Recurring Conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo: the Search for a Regional Conflict Transformation Mechanism premised on Collective Security and the African Ethical Concept of Ubuntu

By
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A Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Postgraduate Programme in Ethics, School of Religion, Philosophy and Classics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa

November 2016
DECLARATION

I, Engelbert Abel Rugeje declare that,

i. The research reported in this thesis, except where otherwise indicated, is my original work.

ii. The thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other institution or university.

iii. This thesis does not contain other person’s data, pictures graphs or any other information, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from elsewhere.

iv. The thesis does not contain other people’s writing unless specifically acknowledged. Where other written sources have been quoted, their words have been re-written but the general information attributed to them and where exact words have been quoted, their writing has been placed in quotation marks and referenced.

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Signed:........................................... Date:...........................................

Supervisor:  Dr Munyaradzi Murove

Signed:........................................... Date:...........................................
DEDICATION

To my family, friends and workmates
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My humble gratitude and appreciation goes to my supervisor, Dr Munyaradzi Murove. Despite his firmness from the first day I registered for my Doctor of Philosophy studies with the University of KwaZulu-Natal, his academic guidance and support remained critical up to the successful completion of this scholarly demanding endeavour. He will forever remain a source of academic inspiration.

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My family, workmates, friends and colleagues in the academia will forever be appreciated for their respective contributions which range from moral support to constructive criticism and scholarly advice during the period of this research study. The views expressed in this thesis are from the author’s own viewpoint.
ABSTRACT

The recurrence of conflict in the eastern of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has resulted in peace-building efforts from national, international, regional and sub-regional as well as well as nongovernmental actors all aimed at bringing about peace and security to that region of the DRC. Despite of all these peace-building efforts, the eastern DRC has remained in a perennial state of armed conflicts. The political situation of DRC which, since the end of colonialism has remained unstable has also contributed to the situation of perennial conflict in the eastern DRC. None of the Congolese political leaders has succeeded in bringing an end to the conflict in the eastern DRC. Whilst numerous efforts have been made in the form of peace agreements, negotiations and reconciliation processes in an effort to bring an end to conflicts in eastern DRC, this perennial situation of conflict has continued unabated. As a result of recurrence of conflict in eastern DRC, there has been rampant violation of human rights, war crimes, displacement of civilians, destruction of property and infrastructure, small arms trafficking and illegal exploitation of natural resources.

The United Nations (UN) and its Security Council (UNSC) has not been effective in addressing this situation of recurring conflict in eastern DRC in the sense that it has failed to provide financial and material support to regional bodies such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). These organisations are more knowledgeable about the solution that can serve as a panacea to the end of of conflict in eastern DRC. However, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has monopolised the whole process of conflict resolution in the eastern DRC to the exclusion of regional organisations and this has been one of the contributory factors to the recurrence. This study thus raises the question of the interests which the UNSC is representing in the eastern DRC. Since the UNSC has failed to bring to an end a situation of recurring conflict in eastern DRC, it is the argument of this thesis that there is a need for peacebuilding mechanisms that are initiated by the SADC as a regional formation which according to the UN Charter is responsible for the implementation of the Collective Security System. The presumption behind the UN Collective Security system is that the regional entity is more knowledgeable on what needs to be done in resolving conflicts in its own region.

Since most the peacebuilding mechanisms that have been applied by United Nations (UN), UNSC and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) with the aim of resolving recurring
conflict in eastern DRC have failed to come to fruition, it is the main argument of this thesis that the African ethic of *Ubuntu* which has principles which echo the ideals of the UN Collective Security system can be a panacea to a durable peace and security in the eastern DRC. The main principles that are imbedded in the ethic of *Ubuntu* such as community, harmony and common belongingness can be appealed to and implemented within the region as part and parcel of creative action in peacebuilding processes in the eastern DRC. In this scenario, Ubuntu has ushered in the need to uphold the humanness, moral virtues and dignity as key aspects in addressing the seemingly unending conflict in the eastern DRC. Both external and internal players must have a fellow feeling of the suffering. The virtue implies human being inherent ability to appreciate the suffering of others as their own in order to raise joy, hope and aspiration for a better future. The conflict transformation whose dignity they want accorded to them should be the same dignity they should accord to others. It was thus the main argument of this study that the African Ethical Concept of *Ubuntu* should be integral to conflict transformation efforts in the eastern part of the DRC.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Allied Democratic Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANR</td>
<td>Agence Nationale de Renseignements</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>Conflict Management</td>
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<td>CR</td>
<td>Conflict Resolution</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>Conflict Transformation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONAKAT</td>
<td>Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>Country Assistance Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR/ RR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIB</td>
<td>Force Intervention Brigade</td>
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<td>FNL</td>
<td>Federacion Nacional de Lucha Libre</td>
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<td>FRPI</td>
<td>Resistance Patriotic Front of Ituri</td>
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<td>GIAT</td>
<td>Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DR Congo</td>
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<td>GLR</td>
<td>Great Lakes Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICGLR</td>
<td>International Conference of the Great Lakes Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISSSSS</td>
<td>International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISDSC</td>
<td>Interstate Defence and Security Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>M23</td>
<td>March 23 Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLC</td>
<td>Movement for the Liberation of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>Operation Sovereign Legitimacy</td>
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<td>OPDS</td>
<td>Organ on Politics, Defense and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>P5</td>
<td>Five Permanent Members of the United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDC-Goma</td>
<td>Rally for Congolese Democracy–Goma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDF</td>
<td>Rwandan Defence Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambique National Resistance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>Republic of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SARPCCO</td>
<td>Southern African Police Chiefs Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish international Development Co-operation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIPO</td>
<td>Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Defence and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West Africa People’s Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3Ts</td>
<td>Tantalum, tin and tungsten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDPS</td>
<td>Union for Democracy and Social Progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Independence of Angola)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>UTR</td>
<td>United Republic of Tanzania</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSS</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>Union for Democracy and Social Progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background
Recurrence of conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has attracted many resolutions and peace-building efforts from national, sub regional, regional and international state and non-state actors. However, most of these resolutions and peace-building efforts have not provided sustainable peace and security in the eastern part of that country. Instead, peace and security in eastern DRC has deteriorated even further. The eastern DRC has for many decades been affected by endemic, cyclic and endless armed conflicts. Many political leaders came and left some governance systems that in one way or the other fuelled conflict. When the Congolese gained their Independence from their erstwhile colonial masters, the independent Congo was beleaguered by security volatility that included an armed secession movement in Katanga and an army mutiny that culminated in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba. The assassination of Patrice Lumumba contributed to national political turmoil. After the death of Patrice Lumumba, Mobutu Sese Seko seized power through a coup in 1965. When Mobutu assumed political office he instituted a highly centralised and dictatorial administration, which saw the enforcement of indigenous Congolese ideologies in the Government.

The dictatorial leadership style of Mobutu led to high animosity on the repressed and oppressed members of different tribes. Mobutu’s rule ignited conflicts in eastern DRC as he favoured the Hutus over the Tutsis in that part of the county. He supported the Rwandese Hutu army and militias during the Rwandese genocide. These Hutus began attacking the ethnic Tutsis who had lived in the DRC for ages- a situation that provoked and angered the neighbouring Uganda and Rwanda who then marched in to the DRC in pursuit of Hutu military forces. This situation has led to unending conflict in the DRC in general and the eastern part of Congo in particular. Laurent Desire Kabila overthrew Mobutu and took power as the new President of the DRC whose takeover was followed by the expulsion of the Rwandese troops in eastern DRC. This move did not augur well with the Rwandese who responded by sponsoring and training rebel groups that later on served as proxies in a war effort that was aimed at overthrowing Kabila’s government from power. Some of the SADC members such as Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe came to the aid of Kabila’s government by providing military support. Laurent Kabila was, however, assassinated shortly after the war and his son Joseph Kabila ascended to power in 2001. Laurent Kabila’s rule failed to bring about peace and security in the eastern DRC because of the Ugandan and Rwandeese sponsored rebel activities in that part of the country.
History records that the main contributory primary factors to recurrence of conflict in eastern DRC are: relative absence of effective governance structures which lead to violation of human rights, alleged policies of exclusion and marginalization, unfair distribution of national resource among the population, injustice, lack of good governance and democracy, etc (Nibishaka, 2013). In addition to that, the other underlying factors to conflict in eastern DRC include struggle for power, greed, grievances about security and survival. Recurring conflict in the eastern DRC has had negative and devastating effects on the Congolese humanity. This conflict has given rise to an economic situation of stagnation, war crimes and crimes against humanity, displacements of civilians, destruction of infrastructure and property, trafficking in small arms, proliferation of armed groups fuelling the illegal exploitation of natural resources, among others (MINAFFET, 2012; see also Nibishaka, 2013).

Thus a recurrent situation of conflict in eastern DRC has been also a source of human insecurity among the Congolese populace at large. This situation of recurring conflict has resulted in the erosion of social values and norms. From 2002 to 2014 more than a dozen major peace agreements were signed. Whilst peace initiatives have been made, there has been a glaring lack of a sustainable ethical conflict resolution and peacebuilding mechanism. The DRC falls within SADC’s area of sub regional jurisdiction. In its effort to resolve the recurrence conflict in eastern DRC, SADC has been working with state and non-state actors at national (DRC government and NGOs and civil society), continental (AU) and international (UN) levels. However, no sustainable and longer term peace and security solution has been achieved. The research problem for this study is why has the situation of recurring conflicts remained unresolved despite the SADC regional and multilateral efforts being applied in solving it? Such efforts towards collective security will be dealt with in relation to the notion of regionalism.

1.2 Literature Review

Mwajiru (2001:5) provides us with the standard approach to conflict resolution as primarily about the alleviation, elimination or transformation of actual and potential violent conflict into peaceful (non-violent) processes. This will be done for the purposes of attaining human security, political stability as well as social and economic development. In this standard approach, conflict resolution seeks to deal with primary causal factors to the conflict. The presumption here is that conflict resolution must make an exploration of the root causes of the conflict. In other words, conflict resolution is about how parties to the conflict can move from zero sum destructive patterns of conflict to positive-sum constructive outcomes. The aim is to
develop “processes of conflict resolution that appear to be acceptable to parties in dispute, and effective in resolving conflict” (Azar and Burton 1986: 1).

Whilst there is agreement among scholars with regards to this standard approach to conflict resolution, there is no scholarly agreement on the issue of whether territorial approaches to conflict resolution can help in presenting the breaking up of existing nation-states. Many scholars such as Pamir Peri, Kaufman Eric, Cozic Charles, Richmond Anthony and Rosenau James have realised that some of the conflicts are ethnic or are caused by nationalistic sentiments that are usually found to be in competition with the sentiments of their neighbouring ethnic groupings or nations. It is also argued that territorial approaches do not solve conflicts, rather they induce conflicts. Scholars in this trend of thought usually base their evidence on the history of those regions that have been engulfed by territorial conflicts. In this regard, it is also argued that federal political design has a strong propensity to leverage territorial conflicts or ethnic induced conflicts because a federal political design is deemed to be more accommodative (Wolf 2011). The argument from historical evidence is usually supported by statistical data in which it is shown that in those territories where regional autonomy has been sought, conflicts motivated by pursuit for independence have often occurred, as Stefan Wolf observed,

Thus at the beginning of the twenty-first century there are more than 120 territorially concentrated ethnic groups worldwide that seek a greater degree of independence from their host state, with demands ranging from cultural and territorial autonomy to secession, leading either independent statehood with another state. In a broader historical assessment focused on Europe only a total of 82 groups in 28 countries have sought a greater degree of political control over territories they consider their traditional homelands at some stage after 1945 (Wolf 2011: 2).

However, within the context of Africa, European colonial rule has sometimes actively promoted “differential treatment of ethnic groups as a matter of policy” (Diamond 1987: 121). In post-colonial Africa, these conflicts have posed a challenge to the post-colonial idea of a nation-state as constitutive of a multitude of ethnic groupings. Ethnic conflicts within a post-colonial African state have tended to undermine the sovereignty and political boundaries of these post-colonial African states. External conflict resolutions to such political contexts are usually faced by enormous challenges. Some of these challenges emanate from the African suspicion on whether those external proponents of conflict resolutions in conflict ridden post-colonial African states have genuine motives aimed at eradicating these conflicts or whether they are on the final analysis the main beneficiaries of those conflicts. Some scholars have argued that places of recurring conflicts such as those of the eastern DRC are lucrative business opportunities for the developed countries’ armaments industries. In this regard they argue that
when conflicts are prolonged the more they are lucrative for developed countries’ armaments industries (Franco 2004: 120-124). In the context of Africa, the approach to conflict resolution has been based on the dictum “that there are certain African problems which should only be solved by Africans themselves” (Mazrui 1976: 12). Sometimes the solutions that have been given to situations of conflicts in Africa have failed to bring about an enduring solution in the post-colonial African context.

The third school of thought advocates regional conflict resolution as a more plausible approach in bringing about an enduring peace solution. The dominant rationale in this school of thought is that it is the political regional organisation that is more knowledgeable on issues of peace and security in its own region. Ali Mazrui observes that regional neighbours do play an important role in the conflicts that occur within the region. He writes;

In the African situation the violence reactivates certain primordial loyalties among peoples with the same ethnic or linguistic ancestry, who have nevertheless been previously divided by artificial colonial boundaries and find in the experience of post-colonial tensions a resumption of militant solidarity. By reactivating those primordial bonds across artificial territorial boundaries, the violence may itself be laying the foundation for deeper forms of integration in the region as a whole. The artificiality of the boundaries then acquires a greater conspicuousness, and the realities of ethnic interconnections might once again be given due credence in the tensions of regional integration (Mazrui 1976: 227).

From a regionalist perspective, the issue of recurrence of conflict requires us to make a critical analysis of regional ethnic dynamics. Primordial ethnic bonds that have been severed by artificially created colonial boundaries have thus two implications. The first implication is that they can lead to conflicts among ethnic groups residing in different national territories. Secondly, the realisation of common belongingness among colonially divided ethnic groups can lead to regional integration. Within the context of eastern DRC, the issue of recurrence of conflict has a plausible explanation from the theory of regionalism in the sense that there are some Tutsis in eastern DRC and Rwanda, hence Tutsis in Rwanda do claim eastern DRC as part of their territory and are prepared to support fellow ethnic Tutsis whenever a conflict arises in eastern DRC. It is mainly for this reason that regionalists maintain that authentic conflict resolutions should be derived from the regional contextual realities.

Conciliation, mediation and negotiation among others are some of the techniques of conflict resolution (Oliver, 2001:23-25). The process of conflict resolution diagnoses the nature of the conflict after which methods that are appropriate are applied with the aim of diffusing the negative emotional energy involved, thus enabling the conflicting parties to understand and resolve their differences with the aim of achieving solutions that are agreeable by all the parties
to the conflict (Muyingi, 2013:562). This obviously implies that the solution to the problems at hand must be mutually satisfactory, self-perpetuating, and self-sustaining. Conflict resolution can be practised with more emphasis on cooperation, non-confrontation, non-competition, and positive-sum orientation (Miller 2005). The primary challenge that is often encountered in conflict resolution is when conflicting parties seek to work towards the escalation rather than resolution of the conflict. When such a scenario exists, then there would be a need for external actors such as state and non-state actors who will create a balance of power in terms of resolving the conflict (Miller, 2005: 83-85).

In this regard, the need to engage the non-actors can pave way for the adoption of ethical ways of resolving violent conflict that is embedded in the traditional or cultural practices of the African people. The ethics of a society are embedded in the ideas and beliefs about what is right or wrong, what is regarded as constitutive of good or bad character is embedded in the conceptions of satisfactory social relations and attitudes held by the members of the society; it is also embedded in the forms or patterns of behavior that are considered by the members of the society to bring about social harmony and cooperative living through the promotion of justice and fairness in our day to day interaction with each other (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2010). The ideas and beliefs about moral conduct are usually in each and every society. African societies have undoubtedly evolved ethical systems—ethical values, principles, rules—aimed at guiding social and moral behaviour of all the members of the given particular community. For example, in Southern Africa the ethic of Ubuntu asserts that our lives are inseperable from the lives of others. Ubuntu refers to behaving well towards others or acting in ways that promote the wellbeing of the community. Mululeki Munyaka and Mokgethi Motlhabi observed that,

Ubuntu is based strongly on the collective. Within the context of Ubuntu, people are family. They are expected to be in solidarity with one another especially during times of duress when the need for Ubuntu becomes more acute. Persons in need should be able to count on the support of those around them. And when some are in need others play their part in contributing to their good and that of society. Individuals manifesting qualities of individualism and selfishness, or lack of caring, do not escape scrutiny or go unnoticed. Such individuals are described as akanabuntu (lacking Ubuntu) or akangomntu, ha se motho (not a person, not human). …The statements akangomntu and akanabantu demonstrate that it is community that defines a person and judges whether he or she has attained the desired standard of humanity (in the moral sense) or not. A person may have inherent dignity but part of being a person is to have feelings and moral values that contribute to the well-being of others. To call a person akangomntu is to say that he or she lacks the inner state of being that feels sympathy for others. (Munyaka and Motlhabi 2009: 71).

In other words, the ethic of Ubuntu is based on a solidaristic communal existence. The individual’s moral predisposition is based on how she or he relates to others in community. A
person is regarded as a person mainly on the basis of how he or she relates to others in the community. There is usually a sincere display of warmth in the way people treat both strangers and members of the community. This display of warmth is not merely aesthetic, rather it enables the existence of the formation of spontaneous solidaristic communities. The resultant collaborative work within these spontaneous communities transcends the aesthetic and gives functional significance to the value of warmth. A belief in human goodness which is pivotal to the ethic of *Ubuntu* implies that human beings are originally endowed with a sense of concern for the wellbeing of others (Murove 2016). It is mainly for this reason that the assumption of this study is that the ethical concept of *Ubuntu* can be used as an ethical tool to address the recurrence of violent conflicts in the eastern DRC, given the shortcomings of the contemporary conflict resolution mechanisms.

It is important to note that, “good character is the essence of the African moral system, the linchpin of the moral wheel”.¹ Gykye’s (1998:321) observed that,

The justification for character-based ethics is not far to seek. For, all that a society can do, regarding moral conduct, is to impart moral knowledge to its members, making them aware of the moral values and principles of that society. When such moral knowledge is imparted it goes a long way in addressing the unfavourable practices and conduct that are likely to fuel violent conflict. In general, society satisfactorily fulfills this duty of imparting moral knowledge to its members through moral education of various forms, including, as in African societies, telling morally-freighted proverbs and folktales to its younger members. But, having moral knowledge—being made aware of the moral principles and rules of the society—is one thing; being able to lead a life consonant with the moral principles is quite another. An individual may know and may even accept a moral rule, such as, say, it is wrong to cheat the customs. But he may fail to apply this rule to a particular situation; he is, thus, not able to effect the transition from knowledge to action, to carry out the implications of his moral belief.

There are four attributes that can be deduced from the ethical concept of *Ubuntu*. These are; human dignity, equality, universal brotherhood, and sacredness of life; these provide the most desirable state of life in community-based living (Van Binsbergen, 2001:19). There is a contradiction between *Ubuntu*, which is often referred to as a communal African worldview and the western culture which is more individualistic with the element of self-centeredness. At the core of *Ubuntu* is the idea that the interests of the individuals are relative to those of the community or group. The community will focus on the interests of each individual member of the community in order to ensure that any activity or behaviour of an individual is meant for the

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goodness or interest of the group or community as a whole (Mokgoro, 1997; Broodryk, 2002: 41-43). It should be noted that *Ubuntu*’s moral thrust relates to human happiness and fulfilment in the community. Any participation in community goals is not for personal gain but for the flourishing of the community (Mbiti, 1990: 220-256).

Before colonialism, the primary role of traditional African ethics was to consider moral conduct. The consideration was done in terms of attitude towards life, and encompasses issues of human dignity and respect based on the understanding that an individual’s humanity interconnects with the dignity and humanity of others (Mabovula, 2011:4-6; Mbangu, 2013:561). What is considered as the common good is that which is done for the protection and promotion of human dignity. Any action which is meant to destroy or negatively affect human life is considered as evil (Mbangu, 2013:561; Swindler, 1992: 40-45). Traditional African societies consider life as a supreme value. The value of life is thus expressed through the respect of human dignity (Muyingi, 2013:561; Abiodum 2000: 25). Whilst a lot has been written in the academia and policy fields regarding efforts by SADC as well as other state and non-state actors as regards conflict transformation in the DRC in general and the eastern part of the country in particular, there has not been any research undertaken at doctoral level, in as far as analysing the effectiveness of SADC’s conflict transformation efforts in the eastern DRC through the influence of the African ethic of *Ubuntu* towards the promotion of peace, freedom, human dignity and development of the Congolese is concerned. Since *Ubuntu* advocates the non-distinction in terms of dignity and good treatment of an individual in the same manner as that of the community, any model or mechanism for the attainment of sustainable peace and security in the eastern DRC should be for the benefit of all the Congolese, specifically taking aboard attributes of *Ubuntu*.

Another concept that resonate the tenets of the ethic of *Ubuntu* is that of Collective Security. Instead of seeing issues of conflict transformation as the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council, the concept of Collective Security maintains that all nations that are responsible for maintaining security by participating in the conflict transformation are deemed indispensable to peace and security. Chapter VII delegates powers to Member States through regional arrangements (Sarooshi 2000: 3). This implies that through Collective Security, SADC has to see the recurrence of conflict in the eastern DRC as part of its regional and communal

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responsibility to implement a durable conflict resolution mechanism through its moral and material resources. Through the ethic of *Ubuntu*, it is argued that SADC as a region should adopt an approach to conflict transformation to the problem of recurring conflict in the eastern DRC as part of SADC’s problem to be resolved collectively or communally by the whole region. In line with this, it can be noted that SADC, which forms a Collective Security system in the southern part of the African continent, serves to protect the interests of its members from aggression. By so doing they will be protecting their region’s interests. In this scenario, the UN Collective Security system is seen to be cascading down to regional bodies such as the SADC, which should safeguard and protect their members. In line with this, it is imperative for this research to capture the concept of regionalism *vis-a-vis* the UN Collective Security system. The thrust is by and large skewed towards transforming conflicts in the eastern DRC. Since the ethic of *Ubuntu* emphasises communal harmony (Mkhise 2008), this ethical tradition echoes the presumptions of conflict transformation whereby the thrust is in transforming conflicts into peaceful relationships.

The available literature has not mentioned how various conflict resolution players and transformationalists and more specifically SADC can take the ethic of *Ubuntu* as the basis of the search for SADC’s Ethical Conflict Transformation Mechanism to the problem of recurring conflict in the eastern DRC. This is the missing academic gap that this doctoral research study seeks to fill through the incorporation of the African ethic of *Ubuntu* and the UN concept of Collective Security as a key tool in SADC’s Conflict Transformation Mechanism. This study will contribute immensely to underestimated essential human security aspects that have an African flavour and context relevant in as far as sustainable peace and security for the Congolese in eastern DRC is concerned.

1.3 Location of the Study

The field research study is confined to those countries within SADC (specifically, the DRC, Republic of South Africa (RSA) and United Republic of Tanzania (UTR) and East Africa i.e. Rwanda and Uganda.

1.4 Key Research Question

The key research question of this thesis is: what factors, forces and movements have been behind the recurrence of conflict in the eastern DRC, and what role can the SADC play in
resolving these conflicts with reference to the ethic of *Ubuntu* and the concept of Collective Security?

1.5 Research Sub-Questions

In order to comprehensively answer the key research question, the following research sub questions will be asked:

(1) What is the role of ethnicity in the recurring conflict in the eastern DRC?

(2) How vital is the traditional approach in resolving the problem of the recurrence of conflict in eastern DRC?

(3) What is the impact of the suggested ethical Conflict Transformation Mechanisms of Ubuntu and Collective Security on the future of conflict recurrence in eastern DRC?

(4) Why did the UN and its UNSC conflict resolution and peace-making efforts fail in eastern DRC? What is the future role of the UN and its UNSC vis-à-vis eastern DRC?

1.6 Objectives

The research study has identified four objectives which have got to be fulfilled as follows:

(1) To understand the role of ethnicity in the recurring conflict in the eastern DRC.

(2) To establish how vital the traditional approach is in resolving the problem of recurrence of conflict in eastern DRC.

(3) To examine the impact of the suggested Ethical Conflict Transformation Mechanisms of Ubuntu and Collective Security on the future of conflict recurrence in eastern DRC.

(4) To examine the reasons or factors that led to the failure of the UN and its UNSC conflict resolution and peace-making efforts in eastern DRC as well as to ascertain the future role of the global body in relation to the eastern DRC.

1.7 Theoretical Frameworks

This study will employ three analytical tools, namely, the African Ethical Concept of *Ubuntu*, UN Collective Security system and the concept of Conflict Transformation. The presumption of this study is that these theoretical tools do complement each other in the sense that they are premised on the idea that as human beings we depend on each other for our well-being and ultimate flourishing. Thaddeus Metz interpreted *Ubuntu* as African moral theory. For Metz what makes *Ubuntu* and African moral theory relies mainly on what he sees as the main premise of *Ubuntu* which can be asserted as follows, “An act is right just insofar it is a way of prising
harmony with others, i.e., relationships in which people share a way of life and are in solidarity with one another. An action is wrong if and only if it fails to honour relationships in which we identify with others and exhibit good-will toward them” (Metz 2009: 340). Thus, for Metz Ubuntu is uniquely an African moral theory because of the primacy which it gives to harmonious relationships as compared to Western ethical traditions. He went on to describe what makes Ubuntu as an African moral theory as follows,

A harmonious relationship consists, beyond identifying with others, in exhibiting solidarity towards them. This is a matter of demonstrating goodwill or being positively oriented towards others’ interests. Such behaviour includes helping others and, furthermore, doing so for their sake. To benefit someone else merely for long-term gain does not exhibit genuine goodwill. Harming others exhibit ill will. Also important is to care about what happens to others. People exhibit goodwill in so far as they are happy when others flourish and sad when others flounder. If people’s feelings and emotions are not affected by how others fare, they are not exhibiting full-blowen good will. People who take pleasure in others’ misfortune are manifesting downright ill will (Metz 2009: 341).

According to Metz, harmonious relationships presuppose an ability to identify and being in solidarity with others in such a way that one always wishes the wellbeing of others just in the same manner that one furthers one’s own interests. In this regard, our actions are deemed ethical when they benefit others instead of using others for the furtherance of one’s own personal interests. In praxis, according to Metz “this African moral theory forbids people from being unfriendly. It prohibits people not only from isolating themselves from others or, worse, defining themselves in opposition to or subordinating them, which is divisive, but also from not caring about others’ interests or, worse, expressing ill will by trying to harm them. What makes it wrong to perform such acts as breaking promises and telling lies is that they consist of unfriendly behaviour. They involve thinking of oneself as I, subordinating others’ ends, making them worse off, and failing to care” (Metz 2009: 142). In this regard, Ubuntu implies that we have a sense of concern for others and a sense of care for the wellbeing of others. On the final analysis one can also say that Ubuntu is an African moral theory which belongs to the genre of virtue ethics. Metz’s understanding of Ubuntu as moral theory was already articulated by other African scholars though they did not describe it as an African moral theory. Mogobe Ramose described Ubuntu as being “respectful and polite attitude towards others” (Ramose 1999: 52). In the same vein, Nkonko Kamwangamalu said in the DRC [Gjimuntu means “respect for any human being, for human dignity and for human life, collective sharedness, obedience, humility, solidarity, caring…interdependence…” (Kamwangamalu 1999: 26).
*Ubuntu* puts emphasis on the intrinsic worthiness of each person as something experiential in our human relationships. What this implies is that a situation of recurring conflict which has characterised the eastern DRC is a traversity to human wellbeing and ultimate flourishing as is presumed in the ethic of *Ubuntu*. Also, as Nhlanhla Mkhise has observed, *Ubuntu* presupposes cosmological harmony whereby “ethics is not a matter of individual legislation by abstract, solitary thinkers; rather it is grounded in practical life and human action” which also demands that human actions should be understood “with reference to a larger whole” (Mkhise 2008: 36).

Tutu (2014) had this to say with regards to the attributes of *Ubuntu*:

*Ubuntu* is the essence of being human. It speaks of the fact that my humanity is caught up and is inextricably bound up in yours. I am human because I belong. It speaks about wholeness, it speaks about compassion. A person with *Ubuntu* is welcoming, hospitable, warm and generous, willing to share. Such people are open and available to others, willing to be vulnerable, affirming of others, do not feel threatened that others are able and good, for they have a proper self-assurance that comes from knowing that they belong in a greater whole. They know that they are diminished when others are humiliated, diminished when others are oppressed, diminished when others are treated as if they were less than who they are. The quality of *Ubuntu* gives people resilience, enabling them to survive and emerge still human despite all efforts to dehumanise them.

In the light of the above quotation, *Ubuntu* can be a tool for transforming conflicts in that it leads to that sense of generosity, hospitality, friendliness, caring and compassion. People are made to treat their colleagues with love, respect and honour as a result of *Ubuntu*, thereby paving way for people to forge peace and tranquility among themselves. *Ubuntu*, therefore, stands for humaneness built on the foundations of a relational worldview embedded in most African cultures and reflected in the philosophy of non-violent conflict transformation.

Secondly, another theoretical framework which is applied in this study is that of Conflict Transformation (CT). The theory of CT echoes the underlying principles of *Ubuntu* in the sense that its focus is on ensuring that social relationships should promote harmonious relationships. On the other hand, previously, scholars put focus on conflict resolution and management which was rather a mechanistic approach. Such an approach failed to capture social relationships that were the contributory factors to social conflicts (Lederach 1999; Botes 2003; Galtung 1995). Conflict transformation theorists such as Johan Galtung maintain that all parties to the conflict should be seen as capable of bringing solutions to the conflict. In this regard conflict transformation is based on the presumption that each part to the conflict has a role to play, hence a solution to the conflict has to be as much inclusive as possible. In this regard the ideal is not to single out a particular ethnic group as the main protagonist to the conflict, rather the focus
is on what each part to the conflict can contribute in bringing about harmonious social relationships at the personal level as well as structural level.

The third theoretical tool that is applied in this study is that of the UN Collective Security system. The UN Collective Security system is based on the presumption that all members of the UN have a role to play in the promotion of peace and security in the world at two levels. Firstly as individual sovereign states they should have concern for peace and security of other countries. Secondly, within their regional membership, they should contribute to peace and security within their respective regions. In Article 2 of the UN Charter it is stated that “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations”. In other words, the maintenance of peace and security in the world is seen as the responsibility of all the Members of the UN. In this regard the maintenance of peace and security in the world is not only the prerogative of the UNSC, but for all the members of the UN. The UN Collective Security system has been applied by the UNSC against those countries that failed “to protect civilians during armed conflict, to control the risk of small arms trafficking, against the recruitment of child soldiers, to stop child abuse and to ensure the safety of its staff” (Loppez-Jacoiste 2010: 283). The UN Collective Security system is also based on the idea that regional organisations have the responsibility to deal with issues of peace and security within the domain of their regions. On the other hand, the Collective Security system is meant to send a message to all states that their peace and security is intertwined with the peace and security of all the countries of the world. Filippo Andreatta observed that, “Collective Security is based upon a generalised principle rather than on a coincidental convergent sum of individual interests” (Andreatta 1996: 44). In other words, Collective Security is aimed at promoting the welfare of everybody. The rationale behind collective security system is that a situation of insecurity experienced by one county should be understood as posing insecurity to all UN member states. The peace and security wellbeing of one state is thus intertwined with the wellbeing of all. In the case of recurring conflict in eastern DRC, the Collective Security system requires the participation of the regional organisation such as the SADC to which the DRC is a member.

In highlighting the facets of Collective Security, it can be noted that Collective Security can be understood as a security arrangement in which all states cooperate collectively to provide security for all by the actions of all against any states within the groups which might challenge the existing order by using force. This contrasts with self-help strategies of engaging in war for purely immediate national interest as under this arrangement each state in the systems accepts
that the security of one is the concern of all, therefore commits to a collective response to threats and breaches to peace. Nation states have adopted the Collective Security system in a bid to prevent or stop wars. In this case, an aggression against one state is considered an attack to all other states which act together to defend each other against an attack from one of the others (i.e their Member). In substantiating this, Blin and Marin (2009:1) assert that the concept of collective security, therefore, leads to a social contract of some sort among states being bound by the goal of stability and peace; while the system of balance of power is expected to maintain the status quo (especially that of the great powers), if need be by resorting to war—with limited objectives—in order to maintain the geopolitical balance. In addition, weaker or vulnerable countries that cannot defend themselves from aggression can stand to benefit from this coalition building practice. Over and above Dinesh (n.d:1) connotes that Collective Security stands for meeting any war or aggression by the creation of global preponderance of power of all nations against the aggression. The UN is perceived as an embodiment of the success of a long-standing dream to create the system of Collective Security that was capable of ushering long-lasting peace in the world by replacing a dubious and dangerous in the end system of balances. In buttressing this notion, Stromberg (1956:258) notes that the UN Collective Security system was a visible sign of wholly new spirit to end wars through integrative collaborative efforts.

In Chapter VII of the UN\(^3\), the concept of Collective Security maintains that all nations should see themselves as ultimately responsible for the maintenance of peace and security in the world. Within this Chapter VII specific reference is made to the idea that the UNSC can delegate regional formations to carry out this responsibility. Legal scholars such as Danesh Saroosh maintain that, “A delegation of powers in the law of international institutions can be defined as taking place whenever an organ of an international organisation which possesses an express or implied power under its constituent instrument conveys the exercise of this power to some other

\(^3\) Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter—“Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”—allows member states to use all possible means, including economic sanctions and military action, to enforce a U.N. resolution. The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security. In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures. It has been invoked by the Security Council numerous times since it was adopted in 1945, notably to authorise military operations in the Korean War (1950), the Gulf War (1991) and in Somalia (1992), and earlier this year to set up an intervention brigade as part of the U.N. peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
entity” (Saroosh 2000: 4-5). The presumption here is that the regional entity is more knowledgeable on what needs to be done in solving the conflict within its region. For this reason, this study will argue that SADC as a regional entity is suitably placed to apply its moral and material resources in resolving the problem of recurring conflict in the eastern DRC. With its ethic of *Ubuntu*, the problem of recurring conflict in the eastern DRC will be collectivised as a regional problem that needs a regional moral and material solution. In this vein, the study will use the terms Collective Security and Community Security interchangeably. The term Community Security is defined by Bennett (2014:4) a people-centred approach to addressing insecurity that integrates human security, development and statebuilding paradigms. Thus investigates the notion of international community where groupings of states are tied together through common values and transnational links that reject violent conflict resolution as unthinkable (Adler and Barnett 1999:23). It works by bringing together a wide range of state and civil society actors from the security demand and supply sides to identify root causes of insecurity collectively and develop coordinated responses to them. It creates an enabling environment for wider reforms and more people focused policies at the international and national levels. According to Achrya (2001:168) people and nations in Community Security are also bound by the sense of “community” the mutual sympathy, trust and common interests. In addition to this, collectivism whilst it is pronounced at the UN level through the same vein, it is and it must be seen to be transmitted to regions- a situation that brings in the notion of regionalism. According to Lombaerde and Shultz (2009:10) “regionalism is the expression of a common sense of identity and purpose combined with the creation and implementation of institutions that express a particular identity and shape collective action with geographical region.” In this regard, SADC member states can share and express a common identity and purpose in their collective grouping.

1.8 Research Methodology

Research methodology is defined by Janckowicz as cited by Collier (2008) as the analysis of, and rationale for the particular method or methods used in a given study and in that type of study in general. Methodology is a way of thinking about and studying social reality and is designed to solve the research problem. The research methodology implies the various techniques that are used in the research. The methodology encompasses the research design, sampling techniques, methods of data collection as well as methods of data analysis. The research design is an arrangement and a way of examining and obtaining answers to research questions and identified problems (Kerlinger 2004; Neuman 2000). In support of this, Chapman
(2007) notes that a research design is a plan that outlines how information was gathered for an assessment or evaluation that includes identifying data gathering methods, the instruments used, how instruments were administered and how the information was organised and analysed. The research design gives a detailed outline of how a research or an investigation will take place. In this regard, the research design is a master plan that details processes and means used in data collection and analysis. The research study used a combination of historical and qualitative research approaches with some flexibility. This research is partly historical. Historical research is “the systematic collection of data which is preceded by the objective evaluation of information related to past events so as to test hypotheses in regards to their causes and effects in order to be able to explain the present trends and have focus on the future” (Busha and Harter, 1980: 90). Historical research, “involves developing an understanding of the past through the examination and interpretation of evidence” which may exist (or be collected) in the form of texts and recorded data, interviews and observations (Kumar, 2005:188-203; Hancock, 2006: 80). Qualitative research designs are naturalistic enquiry processes of understanding based on methodologies that explore social or human phenomena (O’Leary 2004:99; Neumann 2000). Basically, qualitative research is an exploratory process that involves methods of data collection that are non-quantitative or non-numerical (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 32-48). It focuses on “the essence or ambience of something and involves the historical context and sometimes a critique of the ‘front’ being put on to get at the ‘deep structure’ of relations” (Busha and Harter, 1980: 95). Qualitative research resonates around soft data in the form of impressions, sentences and symbols among other forms. The research used the qualitative design because it paved way for the exploration of the feelings, attitudes, preferences and attributes of the respondents in greater depth.

In selecting the respondents, the research used sampling. According to Orodho and Kombo (2002) sampling is a process of selecting a number of individuals or objects from a population such that the selected group contains elements that are representative of the characteristics found in the entire group. The research used the non probability sampling technique (purposive or judgemental sampling) to select the key respondents to participate in the research. According to Crossman (2014) judgemental sampling is the one that is selected based on the knowledge of a population. It is a selective or subjective non-probability sampling method that is characterised by a deliberate effort to gain representative samples by including groups or typical areas in a sample. In purposive sampling the research decides what needs to be known and sets out to find people with expertise, knowledge and experience about the area under study. The
researcher used purposive sampling because it is less time consuming and it yields rich data since the respondents are experts in the area under study.

1.9 Data Collection

Data collection refers to the process of gathering and measuring information on variables of interest in an established systematic fashion that enables one to answer stated research questions, test hypotheses and evaluate outcomes. In this study, data has been derived from primary and secondary sources. Primary sources utilised are first-hand accounts of information and primary documents. These include eyewitness accounts of events and oral histories. Primary sources are highly sought after in historical research and they are first-hand information because finding and assessing historical data is an exercise which involves logic, intuition, persistence and common sense. The researcher has also used questionnaires and personal interviews to collect primary data.

Secondary sources were very useful in giving the researcher a grasp of the subject and the provision of extensive bibliographic information for delving further into the research topic. Secondary sources were used to complement primary sources. Secondary data was gathered from various defence and security sources (including defence and security journals), scholarly journals and books, newspapers and magazines, archival material, declassified operational reports, unpublished theses and the internet as well as seminar papers. The researcher used documents because they have the advantage of being readily available and can be assessed at a time convenient to the researcher.

1.10 Questionnaires

According to Cooper and Emory (1995) questionnaires are sets of questions to gather data from sample respondents on the subject matter. This research instrument is designed to capture responses from respondents in a standardised manner. Well-designed questionnaires were effectively used in this research study to gather information. Self-administering questionnaires such as e-mail questionnaires were used as these were easy to administer confidentially which is necessary to ensure that participants respond with some relative honesty. In this study, semi-structured questionnaires made it possible to compare and interpret the respondents’ views because of the formatted nature and standardization of the questions. During the research study, questionnaires were administered to a select group of scholars within the sub-region’s ethics. Forty (40) questionnaires were sent to political science/international relations, defence and
security related academic institutions, think-tanks. Thirty (30) other questionnaires were also sent to non-academic and non-practitioner experts such as journalists, negative forces and NGO officials among others.

1.11 Personal Interviews

An interview is defined by Wagner (1999) as a conversation between the interviewer and the interviewee intended to directly question the interviewee so as to gather information. The researcher asked the interviewee a set of questions. The research study also made use of the unstructured informal interview technique. Entirely informal and not controlled by a specific set of detailed questions, the method requires the interviewer to be guided only by a predetermined list of issues. The advantage with the unstructured informal interviews is that the respondents will be “encouraged to talk freely about the subject, but kept to the point on issues of interest to the researcher” (Kumar, 2005: 123). Interviews were conducted in SADC countries including the DRC and the GLR. Interviewees were drawn from the following: Thirty five (35) key politicians, Fifty five (55) relevant bureaucrats and policy makers in the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, Forty five (45) key policy makers at the SADC Secretariat as well as those at the United Nations Observer Mission in Congo (MONUC); fifty five (55) relevant members of the civil society and NGOs within SADC whose area of focus is on conflict resolution with an inclination to conflict in the eastern DRC.

1.12 Data Analysis

Data analysis refers to the process of examining and processing what has been collected in a survey for the purposes of making inferences and deductions. In this case, data was categorised with the aim of classification, summarisation and tabulation thereof. The researcher analysed data from the secondary sources (books, journals, internet among other sources) as well as primary data (from in-depth interviews, questionnaires). Data analysis was done using content analysis and thematic analysis. According to Berelson (2005) content analysis is a systematic, replicable technique of compressing many words of text into content categories based on the rules of coding. The researcher used content analysis to examine trends and patterns in data which made it possible to identify the key ideas, phrases and concepts. In undertaking content analysis the researcher identified the main ideas that emerged from the responses given by the respondents and then assigned codes to each theme before counting how frequently each had occurred. This technique enabled the researcher to objectively and systematically identify specified characteristics of data that captured the key ideas of the research problem as well as
answering the research questions. The researcher also managed to systematically sift through large volumes of data with relative ease as the focus was on recurrent ideas within the text.

Thematic analysis was also used in relation to content analysis. According to Berelson (2005) thematic analysis is the process of identifying or pinpointing, examining and recording core patterns or themes and sub-themes in the gathered data. Themes are used on the layout of data sets and are crucial to the description of phenomena. Thematic analysis combined the relevant literature with the relationship and themes of each category that were closely examined under content analysis thereby generalising the research findings. This technique of data analysis places emphasis on pinpointing, examining and recording patterns of themes within data. The themes become the categories for data analysis.

1.13 Outline of Chapters

The research study comprises of seven chapters as outlined below:

**Chapter One: Introduction**

This part consists of background to the study which traces the evolution of conflict recurrence in the DRC. This places the research problem in its historical context. The section also contains the statement of the problem, research objectives, research questions and the location of study. There is also the preliminary review of literature, and theoretical framework whereby the study gyrates on the African ethical framework of *Ubuntu* and the UN Collective Security framework. The chapter also captures the research methodology which basically highlights the methods, strategies and approaches that are used in gathering, analysing, processing and reporting the research findings. This chapter wraps up by giving an outline of the entire study, which in this case, consists of seven chapters.

**Chapter Two: An analysis of the Historical Dynamics surrounding Conflict Recurrence in the eastern DRC**

This chapter makes historical analysis of political, economic, military and security as well as social factors that have contributed to the recurrence of conflict in eastern Congo. It is highlighted in this chapter that the recurrence of conflict in the DRC in general and eastern Congo in particular can be traced back to the time of the Belgian occupation of the Congo.
Under King Leopold II, the country was named Congo Free State. Leopold took Congo as his personal possession. It is noted in this chapter that the Belgian ruler relied on the separatist strategy where he employed the divide and rule method. Leopold elevated the minority ethnic groups to rule over the majority tribes. Thus, the current abuses, violations of human rights, exploitative tendencies in the eastern DRC, allegedly by state and non-state actors, can be historically traced to the repressive rule of King Leopold II’s administration. This chapter also traces the political, economic, military/security and social dynamics in the Congo from independence, where the country experienced conflicts which had secessionist inclinations under Patrice Lumumba, the Mobutu years of political repression, personal economic looting, military dictatorship, and social disintegration. The DRC’s political, economic, security/military and social environment under Laurent Kabila and later on Joseph Kabila is also examined. The chapter also highlights the causal factors of recurrent conflict in the eastern DRC. It will be noted that the violent conflict is a result of tensions over the control of resources, issues of citizenship, military and security disenchantment as well as the seemingly geopolitical relations between the DRC and neighbouring countries.

Chapter Three: Contextualising Conflict Transformation with reference to Conflict Recurrence in the eastern DRC

Conflict Transformation is analysed in a broader analytical perspective in this chapter. It will be noted that as a new discourse to peace-building and peace-making initiatives, CT has attracted scholarly and policy attention from academics, researchers and policy makers in the field of conflict, peace and security studies. The coming into being of CT is a result of the low effectiveness of past peace approaches such as conflict resolution, conflict settlement, conflict management to come up with sustainable theoretical frameworks which would translate into the attainment of sustainable peace in the eastern DRC. The study will discuss the emphatic notion by Conflict Transformationalists that conflicts do not have finite and predetermined lives comprehended in a linear form as a life cycle. This is so considering the fact that some types of conflicts rarely reach a final state of affairs when they seem to have been “resolved.” Instead, they may merely change form and may recur. It will also be noted that, generally, contemporary conflicts require more than the reframing of positions and identification of win-win outcomes. The Chapter makes a typology of CT. Various scholarly views are highlighted on the contextual and conceptual aspects of Conflict Transformation. The personal, relational, structural and cultural dimensions of CT are examined in this chapter. The micro and macro aspects of transformation are analysed with reference to the notion of changes in the parties and the nature
of the conflict, as well as the changes in the socio-political system within which conflict is embedded.

Chapter Four: The quagmire surrounding SADC’s Conflict Transformation efforts in the eastern DRC’s Recurring Conflict

Chapter Four discusses the predicament that the SADC has encountered in the subregional efforts at CT. It will be noted that the regional interventions revolve around the concept of community security and regionalism. The chapter notes that SADC has been putting more effort on human security or the critical security paradigms. However, conflict in the DRC has necessitated the SADC to adopt the traditional concept of Collective Security. This resulted in the formation of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation (OPDSC). An overview of the dynamics surrounding the modus operandi of the OPDSC is made with reference to conflict resolution mechanisms adopted in respect of the DRC conflict. It will be noted that it is through the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Defense and Security (SIPO) II that the OPDSC strives to attain sustainable peace by transforming cyclic conflicts. The constraints and prospects to the OPDSC’s efforts at attaining long lasting peace and security in the subregion will also be analysed. This will be done in relation to the regional and international dynamics surrounding the recurring conflict in the eastern Congo.

Chapter Five: Towards the efficacy of the African ethic of *Ubuntu* and the UN Concept of Collective Security on SADC’s Conflict Transformation capacity in the eastern DRC

An analogy of *Ubuntu* philosophy is discussed in this chapter. The synergy or nexus that exist between the theory of Collective Security and the African Ethic of *Ubuntu* is also analysed. It will be observed that the interconnectedness of the UN Collective Security system and the African Ethic of *Ubuntu* revolve around the quest for the attainment of sustainable peace and security at national, subregional, regional and international levels. The effects of unilateralism on Collective Security are also highlighted. A constructivist interpretation of the UN collective security and *Ubuntu* is also given. The chapter also discusses the effectiveness of *Ubuntu* in addressing the recurring conflict in the eastern DRC. It will be argued that the African Ethic of *Ubuntu* contradicts with the more individualistic Western perspective and that communalism is at the centre of *Ubuntu* as it seeks to promote community interests rather than personal interests. The implications of coloniality, that is, the living legacy of colonialism in the contemporary communities *vis-a-vis Ubuntu* will also be analysed.
Chapter Six: Qualitative analysis of Research Findings

Through the use of secondary and primary sources, this chapter makes a synopsis of the role of the UN Collective Security system and the African Ethic of Ubuntu in finding a lasting solution to the recurring conflict in the eastern DRC. It will be noted that the African Ethic of Ubuntu is a conflict resolution mechanism within the broad ambit of Collective Security. The chapter discusses how Ubuntu is adopted and practiced as a sustainable mechanism in addressing violent recurrent conflict. The effectiveness of Collective Security and Ubuntu will be analysed as mechanisms for reducing or totally eliminating conflict in the eastern DRC. In highlighting the nexus between conflict recurrence and ethnicity in the eastern DRC the study establishes that the primary cause of recurring conflict in the eastern DRC revolves around ethnicity.

Chapter Seven: Conclusions and Recommendations

This chapter proffers both scholarly and policy recommendations on how Collective Security and the African Ethic of Ubuntu can be effective mechanism in transforming the recurring conflict in the eastern DRC. The chapter discusses the common and key attributes of Ubuntu and African humanism and those of CT. It is noted that these mechanisms are critical components to a holistic approach in addressing the root causes of conflict in the eastern Congo. The failure by the conflict resolution strategies that were used by the regional and continental blocs in trying to eliminate violent conflict in DRC has necessitated this research study to focus on the need for Ubuntu and the UN Collective Security system to bring Afrocentric and traditional approaches to address violent conflict in the eastern DRC. The research study brought to light that the isolated application and usage of modern approaches in peace-building is implausible.
CHAPTER TWO: AN ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORICAL DYNAMICS SURROUNDING CONFLICT RECURRENCE IN THE EASTERN CONGO

2.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to present a brief historical analysis of factors that have contributed to the recurrence of conflict in eastern Congo. The evolution of the rulership of DRC and its resultant effect on conflict recurrence will be highlighted. The Belgian rule was punctuated by the rulership of King Leopold II who claimed the Congo Free State as his personal possession in 1885. He worked with an administration which assisted him to oversee his partitioning of their African territory and in the process they ruthlessly plundered Congo’s natural resources resulting in serious abuses against the local population. The abuses, violations of human rights, exploitative tendencies owe their origin to King Leopold II’s extortionate and repressive administration. He introduced the divide and rule strategy whereby he used the minority groups to administer and run the affairs of the locals on his behalf at the expense of the majority a situation that has led the majority nationals to always fight against the minority who occupied the influential posts. After the Congolese secured their Independence from their erstwhile colonial masters, the independent Congo was beleaguered by volatility including an armed secession movement in Katanga and an army mutiny that culminated in Lumumba’s murder. The assassination of Lumumba contributed to national political turmoil.

The chapter also chronicles how Joseph-Desire Mobutu seized power from Lumumba in a coup in 1965 and how he instituted a highly centralised and dictatorial administration, which saw the enforcement of indigenous Congolese ideologies in Government. The dictatorial tendencies by Mobutu led to high animosity on the repressed and oppressed members of the tribes. The study then shows the causes of the First Congolese War which involved nine states in September 1996 where the coalition of neighbouring countries of the then Zaire invaded the country and they succeeded in ousting Mobutu in May 1997. During the 1994 Rwandese genocide, Mobutu provided shelter and protection to the Rwandese Hutu army and militias that directed genocide as well as to Rwandese refugees who had escaped to the eastern Congo. These Rwandese militiamen of Hutu origin quickly aligned themselves to Mobutu’s government and began to attack DRC’s sizeable population of ethnic Tutsis who had lived in the country for generations. This did not go down well with the Ugandan and Rwandese administrations who, in response, marched into Congo in pursuit of Hutu military forces a situation that has led to unending conflict in the DRC.
The ousting of Mobutu saw Laurent Desire Kabila becoming the president who during his reign announced the expulsion of the Rwandan troops who then established armed groups as proxies in an effort to unseat Kabila. This led to the Second Congolese War, which saw countries like Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe intervening on Kabila’s side (Operation Sovereign Legitimacy). However, Laurent Kabila was then assassinated by his bodyguard and Joseph Kabila, his son assumed presidency. Joseph Kabila has been in power since 2001 and has arguably made some significant progress in improving governance and advancing democracy. The study also highlights that violence and unending conflict in the eastern DRC stems primarily from deep-rooted tensions related to control over resources (land), access to citizenship, military reform and regional geo-politics. Secondary challenges also reflect a complex pattern of state negligence, incapacity and coercion throughout the country. Violence is particularly acute in North and South Kivu provinces. Long-standing tensions were entrenched by localised disputes, organised criminal activity and the intervention of neighbouring states. Two large armed groups, a coalition of smaller bands of armed men and the government army who are involved in persistent battle causing enormous human suffering infest the Petit Nord area of the North Kivu.

Underlying factors to conflict in DRC include power, greed, grievances and security or survival in which case greed targeted mining areas, survival targets best hiding areas, power maps the administrative capitals. Others are separatist or secessionist conflicts in which the insurgent movements (such as the Mai Mai Kata Katanga\(^4\) and the Union des fédéralistes et des Républicains Indépendants\(^5\) challenge the established territories and seek to create new states by involving distinctive ethnic, regional and cultural claims. The chapter also shows how the

\(^4\) Mai-Mai Kata Katanga, also called Mai-Mai Bakata Katanga, is a Mai-Mai rebel group in the Democratic Republic of the Congo that supports the secession of Katanga Province. It was formed in 2011 after Gédéon Kyungu Mutanga, the group's leader, escaped from prison in September. "Kata Katanga" means "secede Katanga" in Swahili. It has been estimated that, at its height in 2013, the Kata Katanga rebels numbered approximately 3,000 of whom most were based in Mitwaba Territory. It was a participant in the Katanga insurgency. (http://en.wikipedia.org)

\(^5\) The Union of Federalists and Independent Republicans (French: Union des fédéralistes et des Républicains Indépendants, UFERI) is a political party in Democratic Republic of the Congo. Since the actual electoral strength of the political parties in Congo is not known, the size of the party cannot be determined. It was founded in August 1990 by former First State Commissioner Jean Nguza Karl-i-Bond, who led the party until he fell ill in May 1994. Gabriel Kyungu wa Kumwanza, then governor of Shaba region, was then named the president of the party, but a faction led by Karl-I-Bond's wife Wivine split from the organization, leaving Kyungu with the remainder of the party in Shaba region (now Katanga Province). To the present day, most of the party's membership and leadership comes from the Katanga region, and the earlier days of the party's existence was filled with ethnopolitical battles between the predominantly-BaLunda UFERI and the predominantly-BaLubaUDPS of Karl-I-Bond's rival (and former First State Commissioner) Étienne Tshisekedi.
Rwandese officials regularly contend that the DRC has failed to rein in and indeed has at times, collaborated with anti-Rwandese armed groups operating on Congolese soil. In addition, Rwanda is believed to have immensely benefited from natural resources smuggling in the eastern DRC. In this regard, if destabilisation continues Rwanda will be able to continue looting from DRC. Rwanda has been blamed for continually supporting armed groups and insurgencies against the DRC government.

The chapter also unravels that conflict in eastern DRC gyrates around the need to control natural resources such as land, minerals and timber. Conflict over access to land remains contested as customary informal and statutory law on land tenure systems overlap geographically in that different actors might claim a certain parcel of land under different systems thereby resulting in confusion and dispute. Unequal access to land has intensified local competition, which has transformed into disputes and violence between ethnic communities. Congo’s conflict is also motivated by the need for diverse actors to gain control over the Congo’s rich natural deposits of gold, copper, cobalt, cassarite, tantalum, tin and tungsten. These minerals have helped to fund continued fighting in the region for years. In addition, the renewed interest in the country’s potential oil reserves in the eastern and central Congo could increase tensions. Exports of minerals are alleged to fuel conflict when they are controlled or traded by armed groups. Timber is another natural resource that is being controlled by Ugandan businesspersons who organise the logging through Congolese intermediaries (Kasaija, 2011). The Ugandans who organise the logging and control the export market make bigger profits from the trade than the Congolese. The need for the Congolese to regain control of the market has led to contestations.

2.2 Precedent Political factors to Conflicts in eastern DRC

The rulership of the DRC evolved through five dispensations of different leaders. These included the Belgian rule, which was followed by Lumumba’s ephemeral reign, then Mobutu Sese Seko who assumed power through a coup and was succeeded by Laurent Kabila whom upon being assassinated saw his son Joseph Kabila emerging as his successor. Tracing these different power dispensations clarifies the origin and the pathway and political trajectory that was and is still being taken by the DRC conflict. This also unveils the intricate complexities that undergird these instabilities in this central African country as well as testifying to the imminent difficulties that are existential in trying to pacify and quell the ostensibly interminable and unrelenting conflict in the DRC.
2.2.1 Belgian Rule

According to Arieff (2014:4) Belgium’s King Leopold II claimed the “Congo Free State” as his personal possession in 1885. In further clarifying this notion, from 1878 to 1908, the DRC was known as Congo Free State, then a private concession of the then Belgian King. The administration that worked with him in overseeing this portion of their African territory grew notorious for plundering Congo’s natural resources and overseeing serious abuses against the local population, leading the Belgian government to transition the territory into a formal colony in 1908 (Ocampo 2009:55). According to Moyroud and Katunga (17) the DRC became an official colony of Belgium in 1908. King Leopold II is predominantly kept in mind for the founding and exploitation of the Congo Free State as a private venture. Owing to his greed and mean tendencies King Leopold II neglected the Berlin Conference conditions whereby he was expected to make a commitment towards improving the lives of the native inhabitants (Wertham 1968; Dummet 2004). According to Hochschild (1998) he ran the Congo using the mercenary Force Publique which assisted him to extract a fortune from the Congo, initially by the collection of ivory and after a rise in the price of rubber in the 1890s, by forced labour from the natives.

In chronicling the atrocities committed by King Leopold II and his private police, Ocampo (2009:57) asserts that abuses especially in the industry included the effective enslavement of the native population, beatings, widespread killing and frequent mutilations when the production quotas were not met. His administration was responsible for the deaths of an estimated 2-15 million Congolese (Wertham 1968; Forbath 1977; Hochschild 1998; Dummet 2004). There was an outcry over this bedlam and pandemonium which led to a major global outrage that saw King Leopold II being forced to capitulate power and control of the colony to the civilian Belgian administration in 1908. The adage that goes, “history repeats itself” is a clear acknowledgment of the current instabilities and hostilities in the eastern DRC. The current abuses, violations of human rights, exploitatative tendencies draw their origin to King Leopold II’s extortionate and oppressive administration. The year 1960 witnessed Belgium granting independence, which countenanced the parliamentary elections being conducted shortly prior. It is from these elections that the nationalist leader Patrice Lumumba emerged as the Prime Minister and Joseph Kasa Vubu becoming the first president of the independent Congo.

In highlighting how Belgian rule caused recurrent conflict in the DRC Turner (2007) asserts that Belgian rule in Congo was based on the colonial trinity of state, missionary and private
company interests. The privileging of Belgian commercial interests meant that large amounts of capital flowed into the Congo and that individual regions became specialised and on many occasions, the interests of the Government and private enterprises became closely tied and the state helped companies break strikes and remove other barriers imposed by the indigenous population. The country was split into nesting hierarchically organised administrative sub-divisions, and run uniformly according to a set of native policy (Gibbs 1996; Gondola 2002; Whelan 2006; Thomas 2007; Jullien 2013). In these administrative sub-divisions, people from the minority tribes were made to occupy influential positions at the expense of the majority tribal groups. This created tension as the majority ethnicities felt they should also be accorded the same privileges of occupying the top positions. So the separatist strategies that were used under Belgian rule made it difficult for stability to prevail in the Congo. In addition, Belgian rule was seen to have indirect but immense impact on the Congo as it was responsible for initiating and supporting secessions. For example on 11 June 1961, Moise Tshombe, the leader of the opposition political party Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga (CONAKAT), declared Congo’s southern province of Katanga independent as the state of Katanga, with Elisabethville as its capital and himself as President (Gibbs 1996; Gondola 2002; Thomas 2007). According to Thomas (2007:35) the secession was motivated by the Katangese separatists’ desire to keep more of the wealth generated by the province’s mining operations and to avoid sharing it with the rest of Congo. This selfish desire and ambition led to contestations with other Congolese who were in other provinces as the mineral resources from Katanga were supposed to benefit the entire nation as it was and remains a unitary state. In addition, this Katangese secession was meant to frustrate and weaken the nation building efforts of the new government in the independent Congo as there was untold political disintegration and conflict.

2.2.2 Patrice Lumumba’s Rule

Accordingly, the country’s early years (that is, as an independent African Congo) were beleaguered by volatility including an armed secession movement in Katanga and an army mutiny that culminated in Lumumba’s murder in early 1961 (Arief, 2014). The international community can also be blamed for meddling in the Congolese affairs by supporting the assassination of Lumumba (Arief, 2014). In contrasting this notion, a 1975 Congressional investigation into United States (US) foreign assassination plots concluded that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had pursued plans to assassinate Lumumba but they were thwarted by logistical factors; the investigation further concluded that available evidence did not point to a direct CIA role in Lumumba’s death despite advance CIA knowledge that Lumumba would
likely be killed as he was a target. (State Department, Foreign Relations of the US 1964; Church Committee Report 1975:30). Accordingly, following the assassination of Lumumba shortly thereafter, the country experienced a series of armed groupings and secessionist movements sometimes with the direct encouragement of external actors (Turner 2007, Lemarchand 2009). According to Moyroud and Katunga (n.d), the DRC has been engaged in many wars since its independence in 1960, most of which are linked to the external exploitation of its immense natural resources-initially dominated by the copper wealth to be found in the Katanga province in the south. It can thus be noted that this volatility and instability has all been taking a seemingly perpetual and a ceaseless passageway.

Lumumba’s rule was punctuated by the relentless desire to completely eliminate the relic, nuances and semblances of Belgian or colonial rulership as the Belgians were still occupying the top government and civil service posts. In addition, Seilig (2008:121) connotes that Lumumba appealed for Soviet Union support, which agreed to provide weapons, logistical and material support in a bid to suppress the secessionist states. Lumumba’s appeal for Soviet support split the government and led to calls within the United Nations and the Western countries to remove him from power. Accordingly, Lumumba’s actions distanced him from the rest of the government, especially Joseph Kasa Vubu who feared the implications of Soviet intervention. According to Haskin (2005), the Americans also feared that a Soviet aligned Congo could form the basis of a major expansion of communism in central Africa. Such scenarios led to interventions by many players both local and external who wanted to safeguard their operational turf and secure their national interests. In the process, Mobutu ostensibly launched a bloodless coup and replaced both Kasa Vubu and Lumumba with a Collage of Commissioners consisting of a panel of university lectures/professors (Gibbs 1996; Whelan 2006; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007; Jullien 2013). Lumumba was placed under house arrest. According to Seilig (2008:122) still in captivity, Lumumba was tortured and transported to Thysville and to Katanga where he was later handed to forces loyal to Moise Tshombe-the leader of CONAKAT; on 17 January 1961, Lumumba was executed by the Katangese troops near Elisabethville. According to Thomas (2002) news of the execution, released on 13 February, provoked international outrage; for example, the Belgian embassy in Yugoslavia was attacked by protesters in Belgrade and violent demonstrations occurred in London and New York. His death saw Mobutu assuming power and ultimate control in Congo.
2.2.3 Joseph-Desire Mobutu Sese Seko

Colonel Joseph Desire Mobutu, who had been involved in the recalcitrance against Lumumba, seized power in a coup in 1965 (Prunier 2008). He then instituted a highly centralised and dictatorial administration, which saw the enforcement of indigenous Congolese ideologies in the government. Arieff (2014:4) writes that Mobutu’s pursuit of a more ‘authentic’ indigenous Congolese national identity led him to rename himself Mobutu Sese Seko and the country Zaire. In a bid to strengthen and sustain his 32 year authoritarian rule, Mobutu on the domestic arena, relied on sham and fraudulent elections, brute force, benefaction or patronage associations compounded by wide-ranging corruption by government officials (Moyroud and Katunga:19). In the external arena, Mobutu’s rule drew on the United States and other Western support in the context of Cold War rivalry over the loyalty of African leaders. In reinforcing the notion of the international players seeking the allegiance of African leaders, Stockwell (1979:23) asserts that Mobutu’s government reportedly served as a conduit for US assistance to anti-government armed groups in neighbouring Angola. Corruption was rife amongst the government officials and petty corruption which as noted by Arieff (2014:4) provided a crucial economic safety net for many Congolese. In this regard, Mobutu’s administration was characterised as a kleptocratic establishment (French 1997:2). This led to conflicts as the general populace as well as the armed groups also sought to access and control the means of production- this further destabilised Congo.

Because of the political rot that characterised Mobutu’s leadership, domestic and intercontinental pressures accumulated on him and this also worsened the ageing president’s already dilapidated physical condition, which was fast deteriorating. In addition, state institutions collapsed and the military weakened. In response to the piling up pressure, Mobutu contracted in principle to establish a multi-party democratic system in 1990, however, in spite of the agreement he went on postponing elections repeatedly (Turner 2007; Prunier 2008; Lemarchand 2009). Civil unrest in the surrounding Great Lakes region and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda dribbled over the DRC borders thereby further knocking off balance local communities and fueling the unfavourable diversion of state resources, thereby further exposing the DRC to the debilitating socio-political forces. In highlighting how the Rwandan genocide has led to the instability of the DRC, Arieff (2014:6) postulates that in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, ethnic Hutu extremist forces fleeing Rwanda’s new Tutsi dominated government used the refugee camps in eastern Zaire as bases to remobilise, with reported backing from Mobutu.
Following the 1994 Rwandan genocide, where according to Rosen (2013) some 800,000 people from the minority Tutsis and the political moderates from the majority Hutus were massacred through an initiative of the extremist Hutu government. Mobutu provided protection and shelter to the Rwandan Hutu army and militias that directed the genocide as well as the two million Rwandan refugees who had escaped to the eastern Congo (BBC News, 2012). These Rwandese militiamen of Hutu origin quickly aligned themselves with Mobutu’s government and began to attack DRC’s sizeable population of ethnic Tutsis, who had lived in the country for generations. This did not go down well with the Ugandan and Rwandese administrations who in response marched into the Congo in July 1996 in pursuit of Hutu military forces. Rwanda’s Tutsi government started to back rival militias, fighting both the Hutu militias, Congolese government troops and eventually succeeded in penetrating Kinshasa, overthrew the Mobutu administration, and they then installed Laurent Kabila as president and this was done in what was called the First Congolese War.

In articulating the causative attributes and general actors to the First Congolese War, Carayannis (2009:6) avers that the conflict in the Congo has involved at least nine African states and a number of proxy movements with varying degrees of local mobilisation and support. The war began in September 1996 where the coalition of neighbouring countries of the then Zaire invaded the country and succeeded in ousting Mobutu in May 1997. In 1997, the increasingly corrupt and despotic administration of Mobutu was overthrown by an alliance nominally under the leadership of Laurent Desire Kabila and strongly backed by a number of other governments. In terms of the interventions that were conducted in a bid to contain the war, international action was seen in the form of weak declaratory UN resolutions on the war and intense international and regional diplomatic efforts to negotiate Mobutu’s exit (French, 1997; Stearns, 2011). In addition, Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun of Algeria was appointed in January 1997 as joint UN-OAU Special Representative for the Great Lakes region and this also saw the then South African President Nelson Mandela assuming the role of the principal mediator in the first war.

2.2.4 Laurent Desire Kabila’s Rule

Mobutu’s failing personal health and weak security forces paved way for Laurent Kabila to seize power in 1997 and he renamed the country Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Carayannis, 2009:7). Kabila’s rise to power was based on his being the front man of a regional military intervention (led by Rwanda and Uganda) that aimed to replace the Mobutu regime with a government that would ensure their national security and economic interests;
nonetheless, a few months after he declared himself president, Kabila attempted to “consolidate his regime by expelling the Rwandan troops that brought him to power” (Turner 2000:1 cited in Naidoo 2000). It was this dismissal of the Rwandese soldiers that triggered the launch of the “second rebellion”. Shortly, in his reign, Kabila announced the expulsion of the Rwandan troops following the 1998 rising popular unfriendliness toward Rwandan soldiers and Congolese of Rwandan descent. In this regard, there was fallout between DRC and its erstwhile associates. The Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) rebels comprising former Mobutu soldiers (the Zairean Armed Forces – FAZ), “Banyamulenge6” troops that were part of the AFDL, and long-standing academic opponents of Mobutu, launched a revolt to overthrow Kabila with the direct support of Burundian, Rwandan and Ugandan troops. The internal armed rebellion, led by the RCD, accused Kabila of dictatorship, corruption, nepotism and fomenting the genocide of Tutsis in the DRC (Naidoo 2000). The military supporters of the RCD, representative of an external dimension to the conflict, charged Kabila with regional instability because of his support for rebel groups that were in armed combat with their governments. During his presidency Kabila failed as expected by the Rwandese and Ugandan governments to drive out the Hutu militia and tiny Rwanda, which had assisted him to rise to the presidency, soon sent a new force to oust him (Rosen 2013). This sparked five years of conflict. Despite the war officially coming to an end in 2003 Hutu and Tutsi militias continue to clash in the eastern DRC. A chain of instabilities occurred in the eastern DRC as a proxy war between Rwanda and the Kinshasa government continued in the east until the end of 2008. In line with this, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCHR) (2004:9) asserts that Rwanda launched military operations in the DRC against the extremists in the mid-1990s also reportedly targeting civilians. In addition to this, external involvement was witnessed in 1996, when Rwanda and Uganda backed a Laurent Desire Kabila armed group in what was dubbed the First Congolese War.

According to Arieff (2014:7), Rwanda and Uganda deployed troops into DRC and cultivated armed groups as proxies this time in an effort to unseat Kabila. Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe intervened on Kabila’s side and the conflict was christened “Africa’s World War” and led to a major humanitarian crisis (Moyroud and Katunga n.d: 19). In reinforcing this notion Naidoo (2000:5) notes that the RCD rebels with their military backers made rapid advances toward

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6 According to Rukundiwa (1994:370) the Banyamulenge people are mainly Tutsis of Rwandan and Burundian origins but the community also integrated other Congolese tribes, not necessarily of Tutsi origin and were identified as Banyarwanda. This however, changed dramatically as a result of the political and social realities during the early 70s and the name Banyarwanda was changed to Banyamulenge as the people’s sole identity. This name Banyamulenge has a long history which dates back to the first Rwandan migrations during the 16th century and was used by those who remained in Rwanda.
Kinshasa before being stopped by Kabila’s allies. Reacting in the name of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean troops rushed to Kabila’s rescue and prevented what otherwise would have been an easy overthrow of the new Congolese government. In articulating the general features of the second Congolese war Carayannis (op.cit) connotes that in August 1998 war erupted when a similar configuration of neighbouring states, some of whom had been Kabila’s patrons in the first war, broke with him and attempted a similar ousting but without their earlier success, partly because Angola switched sides and supported DRC. Such tendencies reinforce the notion that there are no permanent friends or permanent enemies in politics thus the need for countries to pursue and safeguard their national interests—a profound guiding principle of the realists. Generally, the relations of the DRC with Angola, Rwanda and Uganda remain thorny and capricious and this has allegedly been worsened by the information that Rwanda is at the forefront in supporting the negative forces in the DRC.

The battle was complex and in articulating the key factors that complicated the battle and almost opened room for it erupt into what other scholars termed “Africa War 1” Naidoo (2000a:6) notes that:

The external dimension to this conflict in producing an inter-state battle with the direct involvement of eight African states increased the enormity and complexity of the crisis. Resulting in what analysts described as the “second rebellion” in the DRC which assumed an unprecedented magnitude for two inter-related reasons. Firstly, the DRC was a battleground for the internal disputes of six neighbouring countries. They were the conflicts between: the MPLA government of Angola and the UNITA rebel movement; the minority Tutsi government in Burundi and the pro-Hutu rebels of the Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD) and the National Liberation Forces (FNL); the Sassou Nguesso government of Congo-Brazzaville and militias backing the ousted president Pascal Lissouba and his ally, the former prime minister, Bernard Kolelas; the Rwandese government of Paul Kagame and the ex-FAR and Interahamwe that were responsible for the 1994 Rwandan genocide; the Museveni government in Uganda and the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF); and the Sudanese government and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). Secondly the conflict in the DRC provided an opportunity for inter-state hostilities, produced by these domestic disputes, to be unleashed. The conflict between Sudan and Uganda illustrates this argument clearly. The governments of Sudan and Uganda went to war because of each one’s support for the rebel movements that were trying to oust the other. Simply put, Uganda supported the SPLA because Khartoum backed the LRA and ADF rebels. Sudan, therefore, rallied to the support of Kabila, because its enemy, Uganda, was at war with the DRC government. During that time Rwanda and Uganda assisted the UNITA rebels in transportation of military hardware and the sale of diamonds, because Angola was backing Kinshasa. In other words, the military “logic” of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”, was readily employed in the “second rebellion” to magnify the conflict into a seemingly irresolvable proportion.
The situation was further compounded by the formation of a new rebel group the Congolese Liberation Movement (CLM) as well as the emergence of splinter factions among the rebel camp thereby making peace in the DRC elusive as the neighbouring armed groups continued with infrequent combats and attacks against their opponents (Naidoo 2000b). This war was followed by some ceasefire negotiations after the allied forces had driven the rebels out of Kinshasa; this victory heralded a moment of ephemeral peace in the DRC. According to Naidoo (2000a) the scale of the conflict produced by the external or regional dimension of the “second rebellion” warranted the focus on an intensive track one process, especially by African governments, in an effort to produce “an African solution to an African problem”. These African governments used some negotiation initiatives that were aimed at arriving at the termination of violent conflict and hostilities involving the warring parties- a scenario that paved way for political settlement. Kabila reigned briefly before his fateful death.

In January 2001 one of his bodyguards assassinated President Laurent Desire Kabila. A strand of assassinations and coups (attempted and successful) continue to provide a fertile seedbed for volatility in the DRC. Joseph Kabila, the son to Laurent Desire Kabila took over the presidency soon after his father’s demise and continued in the furtherance of a tranquility progression that was backed by the United Nations. A peace accord was signed in 2002 and it sought to foster the pulling out of foreign troops and the assimilation of the insurgent assemblages into the national armed forces and government (Stearns 2011). Some strides towards the democratisation of the DRC were witnessed that is: “in 2003 a transitional government was put in place; and a new constitution was adopted by the referendum in 2005 with the year 2006 witnessing the first relatively free and fair multi-party landmark national elections being conducted in the DRC since independence in 1960” (Moyroud and Katunga n.d: 20). Joseph Kabila won following an uptight and sadistic run-off against former armed group leader Jean-Pierre Bemba. In commenting on the credibility of these national elections, the European Union (EU) Election Observation Mission in DRC (2007) noted that international observers viewed the elections as basically credible, despite procedural shortcomings and significant election related violence. Five years down the line, Joseph Kabila was re-elected.

2.2.5 Joseph Kabila’s Rule

President Joseph Kabila has been in power since 2001 and it has been noted that DRC has made some insignificant if not, negligible progress in improving governance and advancing democracy since the landmark 2006 elections. According to Arieff (2014:10) observers regularly note that DRC’s governance problems stretch far beyond the electoral process, citing
endemic corruption and barely functional state institutions; the state’s ability to monitor and manage extraction of its natural resources (a perennial problem), constrained public service delivery as a result of minimum central government control over large parts of the national territory, poor transportation and electricity infrastructure, challenging terrain and protracted local conflicts. These incongruities and marked irregularities among other factors tend to fuel instabilities and hot-blooded conflicts in the DRC in general and the eastern DRC in particular. In a bid to forge some robust security sector reforms a 150 000 person Armed Forces of DRC (FARDC) was formed at the end of 1998 and this sought to reinvigorate the deteriorated Mobutu-era army (Steiner et al 2009:6). The FARDC troops are, however, not provided with consistent doctrine or training. They are also poorly and inconsistently paid and are not given adequate food or supplies (Arieff 2014:12). These shortages encourage looting and other abuses. According to the ICG Report (2011:56) the cyclical integration of new armed groups into the FARDC which accelerated between 2009 and 2011, has reportedly contributed to internal disarray.

The various armed groups in the eastern DRC who are displeased with the rulership of Joseph Kabila have continued to destabilise the country. For example, on Christmas Day 2008, the Lord Resistance Army, a sadistic Ugandan armed group, attacked the town of Faradje in the eastern province of the DRC, killed dozens of men, women and children while looting stores, and destroying property (Human Rights Watch 2010). Even for an important urban centre like Faradje, the Congolese army and police offered no protection to the civilian population. The Congolese state was notorious by its absence. The Joseph Kabila administration has been complacent and adamant about building peace in the Congo to this effect Nzongola-Ntalaja (2011:1) notes that the DRC, despite being a failed state, the Congo is being ruled by irresponsible leaders. This irresponsibility is evident not only in the criminal negligence of top state officials to fulfill their national and international duties to protect innocent civilians, but also in their failure to establish and secure services capable of discharging effectively the responsibility to protect (Dizolele 2010). Nzongola-Ntalaja (2011: 8) asserts that there is need to restructure the Congolese state under the Joseph Kabila administration to enable it to fulfill its fundamental functions effectively and to the satisfaction of the population implies radically transforming it from its current elite-centred bula matari condition and realigning state policy with the needs and interests of the masses. Failure to meet the demands, needs and the expectations of the Congolese has led to the ceaseless cataclysm and recurrent conflict in the DRC.
2.3 Causal Factors of War in the eastern DRC

Arieff (2014:12) asserts that extremely brutal violence has been common in the eastern DRC amid two decades of intermittent conflict. Militia factions continue to fight one another and prey on the civilians in the east’s mineral rich, agriculturally fertile and densely inhabited region. Violence stems from deep-rooted tensions related to control over resources (including land), access to citizenship, military reform and regional geopolitics. Secondary challenges also reflect a complex pattern of state negligence, incapacity and coercion throughout the country, most of which is not directly affected by conflict. Violence is particularly acute in Northern and Southern Kivu provinces, an epicentre of regional unrest since the 1990s. The spillover of conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi in the early 1990s aggravated long-standing tensions in the region between and among communities self-identified as “indigenous” and those that trace their ethnic origins (however distant) to Rwanda. These dynamics have been entrenched by localised disputes, organised criminal activity and the intervention of neighbouring states.

In further expatiating upon the state of war, the specific zones of conflict and the causes of conflict in the eastern DRC Spittaels and Hilgert (2008:15) connote that the eastern DRC is still plagued by violent conflict, the centre of the conflict is the ‘Petit Nord’ region where two large armed groups, a coalition of smaller bands of armed men and the government army are all involved in a persistent battle causing enormous human suffering. The Petit Nord area of Northern Kivu: a western zone situated in the grasing lands of eastern Masisi or western Rutshuru and an eastern zone in the hilly region in the eastern Rutshuru where the borders of the DRC, Uganda and Rwanda meet tends to be a highly conflictual area. According to (Tilly 2003) the “Petit Nord” is the battleground of the current armed conflict in the eastern DRC. The area has seen uninterrupted violence for 15 years in a row (Spitaels and Hilgert 2008:16). This conflict ridden area comprises the territories of Walikale, Masisi, Rutshuru, Nyiragongo and the city of Goma. A lot of ethnic habitat in this region including many Rwandaphones because of the abundant deposits of cassarite and coltan in the territory of Walikale, geographically the Petit Nord can be considered the richest region studied (Rafti 2006:43). The Grand Nord comprises the territories of Lubero and Beni and two cities Beni and Butembo. In the neighbouring regions of the ‘Grand Nord’ and Northern South Kivu open warfare no longer takes place but there is still a considerable presence of armed groups causing security problems. According to Khadiagala and Nijhoff (2007:12) there has been an upsurge of communal conflagrations which arose from the decay of post colonial order and the diminution of the principles that had underwritten the African state system notably the non intervention tenet of sovereignty; civil wars in Angola, Burundi, the DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan.
have exemplified the larger phenomenon of communal groups grappling to create stable rules to manage new and old sources of socio-economic diversity and decay.

In highlighting the causes of conflicts in the DRC IPIS (2006) compares the importance of four different motives underlying conflictual environments that is, power, greed, grievances and security or survival, in which case greed targets include mining areas, survival targets best hiding areas, power maps the administrative capitals. In reinforcing on the causes of conflicts and civil wars in Africa, Khadiagala and Nijhoff (2007:11) opine that Africa’s civil wars result from the old and new fault lines of ethnicity, religion and regionalism. As products of profound inequities in political and economic resources, these wars are compounded by the ability of elites and political entrepreneurs to mobilise ethnic differences and historical grievance (Lake and Rothchild 2006; Carmet and James 1997; Wippman 1999). Some civil wars are centralist, in this scenario, insurgents dissatisfied with the prevailing distribution of state power, employ violence to gain access to political and economic resources. According to Khadiagala and Nijhoff (2007:12) in centralist conflicts such as Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone governments and their challengers struggle for control of state power, to define the nature of the political system and rules of national governance.

2.3.1 Ethnicity

Others are separatist or secessionist conflicts in which the insurgent movements challenge the established territories and seek to create new states by invoking distinctive ethnic, regional and cultural claims (Kelly and Miller 1969:3). Civil conflicts signify deep-seated fissures over identity, legitimacy and the principles of political organisation. Groups seek to assert their distinctiveness and intensify ethno-cultural feelings when states fail to provide rights, security and prosperity. Most obstacles to the termination of civil wars stem from the decimation of civic discourse and routine rules of political contestation. When Government and aggrieved groups resort to violence to redress their problems, it becomes difficult to nudge the parties to peaceful solutions (Olson 1995:12; Riggs 1995:399). Touval (1985:374) contends that “members are locked into a continuous, ongoing relationship; with virtually no ability to escape the system or terminate their interaction, since they are interdependent what happens to one affects the fortune of others. An important issue in their interaction is the competition for power and influence.” As they compete for power, disputants are often far apart, the stakes become too high and the incentives too few for them to settle. Most conflicts are characterised by gross power

In tracing the genesis of ethnicity in the DRC Chabal, Engel and Ghentili (2005:12) note that one has got to look at the history of migration, ethnicity, demographic statistics, economic interests by locals, neighbours and international actors among other factors. Ethnicity indeed was established to be the main cause for conflict recurrence and this is strongly tied to the colonial history which dates back to the 1884 Berlin Conference where there was the scramble for and partition of Africa. According to Colonel Jill Rutaremara7 the arbitrary demarcation of boundaries at the 1884 Berlin Conference divided the Rwanda people as the current location of the border was arbitrarily drawn by foreigners placing some sections of original Rwanda under DRC. While colonisers changed boundaries frequently, they did not move people- Kings and Chiefs remained in their precincts. In addition to this, Lieutenant General Venance Mabeyo8, the Chief of Staff of the Tanzania People’s Defence Forces (TPDF), gave an account of the history of the era where he narrated that pre-colonial and colonial migrations resulted in various tribes mainly Hutu and Tutsi settling in eastern DRC.

In capturing the historical background of conflict along ethnic grounds Col Henry Isoke noted that:

In this scenario, politics and ethnicity (racialisation) constitute the historical foundation of conflict in the Great Lakes Region (especially the area around the eastern part of the lakes). The population in the Great Lakes comprise of Tutsi, Hutu and Bantu. In addition, the Bantu were the original occupants of the eastern Congo whose land was later taken up by Hutu. In the Great Lakes Region the form of identity is pronounced along ethnicity that is Kinyarwanda, Banyaganda, Banyamulenge and Interahamwe. The Tutsi then invaded the land thereby displacing the Hutus and introduced modernisation. In the process of their occupation, Tutsi adopted the Kinyarwanda and Kinyanganda languages and introduced governance structural changes. In a divide and rule style, Tutsis had the power to select the Hutus and intermarriages took place. Immediately resistance to Tutsi domination began and colonisation found the situation as it was and colonisers embarked on a two pronged approach: collaborated with the Tutsi and elevated some Hutus to certain levels, and while maintaining a status quo, and they then continued to civilise the population through Christian education. As time passed, Hutus started claiming for their land, rights and power (chieftainship) leading to the breaking out of a civil war. Tutsi Kings were divided over whether to share power or not. The Tutsi stalemate exacerbated the already volatile political situation which then inevitably escalated. Suddenly, there were successive waves of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the eastern DRC especially in Ituri and the Kivus.9

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7 Interview by author with Colonel Jill Rutaremara, the Director of the Rwanda Peace Academy, Kigali, 8th March 2016.
8 Interview with author, Dare Salaam, 02 March 2016.
9 Interview with author, Kampala, 10 March 2016.
This scenario has also contributed immensely to divisions that were made along ethnic differences. In addition, the Tutsi expansionist ambitions have further widened the ethnic rift. These Tutsi expansionist ambitions that are deeply entrenched in ethnicity are also pedigreed from the 1994 Rwanda Genocide. In the past the problem of ethnicity did not exist; demographically there were more than 450 tribes in the DRC and the chief controlled them under his jurisdiction and all these tribes never bothered to fight one another. The problem was triggered by the 1994 Rwanda genocide.\textsuperscript{10} In highlighting the impact of the Rwanda genocide in fuelling protracted war in the eastern DRC, Ambassador Raphael Faranisi reiterated that before war broke out in Rwanda in 1994, there were no major conflicts in eastern DRC. It was only after the UN requested the Zaire government to extend hospitality on humanitarian grounds to Rwanda refugees that these conflicts in eastern DRC started.\textsuperscript{11} It should be noted that the Hutu whose regime was defeated in Rwanda crossed the border with weapons.

2.3.2 Uganda and Rwanda’s Involvement in DRC Conflicts

According to numerous reports, Rwanda has periodically provided support for Congolese armed groups since mid 1990s (Turner 2007; Prunier 2008; Lemarchand 2009; Stearns 2010). Despicable Rwanda intervention was alleged to have been motivated by various factors. Rwanda’s post-war Tutsi government invaded Congo in 1996 to pursue extremist Hutu militias that had crossed the border, in the process helping Congolese Mobutu’s 32 year rule. According to Arief (2014:11) Rwanda officials view the situation in the eastern DRC as a national security concern. Rwandan officials regularly contend that the DRC has failed to rein in and indeed has, at times, collaborated with anti-Rwandan armed groups operating on Congolese soil. In support of this, Faranisi\textsuperscript{12} noted that: neighbouring countries especially Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda are known to support armed groups who engage in economic activities which in turn support the economies of the countries in question. This notion was also reinforced by Driens Kasikira Kassa, the District Administrator of Goma who asserted that there are widespread allegations of Rwanda and Uganda exploiting resources in eastern DRC to

\textsuperscript{10} The author is indebted to this valuable information by Chief Mwami Ndese, during interview, Goma, 07 October 2015.
\textsuperscript{11} Interview with author, Kinshasa, 30 September 2015.
\textsuperscript{12} Interview with author, Kinshasa, 30 September 2015. Ambassador Raphael Faranisi at the Embassy of the Republic of Zimbabwe in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo. Faranisi is a career diplomat who after completing his university studies at the University of Zimbabwe, joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1986. He served in various foreign missions including Gaborone Botswana and Indonesia. Back in the ministry he served in various capacities including training, administration and protocol. Ambassador Faranisi was deployed in the DRC in 2013 and is currently the Chairperson of SADC Ambassadors accredited to the DRC.
improve their economies and strengthen political and military power.\textsuperscript{13} Rwanda is known to export larger quantities of gold yet geographically there are no known gold deposits in Rwanda. Accordingly, Dr Benjamin Mkapa\textsuperscript{14}, cited that the abundance of natural resources is the major reason for the conflict recurrence whereby ethnic groups clash for dominance and control of those natural resources. By and large, it can be noted that there are some allegations that the neighbouring countries as well as the international community also seem to be benefiting from the crisis in the region, thereby perpetuating the vicious cycle of violence in the eastern DRC. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2015:18) underscores the unfavourable effects of these predatory behaviours to these perpetrators by noting that the DRCs neighbours have a high stake in the end of conflicts given the negative impact of these conflicts on their economy and political stability. For example; the refugee flows constitute not only an economic burden on the receiving country but can also become a source of political and social instability.

A second potential motivation has to do with the two countries’ intertwined populations: Rwandans often point to Congolese efforts to deny land, citizenship and other rights to ethnic communities, suggesting that they require protection. Subsequently, refugees in eastern DRC have dual citizenship and possess double identity cards for convenience. This further compounds the problem of identity and control of the people as they can notoriously use the identity cards that suit a specific environment and country that they would have crossed into thereby making the control of people problematic.

A third potential motivation is economic: some observers contend that Rwandans have profited from natural resource smuggling in the eastern DRC (French 1997). Anti-Rwandan sentiment, at times expressed as ethnic hatred or xenophobia, is a recurrent theme in DRC politics and in grassroots dynamics in the east. Popular criticism of Kabila as supposedly beholden to Rwandan interests appears to resonate among many Congolese who feel that their vast, mineral rich country has been weakened and manipulated by its smaller, stronger neighbour and its purported ethnic proxies in the Kivus. To buttress this notion, Faranisi further noted that:

According to UN reports, it is estimated that DRC loses US$1 Billion dollars monthly in illegal economic activities siphoned with the help of unmarked aerodromes that facilitate these illicit activities that also include poaching. Internal and external groups regard themselves as ethnically belonging to the eastern DRC. The ethnical claims breed discordant among the groups as they all allege unfair practices of exclusion marginalisation and denial of access to resources.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{13} Interview with author, Goma, 06 October 2015.
\textsuperscript{14} Interview with author, DareSalaam, 29 February 2016.
\textsuperscript{15} Interview with author, Kinshasa, 30 September 2015.
Uganda and Rwanda continued to support militias in the area financially and ammunition-wise even after pulling out their national troops. Rwanda has been blamed for continually supporting armed groups and insurgencies against the DRC government. For instance, it was noted by Rosen (2013) that the Rwandese government repeatedly backed the M23; a State Department spokesperson (and the then Assistant Secretary of the State, Carson) alluded to credible body of evidence regarding Rwandan support to the M23 and of Rwandan military personnel in the DRC.

The M23 group was initially said to have been led by Bosco “Terminator” Ntaganda, who is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC), on war crimes charges but was later taken over by Makenga and its main intention was to highlight the grievances of the Tutsi ethnic group and poor conditions in the Congolese army. In highlighting the extent of Rwanda’s involvement in supporting the M23 armed group, Rosen (op. cit) alluded that M23 were alleged to receive direct military orders from Rwanda’s chief of Defence Staff through General Charles Kayonga who in turn takes instructions from the Ministry of Defence staff General James Kabarebe and that Kigali has supplied the M23 with heavy weapons and has stepped up recruitment for the group. In addition, Uganda is accused for backing the armed groups as it sent troops and weapons to reinforce specific M23 operations and assisted in M23’s recruitment and weapons procurement in Uganda (BBC News 2012). Rwanda was also fingered in assisting General Laurent Nkunda-the notorious Tutsi warlord who waged a crusade to annihilate Hutu armed groups from the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) as he accused the Congolese government of backing the FDLR thus causing further instabilities in the eastern DR Congo.

Many Congolese, as noted by Carayannis (2009:34), feel disenfranchised by a government increasingly reliant on strong-handedness as its authority rests on weak national and local institutions- a crisis of governance that the elections did not solve. In the last two years, little progress has been made on the disarmament and reintegration of Rwandan backed armed group-groups or Mai-Mai militias (Congolese civilian self-defence militias in the Kivus who mobilise to fight foreign occupation). According to Tegera and Johnson (2007) these groups especially the Mai-Mai are devoid of common leadership or coordination hence efforts to dismantle and repatriate the Rwandan Hutu Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR) militia have yielded few results. By signing the Nairobi agreement in November 2007, Kinshasa pledged to disarm the FDLR. It has not done so and even continued its collaboration with the Hutu armed group over the lucrative mining interests after signing the agreement. These issues further bring instabilities within the eastern DR Congo.
In addition to the meddling by neighbouring Great Lakes countries, the eastern DRC is dogged by the ethnic component, whereby there are some ethnic tensions which, at a micro level, insinuate instabilities and untold hostilities therein. Rubaya area in the east and its environs as noted by Rosen (2013) are traditionally the domain of the Hunde ethnic group and it is filled with internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees from elsewhere in the DRC, about 15 000 of whom live in crowded and anxious camps on the outskirts of the town. According to BBC News (2012) the absence of violence is not the absence of conflict, as in the IDP camp, the war was still bleeding its survivors. Some notable ethnic clashes involving the Nyatura against some Tutsi groups were also witnessed. In the northwestern province there are still recurrent ethnic clashes which date back to the colonial era were witnessed in the clash between two Lobala tribes, the Enyele and the Manzaya, following a dispute over fishing and farming rights.

2.3.3 Natural Resources

Conflicts in the eastern Congo are believed to be fueled by the need by many political players or actors to control land, minerals and timber.

2.3.3.1 Land

According to Carayannis (2009:12) access to land in eastern DRC remains contested and control over revenues from natural resources remains in the hands of a few armed groups, both foreign and domestic continue to operate with impunity in the eastern DRC and the source of much of the insecurity in the region. According to Huggins (2010) access to, use of and management of land and its links with the root causes of conflict in the two Kivu provinces and Ituri in the DRC. He further notes that, in the DRC, as in other countries, customary informal and statutory land tenure systems “overlap geographically” in the sense that a certain parcel of land might be claimed by different actors under different systems. Individuals and societal groups may claim land through a variety of systems simultaneously, resulting in confusion and dispute. According to Van Acker (2005:76) while land scarcity and alienation of customary land has led to land disputes at the micro-level, the tensions around such “local” and “intra-community” conflicts (conflicts between ethnic citizens and their chiefs who make decisions over community land) have generally been transferred into the inter-community level. Contestations have emanated from the need to control agricultural and pastoral land.

According to Vlassenroot and Huggins (2005:115) the structural organisation of land access and control is one of the root causes of local conflict. This organisation, which is the result of a
longer historical process of colonial land reforms and post-colonial patrimonial rule has turned land into an asset of economic and political power and has marginalised large parts of the rural population (Pottier 2003). The consequent unequal access to land has intensified local competition which then was transformed into disputes and violence between ethnic communities when local elites from the early 1990s started mobilising entire communities on the basis of ethnic belonging and collective land rights (Vlassenroot and Huggins 2005:160). Consequently, it can thus be noted that control over land is a conflict aggravating or sustaining factor. In reinforcing this notion, Mararo (1990) opines that since the start of the DRC conflict land has been turned into an asset to be distributed by local warlords, leading to additional levels of land insecurity and conflict.

Spittaels and Hilgert (2008:28) argued that land conflicts in Masisi or Rutshuru are at the heart of the conflict over the fertile lands, the opposing claims on land ownership and the customary rights of land distribution. The principal dividing line runs between the Rwandophones of Northern Kivu (of which many were relocated from Rwanda to the Congo by the Belgian colonisers) and the original Hunde inhabitants. At different times in history both groups had their own chiefdoms with their own traditional rulers who decided on land issues. The constant changes in the administration of the Kivus, combined with different land laws and the seemingly endless issue of Congolese citizenship for the Rwandophone population, have resulted in confusion over the shifting and overlapping land claims. The massive influx of Rwandophone people since the Rwandan genocide has further disturbed the uneasy balance of power between the two population groups in Masisi and Rutshuru. Other dividing lines for example between the Hutu and the Tutsi make the issue even more complex (Barouski 2007:424).

2.3.3.2 Minerals

According to Rosen (2013) Congo’s vast natural resources have continually attracted violent intervention from abroad and stoked internal conflicts. Congo’s government has never effectively represented or protected its people, and all too often has served as a source of unchecked power and personal enrichment for select individuals. Congo conflict is a resource war motivated by control over eastern Congo’s rich natural deposits of gold, copper, cobalt, timber and cassiterite, a tin ore. In highlighting the richness in mineral resources of the eastern DRC, Rosen (2013) assert that the eastern DRC is a rich source of tantalum, tin and tungsten (3Ts) as well as gold, and these minerals have helped to fund continued fighting in the region
for years. In addition, there is coltan which is a combination of columbium and tantalite and is today among the most important minerals found in the Congo due to use in the ever-increasing number of mobile phones. According to Jackson (n.d:5) coltan is not the root cause of the conflict in DRC, in the sense that the mere presence of this natural resource, or for this matter, any other type of natural resource wealth does not suffice to explain the ongoing conflict, as well as past conflict dynamics in the country. Rather, coltan can be described as a conflict aggravating or sustaining factor, which contributed to the formation of new and localised conflict within the larger conflict system operating within the DRC and to the continuation or reinforcement of ongoing conflict dynamics (Harrison and Garret 2009:23).

According to Garret (2007) a renewed interest in the country’s potential oil reserves in the eastern and central Congo could increase tensions. The contribution of the eastern DRC mineral resources to funding the conflict, conflict minerals are used in the electronics industry, they feed a range of complex supply chains, serving as raw materials for component parts in everything from cellphones and cutting tools to jet engines and jewelry (Vesperini 2001). According to Arief (2014:12) exports of “conflict minerals” (that is, ores that are alleged to fuel conflict when they are controlled or traded by armed groups) are associated with the informal, artisanal mining sector in the eastern DRC. In view of that, the UN Security Council (2014) ascertains that 98% of the gold produced in the DRC is smuggled out of the country and that as a result, Rwanda and Uganda, the main transit country for Congolese gold, are losing millions of dollars annually in tax revenue and tolerating a system that is financing armed groups.

The illicit and licit extraction and exploitation of natural resources in Congo is not a new phenomenon, but a recurrent feature of Congolese history, from the time of its being a private concession of King Leopold II to the establishment of the Mobutu administration in 1964 (Arief, 2014). DRC accounts for 47% of the world’s cobalt reserves and produced 51% of the world’s supply of cobalt in 2010, along with 25% of industrial diamonds, 14% of tantalum, 5% of gem quality diamonds and 3% of copper and tin (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 2013). International players also have some stake in the DRC minerals hence they try to safeguard their interests at all costs. In this regard, international players tend to support the groups that tend to uphold and perpetuate their interests in plundering resources. It is in unstable war-torn environments that lawlessness and impunity thrive which then pave way for the looting of minerals by the international countries. In highlighting the magnitude of foreign players’ stake in the DRC minerals, Arief (2014:13) noted that China has a growing stake in DRC mining: as of mid-2013 nearly 50% of DRC exporters were destined for China, up from
10% in 2005, reportedly including over 90% of mineral exports from Katanga. The plundering of the Congolese resources has formed a recurrent parameter throughout the history of the DRC and its successive violent conflicts; and this is true of the current situation where the illegal exploitation of forests and mineral resources now occurs at an alarming pace (Moyroud and Katunga 2005:16).

2.3.3.3 Timber

According to EITI (2013:23) although the territory of Lubero contains several forests that could be exploited for timber production, logging in the “Grand Nord” is currently limited to the northern part of Beni. The most important logging centres are in the Mabalako forest and near Oicha and Eringeti. The total amount of wood that was cut in the territory of Beni in 2006 is 2865 cubic metres (Forests Monitor 2007:18). The trees are sawn into planks within the forest, after which they are brought to the road where they are sold and loaded onto trucks. Many teams of loggers are financed and equipped by Ugandan businessmen who organise the logging through Congolese intermediaries (Rapport Annuel, 2006). The truckers drive the timber to the border crossing at Kasindi, on the Ugandan side of the Mpondwe border without needing to go through any border formalities. It is in this area that the timber market is located (Forests Monitor 2007). Ugandan nationals control the market and Ugandans sell the wood to third parties. Consequently, the Ugandans who organise the logging and control the export market make bigger profits from the trade than the Congolese. Apart from the production of the Belgian company ENRA, which owns processing facilities, all the timber leaves the DRC as raw material (Arief 2014). The involvement of the FARDC soldiers in the profitable illegal trade lies in the facilitating the transportation of the timber and organising transport for their own account. Trucks commissioned by the FARDC officers can pass the border without any customs or migration official daring to stop them.

In addition, the need to safeguard illegal interests is a cause of ceaseless conflicts. Southern Lubero might be poor in terms of mineral resources but it has fertile soil and lies in the middle of the major route that leads to the Ugandan and Rwandan border crossings, hence the FDLR combatants are stationed in that area as it provides them with favourable conditions to organise lucrative drug trafficking. According to Spittaels and Meynen (2007:52) FDLR run business together with FRDC soldiers hence they run and control most of the cannabis (chanvre) production in the largest trade centre which is located in the Miriki on the border of the Lubero and Walikale territories. The principal buyers are the wives of the FARDC officers. The 9th Brigade controls the route to Goma via Rutshuru, as the officers’ wives are the traders or
negotiants who buy the drugs while their husbands facilitate the transport. The need to safeguard these illegal deals serves as a source for constant conflicts.

Over and above, the current crisis in eastern Congo illustrates the historical patterns at the root of this conflict as long as the Congolese government cannot control its territory, provide basic services or effectively protect its population and as long as armed groups are able to prosper from illicit trade in natural resources and complex regional alliances eastern Congo will remain a battlefield and innocent civilians will pay a tragically high cost. Accordingly, profits from Congo’s resources have been historically extracted by whoever controls the soldiers at the mine gates, making demilitarisation unattractive to those with bank accounts on the receiving end, including politicians in Kinshasa. Consequently, Kinshasa politicians and Congolese big shots have been accused of cashing in on valuable natural resources in the eastern Congo. Such rent seeking tendencies will see chaos being bred and perpetuated thereby enhancing the Kinshasa politicians, armed groups and bigwigs to loot the resources even more.

2.3.3.4 Weak Governance Structures

In addition to weak governance structures, processes and systems being catalysts to recurrent conflict in the eastern DRC, the presence of negative forces has also compounded the situation in the eastern DRC. Accordingly, over the past decades, the DRC has been home to a number of foreign forces (these range from rebels, regulars and UN peacekeepers) some of which had gone overboard and challenged the Kinshasa government. It can be noted that the accommodation of these foreign forces such as the ADF, the FDLR among others has rendered the conflict more complex. These negative forces who are found in the eastern DRC were alleged to be coming from those countries that have interests in that part of the DRC. To this effect, the international community, neighbours, civil society and locals tend to fuel conflict in order to exploit as much as possible natural resources for their own benefit ahead of others.\footnote{16}{The author is greatly indebted to Col Francis Mutiganda, the Director General for External Security in the President’s Office, Republic of Rwanda, for making these valuable comments during interview, Kigali, 04 March 2016.} This points to the notion that there are divergent interests in the eastern DRC which promote ethnicity that fuel conflict recurrence. Over and above, in Col Mutiganda’s viewpoint, ethnicity is not the primary cause of conflict recurrence, instead factors such as poor governance, divergent interests and the presence of negative forces tend to create a seedbed upon which ethnicity sprouts as a divisive tool for promoting conflict recurrence in the eastern DRC.\footnote{17}{Interview with author, Kigali, 04 March 2016.} This observation was reinforced by
Maj Gen Jerome Ngendahima, the Deputy Chief of Staff of Rwanda Defence Forces in Charge of Reserve Force, who convincingly noted that ethnicity is not the major driver of the conflict recurrence in the eastern DRC but it is used by parties who want to advance their own interests. In proving that, Brig Gen Joseph Nzabamwita, the Director General of Policy and Strategy in the Ministry of Defence, Republic of Rwanda, argued that there are more than ten ethnic groups in every province in the DRC but there are no conflicts except in the Kivus and Ituri (areas which constitute the eastern DRC). This reinforces the notion that ethnicity is a secondary factor to conflict recurrence.

By and large, the presence of these negative forces, divergent interests and weak governance have made the eastern DRC borders very porous and vulnerable to ethnic clashes and illegal exploitation of natural resources by the neighbouring countries. Foreign groups tend to have contradictory relations that have far reaching debilitating effects on the internal security of the DRC, thereby weakening the border security as they will be controlling them instead of the DRC security or official personnel. Furthermore, the government of the DRC can also be blamed for lack of a coherent programme to properly settle people. The land has remained sensitive and volatile because communities’ claim that their ancestors lived in the area and therefore they cannot leave as moving is tantamount to selling out their traditional heritage. In this vein, the study established that the centralised Congo has been weak since the mid-1970s, which has made the country prone to political instability. Currently, discriminatory governance practices are still evident in key institutions such as education, military and judiciary systems where ethnicity is seen to be a conspicuous factor in gaining power and control as well as in the allocation of values and resources.

2.3.3.5 The Proliferation of a Multitude of Armed Militia Groups

The eastern DRC continues to be a haven of many armed militia groups. This proliferation makes it difficult to contain recurrent conflict in the eastern DRC as there are multiple armed groups with often divergent and complex goals and objectives that they all seek to satisfy and achieve. It is important to give a brief overview of these armed militias, their origins and purported grievances their political leadership and military command hierarchy tend to harbour. These multiple militia groups generally make it difficult to reinforce the issue of complexity in the implementation and the realisation of the objective of the DDRRR initiative.

18 Interview with author, Kigali, 04 March 2016.
19 Interview with author, Kigali, 04 March 2016.
2.3.3.5a  **Tracing the Origin of the M23 Armed Group**

The M23 rebel group came into existence in April 2012 when hundreds of mainly ethnic Tutsi soldiers in FARDC (the Congolese army), led by Gen Bosco Ntaganda, mutinied over poor living conditions and pay; Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) led by Maj-General Sylvestre Mudacumura, who has been indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC); Mai Mai Hilaire (Union pour la Réhabilitation de la Démocratie du Congo - URDC) an M23 ally, URDC is led by “Brigadier General” Paluku Kombi Hilaire, a FARDC defector; Raia Mutomboki. Another M23 collaborator, Raia Mutomboki, (“outraged citizens”) is the largest armed body in South Kivu, according to Usalama Project. By Congolese army defector Pastor Jean Musumbu in response to FDLR massacres, comprises various groups headed by local leaders and FARDC deserters.21

2.3.3.5b  **Mai Mai Sheka**

Mai Mai Sheka (Nduma Defence of Congo – NDC) was formed in 2009 by long-time minerals businessman Ntabo Ntaberi Sheka in North Kivu’s Walikale Territory, Mai Mai Sheka has 150-180 men, mainly army deserters and youths.22 “General” Sheka has in the past allied himself with ex-CNDP (subsequently M23 leader) Gen Bosco Ntaganda; Mai Mai Kifuafua.23 Its fighters are drawn mainly from the Batembo, Bahunde and Bayanga communities and it is active in southern Masisi Territory (North Kivu).24 The group claims to be protecting “indigenous” interests from purportedly foreign Rwandophone groups.25 In capturing the atrocious activities of the Mai Mai Sheka in fueling recurrent conflict in the eastern DRC the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (n.d:6) highlighted the following:

The Maï-Maï Sheka has contributed to the violence in the DRC by attacking not only civilians, but also UN peacekeepers. The group, which was formed in 2009 by mineral resources businessmen, was also involved in the increased October 2013 rebel conflict experienced in the eastern DRC. Earlier, the Maï-Maï Sheka had gained notoriety for an exceptionally violent episode of sexual violence in 2010. Indeed, during the period of 30 July to 4 August 2010, the mass rape of

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20 The FDLR, made up of Rwandan Hutu extremists who entered the Congo following the 1994 Rwandan genocide, has repeatedly attacked civilians, such as in January 2012, when it killed twenty-six people in South Kivu. It has also been involved in the recruitment of child soldiers. Human Rights Watch further notes that between April 2012 and May 2013 alone, the FDLR murdered 314 civilians in various attacks. Thus, though it has been weakened in recent years, the FDLR remains an important element of the conflict in the DRC. In October 2013, Oxfam reaffirmed that the human rights abuses committed by the FDLR, as well as other rebel groups, could not be forgotten in light of the sudden defeat of the M23 rebels (see Part III for more on the M23’s decline) (International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect www.responsibilitytoprotect.org).
more than 240 people was carried out in the eastern Congo by members of both the Rwandan FDLR and Mai-Mai Sheka rebels. In addition, homes and shops of many who would also be raped were looted. These crimes occurred within miles of the UN peacekeepers’ base, but the UN Organization Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) was unable to protect Congolese civilians. The UN headquarters only became aware of the violence days later, when the International Medical Corps, which was charged with treating many of the victims of these attacks, first reported it. Atul Khare, then UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, acknowledged the failure of the UN by stating that “our actions were not adequate, resulting in unacceptable brutalization of the population of the villages in the area. We must do better.” The UNSC also urged for the “swift and fair prosecution of the perpetrators,” and called for the enhancement of MONUSCO’s “interaction with the civilian population.” Since the mass rapes occurred, UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Margot Wallström, has stated that there is the potential for victims to be attacked in the future by the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC), as “there is already some information from MONUSCO peacekeepers on the ground that rapes, killings and lootings have been perpetrated by FARDC soldiers.”

In addition to the Mai Mai Sheka, there is also the Local Defence Forces Busumba (LDF) Erasto Ntibaturama, an influential ethnic Hutu figure in northern Masisi (North Kivu), established LDF, which has over 50 mainly Hutu men, in 2005, according to the Enough Project, which says the group is reportedly allied to M23; Front de défense du Congo (FDC) Originally a local defence force against the FDLR and FARDC, FDC was established in 2012 under the overall command of “General” Butu Luanda, a former CNDP officer. There is also the Union des Patriotes Congolais pour la Paix (UPCP/FPC) which was established in 2012 and this UPCP is a coalition of Mai Mai groups and FARDC defectors led by “General” Kakule Vasaka Sikulikyolo Lafontaine. It comprises 500-600 mostly ethnic Nande men and is active around North Kivu’s Lubero Territory.

2.3.3.5c Mouvement d’Action pour le Changement (MAC)

There is also the Mouvement d’Action pour le Changement (MAC) whose aim is countering M23’s advance into Masisi. MAC was formed by a faction of local guides and porters, who fell out with Ntaganda (after his mutiny from FARDC to form M23. It is led Lt-Col Bwira, a former FARDC commander from the Hunde community and has 80-300 mostly ethnic Hunde and Nyanga men. It collaborates with other armed group MAP comprises a group of 500 mainly ethnic Hutu FARDC defectors, who left the army in 2011 over perceived marginalization by ex-CNDP officers. It is led by Col Ndagijimana Basabose and claims to protect Hutu interests

against ex-CNDP officers and M23 operations in Rutshuru Territory such as APCLS, FARDC and Nyatura; Mouvement Populaire d’Autodéfense (MPA).\(^2^8\)

### 2.3.3.5d Mai Mai Morgan

Additionally there is also Mai Mai Morgan which is led by Paul Sadala, alias Morgan, and operates in Orientale Province’s Mambasa and Bafwasende territories\(^2^9\). It comprises several dozens combatants, who operate in small groups out of a shifting camp. Additionally there is the Mai Ma Simba which is said to be the oldest Congolese armed group with origins dating back to 1964, (Enough Project n.d), Mai Mai Simba (also known as “Armée Populaire de Libération Nationale Congolaise-Lumumba - APLNC/Lumumba) is led by “General” Mando Masero and “General” Lucien Simba. Comprising 150-200 men, it operates in Maniema and Orientale provinces and has collaborated with FARDC, Mai Mai Morgan, Raia Mutomboki and Sheka/NDC elements, according to the Enough Project, the group’s objective is remodelling DRC according to first President Patrice Lubumba’s political views on unification\(^3^0\).

### 2.3.3.5e Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)

There is also the ADF which is a Ugandan-led Islamist rebel group operating northwest of the Ruwenzori Mountains around DRC’s Beni Territory. Its supreme leader, Jamil Mukulu, a Christian turned Muslim, founded ADF in 1995 with a view to establishing an Islamic state in Uganda\(^3^1\). It is among the oldest but least known groups in eastern DRC and has about 1,200 combatants\(^3^2\). According to the International Coalition of for the Responsibility to Protect (n.d:6) the Ugandan-led ADF has existed since the mid-1990s. While relatively small, the ADF has abducted Congolese nationals and is known to have links to the terrorist networks of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab. While the ADF’s ultimate goal is to establish Shari’a law in Uganda, the FARDC began Operation Ruwenzori in 2010 in an effort to drive the ADF out of the DRC. The group attempted to increase its numbers through recruitment and kidnappings in early 2013 in Uganda, according to the Enough Project report, the ADF made some recruitment in the DRC in 2013 and carried out a series of abductions of Congolese nationals\(^3^3\).

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remnants of its former incarnation as a rebel group continue to operate in the areas of Magunda and Ruhuha, in South Kivu’s Uvira plateau. Formerly led by Agathon Rwasa, FNL is now headed by Isidore Nibizi with “General” Aloys Nzamapema as the military commander. There is also Mai Mai Yakutumba which is an important group in South Kivu, especially Fizi Territory. Founded in 2007, Mai-Maï Yakutumba is named after its military leader “Major-General” William Amuri Yakutumba. Its political wing, Parti pour l’Action et la Reconstruction du Congo (PARC), is led by Raphael Looba Undji. Yakutumba and Undji are both university-educated intellectuals. There is also another splinter called Nyatura which was founded in 2010. Mai Mai Nyatura is a Congolese Hutu militia which collaborates with FDLR and FARDC against M23. The group claims to protect Hutu interests against ex-CNDP officers and M23.

5.3.3.5f Forces des Défense des Intérêts du Peuple Congolais (FDIPC)

FDIPC’s aim was to expel M23 from Rutshuru Territory (captured by government forces on 27 October). It was formed in April 2013 and has about 250 fighters mainly Hutu members from Rutshuru and Kiwandja (the Enough Project). There is also the Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain (APCLS) led by FARDC deserter “General” Janvier Buingo Karayiri, APCLS was created in 2008 to confront a perceived CNDP threat against the Hunde community. APCLS interacts with FARDC elements, FDLR/FOCA and Nyatura and has also acted as proxy for other FARDC elements against M23, says the Enough Project. The group, which has about 1,500 men, is reportedly involved in tantalum (used in mobile phones) mining in Masisi.

5.3.3.5g Coalition des Groupes Armés de l’Ituri (COGAI)/MRPC

COGAI is an umbrella organisation aimed at uniting militias in Orientale Province’s Ituri District. It is led by “Brigadier-General” Justin Banaloki (alias Cobra Matata), who also heads FRPI. COGAI was established in May 2012, and it has some 800 members and controls parts of eastern and southern Irumu Territory in Ituri (Enough Project n.d). Forces de resistance patriotiques en Ituri (FRPI) forms part of COGAI, and it is led by Cobra Matata. According to the UN report, there has been little progress in either integrating FRPI into FARDC or defeating

it. 39 FRPI wants to reach an agreement with the central government similar to the 23 March 2009 accord with CNDP and other armed groups. Furthermore, there is also the Kata Katanga (“cut off Katanga” in Swahili) a loosely structured armed group comprising individuals and groups campaigning for the secession of DRC’s southeastern Katanga Province (Enough Project Report n.d). Kyungu Mutanga (“Gédéon”)’ is Kata Katanga’s most significant leader in the areas of Manono, Mitwaba and Pweto. 40 He is allied with the armed wing of the Coordination pour le référendum et l’autodétermination du Katanga, the report says.

5.3.3.5h Forces de Défense Nationale (FDN)

FDN was created by former FARDC soldiers who defected from the national army in 2010, over perceived marginalisation. 41 The 160-strong group operates in eastern Walikale Territory, and is headed by “Colonel” Akilimali Luendo, alias Akilo, and “Colonel” Jeremie (Enough Project n.d). “The group is gradually declining as some leaders have turned themselves over to the Congolese army,” said the Enough Project; M18 Reuters reported that on 28 October about 10,000 Congolese refugees had fled into Uganda to escape fighting between a new rebel faction identified as M18 and militias in northeastern DRC. The Ugandan military says M18 is not linked to the M23 insurgency in North Kivu Province. "We know that M18 is a new rebel group in Orientale Province and they've been clashing with some militias there and forcing people to flee," Reuters quoted Uganda's military spokesman Lt-Col Paddy Ankunda as saying; M26 was created on 26 October 2012 and it comprises veterans of Nyatura who refused integration in FARDC. Alongside two other armed groups (FDLR and a faction of the Mai Mai group Pareco) it has been trying to gain recruits in the Mpati area of North Kivu (Great Lakes Voice n.d). The M26 is also suspected of involvement in mass rapes in the region. 42 (see Armed groups in eastern DRC http://www.irinnews.org/report/99037/briefing-armed-groups-eastern-drc).

2.4 Conclusion

The chapter presents the historical analysis of factors that have contributed to the recurrence of conflict in eastern Congo. In the process, the chapter highlighted the rulership of DRC and how it evolved and this includes Belgian rule where King Leopold II who claimed the Congo Free State as his personal possession and relied on the separatist strategy where he employed the


divide and rule method whereby they elevated the minority ethnic groups to rule over the majority tribes. The current abuses, violations of human rights, exploitative tendencies owe their origin to King Leopold II’s extortionate and repressive administration. After Congo gained independence, the independent Congo was fraught by volatility and secessions that culminated in the murder of Patrice Lumumba. Mobutu Seseko seised power from Lumumba and he instituted a highly centralised and dictatorial administration, which saw the implementation of indigenous Congolese ideologies in the government.

During the Rwandese genocide, Mobutu provided shelter and protection to the Rwandese Hutu army and militias that directed genocide as well as Rwandese refugees who had escaped to the eastern Congo. These Rwandese Hutus committed atrocities against the sizeable population of ethnic Tutsis who had lived in the DRC for generations. This angered the Rwandese and Ugandan administrations who in response marched into Congo in pursuit of Hutu military forces a situation that led to conflict in the DRC. In this notion, the chapter also highlighted the causes of the First Congolese War, which involved nine African states, which coalesced and ousted Mobutu in May 1997, and Laurent Desire Kabila replaced him. During Kabila’s reign, he banished the Rwandan troops who then cultivated armed groups as proxies in an effort to unseat Kabila and this led to the Second Congolese War, which saw some SADC member states intervening on Kabila’s side. When Laurent Kabila was assassinated by his body-guard, his son Joseph Kabila took over the presidency, and he has made insignificant progress in improving governance and advancing democracy.

The study highlighted the causal factors of recurrent conflict in the eastern DRC. The violence stems primarily from deep-rooted tensions related to control over resources, access to citizenship, military reform and regional geopolitics. Secondarily, complex patterns of state negligence, incapacity and coercion throughout the country have been noted as the causes of violent conflict in DRC. Long-standing tensions were ingrained by localised disputes, organised criminal activity and the intervention of neighbouring states. There were also secessionist conflicts that thrive on ethnic, regional and cultural divisions. Rwanda was also believed to be illegally benefiting from natural resource smuggling in the eastern DRC. In this vein, if destabilisation continues in the DRC, the Rwandese will be able to continue looting from DRC. This has made Rwanda to be blamed for supporting armed groups and insurgencies against the DRC government.

Natural resources in the form of land, minerals and timber were also highlighted to be the causal factors of conflict recurrence. In terms of land, there are contestations between customary
informal and statutory law systems that overlap. Tribes are constantly fighting to gain control over fertile lands. Congo’s conflict is a resource war motivated by the need to exercise control over Congo’s rich natural deposits of gold, cassarite, tantalum, tin, tungsten, cobalt, copper, uranium, and potential oil reserves. Exports of minerals are alleged to stimulate conflict when armed groups control them. In terms of timber, the conspicuous presence of Ugandan businesspersons who organise the logging and control the export markets and siphon bigger profits from the trade than the Congolese has also fuelled conflicts in the eastern DRC as the locals want to retain control over the timber business. Largely, the current crisis in eastern Congo illustrates the historical patterns at the root of this conflict as such the Government should up its game in far as the provision of infrastructure, basic amenities, public goods and services is concerned lest the innocent populace pays dearly from the instability.
CHAPTER THREE: CONTEXTUALISING CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION WITH REFERENCE TO THE EASTERN CONGO RECURRING CONFLICT

3.1. Introduction

The previous chapter placed the study in its historical context by tracing the historical trajectory of violent conflict in the DRC. The Belgian rule and how its divisive policies led to unending violent conflict in the DRC; the rise and eventual demise of Lumumba which was characterised by the emergence of superpowers in the independent Congo, the dictatorial Mobutu administration and how it led to animosities with the neighbouring countries in the wake of the 1994 Rwandan genocide; Laurent Kabila’s administration and how he announced the expulsion of Rwandan troops who then resultantly created proxies in an effort to unseat Kabila. Kabila was assassinated by his bodyguard and this saw his son Joseph Kabila ascending to power. The chapter also captured the underlying causal factors of recurrent conflict in the DRC which include power, greed, grievances and security or survival. In addition, the chapter noted land, minerals, timber and territorial intervention as the key drivers of the ceaseless conflict in the DRC.

This chapter situates the discussion of CT in a broader analytical perspective. CT is a newer discourse to peace-building and peace-making initiatives that has attracted immense attention from intellectuals, peace-builders and policy makers alike. This attention is as a result of the failure of the predecessor approaches (such as conflict resolution, conflict settlement and conflict management) to peace-building to bring everlasting peace and tranquility to the DRC conflict. Thus, peace-builders and some scholars felt that conflicts should be addressed by tackling the root causes of skirmishes. This notion came from the transformationalists’ perspective that conflicts do not have finite and predetermined life comprehended in a linear form as a life-cycle (as put forward by conflict resolution and settlement theorists) as some types of conflicts do not reach a final state of affairs when “resolved” but merely change form and may resurface, even off the agenda, temporarily suppressed and momentarily abandoned in pursuit of other goals. In this vein the chapter noted that contemporary conflicts require more than the reframing of positions and identification of win-win outcomes.

The first section of this chapter will start by unraveling the definitional aspects and the key attributes of CT. In this regard, attention will be given to the diverse scholarly contributions regarding conflict transformation- especially on how relationships, interests, discourses can be transformed. The second section will go on to highlight the four dimensions of conflict
transformation, that is, personal, relational, structural and cultural dimensions and revealing how transformation is crucial in generating changes in these dimensions. Related to this are the ways through which CT is conducted. The chapter identifies micro and macro transformations in which case, micro transformation gyrates around the notion of changes in the parties and the nature of the conflict, whilst macro transformation is hinged on the changes in the socio-political system within which conflict is embedded. The third section delves through the actors who make a wide gamut of applications in the conflict transformation process. The chapter will, in this scenario, capture the three levels of actors whom it refers to as Tracks. Track I includes governmental and diplomatic actors, Track II includes middle level leadership who occupy formal positions and Track III encompasses the grassroots. Finally the chapter will summarise the chapter by highlighting the different broad approaches to peace-building that are used vis-à-vis the levels of actors to conflict transformation as well as seroing in on those points which the chapter sees as significant to contextualisation of conflict transformation. As an overture to the ensuing discussion on conflict transformation, it will be salient to explain what is meant by the term “conflict transformation.”

3.2. Defining Conflict Transformation

Botes, (2003:1) defines conflict transformation (CT) as a relatively new invention within the broader field of peace and conflict studies. The concept of conflict transformation emerged during the 1990s (Bichsel 2009:38), when its proponents felt that the prevailing idea of conflict resolution and conflict settlement no longer met the complexities of contemporary conflict often characterised by scholars such as Kaldor (1999) as ‘new wars’. Hence the term came into view, in relation to the obdurate social conflicts between and amongst groups identifying themselves in terms of attributes such as religion and language rather than ideology. Concepts like conflict resolution, conflict management and conflict settlement that were being used before in the peace and conflict discourse were discovered to be historically, epistemologically, ontologically fall short in the theoretical apprehension and social response and curtailment of violent conflicts. These concepts as asserted by Lederach (1995:16) might not adequately describe the nature of ongoing conflict in the relational ebb and flow over time or its usefulness in the construction of peace and sometimes, inappropriately pushes for the premature reduction of confrontation.

Galtung (1995), one of the transformationalists contends against the notion by conflict resolution and settlement theorists that conflicts have finite and predetermined life comprehended in a linear form as a life cycle by noting that at least some types of conflicts do
not reach a final state of affairs when “resolved” but merely change form and may resurface, even off the agenda, temporarily suppressed and momentarily abandoned in pursuit of other goals. This conception bears testimony to the inherent festering and dynamic nature of contemporary conflicts. Advocates of conflict transformation challenge the alleged notion of the conflict resolution school that conflict is undesirable and should be eliminated or at least reduced, but see conflict as a transforming agent for systemic change (Lederach 1995:18).

Contemporary conflicts require more than the reframing of positions and the identification of win-win outcomes. To further reinforce this notion, Lederach (1995:19) underscores the need for a remedial approach that can capture all the dynamic facets of contemporary conflicts by arguing that, “what is required is an approach that transcends a mere end of hostilities and cessation of violence (as in conflict settlement), or satisfaction of basic needs on personal and relational levels; reframing of positions and the identification of a win-win position (as in conflict resolution).” Crucial ways were sought and these aimed at addressing the conflict through the alteration of the social fabric and configuration as well as fostering variation in the very formation and constitution of society fuelling the perpetuation of violent conflicts. The very structure of parties and relationships may be embedded in a pattern of conflictual relationships that extend beyond the particular site of conflict. The proposal of transforming conflict in a bid to tone down or even terminate long-drawn-out social conflicts has now become a crucial component of the glossary or lexicon used in the peace and conflict studies field. In line with this, Miall (2004) defines CT as a process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and if necessary the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict. In this scenario, there is the transformation of the relationships that support violence.

In the same vein, Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies (2010) substantiates this aspect of changing the constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict by highlighting that CT generically entails actions and processes seeking to alter the various characteristics and manifestations of violent conflict by addressing the root causes of a particular conflict over the long term. By tackling the root causes of conflicts, CT advances a complete reversal if not absolute culmination of all negative forms of change that occur within the social and conflict systems. In defining the concept of conflict transformation, Cacayan et al (2005:15) alluded to the key characteristics attributable to CT which include processes, actions and approaches which seek to constructively address conflict, dealing with attitudes and behaviours of the parties as well as contradictions- the root causes and underlying structures and
dynamics of the conflict. They went on to say that CT leads to the development of a positive constructive outcome, helping parties to the conflict to move forward and beyond, to transcend the conflict, ensuring that the goals of all parties are respected and the basic needs and rights of all parties to the conflict are upheld.

As such, the main aim of this initiative is to completely alter brusque disparaging conflict into positive constructive conflict as it deals with the structural, behavioural, and attitudinal aspects of conflict. Accordingly, societies are transformed when fundamental social and political changes are made to correct inequities and injustices to provide all groups with their fundamental human needs (Harrington and Merry, 1998; Burton, 1990). In this regard, transformation entails the reorganisation or streamlining of social entities as well as the redistribution of power from lofty to low-power groups. There is thus, a deep-seated alteration in the relationship between parties and a change in recognising each other’s ethnic and national aspirations as well as the consciousness and character of human beings. CT entails a process by which conflicts, such as ethnic conflicts are transformed into peaceful outcomes. The thrust here is to alter unjust social relationships. Social conflict thus moves in a processual, predictable manner and phases transforming associations and societal organisations. Transformation therefore represents the role and dynamics of social conflict as it moves through phases of transforming relationships and social organisation. In this regard, Cacayan et al (2005:15) summarised the attributes of CT by noting that it is a process that involves a series of events and approaches rather than a single act, and can apply at the micro, meso and macro levels, at the intra and at the personal, group, community, social, cultural, national and state levels. In a bid to be sustainable, CT must address all the levels and manifestations of the conflict.

3.3. Dimensions of Conflict Transformation

Transformation appreciates social conflict as sprouting from and generating changes in the personal, relational, structural and cultural dimensions of human experience. It seeks to advance positive, beneficial and constructive processes within each of these dimensions. CT simultaneously acts upon one or more facets of these dimensions by working with a multitude of different actors from the bottom to the top, thereby influencing these levels and warrants a more wholesome, durable and robust solution in the long run. Lederach (2000) proposes the four dimensions that should be taken into consideration in order to transform systems and these include: Personal or individual changes in the emotional, perceptual and spiritual aspects of conflict; relational or changes in communication, interaction and interdependence of parties in
conflict. Structural or changes in the underlying structural patterns and decision making in conflict and cultural or group or societal changes in the cultural patterns in understanding and responding to conflict (Schirch, 1999:38).

The personal dimension refers to the alterations impinged upon in and preferred for the individual. Accordingly, CT seeks to lessen the effects of the variance on the person and to capitalise on their aptitude to muddle through conflict for example, psycho-social help, counseling, victim perpetrator, confrontations and spirituality. This includes the cognitive, emotional, perceptual and spiritual aspects of human experience over the course of conflict. Consequently, Lederach and Maiese (2003) dichotomise the perspectives into which individual transformation transpires that is from a descriptive perspective, transformation suggests that individuals are affected by conflict in both positive and negative ways for, example; conflict affects our physical well-being, self-esteem, emotional stability, capacity to perceive accurately and spiritual integrity. Prescriptively (that is, relating to what one should do) transformation symbolises purposeful or conscious involvement to diminish or curtail the disparaging effects of social conflict and maximise its potential for individual growth at physical, emotional and spiritual levels (Lederach 2000). Personal dimension minimises the destructive effects of social conflict and maximise the potential for personal growth (Miall 2004). In essence, positive perceptions and attitudes such as trust and confidence should be enhanced in any transformational initiative at an individual level, this helps to diminish negative outlooks and thoughts such as distrust and fear.

The relational dimension depicts the changes effected in and desired for the face to face relationships. It minimises poorly functioning communication and maximises understanding. CT in this regard, regards inter-dependencies involving groups and the main focus is hinged on communication or interaction means, typecasting or stereotyping and common understanding. In addition to this, issues of emotions, power and interdependence and the communicative and interactive aspects of conflict are central. Descriptively relational transformation entails how the patterns of communication and interaction in relationships are affected by conflict. According to Lederach and Maiese (2003) it looks beyond visible issues to the underlying changes produced by conflict in how people perceive, what they pursue and how they structure their relationships. Most significantly, social conflict makes explicit how close or distant people wish to be, how they will use and share power, what they perceive of themselves and each other and what happens of interaction they wish to have. Prescriptively, transformation represents intentional intervention to minimise poorly functioning communication and maximise mutual
understanding (Lederach 1997 and 2000). This includes efforts to bring to the surface in a more explicit manner the relational fears, hopes and goals of the people involved. Concern is put on the circumstances in which people live since they affect how people perceive themselves as well as each other for example, whether they have equal access to resources, participation in the political system as well as access to economic opportunities.

The structural dimension highlights the underlying causes of conflict and stresses the ways in which social structures, organisations and institutions are built, sustained and changed by conflict (Lederach and Maiese 2003). It is about the ways people build and organise, social, economic and institutional relationships to meet basic human needs and provide access to resources and decision making. In essence, structural transformation scrutinises the extent to which social structures are impacted by conflicts (for example how conflict-laden contexts influence perceptions, attitudes and behaviours of the people) as well as the probability of social structures to cause and harbour conflict. At the descriptive level transformation refers to the analysis of social circumstances that promote conflict and the way that conflict affects social, structural change in the present social, political and economic establishments. At a prescriptive level, Botes (2003) notes that transformation embodies efforts to endow with insight into fundamental sources and social surroundings that generate and advance violent expressions of conflict and to uphold non-violent mechanisms that shrink adversarial relations and play down violence. Pursuit of this change cultivates formations that meet basic human needs (substantive justice) and maximises people’s participation in decisions that affect them (procedural justice) (Lederach 1997). In essence, structural transformation understands and addresses the root causes of violent conflict; promote non-violent mechanisms minimise violence; foster structures that meet basic human needs and maximise public participation.

Cultural dimension as noted by Lederach and Maiese (2003) identifies and understands the cultural patterns that contribute to the rise of violent expressions of conflict; identify cultural resources for constructively handling conflict. In the same vein, it looks at how certain cultural traits such as women’s roles, ownership systems, identities and customary power can negatively fuel conflict. It entails ways that conflict changes the patterns of group life as well as the ways that culture affects the development of processes to contain and react to conflict (Schirch 1999:38). At a descriptive level, transformation seeks to understand how conflict affects and changes group cultural blueprints and how those accrued and communal patterns affect the way people view, comprehend and act in response to conflict. Prescriptively, transformation aims at unearthing the cultural patterns that contribute to violence in a given milieu, and to discover and
assemble on existing cultural possessions and socio-cultural apparatus for handling conflict (Botes 2003).

3.4. Ways of Transformation

In the process of discussing the conflict transformation discourse, it is also prudent to dissect and unpack the facets and elements that undergo a rigorous metamorphosis or transformation. In this regard transformation is generally seen to occur at both macro and micro levels. Micro transformations encompass changes in the parties and the nature of the conflict and macro transformations entail changes in the socio-political system within which conflict is embedded. Augsberger (1992) asserts that conflict transformation transpires when there is a metamorphosis, or at least considerable change in one of three different elements: that is, the process of transformation first transforms attitudes by changing and redirecting negative perceptions; it also transforms behaviour as well as the conflict itself by seeking to discover, define, and remove incompatibilities between the parties. In this regard, Kriesberg, (1998) asserts that transformation occurs when there are changes in the relationship between adversaries, from changes within one of the major adversaries, and from changes in the struggle’s external context.

Accordingly, Vayrynen (1991:163) as cited by Botes (2003:9) charts four ways in which transformations happen that is;

- actor transformation which refers to the internal changes in major parties to the conflict, or the appearance of new actors. Issue transformation alters the political agenda of the conflict, in essence, altering what the conflict is about. Rule transformation redefines the norms that the actors follow in their interactions with each other, and demarcates the boundaries of their relationship. Structural transformation alludes to changes that may transpire in the system or structure within which the conflict occurs, which is more than just the limited changes among actors, issues and roles.

Such transformation of structural and asymmetric power imbalances between parties will yield to sustainable peace. Inherent in the descriptions of what conflict transformation is, lays the notion that personal, relational and structural transformation is essential to deal effectively with conflicts. As such, conflict transformation is aimed at the top leadership, or the level at which negotiations to end conflict normally take place; national leaders such as professionals and intellectuals from sectors where problem solving workshops or training in conflict resolution would appropriate; and finally, local leaders in indigenous non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and grassroots organizations, where the impact would be on local peace commissions and grassroots training.
3.5. Actors in Conflict Transformation

CT usually involves a broad range of actors, who make use of a wide gamut of applications. According to Miall (2004:12) the actors can be categorised into the following groups, since their thrust is to shape the development of contemporary practice: States and intergovernmental organisations; development and humanitarian organisations; international non-governmental organisations concerned with conflict prevention and transformation and parties to the conflict and other relevant groups within the affected societies. In the same vein, Bichsel (2009:40) articulates the three distinct categories of actors that CT seeks to transform by noting that, “CT does not only attempt to transform relations between groups, but also between three levels of actors perceived to represent the socio-political construction of a state.” These three levels of actors are usually referred to as “Tracks.”

According to Reimann (2004) Track I, includes governmental and diplomatic actors with official and formal activities who have high visibility and publicity. In this regard, when conducting some peacebuilding activities, top leadership can be accessed by mediation at the level of states (Track I) and by the outcome oriented approach for example SADC Heads of State and Government had to talk to belligerents’ incumbent President Mark Ravalomanana and coup plotter Andry Rajoelina to restore peace to Madagascar. Track I actors normally rely on mediation efforts and negotiations in trying to resolve conflicts. This was seen in the DRC where for example in August 1999, the South African Foreign Affairs Minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, flew to Kisangani in an attempt to broker a peace deal between friends that had turned enemies in a country whose government they were trying to oust (Matshikiza 1999:24). The various mediation attempts undertaken at the Pretoria, SADC, and the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU) summits, as well as a number of individual efforts by personalities like presidents Mandela, Chissano, Gaddafi among other officials represent the strategies as well as the key Track I actors who participated in trying to forge long-lasting peace in the DRC.

Track II focuses on “middle-level” or “middle range” leadership, including leaders being highly respected and/or occupying formal positions in sectors such as health, business agriculture or education as has been attempted in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq and post-Muammar Gaddafi Libya in a bid to end the conflicts through transitional councils. Mid-level leadership (Track II) can be reached through more resolution-oriented approaches such as problem solving workshops or peace-commissions and with the help of partial insiders that is prominent individuals in society (Paffenholz 2009:5). For Havermans (1999:223) the activities of Track II diplomats “vary from organising problem-solving workshops, acting as go-betweens to help set
up a dialogue between antagonistic communities, offering mediation courses, organising seminars and conferences and private one-on-one diplomacy behind the scenes”. Using this list of activities, several examples can be presented as Track II efforts that were undertaken to contribute to a resolution of the DRC conflict. The fundamental lesson to be learnt from all the Track II endeavours is that sufficient arrangement must be done before endeavouring to convey the warring groups face to face. This preliminary stage must involve the gathering of more information about the dynamics of the contention and the general population required in it. Additionally, more coordinated, one-to-one gatherings must be attempted to decide the probability of a gathering meeting with its rivals with no showdown.

Track III represents the “grassroots” leadership understood as, “those who represent the population at large” (Lederach 1997:38). In the same vein, Paffenholz (op.cit) asserts that the grassroots level (Track III) however, represents the majority of the population and can be reached through a wide range of peace-building approaches such as local peace commissions, community dialogue projects or trauma healing. Rwanda had a peace and reconciliation commission that incorporated such techniques to address entrenched conflict after the 1994 genocide. Evidently, in order to be successful, conflict transformation has to come about on all levels concurrently and that they have to be mutually supporting.

Track I practitioners, states and international organisations are among the most influential of all the actors as their practice impinges most directly and powerfully on the conflict parties and the positive and negative consequences of their interventions are fully in the public eye (Miall 2004:12). In the 1990s the United Nations set out to employ the prolonged commencement of peace-making with prominent peace-building manoeuvres in areas such as Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, Namibia and, Mozambique where recent peace settlements were conducted. These operations led to the development of a model which calls for military measures to secure the demobilization, disarmament and cantonment of opposing forces; constitutional measures including the training and supervision of local police, human rights measures; return of refugees, and restoration of the war-damaged infrastructure (Miall ibid). The model succeeded in Mozambique and Namibia as peaceful transformation was realised in these countries. Nonetheless, despite the peace-building efforts violent conflicts recommenced in Mozambique and Cambodia (Pfetsch and Rohloff, 2000). This helped the United Nations (UN) and the major states to draw some crucial lessons on peace-keeping. While global interventions have in these cases seemed to have brought to standstill ethnic wars, the scope of transformation of the principal conflicts remains restricted and narrow.
The international community has in some cases, managed to prevent conflicts even before they became violent thereby fuelling real changes in the conflict context, and structures. For example, Cochrane and Seamus (2002) note that the Eastonian ethnic conflict was forestalled by the efforts of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) High Commissioner on National Minorities supported by the European Union (EU) and the Scandinavian governments. In the same vein, there was also the introduction of the electoral system that gave room for cross-ethnic voting thereby promoting a shift from ethnic politics to politics of economic and regional interest groups as Non-Eastonian politicians were also included in the party lists of Eastonian parties so that their interests were also represented. This promoted ethnic accommodation. The military equally plays a critical but limited role in supporting Track I efforts. Military contingents and police forces such as UN/ North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) peace forces are normally employed to end hostilities and prevent resumption of fights. Maintaining a ceasefire (including coercive means) provides the opportunity to re-enter into dialogue again and to transform violent and potentially violent conflicts into peaceful non-violent processes of social and political change (Boehlke 2009:15).

The second type of actors are development and humanitarian agencies. Miall (2004:13) notes that these agencies were drawn into the costly business of rebuilding war torn societies and were responding to the acute damage to development, which had resulted from armed conflicts by targeting development programmes specifically towards peace-building. In Mozambique for instance, donors played a crucial role in transforming the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) to become a political party as well as helping to keep the elections on schedule. Development aid is also utilised as an instrument for mitigating conflict. Accordingly, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1996:56) assert that development aid can also be used in directly mitigating conflict for instance. Programmes to support the reintegration of child soldiers are development tasks that have a peacebuilding facet. Development aid can have inadvertent or unplanned consequences that can unintentionally fuel conflict for instance when aid is captured by the parties to conflict and then sustains the fighting. By and large, development agencies act as supporting entities which principally prop up and encourage the work of others, rather than to take prime responsibility for transforming particular conflicts. Hence most of the CT work has therefore been left to NGOs. In line with this, Lederach (1997:15) notes that NGO practitioners advocate a sustained level of engagement over a longer period of time. They seek an in-depth understanding of the roots of conflict, working closely with people both within and outside the conflict parties.
In addition, NGOs play multifarious roles in the peace-building endeavours and these include among others: they seek to open a space for dialogue, sustain local or national conferences and workshops on paths towards peace, identify opportunities for development and engage in peace-building, relationship building and institution building over the long term. In a bid to accomplish the peace-building roles there is need to employ some tools, instruments and methods. Accordingly, Miall (2004:15) accentuates that the methods and tools employed by Track II actors include supporting and sustaining local groups and social movements, building peace constituencies, strengthening capacity, empowering key actors, organisational development and networking and training. The work of NGOs was exhibited by Conciliation Resources a London-based NGO in Fiji where it supported the Citizen’s Constitutional Forum in undertaking coalition with local actors which led to the constitutional settlement in 1996 with the introduction of the alternative vote system and power-sharing (Conciliation Resources, 2000). However, a coup that took place in Fiji in 2000 shows the complexities that are eminent in this kind of work and also that there is need to track the dynamics of a conflict over time.

Local actors themselves have the supreme mandate and a superlative opportunity for transforming their own conflicts. There are cases of embedded third parties who emerge out of conflict parties and play a significant role in opening channels of dialogue and opening political space such as John Hume in Northern Ireland (Fitzduff 1999:42). Cases of groups within political parties who can bring about an actor transformation such as the shift towards political forms of struggle. Civil society actors and local NGOs who often have an enormous influence on bridge building between political parties and local communities exemplified by the Corrymeela Community working on respect for cultural traditions thereby addressing the problems of historical memories and reconciliation (Miall 2004:15). The impact of this peace-building on the macro level of the conflict is hard to evaluate, but on a small scale, the personal and group transformations that it will achieve are keenly felt. The CT approach thus, recommends a mutually elaborate connection with and the productive amalgamation of the levels by fostering dialogue and co-operation between actors ascribed to these tracks, that is, there is a greater need for multi-level participation and dialogue (Reimann 2004:14;Mitchell 2009:9).

3.6. Demystifying Conflict Transformation as a Peace-building Approach

Peace-building is essentially about the process of achieving peace. According to Paffenholz (2008:3) depending on one’s understanding of peace, peace-building differs considerably in
terms of approaches, scope of activities and time-rame. In demystifying the concept of conflict transformation as a peace-building approach there is need to analyse the other predecessor approaches contemporary approaches that Botes (2003:12) asserts that CT follows a continuum, generally beginning with conflict settlement, then conflict management, to conflict resolution and ending with CT hence signifying a sequence of indispensable transitional steps. Lederach (1995b:17) proposes that the theoretical concept of CT has emerged in the search for an adequate language to explain the peace making venture. Botes citing Lederach (1995a:201) ascertains that the term resolution as the better known and more widely recognised term carries a connotation of bias towards ending a given crisis or at least its outward expression, without being sufficiently concerned with the deeper structural, cultural and long term relational aspects of conflict. There is some effort in the peace and conflict studies to clearly distinguish between the terms CT and conflict resolution, they are still used, often used interchangeably both in the common language usage and academic literature.

3.6.1. Conflict Resolution Approach
This approach seeks to solve the underlying causes of conflict and rebuild destroyed relationships between the parties. In this regard Conflict resolution (CR) seeks to put an end to violence by working on the behaviours of actors through the usage of techniques of mediation through negotiations and diplomacy (Paffenholz 2008:4). In line with this, Buckley-Zistel (2008:17) connotes that conflict resolution stands for process-oriented efforts to address the underlying structural causes of violent conflicts. In contrast to the conflict management approach, theorists and practitioners such as John Burton and Ronald Fisher argue that conflicts do not only arise due to incompatible interests, which can be negotiated but also due to non-material, non-negotiable human needs-for instance due to marginalisation, discrimination and inequality- and that these have to be addressed when trying to end a conflict. A notable assumption undergirding conflict resolution is that conflicts have predetermined lives and clear ends and can be resolved or declared obdurate or intractable (Botes 2003:13).

If one looks at the SADC Allied military intervention in the DRC in 1998 and United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) one would think of it more as conflict resolution. This is maybe because according to Lederach (1995: 201) “perhaps unintentionally, this term carries the connotation of a bias toward ‘ending’ a given crisis or at least its outward expression, without being sufficiently concerned with the deeper structural, cultural, and long-term relational aspects of conflict.” One would say the characteristics of the conflict were not addressed at a time mutual understanding inducting change in the parties to the conflict could
have been reached. The just war theorists using the Caroline criteria would probably agree that the threat on the government of DRC necessitated a military venture rather than immediate peace-building and systemic change. It was after the fighting that it would become necessary to make sure that parties understand each other’s ethnic and national aspirations. It would necessitate “fundamental social and political changes are made to correct inequities and injustice to provide all groups with their fundamental human needs,” thereby restructuring social institutions and redistributing power from high-power groups to low-power groups (Burton, 1990). It would also mean a transformative mediation seeking changes in individuals and is designed to change the consciousness and character of human beings (Bush and Folger 1994).

According to Miall (2004:8) CR theorists argue that it is possible to transcend conflicts if parties can be helped to explore, analyse and question and reframe their positions and interests. Thus it emphasises intervention by skilled but powerless third parties working unofficially with the parties to foster new thinking and new relationships. This approach is about how parties can move from sero-sum, destructive patterns of conflict to positive-sum constructive outcomes with the aim of developing conflict resolution processes that appear to be acceptable to parties in dispute and effective in resolving conflict (Azar and Burton 1986:1). Conflict resolution is embedded in human needs approach which as noted by Burton (1990:59) individuals and groups strive for the fulfillment of their needs which, if not satisfied lead to instability, the violent pursuit of fulfillment and in worst cases to protracted social conflict. This derives from the view that in order to survive, humans need a number of essentials that go beyond food and water, including safety and security, love and self-esteem, recognition, personal fulfillment, identity, culture, freedom and distributive justice (Peffenholz 2008).

Methods and processes that are relevant in facilitating peaceful culmination of retribution and violent conflict are adopted in the conflict resolution endeavours. In the early conflict resolution school peace builders were mainly Western academic institutions carrying out conflict resolution workshops with non-official actors, close to the conflict parties (Fisher 1997). With

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43 The Caroline test is a 19th-century formulation of customary international law, reaffirmed by the Nuremberg Tribunal after World War II, which said that the necessity for preemptive self-defense must be "instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." The threat or use of force is prohibited by customary international law and the UN Charter when it is part of a preventive war waged against the territory of any State. In the Lotus case, the World Court decided, "the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that - failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary - it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State." The Caroline test was recognised and endorsed by the Nuremberg Tribunal, who adopted the same words used in the test in judging Germany's invasion of Norway and Denmark during World War II.
the passage of time, the scope of actors substantially broadens that is, what was at first a more elite-based civil society approach becomes a general civil society and grassroots approach including a wide range of actors from individuals to communities and organised civil society groups. To reinforce this notion of actors who are involved in conflict resolution Forsyth (2009) note that, often committed group members attempt to resolve group conflicts by actively communicating information about their conflicting motives or ideologies to the rest of the group. The main activities performed are dialogue projects between groups or communities, peace education, conflict resolution training to enhance the peace-building capacity of actors from one or different groups and conflict resolution workshops. In addition, there is also a wide range of methods and procedures for addressing conflict and these include but is not limited to negotiation, mediation, creative peace-building and diplomacy.

Accordingly, in conflict resolution workshops based on human needs, the mediators first analyse the conflicting issues of the parties to the negotiation table to discuss these issues in order to reach an agreement as to what the real problems are, to recognise each other’s needs and acknowledge the cost of their conduct so far in terms of needs violation (Buckley-Zistel 2008:21). In this regard, the need to reach a shared acceptance of participants’ core needs as well as exploring ways to meet these needs through joint action inclines these workshops towards analytical problem solving orientations. Conflict resolution school has been criticised for noting that improving communications and building relationships between conflicting parties do not necessarily result in an agreement to end war (Bercovith, 1984). The approach was also criticised for its assumptions that the work with civil society and the grassroots does not automatically spill over to the national level (Richmond 2001). The stratagem of conflict resolution workshops to physically and mentally take away the participants from the conflict milieu to permit them to obtain a supplementary, far-flung, and by insinuation, more objective appreciation of their own and their opponent’s outlook is counterproductive for the trickle-down effect on the parties’ constituencies. It is thus, difficult for the skills that would have been acquired through workshops to contribute to absolute conflict termination if they are detached from the socio-political environments at all the levels at which prolonged conflict is in existence.

In articulating the conflict resolution strategies and efforts that were undertaken in the DRC it can be noted that in relation to the DRC second war, there were a number of mediation efforts that the SADC engaged in. accordingly, there was the South African initiative which saw an urgent SADC summit being held in Pretoria 23 August 1998. The former South African
President Nelson Mandela, then chairman of the SADC, was mandated to organise a cease-fire in consultation with the OAU Secretary-General (Bokala 1998:7). The SA initiative was followed by the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU)’s initiative on the 10th of September 1998, where the OAU hosted a meeting of ministers in Addis Ababa during which a draft cease-fire agreement was formulated. That agreement, though agreed to in principle by the belligerents, was never signed (Naidoo 2000).

On 13 September 1998 at the annual SADC summit in Mauritius, Zambian President Frederick Chiluba was mandated to lead the mediation efforts, assisted by Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa and Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano. This initiative, which became known as the Lusaka Peace Process, drafted “modalities” for the implementation of a political settlement which culminated in the signing of a cease-fire agreement at the heads of state and government summit on 10 July 1999 in the Zambian capital, Lusaka. According to Naidoo (2000) on 18 April 1999, the Libyan President, Muammar Gaddafi, brokered a peace agreement between Museveni and Kabila, which was also signed by the Presidents of Chad and Eritrea. Signed in the Libyan town of Sirte, the agreement called for the withdrawal of foreign forces from the DRC. Chad, subsequently, withdrew its troops from the country and Libya sent some 40 military personnel to Uganda to prepare for the deployment of a proposed neutral African peacekeeping force provided for under the Sirte Agreement. All these negotiations bore the imprints of Track I diplomacy. On 24 January 2000, at the UN Security Council special session on Africa, a day-long meeting was devoted to the war in the DRC. The objective of the session was to get the warring sides to reaffirm their commitment to the LA and agree on an immediate end to cease-fire violations (Naidoo 2000). It was for the first time that heads of state and government of parties in the DRC conflict addressed the UN Security Council. However, it can be noted that the initial obstacle encountered by the Track I diplomatic process was to get the many different actors to agree on being party to the conflict. From the start, Kabila refused to acknowledge the internal component of the rebellion and stood steadfast on his assertion that the conflict was solely an external invasion by Rwanda and Uganda (Naidoo 2000).

3.6.2. Conflict Management Approach

The approach aims to end wars through different diplomatic initiatives. According to Miall (2004:3) theorists for conflict management see violent conflicts as an ineradicable consequence of differences of values and interests within and between communities. The propensity to violence arises from existing institutions and historical relationships as well as from the
established distribution of power. Resolving such conflicts is viewed as unrealistic, the best that can be done is to manage and contain them and occasionally to reach a historic compromise in which violence may be laid aside and normal politics resumed. Conflict management (CM) entails appropriate intervention to achieve political settlements, particularly by those powerful actors having the power and resources to bring pressure on the conflicting parties in order to induce them to settle. It is postulated by Bloomfield and Reilly (1998) that the positive and constructive handling of difference and divergence fosters the designing of appropriate institutions to guide the inevitable conflict into appropriate channels. CM deals with ways to bring opposing sides together in a co-operative process as well as designing a practical achievable cooperative system for the constructive management of difference (Miall 2004:4).

The conflict management approach mainly tackles the problems in order to try and contain them without necessarily solving them for example through the use of peace-keeping troops. This is the oldest school of thought, which seeks to foster the institutionalisation of peace-building in international relations. Peace builders in this vein are external diplomats from bilateral or multilateral organisations. In line with this Buckley-Zistel (2008:22) unveils the main objects of the conflict management initiative by asserting that the main targets in conflict management efforts are political, military and religious leaders- with experts and academics playing the role of facilitators- who are assumed to be rational cost-benefit calculators who modify their behaviour once they realise it is to their advantage. Paffelnholz (2008:3) notes that this approach aims at identifying and bringing to the negotiation table leaders of the conflict parties. This is done through what Foucault (1994:22) terms “Principled Negotiation.” Negotiations here, take place in secluded environments among leaders and key stakeholders in order to create some distance to enable participants to see the conflict in a different light. For that reason, Holmes (2001) ascertains that this helps them to listen actively to the concerns and interests of their opponents, to consider their own and their opponents’ position more objectively and to make emotions explicit and legitimate.

The main thrust of conflict management initiatives is to focus on the short-term management of the armed conflict that is why they propel towards separating people physically and personally from the problem, a situation that makes party positions to be viewed as short-term representations of interests rather than deep-seated enduring interests per se. It focuses on those in power who have the ability to bring large scale violence to an end through negotiated settlement. According to Paffenholz (2008:3) this approach is criticised because mediators tend on concentrate solely on the top leadership of the conflicting parties. Often they prey to ignoring
the need for facilitation by different internal and external actors before, during and after
negotiations. The approach also overlooks the deep causes of conflict (Paffenholz 2008 and

In addition, conflict management and settlement comprehend or view conflict as arising due to
irreconcilable or diametrically opposing aspirations, such as access to supremacy, wherewithal
or the fulfilment of needs, which can be made known and concentrated on by means of
negotiation and ultimately by settlement and resolution. In line with this, terminating violent
conflicts becomes a scientific rather than a normative endeavour. However, as argued by Nobert
Ropers, conflicts are not simply about issues, but are also about the relationship between the
parties to the conflict (Ropers 2010). Consequently, when working towards ending a violent
conflict it is paramount to address the relationship between the parties to the conflict also
(Buckley-Zistel 2008:21). Hence the thrust of conflict transformation as a relationship rather
than content centred endeavour is manifested as it is concerned with responding to symptoms and
engaging the systems within which relationships are embedded.

3.6.3. Conflict Transformation Approach

The Conflict Transformation approach focuses on the conversion of deep-rooted armed
conflicts into peaceful ones, based on a different understanding of peace-building. The term
conflict transformation (CT) emerged from a search for a more precise term to describe the
overall peacemaking and peace-building venture as it points to the innate dialectical course, the
ability to transform the dynamic of the conflict and the relationship between the parties indeed
to transform the very creators of the conflict. For Lederach (1995b:17), this process provides
transformative human construction and reconstruction of social organisation and realities. CT is,
therefore, a process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses
and if necessary the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent
conflict. As such it embarks upon behaviours, attitudes and problems with the main aim of
positively altering conflicts (Paffenholz 2008:5).

Constructive conflict is seen as a vital agent or catalyst for change. Theorists argue that
contemporary conflicts require more than reframing of positions and the identification of win-
win outcomes. CT sees the need to resolve the dilemma between short term conflict
management and long term relationship building as well as resolution of the underlying causes
of conflict. Hence, people within conflict parties, within the society or region affected and
outsiders with relevant human and material resources all have complementary roles to play in the long-term-process of peace-building. CT initiatives are often characterised by long term horizons and interventions at multiple levels, aimed at changing perceptions and improving communications skills addressing the roots of conflict, including inequality and social injustice (Search for Common Ground, 2010). In the same vein, it encapsulates the activities of processes such as conflict prevention and conflict resolution and goes further than conflict settlement or conflict management. Such a transformation represents the removing of sources and causes of a conflict as well as an intuitive transformation in the attitudes and relationship between the parties.

Lederach (1997) proposes for the building of “long-term infrastructure” for peace-building by supporting the reconciliation potential of society. There is need to rebuild destroyed relationships, focusing on reconciliation within society and the strengthening of society’s peace-building potential. Thus, suggesting a wide ranging approach accentuating support for groups within the society in conflict rather than for the mediation of outsiders. Third part intervention should concentrate on supporting internal actors and coordinating external peace efforts. Sensitivity to the local culture and a long term time frame are also necessary. This approach has a key focus on peace constituencies by identifying mid-level individuals or groups or empowering them to build peace and support reconciliation, there is a greater shift in focus from international to local actors (thus differing from CM and CR which give primacy to international actors) therefore emphasising more on the civil society and ordinary people. CT also recognises that conflicts are transformed gradually, through a series of smaller and larger changes as well as specific steps by which means a variety of actors may play important roles (Miall, 2004:13).

Mitchell (2002: 1) is of the view that CT has emerged in response to the corruption of resolution even its misuse “to stand for almost anything short of outright victory, defeat, and revenge as an outcome, as well as for many processes involving overt violence (‘bombing for peace’) or covert coercion (economic sanctions to obtain parties’ acquiescence to a dictated settlement) as ‘resolution’ methods.” DRC sero sum politics from Mobutu’s coup, Kabila’s takeover, SADC’s Allied Countries responses, MONUC and Rwanda and Uganda were belligerents that supported different armed group forces are illustrations of such behavior leading to a quest for a new paradigm. Largely because the conflict is internal between militias, ethnic groups and government CT it is a term that “has particular salience in asymmetric conflicts, where the aim is to transform unjust social relationships,” (Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse (1999:21).
Transformation thus aims at corroborating and building on people and resources within the setting. Over and above, Lederach and Maiese (2003) highlight that the CT approach is therefore both analytical (in that it tries first to understand the conflict) and prescriptive (by prescribing possible courses of action). Conflictual circumstances are modified by education, advocacy (non-violent activism) and mediation. This is in line with Clements’ (1997:8) systemic approach which is premised on the fact that transformation occurs when violent conflict ceases and or is expressed in non-violent ways and when original structural sources (economic, social, political, military, and cultural) of the conflict have been changed. A systemic change serves as the recipe for ending conflicts. This strategy is aimed at bringing absolute transformation that leaves no room for any form of recurrence of conflict. As such, CT is primarily the preserve of those working out themselves, by the work of third part interveners or by political intervention.

Mitchell (2002:1) notes that transformation is a process that will make up for the inadequacies of mere resolution. As such, transformation tends to be an ongoing, never-ending and continuous process seen by transformationalists as an improvement over conflict resolution because conflict resolution supposedly resolves the conflict but ultimately sets the parties up for failure, that is, it leaves the underlying causes of the conflict untouched. This differs from transformation which ultimately aims at fostering social change in a conflict ridden environment. In this regard, Botes (2003:9) contrasts conflict resolution as a theory and process that leads to a practical end-state with the more open-ended, and indeed continuous, conflict transformation process.

Kriesberg (1998) makes a distinction between resolution and transformation: conflict resolution means solving the problems that led to the conflict and transformation means changing the relationships between the parties to the conflict. CT thus provides for a profound alteration of the parties and their relationships as well as structural change that is non-existent in the conflict resolution methodologies. Conflict management approaches seek to merely contain and manage conflict and conflict resolution approaches seek to move conflict parties away from sero-sum positions towards positive outcomes, often with the help of external actors (Miall, 2004). In addition to the distinctions, the notion of cultural appropriateness is alluded to by Buckley-Zistel (2008:13) who says that, “importantly, and in contrast to conflict settlement, management and resolution, transformational approaches build on culturally apposite and pertinent models of conflict mediation aimed at empowerment and recognition, hence culture does not become an obstacle but a crucial resource.” Transformationalists unlike conflict resolution and
management theorists view culture as a conduit upon which real transformation can take place. In this notion Buckley-Zistel (2008:14) underscores the triad significance of culture which is:

it constitutes different values, norms and beliefs for socially appropriate ways of dealing with conflicts and disputes, including their management and resolution; it affects significant perceptual orientations towards time, risk/uncertainty, power and authority and it comprises different cognitive representatives or discursive frames such as schemas, maps, scripts or images, bound up in metalinguistic forms such as symbols or metaphors.

Since societies have their own coping and survival mechanisms and techniques for managing conflicts it is widely accepted that efforts to transform violent conflicts should include, “respect and promote resources from within a society and that peace-building efforts should build on existing cultural frameworks. In line with this it can be noted that CT is amenable to the traditional ways of resolving conflicts. The study established that traditional approaches will go a long way in addressing unending conflict in the eastern DRC. Major General Jerome Ngendahimana44 argued that international conflict initiatives have always overlooked and undermined the indispensable role played by local leadership. If the chiefs, religious and ethnic community leaders are roped in from the onset, then the chances of establishing everlasting peace are high. Traditional approaches should not be ignored or side-lined. Instead traditional leaders should be involved so that they associate and are allowed to own the whole process. In reinforcing this notion Dr Aggee Shyaka Mugabe,45 avows that when allowed to perform their functions independently with government support and guarantee, chiefs can always bring about peace within their communities. They have the capacity to bring their subjects together, establish quasi-courts where offenders are tried, confess and judgements meted. In this scenario, the role of traditional chiefs and leaders can also be traced right from the pre-colonial times where through their wise counsel could successfully resolve disputes before they escalated into conflicts. Maj Gen Edzai Chanyuka Chimonyo46 acknowledged the need for upholding traditional practices in forging long-lasting peace in the eastern DRC. He agreed that the Gacaca47 has worked in Rwanda but under the auspices of a very strong Government.

In highlighting the background to Gacaca as well as showing it operates as a tool to transform violence through culturally sensitive mechanisms Karbo and Matusi (2008:12) note that:

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44 Interview with author, Kigali, 04 March 2016.
45 Interview with author, Kigali, 04 March 2016. Dr Shyaka is a Senior Lecturer in Conflict Resolution at the Center for Peace and Security Studies of Rwanda University.
46 Interview with author, Daresalaam, 28 February 2016. Maj Gen Chimonyo is the Ambassador of the Republic Zimbabwe to Tanzania. He is also accredited to the Republic of Rwanda.
47 Gacaca is a traditional mechanism of conflict resolution amongst the Banyarwanda of Rwanda. This method is used to resolve conflict at the grassroots level through dialogue and community justice system. It is an intricate system of custom, tradition, norm and usage.
Gacaca is a Kinyarwanda concept which literally means “justice on the grass”. Gacaca courts are a traditional Rwandese phenomenon, where people sit on the grass to settle their disputes in the presence of community members. In historical Rwanda, gacaca courts were used to settle issues such as land, property, marital and other interpersonal disputes. Gacaca hearings are traditionally held outdoors and the system is based on voluntary confessions and apologies by wrongdoers. In the pre-colonial form gacaca was used as a conduit to moderate disputes concerning land use rights, cattle ownership, marriage, inheritance rights and petty theft, among others. Traditionally, gacaca courts were run by renowned persons who were of impeccable integrity and these were “persons of exemplary conduct.” In the contemporary Rwanda, Gacaca trials are chaired by “community judges” (known as the Inyangamugayo) who are elected household heads and essentially women and men of integrity. These judges are not entitled to pecuniary remuneration but they get free schooling and medical fees for their families. The government of post-conflict Rwanda enacted the Gacaca Law of 2001 to give indigenous courts the mandate to deal with cases of the genocide. Thus, the gacaca in Rwanda is one of the largest community based judicial undertakings of the century. In contemporary Rwanda, during gacaca processes, local residents testify for and against the suspects, who are usually tried in the communities where they are accused of committing crimes. Truth telling is the main attribute of the Gacaca system and this has proven to be invigorating and therapeutic as the presumed perpetrators, witnesses and survivors all come together to witness the full implementation of justice. All parties are required to participate in debates that can help in establishing what would have happened in a bid to come up with the truth and draw up a list of victims as well as identifying the guilty. Those who confess their crimes are then rewarded by halving of their prison sentences.

Thus, Gacaca is in tandem with the African concept of Ubuntu, which translates to “humaneness,” “solidarity”. Ubuntu aims to create an environment where people are able to recognise that their humanity is inextricably bound up in the humanity of other's. Ubuntu also encourages people to see beyond the crimes of the perpetrators by seeking to integrate the evildoer back into the community. Culturally sensitive mechanisms to conflict resolution as endogenous approaches to peace-building are methods that are rooted in the culture and tradition of the community hence they were developed around specific conditions affecting particular populations and communities indigenous to a particular geographical area (Karbo and Matusi 2008:14). In explaining the nature and dimensions of endogenous conflicts Zartmann () had this to say:

Conflict resolution mechanisms in Africa in general and the DRC in particular can only be labeled as endogenous if “they have been practiced for an extended period and have evolved within African societies rather than being the product of external importation.” Endogenous conflict resolution methods are unique, informal, communal, restorative, spiritual, context-specific and diverse, apart from being integrated into life experiences. Furthermore, the use of endogenous methods of conflict resolution reflects the centrality of the community from which the fundamental needs of members are satisfied. Endogenous methods of conflict resolution are based on the premise that, “Understanding conflict and developing appropriate models of handling it will necessarily be rooted in, and must respect and draw from, the cultural knowledge of a people.
The peculiar and unique environment and circumstances in which African conflicts take place actually call for culturally sensitive methods, approaches and mechanisms for addressing violent conflict that are aimed at transforming conflict in a way that addresses the psychological root causes of the cyclical and endless conflict in the eastern DRC. Accordingly, Lederach (1995) connotes that real CT should be based on the realisation that psychological restoration and healing can only occur through providing the space for the survivors to feel heard and for every detail of the traumatic war or violent conflict event to be heard and experienced in a safe environment. These environments can pave way for real and genuine transformation to occur.

The ability to drive transformative efforts from the cultural perspective helps the peace-builders to tackle the causes of conflict from the roots. The notion of culture, norms, and values has a strong inclination towards ethical principles and in the African context there is a thrust towards upholding African ethics of “Ubuntu.” The aim is to evaluate the influence that African ethics can have on peace-building in the eastern DRC in light of the “Ubuntu” as humankind visualization and panacea to violent conflict therein. African ethics which played a role in forging peace as well as fostering social harmony and accord in traditional African communities can serve as a reliable constructive instrument for yielding far-reaching and prolonged conflict transformation in eastern DRC.

3.7. Conclusion

The chapter discussed the concept of conflict transformation. The underlying notion behind conflict transformation is that crucial ways should be sought which address the conflict through the alteration of the social fabric as well as fostering variation in the very formation and constitution of society fuelling the perpetuation of violent conflicts. In this case, scholarly definitions by Lederach, Galtung, and Botes among others were reviewed and they all converged on the need to transform relationships, interests, discourses and the very constitution of the society that supports the continuation of violent conflict. In this regard it becomes needful if not imperative to alter the various characteristics and manifestations of violent conflict by addressing the root causes of a particular conflict over the long term. In line with this, the study aim of the view that a positive transformation of the underlying structures, dynamics and root causes of the conflict should be altered and parties in the conflict should be assisted to move forward and beyond the conflict.
From the definitional aspects, the research study discussed four the dimensions of conflict transformation which are personal, relational, structural and cultural dimensions. The analysis resonated on the notion that positive constructive conflict handling seeks to deal with the structural, behavioural, attitudinal, interactional and culture-related aspects of the conflict. According to Lederach (2000) these four dimensions should be taken into consideration in order to wholly transform the systems. In addition conflict transformation simultaneously acts upon one or more facets of these dimensions by working with a multitude of different actors from the bottom to the top. Working with these actors enables them to come up with ways that are tailor made to address the root causes of the conflict. In respect of this, the study looked at the macro and micro ways of transformation whereby micro transformation was seen to encompass changes in the parties and the nature of the conflict whilst macro transformations entail changes in socio-political system within which conflict is embedded. Additionally, Botes (2003:9) citing Varymen (1991:163) reveals four ways in which transformations occur and these are actor, issue, rule and structural transformations.

In order for real transformation to take place the study noted the need for the inclusion of diverse actors. Chapter I identified three distinct categories of people or actors who steer the conflict transformation wagon and these include practitioners, states and international organisations (Track I actors), middle level or middle range leadership, including leaders being highly respected and/ or occupying formal positions in sectors such as health, business agriculture or education in development and humanitarian agencies (Track II actors). The third category of actors include the local players that is the grassroots leadership which represent the population at large (Track II). One has to understand that colonisation created vicious circles that in turn created the most exceptional leaders and visions into parodies of their opposites. Thus justifying the need for actors to implement the transformational strategies and ways to peace-building.

In order to appreciate the need for conflict transformation the study analysed the different approaches that existed prior to the introduction of CT and highlighted their gaps. Conflict resolution was noted to be an approach aimed at putting an end to violence by working on the behaviour of the actors through the usage of techniques such as mediation through negotiations and diplomacy. The next approach is conflict management which aimed to end wars through different diplomatic initiatives which resultanty yield to political settlements by containing problems without necessarily solving them. The shortcomings of these approaches led to the adoption of conflict transformation. On one hand, conflict transformation resulted in response to
the corruption of resolution even its misuse to stand for almost anything short of outright victory, defeat and revenge as an outcome, as well as for many processes involving overt violence or covert coercion as resolution methods. On the other hand, conflict management was criticised for its failure to solve the root causes of the conflict as it seeks to merely contain the problems. In addition to this criticism, this approach has a pitfall of falling prey to ignoring the need for facilitation by different internal and external actors before, during and after negotiations. To fill these operational crevices, an approach that provides transformative construction and reconstruction of social organisation and realities by altering the dynamics of conflicts itself, and the relationship between the parties by transforming the very creators of the conflict has to be adopted in dealing with unending conflicts in Africa in general and the DRC in particular.
CHAPTER FOUR: SADC INTERVENTIONS TOWARDS ENDING VIOLENT CONFLICT IN DRC

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter talks about the concept of conflict transformation. In this case, the concept was dissected and unpacked by highlighting the definitions of conflict transformation where it was noted that there is need to transform ethnic conflicts into peaceful outcomes by altering unjust social relationships. CT came as a panacea to peace-building after its predecessor approaches such as conflict settlement, conflict management and conflict resolution had failed to yield long-lasting peace in Africa in general and DRC in particular. Dimensions of conflict transformation were also articulated and these include personal, relational, structural and cultural transformation. Consequently, the actors who participate in CT efforts and endeavours as well as the ways of conflict transformation were captured. Furthermore, the process of CT vis-à-vis the distinct approaches to terminating violent conflicts were also underscored. Having looked at the CT strategies and systems it gives room for the study to capture the empirical shortcomings of the conventional peace-building approaches that were used by SADC in its efforts to end recurrent conflict in the DRC. The SADC interventions towards ending violent conflict will be unravelled.

This chapter looked at the recurrent violent military DRC conflict on a grand strategic application level. The chapter focuses on regional interventions by highlighting SADC’s conflict management mechanisms in the DRC and this will be made possible by looking at the composition of the SADC. The regional interventions revolve around the concept of security community and regionalism. The chapter asserts that SADC is coming as a budding regional organisation with the aim of developing and changing the course of history for a region terrorised by foreign domination. In this vein, the chapter notes that SADC has been concentrating on human security or the critical security paradigms but the DRC conflict has necessitated the use of the traditional concept of conflict security which is made possible through the establishment of SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defense and Security (OPDS). In this case, the chapter starts by highlighting the mandate of the OPDS as such making the recurrent conflict in the DRC an arena which can help one understand the SADC conflict resolution mechanism. The OPDS is useful in SADC’s response to several conflicts facing the region in member states. SADC through its arm, the OPDS has its main conflict resolution strategy- the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Defense and Security (SIPO) II which aims at forging
In capturing SADC’s efforts towards ending the DRC conflict the chapter mentions the 1998/9 Allied Forces Intervention whereby Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe coalesced in reaction to Ugandan and Rwandan military activity in the DRC against Laurent Kabila. These countries stepped in to protect a recognised sovereign DRC in a military operation called Operation Sovereign Legitimacy. This opened room for the official mediation process which was led by the then president of Zambia- Fredrick Chiluba which culminated in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. By and large, continuing efforts between and among SADC member states were reported and they encouraged the DRC to open up space to facilitate internal political dialogue which accounts for the interests of all the citizens of the DRC. There was also the Sun Agreement of 2002 which saw the armed group MLC signing the peace agreement with the DRC government in the presence of Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe serving as witnesses. Into the bargain, the chapter also underscores the achievements of SIPO II whereby it facilitated defense and security co-operation among SADC member states by increasing commitment towards collective self-defense through the SADC Mutual Defence Pact. In buttressing this notion of SADC’s success stories, the Intervention Brigade by the United Nations has also shown the importance of a SADC Standby Force which has been operationalised under SIPO II. In spite of these positives, the SADC intervention came on spotlight and was exposed to immense criticism for failing to stop violent conflict in the DRC especially when Bosco Ntaganda surrendered and is awaiting trial at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague- a situation that reflects badly on SADC’s lack of a regional court structure and failure to handle its own issues. This situation is further compounded by the OPDS’ lack of funds and it being legally non-binding. Lack of unity among the SADC states which was exhibited during the 1998/9 Operation Sovereign Legitimacy where only three countries out of 14 states volunteered to participate in the DRC war serve as another striking criticism of SADC’s OPDS and its efforts to end violent conflict in the DRC.

The chapter outlines the shortcomings of the agreements and peace accords in bringing long-lasting peace in the DRC as there was no service delivery improvement and lack of institution building- a situation that led to human rights violations and the proliferation of armed groups. The current DRC problem was reportedly attributed to its decolonisation efforts which have seen conflict drivers serving as events and trends for fueling unending conflict. Such factors have dampened the conflict resolution efforts in the DRC for example, the sluggish
implementation of the DDR as well as the AMANI\textsuperscript{48} process bear testimony to the unsuitability of conflict resolution methods for deep-seated conflicts such as the DRC conflict. This has seen the UN and its partners (the international community) emerging and their presence became a stumbling block to SADC’s peacekeeping efforts as it overshadowed the not so resourced SADC making its role in peace-building programming minimal. Donor funding has generally taken place under the agreed frameworks of SADC and of the DRC as a member state. Donors have intervened in the issues of relevance to CT such as DDR, SSR, service delivery, justice, mining and natural resource extraction, sexual and humanitarian assistance.

More so, the chapter captures the factors that are key in forging long-lasting peace in the DRC and these include security sector and demobilization, justice, sexual violence, humanitarian assistance by showing how the UN players sought to address these key issues in the DRC. Over and above, the chapter ends by highlighting that the ethnic character of conflicts in the DRC has led to calls for ethical means inherent in African tradition in the idea of Ubuntu to be adopted and infused in CT endeavours. In its totality, the chapter is structured as follows: the first section will gyrate on the regional interventions whereby it will focus on the conflict management mechanisms of SADC and the DRC conflict. In the second section SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence and Security and its role in the 1998/9 Allied Forces Intervention in the DRC as well as the interface between the DRC and SADC after the Allied Forces will be captured. The third section basically gives an appreciation of the SADC OPDS’ security strategy’s (SIPO II) successes and/ or achievements in DRC. In addition to the achievements, the section also highlights the weaknesses of the OPDS in executing its duties in the region. The fourth section focuses on CT where it analyses conflict drivers and drivers to peace in the DRC. In the fifth section. The concern will be on the efficacy of the UN and Donor Policies as well as SADC’s support of the FIB, the International Criminal Court (ICC) and Conflict Analysis and DDR.

\textsuperscript{48} October 2010, the first continental exercise of this kind was conducted in Addis Ababa with the aim of evaluating the operational readiness of the ASF. The exercise, dubbed AMANI AFRICA I, Command Post Exercise provided the climax to a two-year training and capacity building cycle designed to evaluate the effectiveness of the African Union Commission, through the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), to employ the ASF for an AU mandated peace support operation. The AMANI AFRICA cycle was a collaborative effort between the African Union and the European Union, as part of the implementation of an ongoing strategic partnership between the two organisations. AMANI AFRICA I focused mostly on validating policies and processes, at the continental strategic level, in employing the African Standby Force within the broader African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It provided objective evidence to support proposals for further organizational and operational developments of training, procedures and multidimensional capacities of the African Standby Force - http://www.peaceau.org/en/topic/amanaifrica-ii-exercise-cycle.
4.2 Regional Interventions: SADC Conflict Management Mechanisms and the DRC Conflict

The Southern African Development Community is a 15 member regional organisation composed of: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe as shown in the map in Fig1.1 below.

![Fig 4.1 Map of SADC Member States](http://www.google.co.zw/imgres?imgurl. Accessed 16/11/12)

Analyzing the emergence of SADC, Goma (2003) extensively examines the prospects of a security community being established in southern Africa although he recognised that it was still in its nascent stages. A security community is “a region in which a large-scale use of violence (such as war) has become very unlikely or even unthinkable,” (Tusicisny 2007:425-449). The importance of security matters, at least in their sense as military security were to lose importance due to the spillover effects of functionalistic approach to regional organization by SADC adopted in its Constitutive Treaty of 1992 and the subsequent which proposed a sectoral approach to integration under the following sectors Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment; Infrastructure and Services; Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources; and the Social and Human Development and Special Programmes (Nieuwkerk 2008). The SADC had played a key role in this region. Its participation in bringing an end to colonialism and apartheid in many countries in the region was well recognised. Today, that organisation continues to play a pivotal role in conflict resolution and development of Member States. In particular, the SADC had played an important role in Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. SADC has
various organs including the SADC Heads of State and Government summit and the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security.

In line with this notion of community security there is also a striking concept of regionalism that is worth assessing. According to Nye (1968) as cited by Mansfield and Solingen (2010:13) regionalism is the formation of interstate associations or groupings on the basis of regions. Regions are frequently defined as groups of countries located in the same geographical space (Rana 2007; Mansfield and Solingen 2010). This definition captures the notion of physical geographical space but the spectrum of regions has now widened to include behavioural, constructivist, functional and cognitive dimensions. This captures the multidimensional facets of regions. In further buttressing the notion, Deutsch et al (1957) view high levels of interdependence across multiple dimensions including economic transactions, communications and political values between and among states that are geographically proximate. Furthermore, Riedel (www.summerchool.eu) connotes that regionalism is a tendency in international relations characterised by the intensification of co-operation through the increase of institutional and non-institutional, formal and informal interrelations among countries belonging to some geographical area.

This definition underscores the role of state and non-state actors in forging these mutual interactions. In this vein it can be underscored that regionalism is an expression of a common sense of identity and purpose combined with the creation and implementation of institutions that express a particular identity and shape collective action within a geographic region. These nations should interact extensively and they must have shared perceptions of various phenomena. Regionalism aims to exhibit traits of mutual interdependence. In line with these definitions it can be noted that regionalism is a process that is political and is punctuated by co-operation and policy co-ordination. SADC as a regional body is a region on its own and it serves to safeguard the interests of its members and the DRC is one of those members. Collectivism whilst it is pronounced at the UN level, it must trickle down or be transmitted to regions. In line with this, Article 34 (1) in Chapter V of the UN Charter clearly vests the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security with the Security Council; the Charter provides a conspicuous role for regional organisations and arrangements in the maintenance of peace and security in their respective regions.
Under Chapter VIII, Article 52 (1)\(^{49}\) gives the regional players the much needed liberty, mandate and room to take regional action when dealing with matters of international peace and security. Accordingly, it proceeds to invite Member States entering into such arrangements or disputes through such regional arrangements or constituting such agencies to “make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council”. This means that the DRC should have firstly referred its disputes to either the SADC or the ICGLR to which it is a regional member. In this scenario, the UNSC (2016) reiterates that the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the SADC, and the African Union (AU) should collectively work together in a complementary stance to restore peace and security in eastern DRC by encouraging the Government of the DRC to ensure continuous close cooperation with these and other international parties. In the process, these regional players should be guided by the need to uphold and respect the basic principles of peacekeeping, including consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, and recognising that the mandate of each peace-keeping mission is specific to the need and situation of the country concerned as well as reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the DRC as well as all States in the region and emphasising the need to respect to the fullest the principles of non-interference, good-neighbourliness and regional cooperation (UNSC 2016:6).

The UN can in certain circumstances delegate the peace enforcement role to regional players. Accordingly Chapter VII, Article 53 (1), provides that the Security Council, “shall where appropriate, utilise such regional arrangements and agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council.” In conducting the peacekeeping activities, these respective regional agencies must aim to consistently furnish and update the UNSC as to the activities being undertaken and the progress thereof. This is enshrined in Article 54, which provides that the Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security. Regional players (SADC included) have a role to promote the security of its Member States.

\(^{49}\)Article 52 stipulates that: “nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations”.

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While the rest of SADC has moved to concentrate more on human security or the critical security paradigm, the DRC conflict has necessitated the use of the traditional concept of security. DRC joined SADC in 1997 at the height of a political coup that continued a protracted conflict that remains recurrent. It is essential to highlight that SADC is coming on not to start or to fuel a conflict but is coming on board as a budding regional organisation with the aim of developing and changing the course of history for a region terrorised by foreign domination. Stemming from the unguarded quest for expansion by colonial Europe, the Great Lakes region like the rest of Africa has been shown in the preceding chapter to have been thrown into a vicious circle of unending conflict. The cataclysm of colonisation and its dislocating anthropological effects were to have more damning effects in the process of decolonisation. This process involved the delimitation of borders and the rediscovery of the African identity. The DRC borders, as with most African borders became contested territory and a place for internecine armed conflict as on the border of Eritrea and Ethiopia. The ensuing chaos transformed the Great Lakes region into the inferno it has become. It is very important to highlight decolonization before getting much deeper into the detail of a series of attempts to stop the conflict. The conflict has run for so long that one can mistake the informing principles in the myriad of detail; which principles shape the interpretations of interveners. This actually helps to figure out if it is the same conflict recurring or if it has mutated and there are now totally different conflicts. It is therefore imperative to analyse the efforts made by SADC through its Organ on Politics, Defence and Security in forging peace in the DRC in general and the eastern DRC in particular.

4.2.1 SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security

A key document guiding conflict resolution in SADC is the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security. The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) was formed in June 1996. The SADC OPDS was formed from the SADC Treaty and the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ- eventually all this effort culminated in the SADC Defence Pact (Ngoma 2003). It is mandated with cooperation, defence, crime prevention, intelligence, peace-keeping, conflict management and human rights in SADC member states. Tawengwa in the Herald of 20 July 2014 notes that “the organ is mandated to deal with inter and intrastate conflicts and can use means such as preventative diplomacy, negotiations, conciliation, mediation, arbitration and as a means of last resort- force.” This mandate justifies the role of the Organ in trying to eliminate recurrent conflict in the DRC.
The recurrent conflict in the DRC is one arena which can help one understand the SADC conflict resolution mechanism. The DRC tests both the interstate and intrastate nature of conflict resolution mechanisms in southern Africa. Probably it is Africa’s first modern regional war involving about five countries: Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe. The OPDS is useful in SADC’s response to several conflicts facing the region in member states such as in Madagascar, Zimbabwe and Angola. Nevertheless, Angola, the DRC, Madagascar and Seychelles have not ratified the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security.

SADC; main mechanism for conflict resolution, the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Defence and Security (SIPO)\(^{50}\) II has targeted the very roots in shortages, hunger and unemployment to avert the effects of the adage: a hungry man is an angry man. SIPO II is titled “SADC strategy for Economic Transformation: Leveraging the Regions Diverse Resources and Sustainable Economic and Social Development,” (www.sadc.intl). Tawengwa (20 July 2014) notes that “SIPO II is a strategic document that establishes SADC’s institutional framework for policy coordination and implementation in politics, defence and security. It was initially developed in 2003 and modified in 2012.” It therefore needs to be strengthened with greater emphasis on issues such as food security and production.

It also seems SIPO II seeks the transformation of vicious circles created by colonisation into virtuous circles. The vicious circle is based on what Hyland (1995:247) citing Michel’s (1911) book entitled Political Parties called “the iron law of oligarchy” whose internal logic is that oligarchies tend to recreate themselves even after power has changed hands. It is noted that “extractive political institutions lead to extractive economic institutions which enrich a few at the expense of the many. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012:308) define the virtuous circle as “a powerful process of positive feedback that preserves institutions in the face of attempts to undermine them and in fact, sets in motion forces that lead to greater inclusiveness.” Clearly, it is based on constraints or limitations placed on the exercise of power and its pluralistic distribution. This would then give rise to inclusive economic institutions thereby empowering a

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\(^{50}\)The Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Defence, Politics and Security is key the implementation framework for the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (1999). This Protocol is based on the over-arching Objectives and Common Agenda of SADC as stated in Article 5 of the SADC Treaty, and is directly linked to the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), which is considered to be the blueprint for development in the region. This is the reason d’être for formulating the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO). The SIPO is not an end in itself. Instead, it is an enabling instrument for the implementation of the SADC developmental agenda embodied in the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP). The core objective of the SIPO therefore, is to create a peaceful and stable political and security environment through which the region will endeavour to realise its socio-economic objectives (www.sadc.org).
broader segment of society by almost equal distribution of income and leveling capabilities in the political arena. It drastically reduces the gains of usurping power and lessens the attraction of reproducing extractive political institutions.

4.2.1.1 The 1998/9 Allied Forces Intervention

In reaction to Ugandan and Rwandan military activity in the DRC against Laurent Kabila Angola, DRC, Namibia and Zimbabwe in a “coalition of the willing” believed the DRC was being invaded and stepped in to protect a recognised sovereign government in a military operation called Operation Sovereign Legitimacy (Cawthra 31). The paucity of states involved 3 against 11 (SADC had 14 member states at the time may lead to the questioning of whether this was a SADC intervention or an Allied Intervention as it is normally called). The number may not mean much in this case considering the historical circumstances, that the operation was a result of a SADC OPDS’s Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) meeting and the most countries that did not participate did not do so mostly because they were ambivalent or averse to the use of force as a conflict resolution tool. A Committee of Four Ministers were sent on a fact finding mission but hostilities broke out before they could make their presentation and the ISDSC met at the level of Defence Ministers and decided that countries able to do something should do so.

Namibia mobilised; Zimbabwe troops and armor began to be airlifted from Manyame Airbase, Angola military equipment and personnel moved from Cabinda. It was also a SADC war when one compares Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) which intervened in Sierra Leone and Liberia which was composed of five of the sixteen Economic Community of West African States Monitoring (ECOWAS) members. Cracks in SADC emerged in the disagreement between Zimbabwe as SADC Chair wanting stronger action in the DRC and South Africa under Nelson Mandela still trying to unshackle itself from the manacles of apartheid pushing for negotiations. Mandela who was to later retract his arguments against military intervention had argued that the DRC was not under invasion from Uganda and Rwanda and therefore did not agree with military intervention since it was an internal conflict (Punungwe 1999:149). The decisiveness of President Mugabe as Chairperson of the SADC OPDS saved the administration in Kinshasa despite the fears of some that an armed response might be difficult to control. SADC had a choice to either watch the DRC government fall or to stand by the government. The Allied Forces had upheld the SADC 1995
Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) resolve against forceful change of government.

It is probably this uncertainty and lack of resoluteness by some SADC Member States that probably led the DRC not to ratify the Protocol on the OPDS, as claimed by the International Crisis Group (2012:6):

The military intervention in the DRC by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe in 1998 left SADC divided on the necessity of such action. Kinshasa is therefore wary that the organisation may not have capacity and willingness to come to its rescue should such need arise again. The SADC summit seems to have confirmed this in August 2012 when it refused to make any clear commitment following a request by the DRC to deploy a neutral force along the Rwanda/DRC border to fight against the M23 (23 March movement) armed groups. SADC’s limited military capacity may therefore explain the DRC’s reluctance to ratify the pact.

Following, the assassination of Laurent Kabila the critical moments that followed were supervised by the Allied Forces until the tottering the DRC government recovered its position. The domino effect of uncontrolled illegal removals of government had been triggered by the forceful removal of the pre-colonial political structures in DRC. The very first local efforts to end the conflict where by the Congolese people fighting colonialism. Recognising its intrusive and degrading nature it was fought nail and tooth at first by backward means in the native states. After defeat, resistance continued in loose political formations until the emergence of political protégés such Patrice Lumumba and Tshombe. Lumumba as noted by Gott (1997) taking the Marxist perspective believed that the proper response of the colonised was to overthrow the very cause of conflict and that was imperialism. However, manipulating fissures in the decolonisation movement a group under Mobutu Seseko thought otherwise.

The totalitarian administration that was to follow for the next forty years necessitated the mutation of independent political element’s into an armed group movement under Laurent Kabila in Uganda. All armed groups united under Kabila. Upon taking power in Kinshasa the armed groups in Kabila’s camp, both under the father and later under the son Joseph Kabila, felt marginalised and regrouped to continue to fight for what they believed was the genuine DRC identity no matter how resource wars and greed distorted that. Eventually, meetings between the internal DRC belligerents took place and the interventions have tended to emphasise the need to democratise the politics, economy and society for there to be lasting peace. It is important to note that “in as much as there has been a massive regional and international response it is felt that it is largely this very level of analysis that is critical to the successful transformation and
resolution of the DRC conflict,” (Punungwe 1999). The intervention was coming in to stop a cycle but the conflict had become so endemic that it needed much more than a military prescription. Subsequent events showed the character of the international system, the extent to which Ubuntu had been eroded and how such a return to Ubuntu meant more than a sentimental appeal but also a resources case especially for the proponents of peace.

4.2.2 DRC and SADC after the Allied Forces

The countries that intervened received a backlash from the international community especially Zimbabwe already simmering with internal political and economic challenges. The EU was the first to issue threats of sanctions (Punungwe 1999:154). From 2002 Zimbabwe was prevented from accessing international lines of credit under a sanctions administration upheld by an EU Appeals Court in 2015 (NewsDay 22 April 2015). Understandably, under the prevailing international order all activity has to be under the ambit of the United Nations (UN) Charter. While some radical ideas questioned the rationale of African states acceding to the UN Charter signed between 1944 and 1945 that question becomes redundant, academic even frivolous and vexatious looking at how the UN web grips the world. Whether it is the African Union, the Maghreb Region, the Asia Pacific countries, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Union of South American Nations, they all stand guided by Article 52:2 of the UN Charter where regional members “shall make every effort to achieve peaceful settlements of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.” This is realism or realpolitik in the Thucydides, Hans Morgenthau or Edward Harlet Carr sense since it is delegated authority. It is an unfair social contract of the Hobbesian and Machiavellian kind that masks an African cry for the

51 Article 52 under Chapter VIII on Regional Arrangements highlights the following:

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve peaceful settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.
3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of peaceful settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.
reformation of the United Nations which position is ably and unequivocally enunciated in the Ezulwini Consensus.

No matter the claim of independence by the African regional bodies, Article 53. 3 Chapter VII of the Charter “the Security Council shall where appropriate, utilise such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement actions under its authorities.” This is an almost unassailable position unapologetically used to facilitate foreign intervention. For example, there are about 1700 French troops in Mali and move to Chad and Niger for counter terrorism despite ECOWAS. More foreign intervention may logically be expected in the conflicts in Central African Republic, Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and the DRC. NATO’s invasion of Libya in 2011 is one example in which one realises that the African Union is powerless when an African Union delegation was not given the permission to jet in a team of negotiators in a last ditch effort to stop the invasion of Libya. The AU was told that it would be violating a no fly zone. But this too is not a reliable remedy since nations are subject to logrolling and horse trading. Even still the three African countries holding non-permanent positions in the Security Council (Nigeria and South Africa) voted in favor of resolution 1973 a position the African Union was to live to rile. The prevailing situation is an open admission of the superiority of other states, especially the P5 countries, but it may well represent a very real means to administering world security after the big flop of the League of Nations (Carr 1939). However, it’s not all loss, as Smit (2004) noted application of constructive theory and critical theory shows that these regional

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52 The Ezulwini Consensus is a position on international relations and reform of the United Nations, agreed by the African Union. It calls for a more representative and democratic Security Council, in which Africa, like all other world regions, is represented. The consensus is named after Ezulwini, a valley in central Swaziland - with several tourist hotels - where the agreement was made in 2005. The consensus was then adopted at an Extraordinary Session of the Executive Council of the African Union, in March 2005, in Addis Ababa. The African Union, having deliberated at length on the Report of the Highlevel Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, adopted a Common African Position, known as ”The Ezulwini Consensus”.

53 Article 53 which is also under Chapter VIII notes the following:

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilise such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

54 This is composed of the five permanent members (P5) of the UN Security Council (the U.S., China, Russia, France and the United Kingdom). Germany was also included in the engagement of Iran to discuss the Iranian Nuclear project and this led to the P5+1.
bodies can exercise a certain ethical and cultural power by showing lack of political will and solidarity with one another.

This system has been operationalised for SADC and the DRC. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is the only state in the region that continues to experience widespread violence, (Fisher and Ngoma 2005:9). The limits of armed intervention became apparent and peaceful recourse began to be sought. There began a SADC official mediation process led by Zambian President Fredrick Chiluba leading to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 10, 30, and 31 July 1999. In October 1998 the Allied Forces had sensed victory but Allied military setbacks brought back talks and by February 1999 the notification of the Security Council took place leading to the UN Peace keeping force extending their stay in the eastern DRC. In a bid to salvage the situation in pursuit of African solutions to African problems, Libyan President Colonel Qaddafi assembled some of the belligerents in Libya and hammered out the Sirte Agreement with commitment for the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan Troops from DRC being replaced by African peace keepers. President Mbeki had his own DRC Peace Plan that invading and intervening troops remain in their positions for a peace keeping force under neutral command. Faced with all these dilemmas the SADC Organ Gaborone Communiqué established the continuance of President Mugabe as chair against the Protocol’s one year chairmanship rotational system. These were the first clear traces that the regional organization was realising the limits of conflict resolution and began pushing more for methods that entailed conflict transformation.

More conflict resolution approaches at state level continued, although now punctuated by calls to address the deeper issues. Between, 7-8 September 1999 Angola, DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe supported the DRC government in its attempt to open up space “to facilitate internal political dialogue which will take into account the interests of all the citizens of DRC,” (Punungwe 1999:141). On 13- 14 September 1999 SADC Heads of State as a whole “emphasised the need for all political actors in the DRC to commit themselves to orderly and peaceful transition to multiparty democracy, primarily through constructive consultations and negotiations involving all stakeholders, (Punungwe 1999:141). There was failure to agree in Addis Ababa Ethiopia talks.

In retrospect “far from being against dialogue, the Allied Forces had in effect prevented a coup in Kinshasa and given the Congolese People an option of dialogue,” (Punungwe 1999:144) This was to lead to the Sun City Agreement of 2002 under the Inter- Congolese Dialogue which was
a series of talks over 19 months talks. The armed group movement MLC signed the agreement and it was witnessed by South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The armed group RCD-Goma and political opposition Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) led by former Prime Minister Etienne Tshisekedi refused to sign. MLC’s Pierre Bemba was made Prime Minister in the Agreement and it was to lead to the country’s first elections since the 1960 independence. The Sun City Agreement has been criticised for having no stipulations on the integration of the army and Pierre Bemba was opposed. All these efforts were not in vain because they eventually led to the Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DR Congo (GIAT) witnessed by the UN and the AU. It was a far cry from when Laurent Kabila brought peace talks during Mobutu’s reign “to a halt, boycotted the mediator Ketumile Masire and did not cooperate with the UN. The son “without repudiating the mantle of his father has basically undone much of what his father did” accepting President Masire, cooperating with the UN” (August 13 2002, New York Times).

In capturing the regional response to the recurrent conflict in the eastern DRC the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (n.d:5) noted that:

On 9 November 2008, the Heads of State of country members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) agreed to immediately deploy both a team of military experts to assess the escalating violence in the country, as well as an additional team to evaluate the situation on the ground. Importantly, the creation of the UN Intervention Brigade was initiated by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and supported by SADC. Following the M23 rebellion, it was clear to national leaders in the region that something needed to be done in order to address the mounting violence in and around the eastern DRC. As such, Congolese President Kabila used the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICLGR) as a platform for discussion by convening a series of meetings that resulted in the Kampala peace talks. On 24 February 2013, a UNSC-brokered peace agreement between the ICGLR Heads of State was signed by Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, the DRC, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Formally called the “Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework for DRC and the Region,” the Agreement emphasised issues of sexual violence and displacement, among other human rights abuses, and noted that progress begins with the cessation of violence. Importantly, the Agreement recognised the distinct yet interdependent roles of actors from the DRC, within the region, and within the international community. At the country level, the DRC agreed to work

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55 The Rally for Congolese Democracy–Goma (RCD-Goma) was a faction of the RCD (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie, or Rally for Congolese Democracy), a rebel movement based in Goma, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) during the Second Congo War (1998–2003). After the war, some members of the group continued sporadic fighting in North Kivu. The movement also entered mainstream politics, participating in democratic elections with little success.

56 The Union for Democracy and Social Progress (Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social, UDPS) party was created in 1982. It is led by Étienne Tshisekedi and it is believed that Jacquemain (or Jacquemin) Shabani is secretary general of the UDPS. In addition, Kahungu Mbemba Raymond as assistant secretary general of the UDPS and Albert Moleka is the chief of staff and spokesperson for Étienne Tshisekedi. UDPS is “the main opposition party” in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) [www.refworld.org].
towards decentralization and further structural reform. Regional players promised to respect one another’s sovereignty, but to also increase cooperation between states.

As a result, the FDLR still remains the region’s largest security concern, according to a December 2014 UN-Secretary-General report on the DRC. A July 2014 meeting between the ICGLR and the SADC, installed a six-month deadline for the FDLR to disarm, threatening military consequences should the group fail to comply. In October of 2014, three months later, a UN Group of Experts and MONUSCO have determined that the FDLR has continued to recruit and organise troops, indicating that the group is not on a path of demobilization (International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect n.d:5)

4.2.3 Achievements of SIPO II in DRC

Some of the achievements of SIPO II since its inception in 2004 for the DRC case study therefore include facilitating defence and security cooperation among SADC countries. This was largely because SIPO II increased the commitment towards collective self-defence through the SADC Mutual Defence Pact. The Intervention Brigade by the UN has also shown the importance of a SADC Standby Force which has then been operationalised under SIPO II. SIPO II promoted regional police cooperation to enhance the fight against organised crime and illegal cross border activities through the integration of the Southern African Police Chiefs Cooperation (SARPCCO) into the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee. For DRC this has the distinct advantage for curbing international crime in a conflict zone—where illegal trade in precious minerals, arms and human trafficking is rampant. The establishment of the Regional Early Warning Centre, tasked with the anticipation, prevention, and management of conflicts is being used to further understand the direction of the conflict and to guide the response of SADC. The establishment of the SADC Electoral Advisory Council and the Mediation Unit, tasked with dealing with the political, governance and observation of elections has been a crucial factor in the management of the DRC elections in 2011 such as pushing for international best practices for free and fair elections.

4.2.4 Weaknesses of the OPDS

Despite the high moral ground SADC is broke. Its role has largely been limited to moral support in meetings and making ethical claims which at times have not been supported by requisite action. Except for the Allied Forces intervention in 1998, the United Nations has taken over all military operations mostly with the active support of SADC. The OPDS has however been criticised for being underfunded and being legally non-binding (Tawengwa in the Herald of 20
July 2014). It has not been put to the test. However, the distinct advantage noted by Tawengwa (ibid) in this complex security setting is that unlike other regions in Africa that have had to rely on foreign troops. Nigeria has sought international help in dealing with Boko Haram especially after the abduction of 234 girls in Borno state, SADC’s strong historical record in championing Pan-Africanism, African liberation and independence has evolved a proud military tradition and ethos that is against beggar thy neighbor approaches into a brother’s keeper safe neighborhood. While international aid remains present it is not the instinctive bunker.

4.3 DRC Conflict Mapping

The DRC conflict has a number of deep seated problems which are more suitable to the procedures of SIPO 11 than to SIPO 1. Interstate conflict around DRC thrives on the intrastate conflict. The internal conflict reveals the role of natural resources especially minerals and to a lower extent timber in pushing the conflict. The character of the conflict refers to causes such as: ethnic grievances and clashing identities; state fragility (inter elite power struggles); land and natural resources conflict (Matthieu and Willame 1998); regionalised war context especially on neighboring countries (Clark 2002); and absence of social service, decentralization, rule of law and the political economy. After the series of peace Agreements in 1999, Addis Ababa and Sun City in 2002 there was optimism to resolution of the conflict. There was hope since 2003 but there was no service delivery improvement or institution building. Government policy interventions included decentralization in the reform of government, provincial distribution and within the state administration. The fiscal rearrangements of 2006/7 brought in provincial governors and a claim that 40% of revenue collected in a province would be managed by the province.

There were human rights violations including the killing of civilians, property rights violations and the sexual violence (UN Human Rights Commission Report). In a weak administrative environment context impunity reigned in the state (Vlassenroot and Romkema 2007). There are many uncontrolled armed groups such that the peace process had to involve the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of repatriation and rehabilitation (DDRRR) of armed non-state actors in Kivu provinces. These groups include the Rwandan (FDLR) and in 2005 the Ugandan Lord Resistance Army operated from Garamba National Park. CNDP linked to Rwanda also developed “privatised security” armed groups. There were also ethnic militias created for self defence and perpetuating self-interest. Subsequently, there has been the “proliferation of and trafficking of small arms and light weapons, a dynamic against which donors have deployed
considerable financing to address through the DDRRR (DDRRR)\textsuperscript{57} and security sector reforms (SSR) initiatives (Channel Research, 2011:45). It has been claimed that there is the slow reform of police, army and justice system (Boshoff et al 2009). It is equally important to briefly discuss the conceptual and operational framework of the DDRRR.

Hopes of economic revival in DRC were based on natural resources exports. Parliament brought in a new forestry and mining code which led to the revision of contracts. China came in with huge contracts for infrastructure development. However, this expected economic recovery was dashed by the 2008 economic depression which saw a drop in prices. This was further complicated by problems with revision of mining contracts, the failure to reform public finance, bad publicity for the country, and resource curse as violence erupted around natural resources particularly in the East. The vicious circle was really cemented by small scale mining which contributes 90% of production such that the deregulated nature of the industry easily leads to abuse and illegality (World Bank 2008). According to the World Bank (2008) 14-16% of the DRC population depends on it. In North Kivu there was also evidence of logistical and military support from Rwanda for the “Nkunda War” which was a resource competition spurred by General Laurent Nkunda (Human Rights Watch 2005).

4.3.1 Conflict drivers and Drivers to Peace

In as much as the DRC conflict has causes stemming from as far back as the colonisation and most of its current problems stem from its decolonization efforts such that it may be useful to separate the causes of the conflict from the drivers of the conflict. Drivers are distinct from causes in that they are “events and trends that have a relationship to the situation,” these are like the immediate causes that fuel the conflict daily (Channel Research, 2011:47). They include unresolved land issues, for example the return of Tutsi’s in South and North Kivu; land struggles in Ituri (Vlassenroot and Huggins 2005). Secondly, there is uneven pressure on mining companies especially in Ituri and Kivu where there are local and regional elites controlling the areas thereby leading to eclectic security and tax structures. The subsequent rent seeking

\textsuperscript{57} DDRRR stands for disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation and rehabilitation. The objective of the DDR process is to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin. The DDR of ex-combatants is a complex process, with political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions. It aims to deal with the post-conflict security problem that arises when ex-combatants are left without livelihoods or support networks, other than their former comrades, during the vital transition period from conflict to peace and development. Through a process of removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society, DDR seeks to support male and female ex-combatants and men, boys, women and girls associated with armed forces and groups, so that they can become active participants in the peace process (www.unddr.org).
practices are damaging for long lasting peace (Raeymaekes 2007). Thirdly, the peace process is complicated by parallel structures between army and territorial administration in resources such as coltan, gold, olfranite and cassiterite. This “continually risks turning the Congolese army into a coalition of semi-autonomous military economic structures,” (Channel Research, 2011:48).

Fourthly, unemployment is high such that the DRC needs more than aid projects necessitated by conflict but lasting social investments which can only be possible and sustainable in peace. Fifthly, there has been the breakdown in political dialogue. Government has had limited capacity to administer the area and there has been high corruption. Local level administration is largely absent in Ituri for example.

The DDR process in DRC has also been sluggish. It is a key donor issue but a small number of combatants have been reintegrated. There was demobilization in 2004 and National DDR (2005 and 2007) which saw 20 000 combatants being demobilised. By 2011, two thousand out of a target of 28 000 had been demobilised and registered in Luberizi and Kaleh in South Kivu, (Channel Research, 2011:50). The DDR process has been criticised for not having livelihoods alternatives; failing to address the causes and communities concerns; and the absence of transitional justice mechanisms between communities (Channel Research, 2011:50).

The further inadequacy of conflict resolution became evident in the paradox that was caused by the peace process. The AMANI peace process produced a new balance of power in South and North Kivu (Puyebroeck 2008). The 2009 agreement led to rearmament. The process reintroduced a rational for mobilization through the money compensation in exchange for disarmament, “a compensation mechanism as a disarmament incentive actually became an incentive to create, or pretend to control, violent armed groups,” (Channel Research, 2011:50). Smaller factions became larger ones and over 40 new militias developed in North and South Kivu since the Amani peace talks. This shows how conflict resolution methods can be unsuitable for a deep seated conflict such as the DRC conflict.

4.4 United Nations and Donor Policies

The nature of the DRC conflict therefore required more than the 1998 intervention by SADC states. As the political, humanitarian and military bill spiraled, a UN peacekeeping force (MONUC) took over from SADC against Mbeki’s leave the SADC troops in DRC approach and Qaddafi’s set up an African peace keeping force approach. The financial constraints and political opposition encountered by the Allied forces from fellow SADC countries and from the
international community took their toll. Hence forth SADC became a spectator, commentator and heckler. It only spoke from the terraces and continued to learn while developing its systems. The United Nations came on board and its efforts became a stumbling block to SADC’s realization of peace in the eastern DRC.

The UN was not coming alone but with a host of partners. The donors are important in that they poured funds into the UN campaign and did most of the other intervention that was not military. An evaluation by Channel Research (2011) conveniently chose to begin an assessment of donor policies in 2002 at the end of the Second Congo War and dividing the donor policies into two phases. The first phase begins after the Sun City Agreement (2002) up to the 2006 elections, and the second phase starting from 2006. The first saw re-engagement in diplomatic relations and development programmes. The result was that a Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme began including the national and international partners numbering 40 and targeting 350 000 combatants for reintegration in 7 countries centered on DRC. The role of SADC became largely that of facilitating dialogue and setting ethical parameters.

The international partners of SADC did what SADC could never do. Between 2002 and 2010 they brought in about US$1.5 billion in Official Development Aid (ODA). The region has its economic challenges for example key countries pushing for peace such as Zimbabwe had a sovereign debt of over 10 billion dollars. Having the money also had its complications as local partners in DRC felt that decisions were now made in capitals and embassies, there was no transparency in donor funds, the state was not funded and the contracts were the preserve wealthier such that it undermined the state. Donors on their part developed the perception that the state was weak, corrupt and lacked capacity. The money was a critical ingredient in stopping poverty and pushing development, such that these other problems are issues which SADC and DRC could swallow just like they had done over the accession to the UN Treaty.

Lack of adequate funding was purportedly a negative force that militated against SADC programming- a situation that necessitated the vultures of the aid industry to descend upon DRC. There was no policy to coordinate the donors and eventually when they were devised the coordination efforts clashed with each other. Absence of a policy strategy complicates the effectiveness of interventions as with Afghanistan, Kosovo, Rwanda and Somalia (Danida 1996). The 2007 Accra Action Plan recognised this deficit and decided China to be included as a new development actor in the donor framework but the World Bank chose to remain outside the framework. The result was the multiplication of consultation forums, especially when it is
considered that churches and mining companies also had their own intervention. In 2006 there was a (Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme) PRSP separate from the Country Assistance Framework (CAF) with 17 donors and 15 thematic groups such that both programs ran parallel to each other (Channel Research, 2011: 64). At the same time the DRC government managed a multi-donor fund and programme called STAREC - a plan for the stabilization and reconstruction of war affected areas with three priorities “security and restoration of the state; humanitarian assistance and social service delivery; economic recovery,” (Channel Research, 2011:65). The result was that the official and probably meaningful processes suffered lack of funds. For example, the UN Stabilization Strategy (UNSS) of 2008 renamed to International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy (ISSSS) experienced low donor participation. It needed 800 million dollars but by mid-2010 only had 160 million dollars in pledges, (Channel Research, 2011:66). There is therefore a multiplicity of policies and coordination schemes despite the DRC being a signatory to the Paris Declaration (2005). SADC could only watch with occasional sneers.

Even on a research level SADC only watched as those that had research funds carried out conflict analyses and conflict mapping workshops. The organizations included Swedish international Development Co-operation Agency (SIDA), Department for international Development (DFID) and Clingendael among others. Research produced was eventually of little use for aid agencies and general intervention even by SADC programming because findings were not widely circulated and at times there would have been the use of information from wrong respondents. Before 2007, donors did not allocate resources to conflict interventions related to the natural resources because they felt there was no relationship between the natural resources and conflict in DRC. Gender inequality was also not considered. Probably, the peripheral role of SADC was to manifest itself in the absence of theory as funders and implementing organizations as private and not public enterprise did not link their activities to policy objectives and did not carry out conflict sensitivity analyses. In the absence of proper impact analyses SADC could not follow or monitor the interventions in DDR/SSR, support to CSO’s, peace education, humanitarian aid and refugees.

4.4.1 Security Sector and Demobilisation

The result of the conflict is that there are several militarised populations in DRC and a bloated military such that Eusec Census established 120 000 soldiers, (Channel Research, 2011:94). Conflict also spurred by the Tutsi Congolese returning for example in the form of Laurent
Nkunda and the unregulated mineral industry led further militarization. Militarization around aid was an opportunistic behavior out of greed and a survival strategy. Security Sector Reform followed the Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition (GIAT 2003) where donors pushed for a stronger role for DDR and SSR programming. The result was that salaries increased and were paid on time and to those being demilitarised “funds were allocated … as immediate support (US$100 lump sum plus 12 months staggered payments of US$25 with income generating activities of between US$150 and US$250),” (Channel Research 2011:94). Due to limitations of ODA funding for security related matters most interventions for DDR have been of a technical nature: increasing income generating opportunities, rehabilitating army camps, border police strengthening, and purchasing of police resources. The DDR and SSR interventions were largely implemented in a very difficult context characterised by a fragmented peace process, continuous insecurity, political interference and weakened government without capacity to fully participate in the process.

In a bid for SADC to strengthen the security sector of the DRC there is need for the provision of good offices, advice and support to the Government of the DRC to encourage and accelerate national ownership of security sector reform by the Government of the DRC, including through developing a national strategy for the establishment of effective and accountable security institutions, as well as the development of a clear and comprehensive SSR implementation roadmap including benchmarks and timelines, and play a leading role in coordinating the support for SSR provided by international and bilateral partners and the United Nations system (UNSC 2016).

4.4.2 Justice

Apart from the DDR and SSR more linked to conflict resolution the other areas of interventions were largely in areas much more in the concept of conflict transformation. The 2008 Action Plan involved the administration of justice to stop impunity. (International Centre for Transitional Justice et al 2008). The idea has been for the restoration of the Rule of Law and justice, Security Sector Reform and essential infrastructure reconstruction such as prisons through projects such as the REJUSCO initiative. Most of the interventions made are emergency interventions to put some semblance of justice hence some, like Kivu lawyers felt some projects were imposed on them such that key issues such as land were at times left out of the intervention for justice and conflict transformation. A major weakness in allowing civil
society to go ahead of government is that it eventually leads to the weakening of the government. The exclusion of the government becomes a source of distortion.

4.4.3 Sexual Violence and Humanitarian Assistance

Due to the violent nature of the armed conflict huge chunks of people were ripped from their settlements and displaced. In the process sexual violence against girls and women was reported as having been perpetrated by warring sides in particular the armed groups. The use of child soldiers became an issue with the UN such that several of the armed group leaders stand accused of that offence. One of them is Bosco Ntaganda and the M23. The involvement of humanitarian organizations increased access to psychosocial care. The hunger that followed led to free distribution of food which has the capacity to disrupt local production capacity although one needs to underline that it is the war which undermines that capacity. However, programs such as OXFAM’s Solidarite projects aim self-sustainability. International NGO’s also stand accused of not conducting conflict analyses in the intervention areas in violation of universal humanitarian aid standards. The humanitarian organizations take on role local authorities are unable to do in a context where there is “generalised privatization of public sector services.” In a bid to do away with sexual violence the UNSC (2016:13) connotes that there is need to come up with the necessary measures to ensure full compliance of MONUSCO with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuses and to keep the Council fully informed through his reports to the Council about the Mission’s progress in this regard, and urges troop- and police-contributing countries to take appropriate preventative action including predeployment awareness training, and to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel.

According to the UNSC (2016:9) there are demands that all parties to the DRC conflict should allow and facilitate the full, safe, immediate and unhindered access of humanitarian personnel, equipment and supplies and the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance to populations in need, in particular to internally displaced persons, throughout the territory of the DRC, respecting the United Nations guiding principles of humanitarian assistance and relevant provisions of international law should be a priority in the peace-building initiatives of the regional and international players. In addition, calls have been made on all Member States of to generously contribute to the United Nations humanitarian appeal for the DRC to help ensure that United Nations humanitarian agencies and other international organizations are fully
funded and able to address the protection and assistance needs of internally displaced people, survivors of sexual violence, and other vulnerable communities in the DRC.

4.5 SADC’s Support of the First Ever Force Intervention Brigade

SADC is not the only institution that has been accused of failing to stop the conflict. Its successor, the UN through its MONUC and later United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) also experience serious setbacks. The retaking of Goma in 2012 led to questions on whether the UN should wage war to make peace. This was an ethical and practical dilemma since its mandate was for peace keeping, but there was no peace to keep. However, in the extremely vicious circle as identified by Acemoglu (n.d) and as played in DRC one can almost pick a Machiavellian disregard for morality and a sophistry disdain for sentimental concerns. The UN responded to fire with fire, the first time in its history in an offensive mandate in which UN (2015) states that:

On 28 March 2013, faced with recurrent waves of conflict in eastern DRC threatening the overall stability and development of the country and wider Great Lakes region, the Security Council decided, by its resolution 2098, to create a specialised “intervention brigade” for an initial period of one year and within the authorised MONUSCO troop ceiling of 19,815. It would consist of three infantry battalions, one artillery and one special force and reconnaissance company and operate under direct command of the MONUSCO Force Commander, with the responsibility of neutralising armed groups and the objective of contributing to reducing the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for stabilization activities. The council also decided that MONUSCO shall strengthen the presence of its military, police and civilian components in eastern DRC and reduce, to the fullest extent possible for the implementation of its mandate, its presence in areas not affected by conflict in particular Kinshasa and in western DRC.

Their first actions they managed was to ensure the withdrawal of M23 armed groups, destruction of four militant factions, disarmament of several armed groups, and capture of arms cache. The armed groups ignored the January 2 deadline resulting in SADC calling out for military action. Reus Smit (2004) notes that moral force is relevant in international relations in condemning abuse. Simbarashe Mumbengegwi in the Herald was quoted saying “this was like the classic case Aristotle attempted to resolve in his Politics and his Ethics only to further continue an argument with Plato that Socrates had with the Sophists, and later that St Augustine and St Aquinas would spur on until the contemporary realists and idealists emerged.” The 2012 taking of Goma is an example of such an attitude. Its mandate allowed use of “all necessary means” against the M23 for the protection of civilians, to enforce an arms embargo and to institute judicial processes. In November 2013 M23 was resoundingly defeated. These actions have emboldened the government to fight the FDLR Hutu armed groups leading to the recapture
by government of Kirumba Kagondo, Kahumiro, Kabwendo, Mugogo, Washing 1 and 2, Kisimba 1,2 and 3 as compared to the 2007 to 2012 situation when they ran away from CNDP armed groups especially in the assaults on Goma.

According to UNSC (2016:13) SADC’s co-operation with the Intervention Brigade has enable these parties to neutralise armed groups in support of the authorities of the DRC, on the basis of information collection and analysis, and taking full account of the need to protect civilians and mitigate risk before, during and after any military operation, carried out targeted at offensive operations. The Intervention Brigade in cooperation with the whole of MONUSCO, either unilaterally or jointly with the FARDC, in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner and in strict compliance with international law, including international humanitarian law, and in accordance with the standing operating procedures applicable to persons who are captured or who surrender, and with the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations-support to non-United Nations, work towards the prevention of the expansion of all armed groups by neutralising these groups, and disarming them in order to contribute to the objective of reducing the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for stabilization activities (UNSC 2016:14).

4.5.1 The International Criminal Court (ICC)

Criticism may be raised over the 18 March 2013 surrender of Bosco “Terminator” Ntaganda and his awaiting trial in The Hague which reflects badly on SADC’s lack of a regional court structure. It could have probably petitioned the African Union. Yet again functioning under Article 52 the Security Council decisions took precedence over SADC. The Rwandan detention of Laurent Nkunda and their holding him is a case in point of how African processes could have handled the capture of Ntaganda. However, it maybe lame to expect the UN system after fighting a hard and costly guerrilla war with the armed groups to then just hand over such a person of interest to African countries.

DRC’s justice system was in shambles and probably his holding in any of the African countries could have destabilised those states most of which have internal strife already. It then presents a paradox on the African position against the ICC elsewhere. The African Union has been critical of the ICC and in October 2013 passed resolutions against heads of state being tried by the ICC (Bekou and Mistry 2014:79-90). Countries such as Zimbabwe, Sudan and the DRC itself have felt uncomfortable with the fact that of the 22 cases from 9 situations before the ICC have all been from Africa (Bekou and Mistry 2014:79-90). It does reveal a weakness in the states and
continents to back up its statements with substance. But be that the case, the lack of resources does not prevent the Africans from making moral judgments on what ought to happen. It is that what ought to happen which informs the spirit of *Ubuntu*, that belief in the inherent goodness of people, which goodness must be protected and upheld as sacrosanct and inviolable despite the lack of resources. Resources are the means to the end, but never the end. The means would never justify the ends.

4.5.2 Conflict Analysis and DDRRR

The SADC Conflict Resolution Mechanism was largely devised for interstate conflict especially under SIPO 1 but has brought in SIPO 2 which has shifted to solving intrastate conflicts. Ethnic character of conflicts for example in DRC has led to calls for the ethical salvation inherent in African tradition in the idea of *Ubuntu*. In this view, the main purpose of the SADC Organ is not as indicated in article 2 (a) to protect people and development, but rather to “protect the state from its people!” The tendency in the region has been adherence to Article 2 of the UN Treaty on the non-violation of internal affairs of sovereign states. In addition, calls have been made on the Government of the DRC to continue to implement and provide without delay appropriate funding to its DDR Plan including with regards to reintegration, training, and preparation for resettlement in communities, as well as to weapons and ammunition management activities, in order to be able to effectively deal with former combatants, including those already under FARDC responsibility and acknowledges that the absence of a credible DDR process is preventing armed elements from laying down their weapons (UNSC 2016).

It is therefore plausible that in the DRC intervention the SADC Organ showed effectiveness in stopping the fall of the government but clearly there remained a gap in the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of the armed group fighting units. SADC has had to resort to diplomacy to fill in this gap by trying to smoother the warring factions in various agreements, which diplomacy has been criticised for being too soft and at times almost complicity- a sort of “brother hood” mentality has then developed in a tendency to cover up for each other and hesitancy to advise and condemn other member states. This has been the difficult Ngoma (2003) picks up over “caging the Lions,” and the “Hawks, Doves, and Penguins,” in SADC. Clearly the idealistic values of *Ubuntu* are thereby playing an inferior role to the primacy of state interest in DRC. This is not just a case of national interest and realism but to a very large extent an issue of resource shortage which severely limits what SADC can do. There is so much commitment as exhibited by the top level summitry diplomacy and the commitment of the entire troop
contingent by three SADC states Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania to the UN Intervention Brigade- but there are just few resources to sustain the independent execution of that will.

4.6 Conclusion

The chapter captured the following sections on regional interventions: SADC’s conflict management mechanisms and the DRC conflict, on SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, the 1998/9 Allied Forces Intervention, on DRC and SADC after the Allied Forces, Achievements of SIPO II in DRC, Weaknesses of the OPDS, DRC Conflict Mapping, Conflict Drivers and Drivers to Peace, UN and Donor Policies, SADC’s support of the FIB, the ICC and Conflict Analysis and DDR. The chapter noted SADC’s intervention mechanisms in the DRC where it was postulated that the recurrent conflict in the eastern DRC has inclined SADC towards conflict security- a shift from the usual human security. This is necessitated by SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defense and Security (OPDS) whose mandate is to foster co-operation, defence, crime prevention and intelligence. In addition SADC has through its main conflict resolution strategy- the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ for Defence and Security (SIPO) II have endeavoured to transform vicious cycles of conflict which came as a result of colonization into virtuous cycles. In 1998/9 the chapter reports that three countries out of the then 14 SADC member states embarked on Allied Forces Intervention mission code-named Operation Sovereign Legitimacy where they fought against Rwandan and Ugandan military activity against Laurent Kabila.

The aftermath of the war saw a series of peace agreements being effected. For example the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement which was then followed by the 2002 Sun City Agreement. These efforts point to the success stories of the SADC. In addition SADC succeeded in facilitating defence and security co-operation among SADC countries as it increased commitment towards collective self defence through the SADC Mutual Defence Pact. However, some shortcomings of SADC operations were noted in that it is divided as was noted in the SADC Allied Forces Intervention as well as SADC’s failure to stop violent conflict in the DRC. In addition the surrender of Bosco Ntaganda for trial in The Hague at the ICC reflects badly on SADC’s lack of a regional court structure. In addition to this the chapter noted that the OPDS is underfunded and legally non-binding thus rendering it ineffective.

The chapter highlighted that the countries that intervened in the 1998/9 DRC war received a backlash from the international community. The current DRC problem was reportedly attributed
to its decolonization efforts which has seen conflict drivers serving as events and trends for fueling unending conflict. Such factors have dampened the conflict resolution efforts in the DRC for example, the sluggish implementation of the DDR as well as the AMANI process bear testimony to the unsuitability of conflict resolution methods for deep-seated conflicts such as the DRC conflict. This has seen the UN and its partners (the international community) emerging and their presence became a stumbling block to SADC’s peacekeeping efforts as it overshadowed the not so resourced SADC and making its role in peace-building programming minimal. Donor funding has generally taken place under the agreed frameworks of SADC and of DRC as a member state. Donors have intervened in the issues of relevance to conflict transformation such as DDR, SSR, service delivery, justice, mining and natural resource extraction, sexual and humanitarian assistance.

SADC’s commitment to resolving the conflict in the face of overwhelming odds is a serious sign in its belief in the principle of Ubuntu, which is in this way a version of the concept of the responsibility to protect. The lived experience of conflict in DRC has engendered certain drivers of conflict that lie beyond military solutions but it is clear that nothing short of military intervention can pave way for conflict transformation methods. This chapter is inclined to note that critical lessons should be taken from the SADC offensive in 1998 and the UN Intervention Brigade in 2013 that all military work must be underlined with addressing key drivers to the conflict such as basic service provision, the establishment of systems of justice, addressing natural resources issues and stopping arms trade. Over and above the concept of Ubuntu and the principle of Collective security will be addressed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER FIVE: TOWARDS THE EFFICACY OF THE AFRICAN ETHIC OF 
UBUNTU AND THE UN CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY ON SADC’S 
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION CAPACITY IN THE EASTERN CONGO

5.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter the study demonstrated that the problem of recurring conflict in eastern DRC is a result of applying peace keeping methods that have proven to be ineffective over and over again. Some of these peacekeeping methods are derived from the UN and the international community and this has resulted in SADC peace efforts being ineffective in bringing about durable peace and security in the eastern DRC and sometimes to the DRC as a whole. For this reason, the aim of this chapter is to argue that the African ethic of Ubuntu is endowed with some ethical characteristics that are applicable to some of the modern peace and security paradigms such as the responsibility to protect and provide collective security.

Western countries, the USA and the UNSC have prescribed Western oriented values such that whilst there has been a scholarly global agreement amongst scholars of security studies, the dominant approach has been mainly Eurocentric. This is whereby the powerful multilateral institutions and countries are looked upon by the poor countries of the world as the only ones that were capable of bringing about peace and security in most of those troubled parts of the world. Sometimes as human rights and democracy as the only available political solutions for the whole world that can only bring about effective peace and security to all parts of the world. Such an approach to peace and security overlooks the reality of cultural and political diversity that exists in the world. In a world characterised by the reality of multiculturalism, and a consciousness that there are diverse ways of dealing with different political situations of conflict, this study argues that the African Ethic of Ubuntu can be applied as a panacea that can bring about effective peace and security in the conflict ridden eastern DRC. It is also the assumption of the study that Ubuntu can be integrating in the contemporary post-colonial African state for security goals and nation building purposes.

As a way of debunking the transatlantic approach to peace and security, the chapter shall argue that the African Ethic of Ubuntu shares the same ethical and political presumption with the UN Collective Security system. As it will be shown later in this chapter, the African Ethical concept of Ubuntu maintains that one’s humanity derives from the humanity of others. Issues of peace and security can only be effectively implemented when there is a common realisation that one’s
wellbeing is inseparable from the humanity of others, and that all of us as human beings are endowed with the responsibility to promote peace and security. Of greatest interest in this study is the issue of commonalities that are shared between the ethic of Ubuntu and the UN Collective Security system as espoused in the UN Charter.

Apart from the introduction, this chapter is comprised of five sections. The first section provides the reader with the definition of Ubuntu. This definition of the ethic of Ubuntu is mainly orientated to the concerns of this chapter – the UN Collective Security system. In the second section of the study proceeds to discuss some of the debates that have arisen on the ethic of Ubuntu after which the study shall deliberately choose the understanding of Ubuntu which is deemed perfectly commensurate with the purposes of this study. The third section will provide a brief succinct discussion of the UN Collective Security system. The fourth section will discuss some of the principles of Ubuntu that are relevant to the UN Collective Security system. The fifth section will be a conclusion to the whole chapter.

5.2 A Conceptual Definition of Ubuntu

The word Ubuntu has its origins among the Bantu peoples of Southern Africa. Among many linguistic scholars the word Ubuntu has been defined as humanness (Samkange and Samkange 1980: 35). Mogobe Ramose defined Ubuntu from a more detailed grammatical analysis where is said that, “Ubuntu is actually two words in one. It consists of the prefix ubu- and the stem ntu. Ubu- evokes the idea of be-ing in general. It is enfolded be-ing before it manifests itself in the concrete form or mode of ex-istence of a particular entity” (Ramose 2005: 36). In this grammatical analysis of Ubuntu it is clear that Ramose is more interested in the metaphysical implications of the word Ubuntu. From a metaphysical perspective the word Ubuntu denotes the idea of becoming. As he put it, “Because motion is the principle of be-ing for Ubuntu do-ing takes precedence over the do-er without at the same time imputing either radical separation or irreconcilable opposition between the two” (Ibid). In this metaphysical conceptualisation, Ubuntu implies an understanding of being as not static but rather becoming – thus implying being in motion as what it means to be human.

It is in becoming or “to actually become a human being” that people are able to judge as to the type of a human being one is. Ramose writes, “What is decisive then is to prove oneself to be the embodiment of ubu-ntu (botho) because the fundamental ethical, social and legal judgement of human worth and human conduct is based upon ubu-ntu. The judgement, pronounced with approval or disapproval respectively, is invariably expressed in these terms: ke motho or gase
In other words, judgement which is given on persons is based on what they do in their day to day relationships with others. Ramose’s metaphysical interpretation of *Ubuntu* was echoed by Nhlanhla Mkhise when he said, “*Ubuntu*, the process of becoming an ethical human being, is the process by which balance or the ‘orderedness of being’…is affirmed. This is realised through relationships characterised by interdependence, justice, solidarity of humankind, respect, empathy and caring. Unethical conduct violates the orderedness of the cosmos” (Mkhise 2008: 36). The main presumption here is that *Ubuntu* is about becoming, a process that manifests itself in what one does in relationships with others. An individual’s humanness is determined by what one does within a communal context. Mkhise put emphasis on the idea that *Ubuntu* is a communal ethic. He writes, “A sense of community exists if people are mutually responsive to one another’s needs” (Mkhise 2009: 39). To be responsive to each other’s needs implies being open to relationships within a social or organisational context. Mkhise went on to emphasise the communal nature of *Ubuntu* when he said,

> South African sayings such as *umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu* (Nguni) or *motho ke motho ka batho babang* (Sotho) point to this relational, interdependent view of the self. Roughly translated, these sayings mean that one attains the complements associated with full or mature selfhood through participation in a community of similarly constituted selves, a community of *abantu* (beings with moral sense). To be is to belong and to participate, it is to be born for the other (*muthu u bebelwa munwe*) as the Xhivenda saying maintains,…(Mkhise 2008: 40).

The implication of the above quotation is that communal participation is vital for the full realisation of one’s personhood. One’s personhood is determined by the way s/he treats others. When s/he treats other people with sympathy, compassion, benevolence and solidarity s/he is considered to be the embodiment of humanness. It is for this reason that some African scholars have defined *Ubuntu* in a way that shows that it is part of virtue ethics. For Marie Samkange and Stanlake Samkange *Ubuntu* could be defined as “The attention one human being gives to another: the kindness, courtesy, consideration and friendliness in the relationship between people; a code of behaviour, an attitude to other people and to life, is embodied in *hunhu* or *Ubuntu*” (Samkange and Samkange 1980: 39 also see Ramose 1999: 52). If *Ubuntu* belongs to the genre of virtue ethics, there are other scholars who maintain that this ethical tradition is universal – hence it is not exclusively an ethic of Bantu speaking people. The idea that *Ubuntu* was not an exclusively an ethic that belongs to Bantu people was expressed by Mvume Dandala as follows,

> The saying *Umuntu ngomuntu ngabantu* (a person is a person because of others) becomes a statement that levels all people. It essentially states that no one can be self-sufficient and that interdependence is a reality of all. …While *Ubuntu* finds most vocal expression, and is inherent, in African culture, it is not exclusively African. It is possible for an African not to have *Ubuntu*,

*motho*” (Ramose 2005: 37).
whereupon people might say *asingomuntu lowo* (that one is not a person), and it is equally possible for non-Africans particularly whites, to show signs of *Ubuntu*, people might say *unobuntu ngathi aythingomlungu* (he/she has *Ubuntu* as if he/she were not a person). Thus, *Ubuntu* is not something one is born with but that can be cultivated and nurtured by anyone (Dandala 2009: 260-261).

The idea that no person is self-sufficient implies that an authentic existence is that type of existence that is based on the realisation that interdependence within social existence is a pervasive reality. It is also important to observe in the light of the above quotation that *Ubuntu*, because of its strong affinity to virtue ethics, it is not exclusively African because any virtuous person can be seen as endowed with *Ubuntu*. Since virtues are cultivated in the formation of character, Dandala maintained that *Ubuntu* has to be cultivated in one’s relationships with other people. Since virtues are cultivated in the formation of character, and *Ubuntu* belongs to the tradition of virtue ethics, it is only logical for us to say that no one is born with *Ubuntu*, but that the individual is described as endowed with *Ubuntu* by cultivating the virtues of *Ubuntu* in one’s own character. According to Michael Boon, *Ubuntu* is an African philosophy that encourages “openness, sharing and welcome” whereby everybody is treated in a way that fosters an ethos of common belonging. But not only that, “*Ubuntu* can be harnessed in the nation-building process” Boon maintained that this nation-building can come in the form of “*tirelo sechaba* (to work for the community)” (Boon 1996: 33-34). Here the implication is that *Ubuntu* does help to create a general national social condition whereby everybody ultimately feels that they belong to each other. In the same vein, Augustine Shutte maintained that *Ubuntu* inculcates into the individual a sense for concern for others. As he put it,

> Probably the most fundamental is the attitude towards others that sees them and treats them as ‘another self’. No distinction is made between their good and one’s own. Everyone, no matter how foreign, is seen as being ‘one of us’ and therefore as having a claim on one’s time and energy. This attitude is the source of marked patience and tolerance of differences in people. It is also the source of the ‘classlessness’ of traditional African society (Shutte 2009: 97).

In the light of the above quotation it can be deduced that *Ubuntu* fosters solidaristic social existence whereby everybody is seen as belonging and having the same claim towards everybody else. In this social existence virtues such as patience and tolerance are thus the defining characteristics of human social relations. The idea that *Ubuntu* is a virtue ethic with some strong bearing on solidaristic social existence was also made by Mluleki Munyaka and Mokgethi Motlhabi when they observed that, “*Ubuntu* is inclusive. Because it is manifested in living in community, it is best realised in deeds of kindness, compassion, caring, sharing, solidarity and sacrifice. Such acts produce positive results for both individuals and community.
They make it possible for an individual to count on and expect the meaningful support of fellow human beings” (Munyaka and Motlhabi 2009: 74). What is implied by Munyaka and Motlhabi is that *Ubuntu* enables the flourishing of the individual and community because of the virtues that are integral to this ethic. Mogobe Ramose argued that the philosophical thinking that undergirds *Ubuntu* does ultimately imply a political social existence that is based on harmonious relations based on equal recognition of the human worthiness of each other in a way that mutually benefit all parties to these relations. Thus Ramose writes, the Sotho saying,

...*motho ke motho ka batho*...means that to be human is to affirm one’s humanness by recognizing the same quality in others and, on that basis, establishing humane relations with them. Its key concept, *Botho*, is understood as being human and having a humane (respectful and polite) attitude towards other human beings. The aphorism rests upon two organically interrelated philosophical principles. The first is that the individual human being is an object of intrinsic value. Were this not so, it would be senseless to base the affirmation of one’s’ humanness on the recognition of the same quality in the other and respect thereof. To denigrate and disrespect another human being is to denigrate and disrespect oneself, only if it is accepted that oneself is an object of worthy of dignity and respect. The second principle is that *motho* (a human being) is truly human only in the context of actual relations with other human beings (Ramose 2009: 420).

Other scholars have characterised *Ubuntu* as the basis of an African ontology. For example, Nkonko Kamwangamalu maintained that, “Sociolinguistically, *Ubuntu* is a multidimensional concept which represents the core values of African ontologies: respect for any human being, for human dignity and for human life, collective sharedness, obedience, humility, solidarity, caring, hospitality, interdependence, communalism, to list but a few” (Kamwangamalu 1999: 25-26). What is implied by Kamwangamalu is that *Ubuntu* is a virtue ethic where the individual’s character in his or her relationship with other people in society remains the crucial determining factor to one’s personhood. Gabriel Setiloane referred to *Ubuntu/Botho* as based on a social understanding of human existence which is common in most of the African cultures South of the Sahara. In this social understanding of human existence, Setiloane maintained that, “Belonging is the root and essence of being. Therefore the whole system of African society and the ordering thereof (law) is based on this” (Setiloane 1986: 10). The social understanding of human existence that is inspired by *Ubuntu* ultimate come to mean that as human beings we are ethical when we have a sense of concern for the wellbeing of others. In this regard we should see their sufferings in an empathetic way because we share the same humanity. However, as we shall see in the following section, some scholars have raised arguments against the ethic of *Ubuntu* from a different array of scholarly perspectives. It needs to said be that the discussion of the debates that have been incited by *Ubuntu* is not exhaustive, rather the study shall pay attention to those scholars whom the chapter deems significant in this debate. The aim here is to
show how these debates contribute to efficacy of Ubuntu as an ethical resource to conflict transformation in a situation of recurring conflict in eastern DRC.

5.3 Some Contemporary Debates on Ubuntu

A popular argument that has been put forward by the critics of Ubuntu is that the communalistic nature of this ethic overshadows the issue of individual responsibility or that it overlooks the reality of individuals as subjects of ethical decision making. Stephen Theron argued against Augustine Shutte’s advocacy of the ethic of Ubuntu on the grounds that the adage Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu which is a proverbial articulation of Ubuntu is incompatible with the notion of individual responsibility. As he put it,

As for the ethical implications, the proverb simply side-steps the slow Western development of the idea of personal responsibility, charted in the Bible and elsewhere, and now known to Africans. Without this consciousness the fruit of technology cannot be enjoyed. The proverb teaches Africans to evade responsibility, rather, to hide behind the collective decision of the tribe (Theron 1995: 35).

The gist of Theron’s critique against Ubuntu is that it undermines the idea that individuals are moral agents who are ultimately responsible for their own decisions. Without individual ownership of their own moral decisions, they can hardly be considered as moral agents who are accountable for their own decisions and actions. Thus for Theron the adage Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu was an encouragement for individual evasion of personal responsibility. Theron’s critique of Ubuntu is based on the presumption that Africans do not have a sense of personal responsibility. I think such a critique fails to realise that the very word Umuntu implies a recognition of the fact that there are individuals who are conscious of themselves as individuals and deliberately decide to have a sense of concern for society. Theron’s argument against Ubuntu displays some element of a general condescending attitude towards Africans in the sense that the argument is based on a salient belief that Africans are not responsible people who are capable of making individual moral decisions, hence the temptation to hide behind the community. Another subtle argument that is proffered by Theron is that the African Ethic of Ubuntu is too ancient and obsolete as to be of relevance to the world of today which has made momentous strides in technological developments. The implication here is that in a modern and technologically advanced world Ubuntu is not relevant. In the same vein, Shutte stated that, “If Africa is to play a part in the worldwide ethical discussion, it cannot be content simply to rehearse its ancient wisdom in the forms in which it was first formulated. It has to find a way of articulating its ethical insights that can engage with a scientific culture” (Shutte 2008: 16).

The argument which is being put forward by Shutte in the above quotation is that African ethical traditions are out of touch with contemporary worldwide ethical discussions which are in line with Western technological developments. What also follows from this way of thinking by implication is that African ethical traditions are not compatible with the modern world. This way of thinking shows some Euro-centric bias because some of the Western ethical traditions such as Utilitarianism and Deontology are always discussed in contemporary ethical discourses
even though these ethical traditions were developed three centuries ago. None of these critics of Ubuntu has ever questioned the relevance of these ancient European ethical traditions in today’s world.

Other critics of Ubuntu such as Wim van Binsbergen argued that “both contemporary Southern Africa, and Ubuntu itself, are among the products of globalisation…” (van Binsbergen 2002). In other words van Binsbergen is claiming that Ubuntu has never existed but came about as a result of globalisation. Van Binsbergen went on to claim that “the majority of the population of Southern Africa today cannot be properly said to know and live Ubuntu by virtue of any continuity with village life. The self-proclaimed experts of Ubuntu form a globally-informed, Southern African intellectual elite who, remote in place and social practice form the emic expressions at the village level which they seek to capture, have officially coined the concept of Ubuntu as a cornerstone of Southern African self-reflexive ethnography” (van Binsbergen 2002). Van Binsbergen relegated Ubuntu as an ethic that belongs to the village life and that an ethic which is only relevant to villagers has no relevance within an urban setting. However, needless to say that Ubuntu remains relevant to the majority of the African people regardless of the context they find themselves. As we have seen in the preceding discussion most of the ethical presumptions of Ubuntu can also be found in Western tradition of virtue ethics as it was systematically developed by Aristotle and is still discussed by scholars up to now.

In the light of the preceding discussion, the arguments that are put forward by the critics of the ethic of Ubuntu are not convincing for us to abandon this ethic as an ethical resource in addressing issues of peace and conflicts in post-colonial Africa. The main concern in the following discussion is to draw on the defining features of Ubuntu with the aim of showing how they can be applied to security problems that have been endemic to the DRC, especially in the Eastern part of DRC. As stated previously, one of the most critical ways of doing this is to connect key points that arise from the ethic of Ubuntu with the aim of coming up with an Afro-centric paradigm of Collective Security system.

5.4 Ubuntu and the UN Collective Security System

As stated previously, the ethic of Ubuntu is based on the presumption that our humanness is indispensable from the humanity of others, and that to be ethical is to have a sense of concern for the wellbeing of others. Here it can be inferred from the ethic of Ubuntu that the experience of peace and security is inseparable from other peoples’ experience of peace and security. It is on the basis of this reason that the UN Collective Security system does theoretically echo the
underlying ethical presumptions of the ethic of *Ubuntu*. Since the chapter has already discussed the meaning of the ethic of *Ubuntu*, in this section I shall provide a brief discussion of the UN Collective Security system with the aim of showing later on how *Ubuntu* provides an ethical basis for pursuit of peace security under this system.

In the UN Charter, Chapter VI there is a strong impression that issues of peace and security in the world should be understood as a collective responsibility of all members of the UN. Scholars of political science have on many occasions relied on this Chapter VI as evidence to the UNSC’s commitment to the idea of Collective Security. In Chapter VI, Article 33, 1-2, it is stated that in cases of disputes, “the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security…” parties to the dispute “shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice”. It is evidently clear that Article 33 is based on the assumption that issues of peace and security should be firstly dealt with by the parties to the dispute and in case failure, resort should be made to mediation, arbitration and the final resort for conflict resolution should be to regional arrangements such as the SADC, ECOWAS, EU etc. However, the most contentious issue is that the five permanent members (P5) of the UNSC have paid lip service to the whole Collective Security system in the sense that these P5 members of the UNSC have monopolised “the powers on the security of the world” (Chiwenga 2014: 48). For example, Article 49 of the UN Charter states that, “The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council”. This article somehow undermines the whole system of Collective Security. Commenting on Article 49, Constantino Chiwenga had this to say,

In other words, Members of the United Nations can only participate in what has been decided by the UNSC, and they cannot decide on the course of actions to be taken. One can caricature this type of thinking by saying that the majority of the members of the United Nations can only rubber stamp what has already been decided upon by the UNSC. The marginalisation of other members of the UN in the planning and enforcement of world peace and security has been one of the contentious issues that is usually raised by scholars with regards to the credibility of the UNSC, especially with specific reference to the legitimacy of its military interventions that have been undertaken thus far (Chiwenga 2014: 48).

In the light of the above quotation Chiwenga is arguing that Article 49 of the UN Charter confers all the powers of the security of the world to the UNSC P5 members. This article undermines the whole Collective Security System because of the practice of double standards in the application of UNSC Resolutions and the monopolisation of issues of peace and security in the world. It is mainly for these two reasons that the UNSC, which is a multilateral organ
entrusted with maintaining the Collective Security System of the world has become a UN organ which has acted in a way that viciously undermines the UN Collective Security system. For example in the aftermath of the Gulf War, permanent member of the UNSC such as the USA and Britain formed what they called ‘a coalition of the willing’ and attacked Iraq with the aim of removing Saddam Hussein from power without the authorisation of the UNSC. The Collective Security system requires that issues of peace and security should be dealt with collectively. The presumption within the Collective System is that UN member states are expected to sacrifice their national self-interest in pursuit of the common good of the international community. Sabine Hassler stated the scope of the UN Collective Security system as follows,

Essentially, collective security transcends the particular interests of the individual and seeks to expand the realm of private interest so that even those whose security is not immediately threatened have a stake in preventing aggression. Ideally, the aggression of one against another is to be resisted by the combined action of all others. Taken in the international context, collective security is the commitment by sovereign entities to resolve disputes irrespective of nationalistic concerns (Hassler 2013: 8).

The formation of the UNSC as a multilateral organ of the UN was based primarily on the presumption that such a multilateral organ of the UNSC was there to promote the Collective Security system of the UN. Here the ideal was that the UNSC, especially the P5 will prioritise the Collective Security system of the world community. However, a controversial issue is that the UNSC has evolved into an autonomous organisation that wields more powers than the UN General Assembly as the main multilateral organ that can genuinely be called the international community. Even though scholars and politicians have expressed their agitation on the issue of democratic reform of the UNSC, most of the permanent members who wield veto powers have resisted any form of substantive reform in this organ of the UN. The use of the veto system by the P5 has been primarily aimed at promoting individual national interests instead of promoting the Collective Security system. Chiwenga observed that, “The issue of the UNSC reform is inseparable from the composition of its membership. The main source of agitation among reformists is the fact that those members who were the original founding members of the UNSC have remained as permanent members for six decades even though there is a worldwide outcry that the SC has remained unreformed with reference to its membership” (Chiwenga 2014: 58).

In this regard the P5 members of the UNSC do not serve the interests of the international community but their national interests. In this regard the humanity of the majority of the world population who are not citizens of the P5 members are not considered as human beings who share the same humanity with citizens of the P5 countries.
Some scholars have critiqued the UNSC on the basis that it was mainly Euro-centric. Problematic security issues in Africa, the Arab world and Asia are usually not taken as a threat to world peace and security. Some of the members of the UNSC P5 such as Britain and France were colonialists who did not have any regard for the majority of the African population who were colonised. The fact that some of the colonised African people had to go through a protracted armed struggle for independence is enough testimony to the fact that the UNSC did value lives of the majority of the African population as deserving protection. In post-colonial Africa, civil wars and ethnic conflicts that result in the loss of hundreds thousands of lives have not been considered as a threat to world peace and security. Recently some of the members of the UNSC have gone on a political mission of destabilising some Arab countries such as Iraq, Libya and Syria – thus overthrowing sovereign Arabic countries who were deemed to be hostile to their national interests. It is in the light of such examples that the mandate of the UNSC as the custodians of the UN Collective Security system becomes highly questionable. Also, in the case of the DRC the UNSC has been reluctant to put the Collective Security system in practice because of their national economic interests. A DRC in a perennial state of civil war makes it easier for some of the P5 members to loot DRC’s mineral resources. Currently the UNSC has bypassed SADC with regards to peacekeeping operations in the DRC – thus bypassing regional arrangements. It is for this reason that the study strongly believe that the UN Collective Security system can find some ethical foundation in the principles that form the foundation for the ethic of Ubuntu.

5.5 Principles in the ethic of Ubuntu Relevant to the UN Collective Security System

As discussed in in the second section, the ethic of Ubuntu is primarily based on the idea that as humans we are related and interrelated to each other and that our human ultimate wellbeing is indispensable from the well-being of each other. Most of the scholars are of the conviction that the ethic of Ubuntu has some relevance when all human beings are understood as a community or human family (Shutte 2008; Mkhise 2008; Dandala 2009; Nussbaum 2009; Broodryk 2006). When a human being is understood as a communal being whose existence is only intelligible within the communal context, it also implies that Collective Security must be primarily understood in terms of promoting the flourishing of communities in a general manner. The UN Collective Security system can only be enriched by the ethic of Ubuntu when national interests of the P5 are relativised to the general interest of the global community. The ethic of Ubuntu sensitised us to the idea that in our quest for Collective Security there is an indisputable existential reality or our human interconnectedness. Regardless of the diversity of our
nationalities and ethnic orientations, the ethic of Ubuntu reminds us that our humanity is inseparable from the humanity of others. As human beings we are bonded in the same life and whatever happens to other nationalities has the propensity of affecting all of us.

A second principle that is echoed throughout the ethic of *Ubuntu* is that of virtue or moral goodness which is presumed to be at the predominant defining feature of humanness. The ethic of *Ubuntu* presumes that we should have a sense of concern and caring for the wellbeing of others in the same manner that we care for our own wellbeing. Collective Security can only be realised when the international community should demonstrate all the virtues such as kindness, generosity, magnanimity, truthfulness and justice, to mention a few, towards all the nations of the world (Samkange & Samkange 1981; Ramose 2005; Gelfand 1973: 121). Thus *Ubuntu* appeals to the peace sentiments within humanity against the scourge of war and violent conflicts. Whilst the ethic of *Ubuntu* has some universal appeal as a virtue ethic, it is argued in this thesis that the UN Collective Security system is more intelligible when premised on the ethic of *Ubuntu* which is a common ethic within the SADC region.

A third principle in the ethic of *Ubuntu* is that of common belonging. As human beings we belong to each other. The idea of common belonging implies an understanding of humanity as interdependent and participating and enjoying the same goods of life. African scholars have maintained that the African understanding of persons and human life is based on the idea that all of us as human beings are “bounded in one common life” and the resultant understanding of community “arises from this bondedness to natural life or the feeling of being in the network of life. In this regard, “consciousness is not consciousness of self but always consciousness of the flow of life in the community world” (Sindima 1995: 127; Kasenene 1994: 141-1142; Mkhise 2008). The implication of the concept of common belonging to Collective Security system is that as a human community we should empathise with all human beings who are experiencing violent conflicts as a result of war. As Muyingi puts it, “the Congolese, as a people, ought to define themselves in a positive and collective sense before the international community. If they focus on their similarities and not on their differences, they can achieve this sense of a shared identity and fate” (Muyingi 2013: 562).

It is evidently clear that the ethic of Ubuntu has a contribution to make towards humanitarian efforts that are aimed at promoting conflict transformation in the eastern DRC. For example, an analysis of Ubuntu as demonstrated above shows that this ethic implies that there has to be a solidaristic outlook in our day to day dealings with each other. The adage Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu implies that our humanity is inseparable from the humanity of others. The humanity of
those who are experiencing a situation of recurring security is inseparable from our own humanity and this implies that an approach to conflict transformation should be empathetic to those who are affected by this situation of recurring conflict.

It was also shown that the ethic of Ubuntu would help to bring about a new understanding of the UN collective security system in the sense that Ubuntu implies that as human beings we active participants in the promotion of peace and security of our societies. In this regard it was shown that the ethic of Ubuntu provides a fresh window of opportunity for the reconceptualization of Collective Security in indigenous modes of thought that sharply differs from a Euro-American centric understanding of the UN collective security system that has been mainly based on understanding collective security in terms of Euro-American initiative for the whole world. A collectivistic understanding of human existence as entrenched in Ubuntu gives us the opportunity to see issues of peace and security as intelligible when they are given a local flavour.

5.6 Conclusion

With the aim of showing what the chapter views to be the contribution of the African Ethic of Ubuntu to the UN Collective Security system, the chapter started by giving a concise definition of the ethic of Ubuntu. It was established that Ubuntu means humanness, and that humanness is characterised by virtues or character qualities that are deemed indispensable to the characterisation of the individual as ultimate embodiment of humanness. The understanding of a person inherent in the ethic of Ubuntu implies that a human being derives his or her ultimate wellbeing by virtue of belonging to the community.

After discussing the meaning of the ethic of Ubuntu, the chapter went on to discuss some of the arguments that have been raised by the critics of the ethic of Ubuntu. The first argument was that Ubuntu is being used by African academics against globalisation processes and that Ubuntu as an ethic does not exist among modernised Africans. This argument was made by Wim van Binsbergen. The argument against van Binsbergen was that he was actually denying humanness to Africans, a scenario which the chapter found implausible. Another argument which was against the ethic of Ubuntu came from Stephen Theron who argued that the ethic of Ubuntu encourages Africans to be irresponsible by hiding behind the community. The chapter’s argument here was that Ubuntu does not deny that individuals are responsible beings, rather it asserts that our humanity is indispensable to the humanity of others. Moreover, the argument
against the critics of *Ubuntu* is that as a virtue ethic, *Ubuntu* belongs to the genre of world virtue ethics.

After arguing that the arguments of the critics of *Ubuntu* were not convincing for us to abandon this ethic, the chapter went on to discuss the UN Collective Security system. In this discussion it was argued that the UNSC has failed to uphold the UN Collective Security system as stated in the UN Charter. The thesis has provided two arguments in support of the claim that the UNSC has failed to realise the UN Collective Security system because the P5 have a tendency of prioritising their national interests above the issues of the Collective Security system. Secondly, it was further argued that this multilateral organ of the UN is mostly Euro-centric in its conceptualisation and praxis with regards to issues of peace and security. It was also revealed that the UNSC has flouted the UN Collective Security system by practicing double standards when it comes to implementing the UN Collective Security system in Africa and in the Arab world.

Finally the chapter went on to discuss some of the principles inherent in the ethic of *Ubuntu* which are deemed to be indispensable to ethical implementation of the UN Collective Security system in Africa. Principles that were identified as pivotal the ethic of *Ubuntu* which were found to be indispensable to an ethical approach to the UN Collective Security system in Africa are relationality, community and common belonging. In this regard, by implication it was argued that the UN Collective Security system has to find its support to African indigenous values. The chapter has thus argued that the ethic of Ubuntu should be taken as a resource in a post-colonial conceptualisation of conflict transformation as well as the UN collective security system as enunciated in the UN Charter. To avoid sweeping statements or speculative approach to the main issues that are central to this study – CT and the UN system of Collective Security seen with the lenses of the African ethic of Ubuntu, the following chapter provides a synthetic analysis of the interviewees perspectives of the efficacy of the ethic of Ubuntu in the eastern DRC situation of recurring conflict.
CHAPTER SIX: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

6.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a synopsis of the role of the African ethic of *Ubuntu* and the UN collective security system in addressing recurrent conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The current conflict situation in the eastern DRC was investigated using interviews with key informants buttressed by secondary data. The chapter broadly covers the ethical concept of *Ubuntu* as a conflict resolution mechanism within the broad ambit of collective security. In this regard I will track the adoption and practice of *Ubuntu* mechanisms in addressing violent recurrent conflict. The effectiveness of *Ubuntu* and the UN collective security system mechanisms are analysed in terms of the reduction or total elimination of conflict in eastern DRC. In highlighting the nexus between conflict recurrence and ethnicity in the eastern DRC the study establishes that ethnicity is the main cause of ceaseless conflict in the eastern DRC. The study established that the Bantu were the original occupants of Congo. The Tutsis then raided the Bantu whose land was later taken up by the Hutu. The Tutsis introduced some governance structures that were premised on the divide and rule style and colonization found the situation like that and the colonisers capitalised on that by collaborating with the Tutsis at the expense of the Hutus. As time passed, Hutus started claiming for their land, rights, power (chieftainship) leading to the breaking out of a civil war.

The colonial political tactic of divide and rule style led to the marginalization of the other ethnic groups of the population in eastern DRC. In addition, the divisive role of the foreigners or colonial powers can also be traced back to the 1884 Berlin Conference where there was the arbitrary demarcation of Africa which saw foreigners placing some sections of original Rwanda under DRC. This saw some ethnic groups from Rwanda residing in the eastern DRC. During the independence of DRC, some of the Rwandofone migrants were denied recognition and identity and this led to conflicts as different ethnic groups tried to defend themselves as well as protect their superiority. Ethnicity played an important role in the conflicts at independence in the history of DRC in that there was ethnic dominance of independent political parties that were ethnic based. In this regard ethnic conflicts in the eastern DRC can be partly contributed to the inherent animosities among the diverse ethnic groups. In addition to this, ethnicity has been seen as fuelling conflict as a result of the Tutsi expansionist ambitions whereby they relentlessly seek to revive the “Bahima Empire”.
The Tutsis have always made themselves as the rulers of the empire in eastern DRC regardless of the fact that they are the minority. In this notion, the history of the Great Lakes Region (GLR) has always been described as volatile because of the ambition of the Bahimas (Tutsi/Nilotic) to dominate and re-create the Bahima Empire. Additionally the 1994 Rwanda Genocide bore testimony of how ethnicity has led to ceaseless conflicts in the eastern DRC. The study noted that the 1994 Rwanda genocide resulted in the influx of the Rwandese Hutus settling in the eastern DRC as they fled from the Tutsi-led government, a situation that disrupted the ethnic balance in the region as genocide increased pressure due to massive refugee movements.

It is also observed in this study that neighbouring countries tend to fuel recurrent conflict in the eastern DRC by supporting armed groups to engage in illegal economic activities. These armed groups tend to have an inclination towards certain ethnicities. It was estimated that the DRC loses USD 1 billion every month in illegal economic activities and there are allegations of Uganda and Rwanda exploiting resources in the eastern DRC to improve their economies and strengthen military power. Over and above, it can be noted that they are taking advantage of the heterogeneous ethnic groups in the eastern DRC to economically exploit the natural resources in the east of Congo. To compound this situation, lack of effective legitimate state authority on the part of the DRC Government to regulate and govern people makes it easy for ethnicity to be a divisive element. The absence of a robust government has made tribal groups to fight and fend for themselves. Ethnic groups are then forced to claim geographic space and power in order for them to survive and have the strategic advantage over other tribal opponents. This has led to the emergence of negative forces who have led to the perpetual destabilization of the eastern DRC.

Secondly, in highlighting the effectiveness of the traditional approaches in promoting peace in the eastern DRC the study establishes that the traditional approaches will go a long way in addressing unending conflict in the eastern DRC. Traditional leaders should be involved in the peace making process as they have the customary legitimacy to bring their subjects together. Gacaca in Rwanda was seen to have worked under the auspices of a strong government in resolving the genocide aftermath. Traditional approaches tend to succeed because they bring in the grassroots in the peace making arena. Nevertheless, international conflict resolution initiatives have always overlooked and undermined the indispensable role played by the local leadership. The study established that the conventional approaches were inadequate as they do not give the locals the chance to participate in conflict resolution as they are well placed to deal with issues involving cultural identity, reconciliation and community building. Conventional approaches that are being used by the UN and other national governments for instance, have
seen actors to the peace making process being foreigners who have vested and diverse interests thus making it difficult for them to effectively participate in forging peace in the eastern DRC. The DDR approach that was designed by the UN fell short in achieving long-lasting peace in the eastern DRC as MONUSCO has been targeted by the armed groups thus making it difficult for them to fully execute their tasks.

On the contrary note, it also established that traditional approaches cannot be panacea to conflict recurrence in the eastern DRC as the traditional practices such as the use of elders and chiefs in conflict resolution has been affected by globalization. Cultures have drastically eroded through various technological developments. In addition, heterogeneity and pluralism that exist in cultures, identities and traditional beliefs makes it difficult for people to co-operate in peace initiatives as well as coming up with an all-encompassing approach that includes all the actors in the various tribes. This situation has also been compounded by lack of trust among the tribes that has fuelled exclusionary tendencies in the eastern DRC. The study also reveals the empirical manifestations of the shortcomings of the traditional approaches to conflict resolution by noting that the security situation in the Great Lakes Region has continued to be unstable as negative forces and armed groups in the eastern DRC continue to commit atrocities. The FDLR and FADRC were reported to be exchanging gunfights. In this vein, the situation in the eastern DRC still remains volatile as much of North and South Kivu are still under the control of other armed groups thus making regional relations fragile.

Thirdly, in establishing the efficacy of the ethic of Ubuntu and collective security in the eastern DRC the study seeks to establish if Ubuntu helps in roping in the crucial values, beliefs and practices of the people in the conflict resolution milieu in the eastern DRC by tackling the personal values, beliefs, preferences and attitudes of the people to the conflict at an individual level. In this vein, Ubuntu revolves around the notion of humanness whereby according to this ethic, a person is presumed to be endowed with consciousness, love, compassion, reason, understanding and creativity. In this regard, Ubuntu has the propensity of keeping people together through shared values. Traditionally people have lived as a community where everything was performed, enjoyed or resolved communally through the practice of Ubuntu. Ubuntu embraces diversity in that people are allowed to believe, think and behave the way they wish and they should learn to live together with those differences without necessarily fighting. Ubuntu basically strives to promote tolerance in this case, the Hutus, Tutsis and Bantus should develop tolerance whereby they should be sensitive and accommodative to each other’s ethnical identities, opinions, cultures and historical backgrounds. The study also seeks to determine the
extent to which the *Ubuntu* concept is seen to be metamorphosing into the principle of collective security in which case, all states co-operate collectively or communally to provide security for all the actions of all against any state within the groups which might challenge the existing order by using force. Ubuntu as a virtue implies that human beings’ inherent ability to appreciate the suffering of others as their own in order to raise joy, hope and aspiration for a better future. In conflict transformation, the implication of Ubuntu is that the same dignity that people want accorded to them should be the same dignity they should extend to others as such the actions of the people should contribute towards the common good of the society as a whole. If people are that selfless then chances of conflict recurrence are minimised or even eliminated. Ubuntu is therefore applied in a collective and communal sense, where relational interaction is a key component in the well-being of the people. The achievement of the collective security is based on the principle that an attack on one is an attack on all. This tallies with the crucial attribute of *Ubuntu* as enshrined in the adage which says *umuntu ngumunthu ngabantu* (a person is a person because of other persons). In this notion, SADC and ICGLR fought on the side of DRC.

However, the study also unveils the imminent challenges that exist in trying to operationalise the principle of *Ubuntu* in eastern DRC whereby it was noted that the Tutsis are not Bantu but Nilotic. It was going to be successful had all the parties been Bantu. There has been severe dilution and invasion of *Ubuntu* by foreign cultures, globalization and technology. In addition the collective security system is naively unrealistic as pledges to defend each other by countries are premised on country’s interests that is, a country can only support another country in the system if there are direct benefits and interests that will accrue to them in the process. The region tends to procrastinate when events are unfolding as was the case with Rwanda in 1994 and the eastern DRC. There is lack of collective will to move in the same direction by member states. The East African Community and the SADC are often divided when it comes to conflict resolution. In 1998 countries like Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe volunteered to intervene in DRC while the remainder of the SADC countries were reluctant.

Fourthly, in highlighting the UNSC’s role in complementing SADC’s efforts in the SADC region the study establishes that regions should be at the forefront in solving their own problems. SADC empirically demonstrated its capacity to solve own challenges in Lesotho, Madagascar and Zimbabwe. SADC through collective security endeavours deployed the FIB to DRC shows that the regional players have got the capacity to solve their regional problems. The study establishes that the MONUSCO contingent in the eastern DRC are there for financial gain
so when conflicts escalate in DRC the UN forces therein are exultant because their stay is justified and prolonged. The study highlights that the presence of MONUSCO does not serve any purpose peace wise as MONUSCO has failed to eradicate the conflict. UNSC should however, support SADC with financial and technical support. SADC should lead its regional activities while the UNSC should complement and support SADC at its request. It should also support SADC in a neutral and an objective manner. However, the study highlights that SADC and the ICGLR’s relations despite being imperative in solving the regional problems are fractured, unconstructive and contradictory as SADC is alleged to want to own the DRC and yet the DRC problems belong to the ICGLR.

In addition, despite the fact that the UN has failed to bring long-term peace in the DRC, the study presents a summary of SADC’s efforts and success stories by highlighting that in August 2013 the UN Forces and the DRC Government made some positive steps on the armed group M23 namely the enactment of Amnesty law and the identification of the ex-M23 both in Rwanda and Uganda. MONUSCO is currently supporting planned operations of the FARDC against the FDLR. There is continued efforts by the DRC government and MONUSCO to repatriate to Rwanda the FDLR forces for those who want to disarm and return voluntarily. The inter-ministerial committee, supported by MONUSCO has been tested with the steering and the implementation of the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement (DDRRR) programme. Thus chapter answers the following question: How can the ethic of Ubuntu and the UN concept of Collective Security be applied in solving the problem of recurrence of conflict in eastern DRC? The section starts by unravelling the relationship between recurring conflict and ethnicity in the eastern DRC. The second section analyses the extent to which the traditional approach to conflict resolution serves as a sufficient panacea in solving the problem of the recurrence of conflict in DRC. The third section examines the effectiveness of the ethic of Ubuntu and the concept of collective security in solving the problem of recurrence of conflict in eastern DRC. The fourth section investigates the role of the UN and its Security Council in the SADC region with specific reference to eastern DRC. Consequent research was directed towards studying and presenting relevant and substantive material to satisfy the research objectives as well as answering the research questions which will then be presented thematically.
6.2 The Nexus between Recurring Conflict and Ethnicity in the eastern DRC

6.2.1 The Link between Colonialism and Ethnic Fragmentation

In highlighting the relationship between ethnicity and recurring conflict in the eastern DRC, the study established that ethnicity is intricately related to conflict recurrence in the eastern DRC. In order to articulate the relationship between conflict recurrence and ethnicity one has to take a glimpse into the history of the people. Many people question as to why there are ethnic problems in eastern DRC borders and not along other borders as the DRC borders nine countries. Why is violence and conflict confined to the east? According to Chabal, Engel and Ghentili (2005:12) one has got to look at the history of migration, ethnicity, demographic statistics, economic interests by locals, neighbours and international actors among other factors. Ethnicity indeed was established to be the main cause for conflict recurrence and this is strongly tied to the colonial history which dates back to 1884 Berlin Conference where there was the scramble for and petition of Africa. According to Jill Rutaremara, Director of the Rwanda Peace Academy, the arbitrary demarcation of boundaries at the 1884 Berlin Conference divided the Rwanda people. In this vein, Lt Gen Mabeyo, connoted that the current location of the border was arbitrarily drawn by foreigners placing some sections of original Rwanda under DRC. While colonisers changed boundaries frequently, they did not move people- Kings and Chiefs remained in their precincts. Mabeyo, gave an account of the history of the era where he narrated that pre-colonial and colonial migrations resulted in various tribes mainly Hutu and Tutsi settling in eastern DRC. However, despite acknowledging the ethnic diversity of eastern DRC, Prof D Kotse blamed the use of ethnicity as a vehicle of statecraft by colonialists at their arrival he argued that the conflict in the Great Lakes existed prior to the arrival of colonialism. He pointed out that some of the modern day Bantu tribes south of Sahara migrated from the Great Lakes especially due to conflict and reinforced this position by noting the similarities in languages as a pointer to the common origins of the tribes south of Sahara.

Overlapping citizenship between the Congolese and the Rwandese

In addition to the colonial contribution to recurrent conflict in the DRC, the study highlighted that matters in the eastern DRC are aggravated by the historical fact that 50% of the population of north Kivu is Rwandafones. For example, Mwami Ndese- a traditional Chief resides in Ichuru Region in North Kivu yet half of his empire is in Rwanda. The Banyamulenge in South

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58 Interview with author, Kigali, 06 March 2016.
59 Interview with author, DareSalaam, 02 March 2016.
60 The author acknowledges these valuable observations made by P Prof D Kotse during interview, Pretoria, 17 May 2016. Kotse is the Heads the Department of Political Science at the University of South Africa.
Kivu existed when Congo was established yet these people are Kinyarwandans, as of now Banyamulenge are not accepted as Congolese. The challenge arose after Congo gained independence when some of these migrants were denied recognition and identity. Rwanda has interests in eastern DRC because Banyamulenge in DRC are Rwandese. King Ndese in North Kivu is Rwandese. Rwanda wishes to influence and occupy eastern DRC to access land (agriculture) and resources. The law governing identity has been manipulated overtime to the extent of marginalising and excluding Rwandan Congolese. The Tutsis continue to be harassed, jailed, maimed and accused of mercenarism and supporting President Kagame. DRC wants those of Rwandan origin especially Tutsi to return home. The move is viewed as ethnic cleansing by Rwanda. Accordingly, Respondent O notes that the leadership of DRC pays a blind eye on the matters and so does the UN (MONUSCO) who purports to be managing the conflict. Some Rwandafones in eastern DRC have been rendered stateless thereby creating tension and xenophobia thereat. It can thus be noted that history has alluded many symptoms, unjustified and inequitable distribution of resources. To this effect, Professor Shyaka Anastase avowed that ethnicity is a huge causative factor to the recurrence of conflict in the eastern DRC.61

In this scenario, politics and ethnicity (racialization) constitute the historical foundation of conflict in the Great Lakes Region (especially the area around the eastern part of the lakes). The population in the Great Lakes comprise of Tutsi, Hutu and Bantu. In addition, the Bantu were the original occupants of the eastern Congo whose land was later taken up by Hutu. In the Great Lakes Region the form of identity is pronounced along ethnicity that is Kinyarwanda, Banyaganda, Banyamulenge and Interahamwe. The Tutsi then invaded the land thereby displacing the Hutus and introduced modernisation. In the process of their occupation, Tutsi adopted the Kinyarwanda and Kinyanganda languages and introduced governance structural changes. In a divide and rule style, Tutsis had the power to select the Hutus and intermarriages took place. Immediately resistance to Tutsi domination began and colonisation found the situation as it was and colonisers embarked on a two pronged approach: collaborated with the Tutsi and elevated some Hutus to certain levels, and while maintaining a status quo, and they then continued to civilise the population through Christian education. As time passed, Hutus started claiming for their land, rights and power (chieftainship) leading to the breaking out of a civil war. Tutsi Kings were divided over whether to share power or not. The Tutsi stalemate exacerbated the already volatile political situation which then inevitably escalated. Suddenly,

61 Interview with author, Kigali, 03 March 2016. Professor Shyaka is the Director General in Charge of Rwanda Governance Board. His research interests include Conflict Transformation in the Great Lakes region.
there were successive waves of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the eastern DRC especially in Ituri and the Kivus.

6.2.2 The role of the Nilotic tribe in fueling Recurrent Conflict

In addition to this, there is need to trace the ethnic history of the diverse ethnic groups within the Great Lakes Region and also to highlight their role in fuelling conflict. The historical presence of the Bantu (agriculturist) and Nilotic (pastoralists) has led to recurrent conflict in the eastern DRC. The Nilotic are inherently war-like and adventurous. In this vein, Dr Mkapa noted that these Nilotic players are still there in the region and they were toying the idea of reviving the Bahima Empire. The Bahima are the Nilotic tribe or Tutsi who have always viewed themselves as the rulers in the empire yet they are the minority. Dr Mkapa noted that while this could significantly contribute towards ethnicity and conflict recurrence, it was difficult to impose a political empire since there were no systems in government to see the programme through. The Bahima are a minority who if they build a capacity, it will be a capacity for self-defence. Interestingly, when Ambassador Kapya went to the office of President Kagame, he was shown a map showing the Bahima Empire covering Burundi, eastern DRC, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania. In further reinforcing the notion of reviving the Bahima Empire Respondent J (His Excellency the Ambassador of the Republic of Zimbabwe to the United Republic of Tanzania, Maj Gen EAC Chimonyo) narrated the history of the region which he described as volatile because of the ambition of the Bahimas (Tutsi/Nilotic) to dominate and recreate the Bahima Empire.

Such a scenario has seen certain leaders harbouring, over-ambitious but shrewd and predatory desires to conquer other nations within the Great Lakes Region in a bid to reinvigorate the Bahima Empire. This move violates the existence of sovereign governments that have distinct territorial structures and physical frontiers. In this notion, Mkapa summed up his response by describing ethnicity as a delicate territory and a symptom or disease that complicate the whole political landscape in the region. He asserted that the fundamental challenge was the insatiable appetite by leaders, traditional chiefs and individuals to self-enrich. This problem in the former president’s belief, forms the basis for perpetuating conflict in the eastern DRC through ethnical differences. Mkapa further saw an embedded pattern of ‘perceived’ militarism where leaders, locals and individuals want to use violence for personal aggrandisement. He reflected with

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62 The author is indebted to Dr Mkapa for sharing this valuable information during interview, Dar-eSalaam, 29 February 2016.
sadness that recurring conflict in the eastern DRC has been exacerbated by the constant clashes between DRC and Rwandan backed armed groups and these clashes are deeply entrenched in ethnic differences and dominance.\textsuperscript{63}

The advent of independence did not resolve the conflict either. The law of majority rule meant that leaders were to be elected and ethinical groups were to be merged in order to form a government. Ethnicity played an important role in the conflicts at the dawn of independence in the DRC. According to Kisangani (2012) a key factor at independence was the ethnic dominance of most political parties as they were ethnic based and explicitly defended the interests of their respective ethnic groups against the “threat of foreigners.” In support of this notion United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2015:13) underscored that the ethnic orientation of the political process was a result of the fact that the colonial system deliberately denied space to the emergence of a dynamic middle class thus suffocating civil society as an avenue for democratic expression and making ethnic kinship a default framework for political completion. The study also noted that the ethnic clashes in the eastern DRC are not a natural upshot of any inherent animosities among the diverse ethnic groups. Instead ethnicity became politicised as a result of the divide and rule agenda of the colonial administration. The manipulation of citizenship and nationality laws by leaders for political purposes has resultantly politicised ethnicity and the Congolese identity. In supporting the need to respect territorial sovereignty and the rule of law in DRC it can be noted that the Congolese constitution forbids dual citizenship- so once you transgress you are no longer Congolese. So when the DRC government upholds and observes the rule of law then those on the wrong side of the law will feel to have been disenfranchised and they end up believing that they are being side-lined on ethnic grounds. To support this, Tumba Dieudonne gave a brief history of how this problem emanated by noting that during Mobutu’s era, the then Chief of Staff (Mr Nkrunzimana) authored a White Paper policy document that allowed dual citizenship because he was Rwandese himself; resulting in a conflict between the constitution and Government Policy.\textsuperscript{64}

6.2.3 Marginalisation and Exclusion and the Divide and Rule Colonial Legacy

Accordingly, Lemarchand (1970:12) posits that the divide and rule agenda of the colonial masters was exploited by the members of the national elites seeking convenient means of mobilising political support. The divide and rule practice by the colonial masters made the

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid

\textsuperscript{64} Interview with author, Pretoria, 17 May 2016.
persistent inborn factors of identification to widen the affective gap between and among the various ethnic groups as members tend to exercise hatred for other groups who do not share the same religion, language, cultural, ancestry or kinship ties. In support of this notion Respondent S opine that colonialists amplified and widened the ethnic rift. These ethnic malpractices perpetuated even after independence. The evolution of all the above brings us to the present day challenges in the eastern DRC. The divide and rule practice has led to the marginalisation of the segments of the population notably people of Rwandan origin as well as fuelling antagonism between them and other groups, while at the same time undermining the relations between the state and the citizenry on one hand, the DRC and its neighbours in the east on the other hand.

Tutsi (Nilotic by background) are a minority in this set up and refuse to integrate for fear of being neutralised. Strangely, besides being married to other tribes, Tutsi women only fell pregnant to Tutsi men through infidelity. Tutsis are bend on maintaining and preserving ethical identity (a life or death attitude). They believe this can only be achieved through a grip on political, military and economic power. Meanwhile colonialism had allowed migrants into eastern DRC to provide labour in the exploitation of resources. Migrants mainly Tutsi then started claiming land and power. Competition for land grew and everything they needed became legalised thereby disadvantaging the local people. Through legal registry documentation, the migrants became residents and when the locals commenced reclaiming their land, the migrants refused to vacate since they were in possession of legal documents stating that they were now Congolese. Migrants became landlords and locals became the workers- that is the Tutsi who had migrated from Rwanda as the labour force had suddenly become landlords with financial power. In reinforcing this notion, Faranisi highlighted that while there were too many tribes in the eastern DRC especially around Goma, the Tutsi (who are well known for an ethnic problem that extended from Ethiopia to the Great Lakes up to Angola) were the tribe with the massive programme as they harbour Nilotic expansionist ambitions and desire to rule eastern DRC- a goal they are assiduously trying to achieve by causing conflict. Instead of integrating, Tutsi remained excluded thus perpetuating conflict as some ethnic groups are mobilising themselves into forces so that they can stop this Tutsi expansionism.65 On the whole, the ethnical claims lean towards breeding discordance among the groups as they all allege unfair practices of exclusion, marginalisation and denial of access to resources.

65 Interview with author, Kinshasa, 30 September 2015.
In further buttressing the notion of marginalisation and exclusion, Respondent T (His Excellency Thabo Mbeki, the former President of the Republic of South Africa) gave a narration of the history of the Congo conflict. His Excellency firmly agrees that there is a relationship between ethnicity and recurrent conflict in the DRC by giving an account of the historical overview of the Congo Conflict from Mobutu to present day. The former President described how Banyamulenge were declared *persona non grata* by Mobutu despite them having lived in Congo for many years. Mobutu had declared them Rwandese giving birth to the Mai Mai who took up the story to present day. The campaign against Banyamulenge especially by the Mai Mai make up the politics of eastern DRC. Some of these refugees where Tutsi who are complicating the whole scenario. What is prudent is to recognise Banyamulenge as Congolese. Over and above it can be noted that on the political front, most government officials have not abandoned the previous mind-set on Banyamulenge thereby creating perpetual animosity and hatred. Circumstances are further exacerbated by the 1994 Rwanda Genocide where multitudes of people fled to eastern DRC.

### 6.2.4 Ethnicity and the Rwandese Genocide

These Tutsi expansionist ambitions that are deeply entrenched in ethnicity are also pedigreed from the 1994 Rwandese Genocide. In the past, the problem of ethnicity did not exist; demographically there were more than 450 tribes in the DRC and the chief controlled them under his jurisdiction and all these tribes never bothered to fight one another. The problem was triggered by the 1994 Rwanda genocide. In highlighting the impact of the Rwanda genocide in fuelling protracted war in the eastern DRC, Faranisi reiterated that before war broke out in Rwanda in 1994, there were no major conflicts in eastern DRC. It was only after the UN requested the Zaire Government to extend hospitality on humanitarian grounds to Rwanda refugees that these conflicts in eastern DRC started. It should be noted that the Hutu whose administration was defeated in Rwanda crossed the border with weapons. In highlighting the spill over effects of the genocide war to DRC the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2015:13) affirms that the influx of Rwandan Hutu refugees in eastern DRC disturbed the ethnic balance in the region which exacerbated underlying antagonisms between ethnic groups associated with Rwandan descent and considering themselves as “autochthone” ethnic groups. In support of the effect of the notion that the Rwandan Genocide had an effect on ethnic imbalances that have fuelled unending conflicts in the eastern DRC, Dr Shyaka confirmed that the Rwanda 1994 Genocide increased pressure in eastern DRC due to massive refugees.

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66 Interview with author, Kinshasa, 30 September 2015.
movements. The overflow of refugees into eastern DRC created a demographic imbalance. Rwandafones became more in number as compared to indigenous Congolese nationals. Because of this new set up, Rwanda claims that the eastern DRC belongs to them, while DRC accuse that the conflict in the area is a Rwandan problem. FDLR feels at home in eastern DRC since they claim to be among their own people. In buttressing this notion it was noted that the influx of refugees following the Rwanda genocide was a major trigger factor for subsequent conflicts in the eastern DRC (Kisangani 2012; Lemarchand 2009; Prunier 2009).

Msee Laurent Desire Kabila led the liberation in the late 1996 whereby and he was reportedly backed by the Rwandese administration of Kagame as he considered the Hutu refugees in Zaire as a threat to his own administration under the pretext of backing Laurent Kabila. Kagame’s forces had a specific mission of getting rid of these Hutu refugees whom he thought might think of returning home (to Rwanda) one day and take revenge. When things went sour Kabila decided to send back the Rwandese soldiers who helped topple Mobutu. These Rwandese forces in complicity with some Congolese nationals recreated an armed group. Laurent Kabila resorted to using some Hutu refugees present in DRC to counter attack Kagame’s forces backing the Congolese armed groups. The presence of a large contingent of the Hutu militias (Interahamwe) among the Rwandan refugees and the threat they posed, created the necessity for the Rwandan Government to intervene in the DRC to prevent the militias from attacking Rwanda. Since then this cycle of violence has taken root – Rwandese imported their internal problems to eastern DRC. In this vein, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2015:8) postulates that the deeply rooted historical violence, competition for power and resources and animosity between Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups continues to be a source of fear, distrust, violence and political struggles at all levels in the eastern DRC - a situation that is compounded by the fear of extermination by ethnic adversaries which has led to pre-emptive attacks in the name of self-defence.

6.2.5 Neighbouring Countries and Their Role in Conflict Recurrence in the eastern Drc

It can thus be noted that, the history of conflict in the eastern DRC takes root in neighbouring countries (Rwanda and Uganda). The study revealed that war is only in the east and nowhere in the DRC. The historical conflict between and among many tribes revolves around boundaries and resources in this case, there is the abundance of natural resources found in the east comprising of fauna and flora and minerals such as gold, diamond etc. Because of this richness

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67 Interview with author, Kigali, 06 February 2016.
many armed groups (be it internally or externally sponsored) have engaged in illegal economic activities in eastern DRC resulting in endless clashes over dominance in the eastern region of Congo. Naturally people arm for defence and protection of possession, turf and empires. Neighbouring countries especially Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda are known to support armed groups who engage in economic activities which in turn support the economies of the countries in question.

According to UN report (2009:15), it is estimated that DRC loses USD 1 billion dollars monthly in illegal economic activities siphoned with the help of unmarked aerodromes which facilitate these illicit activities that also include poaching. There are widespread allegations of Rwanda and Uganda exploiting resources in eastern DRC to improve their economies and strengthen political and military power as has been seen in Chapter three. For instance, Kassa Kasikira Driens asserted that Rwanda is known to export large quantities of gold yet geographically there are no known gold deposits in Rwanda.68 Subsequently, refugees in eastern DRC have dual citizenship and possess double identity cards for convenience. This is dubbed the Kagame Project where ethnic tension fuels conflict for the benefit of Rwanda. In this scenario, it can be underscored that there is the existence of a myriad of ethnic armed groups who are aligned to certain committees and communities and these armed groups are formed under the pretext of protection yet it is widely known that they fight for resources on behalf of interested people who are absent. In addition, it was also discovered that some local populations are now also involved in atrocities to get the natural resources they are selling to Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. To this effect, it is alleged that the neighbouring countries as well as the international community also seem to be benefiting from the crisis in the region, thereby perpetuating the vicious cycle of violence in the eastern DRC. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2015:18) underscored the unfavourable effects of this predatory behaviour to these perpetrators by noting that the DRCs neighbours have a high stake in the end of conflicts given the negative impact of these conflicts on their economy and political stability. For example; the refugee flows constitute not only an economic burden on the receiving country but can also become a source of political and social instability.

6.2.6 The Absence of Solid Governance Structures

Lack of effective legitimate state authority to regulate and govern people makes it easy for ethnicity to be a divisive element. There is a dearth of robust Government structures and

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68 Interview with author, Goma, 06 October 2015.
effective security mechanisms to control and monitor the activities of its citizenry. In this scenario, the study established that there is lack of consolidation of state authority thereby leaving room for the armed groups to perpetuate untold violence in the eastern DRC. In further buttressing the notion of the absence of sound governance in the DRC, Mutiganda asserted that in the eastern DRC, governance was distinctively absent and deficient. In supporting this notion, Nzabamwita noted that since independence the DRC political system has been inherently weak, deficient and problematic as it is characterised by gross corruption, mismanagement of power and natural resources, total ignorance on the part of the leaders and lack of control over the state of affairs. Accordingly, Dr Shyaka affirmed that there are no services, infrastructure and streamlined local government structures in the DRC thus create a vacuum in the provision, allocation and distribution of public goods and services. Now if a vacuum exists, nature tells us that something will occupy it. So in eastern DRC where government is absent, tribal groups, and civil society fight and fend for themselves. They provide own leadership, food and security. Militia groups will then fan ethnicity, form up and start roaming the area in search of provisions and space.

Ethnic groups are then compelled to claim geographical space (land) and power in order for them to survive and have a strategic advantage over other tribal opponents. Ethnicity has served as a seedbed for political corruption and exclusion as politics is viewed as one of the few ways to accumulate resources and improve livelihoods of the ethnic groups. In reinforcing this notion, UNECA (2015) highlights that the ethnic character of conflict is rooted in struggles for state power and access to resources. Conflict in the region involve tribes and militias groups who are fighting for resources. Generally, there is a vicious struggle for land, identity and power and this struggle tends to be dominated by Tutsi.

6.2.7 Ownership Wrangles over Abundant Natural Resources

The abundance of natural resources is the major reason for the conflict recurrence whereby ethnic groups clash for dominance and control of those natural resources. The diversity of numerous ethnic groups makes the aspect of identity a cause of concern. People fall to tribal identity. DRC is endowed with numerous natural resources which are exploited willy-nilly because of poor leadership and governance. To compound the whole situation, there is a multiplicity of foreign individuals, companies, civil society and locals who claim ownership of land and resources. Mutiganda further noted that, statistically 28 different ethnic groups are found in eastern DRC and all claim legitimacy to residence. So given this scenario, it becomes
imperative for the situation to remain under control, had there been a government which is strong willed and focused.\textsuperscript{69} The government would then legislate and organise the people. Rwanda believes if the DRC government was focused and had realistic social economic programmes then disputes over land resources would not escalate into conflicts. The DRC government is viewed as feeble, uninterested, incompetent, corrupt and disorganised.\textsuperscript{70} In support of Mutiganda’s observation, Nzabamwita opined that the real problem of conflict recurrence in the eastern DRC lies squarely on the leadership; that is, the DRC has faced serious problems of leadership since independence.\textsuperscript{71} The absence of competent, dedicated and selfless leaders (ministers and governors among other public officials) will continue to affect the quest for peace and tranquillity in the eastern DRC.

6.2.8 \textbf{Dearth of Credible Security and Defence Architecture}

The other issue that has fuelled conflict is that there is no proper and credible security and defence architecture to protect the citizens in the eastern DRC. In addition to the dearth of infrastructure and robust governance architecture in the eastern DRC, Dr Agee Shyaka Mugabe-blamed conflict recurrence in eastern DRC on the Government’s complacency and complicity to address the conflict.\textsuperscript{72} In this vein, the DRC government has been accused of complicity describing it as very weak and unable to provide for and maintain security among its citizens. Social cohesion and national identity are absent. There is no common will, harmony, social provisions, and infrastructure put together these create security threats to the state and neighbours. Lawlessness is rampant and this scenario is further worsened by appalling practices, lack of political will and a war cry. The Kinshasa government has further been for failing to rally its citizens behind a national cause and as a result ethnic fights manifest and escalate.\textsuperscript{73}

6.2.9 \textbf{The Presence of Negative Forces}

Negative forces have also dealt a great blow to the forging of peace and tranquility in the eastern DRC. In addition to weak governance structures, processes and systems being catalysts to recurrent conflict in the eastern DRC, the presence of negative forces has also compounded the situation in the eastern DRC. Over the past decades the DRC has been home to a number of foreign forces (these range from armed groups, regulars and UN peacekeepers) some of which

\textsuperscript{69} Interview with author, Kigali, 04 March 2016.
\textsuperscript{70} Same interview by author with Mutiganda, Kigali, 04 March 2016.
\textsuperscript{71} Interview with author, Kigali, 04 March 2016.
\textsuperscript{72} Interview with author, Kigali, 06 March 2016.
\textsuperscript{73} Interview with Mutiganda, Kigali, 04 March 2016.
had gone overboard and challenged the Kinshasa Government. It can be noted that the accommodation of these foreign forces such as the ADF, the FDLR among others has rendered the conflict more complex. These negative forces who are found in the eastern DRC were alleged to be coming from those countries that have interests in that part of the DRC.

To this effect, the international community, neighbours, civil society and locals tend to fuel conflict in order to exploit as much as possible natural resources for their own benefit ahead of others. This points to the notion that there are divergent interests in the eastern DRC which promote ethnicity that fuel conflict recurrence. Over and above, ethnicity is not the primary cause of conflict recurrence, instead factors such as poor governance, divergent interests and the presence of negative forces tend to create a seedbed upon which ethnicity sprouts as a divisive tool for promoting conflict recurrence in the eastern DRC. Ethnicity is not the major driver of the conflict recurrence in the eastern DRC but it is used by parties who want to advance their own interests. There are more than ten ethnic groups in every province in the DRC but there are no conflicts except in the Kivus and Ituri (areas which constitute the eastern DRC). This reinforces the notion that ethnicity is a secondary factor to conflict recurrence.

By and large, the presence of these negative forces, divergent interests and weak governance have made the eastern DRC borders very porous and vulnerable to ethnic clashes and illegal exploitation of natural resources by the neighbouring countries. Foreign groups tend to have contradictory relations that have far reaching debilitating effects on the internal security of the DRC, thereby weakening the border security as they will be controlling them instead of the DRC security or official personnel. Furthermore, the government of DRC can also be blamed for lack of a coherent programme to properly settle people. The land has remained sensitive and volatile because communities claim that their ancestors lived in the area and therefore they cannot as moving is tantamount to selling out their traditional heritage. In this vein, the study established that the centralised Congo has been weak since the mid-1970s, which has made the country prone to political instability. Currently, discriminatory governance practices are still evident in key institutions such as education, military and judiciary systems where ethnicity is seen to be a conspicuous factor in gaining power and control as well as in the allocation of values and resources.
Traditional Approaches to Conflict Resolution and Recurrent Conflict in Eastern DRC

The study established that traditional approaches will go a long way in addressing unending conflict in the eastern DRC. International conflict initiatives have always overlooked and undermined the indispensable role played by local leadership. If the chiefs, religious and ethnic community leaders are roped in from the onset, then the chances of establishing everlasting peace are high. Traditional approaches should not be ignored or side-lined. Instead traditional leaders should be involved so that they associate and are allowed to own the whole process.74 In reinforcing this notion, Shyaka avowed that when allowed to perform their functions independently with government support and guarantee, chiefs can always bring about peace within their communities.75 They have the capacity to bring their subjects together, establish quasi-courts where offenders are tried, confess and judgements meted. In this scenario, the role of traditional chiefs and leaders can also be traced right from the pre-colonial times where through their wise counsel could successfully resolve disputes before they escalated into conflicts. There is need for upholding traditional practices in forging long-lasting peace in the eastern DRC. He agrees that the Gacaca has worked in Rwanda but under the auspices of a very strong Government.

6.3.1 The efficacy of Gacaca as a Traditional Approach to Peace-Building

In addition, Mutiganda underscored the importance of the traditional approaches by giving an example of the Rwandan Gacaca traditional tribunals which were set up to resolve the genocide aftermath.76 In support of the need for a strong Government, Mkapa emphasised that for approaches to have impact as a panacea there ought to be close supervision and support by Government.77 In this vein, traditional approaches can be very helpful in forging long-standing conflict resolution by healing people and allowing them to work together once again under the auspices of a robust, well-structured government programme. Conventions, treaties and protocols cannot achieve what Gacaca achieved in such a short space of time.78 However, there were major worries and concerns about outside influence which has impacted on the usefulness of the African way of resolving conflict. In addition, the international community tend to look down upon, condemn and side-line the African system describing it as primitive. In this vein, the international community have always preferred to engage and embrace top leadership in a

74 Interview by author with Nzabamwita, Kigali, 04 March 2016.
75 Interview with author, Kigali, 04 March 2016.
76 Same interview with author.
77 Same interview with author.
78 Same interview with Mutiganda.
conflict and in the process they tend to undermine the locals. Most of the peace initiatives accommodate the concerns of leaders forgetting to address the real challenges or causes to conflict. Any initiatives that are not inclusive, that is, those that do not accommodate culture, tradition, beliefs, family or community values, ethics and dialogue with the locals are doomed to fail. Traditional approaches tend to be successful as they bring in the grassroots to the peace-making arena- a strategy that aims at bringing all key players (great and small) to reach a consensus towards solving particular problems.

6.3.2 The need for Grassroots Participation in Conflict Resolution

In highlighting the need for grassroots participation in the conflict resolution efforts, Driens underscored the inadequacy of the conventional approaches that are used by the UN by highlighting the need for consultations and dialogue with the locals. Locals should be given a chance to participate in all grassroots mechanisms on conflict resolution. Grassroots action is thus influential in the development of conflict resolution. In substantiating this notion, Muller (2003:12) connotes that grassroots actors are well placed to deal with issues involving cultural identity, reconciliation and community building, which are integral to promoting a sustainable peace in many conflicts; in addition, grassroots initiatives are often immune from the opposition that is mounted against other actors. Grassroots actors engage in different activities that directly contribute to the process of transforming conflict as they play a fundamental role to the process of reconciliation and to the promotion of peace. This tallies with Muller (2003:13) who notes that grassroots organisations initiate tasks such as the reconstruction of damaged property, holding peace commissions, prayer meetings and vigils, organising festivals of culture and art, promoting contacts amongst parties to the conflict and assessing community needs. In this notion, these processes often address the need to evaluate underlying assumptions of culture and difference; thus in turn fostering an environment of forgiveness and equality - critical ingredients for forging long-lasting peace. In Rwanda the traditional concept of Gacaca was used successfully in forging peace between the Hutus and Tutsis soon after the genocide. In this case, traditional leaders served as arbiters and these Rwandese ethnic groups forged peace by making reparations and compensations to one another as per the wrongs that they did to each other. In this case, peace was realised using the traditional local conflict resolution methods.

In addition, locally based individuals are better stationed to solve issues of community building and identity formation as they are in close proximity to each individual which builds trust,
respect confidence between those directly involved in the conflict (Muller 2003; Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999; Lederach 1995, Rupasinghe 1995; Galtung 1990). This also tallies with Saunders (1999) who underscores the role of individuals at the grassroots level in peacebuilding by noting that whilst governments can write peace treaties, only individuals can transform human relationships. The fact that grassroots actors are familiar with particularistic traditions of community-building enables them to impact positively and have audience with the locals and the populace in general as they bring in traditional methods that are more favourable to durable stability and peace advancement. In buttressing the essence of grassroots actors in forging long-lasting peace Lederach (1986 as cited in Conradi 1993:443) gave an example of Nueva Guinea where there was successful mediation which was attributed to the fact that the mediation process was undertaken by grassroots actors in a method that conformed to cultural traditions. In this vein, the locals associated themselves with the peace-building strategies that were used.

### 6.3.3 Shortfalls of Conventional Approaches to Conflict Resolution

The study established that the conventional approaches to conflict resolution that are currently being used are falling short as panacea to the problem of conflict recurrence in the eastern DRC. Strategies such as conflict resolution, conflict management and conflict settlement through the following instruments dialogue, negotiations and mediation which involved the international community were seen to be ineffective in addressing violent conflict in the eastern DRC. Muller (2003:12) asserts that the changing nature of conflict in the post-Cold War world has rendered many of the realist, state-centric approaches to conflict resolution insufficient to promote peace-particularly in protracted intra-state ethnic conflicts where an allocation of resources is often not enough to satisfy all involved. Relying on conventional approaches in resolving conflict in eastern DRC was inadequate. The international community had been in the eastern DRC for a very long time prescribing too many unworkable solutions. The current UN resolution 2211

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80 This was a resolution renewing MONUSCO and its intervention brigade until 31 March 2016. In line with this, the Council (UNSC) requested that MONUSCO continue to maximise force interoperability, flexibility and effectiveness in the implementation of the entirety of its mandate and decided that its future reconfiguration and mandate should be determined in consultation with the Government. Reaffirming that the protection of civilians must be given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources, the Council authorised MONUSCO to take necessary measures to ensure effective protection of civilians and United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment. The Mission has also been authorised to support the Government to arrest and bring to justice those allegedly responsible for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, violations of international humanitarian law and other abuses in the country as well as to monitor implementation of the arms embargo. The Security Council extended the mandate of MONUSCO, including, on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent or any prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping, its Intervention Brigade.
on the eastern DRC is intensive and has established parallel structures which have interfered with what is taking place locally. Into the bargain, the approaches that are being used are alien and they emanate from the region or even the continent instead of them being drawn from the local sphere. For example, special envoys including UN Special Representative and Force Commanders because of their alien and imposed nature have a tendency to constantly consult their principals abroad and side-line major stakeholders such as SADC, local authorities, chiefs, religious groups, clans among other local players in decision making. SADC has the structures and will power but is allegedly dwarfed by UN and international agencies. There is need to be very clear on mandates for all the parties concerned in the conflict resolution efforts and initiatives.

In addition, those approaches that emanate from the region as well as the international community are dogged by the dearth in the political will of the concerned parties in fostering a tranquil region in general and a serene eastern DRC in particular. To this effect, there was the intervention by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) which is subjective and ineffective because parties to the conference (Rwanda and Uganda) have long term vested interests in the eastern Congo thus making it difficult if not impossible for them to effectively and magnanimously participate in forging peace and tranquility in the eastern DRC, as this peace will imply that they are going to lose out on the vast resources that they were benefiting from as a result of the instability in the eastern DRC. The actors to the conflict resolution process tend to be foreigners who have vested and diverse interests. Conflict resolution efforts of the UN tend to overlook the traditional structures in their process of transforming conflicts. The marginalisation of the local people renders the carrot and stick instruments used by the UN envoys in the eastern DRC thus rendering the conventional methods of conflict resolution by the UN unsuccessful. The conventional approaches to conflict resolution should do more in protecting the eastern DRC from the exploitation of its resources by neighbouring countries namely Burundi and Uganda who like Rwanda exploit natural resources of DRC to finance maintenance of power in their respective countries. Conventional approaches to conflict resolution have been asserted to be ineffective simply because they fail short in addressing the underlying causes of conflicts as they fail to transform the conflict at a

and endorses the Secretary-General's recommendation to reduce force by 2,000 troops, while maintaining an authorised troop ceiling of 19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers and staff officers, 391 police personnel, and 1,050 personnel of formed police units, until 31 March 2016[RES/2211] (www.un.org/en/ga/).
number of levels. According to Vayrynen (1991) there are five transformations that need to occur in order to have a positive shift in the conflict and these include: context transformation, structural transformation, actor transformation, issue transformation and individual and group transformation. In so doing this approach takes into account the multi-dimensional nature of conflict- attributes that were absent in the traditional approaches to conflict resolution which only sought to address the environmental factors underlying a particular conflict thereby failing to adequately address the complexity of conflict.

6.3.4 States having a stake in the DRC War

The study established that states are not capable of bringing long-lasting peace and tranquility between and among the warring parties simply because they have a stake in and are often a party to the conflict. In support of this Solomon and Mngqibisa (2000) argue that states are often misplaced to engage in or co-ordinate community-based peace-building as the state is often a party to the conflict as indeed, through state-based institutions, a violent culture may be perpetuated. The Kinshasa government also falls short in respecting all conflict resolutions it takes with locals by failing to enforce some follow-ups. The study established that the national government is failing to take a holistic approach to integrate the grassroots and the minorities into the political, economic, social and military structures of the DRC. The absence of dialogue that accounts for traditional set-ups and structures that permits tribes to discuss among themselves and encourage peaceful discourse at grassroots first renders traditional approaches less effective. Over and above, in highlighting the need for the involvement of the locals in conflict resolution Respondent C noted that if one is not Congolese it is difficult to solve a conflict in the traditional sense because they do not appreciate the Congolese culture. In support of this Solomon and Mngqibisa (2000:24) highlight the scepticism that the locals exhibit to the external actors by noting that when dealing with conflicts based in a Third World or non-Western society, action or interference from external actors, such as International Non-Government Organisations, is often regarded as culturally insensitive or an act of Western imperialism. External actors in the conflict resolution and peace-building exercise tend to have time-honoured ways and means of dealings that often disregard the local traditions.
6.3.5 Impediments to the Adoption of Traditional Methods of Conflict Resolution

In highlighting the diversity of cultures as an impediment to the adoption of traditional methods of conflict resolution. Asinda observed that the cultures are so diverse in the eastern DRC such that it will be impossible to come up with an all-encompassing approach that includes all the actors in the various tribes. In support of this, Dr Mkapa asserted that the challenge of lack of trust among the tribes (that is, the Bantu and the Bahimas for instance) has fuelled exclusionary tendencies in the eastern DRC. In further buttressing this notion of exclusionary tendencies against the traditional leaders and tribal heads by the external players as well as Congolese Government; it was established that the DDR plan was designed with the support of the humanitarian partners and despite the endorsement of PNDDR III, there is lack of clarity on the eligibility criteria. There is also ambiguity over the different categories of former fighters, inclusion of dependents and the combatant weapon-ratio- crucial information that could easily be accessed if had they incorporated the grassroots as well as their leaders. When the locals are alienated in any attempt to dissipate disputes they tend to pose some threats to the peacekeeping mission as well as resisting, if not negating the peace-building efforts in those respective locales. For example the Analysis Report for the Situation in DRC (n.d: 2) noted that security threats and risks to UN staff, premises and operations have increased countrywide in the context of offensive UN operations. This could prove worrying for humanitarian actors as protests in Beni against MONUSCO also targeted some humanitarian actors.

This also shows why it is worrying that certain humanitarian actors and UN agencies have been asking MONUSCO to open bases (e.g. in Nobili) for protection purposes during humanitarian interventions. In this vein, it was noted that there is a tendency for populations to gather around bases for protection, but if MONUSCO itself recognises that it is now a target of armed groups then this could result in considerable risk of harm to civilians. This situation shows the levels of disgruntlement by the indigenous people against the UN led Mission (MONUC). In addition to the notion of people’s scepticism about the Government and the external players, the study established that the citizens have lost trust in the state as the respondents echoed how they continue to be relentlessly squeezed for economic gain by armed actors, state and some peacekeeping troops. According to the Oxfam Report (2013:3) the everyday violence and exploitation they live with is entrenched in day-to-day relationship; not only with the armed groups but also with the national army, the police and prominent local figures. The violence

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81 Interview with author, Goma, September 2015.
people experience continues to flourish because the state does not consistently protect the citizenry and state authorities themselves frequently present threats to people’s protection. In this regard, people have lost trust in the state machinery as well as the external peace keepers because instead of them being the vanguards of the peace security, Government elements are actually seen to be at forefront exploiting the people. In this vein, the incorporation of traditional leadership structures will go a long way in promoting long-lasting peace in the eastern DRC as they are the stewards of the true values of *Ubuntu* and the traditional positions enable them to garner respect from the people they lead.

In highlighting the inadequacies of traditional approaches as panacea to recurrent conflict DRC Former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, observed that the existence of multilateral institutions had an effect on African traditional approaches to resolving conflicts. This is so considering that the world is now dealing with multilateral institutions as opposed to individuals and communities.\(^82\) The customary methods can never be a panacea to conflict recurrence in eastern DRC because tradition has ceased to exist and therefore you cannot use something that no longer exists. It has to be noted that the process of colonisation was not just the simple occupation of land but a higher level aimed and achieved through the colonisation of minds including those of chiefs. An anonymous political Science scholar observed that the institutional memory is no longer there due to systematic destruction through laws, religion and schooling. He gave an example of an elephant herd where the eldest female would remember where to find water during drought periods. The moment the elephant herd was fenced and quarantined, they learnt to drink water from boreholes and other artificial sources. When the eldest female dies she goes with her memory resulting in the surviving elephants only remembering to drink from boreholes. The customary ways of conflict resolution have now been adulterated and the new versions attest to the glaring and inherent lack of political independence among blacks (Africans). In addition to the encroachment and adulteration of the African customary practices by Western principles it must be noted that Africans are now good at modern statecraft overlooking the tradition and customary way of doing things. So whatever Africans endeavour to achieve as Africans is trapped by this modern set up. The biggest blunder Africans made at the time of attaining independence was the disastrous failure to embrace the prudence of parallel jurisdiction.\(^83\) There is urgent need to formalise parallel jurisdiction as shown below:

\(^82\) Interview with Former South African President Thabo Mbeki, Johannesburg, 19 May 2016.
\(^83\) The author is greatly indebted to these viewpoints by the scholar during interview, Pretoria, 18 May 2016. The scholar opted to remain anonymous.
The table above shows how the parallel jurisdictions by highlighting the dichotomy showing the equivalence of the components of the modern state craft that have replaced or engulfed the traditional customs. In this table the paramount king from the traditional customs is equivalent to the modern state craft president. The chiefs, headman, kraal heads are in the same way equivalent to modern day ministers, local authorities and councillors respectively. The only similarity lies on the people. People remain people in both categories. In addition Mbeki also supports the notion of parallel jurisdiction, but however he suspects that it may not apply in DRC because the government is feeble.

6.3.6 Globalisation and the Traditional Approaches to Peace-Building

In addition to the rebuttal stance taken in the preceding paragraph, Alloys Tegera vehemently disagreed with the traditional approaches including that the approaches cannot be a panacea to present day challenges. He bemoaned that traditional practices such as the use of elders and chiefs in conflict resolution have been affected by globalisation. Times have since changed. Africans are no longer Africans as in the past. Their cultures have been drastically eroded through the various technological developments. The study established that globalisation has had a tremendous influence on attitudes, ethos, beliefs and all African practices. In bolstering this view, Rutaremara nevertheless agreed to the fact that Africans have their own traditional approaches but over the years we have acquired others through globalization in this process.

There is need to build upon those values and traditions taking into account modernity as culture and tradition are dynamic, they are incessantly evolving so one has to concentrate on the positives by integrating and rationalising the traditional practices with the modern strategies. In support of this position Ambassador Isaac Moyo noted that tradition has its inherent bad

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84 Same viewpoints from anonymous scholar are acknowledged.
85 Interview with author, Goma, 06 October 2015
86 Same interview with Tegera, Goma, 06 October 2015.
87 Same interview with author, Kigali, 2016.
practices so there is need to selectively adopt those traditions that will promote long-lasting peace and tranquility. On a contrary note Henry Isoke argued that traditional approaches are not panacea to conflict resolution in the eastern DRC. In this perspective, differences in identity, cultures and traditional beliefs make it difficult for people to co-operate in peace initiatives.\textsuperscript{89} With this in mind, there are diverse ethnic groups (about 28 ethnic groups) in the eastern DRC- a situation that accounts for pluralism and heterogeneity in the culture, ethics, religion and tradition. These differences and heterogeneities serve as a source for non-co-operation and antagonism. Harmony is difficult to achieve where traditional leaders are denied their rights for instance the arrest of King Mwami Ndese by DRC. Such a situation will lead to resistance by the locals who are loyal to their traditional leader.\textsuperscript{90}

There is a general importation of the perceived good things and practices (international best practices). The introduction of other values through religion and ideologies such as Christianity, Socialism, Marxism, Capitalism and Communism has made the situation even worse. Current generations argue that they cannot live in the past. The advent of modernity, the use of technology (cell-phones, internet and other gadgets) has severely affected the way Africans used to live. African culture is no longer a microcosm. The tendency is now to migrate towards universalism. Traditional leaders are also not immune from technological development and in certain scenarios it is alleged that they are gullible to bribes and kick-backs by the foreigners hence making them unreliable actors in conflict resolution. In addition to this notion, it was highlighted that traditional leaders (chiefs) fuel the conflict as they are part of the equation. They do possess the condign power to influence and mobilise their communities to protect or fight for their ethnic pride and possessions and the communities do listen and obey them.\textsuperscript{91} To this effect, the chiefs can thus be a conduit for fostering real conflict resolution which as noted by Lederach (1995) provides a comprehensive framework for addressing conflict throughout its phases- from the initial stages of indirect conflict, to full-scale direct conflict to lastly, its resolution.

6.3.7 Manifestations of the Shortcomings of the Conventional Approaches to Conflict Resolution in the eastern DRC

In showing the ineffectiveness of the conventional peace-making and peacebuilding strategies that are being used by the UN as well as other regional players in the eastern DRC; the study

\textsuperscript{89} Interview with author, Kampala, 2016.
\textsuperscript{90} Same interview with author, Kampala, 2016.
\textsuperscript{91} Interview with Brig Gen Nundwe, 08 October 2015.
discovered that the security situation in the region has continued to be unstable as negative forces and armed groups in the DRC continue to commit atrocities. According to the Security Situation Report on the Great Lakes Region for the period 15 to 23 May 2015 the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR-FOCA) elements attacked and looted properties from several vehicles along Goma-Rwindi road in Rutshuru territory. However, the attack was repulsed by Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC). On 22 May the same year, at Miriki in Lubero territory, FDLR-RUD elements attacked the FADRC checkpoint and there was a fierce exchange of gunfire with FARDC troops- an incident that resulted in the displacement of people from Miriki to surrounding forests and only returned to their areas after a day. Additional evidence to support the fact that the eastern DRC still remains unstable despite the efforts by the MONUSCO as well as some neighbouring countries was gleaned from the study. On 17 May 2015 in Walendi Bindi in Irumu territory in Orientale Province elements of the armed group Resistance Patriotic Front of Ituri (FRPI) of Cobra Matata was alleged to have attacked some villagers of Mendu, Androso and Maga villages. In the process, they looted food items, burned fifty-seven houses and raped several women. The attack also caused the displacement of over 5000 people. On 24 May, reports from Kasiki, Luhanga and Kanyati in Luofu locality of Lubero territory indicated that there were increased activities by FDLR. It was noted that the FDLR continued to engage in sexual violence, looting of crops and other related activities. To this effect, it is evident that FDLR has continued to be one of the major armed groups causing insecurity in North Kivu Province owing to increased activities in Lubero and Rutshuru.

Over and above, the study highlighted that the situation in the eastern DRC still remains volatile as much of North and South Kivu are still under the control of other armed groups thus making regional relations fragile. In this vein, the report of the Mini-Summit of the ICGLR Heads of State and Government however, noted that the security and humanitarian situation in the DRC is calm but still fragile mainly due to the continued presence of both local and foreign negative forces. The eastern DRC remains a prominent unstable war torn zone in the Great Lakes region. There are some cases of violence in the eastern DRC as was witnessed on the 5th of May in Beni where an ambush took place. It was established that one convoy of TANZBATT trucks that was carrying 46 soldiers from Mavivi to reinforce the FIB position at Maymoya was ambushed by unknown armed men, presumed to be Allied Democratic Forces-NALU (ADF-NALU) at Maibo. The intention of the ADF group was to show force and to kill as many as possible, to inflict fear in the population and reduce the pace of the Operations. In this regard, they only targeted the Civilian vehicles for looting and when the TANZBATT convoy approached they seised the opportunity to take new weapons and ammunition and also to prove a point to
MONUSCO. The ADF is reportedly powering the insecurity situation in Beni and this armed group is believed to be in the eastern DRC just for economic reasons as they are allegedly smuggling minerals from the DRC through Uganda to the International Markets with the support of some Ugandan authorities and some local (Congolese) opposition and businessmen. In this vein, the local oppositions are having a hand and some Ugandan officials. This could explain why Mr Betrand Bisimwa the Political Chairman of M23 is currently holed up in Uganda.

The study in the same notion, highlighted that these ADF-NALU armed groups are enjoying local DRC and Ugandan support on this trafficking of minerals to the International Markets. Respondent B noted that, “what should be borne in people’s minds is that oppositions in the DRC do not want DRC to be peaceful because their illegal activities will be exposed and they will not get funds to run their political parties.” In other words it is their lifeline, stopping it is tantamount to grounding them. The complacency exhibited by the Ugandan Government in fostering peace in the eastern DRC, Respondent C had this to say: “If Ugandan Government is serious about fighting and the elimination of the ADF-NALU armed groups like what she is doing against the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) it should call for joint military operations between DRC Armed Forces and Ugandan Armed Forces because those armed groups originated from Uganda and crossed into DRC.” In this vein, since it is now the problem of the two countries and the fact that the armed groups are based along the border of DRC and Uganda joint efforts must be applied to eliminate ADF-NALU. This will help to identify the culprits behind giving the ADF-NALU a life-line of smuggling minerals and trafficking of weapons in Beni areas.

In further highlighting the state of affairs of violence and conflict in the eastern DRC the study established that there was a case whereby the RDF and the FARDC engaged in fighting in Kanyesheja Busasamana sector Rubavu district of Rwanda and Kanyesheja Buhumba groupment Nyiragongo DRC territories respectively on 11 June 2015. In this case it was alleged that there was violation of territory and attempted stealing of cows from Rwanda Government by FARDC (the DRC Armed Forces). It was alleged that a section of FARDC soldiers violated Rwandan territory with an intention to steal cows. However, it was noted that the fighting emanated from the provocation by RDF on FARDC position at Kanyesheja as well as the alleged capture of an FARDC soldier by Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF). The Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Report (2015) noted that the location of Kanyesheja II Hill is contested by both countries given its positioning along the presumed border line. However, these
peacekeepers from these two neighbouring countries instead of them expending their energy and efforts to eliminate armed groups and instability in the eastern DRC they are fighting against themselves.

Suspicions and mistrust among these two forces contributed to the tension that resulted in these clashes and a probability of future fighting will prevail if urgent measures are not undertaken. Such clashes against the people who are expected to be the vanguards of peace defeats the whole purpose of collaboration against the common enemies- armed groups. The porosity of the borders of the DRC and the multiplicity of negative forces swarming the east side to Kasai will further destabilise the eastern DRC. However, it was also established that the attacks are not limited to the East as there were some attacks in Kinshasa, Lubumbashi Kindu (Maniema) and Kolwezi (Katanga. In addition it must be noted that the attacks are not that widespread but they are basically occurring in pockets and at irregular intervals. In view of the foregoing, there is a growing concern that the MONUSCO peacekeepers in the area have not responded positively to the situation and claimed that the peacekeepers were failing to protect the population from the armed groups’ attacks.

6.4 The Efficacy of the Ethic of Ubuntu and Collective Security in eastern DRC

Ethics of Ubuntu and the UN concept of collective Security can be applied by the SADC The region as well as the ICGLR in solving the problem of recurrence of conflict in Eastern DRC in focusing on the sacred nature of life, collectiveness and humanism. Chief Ndese subscribed to the principle and ethic of both collective security and Ubuntu respectively where he strongly believes that differences can be resolved if thorough traditional structures and tribes are brought together and present their grievances formally to chiefs. Such an initiative will go a long way in roping in the crucial values, beliefs and practices of the people in the conflict resolution milieu in the eastern DRC.\textsuperscript{92} Ubuntu in this scenario, helps to address the problem by tackling the personal values, beliefs, preferences and attitudes of the people to the conflict at an individual level. This aligns with Koka’s (1996:9) insight where he noted that Ubuntu denotes humanness- this resonates around the notion that man (human beings) is endowed with nothing but consciousness, intelligence, wisdom, love and compassion, reason, understanding and creativity. To this effect, the principle of Ubuntu can be equated to humanism. As proposed by Tegera, there is need for a larger set up of humanism through communities. Tegera believes

\textsuperscript{92} Interview with author, Goma, October 2015.
"Ubuntu can help keep people (Africans in the eastern DRC) together through shared values and in the process avoid conflicts. He concluded that there is absolute need to unpack Ubuntu and appreciate what can help all Africans since as humans in community, they share too many things (values, beliefs, practices, tastes, preferences, attitudes among other attributes) in common.\textsuperscript{93}

Traditionally people have always lived as a community where everything was performed, enjoyed or resolved communally through the practice of Ubuntu. In this vein Respondent I (Dr Mkapa) asserts with gratification the diversity of Ubuntu and Ujamaa by highlighting that these practices of Ubuntu and Ujamaa have ever been a practice of common sharing, duty and help. In this scenario he underscored the dimension of communalism and that sense of oneness that was a product of Ujamaa and Ubuntu. Accordingly, Africans believe in humanism, common sharing, understanding and vision. The Africans (Bantu) always lived together communally as well as being bound by the same beliefs, ethos, and practices among other attributes. Ubuntu embraces diversity in that people are allowed to believe, think and behave the way they wish and they should learn to live together with those differences but without necessarily fighting. In this regard, cultural values should strive to promote tolerance and acceptance between and among diverse people. Africans have always survived as a community thus, they co-operated in the things that they do. This makes co-operation in the security easy to implement and perform. That co-operation should enable the Africans to help one another through culture before allowing outsiders to intervene. In this vein, Ubuntu can be used as a tool for solving conflicts.

6.4.1 Ubuntu and Harmonious Co-Existence

In buttressing the notion of Ubuntu as a salubrious tool for long-lasting peace, Broodryk (2006:3) opined that if Ubuntu is implemented in a more global manner, it will pave the way for more harmonious and meaningful human co-existence. The ethic of Ubuntu will facilitate the creation of a moral world order characterised by more humanised societies, with caring, rational, compassionate, peaceful, understanding, loving, friendly and tolerant people in the eastern DRC. In support of this notion Faranisi underscored the need to socialise the youths on values of respect, good neighbourliness, peaceful co-existence to the young so that as they grow these tenets are inherent in them. As much as the youth require space, their perception of the world can be corrected whilst they are still young (catch them young). To this effect, community elders, opinion makers, influential or charismatic members of the society should

\textsuperscript{93} Interview with author, Goma, October 2015.
play a leading role in applying their past in positively shaping the minds of the youths.\(^9^4\) \textit{Ubuntu} as a uniquely African way of approaching life is crucial in forging a human centred world-view whereby one should do unto others as you wish them to do unto you. That is one will reap what they would have sown. Broodryk (2006:20) asserts that if you practice peace and diplomacy in dealing with others, others will also be diplomatic in return; and also he who lives by the sword dies by the sword. Recurrent conflict in the eastern DRC can thus be solved when people share emotive feelings, pity and mercy with others. The Tutsis and the Hutus should develop tolerance (a crucial attribute of \textit{Ubuntu}) whereby they should be sensitive and accommodative to each other’s ethnical identities, opinions, cultures and historical backgrounds among other attributes. In reinforcing this notion, Broodryk (2006:18) articulates that in these human-oriented environments one will observe qualitative happiness where there is less greed, imperialism, individualism and more efforts to share in a spirit of collectiveness and communalism.

6.4.2 \textit{Ubuntu} and the Collective Security System

Additionally, the concept of \textit{Ubuntu} is seen to be metamorphosing into the principle of collective (community) security where for instance SADC played a fundamental role in solving problems in the eastern DRC. This tallies with Onyemaechi’s (2007:23) position where he noted that collective security as an idealist concept is anchored on the need to prevent hostilities by the formation of an overwhelming military force by member states to deter aggression or by implication to launch a reprisal attack capable of defeating a recalcitrant member. In effect, this arrangement of collective security sees all states co-operating collectively or communally to provide security for all the actions of all against any state within the groups which might challenge the existing order by using force. The achievement of the collective security will be based on the principle that an attack on one is an attack on all. This resonates well with the adage which says \textit{umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu} (a persons is a person because of other persons). Ebegbulem (2012:5) asserts that any state contemplating aggression would face the sure prospect of struggle not simply with the prospective victim, but with all other members of the system who would make any necessary sacrifice to save the state attacked. SADC and the ICGLR are two such agencies under which the collective security system has been seen as machinery for joint action for the prevention or counter of any attack against the DRC.

\(^9^4\) Interview with author, Kinshasa, September 2015.
In this scenario, the members of the systems (SADC, ICGLR) are hypothetically believed to have such an overwhelming preponderance of power that will be so unreservedly committed to the principles they have endorsed that aggression against the DRC in general and the eastern DRC in particular will become quite irrational; presumably, it will not occur and in the event that it occurs, it will be defeated. Collective security in this regard breeds some fundamental attributes of *Ubuntu* which include cohesion (that is, a very strong feeling of belonging), teamwork and loyalty as well as commitment. In dealing with the issue of collective security Respondent I notes that collective security and regional oversight by SADC/ ICGLR is paramount as long as there is a very strong political will by all member states. Dr Mkapa concurs that *Ubuntu* and Collective Security can play a significant role in solving the conflict in the eastern DRC. This was evidenced by the establishment of the ICGRL which in many people’s views came about as both a relief to the region and also as a collective deterrence to incessant conflict. The collective security approach which has some nuances of *Ubuntu* is very ideal in the eastern DRC. SADC was seen to have successfully implemented the collective security system in its two intervention endeavours in the DRC. Firstly, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe deployed their troops under Operation Sovereign Legitimacy and prevented the demise of Laurent Kabila in 1998. Secondly, the SADC Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) was deployed in Goma in 2013. In this scenario the intervention by SADC as a collective security mechanism with the values of *Ubuntu* being upheld should be commended and there is also need to acknowledge the positive results the initiatives brought about as well as to applaud the imperative involvement and the role of the collective effort by the region as fundamental.

In supporting the essence of *Ubuntu* and Collective security in ending conflict in eastern DRC Asinda views the morality of *Ubuntu* as a very strong tool for fostering long-lasting peace. Accordingly, “*Ubuntu* runs in every African’s blood” due to the fact *Ubuntu* are commonly and widely held values between and amongst African nations. Asinda further underscored the intricate relationship between *Ubuntu* and collective security and how the locals responded to SADC Force Intervention Brigade’s (FIB) involvement by acknowledging that as soon as the SADC deployed the FIB, the Congolese immediately identified with them- a clear indication that *Ubuntu* and collective security were concepts at play and acceptable to Africans. The deployment of the Forward International Brigade (FIB) though delayed indeed was a positive and welcomed move. The deployment unlike that of MONUSCO was most appreciated by

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95 Interview with author, 2016
96 Interview with author, Goma, 2015.
97 Interview with author, Goma, 2015.
locals because they (the locals) identify themselves with FIB. Dr Mkapa emphasised the importance of deploying a regional force (FIB) to solve regional problems (eastern DRC) and this initiative brings stability. So collective security with a flare of *Ubuntu* can actually form the basis of conflict resolution in eastern DRC. Additionally, collective security is considered as a reaction to protect one another in a community. Therefore SADC as a community was best positioned, collectively to resolve the security problem bedevilling the eastern DRC through recurrence of conflicts.

The MONUSCO political affairs officer, Josia Orbat, underscored the need for local solutions to the internal problems countenancing the people in the eastern DRC by noting that the Congolese people should avoid over reliance on those from outside but should instead endeavour to resolve their own problems. Traditional concepts of dispute resolution such as communal courts (*barasa rawasee* or *dare*) where all communities were represented when arbitrations over disputes takes place and traditional leaders would preside over the cases were seen to be very crucial in promoting peace in the eastern DRC. In this effect, the study established that this traditional concept which is deeply embedded in the praxis of *Ubuntu* has worked extremely well, whereby the elders in the community seek to bring a seemingly huge problem down to the baseline level- by capacitating the most affected people to resolve their outstanding issues. In addition, values such as respect, obedience, humanness are at the centre in these arrangements. In substantiating this notion of local solutions to conflict by the local people Oxfam Report (2013:3) notes that the Government should join hands with the traditional chiefs and resolve their differences; in cases where the Government included these community leadership structures several communities reported positive results when they were able to negotiate with local leaders and state authorities and to find a solution together. However there is a challenge in that current generations no longer observe the ethos of *Ubuntu*. The primordial practice of chiefs as custodians of *Ubuntu* has been eroded. There is conflict in the structures between chiefs and government. Most of these set ups are highly sensitive resulting in claims and counter-claims of marginalisation especially of the Tutsi for instance.

Faranisi was affirmative to the role of *Ubuntu* in conflict resolution and transformation. He felt that it can assist in collective security. He cited the deployment of SADC Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) as an initiative that has stabilised the situation in area in North Kivu and around Goma. However, there is the saddening reality that there are too many armed groups who have

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98 Same interview with author, February 2016.  
99 Interview with author, October 2015.
rendered many people internally displaced. This reality means that there are now challenges to establish internal means to sustain the peace dividend in the eastern DRC. Local structures are no longer able to uphold the ethics of *Ubuntu* and other traditional practices such as governance by traditional leaders have now been infiltrated by the Western and imperialistic tendencies. There is need to re-establish respect and authority to facilitate adherence to the *Ubuntu* ethic. Over the years there has been too much advocacy for human rights by civil society and Westerners. This has eroded the African ethos, ethics, practices and religious beliefs. The West view African tradition as primitive and some of the Africans perceive their tradition to be humane thereby leading to cultural friction which has compounded the situation. In substantiating the notion of erosion of traditional principles and practices it was noted that *Ubuntu* has been diluted to suit specific needs and interests.

African problems are problems created for them by outsiders so it is imperative to leave them alone and attend their challenges. Africa is saddled with coloniality - which is colonialism long after the departure of colonialists. Coloniality manifests has trichotomous dimension that is knowledge, power and being. These have affected the Africans from using their own strategies and means to do away with their problems. In line with this, the colonial legacy is still lingering in the mindsets, actions, activities, behaviours and patterns, lifestyles and systems of the African way after the colonialism has lapsed and we are now left with coloniality.

**COLONIALITY EXPLAINED**

![Diagram of coloniality explained]

1. **Knowledge**: Language and Western Standards- Where inorder for one to be deemed educated they must have acquired the Western form of education.

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100 Same interview with author, Kinshasa, 29 September 2015.
2. **Power:** Formation of UN and UNSC after WW2. Power resides in UNSC who can veto, name and condemn. The UNSC decides who is a dictator terrorist or access of evil.

3. **Being:** Blacks want to empty their Africaness and become Europeans who hate Africans who love them.

Black women want to dress and appear like Europeans. The African way of dressing, talking among others has been long overshadowed by the European way of doing things. Over and above, European lifestyles are modelled towards individualism- an arrangement that contradicts heavily to the communal practices and lifestyles in Africa. To this effect, coloniality can make it difficult if not impossible for the values of communal co-operation, togetherness and oneness that envisaged in the ethic of *Ubuntu* and collective security system to be adopted as the Africans have been conditioned to think that Eurocentrism is the only sure way to go.¹⁰¹

The same anonymous scholar contended that since *Ubuntu* is a philosophy and not a theory it was as good as an asset for humanity and could not solve military problems. In this scenario, *Ubuntu* has been criticised for it being a traditional philosophy that can address micro (community and individual level problems) not inter-state military problems. Matters have become complex. There is risk of retribution and revenge by armed groups and society. Armed groups come from ethnically diverse cultures. The use of child soldiers has made matters worse in that *Ubuntu* requires that values and norms are inculcated into the children whilst they are still young, then they are made to grow up with them, but the issue of child soldiers equips the innocent souls with gross hatred, cruelty, malice, brutality, vindictiveness, wickedness, inhumaness, callousness- attributes that go contrary to *Ubuntu* practices and collective security systems.¹⁰² In addition to these debilitating forces and practices that have weakened *Ubuntu* Respondent T ushered in the argument that customary practices and traditional principles have been overridden by conflicts by noting that there is a breakdown in values due to conflicts. That is, when war breaks out it signals mistrust and antagonism which ultimately lead to a collapse in the value systems.

In giving a lower profile to the essence of *Ubuntu* and collective security in the eastern DRC. The *Ubuntu* concept may be difficult to apply in the eastern DRC because Tutsi are not Bantu but Nilotic. In this scenario, the concept of *Ubuntu* could have been very useful if the parties have a similar Bantu origin- a situation yielding to a level playing field. The Hutus

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¹⁰¹ The author is again indebted to these valuable scholarly viewpoints by an anonymous political science academic at the University of South Africa during interview, Pretoria, 18 May 2016.

¹⁰² Same interview with anonymous academic, Pretoria, 18 May 2016.
understand *Ubuntu* because it is a culture they grew up in and respected; on the contrary note the Tutsis are very aggressive and warlike- they have a culture of lying, stealing and dominating. \(^{103}\) They believe they are masters not servants. Given such a background, it is difficult for *Ubuntu* to be utilised as a conflict resolution tool as *Ubuntu* calls for parties to reach a compromise as well as to have respect for others- attributes conducive for peace-making to be realised in its fullest. On the contrary note, Dr Mkapa hastened to complain that the concepts had been invaded and diluted by foreign cultures; due to globalization and foreign influence, there now exist contradicition in the *Ubuntu* concept such that the younger generations now shun it. He “mourned” that there are too many global influences that have impacted on *Ubuntu*. \(^{104}\) The current developments have led to the severe invasion of the *Ubuntu* culture by foreigners. In this scenario, he mentions that the advent of computerization, the use of the cellphones, information, technology and communication among others, has had an enormous impact on the African *Ubuntu*. Africans are no longer Africans in the real and original sense as a result of the influence of foreign lifestyles. \(^{105}\) This scenario makes it difficult for the ethics of *Ubuntu* to be successfully implemented in the present day Africa.

### 6.4.3 Challenges of the Collective Security System

In reinforcing the notion of problems associated with the collective security system Ebegbulem (2011:24) connotes that the concept of collective security is misguided as it is seen as conceptually muddled and naively unrealistic. Although there are pledges to defend each other, many countries will refuse to do so, if such an act is not in their own best interests or thought to be too risky or expensive. In further highlighting the flipsides of the collective security system Dr Mkapa was not happy with the tendency by the region to take a back seat (that is the regional players tend to procrastinate) when events are unfolding (as in eastern DRC and Rwanda 1994). The region has a habit to wait until things are out of control to react or until the UN has come up with a mandate. He blamed lack of cohesion and mutual responsibility by the region in solving regional problems. Leaders were not bold to tell each other that enough is enough. \(^{106}\) Rutaremara confirms this by noting that member states tend to be cautious when transacting with neighbours (too much good neighbourliness). States shy criticising or telling the truth about other states – for example, during the ICGCR summit in Pretoria only Uganda and Zimbabwe had the guts to tell DRC that they were wrong. Instead there are too many initiatives

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\(^{103}\) Same interview with Chimonyo, DareSalaam, March 2016.
\(^{104}\) Interview with author, DareSalaam, February 2016.
\(^{105}\) Interview with Chimonyo, DareSalaam, March 2016.
\(^{106}\) Same interview with author, DareSalaam, February 2016.
for example, in the eastern DRC where numerous declarations have been made and non-implemented. Such scenarios tend to render the concept of collective security ineffective in forging long-lasting peace in the eastern DRC.107

In highlighting the complacency that is exhibited by the regional players in conflict situations Respondent J (Ambassador of the Republic of Zimbabwe to the United Republic of Tanzania) bemoaned the absence of collective will to move in the same direction by member states. The East African Community and SADC are often divided when it comes to conflict resolution. For example only Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe volunteered to intervene in DRC in 1998 while the remainder of the SADC were either against or reluctant. In reinforcing this point of lack of collective unity Carayannis (2009:11) notes that South Africa- the southern African region’s dominant economy, made it clear that it had no intention of carrying the financial burden of a regional peacekeeping force. Only when the member states of the region pull in the same direction can collective security be viable and useful as a tool in solving conflict recurrence in the eastern DRC. Col Mutiganda downplayed collective security initiatives that tend to alienate the neighbouring countries in the GLR. In this vein, he noted that:

The security of eastern DRC is guaranteed by SADC alone is wishful thinking. If the security mechanism does not involve Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, then you have not started. The deployment of MONUSCO, FIB and any other forces, does not address the fundamental issue of interests in resources. Therefore the deployment of any force in eastern DRC without involving the neighbours is skewed and a security mismanagement of the whole arrangement.

The idea here is that the neighbouring countries should also participate immensely in forging peace in the eastern DRC. However, the need to involve the neighbours was purported to worsen the situation as they are the ones who are being fingered to have a role to play in destabilising DRC. To this effect, it was noted that the ICGLR is allegedly failing to make long-lasting peace in the eastern DRC simply because some of the member states (Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda) are purported to have vested interests in the eastern DRC such that the curtailment of conflict means the end of (illegal) supply of certain resources to their nations. Hence the need to safeguard their national interests renders the collective security principle inadequate in solving recurrent conflict in the eastern DRC. States do not regard themselves as members of one society having a common vital interest in protecting and preserving each other’s rights; there is no doubt that states have demonstrated a willingness to ally themselves with certain other selected states and thus to pledge to defend selected frontiers in addition to their own.

107 Same interview with author, Kigali, March 2016.
An anonymous academic totally agreed in collective efforts in resolving conflicts since the idea embraces everybody and allows those important players to the conflict to be brought on board and participate in peace initiatives. The study also unearthed the notion that the UN’s collective security system has also made some nuances of success as countries in the several regional blocs are joining their hands in a bid to establish long-lasting peace in the eastern DRC. The ICGLR/ SADC Joint Ministerial Communiqué of the 2nd of July 2014 commended the UN, AU, EU, SADC and the ICGLR for their continued support to the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework on the DRC and the Region as well as in the establishment of the mechanism for evaluation and implementation of the DDRRR for those willing to disarm and be repatriated to Rwanda. In supporting the notion of inclusivity of the neighbouring countries in resolving the conflict in the eastern DRC Respondent M highlighted that there is safety in numbers; if the internal security of neighbours is normal, then it guarantees your own security. What is happening in the eastern DRC is a threat to her neighbours and it therefore calls for collective intervention by neighbours and the region. In highlighting the benefits of collective security system the study noted some success stories. Though not conclusive, the deployment of FIB (collective system) in liaison/partnership between ICGLR and SADC has produced some positive results. Still on collective system, Operation Umoja Wethu (a joint operation between FARDC and RDF) against FDLR was rated by the region very successful.

6.5 UNSC’s role in Complementing SADC efforts in Solving Conflicts in the SADC Region

The study established that regions should be at the fore-front in solving their own problems (or problems within their jurisdiction) for the reason that there were existential linkages within regions such as SADC, COMESA, East African Community, Economic Community of Central African States, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries among others which should be exploited before bringing players from outside the continent. In effect, regions must take the lead in conflict resolution. SADC empirically demonstrated its capacity to solve own challenges in Lesotho, Madagascar and Zimbabwe. The study established that the security situation in eastern DRC started showing signs of improvement as far as peace is concerned after the deployment of SADC FIB as the armed groups have now agreed to cease hostilities and comply with DRC as a result of FIB. The SADC continues to monitor the situation in the eastern DRC to ensure that total peace and stability returns to the country.

The tremendous efforts made by SADC through collective security or community endeavours by deploying the FIB are commendable, thus bearing testimony to the fact that regional players have the capacity to solve the problems in their jurisdictions. The Second Joint ICGLR-SADC Ministerial meeting held on the 2nd of July in Luanda, Angola emphasised the need to implement the PSC framework including the UNSC Resolution 2098 in which all negative forces are to be neutralised to lay down their arms or faced military actions if they do not comply with the provisions of the PSC framework. The ICGLR/ SADC Joint Ministerial Meeting took note of the decision by FDLR to voluntarily surrender and disarm. MONUSCO and FARDC were to engage military actions against those FDLR elements who were unwilling to disarm. The study highlights the displeasure that the Congolese have towards the UN and the UNSC by noting that the Congolese have a feeling that not much is being done by the UN to end the conflict. There are about 20 000 UN troops who have failed to neutralise the active armed groups in the region. It appears as if different countries within the UN and Security Council do not have convergent points of view on the crisis in the eastern DRC and this is the reason why the UN mission has been in the DRC since 1999 with little results. UN is a multinational force comprising of an alien force commander (Brazilian), Deputy Force Commander (Germany) alien troop contributing countries (Uruguay, India, Pakistan, Burma, Malaysia, Costa Rica, etc).

6.5.1 Reasons for MONUSCO’s presence in the DRC

To this effect, the study asserts that the MONUSCO contingents are in the DRC for financial gain. In relation to this, if conflicts escalate the UN forces in the DRC are exultant because their stay is justified and prolonged. Their attitude and modus operandi have directly escalated the conflict. It is believed that the UN peace keeping missions are working subtly to see the conflict perpetuating in the eastern DRC for instance it was reported that there were times when the Forces for Democratic Liberation for Rwanda (FDLR) was cornered and ready to surrender but MONUSCU would secure them by para dropping food and ammunition using helicopters so that they continue fighting. It was established that eastern DRC is still experiencing instability as some armed groups, notably the Forces for Democratic Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), are yet to disarm despite an agreement reached in 2014 for total disarmament. More than 3000 FDLR are reported to be in DRC and only 300, mainly old non-essential combatants, had surrendered by December 2014. Over and above, it was also noted that UN resists the deployment of FIB because they know SADC has the resolve and capacity to bring peace in
eastern DRC. The UN dreads the humiliation once SADC succeeds through dialogue and
intervention. For instance since the defeat of M23 in November 2013 by the SADC forces,
armed groups including Mayi-Mayi Lfontaine, FPC, Mayi-Mayi Simba, Mayi-Mayi Shetani and
MPLC expressed their intention to discuss the terms of their surrender with the Government of
the Democratic Republic of Congo. This was a step towards the establishment of long-standing
peace in the DRC. So the UN keeps pronouncing that there is no peace and democracy and
therefore they will not leave. The UN and multilateral cooperating partners advocated for
regions to take responsibility over own respective regions. Instead, the UNSC misled all and
sundry by providing a false analysis of a catastrophe of unimaginable proportion inorder to
justify their intervention.

In addition to the above, the study discovered that people totally condemned the intervention by
the UN in the conflict in the DRC. Chief Ndese had no kind words for the UN and MONUSCO
and views them as extensions of colonialism and imperialism only interested in fattening their
pockets by plundering the God/Ancestors given resources of the DRC.\textsuperscript{109} He however does not
visualise any meaningful role for the UN at all and contends that the UN (MONUSCO) does not
have any meaningful physical role to play in eastern DRC and should therefore pack their bags
and depart. In further reinforcing this notion, Dr Mkapa questioned the mandate and relevance
of MONUSCO in the eastern DRC. He blamed the UN mandate for establishing MONUSCO
which prevented the region from deploying FIB.\textsuperscript{110} In support of this, Mutiganda noted that the
UNSC was created to maintain world order, but over the passage of time, the UNSC has
become an instrument or tool abused by the world’s top three countries (USA, France and
Britain) called the international system to serve their interests.

The study established that there were less problems in the eastern DRC before MONUSCO was
deployed. To this effect, MONUSCO does not serve the intended real purpose and they are
useless as the UN can only control and manage conflict escalation but not complete eradication
of conflict. Nzabamwita noted that the involvement of MONUSCO in the eastern DRC does not
help things as they are there to facilitate exploitation of resources.\textsuperscript{111} Into the bargain, Tegera
accused the UN for coming in and putting a lid on a pot that was already boiling that is, instead
of resolving the conflict, they suppressed it. Unless the UN resolves the issues contained in the

\textsuperscript{109} Same interview with author, Goma, October 2015.
\textsuperscript{110} Same interview with author, DareSalaam, February 2016.
\textsuperscript{111} Same interview with author, Kigali, 2016.
boiling pot, they definitely have no role to play in the eastern DRC. In addition, the media output of the Head of State meeting ambassadors and heads of diplomatic missions, suggests that the approach of MONUSCO was not at all appreciated by the Congolese authorities (Congo News 2016). Whilst they (the UN forces) argue that they were invited and therefore should not interfere with the opposite is true. The UN have categorically declared that they will not leave the DRC until the country is fully democratic. In reinforcing this displeasure the study exposed another unseen facet of UN where it was noted to be a reflection of USA’s whims and interests. The same anonymous academic vehemently criticised the UN by noting that the UN should be declared non-existent. What he saw was a platform for the projection of US foreign policy. When the world is told that the UN has said, for God’s sake it is the sitting American President who has spoken. Progressive forces, the international systems and international best practices are nothing but US themes. UN should only end by providing financial material resources. The UN is fully aware of the problems facing the eastern DRC but they either choose to ignore them or hesitate to work on state building and peace-building. In this vein, there is a missing link in the Congolese society. Furthermore, the Congolese elite have no interest whatsoever in seeing an everlasting solution to the conflict in the eastern DRC suggesting that they could be fuelling and are complicity to what is happening.

The presence of MONUSCO does not serve any purpose peace wise. MONUSCO has failed to eradicate the conflict and instead it is being accused of complicity by standing and fuelling the conflict. External operations especially the UN and negative forces (FDLR and ADF) are a major concern as they negatively impact on any peace initiatives and strategy. For the UN, humanitarian intervention is the discourse but not the main objective. Negative forces are positive to the international actors because their operations allow looting of DRC resources. In addition to the mischiefs of the UN peacekeepers in the eastern DRC, the long history of failure by the UN in the DRC can be traced by noting that UN interventions in the DRC have been a disaster since 1960. Since the independence of DRC, the UN came up with various mandates but none has succeeded. The conduct of the UN in eastern DRC is replete with unaccountable cases of misdemeanors. They are known to secretly fund armed groups in order for the conflict to perpetuate. Their interests come first regardless of what prevails on the ground. In his view, Dr Mkapa feels the UN and AU should only assist in the eastern DRC by providing financial and material resources. The rest should be left to SADC and ICGLR. In substantiating this

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112 Same interview author, Goma, October 2015.  
113 Same interview author, Pretoria, May 2016.  
114 Same interview with author, DareSalaam, February 2016.
notion, Dr Mkapa wishes that the UN and AU leave the regional groupings so that they rediscover themselves and come up with their own solutions and their participation should be confined to financial and material support.

The study then noted that if the UN does not attend to state and peace-building, they have no role to play in eastern DRC. However, despite the United Nations’ failure to placate the Congolese and satisfy their expectations, it must be noted that MONUSCO has in certain circumstances been a little firmer than usual (for example in explicitly pointing out lack of advancement of national PSCF commitments particularly regarding the National Oversight Mechanism). The study established that in an effort to enhance effectiveness in dealing with armed groups, MONUSCO has begun to minimise the use of static sites where the Mission had limited influence. In this vein, MONUSCO were relentlessly trying to penetrate the areas that were formerly dominated by the armed groups a great stride towards the attainment of peace. In addition, further closures were planned following the completion of a tactical infrastructure review- a scenario that saw the operationalisation of MONUSCO’s “Protection Paradigm.”

Reverting to the ineffectiveness of the UN Forces, the study established that the so-called “Protection Paradigm” has however been slow in materialising and has also faced considerable hostility in South Kivu which means it only applied to North Kivu. In further highlighting the gaps in the UN efforts in stalling conflict in the eastern DRC it was discovered that it is questionable whether increased dynamism will improve protection- the intention is to give forces more room to manoeuvre and the ability to be more mobile. However, at the same time contact with civilians and therefore preventive PoC could suffer as bases become increasingly temporary.

6.5.2 UNSC and the SADC

The UN and the Security Council should complement SADC efforts in solving future conflicts in the SADC region with specific reference to eastern DRC whereby it should support SADC in a neutral and an objective manner as possible. The UN and AU interventions have been a disaster but when the SADC deployed that is when progress towards peace was realised in DRC. In this regard it must be noted that UN and AU are relevant in providing the political authority and legislation as well as confining themselves to mobilising resources and they should leave SADC FIB to do the job together with ICGLR. Obart noted the continued presence of the UN in the DRC but he however agreed that ideally the UN should play more of a
supportive role and commence scaling down to allow the region SADC to discharge its collective security responsibility in the eastern DRC.\textsuperscript{115} It is only in the area of providing financial and material resources that the UN international cooperating partners and agencies are needed to strengthen the capacity of regions.

UN through the UNSC should be preoccupied with mobilisation of resources and deploy those resources to the regions as opposed to intervening itself. The study established that the UN and UNSC should through the resolution mandating regions establish roadmaps and supports the regional efforts. Instead the global body has been allegedly seen to be creating a dependence syndrome, excessively demanding transparency and good governance that conforms/complies with international best practices. SADC as a region is far ahead in developing its own capacity. They have a regional peacekeeping training dedicated to enhancing skills, have conducted numerous exercises including the AMANI AFRICA II (a continental military exercise which was expected to pave way for the operationalisation of the African Standby Force (ASF) by validating its mandate and employing a Rapid Deployment Capability of the ASF as a start-up operation, and running a full multidimensional peace support operation) and have established a standby Brigade. In essence, UN and UNSC can only assist by providing financial and material resources. Efforts towards integrative and collaborative efforts by the UN Forces with SADC are underway as the MONUSCO Brigades and the FIB are being more integrated. Such collaborative efforts will lead to the successful peace-making and peacebuilding endeavours in the eastern DRC.

Despite SADC’s cooperation with ICGLR in particular as well as the U.N. in general being imperative; their relations are fractured as the relationship is not constructive. SADC wants to own the DRC yet the DRC problems belong to ICGLR (Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and URT). The relationship should remain sound when doing both business and conflict resolution. It is paramount to have a constructive and common approach to issues. The framework from which the DRC should benefit is ICGLR but because DRC is a member of SADC then the region (SADC) should support the initiative by the former (ICGLR). Thus underscoring the need for complementarity on the part of SADC whereby it must not take the lead role but however she should accompany the efforts of the ICGLR. The interventions by SADC and ICGCR are welcome but again there are signs of competing interests. On paper, there is commitment to fight armed groups yet practically there is lack of enthusiasm. To this effect Mbeki reinforced

\textsuperscript{115} Same interview with author, Goma, October 2015.
this notion by saying that at sub-regional level he sees ICGLR being involved more with SADC in intimate support however there are serious complications that are posed by Rwanda and Uganda who are part of the ICGLR who tend to support the belligerents (FDLR and ADR respectively) in the eastern DRC.\textsuperscript{116} Rwanda can fight M23 but not FDLR said the chairman of M23 (Bisimwa Bertrand). There are also ideological differences between Rwanda and URT, Rwanda and DRC among other members of the ICGLR. These ideological differences tend to complicate the peace-making efforts of these countries. In addition, there are some semblances of duplicity and overlapping (as the United Republic of Tanzania, Angola, and DRC for instance are in both set-ups). In further reinforcing this notion, Isoke asserted that ICGLR and SADC as regional blocs have challenges of ideology, interests and lack of will. For instance, the ICGLR comprises of twelve (12) countries that are French and English speaking countries.\textsuperscript{117} When asked to contribute troops, only URT volunteered; the remainder refused because they hated the deployment of FIB in the region. The deployment of FIB was a morale booster to the locals because they identified with the force. Because of this development, MONUSCO are hostile to FIB.

6.5.3 UN’s Efforts and Success Stories in the eastern DRC

Despite the delays and possibly failure by the UN to forge long-lasting peace in the DRC it is also prudent for the study to basically highlight and appreciate the positive achievements made by the UN in the DRC. To this effect, it was asserted that by August 2013 they (the UN Forces in cahoots with the DRC Government) had made some positive steps on M23, namely, the enactment of Amnesty law as well as identification of ex- M23 both in Uganda and Rwanda. However, the study also highlighted the complementary and supportive efforts of MONUSCO in trying to forge long-lasting peace in the eastern DRC. The study established that MONUSCO is currently supporting planned operations of the FARDC against the FDLR in Fizi. There are continued efforts by the DRC Government as well as MONUSCO to repatriate to Rwanda the FDLR forces for those who were willing to disarm and return voluntarily; and engage urgent military action against those unwilling to disarm. In addition, the MONUSCO mission also pledged support in launching offensive operations of the Congolese armed forces against ADF around Kamango. This launch was affected on the 16\textsuperscript{th} of January 2014. The study also highlighted that MONUSCO is also supporting operations currently under way against FRPI in South Irumu where in an effort to enhance its effectiveness in dealing with armed groups,

\textsuperscript{116} Same interview with author, Joahnnesburg, May 2016.
\textsuperscript{117} Same interview with author, Kampala, March 2016.
MONUSCO has begun to minimise the use of static sites where the Mission had limited influence. It was also noted that the Force is embarking on strategic changes on its structure are under review to maximise its effectiveness in the implementation of the MONUSCO mandate. To this effect, MONUSCO has decided to retain a lean Mission headquarters in Kinshasa that will focus on providing good offices, advice and support to the Government, in particular with respect to the implementation of commitments outlines in the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework. Such an initiative is a grandiose move aimed towards the fulfilment of the UN collective security system.

In addition, the inter-ministerial committee, supported by MONUSCO, has been tasked with the steering and the implementation of the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation Reintegration and Resettlement (DDRRR) programme for instance. The UNCT led by the UNDP has developed a reintegration programme in which case, it was expected that political issues related to the nature of the disarmament and demobilization process were clarified, the reintegration accommodated the vetted former fighters depending with the availability of funds. In support of the Mission’s operations in the East, two thirds of all substantive staff in Kinshasa were redeployed to areas freed from armed groups or co-located in priority zones in North Kivu to support the establishment of islands of Stability. According to the Analysis Report on the DRC (n.d:5) as of 15 February 2014, for instance 130 civilian and uniformed personnel had moved from Kinshasa to Goma. Over and above, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) encouraged the AU, the ICGLR, SADC and other relevant international and regional organisations to continue to work together to support the government of the DRC and the governments of the region towards the full implementation of the national and regional commitments under the PSC Framework. However these efforts are believed not to be enough to bring the much need peace in the eastern DRC. It is regrettable that there is no significant progress towards the complete neutralisation of the armed groups as a top priority in bringing stability in the DRC and the Great Lakes region.

6.6 Conclusion

On the role of ethnicity in fuelling conflict, recurrence in the eastern DRC the study indicated that there is an intricate relationship between ethnicity and conflict recurrence in the eastern DRC. The divide and rule colonial strategy that was separatist in nature brought divisions on ethnic grounds, these divisions perpetuated even after independence. The study noted that the Berlin Conference of 1884 arbitrarily demarcated Africa thereby leading to the placement of
some sections of original Rwanda under DRC. The colonial masters thrived on the divide and rule strategy whereby they collaborated with the minority Tutsis at the expense of the majority Hutus. The Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups embarked on relentless attacks for land, rights and power. The need to revive the Bahima Empire has made the Tutsis to restlessly fight for domination and this has led to unending conflict in the eastern DRC. The Rwanda genocide also fostered an ethnic imbalance in the eastern DRC and this has seen numerous armed groups to team up and fight for dominion in the eastern DRC. In addition, the national elites manipulated laws of citizenship and ethnicity for political purposes thereby politicising ethnicity and the Congolese identity. Neighbouring countries were reported to be fuelling conflict in the eastern DRC by supporting armed groups to engage in illegal economic activities. In addition, lack of effective legitimate state authority to regulate and govern people makes it easy for ethnicity to be a divisive element thus giving room for negative elements to cause perpetual destabilisation of the eastern DRC.

In highlighting the relevance of the traditional approaches in addressing conflict in the eastern DRC, the study established that the traditional approaches will go a long way in addressing unending conflict in the eastern DRC as international peacemaking initiatives such as to conflict resolution, conflict settlement, and conflict management have always overlooked the crucial role played by the traditional leadership in the peacemaking process. For example, the traditional approach of Gacaca worked well in Rwanda in resolving the genocide aftermath. The chapter highlighted that traditional approaches tend to succeed because they incorporate the grassroots in the peacemaking process. Traditional approaches call for conflict resolution strategies that seek to address the root causes of the conflicts as well as the mind-sets of the parties to the conflict. On the contrary note, the study established that the traditional approaches cannot be panacea as the traditional practices such as the use of elders and chiefs in conflict resolution has been affected by globalisation; cultures have drastically eroded through various technological developments. Cultural practices are dynamic and heterogeneous hence making it difficult for people to co-operate in the peace initiatives. The study also empirically presented the evidence to prove the ineffectiveness of the contemporary approaches to conflict resolution by highlighting the volatility of the North and South Kivus they are still under the control of armed groups.

The essence of the ethic of Ubuntu and the United Nations concept of collective security in solving the problem of conflict recurrence in the eastern DRC the study noted that Ubuntu helps to address the problem by tackling the personal values, beliefs, preferences and attitudes of the
people to the conflict at an individual level. *Ubuntu* focuses on collectiveness and humanism as it requires that values and norms and in the process it embraces diversity by allowing people to believe, think and behave the way they wish; so people are made to live together with their imminent differences without necessarily fighting. The *Ubuntu* concept was seen to be metamorphosing into the principle of collective security as the states co-operate communally to provide peace to the member state as an attack on one is an attack on all. To this effect, SADC Forces Intervention Brigade as a collective security mechanism was employed in the DRC in a bid to protect her from external interference and armed group movements. However, the study established that *Ubuntu* was going to be successful in the eastern DRC had all parties been Bantu. There has been severe dilution of *Ubuntu* by foreign cultures, technology and globalisation. In this vein, collective security is hinged on national interests in that countries tend to support countries that can be of benefit to them. For instance, other SADC members were reluctant to fight against the armed groups in the DRC in 1998. This therefore defeats the original intent of the collective security system.

The study also averred that the United Nations Security Council’s role in complementing SADC’s efforts in solving conflicts in the SADC region should be that of creating roadmaps and support regional efforts. In this vein, SADC should be at the forefront in solving the problems in their respective jurisdictions. Regions must take the lead in conflict resolution and the UNSC should support with finances rather taking the lead. In this notion, UNSC’s continued presence in the eastern DRC bears testimony to their failure to forge long-lasting peace in the eastern DRC. The presence of MONUSCO in the DRC is for financial gain and recurrence conflict in the DRC will justify their existence, instead of forging peace they are exultant when conflicts erupt because their stay is justified and prolonged. The UN should give financial and technical support to SADC at its request. The study also chronicles the UN’s success stories, which include working in together with the DRC Government to enact the Amnesty law, the identification, rehabilitation and reintegration of M23 and supporting planned operations of the FARDC against the FDLR.
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Introduction

The main focus of this chapter is on making conclusions and recommendations to the effect that Ubuntu and Collective Security/security community systems will enable us to foster conflict transformation in the eastern DRC which is characterised by ceaseless violent conflict. The chapter concludes that in this regard will be deciphered from the commonalities between Ubuntu and (African humanism) and the key tenets of conflict transformation. It became conspicuously clear in the discussion of conflict transformation and Ubuntu that these two thought patterns and concepts provides a comprehensive and holistic ethic or panacea to recurrent conflict in the eastern DRC as they are crucial in addressing the root causes of the problems that are fuelling endless conflicts in the eastern DRC. The failure by the conflict resolution strategies that were used by the regional and continental blocs in trying to eliminate violent conflict in DRC has necessitated this research study to focus on the need for Ubuntu and the UN. Collective Security system to bring Afrocentric and traditional approaches to address violent conflict in the eastern DRC. The research study brought to light that the isolated application and usage of modern approaches in peace-building is implausible.

The first section of the chapter will conclude that ethnicity is at the centre of the conflicts in the eastern DRC. Everything that happens is closely tied to ethnicity. The need for ethnic dominace, the desire to access natural resources, the quest for supremacy is all pedigreed from ethnical differences. The divide and rule stance by the colonial masters was successful because they capatalised on ethnic heterogeneity that was and still is existential in the eastern DRC. The second subsection of this chapter brings to light the notion that the traditional approaches are also crucial in the peace-building initiatives in the eastern DRC as the people can relate to them and they are built on communal structures of authority whereby traditional leaders, elders and chiefs command loyalty and respect from the people they lead such that when they are incorporated in the peace-building initiatives they can successfully forge long-lasting peace in the eastern DRC. However, it was noted that traditional approaches have been diluted by modernity, religion and globalization such that relying wholly on traditional approaches and African humanism will not solidly resolve violent conflict in eastern DRC. Having shown the implausibility of traditional approaches in conflict resolution in the eastern DRC the chapter shall recommend a synchronization, amalgamation, merging and integration of the good attributes from both the traditional and modern practices (Ubuntu, Collective Security,
modernity and religion) that can go a long way in bolstering unending peace in the eastern DRC.

The third section establish that *Ubuntu* helps in roping in the crucial values, beliefs and practices of the people in the conflict resolution milieu in the eastern DRC by tackling the personal values, beliefs, preferences and attitudes of the people to the conflict at an individual level. *Ubuntu* concept is seen to be metamorphosing into the principle of collective security in which case, all states co-operate collectively or communally to provide security for all the actions of all against any state within the groups which might challenge the existing order by using force. This compliments the UN Collective Security system whereby the defining ethos is that all for one and one for all, whereby aggression or injury inflicted on a member is seen as aggression or harm inflicted on other members of the *bloc*. Because of the shortcomings of this approach the study suggests that navigating self interest that is exhibited by parties (countries and tribes) to peace-building can be contained by emphasising communal belonging. In the final subsection it is shown that the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) role in the eastern DRC should be that of providing material and financial support to the regional players (that is SADC and the ICGLR) in their efforts to end recurrent conflict in the eastern DRC.

6.1 Summary of Research Findings

6.1.1 The role of Ethnicity and Conflict Recurrence in the eastern DRC

On the role of ethnicity in fueling conflict, recurrence in the eastern DRC the research study indicated that there is an intricate relationship between ethnicity and conflict recurrence in the eastern DRC. The divide and rule colonial strategy that was separatist in nature brought divisions on ethnic grounds, these divisions perpetuated even after independence. The research study noted that the Berlin Conference of 1884 arbitrarily demarcated Africa thereby leading to the placement of some sections of original Rwanda under DRC. The colonial masters thrived on the divide and rule strategy whereby they collaborated with the minority Tutsis at the expense of the majority Hutus. The Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups embarked on relentless attacks for land, rights and power. The need to revive the Bahima Empire has made the Tutsis to restlessly fight for domination and this has led to unending conflict in the eastern DRC. The Rwanda genocide also fostered an ethnic imbalance in the eastern DRC and this has seen numerous armed groups team up and fight for dominion in the eastern DRC. In addition, the national elites manipulated laws of citizenship and ethnicity for political purposes thereby politicising ethnicity.
and the Congolese identity. Neighbouring countries were reported to be fuelling conflict in the eastern DRC by supporting armed groups to engage in illegal economic activities. In addition, lack of effective legitimate state authority to regulate and govern people makes it easy for ethnicity to be a divisive element thus giving room for negative elements to cause perpetual destabilisation of the eastern DRC.

6.1.2 The Efficacy of the Traditional Approaches in addressing conflict in the eastern DRC

In highlighting the relevance of the traditional approaches in addressing conflict in the eastern DRC, the research study established that the traditional approaches will go a long way in addressing unending conflict in the eastern DRC as international peacemaking initiatives such as conflict resolution, conflict settlement, and conflict management have always overlooked the crucial role played by the traditional leadership in the peacemaking process. For example, the traditional approach of Gacaca worked well in Rwanda in resolving the genocide aftermath. The chapter highlighted that traditional approaches tend to succeed because they incorporate the grassroots in the peacemaking process. Traditional approaches call for conflict transformation strategies that seek to address the root causes of the conflicts as well as the mind-sets of the parties to the conflict. The study also empirically presented the evidence to prove the ineffectiveness of the contemporary approaches to conflict resolution by highlighting the volatility of the North and South Kivus they are still under the control of armed armed groups.

6.1.3 The essence of the ethic of Ubuntu and the UN Collective Security System

In highlighting the essence of the ethic of Ubuntu and the United Nations concept of collective security in solving the problem of conflict recurrence in the eastern DRC the study noted that Ubuntu helps to address the problem by tackling the personal values, beliefs, preferences and attitudes of the people to the conflict at an individual level. Ubuntu focuses on collectiveness and humanism as it requires that values and norms and in the process it embraces diversity by allowing people to believe, think and behave the way they wish; so people are made to live together with their imminent differences without necessarily fighting. The Ubuntu concept was seen to be metamorphosing into the principle of collective security as the states co-operate communally to provide peace to the member state as an attack on one is an attack on all. To this effect, SADC Forces Intervention Brigade as a collective security mechanism was employed in the eastern DRC in a bid to protect the country from external interference and armed groups.
movements. However, the study established that *Ubuntu* was going to be more successful in the eastern DRC had all parties been Bantu. There has been severe dilution of *Ubuntu* by foreign cultures, technology and globalisation. In this vein, collective security is hinged on national interests in that countries tend to support countries that can be of benefit to them. For instance, other SADC members were reluctant to fight against the armed groups in the DRC in 1998. This therefore defeats the original intent of the collective security system.

### 6.1.4 UN’s role in complementing the SADC’s Efforts in solving eastern DRC Conflicts

The study also averred that the United Nations Security Council’s role in complementing SADC’s efforts in solving conflicts in the SADC region should be that of creating roadmaps and support regional efforts. In this vein, SADC should be at the forefront in solving the problems in their respective jurisdictions. Regions must take the lead in conflict resolution and the UNSC should support with finances rather taking the lead. In this notion, UNSC’s continued presence in the eastern DRC bears testimony to their failure to forge long-lasting peace. The presence of MONUSCO in the DRC is for financial gain and recurrence conflict in the DRC will justify their existence, instead of forging peace they are exultant when conflicts erupt because their stay is justified and prolonged. The UN should give financial and technical support to SADC at its request. The study also chronicles the UN’s success stories, which include working in collaboration with the DRC Government to enact the Amnesty law, the identification, rehabilitation and reintegration of M23 and supporting planned operations of the FARDC against the FDLR.

### 7.3 General Conclusions

This section gives some general conclusions of the study in respect of the thematic areas that were raised in the study by capturing the general overview of the study in its entirety.

#### 7.3.1 Overview

We have now come to the conclusion of this study and it is befitting to try to provide its general conclusions in a comprehensive manner. This is what this section of the chapter aims to do. It also serves as a summary to the entire study. The problem that was investigated in this study is as follows. Modern discourses of peace-building have shown that contemporary methods and approaches have been used in the eastern DRC in a bid to foster long-lasting peace therein. The
multilateral and bilateral resolution and peacebuilding efforts from national, subregional, regional and international state and non-state actors have been adopted in trying to eliminate violent conflict in the eastern DRC. Despite the adoption of these approaches and mechanisms, it appears that violent conflict has been an unending phenomenon in the eastern DRC, implying that these strategies that are being employed by the countries and international players in the peace-building efforts are falling short as panacea to recurrent conflict in the eastern DRC. Most of these efforts have not provided sustainable and long-term security in the eastern part of the country. Issues relating to selfish desires by the neighbouring countries as well as the parties to the peace-building process (ICGLR, UN peace keepers) have made attempts to peace-building in the eastern DRC futile. The approaches that were and are still being used in trying to address recurrent conflict in the eastern DRC are proving to be inadequate, if not ineffective in addressing recurrent conflict in the eastern part of Congo.

Because of the adverse effects that have been posed to DRC by these violent recurrent conflicts in the form of aggravated economic stagnation, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, displacements of civilians, destruction of infrastructure and property, trafficking in small arms, proliferation of armed groups fueling the illegal exploitation of natural resources among others makes it noteworthy to examine why the situation of recurring conflicts remained unresolved despite the SADC regional and multilateral efforts being put in solving it. In trying to come up with an approach to address conflict in eastern DRC this study proposed an ethical conflict resolution mechanism in the SADC based on the theories of Collective Security and the African Ethical concept of Ubuntu. While conclusions were given at the end of each chapter, the main objective in this section is to give an overall summary of this study. The first part of this study (chapter 2) was concerned about with the historical discourses on the evolution of recurrent conflict in the DRC in general and the eastern DRC in particular. The second part, (chapter 3) unpacked the theoretical praxis of conflict transformation whereby its relevance was appreciated vis-à-vis the previous peacebuilding methods that were used. The third part (chapters 4&5) focused on SADC’s interventions towards ending conflict in the DRC as well as the concepts of Ubuntu and Collective security systems as critical ethical tools of conflict resolution. Finally, the fourth part (chapters 6&7) on one hand, gave qualitative analyses of the data that was gathered in the field as well as proffering a synthesis of suggestions and recommendations on how ethical conflict resolution can go a long way in addressing recurrent conflict in the eastern DRC respectively. On the other hand, it is a summary of the whole thesis. The aim is to establish the nexus of these chapters as well as to give a full picture of the study as a whole in a synthesised form.
Chapter 2, started by tracing the historical origins of the recurrent conflict in the DRC by chronicling a brief historical analysis of factors that have contributed to the recurrence of conflict in eastern Congo. The evolution of the rulership of DRC and its resultant effect on conflict recurrence was also highlighted. The Belgian rule was punctuated by the rulership of King Leopold II who claimed the Congo Free State as his personal possession in 1885 which was characterised by divisive rulership. This led to the fragmentation of the ethnic tribes in the Congo. The chapter also looked at the Lumumba’s rule whereby he heralded the era of the involvement of super power interests in the DRC - a development which marked the beginning of foreign forces’ role in the erosion of the Congo’s peace, security and political stability. After the assassination of Lumumba, Mobutu Sese Seko assumed presidency of the Congo. His rulership demonstrated that he was a puppet of the USA, NATO and Republic of South Africa (RSA) who was put in power as a strategic counter of insurgence against Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), South West People’s Organisation (SWAPO) and Angola.

The DRC became a strategic arena for Cold War interests at the expense of the Congolese people’s peace and security. Laurent Kabila succeeded Mobutu as president and his rulership was punctuated by the need to expel Rwandan troops following the 1998 rising popular unfriendliness toward Rwandan soldiers and Congolese of a Rwandan descent. This led to proxy war between Rwanda with the Kinshasa Government which continued in the east until the end of 2008. After his assassination, his son Joseph Kabila took over. His administration is characterised by weak governance systems and structures - a situation that has led to endless, cyclic and endemic armed conflict in the DRC. In addition, the chapter established that conflicts in the eastern DRC are caused by ethnicity, external interference and natural resources (which include minerals, land and timber). Underlying factors to conflict in eastern DRC include power, greed, grievances and security or survival in which case greed targets include mining areas, survival targets best hiding areas, power maps the administrative capitals (Rosen 2013; Carayannis 2009; Vesperini 2001; French 1997; Olson 1995; Mararo 1990; Touval 1985; Carnavale 1986; Kelly and Miller 1969).

Chapter 3, unpacked the concept of Conflict Transformation where a theoretical discussion on the meaning of conflict transformation was made. The various definitions given by major scholars and academics of conflict transformation such as Lederach (1995), Galtung (1995), Miall (2004), Cacayan (2005), among others were highlighted. This was done with the aim of coming up with a working definition for the research study. The chapter noted that conflict
transformation falls within the broader field of peace and security. A dissection was made on how conflict transformation is an equally key extension of the “peace-building family concepts” that begins with conflict settlement, followed by conflict management, then conflict resolution. The major dimensions of conflict transformation ranging from personal to cultural were examined with the aim of advancing the positive, beneficial and constructive processes within these dimensions. Besides the major facets and elements of conflict transformation, a broad range of conflict transformation actors were analysed in relation to their respective categories. This was done with the aim of showing how these actors’ thrusts do influence the development of contemporary practice. It is apparent that conflict transformation signifies a sequence of indispensable transitional steps to peace (Boulke 2009; Bichsel 2009; Paffenholz 2009; Mitchell 2009; Reimann 2004; Richmond 2001; Lederach 2000; Clements 1997). The chapter established that an attempt was made to infuse and synergise conflict transformation with African Ethics in the context of Ubuntu. Being a code of ethics that is rooted in African mutual relatedness, dignity, respect among others, the chapter noted that Ubuntu is a significant ingredient of conflict transformation, since the latter views peace as being centred and rooted in brotherhood, togetherness and mutual respect.

Chapter 4 started by capturing the regional interventions by highlighting SADC’s conflict management mechanisms in the DRC- this was made possible by looking at the composition of SADC. The chapter asserted that SADC is coming as a budding regional organization with the aim of developing and changing the course of history for a region terrorised by foreign domination. In this vein, the chapter noted that SADC has been concentrating on human security or the critical security paradigms but the DRC conflict has necessitated the use of traditional concept of conflict security which is made possible through the establishment of SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defense and Security (OPDS). The chapter highlighted the mandate of the OPDS and its main conflict resolution strategy- the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO II) which aims at forging long-lasting peace by transforming vicious cycles of conflict created by colonization into virtuous cycles. The chapter looked at SADC’s countries’ intervention in the DRC in a military operation code named Operation Sovereign Legitimacy in 1998. SIPO II led to increased commitment towards collective self-defense through the SADC Mutual Defence Pact.

However, the chapter noted that lack of funding and it being legally non-binding and lack of unity among SADC countries has weakened SADC OPDS. The chapter also outlined the shortcomings of the agreements and peace accords in the DRC which are dogged by for
instance the sluggish implementation of the DDR and the AMANI process. More so, the chapter captured the factors that are key in forging long-lasting peace in the DRC and these include security sector and demobilization, justice, sexual violence, humanitarian assistance by showing how the UN players sought to address these key issues in DRC (Ngoma 2003; Fisher and Ngoma 2005; Raeymaekes 2007; Niekerk 2008; Channel Research 2011; Bekou 2014). Over and above, the chapter ended by highlighting that the ethnic character of conflicts in DRC has led to calls for ethical means inherent in African tradition in the idea of *Ubuntu* to be adopted and infused in conflict transformation endeavours (Ebegbulem 2012; Onyemaechi 2007; Miller 2004).

Chapter 5 highlighted the nexus between *Ubuntu* and the UN Collective Security system in addressing violent conflict in the eastern DRC. In this case the chapter captured the various definitions of the *Ubuntu* philosophy, its origins and characteristics and most importantly its importance and effectiveness in resolving conflict in the eastern DRC. The very connection between *Ubuntu* and the UN collective security system is that desire to see permanent peace prevail. In addition to this, the chapter also highlighted the debilitating effects of unilateralism to the collective security system. This, the chapter further buttressed by giving a constructivist interpretation of the UN collective security and *Ubuntu*. The chapter argued that *Ubuntu* contrasts with the more individualistic Western perspective and that communalism is at the centre of *Ubuntu* as it seeks to subdue personal interests ahead of community interests (Soltani, Jawan and Ahmad 2014; Nzongola-Ntalaji 2011; Bennet and Patrick 2010; Mwajiru 2001; Mokgoro 1997). This will enable the Congolese to be loyal, generous, selfless, hospitable and honest among themselves in fostering the health and wealth amongst each other.

Chapter 6 saw a synopsis of the role of *Ubuntu* in addressing recurrent conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) using both primary and secondary data being made. The current conflict situation in the eastern DRC was investigated using interviews with key informants buttressed by secondary data. The chapter focused on the causal factors of recurrent conflict in the eastern DRC whereby it was established that ethnicity is the main cause of ceaseless conflict in the eastern DRC. The study established that the Bantu were the original occupants of Congo. The Tutsis then raided the Bantu whose land was later taken up by the Hutu. The Tutsis introduced some governance structures that were premised on the divide and rule style and colonization found the situation like that and the colonisers capitalised on that by collaborating with the Tutsis at the expense of the Hutus. As time passed, Hutus started
claiming for their land, rights, power (chieftainship) leading to the breaking out of a civil war. This divide and rule style led to the marginalization of the segments of the population. Ethnicity played an important role in the conflicts at independence in the history of DRC in that there was ethnic dominance of independent political parties that were ethnic based. In this vein, ethnic clashes in the eastern DRC are a result of the inherent animosities among the diverse ethnic groups.

The chapter highlighted the essence of traditional approaches to conflict resolution, whereby it noted that the traditional approaches will go a long way in addressing unending conflict in the eastern DRC. Traditional leaders should be involved in the peace making process as they have the customary legitimacy to bring their subjects together. Gacaca in Rwanda was seen to have worked under the auspices of a strong government in resolving the genocide aftermath. Traditional approaches tend to succeed because they bring in the grassroots in the peace making arena. Nevertheless, international conflict resolution initiatives have always overlooked and undermined the indispensable role played by the local leadership. The chapter also established that the conventional approaches were inadequate as they do not give the locals the chance to participate in conflict transformation as they are well placed to deal with issues involving cultural identity, reconciliation and community building.

In addition, the chapter also captured the notion of the utility of Ubuntu and collective security in addressing recurrent conflict in the Eastern DRC where Ubuntu helps in roping in the crucial values, beliefs and practices of the people in the conflict resolution milieu in the eastern DRC by tackling the personal values, beliefs, preferences and attitudes of the people to the conflict at an individual level. In this vein, Ubuntu revolves around the notion of humanness whereby man is endowed with consciousness, love, compassion, reason, understanding and creativity. The chapter broadly covered the ethical concept of Ubuntu as a conflict transformation mechanism within the broad ambit of collective security. The adoption and practice of Ubuntu mechanisms in addressing violent recurrent conflict was tracked. Moreover, the chapter analysed the effectiveness of Ubuntu and collective security mechanisms in terms of the reduction or total elimination of conflict in eastern DRC. The chapter noted that Ubuntu has been diluted and eroded by technology and globalization. In addition the collective security system is naively unrealistic as pledges to defend each other by countries are premised on country’s interests that is, a country can only support another country in the system if there are direct benefits and interests that will accrue to them in the process. The region tends to procrastinate when events
are unfolding as was the case with Rwanda in 1994 and the eastern DRC. There is lack of collective will to move in the same direction by member states.

Lastly, in looking at the role of the UN and its Security Council in addressing future conflicts in the eastern DRC the study concluded that the MONUSCO contingent in the eastern DRC are there for financial gain so when conflicts escalate in DRC the UN forces therein are exultant because their stay is justified and prolonged. The study highlights that the presence of MONUSCO does not serve any purpose peace wise as MONUSCO has failed to eradicate the conflict. UNSC should however, support SADC with financial and technical support. SADC should lead its regional activities while the UNSC should complement and support SADC at its request. It should also support SADC in a neutral and an objective manner. However, the study highlights that SADC and the ICGLR’s relations despite being imperative in solving the regional problems are fractured, unconstructive and contradictory as SADC is alleged to want to own the DRC and yet the DRC problems belong to the ICGLR. Hence there is need for collaboration and complimentarity in running the regional affairs between the SADC and ICGLR players.

7.4 Recommendations

Drawing from the attributes of ethical conflict resolution mechanisms in peace-building in the eastern DRC this chapter was concerned with recommendations for an effective humane strategy that can address conflicts from the roots. These recommendations can enable transformationalists to fortify the contemporary peacebuilding initiatives such that long-lasting peace and tranquility can be permanently built in the eastern DRC.

7.4.1 Transforming Conflict by addressing Ethnic Differences

There is need for a new conceptualization of an ethical conflict resolution mechanism whereby peacebuilders should aim at bringing long-lasting peace through the transformation of relationships, interests, discourses as well as the very constitution that supports the continuation of violent conflicts. The ethical mechanism to conflict resolution aims to completely alter brusque disparaging conflict into positive constructive conflict as it deals with the structural, behavioural and attitudinal aspects of the conflict. We also need to realise that conflict has to be addressed from the roots, in which case societies should be transformed that is the deep-seated cultural, social, political and economic changes have to be made to correct inequities and injustice to provide all the groups in the society with their fundamental human needs. In this
vein, the ethical peace-building initiative seeks to foster transformation that entails the reorganization or streamlining of social entities as well as the redistribution of power from the lofty to lower-power groups.

It is true that artificial societies created by colonialism in which different nationalities, ethnic groups and tribes were forcibly yoked together cannot be wielded in peaceful nation-states that can be stable and prosperous, the problem is not peculiarly African; deeply segmented societies exist virtually everywhere. The mere presence of many ethnic groups in a country does not necessary bring about internal stability, animosity and conflicts. What makes the difference between stable plural societies and unstable ones is usually the response of the leadership to the fact of multinationality. The cultural practices of Ubuntu can be adopted to promote inclusivity and cultural respect and mutuality in the resolution of the conflict in the eastern DRC. Ubuntu is premised on the need to respect others, being sympathetic and empathetic towards others, cooperation, commitment, inclusivity and tolerance these are attributes that can be used in crossing the ethnic differences thereby forging peace among diverse ethnic groups in the eastern DRC.

7.4.2 Transforming Conflict through Ubuntu

Recommendation is that, for the ethic of Ubuntu and collective security system to aid the conception of a moral world order characterised by more humanised societies, with caring, rational, compassionate, peaceful, understanding, loving, friendly and tolerant people in the eastern DRC it must be an all-encompassing approach that brings different people (state and non-state actors) with their diverse views and perceptions to the peace-building table. In underscoring the need for approaches to be culturally sensitive approaches, it is imperative for policy makers as well as all the parties to the negotiation forum to go beyond the paradigm of power and rational choice assumptions to tap on moral and creative human potential to resolve conflicts in a just manner in recognition of human interrelatedness and connection. In this regard, there is need for a greater realization that the focus of any meaningful resolution of conflict should not be about the mere settlement of conflicts, rather it should embrace ways and means by which the parties can be brought to live together and co-operate in the future to avoid a recourse to conflict and war in the eastern DRC. Inclusivity of all the affected parties in the war situation will be very imperative in addressing recurrent conflict in the eastern DRC. In this notion, armed groups, children, women, men, elders and all traditional leaders vis-à-vis government officials and actors must actively participate in fostering sound negotiations which are meant to breed long-lasting peace and tranquility. Inclusivity is a crucial component in any
peace-building initiative. An all embracive community which promotes the spirit of community and belonging which conceptualise human existence as intertwined with the existence of others should be engendered (Murove 2004; Koka 1996; Samkange and Samkange 1980).

7.4.3 Inclusivity and Peace-Building

It was noted that inclusivity creates solidarity, togetherness and oneness in the human community- a crucial ingredient for long-lasting peace. Ethnicities will no longer a problem since the values and norms of oneness and collectivism would have been engendered between and among people through an inclusive approach to peace-building. In line with this, it must be noted that Ubuntu which is a principle for enhancing the humanness of people which is centred on selflessness and human belongingness makes room for collective security to be adopted. Collective security reinforces the notion of Ubuntu as it seeks to promote the commonality that exists between and among countries which belong to the same bloc. Traditional leaders must be incorporated in the peace-building initiatives as they strive to enhance community security since they are the custodians of societal values and beliefs. Inclusivity makes it possible for dialogue to be brokered between and among the warring parties. Dialogue with the grassroots enable people to retell and narrate accounts of what happened during the conflict by both the perpetrators and the victims, and thereby enabling them to open up and narrate their ordeal. This therefore helps in re-establishing community relationships and reintegrating offenders into their communities thereby satisfying the important goals of any sustainable peacebuilding process. This inclusivity enables people to work collectively thereby creating a common experience in which everyone works together towards a common goal, thereby replacing the divisive experience of the cohesive experience of securing justice.

7.4.4 The need to Amalgamate Cultural Practices with Modern Attributes

The other recommendation also emanates from the fact that the traditional approaches to peace-building were infiltrated and diluted by technology, religion, modernity and globalization. In a bid to come up with a robust approach towards ethical conflict resolution the concept of Ubuntu should be metamorphosed into the principle of collective (community) security as well as other modern, religious principles. To this effect, the favourable principles that globalization, modernity and religion usher should be merged with the positive aspects of traditionalism. For instance some conflicts are based on religious divergences so if we are to take Christian practices of say forgiveness, love and peace and merge them with the traditional approaches like Gacaca then the peace-building apparatus will be strengthened as the bridge between modernity.
and traditionalism would have been bridged. However, it must be noted that these ethical principles do not operate in isolation but they must integrate and merge with other favourable principles of modernity and religion (both Christianity and Islam). These will go a long way in promoting long-lasting peace in the eastern DRC. Religious (or Christian) principles for instance seek to promote relational rationality which compels people to love their neighbours as they love themselves as well as thinking with and for others instead of thinking solely in terms of maximising one’s utility (Whitehead 1926; Mbiti 1990; Kwamangwalu 1999; Mazrui 2001; Murove 2004; Broodryk 2002).

The total formal and Western-style justice may be an impossible goal in the DRC. *Ubuntu* as the uncanny, then becomes a very useful way of understanding essential features of the complex relationship between *Ubuntu* and and modernity (both Western and post-colonial) some of which feedback into the racialised matrix of exceptionalism (Praeg 2014). It can be noted that blending the attributes of Western practices with the African cultural practices will create the best of both worlds that are amenable to both the cultural (traditional) and contemporary environments. Amalgamating the favourable dimensions of the traditional and contemporary approaches to conflict resolution will not only help in addressing the root causes of the problem of conflict recurrence in the eastern DRC but it makes way in giving the way forward in light of the prevailing technological developments and general development in the world. The fact that conflict transformation calls for participation of the grassroots, it therefore promotes democracy and rule of law values by shifting power from the central government to the people and dealing with impunity.

### 7.4.5 Strengthening Collective Security and the role of United Nations and Regional Organisations

To strengthen collective security, the Security Council, regional and sub-regional organisations needed to adopt a common approach and comprehensive strategy that is premised on the principles of multilateralism, compliance with international law, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and rule of law. This calls for an effective network of mutually reinforcing mechanisms at both regional and global levels- that are flexible and responsive to the realities of the present day life. This calls for co-operation with redoubled vigour for the fulfillment of the cardinal mission of ensuring peace in the eastern DRC. In this scenario, the fundamental decision States must make rested on their political will and efforts to be deployed, without hesitation or fear, with a view of strengthening the regional and subregional organizations to which they were parties. That would improve relations with their neighbours,
the assertion of their international positions and the provision of an active contribution to collective security. Regional arrangements, based on the political will of States had an enormous potential and could play an increasingly important role in conflict resolution and securing an equitable world, he said. Now more than ever, the United Nations had to promote dialogue among its Members to strengthen those organizations.

It is imperative for nations to co-operate; this becomes a crucial ingredient to successful collective security arrangements. Over and above, conflict transformation should be placed in line with the recent developments and new opportunities for co-operation between the United Nations and the regional organisations. Regional organizations had a vital role to play, as the United Nations could sometimes be too distant and bureaucratic. Regional organizations had a greater vested interest in regional situations, as they recognised that a crisis in a neighbouring State could soon become their own crisis. The United Nations should rely increasingly on regional organizations for maintaining peace and stability. The fact that those initiatives were being taken in the spirit of Africans taking responsibility for the stability of their own region was itself an important development, which must be encouraged. We live in a world which requires governments to deal with one another in the context of multilateral fora and organizations, as well as through the traditional mechanisms of bilateral diplomacy. The disposition of regional players should be given room to continue to be towards working with the Security Council to assume collective responsibility for the identification of problems and the formulation of appropriate strategies by which such problems can be solved.” In particular, it can be necessary to develop structural arrangements, which would allow all regions to fully participate in the evolution and implementation of solutions to the current peace and security problems. By and large, strengthening of regional organizations would, in turn, strengthen the United Nations.

7.4.6 Empowering SADC to deal with Regional Conflicts

SADC should also be empowered financially and materially to address the conflicts within its jurisdiction. The SADC regional body should take the leading role in facilitating the negotiations and peacekeeping efforts and initiatives in the DRC. The other blocs should reinforce and fortify the efforts of SADC through the provision of finances, personnel and materials that is crucial in addressing the recurrent conflict. SADC should also be empowered to co-operate and work harmoniously and mutually with the ICGLR in addressing this regional conflict. The regional bodies are better placed to handle culturally diverse and people because
they are fully acquainted with information about the cultural structures that exist in their respective regions. This is more preferred as compared to a situation whereby foreign or external players such as the United Nations superimpose their peacebuilding initiatives that do not really fit and are not amenable to the environment and traditions of the eastern DRC. SADC can be in a better position to adopt strategies that are culturally amenable. The parties to the conflict are most likely to co-operate and respond when there are insiders (fellow brethren) brokering truces and leading peacebuilding negotiations than outsiders.
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Appendix 1: Letter of Informed Consent to Participants

Dear Participant

My name is Engelbert Abel Rugeje, a PhD Candidate in the school of Religion, Philosophy and Classics, Department of Ethics studies at the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN). The topic of my thesis is: Recurring Conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo: the Search for a Regional Conflict Transformation Mechanism premised on Collective Security and the African Ethical Concept of Ubuntu

Sir/Madam, you may realise that conflict recurrence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is not a new phenomenon. Since 1885, the history of the Congo has been permeated by political power struggles, upheavals, and conflicts. King Leopold’s era was dominated by a colonial system of repression, exploitation and oppression through state sponsored violence, resulting in a holocaust of millions of Congolese civilians. Anti-colonial resistance by peasants, workers and politico-religious groups was experienced in the 1940s. Mass nationalism and the struggle for independence characterised the Belgian Congo up to the attainment of independence. Despite the attainment of independence, Congo experienced political instability and civil war leading to the Katanga session, the assassination of Patrice Lumumba and a coup d’état that resulted in Mobutu Seseko taking over power. Mobutu’s rule was characterised by corruption, human rights violations, assassinations, mass executions of government political opponents and innocent civilians particularly women and children. In the mid-1990s, the
Mobutu regime was ousted and replaced by the Laurent Desiree Kabila led government. Following the death of the later, the Kinshasa regime has been led by President Joseph Kabila.

Sir/Madam, you may realise that despite a considering number of peace initiatives at regional and international levels, and notably efforts by the UN Mission in Congo, conflict has continued to recur, particularly in the eastern part of the country. Different armed groups operating in the eastern part of the country have continued to carry out armed activities which had devastating effects on the citizens of the Congo as well as affecting the respective national security concerns of neighbouring countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and to some extent, Tanzania.

Diplomatic/Political and military/ security efforts have been made by various actors at sub regional, regional and international levels such as the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN) through the United Nations Observation Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO), the governments of the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda and to some extent Burundi, the EU, the US among others. Despite efforts by these actors at resolving the recurring conflict in the eastern Congo, there has not been much progress. The DRC is a member of the SADC. The same country together with other SADC member states and those countries that are directly affected by the eastern Congo recurring conflict (namely Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and to some extent Tanzania) belong to the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). Whilst it can be arguably be noted that the eastern Congo recurring conflict falls within the SADC’s responsible area of Conflict Resolution, it can however be noted that the any of the SADC’s conflict resolution efforts cannot be sustainably be attained without bringing on board initiatives the ICGLR. This is so considering that the eastern Congo recurring conflict encroaches and directly affect the national security concerns of those countries that shares the eastern border with the DRC and are members of the ICGLR.

Sir/Madam, in the context of this research study, questions to be raised revolve around what political, economic and military strategic constraints or challenges that the SADC continue to face in terms of conflict resolution which has resulted in conflict recurrence. Has the SADC done enough to include other relevant groupings such as the ICGLR in efforts at finding a sustainable solution to the recurring conflict? Is this conflict recurrence a result of lack of commonality of interests among member countries in both the SADC and the ICGLR which has led to the former not working closely and in unison with the later in sustainably resolving conflict recurrence? Considering that various respective political, diplomatic and military efforts made so far in resolving the recurring conflict in the eastern Congo have not brought sustainable
peace, this PhD research study will critically focus on the search for an ethically sustainable conflict transformation mechanism to the conflict.

The research is guided by the following objectives:
(1). Examine whether there is a relationship between recurring conflict in Eastern DRC and ethnicity.
(2). Analyse whether the traditional approach to conflict resolution can be a panacea to solving the problem of recurrence of conflict in Eastern DRC.
(3). Evaluate the efficacy of the ethic of Ubuntu and the theory of Collective Security with specific reference to Eastern DRC.
(4) Prescribe scholarly and policy recommendations on how SADC (with the support of the UN and AU) can cooperatively work with the ICGLR to sustainably resolve future conflicts that affect the national security interests of member states of the two groupings.

Sir/Madam, it is against the above, that you are humbly requested to participate in this interview. Considering your academic and strategic peace and security expertise as well as exposure in ethics of international relations, with specific reference to ethics of conflict transformation and peacebuilding, your input will be of immense value to this academic endeavor. Kindly note that the questions that you will be requested to respond to will be in line with the given objectives of this study. You should feel free to honestly answer the questions to the best of your knowledge.

In order for me to capture your answers and not to distort information obtained I will be taking notes and request that I record the interview. Your participation sir/madam is on voluntary basis. If you decide to withdraw from the interview you may do so without prejudice.

The results of this study may be published in journal articles or presented at the post graduate conferences. Sir/madam, the University of KwaZulu-Natal may also use these information/findings for future studies of similar academic interests. Confidentiality will be maintained throughout using pseudonyms and nicknames; hence personalities’ identity will be kept as anonymous as possible.

Sir/madam, if you have any questions regarding the study, you may contact the researcher through the following means: telephone; +263 712 806 066, email; rugejea@gmail.com; PhD supervisor Dr Munyaradzi Murove, University of KwaZulu Natal, School of Religion, Philosophy and Classics, contact number, +27731631241 or +27332606056, email murovem@ukzn.ac.za. The Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee contact details are as follows: Ms Phumelele Ximba, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Research Office, Email: ximbap@ukzn.ac.za, Phone number +27312603587.

Your participation will be highly appreciated

Sincerely
Engelbert Abel Rugeje
If you have any queries, contact

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**Consent**

I (Full names of respondent)  
Hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the study and agree to participate. I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the interview at any time, should I so desire. I understand the intention of the research. I understand that my name will remain confidential.

Signature of Respondent:………………………………..  
Date:………………

Signature of Reseacher:………………………………..  
Date:………………
Appendix 2: Questionnaire


Section One (1)

1.1 Designation of Interviewee
   a). Professor
   b). Senior Lecturer/Researcher
   c). Politician/Political analyst
   d). Security practitioner/Analyst

Section two (2)

Objective One

Examine whether there is a relationship between recurring conflict in Eastern DRC and ethnicity.

2.1 Is there a relationship between recurring conflict in the Eastern DRC and ethnicity?

Objective Two

Analyse whether the traditional approach to conflict resolution can be a panacea to solving the problem of recurrence of conflict in Eastern DRC.
2.2 Is the traditional approach to conflict resolution sufficient enough as a panacea to solving the problem of the recurrence of conflict in Eastern DRC?

Objective Three

Evaluate the efficacy of the ethic of Ubuntu and the theory of Collective Security with specific reference to Eastern DRC.

2.3 How effective can the ethic of Ubuntu and the UN concept of Collective Security be applied by the SADC region in solving the problem of recurrence of conflict in Eastern DRC?

Objective Four

Prescribe scholarly and policy recommendations on how SADC (with the support of the UN and AU) can cooperatively work with the ICGLR to sustainably resolve future conflicts that affect the national security interests of member states of the two groupings.

4.1 With the support of the UN and the AU, what can the SADC do to cooperatively work with the ICGLR to sustainably resolve future conflicts that affect the national security interests of member states of the two regional groupings?
Appendix 3: List of Interviewees

1. **ALLOYS** Tegera; Doctor (PhD), Director of Research at Polly Institute Based in Goma. Interviewed in Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo on 06 October 2015.

2. **AGGEE** Shyaka Mugabe; Doctor (PhD), Lecturer on Conflict Transformation at the Centre for Peace and Security, Interviewed in Kigali, Republic of Rwanda on 06 March 2016.

3. **BISIMWA** Betrand; Mr, Chairman of the M23. Interviewed in Kampala, Republic of Uganda on 10 March 2016

4. **CHARLES**; Mr, Rwandese Business Person. Interviewed in Kigali, Republic of Rwanda on 02 October 2015


7. **DIEUDONNE** Tumba; A Student at the University of South Africa (PhD). Interviewed at Main Campus (Theo Van Wilky Building) UNISA Pretoria on 17 May 2016.

8. **DRIENS** Kassa Kasikira; District Administrator. Interviewed in Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo on 06 October 2015.


10. **FAUL** Asinda Sikabwe; Major General, 34th Military Region. Interviewed in Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo on 07 October 2016.


15. **KABONGO**; Chief of Staff to the Director General in ANR. Interviewed in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo on 05 October 2015.
16. **KAPYA** David Miyeye; Ambassador, Special Advisor to Former President HE, Dr BW Mkapa. Interviewed in Daresalaam, United Republic of Tanzania on 29 February 2016.

17. **KARAHA** Bizima; Former Minister of Foreign Affairs in late Laurent Kabila Government. Interviewed in Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo on 05 October 2015.

18. **KAYUMBA** Lufunda; Professor, at Lubumbashi University. Interviewed in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo on 10 October 2016.

19. **KONI** Gilbert Katutwa; Principal Director of ANR, Office of the Administrator General, Overseeing Diplomacy, Politics, Economics and Intelligence. Interviewed in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo on 05 October 2015.

20. **KOTZÉ** Dirk; Professor, Lecturer of Political Science Department of University of South Africa. Interviewed at Main Campus (Theo Van Wilky Building) UNISA, Pretoria, Republic of South Africa on 17 May 2016.

21. **KUNZWA** Charles; Major, UN Chief Security Officer Great Lakes Region. Interviewed in Kampala, Republic of Uganda on 21 October 2015.

22. **KIBASOMBA** Rodger; Professor, Kinshasa University. Interviewed in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo on 05 October 2015.

23. **MABEYO** Vincent; Lieutenant General, Chief of Staff Tanzania People’s Defence Force. Interviewed in Daresalaam, United Republic of Tanzania on 02 March 2016.

24. **MAIMANG** Pierre (Petter) Akala; Councilor in Charge of Intelligence General. Interviewed in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo on 05 October 2015.

25. **MAKAME** Abdullar H; Doctor (PhD), Special Advisor to His Excellency Dr Ali Hassani Mwinyi. Interviewed in Daresalaam, United Republic of Tanzania on 29 February 2016.


27. **MBEKI** Thabo; His Excellency the Former President of the Republic of South Africa. Interviewed at Thabo Mbeki Foundation, Seven North Avenue, Killarney, Johannesburg on 19 May 2016.

28. **MKAPA** Benjamini William; Doctor, His Excellency the Former President of the United Republic of Tanzania. Interviewed in Daresalaam, United Republic of Tanzania on 29 February 2016.


30. **MUGABE** Agee Shyaka; Doctor (PhD), Lecturer on Conflict Transformation at the Centre for Peace and Security at Rwanda University Kigali, Republic of Rwanda on 06 February 2016.
31. **MUTIGANDA** Fransis; Colonel, Director General for External Security in the President’s Office Kigali, Republic of Rwanda on 04 March 2016.

32. **MUKUNA**; Monique, East African Representative. Interviewed while flying from Kinshasa to Nairobi on 13 October 2015.

33. **MWAKETA** Elton Brian; Defence Advisor to the Embassy of the Republic of Zimbabwe in the United Republic of Tanzania. Interviewed in Daresalaam, United Republic of Tanzania on 02 March 2016.

34. **MWEBASE** Vincent; Major, Personal Staff Officer to Commander Tanzania People’s Defence Force. Interviewed on 02 March 2016.

35. **MWINYI** Ali Hassani; His Excellency the Former President of the United Republic of Tanzania. Interviewed in Daresalaam, United Republic of Tanzania on 29 February 2016.

36. **MWITA** Nzaba; Brigadier General, Director General Policy and Strategy in the Ministry of Defence. Interviewed in Kigali, Republic of Rwanda on 05 March 2016.

37. **NDEZE** Mwami; Paramount Chief of Ruchuru North Kivu. Interviewed in Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo on 07 October 2015.

38. **NGENDAHIMANA** Jerome; Major General, Deputy Chief of Staff Rwanda Defence Force Reserve Force. Interviewed in Kigali, Republic of Rwanda on 04 March 2016.

39. **PETAULE** Fredy; Assistant to Doctor Karaha. Interviewed in Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo on 06 October 2015.

40. **OBART** Josiah; MONUSCO Political Affairs Officer. Interviewed in Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo on 07 October 2015.

41. **RUTAREMARA** Jill; Colonel, Director of the Peace Academy. Interviewed in Kigali, Republic of Rwanda 06 March 2016.

42. **SEROWE** Mike; Mr, Republic of South African Consul in Goma. Interviewed in Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo 07 October 2016.

43. **SANDE** Walter; Minister, Counsellor in the Embassy of the Republic of Zimbabwe to Democratic Republic of Congo. Interviewed in Dar-es Salam United Republic of Tanzania on 02 February 2016.

44. **SHYAKA** Anastase; Professor, Director General in Charge of Rwanda Governance Board. Interviewed in Kigali, Republic of Rwanda on 03 March 2016.