the organisations involved. In terms of the SAPS, this involved contacting the Station Commander of the selected police station in writing. He then granted written permission for the research to be conducted at

the detective branch that operates from a separate station in a suburb of Durban. Hard copies of the ten (10) questionnaires to be completed by SAPS detectives were delivered to the Station Commander of the branch, who distributed them to the relevant detective participants. The questionnaires were retrieved from him at the station after completion by the detectives. The interview with the Detective Commander was conducted on a separate occasion during office hours at the detective branch where he was stationed.

The reaction manager of the private security company with whom the interview was conducted also served as gatekeeper of the security company's head office, which is located in a suburb of Durban. He provided the written permission to conduct the research at this location. The reaction manager/gatekeeper distributed a total of fifteen (15) questionnaires to reaction officers within the department. The completed questionnaires were retrieved from the manager on the same date that the interview was conducted.

6.6 Data analysis

Being mainly qualitative in nature, the design for this research took the form of a content analysis. This process involves inspecting the data individually, followed by grouping the repeated findings into categories. This enables the researcher to identify common and opposing themes in the transcripts. The information obtained by means of the questionnaires was mainly supplied by the participants in the form of written paragraphs. For this reason, it was necessary to filter the text into smaller, more manageable parts, as suggested by Leedy and Ormrod (2010). By employing this method, these extracted parts of the text were able to be grouped and tallied into static categories (normally known as frequency charts/tables). The categories are often referred to as 'themes' of the content analysis performed.

Having classified the research findings into themes, and having calculated the frequency of the occurrence of each theme, it was possible to point out recurring themes (i.e., the same answers or key words provided by a large proportion of the respondents), as well as exceptions to the rule (i.e., answers unique to individual respondents, or provided by only a few of the respondents).

6.7 Data limitations

The truth about qualitative research projects within the social sciences is that research findings largely depend in part, if not entirely, on the social context in which they fall (Nueman, 2007:184). It implies that every social condition present has a direct or indirect influence on what is being studied. For this reason,

it was important to identify which aspects of the research process and involvements may have impacted the results of the study and what affect this may have had on its interpretation.

With regard to the limitations of the questionnaire schedule, its reliability is brought into question. It must be kept in mind that the questionnaire included questions regarding the participants' occupational duties. Therefore, even though the anonymity of the respondents was guaranteed, the truthfulness of the answers had to be reconsidered in cases where the participants manipulated their answers in order to protect their or their department's reputation. A prime example of this setback was seen in the answers provided by the security personnel when asked to what extent private security officers contaminate crime scenes as first responders. All the respondents answered that they never contaminate crime scenes (i.e., 0% of the time). This was a clear case of bias and thus was not considered in the results as a truthful or realistic reflection of the phenomenon.

In addition to protecting or uplifting the reputation of their workplace or their work performance, a sampling bias cannot be denied. Unfortunately, the research was limited to a single PS company due to several restraints. This disables the data gathered by the PS personnel from being representative of the collective PS industry population.

Another factor of the research sample that may have contributed to sampling bias is the fact that the group shared the same work environment, leading to similar work experiences, attitudes, professional opinions, as well as having received identical training. These personal impacts may have caused the respondents to provide the same or similar answers. The same concept also applies to the sample population of the detectives.

Care was taken to limit questions which might pose a conceived threat to the participants' or their employers' work performance and hence influence the reliability of the finding. However, the data obtained from the participants were reliable in terms of measurability; that "the results of [the] study are repeatable" (Bryman, 2004:28).

Chapter 7

Research Results and Data Analysis

7.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an outline of the responses from the research participants. The data obtained by means of the questionnaires were organised according to corresponding categories through a content analysis process. This allowed for the construction of a spread sheet containing a frequency table for each question into which the themes listed by each respondent were tabulated. The tables were incorporated into frequency histograms for easy interpretation and comparison. The results are discussed, followed by a brief evaluation from which meaningful conclusions regarding the research findings are drawn. For guaranteed anonymity, the questionnaire respondents were each assigned an alphabetical letter, and the personal communications via the interviews have not been referenced.

The quantitative outcomes pertaining to questions 1 and 2 are separately developed in section 7.2 due to their numerical nature, whereas section 7.3 contains the qualitative content analysis of questions 3 - 8. The results of the two sample groups (PS and SAPS) were combined in the graphical representations of all the questions to allow for easy comparison. An example of the questionnaire is attached as Annexure 5

7.2 Categorical survey results (Questions 1 & 2 of the questionnaire)

As mentioned, the responses to Question 1 and Question 2 of the questionnaire schedule were categorical in nature and therefore did not require a content analysis. For these two questions, a more appropriate method of interpretation involved a numerical tabulation.

Question 1: Percentage wise, how often do private security officers arrive at housebreaking and theft crime scenes as first responding officers? (i.e., before the SAPS)

This question required the participants to select one of ten boxes consisting of percentage ranges. The number of respondents who selected each range is displayed in the following table.

Table 7.1: Frequency table of the responses pertaining to Question 1

Question 1	SAPS	SAPS %	PS	PS %
0%	0	0%	0	0%
1% - 10%	0	0%	0	0%
11% - 20%	1	10%	0	0%
21% - 30%	2	20%	0	0%
31% - 40%	1	10%	0	0%
41% - 50%	5	50%	0	0%
51% - 60%	0	0%	0	0%
61% - 70%	0	0%	1	7%
71% - 80%	0	0%	1	7%
81% - 90%	0	0%	10	67%
91% - 100%	1	10%	3	20%
Total	**10**		**15**	

Discussion:

It is interesting to note that all the SAPS respondents, except one, believed that private security officers were the first to arrive at scenes only half of the time, or even less often (0% - 50%), as indicated on the graph below. This finding is contrary to the many reports that claim that private security officers are the first to respond to housebreakings due to PS services being notified whenever the clients' alarm system goes off and the fact that they patrol neighbourhoods (Mahlutshana, 2014; Minnaar & Ngoveni, 2004; Irish, 1999). The answer by Respondent I, who selected the option of 91% - 100%, at first seemed like a data outlier (i.e., the response was inconsistent with the associated data). Upon inspection, however, the respondent justified his answer by explaining that PS officers were almost always the first responders at a housebreaking scene due to their connection with the client's alarm system/panic button. Detective Commander Captain James (pseudonym) answered the question similarly, stating that PS officers "…arrive first 60 – 70 % of the time. This is because most of them have access to connection with the homeowner's alarm system." These logical responses therefore seem to be a closer reflection of reality than the responses from the remaining detectives. The limitation of bias should be considered when

interpreting these results as it concerns the participants' work performance (which was discussed in section 6.7 of Chapter 6). This impacts the reliability of the responses to this question.

On the other hand, the majority of the private security personnel reported that they were the first to arrive at housebreaking scenes 81% - 90% of the time. In his interview, training manager Mr Chetty (pseudonym) provided a corresponding answer, stating that PS officers first arrived at housebreaking scenes "all the time" due to alarm system notifications. This result is more generally corroborated by existing literature (Mahlutshana, 2014; Minnaar & Ngoveni 2004; Irish 1999) and therefore seems a more likely and realistic expectation.

In addition to his previous comment, Mr Chetty also revealed that "it is unlikely for police to even attend housebreaking scenes." This blunt response may appear surprising at first. However, Captain James (pseudonym) of the SAPS acknowledged in his interview that the police rarely attended cases of housebreaking. He explained this by stating: "The presence and services of the police are high in demand and that they thus mostly attend scenes of serious crimes such as noteworthy violent crimes, large drug related crimes, and reported homicides."

Figure 7.1 on the following page presents a graphical presentation of the responses to Question 1.

Figure 7.1: Quantitative comparison of SAPS and PS respondents' views regarding what percentage of cases the private security arrive at crime scenes before the SAPS

Question 2: Of the above mentioned percentage, how often are crime scenes of housebreaking and theft contaminated by private security officers as first responding officials?

This question, as was the case with the previous one, required a selection from one of ten percentage ranges. Of the 10 SAPS detectives, 9 answered this question, whereas all 15 PS participants answered this question.

As was revealed by responses to the previous question, the majority of PS participants believed that security officers were first responders in most cases. For Question 2, the survey revealed that *all 15* of the PS participants believed that security company officers never contaminated crime scenes; they thus responded by stating: "0% of the time". As with Question 1, the possibility of bias in these results cannot be denied. Since *all* the PS respondents answered "0%", it was irrelevant to include this group's results in the graphical representation of Question 2. Thus, only the results pertaining to SAPS respondents are shown in the graph below.

For each of the 9 SAPS participants who responded to this question, this graph shows the proportion of time that SAPS detectives believed that PS officers contaminate a crime scene, given that they are the first responding officers. For example, respondent F felt that security companies arrived at a crime scene as the first responding officer 40 - 50% of the time, but that they contaminated the crime scene 50 - 60% of these times. Only one SAPS respondent felt that security company officers were the first to arrive at the scene 100% of the time and that they never contaminated the crime scene (i.e., 0% of the time). This outlier was excluded in the calculation of the average response, which is shown in green.

As displayed in the graph below, the majority of SAPS detectives believed that PS officers contaminated approximately half of the housebreaking crime scenes they attended.

Although most of the SAPS detectives believed that PS officers contaminated crime scenes half the time, bias in these responses is a distinct possibility. Captain James had an opposing opinion, stating: "I am not aware of any serious cases in [the Berea] area in which scenes were contaminated by private security officers," and claimed that this was due to PS officers rarely entering buildings where crimes had allegedly taken place. According to him, it is important to note that many managers of PS companies are ex-police officers and that they therefore have knowledge of contamination avoidance and crime scene priorities and therefore will reiterate this information to security officers in training. He named few of the large, well-known security companies, commenting that their work and activities were very efficient and satisfactory.

Mr Chetty similarly stated in his interview that response officers from their company never contaminated crime scenes, as the private training they underwent involved a large section concerning crime scene contamination and how to avoid it.

As mentioned above, only the results for SAPS are shown in the graphical representation of the results for Question 2. These results are presented in a graph on the next page.

Figure 7.2: SAPS respondents' opinions of how often first responder PS personnel contaminate crime scenes of housebreaking

7.3   Results pertaining to Questions 3 – 8 of the Questionnaire

The following section is dedicated to: (1) outlining the recorded responses of each participant pertaining to Questions 3 - 8 of the questionnaire; (2) classifying the research results into respective categories; and (3) developing conclusive themes. The emerging themes (the delineation of answers collected from the questionnaires) and the rates at which they occurred are listed in their respective frequency tables.

7.3.1   Outline of Question 3

Question 3: If private security officers as first responders contribute toward crime scene contamination, please provide examples thereof.

Group 1: SAPS detectives

Pertaining to this question, Respondent A provided four examples: (1) trampling evidence; (2) unauthorised collection of exhibits; (3) cleaning up at the crime scene due to PS officers' client-based intentions; and (4) moving of objects.

Respondents B, C, and E singled out the fact that unauthorised persons, such as inquisitive bystanders entering and walking across the crime scene, cause evidence to be trampled.

Respondent D mentioned the example of removing exhibits from the scene.

The four examples provided by Respondent F are: (1) movement at windows where potential footprints could be found; (2) cleaning up at the crime scene; (3) touching objects that may possess offender fingerprints; and (4) moving objects, specifically closing windows where entry was gained.

The only example of contamination offered by Respondent G was the touching of items where potential fingerprints could be found.

Respondents H and I both listed trampling evidence such as walking over potential footprints as well as tampering (and in fact any contact) with evidence. Respondent H specifically mentioned that any contact with objects "results in the disruption of potential fingerprints and DNA evidence such as hair, while simultaneously leaving the officer's *own* DNA behind".

Respondent J also listed the touching and moving of objects as examples of contamination.

Group 2: PS officers

The majority of this group did not provide examples of contamination by PS officers, which coincided with their answers to Question 2 (i.e., that PS officers contaminate 0% of cases). Only five of the PS respondents answered the question.

Respondents K, P, Q, and R provided the example of walking across the crime scene, thereby trampling any physical or biological evidence such as DNA or fingerprints.

Respondent U gave a few examples: (1) walking across the crime scene; (2) removing any item linked to the crime; (3) cleaning up at the crime scene; and (4) touching objects within the crime scene.

Table 7.2: Frequency of recurring themes pertaining to Question 3

Themes pertaining to Question 3	SAPS	PS	Total
Walking over/trampling evidence	7	5	12
Removing evidence	2	1	3
Cleaning up	2	1	3
Moving objects	3	0	3
Touching objects	5	1	6

Figure 7.3: Graphic representation of examples of crime scene contamination sourced by means of the questionnaires

Discussion:

As depicted in the graph above, the most recurring example of crime scene contamination by both sample groups is that of walking across the crime scene and trampling potential evidence. This is consistent with findings reported in the literature as was outlined in section 5.7 of Chapter 5; i.e., that crime scene contamination occurs easily when the scene is overcrowded by officials (Lundrigan, 2001; Schiro, 1999). A few respondents pointed out that this action is not exclusive to the responding officers but is also the result of unauthorised persons entering the scene, such as inquisitive bystanders or neighbours. This finding is not necessarily surprising because, depending on the extent of the housebreaking, curious neighbours or perhaps even second or third PS responders will naturally approach the crime scene to discover what happened. Inadvertently, these persons pose a threat to the preservation of evidence. Invisible or unidentifiable evidence such as fingerprints or footprints are easily taken for granted and unintentionally trampled on.

The second most frequent example provided is that of touching objects within the crime scene. The respondents generally referred to contact with items that may possess offender fingerprints, or contact with any item or surface where DNA evidence (hair, blood, etc.) could be found. It applies largely to windows, doors, or other points of entry. Captain James agreed in his interview that contamination at crime scenes of housebreaking mainly involves the touching of doors and gates where the perpetrators enter and exit the property, as well as disturbance of potential evidence that can be found outdoors, such as footprints. With regard to items or materials present at the crime scene, Mr Chetty made it clear in his interview that the PS officers of this particular company were specifically trained to avoid touching or moving any objects within the crime scene.

The remaining three themes included moving evidence, cleaning up, and removing objects. In some instances, it may be necessary to move furniture blocking a passage, for example, or to shut open doors or windows after the housebreaking occurred. However, by moving an object containing evidence (even if it is later replaced), that evidence loses its integrity and value to the investigation process. According to Mr. Chetty, it may happen, although seldom, that it is necessary for officers to move objects such as when a piece of furniture is blocking an entry way. In this rare event, officers are instructed to record the movement of all objects.

Premature cleaning of the crime scene was a contamination concern by some respondents. As noted, the primary intention of PS officers is to ensure the safety of their clients by personally reporting to the premises and possibly deterring the offenders. Because the goal of PS officers is to serve the client's security needs, it may well occur that the officers assist the client in additional duties to satisfy their

requirements. This may involve sweeping up shattered glass at a window, cleaning up any mess left by the intruders, picking up objects that were knocked down, wiping dirtied windows, etc. Evidence is hereby directly contaminated and even destroyed.

Lastly, the removal of evidence is another example of contamination listed by more than one respondent. In terms of this, PS training manager Mr Chetty revealed in his interview that evidence is in fact sometimes collected by PS officers if necessary, but he stated that it was definitely more the exception than the rule. Mr Chetty pointed out that not all PS companies are competent in collecting evidence at crime scenes. According to him, the security officers employed by the PS company in question are fully qualified and equipped with a crime scene kit in order to perform evidence collection. He stated that PS officers are, however, not naturally entitled to collect evidence from a crime scene. In order to perform evidence collection, official permission should be granted by relevant personnel of the SAPS. This rare event generally occurred when members of the SAPS were unable to attend the crime scene (within a reasonable time period, or not at all). When this happened, the SAPS would request evidence collection from the first responding PS officers, provided that they were competent in doing so. Only if authorised by the SAPS could PS officers collect evidence from a crime scene. Mr Chetty further explained that once evidence had been collected by PS officers, it was promptly handed over into the custody of a SAPS officer, who would then take responsibility for processing the evidence and investigating the criminal event. Mr Chetty was adamant that PS officers were under no circumstances allowed to keep possession of evidence gathered, or to utilise evidence in an attempt to investigate the crime privately. He declared that crime scene investigation was solely the responsibility of the SAPS.

The 'removal of evidence' as an example of crime scene contamination thus refers to the unauthorised collection of evidence from the crime scene, even by PS officers. In fact, Respondent A described in his questionnaire how some PS officers would unlawfully collect evidence with the goal of solving the crime, thereby promoting their PS company.

7.3.2   Outline of Question 4

Question 4: What factors contribute toward the contamination of housebreaking and theft crime scenes in general?

Where Question 3 asked for *examples* of contamination by first responding PS officers, Question 4 was concerned with the overall *contributing factors* to crime scene contamination by both private and public officers who arrived first at housebreaking crime scenes.

Group 1: SAPS detectives

According to Respondent A, one factor contributing to crime scene contamination was disturbance of evidence by the victim. The respondent explained that PS officers, as first responders, occasionally informed their clients incorrectly regarding the procedure to be followed after experiencing a housebreaking. Specifics were not provided, but it was mentioned that PS officers might advise their clients to clean the crime scene, thereby disregarding the potential of any evidence present. Additional answers by Respondent A included: (1) not cordoning off the crime scene; (2) allowing unauthorised persons to enter the crime scene; and (3) delays in summoning the SAPS.

Respondents B and C were both of the opinion that two factors contributing to crime scene contamination were: (1) PS officers advising the victims incorrectly about procedures; and (2) not following correct protocol in securing the crime scene.

For Respondent D, the factors contributing to contamination included: (1) not securing the crime scene; (2) poor preservation of exhibits; and (3) being unorganised in terms of not contacting the SAPS as soon as possible.

Respondents E and H believed that not properly securing the crime scene as well as unnecessary entry into the scene contributed to contamination.

According to Respondent F, poor preservation of evidence was the single causal factor of crime scene contamination.

The question was not answered by Respondent G.

Respondent I provided three answers: (1) a lack in cordoning off the crime scene; (2) the inexperience of the PS officers; and (3) lack of training of PS officers as first responders.

A lack of organisation as a consequence of being inexperienced was the only answer given by Respondent J.

Group 2: PS officers

Respondent K believed that contributing factors to crime scene contamination were: (1) failing to secure the scene; and (2) being untrained in how to preserve a crime scene.

Respondents L and U attributed "unorganised" and "untrained" factors to crime scene contamination.

Respondents M, N, P, Q, and W all listed the following: (1) failing to properly secure the crime scene; (2) poor preservation of the evidence; (3) the lack of planning and coordination by officers; and (4) having received poor training as a first responder.

Poor preservation, poor planning, poor coordination, and poor training were provided as factors by Respondent O.

Respondent R provided the lack of securing the scene and being unorganised as contributing factors, whereas Respondent S listed: (1) not cordoning off the crime scene; (2) neglecting to preserve the evidence; and (3) no planning or coordination as the causal factors of contamination.

Respondents T, X and Y argued that (1) failure to secure the crime scene; (2) being unorganised in terms of not taking the case seriously; and (3) a lack of responder training as factors contributing to crime scene contamination.

Lastly, Respondent V believed that (1) failing to secure the scene; (2) poor preservation of the scene; (3) no planning; (4) not accepting responsibility for their actions; and (5) bad management at the scene all contributed to crime scene contamination.

Table 7.3: Frequency table of recurring themes pertaining to Question 4

Themes for Question 4	SAPS	PS	Total
Unnecessary/unauthorised entry	3	0	**3**
Advising client incorrectly	3	0	**3**
Not securing/cordoning off the scene	7	12	**19**
Poor preservation of evidence	2	8	**10**
Being disorganised	4	15	**19**
Lack of training	1	12	**13**

Figure 7.4: Graphic representation of contributing factors of crime scene contamination sourced by means of the questionnaires.

Discussion

Pertaining to Question 4, six clear themes emerged from the responses. The majority of the PS participants provided similar and even identical answers. According to this group, four causal factors of contamination exist: (1) failure to secure the crime scene; (2) poor preservation of evidence; (3) being unorganised; and (4) being untrained (or lack of training).

Notably, *all* 15 of the PS participants believed that lack of organisation, particularly involving poor planning and poor coordination at the crime scene, contributed to contamination. Not taking their responsibility as first responders seriously was mentioned by a few of the officers.

The two categories: (1) a lack of training regarding first responder responsibilities and lack of preservation of exhibits, as well as (2) failing to secure the scene, were the second highest reported causal factors of contamination, with each being listed by 80% of the PS respondents. Poor preservation of evidence was the only other theme provided by the PS officers, and was mentioned by 8 of the 15 respondents.

Neglect of securing the crime scene appears to be the only factor that both groups agreed upon, with 70% of detectives and 80% of PS officers listing this factor largely as a cause of crime scene contamination.

For the SAPS participants, the emerging trend was 'a little bit of everything', but "not following protocol in cordoning off the crime scene" stood out more than the rest. It is interesting to note that the detectives additionally agreed upon the "lack of organisation" as a contributing factor to contamination.

Overall, the lack of securing the crime scene and being unorganised were the highest reported factors, with each being listed by 19 of a total of 25 participants.

7.3.3   Outline of Question 5

Question 5: In your opinion, what can be done to prevent the contamination of housebreaking and theft crime scenes by first responding officers?

Group 1: SAPS detectives

Respondent A listed numerous points. These included: (1) cordon off the crime scene using barriers or tape; (2) only allow authorised persons to enter the crime scene; (3) make use of a crime scene kit (e.g., wear gloves and protective shoes); (4) identify possible evidence at the crime scene; (5) record possible evidence at the crime scene; (6) no touching of evidence; and (7) receive proper training in first response.

Respondent B suggested the following: (1) securing the crime scene; (2) using a crime scene kit; and (3) avoid touching objects in the crime scene.

According to Respondent C, first responders should always use a crime scene kit (i.e., wear gloves), especially when identifying and recording potential evidence.

For Respondent D, to avoid contamination first responders should wear gloves and cordon off the crime scene.

For Respondent E, the crime scene should be cordoned off, thereby denying entry to unauthorised persons. This person also stated that proper first response training was essential; that armed response members should contact the police as soon as possible; and that they should then wait for their arrival.

Respondent F believed that crime scene contamination could be avoided by receiving training regarding crime scene management.

For Respondent G, it was important that first responders should avoid touching and moving any items, as well as limiting their movements in the area of the crime scene.

According to Respondent H, first responders ought to contact the police immediately and wait for them to arrive. They should additionally receive training regarding first response actions.

Respondent I only mentioned the use of gloves and protective clothing.

Respondent J believed first responders should receive training regarding crime scene protection and that the officers should not touch objects at the crime scene.

Group 2: PS officers

PS Respondents K, M, P and Y indicated that awareness of contamination and training regarding crime scenes were both important requirements.

Respondents L, Q, R and S believed that proper training and the use of gloves could help prevent contamination.

Respondent N listed various points, including: (1) securing the crime scene; (2) only allowing authorised personnel to enter the scene; (3) making use of protective clothing; (4) receiving proper training; and (5) making use of a single path when entering and exiting the crime scene.

Respondent O likewise named (1) only allowing authorised persons to enter; (2) wearing protective clothing; (3) receiving first responder training; and also (4) using the same path for moving into and out of the scene.

For Respondent T, recording possible evidence, being trained, and being prepared were important.

Securing the crime scene, no touching or moving of items, being trained, and being prepared were features listed by Respondent U.

Respondent V provided several points: (1) secure the crime scene; (2) only allow authorised and necessary people into the crime scene; (3) wear protective clothing inside the crime scene; (4) record all possible evidence; (5) undergo relevant training; (6) use the same path for entering and exiting the crime scene; and (7) and have a good understanding of crime scene management.

Respondent W believed that to prevent contamination, the officer should be well trained, use only one path for walking around the scene, and be prepared for the job.

"Training" was the only factor listed by Respondent X.

Lastly, Respondent Y listed (1) the use of gloves and protective clothing; (2) having received training; (3) moving in a single path when entering and exiting; as well as (4) preparedness.

Table 7.4: Frequency table of recurring themes pertaining to Question 5.

Themes pertaining to Question 5	SAPS	PS	Total
Securing/Cordoning off the scene	4	3	7
Only allowing authorised persons	2	3	5
Using a crime scene kit	5	8	13
Identifying possible evidence	2	0	2
Recording possible evidence	2	2	4
No touching	4	1	5
Contacting and waiting for the police	2	0	2
Training	5	15	20
Using a single/same path	1	5	6
Preparedness	0	5	5

Discussion:

Both groups provided a wide variety of points for this question, indicating the numerous ways in which contamination can be prevented. In terms of the frequencies of the themes, two immediately stand out from the rest, namely using a crime scene kit and undergoing training.

Most of the participants who reported the use of a crime scene kit regarded this as the practice of wearing latex gloves and protective clothing when inspecting the crime scene. Of a total of 13 participants who listed this practice, 8 belonged to the PS officers group. This result indicates that PS officers belonging to this specific PS company were aware of the need for using a crime scene kit in order to avoid contamination. Mr Chetty confirmed in his interview that first response officers of this company were indeed equipped with latex gloves when responding to reports of housebreaking.

The highest recorded factor for avoiding crime scene contamination was "training". It was stated by 5/10 of the detective respondents and by 15/15 of the PS respondents. Some of the detective respondents specifically indicated that first response training ought to be centred on crime scene management and protection.

With regards to the specific first responder training received by the PS sample group, Mr Chetty revealed in his interview that these PS personnel did in fact undergo compulsive training concerning the nature of crime scene contamination. According to him, the training that the officers received highlighted the importance of contamination. According to Mr Chetty, the training included detailed lessons on what contamination is, what the consequences of contamination are, and how to avoid contamination. As mentioned previously, the officers would be instructed to avoid touching or moving any objects.

The numerous remaining themes, although reported at lower frequencies, nevertheless indicate the range of possibilities available to avoid crime scene contamination.

Figure 7.5: Graphic representation of contributing factors of crime scene contamination sourced by means of the questionnaires.

7.3.4   Outline of Question 6

Question 6:   What is your opinion regarding the quality of training that private security officers receive, specifically in terms of acting as first responders to a crime scene of housebreaking and theft?

The responses to this question by both groups revealed that this question was not clearly understood by any of the participants, as none of them commented on the quality of PS officer training

Group 1: SAPS detectives

In response to this question, Respondents A and E merely stated that it was essential for these individuals (PS officers) to receive training regarding first response.

Respondents B, C and D did not answer this question.

Respondents F and H shared the opinion that PS officers received no training.

Respondents G, I and J stated that correct training was crucial for first response officers, but claimed that only a proportion of PS officers received training.

Group 2: PS officers

PS Respondents K, M, N, O, P, R, S and Y answered this question by stating that training for PS officers regarding first response was vital, and that these officers themselves had undergone comprehensive training.

Respondent L simply stated that first response training was very important.

The remainder of the PS respondents (Q, T, U, V, W and X) indicated that they had personally received training.

Table 7.5: Frequency table of recurring themes pertaining to Question 6

Themes pertaining to Question 6	SAPS	PS	Total
Training is very important	4	9	**13**
No training received	2	0	**2**
Some not trained	3	0	**3**
Received training	0	14	**14**

Discussion:

Unfortunately, the lack of detailed responses for this question rendered it difficult to draw conclusions regarding opinions of the quality of PS training.

Similarly, detective Captain James did not elaborate on this subject, stating that he was uncertain about the type and quality of training PS officers received.

Training manager Mr Chetty was naturally able to shed some light on this question. According to him, first response officers of this particular PS company underwent a variety of training methods, as the company adhered to several Unit Standards for security officers as set out by the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA), in addition to receiving obligated training provided by the company privately.

Mr Chetty provided me with the following list of Unit Standards, all of which are prerequisites for employment as a reaction officer at the PS company in question:

1. ID no. 117705 - Demonstrate knowledge of the Firearms Control Act 2000 (Act No 60 of 2000) applicable to possessing a firearm

2. ID no. 119649 - Handling and using a handgun

3. ID no. 123515 - Handling and using a handgun for business purposes

4. PSIRA training standard of armed reaction

5. PSIRA training standard of customer relation

6. PSIRA training standard of crime scenes

(information on training standards at:
(http://www.psira.co.za/psira/dmdocuments/circular/mou_sasseta.pdf)

Apart from these standard qualifications, Mr Chetty explained that this specific PS company provided private instruction that focused on crime scenes and crime scene investigation. According to him, the objective of this training was not to prepare the PS officers for performing investigative tasks, but rather to provide them with knowledge and background regarding important crime scene aspects. He stated that this training highlighted the implications of contamination and included detailed lessons on what contamination was, what the consequences were, and how to avoid them. He reiterated that a training

manual was used that officers were to study comprehensively, followed by an examination that should be passed with a high mean grade.

7.3.5 Outline of Question 7

Question 7: What actions/duties do private security officers perform when arriving at a housebreaking and theft crime scene as first responders? (Please provide as many examples as possible).

Group 1: SAPS detectives

Respondent A listed the widest variety of actions/duties that PS officers typically perform when arriving at these crime scenes:

- They contact the police to inform them of the crime and request them to the crime scene.
- They identify possible suspects in the vicinity.
- They identify what items were stolen by the burglars.
- They identify how entry was gained to the premises (or the house).
- They secure or cordon off the crime scene or relevant part of the scene (barriers or tape).
- They inform their client of their observations, their actions, their intentions, etc. and inform the client of what to do, what steps to take, etc.
- They record their observations, relevant information given by the client or witnesses, information about evidence or potential evidence, etc.

According to Respondent B, PS officers first contacted the police. They then secured the crime scene and assisted with their client's needs.

Respondent C claimed that after contacting the police, PS officers attempted to identify possible suspects in the surrounding area, and advised/assisted the client.

To Respondent D's knowledge, PS officers simply cordoned off the area and summoned the police.

The only action provided by Respondent E was "identifying possible suspects".

Respondent F stated that PS officers would first contact the SAPS, followed by searching for possible suspects.

According to Respondent G, PS officers contacted their private control centre who would then notify the police. This respondent stated that it was the responsibility of the PS officer to make contact with the owner of the premises.

Respondent H indicated that PS officers typically inspected the premises and identified where entry had been gained by the offenders, followed by contacting the police and identifying possible suspects in the area.

According to Respondent I, PS duties involved summoning the police to the premises and identifying what items had been stolen. The officers additionally assisted the client/victim with their needs and advised them on the protocol to be followed. The officers would then attempt to identify suspects in the vicinity and, if apprehended, possibly arrest them.

Lastly, Respondent J stated that PS officers would inform the police about the incident, identify potential suspects in the surrounding area, and secure the crime scene.

Group 2: PS officers

Respondent K listed a number of duties to be performed as first responders, including (1) securing the scene; (2) contacting their control room to summon the police or dispatching additional officers for assistance if needed; (3) making contact with the owner of the premises; (4) coordinating necessary activities; (5) preventing any unauthorised entry into the crime scene; and (6) recording necessary information.

The responsibilities of officers according to Respondent L involved securing the crime scene, thereby preventing unauthorised or unnecessary entry, as well as recording visible evidence. They should also record the names of all individuals found present in the vicinity of the crime scene.

Respondent M believed that officers should display good planning regarding their duties and responsibilities at the scene, in addition to warding off unnecessary entry of persons into the crime scene.

Respondents N and O both indicated that when PS officers arrived at a housebreaking, they firstly secured or protected the scene from unauthorised entry, followed by taking control of and coordinating subsequent activities and actions.

The only duty provided by Respondent P was for PS officers to identify how entry had been gained to the premises or building.

Respondent Q outlined two duties, namely cordoning off the crime scene and preventing the unauthorised entry of persons into the scene.

For Respondent R, first response involved a couple of tasks:

- Identify how and where entry was gained
- Secure the crime scene
- Plan and coordinate required activities
- Prevent unauthorised entry
- Assist the client with their needs

PS Respondents S, T, V, W, X and Y believed that four tasks were important for first respondents: (1) secure and protect the crime scene; (2) plan and coordinate the relevant activities and responsibilities; (3) avoid unnecessary entry to the scene; and (4) record all relevant information that police personnel might miss. Respondent V added that it was important to be observant of the surroundings.

Respondent U listed various first responder duties:

- Inform the SAPS of the incidence
- Identify possible suspects in the area
- Identify how entry was gained
- Inform the private control room to send assistance if needed
- Contact the owner of the residence/premises

Table 7.6: Frequency table of recurring themes pertaining to Question 7

Themes pertaining to Question 7	SAPS	PS	Total
Contacting police	9	1	**10**
Identifying possible suspects	7	0	**7**
Identifying what was stolen	2	0	**2**
Identifying how entry was gained	2	3	**5**
Securing/Cordoning off	4	13	**17**
Contacting control room	1	2	**3**
Contacting owner of premises	1	2	**3**
Good planning/Coordinating activities	0	11	**11**
Preventing unauthorized entry	0	12	**12**
Assisting/advising client	4	1	**5**
Recording all information	1	8	**9**

Discussion:

The results show that both the PS officers and police members were aware of a handful of actions that ought to be performed by armed response officers.

For the SAPS detectives, the most consistent answer was 'contact the police', as this requirement was reported by 90% of these respondents. Moreover, both Mr Chetty and Captain James confirmed this task, stating that after arrival at the scene, officers should contact/inform the police and are expected to wait for their arrival in order to take control of the situation. It is established that PS officers ought to inform the police of the crime after arrival at the premises, although it was mentioned in a few of the questionnaires that PS officers would contact their control centre who would then inform the police of the crime.

Figure 7.6: Graphic representation of duties performed at crime scenes by PS officers sourced by means of questionnaires

The second highest reported theme by the detectives was 'identify possible suspects', which was reported by 70% of the SAPS respondents. Captain James additionally stated in his interview that PS officers would monitor the area for any suspects or suspicious signals. Following an incident of housebreaking, they could be expected to patrol around the premises and the surrounding area.

'Cordon off the area' was the most prominent theme for 17 of a total 25 participants as well as for both interviewees who listed this as an answer. The term 'cordon off' (the crime scene) was used by the detectives, whereas the PS officers preferred the term 'secure' (the crime scene).

Mr Chetty confirmed that the most important objective was to cordon off the area using a barrier or a tape. He stated that a large piece of the property – or areas surrounding the site where the crime took place – would be "casually cordoned off". This would be done to restrict unnecessary entry onto the premises. This was a duty with a 70% report rate by the PS officers. According to Mr Chetty, the premises would then be further cordoned off more specifically at sites where entry had been gained, where doors/windows had been tampered with, or where any clear disruptions or damage to the property could be found. He stated that this was done to restrict contact with evidence.

Captain James revealed in his interview that "the main purpose of PS at crime scenes is to have authority figures present to monitor the area and situation when police officers are absent." He added that their objective was to confirm the safety of the homeowners.

A frequent reported duty/task mentioned by the PS officers was 'good planning and coordinating activities'. This may imply that PS officers must display adequate understanding of their duties and responsibilities, show individual cooperation and professionalism, and are able to manage the situation. Unfortunately, no other details regarding this task were specified in the questionnaires.

Furthermore, 53% of the PS respondents stated that their responsibilities included recording important information of, or observations from, the crime scene. Two officers specifically explained in their answers that they recorded information regarding any evidence present, as well as the names of everyone present on the premises. Mr Chetty confirmed this task in his interview, stating that "as much information is recorded as possible to assist with the investigation of the crime, especially any information that the CSI or police will miss if they investigate at a later stage." Mr Chetty revealed that first response officers were equipped with a notepad dedicated for making recordings and taking notes of the event, which would include: (1) the time that the crime took place; (2) the time of PS officers' arrival; (3) names or indications of persons who left the scene; (4) weather conditions that may have an influence on evidence; and (5) lighting conditions. According to Mr Chetty, in some events it might even be necessary for photographs

to be taken, to create rough sketches, or to take measurements. Mr Chetty's references to the recording of information by the officers (such as evidence present and names of individuals present at the scene) coincide with the requirements stipulated in official documents that are to be completed by first members at crime scenes, according to SAPS policy as outlined by Omar (2009:68):

Table 7.7: Documents used during crime scene management. Source: Omar (2009:68).

Table 4: Documents used during crime scene management

Document	Person responsible
SAPS 297	Call taker and/or dispatcher
First member report	First Member
Access log	First member and/or Commander of Joint Operational Centre (CJOC) or Command Centre Commander (CCC)
Casualty log	First member and/or CJOC or CCC
Exhibits log	First member or Crime scene technician
Witness log	First member and/or detective
Crime scene manager report	Crime scene manager
Crime scene technician report	Crime scene technician

Source: SAPS Policy 2 of 2005

Duties with a low report rate by the participants included: (1) identify what was stolen; (2) identify how entry was gained; (3) contact the control centre; (4) contact the client; and (5) assist the client. The fact that these themes were only listed by five or fewer of the total respondents means that they are not generalizable to all PS companies/officers.

7.3.6   Outline of Question 8

Question 8(a): In your opinion, do you think that any of the actions/duties you mentioned above should NOT be performed by private security officers? (Please explain and give reasons for your answers in as much detail as possible.)

Group 1: SAPS detectives

This question was unfortunately left unanswered by most of the SAPS detectives. There is a possibility that the question was not clearly understood by the participants.

Respondents A, I and J answered "no" to Question 8 (a), implying satisfaction with the performance of PS officers' duties.

Respondent E answered "yes", and indicated that PS officers' only duty should be to identify and arrest possible suspects in the vicinity.

Respondent F also answered "yes". The opinion of this respondent was that PS officers always contaminated crime scenes and thus that all tasks regarding/involving the crime scene should be left to members of the SAPS who are more knowledgeable about the subject.

Group 2: PS officers

Respondent K answered "yes" to this question but did not provide reasoning.

The majority of the PS respondents (L, M, N, O, P, Q, U, V, W and Y) all stated "no". The consensus among these participants was that the duties/tasks listed in Question 7 were generalizable to all first responders at crime scenes of housebreaking. Therefore, if these officers themselves happened to be the first responders, they should perform these tasks.

Table 7.8: Frequency table of responses pertaining to Question 8(a).

Response	SAPS	PS	Total
Yes - PS should not do it	2	1	3
No - PS should continue to do it	3	10	13

Discussion:

Only two detectives (Respondents E and F) displayed discontent with PS officer behaviour, stating that PS officers should not be involved at the crime scene and should only concern themselves with identifying and arresting suspects.

Regardless of the lack of detailed answers, the reality is that only a single SAPS official from the total eleven (11) involved in the research believed that the contamination caused by PS officers renders all their executed duties valueless.

It can be argued that because the majority of the PS officers claimed that the duties listed pertaining to Question 7 comprised the job of any first responder to a crime scene, it is deemed the responsibility of all armed response officers to perform any necessary first responder tasks.

The lack of information pertaining to this question rendered a graphical representation of the themes unnecessary.

Question 8(b): In your opinion, do you think that private security officers should be doing more than the mentioned actions/duties? (Please explain and give reasons for your answers in as much detail as possible.)

Group 1: SAPS detectives

Half (50%) of the SAPS detectives left the question unanswered.

It is interesting to note that Respondent C was of the opinion that PS officers should optimize their capabilities by allowing for their own criminal and forensic investigations.

Respondent D felt that PS officers should improve their skills in terms of writing comprehensive statements.

The answer provided by Respondents G and H held that PS officers should improve their success rate of identifying and arresting suspects by being more alert and observant of the environment/surroundings.

Group 2: PS officers

Nearly all the respondents of this group (K, L, M, Q, R, S, T, V, W, X and Y) stated "no" in response to the question and provided a single argument, stating that PS officers are neither equipped nor qualified to perform additional investigative tasks.

Similarly, Respondents N, P and U answered "no", explaining that PS officers possessed limited [crime investigation] skills.

Respondent O left this question unanswered.

Table 7.9: Frequency table of responses pertaining to Question 8(b)

Question 8(b)	SAPS	PS	Total
No - PS shouldn't do more	0	11	**11**
Yes - PS should do more	4	0	**4**

Discussion:

As with Question 8(a), drawing meaningful conclusions from these results was a challenge due to the lack of information.

The result of PS officers acknowledging their limited skill, qualification, and equipment as a reason/excuse for not performing additional duties at the crime scene seems to be perfectly logical, and considering the lack of responses by Group 1, it may be taken as a reasonable conclusion to this question.

One aspect is nevertheless noted: both a detective (Respondent D) and Captain James were of the opinion that PS officers should improve their capability of writing statements for the police. "They must create and give statements, since they have all the information first hand – something they rarely do," said Captain James.

According to Mr Chetty, however, all the information recorded by the officers concerning the crime scene (as outlined in the discussion pertaining to Question 7) and any additional notes would be given to police in the form of statements. Unfortunately, based on the comment by Captain James, this task is not generalizable to all PS companies/officers.

7.4   Additional findings

In terms of private-public partnerships, Mr Chetty informed that their PS company had an adequate working relationship with the SAPS and that they very seldom experienced challenges with regards to their cooperation or assistance. Captain James was able to confirm this claim by stating that PS and police officers generally had a very good working relationship:

> "*There exists a mutual agreement that PS share any knowledge of criminal activity with the*
> *police. The big PS companies, including Blue Security, Chub, and ADT, etc. and the SAPS*
> *detective unit set up meetings on a regular basis to discuss and share information to help*

each other. This enforces a good working relationship for when the two must cooperate with each other."

The questionnaire schedule provided the research respondents with an open section for offering any additional thoughts, opinions, or conclusions. Delightfully, half of the SAPS detectives explained in this section that despite the gaps in training of PS officers, they did vital work and that their function of deterring crime was very valuable.

While compiling the literature review for this research, one aspect that appeared troubling was the regulation of PS companies and officers. This motivated me to direct an enquiry about the subject to the PS training manager, Mr Chetty.

In response to my question, he revealed in his interview that the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) attempts to regulate the industry by employing quality checks at all registered PS companies, which occurred every eighteen (18) months. During these quality checks, each PS officer employed by the company would have to verify his/her qualifications and training received, as well as their PSIRA registered ID card/number.

Furthermore, Mr Chetty revealed that the PS company did its own pre-employment quality checks on applicants. He also indicated that all staff members underwent background screenings and polygraph tests in order to confirm their qualifications, a clean drug and alcohol history, and clean criminal history before they would be employed at the company. It was evident that this process is followed to guarantee the professionalism of the company's staff members. The PS company employs PS officers of grades E, D and C. A description of PS officer grades are provided by the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (75 of 1997): Amendment of Sectoral Determination 6: Private Security Sector, South Africa. An outline of grades E, D and C is provided:

(1)   "**security officer grade C**" means an employee who performs any one or more of the following duties –

      (a)   supervising or controlling security officers, grade D or E;

      (b)   driving a motor vehicle in the course of supervising or controlling security officers grade D or E;

      (c)   driving a motor vehicle for the purpose of transporting security officers; and

      (d)   who may be called upon to perform any or all of the duties of a security officer, grade D;

(2)   "**security officer grade D**" means an employee who performs any one or more of the following duties –

      (a)   controlling or reporting on the movement of persons or vehicles through checkpoints or gates;

      (b)   searching persons and if necessary, restraining them;

      (c)   supervising or controlling security officers, grade E;

      (d)   searching goods or vehicles; and

      (e)   who may be required to perform any or all of the duties of a security officer, grade E;

(3)   "**security officer grade E**" means an employee, other than a security officer, grade D, who performs any one or more of the following duties –

      (a)   guarding, protecting or patrolling premises or goods;

      (b)   handling or controlling dogs in the performance of any or all of the duties referred to in (a);

Figure 7.7: Description of PS officer grades

Source: Extracted from the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (75 of 1997): Amendment of Sectoral Determination 6: Private Security Sector, South Africa (p. 10).

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Chapter 8

Research Findings, Recommendations, and Conclusion

8.1   Research findings and respective recommendations

8.1.1   First responders and attendance

The reactions to the first question of the questionnaire revealed the first large discrepancy regarding which of the two groups (PS and SAPS) are believed to be first responders at housebreaking crime scenes. As mentioned in Section 7.2, both interviewees confirmed that members of the SAPS are hardly first responders to housebreaking crime scenes, if indeed they even attend the scene at all. This finding generates two large implications.

Firstly, detective commander Captain James revealed in his interview that the SAPS limit their urgent attention and attendance to reports of "more serious crimes" due to their restricted resources. Understandable as this may be, the VCS outlined that housebreaking is the most feared crime by locals (see page 14).

Consider the follow statement by Gilbert (2010:201): "Being the most commonly reported felony…policing agencies are incapable to assign investigators and resources to every case, especially since it is a low priority crime." The author proposes this is one reason why burglary scenes are notorious for receiving poor, or no crime scene investigations (Gilbert, 2019).

This report in conjunction with the extensiveness of housebreaking in South Africa raises the argument of why housebreaking is categorized as a minor crime (considering the statement made by Captain James).

The crime may not be labelled as serious compared to violent and contact crimes, but if the extent and fear of housebreaking is to be reduced by the state, the SAPS need to be able to adjust their resources to address *all* crime types appropriately, regardless of severity.

Secondly, the absence of SAPS members at housebreaking crime scenes exacerbates reasons for underreporting crime by victims, namely, the lack of faith in the police to address crimes, and their disinterest in attending to less serious crimes. The attendance of SAPS at housebreaking crime scenes reassures victims of the SAPS' willingness and concern to assist in the criminal case. Victims will thus

be encouraged to report less serious crimes such as these to the police; one way of addressing the underreporting of crime in the country.

8.1.2   Crime scene contamination

In section 1.4 the broad concept of 'criminal investigation' was enlightened by the use of extensive theoretical approaches, mostly possessing historical roots. As discussed, before an alleged offender can be apprehended for a crime, the state must first prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt (Zeffertt, Paizes & Skeen, 2003:173). In order to achieve this, it is the duty of the state and of the police, as representatives of the state, to collect the relevant evidence necessary to prove the individual's guilt of the crime in question.

Contamination to crime scenes disables the collection of usable physical evidence within crime scenes, which, needless to say, hampers the criminal investigation process. The Locard exchange principle indicates how crime scene contamination comes to pass, and was therefore incorporated into the theoretical approach of the research. Contamination is arguable the most likely to occur via first responders to the crime scene, and thus an important concern of PS officer behaviour.

8.1.2.1   Broad context

The research results indicated that the majority of SAPS detectives believed that PS officers contaminated approximately half of the housebreaking crime scenes they attend. It was noted in Chapter 5 that the largest contributor towards failed housebreaking investigations is the lack of evidence found for the crime (Oppler, 1998; Coupe & Griffiths, 1998 cited in van Zyl et al., 2003:107). If PS officers are the first responders to at least a half or more of all reported housebreakings (which in itself may only be a fraction of the total incidences of housebreakings due to underreporting), about half of these cases are contaminated (i.e., assuming that the research findings are a truthful reflection). Such incidences will therefore not receive a full investigation, therefore resulting in the cases being dropped by the SAPS.

This does not imply that PS officers are the only contributors to crime scene contamination, as revealed by the numerous reports of crime scene contamination by the police service (see section 5.8 in Chapter 5).

A discrepancy is noted in the opinion of Captain James regarding contamination by PS (it rarely occurs) versus the opinions of the remaining detective respondents (it occurs in half of the cases).

To justify his belief that contamination by PS is a rarity, Captain James stated that many managers of PS companies are ex-police officers and that they are therefore knowledgeable in crime scene priorities and potential contamination, and therefore will reiterate this information to security officers through their training. The problem with this statement is that the passing on of this knowledge to reaction officers is an assumption rather than a fact. Albeit the information held by training managers is indeed passed on to the reaction officers in training, it is firstly not generalizable to all PS companies, and secondly it cannot be guaranteed that the officers actually employ these contamination avoidance measures at crime scenes.

8.1.2.2 Walking and/or trampling

Focusing the attention now to specific research results, the example of crime scene contamination listed by 70% of the SAPS respondents was walking across the crime scene and thereby trampling evidence. This includes the trampling by police officers, PS officers, as well as by victims, homeowners, and/or bystanders. Invisible or unidentifiable evidence such as fingerprints or footprints are easily taken for granted and unintentionally trampled on.

It is the first responders' duty to promptly cordon off the applicable areas and thereby deny entry into the crime scene to all unnecessary and unauthorised persons. The expected task of cordoning off the relevant parts of a crime scene is further discussed below.

As a recommendation, this task ought to be reiterated as a crucial one within PS training schedules. Secondly, although only relevant PS and SAPS personnel must possess authority to enter the crime scene, entry by these staff members should additionally be limited as much as possible to prevent overcrowding at the scene. It is vital that all PS officers be aware of the implications of unintentional trampling of evidence and that, because of this, crime scene contamination can ultimately lead to a failed investigation. This knowledge must additionally be communicated to clients/homeowners to increase their own awareness of the implications of walking around the crime scene.

8.1.2.3 Touching and/or moving objects

Half of the SAPS respondents indicated that the touching of objects at crime scenes poses a threat to the value of the evidence found. Mr Chetty made it clear that officers of his security company are equipped with latex gloves should it be necessary to inspect, touch, or move any objects. Unfortunately, this

practice cannot be generalized to all PS companies. Caption James mentioned that this aspect largely applies to doors, window, or other points of entry.

The custom of using gloves when inspecting a crime scene as a first responder should perhaps receive greater recognition by regulatory figures so that it may be implemented as a required practice by first responders. Most importantly, avoiding the touching of any items at a crime scene as a first responder must be strengthened through training initiatives. It must be understood by the security officers that when it is absolutely necessary to move or touch any objects, that wearing gloves is an obligation. An aspect that is troubling however is that Captain James specifically mentioned in his interview that PS officers are not allowed to enter the buildings at a crime scene. If this response was accurate, measures of how to go about touching objects when necessary would not be needed. This inconsistency should be further investigated.

Neglect of securing the crime scene appears to be the only factor that both groups agreed upon, with 70% of detectives and 80% of PS officers listing this factor highly as a cause of crime scene contamination. Needless to say, it is because the lack thereof provides open access to walking through the crime scene and availability to touch objects within it. Accordingly, securing the crime scene was listed as a necessary task in order to prevent contamination.

One discrepancy is evident in the research results; that cordoning off the crime scene is listed as a duty performed by PS, yet the respondents listed touching, moving, and walking through the scene as the most prominent example of contamination. It brings into question the quality of adherence of officers to the duty of securing crime scenes as first responders. It is to say that what is expected of the officers is not necessarily executed. This inconsistency deserves further research.

To help rectify this dilemma, it is firstly essential that PS officers be equipped with suitable methods of securing a crime scene (such as barriers or restriction tape), and secondly, that they are given adequate instruction on how to use these methods and materials. To repeat the subject regarding evidence integrity as explained by Chisum and Turvey (2007), first responding officers may tend to assume that physical evidence remains uninfluenced by any factors once the area has been cordoned off. This potential dilemma must be addressed through training.

8.1.2.4   Investigation and evidence removal

As mentioned, Mr Chetty stated that the security officers employed by the PS company in question are fully qualified and equipped with a crime scene kit in order to perform evidence collection. He explained that, though seldom, PS officers may indeed collect physical evidence when authorised by the SAPS.

Consider the following statement by Omar (2009):

"While Policy 2 of 2005 says the role of detectives at a crime scene does not include collection of physical evidence, in practice this is often the case. The primary responsibility of detectives assigned to a crime scene is to investigate and manage the case, while collection of physical evidence is the function of suitably qualified crime scene technicians only" (p. 75).

Based on the above, at least in the South African context, detectives sometimes collect evidence from crime scenes while it does not fall under their responsibility, not to mention expertise. The current research findings indicate an even worse scenario however, where now even *PS officers* are suitable candidates for collecting physical evidence. This appalling inconsistency with government policy deserves the urgent attention of policy makers.

For the question regarding the prevention measures of contamination, the PS officers were aware of the need for using a crime scene kit in order to avoid contamination. Mr Chetty confirmed in his interview that first response officers of this company were indeed equipped with latex gloves when responding to reports of housebreaking. If, as mentioned earlier, evidence collection does not fall in the scope of PS officer duties, why then would it be necessary for the officers to be equipped with a crime scene kit? Further research is recommended to learn more about what the 'crime scene kit' contains, and who ought to be equipped with it.

The dilemmas encountered thus far regarding the investigation of housebreaking and the challenges thereof is summarised by Omar (2009), who proposes the main reason why housebreaking investigations in South Africa are troublesome and inconsistently executed. According to him, the SAPS Policy 2 of 2005, which contains the protocol of *all* criminal investigations, is flawed:

"[this policy] has two serious shortcomings. Firstly, it is intended for very serious crimes and does not make realistic suggestions about dealing with less serious crimes. Secondly, it does not accommodate the realities of daily police work. For example, the policy requires a designated and separate crime scene manager, whereas in fact it is more likely that an individual police member will fulfil the function of two or more of the role-players laid down in the policy. Human resource constraints within [the] SAPS, along with the high number of violent crimes in the country, means that in reality not all the functions envisaged

in the policy are fulfilled. In fact, it is rare for South African crime scenes to be processed in complete adherence to policy requirements…" (Omar, 2009:74-75).

8.1.3 Training

Untrained officers as a contributing factor to crime scene contamination was a significant matter of concern among the respondents. Accordingly, *training* was the highest recorded factor for avoiding crime scene contamination. It was stated by 5/10 of the detective respondents and by 15/15 of the PS respondents.

This appears to be a logical response, as it was indicated in section 4.4 of Chapter 4 that up to 14% of national PS companies have been found deploying untrained officers. What is more, the large number of unregistered officers deployed by PS businesses may well be assumed to be untrained, because a lack of registration is likely a consequence of or results in a lack of training. Moreover, there are PS companies that are not registered at all, despite this legal requirement. This matter needs to be urgently addressed and falls under the responsibility of the regulatory authority.

As was revealed by the results, more than half of the PS participants signified the importance of first response training for PS officers and additionally indicated that they themselves had undergone comprehensive training regarding first response behaviour at crime scenes. Mr Chetty additionally explained that the PS officers receive elaborate training regarding crime scene protection.

However, these findings do not guarantee a generalizable truth. Five detective respondents believed that PS officers received zero to little training as first responders. Strangely, when asked his opinion regarding the quality or PS officer training, Captain James was sceptical about answering the question, stating that he was uncertain about the type and quality of training PS officers received (more about this finding below). Quality and measure of training is once again a dilemma that deserves the urgent attention of the regulatory authority.

8.1.4 Procedure followed by PS officers

The results pertaining to Question 7 of the questionnaire uncovered the wide assortment of tasks performed by first response officers.

It was established by both interviewees as well as 90% of the SAPS respondents that PS officers ought to inform the police of the crime after arrival at the premises. Surprisingly, only on PS respondent mentioned that they contact the police, and two mentioned that they contact their control centre (who will then summon the police to the scene). This is the first discrepancy encountered between the two groups regarding first member procedure. It may well be questioned why only three of the PS respondents listed this aspect as a priority.

According to Captain James, the main objective of PS upon arrival at the property is to confirm the safety of the residents. This response seems logical considering private protection is the purpose of employing PS services. The priority of confirming the safety of the client was in fact not mentioned by any other respondents, although 'contacting the owner' was listed by one SAPS and two PS respondents, and 'assisting client' was mentioned by four SAPS and one PS respondent. It is surprising that only three PS officers cited their clients as a priority, not to mention confirm their personal safety.

A contradiction is encountered in answers provided by Captain James. According to him, PS officers responding to the crime are not allowed to enter private premises unless granted permission by or guided by the homeowners. To repeat the statement from earlier, he also stated however that the prime duty of PS is to confirm the safety of their clients. One may ask the question then, "Is it in every case possible to confirm the personal safety of the homeowner without being authorised to enter the building?"

The impact of poor organisation was a popular and predominant theme amongst the PS officers themselves. It was noted that *all* fifteen (15) of the PS participants believed that lack of organisation, particularly involving poor planning and poor coordination at the crime scene, contributed to contamination. Not taking their responsibility as first responders seriously was mentioned by a few of the officers.

In order to address this problem, it is essential that PS officers responding to crime scenes act with cooperation and a mutual understanding/agreement of the actions that need to be taken and the protocols that need to be followed. Briefing on this subject should be implemented on a more serious and detailed scale. It is perhaps a noteworthy suggestion that individual officer-partnership assignments take careful consideration of employees' working chemistry and their ability to cooperate on a personal level.

An additional task expected of PS officers as first responders is the recording of crime scene information. It was outlined in the previous chapter that apart from the basic recording of scene information for investigative purposes, SAPS policy states that 'first members' at crime scenes are responsible to fill in a first member report, access log, exhibit log, and witness log (Omar, 2009:68). These formal reports would certainly make the difference between a win or loss of a criminal court case, in the rare cases that

housebreaking related incidents reach that extent. However, it is uncertain within the literature and the policy if "first member" are limited to SAPS officials.

If indeed PS officers qualify as "first members", it nevertheless seems unlikely that PS officers would commit themselves to completing such formal documents. Further investigation into this scenario is required.

8.2   Additional recommendations in response to contamination

Overall, the lack of securing the crime scene and being unorganised were the highest reported factors contributing to contamination of housebreaking crime scenes, with both of these aspects being listed by 19 of a total of 25 participants. These two factors would therefore need to be placed at the top of the priority list when addressing improvement strategies for crime scene investigation of housebreakings.

A reasonable conclusion drawn from the results is that crime scene contamination may occur more readily by staff of smaller, lesser recognised PS companies. It is evidenced by the findings that SAPS detectives are aware of contamination by PS officers, but not necessarily by the "big" companies, as Captain James implied. This makes sense when considering that the participating company, being a large operating PS company in the KwaZulu-Natal area, does provide adequate crime scene management training for their officers. It is therefore argued that crime scene management/preservation training must be incorporated into all first response training schemes and that it is implemented as a compulsory requisite by all PS/armed response companies.

In response to the contamination dilemma, it is crucial that greater emphasis is placed on the importance of crime scene preservation, regardless of the type or severity of the crime. Focus areas in this regard should include; increased public awareness of crime scene contamination; greater awareness within the CJS and PS departments; and obligated training for all relevant personnel. The heightened awareness measures ought to involve detailed discussions regarding the impact of crime scene contamination on the investigation process, and that this in turn affects the national solvency rate of housebreakings. It is recommended that both private and public departments place a lower tolerance standard upon incidences of crime scene contamination by their employees.

The results pertaining to Question 5 clearly revealed that a number of straightforward, practical guidelines exist to prevent crime scene contamination. These guidelines are evidently familiar to both police and PS members. This in fact means that the solution to decreasing crime scene contamination – which consists of simply applying the methods of wearing gloves when the touching of objects is needed, cordoning off the area, no unnecessary touching/moving etc. - is recognised by these staff members, but yet not

properly performed. In blunt terms, the solutions to address the dilemma of contamination are explicitly known by authority figures, but are nonetheless not implemented. It is a shortfall that can only be corrected by the regulatory authority.

8.2.1 Overall functioning

To repeat the section regarding private-public cooperation from the previous chapter:

Mr Chetty informed that their PS company had an adequate working relationship with the SAPS and that they very seldom experienced challenges with regards to their cooperation or assistance. Captain James was able to confirm this claim by stating that PS and police officers generally had a very good working relationship: "There exists a mutual agreement that PS share any knowledge of criminal activity with the police. The big PS companies, including Blue Security, Chub, and ADT, etc. and the SAPS detective unit set up meetings on a regular basis to discuss and share information to help each other.
This enforces a good working relationship for when the two must cooperate with each other."

Another contradiction arises here. It is claimed that the SAPS detectives congregate with members of well-known PS companies in order to discuss current crime events, and share with one another any relevant security information. As outlined earlier however, Captain James revealed that he was unsure of the quality and curriculum of the training received by PS. In addition to this, some detective respondents believed PS officers receive *no* training at all. Surely if the two groups do assemble meetings on a regular basis to share knowledge, the SAPS would have an adequate understanding of the training received by PS officers. This inconsistency ought to be further investigated.

Two SAPS officials believed that PS members could improve their function of writing adequate statements for the police, and two SAPS officials felt that PS officers could improve their capabilities of identifying and arresting possible suspects in the area. The good news is that only one SAPS official of the 11 officers involved in the research stated his major dissatisfaction with PS staff, believing that the contamination caused by PS officers outweighed the value of the duties they performed as first responders. With the exception of this one respondent, none of the other research respondents implied their dissatisfaction with any of the tasks performed by PS officers. On the contrary, a couple of the SAPS detectives revealed that the work of PS first responders is valuable to the police and that they play a large role in the function of crime prevention and deterrence.

Actions performed at crime scenes of course vary between PS companies and even between officers belonging to the same company. The behaviour of officers at a crime scene naturally depends on various

factors, including the type of training they have received, the nature of the housebreaking which occurred, the officer's personal values and attitudes, the officer's previous experience, the attitudes of the clients, and the ability of the officer to manage the situation and/or cooperate with fellow responders To conclude this section, first response officers are encouraged to undergo adequate training for crime scene management and evidence preservation in order to continue their valuable contribution to deterring crime.

8.2.2 Regulation

Mr Chetty explained in his interview that the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) attempts to regulate the industry by employing quality checks at all registered PS companies, which occurred every eighteen (18) months. During these quality checks, each PS officer employed by the company would have to verify his/her qualifications and training received, as well as their PSIRA registered ID card/number. This is good news in terms of regulating registered PS companies.

In section 4.4 of Chapter 4 it was indicated that the rapid growth of the industry has led to a trend of disregard for registration compliances among a large proportion of PS companies. Thus, the regulating authority must find measures to address the dilemma of unregistered PS companies and guards in order to prevent unauthorised and untrained guards from selling their services to the public. Additionally, this problem will have to be addressed before the implementation of additional training for PS will show effective results.

8.3 Recommendations sourced by the literature review

8.3.1 SAPS regulation

With the ever-growing supply and demand of private contractors in the security field, the importance of implementing standards and regulations has also grown. This applies to both the state and private industries. Thus far, emphasis of increased regulation and monitoring has mostly been placed on the PS industry. However, we should not forget that reports of misconduct in the form of crime scene contamination and neglect by the SAPS remain an underrated issue.

The Independent Complaints Directorate was established to conduct inspections for reported SAPS misconduct, including incidents of crime scene contamination. But according to du Plessis and Louw (2005:440), this department remains under-resourced and under-staffed, preventing quality service.

These authors argue that, due to "corruption, misconduct, torture, and the failure to deliver the required services", less serious crimes are rarely investigated (du Plessis & Louw, 2005:440).

8.3.2   Infringement on taxes

Safety and security is considered a state-provided human right of all South Africans, as stipulated by the Constitution (South Africa, 1996), and the country's citizens may not be denied the right to security sourced by governmental departments. Unfortunately, the crime pandemic in South Africa has reached the extent that the public police service cannot provide the national security promised to all tax payers. In essence, the large proportion of those who can afford the services of supplementary security protection against crime are giving up their well-earned wages to private organisations to provide a service they should not have to pay for in the first place.

In addition, more sufficient security initiatives should be implemented in locations where crime is most rife, such as townships and inner-city areas. These are paradoxically also the populations where individuals cannot afford supplementary security services. This dilemma needs to be urgently addressed. Notably, the PS industry possesses the manpower lacked by the public police service to aid in the security within these notoriously crime infected communities. Unfortunately, being originally client-based, it means that PS companies purely cater for paying customers. A suggestion for a preliminary security initiative in crime-rife areas is to involve regular patrolling PS personnel and/or vehicles that are funded by government agencies.

8.3.3   Underreporting of crime

One solution to encourage the reporting of crime is to once again generate society's new-found trust and confidence in the public police force. National statistics have shown the dissatisfaction of the public with the manner in which the crime levels in South Africa are being "addressed" by the police services (Statistics South Africa, 2014). The perception that the public police are incompetent in effectively dealing with crime has been shown to be one of the greatest determinants for the under-reporting of crime, as the public belief persists that the efforts to report a crime and to expect results are simply a waste of time (as was discussed in section 2.6.2 of Chapter 2). This is especially true for individuals who have experienced secondary victimisation or other forms of poor service from the police and authority officials.

Regaining the lost faith and confidence in South Africa's public police force can directly and indirectly be achieved through the optimization of nationally distributed victim empowerment projects:

> *"[V]ictim empowerment suggests an approach that facilitates access and delivers a range of services to those who individually or collectively have suffered harm, trauma and/or material deprivation through violence, crime, natural disasters, human accidents and/or socio-economic conditions…. Victim empowerment also refers to a certain philosophy of care and assistance and to…delivering available services to victims of crime"* (Nel & van Wyk, 2013, p. 78).

Numerous victim empowerment centres exist in South Africa and are often situated next to or on police station premises to allow easy and rapid access to them (Kaldine, 2012:313). These centres offer various services to victims of crime, including short- and long-term psychological counselling, practical need support, and health/medical assistance. However, the most applicable service that seems to be absent from these centres is assisting victims with the criminal justice process. Such assistance should be provided in terms of educating victims about the reporting of the crime, the relevant paperwork, criminal justice procedures, and possible court proceedings. Thus, if victims are properly informed of how to initiate and proceed with the report and if they are offered assistance in doing so, it will encourage individuals to go through with the process (see Nel & van Wyk, 2013, pp. 77-92 for a detailed discussion of CJS empowerment in South Africa).

Empowered victims will be less reluctant to communicate and cooperate with police officials, and this in turn will contribute to criminal investigations and, ultimately, the probability of solving crimes in general. A sense of concern, caring, and justice will endorse society's responsibility of reporting crime to the police, increasing awareness of criminal activities and thus allowing the authorities to adjust their crime controlling methods, resources, and priorities. Of course, dependence is placed on the quality of the staff and ultimately on the proper management of the victim empowerment projects and centres in order to fulfil their goals.

8.4   Next-step research

The biggest limitation of the executed research is that it only focused on a single PS company and police station. Therefore, findings regarding frequency of crime scene contamination, practices for avoiding contamination, tasks performed, and police satisfaction cannot be assumed as the general truth.

Similar research endeavours that (1) will include more than one PS company; (2) will be undertaken in a larger, or multiple, geographical area/s; and/or (3) will include more than one police station, are recommended. An additional suggestion is a similar research project that will involve gathering public perceptions of PS performance. The study sample should particularly involve victims of housebreaking who employed PS companies. Lastly, it may be valuable to conduct the research from the regulatory authority's perspective in order to learn about their perceptions and challenges regarding this subject.

8.5 Conclusion

Throughout the literature it is clear that the private security industry is experiencing phenomenal expansion and development, nationally and globally, in an effort to fight the growing crime epidemic. Despite the traditional philosophy that the security/protection of a given society is the responsibility of the state or government in power, it is evident that private security organisations are gradually increasingly playing a larger role in the task of civil protection.

As discussed earlier, it is crucial that first responding PS officers be knowledgeable about crime scene contamination and its investigative implications, lest we forget that the security of the clients is the main concern of first responders. Moreover, to ensure successful criminal investigations by the SAPS, these officers ought to be more aware of the potential impact of their actions and behaviours at crime scenes, whether such incidences are being regarded as less serious or not.

It must be reiterated that the purpose of outlining inconsistent and/or troublesome reports, either within the literature or the research findings, is not to point fingers or to criticise any group or department, but rather to determine the areas in which improvements must be considered by the state.

Notwithstanding the discovered areas that require addressing by the state, police officials, as well as PS businesses, the SAPS detective respondents indicated their gratitude to and satisfaction with the contribution of the PS industry to the fight against crime, providing reference to their crime prevention and deterrence functions. Half of the detective respondents who granted personal comments on the subject of PS stated that despite the gaps in training of PS officers, they did vital work and that their function of deterring crime was very valuable.

In acknowledging the limited and stretched resources of the SAPS, the truth is that there is a much needed working and trust relationship among, inter alia, the state police service, community policing projects, the private security industry, and community watch structures (Cartwright & Shearing, 2009). This concept

is reiterated by Schneider (2013:104), who states that the "modern-day reality is that it is a combination of policing and private security functions that ensure [sic] the safety and wellbeing of a community".

The Criminal Justice System should not be denied its due credit for operating through the ruthless scrutiny of South African society regarding the fight against crime. Despite the crime epidemic the country faces, the efforts of the CJS in dealing with the situation are easily taken for granted considering the challenges and criticisms they face.

> *"Let us apply these cooperative human capacities to the South African criminal justice system. If we demonstrate the necessary maturity – as individuals and in our many and varied kinds of collectivity – we will find that we have the resources and the capacity to make South Africa a truly safe place in which to live"* (Cartwright & Shearing, 2009:8-9).

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Annexure 1 - Permission to conduct the research by the UKZN

SECTION 4: FORMALISATION OF THE APPLICATION

APPLICANT

I have familiarised myself with the University's Code of Conduct for Research and undertake to comply with it. The information supplied above is correct to the best of my knowledge.

NB: PLEASE ENSURE THAT THE ATTACHED CHECK SHEET IS COMPLETED

27 February 2015

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT   DATE

SUPERVISOR/HEAD OF SCHOOL

NB: PLEASE ENSURE THAT THE APPLICANT HAS COMPLETED THE ATTACHED CHECK SHEET AND THAT
        THE FORM IS FORWARDED TO YOUR FACULTY RESEARCH COMMITTEE FOR FURTHER ATTENTION

DATE: 26 February 2015

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR/ PROJECT LEADER : _____ Tecn Sten _____

RECOMMENDATION OF FACULTY RESEARCH COMMITTEE/HIGHER DEGREES COMMITTEE

The application is (please tick):

✓	Approved *
	Recommended and referred to the Human and Social Sciences Ethics Committee for further consideration
	Not Approved, referred back for revision and resubmission

*   Senate has delegated powers to Faculty Committee to:
-   Approve Undergraduate and Honours projects
-   Approve Masters projects (if the required capacity exists within the faculty)

NAME OF CHAIRPERSON:
T. S. MAGOJO   SIGNATURE: TMagjo

DATE 26 February 2015

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Annexure 2 - Permission to conduct the research by the SAPS

South African Police Service   **Suid-Afrikaanse Polisiediens**

Umbutho Wamaphoyisa Aseningizimu-Afrika

Our Reference / U Verwysing / Inkomba Yakho		THE PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONER
My Reference / My Verwysing / Inkomba Yami	25/7/12/2/3 (281)	KWAZULU-NATAL
Enquiries / Navrae / Buza	Colonel A.D. van der Linde / CAC R. Moodley	P O BOX 1965
Telephone / Telefoon / Ucingo	031 – 325 4841 / 6116	DURBAN
Fax No / Faks No	031 – 325 6022	4000

Ms M. Engelbrecht
P.O. Box 95608
WATERKLOOF
0145

RE: RESEARCH REQUEST: THE PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICER'S BEHAVIOUR ON THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF HOUSEBREAKING AND THEFT CRIME SCENES IN BEREA, DURBAN: MASTERS DEGREE: UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL: RESEARCHER M. ENGELBRECHT

Attached, please find Head Office minute 3/34/2 dated 2014-10-24 from the office of Major General Menziwa regarding permission to conduct the above-mentioned research.

Recommendation to conduct the said research has been granted in terms of SAPS Research Policy (National Instruction 1/2006).

Approval from the office of the Provincial Commissioner is hereby granted to conduct the research at SAPS Berea on condition that the contents stipulated in paragraph 4 of Head Office minute 3/34/2 dated 2014-10-24 are adhered too.

Page 1 of 2

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RE: RESEARCH REQUEST: THE PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICER'S BEHAVIOUR ON THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF HOUSEBREAKING AND THEFT CRIME SCENES IN BEREA, DURBAN: MASTERS DEGREE: UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL: RESEARCHER M. ENGELBRECHT

Attached, please find statement of undertaking that must be completed and returned to this office (MoodleyRohine@saps.gov.za) prior to the commencement of the research study.

For any queries, please contact Colonel A.D. van der Linde on the following numbers:

Office: 031 325 4841

Cell: 082 496 1142

Thank you.

....**MAJOR GENERAL**
DEPUTY PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONER: OPERATIONS OFFICER: KWAZULU-NATAL
P.E. RADEBE

DATE: ....2014 - 11 - 12......................

AGREEMENT OF

RELEASE OF LIABILITY, WAIVER OF CLAIMS & INDEMNITY

IN FAVOUR OF

INTRODUCTION

1.

Reason for signing this agreement:

The signatory wishes to observe all aspects of the business carried on by   including accompanying armed response officers employed   in the performance of their duties and travelling in   vehicles, which activities are extremely dangerous and by so doing he/she will become exposed to risks to which he/she is not normally exposed.

2.

The purpose of signing this agreement:

By signing this form the signatory agrees that in the event that he/she suffers any bodily injury, loss of or damage to any property or loss of life whilst observing the business activities of   then neither he/she nor any third party whatsoever will have any claim in law against   its shareholders, employees, agents, contractors and customers, whatsoever.

CONTRACT

I the undersigned Maretha Engelbrecht   , (identity number 9011010210 054   ), do hereby agree that:-

1.   I freely accept and expressly assume all risks, dangers and hazards that may arise in the course of my observing the business activities

2.   I acknowledge that the business activities of   are extremely dangerous and that while observing such activities, including but non-limited to accompanying armed security officers of   in responding to alarm activations and other emergencies, and travelling in   motor vehicles, I will become exposed to the inherent risks and hazards of those activities including bodily injury, loss of or damage to property and loss of life;

3.   I hereby waive and release   its shareholders, employees, agents, contractors and customers from any claim which I may have in law, howsoever arising from or in connection with my being present on the premises of   and/or its customers or in any   vehicles or accompanying any of

employees, agents and sub-contractors for the purpose of observing the business activities

4. I further hereby indemnify and the persons mentioned in paragraph 3 above and hold them harmless against any claim which might be brought against them by any third party whatsoever, including but not limited to my dependents, heirs, executors and assigns, arising from or in connection with my observing the business activities s described in paragraph 2 above;

5. I acknowledge that in signing this agreement I do not rely on any verbal or written representations or statements made or any other person whatsoever on its behalf other than what is set out in this agreement;

6. If any provision in this agreement is found to be unenforceable or invalid, such provision shall be severed from this agreement. The remainder of this agreement will therefore be construed as though the unenforceable provision had never been contained in this document.

7. I warrant that I am competent to sign this agreement and that I have read this agreement, I understand the terms thereof and agree to bind myself thereto.

Dated at _____ this _23 rd_ day of _January_ 2014. 2015

SECURITY

Full name:

WITNESSES:

1. _____

2. _____

Dated at _____ this _23 rd_ day of _January_ 2015 2014

OTHER

Maretha Engelbrecht
Full name: _____ Other signature

WITNESSES:

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4. _____

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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE/QUESTIONNAIRE

Title of project: The perceptions of private security officer behaviour on the preliminary investigation of housebreaking and theft crime scene in Berea, Durban.

Researcher: Ms M Engelbrecht	Supervisor: Dr Jéan Steyn	HSSREC Research Office-
Contact details:	Contact details:	Ms P Ximba
mickey.eng@gmail.com	steynj@ukzn.ac.za	Contact details:
082 464 2071	031 260 734 5	ximbap@ukzn.ac.za
Institution: University of KwaZulu-	Institution: University of KwaZulu-	031 260 3587
Natal	Natal	
School of Applied Human Science	School of Applied Human Science	
Department of Criminology and	Department of Criminology and	
Forensic Studies	Forensic Studies	
Qualification: Social Science Honours (Criminology)		

Dear participant

I, Ms Maretha Engelbrecht, a student at the University of KwaZulu-Natal Howard College, pursuing a master's degree, invite you to participate in my research which is titled – "The perceptions of private security officer behaviour on the preliminary investigation of housebreaking and theft crime scene in Berea, Durban"

Section A: Purpose of study

The main **objective** of this project is to explore the impact of private security officer behaviour on the preliminary investigation of housebreaking crime scenes in Berea, Durban. The **purpose** of the study is to verify whether, or to what extent, private security officers who attend housebreaking crime scenes in Berea, Durban, effectively and efficiently manage these crime scenes as first responding officers. The **aim** of this study is to potentially find a solution for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of private security officer behaviour on these crime scenes.

This questionnaire has therefore been designed to gain insight into the behaviour and actions performed by private security officers on housebreaking and theft crime scenes in Berea as first responders.

Section B: Ethical Considerations

The identity of all participants will be strictly held confidential with anonymity guaranteed. No personal identification will be used in either the thesis or subsequent/parallel reports (published or unpublished). Participants are free to withdraw from the study at any time. All participants will also have the right to a copy of the study report on request.

Section C: Instructions and guidelines on how to complete the questionnaire

When answering the questions please remember the following:

1	Make sure you answer every question.
2	There is no RIGHT or WRONG answer! It is just a matter of how you personally react or respond to each question when expressing your opinion, perception or attitude that matters.
3	The information given in a question may not be as comprehensive as you would wish, but answer as best you can.
4	Try to avoid the option *"I do not have an opinion"* wherever possible.
5	Please apply your answer to only housebreaking and theft crime scenes in Berea, Durban

Section D: Questions

1. Percentage wise, how often do private security officers arrive at housebreaking and theft crime scenes as first responding officers? (i.e. before the SAPS)

Please mark a box

0%	1-10%	11-20%	21-30%	31-40%	41-50%	51-60%	61-70%	71-80%	81-90%	91-100%

2. Out of the above mentioned percentage, how often are crime scenes of housebreaking and theft in Berea contaminated by private security officers as first responding officials?

Please mark a box

0%	1-10%	11-20%	21-30%	31-40%	41-50%	51-60%	61-70%	71-80%	81-90%	91-100%

3. If private security officers as first responders contribute toward crime scene contamination, please provide examples thereof.

4. What factors contribute toward the contamination of housebreaking and theft crime scenes in general?

5. In your opinion, what can be done to prevent the contamination of housebreaking and theft crime scenes by first responding officers?
6. What is your opinion regarding the quality of training that private security officers receive specifically in terms of acting as first responders to a crime scene of housebreaking and theft?

7. What actions/duties do private security officers perform when arriving at a housebreaking and theft crime scene as first responders? (Please provide as many examples as possible).

8. In your opinion, (a) do you think that any of the actions/duties you mentioned above should not be performed by private security officers? (b) do you think that private security officers should be doing more than the mentioned actions/duties? (Please explain and give reasons for your answers in as much detail as possible).

9.   If you have additional comments or opinions, please provide them here.

Section E: Declaration

Name..

Signature...

Date..

Time of questionnaire/interview...

End of questionnaire-Thank you

Annexure 5 – Consent form

CONFIRMATION OF INFORMED CONSENT

Title of project: The perceptions of private security officer behaviour on the preliminary investigation of housebreaking and theft crime scene in Berea, Durban.

Researcher: Ms M Engelbrecht Contact details: Mickey.eng@gmail.com 082 464 2071	Supervisor: Dr Jéan Steyn Contact details: steynj@ukzn.ac.za 031 260 734 5	HSSREC Research Office- Ms P Ximba Contact details: ximbap@ukzn.ac.za 031 260 3587
Institution: University of KwaZulu-Natal School of Applied Human Science Department of Criminology and Forensic Studies Qualification: Social Science Honours (Criminology)	Institution: University of KwaZulu-Natal School of Applied Human Science Department of Criminology and Forensic Studies	

Date:

Dear Participant

I, Ms Maretha Engelbrecht, a student at the UKZN Howard Campus pursuing a master's degree, invite you to participate in my research which is centred on the behaviour of private security officers at housebreaking and theft crime scenes in Berea, Durban. I hereby request your written consent for the use of any information that may be acquired during this research.

Project description

The main objective of this project is to explore the perceptions of private security officer behaviour on the preliminary investigation of housebreaking crime scenes in Berea, Durban. The purpose of the study is to verify whether, or to what extent, private security officers who attend housebreaking crime scenes in Berea, Durban, effectively and efficiently manage these crime scenes as first responding officers. The aim of this study is to potentially find a solution for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of private security officer behaviour on these crime scenes.

Your participation in this project will involve a face to face interview or a self administrated questionnaire. The interviews will be taped recorded.

Questions of project

- Percentage wise, how often do private security officers arrive at housebreaking and theft crime scenes as first responding officers? (i.e. before the SAPS)

- Out of the above mentioned percentage, how often are crime scenes of housebreaking and theft in Berea contaminated by private security officers as first responding officials?

- If private security officers as first responders to housebreaking and theft crime scenes in Berea contribute toward contamination, please provide examples thereof.

- What factors contribute toward the contamination of housebreaking and theft crime scenes?

- In your opinion, what can be done to prevent the contamination of housebreaking and theft crime scenes by first responding officers?

- What is your opinion regarding the quality of training that private security officers receive specifically in terms of acting as first responders to a crime scene of housebreaking and theft?

- What actions/duties do private security officers perform when arriving at a housebreaking and theft crime scene as first responders? (please provide as many examples as possible).

- In your opinion, (a) do you think that any of the actions/duties you mentioned above should not be performed by private security officers? (b) do you think that private security officers should be doing more than the mentioned actions/duties? (please explain your answers in as much detail as possible).

Selection of research participants

You have been purposively selected to participate in this research study as you meet the required criteria namely: you have first-hand experience regarding the actions of private security officers at housebreaking and theft crime scenes.

Procedure

The researcher will make an appointment for the interview or self administrated questionnaire. The interview or self administrated questionnaire will take place at the office of the participant, which will last approximately 15-20 minutes.

Possible benefits

You will provide valuable information on the behaviour of private security officers at housebreaking and theft crime scenes in Berea as first responding officers. Recommendations and improvements can possibly be used to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of managing a housebreaking and theft crime scene as first responders. This information can be applied and utilised in order to better preliminary crime scene investigations, and increase the solvency rate of housebreaking and theft crimes.

Ownership and documentation of research data

All data gathered will be used solely for the purpose of the above-mentioned research study. Research data will be filed in the department of criminology and forensic studies at the UKZN. Data will be kept for five (5) years after which it will be destroyed by means of shredding.

Research findings will be documented in a form of a thesis and possible publications. The research will not divulge the names of any research participant unless they indicate that they want to be named in any publication.

Research findings

All participants have a right to a copy of the research findings which will be made available on request.

Confidentiality

The identity of all participants will be strictly held confidential with anonymity guaranteed. No personal identification will be used in either the thesis of subsequent/parallel reports (published or unpublished). Participants have the right to withdraw from the study at any time without any negative consequence. If you require any further information or if you have any concerns regarding this research project, you can contact me Ms M Engelbrecht, or the research supervisor, Dr Jean Steyn. I will greatly appreciate your input into this research project.

Declaration

I...hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research project, and consent to participating in the research project. I understand that my taking part in this project voluntarily. I also understand that I am free to refuse to answer any questions and also free to withdraw from the project at any time, should I desire, and that doing so will not have any negative consequences for myself. I also **consent / do not consent** to have this interview recorded. Please print name and sign to confirm your participation in this project.

Name   **Signature**

 ....

Date

....