UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL

INYUVESI YAKWAZULU-NATALI

The Management of Intergovernmental Relations in KwaZulu-Natal's Operation Sukuma Sakhe

By

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ABSTRACT

Governments around the world have come to the realisation that in order to respond effectively to the challenges facing their societies there is a need for coordinated effort. South Africa has not been an exception to this movement towards coordinating efforts to ensure the efficient delivery of services to communities. Intergovernmental relations have been the pillar of the efforts to ensure a coordinated response to the challenges facing society. Intergovernmental relations have a long history in South Africa; they can be traced from pre-colonial times to today. Intergovernmental relations in South Africa have been flexible and changed to respond to the challenges of that particular day. In the post-apartheid period, successive governments in South Africa have been confronted with the challenges of improving the lives of millions of South Africans who had suffered from hundreds of years of dispossession. As part of the efforts to coordinate efforts to fight against the scourge of poverty President Thabo Mbeki declared a War on Poverty in his State of the Nation Address in 2008. The KwaZulu-Natal Government under the leadership of Premier Dr Zweli Mkhize heeded the call and launched Operation Sukuma Sakhe (OSS) in uMsinga. OSS was identified as a Flagship Program of the KwaZulu-Natal Government and it was to be used to coordinate the delivery of services to the poorest communities in KwaZulu-Natal. The success of Sukuma Sakhe heavily relies on effective intergovernmental relations; therefore, the current study is aimed at exploring how intergovernmental relations are managed in KwaZulu-Natal's Operation Sukuma Sakhe, to understand the challenges faced by OSS, to establish the impact of OSS on poverty alleviation and lastly, to determine the role played by community members in OSS. The study was underpinned by both the collaboration theory and the social exchange theory. A qualitative methodology was employed in the study. The population of the study consisted of provincial government officials, local politicians (councillors), a district task team chairperson, a local task team chairperson and community-based conveners. Data was collected using semi-structured telephonic interviews. Policy documents, acts of parliament, speeches, books, journals etc. were also reviewed. Study participant were purposively sampled based on their knowledge of OSS. Data were analysed using thematic analysis to generate a descriptive narrative. The findings of the study reveal that although stakeholders are enthusiastic about collaboration results have not been positive. The study also found that senior leadership support for the programme is not

improving its outcomes. The challenges facing the programme were found to include non-participation by government departments, political conflicts between local and provincial governments, inter-party mistrust, lack of resources and the lack of capacity in the community. All these challenges affect the integrated delivery of services to communities. The study recommends that each government department must have people who are dedicated to ensuring that their department is involved in OSS activities. These people must only focus on OSS and nothing else because it has been shown that those officials who are employed for something else and have OSS as their secondary task are not able to deliver because their focus most of their energy in doing what they are primarily employed to do. The study also recommends that all relevant stakeholders must be involved in the formulation of the purpose of the collaboration in order to achieve commitment and ownership. If some stakeholders are not involved in the formulation of the purpose, they are unlikely to be committed to the collaboration.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ANC	African National Congress
CBO	Community-Based Organisation
CCG	Community Care Giver
CODESA	Convention for a Democratic South Africa
CDW	Community Development Worker
COGTA	KwaZulu-Natal Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs
COHOD	Committee of Heads of Departments
DSD	Department of Social Development
DTT	District Task Team
EXCO	Executive Committee
FET	Further Education and Training
FOSAD	Forum of South African Directors-General
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HOD	Head of Department
ID	Identity Document
IDP	Integrated Development Plan
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
IGF	Intergovernmental Forum

IGR	Intergovernmental Relations
JD	Job Description
KPA	Key Performance Area
KZN	KwaZulu-Natal
LGE	Local Government Elections
LTT	Local Task Team
MEC	Member of the Executive Council
MINMEC's	Ministers of Cabinet and Members of Provincial Executive Council
NCOP	National Council of Provinces
NP	National Party
OSS	Operation Sukuma Sakhe
OTP	Office of the Premier
PCC	President's Coordinating Council
PF	Premier's Forum
PGDS	Provincial Growth and Development Strategy
RED	Regional Electricity Distribution
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
SALGA	South African Local Government Association
SASSA	South African Social Security Agency
SCOPA	Standing Committee on Public Accounts
SMMEs	Small Medium and Micro-sized Enterprises

SONA	State of the Nation Address
TB	Tuberculosis
UDF	United Democratic Front
WC	Ward Committee
WTT	Ward Task Team
YA	Youth Ambassador

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

This study sets out to investigate the management of intergovernmental relations in KwaZulu-Natal's Operation Sukuma Sakhe. Intergovernmental relations are intended to promote and facilitate cooperative government and decision-making by ensuring that policies and activities across all spheres encourage service delivery to meet the needs of citizens in an effective way (Edwards, 2008). They are concerned with political, financial and institutional arrangements for interactions among the three spheres of government and organs of state within each sphere (Edwards, 2008). Strategically, intergovernmental relations aim to (1) promote and facilitate cooperative decision-making, (2) coordinate and align priorities, budgets, policies and activities across interrelated functions and, (3) ensure a smooth flow of information within government and communities, with the ultimate aim of enhancing the implementation of policies and programmes (Baatjies, 2010).

Intergovernmental relations have steadily grown in popularity as a means employed by governments in delivering services to communities. This enthusiasm about intergovernmental relations is driven by the prospect of tackling complex issues collaboratively, use resources effectively, and involving citizens and the community in issues that have a direct impact on their lives. In the current era of austerity, it has become increasingly important for government agencies and departments to work together, share knowledge, resources and expertise. However, collaborative endeavours in the public sector have proven to be particularly difficult to execute. This is mainly because each agency or department has different aims, accountabilities, professional perspectives and organisational culture. Despite these challenges, there have been concerted efforts from government to promote collaboration through legislation, structural reorganisation and financial incentives; the results, however, have not been encouraging. Even though intergovernmental relations in the public sector remain chronically difficult, governments remain enthusiastic about it (Jones & Thomas, 2007).

In the South African context, intergovernmental relations are intended to promote and facilitate cooperative governance and decision-making by ensuring that policies and activities across all government spheres are geared towards the delivery of services to meet the needs of communities in an effective way (Edwards, 2008). The South African government understands that cooperation and the integration of actions depend on a stable and effective system of intergovernmental relations (Baatjies, 2010). To achieve this, the South African government has established intergovernmental structures, procedures, and toolkits (Edwards, 2008).

In many of these structures service delivery is at the top of the agenda. In part, this is caused by the widespread of service delivery protests which have become an everyday reality the country. This has led to increasing calls for the government to speed up service delivery and improve the lives of the people of South Africa (Ile, 2010). Weak intergovernmental relations are seen as one of the reasons behind slow service delivery in the country. Therefore, this study sought to understand how intergovernmental relations are managed in KwaZulu-Natal's OSS in order to determine whether weak intergovernmental relations are the cause of the failure of the programme.

After the democratic elections in 1994, one of the major challenges which faced the new government was the issue of poverty. The birth of democracy in 1994 provided a window of opportunity for South Africa to change the development path of the country. There are few things in post-apartheid South Africa which are as politically fateful as the persistence of entrenched poverty in our country. There has been an almost universal consensus in the post-apartheid era that poverty is an endemic problem which must be resolved as attested to by du Toit (2012: 1) in the following statement:

In policy making circles, in the public sphere and across almost the entire political spectrum from left to right, South Africans seem to agree that the existence of poverty poses a profound challenge for the country as a whole- and that the ability to eradicate it, to reduce it significantly or to offer those who suffer it credible hope of upward mobility and escape is one of the most important tests of the post-apartheid political and economic order.

Failure to address the problem of poverty is widely believed to have the potential to undermine both the short-term and long-term legitimacy of our democratic dispensation.

As a result, the South African government has committed itself to poverty reduction through its targeted pro-poor state expenditure on social security (Ngobese & Msweli, 2013). The government primarily focuses on the provision of primary health care, compulsory education, and provision of housing, electricity and water. The commitment of the South African government to reducing poverty is reflected in the fact that there are over 29 000 government-sponsored programmes which are aimed at reducing poverty (Public Service Commission, 2007). Despite the attempts by the South African government to reduce poverty and improve services, several challenges hindering successful reduction of poverty remain. These challenges prompted the government to embark on the so-called "war on poverty", a term coined by President Lyndon Johnson of the USA in his state of the nation address in 1964 (McKee, 2014). The South African government realised that the ultimate goal of any state is to advance the welfare of the population and that this can be attained through the promotion of intergovernmental relations and cooperative government. One strategy which was developed by the government to fight poverty was the "War on Poverty".

In 2008 in the State of the Nation Address (SONA) President Thabo Mbeki announced the 'War on Poverty' initiative which was aimed at addressing the plight of poverty in South Africa. The war on poverty was adopted by Cabinet as part of the South African government's Apex Priorities (Policy Coordination and Advisory Committee, 2008). President Mbeki emphasised the importance of responding to the challenges of widespread poverty with agency. He noted that the poor citizens of South Africa can no longer wait for strategies, dialogues and workshops – important as these may be (Mbeki, 2008). President Mbeki also emphasised the need to integrate efforts in order to deal effectively with the challenges of poverty. He called for the three spheres of government, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and business to integrate their efforts in order to wage a more potent war against poverty. The Kwa-Zulu-Natal government responded to the call by the President by launching its war on poverty Campaign in uMsinga in the same year. In 2011, the KwaZulu-Natal Government under the leadership of Premier Zweli Mkhize re-launched the war on poverty campaign under the banner of OSS which aims to deliver services to communities in a coordinated manner where government departments, local authorities, community members, NGOs and business people work together to improve the delivery of

services (OSS, 2012). In attempting to implement this idea, a number of structures have been established across the 11 district municipalities in KwaZulu-Natal to facilitate intergovernmental relations and service delivery. However, no study had been done to understand how intergovernmental relations are managed in the integrated service delivery programme. This study fills that gap by exploring how intergovernmental relations are managed in the programme.

As stated above, the KwaZulu-Natal Government in 2011 adopted the war on poverty as its flagship programme under the banner of OSS. The main sub-programmes of OSS are (1) food security; (2) fighting TB, HIV/AIDS, and poverty; and (3) the empowerment of women and youth while addressing social ills and driving an aggressive behavioural change campaign.

The top five priorities of the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government are embedded in the OSS service delivery model (OSS, 2012). The top five priorities of the KwaZulu-Natal Government are (1) rural development/agrarian reform and food security; (2) creating decent work and economic growth; (3) fighting crime; (4) education; and (5) health. OSS aims to create comprehensive, efficient, effective, quality service delivery systems which contribute to a self-reliant society (OSS, 2012: 1). The KwaZulu-Natal Government aims to eradicate the practice of communities being passive recipients of government services and wants them to take charge of their own development.

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

Governments across the world have realised that to solve the multifaceted challenges confronting societies, collaborations are indispensable. They realise that the complex challenges of today's world cannot be solved by agencies/organisations working in isolation. Despite the obvious and acknowledged need for collaboration to solve societal problems, this remains difficult to achieve and to manage. The failure to work collaboratively and to manage collaborations limit the capacity to deliver multi-sectoral social programmes (Tapscott, 2000).

The lack of coordination in delivering services to communities means that those communities who are deprived are negatively affected. The uMsinga Local Municipality in

particular and uMzinyathi District Municipality, in general, are very poor municipalities. This means that lack of coordination in the delivery of services has fateful consequences for these areas. Understanding the challenges to coordination and finding solutions is therefore paramount. By investigating how different organisations and spheres of government coordinate their efforts in OSS, this study explores the challenges which confront organisations operating across organisational boundaries. This study also suggests ways to overcome these challenges. Given the fact that the OSS model of service delivery is intended to be implemented across South Africa, it is important that lessons are learned from where it was first implemented.

1.3 PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Between 2012 and 2013, the researcher worked at the KwaZulu-Natal Department of Economic Development and Tourism (at the time of writing it is known as the Department of Economic Development, Tourism and Environmental Affairs). In this government department, the researcher worked in the intergovernmental relations division within the office of the Head of Department (HOD). It was during this time that the researcher came to know about KwaZulu-Natal's community-centred, integrated service delivery framework/programme; OSS. That is also when the researcher realised that the programme was failing to achieve its objectives and was viewed with scepticism by some government officials. However, the researchers' first impression of the programme was positive. The researcher thought it was an excellent model of service delivery because it involved diverse groups of stakeholders whose objective was to deliver services to communities thus improving the lives of community members in even the most remote areas of KwaZulu-Natal.

The researcher learned that even though the concept of involving a wide range of stakeholders in the process of service delivery was a good idea, it was not working in practice, hence the scepticism. Having been involved in several government programmes, the researcher thought that what was causing the programme to fail was the lack of coordination between the provincial government and local government. This hunch was in line with what was stated in the 1998 Presidential Review Commission that poor coordination within and between different departments and spheres of government created

incapacity to implement national programmes and consequently led to a failure to deliver basic services (Presidential Review Commission, 1998). Hence the study seeks to find out how intergovernmental relations are managed in the programme. The study also seeks to find out the challenges facing the programme with the view to finding solutions to these problems. No proper attention has been given to how intergovernmental relations are managed on the ground level in multi-department government projects like OSS. Studying the dynamics of intergovernmental relations at this level is important if we are to achieve improved service delivery. No study has been done which looks at the impact of OSS on poverty alleviation or the role played by community members in integrated service delivery initiatives, particularly in Operation Sukuma Sakhe. This study fills these gaps.

The study will contribute to the fields of intergovernmental relations, integrated service delivery and collaboration. The study explores the process of working across organisational boundaries to achieve common goals using the collaboration theory and the social exchange theory. It also explores the complexities involved in working across organisational boundaries. The study has found many challenges associated with working collaboratively to solve common problems. These challenges include but are not limited to, the lack of commitment from some collaboration partners, lack of resources to operationalise the collaboration, and lack of clearly defined roles for collaboration partners. The study also found that there is mistrust between the provincial government and the local government. This mistrust is caused by the political difference of the actors in these two spheres. This study will contribute to the understanding of the dynamics of trust in cross-sphere collaboration. The study will also contribute to the understanding of conflict management in cross-organisational collaborations. It also explores the role traditional leaders play in conflict management within such settings. The study also serves an evaluative purpose by exploring the contributions made by OSS in the alleviation of poverty in KwaZulu-Natal.

1.4 PRELIMINARY LITERATURE REVIEW

The term intergovernmental relations appeared for the first time in print in the 1930s in an article by Snider (1995, cited in Kahn, Madue & Kalema, 2011: 4) on country and township government. In the 1960s, Anderson (1960, cited in Kahn, et al., 2011: 4) attempted to end the conceptual uncertainty in intergovernmental relations by defining it as "an important

body of activities or interactions occurring between governmental units of all types and levels within a political system". The concept of intergovernmental relations entered into public administration in the United States of America in the 1930s. The New Deal policy meant that the federal government had to make a concerted effort to combat the economic and social havoc which was brought about by the Great Depression (Maud & Wood, 1974, cited in Kahn, et al., 2011: 4). To be able to deal with these challenges, all levels of the United States government had to work together in a coordinated manner which could only be achieved through intergovernmental relations.

The emergence of intergovernmental relations in South Africa can be traced to the arrival of Dutch colonialists in the Cape in 1652. Colonialist brought with them the administrative system of their native country. The legacy of the Dutch administrative systems has been resilient and its hand can be seen in the governance systems and laws of the country presently. In 1806, when the British wrested control of the Cape from the Dutch, Dutch administrative systems were replaced by the Westminster model. This prompted the Dutch to move further inland and form the two Boer Republics; the Orange Free State and the Transvaal (Parsons, 1982, cited in Kahn, et al., 2011: 48). In the colonies and Boer Republics, intergovernmental relations were centralised. This meant that local authorities were nothing more than agents of the central government (Tapscott, 1998).

The centralisation of intergovernmental relations continued when the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910. Provinces were subjugated by the central government through the powerful administration and, in turn, municipalities were subjugated by the provinces. The Union itself was subjugated to the British Crown (Worden, 1994). The dominance of the central government in intergovernmental relations continued under the apartheid government. The Bantu Authorities Act, 1951, was enacted to establish self-governing homelands for black people (Horrell, 1956, cited in Kahn, et al., 2011: 57). The tribal, regional, and territorial authorities were created by the Act to manage the affairs of the homelands. However, these authorities were not completely independent of the central government; they acted as agents of the central government in the homelands which was keeping in line with the practice of centralised intergovernmental relations.

The apartheid government attempted to restructure the system of intergovernmental relations in the 1980s. This was partly because of the pressure they were facing in liberal cities like Durban and Cape Town (Boulle, 1984, cited in Khan, 2011: 59). It did this by introducing the tri-cameral parliament which incorporated Indians and Coloreds in the legislative process. This arrangement continued to exclude the majority black population from the legislative process. This led to mass protests and condemnation of the apartheid government across the world during which heavy sanctions were imposed. The apartheid government finally caved under pressure and started negotiations with opposition movements on the path to the new South Africa (Worden, 1994, cited in Kahn, 2011: 61). In one of its last actions, the tri-cameral parliament passed the Interim Constitution which paved the way for the intergovernmental relations structure we have today.

After the democratic elections in 1994, one of the major challenges which faced the new government was the issue of poverty. The definition of poverty used in this study is the one by Chambers (2006) which includes income poverty (living below the poverty line) and material lack (lack of proper shelter, clothing, access to health, and the general lack of access to services). The problem of poverty in South Africa was given special attention in the early 20th century within a racialized context. In 1929, "white poverty" became a matter of concern and the government contracted the Carnegie Corporation to undertake a study that looked closely at white poverty (Buccuss, 2004). The Carnegie Corporation produced a paper titled "A Scientific Investigation into the Causes of White Poverty, its Extent, and the Means it could be Reduced". This report was followed by the National Conference on the Poor White Problem which led to the creation of the State Department of Social Welfare in 1937 (McKendrick, 1987). The Second Carnegie Report which was released in 1980 was the first comprehensive study to investigate black poverty in South Africa. This report demonstrated the complex inequalities which existed in the South African society which were reinforced by racist policies.

The birth of democracy in 1994 provided a window of opportunity for South Africa to change the development path of the country. The South African government realised that the ultimate goal of any state is to advance the welfare of the population and that this can be obtained through the promotion of intergovernmental relations and cooperative government (Malan, 2005). The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, (Act 108 of 1996) has

8

been hailed as a masterpiece that sought to advance the achievement of governmental goals, through an intergovernmental relations system that would improve coordination and alignment of governmental activities (Ile, 2010). The principle of cooperative governance, as envisioned in the Constitution, requires that the three spheres of government should work together to ensure that the needs of citizens in the local sphere are considered at both the provincial and national level. In 2005, the South African parliament passed the Intergovernmental Relations Framework (Act 13 of 2005) to provide specific guidelines to the three spheres of government in terms of implementing policy and legislation, of establishing structures; managing conflict, monitoring and evaluation, and managing the general conduct of intergovernmental relations (Edwards, 2008).

There are several structures and forums which have been created to facilitate intergovernmental relations in South Africa. These structures include the President's Coordination Council, which is aimed at assisting in improving relations and coordination among the national and provincial government. Another intergovernmental structure is the Committee of Ministers and Members of the Executive Councils (MINMEC). The MINMEC was formed to discuss matters of national interest within a specific functional area with provinces and if possible with organised local government (Mubangizi, 2005). Another important intergovernmental structure is the Forum for South Africa Directors-General (FOSAD) which was created to enable directors-general to raise critical issues and the sharing of best practice between state departments. On top of these national intergovernmental forums, there are provincial forums and district forums.

Mbedu (2014) has studied OSS as a way of ensuring social cohesion within the context of land reform; Gaede and Versteeg (2011) have studied OSS in establishing the implementation of the right to health in rural South Africa. However, no study has been done to understand how intergovernmental relations are managed within OSS. This is what the study seeks to do. It seeks to investigate how intergovernmental relations are managed in order to ensure coordination in this integrated service delivery models. It is also important to note that there has been nothing written on OSS except being mentioned in passing in studies which focus on poverty. This study is worthwhile because to really deliver service to the people, different stakeholders, including government departments, need to work collaboratively. If there are no proper structures for collaborative service

delivery the fight against poverty and all social ills is unlikely to be won. This study is also necessary because the South African government wants to implement the OSS model across South Africa. It is therefore important to understand the challenges and opportunities which the model offers.

1.5 OBJECTIVES

Arising out of the problem statement, the objectives of this study are:

- To understand how intergovernmental relations are managed in OSS.
- To investigate the challenges facing OSS and to suggest possible solutions.
- To determine the role played by OSS in alleviating poverty and other social ills.
- To evaluate the role played by the community in integrated service delivery.

1.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The primary research question is how are intergovernmental relations managed in OSS? To answer this question the study uses the collaboration theory and the social exchange theory. The following sub-questions were formulated in order to get insight on how intergovernmental relations and collaboration are managed in OSS. Answers to these questions will give us insight into the processes involved in managing intergovernmental relations and cross-sector collaboration in OSS.

- What is the purpose of OSS?
- How are conflicts managed in OSS?
- How is trust built in OSS?
- How is organisational ownership of OSS achieved?
- How are OSS decisions implemented?
- How are monitoring and evaluation done in OSS?
- How is stakeholder communication maintained in OSS?

As I noted earlier, the South African government has proposed plans to roll out OSS throughout South Africa. It is important to examine the challenges and the success stories which have come out of OSS especially where it was first launched in uMsinga.

Understanding the challenges and success of the programme will provide lessons for other areas which seek to implement it. To this end, the following questions are asked:

- What are the challenges which have been faced by OSS?
- What are the noticeable positive contributions which have been achieved by OSS?
- To what extent is the community involved in OSS in the KwaZulu-Natal?

1.7 PRINCIPAL THEORIES UPON WHICH THE STUDY WILL BE CONSTRUED

The study is underpinned by the collaboration theory and the social exchange theory. The two theories are important and relevant to the study because they explain why organisations choose to collaborate. They also explain the factors which must be considered before and during the collaboration process in order to make the collaborative initiative a success. These theories have been chosen because they seek to provide a framework for understanding inter-organisational cooperation. They allow us to analyse how different stakeholders work together to resolve common problems and what conditions should be present for joint work to be successful. The collaboration theory seeks to explain why and how organisations collaborate. On the other hand, the social exchange theory seeks to explain both individual and organisational motivations for collaboration. The social exchange theory understands that there is a human element to intergovernmental relations which also needs to be explained. Used together, these theories allowed the researcher to understand both organisational and individual motivations to collaborate in OSS. These theories are explained in detail in Chapter 3.

1.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ADOPTED IN THE STUDY

The employed a qualitative research design. The qualitative research design was chosen because the study seeks to understand how intergovernmental relations are managed in in real world conditions (Yin, 2011). The study sought to collect rich descriptive data in order to understand the process of managing intergovernmental relations in an integrated service delivery context. It also sought to get rich descriptive data about the challenges which are experienced in the OSS service delivery model, its role in alleviating poverty and the level of community involvement/participation. The only way the study could achieve its

objective was by soliciting the views and perspectives of OSS officials; hence, the choice of qualitative research design.

The study purposively sampled twenty participants. The participants were interviewed using the telephonic interview technique. Participants were selected based on their experience working in OSS. All the participants who were interviewed hold official positions in OSS. The sample featured a diverse group of participants which included local politicians, provincial government officials, district government officials and community-based conveners. Having a diverse group of participants in the study served the purpose of triangulation thus giving the results of the study credibility. A more comprehensive description of the methodology is given in chapter 4.

1.9 DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY

This study is limited to investigating the management of intergovernmental relations in OSS, the challenges facing the programme, its impact on the alleviation of poverty and the role played by the community in the programme. The study included only the participants who hold or have held leadership positions in the programme. The study was located in uMsinga Local Municipality which is where the programme was first launched in KwaZulu-Natal. Study participants included provincial government officials, local government officials, local politicians and community-based conveners. The study did not include the views of provincial politicians because of their unavailability.

1.10 OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

The structure of thesis is based on the Powell and Connaway's (2004) model of organisation. The study is structured into seven chapters.

1.10.1 Chapter 1: Introduction

This chapter provides the general background of intergovernmental relations. It argues that intergovernmental relations have grown in popularity as a means employed by governments to deliver services to communities in a coordinated manner. It also gives a historical account of the development of intergovernmental relations in the world in general and South Africa in particular. The chapter outlines the statement of the problem, the objectives,

delimitation and significance of the study. It briefly introduces the literature, methodology and the theoretical framework used in the study.

1.10.2 Chapter 2: Literature Review

The chapter outlines the historical development of intergovernmental relations in South Africa. It also discusses the different approaches to the study of intergovernmental relations. The chapter discusses how different forms of government affect the conduct of intergovernmental relations. It explores the norms which govern intergovernmental relations in South Africa. The chapter highlights the problem of poverty in South Africa and the attempts the South African government has made to solve the problem. It stresses the importance of coordinating the efforts of different stakeholders in the fight against poverty.

1.10.3 Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework

This discusses the collaboration theory and the social exchange theory. The chapter provides a justification for the use of these theories in the study. The collaboration theory is a framework which explains why organisations collaborate. On the other hand, the social exchange theory explains individual and organisational motivations for collaboration. These two theories are used to understand and explain collaboration in Operation Sukuma.

1.10.4 Chapter 4: Research Methodology

Chapter 4 outlines the research methodology employed in the study. It provides a justification for the use of the qualitative research design. It also elaborates on the case study method and its relevance to the study. Furthermore, the chapter provides a justification for the use of telephonic interviews as a data-gathering tool. In addition, the study site, sampling, data analysis, the transcription process and ethical considerations are discussed.

1.10.5 Chapter 5: Managing intergovernmental relations and Cross-sector collaboration in OSS

This chapter presents the results of the study in line with the research questions. It discusses the purpose of OSS and what it seeks to achieve. The chapter also discusses the myriad of challenges that the programme faces. These challenges include but are not limited to lack of

13

attendance by government officials and members of the community; lack of capacity; political challenges driven by party competition; poor understanding of the purpose of the programme and inadequate resources. The chapter also discusses the importance of trust in collaboration. It also assesses the impact of OSS on poverty alleviation. In this regard, the study found that while some interviewees believe that the programme has had an impact on poverty alleviation, others perceive that it has not had that impact.

1.10.6 Chapter 6: Discussion of Research Results

This chapter discusses the findings of the study presented in Chapter 5 using the collaboration and the social exchange theory. The discussion chapter highlights and discusses the key features, strengths, challenges and gaps in OSS. Findings and conclusions are outlined under each research question. One of the key findings revealed in this chapter is that a lack of participation by government departments in the programme negatively affects intergovernmental relations. Another key finding discussed in the chapter is that the challenges faced by the programme have led to the programme being perceived negatively by community members. This chapter also reveals that even though conflict is minimal in OSS, however conflict driven by political competition remains a feature.

1.10.7 Chapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations

This chapter provides a summary of the main findings of the study. It also highlights the contribution of the study to theory and makes recommendations for future research. The study concludes that despite a strong leadership structure, frontline administrators prioritise the performance of contractual tasks over and the deliverables of OSS. This negatively affects OSS. What this means is that the presence of strong leadership structures does not guarantee success in collaborative endeavours. The study also concluded that the lack of attendance by government departments, staff turnover and the top-down approach to monitoring and evaluation all negatively affect the programme.

1.11 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter has provided a snapshot of the rest of the study. It does this by outlining the background of the study, the problem the study investigated and the significance of the study. The chapter has also outlined the preliminary literature, the theories upon which the

14

study is construed and the research methodology used in the study. In the five years since the programme was launched in uMsinga, no study has been done to assess its effectiveness and the challenges it faces. This study serves that purpose. The next chapter discusses literature that is relevant to the study.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter focuses on literature which is relevant to the study of intergovernmental relations. The literature provides the context within which intergovernmental relations in the world in general and South Africa, in particular, unfolds. The chapter explores the origins of intergovernmental relations in South Africa and the current intergovernmental relations structures. Among other things, it also discusses the ethical or normative framework within which intergovernmental relations are conducted. The chapter also discusses the role played by intergovernmental relations in service delivery. The significance of the human factor in intergovernmental relations is also discussed. It also discusses KwaZulu-Natal's war on poverty initiative, OSS.

2.2 WHY DO A LITERATURE REVIEW?

Successful research largely depends on a well-planned and thorough review of relevant literature. The literature review usually "entails obtaining useful references or sources on a particular topic" (Brynard & Hanekom, 1997:31).

> A literature review is conducted to obtain perspectives on the most recent research findings related to the research topic, and to obtain an indication of the best methods and instruments for measurement which can be used to improve the interpretation of one's own results and help in determining the relevance of research on a specific topic (Sokhela, 2006:51).

A proper literature review entails reading literature that is relevant to the research topic. This is useful because it familiarises the researcher with the latest developments in the research area.

2.3 THE CONCEPT OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

The concept of intergovernmental relations (IGR) has been in use by public officials and scholars for a very long time but its definition continues to be highly contested (Wright, 1982, cited in (Kahn, Madue and Kalema, 2011: 4). The term appeared for the first time in print in the 1930s in an article by Snider (1995) cited in (Kahn, 2011: 4) on country and township government. In the 1960s, Anderson (1960 cited in (Kahn et. al, 2011: 4) attempted to end the conceptual uncertainty in intergovernmental relations by defining it as "an important body of activities or interactions occurring between governmental units of all types and levels within a political system". Both Snider and Anderson used the term intergovernmental relations but neither of them claimed credit for its creation or its origins.

The concept of intergovernmental relations became part of public administration terminology in the United States of America in the 1930s. The New Deal policy meant that the federal government had to make a concerted effort to combat the economic and social havoc which was brought about by the Great Depression (Maud & Wood, 1974, cited in (Kahn, et al., 2011: 4). To be able to deal with these challenges, all levels of the United States government had to work together in a coordinated manner which could only be achieved through intergovernmental relations. What this indicates is that organisations/spheres of government are more likely to work together when the scope of the problem is too big for one organisation to resolve. At the time, intergovernmental relations was a policy instrument, that is, its orientation was towards the choice of different paths of action.

> The policy-oriented nature of intergovernmental relations in the United States was typified by President Franklin D. Roosevelt's skirmishes with the United States Supreme Court over various social welfare programs and his pragmatically-oriented techniques for circumventing the courts legalistic resistance to the changes that he was introducing (Wright, 1982 cited in (Kahn, et al., 2011:4).

Generally speaking, "the concept of intergovernmental relations is understood to refer to the way in which the different spheres of government relate to one another" (Kahn, et al., 2011: 4). The vitality of the concept of intergovernmental relations was brought to the fore by

Botha (1996, cited in Kahn, et al., 2011: 4) when he observed that the concept assumes importance where there is a division of powers at both administrative and legislative levels among different spheres of government. In other words, intergovernmental relations are creative mechanisms which are used to maintain cooperative relationships and coordination among and between vertical and horizontal parties.

From the above discussion, two things can be deduced. Firstly, intergovernmental relations imply forms of interaction between various levels of government (vertical interactions), and between equal governmental jurisdictions (horizontal interactions) within a given state. Secondly, coordination and cooperation are the main objectives of intergovernmental relations. One must, however, note that coordination and cooperation are not the only aims of intergovernmental relations. Maud and Wood (1974, cited in Kahn, et al., 2011: 5) state that "the concept of intergovernmental relations has a broader perspective which includes interventions, directions and control by higher levels of government, and consultation among all levels of government both horizontally and vertically". These elements do not always improve or advance cooperation and coordination; instead, they are often exploited to either reinforce subjugation of one level of government to another or promote dependence of lower levels of government on a higher one (Kahn, et al., 2011).

It is also important to note that there are many different forms of government which include unitary, federal and military dictatorships among others. Each of these systems gives rise to different forms of intergovernmental relations systems.

> "While a unitary system may, in principle assign limited powers to lower levels of government, a federal system should by definition do the opposite, on the other hand, military dictatorships not only tend to keep all power at the centre but even within one arm of government, namely, the executive" (Kahn, et al., 2011: 5).

According to Boraine (1995, cited in Kahn, et al., 2011: 5), intergovernmental relations may be categorised into constitutional, political and financial relations. This reference to the constitutional dimension of intergovernmental relations is crucial because "the constitution in most instances is a product of the national government legislature and by this fact; all

18

levels of government are subject to central government" (Kahn, et al., 2011: 5). This means that provincial and local governments are subordinates of the central government and their relations reflect this subordination. Consequently, the power of the central government vis-à-vis other levels is a source of mistrust and suspicion in the intergovernmental relations of many states.

It is worth noting that there is a tendency in literature to restrict the definition/description of intergovernmental relations to formal structures, especially constitutional and legal provisions. "While these constitutional and legal provisions are important, they are almost always supplemented and supported by semi-formal or informal interactions which often play a decisive role in shaping intergovernmental relations" (Boraine, 1995, cited in (Kahn, et al., 2011: 5).

2.4 DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS (IGR)

Just like in any field of study there are many lenses or approaches to the study of intergovernmental relations. Hattingh (1998) identifies four distinct approaches to the study of intergovernmental relations. These are the constitutional/legal approach, the democratic approach, the financial approach and the normative approach. These approaches are discussed briefly below.

2.4.1 The Democratic Approach

The democratic approach to intergovernmental relations emphasises the right of the provincial and local government to autonomy. It contends that the local and provincial governments have the right to self-determination. The approach advocates a move from centralised authority through the decentralisation of power to regional and local institutions (Kahn, et al., 2011). If the objective of this approach were taken to its logical conclusion, it would mean that provincial and local authorities would be independent of any higher authority, and therefore autonomous. "In the real world, the notion of autonomy should be understood as the measure of autonomy given to provincial and local institutions by the central government" (Hattingh, 1998, cited in Kahn, et al., 2011: 6).

The separatist nature of the democratic approach would lead to chaos in many states. In polities with many different competing ethnic groups, it can undermine efforts aimed at achieving national unity.

The views of the democratic approach should not, however, be cast away as useless. This is because the opposition to the centralization of power continues to be reflected in the struggle between local government and central government over the extent of authority to be assigned to local and provincial governments. One must also note that "the emphasis placed by the democratic approach on autonomy is too restrictive to create an adequately holistic view of intergovernmental relations" (Hattingh, 1998, cited in (Kahn et al., 2011: 6).

2.4.2 The Constitutional/Legal Approach

The constitutional/legal approach emphasises the centrality of constitutional and legislative provisions in the study of IGR. According to Roux (1997: 171) "in the 18th and 19th centuries, the federalist movement in the United States advocated the constitutional approach and accepted the existing hierarchy of governments as a constitutional fact". The Constitution was considered to be a vehicle for achieving harmony and was the basis for determining intergovernmental relations. The constitutional/legal approach entails a structural and hierarchic analysis of the Constitution and legislation pertaining to central, provincial and local governments which have a bearing on relations between government bodies. "The result of such analysis would be a long list of governmental bodies and structures with a comprehensive description of the duties and powers of every political office-bearer within each institution" (Hattingh, 1998, cited in (Kahn et al., 2011: 6).

The constitutional/legal approach is particularly relevant in the case of the Republic of South Africa. The 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa is the supreme law of the land and all actions must conform to it. The fact that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land means that intergovernmental relations are dictated by and must operate within the constitutional framework. Section 41(2) of the Constitution, in particular, requires that an Act of Parliament be enacted to provide for structures and institutions to promote and facilitate intergovernmental relations. This constitutional clause has led to the enactment of

the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (no. 13 of 2005). The heavy reliance on the Constitution for the framework of intergovernmental relations and the enactment of legislation to facilitate intergovernmental relations is proof that South Africa mainly uses the constitutional/legal approach to intergovernmental relations.

The influence of the constitutional/legal approach in South African IGR is reflected in a judgement given by the constitutional court. In Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (The Southern African Legal Information Institute [SAFLII], 1995), the dispute was about some sections of the Municipal Structures Act (No. 117 of 1998). The Western Cape provincial administration as the applicant in the case argued that certain sections of the Act violated Chapter 7 of the Constitution which deals with local municipalities. The constitutional court ruled that Sections 4, 5, 6(2), 13 and 24 of the Municipal Structures Act were unconstitutional and invalid (Constitutional Court Judgement, dated 15 October 1999, Case CCT 15/99). This is one example of how intergovernmental relations in South Africa are regulated by the Constitution and other pieces of legislation.

Despite its popularity in many states, there has been a strong criticism of the constitutional/legal approach to intergovernmental relations. One of the criticisms is that the approach accepts the information contained in legislation as accurate and unchanging until amended by new legislation (Kahn, et al., 2011). Another criticism levelled against it is that it assumes that relations between governmental bodies only exist within the framework of the legislation permitting such relations. This is not true because, as noted above, there are some informal intergovernmental institutions which are as important as the formal ones. The constitutional/legal approach has also been criticised for failing to explain the dynamics of relations among various government bodies and among people working within these bodies which also need to be analysed to get a complete view of intergovernmental relations within a given state. What becomes apparent from this discussion is that the constitutional/legal approach is useful if the purpose of the study is to obtain a comprehensive list of governmental bodies and the powers of such bodies.

2.4.3 The Financial Approach

The financial approach to intergovernmental relations has been used in South Africa since 1910 when various commissions and committees were appointed to investigate financial relations between the three spheres of government. Section 214(1) of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa requires that an Act of Parliament be enacted to provide for the equitable division of revenue among national, provincial and local spheres of government. This section of the Constitution led to the enactment of the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act (No. 97 of 1997) (IFRA), which states as its purpose the promotion and coordination "between national, provincial, and local spheres of government on fiscal, budgetary, and financial matters" and the prescription of "a process for the determination of an equitable sharing of revenue raised nationally" (IFRA, 1997, Preamble). This Act also provides for the establishment of the Budget Council and the Budget Forum.

From this discussion, it can be seen that fiscal intergovernmental relations play a significant role in intergovernmental relations, especially, with the establishment of the Budget Council and Budget Forum where fiscal matters are deliberated by all spheres of government. The importance of intergovernmental fiscal relations in South Africa is mainly driven by the importance of finance as a resource. However, one must note that even though it can be argued that all relations between government institutions have financial implications, it would be incorrect to reduce intergovernmental relations to mere financial relations as this would exclude other types of relations that are just as important and deserving of attention (Hattingh, 1998, cited in (Kahn, 2011: 7).

2.4.4 The Normative Approach

The normative-operational approach of intergovernmental relations examines the importance of considering all the norms to analyse the total operational existence of intergovernmental relations without over-emphasising one aspect of intergovernmental relations over another (Kahn, et al., 2011). "If required, this approach uses all the generic functions and normative factors in the administrative process to determine, examine or investigate a specific relationship" (Hattingh, 1998, cited in (Kahn, et al., 2011: 7).

2.5 CLASSIFICATION OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

Intergovernmental relations can be divided into four distinct categories, (1) intergovernmental relations (which are relations between governmental institutions); (2) intra-governmental relations (which are relations within governmental institutions); (3) extra-governmental relation (which are relations between the government and the community); and (4) interstate/international relations (which are relations between states). It is important to look at the different forms of intergovernmental relations in order to get conceptual clarity on what each form of intergovernmental relations entails.

2.5.1 Intergovernmental Relations

The term intergovernmental relations refer to mutual relations between all spheres of government and all organs of state. In the case of South Africa, the legislative framework for intergovernmental relations and the hierarchic order of governmental institutions are specified in the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and in other legislation. The 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa promotes intergovernmental relations that must be followed by all spheres of government and all government bodies in South Africa (Watts, 2001). Intergovernmental relations can be further divided into vertical and horizontal relations.

2.5.1.1 Vertical intergovernmental relations

Vertical intergovernmental relations in the context of South Africa means the relations between the national, provincial, and local governments and government institutions. In vertical intergovernmental relations, the concept of power plays a central role, and the national sphere has more power than the provincial and local governments. The provincial and local governments in such settings depend on the national government. The dependence of lower levels of government on the central government is evident with regard to the resources these authorities need to achieve their objectives and goals. This dependence of local authorities on higher ones also limits the discretion that can be exercised by lower authorities in deciding which goals to pursue.

Hattingh (1998: 23) notes that "while it is true that local authorities depend on higher authorities, this takes the form of interdependence between authorities (which means there is a reciprocal relationship) and this gives negotiating power to lower authorities". Levy and Tapscott (2001) further note that one should not assume that the national government will always dominate lower levels of government since the relations between different spheres of government are shaped by the structure of government in that particular polity.

2.5.1.2 Horizontal intergovernmental relations

Horizontal intergovernmental relations are those relations between governmental authorities in the same sphere of government. In the South African context, such relations would refer to the relations between the nine provincial authorities and between the municipalities. We can also speak of horizontal intergovernmental relations when we speak of relations between government departments or agencies which operate at the same level.

From the above, it is apparent that there is a significant difference between vertical intergovernmental relations and horizontal intergovernmental relations. This difference is reflected through the fact that (1) there is no formal concept of power in horizontal intergovernmental relations while in vertical relations power is a central concept; (2) in horizontal intergovernmental relations there is no or there should be no difference in the negotiating abilities of parties in the intergovernmental relationship while in vertical relations the central government is in a stronger negotiating position because of its vast resources compared to provincial and local governments; and (3) horizontal intergovernmental relations are generally based on interdependence while in vertical relations dependence tends to dominate (Kahn, et al., 2011).

Levy and Tapscott (2001: 17) further add that "vertical intergovernmental relations are dominated by resources such as policy and finance while horizontal intergovernmental relations focus on information and physical assistance". For example, local authorities could form an agreement on mutual assistance on issues such as traffic services.

2.5.2 Intra-Governmental Relations

Intra-governmental relations refer to the internal relations of government bodies. The Constitution only gives a broad outline of how intergovernmental relations should be managed in South Africa. "This gives governmental structures some degree of discretion to create extra internal institutions as they deem necessary" (Kahn, et al., 2011: 13). This discretion gives the State President and the city councils power to establish as many departments as they deem necessary (Hattingh, 1998; Thornhill & Hanekom, 1995, cited in (Kahn, 2011: 13). For example, in South Africa, there are currently 35 cabinet ministries (eNCA, 2014); in 2009, there were 27 (South African History Online, 2015). The departments are created after the needs of the community have been identified. Once the needs have been identified then an organisation/department is formed to respond to those needs. These departments usually have a hierarchical organisational structure comprising of vertically distinct levels of authority and horizontally distinct units such as departments, divisions or sections.

The purpose of the organisational structure is to achieve the goals of the institution. In this regard, there are two vital principles to note: "(1) the principle of specialisation, which requires that tasks are divided into smaller tasks; and (2) the principle of departmentalization, which requires that similar activities are grouped together to form departments, divisions or sections" (Kahn, et al., 2011: 13). Just like in intergovernmental relations discussed above, there are vertical and horizontal intra-governmental relations. One must, however, note that here the distinction between horizontal and vertical relations is not as clear-cut.

2.5.2.1 Vertical intra-governmental relations

Government institutions and people who work in these institutions are grouped according to a vertical structure of authority. At the national level, the vertical structure of authority is as follows: parliament, cabinet ministers (the executive), and departments (Kahn, et al., 2011). A similar arrangement is seen in local government with the city council at the top, followed by committees, the town clerk and then departments (Cloete, 1997, cited in Kahn, 2011:

14). Over and above the formal structure, it is important to highlight that informal relations between individuals also play a major role in intra-governmental relations.

2.5.2.2 Horizontal intra-governmental relations

Within government bodies, there are horizontal relationships between various executive departments that are on the same hierarchical level. The formal location of horizontal intra-governmental relations between national departments is in the cabinet and cabinet ministers. Of course, "this does not preclude other forms of horizontal relations between departments at levels that are formed in communicating about matters of common interest" (Hattingh, 1998, cited in Kahn, et al., 2011: 14). Horizontal relations at national level differ markedly from those at local government level where coordination between the departments is mainly the duty of the town clerk. However, the departments at the national level can and do have a horizontal relationship which is made possible by the fact that they communicate with each other on matters of common interest and negotiate the distribution of resources (Hattingh, 1998 cited in (Kahn, et al., 2011: 14).

2.5.3 Extra-Governmental Relations

Extra-governmental relations are born out of the fact that the primary goal of the government is to promote and advance the general welfare of society. However, modern governments are more than just mere service delivery vehicles; they are about the relationship between the state and the citizens. Today citizens can hold their governments to account for their actions or lack thereof. Even though citizens primarily want service delivery from the government, they also want their voices to be heard and their choices and preferences to be respected. This clearly indicates the importance of relations between the government and individual or non-governmental institutions (Freysen, 1999, cited in (Kahn, 2011: 15). The implication of citizens having their voice in governance is that they can influence how intergovernmental relations play out in their province or state. The different forms of extra-governmental relations are:

- Social extra-governmental relations: "These relations come into being when the government is involved in welfare matters such as unemployment, housing shortages and other social phenomena" (Kahn, et al., 2011: 15).

26

- Political extra-governmental relations: These relations arise from the political office-bearer's responsibility to recognise the norms and values of the community. These include the relationship with the media, relationship with voters during the election season and lobbying efforts in support of specific policies.

- Economic extra-governmental relations: One of the main responsibilities of the government is to ensure the economic well-being of the country. This means that the government should be actively involved in setting up economic and financial systems/frameworks within which the community and organised labour and industry must work. This means that the government must create or establish relations with the private sector to deal with matters of an economic nature.

- Institutional extra-governmental relations: In South Africa, the government maintains relations with governance-oriented institutions like the South African Local Government Association (SALGA) and the Institute for Local Government Management (former Institute of Town Clerks). These organisations and institutions are important because they establish communications between like-minded groups and are experts in their fields which make them invaluable to the government.

- Elite extra-governmental relations: In all communities or states there are those people who have influence over the government. These people or sometimes organisations are able to share the policy direction of their country. They influence the government directly by engaging with it or indirectly through media statements. Successful business people and other public figures are those with the skills and the opportunity to take advantage of elite extra-governmental relations.

2.5.4 The Influence of Different Forms of Government on Intergovernmental Relations

There are many types of government systems a state can choose to adopt. The type of system a country uses is usually enshrined in the constitution of that particular country and is the main variable influencing the relationship between the different spheres of government. The practice of copying either the French, British, and American constitutions (coupled with colonisation) has resulted in mainly two types of government systems being adopted worldwide: the federal and unitary government systems (Harris, 1983; Haysom, 2001, cited in (Kahn, et al., 2011: 26).

2.5.4.1 Unitary government system

Unitary governments can be traced back to the so-called philosophy of sovereignty. "In the past, identifiable geographic areas such as England were established and consisted of small, separate, autonomous authorities under the control of the king and the aristocracy" (Hattingh, 1998, cited in (Kahn, 2011:28). "In the case of England, these units were united through a series of wars until a united state was formed with supreme authority vested in the ruler. Again, after a long civil war between the king and parliament, supreme authority came to be vested in Parliament" (Hinsley, 1986 cited in (Kahn, et al., 2011: 28).

In modern unitary states, power is centralised at the national level. This leaves lower levels of government with little or no power. "In unitary states, the central legislative authority can pass, repeal and amend laws that regulate the internal and external affairs of the state without any limitations apart from those it imposes on itself" (Roux, 1997: 174). In unitary systems, the ultimate authority rests with the central/national government (Asmal & de Ville, 1994). Limits to the power of the central government have mainly come from the bill of rights which is usually enshrined in every constitution. However, in a country like Britain, there is no one document called "the Constitution" and ultimate authority rests with parliament. In the case of South Africa, the 1961 Constitution made South Africa a unitary state.

Sections 1-3 of the 1961 Constitution declared South Africa a republic under the State President, and an executive comprising of the prime minister and cabinet. Section 59 of the 1961 Constitution conferred legislative authority on Parliament; this authority could not be questioned or reviewed by the judiciary. In 1983, a new Constitution came into effect. This Constitution brought a number of significant changes to the intergovernmental relations structure of South Africa. The main change which came with the 1983 Constitution was the establishment of the tri-cameral parliament for Whites, Coloureds, and Indians. Section 37(1) of the 1983 Constitution stated that "Parliament shall consist of three houses, namely; a House of Assembly for Whites, House of Representatives for Coloureds and a House of Delegates for Indians" (O'Malley, n.d.).

The majority black population were still disfranchised. The 1983 Constitution like its predecessor made Parliament the ultimate authority in South Africa. The 1983 Constitution also failed to take into account the principle of separation of powers by strengthening the powers of the president in the law-making process and by denying the judiciary the right to review legislation and executive decisions (Kahn, et al., 2011).

In 1996, the 1996 Constitution was passed, and there was a move away from parliamentary supremacy to constitutional supremacy in South Africa. Section 2 of the 1996 Constitution states that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land and any law or conduct which is inconsistent with is invalid, and obligations imposed by it the must be fulfilled. This section is very important because it basically says that all the actions and processes of intergovernmental relations must conform to the Constitution. Section 83(a) of the Constitution places the president in a central role as a driving force of government programmes, and by extension, this means the president should be the driver of intergovernmental relations in South Africa.

2.5.4.2 Federal government system

A federal government may be defined as a government in which authority is decentralised to subnational units, as in the Nigeria (where subnational units are states), Australia (territories), Switzerland (cantons), and Germany (bunderslander) (Kahn, et al., 2011). According to Strong (1963:105) "federalism can take two extremes, that is; where federal authority's powers are prescribed (like in the United States) leaving the rest to constituent political entities and where power of the constituent bodies are prescribed in the Constitution (like in Canada) leaving the remainder to the federal government".

The federal system involves more that the mere creation of separate spheres of government. It involves constitutional principles, laws and court interpretations that settle issues of allocation of authority between national and state government (Garson & Williams, 1982). Dent (1989: 169) concurs that federalism is not merely the creation of separate spheres by arguing that:

Federalism is an elusive concept which refers to both a constitutional dispensation and a means of exercising power; it applies to the decentralised ordering of an existing state where various geographical parts are inhabited by people with a separate ethos and identity which they wish to preserve within a single federal union. And as a process of government, federalism is essentially a form of power-sharing.

Elazar (1994: 83) further concurs by stating that "federalism is a rich and complex thing, a matter of formal constitutional divisions, appropriate institutions, patterns of political behaviour, and ultimately political culture". From the above, it is apparent that federal governments emerge in the context of power-sharing between national governments and constituent state governments who seek to preserve their identity while being part of one nation. It is also clear that the complex relations in federal governments need to be clearly articulated in the Constitution to prevent conflict and abuse of power.

2.5.4.3 The structure of government in South Africa

When one looks at the structure of South African government, it is apparent that it is essentially a unitary system with very strong federal characteristics. The reason for this is that the drafters of the Constitution wanted to democratise the South Africa society by bringing government closer to the people. This is why they conferred specific constitutional mandates on provinces and municipalities. The government has however kept some measure of central control to regulate and improve transformation and democratisation. The central control was also kept so that the government can facilitate reconciliation and coordinate reconstruction and development of disadvantaged communities. The above makes it very difficult to classify the South African system in terms of either the classical unitary or federal classifications.

2.6 NORMS IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

It is common for intergovernmental relations scholars to look at the normative underpinnings of intergovernmental relations when conducting studies on the subject. "The fact that intergovernmental relations are practised within a public administration environment means that there are norms and values to which they must subscribe" (Mathebula, 2004: 131). Normative standards in public administration have developed over

a very long period of time and they are applicable to virtually all circumstances in the administrative process (Hattingh, 1998). Since it is clear that normative standards cannot be ignored in the public administration environment, it is important to look at the normative guidelines under which intergovernmental relations should operate.

2.6.1 The Supremacy of the Constitution

Earlier, the Constitution was briefly discussed as the supreme law of the land to which all other laws are subservient. However, Mathebula (2004) predicted that the role of the president as a head of government would be central in the conduct and management of intergovernmental relations in South Africa. This was confirmed when the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (No. 13 of 2005) was passed and placed the president at the apex of intergovernmental relations structures through the newly reorganised President's Coordinating Council.

2.6.2 Public Accountability

One of the principal values in democratic systems is the ability of the public to hold into account their political representatives and public officials for their actions and inaction. Public officials and political representatives are expected to display a sense of responsibility in the execution of their duties (Gildenhuys & Knipe, 2000). Hattingh (1998: 84-85) agrees, stating that "public accountability refers to a system of representative government where the elected officials should be accountable for how they discharge their duties". Cloete (1988: 170) had earlier stated that "all political office-bearers or public officials should be responsible and accountable for their actions". The democratic nature of the South African political system means that accountability is paramount. This also means that the manner in which intergovernmental relations are managed and practised must be open to public scrutiny.

2.6.3 Public Efficiency

Public efficiency means that, in all government activities, care must be given to the manner in which resources are managed and used. This is because the government is not operating with inexhaustible sources of funds. This principle has become central to all government activities in an age of economic decline and austerity. Cloete (1995: 82) defines efficiency

31

as "the greatest possible quantitative and qualitative satisfaction of essential needs with limited resources". This means that intergovernmental relations should be conducted in a manner that ensures that minimal resources are used because the inefficient use of limited resources will impact negatively on service delivery. This also means that the government should strengthen its intergovernmental relations so that there is no duplication of activities and where possible departments and agencies should work collaboratively to limit wasteful use of resources.

2.6.4 Adherence to South African Administrative Law

Intergovernmental relations can sometimes become an intense exercise which might unintentionally lead government decision-makers to act outside or beyond their powers. This could lead to breaches of constitutional and administrative law. When public services are executed or performed there must be adherence to the rule of law at all times. "Administrative law encompasses the authoritative rules governing the organisation of the public sector, interactions between government and citizens and between the public authorities together" (Kickert, 1997: 199). This clearly means that in the conduct of intergovernmental relations, public officials must follow laws, ordinances and regulations.

For Griffith and Street (1963, cited in Hattingh, 1998:104) the criteria guiding the behaviour or actions of government institutions and state organs should be:

> Actions should be authorised; behaviour should be lawful and subject to relevant legal requirements; actions should comply with required legal procedures; the misinterpretation of justice should be avoided; discretion should not be used unfairly or unjustly; actions should only take place after all relevant information and facts have been considered; the behaviour of officials should be reasonable and justifiable.

2.6.5 Acknowledgement of Community Values

According to Tshikwatamba (2004: 257), "values are those deep-seated beliefs which govern the daily lives of people living in a particular geographic location or community". These values reflect what amounts to acceptable and unacceptable behaviour within that location or community. Cloete (1988: 6) concurs by stating that "values refer to what

human beings deem acceptable and unacceptable". When conducting intergovernmental relations, public office-bearer should uphold the values of the society or community they are operating in. In South Africa, there have been many debates about the appropriate values which should be applied when conducting intergovernmental relations. This stems from the fact that the diverse nature of the South African people makes it very difficult for public officials to adopt one specific communal value. Even among public officials, there are different values which might even conflict at times.

In this regard, Tshikwatamba (2004: 255-257) states that "South Africa public administration advocates the guidelines emanating from community values without contextualising them into values of specific communities". He, therefore, contends that intergovernmental relations should be informed by cultural values of the community in question. I concur with Tshikwatamba that values need to be contextualised especially in South Africa where values such as Ubuntu, collectivism, and communalism were pushed to the periphery by colonialists.

2.6.6 Maintenance of Ethical Standards by Public Officials and Political Office-Bearers

Public officials and office-bearers are expected to maintain high ethical standards in their dealings. This means they must be honest, fair and helpful to the citizens, refrain from corrupt activities and not discriminate unfairly (Roux, 1997). In order to ensure that high ethical standards are adhered to, different government institutions have regulations which deal with ethics in the workplace. "Section 95 of the 1996 Constitution states that public administration must be governed by democratic values and principles which include the principle that a high standard of professional ethics must be promoted and maintained" (Sokhela, 2006: 68). This section also states that national legislation should be enacted to ensure the promotion of such values.

2.6.7 Social Equality and Justice

The Bill of Rights in the 1996 Constitution guarantees the human rights of every South African. In intergovernmental relations, this means that public officials should respect the rights of everyone and should not discriminate unfairly on the basis of race, religion,

culture, gender or any other characteristics when engaging in relations with other government bodies. The current structure of the South African society demands that particular attention is given to social justice and equality. "In the current system, social equality pertains to equality in government services; responsibility for decisions and implementation by public managers; change in the management and administration of public institutions; and an approach to and education for public administration that is interdisciplinary" (Denhardt & Hammond, 1992: 177).

2.7 THE EVOLUTION OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Before we look at the current structure and form of intergovernmental relations in South Africa, it is important to look at how our intergovernmental system emerged and what forces shaped it. This section explores the administrative system that existed during colonial times and how it shaped the current intergovernmental system. It also looks at how intergovernmental relations were managed during the apartheid era.

2.7.1 The Birth of Intergovernmental Relations in South Africa

To understand intergovernmental relations in South Africa one must first understand the administrative systems which were in operation during the period of Dutch and British colonial rule.

In 1652, the Dutch East India Company established an outpost in the Cape which was to serve as a refreshment station for those travelling from Europe to Asia (Cory, 1965; Keegan, 1996, cited in (Kahn, et al., 2011: 48). Because the Dutch wanted to avoid unnecessary costs, the Cape outpost had a very limited administrative structure (Spilhaus, 1966, cited in (Kahn, et al., 2011: 48). "This small refreshment station grew into a settlement of about 110 000 square miles by the 18th century" (Du Toit & Giliomee, 1983, cited in (Kahn, 2011: 48). Initially, the Cape was ruled by the Dutch but by 1806 the British had wrested the control away from them (Wilson & Thompson, 1969 in (Kahn, et al., 2011: 48). The Dutch had established an administrative system based on the Dutch model and when the British changed the system to that of their homeland, the Dutch settlers decided to

move and migrate further inland. Those who migrated inland formed Boer Republics in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal (Parsons, 1982; Wilson & Thompson, 1969, cited in Kahn, et al., 2011: 48).

The British also extended their colony to include Natal. In the British colonies, the system that was used was the Westminster system which consisted of a central government (appointed by the British government) and locally elected municipalities (Ismail, 1997, cited in Kahn, et al., 2011: 48). In the Boer Republics, there was no structured system of local government. During both the Dutch and British rule, intergovernmental relations were centralised and local authorities became mere agents of the central government (Tapscott, 1998, cited in (Kahn, et al., 2011: 48). This meant that municipalities only exercised powers that were expressly given to them by the central government. Even though the British and the Dutch rules provided a foundation for South African administration, intergovernmental relations really took form in 1910. This was the time when the British colonies and the Boer Republics united to form the Union of South Africa (Welsh, 1999).

2.7.2 Intergovernmental Relations in the Union of South Africa

The current system of intergovernmental relations in South Africa has its roots in the Union of South Africa Act of 1910. This Act created the Union of South Africa on the 31st of May 1910. As was noted above, the Act united the British colonies and Boer Republics. This came after the Boers were defeated and lost independence in the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) (Selby, 1973, cited in (Kahn, 2011: 49). The Act created four provinces which coincided with the former British colonies and Boer Republics. Section 70 of the Act stated that there would be provincial councils in these provinces. The Act went on to state that municipalities fell under the authority of the provincial councils. This meant that "provinces had to undertake the supervision, development, and extension of municipalities" (Hill, 1964, cited in (Kahn, 2011: 49).

The Act also stated that provinces were not sovereign entities and all their acts had had to be in line with national legislation; if there was a conflict, national legislation would take precedence and provincial legislation would be invalidated. This meant that the provincial government was subordinate to the national government. It is important to note that the

subordination of provinces to the Union government was not the end of subjugation as the Union government itself was subordinated to the British Crown.

2.7.2.1 British influence in the Union

South Africa was part of the British Empire and unsurprisingly the British government had considerable influence over the administrative system in South Africa (Selby: 1973, cited in (Kahn, 2011: 4). Until her withdrawal from the British Commonwealth of Nations in 1962, South Africa was a British dominion. According to Worrall (1971: 36), Britain had four main forms of control over the South African Union.

- The Union could not pass laws which conflicted those of Britain. The British parliament could pass laws which could be applied to the Union by proclamation.
- The legislature of the Union was subject to the British executive, which could veto bills of the Union by advising the monarch to instruct the governor-general not to assent to certain bills. The executive could also advise the monarch to nullify bills already assented to by the governor-general.
- The Union executive required the cooperation and sanction of the British executive in so far as the governor-general owed allegiance to the Crown and was appointed by the British executive.
- The judiciary in the Union was forced to implement/enforce British laws in the Union. On top of this, at the apex of the Union judiciary was the Privy Council which heard appeals against decisions taken by the South African Appellant Division (Steward, 1977, cited in Kahn, et al., 2011: 50; Worrall, 1971: 3;).

It must be noted, however, that the existence of these powers does not mean that they were used or was there any significant conflict which emanated from their existence. But the fact that they existed meant that they had a significant impact on the intergovernmental system in South Africa.

2.7.2.2 Managing the three spheres of government

The Union of South Africa Act of 1910 created three spheres of government: the central, provincial and local spheres. Under the Act, lower tiers of government had limited powers.

The merger of the two colonies and two Boer Republics meant that South Africa had to adopt a unitary system with some federal characteristic (Worrall, 1971, cited in (Kahn, et al., 2011: 51). The concept of provincial government was introduced to accommodate the vested interest of the former British colonies and the Boer Republics within the new South African polity. The Union Act assigned some delegated powers to the provinces in an attempt to reduce rivalry and promote unity. Even though provincial councils were subordinated to the national government, they had powers to pass some ordinances (Omar-Cooper, 1994, cited in Kahn, et al., 2011: 51).

Because of this delegated power, provinces had the right to make laws which could not be repealed unless they were contrary to national legislation. The fact that provinces had delegated powers did not mean that central government did not have control over them. The forms of control the central government had over provinces are discussed below.

2.7.2.3 Central control over lower levels of government

According to Kahn, et al. (2011: 52), "the control the central government had over provinces was almost total". This control was achieved by the appointment of an administrative representative of the Union government at both the provincial and local levels of government. The administrator was the primary symbol of centralisation of intergovernmental relations during this period. The administrator was a member of the provincial executive committee but unlike other committee members who were elected, the administrator was appointed by the Union government. The administrator had vast powers which included being the chief executive officer of the province and the representative of the Union government at the provincial level.

The administrator could also be mandated by the Union government to act on matters not delegated to the provincial council (Kahn, et al., 2011). In addition, the administrator chaired the executive committee of the province and no business could be discussed without his presence or his representative. No expenditure ordinance could pass without his recommendation and he was not obliged to listen to other members of the executive committee. This clearly shows that the powers of the provinces at the time were very limited. In a sense, provinces were used as means to reduce the concentration of tasks in the

centre (Pampallis, 1991, cited in (Kahn, et al., 2011: 52). Effectively the powers of the provinces were limited to managing things like education (excluding higher education), roads, bridges, local government, and charitable institutions.

The provincial councils had no control over the administrator who could only be removed by the Union president. In this period, provinces had no real legislative powers but merely rubber-stamped decisions or legislation of the central government (Tapscott, 1998). According to Selby (1973) and Tapscott (1998) cited in (Kahn, et al., (2011: 52), this state of affairs made intergovernmental relations a technocratic exercise concerned with the coordination of actions rather that being a mechanism for balancing power between the spheres of government.

The administrator was but one of the forms of control the Union government had over provinces. At the time, intergovernmental fiscal relations were skewed in a manner which ensured that provinces almost entirely depended on the Union government. This was so extreme that "in the first three years of the Union, provinces were fully financed by the Union government" (Walker, 1998, cited in (Kahn, et al., 2011: 53). This trend continued when South Africa became a republic. By the 1970s, the central government was responsible for 88% of provincial budgets and in the 1977/1979 financial year, the central government's contribution to provinces was almost a quarter of its budget. The above shows that even though provinces had delegated power, the central government remained in control.

During the time of the Union, municipalities constituted the third tier of government. Municipalities were basically extensions of the provincial and central government. The very existence of municipalities depended on a proclamation by the provincial administrator. All municipal by-laws had to be approved by the administrator who could modify or repeal them if he was not happy with them (Davenport, 1991). Even though municipalities had legal status, it is clear that they were under strict control of the central and provincial governments.

2.7.3 Intergovernmental Relations during the Apartheid Era

By the end of the 19th century, Africans had lost all their independence through colonial conquest. However, some tribal structures remained, these ranged from consensual structures to centralised and authoritarian structures. After achieving white unity in 1910, the white government enacted a number of laws which were aimed at the systematic subjugation of indigenous African people. One such measure was the Land Act of 1913 which deprived African people of their land (Du Preez, 1959). Through such legislation, African people were dispossessed of their land and were forced to provide cheap labour to Whites and were rendered pariahs in their ancestral land (Plaatje, 2007). The South African economy was labour-intensive at the time and the white government tapped into the large pool of cheap and unskilled African labour.

This shows that segregation was implemented way before the policies of separate development were instituted by the apartheid government in 1948.

2.7.3.1 The Land Act, 1913

All over the world, it was common practice for Europeans to dispossess indigenous populations of their land after they had conquered them. In South Africa, the government of the time went a step further and formalised the dispossession of African land through the Land Act of 1913. The Act was aimed at forcing African people to reside in areas which were considered to be their tribal birthplaces. This was inspired by the Native Reserve Policy which restricted the African population to owning only 13% percent of the land, leaving the rest to the white minority (Bureau for Economic Research, 1976: 19; Van de Horst, 1972, cited in (Kahn, 2011: 56). Not only was the majority African population given a disproportionately small piece of land, they were given land which was less economically viable compared to that given to the Whites. The consignment of African people to ethnically-defined geographic areas later led to the formation of the homelands.

2.7.3.2 The Bantu Authorities Act, 1951

The Bantu Authorities Act of 151 was one of the first pieces of legislation of the apartheid government which sought to implement the policy of separate development. It aimed to do

this by creating self-governing homelands for African people (Horrell, 1956, cited in (Kahn, et al., 2011: 57). The Act created tribal, regional, and territorial authorities in the homelands which were responsible for the administration of welfare and pensions systems. This Act gave back some powers to tribal authorities which had been largely eroded during British colonial rule. However, this did not mean that tribal authorities were independent of central control; in fact, they were representatives of the central government in the homelands.

The tribal chiefs (like Inkosi Albert Luthuli) who defied the central government in Pretoria faced penalties or lost their status altogether (Debroey, 1990). The Act also expanded the judicial powers of the chiefs, allowing the Chiefs to charge a levy for the allocation of land. According to Giniewski (1961, cited in (Kahn, et al., 2011: 57), "Chiefs even had the power to charge levies on those receiving social services". Chiefs in the homelands also had the power to appoint professionals like teachers (Stander, 1987, cited in (Kahn, et al., 201: 57). The Bantu Authorities Act ensured that the apartheid government had loyal chiefs who would carry out their wishes in the homelands and remain loyal to Pretoria (Snail, 1993 cited in (Kahn, et al., 2011: 57).

In the 1950s and 1960s, 10 ethnic homelands were proclaimed: KwaZulu, QwaQwa, Transkei, KwaNdebele, Lebowa, Ciskei, Gazankulu, KaNgwane, Venda, and Bophuthatswana (Prince, 1991, cited in (Kahn, et al., 2011: 57). Ciskei, Venda, Transkei and Bophuthatswana were given full independence by the apartheid government; however, these homelands never received international recognition (Phatlane, 1998). The apartheid government wanted the homelands to be economically viable and self-sustainable but this was not possible because of limited land and other resources in the homelands. The homelands mainly served as labour reserves for the industries of white South Africa (Kahn, et al., 2011).

2.7.4 Local Government in the Homelands

When the apartheid government took office in 1948, there was a well-developed council system in the homelands. "These included 14 local councils in Transvaal, 3 in Natal, and 8 in Ciskei" (Kahn, et al., 2011: 58). The structure of local government in the homelands was set out in the Bantu Authorities Act, 1951. According to the Minister of Native Affairs,

H.F. Verwoerd, the Bantu Authorities system was created to expand local government in the homelands and build upon the traditional administrative systems (Kotze, 1995, cited in (Kahn, 2011: 58). With the benefit of hindsight, we know that Verwoerd was not interested in the democratisation of tribal systems but was interested in the entrenchment of the policy of separate development.

The Bantu Authorities Act established a three-tier system of local government which included the tribal authorities (first tier), the regional authorities (second tier), and the territorial authorities (third tier). The central government had some form of control over all of these tiers of government. In the 1970s and 1980s, the system of central control and discrimination came under increasing pressure from the majority African population. Protests and demonstrations were commonplace with black people seeking a reform of the system.

2.7.5 The Reform of Intergovernmental Relations during Apartheid

During the latter part of apartheid, there were significant changes to the intergovernmental relations structure in South Africa. This was mainly because "the central government faced widespread protest in liberal cities such and as Durban and Cape Town" (BouIle, 1984, cited in (Kahn, et al., 2011: 59). At the same time, municipalities in African areas were being weakened by the rise of national liberation movements opposed to the apartheid state. This was not helped by the fact that tribal authorities had little or no popular legitimacy because they were seen as agents of the oppressive apartheid state. These events persuaded the apartheid government to change the political system in South Africa which ultimately changed how intergovernmental relations were conducted.

In 1981, the second tier of government, the Senate, was abolished and plans to create a new constitution which would allow for the representation of coloureds and Indians in government were initiated (Friedman & Atkinson, 1994, cited in (Kahn, et al., 2011: 59). These reforms also sought to create black local authorities with the hope of appeasing Blacks while maintaining white privilege (Kahn, et al., 2011). In 1983, a new constitution was created. This new constitution established the tri-cameral parliament which came into effect in 1984. This meant that instead of having one house of parliament, there were three:

(1) the 179-member House of Assembly (for Whites); an 85-member House of Representatives (for Coloureds); and the 45-member House of Delegates (for Indians) (Lawrence, 1994, cited in (Kahn, et al., 2011: 59).

The President was elected by an 88-member electoral college that maintained a 4:2:1 ratio for Whites, Coloureds, and Indians respectively. This arrangement meant that the Whites were guaranteed the majority in any joint seating. Even though the apartheid regime tried to defuse tensions by making such changes, it is clear that such changes remained unfair. The changes still excluded the majority 75% black population (Bhana, 1997). The inclusion of coloureds and Indians in government was nothing more than a façade. The apparent unfairness of the process seemed to add further fuel to demonstrations and resistance against the apartheid government.

"In 1983, the United Democratic Front (UDF) was formed, boasting more than 3 million members. It sought to persuade the government to withdraw its constitutional process and incorporate the homelands under one South Africa" (Friedman & Atkinson, 1994, cited in (Kahn, et al., 2011: 61). By the 1990s, the apartheid government was unsustainable and the strategy of liberation movements to make the country ungovernable coupled with external pressure became too much for the apartheid government to bear. On the 2nd of February 1990, opposition groups which included the African National Congress (ANC) were unbanned. The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) soon commenced in a search for a new governing structure and a new constitution which would lead to a new system of intergovernmental relations (Wodern, 1994, cited in (Kahn, et al., 2011: 61). The tri-cameral parliament passed the 1993 Interim Constitution which together with the 1996 Constitution forms the basis for intergovernmental relations in South Africa today.

2.8 INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN POST-1994 SOUTH AFRICA

The fall of apartheid in South Africa provided a window of opportunity to change the structure of government and ultimately the structure of intergovernmental relations. The new structure which emerged in South Africa after apartheid was different in the sense that it sought to promote democracy and service delivery. A number of legislative measures

were taken to ensure that intergovernmental relations were effective and efficient. In the post-1994 period, a number of informal forums emerged to supplement formal intergovernmental relations structures. This section looks at the legislative framework of intergovernmental relations in South Africa, the new forums which were formed to facilitate intergovernmental relations and the challenges such forums face.

2.8.1 Legislative Framework for Intergovernmental Relations in South Africa

"The 1996 South African Constitution has been hailed as a masterpiece which sought to advance service delivery through intergovernmental relations which would ensure coordinated and aligned government activities" (Ile, 2010: 51). Chapter Three of the Constitution establishes the principle of cooperative government. It requires the national, provincial and local governments to function as a whole in the execution of government plans and policies. According to Malan (2005) cooperative government is a partnership among the three spheres of government requiring each government to fulfil a specific role. Malan (2005) also notes that there is a difference between co-operative government and intergovernmental relations. He argues that "cooperative government is a fundamental philosophy of government that governs all aspects and activities of government and encompasses the structures of government as well as the organisation and exercising of political power" (Malan, 2005: 230). On the other hand, intergovernmental relations are one of the means through which the values of cooperative government may be given institutional and statutory expression (Edwards, 2008).

Section 40(1) of the Constitution stipulates that South Africa is one, sovereign democratic state and provides a broad framework for intergovernmental relations. The Constitution makes provision for the creation of three spheres of government, namely, the national, provincial, and local spheres. These spheres of government are distinct, interdependent, and interrelated (Edwards, 2008). It is important to discuss what the Constitution means by distinct, interdependent, and interrelated. With regard to the spheres of government being distinct, Section 41(1) (e) of the Constitution stipulates that there should be respect for the constitutional standing of institutions, their powers, and functions. This means that each of the three spheres has its own distinct mandate. That is why Section 41(f) states that spheres must not assume any power or function except those conferred on them in terms of the

Constitution. Section 41(e) further stipulates that spheres must exercise their powers and functions in a manner that does not encroach on the geographical, functional, or institutional integrity of government in another sphere. Lastly, Section 41(g) states that spheres must cooperate with one another in mutual trust and good faith.

With regard to the interdependence of spheres, Section 41(h) of the Constitution stipulates that spheres must cooperate with each other in order to achieve national goals. Interdependence comes in the form of communications, consultation, coordination, and support. Interdependence means the degree to which one sphere depends on another for the fulfilment of its constitutional duties. In short, the principle of interdependence means no one sphere can achieve national goals alone – the assistance and coordination of the other spheres are needed.

Friedman (1999) notes that the 1996 Constitution provides for a general or broad framework of intergovernmental relations but does not provide specific directions on how to operationalise it. The drafters of the Constitution intentionally left space to manoeuvre to encourage flexibility of intergovernmental relations. The framework of intergovernmental relations in the Constitution is, nevertheless, supplemented by-laws and regulations which seek to operationalise intergovernmental relations. These laws are enacted in line with Section 41(2) of the Constitution which prescribes that an Act of Parliament must be promulgated to establish structures and institutions to promote and facilitate intergovernmental relations (Mello & Maseramule, 2010). Table 2.1 below shows some of the policies and Acts which are aimed at facilitating intergovernmental relations in South Africa.

Table 1.1 Policy environment for intergovernmental relations

Policy	Intergovernmental relations implications
White Paper on Reconstruction and Development, 1994	Policy document that stipulated the importance of participatory local government system to encourage provincial-local intergovernmental relations

Policy	Intergovernmental relations implications
Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995	The Act provides a basis for a coherent framework for land development according to a set of binding principles-promotion of intergovernmental relations among all spheres of government and stakeholders in the process of land development.
Auditor General Act 12 of 1995: South African Qualifications Framework; Housing Act 107 of 1997; National Water Services Act 108 of 1997; Rural Development Strategy, White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery, 1997; National Environment Management Act 107 of 1998; Skills Development Act 97 of 1998. White Paper on Municipal Service Partnerships, 2000, among others	Reflect some principles of cooperation, integration and the promotion of governmental relations pertaining to development, planning and service delivery issues.
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996	Chapter 3 – Principles of cooperation and intergovernmental relations.
Organised Local Government Act 52 of 1997	Relationship between provinces and municipalities was formalised in terms of monitoring, supervision ad intervention
Financial Fiscal Commission Act 99 of 1997 and Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act 97 of 1997	Makes provisions for the establishment and determination of fiscal intergovernmental relations among the three spheres of government.
Division of Revenue Act-for each financial year	Provides for the equitable division of funds to all three spheres of government and promotes transparency during the budget allocation process.
White Paper on Local Government, 1998	Encourages provincial governments to support

Policy	Intergovernmental relations implications
	the promotion and maintenance of intergovernmental relations.
Municipal Demarcation Act 27 of 1998; Local Government Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 and Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000	Formalisation of the various roles of provincial governments in terms of provincial-local intergovernmental relations
Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 and Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999	Modernised the financial management system and ensures accountability. Defines the relationship between spheres of government in terms of local government financial management as well as the supervisory and monitoring roles of provincial governments.
Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005	Seeks to provide focus, clarity and certainty regarding core aspects of intergovernmental relations at the executive level of government. It provides for the establishment of intergovernmental structures as well as the conduct of intergovernmental relations and the resolution of intergovernmental relations disputes.

Source: Malan (2005: 230-232).

Before discussing the various instruments of intergovernmental relations in South Africa, it is important to give a brief overview of how intergovernmental relations were managed in the early post-1994 period. The enactment of the Interim Constitution in 1993 gave democratic South Africa its first taste of structured intergovernmental relations. For the first time, provincial governments had constitutionally entrenched rights associated with federations (De Villiers, 2012). Soon after the Interim Constitution came into force a number of informal intergovernmental relations structures were formed to deal with the enormous changes the system was undergoing.

However, none of the newly formed structures had any statutory base. Even though a number of stakeholder meetings did take place between different spheres of government, intergovernmental relations lacked reliability and were very disorganised (De Villiers, 2012). The loose manner in which intergovernmental relations were managed in early years of democracy in South Africa reflected a common practice in other countries where intergovernmental relations are conducted without any constitutional framework. This arrangement had a number of challenges which included the fact that the system of intergovernmental relations was confusing and many decision-makers did not understand it.

During this time, intergovernmental forums were ad hoc, had no clearly agreed objectives, attendance was very poor, and there was little or no follow-up on the decisions taken at these forums (De Villiers, 2012). In these informal forums and structures, there was uncertainty as to who was responsible for the implementation of recommendations and there was no clear process of holding those in intergovernmental relations structures and forums accountable. Because of the dominance of the ANC in these informal intergovernmental structures, party discipline replaced any chance of serious input from provinces and local municipalities. There was no coordination around areas of policy planning, implementation, and assessment. Different spheres virtually operated in isolation. By the year 2000, there was a clear need for formal structures in South African intergovernmental relations to bring predictability and accountability. This was mainly achieved through the enactment of the Intergovernmental Framework Act 13 of 2005. The important intergovernmental structures are discussed below.

2.8.2 Intergovernmental Structures/Forums in South Africa

2.8.2.1 The Intergovernmental Forum (IGF) (now defunct)

The intergovernmental forum was formed to provide space for consultation and joint decision-making between the premiers of provinces and national ministers. It also played the role of encouraging and ensuring the development and maintenance of cooperative relationships between national and provincial governments. The intergovernmental forum was an informal structure which had no legal basis. The composition of the intergovernmental forums was as follows: Minister of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional

Development, Minister of Public Service and Administration, Minister of Finance, the Director-General in the Office of the President, nine provincial premiers, and the President and Deputy President in ex officio roles. "The main role of the intergovernmental forum was to create a coordinated intergovernmental policy framework; multi-sectorial policy issues; finance and matters of constitutional concern" (Du Toit, 1998; 253).

The intergovernmental forum also played the role of coordinating and integrating policy activities of the MINMECs. The fact that the intergovernmental forum was one of the first intergovernmental structures created after 1994 meant that it was going to face a number of problems. The first major challenges faced by the intergovernmental forum was the fact that its recommendations were not binding since it was not a statutory body. The intergovernmental forum was also criticised for lack of focus because presentations made in this forum were mainly generalisations (Sokhela, 2006). Another criticism which was levelled against the intergovernmental forum was that it had a wide-ranging agenda which included topics like finance, social welfare, education, health and so on. Addressing all those problem areas was beyond the scope of one forum. The intergovernmental forum was also criticised for not having any linkages with other intergovernmental institutions. In a sense, the intergovernmental forum operated in isolation. Because of its vast challenges, the intergovernmental forum was replaced by the President's Coordinating Council in 1999.

2.8.2.2 The President's Coordination Council (PCC)

As mentioned in the previous sections, the President's Coordinating Council forms the apex of intergovernmental relations structures in South Africa. The PCC was created to assist in improving relations and coordination between national and provincial government. It also aims at developing linkages between intergovernmental institutions and structures (Malan, 2005). This structure serves as a theatre where matters that affect all spheres are discussed and it is where national policies are launched. Other functions of the PCC include:

- Enhancing the ability of the provincial executives to make an impact on the formation of national policy;
- Promoting inter-provincial dialogue and mediation at a higher level in cases of disputes between provinces themselves and also with national government;

- Strengthening the capacity of provincial governments to implement government policies and programmes;

- Integrating provincial growth and development strategies within national development plans;

- Improving cooperation between national and provincial government with regard to strengthening local government;

- Improving cooperation with regard to fiscal issues;

- Enhancing cooperation with regard to the institutionalisation of a cooperative relationship between the elected institutions and the structures of traditional leadership;

- Ensuring that there are coordinated programmes of implementation and structures with regard to such issues as rural development, urban renewal, and safety and security; and

- Increasing the possibility for officials to interact will all spheres of government in a one-centre approach to ensure that the system of government functions in a manner which empowers the citizen. (Thornhill, Odendaal, Malan, Mathebula and van Dijk, 2002: 27).

The members of the PCC are the President, Deputy President, Minister in the Presidency, Minister of Public Service and Administration, premiers of the nine provincial administrations, and the chairperson of the SALGA. Sokhela (2006: 111) is of the view that "the inclusion of a representative from SALGA in the PCC gives a direct voice to the municipalities in intergovernmental relations". However, writing earlier, Mubangizi (2005: 637) argued that "municipal interests are not well articulated in the Council and should be addressed through provincial and municipal intergovernmental forums". Levy and Tapscott (2000) are of the view that the PCC structure is too big to align policy and too daunting a combination of high-ranking politicians and appointed officials for ideas to be shared candidly.

2.8.2.3 Ministers of Cabinet and Members of Provincial Executive Council (MINMEC's)

The purpose of the MINMEC's is to improve the coordination of activities within all spheres of government. "MINMEC's are responsible for the alignment and coordination within specific sectors" (Edwards, 2008: 7). This means that each MINMEC focuses on a specific field for example; there is a MINMEC for agriculture, arts and culture,

environmental affairs, social development and so on. Responsibilities of MINMECS include:

> the harmonisation of legislation within a given sector; the division and deployment of financial resources; the harmonisation of programs on a national basis; consultation and negotiation on national norms and standards; the formulation of joint programs and projects; the sharing of sectorial information and the assignment of roles and responsibilities between spheres of government (Presidential Review Commission, 1998: 38).

The MINMEC forums are very important because they allow provinces to share information and experiences with each other and try and come up with solutions. MINMEC forums provide MECs with an opportunity to interact with the national minister. It is in the MINMECs where decisions about the long-term government objectives are taken. Despite their very important role in coordinating government activities, MINMECs have several shortcomings. One of them is the fact that the effectiveness of dialogue and debate in the forum depends on personalities of national ministers (Kahn, et al., 2011). This is because the national minister as the senior government official sets the tone for these forums. Another criticism levelled against the MINMECs is that they have frequent meetings which result in poor attendance or attendance by officials who have no decision-making power. MINMECs have also been criticised for being dominated by national government officials and the sidelining of provincial voices. One must note that despite these shortcomings, MINMECs remain on of the most important intergovernmental forums in South Africa.

2.8.2.4 Forum of South African Directors-General (FOSAD)

FOSAD is an intergovernmental relations structure which was created to facilitate intergovernmental relations in South Africa. FOSAD is made up of the highest-ranking administrative government officials. It is a non-statutory body which provides directors-general space to raise critical issues without political interference (Mubangizi, 2005). FOSAD was formed in June 1998 as a response to the ever-increasing scale and complexity of service delivery. This structure is entrusted with the role of coordinating policy and the facilitation of intergovernmental relations at horizontal and vertical levels of government. The structure allows for the sharing of best practice between government departments (Mubangizi, 2005).

The advantage of this forum is that it brings together directors-general of national and provincial government level. This forum "allows provincial directors-general to share valuable experience on intergovernmental issues and improve implementation of programmes across the spheres" (Edwards, 2008: 71). Meetings of FOSAD are held quarterly and are chaired by the Director-General from the Presidency. FOSAD has a number of smaller forums which focus on specific problem areas. This means there would be a forum which deals with the economy, justice, social welfare and so on. It is apparent from the above that FOSAD plays a critical role in the intergovernmental relations in South Africa.

Despite its crucial role in intergovernmental relations, there are a number of weaknesses which have been attributed to the forum. The forum has been criticised for being nothing more than a trade union for directors-general (Kahn, et al., 2011). FOSAD has also lost its relevance because of the roles and responsibilities of the PCC; it is seen as a duplication of activities. The creation of cabinet clusters has also diminished the role of FOSAD.

2.8.2.5 South African Local Government Association (SALGA)

SALGA represents organised local government in South Africa (Reddy, 2001). The 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa allows for local authorities to organise forms of local associations. In that light, the South African Parliament passed the Organised Local Government Act of 1997 which led to the formation of SALGA. The primary role of SALGA is to represent the local government in the legislative process in all spheres of government. It also serves as a point of entry for local government as far as influencing the direction and content of national policy is concerned (Reddy, 2001). SALGA influences policy through its participation in formal and informal intergovernmental forums such as the National Council of Provinces, MINMECs, President's Coordinating Council, Financial and Fiscal Commission and so on.

The inclusion of organised local government in the policy making process in the new South Africa has been lauded because it was not previously given space to influence policies. It was mainly used as a vehicle to deliver services. Even though SALGA is represented in these very important intergovernmental forums or structures, there are still some challenges to its role and status. Challenges faced by SALGA include poor coordination of

intergovernmental relations at the provincial level, lack of permanent representation in the National Council of Provinces, and minimal representation in the provincial legislative process.

2.8.2.6 The National Council of Provinces (NCOP)

The NCOP is the second house of parliament and represents the interests of provinces in the legislative and policy process at the national sphere of government. "The 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa established the NCOP to create a link between the two spheres (national and provincial) within a bicameral system" (Bodipe, 1998: 4). Because of this, the NCOP plays a central role in intergovernmental relations in South Africa. "The NCOP has a number of important functions which include oversight over the executive, review of actions affecting the distinct spheres of government, and participating in the Judicial Review Commission" (Reddy, 2001: 33). The taking parliament to the people initiative, for example, gives members of the public an opportunity to discuss key policy issues with the political executive (Edwards, 2008).

Tapscott (2000) has argued that the NCOP has not made use of its unique position efficiently to influence policy. He also argues that the NCOP is unfocused, and could lose its identity if it continues to be merged too readily with the National Assembly in its committee work (Tapscott, 2000). Another criticism levelled against the NCOP is that it is dominated by the cabinet and does not challenge the policy assumptions of national ministers (Reddy, 2001).

2.8.2.7 The Premiers Forum (PF)

"The Premier's Forum was established as a reaction to the dominance of the national government over intergovernmental relations and the need for premiers to coordinate their activities" (Sokhela, 2006: 113). The Premier's Forum was established by Section 16 of the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005. It was established to promote and facilitate intergovernmental relations between provincial government and local government (Sokhela, 2006). The Premier's Forum is chaired by the premier of the province; its other members include the MEC responsible for local government in the province, any other member of the executive council nominated by the premier, the mayors of the district and

metropolitan municipalities in the province, and a municipal councillor designated by organised local government in the province (The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005, Section 17). When one looks closely at the Premier Forum it becomes clear that it is essentially an executive forum.

The regularity of meetings of the Premier's Forum is not prescribed in the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, 2005. This has meant that these forums have had variable success. According to Section 21 of the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, the premier of each province may establish other provincial intergovernmental forums as he/she deems fit. On top of that, the premier may establish inter-provincial forums which may be ad hoc or permanent to coordinate matters of mutual importance between provinces. These issues may include traditional authorities, movement of people, access to resources, and so on (De Villiers, 2012). The researcher submits that the inter-provincial forums are very strategic because they allow neighbouring provinces to share information and strategies to improve administration and the delivery of services.

2.8.2.8 Municipal intergovernmental forums

Section 24 of the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, 2005 establishes district intergovernmental forums to facilitate intergovernmental relations between the district and the local municipalities. The forum is chaired by the Mayor of the district municipality and consists of mayors from local municipalities within the district. The forum serves as a consultative body where local municipalities share ideas with the district municipality and among one another. On top of this, two municipalities may agree to form inter-municipal forums to deal with matters of mutual interest (The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005, Sections 28 & 29).

Baatjies and Steytler (2006: 26-27) are of the view that the district intergovernmental forums have improved since the enactment of the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act. Edwards (2008: 96), however, disagrees and argues that there is much that needs to be done to improve the effectiveness of municipal intergovernmental relations structures. He argues that most intergovernmental forums in municipalities are still new and are still at a developmental stage. For Steytler and Jordan (2005), what makes district intergovernmental

forms ineffective is that most municipalities misinterpret the requirements of the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005.

2.9 DELIVERING SERVICES THROUGHT INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

Having looked at the structures which are responsible for the management and organisation of intergovernmental relations it is important to assess how intergovernmental relations affect service delivery in South Africa. On top of the agenda of intergovernmental forums is the question of how to improve service delivery. This has been in part caused by the widespread of service delivery protests which have become an everyday reality in many parts of the country. This has led to an increasing call for the government to speed up service delivery and improve the lives of the people of South Africa (Ile, 2010). Weak intergovernmental relations have been credited among other things with the slow pace of service delivery. This section of the literature study looks at how intergovernmental relations affect the delivery of services.

During apartheid, the service delivery machine of the South African government was seen as very effective in delivering services to communities. However, it must be noted that the apartheid government was only delivering services to a small portion of the South African population. Thus, when you compare the apartheid government with the government after 1994 on service delivery, the latter has done a commendable job. Since 1994, the government has been able to make significant strides in the delivery of services to communities (Daniel, Southall & Lutchman, 2005; Pretorius, 2004, cited in (Kahn, et al., 2011: 116). This does not, however, mean that the post-apartheid government has done a perfect job in service delivery.

While important strides have been made in the provision of basic services such as water and electricity, there have been serious shortcomings in the areas of unemployment and crime prevention. At some level, these shortcomings can be attributed to the lack of coordination of programmes by the government (Kahn, et al., 2011).

2.9.1 Intergovernmental Relations and Service Delivery in Local Government

The issue of lack of service delivery in South Africa is more evident at the level of local government. Local government is generally viewed as the weakest link in the service delivery chain. In a survey conducted by the Washington Post (2004), it was revealed that only 30% of the respondents rated municipal performance as being either good or excellent. Manor (1999) is of the view that municipalities can be in a better position to respond to the needs of the community if three things are in place. These are (1) adequate resources, especially funds; (2) sufficient powers, meaning municipalities must be empowered so that they can execute their mandate; and (3) reliable accountability mechanisms for both the elected and appointed officials.

With regard to the first element identified by Manor, since 1994 attempts have been made to support the local government by providing funds to enable service delivery. This kind of support and services was not available in black areas during apartheid. Even though the new dispensation has brought about commendable improvements, municipalities still remain less empowered. This can be attributed to the fact that funds that are assigned to municipalities are held by provincial departments (Kahn, et al., 2011). Municipalities must be given full control of their funds if they are to function effectively. This kind of situation can be seen when we look at the management of some water projects by the Department of Water and Sanitation. The department appoints Free Basic Water Provincial Support Units to support provinces and municipalities, but this measure reduces municipality's control over the distribution of water (Republic of South Africa, 2003). The municipality's lack of control over resources is also evident in the national government-controlled Regional Electricity Distribution (RED) networks; the distribution of electricity has always been a responsibility of the local government and is one of its major sources of income. The regional structures limit the municipality's role, hence its income base (Republic of South Africa, 2003).

Another manifestation of the challenges of intergovernmental relations and its impact on service delivery is the issue of unfunded mandates. Unfunded mandates arise when the national and provincial governments delegate duties to municipalities where there are no resources to execute that function or duty. Steytler and Baatjies (2006: 4) state that

"municipalities get their policy direction from provinces and the national government and this, at times, results in unfunded mandates". Unfunded mandates are a burden on municipalities and contribute to their failure to provide services efficiently. In the 2008-9 financial year, metropolitan municipalities spent R3.819 billion on unfunded mandates. That amount increased to R4.194 billion in the 2009-10 financial year (Financial and Fiscal Commission, 2011). Politicians such as Mbazima Shilowa have raised concerns about unfunded mandates by arguing that Parliament must be careful when passing legislation that imposes financial obligations on the local government (Clemence, 2003). Another issue related to municipal finance is the fact that those municipalities with large rural areas are not able to raise revenue because of a limited tax base.

With regard to the empowerment of municipalities, since 1994, they have been expected to shoulder more responsibility than before, with limited resources and capacity. This has been evident in the fact that municipalities are expected to implement programmes and policies which originate from the provincial and national governments. With limited resources and many activities to coordinate, municipalities end up not being able to work effectively. It is also a well-documented fact that, in South Africa, local government is tasked with a wide array of activities which they frequently struggle to fulfil because of lack of resources and capacity (Financial and Fiscal Commission: 2011).

In terms of Schedule 4(b) of the Constitution, municipalities are charged with the responsibility of providing transport services and must develop strategies based on provincial and national guidelines. Added to this responsibility, municipalities are expected to boost local economies and create jobs by increasing competitiveness and promoting small-scale enterprises. This involves "the provision of labour market information, supporting entrepreneurial efforts of non-governmental organisations, community-based corporations, training agencies, and small business coalitions" (Kahn, et al., 2011: 121). Municipalities are further expected to promote and develop arts and culture in conjunction with provincial and national governments. They are also required to implement social crime prevention measures. Further to that, municipalities are required to assist the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform by ensuring that sectoral plans are coordinated and streamlined into a single planning regime and that land reform and restitution are integrated into IDP (Republic of South Africa, 2011).

Further to that municipalities are expected to ensure that all inhabitants of the municipality have adequate housing. This means that they have to act as administrators and developers of the national housing project. Municipalities are also required to draw up water management plans and develop tourism. From the above, it is clear that municipalities are tasked with many responsibilities. This is one of the reasons why municipalities, especially in poverty-stricken areas, are unable to deliver services. The burden faced by municipalities was acknowledged by former Minister of Provincial and Local Government, Sydney Mufamadi when he stated that

> The limited capacity and resources of some municipalities are clearly obstacles to action, whether, in the areas of planning, budgeting, and implementation, some of our municipalities rest on a deficit human capital base. Thus, they fail to implement new strategies of delivery and cost recovery (Mufamadi, 2004: n.p.).

Another major issue confronting local government in the post-apartheid era is the issue of urban bias. This is because the local government seems to thrive in and around urban areas while rural municipalities remain very weak and at times ineffective. For Akitan (2006: 7), "the allocation of functions does not take into consideration different conditions, challenges and capacities of municipalities of different sizes". A significant portion of the South African population lives in rural areas where municipalities have limited capacity. Given this fact, the matter of urban bias is a big issue. The lack of services in rural areas has led to a number of violent protests over service delivery as was the case recently in Limpopo's Malamulele area in 2015 and 2016.

In the Eastern Cape and Limpopo, two provinces with a high number of people residing in rural areas, 60% of the population still does not have access to on-site water (Kahn, et al., 2011). In KwaZulu-Natal and the North West, which also have high ratios of people living in rural areas, 40% of the population do not have access to on-site water. This is in sharp contrast to the urbanised provinces of the Western Cape and Gauteng where access to on-site water stood at 80% in 2005 (Business Day, 2005, cited in (Kahn, et al., 2011: 124). This makes it clear that the national and provincial spheres must pay special attention to such poor municipalities in order to correct the situation. This can only be done through a coordinated effort which requires a well-developed intergovernmental relations framework.

2.9.2 Intergovernmental Relations and the Implementation of Programmes

Having discussed local government and the importance of well-coordinated intergovernmental relations in improving service delivery, this section now discusses three major programmes and their implications for intergovernmental relations. These programmes are the HIV/AIDS delivery programme, the housing programme, and the 2010 FIFA Would Cup.

2.9.2.1 IGR and the delivery of HIV/AIDS programmes

HIV/AIDS has been one of the major challenges that have faced the democratic South African government. There have been numerous efforts by the private sector, public sector, and the community to fight the scourge of the disease. Unfortunately, partly because of poor coordination, the fight against HIV/AIDS is far from being won. The refusal by the national government to roll out antiretroviral treatment meant that the rollout was delayed also in the lower tiers of government. The governments of Gauteng and the Western Cape defied the national government and rolled out antiretroviral programmes in their respective provinces. This was a positive move which changed South Africa's approach to the fight against the disease. However, the damage had already been done.

Even when the national government committed itself to the antiretroviral programme there were delays caused by ineffective funds transfer from the national government to other spheres. In the early stages of the rollout, the national government paid out billions of rand in conditional grants to provinces but failed to monitor how these funds were used. The National Department of Health did not verify all payments it made to provinces, namely R7 billion, which comprised 91% of the conditional grants for provinces. Not only were the transfers slow and unmonitored, when funds did finally become available, provinces did not make good use of them. In 2004, KwaZulu-Natal which has the highest HIV prevalence in the country only spent 11% of its conditional grant for HIV/AIDS.

Gauteng and Mpumalanga used almost zero percent of their grants while the Eastern Cape, Northwest, and Limpopo used between 20% and 24% of their grant (Health Systems Trust, 2004). The practice of underspending continued with the Department of Health coming under fire from the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) in 2007 for failing to

spend R75 million on HIV/AIDS prevention initiatives. Lack of monitoring also continued with the department failing to follow procedure on its R35 million grant to Lovelife (Cape Argus, 2007). This underspending and lack of monitoring and evaluation can be attributed to poor coordination and weak intergovernmental relations, among other factors. The weakness of intergovernmental relations at a local level of government has further derailed the fight against HIV/AIDS. Municipalities have a responsibility to attend to the basic needs of the community and this includes the needs of those suffering from HIV/AIDS (Versteeg & Maredi, 2006: 15).

The local sphere has, for the most part, failed in its fight against the disease. In major cities, the lack of resources has been a stumbling block in the fight against HIV/AIDS. In Johannesburg, for example, HIV/AIDS programmes were not adequately funded in 1999. The provincial government refused to increase its HIV/AIDS funding largely over issues of control (Kahn, et al., 2011). This led to the shrinking of the programme, with posts being frozen, the media budget being reduced, and training initiatives being abandoned (Thomas & Crewe, 2000, cited in (Kahn, 2011: 130). The larger municipalities have had more success in implementing HIV/AIDS programmes compared to rural municipalities. Hall (2006) argues that the new district municipalities have little experience in delivering health services and that has hindered the implementation of HIV/AIDS programmes. However, if the programmes were well-coordinated and there was a proper intergovernmental structure linking the efforts of all three spheres, this could have been averted. Mechanisms like training and skills transfer could have prevented poor performance in the implementation of HIV/AIDS programmes.

Unfortunately, these municipalities did not get adequate support and the result was the spread of the disease. A study conducted by the Human Science Research Council (HSRC) found that the prevalence of HIV/AIDS had increased from 10.6% in 2008 to 12.2% in 2012 (Shisana, Rehle, Simbayi, Zuma, Jooste, Zungu, Labadaerios & Onoya, 2012). Provincially, KwaZulu-Natal has the highest HIV prevalence in the country which stands at 16.9% and the Western Cape has the lowest at 5% (Shisana, et al., 2012). Women between the ages of 30 and 34 and males aged 35 to 39 have the highest infection rate. 36% of the females and 28.8% of the males contracted HIV (Shisana, et al., 2012). This study shows that the government is not winning the war against the disease and, although there are a

59

number of reasons for this, lack of coordination between the spheres is certainly one of them.

2.9.2.2 IGR and the delivery of housing

Before focusing on how intergovernmental relations impact on housing delivery, a brief historical overview is necessary. By the late 20th century, segregation in South African urban areas was well-developed (Robinson, 1996). At that time, some 55% of the Whites were urbanised (Lemon, 1991, cited in (Kahn, 2011: 131). Various devices were used to ensure segregation including racial exclusion clauses in property deeds. In 1923, the government took a systematic approach to segregation by enacting the Native (Urban) Areas Act. This Act embodied the sentiments of the Transvaal Local Government Commission of 1922 which stated: "The native should only be allowed to enter the urban areas which are essentially a white man's creation when he is willing to enter and minister to the needs of the white man, and should depart there from when he ceases so to minister" (Lemon, 1991: 8).

This is proof that by the time the National Party (NP) took office in 1948, South Africa was already a highly-segregated state. The Group Areas Act of 1950 and the Group Areas Development Act of 1955 designated land for occupation by one of four racial groups, namely Africans, Whites, Indians and Coloureds. Africans were effectively barred from white areas except for domestic workers. Africans were placed in distant, overcrowded townships while Whites lived in low-density areas with high security. Indians were concentrated in poor housing conditions, some built for owner-occupant by the state in small areas. "Coloureds who were mainly living in the Western Cape were removed from District 6 to the Cape Flats Township far away from the city centre" (Davies, 1978, cited in (Kahn, 2011: 132). Those Africans who lived in rural areas were forced into homelands which were supposedly based on traditional allegiances. "Because of these forced removals, the population of the Bantustans grew by 70%" (Worden, 1994, cited in (Kahn, 2011: 132).

The above discussion clearly shows that the Africans, Coloureds, and Indians were discriminated against in terms of where they could stay and in their ownership of property. After the first democratic elections in South Africa, the ANC appointed its senior member and struggle icon, Joe Slovo, as a Minister of Housing. This was an indication by the ANC

that they took the issue of housing very seriously. In its 1994 election manifesto, the ANC promised to implement the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to build 1 million homes within the first five years in office. However, "at the end of the first year only 878 houses had been built" (Forbes, 1995, cited in (Kahn, et al., 2011: 132).

Even though the government has managed to build more than 3 million homes to date there are still challenges when it comes to housing delivery. More could have been achieved had there been proper coordination between the three spheres of government. The provision of housing is a shared responsibility among all three spheres and, consequently, it is important that the activities of these spheres are integrated and coordinated. In 2007, the then Minister of Finance, Mr Trevor Manuel, stated that the assignment of powers and functions among the spheres of government was problematic because some functions were allocated to inappropriate spheres (Manuel, 2007, cited in (Kahn, et al., 2011: 133).

2.9.3 Intergovernmental Relations Lessons from the 2010 FIFA World Cup

The 2010 FIFA World Cup was the biggest sporting event South Africa has ever hosted. To have a successful World Cup, all government departments and the private sector had to play their roles and their actions needed to be well-coordinated. "The preparation for the World Cup was a good illustration of joint work which requires far-ranging inter-sectoral and inter-sphere collaboration" (Department of Provincial and Local Government, 2008: 43). The stakeholders in the project ranged from broadcasting (Department of Communications); provision of visas for FIFA officials, fans, teams, international media (Department of Home Affairs); medical and disaster management services (national and provincial Departments of Health); sports facilities (national and provincial Departments of Sport and Recreation); and trademark protection and merchandising (Department of Trade and Industry), to name but a few (Department of Provincial and Local Government, 2008).

To ensure a successful event, institutional coordinating structures were set up. These structures included the Local Organising Committee, the inter-ministerial committee which was headed by Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe, the Technical Coordination Committee, the Host Cities Forum which was the main intergovernmental structure, the Provincial Coordinating Committees, and the Integrated Project Offices. In addition to these structures, various departments and municipalities set up internal units to discharge their

2010 World Cup responsibilities inter alia The Department of Provincial and Local Government, National Treasury, Department of Sports and Recreation, Department of Transport and so on. Host cities also entered into agreements with their provincial departments to create structures which would ensure that the event ran smoothly.

What made intergovernmental relations successful in the 2010 FIFA World Cup planning was the fact that roles were clearly articulated and the committees were closely monitoring progress. For example, the city of Mangaung and the province of Free State clarified their roles during the planning phase. The roles were divided as follows: the Mangaung host city was responsible for the development, implementation and hands-on management of all activities necessary to ensure a successful World Cup and the Free State provincial government was responsible for providing a facilitating, supporting and monitoring role to ensure that the province, in general, benefited from the hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, in accordance with the broader objectives of the Free State's Provincial Growth and Development Strategy (PGDS) and national government objectives (Department of Provincial and Local Government, 2008).

These two partners formed three committees to help carry out their work, namely the Political Committee, Technical Committee and Subcommittees (e.g. transport, health, safety and security). The success of the 2010 FIFA World Cup clearly demonstrates the value of well-coordinated programmes in the delivery of services and the national government should set a clear direction on integrating programmes so that other programmes can also enjoy success. The culture of joint work in the public sector should be encouraged and rewarded.

2.10 THE WAR ON POVERTY: OSS

After the democratic elections in 1994, one of the major challenges which faced the new government was the issue of poverty. Poverty is a highly contested concept and with good reason. Before one looks at the strategies which have been developed by the South African government to fight against poverty, it is important to get conceptual clarity on what poverty is. Arguments on what constitutes poverty go beyond semantics and academic debates. The conceptualization, definition and measurement of poverty have political, social and economic implications. Poverty also serves as a mirror-image of the ideals of society: it

tells us what is unacceptable in society and how we would like things to be. More often than not, internationally, the task of defining what constitutes poverty is given to those in power and reflects the dominant ideology at that particular point in time (Magasela, 2005).

Poverty can mean various things to different people. One important thread in the poverty discourse is poverty as material lack. This refers to those people who do not have the necessary resources for survival. The crudest of poverty studies have resorted to identifying what goods human beings would not be able to survive without (Magasela, et al., 2013: 9). Another important thread is dignity; even if people have the necessary resources to survive, they might still be considered poor if their survival requires them to give up their self-respect. Poverty can be looked at in a broad and narrow sense. In the narrow sense, it can mean lack of income. In a broad sense, it can be seen as multidimensional, encompassing things like lack of adequate housing, health, education, and access to essential services (Magasela, et al., 2013).

Historically, income has been the core measurement of poverty and to some extent, it remains central today. However, income is itself a very problematic concept to conceptualise. "Defining poverty in terms of income developed in Victorian England where families were defined to be in poverty if their incomes were not sufficient to obtain the minimum necessaries for the maintenance of physical efficiency" (Townsend, 2006: 5). A family was considered to be in poverty if its income minus rent fell below the established poverty line. The Victorian era definition of poverty has influenced policies in many countries for over 100 years. "The idea of subsistence was exported to members of the former British Empire; for example, the same measurement was used for setting wages for blacks in South Africa and framing development in India and Malaysia" (Townsend, 2006: 5). The use of only subsistence to define poverty has come under immense pressure recently. This is because it implies that human needs are mainly physical rather than social. People are not simply organisms which need only subsistence: they are also expected to perform socially demanding roles as workers, neighbours, parents and so on. That is why the definition of poverty used in this study is the one by Chambers (2006) which includes income poverty (living below the poverty line) and material lack (lack of proper shelter, clothing, access to health, transport and, the general lack of access to services).

The problem of poverty in South Africa was given special attention in the early 20th century within a racialized context. In 1929, "white poverty" became a matter of concern and the government contracted the Carnegie Corporation to undertake a study that looked closely at this phenomenon (Buccuss, 2004). The Great Depression had a devastating impact on South Africa and the government had to come up with ways to reverse this. The Carnegie Corporation produced a report titled "The Poor White Problem in South Africa"". This report was followed by the National Conference on the Poor White Problem which led to the creation of the State Department of Social Welfare in 1937 (McKendrick, 1987). The Second Carnegie Report which was released in 1980 was the first comprehensive study to investigate black poverty in South Africa. This report demonstrated the complex inequalities which existed in the South African society which was reinforced by racist policies.

The birth of democracy in 1994 provided a window of opportunity for South Africa to change the development path of the country. There are few things in post-apartheid South Africa that are more politically fateful than the persistence of entrenched poverty in our country. There has been an almost universal consensus in the post-apartheid era that poverty is an important problem which must be resolved.

In policy making circles, in the public sphere and across almost the entire political spectrum from left to right, South Africans seem to agree that the existence of poverty poses a profound challenge for the country as a whole- and that the ability to eradicate it to reduce it significantly or to offer those who suffer it credible hope of upward mobility and escape is one of the most important tests of the post-apartheid political and economic order (du Toit, 2012: 1).

Failure to address the problem of poverty is widely believed to have the capacity of undermining both the short-term and long-term legitimacy of our democratic dispensation.

Consequently, the South African government has committed itself to poverty reduction through its targeted pro-poor state expenditure on social security (Ngobese & Msweli, 2013). The government has primarily focused on the provision of primary health care, compulsory education, and provision of housing, electricity and water. The commitment of the South African government to reducing poverty is reflected in the fact that there are over 29 000 government-sponsored programmes which are aimed at reducing poverty (Public

Service Commission, 2007). Despite the attempts by the South African government to reduce poverty and improve services, there continues to be a number of challenges hindering successful reduction of poverty. In 2002, almost 20 million people in South Africa were living below the poverty line. Wilson (2005) argued that 50% of the South African population had an income that was too low to sustain a decent life. These challenges prompted the government to embark on the war on poverty. The South African government realised that the ultimate goal of any state is to advance the welfare of the population and that this can be obtained through the promotion of intergovernmental relations and cooperative government. One of the ways or strategies which were developed by the government to fight poverty was the "War on Poverty".

In February 2008, former President Thabo Mbeki launched a National War on Poverty in his SONA. The campaign was launched in three presidential nodal areas which included uMsinga in KwaZulu-Natal. The war on poverty was adopted by Cabinet as part of the South African government's Apex Priorities (Policy Coordination and Advisory Committee, 2008). The KwaZulu-Natal Government in 2011 adopted the war on poverty as its flagship programme under the banner of OSS. The main sub-programmes of OSS are (1) food security; (2) fighting TB, HIV/AIDS, and poverty; and (3) the empowerment of women and youth while addressing social ills and driving an aggressive behavioural change campaign.

The top five priorities of the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government are embedded in the Operation Sukuma Sakhe service delivery model (OSS, 2012).

> The top five priorities of the KwaZulu-Natal Government are (1) rural development/agrarian reform and food security; (2) creating decent work and economic growth; (3) fighting crime; (4) education; and (5) health. Operation Sukuma Sakhe aims to create comprehensive, efficient, effective, quality service delivery systems which contribute to a self-reliant society (OSS, 2012: 1).

The KwaZulu-Natal Government aims to eradicate the practice of communities being passive recipients of government services and wants them to take charge of their own development.

OSS identifies five critical areas of the programme. The first is community partnerships. By this, the KwaZulu-Natal Government aims at involving communities in the process of OSS so that they can know their rights and own the programme while becoming part of the solution to their challenges. OSS creates a platform for communities to raise their concerns regarding the delivery of services and gives them a voice on how service delivery can be improved. It also creates room for communities to give feedback on the quality of the services they receive from the government. The second critical area of OSS is behavioural change. OSS notes that behavioural change is primarily a responsibility of the citizen. CCGs) are tasked with the role of affecting the change of health and social behaviour in communities through door-to-door campaigns.

In addition, YAs have been appointed across the 11 district municipalities to assist with effecting behaviour change among their peers (OSS, 2012). The youth, in particular, are encouraged to act responsibly, to take responsibility for their sexual behaviour, practise safe sex, respect the law, prevent violence and live healthy lifestyles. The third critical area of OSS is the integration of government services. This is of particular relevance to this study because it is where different stakeholders come together to deliver services to communities. All government departments, civil society organisations and the private sector are mobilised to deliver service to communities in a coordinated manner through War Rooms.

War Rooms are integrated service delivery structures comprised of government departments, the municipality, CBOs, business and other stakeholders at the ward level. Government departments play an important role at the ward, local, district and provincial level in ensuring that services are appropriately delivered to those communities in need. For War Rooms to be functional there should be an inventory of all government services available per ward (OSS, 2012). To ensure that services are delivered in a coordinated manner and that the government responds to communities, fieldworkers are utilised. These include CDWs, CCGs, YA, Extension Officers, Sports Volunteers, Social Crime Prevention Volunteers. War Rooms approach individual, family and community problems in a collective manner, collect and collate information in a single database and then present solutions in a coordinated way in War Room meetings (OSS, 2012).

The fourth critical area of OSS is economic activities. The KwaZulu-Natal Government understands that infrastructural development is linked with job creation for the local community. The War Rooms are supposed to play the crucial role of creating access and linkages to markets for local producers of goods and services. In line with this the former Premier of KwaZulu-Natal, Dr Zweli Mkhize, launched the "one home one garden" programme which was aimed at fighting hunger and malnutrition and creating jobs (OSS, 2012). The "one home one garden" programme was extended to community gardens which are aimed at raising income and commercialising farming. In War Rooms, there is supposed to be engagement between government, the community and business on how to create employment opportunities. The government also builds infrastructure to support the creation of jobs.

The fifth important area of OSS is environmental care. Issues of environmental protection have taken centre stage in the past decades. War Rooms are supposed to discuss environmental impact of development programmes taking place in the communities. Communities are also encouraged to protect the environment by preventing things like pollution and deforestation.

There are three types of committees which are responsible for the steering of OSS namely; political oversight committees, coordinating committees and technical oversight committees. Each of these structures operates at all levels of government: provincial, district, municipal and ward. "The coordinating task teams consist of the Provincial Task Team (PTT), the District Task Team (DTT), the Local Task Team (LTT) and the Ward Task Team (WTT) also commonly referred to as the War Room" (OSS, 2012: 7). Each of these task teams reports to both the political and oversight committees. There is high-level political support for OSS at provincial, district, local and ward levels. The PTT is supported by two technical oversight committees, the Committee of Heads of Departments (COHOD) and all the clusters where OSS is a standing agenda item. Support for the programme at this high level increases the visibility and importance thereof. On the political level, OSS is backed by the premier and the MECs.

"The overall champion for OSS is the Premier of KwaZulu-Natal. The Premier, MECs and HODs have been assigned to each of the 11 districts to play the role of a champion from a

political and administrative perspective respectively" (OSS, 2012, 7). Furthermore, a provincial level senior official has been appointed as the provincial convenor for a district to assist in gaining buy-in and support for OSS from all stakeholders and in mobilising resources. At the district level, the district mayor is the political champion. The DTT Chair is elected from among the task team members and is supported by the District Municipal Executive Committee (EXCO).

At the local level, the local mayor is the political champion. The LTT chair is elected from among the local task team members and is supported by the EXCO. At the ward level, OSS is championed by the ward councillor and the Inkosi (chiefs). The WTT chair is elected from among the War Room members and is supported by the ward committee. Despite the clear mission and vision of OSS and the presence of supporting structures, there have been challenges in implementing the programme. This study seeks to understand how intergovernmental relations are managed in the hope that it can find out what has been hindering the success of this very important programme in KwaZulu-Natal.

2.11 THE HUMAN FACTOR IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

In the previous section, a number of intergovernmental structures or forums were explained. It must be noted that these structures are just frameworks and that it is people who make these structures work. It is people who create and maintain the relationships explained in policy documents and legislation on intergovernmental relations. This means that intergovernmental relations are influenced by people who are at the core of these structures and forums (Hattingh, 1992).

The human factor can lead to the development of an informal organisation which is based on interpersonal relations among staff and can influence decision-making (Kahn, et al., 2011). These relations are outside the formal structures and represent interpersonal relationships which develop over time. If these relationships are geared towards organisational goals they can be very useful but if not, they can be destructive. It should be noted that these personal informal channels are very strong since it is normal for people to form groups with like-minded individuals (Thornhill & Hanekom, 1995 cited in (Kahn, et al., 2011: 17). However, these personal relations must conform to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa since it provides the framework for intergovernmental relations.

2.12 CHAPTER SUMMARY

The chapter has focused on the relevant literature in the study of intergovernmental relations. It looked at the conceptual foundations of intergovernmental relations. It also looked at the different approaches to intergovernmental relations and their applicability in the South African context. The chapter has outlined the models of intergovernmental relations in unitary and federal state systems and concluded that in the case of South Africa both unitary and federal models are applicable, given the nature of our political system. Furthermore, the normative underpinnings of intergovernmental relations and the basic principles which govern the conduct of officials involved in public administration in general and intergovernmental relations, in particular, were investigated.

The chapter has also traced the development of intergovernmental relations in South African from the time of Dutch colonial rule through apartheid to the present time. It showed that there have been vast improvements made over time as far as formalising the structures of intergovernmental relations and giving power to the lower tiers of government. The chapter discussed the various forums of intergovernmental relations which currently exist in South Africa and highlighted their strengths and weaknesses, including how intergovernmental relations impact on service delivery. It has also discussed OSS and its supporting structures. The chapter noted that human relations play a decisive role in the success and failure of governmental relations and that structures alone cannot achieve desired change without the people who work in these structures.

The next chapter discusses the two theories which guide this study.

CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses two theories which inform this study. These theories are the collaboration theory and the social exchange theory. These two theories are of particular relevance to this study because they both seek to explain why and how organisations work together to solve common problems. These theories are vital in explaining the structure and form of intergovernmental relations within OSS.

This chapter explains the theories which inform the present study. The two theories discussed in this chapter are important and relevant to the study because they explain why organisations choose to collaborate. They also explain the factors which must be considered before and during the collaboration process in order to make the collaborative initiative a success. These theories have been chosen because they seek to provide a framework for understanding inter-organisational cooperation. They allow us to analyse how different stakeholders work together to resolve common problems and what conditions should be present for joint work to be successful. The collaboration theory seeks to explain why and how organisations collaborate. On the other hand, the social exchange theory seeks to explain both individual and organisational motivations for collaboration. The social exchange theory understands that there is a human element to intergovernmental relations which also needs to be explained. Used together, these theories allow the researcher to understand both organisational and individual motivations to collaborate in OSS.

3.2 THE COLLABORATION THEORY

In the public sector, inter-sectorial collaboration has long been viewed as a virtue in an attempt to solve societal problems. However, a collaboration of different sector departments has been very difficult to achieve. This was confirmed by the Audit Commission which stated that "local partnerships are important in delivering services to local communities and improving their lives…. [Despite the fact that] working across organisational boundaries is complex and ambiguous and often very confusing and weakens accountability" (Audit Commission, 2005: 2). The literature on collaboration reflects that it can be

overwhelmingly complex (Ansell & Gash, 2007). Wimpfheimer, Bloom and Kramer (1991: 92) have gone as far as saying "collaboration is a minefield filled with unexpected problems, unexpressed differences of opinion and unanticipated outcomes". As a result of the difficulty of collaborating Hudson, Hardy, Henwood and Wistow (1999) attempted to come up with a theory of collaboration to limit the complexity, confusion and ambiguity that comes with working across organisational boundaries.

The collaboration theory seeks to formalise collaboration in order to ensure efficiency. Before the collaboration theory is discussed in depth it is important to note that collaboration as a concept remains elusive. Different theorists have different explanations of the concept of collaboration. Despite definitional challenges, collaboration can be used effectively to resolve conflicts and ensure the delivery of services based on a shared vision, where stakeholders recognise the potential of working together (Gray, 1989a). Collaboration studies have often highlighted the importance of trust, leadership, shared purpose, and organisational ownership to the success of collaborative. The researcher adds an equally important theme which is collaborative administration. Before discussing the main themes of collaboration, it is important to discuss the context within which collaboration mergers and to understand why organisations chose to collaborate. It is also important to discuss conflict which seems to be an omnipresent feature in collaborative arrangements.

3.2.1 The Context of Collaboration

The difficulties associated with fragmented approaches to service delivery are well-documented (Bryson, Crosby & Stone, 2006). As a result, collaboration is deemed as an essential activity by many governments around the world.

Today organisational individualism is seen as ineffective in dealing with the diverse challenges faced by society (Alter & Hege, 1993). Because organisations are not able to respond individually to society's challenges and deliver services, there is a need for collaboration (Thomson & Perry, 2006). When organisations perform activities in isolation there is a possibility of duplication of activities. Duplication of activities can happen where two or more organisations perform a task which can be performed by one organisation. In environments where resources are scarce, this can be particularly costly. Another equally

serious pitfall of organisational individualism is omission. This can happen when essential activities are not performed because each organisation assumes that the other is performing the activity (Huxham & Macdonald, 1992). A study by Wimpfheimer, Bloom and Kramer (1990) showed that thinking that other organisations are performing interventions can lead to omission which can seriously damage the reputations of all organisations involved.

The shortcomings of organisational individualism have led policy makers to view collaboration as a virtue worth pursuing in both the public and the private sectors. For example, "there is extensive literature on the Japanese inter-firm networks which set them apart from most industries. Toyota, for example, works with over 180 primary firms that supply components and conduct research; this enables Toyota to only focus on assembly" (Hudson, et al., 1999: 239). Because of the success of the Japanese model, more organisations were drawn towards collaboration. Kanter (1994) cited in Hudson, et al., (1999: 239) termed this a 'collaborative advantage' and argued that it significantly improves business performance. In the public sector, collaboration has become highly favoured recently. Governments around the world have realised that complex challenges such as inequality, service delivery, terrorism, climate change etc. cannot be resolved in isolation without collaboration (Bryson and Crosby, 2008). As a result, collaborations have dominated the policy agenda of many states.

It is clear from the above discussion that collaboration has emerged in contexts where organisational individualism has failed to resolve challenges and where the scope of the challenges to be addressed is beyond that of any single organisation.

3.2.2 Understanding Conflict and Collaboration

This aspect of the collaboration theory deals with the divergent views on conflict and discusses the difficulty of explaining collaboration as a concept and using it as a policy tool.

3.2.2.1 Understanding conflict in collaborative initiatives

Parsons (1937) takes a rather dismissive stance towards conflict. He views conflict as a disease with disruptive, dissociating and dysfunctional consequences. Parsons saw society as a system which is made up of complementary parts such as social values, intuitions and organisations. For him, solidarity and cohesion were important for goal attainment hence he

viewed conflict as destructive. Just like most functionalists, he placed great value on stability. In contradistinction, Distefano (1984) and Alter (1990) argue that conflict and collaboration are not diametrically opposed to each other and should not be seen as such. They argue that conflict and cooperation can and, in most cases, does happen simultaneously. In their view, conflict cannot be avoided where different organisations work together. This is in line with what was earlier argued by Simmel (1950), that "conflict is a form of socialisation; that is, groups require harmony and disharmony, dissociation, as well as association and conflict within them, are not wholly disruptive".

Crowley and Karim (1995) also agree by stating that more productive teams generally have more interpersonal conflict, suggesting a correlation between conflict and high performance. The same view is held by Ansell and Gash (2007) who argue that there is a link between high levels of conflict and the incentive to collaborate among highly interdependent stakeholders. Similarly, Futrell (2003) argues that policy deadlocks sometimes push organisations towards collaborative governance. For Hudson, et al. (1999), organisations would be better off trying to find ways to manage conflict when it arises rather than trying to avoid it all together. It is clear from the literature that most theorists see conflict as a natural occurrence in an inter-organisational collaboration which must be managed rather than be frowned upon as disruptive.

3.2.2.2 The intricacies of defining collaborating as a concept

I noted earlier that collaboration as a concept is very difficult to pin down. This led Weiss (1981: 41), to argue that:

> the definitional ambiguity which makes collaboration a handy political device has led to a chasm between rhetoric and operationalisation: collaboration is discussed in the political arena as though everyone knows precisely what it means, when in fact it means many inconsistent things and occasionally means nothing at all.

Warren, Rose and Bergunder (1974: 16) describe collaboration as "a structure or process of concerted decision-making wherein decisions or actions of two or more organisations are made simultaneously in part or in whole with some deliberated degree of adjustment to each other". Similarly, Gray (1989b: 5) defines collaboration as "a process through which parties who see different aspects of a problem can constructively explore their differences

73

and search for solutions that go beyond their own limited vision of what is possible". In later work, Wood and Gray (1991: 146) state that authors like Roberts and Bradley, see collaboration as "an interactive process having a shared transmutational purpose and characterised by the explicit voluntary membership, joint decision-making, agreed-upon rules, and temporary structure".

From the above, it is clear that there is no one perfect definition of collaboration. All the definitions have useful elements which help us better understand the process of collaboration.

The difficulty of defining the term collaboration is matched by the difficulty of using it as a policy tool. Hardy, et al. (1992, cited in Hudson, et al., 1999: 241) identified five barriers to collaboration as a policy tool, namely:

> structural (fragmentation of service responsibilities across inter-agency boundaries, fragmentation of service responsibilities within agency boundaries, non-coterminosity of boundaries); procedural (difference in planning horizons and cycles and differences in budgeting cycles and procedures); financial (differences in funding mechanisms and basis and differences in the flow of resources); professional (differences in ideologies and values, professional self-interest, threats to job security, and conflict views about user interests and roles); status and legitimacy (organisational self-interest and concern for threats to autonomy and domain, differences in legitimacy between elected and appointed agencies/officials).

Other factors which make using collaboration as a policy tool difficult include the fact that organisations which are in a collaborative relationship lose some of the leeways to act as independent organisations. Some organisations might not be happy with losing this power. Another challenge to collaboration as a policy tool is that organisations are expected to invest resources (time, expertise and money) in a collaborative relationship without any guarantee that the collaboration will be successful (Hudson, 1987). It is important to consider that organisations with similar goals are more likely to collaborate (Hudson, et al., 1999). Alter and Hege (1993) concur by arguing that when organisations have similarities in goals and objectives, collaboration is likely to be stable and strong.

3.2.3 Reasons for Multi-Stakeholder Collaboration

This aspect of the collaboration theory deals with the reasons why organisations choose to collaborate. One reason is that we live in a world where different groups and organisations are involved in, affected by, or have some responsibility to act on the challenges of society. However, due to resource scarcity, organisations cannot allocate their resources to solve every social problem. They have to make choices about which social problems are the most important to their key interests. Organisations are also motivated to collaborate when they realise that they cannot achieve their goals individually. To put it differently, organisations will only collaborate if they cannot achieve their objectives without collaborating (Robert, 2001). In recent times, much of political science and public administration has been concerned with the pursuit of self-interest. Scholars such as Dows (1976) and Niskanen (1971) have investigated how the pursuit of self-interest shapes the behaviour of organisations. Interests play a significant role in understanding how politics works. In his seminar work, Lasswell (1936) argued that individuals and groups always want to gain something from political action. This means that for any collaborative endeavour to be successful there has to be a clear outline of the benefit each participant will gain from being in the relationship. What this indicates is the fact that interests play an important role in the decision to enter into inter-organisational collaborative endeavours. This is in line with the findings of Logsdon (1991) that self-interest is a necessary precondition for collaboration formation.

3.2.4 The Importance of Assessing the Capacity to Collaborate

As has already been noted above, organisations collaborate in order to achieve the outcomes they would otherwise not be able to achieve on their own. Before organisations can enter into collaborative agreements, they must first assess their capacity for joint action. Assessing capacity for joint action helps organisations identify potential challenges and opportunities associated with collaborating. According to Saint-Onge and Armstrong (2004: 17) "capacity for joint action is a collection of cross-functional elements that come together to create the potential for taking effective action and serves as a link between strategy and performance". When organisations are assessing their capacity for joint action they must make sure that (1) procedural and institutional arrangements which will drive the

collaboration process are in place; (2) there is strong leadership, (3) they organisations have knowledge that can be shared; and (4) that there are enough resources to sustain the collaboration and to ensure that the objectives of the collaboration are achieved.

For collaboration to be successful, procedural and institutional arrangements must be in place. Procedural and institutional arrangements are necessary for the management of repeated action over time (Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh, 2011). These explicit structures are essential in the administration and management of long-term collaboration (Milward & Provan, 2006). In the words of Emerson, et al. (2001: 35) "It is important that procedural and institutional arrangements are defined at both the intra-organisational level (how a single organisation will govern and manage itself in the collaborative initiative) and at the inter-organisational level (how the group of organisations will govern and manage together in the collaborative initiative)".

Defining procedural and institutional arrangements intra-organisationally can help improve organisational ownership of the collaborative initiative.

The second crucial element in capacity for joint action is leadership. There is a wide consensus on the importance of leadership in collaborative arrangements (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Bingham & O'Leary, 2008; Carlson, 2007; Saint-Onge & Armstrong, 2004; Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987). For Emerson, et al. (2011) "leadership can be an external driver, an essential ingredient of collaborative governance itself and a significant by-product of collaboration".

For collaborative governance to work there should be multiple opportunities and roles of leadership (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Bryson, et al., 2006). It is very important that leaders have authority in collaborative arrangements. Leaders with authority can play an important role in conflict resolution and they can ensure that collaboration partners are accountable. Political skills and integrity are also important qualities for a collaborative leader to have. Knowledge, which is the third element of the capacity for joint action plays an important role in collaboration. In fact, it is fair to say that one of the main reasons which drive organisations towards collaboration is sharing knowledge. There seems to be a strong consensus among scholars about the importance of knowledge in the management of collaboration across networks or organisations (Agranoff, 2008; Cross and Parker, 2004).

Knowledge is information combined with understanding and capability; it lives in the minds of people and guides action. It is important to note that there are hierarchies of knowledge. The implication of this is that the actors in a collaborative relationship who have knowledge that is highly valued will have more power. It is important that actors in these relationships share knowledge because this leads to the distribution of power. For Ansell and Gash (2007) "as knowledge becomes increasingly specialised and distributed and as institutional infrastructures become more complex and interdependent, the demand for collaboration increases".

Resources are the fourth and final element that organisations must consider when assessing capacity for joint action. The sharing of limited resources is one of the main benefits of collaboration (Thomson & Perry, 2006). To be successful, collaborative arrangements must have access to adequate budget support and other resources (Lubell, Leach & Sabatier, 2009). Resources needed in a collaborative relationship include but are not limited to funding, time, technical and logistical support, research, administration among others. Power can also be a very important resource. In addition to these elements, organisations in a collaborative relationship must manage their demands carefully. Demands can both under-reach or overreach the threshold of capacity. "An underestimate can mean that a committed collaborative effort is confined to marginal tasks, while an overestimate can lead to unrealistic expectations of what can be achieved within a particular period of time" (Hudson, et al., 1999: 246). Gajendran and Brewer (2012) have also argued that unrealistic expectations can lead to "the blame game" which is not good for collaboration. A judgement of what is achievable must take contextual factors into account.

3.2.5 The Importance of a Shared Purpose

Having a common purpose has been proven to be essential for achieving success in collaboration (Huxham & Vagen, 2005). For Mattesich and Monsey (1992) having a clearly demarcated mission, objectives and strategy is necessary to achieve collaborative success. They also emphasise the importance of goals and objectives being clear to all parties involved and reasonably attainable. This is because goals and objectives which lack clarity and are unattainable diminish collaborative enthusiasm. In the same vein, Cropper (1995) cited in Hudson, et al. (1999: 247) sees explicit statements of purpose as having value in a

number of ways namely, "(1) as a source of identity for collaborating organisations, (2) helping to clarify boundaries and commitment, (3) defining the scale and scope of joint work, (4) providing a control against collaborative drift and (5) providing a mechanism for the regulation of collaborative arrangements". When parties to collaboration construct a shared purpose this creates an enabling environment for them to discover what they have in common and it allows them to tackle common problems (Kouzes & Posner, 2002).

Shared motivation is also important in collaborations. Emerson, et al. (2011: 13) define "shared motivation as a self-reinforcing cycle consisting of four elements; mutual trust, understanding, internal legitimacy, and commitment". Shared motivation highlights the relational elements of the collaborative dynamics and is sometimes called social capital (Colman, 1988; Putnam, 2000; Putnam, et al., 1993). The first element of shared motivation trust does not develop overnight. Parties to a collaborative arrangement have to work together for some time before trust develops. In a sense, trust can be viewed as a by-product of familiarity and a history of good working relations (Fisher & Brown, 1989). As collaboration partners share information, knowledge, demonstrate competency and follow-through, trust develops. Conversely, failure to follow through on commitments erodes trust (Arino & de la Torre, 1998; Merrill-Sands & Sheridan, 1996).

When parties to a collaborative arrangement trust each other, this can lead to high levels of mutual understanding, legitimacy and commitment (Emerson, et al., 2011). Because of trust, people are able to go beyond their own personal, institutional, and jurisdictional perspectives towards understanding other people's interests, needs, values, and constraints (Bardach, 1998; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Trust enables mutual understanding which is the second element of shared motivation. Mutual understanding in collaboration entails that parties to the collaborative arrangements must respect each other's views and interests. "Mutual understanding generates a sense of interpersonal validation and cognitive legitimacy" (Emerson, et al., 2011: 14). The confirmation that participants in a collective endeavour are trustworthy and credible, with compatible and interdependent interest legitimises and strengthens on-going collaboration.

Once credibility is established, commitment, the fourth element, will follow. Commitment to the collaborative initiative lays the foundations for organisations to commit to a shared

path. Gillet, Loader, Doherty and Scott (2016) have shown that lack of a shared purpose can lead to divergent expectations which can negatively affect the collaboration.

3.2.6 Building Trust in Collaboration

Trust is often identified as an essential ingredient of successful collaboration and, conversely, mistrust as a primary barrier (Getha-Taylor, 2012). Weech-Maldonado and Merril (2000) argue that "lack of trust among stakeholders is a starting point for collaborative governance". Therefore, trust-building preoccupies the minds of managers involved in cross-organisational collaboration. Trust-building is known to be a time-consuming process which requires a long-term commitment. But once it is achieved it can serve as the glue that holds collaboration together. A number of scholars highlight the significance of trust in collaboration (Imperial, 2005; Murdock, Weissner & Saxton, 2005; Short & Winter, 2005; Tett, Crowther & O'Hara, 2003; Misztal, 2013). In situations where there is pre-history of antagonism between stakeholders, trust-building becomes the primary focus (Linde, 2010).

The definition of trust adopted here is one by Gambetta (1988: 217) which states that

> trust is a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action, both before he can monitor such action or independently of his capacity ever to be able to monitor it and in a context in which it affects his own action.

Basically, trust allows us to cope with the freedom of other persons whose intentions can never be fully known to us (Lunmann, 1979).

In the "Prince", the classic work by Machiavelli (1532), it was emphasised that political leaders do not have to be honest to be successful rulers. However, in collaborative arrangements, trust is important mainly because other parties' motives are not always transparent (Hawley, 2014). It is exactly this mystery of motives and intent of the other parties which makes trust necessary in a collaborative relationship. For MöIlering (2013) maintaining trust is a continuous process which requires the commitment of all those involved in a relationship. For Lioukas and Reuer (2015), personal relationships play an important role in creating a culture of trust.

3.2.7 Organisational Ownership of the Collaborative Initiative

For collaboration to be successful, there has to be a link between the macro and micro levels of activity in collaborating organisations. This link can be achieved through organisational ownership of the collaborative initiative. In the context of inter-organisational or intergovernmental collaboration, organisational ownership means that each organisation which is party to the collaborative initiative must own the projects and processes of the collaboration as if they are their own. This entails full commitment from members of each organisation to the achievement of the goals of the collaborative initiative. This component of the collaboration theory is divided into two parts, (1) facilitative leadership and (2) engaging frontline staff.

3.2.7.1 Facilitative leadership

The people who have charisma and commitment are crucial to the success of any collaborative relationship. They are able to draw a variety of stakeholders to the table and get them to commit to the collaborative process (Ansell & Gash, 2012; Frame, Gunton & Day, 2004; Hsieh & Liou, 2016; Margerum, 2001). Leaders play a key role in the drawing up of and the maintenance of rules of engagement in collaboration. They also serve as catalysts in building trust and in facilitating dialogue among stakeholders (Ansell & Gash, 2007). For Vagen and Huxham (2003), leadership is important for embracing, empowering and involving stakeholders and then mobilising them to move forward collaboratively. Chrislip and Larson (1994: 125) state that "a collaborative leader is a steward of the process whose leadership style is characterised by its focus on promoting and safeguarding process". Collaborative leaders must also manage interpersonal relations between participants by encouraging them to respect each other's views. For Lakser and Weiss (2003, 30) "a collaborative leader must have skills to (1) promote broad consensus and achieve participation, (2) ensure broad-based influence and control, (3) facilitate productive group dynamics, and (4) extend the scope of process".

Collaboration cannot depend on one leader; there should be multiple leaders in a collaborative enterprise. Linked to the idea of facilitative leadership is what is called reticulists. Reticulists are those individuals who are skilled at mapping and developing policy networks and identifying the key resource holders and other reticulists (Ilium, 2016).

Reticulists must have both technical and interpersonal skills to succeed. They must also have the legitimacy that is, a perception by others as having the legitimacy to assume the role, be perceived as unbiased and able to manage different points of view, have vision and sense about critical issues and previous experience in the collaborative environment.

3.2.7.2 Engaging frontline staff

Top-down approaches in collaboration studies tend to focus on the role of leaders/managers and sideline frontline staff. This should not be the case because the whole organisation should be geared towards achieving the objectives of the collaborative initiative. According to Lipsky (1980), frontline staff can contribute a lot to the development of the collaborative initiative by utilising their formal and informal contacts with outside organisations. Isbell (2012) emphasises the role of boundary spanners, that is, those individuals who have the skill to build and manage interpersonal relationships. He further argues that boundary spanners enhance the likelihood and strength of collaboration.

3.2.8 Collaborative Administration

It is important to note that collaborations are not self-administrating enterprises. Organisations collaborate because they want to achieve some objective and to do so there must be some administrative structure(s) which initiate action. Thompson (2001) in his study of public managers found that administration is a critical dimension for collaboration.

For most collaboration theory scholars, the key to getting things done in a collaborative setting rests in finding the right balance of administrative capacity and social capacity to build relationships. For Sagawa and Segal (2006) cited in Thompson and Perry (2006: 25) "coordinating roles need to be augmented by 'relationship managers' whose specific task is to manage and build inter-organisational relationships, not just to make sure that collaboration requirements are met". Isbell (2012) emphasises the role of boundary spanners, that is, those individuals who have the skill to build and manage interpersonal relationships. He further argues that boundary spanners enhance the likelihood and strength of collaboration.

3.3 SOCIAL EXCHANGE THEORY

The social exchange theory posits that individuals have hedonistic motivations. What this means is that individuals always seek to reduce their losses while maximising their gains. Those actions which bring pleasure will be maintained while those which do not will be avoided or abandoned. It seeks to explain any interface between individuals where resources are exchanged (Homans, 1958). The resources exchanged are both tangible and intangible. In his seminal work, Blau (1964: 91) views "social exchange as a process of central significance in social life and as underlying the relations between groups as well as between individuals". For him, "social exchange refers to voluntary actions of individuals that are motivated by the returns they are expected to bring and typically do in fact bring from others". Social exchange does not specify the exact kind of returns one will receive in the future (Hass & Deseran, 1981).

According to Blau (1964: 93) "social exchange involves the principle that one person does another a favour and while there is a general expectation of some future return, its exact nature is definitely not stipulated in advance". Aryee, Budhwar and Chen (2002: 267-8) agree with Blau by stating that "social exchange is premised on a long-term exchange of favours that precludes accounting and is based on a diffuse obligation to reciprocate". Blau (1964) further argues that social exchange occurs when an individual or organisation is attracted to another if he/it expects that associating with it will be in some way rewarding for himself/itself and his/its interests in the future. Social exchange produces a feeling of personal commitment on parties in an exchange relationship (Cole, Schaninger & Harris, 2002).

The social exchange has been mainly used to understand exchanges within organisations rather than between them. But recently it has been used to explain exchanges between organisations and this has been termed organisational exchange. Levine and White (1961: 583) define organisational exchange as "any voluntary activity between organisations which has consequences, actual or anticipated, for the realisation of their respective goals or objectives". There are four basic assumptions of the social exchange theory;

> (1) exchange interactions result in economic and/or social outcomes, (2) these outcomes are
> compared over time to other exchange alternatives to determine dependence on the

exchange relationship, (3) positive outcomes over time increase organisation's trust of their trading partners and their commitment to the relationship, and (4) positive exchange interactions over time produce relational exchange norms that govern the exchange relationship" (Lambe, Wittmann & Spekman, 2008: 6).

With regard to the first assumption, the social exchange theory views exchange as social behaviour that may result in both economic and social outcomes. The implication of this is that individuals and organisations alike will only initiate new exchange relationships and renew old ones when they see a possibility of future rewards (Cook, Cheshire, Rice & Nakagawa, 2013). "Although economic rewards such as money are important, social rewards such as emotional satisfaction, spiritual values, and sharing humanitarian ideals are often valued more" (Lambe, et al., 2008: 6). This is in line with Blau (1968: 455) who posits that the "most important benefits involved in social exchange do not have any material value on which an exact price can be put at all, as exemplified by social approval and respect".

The second assumption of the social exchange theory states that as long as satisfactory rewards continue parties will remain in the exchange relationship (Homans, 1958). Whether the results of the exchange relationship are satisfactory or not is judged on a relative standard which varies from party to party. Some parties are understandably motivated by economic rewards while others are more interested in building trust with the exchange partner (Lambe, et al., 2008). Regardless of what the parties value more, the outcomes of the exchange relationship are weighed against potential outcomes of alternative relationships, taking into account opportunity cost.

With regard to the third assumption of the social exchange theory, positive outcomes, in the long run, increase trust and commitment of parties in an exchange relationship (Vanneste, Pranaum & Kretschmer, 2012). Trust is pivotal in social exchange because it is based on obligations rather than contracts. When an organisation provides another organisation with a benefit it must trust that the organisation will return the benefit in time or that it will reciprocate. This means that mutual reciprocation of benefits over time creates trust (Lambe, et al., 2008). Thus, the process of trust-building creates obligations between exchange partners. When parties to an exchange relationship reciprocate, mutual trust develops. The process of trust-building is therefore important in exchange relationships

because it helps create predictability and stability in the exchange relationship (Homans, 1958).

With the increase in interactions, trust also increases. For Misztal (2013), if reciprocation occurs a pattern of behaviour [and trust] begins to be entrenched. The presence of trust can make exchange partners be more committed to the exchange relationship. Therefore, it is important to build trust because the lack of trust can to lead to negative outcomess such as cynicism, low commitment, low motivation and lack of confidence among parties (Carnevale & Wechsler, 1992; Kaufman, 2012). Bannis and Nanus (1985) state that trust is a precondition for inter-organisational cooperation. Birkenmeier and Sanséau (2016) add that trust increases efficiency and effectiveness. For Aryee, et al. (2002) cited in Agarwal (2014), trust reinforces mutual loyalty, goodwill and support.

The fourth and final assumption of the social exchange theory is that positive outcomes over time produce relational exchange norms. Norms are mutually agreed-upon rules for behaviour that are developed over time as the parties in the relationship interact with each other (Lambe, et al., 2008). The social exchange is a normative theory which means that norms play a central role in the theory. Norms help reduce the degree of uncertainty in exchange relationships because they define the manner in which interactions will take place in the relationship (Lambe, et al., 2008). For Mitchell, Cropanzano and Quisenberry (2012) adhering to norms is important because it brings rewards. The more an organisation conforms to the norms, the more rewards it will gain.

There are several variables which have to be present in an exchange relationship if it is to succeed. For our purposes here, six will be briefly examined. They are dependence, trust, commitment, cooperation, relational norms, and satisfaction.

- Dependence: the dependence of one organisation on another in an exchange relationship is directly proportional to the investment such parties will make to the relationship. Organisations are dependent upon exchange relationships to the degree to which rewards sought and gained from the relationship are not available outside the relationship (Thibault & Kelly, 1959).

- Trust has been regarded as the most important variable in relational exchange by social exchange theorists (Dwyer, Schurr & Oh, 1987; Smith & Barclay, 1997; Weitz & Bradford, 1999). Morgan and Hunt (1994) have briefly described trust as the belief in an exchange partner's reliability and integrity. For Ganesan (1994), it is the possession of benevolence and credibility.

Commitment is perhaps the most widely used dependent variable in studies examining exchange (Wilson, 1995). Morgan & Hunt (1994: 23) define commitment as "an exchange partner's belief that an on-going relationship with another is so important that it warrants maximum efforts at maintaining it; that is, the committed party believes the relationship is worth working on to ensure that it endures indefinitely". Commitment is mainly influenced by the level of social and economic rewards each party receives in an exchange relationship. When organisations receive a high level of benefits from a relationship, they tend to commit to it. For Morgan and Hunt (1994), trust shared values, and relationship termination costs are positively related to commitment.

- Cooperation may be defined as "similar or complementary actions taken by organisations in interdependent relationships to achieve mutual outcomes or reciprocating over time" (Anderson & Narus, 1990: 45). As a collaborative relationship develops, organisations cooperate more to receive greater benefits. Exchange partners begin to expect that their partners will participate in cooperative behaviours that benefit the organisation (Spekman, Salmond & Lambe, 1997). There is a strong relationship between cooperation and trust. Anderson and Narus (1990) found that cooperation positively influences trust while Morgan and Hunt (1994) found that trust positively influences cooperation.

- Relational norms are vital to the continuance of exchange between organisations. Relational norms serve as governing mechanisms for exchange relationships. They also guide actions of exchange participants and reduce the threat of opportunism. For Gundlach, Achrol and Mentzer (1995), credible commitment positively influences the formation of relational norms. Relational norms also support long-term orientation towards the relationship satisfaction.

Performance satisfaction is the level in which a transaction meets the expectations of partners. For Frazer (1983), satisfaction is a state reflecting a feeling of being rewarded adequately for contributions to the relationship. If organisations are satisfied with the outcomes of the exchange relationship, they are likely to maintain or even expand the relationship. In short, satisfaction serves as a measure of an organisation's view of the outcomes of the relationship. For Lin and Germain (1998), problem-solving positively influences performance satisfaction while coercive means of conflict resolution produce negative results. Weitz and Bradford (1999) are of the view that performance satisfaction is a key attitudinal indicator of relationship quality.

The table below maps the research questions to attributes of the collaboration theory and the social exchange theory. Its purpose is to display the connection between the research questions asked in the study and the theories upon which the study is construed.

Table 2.1 Mapping Research Questions to Attributes of Theoretical Frameworks

Research Questions	Attributes of collaboration and social exchange theories
What is the purpose of OSS?	Collaboration theory- shared purpose.
How are conflicts managed in OSS?	Collaboration theory- Understanding conflict in collaborative initiatives.
How is trust-building achieved between stakeholders?	Social exchange theory- positive outcomes, trust and commitment. Collaboration theory- building trust in collaboration.
How is organisational ownership of OSS achieved?	Collaboration theory- organisational ownership of the collaboration. Social exchange theory- reciprocity, self-interests.
How are OSS decisions implemented?	Collaboration theory- capacity to collaborate.
How are monitoring and evaluation done in OSS?	
How is stakeholder communication maintained in OSS?	Collaboration theory- capacity to collaborate.
What are the challenges which have been faced by OSS?	Collaboration theory – capacity to collaborate: procedural and institutional arrangements, leadership, shared knowledge. Social exchange theory- reciprocity, self-interest.
What are the noticeable positive contributions which have been achieved by OSS?	Collaboration theory- capacity to collaborate.
To what extent is the community involved in OSS in the KwaZulu-Natal?	

3.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter has discussed the two theories which inform this study. These two theories explain why organisations and individuals chose to collaborate. This chapter has argued that there is a move towards collaboration to solve common problems in both the private and the public sectors. This move is inspired by the realisation that the complexity of today's problems requires collaboration across organisations/sectors. What emerges as the main motivation for collaboration are interests. The collaboration theory argues that organisations will only collaborate if they cannot achieve their objectives individually. This means that

organisations collaborate mainly because they want to achieve their objectives. Similarly, the social exchange theory argues that people or organisations expect to gain some reward from collaborating. Consequently, organisations or individuals will only stay committed to a collaborative arrangement if satisfactory rewards continue. Over and above the motivation for collaboration these two theories explain the conditions which must be present for collaborations to blossom. The collaboration theory, for example, notes the importance of assessing collaborative capacity. Without assessing collaborative capacity there is a risk that collaboration partners will set unrealistic goals for the initiative and when those goals are not reached trust can be eroded. The collaboration theory also emphasises the importance of a shared purpose which means that collaborating partners must have the same mission, vision and strategy. It also emphasises the importance of organisational ownership of the collaborative initiative. Organisational ownership must involve both the management and frontline staff. Another crucial element of collaboration is administration. There must be deliberate structures put in place which will administer the collaborative initiative. Both human and financial resources must be made available for this task. Both the social exchange theory and the collaboration put primacy on building trust among collaboration partners. The reason for this is that trust is a precondition for successful inter-organisational collaboration. The next chapter explains the methodology adopted in this study.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides a rationale for the choice of the qualitative research design for the study. It also explains the case study research methodology which forms the basis of this study. The chapter also discusses the research techniques used in the study and their relevance to the study. Lastly, ethical issues which arose during the study are discussed.

4.2 THE RATIONALE FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCH DESIGN

This study used a qualitative research methodology. According to Silverman (1993: 170) "qualitative methods are especially interested in how ordinary people observe and describe their lives". Payne and Payne (2004) agree, arguing that qualitative research is concerned with interpreting meaning that people bring to their own actions. For Yin (2011: 8), "Qualitative research involves studying the meaning of people's lives under real world conditions". In qualitative research, particularly when open-ended interviews are used to collect data, social interaction occurs with minimal intrusion by artificial research procedures, and people say what they want to say, not, for example, limited to responding to a researcher's pre-established questionnaire. Likewise, people will not be inhibited by the confines of a laboratory or any laboratory-like setting (Yin, 2011). Qualitative research is the kind of research that attempts to collect rich, descriptive data in respect of a particular phenomenon or context with the intention of developing an understanding of what is being observed or studied. As a research methodology, "qualitative research is concerned with understanding the processes and the social and cultural contexts which underlie various behavioural patterns and is mostly concerned with exploring the "why" questions of research" (Maree, 2007: 51).

According to Halloway and Wheeler (1996), qualitative research studies people or systems by interacting with and observing the participants in their natural environment and focusing on their meanings and interpretations. Qualitative research puts more emphasis on the quality and depth of information rather than on the scope or breadth of the information provided. It also "requires a willingness from researchers to spend extensive time in the

field collecting data, gaining access, for rapport and for an insider perspective on issues at hand" (Creswell, 1998: 17). Qualitative research differs from other kinds of research because it interprets reality from the respondent's frame of reference (Bless, Higson-Smith & Sithole, 2013). This means that the events and ideas which emerge from qualitative research can represent the meaning given to real-life events by the people who live them, not the biases, values, ideologies, perceptions, or meanings held by the researcher. In this study of the management of intergovernmental relations in Operation Sukuma Sakhe, the views of the participants were sought because they are the people who are best placed to describe or define how intergovernmental relations are managed in OSS since they work in the programme.

Another reason for choosing the qualitative research design for this study was because it covers contextual conditions – the social, institutional, and environmental conditions within which people's lives take place. These contextual conditions, in many ways, strongly influence all human events. It is assumed that many of the factors which affect intergovernmental relations are influenced by the rural and underdeveloped nature of the environment OSS operates under in uMsinga. The qualitative research design was also chosen because it endeavours to gather, integrate, and present data from a variety of sources of evidence as part of a given study. This means that the results of a qualitative study are likely to be based on triangulating data from different sources. This ensures that the study is credible and trustworthy.

For Creswell (1998: 15), "Qualitative research is a process of understanding based on a distinct methodological tradition of inquiry that explores a social problem". Creswell (1998: 15) further states that "in qualitative research, the researcher consistently builds a complex and holistic picture, analyses words, reports views of informants and restricts the study to its natural setting". This is true for this study because participants who have intimate knowledge of how intergovernmental relations are managed in OSS were involved in the study. The qualitative approach was of particular relevance because the study sought to answer the "how" question. The primary research question of the study is "how are intergovernmental relations managed in KwaZulu-Natal's OSS". To answer this and other research questions, the researcher sought the views of those who are involved in managing OSS at the ward level, local municipality level and district level. The need to present a

detailed view of how intergovernmental relations are managed in OSS required a qualitative approach.

4.3 CASE STUDY RESEARCH

According to Bromley (1990: 302) "case study research is a systematic inquiry into an event or a set of related events which aims to describe and explain the phenomenon of interest". Yin (1984: 23) defines case study research as "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context". What this means is that virtually every real-life occurrence can be the subject of a case study inquiry. The typical characteristic of a case study is that it strives to get a comprehensive understanding of how participants relate and interact with each other in a specific situation. A qualitative case study is an approach to research that facilitates exploration of a phenomenon within its context using a variety of data sources. This "ensures that the issue is not explored through one lens, but rather a variety of lenses which allows for multiple facets of the phenomenon to be revealed and understood" (Baxter & Jack, 2008: 544).

The purpose of this study is to understand the management of intergovernmental relations within the context of OSS; case study research is thus relevant to the study because it seeks to understand how people and organisations relate to each other; allows the researcher to explore individuals or organisations, relationships, communities, or programmes (Yin, 2003); and supports the deconstruction and the subsequent reconstruction of various phenomena. This approach is valuable to develop theory, evaluate programmes, and develop interventions because of its flexibility and rigour (Baxter & Jack, 2008). One of the advantages of the case study approach is the close collaboration between the researcher and the participants while enabling participants to tell their stories (Crabtree & Miller, 1999).

The choice of this method affords the researcher an opportunity to infuse the context as a major part of the research. Case study research relies on multiple sources of evidence as opposed to a single data collection method, and the need to employ distinctive strategies of research design and analysis (Yin, 2003). The multiple sources of evidence include observation, interviews, audio-visual material and documents and reports. In this study telephonic interviews were used in conjunction with government policy documents and reports.

The reason for choosing uMsinga Local Municipality as a case study is because it is one of the most deprived municipalities, not only in KwaZulu-Natal but in the whole country. This means that the community of uMsinga is in dire need of government services which are provided through the integrated service delivery model, OSS. Another reason for choosing the case study of uMsinga is that OSS was first launched here in KwaZulu-Natal when the former premier, Dr Zweli Mkhize, heeded the call by former President Thabo Mbeki to initiate a war on poverty. As noted earlier, the South African government is planning to launch OSS country-wide. Therefore, it is necessary to study how intergovernmental relations are managed in the programme so that, when it is launched in other areas of the country, policy makers and those responsible for implementation can preempt the challenges and opportunities associated with implementing OSS.

4.4 GAINING ACCESS TO THE RESEARCH SITE

To gain access to the research site and the participants the researcher had to request gatekeeper's letters from the KwaZulu-Natal Office of the Premier and the Office of the Municipal Manager for the uMzinyathi District Municipality. An email was sent to the office of the Director-General in the KwaZulu-Natal Office of the Premier requesting permission to conduct research with government officials working in OSS. Another email was sent to the office of the Municipal Manager for the uMzinyathi District Municipality requesting permission to do research in the uMsinga areas with councillors and ward conveners. The Office of the Premier granted the researcher permission to do the study on two conditions, (1) all information collected had to remain confidential, and (2) a copy of the study had to be made available to the Office of the Premier. The office of the Municipal Manager for the uMzinyathi District also granted permission for the study to be conducted on the condition that data collected would be treated with confidentiality and anonymity.

The researcher then contacted the Special Projects Unit in the KZN Office of the Premier and requested a list containing the names and contact details of government officials, conveners and ward councillors working in OSS in the uMsinga Local Municipality. The list containing contact information of OSS stakeholders was received and the researcher proceeded to contact the participants to establish contact. When the researcher began contacting participants, it became clear that the list was outdated. Some of the names in the

list were the names of people who were no longer working in OSS, some were deceased and some councillors had been removed from their positions. The researcher had to request a new updated list of stakeholders. The list was received from the Special Projects Unit of the KZN Office of the Premier.

The researcher contacted potential participants, starting with those based in Ward One up to Ward Nineteen. He explained the purpose of the study to the participants and the fact that he was a doctoral candidate at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus. The researcher then asked the participants if they would be interested in participating in the study. All those who were contacted showed a willingness to participate. The author then made appointments for face-to-face interviews which began in July 2015. On the first day, all the participants who had agreed to participate had to cancel because they had other commitments. The researcher then called the participants he had set up meetings with for the following days and all but one of them had to cancel because something had come up. That is when the researcher realised that getting people to do face-to-face interviews was going to be difficult because most of the participants were preoccupied during the day. It was decided that the best way to conduct interviews would be via telephone. The researcher then proceeded to make appointments for telephonic interviews.

4.5 SAMPLING

One of the main differences between qualitative and quantitative methods of research is found in the different logics that undergird sampling approaches. Qualitative methods typically focus in-depth on relatively small samples or cases, selected purposefully (Patton, 1990). "Quantitative methods … typically depend on larger samples selected randomly. Not only are the techniques for sampling different, but the very logic of each approach is unique because the purpose of each strategy is different" (Patton, 1990: 169). The purpose of probability sampling is generalisations, therefore, it depends on selecting a truly random and statistically representative sample that will permit confident generalisation from the sample to a larger population. Conversely, the logic and power of purposive sampling lie in selecting information-rich cases for in-depth study. Information-rich cases are those from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of

research. In other words, the purpose of purposive sampling is to select information-rich cases whose study will illuminate the question under study.

Yin (2011) concurs with the above by arguing that the goal of purposive sampling is to have those units which will yield the most relevant and plentiful data. Kuzel (1992: 37) follows the same reason when he states that "a sample must seek to obtain the broadest range of information and perspectives on the subject of a study". In this study, participants were chosen based on their knowledge of OSS. All the participants in the study hold positions within OSS. The researcher asked potential study participants how long they had worked in OSS; those who had worked for less than six months were not interviewed and those who had worked for six months or longer were interviewed. The researcher thought that those who had worked on the programme for more than six months had enough experience to answer questions about the management of the programme. Study participants included conveners, political champions (ward councillors), a LTT chairperson, a DTT chairperson and a senior official from the KwaZulu-Natal Office of the Premier. These participants were the best people to interview about the management of intergovernmental relations in OSS because they are responsible for its implementation at various levels. The study participants work on OSS on a daily basis which places them in a good position to answer questions related to the everyday operation of the programme. This also makes them the most knowledgeable people on how intergovernmental relations are managed in OSS in uMsinga.

4.6 STUDY SITE

It has been suggested that qualitative research should contextualise the study by describing the context where the research was conducted (Lyons & Coyle, 2007). The data was collected over a period of eight months through telephonic interviews. The majority of participants in the study were based in uMsinga Local Municipality located in the uMzinyathi District Municipality in KwaZulu-Natal. The uMsinga Local Municipality comprises a rural-based subsistence economy with cultural heritage areas that attract some tourists, but that still need to be substantially developed (Statistics South Africa [StatsSA], n.d). Owing to its rugged terrain, uMsinga's population is relatively dispersed. Where

services exist, they are concentrated along road infrastructure and water resources such as the uThukela River.

The uMsinga Local Municipality is predominately rural, with 99.1% of the population living in non-urban areas. Pomeroy, which is a small urban town in uMsinga is home to only 0.9% of the municipality's population. The municipality has a total population of 177,577 people of which 43.7% are aged between 0-14 years. The unemployment rate sits at 49.5% while youth unemployment is at 58.2% (StatsSA, n.d). Of the households in the municipality, 66% are headed by females. With regard to access to basic services, only 25.1% of the population has access to electricity for lighting while only 3.7% have access to piped water inside their dwelling (StatsSA, n.d).

4.7 DATA COLLECTION METHOD

4.7.1 Telephonic Interviews

Initially, the study was going to use face-to-face interviews to gather data but as discussed above, it became necessary to conduct interviews via the telephone. The use of telephone interviewing in qualitative research is uncommon due to concerns about whether they are well-suited to the task. The common practice for qualitative researchers is to use face-to-face interviewing when conducting semi-structured and in-depth interviews (Sturges, 2004). Telephone interviews can, however, be useful in a number of situations in qualitative research. According to Fenig and Levav (1993), respondents who agree to be interviewed about sensitive topics may prefer the relative anonymity of telephone versus face-to-face interaction with the researcher.

Greenfield, Madanik and Rogers (2000), have reported that telephone interviews increase respondents' perceptions of anonymity. McCracken (1988) has argued that participation in qualitative interviewing can be time-consuming, privacy endangering, and intellectually and emotionally demanding, therefore, researchers need to do whatever is possible to maximise data quality while minimising imposition on respondents. In interview-based studies, respondent reluctance to participate is well-documented (Creswell, 1998). Therefore, telephone interviewing is only useful if the researcher seeks to get access to hard-to-reach groups or people with fluctuating work schedules. Tausig and Freeman (1988: 420) concur,

arguing that "telephone interviewing provides researchers with an opportunity to obtain data from potential participants who are reluctant to participate in face-to-face interviews or from groups who are otherwise difficult to access in person". In such cases, the use of telephone interviewing could make it possible to obtain data from people who would not otherwise have their views represented (Miller, 1995).

As was noted in the above sections, it was difficult for the author to gain access to the study participants because they were busy during the day. The author had to use means which were not obstructive to the daily commitments of the study participants hence the choice to use telephone interviewing. Many study participants were employed which would have made it difficult to conduct face-to-face interviews. The use of telephone interviewing allowed the author to set up interview appointments after hours and early in the morning before work. Some interviews were conducted as early as 06:00 and some as late as 21:00 because study participants were not available during the day.

Another advantage of telephone interviewing is that it is cost-saving. Telephone interviewing is a cost-effective method of data collection, particularly when compared to face-to-face interviews located in the respondents' normal environment (Aquilino, 1992; Miller, 1995; Tausig & Freeman, 1988). The researcher would have had to travel extensively to collect data in uMsinga. This would have involved making several 300km return trips to collect data. This would have been very costly given the fact that some participants cancelled interview appointments at the last minute. Conducting the interviews telephonically proved to be very cost-effective in this case. This is in line with the argument made by Fenig and Levav (1993) that the cost of telephone interviews is one-fourth to one-half of that of face-to-face interviews. One must, however, note that even though "telephone interviewing makes it possible to collect relatively inexpensive data, this saving makes sense only when the data are of sufficient quality" (Sturges & Hanrahan, 2004: 110). In this study, the quality of the data was not compromised by telephone interviewing. This is evidenced by the fact that study participants shared information which provided answers to the research questions. Study participants also displayed a willingness to share sensitive information about the happenings in OSS. Some participants shared information about the barriers to collaboration such as inter-political party conflict and the lack of trust between

local politicians and politicians at the provincial level. This makes the researcher confident that the data collected was of sufficient quality.

Sobin, Weissman, Goldstein, Adams, Wickramatne, Warner and Lish (1993) concluded that telephone interviewing is an acceptable and valuable method of data collection. Miller (1995: 37) concurs, concluding that "telephone interviews are not better or worse than those conducted face-to-face". In addition, using the telephone was found to be an effective means to gather sensitive data (Babbie, 1986; Tausig & Freeman, 1988), even when compared with direct questioning (Weissman, Steer and Lipton, 1987). The above arguments prove that telephone interviewing is an accepted way of gathering data in qualitative research.

It must be noted however that when using telephone interviewing, researchers can encounter a number of challenges. When the researcher was conducting telephone interviews, the network was disturbed on a number of occasions and the call got cut off. The researcher would call again to re-establish contact. The researcher observed that this disturbed the flow of the interview. Another challenge that arises from conducting telephone interviews is that the cell phone battery might die during the interview. This happened when the researcher was conducting an interview. Again, this affected the flow of the interview. To prevent this from happening researchers must inform participants prior to the interview that they must make sure that their phones are adequately charged before the commencement of the interview.

4.7.2 Transcription Process

All recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim. The process of transcription took about three months due to the need to listen to the recorded interviews repeatedly in order to capture the views of participants correctly. During the transcription process, utterances by participants were noted, such as laughter, side comments, momentary pauses, interruptions and jokes. "uh-huh…" was used to reflect hesitation by participants. All interviews were conducted in isiZulu. This was done because all the participants were native isiZulu speakers. The researcher is also an isiZulu speaker so it made sense to conduct interviews using IsiZulu. Another reason for using IsiZulu was to ensure that the views of the participants were captured correctly without the language barrier. Despite being an isiZulu

speaker the researcher faced some challenges during the translation process. The challenges were caused by the fact that the researcher was not familiar with some of the words which were used by study participants. To remedy the situation the researcher downloaded an isiZulu dictionary application which helped to translate the words the author did not understand. During the transcription process, the names of the participants were removed and replaced with numbers (e.g. Councillor 1). The data analysis process is explained in the next section.

4.8 DATA ANALYSIS

This study used thematic analysis to guide the data analysis process. According to Braun and Clarke (2006), thematic analysis is used to identify, analyse and report patterns within data. The thematic analysis allows researchers to organise and describe their data in rich detail. It also involves searching across a data set to find repeated patterns of meaning. "Thematic analysis puts emphasis on the content of the text with a focus on 'what' is said more than 'how' it is said" (Riessman, 2008: 704). It also allows for a presentation of narratives emerging from the data thematically (Riessman, 2008).

After collecting the data, all the notes taken during the interviews were typed up and any initial impressions of the themes that emerged from the data were noted. After transcribing the recordings and translating the text into English, each interview listened to several times for accuracy of the translation, and each transcript was read and re-read. Thereafter began the process of generating codes. This is regarded as a key phase of data analysis within "interpretative qualitative methodology" (Bird & Bogart, 2005: 227) as it is where meanings are created (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Crabtree & Miller, 1999).

Once the data were coded, a process of developing themes using the codes began. Different codes were sorted into potential themes and grouped. Firstly, the themes identified were clustered (Crabtree & Miller, 1999) and named accordingly (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Then the themes were categorised and re-categorised in line with the research question and the aims of the study (Braun & Clarke, 2006). An attempt was also made to identify dominant narratives and focus on the functions of these group narratives. Themes were re-examined repeatedly during the analysis process in order to refine what they captured. Themes found to be misclassified were re-categorised. Major themes and sub-themes were identified.

4.9 VALIDITY

For all kinds of research, the key quality control issue deals with the validity of the research and its findings. According to Yin (2011: 78) "a valid study is one that has properly collected and interpreted its data so that the conclusions accurately reflect and represent the real world that was studied". There are many ways researchers have used to ensure the validity of their research and research findings. For the purposes of this study, triangulation was used. The principle of triangulation pertains to the goal of confirming or corroborating a particular event, description, or fact being reported by a study (Yin, 2011). This serves to strengthen the validity of the study. Triangulation can be defined as the combination of two or more data sources, investigators, methodologic approaches, theoretical perspectives (Denzin, 1970; Kimchi, Polivka & Stevenson, 1991). In this study, several data sources were used – councillors, convenors, community members and NGO staff.

Triangulation can benefit a study by increasing confidence in the research data, creating innovative ways of understanding a phenomenon, revealing unique findings, challenging or integrating theory, and providing a clearer understanding of the problem (Jick, 1979). This study achieved triangulation by interviewing different stakeholders working in OSS. The participants came from different professional backgrounds which meant that their understanding of OSS and its challenges also differed. Some of the participants were elected community representatives (ward councillors), some were government officials, some came from the community (conveners) and some came from NGOs. The selection of participants from different backgrounds meant that the study was rich in diversity which increases the validity of the study. The study also made use of government documents to supplement the information that was collected through the interviews.

The study also made use of theoretical triangulation by using the collaborative theory and the social exchange theory. According to Mitchell (1986) using more than one theoretical perspective or hypothesis can decrease alternative explanations for a phenomenon. Banik (1993) argues that one of the greatest benefits of theoretical triangulation is that it provides a broader and deeper analysis of the research findings. Theoretical triangulation increases the confidence of the accepted hypothesis or theory when data findings are tested against an opposing hypothesis or theory.

4.10 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

All participants in this study participated voluntarily. Because the interviews were conducted telephonically, study participants were read the consent form and asked if they agreed to participate in the study. They were also made aware that the conversation was going to be audio-recorded. All study participants were informed that their participation was voluntary and that they had a choice to participate, not participate and to stop participating in the research. They were also given contact information of the University of KwaZulu-Natal's Human and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee. Study participants were also given contact information of the study supervisor, Dr Khondlo Mtshali. They were also assured that their identities would be treated with strict confidentiality. Confidentiality is very important in research. It serves to protect study participants from negative consequences that may arise as a result of their participation in the study. It is believed that a participant is more likely to provide honest responses to research questions if they have a guarantee that their identity is not going to be exposed. In this sense, confidentiality is beneficial to both the participants and the researcher.

All audio recordings and transcripts were filed electronically on the researcher's computer, with access to the files being password-protected. Once all the information was transcribed, names and all identifying information were removed to ensure anonymity. Ethical clearance for this study was granted by the University of KwaZulu-Natal's Human and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee.

4.11 LIMITATIONS

While the current study sheds light on the management of intergovernmental relations in KwaZulu-Natal's OSS, there are two major limitations. The first major limitation of the study is that it was based in a rural municipality which might mean that the results are applicable in rural settings only. It might be that case that in urban settings some of the challenges discussed in the study do not exist. The author would have loved to have conducted research in all the 11 districts of KwaZulu-Natal but this was not possible because of time and monetary constraints. As a result, the views of only 3 districts are represented namely, uMzinyathi District, Amajuba District and uThukela District. This means that the study does not represent what happens in the entire province of KwaZulu-

Natal. The second limitation of the study is that the views of politicians from the district and provincial levels are not represented. Attempts were made to interview politicians with no success. This might be due to the fact that politicians had busy schedules since the study was conducted around election season.

4.12 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter explained the data-gathering process of the study. It provided the rationale for using a qualitative research design in the study. It also discussed the relevance of the case study method in this study and explained the process of gaining access to the research participants. The use of purposive sampling in the study was discussed and justified. The chapter also provided a justification for the use of telephonic interview in qualitative research. Lastly, the study highlighted some of the ethical considerations which emerged during the study.

CHAPTER 5

MANAGING INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND CROSS-SECTOR COLLABORATION IN OPERATION SUKUMA SAKHE

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the results of the study. The approach the researcher has adopted is to provide the results from the interviews on key themes, and then to give a summative opinion at the end of each section. The first theme deals with the perceptions of the participants on the purpose of the programme and what it seeks to achieve. The study found that OSS is a programme for fighting poverty and hunger, a forum for sharing of views, an integrated service delivery model and a forum for the resolution of community challenges. The second theme deals with the challenges facing OSS. These challenges include but are not limited to the lack of attendance by government departments, lack of capacity in both government departments and in the community, inter-party completion which leads to conflict and lack of resources. Other themes presented in this chapter deal with the importance of collaboration, trust, organisational ownership and conflict management. The chapter also deals with the impact of OSS on poverty alleviation as well as the role played by community members in the programme.

5.2 UNDERSTANDING OSS

This section presents the views of the participants on what OSS is and the purpose it seeks to achieve.

5.2.1 An Integrated Service Delivery Model which brings Services closer to Communities

The opinions of the various interviewees are captured below.

Official from the KwaZulu-Natal Office of the Premier: *OSS is a service delivery implementation model that we use as a province whereby we integrate service with all government department, the municipalities, civil society and the community at large. What we do is we coordinate OSS provincially, within the districts, locally and within the wards.*

Convener 1: *OSS is where government departments meet and make plans to bring services to communities. Sukuma Sakhe is designed to make it possible for members of the community to get access to services closer to where they stay.*

Convener 2: *OSS was created to enhance service delivery in mostly rural areas and other areas lagging behind on service delivery matters. The premier saw the situation and decided to create a way to bring services to communities. To achieve this, the premier created War Rooms in wards to make it easy to find out about and respond to the challenges facing communities. In the War Room, you sit as a ward and discuss issues with CCGs, CDWs, community members as well as government departments. The War Room is meant to make it easy for departments to be available to communities but they are hardly available.*

Convener 3: Ok*, Sukuma Sakhe is where the community meets with different departments with the intention of helping the community with what they need. Let me not say department; let me say, stakeholders, because all stakeholders are there. The War Room allows residents or community members to get access to government services without having to go to government offices.*

Convener 4: *OSS was founded or organised by Premier Zweli Mkhize with the aim of making sure that services reach communities in time. War Rooms in wards serve this very purpose which is to bring services closer to the communities.*

Convener 9: *OSS is a programme that was designed to respond to the needs of the community collaboratively. It also seeks to listen to the community to understand their needs. The programme also seeks to bring government departments closer to the community to facilitate the delivery of services.*

LTT Chairperson: *OSS is a strategy which is meant to bring the government closer to the people in an integrated approach where all departments descend without the need to do referrals. Another role of OSS is to resolve challenges we find in communities on the spot. However, there are some challenges we cannot solve on the spot, for example, there are cases which require technology where officials have to engage their systems, which can only be done at the office.*

5.2.2 A Forum for Resolving Community Problems

Several participants felt that OSS was a forum for resolving community problems. Their opinions are provided below:

Convener 5: *OSS is where people bring their problems so that they can be resolved. It is where all stakeholders meet to try and resolve the challenges faced by communities. OSS is useful because people cannot access government offices because they are too far and too full. OSS makes it easy for them because officials come to the community to assist the people.*

Convener 6: *Sukuma Sakhe was created with the vision of helping the community bring what is hidden to the fore so that they can be assisted. Field workers go to individual households and do profiling after they are done with the profiling they bring their reports to the War Room so that specific departments can plan interventions.*

Convener 7: *I would say that Sukuma Sakhe is a committee where all stakeholders which include the community, community organisations and government officials meet and discuss issues which are affecting the ward. As officials of government, our role is to do interventions and help communities overcome their challenges. Basically, it is where we resolve issues of the ward collaboratively.*

Convener 10: *According to my knowledge, Sukuma Sakhe is where problems of the community are presented and resolved. The programme was created to bring services closer to the people and to ensure a speedy response.*

Councillor 1: *As far as I know Sukuma Sakhe is a programme brought by the government for us to work together in the wards so that the people's needs can be met. It brings all stakeholders who are represented in the ward to discuss the challenges faced by the community and to try and resolve them. Before we had Sukuma Sakhe we would meet and discuss issues faced by the community but it would end there, there was no follow-up. Now that there is Sukuma Sakhe, it is easy because departments come to the War Room, which makes it easy for us to follow-up on particular cases.*

Councillor 2: *From where I am sitting what is supposed to be happening in OSS is that the community must present its challenges and then individual departments must present what they can offer the community.*

Councillor 3: *Sukuma Sakhe is where different government departments work together with the community to resolve problems faced by the community. The community reports their challenges in the War Room and departments come up with interventions to resolve those challenges. ... OSS is about departments working together to resolve challenges and assisting the community.*

Councillor 5: *OSS consists of stakeholders from uMsinga where they meet and discuss things which affect the ward so that they can come up with solutions to the challenges facing the community.*

Speaker of the Municipality: *In OSS, all stakeholders converge with one purpose and that is to resolve the challenges faced by the community. Each department represented in the War Room makes sure that it does interventions on issues which fall within its area of operation.*

5.2.3 A Programme for Fighting Poverty and Hunger

Two interviewees said that OSS was intended to fight poverty and hunger.

Convener 8: *Even though I might be wrong, but I think Sukuma Sakhe is where government departments and department officials converge to fight against hunger and poverty.*

DTT Chairperson: *Sukuma Sakhe is a way in which the government, NGOs and other community organisations come together to work in service of communities. We also try to meet the issues of poverty, hunger etc. halfway. Our task also includes fighting the HIV disease; we also do TB awareness as well as ensuring that services are delivered efficiently to communities. It is not the responsibility of the government alone; we work collaboratively with groups like churches and so on.*

5.2.4 A Forum for Sharing Views

Councillor 6 stated that *OSS is a platform for sharing views on what is happening in the community. This platform involves all stakeholders in the ward including traditional leadership*.

5.2.5 Summary of the Findings on the Purpose of OSS

From the data, it appears that OSS means different things to different people. Some respondents view OSS as a way of bringing services closer to communities, others see it a forum for resolving community problems and other see it as a forum for fighting poverty and hunger. What is also clear from the data is that every respondent appreciates the fact that it is an initiative designed to help communities and to bring services closer to communities. This is particularly useful in rural communities which are still left behind in terms of service delivery. When government services are brought closer to communities, community members get assistance with what they need without having to go to government offices which are usually far away in town. The study has also found that OSS does not only bring services closer to communities but it also allows for community voices to be heard. In addition, OSS is responsible for resolving community problems. It not only deals with problems on the surface but also deals with the problems which are hidden in society. The role of resolving community problems is not only a responsibility of government departments but a role played by a myriad of stakeholders represented in the War Room which includes the community. One of the aims of OSS is to fight poverty and hunger in poor communities. Some respondents view this role as a role played by government departments while others see it as a collective responsibility of government departments, NGOs and other community-based organisations.

5.3 CHALLENGES FACING OSS

The study participants shared their views about the challenges facing OSS as follows:

5.3.1 Lack of Attendance by Government Departments

DTT Chairperson: *One of the challenges we encounter particularly at the War Room level is that very few departments have the capacity to attend. All departments are supposed to attend the War Room but very few are able to do that. For example, the department I work for (Department of Public Works) does not have capacity because of its limited role in government. We work as an implementing agent, for example, if the Department of Health wants a hospital, we build it. You then have the mega departments like the Department of Health and the Department of Basic Education who operate at lower levels. In a ward, for*

example, you find clinics, hospitals and schools. The capacity of departments is not the same. You cannot compare the Department of Health with the Department of Economic Development. The Economic Development Department within uMzinyathi has about 3 or 4 employees; you can imagine how many wards we have in the district. ... Last year (2015) we had around 50 wards and with the demarcation set to take place this year, I don't know how many wards we will end up having. The Department of Economic Development is a valuable department because it deals with things like economic development, small, medium and micro-sized enterprises (SMMEs) and cooperatives. The government is trying to go the route of co-ops and to have 3 officials dealing with all the wards in the district becomes impractical. So, I can say that the major challenge is the lack of capacity in departments.

Official from the KwaZulu-Natal Office of the Premier: *The main challenges facing OSS basically is non-participation of government departments in War Rooms. It is their duty or it is within their mandate that they should attend the War Room so that they identify the issues that were raised at the War Rooms and intervene. The intervention process gets delayed because government departments do not participate, not all of them some of them. Basically, their argument is that they are short-staffed in some departments like Home Affairs. ... So, what they do is collect the issues and take them back to the office. They do not necessarily sit in the War Room; for an example, they would take the names of all the people who want IDs and then bring back a report to the War Room. … To help fight department absenteeism, we have developed what we call a Track Register which tracks the attendance of a particular department. It does not track a person but the department; if the person who is designated to attend the War Room is not available, somebody else should attend. We have collated information that we collected for tracking the attendance. It was tabled at the COHOD: the COHOD is a Committee of HODs which sits at the Office of the Premier so that the HODs can intervene where their departments are concerned. That is the highest committee that we have tabled the challenge to.*

Speaker of the Municipality: *The biggest challenge we are facing is that departments do not attend War Rooms. It is very difficult! We were just saying the other day that our biggest challenge is those departments which do not want to attend. The only department that we know we can depend on in the ward is the Department of Agriculture. The Department of*

Health is only helped by the presence of CCGs but officials do not attend. It is difficult to get the Hospital Matron to come to meetings. We want to hear what are the challenges she is faced with so that we can assist.

Convener 2: *What I can say is that the major challenge facing the War Room is the lack of cooperation by some departments. When people present their problems in the War Room, they hope that there will be a solution. If the relevant department is not represented in the War Room that becomes a challenge because it means the person who requires assistance will not receive a quick feedback. If a person is not assisted they tend to lose hope and they start to see us a people who are only interested in telling stories.*

Convener 7: *We also have a problem with the attendance of departments. The only department that is attending War Room meetings is the Department of Social Development (DSD). Even the Department of Social Development has lost hope because of the problems we are having, they are attending less frequently.*

Convener 4: *Just like I said earlier, the War Room can only function well if government departments play their role. If you look at the OSS Green Book it spells out clearly that departments must attend War Rooms. However, departments do not attend War Rooms. That's the reason why there are many problems within the War Room. It would be easier to work if all departments attended War Room meetings because you can refer cases directly to the relevant official. The government must instruct officials to come to War Room because without officials we just sit in the War Room and speak to ourselves.*

Convener 5: *Another problem we face is that departments do not attend the way they should. The only department which attends War Room meetings is the Department of Social Development. Departments like Health and Education do not come to meetings. The Department of Agriculture tries to come to meetings every now and then.*

Convener 6: *The biggest problem we are faced with right now is that departments do not attend. The lack of attendance by departments means that cases lie in files without being referred to the relevant departments for interventions.*

Convener 10: *The biggest challenge we face in the War Room is the lack of attendance by departments. They don't attend meetings; we end up alone. As I have said we are still new*

in the War Room, you find that at times we find ourselves not knowing how to resolve certain challenges. We end up depending on the political champion (councillor) to help us resolve challenges faced by the community. The political champion goes directly to government offices to ask for assistance. He also tries to get the municipality to assist where it can.

Councillor 1: *We also face low attendance rates from officials and other stakeholders. Sometimes we have challenges which involve crime but police personnel are not available. When we go to the station commander to check why the police are not attending, he tells us that they do not have enough personnel and cars to attend the War Room. When you go to Home Affairs you find the same challenges, they tell us that they have two or three people and they cannot attend the War Room all the time.*

Councillor 2: *Sometimes you find that departments do not attend War Rooms. Some do not attend at all. Another problem we face is that departments send different people to the War Room which affects continuity. Today it's this person, tomorrow it's another person. The one who was there before knows what's going on in the War Room whereas the new one has to start from the beginning without the knowledge of what's going on. The lack of attendance by government departments is a problem because if everyone attends we are able to share ideas and move forward in resolving the challenges faced by the community.*

Councillor 3: *Mr Phakathi, there are many challenges and they make it very difficult for OSS to be operational. Departments do not attend where there should be doing interventions. They tell us that they do not have cars; as a result, they cannot come to communities. Even when we have gone out and did household profiling, people still can't get the help they need because departments do not attend War Rooms.*

Councillor 5: *There are so many challenges we are faced with particularly with the departments. The first challenge we face with regards to the departments is that they do not attend War Room meetings. Even if we try to refer the cases we find in the community to them, they do not respond. This is a big problem because when you go into someone's house and make promises to them, they believe that their lives will change for the better but that doesn't happen.*

Councillor 6: *The biggest challenge we face is the departments. You find that officials leave their offices to go to OSS meeting but they do not arrive in the meetings. If the departments can commit themselves to working together, that would make doing interventions easy and fast. Our biggest problem is that we can't do interventions because some departments do not attend War Rooms.*

5.3.2 Lack of Capacity in the Community

DTT Chairperson: *Another challenge is the lack of capacity in the community. The KwaZulu-Natal Government wants the programme to be managed by communities themselves. The government insists that the chairperson of the War Room and the Secretariat must be members of the community. For these people to effectively execute their duties, they need resources. They need to have access to things like phones and printers to facilitate the work of the War Room. For us as government officials, it is easy because we can always access emails, fax machines and we have access to telephones which makes it easy to follow up on cases. On the other hand, the community does not have access to such resources. The main problem in relation to communities is the lack of resources.*

Convener 1: *The biggest problems we face has to do with the conveners. If you are a convener, you are chosen from the community and you work as a volunteer. But you find that the amount of work becomes too much because you are expected to attend LTT meeting, have transport and make many phone calls. This becomes difficult if you are only volunteering and you have no money. If a department was not able to attend the War Room and someone needed help from that particular department, it is your duty to do follow-ups with that department which becomes difficult if you do not have the resources to do that. … Sometimes you have to report a particular case to a government department but you do not even have airtime to call that department. Even when you do have airtime, you call the government departments and they don't take you seriously because you are just a volunteer. They have the advantage that they get paid and you don't get paid. This is problematic because if the community doesn't get the assistance they are supposed to get I am the one who gets suspected of not knowing what I'm doing.*

LTT Chairperson: *My brother, what I can tell you is that I led OSS at the time when it was being launched when we were at the stage of trial and error. You had a situation where*

War Rooms were still chaired by government officials even though the provincial government had made a decision that all chairpersons of War Rooms must be chosen from the community. Obviously with a major change like that there were bound to be challenged. An ordinary civilian does not have the same level of knowledge of government policies as a government official. They had to be oriented into their new roles. … We had to take baby steps with the new community-based chairpersons. Some turned up for the meeting; some did not. Those who did not turn up for meetings did not do so not because they didn't want to attend but because they did not have transport to move them from point A to point B. Because the role of a convener is a voluntary role, it was problematic because these people had no allowance and transport to use in executing OSS duties. The programme at that time was not well-resourced; it did not even have guiding documents. … How was the convener supposed to get to LTT meeting? Who was responsible for providing transport to the new community-based conveners? As much as they were volunteering, ... we know that it is taxing to pay for a trip which is not necessarily in your best interest.

Official from the KwaZulu-Natal Office of the Premier: *There are positives and there are negatives as far as having community-based conveners is concerned. The positive about it is that the community member resides in that particular ward. They are born and bred there; they know everything about the ward and the status of the ward. It's not like they do the job because they are employed to do it, they relate to the issues of the ward because they are born and bred there. I think it was a good move to remove government officials and introduce community members as conveners. … I will make an example, I went to one of the wards in Harry Gwala; a CDW who is born and bred in that ward is also a convener of that ward. You know if you are born and bred in that area you know each and every corner of the ward. You know about the infrastructure of the ward and the dynamics within the ward. That CDW won a silver award in the premier's service sector awards because of the nature of the work that he does. He takes this very seriously because it affects his own community. … The negative is that not all community conveners are employed. This convener is employed by COGTA as a community development worker. An ordinary member who is unemployed and is a convener faces difficulties when they want to go to town. There are positives and negatives as I have said. But I think that having a community member as the convener of the War Room is better than having a government official*

because government officials change jobs all the time. For example, if you are a convener of a particular ward and you get a job in another district or another province you just leave that ward and focus on your new job, unlike somebody who is born there.

5.3.3 Political Challenges

DTT Chairperson: *Another challenge is political dynamics at the ward level. The KwaZulu-Natal Government has a programme of CDWs. CDWs are responsible for profiling households which make them the people who really know what is going on within communities. Because of this, some councillors become fearful and uneasy. This is because they think/ feel that CDWs are taking over their role in the community. In other War Rooms, this causes the working relationship between councillors and CDWs to become dysfunctional. When a councillor knows that the CDW belongs to party he/she will make sure that the work of the CDW is disturbed. As a result, it becomes impossible to work.*

Official from the KwaZulu-Natal Office of the Premier: *Apart from the non-participation of government departments, we have political dynamics as well. You find that the councillor who is the chairperson or the champion of the War Room is within another political party and they believe that OSS is for another party so they don't believe in it or give their all to make OSS work. They would probably criticise it.*

Convener 1: *Sometimes we have political challenges; you find that the person who needs help must contact the councillor to be assisted. If the councillor knows which political party they belong to, he will not assist them because they do not come from the same political party. When councillors refuse to help people based on the political difference, you end up looking like you are a liar; you promise things you cannot deliver.*

Convener 4: *We also have political challenges which affect the work of OSS. In the War Room, the ward councillor is IFP (Inkatha Freedom Party). What the councillor does is… according to the Sukuma Sakhe Green Book whatever comes from the government to the ward must be presented in the War Room so that the War Room can analyse the situation and work on it. If the councillor sees that this will win him votes he will send the ward committee and work this politically and identify only the people who belong to his political organisation so that he can build trust within his own organisation. What about other people who are not part of his organisation? People suffer and point fingers at the*

government saying the government is not doing anything when it is doing things but these things go through the wrong door. … In the last meeting we held last week, we were visited by the Department of Health and we were told that that the CCGs do not want to work with us. Some people are controlled by others so if they are told not to go there they do not go there. CCGs do not participate in War Room activities because they are told not to pay attention to the War Room/OSS because it is someone else's thing. I don't know how you can say a government programme is someone else's thing because after elections the organisation who won has the power to govern. You cannot look at me and say 'you are working with that person who is wearing that T-shirt' even if I am not wearing it anymore. This attitude is then spread throughout the community and then you find that structures do not work properly because there are political heads that attack the government, the same government which pays their salaries every month.

Councillor 2: *Another challenge or threat which disables this beautiful thing is that sometimes there are political aims. Sometimes when things are planned, for example, if the provincial government or an MEC is visiting the area, as the political champion, you are not told. You hear rumours that someone will be visiting the ward. That's politics! Now when community members ask you what is happening, you are blank because you were not told. You are left behind. They plan a long time in advance and we are not consulted, which makes working in this beautiful programme difficult. It leaves a bitter aftertaste.*

Convener 5: *The main challenge we are faced with is the lack of attendance by politicians. This lack of attendance by politicians is caused by the belief that the War Room is biased towards the political champions. This is the reason why opposing politicians do not attend the War Room. I think they don't come to meetings because they do not come from the same political organisation as the political champion. This is wrong because the War Room does not work in a partisan way. Government officials are not affiliated to any political organisation.*

5.3.4 Lack of Understanding of the Purpose of OSS

Local Task Team Chairperson: *There are challenges faced by the LTT. When I started working in OSS it was still a new concept to many people. Departments had solutions for community problems which were not aligned to the ward-based approach. You found that*

departments were clueless on what Sukuma Sakhe is about and they did not understand their role within OSS. Even though some departments hit the ground running as far as implementing OSS was concerned they were still frustrated because others had not understood what it was about. Maybe that was caused by the fact that people had not been trained on how to integrate their programmes with those of other stakeholders. For example, departments like the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development think that their role is limited to courts but they are also needed in communities. … What I also noticed is that the people who were meant to represent their respective departments on OSS always came unprepared which meant that the work might have been too much for the staff complement they had. … Another challenge is that every department has its own protocol. When an instruction comes from the outside (OSS) and that information cannot be verified on the inside, the official cannot take that information because it comes from someone with no credentials within the department. It would have been better if departments aligned their job descriptions (JDs) to include fieldwork. This is because as long as fieldwork is not included in their JD they will not focus on OSS, they will only focus on their deliverables. How can you expect a person to dedicate their time to something they are not required to report on? … If we are fortunate to get a person who understands OSS, then it becomes easier to work. But if the person is paper-based, they will say this is not on my JD so I can't do it. Once OSS is included in an official's JD then it becomes a key performance area. That means they are expected to deliver because there are targets that every employee has to meet.

5.3.5 Lack of Resources: Transport, Personnel, Working Equipment

LTT Chairperson: *Beyond the challenge of JDs there is a challenge of lack of resources. OSS is a mobile strategy and without mobility (you have to use vehicles to go to communities) it is as if you are playing. It defeats the very purpose of OSS because that means communities still have to go to government offices. If government officials can't go to the people that means the government has not transformed.*

Official from the KwaZulu-Natal Office of the Premier: *In term of office furniture and stationery the Office of the Premier has provided those resources. Not all of them but we have started with the five municipalities that have been identified as the most deprived*

municipalities in the province. These municipalities are uMsinga Local Municipality under uMzinyathi District, uMumhlabuyalingana Local Municipality under uMkhanyakude District, Vulamehlo Local Municipality under Ugu District and the last one is Inkandla Local Municipality under Uthungulu District which is now referred to as the King Cetshwayo District.

Convener 2: *Another major challenge we face is the lack of resources. We simply do not have the resources required to carry out the work. We were thinking of asking the municipality to donate their old computers and photocopy machines to our War Room so that we can be able to function. Having a computer and a photocopy machine can help us create a proper filing system. We are also experiencing a shortage of stationery in the War Room. CCGs have to go to either Greytown or uMsinga to do administrative work because in the rural areas we don't have access to the necessary resources. … When I am going to call a War Room meeting, I go and ask the neighbourhood school to print the agenda for me so that I can file it. The minutes of meetings are just written in an exercise book which means there is no proper filing system.*

Convener 3: *The other problem we face in OSS is the lack of transport. Many people are unemployed and have to travel long distances to reach government offices. Even the CCGs who are tasked with collecting information from the community do not have transport because they are volunteering. If all the stakeholders attended War Room meetings, it would make everyone's life easier because people would not need to travel far to get assistance.*

Convener 6: *We have a problem with office stationery; if we need stationery, we ask the ward councillor. We also do not have a computer; if we need to use a computer we borrow it from the CDW from Home Affairs. We are also experiencing a shortage of CCGs. CCGs are the ones who go to the community to collect information on the challenges faced by the community and bring it to the War Room so that interventions can be done. I think we only have two CCGs in our entire ward. The representative of the local clinic relies on us for transport to go to the War Room. When I come from uThukela, I have to pick her up so that she can … attend the War Room meeting. If I don't do that, it means she won't attend.*

Councillor 1: *The challenge we face is that sometimes you get people who are really poor in the communities and when you go to the departments, you are not able to get assistance with food parcels. Even if you go and ask for assistance in the municipality, you don't get assistance because they can only assist a few people and not all the people who need urgent assistance. … In the War Room, we also don't have basic things like chairs. They created the War Room but did not provide us with tables, chairs etc. We don't have anything.*

Councillor 3: *Another challenge is that CCGs do not have transport to do household profiling. The ward is very big and the CCGs require transport to do their work effectively. The problem has become even bigger because now we don't even have the CCGs. The CCGs we had were employed by the Department of Health when a new hospital was opened. Now we have no CCGs. So now when we call a War Room, no one comes; even members of the community do not come to the War Room anymore. If they come, it's only a few people.*

Councillor 4: *There are so many challenges which affect the work of OSS in this ward. The War Room is held at a One Stop Centre which does not have electricity. It is very difficult to work in a place with no electricity. Sometimes you want to make a photocopy of a document but you can't do that because there is no electricity. A person has to travel to town just to make a photocopy; this is a huge inconvenience. The second major challenge we face is that the area we operate in is not fenced. It is not a safe and secure environment to work in. We don't even have the most basic office materials which make it very difficult to execute our duties. … We also have challenges related to transport. We plan a programme for our community only to be set back by the lack of transport. Government officials also fail to attend War Room because they are understaffed in the local offices. This is a problem because it means that community members will not be assisted as quickly as possible; they have to wait long periods of time for government interventions.*

Councillor 6: *We also have a problem of lack of resources; the offices we are using do not have computers and the building does not have electricity which makes working very difficult. We have asked the municipality to help us with electrifying the building.*

5.3.6 Lack of Attendance by Stakeholders

Convener 3: *Stakeholders do not participate in War Room. Some come but some do not come. I am afraid that in the end there will be no one coming to the War Rooms. However, we do try to refer many of the challenges faced by communities to relevant departments and many of them do get the assistance they require. You will find that most of the time people have problems but they don't know where they can go to get assistance. The War Room provides them with an avenue to resolve their challenges.*

Convener 8: *We have a problem with schools. School representatives do not come to the War Room. The chairpersons of school governing bodies are not committed. We also don't have social workers in our War Room. The police are also not represented in our War Room. We have been promised that we will get a social worker who will be working with us in the War Room. Social workers are important because it is they who go into the community, assess the situation and then ask for interventions from relevant departments.*

5.3.7 Lack of Clearly Defined Roles and Powers in the War Room

Convener 1: *Another problem we are faced with in the War Room is that as conveners we do not have powers. As the convener, I have never gone through any training where my powers and responsibilities were explained to me. I do not know where my powers begin and end. Which makes things difficult because we are working with professional people who went to school for their jobs. You end up being the one who is told how to do things. For example, if you do reports, government officials want to be the ones who tell you how to report. You only learn about your duties once you attend the LTT. … Another problem is that the people we are supposed to be convening are more educated than us. They have qualifications and they get paid while we don't get paid. That gives them a major advantage. When you request a report from some government officials, they even go as far as saying they only report to their departments, not to us. It would be better if we knew the extent of our powers so that if an official does something, we know what the proper course of action to take is.*

Convener 7: *We face so many challenges in our War Room; we have never even elected a convener. That takes us back by a lot. As an official, I do not have the power, the power is*

with the political champion. The political champion himself is not a regular in the War Room. Even the community is not able to attend the War Room because we are in a remote area and transport is not available.

5.3.8 Geographical Issues

Convener 2: *Another problem we face is that we are in a remote area and government departments are not too keen to visit remote rural areas. They do not like coming to us because we are too far. We always report them to their managers and to higher structures but that takes too much time and delays the process of delivery.*

5.3.9 Mandela Week: Unfulfilled Promises

Convener 2: *Another challenge we have particularly during the Mandela Week is that we are told to go profile poor households who will get assistance. They promise us that a manager from the government will come and people will be assisted. But that does not happen and we end up looking like liars in the eyes of the community.*

Councillor 2: *Another challenge which I think is making people lose interest in OSS is that we discuss issues, profile poor households but nothing happens. This happened a lot during the Mandela Week. During the Mandela Week people are promised that they will be assisted but when the time comes nothing comes of it. During the Mandela Week, we run around profiling impoverished households promising them assistance. Some of these people live in appalling conditions. It is very difficult, some of them do not even have food to eat, and they sleep on empty stomachs. It is people like these who hope that they will receive assistance but nothing materialises. This lack of delivery makes people turn against you as the political champion because they sincerely believe that they will be assisted, but year after year they are disappointed. … Another challenge is that we would sit down in the War Room and discuss things which will move our communities forward only to find that it ends there. Nothing happens. They say it will happen but it does not happen, they say they will follow up but it doesn't happen. If I had money I would pay for these things myself. The children with matric certificates are recruited to help with profiling households but they don't get anything in return. It's been many years, two or maybe three, they promised that they will give them something for their efforts but nothing has happened. How are we going*

to ask these children to help us with household profiling again? These children can see that they are being taken advantage of because they are poor and they have nothing!

5.3.10 Summary of the Findings on Challenges with OSS

The study has found that the main challenge facing OSS is the lack of attendance at meetings by government departments. There are various reasons why government departments fail to attend these meetings, ranging from the size of the government department, its role within government and the resources it has at its disposal. The departments which have a small number of personnel are not able to send people to War Room meeting regularly. The lack of attendance by government departments renders War Rooms dysfunctional because government departments are the only stakeholders who are empowered to do the necessary interventions in communities. In addition, the lack of attendance by some government departments discourages the departments who are committed to OSS. The lack of War Room attendance by government departments has led to cynicism on the part of the community who have lost hope in OSS as a genuine means to resolve their problems. The study also discovered that the only government departments who are showing consistency in their commitment to OSS are the Department of Agriculture and the DSD.

Another challenge which affects the work of OSS is the lack of capacity in the community. Community members who are tasked with managing OSS at the ward level do not have the necessary resources to effectively execute their duties. The study found that community-based conveners sometimes fail to attend meetings because they do not have transport. They even lack airtime needed to coordinate meetings. This appears to be a classic case of an unfunded mandate from the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government. Some community-based conveners did not go through proper training on government policies to enable them to do their jobs effectively. Even though the idea of a community-led Operation Sukuma Sakhe is a plausible one, it appears that the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Government did not adequately plan how this new model of OSS would be operationalised.

The study also discovered that political challenges affect the intergovernmental relations in OSS. CDWs are perceived as a threat by ward councillors because they do the work which traditionally falls within the purview of councillors. This has caused turbulence in the

working relationship between some CDWs and some ward councillors. This tension affects intergovernmental relations in OSS. Furthermore, party politics disturb the working relationship among members of OSS. The data show that some members of the War Room do not want to work with people who belong to other political parties and that opposition politicians do not attend War Room meetings because they do not hold the same political views as the political champion. What also emerges from the data is that political party affiliation affects whether a community member gets assistance in the War Room or not. This is very worrying because OSS is a government programme which should not be partisan but should service every member of society. Another political challenge which emerged from the data is that local authorities are not consulted by the provincial government when hosting events. This causes friction between the local government and the provincial government thus affecting intergovernmental relations.

The study also discovered that one of the challenges facing OSS is that some government departments still do not understand the purpose of the programme. This is very surprising because the programme is the brainchild of the provincial government which means that all provincial government departments must be clued up about its purpose and goals. This might indicate that organisational ownership is still weak in some government departments.

The lack of resources was highlighted by a significant number of respondents as one of the main challenges facing OSS. It is clear to see from the data that OSS is not a well-resourced programme. Some respondents reported that they do not have access to transport to attend the meeting and to do household profiling, airtime to coordinate meetings, office stationery, and office equipment such as printers, fax machines and computers. Some even reported that the office buildings they use do not have electricity and chairs. It is clear that the lack of resources negatively affects intergovernmental relations in OSS. Data indicate that the lack of transport is a huge barrier to doing household profiling. This means that War Room members cannot know what is happening in the community. The study also discovered that some of the community-based conveners do not have knowledge regarding the extent of their powers. This indicates that they did not get proper training before they assumed their roles as conveners.

5.4 THE IMPORTANCE OF COLLABORATION IN OSS

According to the collaborative theory parties to a collaborative endeavour must see the need to collaborate for the collaborative initiative to be successful. The opinions of study participants regarding the importance of collaboration in OSS are captured in the subsections below.

5.4.1 Collaboration as a way to Save Costs for Community Members

Convener 1: *The way I see it there are people here in the ward who are not able to access services because most of the services are only found in town. But if departments come to the War Room, people are able to get assistance without incurring costs. Working collaboratively is very helpful but departments must be monitored so that they can do what they are supposed to do. If we can make departments to do their work, collaboration can be successful. What would also make collaboration more effective is making sure that the convener has powers. This is important because the way things are done currently is not right. Government employees take advantage of the fact that they are employed.*

Convener 5: *The presence of departments is important because some people do not have money to go to government offices which are far away in town. Having departments near communities makes things easy.*

Convener 10: *I think collaboration is very important because when government departments are closer to the community the community can be assisted fast. This also saves money which would otherwise have been used travelling to government offices in town. Having different stakeholders collaborating also helps the community because they get valuable information of what to bring to offices so that their challenges can be addressed.*

5.4.2 Collaboration as a way to Ensure Efficiency in the Delivery of Services to Communities

Convener 2: *The War Room is built in such a way that all types of people/stakeholders in the community must be represented. When I started working on OSS, I was a representative of an NGO, after that, I was appointed as a convener. In that time, I have learned that the War Room is like a human body, everything must function properly. When one government*

department is not represented, that affects the functionality of the whole War Room. For example, if people need Identity Documents (IDs), they have to have a police affidavit which means that Home Affairs and the police must be represented in the War Room. There is no department that is not needed, which is why collaboration is important.

Convener 3: *There is a need to collaborate with different stakeholders because people do not only require the services of one stakeholder but all of them. If stakeholders are not present or represented in the War Room, it makes the process of assisting someone long and difficult but if all stakeholders are present the problem is solved for sure*.

Convener 7: *Collaboration is very important. There is a need for collaboration between government departments and other stakeholders because it makes it easy to work on something quickly and move on to other tasks. Working collaboratively with different stakeholders ensures that there is no duplication of activities. If we work together, we make a bigger impact because we can resolve things quickly*.

Convener 8: *It is very important to collaborate because, when different government departments are present and there is an intervention which requires their department, they can be able to respond quickly*.

Convener 9: *Mmm… my brother, it is very important for government departments to work together to bring services and development to the community. When departments are present in War Room meetings, it makes it easier to do interventions speedily. When all departments are present you can make the necessary interventions on the spot. For that reason, I believe that it is very important to work collaboratively*.

LTT Chairperson: *The need for integration/collaboration with other departments is very high because an intervention that could have taken you three months can be done in three weeks. Collaboration is also important because it makes the government more efficient which means that the government can deliver services timeously*.

5.4.3 Collaboration as a Way of Sharing Ideas/Knowledge

Convener 4: *Working collaboratively is important and it can work, together we can do more. You cannot work as an individual, even if you a councillor you do need other*

people's views that's why they call community meetings and talk. They then use the views of the people to respond to the challenges faced by the community.

Convener 5: *There is a need for departments to work together in OSS, as I said before, that makes our work much easier. CCGs collect information on the challenges facing the community and then present their findings in the War Room where they are directed to particular departments for interventions. Government officials then give him/her ideas as to how to go about resolving those challenges. A person goes to the offices with full knowledge of what they must bring so that they can be assisted.*

Convener 6: *Collaboration is very important. It is important because the community does not have access to resources that enable them to help themselves. Collaboration allows us to come up with different solutions to challenges faced by the community. No one can help the community on their own.*

Councillor 1: *I do see the need for collaboration between different stakeholders. There is a Zulu proverb which goes akukho songo lakhala lodwa which basically means that you cannot achieve anything if you work alone. No one can solve all the community's problems alone, what if the problems you are facing requires someone from a specific department and you are not from that department? There are so many challenges in the community and these challenges require efforts from different stakeholders if they are to be resolved. When we work with other stakeholders, we gain a lot of knowledge and we grow.*

Councillor 2: *Collaboration is very important but that's only if it is done right and there are no hidden agendas. If it is a clean process, then it becomes very important because you get to know what is happening in other departments. I also think that if they can give control to us, Sukuma Sakhe can work better. Because currently many things are being said but nothing comes to fruition. If they can allow us to tell them how the money should be used, that would help the programme. We would do everything in the open without hiding anything.*

Councillor 5: *Working in collaboration with others is very important. As councillors, we have a bad reputation of being known as people who like to exaggerate things to get services faster but if we are all there in the War Room, the government departments can see*

that the issues are real. Collaboration must also extend to the community because it is important for the community to know what we do.

Speaker of the Municipality: *For me, working in collaboration with other stakeholders is very helpful because otherwise, I would not know what is happening in other departments. Even my ward committee sometimes doesn't know what to do to resolve a particular challenge. But because of War Room meetings, I am able to learn things which I didn't know which makes it easy for me to resolve community challenges.*

DTT Chairperson: *Collaboration is very important because, when we work together, we assist each other and share ideas. We all have different ideas. Sometimes you have an idea but when others share their ideas, whatever intervention or programme we were planning becomes much better than it would have been had we done it alone.*

5.4.4 Summary of Findings on Collaboration

All the respondents view collaboration as an important element in the success of OSS. Some respondents view collaboration as a way to save costs for community members. As noted in the description of the research site, uMsinga is a poor municipality with high levels of unemployment. This means that many members of the community cannot afford to always travel to town to access government services. UMsinga is a vast rural area and it is expensive for some community members to go to town every time they need to access government services. By bringing different government departments and other relevant stakeholders closer to communities; OSS reduces the costs of accessing services for community members.

Furthermore, collaboration helps to ensure that services are delivered in an efficient manner and when different stakeholders work in collaboration, interventions are done quickly. However, some respondents noted non-attendance by some government departments with concern. They argued that non-attendance by government departments negatively affects efficiency in the delivery of services. The study also discovered that OSS serves as a forum for sharing ideas and knowledge. It is best placed for such role because it is made up of different stakeholders who possess knowledge in diverse fields. There seems to be consensus from the study participants that no single individual or organisation has all the

knowledge and resources required to solve all community problems, hence the need to collaborate.

5.5 CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN OSS

The collaborative theory stresses the importance of conflict management mechanisms in any collaborative initiative. The architects of OSS also appreciated this reality. The OSS implementation model document concedes that in OSS conflict is unavoidable because there are various stakeholder groups, each having their own objectives, ideas and perspectives (OSS, 2012: 24). In the implementation model, conflict is defined as a state of opposition, disagreement or incompatibility between two or more people or groups of people. The implementation model states that people must be trained to deal with intra and inter-group conflict situations. The model recommends a five-step approach to dealing with conflict in meetings. The first step is to listen: this means that everyone must be given a chance to air their views and that they must not be disrupted or cut off while they are still trying to make their point. The second step is to check for understanding which means that where there is no clarity the speaker must be asked to repeat himself or herself. The third step is to clarify and summarise the point made, the fourth step is to come up with suggested solutions and the fifth step is to conclude the matter.

The following are the views of the participants on the importance of clearly defined conflict resolution mechanisms in OSS.

5.5.1 Deliberations as a Conflict Management Mechanism

Convener 6: *We do have conflicts but they are resolved quickly. What is caused by word of mouth can be fixed by word of mouth. Conflicts are usually minor and are easily resolved. We have not had a major conflict.*

Convener 7: *I'm not sure what to say because we have never had a conflict in our War Room because even if there's just two of us in the War Room, we carry on with the work that we are supposed to do. It has never happened but I believe that to resolve conflicts there must be someone with authority to execute that task. I also believe that to resolve conflicts, we need to sit down as a team and come up with a solution or solutions.*

Convener 9: *Even though we have never had any conflict in our ward, I think that the best way to resolve conflicts is by first identifying the cause of the conflict. All parties to the conflict must be given an opportunity to tell their side of the story. You then have to calmly deliberate and come up with ways to resolve the conflict. You must then ask the conflicting parties to forgive each other because, when you are working with people, it is important to be humble.*

Councillor 2: *We have never had conflict but if it happened it would not affect the whole War Room; it would affect only those who are involved in the feud. If that happened, then we would sit down with those who are involved in the conflict and discuss how to resolve the issues which caused the conflict. To resolve conflicts, you should not take sides. It doesn't matter whether it involves your brother, relative or friend, what is right is right and what is wrong is wrong.*

LTT Chairperson: *I don't believe that in a work environment you can have conflicts but you can have debates around policy issues or debates about which policy approach to use. Since we work as a forum in OSS, we use a democratic approach to decide on which policies to use. Once we agree on the approach to use, that decision stands even if it does not suit your individual department because we work as a team.*

5.5.2 Traditional Authorities and Conflict Management in OSS

Convener 8: *We have not experienced any conflict in our War Room meetings. What we would do in case we have a conflict is sit down and deliberate on what is the cause of our differences and work on resolving our differences. In the War Room, we have Inkosi which means that we can relay our troubles to him for resolution.*

Councillor 6: *Involving all stakeholders which are represented within the ward makes working collaboratively easier. In our War Room, we have Izinduna which we respect very much; as a result of that we do our work honestly and we do not have conflicts. We also make sure that there are no personal attacks on any member of the War Room. We just require that everyone must present a report on the interventions they have made in the households which were identified. To resolve conflict, we take advantage of the fact that, in the War Room, we have different stakeholders. For example, if there is a conflict between an official from the Department of Health and an official from the Department of Home*

Affairs, the stakeholders who are not part of the conflict play the role of a mediator to resolve the conflict.

5.5.3 Political Challenges as a Cause of Conflict in OSS

Convener 4: *There is a structure called the LTT which we use to resolve challenges that we may come across during the course of our work. This structure is based in uMsinga. However, we have never had a conflict which required us to seek outside assistance. We have had a conflict which stemmed from political differences where some people try to use Sukuma Sakhe to achieve certain political goals. We reminded that particular person that OSS is not for the people who voted for him only but it is for the whole community.*

Official from the KwaZulu-Natal Office of the Premier: *Ok, in OSS we try by all means to emphasise that it is not politically aligned. It is a service delivery model for KZN which everyone is entitled to use. Maybe I didn't get your question correctly. But we try and do workshops like now we have workshops due because there are newly elected councillors in our wards so that they know that OSS is not politically aligned – it is for the government and the community.*

5.5.4 Clear Reporting Lines as a Conflict Prevention Mechanism

Councillor 4: *We have never experienced a conflict because in our War Room there is a standard format for reporting what each department has done since the previous meeting. This prevents conflicts because everyone knows what is expected of them. As far as our War Room is concerned, there are no conflicts because there is nothing which can lead us into conflict.*

Speaker of the Municipality: *In my War Room, we do not have conflicts. Who will fight with another person because no one interferes in another person's territory? Each person presents a report on the interventions they have done and we work on resolving whatever challenges they may have encountered.*

5.5.5 Prayer as a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention

Councillor 5: *Errr… luckily, we have never had a conflict in our War Room. What prevents conflicts in our War Room is the fact that before the meeting starts we pray to the Lord and*

ask the Lord to be part of the meeting. As the political champion, I always make it a point that before we start I remind everyone that in OSS we do not represent our political parties but we are working to make the lives of community members better. I tell government officials that they should focus on working for the community not their political parties because officials of the government are not supposed to be partisan.

5.5.6 Conflicts Caused by the Lack of Attendance of Government Departments

District Municipality Chairperson: *To resolve conflicts, you have to use your own leadership skills that you have acquired from your employer. As a District Chairperson, sometimes I convene people who are senior to me in term of their appointment. The seniority of the official concerned does not matter if I want a report. If I do not get joy, there is nothing which stops me from writing to the Mayor of the District Municipality or their immediate supervisor. If you report to a General Manager, I write a letter to that General Manager and state that your department is not cooperating in terms of submitting intervention reports. … That's where the conflict starts because officials don't want to be reported to their superiors. At one stage I had a case where officials from the Department of Education did not want to comply and I couldn't find joy. I couldn't get through to anyone in their offices so I ended up writing to their head office. Sometimes I write to the HOD who is responsible for our district to report lack of cooperation from other departments. He signs the letters and sends them to the HODs of the departments concerned and he asks them to provide written reasons for their department's lack of participation. So, when these reports are coming from the top that's when officials [find out] about you reporting them. … People end up not liking you but I always tell myself that when I am at work, even if we are friends you have to do your work. This has caused a lot of conflicts even with the people I have a close relationship with. They think that because we are close outside the work environment, they can take that for granted and not submit reports when they are needed. … Even if I have a problem with LTTs who do not want to cooperate, I write to the local mayors and request their intervention since they are the political champions of OSS in their respective local municipalities.*

Convener 1: *The most important thing you can do to prevent conflict is respecting each other. Respect is the cornerstone of our work. Because we respect each other, we never*

experience any conflicts. The only problem we have is that sometimes government departments do not pitch for meetings.

Convener 3: *There are no conflicts in our War Room. The way we are committed to working together ensures that we don't have any problems. Your question has given me an idea that it might help us to formulate a conflict resolution mechanism for our War Room. Creating a conflict resolution framework would allow us to know what to do should a situation like that emerge. But ever since we started working in the War Room, we have never had any conflict. The major problem we have faced has been a lack of attendance by government departments in the War Room.*

Councillor 1: *Thank you, we do have conflicts but they are never major; they are just minor conflicts. What causes most of the conflicts is the lack of attendance by departments. If government officials don't attend meetings we report them to their supervisors and that might cause a conflict in the War Room. When their supervisors reprimand them, it looks like we sold them out to their supervisors. The problem with the lack of attendance by officials is that it makes it difficult for us to resolve challenges faced by communities timeously.*

Councillor 3: *One of the causes of conflicts in the War Room is the lack of representation of some departments. You find that there are challenges in the community and we need urgent interventions only to find that government officials do not come to War Room meetings. If they were present, we would be able to resolve the challenges faced by communities more effectively. What we do with those stakeholders who attend meetings is to sit down and discuss the issues which might be causing conflicts and come up with solutions. We use deliberations to resolve conflicts.*

5.5.7 Summary of Causes of Conflicts

Conflicts are rare in OSS at uMsinga and when they do occur they are caused by government departments not attending War Room meetings and political differences. In terms of the five-step approach to conflict management, the study has discovered that there are a variety of ways which are used to resolve/prevent conflict in OSS. One of the methods used is deliberations where War Room members sit down and talk about the causes of the conflict and work out solutions. Another method used is traditional authorities. As noted

earlier, uMsinga is a rural area and most parts of it fall under traditional authorities. The presence of traditional leaders in OSS prevents conflicts. This has to do with the fact that in this kind of context, traditional leaders are highly respected. This can be interpreted to mean that respect plays a major role in preventing conflicts in OSS.

The study also found that clear reporting lines prevent conflicts in OSS. Religious practices such as prayer are also used to prevent conflicts. An overwhelming majority of study participants stated that they have never had any conflicts. This proves that the strategies which are currently in place are working. Those who stated that they have had conflicts indicated that these conflicts are caused by political differences and the lack of attendance of War Room meetings by some government departments.

5.6 BUILDING TRUST IN OSS

Scholars of both the collaboration theory and the social exchange theory argue that trust is a *sine qua non* for successful collaboration. They place trust as one of the indispensable requirements for successful and effective collaboration. Below are the extracts from interviews that address trust in OSS.

5.6.1 Reporting as a Way of Building Trust

Councillor 1: *Trust is very important when you work with many different stakeholders. To ensure that we maintain trust among stakeholders, we ask each and every member of the War Room to report on their interventions every time we meet. You have to give us a report of all the things you have done since our last meeting. That way we ensure that there is trust because we know what each member is doing. However, we also appreciate the fact that people are not the same. Some people are lazy and they do not want to do their jobs. What we do is that we go to the department which deployed the person to the War Room and tell them that the person they have sent is not doing his/her job.*

Convener 10: *Trust is very important. We ensure that there is trust in our War Room by requesting reports in every meeting we hold. This ensures that everyone does the job that they are supposed to do. What we do is that at the beginning of every meeting we read the minutes of the previous meeting and ask each person how much progress have they made with their interventions. This is how we ensure trust.*

LTT Chairperson: *To achieve trust between members of the LTT, I made sure that every member of the task team had a task to perform. If everyone is allocated a task to do, automatically they feel that they have to complete it because they know that if they don't the whole team will suffer. They also know that if they don't do their task that it's not only their problem but their department's problem because, in OSS, we deal with departments, not individuals.*

5.6.2 Collaborative Implementation as a Way to Build Trust

Convener 1: *To achieve trust in our War Room we do not separate our activities per department but we all go to the community. That ensures that there is trust in our War Room. If we have an intervention which needs the Department of Agriculture, we all go there to assist; the same applies to other departments. Even though the lack of attendance by departments is an inconvenience, I don't think it erodes trust. We try to tell departments to come to War Room meetings but they don't. They only come if they are forced by their superiors. It must be noted that not all departments are the same; some are really committed while others are not.*

Convener 3: *What strengthens our trust is the fact that we work on issues as a group. It does not matter whether the intervention falls under the competency of Agriculture, Health or Justice, we all get involved, and no one stands aside. We do this because we don't want the responsibility to fall in the hands of one person; we share the responsibility because we all want to help the community. We know that if one cannot assist the others can and trust is built in the process.*

5.6.3 The Effect of the Lack of Attendance of War Room Meetings by Government Departments on Trust

Councillor 2: *Trust is important but sometimes you find that some government departments don't attend OSS meetings because they look down on it and they don't see its usefulness. They see OSS as a waste of time because they would rather be using their time doing their professional work. To achieve trust, we have to be truthful at all times; we cannot trust each other if we are not truthful. The truth is the most beautiful thing. If you are truthful to people they can see when they are wrong and then change their behaviour. If someone is*

not trustworthy as members of the War Room, we must tell them that this is not the right way to do things and show him/her the right way. People can change!

Councillor 3: *My brother, I can say it without hesitation, there is no trust in our War Room. This lack of trust is affecting the effectiveness of OSS. The way I see it would be helpful if the HODs of government departments can come down to us so that they can see what is happening. What happened during the last Mandela Week is that a HOD came to us and we told him the challenges we face but his only interest was clearing his name from blame because his department was not participating. The HOD then blamed his underlings for not attending the War Room which left us confused because he should know whether his employees are participating or not. This means that there is no accountability.*

Councillor 6: *When we think of trust we think about it at an individual level. If someone doesn't do what they are supposed to do, that might lead to loss of trust in that person but that does not mean we lose trust in the entire department that has deployed him/her. To achieve trust in OSS, we have to get rid of I and approach things as we – that is the only way we can achieve trust and success.*

Speaker of the Local Municipality: *Trust is important as I have said but sometimes you get government departments which have the necessary skills and resources to help the community but they chose not to participate in OSS. These departments who do not participate are letting down their premier because now it seems as if the premier didn't know what he was doing when he started this programme. As the municipality, we are being too forward because those who are supposed to be at the forefront (government departments) are dragging their feet. That leads to the breakdown of trust. Why are government departments not attending? That means there is a breakdown of trust.*

There were those respondents who believed that the lack of attendance by government departments does not affect trust in the War Room. Their views are presented below.

Convener 7: *Trust is very important. If we trust each other we can work more effectively. The lack of attendance by some departments does not affect trust that much because they do say that they have problems with transport. If they cannot come to the War Room, we do referrals and they are able to do the interventions.*

5.6.4 The Lack of Consultation and its Effect on Trust

Councillor 5: *Trust is important for success; without trust, there can be no success. I can confirm that, in our War Room, there is a shortage of trust particularly when it comes to government departments. This is because when an MEC is going to be visiting the ward, some things are hidden from you as the ward councillor. When you try to follow up you discover that departments have programmes in your ward without informing you. Even though we try to build relationships and trust with departments, we are trying to communicate to them that OSS is not a political programme but a community programme. This is still a major challenge. … It is very sad to see government officials mixing politics with community work; we always preach that politics must not become a factor when we work in the War Room.*

5.6.5 The Importance of Trust when dealing with Sensitive Information

Convener 2: *To achieve trust nothing beats doing things in a transparent manner. However, there are things which are private which must be handled with caution. We have to ensure that before we pass something on to the community, it is packaged correctly because these days there is politics and people become sensitive when you discuss political matters. Sometimes there are accusations that a certain person did something for someone because both of them belong to the same political party. To build trust requires that all people are treated equally. Even if you belong to the same political party and you hold similar views, you must recognise that what is wrong is wrong; you should not be biased. … Trust is very important because it makes your work easy to do if people present their challenges to the War Room they know that their issues will be taken seriously because the War Room is not a political body. In the War Room, we have different stakeholders and we always try to remind members of the War Room that no one is bigger than the next person. The works like a human body: a hand cannot see and an eye cannot pick up things; they need each other. This is how the War Room should work.*

Convener 5: *In order to build trust, the most important thing is that people must not lie. In OSS, we work like a family; by that, I mean that what we discuss in the War Room must not be discussed outside. This is because the identity of those we help must not be exposed to people who are outside of the War Room. We must try to prevent that.*

Convener 8: *Yes, I believe that trust is very important. When we are in meetings we agree that the details of the cases we deal with must not be shared with people who are not members of the War Room. We teach each other about the importance of trust and that we should not discuss community issues with nonmembers.*

Convener 9: *Trust is very important for success when you work as a team. We must make sure that sensitive information is not discussed outside of the War Room. This is important because if we can keep secrets, the community can trust us. The lack of interventions by some departments has negatively affected trust in the War Room. We go to communities and do household profiling but when it comes to interventions nothing happens. Even if we report to the LTT nothing is done, that has affected trust greatly.*

5.6.6 Summary of Findings on Trust

In line with the two theories, the study found that trust is very important in OSS. There are a number of strategies to build trust in OSS. One of the strategies used is reporting. Some respondents stated that asking in every meeting every member of the War Room to report on the interventions they have done ensures that there is trust. This is remarkable because asking for reports in every meeting indicates that there is actually a lack of trust.

Another strategy that is used to build trust is collaborative implementation. Data indicate that implementing OSS decisions as a group helps build trust among War Room members. Non-attendance by government departments in War Rooms and lack of consultation between the local government and the provincial government are other factors which negatively affect trust in OSS. One councillor noted with concern the fact that the provincial government hosts OSS events in his ward without involving him. In OSS, trust is not only limited to those who work in the programme but also extends to the community. OSS officials are not supposed to discuss what is discussed in War Room meetings with anyone outside the War Room. This is because some of the information they deal with in the War Room is very sensitive.

5.7 ENSURING ORGANISATIONAL OWNERSHIP IN OSS

According to the collaborative theory organisation-wide ownership of the collaborative endeavour is important to prevent actions from within the organisation which undermine

the collaborative effort. When asked about the importance of organisational ownership of OSS, this is what the participants had to say:

Official from the KwaZulu-Natal Office of the Premier: *There are HOD champions within OSS. So a Head of Department will be a champion of a particular district … I will make an example with our HOD, HOD Nzimande from the Department of Sports, Arts and Culture is a HOD Champion for uThukela District. So there are officials who support HOD Nzimande from the Department of Sports, Art and Culture. They support him in all the activities that happen at uThukela. … You know when we have what we call OSS Cabinet Day, which is when OSS becomes visible to the community. This is because, every month, the whole cabinet of KwaZulu-Natal goes to a particular local municipality in one of the districts. For example, this month we are going to Amajuba District focusing on Newcastle Local Municipality. All MECs, HODs and other senior government officials will go to Newcastle Local Municipality. So that's how we make sure that we are visible in our communities. The departmental reps coordinate the activities of that particular department during the OSS Cabinet Day*.

LTT Chairperson: *There is nothing more important than knowing what kind of animal we are dealing with. The government departments which are usually successful in OSS are those who know the programme very well. OSS has a public document which is available to everyone. It is the responsibility of respective managers to take it and pass it on to the rest of the staff. … However, as people, we are not the same. We understand government policies differently. A manager who understands government policies will follow those policies and even go well beyond the confines of the policies. For example, there are managers who take money from their own pockets to help the destitute. Some even go as far as getting their business associates to come and assists communities. Some managers even work with organisations like the Gift of the Givers to try and get assistance for the people of uMsinga.*

DTT Chairperson: *I think the provincial government has tried that but it just doesn't work. We are told that HODs have that kind of KPA in their employment agreements but that does not extend to the lower ranking civil servants. Actually, it would be way better if junior staff had that kind of KPA because it would be easier to report. For now, it is difficult to get*

government employees to do OSS related work because OSS does not form part of their performance agreements.

Convener 1: *What made me end up being a ward convener in this War Room is the fact that my department, the Department of Community Safety and Liaison, makes it compulsory for us to work with War Rooms. We work with War Room because we want to end crime in our societies. Every worker from the Community Safety Department should be part of a War Room.*

Convener 3: *In OSS, I represent a community-based organisation I think that organisational ownership of OSS is very important because some member of my organisation work in other wards which helps us share information which in turn helps us come up with comprehensive solutions to the problems faced by the community.*

Convener 7: *I believe that organisational ownership is important because we work with the community to try and find solutions to poverty and ensure food security. So it is important for us to work together collaboratively so that we can help our communities. Working together is very important because it allows you to reach people you would not have been able to reach if you were working alone.*

Convener 9: *It is very important that every member of the community becomes involved in OSS because most of the things which are discussed in the War Room come directly from the community members themselves. Government departments are told by community members about the challenges they face and the things which are working well in their communities.*

Convener 10: *I work for an NGO called Phila Njalo which came to the community to help community members. The organisation does not understand Operation Sukuma Sakhe fully and it is very difficult for us to leave our organisational work and focus on OSS. This means that I can only attend OSS if it does not clash with my organisational duties.*

Councillor 1: *In our War Room, we were very lucky because we had a municipal project that was being implemented in the ward. We then approached the manager of the project and asked him to be part of our War Room. So now we have a manager from the*

municipality who is part of our War Room which means that there is organisational ownership. The manager is fully behind OSS.

Councillor 3: *Ward committees are part of OSS even though there are some things which kill the spirit. The problem is that you work on OSS but you don't see the results which can demoralise you. Even the NGOs we were working with are starting to withdraw their support; OSS is slowly losing its momentum.*

Councillor 4: *Luckily one of the representatives of the municipality in OSS is the councillor himself. Ward committees also play an important role in OSS which means that as far as the municipality is concerned, there is organisational ownership.*

Councillor 5: *Organisational ownership is very important. If I had my way, all of us in the municipality would be attending Operation Sukuma Sakhe because we all have different skills and knowledge which are needed in OSS. For example, if there are vacant posts within the municipality a person from human resources should make that known to the War Room so that we can spread the word. Even if the finance division has bursaries and scholarships for those who want to further their education, this should be presented in the War Room.*

Councillor 6: *Organisational ownership is very important. As political champions, we represent the municipality and the things that we find in the War Room are conveyed to the municipality. Everyone within the municipality knows the type of challenges found in the respective wards. We also have a structure called the LTT where many government departments which operate in the municipality are represented together with chairpersons of the different War Rooms. In this structure, we discuss what is happening in each ward and we try to prevent War Rooms from being dysfunctional.*

5.7.1 Summary of Findings on Organisational Ownership in OSS

The majority of study participants view organisational ownership as an important element in the success of OSS. Data indicate that the uMsinga Local Municipality is doing all it can to ensure organisational ownership. On the other hand, government departments seem to be struggling to ensure organisational ownership. This could be attributed to the fact that OSS does not form part of the job description of many government officials. Instead of spending

time doing OSS activities, government officials prefer to use their time doing activities which are in their performance agreements. This is despite the fact that there are governmental representatives for OSS in all government departments. The KwaZulu-Natal Government has also tried to ensure organisational ownership by assigning each HOD to a district municipality but this does not seem to be helping to reduce department non-participation in OSS. Data also indicate that NGOs are also struggling to ensure organisational ownership.

5.8 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF WAR ROOM, LTT AND DTT DECISIONS

The opinions of the participants on the implementation of decisions are provided below.

5.8.1 The Impact of the Lack of Resources on the Implementation of OSS Decisions

Councillor 2: *When it comes to the implementation of OSS, we face major challenges. Let me first start with the issue of IDs. When we find that there are community members who do not have birth certificates and IDs, we contact Home Affairs and people get assistance. However, when it comes to reducing poverty, we have had many shortcomings. Many areas in uMsinga are still poor. UMsinga has 19 wards but I can say that its only 4 or 5 wards which have benefited from interventions which seek to end poverty. The programme started in ward 4 where only those who were identified during the household profiling were assisted. That intervention was not enough because many people who qualified for assistance were not assisted because of the shortage of resources. We ended up only assisting those whose situation was too dire; the people who go to sleep without food in their stomachs. That's how we did it. If we can get more money, we can assist even more people.*

Councillor 3: *If we identify a particular case, we seek assistance from the relevant department. We battle with the Department of Home Affairs because if we call on them for interventions, they tell us that they do not have transport and staff to come and assist us. This affects the implementation of OSS programmes. We end up relying on referrals to ensure that a person who needs assistance gets the assistance when they go to government offices. The referral system is not the most effective system because after we refer people to government departments, they still face challenges and some are not assisted.*

Convener 10: *Implementation depends on how trustworthy is the department which is supposed to do the intervention. In our War Room, the most active stakeholders are the uMsinga municipality and the Department of Home Affairs. There's also the Department of Social Development but they don't always attend because they have transport problems. We also face the same problem as conveners; we cannot go to the places which are far in the ward because we do not have transport.*

5.8.2 Following up with Government Departments as a way of ensuring Implementation

Councillor 5: *To ensure implementation we do follow-ups with the departments concerned. We call the manager of that particular department and ask how far they have gone regarding a particular intervention. Sometimes we have problems with officials so it is better if we follow up with the manager. The manager then tells us what they have done and how far they have gone with the intervention. There are some departments we are not able to follow up on but those who are accessible usually sit down with us and tell us about the progress of their interventions.*

Convener 9: *It is easy to follow up on those departments which are represented in our War Room. We ask them to report on the activities they have been busy with since our last War Room meeting. We use reporting to ensure that what we agreed upon in our last meeting is actually done.*

5.8.3 Setting Clear Targets to ensure Implementation

Councillor 4: *To ensure effective implementation we use a schedule of activities. We know that on a particular day, we are dealing with 1, 2 and 3. If there are any delays in implementation, we go straight to the government department concerned to get clarity on why are they not doing what they are supposed to be doing. Working collaboratively also makes it easy to implement because we always remind each other of the tasks that have to be done.*

Councillor 6: *We ensure implementation by assigning tasks to various government departments represented in the War Room. For example, if the community needs a road we assign that to the representative from the Department of Transport. It is easy to follow up*

because the official from the Department of Transport sits with us in the ward and every time we have a War Room meeting he will have to report the progress made.

5.8.4 The Lack of Attendance by Government Departments and Its Effect on Implementation

Convener 3: *In the past, it was easy to ensure implementation because, for example, if we would have a representative of Home Affairs and if someone needs an ID, they would get assistance right there in the War Room. But it has become hard these days because now we focus much on doing referrals. We do referrals because government officials cannot attend War Rooms all the time. This affects implementation because referrals take long but, if officials attend War Room, people can be assisted on the spot.*

5.8.5 The Effect of Municipal Demarcation on Implementation

Convener 2: *We have had challenges with the implementation because the War Room was affected by municipal demarcation. Our War Room has had to move from the uMsinga Local Municipality to the uMvoti Local Municipality. As a result of this, the uMsinga municipality has decided to withhold certain powers of the War Room. The uMsinga Local Municipality is now reluctant to assist us because we no longer fall under its jurisdiction. The municipality is not happy with the moving of the ward from uMsinga to uMvoti. We are currently not receiving any support from uMvoti. We are now waiting for the Local Government Elections (LGE) so that the ward can be officially moved to the uMvoti Local Municipality. This has negatively affected our work and has discouraged some government departments from attending our War Room.*

5.8.6 Poor Implementation and the Erosion of Trust

Convener 4: *Mr Phakathi, if I ask you to go and buy bread for me, you do not come back and give that bread to someone who did not send you; you bring it back to me. We had a problem with the Department of Human Settlements when they asked us to identify 10 households which were in need of housing. When we were done with identifying those households, we were made to wait and wait. Up to this day, those people have not been assisted with housing. This creates problems for us because community members lose trust in us. They end up not attending War Rooms because nothing gets done.*

Convener 8: *We have a War Room member who attends the LTT meeting in uThukela; he is the one who reports on our interventions. However, most of the interventions are not successful. We are told to do household profiling to find out which households are in need of services. People are promised that they will get something but it doesn't happen. This happens a lot during the Mandela Week. There are no follow-ups to the promises made to the communities. Community members end up looking at us as nothing more than liars because they are promised but nothing comes of those promises.*

5.8.7 The Role of Higher Structures in ensuring Implementation

Convener 1: *We have our War Room meeting twice a month, on the first week and on the third week of the month. As a convener, I have to send a report to the LTT every month which states the activities/ interventions which we have done as the War Room over the past month. If there are some things we failed to do that's where we ask assistance from members of the LTT. If the LTT cannot come up with a solution, we take the matter up to the DTT and so on.*

5.8.8 The Role played by CCGs in the Implementation of OSS Decisions

Convener 5: *CCGs are the most important players when it comes to ensuring implementation because they can take the affected person directly to the relevant department to ask for assistance. If we have an orphan, the CCG helps with the applications so that the orphan can get a foster care grant. CCGs are the most important people when it comes to implementing OSS.*

Convener 7: *As I have said before, we face a number of challenges. Our work depends heavily on CCGs who are the ones who collect information from the community. If we have a shortage of CCGs, it becomes difficult for community members to get access to valuable information. The shortage of CCGs in our ward is negatively impacting on implementation. The discontinuation of the Youth Ambassadors Programme also affects the implementation of OSS because youth ambassadors used to help the CCGs do their jobs.*

5.8.9 Summary of Findings on the Implementation of OSS Decisions

With regard to the implementation of OSS decisions, the lack of resources, non-attendance at meetings by government departments and municipal demarcation are the major barriers

to implementation. Setting clear targets, following up with government departments and consulting higher structures helps to improve implementation while slow or lack of implementation erodes community trust in OSS. What also emerged from the data is that Community Development Workers play a key role in ensuring the implementation of OSS decisions. And, that the shortage of CCGs negatively affects the implementation of OSS decisions.

5.9 MONITORING AND EVALUATION IN OSS

Monitoring and evaluation seek to learn from experiences to improve practices and activities in the future and to have internal and external accountability of the resources used and the results obtained. This is done so that informed decisions can be taken on the future of the initiative and to promote the empowerment of the beneficiaries of the initiative. Below are the views of study participants on how monitoring and evaluation are carried out in OSS.

LTT Chairperson: *The device we use for monitoring and evaluation is political oversight. The provincial leadership visits the lower structures of OSS to ensure that the work is being done. We also have what is called the Cabinet Day where politicians, senior managers and district managers go to visit wards to evaluate the overall work of the War Rooms. MECs visit the War Rooms physically to check if the work is being done. … The best way to monitor Sukuma Sakhe is through political oversight because it allows us to get an idea of what is happening on the ground by going there physically rather than relying on what the reports say. Political oversight is done through visiting projects, offices and interviewing the community. … I believe that if political oversight is strong and the people responsible for it are hands on the War Room can be able to deliver on its projects. If it is not present, then government departments won't attend the War Room because they have no one to respect. Anything that happens in the War Room must pass through the ward councillor as the political champion. If the councillor is not committed, then you cannot have proper monitoring and evaluation in the War Room. … Beyond political oversight, government officials have supervisors who ensure that there is quality in what we do. All reports will pass through the supervisor and in that way monitoring and evaluation are done.*

Official from the KwaZulu-Natal Office of the Premier: *We do have progress reports that we receive from districts and we analyse them. We have our monitoring and evaluation team in the Office of the Premier. Our social partner, BroadReach Healthcare, takes care of the monitoring and evaluation part. They analyse those reports and ensure that issues are dealt with and that the interventions are done. But some of the issues take longer to resolve and it does not depend on a particular department. You find that someone complained about housing and human settlement works with the local municipality only to find that that area is not in the IDP of the municipality in that period. So there are other delays like that. … We have what we call OSS social partners who provide us with assistance as and when we need it and then we have those who provide assistance continuously like BroadReach. They are based in the Office of the Premier; they are part and parcel of OSS. They design our reporting tools so that it is user-friendly for them to compile reports, monitor and evaluate.*

DTT Chairperson: *Monitoring and evaluation are done through following up with the relevant structures. If there's something which happened in uMsinga, for example, I follow up with the LTT chair. If it has to do with a government department, then I follow up with that relevant government department.*

Convener 1: *If someone is poor, for example, we make sure that he/she is assisted with food vouchers and so on. While they wait for the food vouchers, we try to organise food parcels for them as members of the War Room.*

Convener 5: *When you report a case you have identified, you have to say which steps you are going to take to help the person in need. In the following meeting, you have to provide feedback in the War Room on what you were able to achieve.*

Convener 7: *We go to the community and identify cases of people who need assistance. To monitor whether the person we identified has been assisted we do live visits to check if, indeed, they have been assisted. We then check if the person's situation has improved since our last visit to the household.*

Convener 8: *The person who is seeking assistance does report to us whether they got the assistance or not. If they did not get assistance, we try to help them get the help they need. We do have situations where children don't have either parent. The other day there was a*

man who wanted to do a birth certificate for a child and we referred him to Home Affairs for assistance.

Convener 9: *What we do is to ask the CCG whether a department that was supposed to do an intervention has done that intervention. If the department has not done the intervention, then we follow up on that department. They have to tell us why they haven't done the intervention. The councillor helps us with drafting reports and sending them to departments who are failing to do the interventions they are supposed to do.*

Convener 10: *In our offices, we have the contact information of all the departments which are represented in our local municipality. If a department was supposed to do an intervention but failed to do so, we call that department to check why they didn't do the intervention. If they had forgotten, we remind them that there is some work outstanding. Sometimes the CCG and the political champion go to government offices physically to remind officials about outstanding interventions.*

Councillor 3: *Monitoring and evaluation do happen even though I cannot say its 100%. We rely on those who were seeking assistance to come back and tell us once they have been assisted.*

Councillor 4: *CCGs are responsible for collecting all the challenges in the community and bringing them to the War Room. Before every meeting, we check if the interventions which should have been done were indeed done. We follow up with departments to make sure that they do the interventions. This is important because the CCGs have to have something to tell the community. They must be able to give them feedback. We work very closely with CCG whose job is not only collecting information from the community but also to do follow-ups and keep community members updated with the developments.*

Councillor 6: *In the War Room, we have something we call a logbook where we write down what we found in the community during household profile. We then link particular departments with the interventions to be done. Once that department has intervened, we then note it in our logbook. In the logbook, a department has to specify how long it will take them to do the intervention and it is on that basis that we monitor and evaluate their progress.*

5.9.1 Summary of Findings on Monitoring and Evaluation

Political oversight plays an important role in the monitoring and evaluation of OSS. This is achieved through physical visits by senior politicians and government officials to War Rooms. Monitoring and evaluation are also achieved through reporting. All the 11 district municipalities of KwaZulu-Natal are expected to report to the PTT on their OSS activities. At the War Room level, reports are required from task team members in every meeting to monitor whether the tasks which were supposed to be accomplished were indeed. Households are also visited to monitor whether interventions which were promised have indeed been done.

5.10 STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT IN OSS

This section presents the views of different participants on how stakeholder management is done in OSS. For collaboration to succeed there must be consistent communication between stakeholders. When the participants were asked how they ensure and maintain this communication between different stakeholders this is what they had to say:

5.10.1 Predetermined Schedule of Meeting Dates As a Way of Maintaining Stakeholder Communication in OSS

Convener 3: *To maintain relations with other stakeholders in the War Room we make a schedule of meetings for the whole year. But it has become increasingly difficult for us to work because departments do not honour these dates. As a way to try and resolve the problem of lack of attendance by government departments, we wrote letters to the departments concerned but nothing has changed. We now think that the only person who can help us is the mayor. He should call managers of these government departments and explain to them the importance of their department's attendance in the War Room.*

Convener 9: *We have a problem of stakeholders who do not attend meetings. What I have seen is that those who remain interested in working in OSS are those who love working with communities. We do not have any special communication with those who attend; they just attend because they love working with communities. We just make a schedule of dates for meetings at the beginning of the year and send them out to all stakeholders. This means that all the stakeholders know when we have meetings.*

Convener 10: *We set the dates for War Room meetings at the beginning of the year for January up to December. We then take the contact details of all the stakeholders represented in the War Room. When there are special meetings, we contact all the War Room members and tell them about the special meeting.*

Councillor 3: *At the beginning of the year we make a schedule of meetings for the whole year. Despite the fact that we set our meeting dates well in advance, government departments still do not attend. If I am not mistaken, only the Department of Agriculture attends our meetings. Only one department! All the other departments don't attend which makes working very difficult. The problem of departments is a big one and as a result, we have lost direction in terms of what we are supposed to do.*

Speaker of the Local Municipality: *As a speaker of the municipality I make sure that all the things my councillors are supposed to do are done. Each and every ward has a yearly schedule of meetings; this schedule is sent to all government departments and all the members of the War Room. Those who do not attend have no excuse because they are told beforehand about the meetings. … We do our schedules of meetings at the beginning of the year. Even the mayor has the dates of the meeting which means that he knows that on this particular day there is a War Room meeting in this or that ward.*

Local Task Team Chairperson: *As the LTT, we had a yearlong plan of action which guided us on what we were supposed to do each month. For example, in January we have a standing programme for back to school. In February, we ran a substance abuse awareness campaign. We centre all our activities around the main theme for that month. That is how we keep stakeholders in touch.*

5.10.2 The Use of Social Networks and SMSs to Maintain Stakeholder Communication in OSS

Councillor 5: *As the War Room, we have fixed meeting dates which run from January to December. We hold our War Room meetings every other Tuesday. If there is an urgent issue that we need to discuss we communicate in our WhatsApp page.*

DTT Chairperson: *We have a secretariat of the district task team which is responsible for maintaining relations among the members of the team. The secretary and the chairperson*

are responsible for issuing notices to members. They are also responsible for the calendar of events. If there is a change in the calendar of events that change is communicated through emails, SMSs and we recently created a WhatsApp group which we use to communicate urgent matters.

Convener 2: *To maintain communication, we usually make use of SMSs. There is still a tendency from those up in the top to be inconsiderate of the needs and conditions of those at the bottom. For example, yesterday I received an SMS late in the afternoon telling me that there is an LTT meeting in uMsinga. That is inconsiderate given the fact that you know I have to go to a meeting unprepared and I had to cancel other pressing commitments I had. It would be better if they had a year planner for meetings.*

5.10.3 The Use of Referrals to Maintain Stakeholder Communication in OSS

Councillor 6: *One of the things we do particularly with regard to those departments which are understaffed is that we use a referral form to refer those who need help to the department concerned. That means there is constant communication between the War Room and those departments who have to intervene. We also make use of attendance registers to ensure that stakeholders attend the meetings. We also have the contact numbers of all the stakeholders represented in our War Room which helps us with communication.*

5.10.4 The LTT and Stakeholder Communication

Convener 7: *We do not only sit in the War Room but we also attend LTT meetings. In that way, all government departments know what is happening in each and every War Room in the municipality. We report to the LTT and the government departments must plan interventions to respond to the issues we raised in our reports.*

5.10.5 Summary of Findings on Stakeholder Communication

This section has shown that yearly schedules of meetings are sent to all government departments and other stakeholders as a way of ensuring maximum attendance in OSS meetings. Despite this, many government department and stakeholders do not attend meetings. The study also found that technology particularly social networking applications play an important role in facilitating communication in OSS. The study further found that

referrals are used to maintain communication with the government departments who are not able to attend meetings due to understaffing.

5.11 THE CONTRIBUTION OF OSS TO POVERTY ALLEVIATION

It was noted in the literature chapter that one of the main goals of OSS is to fight against poverty. Below are the views of the study participants on the role played by OSS in poverty alleviation.

Speaker of the Local Municipality: *My friend, if it was about proposals, we would always come up tops. In our War Room, we have the Department of Agriculture which always attends and is very committed to OSS. The problem we have is that the Department of Agriculture does not have enough resources to help people. Giving people food parcels is not a sustainable solution because you have to continue giving them those parcels and for how long should you do that? If the Department of Agriculture had money they would fence the gardens and give seeds to the people so that they can plant vegetables in their own backgrounds. … But all this does not happen, we have solutions but we can't do anything because there is no money. Even the One Home One Garden programme which was proposed by Premier Zweli Mkhize is not implemented. Even the Department of Rural Development which is supposed to help us with resources is failing to provide us with resources. Two or three years ago, the department told us to take down names of women who could run chicken farms and they will provide them with chickens but that has not happened to this day. Even the people we helped with the fencing have not received the assistance they were promised. In OSS, we have brilliant ideas but we don't have the means to execute our ideas.*

DTT Chairperson: *There are many positive contributions which have come as a result of OSS. Even though I cannot recall all the things we have done but we do have annual and quarterly reports which contain information about the cases we worked on. We take people from the point of identification up until their graduation. There are quite a few households where families have been identified, interventions done and at times through the involvement of the Department of Human Settlement houses were built for them. Some of these families which are helped were living under very bad conditions where the houses were in a very poor state not fit for human occupation. … We also identify children who*

will get bursaries to go to university. In some cases, we intervene to assist in child-headed households. … The impact of Sukuma Sakhe is being felt in the district even though it remains difficult to extend the reach of the programme to cover more people because of the lack of capacity. UMsinga is one of the most deprived municipalities in the country and has interventions from many levels including the president's office. There is some progress being made but, if we had more people, we would do even more. Because as we speak, I am a chairperson of Sukuma Sakhe in 3 districts, uMzinyathi, uThukela and Amajuba District. Sukuma Sakhe is a full-time job which means that I always have to make sure that if there are job opportunities which become available within these 3 districts that poor people get hired.

Councillor 1: *Even though it is not a good as it should be. I can say that they are trying. We have a number of projects which seek to make the lives of people better. For example, we have a programme which teaches the elderly how to read and write. However, since we are in the rural areas, this does not happen as it should. We also have skills development like the training that the youth are enrolled in which deals with environmental management. We also give out bursaries for those students who want to further their education at FETs.*

Councillor 2: *I would say there has been no noticeable contribution made by OSS in the fight against poverty. Sometimes we have to go and fundraise from shop owners so that children can get something to eat. Nothing is coming from the government; it remains dark.*

Councillor 3: *Even though we cannot say that it is happening at the level it is supposed to be happening ... the Department of Social Development and the local municipality do help where the need arises. It is not a strong as it should be; we are doing something but the programme remains weak.*

Councillor 4: *There are contributions made by OSS in the fight against poverty but not in the level which the people expect. What we do is to check with departments if they have means that can be used to fight the poverty we are faced with. We work very closely with SASSA where we ask for food vouchers for those families who are very poor. As the municipality, we also give out food parcels when we are having community events to help those who are in need. We also provide bursaries to students who want to register at*

universities so that they don't stay at home because they cannot afford fees. We also help those who want to farm with seeds so that they can have something to eat.

Councillor 5: *I can honestly say that we have not done much in fighting against poverty in the ward. What I can say is that the department which has shown outstanding commitment has been the Department of Home Affairs. Home Affairs has done a lot. With regard to the other departments, I cannot lie: they have not done anything. There is nothing I can say we have gained in the ward through OSS. However, that does not mean that we have lost hope. … Sukuma Sakhe seems to function well if an MEC is coming to the ward or to the municipality. All departments avail themselves but, as soon as the MEC goes, the departments disappear. We also see the same trend on the 18th of July; departments become available but after that, they are nowhere to be seen.*

Councillor 6: *There have been positive contributions made by OSS in the fight against poverty. For example, we had a project which was done by the Department of Rural Development which employed 145 people. That is a big number. The project was designed to help people with land for grazing and crop farming. We also had a further 16 people who were employed to work in the electrification project. Further to that, we had 3 families who received houses under the banner of OSS. One of the people who received a house was an elderly woman who was staying in a house which only had the front wall. The other walls had collapsed and she had been living under those conditions for a long time. We were able to build a two-room house for her.*

Convener 2: *Even though there are interventions… it remains difficult. In the rural areas, we need assistance so that we can produce food; we also need employment opportunities to be created so that people can work and get something. We still face a number of challenges because the people we sit within the War Room do not have the power to implement decisions. … I was in a meeting today and I asked my colleagues that if someone walked in here and asked us what have we achieved, what would we say we have achieved? We all need to have clearly defined roles we play in OSS and we have to have strategies to achieve our goals. I can honestly say that I am not satisfied with what we have achieved so far with our efforts in dealing with poverty. What makes it even worse is that government departments are far away.*

Convener 3: *There is a contribution being made by OSS in the fight against poverty. For example, the Department of Agriculture helped people with seeds and provided them with tractors for ploughing. The municipality assisted with the fencing of the gardens. There was plenty of food produced and you could see that something was happening. What became a challenge is that the people who were assisted did not want to do anything for themselves. The following season when the community member had to plough for themselves, they didn't do it. They waited for the department to come back and plough for them again. The Department of Agriculture has played a huge role in teaching people about farming.*

Convener 4: *In my ward, the Department of Social Development has established a soup kitchen where those who cannot afford food can come and eat every day. We have people who are sick and, as you know, it is not good to take medication without eating first. However, we face challenges because our ward is very big and the people who stay far from the soup kitchen do not get access to food. The Department of Social Development promised us that they will provide us with transport so that those who stay far away from the kitchen can also get food but that has not happened. I believe that if we can double our efforts, we can achieve a lot and we can help our community.*

Convener 5: *Nothing much has been done as far as ending poverty is concerned. However, we did have a programme by the Department of Agriculture but that programme is no longer functional. The Department of Agriculture used to provide tractors which were used to help members of the community with ploughing. Now the departments say they do not plough for individual households but only plough for cooperatives. Only the Department of Agriculture has a programme like that but we have not seen anything similar from the other departments. … We also have a programme by SASSA which helps those who are poverty stricken. There is a form they have to fill in to get assisted with food parcels. If you qualify, they give you a short-term grant. This programme is new and has not assisted many people.*

Convener 7: *Mmm... (Bad audio) as the Department of Agriculture our biggest contribution has been supplying seeds to community members so that they can plant. This made a huge difference. The Department of Social Development made sure that a person has food in the immediate term by providing them with food parcels and, as the Department of Agriculture, we give them seeds so that they can have food on a sustainable basis. SASSA also provides food parcels to poor families for 6 months. This is done mainly to those families which have*

young children. This shows that there are initiatives which try to alleviate poverty in communities.

Convener 8: *I cannot say that we have played a role in ending poverty because we still depend on food parcels. When the municipality has events, they make sure that they have food to give to those who are in need. The municipality chooses a few families who will benefit from this; they usually choose the poorest families. The municipality also creates employment opportunities for those who are unemployed so that they can get something. I feel that it would be better if we opened community gardens instead of having food parcels because food parcels are not a long-term solution.*

Convener 9: *For now, I can say that I am not satisfied with what has been achieved. What we have currently are food vouchers which are given out by the Department of Social Development. This is not satisfactory because vouchers are not a sustainable means of livelihood.*

Convener 10: *I can say that OSS is working to alleviate poverty even though not all the departments are involved. For example, we have programmes like One Home One Garden. Because of OSS, fewer people are without IDs. The municipality also creates employment opportunities through the construction of community halls and crèches.*

5.11.1 Summary of Findings on Poverty Alleviation

Looking at the data, two trends can be discerned: there are those who are of the view that OSS has played a crucial role in the fight against poverty in uMsinga in particular and KZN in general, and there are those who believe that nothing has been achieved in this regard. The lack of resources appears to be one of the main reasons why OSS is struggling to win the war on poverty.

5.12 THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNITY IN OSS

According to the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government, the main stakeholders and beneficiaries of OSS are community members. Below are the views of study participants on the role of the community in OSS.

Convener 1: *The biggest problem we have is that the community does not participate in OSS. Community members depend on ward committee members who sit in the War Room for information about what goes on in the War Room. If in the area they reside in, there is no member of the ward committee then they cannot get information about the War Room. The biggest cause of this is politics. In some instances, you have a situation where the councillor cannot relay information to some areas of the ward because that area supports another political party. … We have that kind of challenges. I hope that the government can do something so that people are informed about the War Room and the help they can get from it.*

Convener 3: *I can say that the community is involved in OSS but not that much. What I have noticed is that the people who attend the War Room are the women with small children. You hardly see men attending the War Room. This shows that people are not well informed about the War Room and there is still a need to teach people about the War Room and its work.*

Convener 5: *The community is very much involved in OSS. The only problem is that people want to know what they stand to gain by attending the War Room. What the community members don't get is that you have to attend War Room meetings even if what is discussed does not affect you personally. This is because you might know someone who will benefit from what is discussed in the War Room. …*

In my ward, we still have a situation where people sit in their homes and do not come to the War Room even though they need assistance. If they came to the War Room, they would be assisted. Another thing which I have noticed which is affecting OSS is that government officials sit in their offices and refuse to come to the people.

Convener 7: *I believe that the community should be involved in OSS; however, some people still do not know what it is about. There are still people who travel long distances to town to seek assistance they could have received from the War Room. This shows that people have not understood the War Room. … Community members are further discouraged from attending by the fact that when they attend you they find that the key departments are not present. This has negatively affected how the community views OSS.*

Convener 8: *So far, I have not seen the role played by community members in OSS. Even the CCGs are no longer welcome in the community because most things discussed do not become a success. They end up being seen as liars and they are not welcomed in the community. The community is still left behind as far as Sukuma Sakhe is concerned. Even the organised groups in the community do not attend the War Room. … I wish that government departments can come together and resolve the problems that we are currently experiencing. We end up not knowing whether this is working or not. Sometimes we feel like this is just a waste of time. We spend a lot of time trying to solve the problems of the community but we don't get results.*

Convener 9: *Even though the community is not currently playing a major role in OSS we do try to inform them about the programme. The problem we face is that community members are not interested in attending meetings. People are told that they must attend Sukuma Sakhe meetings but they are lazy; we end up only sitting with Izinduna.*

Convener 10: *The community does participate but recently we have witnessed a decrease in interest from community members. This is caused by a lack of a speedy response when assistance is sought. However, community organisations do attend. In the War Room, we have traditional councillors, ward committee members, Izinduna and the chairperson of the school governing body. Business people come but not often enough. We always make sure that we give them the dates of War Room meetings but they tell us that they don't have people to help keep the store open when they are attending the War Room meeting.*

Councillor 2: *People do come but it's infrequent. In the past, the numbers were high but recently only a few people have been attending. If you take a look at it, you can understand why people are no longer attending. When we sit down and discuss what we have to do, we always come up with the most beautiful ideas, but when it comes to implementing those ideas, nothing happens. It's like we are playing games. When you promise the same thing over and over again but you don't deliver people start to lose hope. That also creates a conflict between us and members of the community. People end up not trusting you. It would be better if we were given money to run the programme because we are the ones who are close to communities, not the provincial and national government.*

Councillor 3: *The community is involved because they were told that OSS is there to help resolve their challenges. People do indeed bring their problems to the War Room but the problem starts when they have to be resolved. Others end up losing hope and stop attending Sukuma Sakhe. The morale is down on the side of the community.*

Councillor 4: *The community is involved in OSS. They know that if they have problems they can always bring them to the War Room.*

Councillor 5: *When we started, Sukuma Sakhe was very popular and people were attending War Room meetings. The lack of implementation by departments led to a lack of attendance by community members which hurt us a lot. Because we were not implementing, we ended up having a lot of unresolved cases. So today people come and sometimes they don't come; it's not like when we started.*

Councillor 6: *The community is involved because ward committee members which represent different sectors of the community are involved. We also have Izinduna who serve as the representatives of the people and then we have the ward councillor who is also a representative of the community. For these reasons, I can say that the community does play a role in OSS. However, we still face a challenge because all the issues we deal with in the War Room are the problems which are identified by either the ward committee or CCGs. We are yet to see community members coming to report problems directly to the War Room.*

Chairperson of the LTT: *Mmm... what can I say, there are a few people who participate; even then they only come if there are government events. I can safely say that when it comes to the War Room participation levels are very low. A lot depends on the political champion of the ward. If the political champion has a buy-in on OSS, then community members will participate, but if there is no political buy-in, then the opposite will be true. According to my experience in uMsinga, it was very rare to see ordinary community members participating in the War Room.*

Speaker of the Local Municipality: *I would say that the community is very much involved in OSS because without the information we get from the community, we wouldn't know what's happening in the community. Without the information we get from communities we would be scratching our heads trying to figure out what we should do. I have to say that if we had enough resources the community would be playing an even bigger role. For now, you*

cannot point at anything and say this was done by OSS because departments do not give us the resources.

5.12.1 Summary of Findings on Community Involvement

From the data, it appears that by and large community members are not participating in OSS. The lack of involvement of community members is caused by a number of factors which include political challenges, lack of knowledge about what OSS offers, the non-attendance of government departments and the lack of results. This is a big problem because the hallmark of OSS is that it is a community-centred programme. If community members are not participating, it means there is something fundamentally wrong.

5.13 CHAPTER SUMMARY

The chapter has presented the findings of the study. The study has found that there are multiple interpretations of the purpose and goal of OSS. The main challenges which plague the initiative are the failure to attend meetings by government departments, the lack of capacity of the community-based conveners, political squabbles and the lack of resources. These challenges have a negative impact on intergovernmental relations in OSS. The chapter looked at the different strategies which are used to prevent and manage conflict in OSS and found that collaboration and trust play an important role in ensuring that services are delivered efficiently to communities. The chapter also looked at the strategies used to ensure organisational ownership in Operation Sukuma Sakhe, presented the study participants' views on the implementation of OSS decisions, the strategies used in monitoring and evaluation and on whether OSS has been able to make a positive contribution in the fight against poverty in uMsinga and uMzinyathi. Finally, it was also revealed that despite OSS being a community-centred initiative, community involvement is relatively low. The next chapter will discuss the findings using the collaboration theory and the social exchange theory.

CHAPTER 6

DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH RESULTS

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter presented the results of the study. This chapter discusses what these results mean. The results of the study are discussed in line with the research questions and conclusions are drawn. Furthermore, the limitations of the study are briefly discussed. An evaluation of how it contributes to theory is provided. The thesis ends with recommendations for stakeholders as to how the problems found with the implementation of OSS could be resolved.

6.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 1: WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF OSS?

According to the OSS Implementation Model (2012: 4):

> OSS aims to rebuild the fabric of society by promoting human values, fighting poverty, crime, diseases, deprivation and social ills, ensuring moral regeneration and by working together through effective partnerships. These partnerships include civil society, development partners, communities and government departments all of whom work together to provide a comprehensive integrated service package to communities.

The purpose described above mirrors the views expressed by study participants. This indicates that those who are responsible for the implementation of OSS share the same purpose. Perhaps what is striking about the views of the study participants is that they do not mention the role played by development partners in OSS. I take this to mean that development partners are not playing the role that they are supposed to be playing. Development partners such as business, community forums, faith-based organisations (FBOS) are expected to participate in OSS tasks teams and to work hand in hand with the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government in the fight against poverty. What also stands out is that some study participants see government departments as the main players in OSS. This is in contrast to the purpose of OSS which aims to empower communities to be able to help themselves rather than wait for the government to come and resolve their problems.

Masisukume sakhe is an isiZulu expression which means "let's wake up and build". This expression was deliberately chosen by the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government to

encourage people to take charge of their development. The KwaZulu-Natal Government wanted to put an end to the culture of relying on the government by empowering communities to resolve their own challenges. From the data, it is clear that the community is not in charge of its destiny because it still relies heavily on government departments for interventions. OSS seeks to build partnerships with NGOs, Faith-Based Organisations, business and other stakeholders. This is done because the KwaZulu-Natal Government realises that the task of helping communities not only requires government involvement but requires a collective effort from a variety of stakeholders. In uMsinga, it appears that the role of resolving community challenges still rests heavily on the government and that is not in line with the purpose of OSS.

The heavy reliance on government departments to resolve community challenges in uMsinga might be caused by the fact that this is a predominantly rural area. In the rural areas of KwaZulu-Natal, people are mostly poor which means that they do not have the capacity to resolve their challenges. This leads to reliance on government departments to resolve the challenges because government departments usually have the necessary skills and resources to resolve community problems. The low participation level of community organisations and business shows that there are poor extra-governmental relations in uMsinga. These stakeholders are very important because they have the skills and resources which can help communities.

Mattesich and Monsey (1992) argue that having a clearly demarcated mission, vision, objectives and strategy is necessary to achieve collaborative success. They also note the importance of having clear and attainable goals. This is important because vague and unattainable goals diminish collaborative enthusiasm. This study argues that one of the reasons why OSS is failing despite the presence of a shared purpose is that the aims of the initiative are too broad. "Rebuilding the fabric of society by promoting human values" for example is a very vague goal. This is more of a common cause than a specific goal. While having a common cause like rebuilding the fabric of society might be good for mobilising awareness and garnering support, it is not helpful in making collaboration successful. On the other hand, framing specific goals allows collaborating partners to monitor their progress thus guarding against collaborative inertia.

This brings us to another important consideration. This consideration has to do with whether or not the collaborating partners were involved in the formulation of the shared purpose. In the case of OSS, it appears that the other partners (community members, NGOs and the local government) were not involved in the formulation of the shared purpose. The KwaZulu-Natal provincial government initiated the programme and then roped in other players to help implement it. The researcher argues that one of the reasons OSS is failing is because it was initiated in a top-down fashion. Had other partners been involved in its formulation, it would have been much easier to get them to buy-in into the initiative. If the purpose of the collaborative is constructed in a top-down manner it is not likely to achieve buy-in from other stakeholders whereas if multiple stakeholders are involved in its formulation it is likely to garner wide-ranging buy-in. Involving diverse stakeholders in the formulation of a shared purpose means that they can explore the causes of the problem, analyse different solutions to the problems and come up with more comprehensive solutions to the problems identified. In a sense involving multiple stakeholders in the formulation of the purpose of the collaborative initiative distributes power. Those who are involved in the naming of the collaboration and the construction of its purpose have power since they influence what it will do. The greater the diversity of the stakeholders involved in the formulation of the collaborative purpose, the wider power is distributed.

I noted above that OSS seeks to encourage community members to participate in their own development. It follows therefore that community members should have been involved in the formulation of the purpose of OSS. Data indicate that in some wards community members do not know what OSS is about. Data also indicate that community members are not participating as expected. What this means is that if community members are not involved in the formulation of the purpose of the collaborative initiative then they are not likely to participate in its activities mainly because they do not have a sense of ownership of the initiative.

6.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 2: WHAT ARE THE CHALLENGES FACED BY OSS?

As indicated in the results chapter, there are many challenges which affect the work of OSS in uMsinga, in particular, and KwaZulu-Natal, in general. What emerged from the data as the main challenge to the programme and the management of intergovernmental relations

within the programme was the lack of participation by government departments. Government departments appear to be central to the success or failure of the programme. This, therefore, means that lack of participation by government departments negatively affects the programme and intergovernmental relations within the programme.

The collaboration theory states that before organisations enter into a collaborative agreement, they must first assess their collaborative capacity. According to the theory, capacity for joint action is conceptualised as a combination of four elements namely: (1) procedural and institutional arrangements, (2) leadership, (3) knowledge and (4) resources. Regarding the first element, Milward and Provan (2006) argue that long-term and complex collaborative arrangements require more explicit structures and protocols for administration and management of work. It is important that procedural and institutional arrangements are defined at the intra-organisational level and at the inter-organisational level. In the literature review, I mentioned that OSS has a number of structures which were created to manage the initiative. At the ward level, we have the War Room, at the local municipality level we have the LTT, at the district municipality level we have the DTT and at the provincial level, we have the PTT. These structures are responsible for the management of collaboration among different stakeholders. This means that at an inter-organisational level there are clear procedural and institutional arrangements. On the other hand, procedural and institutional arrangements do not seem to be present intra-organisationally. This is evidenced by the non-attendance at OSS meetings by most government departments.

The lack of intra-organisational procedural and institutional arrangements in government departments has led to a conflict between organisational commitments and commitment to OSS. Data indicate that government officials prioritise organisational work over OSS activities. Using the social exchange theory to analyse this phenomenon reveals that government officials prioritise their organisational work because they have something to gain from it but have nothing to gain from performing OSS duties. Operation Sukuma Sakhe does not form part of the job description of junior government officials which means that their participation in OSS is not rewarded. This means therefore that professional self-interests play a major role in the decision by some government officials not to participate in OSS activities. This is in line with Hudson, et al.'s (1999) argument that professional self-interest is a barrier to collaboration.

This brings us to the second element of the capacity for joint action which is leadership. The provincial government has tried to ensure that OSS has strong leadership from the ward level up to the provincial level. At the ward level, the ward councillor is the political champion of Operation Sukuma Sakhe, at the local municipality level, the municipal mayor is the political champion of OSS. The same applies to the district mayor up to the premier of the province who is the provincial champion of OSS. Heads of provincial government departments are also appointed as champions for the 11 district municipalities in KwaZulu-Natal. This, however, does not resolve the problem of lack of participation by government departments.

Another challenge facing OSS which is linked to leadership is the differences in legitimacy between elected and appointed officials. Data indicate that community-based conveners lack legitimacy. As a result, they have faced resistance from some stakeholders when they try to perform their duties such as requesting reports. Some have even confessed that they do not even know the extent of their powers. Having conveners who do not have legitimacy and who do not know the extent of their powers is a major barrier to successful collaboration. Authority is another challenge that is linked to leadership in OSS. Local leaders such as ward councillors seem to lack authority to summon government departments and other stakeholders to meetings. The provincial government, however, can mobilise government departments when it hosts Cabinet Days and during the Mandela Week. This clearly indicates that the provincial sphere has more power vis-à-vis the local sphere. This confirms the expression 'the power is in the purse strings' which means that those who control financial resources have more authority.

The knowledge that is shared in OSS is useful, the extract below demonstrates the importance of sharing knowledge.

> *"For me working in collaboration with other stakeholders is very helpful because otherwise, I would not know what is happening in other departments. Even my ward committee sometimes doesn't know what to do to resolve a particular challenge. But because of the War Room meetings, I am able to learn things which I didn't know which make it easy for me to resolve community challenges"* Speaker of the Municipality.

It must be noted however that the lack of attendance in OSS by some government departments and other stakeholders deprives members of the War Room knowledge and consequently affects their ability to resolve some of the problems they found in the community. Improving the attendance of government departments particularly will go a long way in improving the distribution and the sharing of knowledge. This would also allow citizens to access service in an integrated or seamless manner as the programme intended. Another important point that must be made regarding knowledge is that the knowledge held by members of the community is not being utilised as much as it should be. Throughout the study, the researcher did not get the sense that knowledge which comes from community members is being integrated into the attempts to find solutions to community problems. It is expected that solutions will come from government departments or from the local authorities. This goes against the spirit of involving community members in solving their problems. I argue that in order to truly involve communities in resolving their challenges the knowledge which comes from the community must be given primacy. The assumption that community members have no knowledge to contribute to the improvement of service delivery is an antithesis of the rationale behind the OSS model.

The challenge of lack of resources will be discussed later but for now, it suffices to say that the failure of government personnel to attend OSS meetings shows that the provincial government does not have the necessary resources for joint action. Government departments lack the human resources needed to implement OSS. The fact that the KwaZulu-Natal Government is chronically short of personnel who are supposed to attend War Room meetings proves that the government did not assess its own capacity to collaborate.

From the data, it also appears that the provincial government has come up with a Track Register which has been tabled in the KwaZulu-Natal Committee of Heads of Department. The purpose of the Track Register is to keep track of departments who attend and those who do not attend OSS meetings. This is a very good initiative directed at reducing or curbing departmental absenteeism. However, I do not believe that it will resolve the problem of non-participation by government departments. This is not caused by laziness or lack of interest in Operation Sukuma Sakhe but by the shortage of personnel in government departments and lack of reward for government officials participating in OSS. The Track

Register will record high levels of non-attendance unless the provincial government employs people who will be tasked with overseeing OSS operations.

In the literature review, it was stated that in the Ministers of Cabinet and Members of Provincial Executive Council (MINMECs), there is low attendance at meetings. This is replicated in OSS. This means that there is usually a challenge of lack of attendance in intergovernmental initiatives, one reason being that there are many meetings. In OSS, War Rooms sit twice a month. Perhaps, if each War Room held only one meeting a month, the attendance rates might improve. However, this would mean that community members would have to wait longer to get feedback on their cases.

The lack of capacity in the community also proves that the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government did not assess collaborative capacity before initiating OSS. The KwaZulu-Natal provincial government ingeniously decided that OSS should be managed by community members who are based at the ward where the War Room operates. This is in line with the original purpose of OSS which is to help communities help themselves. However, it does not seem as though the KwaZulu-Natal Government, particularly the Office of the Premier, assessed the capacity of community members to carry out the duties of OSS. The findings of the study point to the fact that community-based conveners lack basic resources like airtime to organise meetings and do follow-ups with government departments. They also lack transport to attend meetings which negatively affects the operation of the War Room. This clearly demonstrates that community-based conveners are not empowered to carry out their duties.

The KwaZulu-Natal provincial government must have assumed that there would be enough capacity in the community when they decided to replace government officials as conveners with community members. The convener of the War Room is the person who is primarily responsible for managing intergovernmental relations in the meeting and, if he/she is not capacitated, that negatively affects intergovernmental relations. As was noted in the methodology chapter, uMsinga is mostly rural and has very high levels of unemployment. This means that some of the community-based-conveners are also not employed and without some form of financial support from the provincial government they cannot successfully carry out their duties. As things stand it appears as though the provincial government overlooked the fact that in some areas especially the rural areas people lack the

resources to do the kind of work required of a convener. Had the provincial government assessed the capacity in the community before rolling out community-based conveners they might have realised that there is a serious lack of capacity in some areas and they would have come up with ways to remedy the situation.

The study also found that OSS is heavily politicised and that this affects its work. When opposition politicians do not attend because they do not share the same political views with the political champion that means there is something fundamentally wrong. OSS is supposed to be accessible to everyone regardless of their political affiliation. When opposition politicians do not attend, that means their followers will not know what is happening in the War Room and will not get the assistance they need. The study also found that if you belong to a political party other than that of the political champion, you will not get assistance from some War Rooms. This indicates that some political office-bearers do not follow the ethical standards which underpin public administration. This is totally unacceptable because OSS is a government programme and no one should be discriminated against unfairly as far as accessing government services is concerned.

The study also discovered that there is a feeling among some councillors that the provincial government is encroaching into their area of jurisdiction without consulting them. These councillors feel that they are being intentionally sidelined by the provincial government. This negatively affects intergovernmental relations between the two spheres of government because it creates an atmosphere of mistrust. The way OSS is designed makes the role of councillors indispensable to its success. If councillors feel that they are being pushed to the sidelines in the programme that will in all likelihood lead to the failure of the programme.

Another challenge to OSS discovered in the study is the lack of resources. I argued above that the shortage of staff in government departments proves that the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government did not assess its capacity to collaborate. The lack of resources to operationalise OSS also proves that the government did not adequately assess its capacity to deliver in OSS. According to Steytler and Baatjies (2006: 4), municipalities get their policy direction from provinces and the national government which sometimes results in unfunded mandates. They further state that unfunded mandates are a burden on municipalities and contribute to their failure to provide services. OSS appears to be another case of an unfunded mandate. The findings of the study point to the fact that those responsible for

164

operationalising OSS do not have access to basic office equipment, transport and that the buildings they use are not fit for the purpose of OSS. Some of the buildings they use do not even have electricity.

In some instances, OSS officials have to go to town just to do administrative work. They do this using their own funds and they are not compensated for it. OSS relies heavily on the work done by CCGs. CCGs collect data from the community which is then used to plan interventions. The findings of the study demonstrate that the provincial government does not provide CCGs with transportation to enable them to do household profiling. This negatively affects the work of OSS because without household profiles there is very little the War Room can do to help those who need assistance. Councillors have to take up the responsibility of transporting CCGs so that they can be able to do household profiling. This puts added pressure on councillors.

The findings of the study also indicate that there are no computers, printers and other office equipment in some of the War Rooms. According to the collaborative theory, collaborative administration is crucial in ensuring that a collaborative initiative is successful. Without proper office equipment, it is difficult to maintain an efficient administrative system in OSS. Without proper office working tools, it is difficult to do follow-ups with government departments and to do monitoring and evaluation. It is also difficult to keep records. The extract below shows how dire the situation is in some War Rooms.

> *When I am going to call a War Room meeting I go and ask the neighbourhood school to print the agenda for me so that I can file it. The minutes of meetings are just written in an exercise book which means there is no proper filing system.* Convener 2.

As noted above some community-based conveners do not understand the extent of their powers. This in some instances has led to political champions taking over the roles of the convener. This is mainly caused by lack of orientation of new conveners into their roles. The study also found that some government officials show disrespect to the community-based conveners mainly because some of them are not as formally educated as them and are unemployed. This undermines the power of the convener in the War Room. Some conveners reported that when they ask for reports from some government officials, they do

not receive them because they are not respected. This is contrary to the principles of Ubuntu where everyone is respected on the basis of their humanity and not the position they hold or academic qualifications they possess.

Another challenge facing OSS is that some government departments do not want to go to War Rooms located in remote areas. This should not be the case because OSS seeks to bring government services to the people where they are located. Remote areas should be the playground of OSS because those areas have been left behind in terms of service delivery. The remoteness of an area cannot be accepted as a legitimate reason for not delivering services.

The KwaZulu-Natal Government has what is called the Mandela Week in the month of July every year. This week is also known as the Public Service Volunteer Week. During Mandela Week, a number of senior government officials visit War Rooms and promise that they will help resolve some of the challenges faced by communities. This study has found that government officials do not fulfil these promises. They do not a follow-up to see whether the reported challenges have been resolved. This causes major disappointment in the communities which were promised assistance and leads to mistrust. I am of the view that some senior government officials only attend the Mandela Week because they are expected to attend. They do it for compliance purposes. However, I must note that this does not mean all of them do this because there are senior government officials who are very committed to OSS. When government officials fail to live up the promises they make to communities, this negatively affects the way community members perceive OSS.

6.4 RESEARCH QUESTION 3: DO OSS STAKEHOLDERS RECOGNISE THE NEED TO COLLABORATE?

Alter and Hege (1993) argue that organisational individualism is an ineffective way of dealing with the challenges faced by society. Because of this, there is a need for collaboration (Thomson & Perry, 2006). Those who are involved in the management of OSS realise that collaboration is needed to ensure the efficient delivery of services. They realise that no single stakeholder has the resources or the knowledge required to resolve all the problems of society. The study found that working collaboratively increases efficiency

in the delivery of services. When stakeholders collaborate in OSS, they are able to implement interventions quickly which means they can assist more people.

Collaboration between different stakeholders also provides an opportunity for the sharing of ideas. Since OSS involves many different stakeholders who come from different professional backgrounds, this allows for these stakeholders to share their experiences on how to best assist communities. Collaboration makes it possible for stakeholders to learn new skills and knowledge which they can use in their diverse fields of specialisation. Working in collaboration with government departments also provides other stakeholders with an opportunity to know about the government's plans and programmes. It must be noted that even though stakeholders recognise the importance of collaborating in some cases they still find it difficult to collaborate in practice.

6.5 RESEARCH QUESTION 4: HOW ARE CONFLICTS MANAGED IN OSS?

There is no agreement among collaboration theory scholars when it comes to understanding conflict in collaborative initiatives. Some adopt the Parsonian perspective which views conflict as a disease with disruptive, dissociating and dysfunctional consequences (Parsons, 1939). For these theorists, conflict is a barrier to successful collaboration. Other collaboration theory scholars see conflict as an inevitable consequence of collaboration. They argue that conflict and cooperation can and, in most cases, does happen simultaneously. This means that conflict has to be accepted as an unavoidable process in all intergovernmental or inter-organisational partnerships.

This study has found that there are very few conflicts in OSS. This is caused by the fact that there are many different strategies which are used to prevent or to resolve conflict in the programme. The varied approaches to conflict management indicate that there are no one-size-fits-all when it comes to conflict management. This contrasts with the five-stage approach suggested in the implementation model. The five-stage approach is too rigid. The advantage of applying different strategies in conflict situations is that each case is dealt with based on its merits. This allows mediators to the conflict to be creative when dealing with conflict situations. The most prominent method of conflict management that is used in OSS is deliberations. Deliberations are grounded on the principle of Ubuntu where the views of every member are treated with equal respect. Forgiveness and respect play a major role in

167

this kind of conflict management strategy. Just like in any conflict management strategy those who are tasked with the role of mediating must not be biased in favour of one party over the other. If the mediator is not biased, the parties to the conflict are likely to accept the results of the adjudication.

According to Tshikwatamba (2004: 255-257), intergovernmental relations should be informed by cultural values of the society in which they take place. In line with the views of Tshikwatamba, the study has found that in uMsinga traditional leadership play a major role in resolving conflict in OSS. In traditional contexts, Amakhosi are the highest authority in the community. The task of resolving conflicts in traditional societies usually rests with them. The fact that in OSS this is appreciated and utilised shows that cultural values are respected in the programme. This also shows the importance of having a diverse group of stakeholders in OSS.

The study also found that some members of the War Room seek spiritual guidance from God in order to prevent conflict. They use prayer as a way of preventing conflicts in meetings. This is not surprising because South Africa is a religious country in general. However, this strategy must be applied with caution because people belong to different religious groups. The use of prayer as a way to prevent conflicts also shows that relying on a step-by-step model is not always the most practical way of resolving conflicts. The study further found that having clear reporting lines can prevent conflicts. The researcher is of the view that having clear reporting lines on its own is not enough to prevent conflicts because you can have clear reporting lines but still have people who do submit reports which might cause conflict. The fact that reporting lines are clear does not mean that they will be respected.

The study also found that there are a number of factors which lead to conflict in OSS. One of the factors which lead to conflict in OSS is political challenges whereby certain members use OSS to achieve political objectives. This was discussed in the previous sections as one of the major challenges facing OSS. To prevent the phenomenon of using the programme for political purposes, the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government organises workshops for councillors where they are taught about the purpose and objectives of OSS. Councillors are made aware that OSS is not a political programme but it is a service delivery programme which should benefit every member of the community. Even though I think that having

168

workshops for councillors can help reduce political squabbles in OSS I believe their effectiveness is limited. The reason for my argument is that sometimes it is the provincial government which is accused of using OSS to achieve political goals. For example, some ward councillors feel that the main reason why they are not consulted when the provincial government hosts events or programmes in their wards is because the provincial government wants to score political points with members of the community. This is particularly the case in those wards where the party in power is in opposition to the party in government at the provincial level.

This study has established that the biggest challenge facing OSS is the lack of participation by government departments. Lack of participation by government departments has been shown to be the main obstacle to intergovernmental relations in this integrated service delivery model. When OSS officials try to prevent lack of participation by reporting those government officials who do not attend meetings conflict ensues, the official doing the reporting ends up not being liked by colleagues who see him/her as a squealer. The implication of this might be that some officials do not report lack of attendance by government officials because they fear that doing so will negatively affect their relationship with colleagues.

6.6 RESEARCH QUESTION 5: HOW IS TRUST-BUILDING ACHIEVED IN OSS?

According to Emerson, et al. (2011), trust generates mutual understanding which in turn generates legitimacy and finally, commitment. Commitment enables participants to cross the organisational and sectorial boundaries that previously separated them and commit to a shared path. Building trust in collaborative endeavours is an important consideration. A lack of trust has been found to lead to dysfunctional outcomes, low commitment, low motivation and lack of confidence among parties (Carnevale & Wechsler, 1992). A significant majority of study participants agreed that trust is very important in collaborative initiatives. One of the ways which are used to build trust in OSS is reporting. To ensure that everyone does what they are supposed to do reports are required at the beginning of every meeting. That way, members of the WTT, LTT and DTT know what each member was able to achieve. I argue that reporting is not the best way to build trust. If reports are always required from task team members, this means that there is no trust. Reports are not a way of building trust but a way of ensuring compliance. Be that as it may, reporting is not without

169

its use because it allows for task team members and community members to know about progress made on interventions.

In OSS, trust does not only relate to members of the task teams but also extends to members of the community. Some of the matters which are discussed in the War Room are very sensitive which means that they should not be discussed outside of the War Room. Community members trust members of the task team with their secrets with the expectation that they will honour that trust. Task team members can earn the trust of the community by not discussing what is shared in the War Room with anyone outside the War Room.

The study found that the failure to deliver on the promises made during household profiling negatively affects community trust. The reason for this is that when CCGs come to do household profiling, members of the household are given the impression that their problems will be resolved. When this does not happen, they lose trust in OSS. What this means theoretically is that community trust is rationally based, that is, it depends on how well the programme performs. Consequently, the only way to ensure that community members do not lose trust in OSS is by making sure that those families which are profiled get the assistance they need in reasonable time. If community members lose trust in OSS, the whole idea of community-based, integrated service delivery would become untenable.

Another factor which negatively affects trust in OSS is the lack of participation by some government departments. Some task team members seem to be convinced that government departments do not participate intentionally. Some are of the view that government officials prefer to do the work they are employed to do rather than spend their time on OSS. Government departments are seen to be dragging their feet because they do not see the importance of OSS. What makes matters worse is that when task team members report the lack of participation by departments to senior government officials, nothing changes.

Another factor which diminishes trust in OSS is the lack of consultation between the provincial government and the local government. Some local politicians are of the view that the provincial government seeks to achieve political aims through OSS. They argue that the reason they are not being consulted when the provincial government brings services to their wards is that the provincial government wants to be seen as the ones who are bringing development and not the local authorities. This is a big mistake because the buy-in of local

authorities is needed to ensure the success of OSS. If local authorities see OSS as a vehicle of the provincial government to win political favour among community members they might choose not to participate in it or deliberately frustrate its activities in their wards. Sidelining local authorities for political reasons is not a good strategy in both the short and long-term.

6.7 RESEARCH QUESTION 6: HOW IS ORGANIZATIONAL OWNERSHIP OF OSS ACHIEVED?

For a collaborative initiative to succeed there must be facilitative leadership and frontline staff must be actively involved in the collaborative initiative. People who have charisma and commitment are crucial to the success of any collaborative relationship. Facilitative leadership is important for bringing stakeholders together and getting them to embrace the collaborative spirit (Chrislip & Larson, 1994). Leadership is important for embracing; empowering and involving stakeholders and then mobilising them to move forward collaboratively (Vagan & Huxham, 2003).

Collaboration studies have tended to focus too much on the role of leaders/managers and sidelined frontline staff. This is wrong because frontline staff also play an important role in strengthening and facilitating collaboration. Frontline staff have considerable contact with outside organisations and often enjoy discretionary powers which accord them autonomy from their managers (Lipsky, 1980).

OSS has a very strong system when it comes to leadership. The programme is supported by top administrative and political leadership in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. At the provincial level, it has the provincial premier as the political champion. It also has MECs and HODs of provincial government departments as political and administrative champions for the eleven municipal districts of the province of KwaZulu-Natal. Over and above that OSS is a standing agenda item in the COHOD and in all cabinet clusters. At the district level, the district executive mayors of the eleven districts are political champions and the DTTs of these districts are supported by their respective district municipality EXCO. At the local municipality level, the local mayors are political champions and the LTTs are supported by the Local Municipality EXCO. At the ward level, ward councillors serve as political champions and the WTTs (War Room) are supported by the Ward Committees.

Despite all the leadership support available in OSS, organisational ownership remains tenuous. This is indicated by the lack of participation by most government departments in the programme.

What appears to be crippling organisational ownership in government departments is a failure to engage frontline staff. Data indicates that senior government officials like HODs have OSS as a deliverable in their performance agreements but that is not the case with frontline/junior staff. Frontline staff prefer to do the duties stipulated in their performance agreements and job descriptions than spending their time on OSS activities. This behaviour is in line with the central argument of the social exchange theory. According to Blau (1964), social exchange refers to voluntary actions of individuals that are motivated by the returns they are expected to bring and typically do bring from others. The social exchange also engenders a feeling of personal obligation on parties in an exchange relationship (Cole, et al., 2002). Frontline staff are aware that being involved in OSS activities will not bring any rewards to them. On the other hand, doing what is stipulated in their performance agreements will bring rewards because that is the benchmark against which their performance is measured. Government officials have a personal interest such as seeking promotions at work and they can only get that promotion if they deliver the targets stipulated in their job descriptions and in their performance agreements. Since they do not stand to gain any rewards from their involvement in OSS, they have no feeling of personal obligation to the programme.

NGOs are also affected by the issue of prioritising organisational duties over OSS duties. One NGO representative noted that he is able to attend to OSS activities only if they do not clash with his organisational duties. This might also be explained by the social exchange theory. Organisational ownership is also important for NGOs because through their involvement in OSS they get to interact with different stakeholders who possess knowledge about the communities they seek to help. If there is organisational ownership of OSS in the NGO, that means they will gain enough information to enable them to devise comprehensive strategies that will improve the lives of community members.

Contrary to what is happening with the government departments and to a lesser extent with the NGOs, the local municipality, particularly in uMsinga, is not struggling to ensure organisational ownership of OSS. The reason for this is that at the ward level there is both

leadership in form of ward councillors and frontline staff in the form of ward committee members. Ward councillors serve as political champions in the ward and they are also members of the municipal councils. This makes it easy for them to share what is happening in the War Room with the municipality thus facilitating organisational ownership. The role of the ward councillor is to deliver services to the ward and improve the lives of community members. Ward committees exist to help the ward councillor to fulfil these tasks. The work of the ward councillor and the ward committee is directly related to OSS and that is why there is no crisis of organisational ownership.

It is clear from the data that there is a shortage of reticulists in OSS particularly in uMsinga. Those who are tasked with managing OSS are not able to get key resource holders such as business people to buy-in to the programme. What this means is that conveners and political champions must be capacitated in order to be able to market the collaboration to key resource holders. The collaboration theory is silent on the importance of marketing the collaboration.

6.8 RESEARCH QUESTION 7: HOW ARE OSS DECISIONS IMPLEMENTED?

CCGs play a crucial role in the implementation of OSS interventions. They are the foot soldiers tasked with collecting information from the community and bringing it to the War Room. They also follow up with government departments to ensure that people who require assistance get assisted. In some wards, there is a shortage of CCGs. This negatively affects the implementation of OSS interventions. As noted in earlier sections, despite the immensely important role they play in OSS, CCGs are underpaid and are not given enough resources to effectively execute their duties. Because CCGs are underpaid, when an employment opportunity arises they take it and when this happens it takes a very long time to replace the departed CCG which affects implementation.

Earlier sections have discussed some of the challenges facing OSS. Implementation is one of them. Failure to implement the decisions taken in the War Room, LTT and DTT affects how OSS is viewed by members of the community. As a result of poor implementation, some community members have lost hope in OSS. As a way of protest, some have decided to stop attending OSS meetings. This does not bode well for the future of the programme in those communities. The failure to implement appears to be the fault of the provincial

government because it promises things but does not deliver. This is particularly the case during the Mandela Week.

The lack of attendance by government departments also negatively affects implementation. When government departments are represented in the War Room, interventions are made quickly and efficiently. If government departments are not represented, this means referrals have to be used. Using referrals means that community members have to wait for long periods before they are assisted. The use of referrals goes against the spirit of OSS because community members still have to go to government offices to access services. The lack of resources is another factor which affects implementation. Referrals are used because departments lack the human resources required to attend War Room meetings. The programme also lacks the financial resources required for effective implementation. In some instances, household profiling is done only to find that there is a shortage of financial resource to assist the identified households. If the programme was well-resourced, it would be easier to implement interventions.

Municipal Demarcation can also impact on implementation in OSS. This is especially the case when there are political disagreements regarding the demarcation process. Municipal demarcations are a hotly-contested terrain in some parts of the country as we have seen recently in Vuwani and Malamulele. Disputed municipal demarcations negatively affect the functionality of OSS. To prevent this, the LTTs of the affected municipalities must facilitate a handover process. This would allow the War Room to get the required support from its new municipality.

6.9 RESEARCH QUESTION 8: HOW ARE MONITORING AND EVALUATION DONE IN OSS?

Measuring results is an important aspect of every programme. If you do not measure results, you cannot tell success from failure, and if you cannot see success, you cannot reward it. If you cannot see success, you cannot learn from it and, if you cannot recognise failure, you cannot correct it (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Demonstrating results is also important for winning public support.

In OSS, monitoring and evaluation are twofold. There is a top-down approach and a bottom-up approach. The top-down approach relies on political oversight as a means of

174

monitoring and evaluating OSS. Politicians and senior administrators from the provincial government visit wards to check if War Rooms are functional and whether they are able to do the interventions they are supposed to do. During these visits, community members are interviewed with the purpose of finding out if they are satisfied with the work of the War Room. This approach to monitoring and evaluation puts the community at the centre of the monitoring and evaluation process. This is good for enhancing accountability in OSS. The weakness of this monitoring and evaluation approach is that it is infrequent. Personal visits by politicians and senior civil servants to War Rooms do not happen regularly. This means that personal visits to War Rooms cannot tell us about the day-to-day running of the War Room.

The top-down approach to monitoring and evaluation is also apparent when we look at the fact that the Office of the Premier through its social partner BroadReach Healthcare is responsible for monitoring and evaluation. BroadReach is responsible for designing the reporting tools which are used at the local level. The fact that actors at the local levels have no say in the development of these reporting tools indicates a top-down approach.

The bottom-up approach can be seen when one looks at the use of logbooks in War Rooms to monitor whether government departments have done the interventions required of them. Through the use of logbooks, task team members monitor the performance of provincial government departments. If government departments fail to do interventions, the CCG and the ward councillor go to the government department concerned physically as a way of monitoring progress.

Another M&E strategy that is used in OSS is asking community members who required assistance whether they have been assisted or not. WTT members do a live visit to the household which was profiled to check if it has been assisted. This is a hands-on approach to monitoring and evaluation. Instead of relying on the reports by a government department, WTT members visit the household to verify if the intervention did indeed take place. This approach allows task team members to do a pre- and post-intervention comparison. The weakness of this approach is that it takes too much effort. Earlier I stated that in OSS there is a severe shortage of personnel. This means that not all profiled households can be revisited to monitor whether interventions have been done or not.

6.10 RESEARCH QUESTION 9: HOW IS STAKEHOLDER COMMUNICATION MAINTAINED IN OSS?

One of the main challenges facing OSS in the province of KwaZulu-Natal is the lack of participation by government departments. This is despite the fact that War Room meetings are planned in advance. The WTTs set annual dates for meetings and send them to all OSS stakeholders including government departments. This is done so that every stakeholder can plan around the meeting dates to ensure maximum participation. The lack of participation by most government departments is not due to poor communication because they are told well in advance about the dates for War Room meetings. The strategy of having a yearlong list of standing meetings is a very good idea if you want to maximise participation. However, it does not seem to be working in the case of OSS. The shortage of personnel is one of the reasons why departments fail to attend meetings despite knowing beforehand about them.

Some War Rooms and the DTTs of uMzinyathi, Amajuba and uThukela districts, have already started incorporating innovative ways of communication. The use of social networks as a tool of communication in OSS is a new approach. It is also a very convenient way of communicating with stakeholders because it provides an opportunity for real-time information sharing. Using social networks as communication tools also saves time because it means that War Room members do not always have to meet in person to discuss certain issues. The downside to this is that not every member of the War Room will have access to a phone which supports social networking applications like WhatsApp. As noted earlier, some conveners are not employed which means that they cannot afford technologically-advanced cellphones. This means that the usefulness of this form of communication is limited.

Another communication strategy that is employed in OSS is the use of referrals. The reason why this communication strategy is used between the War Room and government departments is that some government departments are understaffed and cannot attend War Room meetings. Earlier I argued that the use of referrals goes against the spirit of OSS.

Respondents have noted that using referrals delays the process of interventions hence it is not a good strategy of communication.

6.11 RESEARCH QUESTION 10: HAS OSS CONTRIBUTED TO POVERTY ALLEVIATION IN UMSINGA?

In February 2008, former President Thabo Mbeki launched a National War on Poverty in his SONA. The war on poverty was launched in three Presidential Nodal Areas which included Umsinga in KwaZulu-Natal. In March 2011, under the leadership of Premier Dr Zweli Mkhize, the "War on Poverty" initiative was re-launched as OSS. I saw it as necessary to solicit the views of those involved in the management of OSS regarding the impact of the initiative on poverty alleviation in Umsinga and the uMzinyathi District.

There are two contrasting views on the impact of OSS on poverty alleviation. Some are of the view that the programme is playing a major role in poverty alleviation while others think that the programme has not played any significant role in the fight against poverty. Those who argue that the programme is not working point to the fact that people are still given food parcels by the government. They argue that handing out food parcels is not a sustainable way of alleviating poverty. I agree with this. Even though, in the short-term, a situation can be so dire that food parcels are needed to bring temporary relief, in the long-term they are not sustainable. I noted in previous sections that OSS is about community members taking charge of their destinies. Relying on food parcels goes against this spirit.

Those who argue that the programme is not working also believe that if more resources are poured into the programme things would change for the better. They argue that they have the plans but they are not able to execute them because of the lack of resources. They also believe that helping community members with seeds and ploughing is a more sustainable way to alleviate poverty in the long-term. Some believe that the lack of consistency from government departments is hurting efforts which seek to alleviate poverty. They argue that during the Mandela Week MECs and government officials become available only to disappear after the week ends. The Mandela Week appears to be a show for politicians as far as some study participants are concerned. The lack of following up on Nelson Mandela Week promises has been a recurring theme throughout the study. This means that it is a problem that needs to be addressed because it is leading to cynicism towards OSS.

Those who argue that OSS has contributed positively to poverty alleviation note that the programme has given student bursaries to further their education in institutions of higher learning. There is almost universal agreement that education is one of the most important weapons to fight against poverty. In South Africa currently, there is a huge debate around the affordability of university education. High university fees negatively affect those who come from poor backgrounds. As noted earlier, uMsinga is a very poor municipality, which means that many people in the area cannot accord afford university fees. Providing students fees for students from such backgrounds goes a long way to alleviating poverty.

Another way of alleviating poverty that has been adopted under the banner of OSS is teaching the elderly how to read and write. This is a very useful intervention because if you have literate old people, they can teach the young. Community members have also been assisted with seeds, ploughing and fencing of gardens through OSS. These interventions were made to ensure food security for the community of uMsinga. OSS has also helped some members of the community find employment in government projects which helps in the fight against poverty.

The different views regarding the role of OSS have played in poverty alleviation indicate that impact is not the same everywhere. In some wards, OSS has played a role in poverty alleviation while in other it has not.

6.12 RESEARCH QUESTION 11: IS THE COMMUNITY INVOLVED IN OSS?

OSS understands that for a society to be self-sufficient it is important that its members are not passive recipients of services, but that they participate actively in local interventions which have an impact on their lives (OSS, 2011). OSS envisions a society where community members are engaged to ensure that they contribute to their own development. Despite the community-centredness of the OSS approach, the study has found that, in some wards, community members are not participating in OSS. This is worrying because it goes against the very idea of OSS.

There are a number of factors which have contributed to community members not participating in OSS. One of these factors is the politicisation of the programme. Some politicians will do anything to frustrate their opponents to gain an advantage over them. In some instances, ward councillors withhold information from community members who

178

reside in areas which do not support their political party. This means that community members from those areas will not know about the services which are offered in the War Room. Since community members are denied information about the War Room, they cannot attend which leads to low levels of community participation. Political squabbles are a major hindrance to the realisation of OSS objectives.

Another factor which contributes to non-attendance by members of the community is the lack of results. Community members have lost hope in OSS because the programme is failing to produce tangible results. When the programme was first launched, community members were attending in their numbers but, as soon as they realised that the promises made to them were not being fulfilled, attendance levels decreased. Not only did the lack of results lead to lower turnout, it also tainted the image of task team members. Community members started seeing task team members as nothing but liars. Even task team members have started to lose hope in the programme as a result of poor returns. They see the programme as a waste of time because all they seem to do is talk but have no results to show. The lack of results has significantly eroded trust in OSS.

The lack of results is linked with the non-participation of government departments. If government departments were participating in OSS interventions would be done speedily and community member would be happy therefore would have no reason for not participating in OSS activities. It appears that many problems in OSS can be directly linked to non-participation of government departments. This is the main challenge that the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government must address if OSS is to be successful. This should also be a lesson for other provinces who wish to adopt the OSS model of service delivery.

Another reason why community members do not participate in OSS is that they do not understand the programme. Some people still travel to distant towns to access services that they could access close to their homes. This shows that having a community-based service delivery model does not automatically mean that community members will know about it or make use of it. The fact that some community members do not know about OSS indicates that not enough time was invested in developing extra-governmental relations.

Those who argue that the community is involved in OSS point to the fact that community representatives such as ward councillors and Izinduna are representing the community.

They do not look at whether ordinary members of the community are participating or not but they look at whether community leaders are participating. For them, if community leaders are involved, that means the community is involved. I believe that conceptualising community participation in this way is incorrect in the context of OSS. The reason for this is that, if community members rely on their leaders to represent them, it cannot be said that they are taking charge of their destiny. This does not indicate a community which is playing a role in its own development. This also assumes that community leaders know everything that is happening in the community which is not the case.

6.13 CONCLUSION

The lack of participation by government departments in OSS affects intergovernmental relations. This is the main problem facing this community-based, integrated service delivery model. This study has shown that without adequate funding community-based service delivery models cannot function. The reason for this is that communities do not have access to the resources required to operationalise the programme. This is particularly the case in poor communities. Interestingly, the study found that having high-level political buy-in and support for a programme does not mean the programme will be a success.

Another significant finding made by this study is that OSS is much politicised despite being a government programme. The study found that being a member of a political party sometimes determines whether a community member or household accesses services or not. The study also found that some community members have lost hope in OSS because of the lack of results. Some have resorted to not participating in OSS activities. This is a problem because the hallmark of OSS is community participation in service delivery.

6.14 CONTRIBUTION TO THEORY

The study contributes to collaboration theory by arguing that the manner in which the purpose of the collaborative initiative is formulated affects its success. The study argues that all relevant stakeholders must be involved in the formulation of the purpose of the collaboration in order to achieve committeemen and ownership. If some stakeholders are not involved in the formulation of the purpose they are unlikely to be committed to the collaboration.

In terms of leadership, the implication for collaboration theory is that it is not enough to have multiple opportunities and roles of leadership in a collaborative initiative. It is also not enough to have leaders with authority. To achieve collaborative success, leaders must also have access to resources and be willing to mobilise those resources towards the collaborative effort. Furthermore, contrary to the arguments of the collaboration theory, it is possible to have multiple opportunities and roles of leadership in a collaborative endeavour and still experience collaborative failure.

Both the collaboration theory and the social exchange theory view trust as an important element to achieve collaborative success. These two theories focus on trust between the collaborating organisations. However, they are silent when it comes to trust in the collaboration by the target population (in this case community members). This study adds to theory by arguing that it is not enough to only build trust between collaborating organisations but getting the target population of the collaboration to trust in the collaboration is also important to its success.

The collaboration theory is not useful in regard to organisational ownership because, despite strong leadership support in OSS, organisational ownership remains weak particularly when one looks at government departments. This means that it is possible for a collaborative initiative to fail despite the presence of top leadership. Perhaps what the theory fails to account for is the fact that it is possible to have strong facilitative leadership but still lack the resources (as it has been proved to be the case in OSS) necessary to make the collaborative initiative a success.

This study also adds to the collaboration theory by arguing that, for collaboration to be successful particularly in environments where there is a scarcity of resources, marketing the collaboration to key resource holders is vital.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

7.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study was to determine how intergovernmental relations are managed in KwaZulu-Natal's Operation Sukuma Sakhe, to investigate the challenges faced by OSS, to determine the impact of OSS on poverty alleviation and lastly, to evaluate the role (if any) played by community members in OSS. The study was underpinned by both the collaboration theory and the social exchange theory. A qualitative methodology was employed in the study. The sample for the study consisted of provincial government officials, local politicians, a DTT chairperson, an LTT chairperson and community-based conveners. Data was collected using semi-structured telephonic interviews. Policy documents, acts of parliament, speeches, books, and journals articles were consulted to guide the research agenda and reviewed as part of triangulating the research findings. Study participants were purposively sampled based on their knowledge of OSS. Data were analysed using thematic analysis to generate a descriptive narrative. The collaboration theory and the social exchange theory were then used together as complementary analytical tools, which aided in the understanding of the descriptive narrative identified in the data. This chapter provides a summary of some of the key findings and conclusions of the study.

7.2 CONCLUSIONS

7.2.1 Facilitative Structures

There are a number of structures that have been created to facilitate intergovernmental relations in OSS. At the ward level, there are WTTs (war rooms); at the local municipality level, there are LTTs; at the district municipality level, there are DTTs; and at the provincial level, there is the PTT. These structures serve as information-sharing forums for the various stakeholders involved in OSS. They are supported by oversight and administrative

committees. They also boast high-ranking politicians and government officials. Despite this, the programme still faces major challenges in living up to its promise.

7.2.2 Reliance on Government Assistance

Contrary to the aims of OSS, community members are still relying heavily on the government for assistance. The reason for this is that other key role players like the private sector are not involved in the programme. Another reason is that community members lack the resources required to help themselves. Poor representation of the private sector in OSS indicates that not enough effort is being made to improve/ strengthen extra-governmental relations. Local government, community members, and non-governmental stakeholders were not involved in the formulation of the programme. The programme was announced by the former President Thabo Mbeki in 2008 and then in 2011, it was adopted by the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government under the leadership of Premier Dr Zweli Mkhize. One of the reasons why the programme is facing major challenges is that it was initiated in a top-down approach. If a diverse group of stakeholders had been involved in the formulation of the purpose of the programme, they would have a sense of ownership of the programme and as a result, they would be more committed to it.

7.2.3 Collaborative Efforts

Those who are involved in the management of OSS believe that collaborating with different stakeholders ensures efficiency in the delivery of services. Working in collaboration with other stakeholders also allows for the sharing of ideas and best practices. The study also found that stakeholders collaborate because they realise that they cannot achieve their objectives working individually. This is in line with the argument made by collaboration scholars (Bryson, et al., 2006), that organisations collaborate only if they cannot achieve their goals individually, therefore, denoting personal interest in the decision to collaborate.

Trust is viewed as an important ingredient for collaboration success in OSS. Reporting is one of the strategies used to build trust. Members of the task teams are required to report on what they have been able to achieve every time the task team meets. This does not indicate the presence of trust but actually, indicates the opposite. Nevertheless, collaborative implementation of projects and interventions is a measure that is used to build trust in OSS,

although, despite these measures, there is still a lack of trust. Some community members have lost trust in OSS. This is caused by lack of and slow service delivery to communities. Lack of participation by some government departments leads to lack of trust among task team members. Lack of consultation between local government and provincial government is another factor which diminishes trust. Local politicians believe that the reason they are not consulted is that politicians from the provincial level want to wrest votes away from them. This mistrust between the two spheres of government negatively affects intergovernmental relations and consequently service delivery.

7.2.4 Conflict Management

The study found that there are few conflicts recorded in OSS. The reasons for this are that there are a number of strategies that are used to prevent/manage conflict. The most used conflict management strategy is deliberations. Deliberations are favoured because they are grounded on Ubuntu where the views of every member are treated with equal respect. In this conflict management strategy, forgiveness and respect play a central role. The study also found that traditional leaders play an important role in preventing conflict in War Rooms. This is an indication that having a diverse group of stakeholders helps rather than hurts collaborations. The study further found that prayer is used to prevent conflicts. This strategy must, however, be used with caution since people belong to different religious groups. If not used cautiously, this strategy can cause rather than prevent conflicts. The few recorded cases of conflicts in OSS were caused by political differences and the lack of participation by some government departments.

7.2.5 Organisational Management

Organisational ownership of the programme in government departments is weak which negatively affects intergovernmental relations. The reason for the weakness in organisational ownership in government departments is that frontline staff do not have OSS as a deliverable in their performance agreements. Because of this, frontline staff are not motivated to work in OSS. They prefer to focus on delivering what is contained in their performance agreements. The study also found that those who are tasked with managing OSS in uMsinga are not able to get key resource holders to buy into the programme.

7.2.6 Implementation of Decisions

Implementing OSS decisions is fraught with difficulties. One of the causes of this is the lack of participation by some government departments. If government departments are not represented in the War Room, that means that interventions which require the attention of that department will not be attended to. This causes delays in the implementation of interventions. When this happens, community members start to lose trust in the programme as a platform to solve problems. The lack of financial resources also negatively affects implementation. Sometimes the households that have been identified as needing assistance cannot be assisted because of the shortage of financial resources. This necessitates the capacitation of task team members with the skills to attract key resource holders including business people.

7.2.7 Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring and evaluation happen in both top-down and bottom-up fashion. With regard to the top-down approach, politicians and senior government officials visit War Rooms to assess whether they are delivering services to communities in the manner they are supposed to. The major weakness of this approach is that it is infrequent. The bottom-up approach to monitoring and evaluation entails task team members using logbooks to track the performance of provincial government departments. Despite these approaches monitoring and evaluation in OSS remain weak; testimony to this is the lack of participation by government departments. Those departments who do not attend War Room meetings are not made to account for non-attendance and this has negative consequences for the sustainability of the programme.

7.2.8 Intergovernmental Relations

There are numerous challenges which affect intergovernmental relations and the general functioning of OSS. The main challenge facing the programme is that many government officials do not attend meetings. Government departments are given meeting dates in advance but despite this, they still do not attend meetings. This shows that poor communication is not the cause of government's non-participation in the programme. The

causes of non-attendance are understaffing in government departments and the pursuit of self-interest by government officials. These challenges can be solved by hiring more staff that will focus on OSS and by including OSS as a deliverable in the performance agreements of government officials. The researcher is aware that hiring more staff might not be the most feasible of options given the economic climate prevailing in the country currently. The mistake that was committed by the KwaZulu-Natal Government was to assume that there is capacity in both government departments and the community. The study has shown that a lack of results has prompted community members to stop attending OSS meetings and events.

As noted above, another challenge facing the programme is the lack of capacity in the community. Community-based conveners do not have the capacity to carry out the duties of a convener. They lack the resources required to carry out their duties effectively. Community-based conveners also lack legitimacy, indicated by the fact that when they try to do their work they face resistance from some government officials.

Another challenge to intergovernmental relations is political conflicts between the provincial government and local authorities. This conflict is caused by the lack of consultation between the two spheres. Some councillors feel that the provincial government is encroaching into their area of jurisdiction with the intention of winning votes. This is a major problem because it creates mistrust and breeds uncooperative behaviour.

Another major challenge facing the programme is the general lack of resources. The study argues that OSS has all the signs of an unfunded mandate. The local municipalities are expected to coordinate the initiative but they are not provided with the necessary human and financial resources to do so. The lack of resources also negatively affects the administration of the programme. There is a chronic shortage of basic office equipment across the War Rooms which negatively affects monitoring and evaluations and consequently accountability. The lack of resources is another tell-tale sign that the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government did not assess capacity before launching the programme.

7.2.9 Alleviation of Poverty

Regarding whether the programme has played a role in the alleviation of poverty, there are two contrasting views. Some thought the programme had played an identifiable role in poverty alleviation while others thought it had not had any impact. Those who argued that it has played a major role in poverty alleviation pointed to things like bursaries given to students to further their education at tertiary institutions, the houses built for the poor and the agricultural projects which have been launched under the auspices of the programme. Those who argued that the programme was failing to alleviate poverty pointed to the fact that people still relied on unsustainable means of livelihood, such as food parcels. They argued that these measures were not sustainable in the long-term. By and large, community members are not participating in the programme. This is caused by the politicisation of the programme, non-participation by government departments and the lack of positive results. Furthermore, community members do not know about the programme. Social networks could play an important role in the coordination of activities and the sharing of information in OSS.

7.3 CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY

The present study investigated the management of intergovernmental relations in the integrated service delivery model OSS. The study also investigated the challenges confronting the programme, the role it has played in poverty alleviation and the extent to which the community is involved in the programme. The study contributes to the understanding of intergovernmental relations and integrated service delivery. The findings of this study reveal that much work still needs to be done to achieve integrated service delivery. The study contributes to collaboration theory by arguing that the manner in which the purpose of the collaborative initiative is formulated affects its success.

7.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

Arising out of the findings and conclusions discussed above, the following recommendations are made:

- Efforts must be made to encourage community stakeholders to participate in the programme so that the aim of the programme, which is to empower communities to resolve their challenges without heavily relying on government, can be achieved.

- Each government department must have people who are dedicated to ensuring that their department is involved in OSS activities. These people must only focus on OSS and nothing else because it has been shown that those officials who are employed for something else and have OSS as their secondary task are not able to deliver because their focus most of their energy in doing what they are primarily employed to do.

- To remedy the situation with regard to the lack of financial resources, community-based conveners must be given a substantial stipend and an operational budget so that they can carry out their duties without suffering financial losses.

- The provincial government must provide transportation for CCGs so that they can do their work effectively. Alternatively, they must be provided with transport money so that they can use public transportation to do household profiling.

- The provincial government must make sure that technology and working tools are available in each and every War Room in the province of KwaZulu-Natal.

- The provincial government must work hard to build strong relationships with local authorities otherwise OSS will not be as successful as it can be.

- OSS should be included in the performance agreements and job descriptions of frontline staff, as they would then be keen to participate in OSS because there would be a reward attached to the exchange relationship.

- Deliberate actions must be taken to educate community members about the purpose of OSS and the services they can access in War Rooms. Ward councillors, Ward Committees and CCG can play a huge role in raising awareness about OSS in the community. Community radio stations must also be used to spread the word about OSS.

- The KwaZulu-Natal provincial government must increase the number of personnel dedicated to the operationalisation of OSS. Other provinces who wish to use this model must ensure that there have enough personnel to operationalise it. They must also make sure that the programme is well-resourced.

- Political buy-in must be matched by the investment of resources.

- Other provinces must ensure the involvement of different stakeholders in the formulation of the purpose of the programme if they want to improve the chances of success of the programme.

- Policy makers must come up with innovative strategies and ways of mobilising the resources which are needed to operationalise the programme. Training must be provided on how to market the programme to key resource holders to get their buy-in. Before the programme is launched in other provinces, a comprehensive assessment of capacity in terms of staffing and other resources must be undertaken.

- Policy makers must find ways to build trust across political party lines. This has been shown to be one of the main challenges to effective intergovernmental relations in the programme. Before the programme is adopted in other provinces, steps must be taken to prevent conflict between the provincial government and local authorities. Politicians must be constantly reminded of the constitutional principle of cooperative governance.

- Better monitoring and evaluation measures must be implemented in order to improve accountability and performance. Improving monitoring, evaluation and performance have a potential of reversing this trend.

- All relevant stakeholders must be involved in the formulation of the purpose of the collaboration in order to achieve commitment and ownership. If some stakeholders are not involved in the formulation of the purpose, they are unlikely to be committed to the collaboration.

- The provincial government must take steps to protect community-based conveners from obstructive and supercilious behaviour by government officials. Community-based conveners must be oriented into their roles so that they can have full knowledge of the extent of their powers.

7.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The study found that one of the main challenges facing OSS is the shortage of resources. It would be interesting to study the role the private sector can play in supporting the programme. I noted that one of the limitations of the study is that it did not study the entire province of KwaZulu-Natal, so it would be interesting if a comparative study of the 11 districts can be done so that we can get a comprehensive view of the challenges and opportunities of OSS.

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APPENDIX A: ETHICAL CLEARANCE LETTER

UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL ™

INYUVESI YAKWAZULU-NATALI

3 June 2015

Mr Mlungisi Phakathi 208520445
School of Social Sciences
Pietermaritzburg Campus

Dear Mr Phakathi

Protocol reference number: HSS/0532/015D
Project title: The Management of Intergovernmental Relations in KwaZulu-Natal's Operation Sukuma Sakhe

Full Approval – Expedited Application

In response to your application received on 22 May 2015, the Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee has considered the abovementioned application and the protocol have been granted **FULL APPROVAL.**

Any alteration/s to the approved research protocol i.e. Questionnaire/Interview Schedule, Informed Consent Form, Title of the Project, Location of the Study, Research Approach and Methods must be reviewed and approved through the amendment/modification prior to its implementation. In case you have further queries, please quote the above reference number.

PLEASE NOTE: Research data should be securely stored in the discipline/department for a period of 5 years.

The ethical clearance certificate is only valid for a period of 3 years from the date of issue. Thereafter Recertification must be applied for on an annual basis.

I take this opportunity of wishing you everything of the best with your study.

Yours faithfully

....
Dr Shenuka Singh (Chair)
Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee

/pm

Cc Supervisor: Dr Khondlo Mtshali
Cc Academic Leader Research: Professor Sabine Marschall
Cc School Administrator: Ms Nancy Mudau

Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee
Dr Shenuka Singh (Chair)
Westville Campus, Govan Mbeki Building
Postal Address: Private Bag X54001, Durban 4000
Telephone: +27 (0) 31 260 3587/8350/4557 Facsimile: +27 (0) 31 260 4609 Email: ximbap@ukzn.ac.za / snymanm@ukzn.ac.za / mohunp@ukzn.ac.za
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APPENDIX B: PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH: KZN OFFICE OF THE PREMIER

premier

Office Of The Premier
PROVINCE OF KWAZULU-NATAL

DIRECTORATE:

Private Bag X9037, PIETERMARITZBURG, 3200

Office of the Director-General

4th Floor, Moses Mabhida Building, 300 Langalibalele Street, Pietermaritzburg, 3201

Ms SF Shozi

Tel: 033 341 3407 Fax: 033 394 4505

Mr Mlungisi Phakathi
Lecturer: Political Science Programme
University of KwaZulu-Natal: Pietermaritzburg Campus
Scottsville
3209

Re: Request to do Research at the KZN Office of the Premier

The above subject bears reference.

This letter is in response to your request as per the attached communique.

The Director-General consents to your request on the following terms:
1. All information collected will remain confidential.
2. A copy of your research will be made available to the Office of the Premier.

We look forward to the outcome of your research and hope it would contribute positively to the OSS flagship project.

Yours sincerely,

Mr N V E Ngidi
Director-General

Date: 09. 03. 15

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APPENDIX C: PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH: UMZINYATHI DISTRICT MUNICIPALITY

UMZINYATHI DISTRICT MUNICIPALITY

www.umzinyathi.gov.za

PRINCESS MAGOGO BUILDING, 39 Victoria Street, Dundee 3000, P.O Box 1965, Tel: 034 219 1500, Fax: 034 218 1940
e-mail:rc3@umzinyathi.gov.za

Ref: 2/9/5   Date: 23 February 2015

Enquiries: Mr. T.R. Malunga   e-mail:thami@umzinyathi.gov.za

Mr Mlungisi Phakathi
School of Social Sciences
Collage of Humanities
Pietermaritzburg Campus
University of KwaZulu-Natal
Email: 208520445@stu.ukzn.ac.za

Dear Mr Phakathi,

RE: Permission to Conduct Research:

Gatekeeper's permission is hereby granted for you to conduct research at the UMzinyathi District Municipality provided that ethical clearance has been obtained. We note the tittle of your research is: "The Management of Intergovernmental relations in KwaZulu-Natal's Operation Sukuma Sakhe".

It is noted that you will be constituting your sample by conducting structured interviews with ward councillors, Sukuma Sakhe ward task team chairpersons, Umsinga Local Municipality task team chairperson, and the UMzinyathi District task team chairperson.

Please note that the data collected must be treated with confidentiality and anonymity.

Yours sincerely,

Mr T.R. Malunga
Acting Municipal Manager

T H U T H U K A M Z I N Y A T H I

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APPENDIX D: INFORMED CONSENT LETTER

Dear Participant,

My name is Mlungisi Phakathi. I am a PhD candidate studying at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus. The title of my research is: **The Management of Intergovernmental Relations in KwaZulu-Natal's Operation Sukuma Sakhe**. The study seeks to understand how intergovernmental relations are managed in this KwaZulu-Natal flagship program.

Please note that:

- The information that you provide will be used for scholarly research only.
- Your participation is entirely voluntary. You have a choice to participate, not to participate or stop participating in the research. You will not be penalized for taking such an action.
- Your views in this interview will be presented anonymously. Neither your name nor identity will be disclosed in any form in the study.
- The interview will take about 30 minutes.
- The record as well as other items associated with the interview will be held in a password-protected file accessible only to myself and my supervisors. After a period of 5 years, in line with the rules of the university, it will be disposed by shredding and burning.
- If you agree to participate please sign the declaration attached to this statement (a separate sheet will be provided for signatures).

I can be contacted at: School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus, Scottsville, Pietermaritzburg Email: 208520445@stu.ukzn.ac.za Cell: 0720379218.

My supervisor is Dr. Khondlo Mtshali who is located at the School of Social Sciences, Pietermaritzburg Campus of the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Contact details: email Mtshalik@ukzn.ac.za. Phone number: 0332605892.

The Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee contact details are as follows: Ms Phumelele Ximba, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Research Office, Email: ximbap@ukzn.ac.za,Phone number +27312603587.

Thank you for your contribution to this research.

DECLARATION

I………………………………………………………………… (*full names of participant*) hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project.

I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so desire. I understand the intention of the research. I hereby agree to participate.

I consent / do not consent to have this interview recorded (if applicable)

SIGNATURE   OF   PARTICIPANT
DATE

.…………………………………………………………………………………

APPENDIX E: RESEARCH SCHEDULE

My name is Mlungisi Phakathi. I am a PhD candidate at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus. I would like to ask you some questions about your role in Operation Sukuma Sakhe. I hope to use the information to understand the process of intergovernmental relations in Operation Sukuma Sakhe. The interview should last about 30 minutes.

(a) How long have you held the position of (Ward Councillor (political champion)/ Ward Task Team Chairperson/ Local Task Team Chairperson/ District Task Team Chairperson/ Provincial Task Team Convenor/ General Manager Sukuma Sakhe)?

(b) Tell me about OSS, what is it about and why do we have it?

(c) What does your role as a (Ward Councillor/ WTT Chairperson/LTT Chairperson/DTT Chairperson/ Provincial Convenor/ General Manager Sukuma Sakhe) entail?

(d) What are the structures responsible for the management of OSS?

(e) What are the challenges faced by OSS? How has the Provincial government tried to resolve them?

(f) Do you have a conflict management mechanism for OSS?

  ✦ How do you manage conflicts?

(g) What is your view on trust-building in intergovernmental relations?

  ✦ How do you build trust in OSS?

(h) Do you think it is important to have organisational ownership of OSS?

  ✦ What measures are taken to ensure organisational ownership?

(i) How do you make sure that OSS is implemented?

(j) How do you ensure monitoring and evaluation in OSS?

(k) How are intergovernmental relations maintained in OSS?

(l) Are there challenges which have been faced by OSS?

  ✦ What are these challenges?

  ✦ What are the plans to overcome these challenges?

(m)Are there any positive contributions in the fight against poverty which have come as a result of OSS?

  ✦ What are these positive contributions?

(n) Is the community involved in the processes of OSS?

  ✦ In what way is the community involved?

I appreciate the time you have taken to do this interview. Have a great day.