The nexus between the United Nations Security Council reform and peacebuilding in Africa

By

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DECLARATION

I, Ekwealor Chinedu Thomas, Student Number 210556027, hereby make the following declaration:

(i) That the research initiative reported in this thesis except where otherwise stated is my original work.

(ii) That this thesis has not been submitted for any other degree for examination at any other University.

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(a) Their words have been re-written and that any general idea attributable to them has been duly referenced;

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CERTIFICATION

It is hereby certified that this thesis entitled "The Nexus between the United Nations Security Council reform and Peacebuilding in Africa" is an original work carried out by Ekwealor Chinedu Thomas (Student Registration Number 210556027).

This work was carried out under our supervision and guidance and is hereby accepted and recommended for approval for the Award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal.

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DEDICATION

This Doctoral thesis is dedicated to my father Chief Ekwealor Joseph Udekwe (#Udekwe77) who joined the Almighty God the same month this thesis was being completed (November 2015). #Udekwe77, growing under your solicitous tutelage, I am inspired to desire, and pursue peace at the global level. You were simple in nature, humble in appearance, pure in heart, and indeed, brave in all of your actions, including the decision to send me to the University to obtain this Doctoral Degree. Now that I am aware that you have removed the mortal apparel and dressed in the robes of immortality, may the Almighty God grant eternal and peaceful rest to your gentle soul, Amen!

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACCORD   African Centre for Resolution of Disputes

ACG   African Caucusing Group

ACLED   Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project

AMISOM   African Union Mission to Somalia

APC   Armoured Personnel Carriers

AU   African Union

AUPSC   African Union Peace and Security Council

BBC   British Broadcasting Corporation

BINUB UN   Integrated Office in Burundi

BRICS   Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa

DDRR   Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reinsertion, and Reintegration

DPKO   Department of Peace Keeping Operations

DRC   Democratic Republic of Congo

ECOWAS   Economic Community of West African States

EFT   Electronic Fund Transfer

EIS   Egypt Information Service

EU   European Union

FSU   Former Soviet Union

G4   Group of Four

UNGA   United Nations General Assembly

GAS   Group of Arab States

GBAV	Global Burden of Armed Violence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HHI	Hillebrand-Herman Index
HHMI	Hillebrand-Herman-Moyer Index
HIICR	Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research
HLPR	High Level Panel Report
HSR	Human Security Report
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IFs	International Futures
IGSMC	Informal Group of Small and Medium Countries
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
ITF	International Task Force
MINURCAT UN	Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINURSO UN	Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSTAH UN	Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MNAC	Movement of Non-Aligned Countries
MONUC UN	Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NAF	Nigerian Armed Forces

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NHAPP	National HIV/AIDS Prevention Plan
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
P5	Permanent Five
PITF	Political Instability Task Force
PMSA	Permanent Mission of South Africa
PPP	Public Private Partnership (PPP)
PRC	People's Republic of China
S5	Small Five States
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAI	South Africa Info
SAUNSC	South Africa in the United Nations Security Council
SSR	Security Sector Reform
START	National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UFC	Uniting for Consensus
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMA UN	Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMIS AU/UN	Hybrid operation in Darfur

UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDOF UN	Disengagement Observer Force
UNEP	United Nations Environment Program
UNFICYP UN	Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNIFIL UN	Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIOSIL UN	Mission Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UNIPSIL UN	Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone
UNMEE UN	Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIK UN	Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL UN	Mission in Liberia
UNMIS UN	Mission in the Sudan
UNMIT UN	Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNMOGIP UN	Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNOCI UN	Operation in Cote d'Ivoire
UNOMIG UN	Observer Mission in Georgia
UNP	United Nations Peacekeepers
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNTSO UN	Truce Supervision Organization
UPEACE	United Nations mandated University for Peace
US	United States
WEOG	Western Europe and Others Group

WHO   World Health Organisation

WMD   Weapon of Mass Destruction

WWI   World War One

WWII   World War Two

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF APPENDICES

TABLES OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

The nexus between the United Nations Security Council reform and peacebuilding in Africa is underpinned by the recognition that the Security Council is the supreme organ of the UN; and its reform saga is a conundrum to Africa's peacebuilding and security praxis. In assortment of ways, this study observes that the Council is created in atmospheres of major realpolitik and has unrepentantly deprived the African continent for 70 seventy years, of meaningful contribution. As the harbinger for global peace and security, the Council lacks *geographic representativity* and is bias towards Africa's real peace which has fanned insecurity paradigm in the continent. The study recognises that African inclusion into the permanent chambers of the Council will entrench Africa's role for global security and armistice. The African exclusion matrix is a clearly-thought-out strategy of the imperial forces in the Permanent Five (P5) which has processed economic deprivation - making the continent perpetually dependent on imperial powers, and politically marginalised - keeping the same at the periphery of the pot of global politics since 1945. In the current global community, peace in Africa is a call of worldwide significance due largely to the observation that, conflicts in Africa accounts for over calculated 70% of world conflicts. Conflicts destroy the pillars for peace and terminate Africa's interest to succeed in containing insecurity regime in the region and elsewhere. Conversely, lack of Council's restructuring has reinforced insecurity regime, and exacerbated the dependency syndrome in the thinking-faculty of African leaders. Actually, some African nations are with necessary capabilities to become permanent members of the Security Council, but US and allies are against African inclusion on the altar of maintaining the status quo and retaining the exclusive core for a realist outlook that, the League of Nations and United Nations are children of World Wars I and II respectively. However, the study among other things learnt that dependency on external actors and marginalisation of Africa may continue until Africa speaks one word with one voice. That is, to demand permanent seat with veto or simultaneously withdraws membership from the UN through the AU's common front. The study, essentially, extended the frontiers of existing knowledge and expanded the horizons of facts on the Security Council reform, and peacebuilding in Africa.

CHAPTER ONE

Background and Outline of Research Problem

1.1   Introduction

Given its enduring crusade for democratisation across the globe, the United Nations (UN) was expected to fully return the Council to democracy before its entire constituent member nations became democracies, and yet it remains the most undemocratic global institution in the world. Pertinent to test is, is it because democratisation is unrelated in the current international system or because the assumption on which this prediction was based is false? Caron, (1993: 552) opines that, sometimes it is about situating the determinant actor. His words, it is not "what principle (democracy or dictatorship) is acknowledged, but who is accepted as the authoritative interpreter of the principle, or, to put it in institutional terms, how does the process of legitimisation works." Essentially, the UN was created on 24 October 1945 with six main organs, namely: General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council[1] (inactive since 1994), International Court of Justice (ICJ), and Secretariat (United Nations Charter, 1945: 4).

Informed by the roles of the UN various organs, the Security Council is the most powerful organ of the UN. It is charged with the maintenance of global peace and order and seats fifteen members (Cox, 2009). Five of which: China, France, Russian Federation, the United States (US), and the United Kingdom (UK), are the P5 empowered with a veto. The remaining members are elected from the UN regions — Africa, Americas, Asia pacific, and Europe — as follows: three from Africa, two from Asia, two from Latin America and the Caribbean, two from Western Europe and others, and one from Eastern Europe. The non-permanent members hold their seats for two years and cannot be immediately re-elected (Ronzitti, 2010: 5). Since the UN inception at the end

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[1]In 1945, when the United Nations was established, there were eleven territories (mostly in Africa and in the Pacific Ocean) that were placed under international supervision. The major goals of the Trusteeship System were to promote the advancement of the inhabitants of Trust Territories and their progressive development towards self-government or independence. The Trusteeship Council is composed of the permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States). Each member has one vote, and decisions are made by a simple majority. Since the last Trust Territory — Palau, formerly administered by the United States — achieved self-government in 1994, the Council has formally suspended operations after nearly half a century. It will meet only as the need arises.

of World War II there had been persistent call by its regions. Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa and Zimbabwe, have primarily called for the Council reform with a view to including Africa in the Council's veto-holding permanent category. The advocates of this position argue that the inclusion of Africa in this category will enable Africa influence the overall Council's decisions, policies and agenda.

After seven decades of calls for reformation of the Council, no meaningful reform has taken place. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), at the 68th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) plenary session in November 2013, in consonance with (1992, 2004, 2009,) previous reform calls, resurrected the reform debates. The African Union (AU) unanimously made a key demand, voting for overhauling and rehabilitation of the Security Council to include streamlined working methods and a broader, more representative membership that reflected geopolitical realities and regional representations in the permanent seat of the Council (African Union, 2005: 7). Africa's calls is predicated on the notion that the current configuration of the UNSC is chiefly discriminatory, entirely not democratic, truly lacks balance, endangers global peace and security prospects, and actually stoke and breeds conflict in non-permanent regions of the UN, of which Africa is one (Gowan and Gordon, 2014: 17).[2] Therefore, Africa calls for reform not only to entrench balance so as to be able to survive within a balanced and ordered structure, but actually, as action prerequisite to secure its house from total decimation. Across Africa, adage plays important role in understanding situations around humanity. May be inspired by one of the *Igbo* adages, African countries such as Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa, to mention a few, has stepped forward to represent Africa at the permanent chamber of the Council at different times. But none of these attempts drafted Africa unto the permanent seat of the Council (Akpotor and Egbebaku, 2010: 52), hence, the questions: what are the remote and immediate causes of African exclusion from the United Nations Security Council permanent seat? How has the exclusion impacted on Africa's peacebuilding architecture and what lessons are there for Africa?

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[2] For Africa the push for permanent seat on the Security Council is weaved into an *Igbo* adage that says: *Onye oku n' agba ulo ya adighi achu nta oke*. Translated in English, means "he or she whose house is under fire does not hunt for rat".

In grappling with these questions, it became evident that the P5 have contending views and reservations regarding empowering any other country from the represented region, or excluded region with permanent seat and veto power. The P5 are of the view that the United Nations Security Council, notably, works for international peace and security, the security of African region, being one of them (Caron, 1993: 552). In this light, absorbing Africa into the Council will tilt the political landscape of the Council to disadvantage the P5. For example, the United States (US) clearly, believes that the Council will function better without Africa on the Council's permanent seat map. To this end, US espoused a reform strategy that empowers only four continents, a proposal that is popularly known as the "Four Policeman", the United States, the United Kingdom, the Russia, and China (Cox, 2009: 95). The US claims that Africa lacks the clout — military and economic might — that is, super power credentials, required to occupy a permanent seat. This is, despite France, and to some extent, Britain leaving in the shells of their post war glory.

But accounts available on global economic calendar compiled by the *Africanholocaust.net* holds that Africa is the largest and fastest growing economy in the world. Specifically, the accounts narrates that "In terms of natural resources, Africa is the world's richest continent. It has 50% of the world's gold, most of the world's diamonds and chromium, 90% of the cobalt, 40% of the world's potential hydroelectric power, 65% of the manganese, millions of acres of untilled farmland, as well as other natural resources" (*Africanholocaust,* 2012: 1). Correspondingly, with US's seeming exclusivist arrangement, Britain actually called for a three regional councils, one each of the tiered system is for Europe, Asia, and the Americas, charged with enforcing regional security and collective responsibility as a Supreme United Nations Council (Cox, 2009: 95).Russia's reform position is not African inclusive. The Russian Federation favored a straight military alliance with the United States and Britain rather than a United Nations that would assume the right to decide the fate of all other peoples, Russia sees both British and US proposals as an institutionalisation of war-time alliance cloaked in democratic trappings. France is a lone voice, faintly, calling for African inclusion while China continues to make references to the amendment of the Charter as the basic basis for African inclusion.

This thesis splits the United Nations history into halves, the moment the United Nations Charter was signed and the Security Council created, and the time Africa and disgruntled members started calling for a balanced and representative Security Council. Prior to 1945, the world was closely rated an arena of total sovereigns, each wielding a legitimate right to solve conflict with aggressive warfare; after 1945, those sovereigns, by a mutual agreement, began surrendering that right for principled reasons of law and humanity and practical security reasons (Cox, 2009). Without a doubt, World War II painfully demonstrated civilisation's power for self-destruction through the unrestrained use of force. So in 1945, a restraint was created in the form of the Security Council. Current studies on the P5 resistance, and the consequent agitations for reform by the UN member states, suggest that the Council has actually become a source of conflict and insecurity within the global political arena, lending itself to bias interventions and adoption of skewed resolutions (Hawkins, 2003:67). This thesis collects empirical accounts, matched with literature evidence and examines the variegated reform proposals strewn in recent years. The assessment is undergirded, to better understanding of the best reform practice and how it will impact on peacebuilding architecture in Africa. In this pursuit, the thesis is divided into seven chapters. The layout is provided under the structure of thesis below.

1.2. A brief search for Africa on the global security map

A central issue for global security organisation since its cradle in 1815 has been, not only the character of the central decision making body, but also, their membership and voting rules and regulations (Zacher, 2004). For example, the 1815 Congress of Vienna established the Concert of Europe and confined membership to great powers who must make unanimous decisions and votes. Equally, Zacher, (2004) notes that the Hague Peace Conference of 1899 and 1907 introduced large numbers of non-super powers into global security deliberations, and the 1907 conference adopted the practice of passing recommendations by simple majority (Zacher, 2004: 211). At the 1919 Versailles conference in which the Covenant of the League of Nations was formulated, the dominant consensus was that security of the Nations, is the business of great powers, it was also agreed that resolution from the council would require the unanimous consent of all member states, with exception to the accused aggressor, if it were a Council member.

A distinctive feature of the deliberations to formulate the character of the League of Nations and the United Nations was that they occur during two major wars. One important impact of the war was that the major powers such as the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union that were winning the war had an overriding impact on the deliberations (Zacher, 2004: 212).And this is how China and France which were coopted into the negotiations and permanent seats. Britain, US and Russia, made other nations formerly enter into the deliberations on invitation to attend the San Francisco conference in June 1945. At the instance of San Francisco, only 51 states were on the political map of the United Nations. Five veto states and six non-permanent members were the central actors in 1945. The UN members agreed that seven of the eleven members — that is the permanent and non-permanent members — shall approve a resolution before it will be of any effect, while veto will be reduced to addressing the needs of use of military force (Zacher, 2004). Conversely, the Soviet Union threatened to leave the UN if there were a diminution of veto power that tampered with the original scope of its ability to neutralise matters of substance. The participant gave in to Soviet's stand and the veto mechanism remained the most valuable instrument in the Security Council to date. At that era, Africa was not a visible actor since only three African States, Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, were members in 1945, before Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia in 1956, and Ghana and Guinea in 1957 and 1958 respectively. The rest of African states started joining the UN from 1960s according to the year in which they are released from colonial bondage and apartheid (United Nations, 2014a).[3] Actually, UN member nations succumbed to Soviet's pressure in 1945; the call to increase the Council to become more representative was resurrected with the arrival of Africa on the global stage. According to Zacher (2004: 212), after 20 years of UN inception, in 1965, the United Nations, reformed its security membership outlook, increased the six non-permanent members to ten for a two year term as provided in the Charter (United Nations Charter, 1945: 7). Since 1965, the Council's non-permanent members have progressively increased to fifteen, for the leadership and governance of 193 nations of the United Nations.

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[3]United Nations Member state, Growth in the United Nations membership, 1945-present (2014a).

Despite the dramatic increase of UN members from 51 in 1945 to 114 in 1963 and 193 in 2014 the P5 has reasons and justifications to be stagnant with the permanent seat and veto structural arrangements. Let us say that the member states of the United Nations are unofficially divided into five geopolitical regional groups — African group, Asia-pacific Group, Eastern European Group, the Latin America and the Caribbean group, and the Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG) (United Nations, 2014b). In these groupings, Africa and South America are the only UN regions not represented at the permanent category of the Council. Since early 1960s, Africa's interest is to belong to the permanent category of the Council. But none of Africa's quests has had any effect since the call in about 70 years ago. Ironically, out of the 193 UN member states, Africa represents the 54 member group — the highest members in the UN after a 55 Asian-Pacific, that is 28% of the overall membership, an approximate one-fifth of the UN member states. As stated earlier, Africa has a slot for three non-permanent members of the Council. This is a number that cannot change any decision that any veto wielding states supports. Veto system, makes Africa's presence on the Council insignificant, relegating the wishes of the population of 54 nations to the oblivion, as well as, not making any meaningful contribution in addressing substantive policy or reform debates that affects the continent. And, this has been the nuisance in Africa's odyssey in the UN since 1945. Even if it wishes to form a common front as some strategic scholars may suggest in order to tilt negotiation and voting in the Council debates, it has no veto power — the most important political instrument in the Security Council — to back up the will to do so. Thus, all efforts may amount to void.

Surely, underlying the characteristics of the UNSC veto mechanism and the call for African inclusion into the permanent seat is violation of the established international decision making norms. They are "the state autonomy or state sovereignty norm; international order; power; and democratic representativeness" (Walker, 1990; Wendt, 1987: 337; Zacher, 2004: 219). The state autonomy or sovereignty is an important political gadget, central to interstate system. Autonomy or sovereignty seeks to uphold the virtue of equality of nations before the international law and community. Specifically,

in the words of Inis Claude, cited in Zacher (2004: 219), autonomy or sovereignty maintains "the rule that every state has an equal voice in international proceedings, and that no state can be bound without consent." Although it has central status in international legal order, it does not commensurate with practice in the current international order. This partly explains why a 54 African sovereign nations has no contributions whatsoever, through the Council's permanent seat to the world. Further, the international order norm directs that states must seek to reduce obstacles to the development of international laws and actions by international institutions so as to facilitate the management of their interdependencies. The point here is that the P5 of the Council advances positions that process disruption which underlies the African political exclusion and several other undue incursions into the region outside the rule of unanimity. In this fashion, the tension between the imperatives of international political participations and Africa's quest to acquire adequate degrees of power, notably, the permanent seat and veto power will continue to inject conflicts in the organ until every power play by the rules, or all rules broken and new ones set up or weaker powers crunched. The third norm speaks to power. Zacher (2004) notes that centrally, international laws and legal binding treaties should require the support of those states whose backing will secure the implementation of an accord, and that voting arrangements should reflect the distribution of resources in issue area. The net idea is that first and foremost, the UNSC, a global security organisation, enjoys the support of UN member nations or at the minimum does not suffer the excluded nations such as Africa within the relations. The fourth norm—democratic representativeness norm—specifically states that the UN decision and laws should have broad support from the international society of states, that is to say, that the backing should be representative in structure and character, not only to entrench balance but also to avert injustices. Pertinent to the four norms are, how Africa's exclusion from the Council constitute a violation of several rules guiding the conduct of international politics. Yet, no tangible effort from the P5 to root democratic representativeness is within sight. This study will flesh out this debate, in the Chapter two of this study, under literature review and link it through the rest of the chapters.

1.3.   Research Task

In the main, the study investigates how the political marginalisation of African region from the United Nations Security Council permanent seat impedes peacebuilding architecture in Africa and exacerbates state and human security while stoking trajectories of conflict. Thesis considers the linkage between permanent seat and veto power relations and the notion of development, peace, and security. Although, Africa alone has nearly 30% of overall UN membership population, it has no permanent seat on the Council. This causes inhibition towards Africa's peacebuilding efforts. This observation is based on the accounts that, some P5 nations who have intervened in Africa were without adequate knowledge of how to address the affected African people with a view to dealing with their insecurity regimes. The relevance of African actors in addressing Africa's problems is out of debate, however, the questions that still need to be asked, are have Africa's numerical strength translated to its relevance in the Council? Answer is no. How significant is the region's position and disposition in addressing the security concerns and peacebuilding options for Africa, very significant? Answer is no. Actually, the 70 years existence of the Council without a permanent seat for Africa, eviscerate the regional leaders. And beyond the selective deprivation or still political marginalisation argument, why is the Council reform, securitised and Africa secluded? For example, the demographics of the UN recognised regions evidently, show that African Group has 54 members, Asia-Pacific Group has 55 members, Eastern European Group has 23 member states, Latin American and Caribbean has 33 member states; Western Europe and Others has 28 member states.   In all of these, resistance to reform, frustrates the democratic ordinances and ideals of such global institution, and undermine the supposedly neutral arbiter and harbinger of global peace and security primary role of the Council. Tinker (1977) notes that the net effect of this outlook is a seeming second form of imperial expansion (Tinker, 1977: 17). For instance, in 2011, the Council, under the guise of responsibility to protect, invaded Cote d'Ivoire, and especially Libya with exceptional impunity. In a UN-backed North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO's) bombing campaign, the Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was dethroned and assassinated, against the dictates of the African Union (AU) who had a five point roadmap to secure Libya peacefully (Ekwealor, 2013: 64). This was after the three African nations—Gabon,

Nigeria, and South Africa—at the non-permanent seat of the Council voted for the enabling Resolution 1973 in Libya. Assuredly, the case in point of fact is that even if the three voted against the intervention, the Council will still make incursion into Libya using the permanent seat and veto instruments as determinant factors. So, understanding powerless Africa at the global stage and developing modalities to empower Africa at least to be able to save human and natural resources from imperial abuse, are some of the critical tasks this study unpacks and provides guidelines to overcome.

The confined nature of exclusion and imbalance, and the attendant human underdevelopment in Africa is also reflected in the Security Council's configuration. The obvious exclusion and selective and bias adoption of resolutions on Africa are also replicated in addressing the basic need of peacebuilding and access to security and development in the region. The inequitable representation in the Security Council, especially in its permanent category, poses root problems in terms of the democratic representation of the views of member states, and indeed occupation issues in decision making (Sandole, 2010: 107). Beyond the P5 marginalisation of the African region, *Africa insight* (2012) records that, as the fastest growing economy in the world [after Asia] and the richest continent in terms of mineral deposit, Africa has a lot of security and interest factors at stake and stands a chance of losing more than any other region in the UN circle. As such, the region has to deal with a myriad of constraints artificially created and factored into the most representative global organisation (the UN). Many of these constraints relate to interest and reinforced by power, played through the permanent seat and veto device. And our task in this instance is to study and observe Africa's capabilities and recommend some practical ways that will make the Council inclusive and work better for Africa's peacebuilding.

1.4.   The Hypothesis

Peacebuilding architecture and state and human insecurity regime in Africa are exacerbated by the exclusion of African states from the permanent seat of the United Nations Security Council. The inclusion of African countries in the UNSC with veto powers will assist the continent's quest for sustainable peace and security.

1.5.   Research problems and objectives; Key questions to be asked

The Security Council reform and Africa's peacebuilding occupy a unique stance in the homily of global security due to the significant patterns they have set. The reform and the Africa's insecurity have endured for more than seven decades (since 24 October 1945). Narrating on the Africa's state and human insecurities over the years and its experiences of unending conflict and marginalisation, Ricigliano (2003) observed that peacebuilding in Africa is "in a class by itself among the world's worst cases" (Ricigliano,2003: 447). Using the Security Council's exclusivist paradigm and some African countries' involvements in varieties of peace and security initiatives in Africa, as well as globally as the focal point, the aim of this study is to understand the dynamics of the Council's permanent seat and veto mechanism and to canvass for its reform especially, along the lines of geographical representativeness. This will interrogate the African exclusion,weighing Africa's suitability for at least a permanent post on the scale of its interest, resources, security and peacebuilding roles in the current international system. In this regard the study will specifically focus on the following objectives:

1.6.   Research Problems and Objectives: Broader issues to be investigated

1. To determine how has Africa contributed to its continued exclusion from obtaining a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council;
2. To determine how the United Nations Security Council inhibited Africa's permanent representation;
3. To articulate what lessons can be learnt from the composition of the United Nations Security Council permanent seat, in terms of how to deal with Africa's peacebuilding and security issues.

1.7.   Research questions

The following central questions are posed and will therefore be answered:
1. How has Africa contributed to its continued exclusion from obtaining a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council?
2. How the United Nations Security Council inhibited Africa's permanent representation?
3. What lessons can be learnt from the composition of the United Nations Security Council permanent membership in terms of how to deal with Africa's peacebuilding and security issues?

In grappling with these key questions, this study seeks to underscore the rethinking of two paradigms that inform research and practice in the domain of global security, peace and conflict. In other words, the paradigms relate to theory and praxis. One is the orthodox conflict analysis paradigm, which focuses essentially on armed groups or warring parties. The second is the formal governmental peace process paradigm that emphasises the role of state actors but largely ignores powerful non-state actors whose actions in conflict zones shape the dialectics of conflicts. In addressing these questions, this study emphasises the instrumentality of a holistic framework that encapsulates the motivations, strategic interests and multifarious roles of key and powerful non-state actors in the permanent and non-permanent seats of the Security Council.

1.8.   Statement of the Problem

The world faces old and new security challenges that are more complex than our multilateral and national institutions are currently capable of managing. International cooperation in this regard is ever more necessary in meeting these challenges (Gowan and Gordon, 2014: 1). A structurally imbalanced Council tasked with sustaining a global peace and security, to enhance international responses to conflict, insecurity, and scarcity through adoption of resolution or direct military intervention within the existing international political environment, is believed to be inefficient in establishing and managing the global order without the combined support of the geopolitical actors and their natural resources. Lack of geographical representativeness which affects the regions of Africa and Latin America and Caribbean is an enduring source of antagonism within the Council since Brazil is resourced sufficiently to represent the Latin American region as does Nigeria, Egypt and South Africa for Africa. Therefore, exclusivist Council does not have the suitable binocular that monitors the spectrum of conflict, insecurity, and scarcity issues in the isolated regions. The shortage of representativeness does not allow the Council to see critical security dilemmas in every region, which, highlights the absence of coherence often necessary for effective security response globally (Gowan and Gordon, 2014: 1). Thus, the thesis invariably, weighs in on verifying the popular assertion that unity of the nations is strength, with a view to locating the Council within the statement.

The importance of unity in enhancing effective and efficient Council in the world, with a very high rate of terrorism, need not be over-emphasised. According to Cox (2013) only five countries determine insecurity and decide intervention. This trend is not sustainable. In order to function properly, the Council should become holistically representative, involving all actors in the fight against insecurities in defence of humanity. Functionality and can be achieved by investing in the representativity and creating balance. The P5 in this regard are vital to drive reform and innovation in combating global conflict. Security Council is a critical organ in global security and peace efforts. The resultant effects of these lingering problems since 1945 in the context of this study are: i) poor control over terrorism and even development in the world; ii) low participation in peace missions in

selected conflicts; iii) inadequate skills and innovations in all regions to promote peace; iv) declined Council popularity among disgruntled members and impede global development; and v) high dependency on external actors to resolve domestic unrests, especially in Africa.

1.9. Significance of the Study

> The impact of a lack of veto power to African state in times of crises in Africa and elsewhere has been under-researched and largely ignored (Banfield, Haufler and Lilly, 2003: 17).…only a limited number of studies have focused on explaining the P5s' behaviour in general and very few have looked specifically at their role in peacebuilding of war torn zones in Africa (Rieth and Zimmer, 2004: 10).

Some of the key purposes for establishing the United Nations are: (i) maintain international peace and security, and to that end, take collective measures for the prevention and removal of the threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of peace (United Nations Charter, 1945). And to bring about, by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace; (ii) develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace; (iii) achieve international cooperation in solving international problems…" (United Nations Charter, 1945: 3). Assuredly, the Security Council is the principal organ charged with these missions. As such, the Charter delivers express powers to the Council for fulfillment of these duties.

From a security perspective, agitations for a balanced Council and the attendant refusal to reform, currently, seeks to polarise the age long not consolidated UN Security body, into more factions. The polarity will adequately hinder every effort towards the principle of collective measures as inspired by the Charter. Further, friendly relations among UN member nations are under attack in its current existence, without a doubt, it is the P5 versus the rest of the UN family. Even more, is that the agenda for international cooperation, is being suffocated by the exclusivist Council's outlook. These are actually

the underlying causes of both economic and political instability, which in most cases in Africa as elsewhere result in armed conflicts between groups and communities within the states. Therefore, emphasis on global security approach to economy, politics and peacebuilding is important to avert conflicts and wars, and advance and prosper in secured global environments. It was understood that security was the anchor since it would be impossible to ensure and sustain investments, growth and development in a conflict-ridden environment. Even so, lack of collective action, relationship and/or cooperation among the UN peoples beget acrimony and have continued to result in wars and anarchy as was the case of Africa's Cote d'Ivoire and Libya. This thesis is pertinent, since Soest (1995) sees war as psychos is caused by an inability to see relationships. The neglect of Southern hemisphere by the Northern hemisphere in the permanent seat of the Council can actually cause separation in the Council and may be used instrumentally to entrench rivals and make enemies. This can be traced in part to the pervasive ideology of self-appointed oligarchy of the P5. Ostensibly, the thesis has the awareness that the current configuration of the United Nations Security Council, risks the foundations of modern era of global peace and even more, of security (Haftendorn, 2013: 4). Hence, the significance of the study lay, partly, in the thesis' commitment to recapture the Council's image as a united body pursuing a collective global security purpose and also to undercut the viewpoints on the world impression of the Council as a self-appointed oligarchy or a tool for the advancement of Western interests. This research study breaks new ground in that it approaches the Security Council reforms from a relatively new perspective – peacebuilding in Africa that seems to have continued to play a significant role in shaping and sharpening the reform debates. That, the UN is the most representative global political institution is undoubtedly true. However, the ill-structured Security Council organ of the UN has triggered various clamours not only on the credibility of the organ but also on its constituency. The import of this study primarily hinges on the calculated effort to achieve global peace by developing pertinent trajectories and modalities for conflict transformation, and insecurity regime containment that will guarantee Africa's peacebuilding architecture.

Thus, the utility of Africa in this study is anchored on the thesis of mitigating conflict, peace and security patterns of the global agency of peace in the Southern hemisphere through an Africa's peace and security advocate (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). In this fashion, thesis explores some African states' peace and security efforts in Africa and peacekeeping record globally through which new knowledge will be brought to bear not only on modalities to balance the Council, but also, and especially to contribute towards new knowledge in the domains of conflict, intergovernmental institutions, international law, and Africa's disposition in the world. The thesis is therefore, fundamentally significant, as it truly extends the frontiers of existing knowledge and expands the horizons of facts in the areas of Africa and global conflict and security, but also chat the methods for embracing peace and security in the world.

The implications of the undemocratic and unrepresentative structural Council is mauled nations as examined, giving deep insight and standing on the shoulders of current studies into the security roles of the P5 as it affects developing countries, non-permanent continents and Africa exactingly is exposed. Specifically, this work is vitally momentous as it indeed, widens the scope and horizons of information available in the field in assortments of paradigms, using the current international Security Council system, especially towards the resolving conflicts in the world to inculcate democratic culture which straddles geographical representativeness in the UN permanent seat and a structurally angry-free United Nations regions that will necessitate a peaceful world.

Further, the study is equally significant in terms of policy imperatives –the thesis serves as a basis for re-evaluation, re-focusing and re-strategising the Council activities through the provision of clear policy direction and implementation strategies for a robust democratic and balanced UN Security Council

Prudence of Practice –the thesis provides an impetus for the improvement of Council (P5) practices, thereby ensuring enabling grounds for effective response to global conflict, especially in the African region of the UN.

Theory nexus –the thesis makes some contributions to the domain body of literature/knowledge and providing awareness of the Council strategies and practices as it

affects permanent and non-permanent member states respectively. Actually, it introduced a new approach to resolving and transforming conflict, through the theory of Native Support Approach.

Improved society- the findings and recommendations of this study benefits the UN and AU communities through improved systems and innovations developed through inclusive Council, thereby laying the foundations for attaining peace and security and an enhanced peacebuilding cultures globally.

1.10. Research methodology and techniques

Within this specific study, the researcher obtains information from both primary and secondary sources. Both primary and secondary sources of data are packaged together by dominantly, secondary sources supporting primary data with a view to validating the claim and sometimes *vice versa*.

Bearing in mind that both primary and secondary sources of data required validations, primary sources of data were validated through a consensus among the interviewees on a specific question in the study. In areas from chapter four of the study till chapter six, the researcher asked certain question to at least three different respondents and the theme of their response is used as those vividly validated the test through consensus. In a similar vein, secondary sources of data were tested and validated through a content similarity among authors on any said subject. As evident through the thesis, the researcher has quoted more than two or three sources on certain contested cases; this is aimed at validating the account under canvass.

Hart (1998:28) defines methodology as a system of methods and rules that facilitate the collection and analysis of data. It involves making choices from various approaches to know which to use in analysing the topic under study. Additionally, Mouton (1996:107) defines research design as a set of guidelines and instructions to be followed in addressing the research problem. Bearing these definitions in mind, this study employs historical and qualitative approaches. The historical approach was necessary to show the link between this research and other pertinent literature in the field. And qualitative

approach ensures the understanding of a given research problem or topic from the perspective of the local population under focuses (Babbie and Mouton, 2006:70). Silverman (1997: 1) describes qualitative research method as that "built on a dialogue between Social Science and the community." He discerns also that "qualitative research delivers a profound understanding of social phenomena" (Silverman, 2005: 10).

According to Denzin and Lincoln (2000: 8), qualitative research stresses "the socially constructed nature of reality, the intimate relationship between the researcher and what is studied, and the situational constraints that shape inquiry. Further, it generates non-numerical data, focuses on gathering mainly verbal data from human persons rather than measurements. In this instance, qualitative approach is appropriate and invaluable in this research, especially, in placing the issues under investigation in their proper social context while getting as close as possible to the "actors' perspectives … prioritising the study of perceptions and meanings" from the subject's perspective through interaction (Denzin and Lincoln 2000: 10).This gathered information is then analysed in an interpretative and diagnostic manner for authentic outcome. Thus, qualitative research is utilised in this study because of its ability in bringing together the researcher and the people under study. Qualitative research methods also allowed the researcher the first hand information from the community on all areas of contested terrain. In this manner, the behaviour of the P5 towards Council's reform, and Africa's peacebuilding *cum* suitability and possible balance and efficient Council following its inclusion, will be learned from the affected population. As Perecman and Curran (2006: 146), would advise the researchers, "let the respondents tell their stories."

Accordingly, the in pursuant of realising the objectives of the study, the combination of these methods is key, since the approaches embodies some flexibility for academic sagacity. The qualitative method, combined with the historical research technique best marries the literature standpoint and empirical data sourced in accordance with the study objectives. This was necessary for two principal reasons. First, the nature of the research questions required the use of qualitative data from primary sources. Second, since the United Nations Security Council reforms and Africa's peacebuilding are the subject of

the study, it was imperative to study them in their dominant locales and through the account partly take Africa's feelings and experiences of exclusion and marginalisation from the Council's permanent seat with veto, and the peacebuilding processes in the region into accurate account as peace and security research underscores.

In this manner, information sourced from desktop literature and interview approaches will be utilised to unpack the challenges of political exclusion of Africa in the international politics of Council's permanent seat. More specifically, the approaches help interrogate in depth the controlling idea of Council reform, permanent seat, veto mechanism and Africa's peacebuilding architecture. And indeed, in areas where interview sources may be insufficient to explain some phenomena, the desktop document is used to corroborate the views of the officials. Equally, desktop literature evidence is used to initiate debate on germane issues. Primary sources of data are those interview accounts, and original texts, and reports. This straddled the linked and reciprocally buttressing discussions with the United Nations officials, African Union Representatives, and the Representatives of the Federal Government of Nigeria, textbooks, United Nations official documents and relevant commissioned reports. Secondary sources of data included: peer-reviewed journal articles, and assortments of interpreted online journal articles and pertinent internet sources. Imperative to underscore is that, the secondary sources are based on the document and not necessarily the mode under which they were acquired.

1.10.1. Research setting

Africa has a fundamental stake at the deliberations of the Security Council. Hence, the call for reform to include an African state with a view to securing Africa's peacebuilding architecture emerged. Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa and South Korea are the settings employed to carry out this research. However, in the event of struggling to track down the UN and AU interviewees, the researcher had travelled to Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Johannesburg and Pretoria (South Africa), and Seoul (South Korea) to meeting with interviewees. Through E-interview the researcher collected data from Abuja, Nigeria.

1.10.2. Sample Size and Sampling Technique

The initial plan was to interview a total of twenty respondents from the AU, UN, Nigeria and Researchers. This was aimed at securing the views of five respondents each from these identified groupings. However, following from the difficulties involved in accessing the AU and UN officials, especially, plus the fact that the knowledge they possess is hugely unique to them, the researcher was unable to access the AU and UN officials in their numerals. Concisely, two high-ranking UN officials were interviewed, one AU official was interviewed, a University professor (researcher) was interviewed, and a United Nations University for Peace (UPEACE) official was equally interviewed. In this manner, five informed respondents responded to our questions. Their views together with the literature documents such as commissioned reports constitute the thesis Chapters Four to Six. Out of which, two respondents were drawn from the United Nations perspective, one respondent from the African Union, one respondents from Nigeria, one respondent from research field.

In areas such as **the reasons for African exclusion, Africa's security roles, and lessons for Africa,** same sets of questions were given to these respondents bearing in mind that they are well informed on these related questions. Their views were analysed through content and thematic analyses. The researcher's sample design for interviewing the directly affected actors is purposive sampling technique. According to Wadsworth Cengage Learning workshop (2005) and Tongco Dolores (2007: 151) "purposive sampling targets a particular group of people and helps find knowledgeable and reliable informants from the community." When the desired population for the study is rare or very difficult to locate and recruit for a study, purposive sampling may be the only option. In this study, it indeed, is the best option. The research targets (African Union official, United Nations official, Nigerian Government official), all particular groups which make purposive sampling truly appropriate. The interviews are also semi-structured and open ended so as to allow divergent views on the topic and for thematic collation of data which guarantees the academic standardisation of the data on one hand and its scientific rigour on the other.

1.10.3. Data Collection

Primary and secondary sources of data collection were employed. The main sources of primary data comprise the personal in-depth interviews with informed actors. This technique is invaluable in conducting "systematic social inquiry, generating empirical data about [the] social world by asking people to talk about their lives" (Holstein & Gubrium 1995: 113). Government and official documents from the United Nations, books and certain newspaper reports that speak originally to peace and security in Africa and the United Nations Security Council reform also forms part of the primary sources of data. Secondary data consists of reviewed and interpretative publications that do have alluded position and information on the topic. These sets of data were obtained through the reading of books, articles, online secondary materials. Essentially, they were accessed through the dominant desk top interrogation of relevant documents. These secondary sources provide the extensive bibliographic and contextual information that supports the primary sources meaningfully. The primary data are collected through semi-structured, open-ended interviews, obtained through interaction with relevant stakeholders of the UN and the AU. This cross-examination of data enriches the study and also entrenches standardisation in the overall approach and maintains the science in the research task. Semi-structured interviews are appropriate due to the patterned elasticity they afford researchers to generate valuable facts from respondents.

1.10.4. Data Analysis

The research employed two analytical tools: the **content** and **thematic** analyses. *Content analysis* is practically employed to analyse the collected data based on their valued content. The study dominantly employed content analysis in addressing issues raised in chapters four, five, and six. This was necessary since the sense –making of several viewpoints the respondent and supporting materials could be possible through the collation of data and literature. Patton (2002) defines content analysis as "any qualitative data reduction and sense-making effort that takes a volume of qualitative materials and attempts to identify core consistencies and meanings" (Patton, 2002: 453). Since the interviews were semi-structured, the researcher collated all responses accordingly and

reduces responses in accordance with their content. In this sense, the study also employs *thematic analysis* on interpretation and application of data. Thematic analysis as indicated was employed in the analyses of the viewpoints of the various respondents from the fieldwork. The researcher used thematic analytical tool in paring viewpoints and finding common grounds among the respondents. This tool was hugely utilised through chapters four, five, and six. Thematic analysis has been branded as one of a range of potential methods for research synthesis. It moves beyond counting explicit words or phrases and focuses on identifying and describing mutually implicit and explicit themes or the controlling ideas within the data.

1.11.   Limitations of study

Using a purposive sampling technique for data collection requires an operational suppleness in order to angle out the best informed participant and accommodate the strengths of each respondent to mitigate their weaknesses as well as get around other methodological difficulties of the study.

Without a doubt a study of this nature is – expectedly – fraught with limitations. The researcher acknowledges the possibility of bias on the part of the study respondents, who might be interested actors in the reform. This possibility has an implication for objectivity. In order to address this challenge and mitigate its effect as well as to ensure impartiality, the researcher undertook a careful analysis and juxtaposition of respondents' views. Moreover, the alacrity at which some of the UN and AU officials and Nigerian government representatives targeted for interview were not available to respond to the researcher presents a formidable challenge in time-limited research of this nature. Indeed, unless in a commissioned research, unlike this scholarly research, tracking down the key actors of global institutions such as the AU, and the UN have proven difficult. This thesis experienced this fate. In addition, the fluidity and unpredictability of events in the global institutions such as the UN often defy common and established logic in conflict analysis. Against this backdrop, there is the potential danger that the UN may reform, or have certain   structural   developments   within   its   structure   vis-à-vis   the   study's

arguments/findings may confound future readers, or even negate some of the study's recommendations.

Although the chase for respondents was tedious, it resolves the problem of relying on self-reporting as empirical basis for conclusions in social research (Kumar, 1996:114; Payne and Payne; 2004:90).The fewer number of respondents secured as opposed to higher number was equally mitigated by the follow-up question responses that clarified and validated contrivances in the interview. As Bem (2008) puts it, in a social science research, one key informant is better than twenty misinformed informant in addressing a real situation. He argued that the key is to ensure that the views of the appropriate respondent that will ensure the fulfilment of the overall aims of the study are recorded. He further maintains that in the social and bahavioral sciences, it is important to always provide sufficient information from the key informant. This information is particularly important because it is the real issue from the main actor and will help develop pool of new knowledge in the area.

1.12. Structure of Thesis

This study is organised into seven chapters as follows:

1.12.1. CHAPTER ONE

Introduction and background

Chapter One is an introduction to the study. It specifically provides a general background and an overview of the study. The chapter includes an outline of the research problem, a statement of the research problem, Research task, hypothesis, objectives of the study, and research questions. It also explicates the significance of the study, the research methodology and methods, research setting, sample size and sample technique, data collection, data analysis, its scope as well as its methodological and practical limitations, and finally, the structure of the thesis.

1.12.2. CHAPTER TWO

The United Nations Security Council reform and Africa's peacebuilding praxis

Chapter Two undertakes a review and comparison of pertinent literature evidence on the nexus between Security Council reform and Africa's peacebuilding praxis and attendant conflicts through an interrogation of the various reform proposals and Africa's peacebuilding capabilities. It examines the contending narratives that affirm and falsify the reform and peacebuilding thesis. The chapter probes the potential and actual impacts of lack of reforms and identifies some gaps which the existing literatures have missed. In essence, it engages, critically, with extant literature on the correlation between pro and anti-reform crusaders noting in essence, that lack of democratisation of the Council is an enduring source of conflict in the world. In doing so, the chapter foregrounds the intervening variables in the reform, peace building and securitisation nexus. The analysis in Chapter Two underscores a nuanced understanding of the United Nations Security Council's P5 politics of exclusion aimed at dependency of the marginalised. In this way, it provides the link and a contextual framework for unpacking the resistance struggle of the P5 and lays the ground for observing that African states of Nigeria, Egypt and South Africa are equal to the task of permanent seat with veto. It has canvassed for Africa's inclusion based on observed merits.

1.12.3. CHAPTER THREE:

Behaviorism, Dependency, Realism, and Society of State: navigating the Council reform conundrum

Chapter Three discusses theoretical and analytical perspectives on Security Council reform. Essentially, it examines important theoretical tools such as: Behaviorism, Dependency, Realism, and Society of State paradigms on reform and peacebuilding, especially their traditional arguments on the roles and impacts of concerned and affected actors in the global political environment. The premises and conclusions of these theories

provide broad analytical parameters for understanding the issues within the Security Council reform saga on one hand and peacebuilding programme in Africa on the other. The chapter examines the main trends of P5 as well as African Group behaviour in pursuit of permanent seat with veto (for a reformed Council), highlighting implications of the behavioural forms and nursing of interest tactics of representative political actors in the UN. It notes that the significance of the P5 actions in conflict zones is determined by the amount of interests (pecuniary and political) that is at stake.

1.12.4.   CHAPTER FOUR

The African exclusion from the Council's veto power: weighing the nexus

Chapter Four answers to Question One (Q1) Objective One (O1) the first question of this thesis through combined field work data and literature reports. That is, *what are the remote and immediate causes of African exclusion from the United Nations Security Council?* It analyses the formation of global institutions such as the League of Nations, the sources of Concert of Europe, which encapsulates the dialectics of politics of power and interest, and representative and participatory. It shows the nexus between exclusion and its weights on Africa underpinning the actions of colonial rule and the trajectories of conflicts and prospects for dependency. It deduced that protection of own national interest shaped the behaviours of the P5 actors in both pre and post 1945. In line with this realisation, the chapter discusses the strategic P5governance African Group as they see each other. This study's theoretical framework such as the dependency theory is aptly situated in the discussion.

1.12.5.   CHAPTER FIVE

Africa: the construal of regional and global peace and security

Chapter Five responds to Question Two (Q2) Objective Two (O2) of the thesis through combined field work data and literature reports. The chapter provides broad explications of violence and death in Africa interrogating the implications of Security Council permanent seat in the African continent. As a matter of interrogating the strategic importance of Africa's peacebuilding capabilities in the world, the top five African states, were measured with a view to understanding whether the permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council inspired Africa's conflict and inhibited Africa's active peace and security roles in the region and globally. It presents the profile of Africa with reference to its regional peacebuilding strategy for global harmony. In addition, the chapter analyses the key challenges and prospects for African inclusion in the permanent category of the Council discussing the contextual factors that underpinned Africa's peace and security thus explicating the study's hypothesis.

1.12.6.   CHAPTER SIX

The United Nations Security Council's deeds: lessons for Africa

Chapter Six responds to Question Three (Q3) Objective Three (O3) of the thesis through combined field work data and literature reports. It discusses the United Nations Security Council's deeds and lessons for Africa in terms of how to deal with Africa's peacebuilding and security issues. In doing so, the chapter contextualises the activities of the Security Council in Africa against the backdrop of the typology of security behaviour in conflict zones. It also discusses the issues that emerge from the review of literature, theoretical frameworks, paradigmatic perspectives and survey findings. Based on research findings, the chapter makes analytical deductions and presents a prognosis on Africa's conflict burden compared to non-African conflicts.

1.12.7.   CHAPTER SEVEN

Summary of findings, Conclusion and Recommendations

Chapter Seven is the concluding chapter. It presents a summary of the study and draws logical conclusions from research findings. The conclusions engender specific recommendations on peacebuilding in Africa and United Nations Security Council reform in addressing global conflicts and insecurity regimes. Beyond the peacebuilding outlines for Africa, the recommendations in varieties of ways inform public policy choices and practices in transformation of conflicts in countries plagued by or emerging from conflict and in those striving to circumvent the slide into the vortex of violence and economic or political instability. It also made vivid policy suggestions for the reform of Security Council and suggested basis for Africa's relevant participation in the Council.

CHAPTER TWO

The United Nations Security Council reform and Africa's peacebuilding praxis

2.1   Introduction

The name United Nations was coined by former United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt. As a tribute to President Roosevelt, who died a few weeks before the signing of the Charter of the UN, all those present at the San Francisco Conference agreed to adopt the name 'United Nations.' (United Nations, 2008: 4). It was first officially used in 1942, when representatives of 26 countries signed the Declaration by United Nations (United Nations, 2008: 4). With the deposit of the necessary 29 ratifications, including those of the five major powers, the Charter of the United Nations came into force (Fernbach, 1945: 114). The work of the United Nations is carried out almost all over the world and is done by the six main organs alluded to in chapter one.

Despite its works, the United Nations has been styled as a huge and grand arena of conflict of interests, of competition of values, and of cooperation in search of solutions to common problems (Adebo, 1988; Akindele, 1999:17; Nader and Grande, 2002;). Given the actual anarchical nature of the international society in which the UN operates and the sovereign equality of its principal, primary and dominant state actors, the UN is arguably the most urbane political equipment mankind ever constructed and developed to maintain international peace and security. But member-states of the organisation have variegated perceptions of it. While a few powerful states which designed it *ab initio* have shown a determination to preserve the *status quo*, which historically has been in their favour, the galactic majority of member-states, largely concentrated in the southern hemisphere, poor, unfledged and at the periphery of high global politics, would prefer the UN to mutate into an appliance of change; an instrument for linking the economic and technological gap between the rich North and the poor South (Akindele, and Akintererinwa, 1995; Adeniji, 2004; Adeniji, 2005;). At the focus of this perilous challenge are three crucial tasks: (a) reform of the international economic order,

fashioned at the end of World War II, ostensibly to defend only the concern of the overriding powers (particularly the developed, industrialised and market-economy countries of the North) at the   expense of the other participants in the international community; (b) introduction and enhancement of the values of justice, fair play and equity in the management of global order; and (c) to end the perpetuation of economic deprivation and political marginalisation and exclusion from the UN Security Council in whatever form (UNSC, 1992; UNSC, 2000a; UNSC 2000b; UNSC, 2004; United Nations, 2007).

The Security Council is undoubtedly, the most powerful organ of the UN (Boyd, 1971; Akinrinade, 1992; Annan, 1997). Following the perception that the Council is becoming a "mutual vilification society" and the actual mounting of international pressure for its substantial reforms after 70 years of its formation, fueled in part by its abysmal performances in conflict-affected member nations, Bosnia, Rwanda, Libya, Iraq, Syria, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the call is unending (Maclaurin, 1951: 6). The perceived bias of the P5 cum their alleged usual pecuniary interests during mediation in naturally rich and strategically situated countries which runs contrary to "advancing human welfare" is in fact among the angers that sparked reform chorus in the relevant quarters of the UN (Bailey and Daws, 1998: 3; Steckel, 2008: 18;Posner, 2008: 1769). Specifically, Andrew Boyd observed that the first time the tool — Security Council — is used, there are almost bound to be complaints from one quarter or another, that it is bent sinisterly (Boyd, 1971;Babangida, 1991). Since then, pertinent questions regarding the Council reassert themselves and change seems both possible and overdue.

In this vein therefore, this chapter interrogates such question as what is the purpose of the Security Council and why its reform? What are the motivations behind the resistance? Why was the reform plans not implemented? If change will happen does African state qualify for permanent seat? Does the Council care for countries recovering from conflict in fashion of peacebuilding, and are there any correlations between the UNSC reform and

Africa's peacebuilding architecture? We will try to unpack these issues and respond to them with specificities of documented literature evidence.

2.2   Purpose of the Security Council: the scrutiny of United Nations Charter Chapter V

The formal purpose of the United Nations is to "maintain international peace and security [using] collective measures for the prevention and removal of the threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace" (Franck, 1992, 522;Kirgis, Jr.1995, 506; Cox, 1999: 91;). The functions and roles of Security Council, found under Chapter 5, article 24 aims to guarantee swift and effective action by the United Nations. The members of the United Nations confer on the Security Council principal obligation of the preservation of "international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf" (Charter, 1945: 7).

Chapter 5 of the Charter opens the precise conversation of the Security Council with Article 23, and finished with Article 51 (Charter, 1945). Specifically, Article 23 details the Council's composition: "the Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (now Russian Federation), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America as the permanent members of the Security Council" (Charter, 1945: 6). The General Assembly elects non-permanent members of the Security Council, due respect being particularly paid, in the first instance to the input of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the UN, and also to unbiased geographical distribution (Charter, 1945). With an aim on prompt, efficient and effective action by the United Nations, under Article 24, the Members confer on the Security Council, the primary responsibility for the "maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf" (Charter, 1945: 6; Martin and Edwards, 1955: 67; Weston, 1991: 519). In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in tandem with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations as outlined in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII (United Nations, 1945).

Article 25, draws Members of the United Nations to agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the spirit of the Charter, especially with a view to maintaining international peace and security through the "regulation of armament" as authorised by Article 26.

In keeping with the task of global security, when the Council from time to time disagrees on procedures as enshrined in Articles 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32, it would have to revert to voting as established in Article 27 to break the deadlock (Bailey and Daws, 1998: 225). Article 27 states that each member of the Security Council shall have one vote (Charter, 1945; Liang, 1950; Gross, 1951; Gross, 1953; Gross, 1968). And that, "decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven [nine in 2015] members … including the concurring votes of the permanent members" (Charter, 1945: 7). This provides that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 — the Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council. In Charter's Article 33, the Council is empowered to first of all, seek a peaceful solutions, and Article 34 is coined to investigate dispute or situation likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. According to the Charter (1945), provisions of Articles 35, 36, 37 saddled the Council with issues of disputes and natures and settlements. Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37 on pacific settlement of disputes, the Security Council in Article 38 may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, "make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute" (Charter, 1945: 9).

In a similar spirit, Article 39, seeks to determine breach of peace, Article 40 promises to prevent aggravation, Articles 41 and 42 decide what measures not involving the use of armed force including complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations (Charter, 1945; Fox, 1945; Nasu, 2009). Article 43 calls for contribution of, and agreements between the Security Council and groups of Members.

The types of agreements are further explained in Article 44 which calls upon members to provide armed forces in fulfillment of the UN security obligations. Article 45 introduces Military Staff Committee, Article 46 Plans the utility of the Military Staff Committee, Article 47 established the roles of Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council. Article 48, Article 49, and Article 50, provide guidelines for carrying out enforcement measures, while Article 51, the last Article on Security Council Chapter declares in a parting short, that "nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security" (Charter, 1945: 10; Franck, and Patel, 1991; Gowlland-Debbas, 1994). It is consequently with no small measure of causticness that the international community actually ceded quite amount of power to the Council for global concord. This explains, in part why the Security Council is the chief organ charged with security mission. Priming global peace and security, the Charter delivers express powers to the Council for the fulfillment of this duty. The question therefore is, since the Charter provided for every conduct of the Council, what is wrong with the status quo? We will tease out this question and respond to it in section 2.3 through literature evidence.

2.3. Why challenge the status quo, why reform the Council, why the resistance?

In views of Hovet (1960: 32), Rozintti (2010), and Okhovat (2011) there are a number of important reasons for reforming the Council. The UN in 2014 counts 193 members, a situation quite different from its foundation and from that existing in 1963 when the Council was expanded from 11 to 15 members. The examination of the United Nations Security Council and the utility of permanent membership and the actual instrument of veto mechanism — the ability of the five permanent members of the Council to quash any non-procedural matter with their negative vote, irrespective of its level of internationals support (Okhovat, 2011: 3) — and its overall authority over world nations, always returns scholars of security to five cardinal points. (a) the working method; (b)

legitimacy; (c) faulty structure, (d) veto power and (e) the new threats (Caron, 1993; Panel Report, 2004).

Within these matters are associated focal cases of discrimination, dominance, participation, size, and tyranny within the 'club' (Bailey and Daws, 1995: 16). Surrounded within the confines of reform debates, the important question remains how the decision-making authority of the Council should be owed so as to maximise the effective use of its authority and the perceived legitimacy of that use (Fernbach, 1945; Wouters and Ruys, 2005; Cox, 2009). This is vital since the commanding presence of the veto, has actually captures the attention of Member Nations in a way that mislays the focus of both the academic and the diplomatic worlds (Caron, 1993: 567). Ironically, the motivating force behind diplomatic concerns often seems to be more the preservation and attainment of status than the efficacy and legitimacy of collective decision. Whether status or legitimacy, both concerns are begging attention but the latter landed on the laps of the academia. Thus, the cardinal issues which informed the reform proposal and continued to challenge the status quo as outlined above will be considered below, in turn.

2.3.i. The Legitimacy debate

Legitimacy of the Security Council occupies a middle ground between the composition of the Council and its enforcement mechanism (Sens, 2004: 142). And the fact that the Council through its decisions can both legislates and validates claims underscores that, it issues command and truly expect obedience among the UN Nations (Caron, 1993). The Council can validate the actions of other nations because it is purport to authorise those actions on behalf of the United Nations (Charter, 1945). Caron (1993: 562) observes that the current composition of, and the utility of permanent membership and the veto instrument vividly serves legitimacy problems. In his view, although not wholly separate, the composition and veto elements probes the correctness of the overall Council's essence and tends to make a caricature of this important organ.

According to Köchler (2007), part of many issues with the Council's legitimacy is the "virtually non-existent separation of powers within the organization, a condition that, in

structural terms, almost resembles the decision-making procedures in a dictatorial system" (Köchler, 2007: 3). Especially since the end of the Cold War's bipolar order, the Council's P5 has been annually accused of arrogating more and more competencies, in certain cases circumventing relevant provisions of the UN Charter. For scholars, such as Maclaurin, (1951), Luck (2004: 362), and Köchler (2007), violation of any verse of the Charter is a "systemic arbitrariness of Security Council action … under Chapter VII of the Charter which exclusively depends on the constellation of interests among the P5 and not on considerations related to international security (Köchler, 2007: 3). Legitimacy challenge is therefore, a problem that is further exacerbated by the realpolitik and power balance in the present international environment.

When the P5 goes on intervention with an aim on interest, there have been instances of policy issue of double standards resulting from the lack of (political) checks and balances as well as of legal restraint within the Council (Gowan and Gordon, 2014). These have played out several times in the international political gallery, and each appearance presented the veto wielding states as dominating proceedings and tilting the scale for global peace and security agenda (Hay, 2002; Rothwell, 2013). The perception of dominance of the Council by a few states is another major charge against it. Giving the roles of P5 in either adopting resolutions or engaging in direct military intervention, it is very believable that the Council is dominated by several of the permanent members. Ironically, "though the Council's voting rules require that at least nine of the fifteen members must vote in favour of an action potentially binding all the members of the United Nations, it nonetheless suffers from the allegation of dominance by subgroups" (Caron, 1993: 562). This was possible because of the roles veto plays in Council's voting and also the organ's working method, places the P5 beyond touch.

While legitimacy of the Council has been judged and placed in doubt by several scholars judiciously noted above, authors such as (Hurd, 2002: 36; Dickinson, 2003: 301; Hurd, 2007: 83) have contending views. According Hurd (2002) the Council is efficient and an important element of its power is largely a function of its legitimacy. An institution that is perceived as legitimate by an individual is treated with more respect, is endowed with a

corporate existence beyond the units that make it up, and finds compliance with its rules more easily secured than in the absence of legitimacy. Lobel and Ratner (1999) believe that beyond respect and compliance that legitmises the Council, some possible arguments that negates Council's legitimacy appear to have been an oversight for the security and humanitarian roles the Council has been able to command through legitimate routes.

2.3. ii.Working methods

Most of the Council's decisions are in the form of resolutions, which generally consist of two parts, a preamble and the operative section (Hadwen and Kaufmann, 1960: 36). According to Ekwealor (2013) adoption of resolution and authorisation of direct military intervention are the two chief working procedures employed by the Council in discharging of its security duties. Ekwealor (2013: 26) accounts that "between 1960 and 2011, the Council adopted 2,547 resolutions, of which 1,844 [are] related to Asia, North America, South America, Australia/Oceania and Europe, while the continent of Africa attracted 706." The points for a broad reform of the Council's working methods were spelt out in the note by the President of the Security Council in 2006 (President of the United Nations Security, 2006) S/2006/507 on the "perception of the transparency, efficiency and inclusiveness" of the Security Council's activity (Rozinthi, 2010: 15). The 2006 Presidential note was an activation of the basic assumption often made in discussions regarding the working method and also the allegations of a structurally imbalanced Council. In the view of Bailey and Daws (1998: 21) and Rozinthi, (2010) such note themed around encouraging enhanced stakeholders' participation in the Council's public and private meetings, interaction and dialogue between the Council and contributors of troops to UN missions, are systemically targeted at cooperation with regional and sub-regional Organisations (Rozinthi, 2010: 15).

Therefore, those disputations around bended Council structure make an applied difference. Whether this assumption truly connects to a fact, the possible supposition in the case of the Security Council is that the prospect of sustained shared deed depends in part on the professed balance of the decision maker, the Council itself (Panel Report, 2004). For Caron (1993), to achieve balance, the final curve of reform proposals shall

open up Council proceedings to the General Assembly and thus increase the sense of participatory governance and to a great extent creates political accountability for members of the Council. The principle motivating these applications is that the decision making of the Council increasingly takes place in informal consultations that progressively involve only a sub-group of its membership and that accordingly discount not only the nonpermanent members but the membership generally (Hovet, 1960: 38; Bailey and Daws, 1998: 21).

Agreeing with Caron, Gowan and Gordon (2014) discern that working methods have frequently formed part of experts concerns with the overall faulty mechanics of the Council, especially, pertaining to "providing order, transparency and inclusiveness in its procedures, as well as strengthening the capacity of the UN to implement the decisions of the Security Council" (Gowan and Gordon, 2014: 11). This partly explains why Professor Peter Wallensteen of Uppsala University, cited in Gowan and Gordon, is adamant that even if comprehensive reform are unlikely in the short-term, reforms in certain areas such as working methods including work habits of the Council not limited to improving transparency, reducing veto use to a minimum which can be achieved in a short term basis for efficient Council must be implemented (Gowan and Gordon, 2014).

Despite these postulations, Woods (1996) in his '*Security Council Working Methods and Procedure: Recent Developments'* underscored that Council's working method is the best part of its behaviours. Specifically, he wrote that the Council should not commit itself to procedures which in practice might prove to be excessively rigid. Johnstone (2008) agrees and asserts that this is crucial, since each dispute with which the Council has to deal has unique characteristics. In affirmation, Weiss and Young (2005) also, argued that the basis of meaningful successes in the Security Council since 1945 lies in pragmatic adaptations the Council's working methods have provided in exploring the panacea of reform for many critics.

2.3.iii. The veto mechanism and its contested terrains

The word veto was never mentioned in the United Nations Charter. However, Article 27 of the Charter provided for its functions (Charter, 1945: 7). According to the rules, "Article 27 of the UN Charter allows the permanent members of the Security Council to quash any non-procedural draft resolution with their negative votes [veto power], irrespective of its level of international support and popularity" (Okhovat, 2011: 11; United Nations Charter, 1945). The power to quash non-procedural draft in the Council is therefore, referred to as the veto.

The veto essentially, subjected decision-making in the Council to unanimity of the permanent members, both with regard to enforcement action and the peaceful settlement of disputes (Charter, 1945). Veto, then serves not only as deterrence, but actually an ultimate weapon available to the P5 members to 'shield' friends from attack and exert influence on all matters since *de facto*, its effects affect both procedural motions and substantive decisions of the Council (Bailey and Daws, 1998: 225). In this approach, veto means, however, that certain members of the community potentially are not governed. Actually, the P5 who wields the veto power and whatever states any of the five is willing to shield, potentially are free from the governance of the Council. In this way, the P5 does not only go against the political claims of equality but also undermines the sovereign equality clause of the Charter.

Partly in light of the above, the veto rule of Article 27 (3) of the Charter means a *de facto* and *de jure* negation of the basic democratic principle of the equality of votes (Bailey and Daws, 1998: 227). And veto also implies, whatever may be said to the contrary, an irreconcilable normative contradiction to the article of "sovereign equality of all Members Nations as provides Article 2 (1) of the Charter" (Köchler, 2007: 4; United Nations Charter, 1945). Since 70 years ago, the question of the veto remains one of the dividing issues that continue to stall the reform process (Rozinthi, 2010: 13). In essence, as Wouters and Ruys (2005: 3) put it, "apart from the Council's faulty composition, one of the traditional stumbling blocks has been the existence of the veto power of the Council's permanent members." In an international community of professed sovereign

equality of all nations, regrettably, the veto instrument enables only the P5 to block any resolution that is not merely procedural in nature.

The veto is considered fundamentally unjust by a majority of States and is thought to be one of the main reasons to reform the Council since a negative vote of one permanent member nullifies the decision other members have voted in favour (Bailey and Daws, 1998: 228). Somewhat, scholars of security and strategy opine that Council's failure to respond adequately to humanitarian crises as witnessed in Bosnia (1992), [as well as Rwanda (1994), Darfur (2004), Cote d'Ivoire (2011), Libya (2011), Syria (2012), Central African Republic (2013), and Mali (2013)] can be linked to veto mechanism (Cutts, 1999: 3). Admittedly, assurances of global peace and security is difficult, and the ability of the Council to take decisions binding on the community as a whole in the area of peace and security is also a strong form of governance. However, veto power in the pockets of the P5 always denotes that "certain members of the community destroy the sovereign plank upon which the global security tent is built" (Caron, 1993: 565).

In the context of the Council's actions in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait the question for many became: is there a double standard? Will the Council be as assertive — adopting Resolution 661 (Chitalker and Malone, 2013) — with Israel as it was with Iraq? Giving the seeming bias and selective adoption of resolutions by the Council, especially, when a P5 member threatens to veto resolution, it becomes obvious that there are no easy answers to questions surrounding the P5's utility of veto. The veto, even though it relegates non-holding states to a state of excited confusion during crisis, it indeed, distorts governance among the P5, because it severely limits the basis of possible discourse.

To the non-members, the adverse impact of the veto mechanism in the Council is enormous, since "it reinforces the perception and reality of dominance of the Council by the permanent members" (Caron, 1993: 566). For example, in Iraq and Kuwait conflicts, in response, particularly to the Soviet peace efforts, both the United States and the United Kingdom reportedly stated that they had "the power to maintain the UN sanctions and to

continue the use of force authorised by the Council because any alteration of the sanctions or the authorisation to use force would require a new resolution that they, as permanent members, could veto" (Caron, 1993: 577). The initial reason for the inclusion of this power in the Charter was to prevent the UN from taking direct actions against any of its principal founding members but veto has become an enduring source of discord within the organ.

Historically, dating from 1945, the first ever veto casted was "in February 1946 by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)" (Okhovat, 2011: 11). Between 1946 and 2012, a total of 264 vetoes have been casted (Multilateral Research Group, 2012). Russia (Soviet Union) "vetoed 123 draft resolutions; United States 83; United Kingdom 30; France 18; and China 10" (Multilateral Research Group, 2012: 3). Further, between the years "1946 – 1955, 1 - 77 vetoes were casted; Vetoes 78 - 106 (1956-1965); Vetoes 107 – 130 (1966-1975); Vetoes 131 - 171 (1976-1985); Vetoes 172 to 197 (1986-1995); Vetoes 198 - 219 (1996-2012)" (Multilateral Research Group, 2012: 4-6) every single one of these veto says no to general demand. Specifically, Western influence in the first decade of the Security Council's existence is visible in the account that shows how the Soviet Union vetoed 75 of the 77 draft resolutions from 1946-1955. The Western ability to influence the Security Council without much recourse to the veto is perhaps the most noticeable factor during the first two decades of Security Council vetoes. The next two and a half decades (up to May 1990) were dominated by Third World attempts, in an enlarged Security Council, to get changes from the Western powers on issues of security importance (Okhovat, 2011: 12).

Despite the huge powers the veto bestowed on the P5 that has made it possible to marginalised the non-permanent members, and the call for even distribution of veto power among the actors, a number of authors still believe that either amendment of veto or removal of veto is at best nonsensical. For emphasis, McCarty and Poole (1995), Akande (1997), Voeten (2001), argued that veto power allows for the functions and actions of the Council to be done. While McCarty and Poole (1995) variously suggested that the veto is important instrument and its geographic distribution makes no-sense of its

purpose, these writers further believe that the decisive nature of the Council is built into its veto strength. In the same regard, Shapley and Shubik (1954) copiously concur and further stretch the importance of the veto status quo to include simplifying the already complicated Security Council. The two hold that more veto votes mean more power, and simply more problems to the world body in and in general. For these authors, let the P5 remain. Below, figure 2.1 is the flag of the status of state of the Council.

Figure 2.1: The Five Permanent Members: US, China, Russia, France and Britain – in order

Adapted from theMetro-Detroit Model United Nations II

Having recognised the P5 states who (in) advertently preaches the maintenance of status quo, below are some of the diagrammatic presentations of their use of veto between 1946 and 2012.

Figure 2.2: Total number of vetoes per Permanent Member 1946-August 2012

Adapted from the Multilateral Group, Research Analysts Research, 2012

Figure 2.3: Permanent Members' veto use 1946-August 2012

Adapted from the Multilateral Group, Research Analysts Research, 2012

2.3.iv. The blind spots within the existing arguments on veto

Figures: 1 and 2 above show that the veto instrument has been used radically, and abused stringently, as a constituent of Power and ingredient of decision making and taking. While in accordance with Article 27(3) of the UN Charter, both elected and permanent members are obliged to abstain from voting in decisions regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes whenever they are a party to the dispute under consideration, this obligatory abstention is not faithfully honoured since the veto is somewhat used to shield states from scrutiny. This study extricates the existing judgments on the relevance of veto and in part presses further Wouters and Ruys (2005) argument that the main reason why many states abhor the veto power is the fact that permanent members often use the privilege to wrongly guard friendly states from condemnation or the imposition of economic sanctions.

Further, the veto device as opposed to Voeten's postulations, has been used for wrong political reasons (the collapsing of the AU peace talks in Libya, 2011), making veto wielders intimidating members and , the instrument responsible for more misstatements than any other feature in the UN, including claims of preventing the UN peacekeeping/peacemaking (Maclaurin, 1951: 196). Truly, some permanent members have not only exerted their prerogatives to shield friendly states from condemnation or economic sanctions, they actually, have also used veto to stall peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. When McCarty and Poole (1995), and Akande (1997), wrote that maintenance of the status quo is key to the survival of the Council, it only provides rooms for assumption that the authors seemingly promote the culture of colonial alliance (that is the politics of old order) when the underlying arguments in their study is somewhat maintaining the status quo. The issue with veto alliance is, for example, "China, a veto welding state, temporarily impeded the continuation of UN peacekeeping missions in order to penalise UN Member states maintaining close relations with Taiwan" (Wouters and Ruys, 2005:16).

The shielding of alliance partners and attacking of 'enemy' states through the agency of veto has served contradiction against the dictates of both the Charter and the spirit of

security. Other controversies regarding the use of the veto are the recourse to the veto by a permanent member which intervenes in a third country in contravention of the Charter. Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits the use of force. And Article 27(3) further held the veto nations accountable in whichever way the veto power is administered (Shane Kelleher, 2005). Correspondingly, the permanent members have also cast vetoes to block nominations for the post of Secretary-General,in abrogation of Article 97 of the Charter. Specifically, "these vetoes were cast during closed sessions of the Council which, for example, include vetoes against the re-election of Kurt Waldheim in 1981 and Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1996" (Wouters and Ruys, 2005. 18). While Shapley and Shubik (1954) would insist that veto allows for effective functioning of the Council, it, indeed, blocks the way as well.

For most UN Member states, there are gross violations of the voting code as provided in the Charter. Essentially, Wouters and Ruys (2005: 24), recognise that "Article 27 of the Charter is a codification of the painful reality that some states are more equal than others." This clue is perceptibly at odds with the moralities laid down in the Charter, such as Article 1(2), pursuant to which the UN aims at developing friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights of peoples, and even Article 2(1) which affirms the principle of sovereign equality as one of the basic pillars of the world body (Charter, 1945).

Basically, the veto privilege in favour of the permanent members 'protected' by means of a kind of self-referential arrangement sincerely defies all rules of democracy and fair play. Historian, Paul Kennedy (2006: 51), who studied the functionalities of the UN, believes that it is outrageous to any right thinking mind, that a "mere 5 of the [193] sovereign states that make up the United Nations have special powers and privileges" (Kennedy, 2006: 51). The P5 countries are permanently seated at the core of the UN Security Council, which itself is the heart of the current global security system. "Upon what they do, or decide not to do, and upon what they agree to, or veto, lies the fate of our efforts to achieve peace through international covenants" (Kennedy, 2006: 51).

But, in line with Article 108 of the Charter, any amendment to it, including, of course, the provisions of Article 27 (the veto), requires the consent of the permanent members. Even though, this amounts, in essence, to political *circulus vitiosus* that has prevented UN reform from the outset, the veiled wording of paragraph 3 of Article 27, the principle effectively endorses decisions *pro domo* whenever the interests of a permanent member are at stake [whether in regard to Charter reform or "operative" matters to be decided under Chapter VII or any other matter whatsoever] (Köchler, 2007: 6). This is why Caron (1993: 568) is adamant that practically speaking, it is quite unlikely that the veto can be eliminated or even significantly limited, adding that if one's goal in reforming the veto, is to mitigate the possibility of a double standard in governance, any substitute voting procedure will in all likelihood allow some sort of double standard to continue because it is about the protection of interests of power holders. While agreeing with Caron on the vested interest and Shapley and Shubik (1954) that veto is important instrument in international leadership, the current status quo preserves only the colonial and dependency orders and these are the major problems.

2.3.v. The New threats

Traditionally, states posed the greatest threats to international security especially through wars that have caused massive death and destruction (Cato Institute, 2013). In the past and recent times, commonly referenced threats to the current international peace and security include conflicts between nations and civil wars within nations, the impacts of rising nations, weapon proliferations, general unrest, cybercrime, transnational organised crime, poverty, infectious disease and climate change, and state failures as well and technological developments, and requirement to maintain stable global economic system (Cato Institute, 2013; Erik Tamarkin, 2015). Also, Ronzitti (2010) and Panel Report (2004) who corroborated the account, underlines that cyber security; cyber wars; uncertainty of access to sources of energy; international terrorism; Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons, (Weapon of Mass Destruction [WMD]); state and human insecurity; and the role of sanctions are all new threats to global security endangering harmony and cooperation (Ronzitti, 2010: 7; Panel Report, 2004: iii - iv).

2.3.vi. The structure and composition

According to Article 23 of the Charter which designed the Council's structure and composition, there shall be permanent and non-permanent members of the Council (Charter, 1945). As listed earlier, the five permanent members are from Asia-Pacific, Eastern Europe and Western Europe and North America. This structural configuration leaves out the African and the Latin American and Caribbean regions from the permanent seat of the Council. As we will see in the discussion of reform proposals, one factor inherently wrong with the current configuration of the Council is the partial style of its structure (Martin and Edward, 1955: 102).

The 'partial' composition also continues to resurrect reform debate among scholars of security and strategy, who blame the lack of regional (geopolitical/geographical) representativeness of the Council on the P5 resistance. Many reform documents favours 'one region one permanent seat' at the minimum, as a means to straightening the crooked Council pillars (Panel Report, 2004). African group for example, claims that the Council is composed in a bias manner which negatively affects Africa's overall development and especially its planned peacebuilding frameworks (President Robert Mugabe's UNGA Speech, 2008).

2.4.   Africa's peace and peacebuilding praxis

As Sandole (2010: 8) and Galtung (1964) put it, peacebuilding seems to break nicely to the 'building of peace.' Galtung, often seen as the forerunner of peace studies presented a binary stage cataloging of the notion of peace: (i) positive peace or preventive initiatives, and (ii) negative peace (curative measures) from thence, the knitting of a pieces society together becomes peacebuilding. The essential individualities of positive peace according to Galtung are structural integration, optimism, prevention, and encouraging peace by peaceful means, while negative peace denotes the presence of violence, pessimism and the facilitation of peace through a relatively non-peaceful means (Galtung, 1964).

Erin McCandless and Tony Karbo, (2011) looked at peace as "the resolution and transformation of conflict and also the conversion of extant social systems at national and international levels to respond to nation's developmental needs for the wellbeing of the mass of its humanity" (McCandless and Karbo, 2011: 1). The World Health Organisation (WHO) (2008) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2008) suggest that peacebuilding compartmentalises and harmonises both positive and negative peace while focusing on reducing or ending violent conflict and/or promoting a culture of peace (OECD, 2008; Erin McCandless, 2011). This is why the inkling in overall and especially Africa's peacebuilding concerns peace, and is intimately tied to development, unlike the initial preoccupation in the northern hemisphere with removing the threat of nuclear war. This is why McCandless argues that in Africa, peace usually involves concerted reference to harmonious societal relationships among the population" (Erin McCandless, 2011: 20). Indeed, African conceptions of peace makes that peace is measured by the well-being of the individual and his or her community gauged by physical, material, and spiritual considerations. As such, the basic starting point for Africa's peacebuilding is the understanding of the nature and character of conflict and recovering and assembling the nation from its pieces (Kuna, 2005: 5). Hansen (2011) whose study of peace is rooted in African perspective, fortifies Kuna and asserts "that the resolution of conflict is only a minimalist condition for the achievement of peace, adding that understanding the nature and character is the key" (Hansen, 2011: 11).

In effort to locate peace and peacebuilding contextually in Africa, Erin McCandless opines that the concept of conflict must be understood. She argues that the common denominator in the definition of the concept of conflict refers to a struggle (physical or verbal, or emotional) clash, disagreement, or negation to harmonious co-existence between diametrically opposing forces or a people (Erin McCandless, 2011: 29). In her view, there are terms associated with conflict and peace that have to be understood in order to achieve a balanced view on the concept of peacebuilding. Below are some of them.

Conflict prevention: aims to prevent outbreaks of violence (minimalist) and to root out structural injustices that may cause conflict (maximalist).

Conflict resolution: aims to address causes of conflict and seeks to build new and lasting relationships between hostile groups.

Conflict transformation: focuses on the relationships and transactions between the parties in the midst of or previously engaged in a given conflict; addresses wider social, economic, and political sources of a conflict; and seeks to transform negative energy and war into positive social change (Erin McCandless, 2011: 30).

Peacekeeping: provision of monitors or peace-keeping military forces, with consent, to stop violence and monitor a cease-fire, generally to provide a buffer between conflicting parties. Can prevent looting of humanitarian assistance, help implement peace agreements by overseeing or observing demobilisation and disarmament, and employ other techniques to monitor compliance with agreements and foster mutual confidence.

Peacemaking: political, diplomatic, and sometimes military interventions directed at bringing warring parties to agreement (Erin McCandless, 2011: 30-31).

2.4.1. Peacebuilding in perspective

Paragraph 97 of the Outcome Document of the United Nations recognised "the need for a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict appeasement and reconciliation (World Summit Outcome, 2005: 24). On this basis, the General Assembly decided "to establish a Peacebuilding Commission as an inter-governmental advisory body (Outcome Document, 2005). This body, backed by a Peace Support Office and "a multi-year standing Peacebuilding Fund marks a new level of strategic commitment to enhancing and sustaining 'peace after conflict'. Peacebuilding viewed through the prism is "a strategic process involving a synergetic series of actions targeted at addressing the sources of conflict and supporting the structures and capacities for peace aimed at institutionalising justice, and building positive peace" (Erin McCandless, 2011: 31).

In the early 1990s, when the concept of peacebuilding entered the lexicon of security and conflict studies, it was an attempt to arrest a new pervasive and pernicious internal

violence that threatens global security and human welfare (Jackson, 2011). Civil wars in 1990s accounted for 94 percent of all armed conflicts fought in that era (Paris, 2008: 8). These, introduced internecine violence and collapsing states that became an unfortunate but familiar feature of the post-Cold War political landscape in Africa. For example, Paris records that some of the major peacebuilding operation in the 1990s were deployed to "Namibia in 1989; followed by missions to Nicaragua (1989), Angola (1991), Cambodia (1991) El Salvador (1991), Mozambique (1992), Liberia (1993), Rwanda (1993), Bosnia (1995), Croatia (1995), Guatemala (1997), East Timor (1999), Kosovo (1999), and Sierra Leone (1999)" (Mingst and Margaret, 2000; Rupert, 2000; Ougaard and Richard, 2002; Paris, 2004: 1-10, 235-236).

These post-conflict missions after the civil wars aimed at preventing a recurrence of violence are essentially peacebuilding operations (Humphreys, 2011: 380). Accordingly, former UN Secretary-Generals Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992) and Kofi Annan (2005) opine that the controlling idea of peacebuilding is not only to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict or take preventive actions to guarantee peace, but also, to create the conditions necessary for a sustainable peace in war-torn societies — that is, a peace that would endure long after the departure of the peace builders themselves (Erin, McCandless, 2011).

2.4.2. The Security Council reform and peacebuilding in Africa: the linkages

As the Cold War came to an end, a new type of international peace operation emerged, a new security activity of the United Nations missions aimed at helping war-torn countries make the transition from a fragile ceasefire to a stable peace emerged. This became known as "post-conflict peacebuilding" (Fassbender, 1998: 7; Paris and Sisk, 2007:5; Hassler, 2013: 9). In this drive, the United Nations considers democratisation of all nations as non-negotiable, intertwined with good governance and human development and security for peace (Russett, 1993; Erin and Hope, 2011: 276). However, the identification and development of mechanisms and processes for co-existence and

interaction that support peace rather than conflict represents a critical gap in the UN practice as it relates to state-building and peacebuilding, especially in Africa (Deo, 2009).

While scholars have strived to link Africa's insecurity paradigm with the Security Council's involvement in African security affairs, Francis Deng (2008) points to the need for Africans to achieve clarity on political frameworks. In his *Introduction to Identity, Diversity, and Constitutionalism in Africa*, he argues that the legacy of constitutions and political frameworks of colonial powers has proven largely ineffective and has contributed to a crisis throughout much of the African continent. Deng and other authors claim that although existing legal and institutional frameworks [such as the UN Security Council] stress unity, they actually suppress diversity, leaving many Africans representatives at the Council feeling disempowered and unable to identify with governance processes in their own nations (Wilkinson, and Steve, 2002; Sutterlin, 2003; Deng, 2008).

Focusing on peacebuilding as an important objective, Africa's peacekeeping, state-building, state-making, state-breaking and state failure are matters that are to some degree connected to the Council's decisions and machinations (Kranso, 2004: 225; Malone, 2004; Bourantonis, 2005). According to Mohammed Ayoob (2007), when the Cold War overlay is removed from Third World conflicts, it exposes the fundamental local dynamics inspired by international insecurity regime. However, his continued explanations also suggest that states are fragile when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed to guarantee peacebuilding initiatives and development (Ayoob, 2007).

The above, is a part of the major security problems with Africa which is currently excluded from the veto of global security governance. The OECD (2007), underscores that Africa has prioritise prevention of conflict and peacebuilding missions but international actors within the Security Council may not be ready for Africa's inclusion as yet. The OECD writes that the UN Security Council's inclusive action today can reduce fragility, lower the risk of future conflict and other types of crises, and contribute

to long-term global development and security in Africa. (OECD, 2007: 222). The core of the document is that the current configuration of the Council is self-evident of Africa's dependency on the veto-welding nations for basic security survivals.

Walter Hoffmann, (1994) in his *United Nations Security Council reform and restructuring* and Theo Neethling (2005) citing the Commission on Global Governance (1995:84–85), related that the primary goals of global security organ such as the Council should be to prevent conflict and war and to maintain the integrity of nations and avert conditions that generate threats to the security of the people and state. Neethling (2005) further claims that such organ should anticipate and manage crises before they escalate into armed conflicts through a balanced agency of all Member Nations. The principles advocated by the Commission on Global Governance in 1995 clearly "pointed towards changing perceptions of what constitutes security and how it can be achieved" collectively as a community of nations (Diehl, 2001; Neethling, 2005: 228).

Conversely, where people and state security are affected by political marginalisation and other factors that (may) cause or actually process insecurity are lying at the nexus of development and security, peacebuilding is imperative to return the nation to sustainable peace (Erin McCandless and Hope Mary, 2011). In this regard, without permanent seat to Africa and effective government institutions partly sustained through the veto might, and healthy state- society relations, African states are unlikely to be free of violence and poverty (Köchler, 2007). At the same time peacebuilding processes are internal focal trajectories towards a nation's peace and security while external interventions such as those of the UN-backed NATO mission in Libya, during the 2011 crisis, puts strains on Africa's peacebuilding praxis and its security outlook (Erin McCandless and Hope Mary, 2011; Ekwealor, 2013). Actually, Paris and Sisk (2007: 5) view external involvement in the domestic affairs of African countries as obstacle to achieving peace and security in the region. The two argues that UN's programming in peacebuilding process in Africa sometimes deviates from the domestic need and resulted in foreign ownership of local reforms. They add that even though civil wars usually have domestic drivers, at bottom,

they are also local and international phenomena pulling the triggers for insecurity, and the Council is one of those (Paris and Sisk, 2007: 5;Call and Cook, 2003: 135).

Further, Addison (2003: 4) believes that one of the problems facing peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction processes in Africa is the proliferation of external actors. Addison further notes that these external actors such as the P5 engage with post-conflict reconstruction processes for various reasons. While there are those who are genuinely interested in improving the welfare of the target populations, "there are others who may seek to engage with post-conflict reconstruction processes in order to secure their own economic or political interests" (Addison, 2003: 4; Murithi, 2006: 245; Cooper, 2006: 20). The view of Addison alongside Murithi and Cooper who regularly indict foreign actors in African Affairs partially confirms the canvass that African inclusion into the permanent category of the Council will ensure a local-breed peacebuilding effort in the continent (Cooper, 2006: 21). This is a call that Africa and other Member Nations of the United Nations have repeatedly made under the banner of proposals for the Security Council reform. This call has not yielded any fruit, and we will engage the reform proposals here, in turns.

2.5. Assessing the United Nations Security Council reform proposals since the 1990s

It is interesting to read that the UN says the following "We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom" (Charter, 1945: 1).

On this creed, is predicated the calls for reforms of the UN Security Council to instill equality in the Council organ. The new phase of reform after the 1963 began in 1992 with United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 47/62, which invited members to submit written comments on a possible review of the membership of the Security Council (Razali Plan, 1997). The invitation generated so many proposals that UNGA Resolution 48/26 was passed to allow the committee sufficient time for a successful completion of their task (Cox, 2009: 103). The tone for the new phase of reform was therefore, set "on 3 December 1993, through a UNGA Resolution 48/26 inter alia to establish Open-ended Working Group" (Razali Plan, 1997: 4) to consider all aspects of the question of increase in membership of the Security Council, intended to provide a platform for any nation to submit proposals and discuss plans and other matters related to the Security Council" (Razali Plan, 1997: 1).

The Open-ended Working Group which started its work in January 1994 extended its task through UNGA Resolution 50/489 of 16 September 1996 before the presentation of its findings on 18 July 1997 (Razali Plan, 1997). The Open-ended Working Group was the first comprehensive reform plan aimed at the reformation of the United Nations Security Council (Cox, 2009). The plan proposed an expansion in Council membership and transparency in operating methods, noting that the "effectiveness, credibility and legitimacy of the work of the Security Council depend on its representative character, on its ability to discharge its primary responsibility and duties on behalf of all members" (Razali, 1997: 6; Luck, Blokker and Schrijver, 2005; Luck, 2006; Cox, 2009: 102). Therefore, the UNGA through its Resolution 48/26 decides:

> *(a), To increase the membership of the Security Council from fifteen to twenty-four by adding five permanent and four non-permanent members;*
> *(b), that the five new permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following patterns: (i), one from the developing state of Africa, (ii), one from the developing state of Asia, (iii), one from the developing state of Latin America and the Caribbean, (iv), two from the industrialised states; (c), that the four new non-permanent members of*

the security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern: (i), one from African states, (ii), one from Asian states, (iii), one from Eastern European states, (iv) one from Latin American and Caribbean. The working document, under section 4(a), recognising the veto instrument as anachronistic and undemocratic, calls for its elimination and decides to discourage the use of veto by urging the original permanent members [P5] of the Security Council to limit the exercise of their veto power to actions taken under Chapter VII, and that new permanent members shall have no veto provision (Razali Plan, 1997: 7).

Moreover, the Razali plan (1997) initiated the often-repeated calls for regularly-scheduled, open meetings to allow direct expression of opinions by concerned states and organisations; regular consultations between the Council, the other organs, and affected countries; regular briefings to all member states; open debates to orient the Council before taking decisions; clear delineations on what matters are procedural and not subject to a veto; greater use of the International Court of Justice for advisory opinions; and more consultations with regional actors under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (Razali, 1997: 8-9). Since 1997, several other reform plans have emerged including (the Informal Group of Small and Medium Countries (IGSMC), Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (MNAC), the Mongolia, Group of Arab States (GAS), the African Union (AU), High Level Panel Report (HLPR), the Group Four (G4) Plan, the Uniting for Consensus (UFC), the Small Five States (S5) Plan, Overaching process, Italian Proposal, Panama Proposal, Academic Proposal-model C, Model X, and Regional Economic Plan (Razali Plan, 1997). We will discuss these proposals in turn, below.

2.5.1 The Informal Group of Small and Medium Countries (IGSMC)

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia Hungary, Ireland, Portugal, and Slovenia constitute the (IGSMC) states (Razali Plan, 1997). While these nations agreed with the propositions of the Razali Plan, they accentuated that reform of the Security Council should strengthen its effectiveness, and expansion should not be so large to impede its efficiency (Razali Plan, 1997). Specifically, the IGSMC under section

'b' underscores that enlargement of the Security Council must "ensure representativity of increased general members; take into account new economic and political powers; enhance equitable geographic representation; and will take place in both the categories of permanent and non-permanent members" (Razali Plan, 1997: 10-11). In this way, the IGSMC holds that the upper numerical limit for the size of the Council should be no more than twenty-five, adding that the under-represented groups of Africa, Asia, Latin America and Caribbean should become part of the permanent group.

2.5.2. The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (MNAC)

The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries submitted a negotiating paper towards the Security Council reform. While the MNAC is convinced that set of recommendations by the Razali Plan improves transparency and decision-making processes of the Council, they are concerned with the consultation process of the Council, especially with regards to peacekeeping and troop contributions. MNAC want open public meeting as a rule and actually fuller participation of non-members before reaching decision of important security issues including sanctions (Razaali Plan, 1997).

2.5.3. Mongolia reform plan

Mindful of the substance of Razali proposal, Mongolia working paper, has a more radical position, calling for non-members' full participation in the formal meetings of the Council (Razali Plan, 1997: 24). In the view of the Mongolia paper, no degree of expansion in the Council will bear a direct representation of the overwhelming interests of Member States, but it is necessary that the Council does at least the minimum which is inclusive participation.

2.5.4. The Group of Arab States

Even though the concerns of the Group of Arab States seem many, the controlling idea of their call is to attain reform. Their reform strategies, although agree with the position of the MNAC on the principle of equitable geographical distribution of power within the Council, GAS request two non-permanent seats to themselves. They also called for "the periodic review of the United Nations Charter with a view to phase out the veto instrument (Razali Plan, 1997).

2.5.5. The African Union – Ezulwini Consensus

The African Union, praying the collective responsibility of maintaining international peace and security in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, suggest the democratisation of the Council. The AU specifically, stated that "the membership of the Security Council should be expanded to twenty-six with a two permanent seat for Africa for the benefit of developing nations, Africa, in particular" (Razali Plan, 1997: 58; Ezulwini Consensus, 2005: 9). While adopting the relevant document of the MNAC regarding efficiency and transparency, the AU actually sought two permanent seats and five non-permanent seats for Africa. Its letters under section 2(a) of the Razali Plan read: "Africa should be allocated no less than two permanent seats; 2(b) Africa should be allocated five non-permanent seats in the expanded Security Council" (Razali Plan, 1997: 58; Ezulwini Consensus, 2005: 9). According to both documents on Africa's position on reform, the veto instrument is to be abrogated by disuse. Further, in 2013 UNGA session, African representative pressed further the call for reform and argued that, it was inconceivable that a region like Africa, with the highest cases of conflict, 54 member nations, abundant natural resources, and a huge contributor to the UN peacekeeping operations does not have a permanent seat on the Council (UNGA, 2013). They are adamant that reform must guarantee balance and spirit of global democracy and governance.

2.5.6. High Level Panel Report

Mindful of the issue areas identified in the Razali reform Plan, which elicited consensus and disagreement in pertinent expanses, in 2003, United Nations Secretary-General Koffi Annan renewed the push for reform with an aim on a more secure World (Panel Report, 2004). His report — High Level Panel Report — attempted to strike a balance between two major considerations that should govern the composition of the Council, firstly, the "contribution to the Organisation — financial, military, and diplomatic — and secondly, the overall representativeness of Member States in the Council" (Panel Report, 2004; 79: Cox, 2009: 104). The Panel Report believing that a decision on the enlargement of the Council, is now a necessity, introduced two important proposal models, Model A and Model B (Panel Report, 2004). Models A and B both involve a distribution of seats as between four major regional areas, which were identified respectively as "Africa", "Asia and Pacific", "Americas", and "Europe" (Panel Report, 2004: 81). Model A provides for six new permanent seats, with no veto being created, and three new two-year term non-permanent seats, divided among the major regional areas as follows:

Table 1 – Proposed Security Council reform plan – Model A

Regional Area	Number of seats	Permanent Seats (continuing)	Proposed New Permanent seats	Proposed two-year seats (non-renewable)	Total
Africa	54	0	2	4	6
Asia and Pacific	56	1	2	3	6
Europe	47	3	1	2	6
Americas	36	1	1	4	6
Totals Model A	193	5	6	13	24

Source: High Level Panel Report with minor corrections

While Model A proposed three new non-permanent seats and six new permanent veto-less seats, Model B, on the other hand, essentially created a downright new category of seats instead of merely adding permanent seats" (Panel Report, 2004: 80; Cox, 2009: 104). Conversely, Model B provides for no new permanent seats but creates a new category of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new two-year nonpermanent (and non-renewable) seat, divided among the major regional areas as follows:

Table 2 – Proposed Security Council Reform Plan – Model B

Regional Area	*Number of seats*	*Permanent Seats (continuing)*	*Proposed four year (renewable seats)*	*Proposed two-year seats (non-renewable)*	*Total*
Africa	55	0	2	4	6
Asia and Pacific	56	1	2	3	6
Europe	47	3	2	1	6
Americas	36	1	2	3	6
Totals Model A	193	5	8	11	24

Source: High Level Panel Report with minor corrections

Model B proposed a four years, instead tenure of two, in which the incumbent state would have been immediately available for reelection. In this scheme, two four-year seats would have been reserved for Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and the Americas. Each plan would have increased the Council to twenty-four members (High Level Report, 2004: 81; Cox, 2009: 104-5). According Cox (2009: 105) and High Level Report, (2004: 81) "the report proposed an 'indicative voting' in which members of the Security Council could call for a public indication of positions on a proposed reform whereby action would have a first vote with no effect or veto and a second formal vote under the usual practice, which it was believed would increase accountability of the veto function. This was necessary to ensure transparency and guarantee efficiency in the Council's functions.

2.5.7. The Group Four (G4) Plan

The Group of Four (G4) consists of Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan (Gowan and Gordon, 2014: 29). The G4 marries Model A's focus on enhancing effectiveness, credibility and legitimacy of the Security Council by improving its representative character with the Razali concern for developing nations. As Cox (2009) notes the G4 plan also subtly broadens the meaning of 'security' under the Charter by claiming that "security and development are intertwined and mutually reinforcing and that development is an indispensable foundation of collective security" (Cox, 2009: 106). For that reason, the G4 plan privileges security issues of existing world veracities and that the Security Council needs the enlargement of the members chiefly to enhance responsiveness towards the visions and wishes of all Member States, especially the excluded nations. The G4 plan sought to increase the Council from fifteen to twenty-five members by adding six permanent members and four non-permanent members (Panel Report, 2004). Also, the new non-permanent seats would seat one member from each of Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean without veto until a review of the entire plan at a fifteen years mark (Cox, 2009). Indeed, the plan reiterated many of the reform strategies as enunciated in the Razali plan on geographic representativity.

2.5.8. Uniting for Consensus

Uniting for Consensus (UFC) consists of countries such as: "Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, San Marino, Spain, and Turkey" (Gowan and Gordon, 2014: 29). China and Indonesia participate in expert level meetings of the UFC. The Uniting for Consensus' plan is essentially a reaction against the alleged efforts of certain G4 proponents to become permanent members of the Council (Cox, 2009). Supporters of the Uniting for Consensus plan favour a variant Model B proposal which they believe is flexible and more representative. The plan describes the Security Council as 'inequitable and unbalanced' and asserts that any expansion "should make it more democratic, more equitably representative, more

transparent, more effective and more accountable" (Okhovat, 2011: 22). It actually underscores, that, the strongest means to promote real accountability, is to allow for frequent rotation and fair and equitable representation (Cox, 2009). The plan also calls for increasing the number of Council members from fifteen to twenty-five, holding however, that the five permanent seats would remain unchanged; the twenty non-permanent seats would be held for two years and would be redistributed along these lines: "six from African States; five from Asian States; four from Latin American and Caribbean States; three from Western European and other States; [and] two from Eastern European States" (Cox (2009: 107).

2.5.9. The Small Five Group (S5) Plan

The S5 group comprises: Switzerland, Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, and Singapore (Emch, 2012). Their plan is a modest attempt at reforming the Council's working methods. The plan suggests a number of improvements to "enhance the accountability, transparency and inclusiveness of its work, with a view to strengthening its legitimacy and effectiveness and to stop the P5 from using the veto power" (Cox, 2009: 109; Emch, 2012: 1). They suggest institutionalising regular, open exchanges between the Council members and affected member states as reform strategy. According to Cox (2009) permanent members are asked to voluntarily abstain from exercising the veto in any matter of "genocide, crimes against humanity and serious violations of international humanitarian law" (Cox, 2009: 109).

2.5.10.   Overarching Process (OP)

Essentially, the Overarching Process is an endeavor to halt the standoff that had emerged between G4, Uniting for Consensus, and the Ezulwini Consensus plans (Cox, 2009). The plan puts in firm terms that common denominator, that is, only those reform measures that are common among the proposals be accepted and leaves all the key dissimilarities "open for negotiation" (Caron, 1993: 568). Simply put, the Overarching Process is a covenant to agree on the basic points from which further negotiations regarding the Security Council will proceed, and to leave the real tough talking and the dealing for the

negotiations themselves (Cox, 2009). In this reform arrangement, the Council tentatively grows to twenty-two, and another seven new seats created and distributed as follows: two seats to Africa; two seats to Asia; one seat to Latin America and Caribbean; one seat to Western Europe and others; and one seat to Eastern Europe (UN special report, 2014: 8).

2.5.11.   Italian Proposal

The Italian proposal is one of *minor state-sponsored* proposals. It is distinctive in that the plan creates rotational regional seats, not seats for individual states assigned by region (Cox, 2009: 111; Razali 1997: 63). By implanting strictly regional voices on the Council, broader collective interests are caused to triumph over the more narrow interests of single powerful states. The Italian proposal gives two added permanent but veto-less seats to Africa, Asia, Western Europe and other groups, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Eastern Europe (Razali Plan, 1997). Each regional group would have the operational management of the seats and outline principles and mechanisms with appropriate checks and balances to avert national occupation of the seats and ensure regional representation (Razali Plan, 1997: 63).

2.5.12.   Panama Proposal

Panama proposal is another *minor state-sponsored* proposal. In 2007, Panama proposed a simple plan to increase member representation. Under its plan the Security Council would seat an additional six members with five-year renewable terms (Cox, 2009: 111). The seats would be spread among the current regions: two for Asia, two for Africa, one for Latin America and the Caribbean, and one for Western Europe and other States (Razali Plan, 1997; Cox. 2009). In Panama plan, any state chosen for four uninterrupted terms would automatically converted to, and for this reason only, a permanent member with no veto. These reform plans further inspired academics to wade into the reform negotiations. Below are some of the academic proposals.

2.5.13.   The Models of Academic Proposals
2.5.13.i.   Model C

Almost all problems of the United Nations reform revolve around the composition of the Security Council (Panel Report, 2004). This in part necessitates the academia's Model C position on the Council's reform. Model C is chiefly a proposal developed from a variation of Models A and B which retains focus on equitable representation through increased membership (Cox, 2009). In this Model, membership would be increased and distributed in the same manner as Model A or B, but would create a new Pacific Rim region (Razali Plan, 1997). The Pacific Rim group would consist of the "U.S., Canada, Japan, the Philippines, the states other than China along the East Asian coastline, Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Island States, while the Asian Group would consist of China plus south and southwest Asia" (Cox, 2009: 129).

Brian Cox (2009) for one notes that model C is calculated to offer greater recognition to the large populations of Asian states. The general orientation of model C is to retain the original five permanent members but redistribute the ten two-year term seats members: three to Africa; two to Asia; one to Europe; two to the Pacific Rim; and two to Latin America and the Caribbean (Cox, 2009). The plan then creates one four-year renewable seat and one eight-year renewable seat for each region. The eight-year seats would be dual-seated, meaning that two nations would occupy the seat on a two-year rotation. The dual seat is meant to reduce "political rancor from the large states in each region which are not selected" (Cox, 2009: 105). The four-year seats are reward seats. Each region selects the constituent nation that has contributed most to peacekeeping and other United Nations operations and that has met its financial obligations.

2.5.13.ii.   Model X

Given that none of the proposals has yet gained wide spread support. Model X is an attempt to make Model B more palatable to more member states. The plan sacrifices some equitable depiction in favour of a smaller, more efficient Council of no more than twenty (Cox, 2009). Model X recognises that the developing world is not sufficiently accounted for but not neglected either. The plan favours and rewards major contributors to the United Nations programme. It adds five four-year renewable term seats; two four year renewable seats for Africa, two for Asia, and one for the Americas and the Pacific (Kelleher, 2005). At the heart of the Model X plan, each UN region would itself regulate whether a nation will be re-elected. Europe is not allocated a new seat, which somewhat redresses their overrepresentation among the permanent members (Köchler, 2007: 9; Okhovat, 2011). In the face of these designs, unfortunately, the permanent states are adamant that no reform of the Council can take effect, essentially sticking to their position since 1945. Collectively and individually, the P5 insists that "no reform can occur without the full consent of the P5" (Gowan and Gordon, 2014: 4). Below are the positions of the: United States, Britain, Russia, China, and France on reform of the Council.

2.5.14.   The American Position on Security Council Reform

The United States envisioned a Security Council with a "Four Policeman" at the inception of the Council (Cox, 2009). The *four* includes the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China, making up a separate body within the United Nations that would have "exclusive authority whose sole responsibility is to decide on the utility of force" (Cox, 2009: 94). While rhetoric from the US government may have tilted, the core of their position is unshaken. In US arrangement, there shall be a separate Executive Council composed of the Policemen and six or seven representatives chosen from regions to deal with nonmilitary matters. Yes, there is no Four Policemen; there are five in the form of permanent members, with the duties of the Policemen. This outlook is fortified by the US' firm belief that peace could be held only by the willingness to use overwhelming military power against any population. This belief is the ideology driving

the US foreign relations. This view specifically conflicts with the modern, popular viewpoint that the United Nations is, in all aspects, "based on sovereign equality and must permit the smaller nations a meaningful role" (Charter, 1945: 1). And even more, the views of those peace and security authors such as Micheal Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis who passionately argued that "peace cannot be enforced on any resistant population" (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006: 14) is at wrestle with the US plan. Indeed, while the US routinely conveyed in its proposal and any other dais it sees, that small nations should not be allowed to complicate the supreme task of keeping the peace, it also believed that the P5 should champion the rights of those states. Thus, the US position on the use of force and equality are crafted contrarily to the principles of the Charter (Charter, 1945; Cox, 2009: 95).

2.5.15.   The British Position

Britain likewise the US, is unrepentant. The position it held in 1945 is the one it pursues and maintains today. According to Brian Cox (2009), the British envoys sought for three regional councils, one each for Europe, Asia, and the Americas, charged with enforcing regional security and collective responsibility as a Supreme United Nations Council (Howard, 1998) is settled with non-African permanent member. In its original plan, Britain believes that this tiered system would allow the regional councils to enforce peace locally and avoid having every nation poking its finger into every other nation's business. While local ownership of enforcement process seems situated at the heart of British's proposal, it later shifted its goals to balancing European power against the Soviet Union and to protecting the British Empire from being dissolved by independence and self-determination at the end of the war (Cox, 2009: 95). The British ultimately viewed the Security Council and the United Nations less as a new system of international relations and more as an added tool in traditional diplomacy. Even when it has, in sermons at the General Assembly preached inclusion, Britain has not worked for African inclusion in Security Council.

2.5.16.   The Soviet Position

The Soviet (present day Russian Federation) originally, preferred an orthodox soldierly cooperation with the United States and Britain rather than lording themselves over weaker nations (Roach, 1952). Undeniably, the Soviet regards the US proposal especially as a catalyst for war, holding that it is insufficiently democratic and as a result can re-invite war among nations. Thus, the Soviets called for a reform that did not endanger the security or hegemonic ambition of global powers. In this fashion, Cox (2009) accounts that the Soviets maintained an absolute, insoluble position on maintaining an unrestricted power of the veto as an instrument to contain the excesses of powerful counterparts. In Cox account, the Soviets were willing to compromise on almost all points except the unanimity principle (Cox, 2009: 96).

2.5.17.   The position of France

France in a response to the Council reform supports an expansion of the Council in both permanent and non-permanent categories of members. A position that the US and Britain claim is informed by the weak status of France in the Council. Specifically, it favours the inclusion of "Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan for new permanent seat along with a representation from Africa among the permanent Council" (*Mission de Permanente de la France*, 2010: 1). With a view to breaking the deadlock arising from the variegated proposals, France proposed the creation of new seats with longer mandate as intermediate solution to the seeming unending reform debate.

2.5.18.   The Position of China

China is one of the P5 members who has vetoed only a very few resolutions, an act some scholars linked to its multilateralism and diplomacy. Regarding, the reform of the Security Council, while China has not been vehement in its stance in its individual capacity, It recalls that for the purpose of "regulating the use of force, for the application of the Responsibility to Protect, for making the Security Council more representative" the Council can be reformed to meet these outlined requirements (Geeraerts, *et al*, 2007: 2-

5). China however, notes that changing the Security Council's membership or veto power or any of its structures, requires amendment of the UN Charter (Article 108) and necessitates the approval of two-thirds in the UN General Assembly including the mandatory backing of the P5 (Geeraerts, *et al*, 2007: 6) . Hence, only one such *de jure* amendment has been made to the UN Charter since its formal signing on 26 June 1945.

2.5.19. Regional Economic Plan (REP)

Regional Economic Plan (REP) is pertinent because it seeks to reconcile the "unrepresentative, illegitimate, and increasingly ineffectiveness of the Council especially in matters of dealing with global crises squarely" (Cox, 2009). The REP proposes a new Security Council that will consist of ten new regional groups: "Northern America, Latin America, Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East, Northern Eurasia, Southern Asia, Eastern Asia, Southeastern Asia and The Pacific" (Cox, 2009: 114). Under this formula, participation in a region would be limited to states with a population of at least four million or a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and or Public Private Partnership (PPP) of at least 40 billion constant US dollars. Thus, the regional groupings will distribute representation equally, according to population and wealth of relevant states.

The ten groups would be headed by 'an anchor country' or by co-anchor countries. Cox (2009) writes that under the arrangement, a vote could only be cast by any region on a specific issue when backed by individual states representing 60 percent of its population and 60 percent of its GDP (PPP). The plan refers to this as the 60/60 rule, which governs all votes save those cast in emergency situations (Cox, 2009). In the case of an emergency, the anchors, or co-anchors, can vote their will. The wealthiest regions, those with at least 18 percent of the combined GDP (PPP) of all Regions, would receive an additional two votes. This plan eliminates the veto because the "gridlock and inaction caused by the veto could severely damage the UN as it did during the Cold War" (Cox, 2009: 115).

2.6. Analysis of the reform proposals

Recurring themes and shared concerns that run through a majority of the proposals are the need for increased membership in the permanent category; the elimination or limitation of the veto; African inclusion; and improved working methods. These are the common pleas. According to (Köchler, 2007; Guzzardi and Mullenbach, 2008; Cox, 2009; Okhovat, 2011; and Gowan and Gordon, 2014), some of these ideas cannot help but improve the Security Council but not all of these reforms strategies are popular among the reformist. Actually, the majority of the reform propositions conceivably, are quite safe and even beneficial to the current members of the UN for collective global security. Further, the new formulae centrally create a structure that compartmentalises every concern and responds specifically to the balance needs within the organ. Although, several of new proposals barely resemble the Council's originally agreed upon structure and tends to threaten the old foundations of the organ, it is important to reform with a view to keeping on par with current security changes and challenges. Increased membership is called for by every proposal except the S5 plan. This, indeed, shows global community's overwhelming support for the reform. The different plans offer a variety of reasons for these suggested increases in the membership of the Security Council.

To be sure, the Razali, G4, United for Consensus, REP, and Model C plans, in particular, argue that the Council's effectiveness, credibility, and legitimacy depend on a representative character that the current body lacks. The High Level Panel Report, G4, and Model C plans also add that a membership increase would create a Council better conformed to the actual contribution of world states. The Ezulwini Consensusfor one argues for increased membership based on essential fairness and egalitarian values. In calling for increased membership, all made valid observations, but faces resistance as some of the plans seems to ignore the original purpose of the Council and neglect the functional complications. These are the current basis for resistance.

Furthermore, no plan approves of the unrestricted veto utility only the Elzuwini Consensus extended the power to new permanent members. The remaining proposals

condemn the veto power as anachronistic and undesirable. Arguably, veto carries the most blame for the Council's ineffectiveness. The blame is chiefly rested on the claim that the veto is habitually used to protect the interest of P5 and countries with which the P5 have close cultural, economic and/or political ties, most notoriously in situations of mass genocidal killings. This, in part provided the reason most of the reforms call for some form of restraint, if not outright elimination, of the veto (Razali, 1997; Cox, 2009).

2.6.1. The Working Methods analysis

Several recommendations and observations under the working method, underscores that the Security Council should improve its functioning techniques (Panel Report, 2004). Particularly, every proposal agrees on changes to the procedural aspects of the Council. Some insists on regular briefings and consultations with affected groups of states with a view to guarantee non-permanent members with the opportunity for real participation and control in Council decisions without substantial infringement on permanent member rights and duties (Cox, 2009; Ekwealor, 2013). Under working method, replacement of secretive, informal decision-making sessions with more open hearings is suggested for efficiency (Gowan and Gordon, 2014). Also, the reform should take into account activities that would prevent the exclusion of the non-permanent members and must abhor the selective deprivation tactics in the Council that actually offend the integrity of the United Nations.

As enunciated in Italian proposal and the REC plan, the core of concentration of power on regional bodies is that the UN will create an organisation that better acts for the world as a whole. For example, most of Europe could easily be managed through the European Union and Africa through the African Union (Cox, 2009). Increased use of regional organisations as espoused in S5 plan assures closer coordination of security activities and proven reliance in the management of people and resources of the Council. Cox, (2009) notes that under the new regional arrangements, that, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) acts under the United Nations flag, and the African Union acts as a stabilising force in Africa which is good for the UN. Although, critics are querying the

utility of regional organisation for the UN security programme, labelling same as divisive.

2.7. Colonialism and neo-imperialism in the Security Council: the conundrum for Africa

In view of Lenin cited in Aja (1998:46) imperialism is secured on economic domination, subordination and exploitation of weak economies by the developed economies. Aja (1998) argues that imperialism's most outstanding technical meaning is that it is the highest stage in the promotion of capitalism when, among others the business interests of monopoly capitalists in Europe became more pronounced among all subordinate nations (Ake,1985:20). The attitude of monopolisation of veto power is actually the newest colonial stock in trade for the powerful European nations duplicated in the Security Council. Closely related to imperialism is the concept of neo-colonialism. The substance of neo-colonialism is the continual economic and technological domination of the dependent states by foreign states and other interests without direct political control and subordination (Yansane, 1980: 24). Implicitly, neo-colonial dominance is the continual utility of power from the developed countries to expand and deepen the sphere of capitalist accumulation at the expense of the developing regions such as Africa (Onwuka, 1987: 52).

The contrivances for neo-colonialism in developing regions, Africa inclusive, are the multinational corporations (MNCs), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Security Council, and even the weak and subservient neo-colonial states in the periphery (Aja, 1998:51). In security and political sense, neo-colonial strategy is expedited through Western maneuvers through the instrumentality of foreign grants, loans, aid, economic assistance, military-defence pacts and agreements through which dependent nations get more chained into insecurity paradigm in the world dominated by developed capitalist states. For example, in Nigeria, foreign oil companies have exercised monopolies in exploration and exploitation of resources. Western multinational corporations (such as Texaco, Chevron, Total, Elf, Mobil and Shell) have monopolised Nigeria's rich oil reserves with sheer impunity. According to Ake (1985:126), in virtually all the

underdeveloped countries in which neo-colonialism has managed to bolster its position, there are growing crises of external debt burden, food crisis, high unemployment rate, technological backwardness and diversion of scarce resources to arms for the sole benefit of colonial commanders, notably the P5 nations.

The P5 at the centre of global powers perpetuate their presence in the security arena of their former colonial outlets, particularly through the extraction of raw materials and engagement in securitisation interventions. The P5 are thus involved in interfering in, and controlling the governance and security and peace programmes of fragile African nations with a view to sustaining the flow of raw materials into the P5 states at prices which overly profit the P5. Essentially, neo-colonialism enhanced and eventually replaced colonialism. This explains why Africa continues to pay huge amounts of money annually in debt service to the some P5-members controlled Bretton Wood institutions. This dependence, in turn, gives the IMF and World Bank the undue advantage to reap from where they did not actually sow.

The post-independence African leaders in the face of these inauspicious developments appeared crippled by their own powerlessness and veto threats of the some of the P5 nations, especially Britain, France and the US – the P3. The P5 through the veto instrument of neo-colonialism dismember African leaders from unity that will earn them political power to make economic decisions. According to Cilliers (2004:23) France (a veto state) carried out one military intrusion on average in Africa each year from 1960-1994, and it has been scot-free since there is no laid-down power to challenge its audacity. Indeed, the global post-colonial order is nurtured on the lop-sided socio-economic and political nature it has had. Indeed, Zeleza (2008:1-2) and Kastfelt (2005:2) vividly note that several postcolonial wars are deep-rooted in continued obtaining advantage of the colonised.

At the centre of the resistance towards Council reform is the appreciation of transformation of Europe and world history orchestrated by Africa's anti-colonial wars, which culminated in somewhat political association of Africans and colonial emperors.

Regrettably, gains made at the heels of Africa's political independence were capsised in the sea of permanent seat of the neo political order of the United Nations Security Council. The uncertainties and timorousness of postcolonial Africa are founded in the governmental and cultural economies of colonialism and the neo-colonial oracle, the UN Security Council permanent seat with veto. The veto power is laced on to the neo-colonial agenda inherited from colonial knowledge. In essence, the veto power is used to secure the colonial parlance in the global political arena.

2.8   Justification for sampling Africa

The main African contenders that have officially declared themselves able, available, willing, and ready to occupy the Council's permanent seat are: Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa (Fafowora, 1997; Ciroma, 1995; Cantori, 2002; Spies, 2008). Although, countries such as Kenya, Libya, Senegal, and others have shown interests in 'permanent seat' some authors such as Hovet, (1960: 93) and Cox, (2009) qualified such calls as sabotage to the common African front of the "African Caucusing Group" (ACG). Actually, since the 1960s when Africa started actively wriggling herself out of colonial odyssey characterised by sorrowful asymmetrical encounter with Europe, its constituent states have prayed larger freedom in all spheres and strata of international institutions and regimes, inclusive of the United Nations (Ekwealor, 2013). In this vein, African members of the UN sought inclusion into the permanent seat of the Council with a view to achieving security and greater freedom for Africa (Gambari, 1992; Gambari, 1997; Garba, 1997; Fawole, 2000; Ezulwini Consensus, 2005). While these ambitions are limitless, there are real challenges confronting Africa's ambitions. Some of the gaps are discussed below.

2.8.2.i. The gaps within the existing Security Council reform proposals

Some of the principal challenges with the reform of the Security Council are the actual proposals which in turn serve working problems for the UN. Some of the gaps in the existing literature are as follows:

Assessment of Africa's capabilities in relation to Security Council permanent position: the plethora of literature reviewed, have unanimously suggested reform on the basis of geographic representativity or in view of democracy and better practices. However, no literature has actually assessed or weighed up Africa's capabilities and strengths in all of the recommendations. This lack of assessment of the capabilities in terms of military might, economic development and potentials, prudent peacekeeping and building capabilities of Africa's top five nations is a gross oversight. This oversight is a major hindrance to securing the various proposed reform strategies. This study, therefore, in chapter five (5.3; 5.3.1; 5.3.2; 5.3.3; 5.3.4; 5.4; 5.5; 5.6; and 5.7) weighs into these grey spots in literature and provide lucid basis for the African inclusion narrative.

The politics of P3 (Britain, France and US) versus P2 (China and Russia): while in areas such as adoption of resolutions, the P5 have relatively worked together exception to instances such as the Syria crisis, the division between the P3 and the P2 has not been adequately accounted for by the various literature proposals. The need to recognise this inadequacy is a prime factor since it provides the groundwork for non-agreement and lays the foundation for sturdy disunity within the P5. This study, actually to fills this gap by providing the specific engagements and positions of the individual P5 nations in relation to the business of global security, the reform of Security Council being one of them. These discords and gaps relating to reform were discussed in chapter four of this thesis in which variegated non-progressive positions of the P5 were highlighted and technical rearrangements of the Council, such as African inclusion suggested on the basis of not only inclusivity but indeed, progressivity.

The Razali plan: the plan has been praised as the most comprehensive document on reform since 1945. The underlying message of the plan is expansion and inclusion, but it makes this proposal outside the dictates of the Charter. The Plan is legally flawed. Article 108 states: "amendments to the Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council" (Charter, 1945, Article 108). Razali Plan specifically deviated from Article 108, and not in tandem with the Charter. If it had gone through, the Plan would have created precedence and opened the gate for Charter abuse. This research has signaled this warning and laid the framework that encouraged both the P5 and General Assembly to abide by the principle of democracy upon which the UN is supposedly constructed.

High Level Panel Report: the High Level Panel Report intentionally emplaced emphasis of reform on 'contribution to the Organisation — financial, military, and diplomatic'. Surely, while contribution serves good purpose, the blind spot with this proposal is that it does not know which of the elements is most vital to the organisation. It also, did not categorise the elements in any other of importance to allow for whatever claims it has made. Financial capacity without military support is useless, military expertise without financial vehicle is immobile, and also does diplomatic channels. One thing that makes the Panel Report inapplicable is the stack lack of actuality in its recommendation. It lacks practical guidelines because developing nations, Nigeria inclusive have been hugely responsible for the donation of troop but instead of mentioning Nigeria, the statement is blanket, making it difficult to establish strength and determine way forward. This study, has highlighted the missing link in the High Level Panel Report, and lucidly accounted for Nigeria's security services to the world.

The removal of the veto power: Essentially a common denominator among other (forms of) proposals such as the G4, with exception to the Ezulwini Consensus is the removal of the Veto. Fact is that veto power is a major problem within the Council. But it is not

inherently evil. The only issue with the veto is the selective deployment. This study does agree that veto is intrinsically mayhem but underscores that a solution to veto and its attendant crises is to infest all UN geographic actors with the sauce of veto power. Its availability to all geographic regions will dilute the sting of veto and increase regional cooperation that has been lacking in the Council through the colonial acrimony that has processed *"a diplomatic cul-de-sac"*in many UN activities (Spies, 2008: 109).The gaps on veto were highlighted in this chapter, teased out in chapter three and further engaged in chapter six.

2.9.   Conclusion

In order to achieve greater security and peace in the current international system through the United Nations Security Council, the organ must reform itself. Currently, the P5 struggles to keep up with the purpose of the Council because the status quo is shaken by the various tests of current time. Assuredly, the Council will regain its legitimacy, harness its working method, respond quickly to new threats and organise its structure only when the P5 allows for the expansion of the Council to accommodate geopolitical balance and evenly distribute the veto power or eliminate the utility of veto entirely.

Truly, there is a link between insecurity in Africa and the Security Council permanent seat. Africa is currently inefficient in addressing its conflict partly due to the exclusion and attendant hindrances of veto power. Africa needs to occupy permanent seat with assured veto power which will allow them deal with matters without the fear of the interests of the current P5 in Africa's conflict. Point of fact is that, the P5 are on duty first to guard their own nations and secondly to guard the world. And as international actors, they usually have domestic interest which hinders their international roles as neutral arbiter. It is plausible that when Africa becomes a permanent seat holder and the Latin America and the Caribbean becomes one too, the regional balance is greatly achieved. In this way, Africa will be better placed to address matter of neocolonialism and peacebuilding in particular. The degree of insecurity in Africa blamed on lack of permanent power offers that at least one of the three African states: Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa that have availed themselves to serve are given positive consideration to

represent the region. A permanent seat to Africa is as good as permanent peace to the region and to the global community.

In the following chapter (Chapter Three), we will provide the theoretical basis and perspectives for which we chose the instruments used in this study and demonstrate how the approaches address the core issues of this research, including: international politics of interest and power (Realist Theory); human orientation, behaviour and conduct (Bahaviourist Approach); the business of lording it over the other to sulk the weak (Dependency Theory); and most importantly the legislation of leading by the rules (the Society of State Approach). These theories have been chosen for their specific importance to the issue-areas of this research.

CHAPTER THREE

Behaviourism, Dependency, Realism, and Society of State: navigating the Security Council reform conundrum

3.1   Introduction

"As long as the current Charter of the United Nations remains in force and unamended, the existing United Nations Security Council structure is legitimate" (Ashley,1988;Baker, 2000; McDonald and Patrick, 2010: 7). Despite the notion that the UNSC is structurally imbalanced, social, economic and, indeed, political institutions such as the configuration of the Council which excludes some nations actually impedes developmental trajectories and essentially processes vulnerability on excluded nations (McDonald and Patrick, 2010: 7). Vulnerability in turn ushers in both state and human insecurity regime among the affected populations. From the literature review, we learnt that the view of the UN regional blocs, is that the Council's domination by Western countries and failure to include permanent members from Africa and Latin America gives it dwindling authority to issue binding international decisions, a perspectives from the global South which reinforces perceptions that the Council is a neo-colonial club, determining questions of war and peace for the poor without their input (Cox, 2009; McDonald and Patrick, 2010).

In essence, this chapter scrutinises the conduct of the P5 actors who are either explicitly or stealthily convoluted in the reform saga in relations to the Africa's quest for permanent position in the Council. The resistant behaviours of the P5 influenced the appeal and dynamics of the reform since 1945. The chapter narrates the P5's motivation anchored on the lexicon of protection of their interest against the perceived 'enemy' (the Africa Group). Thus, this chapter examines in turn, the analytical usefulness of a number of theories including, principally the Realist Theory of International Relations, the Behaviourism, the Society of State Approach, and the Dependency Approach.

3.2 Realist Theory of International Relations: negotiating the bends

3.2.1. Brief Introduction of Realism

Realist theory examines a body of realist philosophies that argue states care deeply about the balance of power and compete among themselves either to gain power at the expense of others or at least to make sure they do not lose power. They do so because the structure of the international system leaves them little choice if they want to survive. This competition for power makes for a dangerous world where states sometimes fight each other. There are, however, important differences between traditional realists and structural realists and further distinctions among structural realists. In particular, defensive realists – a variant of structural realist-argue that structural factors limit how much power states can gain, which works to ameliorate security competition. Another variant of structural realist – offensive realists - on the other hand, maintain that the system's structure encourages states to maximise their share of world power, to include pursuing hegemony, which tends to intensify security competition (Mearsheimer, 2006).

Realists believe that power is the currency of international politics. Great powers, the main actors in the realists' account, pay careful attention to how much economic and military power they have relative to each other. The presence of power within the arena of international politics, does not only make realism pertinently useful in this study, but also accentuate the root causes of Africa's exclusion. It is important not only to have a substantial amount of power, but also to make sure that no other state sharply shifts the balance of power in its favour.

For realists, international politics is synonymous with power politics. There are, however, substantial differences among realists. The most basic divide is reflected in the answer to the simple but important question: *why do states want power?* For traditional realists like Hans Morgenthau (1948), the answer is human nature, adding that whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim. This account satisfies the requirement for the claim of this study, that African exclusion from the Security Council is based solely on the human nature and character of those P5 nations who already wielded veto power. Since traditional realist argues that virtually, everyone is born with a will to power hardwired into them, which effectively means that great powers are led by individuals who are bent on having their state dominate its rivals (Adler, 1997;

Mearsheimer, 2006), is it still difficult for anyone to see why the US president of African descent defends the US instead of Africa? This is still the case with the UN. It is humanly natural for one to be better than the other. This may include destroying the qualities one has if it aids the interest. However, for structural realist such as Waltz (1979), human nature has little to do with why states want power. Instead, it is the structure or architecture of the international system that forces states to pursue power. So the distinction between the traditional and structural realists is that, for traditional realists, *power is an end in itself;* for structural realists, *power is a means to an end and the ultimate end is survival*.

3.2.2. The Structural Realism

Structural realism divides into two camps: those who argue that states are security maximisers (defensive realism), and those who argue that states are power maximisers (offensive realism). Despite the specificities between these structural realists, both agree that the US's refusal of African inclusion is for the sole interest of the US and not of any other concerned elements. This also, stresses the importance of this theory in this study. Structural realists developed the concept of system's structure which permits understanding of 'how the structure of the system, and variations in it, affect the interacting units and the outcomes they produce' (Waltz, 2003: 29). With this assertion in mind, it is needless recalling that the UN, especially the Security Council is a structure of a system that functions with various units and African being one of the parts. Waltz defined the structure of the international system in terms of three elements—organising principle, differentiation of units, and distribution of capabilities (Waltz, 2003). Waltz (1989) identifies two different organising principles: anarchy, which corresponds to the decentralised realm of international politics; and hierarchy, which is the basis of domestic order. Building on Waltz's, anarchy and hierarchy are man-made structures to advance human natural interests, in the case of Security Council's P5, to permanently hold on to power. He argues that the units of the international system are functionally similar for sovereign states; hence the unit-level variations within the Council's structure such as Africa's or the South American continent exclusions are irrelevant in explaining international outcomes. It is the third tier, the distribution of capabilities across units that

is of fundamental importance to understanding crucial international outcomes (Dunne and Schimdt, 2004).

According to structural realists, the case of African exclusion from the permanent seat of the Security Council, as needled into the relative distribution of power in the international system is the key independent variable in understanding important international outcomes such as war and peace, alliance politics, and the balance of power. Simply put, the current Council's organisation remained imbalance due to power politics. Structural realists are interested in providing reason why African exclusion is not a matter of interest to US, Britain or any other P5 state, since the organ is clothed with a rank-ordering of states so as to be able to differentiate and count the number of great powers that exist at any particular point in time. This determination is important since the number of great powers, in turn, determines the structure of the international system. For example, during the cold war from 1945 to 1989 there were two great powers—the USA and the Soviet Union—that constituted the bipolar international system (Dunne and Schimdt, 2004).

In the web of power politics in the Security Council, the researcher somewhat concerns himself with understanding how the international distribution of power impact the behaviour of states, particularly their power-seeking behaviour? In the most general sense, Waltz argues that states, especially the great powers, have to be sensitive to the capabilities of other states. The possibility that any state may use force to advance its interests results in all states being worried about their survival. This, specifically, is the case in point with Africa, currently, Africa's stand in global politics is blurred but it will continue to degenerate without a voice in the global security operations, through the Council. According to Waltz, power is a means to the end of security. In a significant passage, Waltz writes 'because power is a possibly useful means, sensible statesmen try to have an appropriate amount of it'. He adds, 'in crucial situations, however, the ultimate concern of states is not for power but for security' (Waltz 1989: 40). In other words, rather than being power maximisers, states, according to Waltz, are security maximisers. Waltz argues that power maximisation often proves to be dysfunctional because it triggers a counter-balancing coalition of states. Counter reactions include the current Africa's agitation for inclusion as does, Argentina, Brazil, and India, to mention a few.

As indicated earlier, for traditional realists, human nature has bantam to do with why states want power, by extension why the US, Britain, and France for instance wanted Africa out of the circle of global security leadership. Alternatively, it is the man-made structure or architecture of the international system that forces states to pursue power that destroys another. Structural realist argues that in a system where there is no higher authority that sits above the great powers, and where there is no guarantee that one will not attack another, it makes eminently good sense for each state to be powerful enough to protect itself in the event it is attacked, this is at the core of African exclusion (Mearsheimer, 2006: 75). Russia and US are fearful of each other, but will readily have a proxy test of their might through other weaker states. In essence, great powers are 'trapped in an iron cage' where they have little choice but to compete with each other for power if they hope to survive even when it is not directly competed. Structural realist theories ignore cultural differences among states as well as differences in regime type, mainly because the international system creates the same basic incentives for all great powers. Whether a state is democratic or autocratic matters relatively diminutively for how it acts towards other states (Yanow, 1996). Nor does it matter much who is in charge of conducting a state's foreign policy. Structural realists treat states as if they were black boxes: they are assumed to be alike, save for the fact that some states are more or less powerful than others (Waltz, 1979). Point of interest here is that the great powers with veto, believe that Africa will rattle them should Africa become empowered.

Bearing this notion in mind, there is a significant divide among structural realists, which is reflected in the answer to a second question that concerns realists: *how much power is enough?* Defensive realists like Kenneth Waltz (1979) maintain that it is unwise for states to try to maximise their share of world power, because the system will punish them if they attempt to gain too much power. The pursuit of hegemony, they argue, is especially foolhardy. Offensive realists like John Mearsheimer (2006) take the opposite view; they maintain that it makes good strategic sense for states to gain as much power as possible and, if the circumstances are right, to pursue hegemony. The argument is not that conquest or domination is good in itself, but instead that having overwhelming power is the best way to ensure one's own survival. This is why realism is apt in this discussion, without veto power and permanent seat, how does African continent survive?

Let us now consider in greater detail the structural realists' explanation for why states pursue power, and then explore why defensive and offensive realists differ about how much power states want. The focus then shifts to examining different structural realist explanations about the causes of great power war. This great power war can be likened to the current debate of African exclusion from the permanent seat of Security Council after 70 years of functioning. Finally, the study illuminates these theoretical issues with an assessment to validate why the Security Council permanent members resisted reform and will continue to do so.

3.2.3. Why do states pursue power, control, and supremacy?

There is a simple structural realist explanation for why states compete among themselves for power. It is based on five straight-forward assumptions about the international system. None of these assumptions alone says that states should attempt to gain power at each other's expense. But when they are married together, they depict a world of ceaseless security competition.

The first assumption is that great powers are the main actors in world politics and they operate in an anarchic system. This is not to say that the system is characterised by chaos or disorder. Anarchy is an ordering principle; it simply means that there is no centralised authority or ultimate arbiter that stands above states. The opposite of anarchy in this instance is hierarchy, which is the ordering principle of domestic politics (Mearsheimer, 2006: 75).

The second assumption is that all states possess some offensive military capability. Each state, in other words, has the power to inflict some harm on its neighbor (Keohane, 1986). Of course, that capability varies among states and for any state it can change over time. The third assumption is that states can never be certain about the intentions of other states. States ultimately want to know whether other states are determined to use force to alter the balance of power (revisionist states), or whether they are satisfied enough with it that they have no interest in using force to change it (status quo states). The problem,

however, is that it is almost impossible to discern another state's intentions with a high degree of certainty. Unlike military capabilities, intentions cannot be empirically verified.

Intentions are in the minds of decision-makers and they are especially difficult to discern. One might respond that policy-makers disclose their intentions in speeches and policy documents, which can be assessed. The problem with that argument is policy-makers sometimes lie about or conceal their true intentions. But even if one could determine another state's intentions today, there is no way to determine its future intentions. It is impossible to know who will be running foreign policy in any state five or ten years from now, much less whether they will have aggressive intentions. This is not to say that states can be certain that their neighbours have or will have revisionist goals. Instead, the argument is that policy-makers can never be certain whether they are dealing with visionist or status quo state.

The fourth assumption is that the main goal of states is survival (Mearsheimer, 2006). States seek to maintain their territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order. They can pursue other goals like prosperity and protecting human rights, but those aims must always take a back seat to survival, because if a state does not survive, it cannot pursue those other goals.

The fifth assumption is that states are rational actors, which is to say they are capable of coming up with sound strategies that maximise their prospects for survival (Mearsheimer, 2006). This is not to deny that they miscalculate from time to time. Because states operate with imperfect information in a complicated world, they sometimes make serious mistakes

Yet again, none of these assumptions by themselves says that states will or should compete with each other for power. For sure, the third assumption leaves open the possibility that there is a revisionist state in the system. By itself, however, it says nothing about why all states pursue power. It is only when all the assumptions are combined together that circumstances arise where states not only become preoccupied with the balance of power, but acquire powerful incentives to gain power at each other's expense

(Mearsheimer, 2006). In the case of the Security Council, the P5 acquire power at the expense of Africa and other excluded actors.

3.2.4. How much power is enough: the structural realists arguments

There is incongruity among structural realists about how much power states should aim to control. Offensive realists argue that states should always be looking for opportunities to gain more power and should do so whenever it seems feasible (Mearsheimer, 2006). States should maximise power, and their ultimate goal should be hegemony, because that is the best way to guarantee survival. While defensive realists recognise that the international system creates strong incentives to gain additional increments of power, they maintain that it is strategically foolish to pursue hegemony. That would amount to overexpansion of the worst kind. States, by their account, should not maximise power, but should instead strive for what Waltz (1979: 40) calls an 'appropriate amount of power'. This restraint is largely the result of three factors (Mearsheimer, 2006: 75). Why is the question how much power important is this study? It is typically necessary since it helped reveal that pursuant of hegemony is the obstacle in the reform of the Council as opposed to other claims such as capabilities.

Defensive realists emphasise that if any state becomes too powerful, balancing will occur. Specifically, the other great powers will build up their militaries and form a balancing coalition that will leave the aspiring hegemon at least less secure, and may be even destroy it. This is what happened to Napoleonic France (1792–1815), Imperial Germany (1900–18), and Nazi Germany (1933–45) (Mearsheimer, 2006: 75) when they made a run at dominating Europe. It becomes apt here to suggest build-up of the excluded actors in order to make concrete inroad into the inclusion quest. In Europe, following the build-up, each aspiring hegemon was decisively defeated by an alliance that included all, or almost all, of the other great powers. Otto von Bismarck's genius, according to the defensive realists, was that he understood that too much power was bad for Germany, because it would cause its neighbours to balance against it. So, he wisely put the brakes on German expansion after winning stunning victories in the Austro-Prussian (1866) and Franco-Prussian (1870–1) Wars (Mearsheimer, 2006).

Some defensive realists argue that there is an offence–defence balance, which indicates how easy or difficult it is to conquer territory or defeat a defender in battle. In other words, it tells you whether or not offence pays. Defensive realists maintain that the offence–defence balance is usually heavily weighted in the defender's favour, and thus any state that attempts to gain large amounts of additional power is likely to end up fighting a series of losing wars. Accordingly, states will recognise the futility of offence and concentrate instead on maintaining their position in the balance of power. If they do go on the offensive, their aims will be limited. In the view of this study, Africa should embark on the offence-defence approach for the account that it has liberated the politically oppressed nations in Europe.

Defensive realists further argue that, even when conquest is feasible, it does not pay: the costs outweigh the benefits. Because of nationalism, it is especially difficult, sometimes impossible, for the conqueror to subdue the conquered. The ideology of nationalism, which is pervasive and potent, is all about self-determination, which virtually guarantees that occupied populations will rise up against the occupier. The relevance if the defensive realist to the study is the bearing indication that conquest should not be the order or relationship and interactions. This is a subtle message for the P5 especially now they are governing the Security Council. In sum, not only is conquest difficult but, even in those rare instances where great powers conquer another state, they get few benefits and lots of trouble (Mearsheimer, 2006).

According to defensive realism, these basic facts about life in the international system should be apparent to all states and should limit their appetite for more power; all the P5 nations especially the P3 should note the departing argument of the defensive realists. Otherwise, they run the risk of threatening their own survival. If all states recognise this logic – and they should if they are rational actors – security competition should not be particularly intense, and there should be few great power wars and certainly no central wars (conflicts involving all or almost all the great powers).

Offensive realists do not buy these arguments wholly. They understand that threatened states usually balance against dangerous foes, but they maintain that balancing is often

inefficient, especially when it comes to forming balancing coalitions, and that this inefficiency provides opportunities for a clever aggressor to take advantage of its adversaries. Furthermore, threatened states sometimes opt for buck-passing rather than joining a balancing coalition (Mearsheimer, 2006). In other words, they attempt to get other states to assume the burden of checking a powerful opponent while they remain on the sidelines. This kind of behaviour, which is commonplace among great powers, also creates opportunities for aggression. This aggression is evident in the account of P3 versus the P2 within the Council.

Offensive realists also take issue with the claim that the defender has a significant advantage over the attacker, and thus offence hardly ever pays. Indeed, the historical record shows that the side that initiates war wins more often than not. And while it may be difficult to gain hegemony, the USA did accomplish this feat in the Western Hemisphere during the nineteenth century. Also, Imperial Germany came close to achieving hegemony in Europe during the First World War. African nations should be better footed when they position themselves on the offence than defence.

Both defensive and offensive realists agree, however, that nuclear weapons have little utility for offensive purposes, except where only one side in a conflict has them. The reason is simple: if both sides have a survivable retaliatory capability, neither gains an advantage from striking first. Moreover, both camps agree that conventional war between nuclear-armed states is possible but not likely, because of the danger of escalation to the nuclear level. Finally, while offensive realists acknowledge that sometimes conquest does not pay, they also point out that sometimes it does. Conquerors can exploit a vanquished state's economy for gain, even in the information age. Indeed, Liberman (1996: 126) argues that information technologies have an 'Orwellian' dimension, which facilitates repression in important ways.

While nationalism surely has the potential to make occupation a nasty undertaking, occupied states are sometimes relatively easy to govern, as was the case in Franceunder the Nazis (1940–4). In the theoretical sense of the word, Africa is currently occupied by some members of the P5 nations in global politics. Moreover, a victorious state need not

occupy a defeated state to gain an advantage over it. The victor might annex a slice of the defeated state's territory, break it into two or more smaller states, or simply disarm it and prevent it from rearming. For all of these reasons, offensive realists expect great powers to be constantly looking for opportunities to gain advantage over each other, with the ultimate prize being hegemony (Mearsheimer, 2006: 77).The security competition in this world will tend to be intense and there are likely to be great power wars. Africa should be on the lookout to gain advantage towards inclusion in order to be relevant in the global security scheme.

Moreover, the grave danger of central war will arise whenever there is a potential hegemon on the scene. The past behaviour of the great powers has been more in accordance with the predictions of offensive rather than defensive realism. During the first half of the twentieth century, there were two world wars in which three great powers attempted and failed to gain regional hegemony: Imperial Germany, Imperial Japan, and Nazi Germany. The second half of that century was dominated by the Cold War, in which the US and the Soviet Union engaged in an intense security competition that came close to blows in the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) (Mearsheimer, 2006: 75). While the above accounts were not on the instance of the Security Council reform, Africa's agitation can bring about similar effects since it is among human population and actors.

Many defensive realists acknowledge that the great powers often behave in ways that contradict their theory. They maintain, however, that those states were not behaving rationally, and thus it is not surprising that Imperial Germany, Imperial Japan, and Nazi Germany were destroyed in those wars they foolishly started (Mearsheimer, 2006). States that maximise power, they argue, do not enhance their prospects for survival; they undermine it. This is certainly a legitimate line of argument but, once defensive realists acknowledge that states often act in strategically foolish ways, they need to explain when states act according to the dictates of their structural realist theory and when they do not.

Thus, Waltz famously argues that his theory of international politics needs to be supplemented by a separate theory of foreign policy that can explain misguided state behavior. However, that additional theory, which invariably emphasises domestic

political considerations, is not necessarily a structural realist theory. The theories of defensive realists such as Barry Posen, Jack Snyder, and Stephen Van Evera conform closely to this simple Waltzian template. Each argues that structural logic can explain a reasonable amount of state behaviour, but a substantial amount of it cannot be explained by structural realism. Therefore, an alternative theory is needed to explain those instances where great powers act in non-strategic ways. To that end, Posen (1984) relies on organisational theory, Snyder (1991) on domestic regime type, and Van Evera (1999) on militarism. Each is proposing a theory of foreign policy, to use Waltz's language.

In essence, defensive realists have to go beyond structural realism to explain how states act in the international system. They must combine domestic-level and system-level theories to explain how the world works. Offensive realists, on the other hand, tend to rely exclusively on structural arguments to explain international politics. They do not need a distinct theory of foreign policy, mainly because the world looks a lot like the offensive realists say it should. This means, however, that they must make the case that it made strategic sense for Germany to pursue hegemony in Europe between 1900 and 1945, and for Japan to do the same in Asia between 1931 and1945. Of course, offensive realists recognise that states occasionally act in strategically foolish ways, and that those cases contradict their theory. Defensive realists, as emphasised, have a fall-back position that is not available to offensive realists: they can explain cases of non-strategic behaviour with a separate theory of foreign policy (Mearsheimer, 2001). When one pairs Africa against the P5, the ingredients that make offensive and defensive realist as opposed are found, with Africa being required to adopt the offensive position.

3.2.5. What causes great power war: the structural realist perspectives

Structural realists recognise that states can go to war for any number of reasons, which makes it impossible to come up with a simple theory that points to a single factor as the main cause of war. There is no question that states sometimes start wars to gain power over a rival state and enhance their security. But security is not always the principle driving force behind a state's decision for war. Ideology or economic considerations are sometimes paramount. In the case of African inclusion, it is important to account that

both ideology and economic considerations are laced into security concerns for Africa. For example, nationalism was the main reason Bismarck launched war against Denmark (1864), Austria (1866), and France (1870–1) (Mearsheimer, 2006).

Wars motivated largely by non-security considerations are consistent with structural realism as long as the aggressor does not purposely act in ways that would harm its position in the balance of power. Actually, victory in war almost always improves a state's relative power position, regardless of the reason for initiating the conflict (Brown, Coté Jr, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, 2004) and Copeland, (2000). The German state that emerged after 1870 was much more powerful than the Prussian state Bismarck took control of in 1862. Although isolating a particular cause of all wars is not a fruitful enterprise, structural realists maintain that the likelihood of war is affected by the architecture of the international system. Some realists argue that the key variable is the number of great powers or poles in the system, while other focus on the distribution of power among the major states. Issue here is that major power status is not offered to interested candidates, states become by asserting oneself, and this is one thing Africa needs to do to validate itself within the Council.

3.3. The Traditional Realism

> Society in general is governed by objective laws that have their root in human nature (Morgenthau, 1958: 4). This is to say that the main signpost that helps political realism find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined or utilised as power. This in turn explains why the ultimate destination of traditional realists is *power*.

At the outset, it seems prudent to settle upon and contextualise a working definition of realism. The traditional realist theory of international relations is centuries old, but experienced a rebirth fathered by Hans Morgenthau during the interwar period. The definition of traditional realism has been contested, and it has spawned variations of realist theory as well as many alternative theories about the human nature and of international law. The latter include the New Haven School, rationalist-institutionalism, liberalism, constructivism and critical legal studies, as well as theories of international

law's legitimacy. While diverse, what these responses to traditional realism have in common is that they regard international law as consequential to varying degrees. International law may inter alia explain the process that leads to the human desire for power to rule and the outcomes it creates (Dunne and Schmidt, 2004)

The traditional realist lineage begins with Thucydides' representation of power politics as a law of human behavior and nature (Morgenthau, 1948). The drive for power and the will to dominate are held to be fundamental aspects of human nature (Dunne and Schmidt, 2004). The behaviour of the state as a self-seeking egoist is understood to be merely a reflection of the characteristics of the people that comprise the state. It is human nature that explains why international politics is necessarily power politics. This reduction of traditional realism to a condition of human nature is one that frequently reappears in the leading works of the realist canon, most famously in the work of the high priest of post war realism, Hans J. Morgenthau. Traditional realists argue that it is from the nature of man that the essential features of international politics, such as competition, fear, and war, can be explained. This in part provides the basis for the study's utility of realism and traditional realism in particular. This is because it touched cord with the reality of the Security Council existence. Morgenthau notes, 'politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature' (Morgenthau [1948] 1955: 4). The important point for Morgenthau is, first, to recognise that these laws exist and, second, to devise the most appropriate policies that are consistent with the basic fact that human beings are flawed creatures. For both Thucydides and Morgenthau, the essential continuity of the power seeking behaviour of states is rooted in the biological drives of human beings.

Another distinguishing characteristic of traditional realism is its adherents' belief in the primordial character of power and ethics. Even though moralists are not security experts, they would argue that the current configuration of the Security Council suffocates the principles of the morality of human conduct. Traditional realism is fundamentally about the struggle for belonging, a struggle that is often violent (Dunne and Schmidt, 2004). In this account, Africa is simply struggling to belong to the inner chamber where the decision-making that guides global security is announced. The duo asserts that patriotic

virtue is required in order for communities to survive in the notable battle between good and evil, a virtue that long predates the emergence of sovereignty-based notions of community in the mid-seventeenth century. Traditional realists therefore engage with moral philosophy and sought to reconstruct an understanding of virtue in light of practice and historical circumstance. Two traditional realists who wrestled with the degree to which state leaders could be guided by ethical considerations were Thucydides and Machiavelli (Carr, 2001).

Thucydides was the historian of the Peloponnesian War, a conflict between two great powers in the ancient Greek world, Athens and Sparta. Thucydides' work has been admired by subsequent generations of realists for the insights he raised about many of the perennial issues of international politics. Thucydides' explanation of the underlying cause of the war was 'the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta' (Dunne and Schmidt, 2004). This is considered to be a classic example of the impact that the anarchical structure of international politics has on the behaviour of state actors. On this reading, Thucydides makes it clear that Sparta's national interest, like that of all states, was survival, and the changing distribution of power represented a direct threat to its existence. Sparta was, therefore, compelled by necessity to go to war in order to forestall being vanquished by Athens. Thucydides also makes it clear that Athens felt equally compelled to pursue power in order to preserve the empire it had acquired. The famous Athenian leader, Pericles, claimed to be acting on the basis of the most fundamental of human motivations: ambition, fear, and self-interest (Dunne and Schmidt, 2004).

Bearing the above in mind, traditional realists—notably Machiavelli and Morgenthau— would concur with Thucydides' suggestion that the logic of power politics has universal applicability. Instead of Athens and Melos, we could just as easily substitute the vulnerability of Gaddafi's beloved Libya to the expansionist policies of external great powers. In Morgenthau's era, there were many examples where the innate drive for more power and territory seemed to confirm the realist iron law: for example, Nazi Germany and Czechoslovakia in 1939, and the Soviet Union and Hungary in 1956 (Dunne and Schmidt, 2004). The seemingly endless cycle of war and conflict confirmed in the minds

of twentieth-century traditional realists the essentially aggressive impulses in human nature. How is a leader supposed to act in a world animated by such hegemonic antagonism? The answer given by Machiavelli is that all obligations and treaties with other states must be disregarded if the security of the community is under threat (Zakaria, 1998). Moreover, imperial expansion is legitimate as it is a means of gaining greater security.

Other traditional realists, however, advocate a more temperate understanding of moral conduct. Mid-twentieth-century realists such as Butterfield, Carr, Morgenthau, and Wolfers believed that anarchy could be mitigated by wise leadership and the pursuit of the national interest in ways that are compatible with international order (Carr, 2001). Taking their lead from Thucydides, they recognised that acting purely on the basis of power and self-interest without any consideration of moral and ethical principles frequently results in self-defeating policies. After all, as Thucydides showed, Athens suffered an epic defeat while following the realist tenet of self-interest (Dunne and Schmidt, 2004).

Not surprisingly, this theory gained significant traction during the Cold War. Hans Morgenthau attacked the classical view of international law as idealist and utopian. Elihu Root and others envisioned international law as possessing the potential to be apolitical, neutral and predicated on the discovery of common interests between states, which trump the interests of any one state to have a harmonising, codifying function analogous to municipal law. By working together to codify the rules and obligations of international law, states would elect to observe these rather than risk becoming outcasts in the international community (Rose, 1998). Morgenthau countered this view by pointing out that reality bore no relation to it and that, in fact, international law owes its existence to identical or complementary interests of states, backed by powers as a last resort, or, where such identical interests do not exist, to a mere balance of power which prevents a state from breaking these rules of international law (Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro (2009). The reason for characterising international law as irrelevant or merely rhetorical was the belief that it is a means for states to pursue and preserve power and that, since much of international law is not respected and no sanctions result from its breach, it is not

really law at all (Grover, 2011). The United Nations Charter that guides the conduct of member nations seems to have been flagrantly removed from the operations of the Security Council, especially the article of equality of all nations.

3.4.   The essential elements of structural and traditional Realism

The previous paragraphs have reasoned that realism is a theoretically broad church, embracing a variety of authors and texts. Despite the numerous denominations, it is evident that all realists subscribe to the following 'three Ss': statism, survival, self-help. Each of these elements is considered in more detail in the subsections below.

3.4.1. Statism

> Statism is the centre piece of realism. This involves two claims. First, for the theorist, the state is the preeminent actor and all other actors in world politics are of lesser significance. Second, state 'sovereignty' signifies the existence of an independent political community, one that has juridical authority over its territory (Dunne and Schmidt, 2004).

For realists, the state is the main actor and sovereignty is its distinguishing trait. The meaning of the sovereign state is inextricably bound up with the use of force. The African members of the UN are sovereign and independent states but the barely use any force in the UN Security Council's gallery, states such as the US does. In terms of its internal dimension, to illustrate this relationship between violence and the state we need look no further than Max Weber's famous definition of the state as 'the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory' (Smith, 1986: 23). Within this territorial space, sovereignty means that the state has supreme authority to make and enforce laws (Williams, 2003). This is the basis of the un-written contract between individuals and the state. According to Hobbes, for example, we trade our liberty in return for a guarantee of security. Once security has been established, civil society can begin. But in the absence of security, there can be no art, no culture, and no society. The first move for the realist, then, is to organise power domestically. Only after power has been organised can community begin.

Realist international theory appears to operate according to the assumption that, domestically, the problem of order and security is solved. However, on the 'outside', in the relations among independent sovereign states, insecurities, dangers, and threats to the very existence of the state loom large. Realists largely explain this on the basis that the very condition for order and security—namely, the existence of a sovereign—is missing from the international realm (Walt, 2002).

Realists claim that, in anarchy, states compete with other states for power and security Dickinson, (1916).The nature of the competition is viewed in zero sum terms; in other words, more for one actor means less for another. This competitive logic of power politics makes agreement on universal principles difficult, apart from the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other sovereign states. But even this principle, designed to facilitate coexistence, is suspended by realists, who argue that in practice non-intervention does not apply in relations between great powers and their 'near abroad'. As evidenced by the most recent behaviour of the USA in Afghanistan and Iraq, powerful states are able to overturn the non-intervention principle on the grounds of national security and international order (Walt, 2002).

Given that the first move of the state is to organise power domestically, and the second is to accumulate power internationally, it is self-evidently important to consider in more depth what realists mean by their ubiquitous fusion of politics with power. It is one thing to say that international politics is a struggle for power, but this merely begs the question of what realists mean by power. Morgenthau offers the following definition of power: 'man's control over the minds and actions of other men' ([1948] 1955: 26). There are two important points that realists make about the elusive concept of power. First, power is a relational concept: one does not exercise power in a vacuum, but in relation to another entity. Second, power is a relative concept: calculations need to be made not only about one's own power capabilities, but about the power that other state actors possess (Dunne and Schmidt, 2004) and (Guzzini, 1998). Yet the task of accurately assessing the power of states is infinitely complex, and is often reduced to counting the number of troops, tanks, aircraft, and naval ships a country possesses in the belief that this translates into the ability to get other actors to do something they would not otherwise do.

Structural realists have attempted to bring more conceptual clarity to bear on the meaning of power. Waltz (1979: 131) tries to overcome the contestations by shifting the focus from power to capabilities. He suggests that capabilities can be ranked according to their strength in the following areas: "size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence." The difficulty here is that resource strength does not always lead to military victory. For example, in the 1967 Six Day War between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, the distribution of resources clearly favoured the Arab coalition and yet the supposedly weaker side annihilated its enemies' forces and seized their territory. The definition of power as capabilities is even less successful at explaining the relative economic success of Japan over China pre 1945 (Mearsheimer, 2006: 75). A more sophisticated understanding of power would focus on the ability of a state to control or influence its environment in situations that are not necessarily conflictual.

A weakness of the realist treatment of power concerns its exclusive focus upon state power. For realists, states are the only actors that really 'count'. Transnational corporations, international organizations, and ideologically driven terrorist networks, such as Al Qaeda, rise and fall but the state is the one permanent feature in the landscape of modern global politics. Yet many today question the adequacy of the state-centric assumption of realism.

3.4.2. Survival

> The primary objective of all states is survival; this is the supreme national interest to which all political leaders must adhere (Waltz, 1979)

The important principle that unites realists is the assertion that, in international politics, the pre-eminent goal is survival. Although there is ambiguity in the works of the realists as to whether the accumulation of power is an end in itself, one would think that there is no dissenting from the argument that the ultimate concern of states is security (Mearsheimer, 2006). Survival is held to be a precondition for attaining all other goals, whether these involve conquest or merely independence. According to Waltz (1979: 91), "beyond the survival motive, the aims of states may be endlessly varied." Yet, as we

mentioned earlier, a recent controversy among structural realists has arisen over the question of whether states are in fact principally security or power maximisers. Defensive realists such as Waltz argue that states have security as their principal interest and therefore seek only the requisite amount of power to ensure their own survival. According to this view, states are profoundly defensive actors and will not seek to gain greater amounts of power if that means jeopardising their own security. Offensive realists such as Mearsheimer argue that the ultimate goal of all states is to achieve a hegemonic position in the international system. States, according to this view, always desire more power and are willing, if the opportunity arises, to alter the existing distribution of power even if such an action may jeopardise their own security. In terms of survival, defensive realists hold that the existence of status quo powers lessens the competition for power, while offensive realists argue that the competition is always keen because revisionist states and aspiring hegemons are always willing to take risks with the aim of improving their position in the international system (Mearsheimer, 2010).

Niccolò Machiavelli tried to make a 'science' out of his reflections on the art of survival. His short and engaging book, *The Prince*, was written with the explicit intention of codifying a set of maxims that would enable leaders to maintain their hold on power (Mearsheimer, 2006). In important respects, we find two related Machiavellian themes recurring in the writings of modern realists, both of which derive from the idea that the realm of international politics requires different moral and political rules from those that apply in domestic politics. The task of understanding the real nature of international politics, and the need to protect the state at all costs (even if this may mean the sacrifice of one's own citizens), places a heavy burden on the shoulders of state leaders. In the words of Henry Kissinger (1977: 204) cited in Dunne and Schmidt (2004), "a nation's survival is its first and ultimate responsibility; it cannot be compromised or put to risk." Their guide must be an ethic of responsibility: the careful weighing up of consequences; the realisation that individual acts of an immoral kind might have to be performed for the greater good. By way of an example, think of the ways in which governments frequently suspend the legal and political rights of 'suspected terrorists' in view of the threat they pose to national security. The principal difficulty with the realist formulation of an 'ethics of responsibility' is that, while instructing leaders to consider the consequences of their

actions, it does not provide a guide as to how state leaders should weigh the consequences (Smith 1986: 51).

Not only does realism provide an alternative moral code for state leaders; it suggests a wider objection to the whole enterprise of bringing ethics into international politics. Starting from the assumption that each state has its own particular values and beliefs, realists argue that the state is the supreme good and there can be no community beyond borders. This moral relativism has generated a substantial body of criticism, particularly from liberal theorists who endorse the notion of universal human rights.

3.4.3. Self help

> No other state or institution can be relied upon to guarantee your survival. Self-help is not an inevitable consequence of the absence of a world government it is a logic that states have selected (Dunne and Schmidt, 2004).

Waltz's Theory of International Politics (1979) brought to the realist tradition some deeper understandings of the international system within which states coexist. Unlike many other realists, Waltz argued that international politics was not unique because of the regularity of war and conflict, since this was also familiar in domestic politics. The key difference between domestic and international orders lies in their structure. In the domestic polity, citizens do not have to defend themselves. In the international system, there is no higher authority to prevent and counter the use of force. Security can therefore only be realized through self-help. In an anarchic structure, 'self-help is necessarily the principle of action' (Waltz 1979: 111). But in the course of providing for one's own security, the state in question will automatically be fuelling the insecurity of other states.

The term given to this spiral of insecurity is the security dilemma. According to Wheeler and Booth(2007), security dilemmas exist 'when the military preparations of one state create an unresolvable uncertainty in the mind of another as to whether those preparations are for "defensive'' purposes only (to enhance its security in an uncertain world) or whether they are for offensive purposes (to change the status quo to its advantage)." This scenario suggests that one state's quest for security is often another state's source of

insecurity. States find it very difficult to trust one another and often view the intentions of others in a negative light. Thus the military preparations of one state are likely to be matched by those of neighbouring states (Mearsheimer, 2006: 82). The irony is that, at the end of the day, states often feel no more secure than before they undertook measures to enhance their own security.

In a self-help system, structural realists argue that the balance of power will emerge even in the absence of a conscious policy to maintain the balance (that is prudent statecraft). Waltz cited in Mearsheimer (2006) argues that balances of power result irrespective of the intentions of any particular state (Mearsheimer, 2006: 75). In an anarchic system populated by states that seek to perpetuate themselves, alliances will be formed that seek to check and balance the power against threatening states. Traditional realists, however, are more likely to emphasise the crucial role that state leaders and diplomats play in maintaining the balance of power. In other words, the balance of power is not natural or inevitable; it must be constructed.

There is a lively debate among realists concerning the stability of the balance of power system. This is especially the case today, in that many argue that the balance of power has been replaced by unipolarity, while others insist that multipolarity and interpolarity have become the order of the day. For unipolarity advocates, it is questionable whether other countries will actively attempt to balance against the USA, as structural realism would predict. But the multipolar crusaders are adamant that Russia and China have already counter balanced the US. Whether it is the contrived balance of the Concert of Europe in the early nineteenth century, or the more fortuitous balance of the cold war, balances of power are broken—either through war or through peaceful change—and new balances emerge (Dunne and Schmidt, 2004). What the perennial collapsing of the balance of power demonstrates is that states are at best able to mitigate the worst consequences of the security dilemma but are not able to escape it. The reason for this terminal condition is the absence of trust in international relations (Mearsheimer, 2006).

3.5.   The bearing of realists theory: combined discourse

> The unifying theme around which all realists thinking converges is that states find themselves in the shadow of anarchy such that their security cannot be taken for granted (Dunne and Schmidt, 2004)

Realism is uniquely important to this study of the UN and Africa's reform calculation since it is the dominant theory of International Relations. Why? Because it provides the most powerful explanation for the state of power, security, and war that is the regular condition of life in the international system. Despite important differences, such as emplaced emphasis on either states' power as the end in itself or survival as the end in itself, particularly between classical and structural realism respectively, it is possible to identify a shared core set of assumptions and ideas like 'self-help, statism, and survival.' Essentially, realism is relevant and pertinently apt for explaining or understanding the dynamics of globalisation of world politics on the Security Council reform, for example the structural realist accentuates *survival* and traditional reveres *power* in trade for global political merchandise.

The realists theory (structural and traditional), approach in this study is significant in a number of respects. For example, they appreciates the role of power, underscore the degree to which human beings were rational, and have different set of interests that motivate for guided actions such as exclusion, anti-reform, and war. Indeed, realism offers something of a 'manual' for maximising the interests of the state in a hostile environment which explains in part why it remains the dominant tradition in the study of world politics, which the reform game in the Security Council depicts.

The insights, realists such as Thucydides (c. 460–406 BC), Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), and Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–78) (Dunne and Schmidt, 2004) offered into the way in which state leaders should conduct themselves in the realm of international politics which are often grouped under the doctrine of Friedrich Meinecke's *raison d'état*, or **reason of state** provides a set of maxims to leaders (whether

the P5 nations or the African Group) on how to conduct their foreign affairs so as to ensure the security of their relevant states (Mearsheimer, 2006).

Realist theory (traditional), as discussed, underpins the notion of human nature and moral standards that play and affect the conditions of international politics. This often make it necessary for state leaders whether pro or anti reformers of the Security Council to act in a manner (for example, cheating, lying) that would be entirely unacceptable for the individual. It is important to add that proponents of *raison d'état* argue that the state itself represents a moral force, for it is the existence of the state that creates the possibility for an ethical political community to exist domestically.

While in principle, there exist variations of the realist paradigm, it is fair to say that there is a significant degree of continuity between traditional realism and structural realism with structural realism's attendant modern variants. Indeed, the three core elements that we identify with realism— statism, survival, and self-help—are present in the work of a Traditional realist such as Thucydides, and Morgenthau and structural realists such as Kenneth Waltz. This is why, when Thucydides and Machiavelli were writing, the basic unit was the polis or city state, but since the Peace of Westphalia (1648) realists consider the sovereign state as the principal actor in international politics (Mearsheimer, 2006). The legitimacy of the state is what enables it to exercise authority within its domestic borders. It is also the instrument responsible for exercise of authority outside its border as witnessed in the UN. Yet outside the boundaries of the state, realists argue that a condition of anarchy exists. This configuration is clearly pointed out by the structural realist in the analysis of the United Nations Security Council.

A prominent explanation that realists provide for the difference in behaviour in global politics (for instance within the Security Council) relates to the different organisational structure of domestic and international politics. Realists fittingly noted that the basic structure of international politics is one of anarchy in that each of the independent sovereign states considers itself to be its own highest authority as oppose to domestic politics that is ordered in hierarchical structure. The ordering principles, whether in international or national politics is partly explained in light of the power differentials of

states. Intuitively, structural realist apprises that states with more power stand a better chance of surviving than states with less power. Power is therefore, crucial to the realist lexicon. Yet, irrespective of how much power a state may possess, structural realists are insistent that the core national interest of all states must be survival. Like the pursuit of power for traditional realist, the promotion of the national interest is, according to two realists, an iron law of necessity (Dunne and Schmidt, 2004).

Consistent with the principle of self-help, realism reveals that if a state feels threatened, it should seek to augment its own power capabilities by engaging, for example, in a military munitions build up. Nevertheless, this may prove to be insufficient for a number of smaller states (supposedly African nations) who feel threatened by a much larger state. This brings us to one of the crucial mechanisms that realists throughout the ages have considered to be essential to preserving the liberty of states—the balance of power. Although various meanings have been attributed to the concept of the balance of power, the most common definition holds that if the survival of a state or a number of weaker states is threatened by a hegemonic state or coalition of stronger states, they should join forces, establish a formal alliance, and seek to preserve their own independence by checking the power of the opposing side, hence the call for the United Nations Security Council reform.

3.6. Behaviourism (the Scientific School)

3.6.1 What assumptions do behaviourists make?

Formally founded by John B. Watson in 1913, behaviourism is about the observation and recording of people's behaviour (Danley, *et al*, 2012). Behaviourists such as Ivan Pavlov (founder of classical conditioning) claim that unconditioned stimulus causes unconditioned response. B.F. Skinner who is credited with the notion of radical behaviourism (Operant Response) also argues that all action is determined and that human behaviour controls the rate at which specific consequences occur. This study found the activities within the Security Council as equally that of control by the P5 and consequences for the African nations of the UN. According to Danley *et al* (2012),

Behaviourists regard all behaviour as a **response** to a **stimulus**. They assume that what humans do is determined by the **environment** they are in, which provides stimuli to which they respond, and the environments they have been in, in the past, which caused them to learn to respond to stimuli in particular ways. The opponents of African inclusion have regularly argued that Africa is poor which makes difficult for it to serve in the Council. This account as espoused by some P5 nations as noted in Chapter Two has underpinnings that seek to keep Africa thinking that it is poor and possess less of its abilities.

Behaviourists are unique in believing that it is unnecessary to speculate about internal mental processes when explaining behaviour: it is enough to know which stimuli elicit which responses. These behaviourists named above also believe that people are born with only a handful of innate reflexes (stimulus-response units that do not need to be learned) and that all of a person's complex behaviours are the result of learning through interaction with the environment. They also assume that the processes of learning are common to all species and so humans learn in the same way as other animals.

3.6.2. How do behaviourists explain human behaviour?

Behaviourists explain behaviour in terms of (1) the stimuli that elicit it and (2) the events that caused the person to learn to respond to the stimulus that way. Behaviourists use two processes to explain how people learn: classical conditioning and operant conditioning. In classical conditioning, people learn to associate two stimuli when they occur together, such that the response originally elicited by one stimulus is transferred to another. The person learns to produce an existing response to a new stimulus. For example, Watson & Rayner (1920) conditioned a young boy ('Little Albert') to respond with anxiety to the stimulus of a white rat. Africa is anxious and shows anxiety. They achieved this by pairing the rat with a loud noise that already made Albert anxious. The anxiety response was transferred to the rat because it was presented together with the noise. The response also generalized to other stimuli that resembled the rat, including a rabbit and a fur coat. Over time, conditioned responses like this gradually diminish in a process called extinction.

In operant conditioning, people learn to perform new behaviours through the consequences of the things they do. If a behaviour they produce is followed by reinforcement then the likelihood of that behaviour being repeated increases in future (the behaviour is strengthened). A consequence can be reinforcing in two ways: either the person gets something good (positive reinforcement) or they avoid something bad (negative reinforcement). Conversely, if behaviour is followed by a punishment then the likelihood of that behaviour being repeated in future decreases (the behaviouris weakened). Whereas classical conditioning only allows the person to produce existing responses to new stimuli, operant conditioning allows them to learn new responses.

3.6.3.   Evaluation of the behaviourist approach

The main strengths of the behaviourist approach come from the methods it uses. The insistence on objectivity, control over variables and precise measurement means that the studies carried out by behaviourists tend to be very reliable, and the behaviourists can be credited with introducing the scientific method into psychology. The drawback of these methods, however, is that behaviour may be studied under very artificial conditions than do not reflect real-world contexts very well (although this criticism clearly does not apply to all behaviourist studies). The widespread use of animals is a source of criticism. Whilst conditioning can be observed in most species, there are genetic influences on what different species can and cannot learn which reflect their different evolutionary histories (e.g. rats can be conditioned to respond to tastes but not smells). This means that generalizations between species must be made with more caution than many behaviourists apply.

A more fundamental criticism of behaviourism is that it ignores the influences of mental processes on learning. In behaviourist theory people can only learn as a result of their own experiences. However, experience and many studies (e.g. by social learning theorists like Bandura) show that people are quite capable of observing and learning from the behaviour and experiences of others. Furthermore, studies of a wide range of human behaviours (principally language learning and use) have shown that classical and operant conditioning cannot adequately explain how people are able to solve problems without

the lengthy period of trial and error that behaviourism would say is necessary. These findings imply that mental processes must play a part in explaining much human behaviour.

Nonetheless, behaviourism has supplied practical solutions to many human problems. Operant conditioning has proven an effective way of modifying behaviour amongst people who may be difficult to teach in other ways (e.g. autistic children) and many people with problems like phobia have benefitted significantly from behaviour therapies including systematic desensitization.

3.6.4. The behaviourist approach and key debates

The behaviorist approach is **deterministic**: people's behaviour is assumed to be entirely controlled by their environment and their prior learning, so they do not play any part in choosing their own actions. The approach takes the nurture side of the nature-nurture debate, believing that apart from a few innate reflexes and the capacity for learning, all complex behaviour is learned from the environment. Their insistence that all learning can be accounted for in terms of law-governed processes like classical and operant conditioning, reflects a **nomological** approach to studying human behaviour (although behaviourists never ignore individual differences, since every person's history of learning is unique). The behaviourists' view that all behaviour, no matter how complex, can be broken down into the fundamental processes of conditioning makes it a highly **reductionist** approach to psychology.

According to Skinner (1977) Behaviourim is a theory of psychology of human relations. He holds that the principal pillar upon which behaviourism is anchored is manipulation. Through manipulation, one controls the behaviour of the other, either by offering rewards or by meting out punishment. Skinner (1977) asserts that human behaviour is determined by human endowment which lends itself to what happens to us, and those we happen. In his view, we have control over ourselves and the good and evil things we do. We have control over evil activities (including, usurping of state resources, political exclusion and economic marginalisation, resource wars and (un)healthy interventions). This is possible

by manipulating ourselves the same way we manipulate others. As human animals we are being shaped by the things that happen to us and in our environment through reinforcement.

3.6.5. Relating theory to the Security Council reform

Both classical and operant conditionings have specific implications to what happens in the UNSC chamber. According to the Elinor Ostrom (1998), a behavioural commitment to theory grounded in empirical inquiry is essential if we are to understand such basic questions as why face-to-face communication so consistently enhances cooperation in social dilemmas or how structural variables facilitate or impede effective collective action (Ostrom, 1998: 1). The behaviourist authors advocated the use of observable facts and precise calculations to provide empirical explanations of political behaviour that determines why people — the P5 and African Group — behave politically (uses power, creates international government) which in turn cultivates the political system. Also, in social dilemmas with many structural variables, as well as in theories that predict either, zero or 100% cooperation in one-shot or finitely repeated dilemmas, structural variables do not upset levels of cooperation and may not dilute the strength of the Security Council.

A coherent explanation of the relationship among structural variables (such as the representative character of the Council) and the likelihood of individuals solving social dilemmas (such as deprivation and marginalisation) depend on developing a behavioral theory of rational choice (Ostrom, 1998: 1). Behavioural theory, while it allows scholars who stress structural explanations of human behavior and those who stress individual choice to find common ground, rather than continue the futile debate over whether structural variables or individual attributes are the most important, this theory is pertinent to the structural issues within the Council organ and the P5 and African group actors. According to Isaiah Berlin (1960) who appraises political theories, underscores that those theorists who are called fanatical because their faith in a given pattern is not overcome by their sense of reality implies that behaviourism is central to identifying the scientific character and instrument that are capable of generating analyses of events with rigorous generalisations rooted deeply, in empirical evidence (Berlin, 1960). While this may be

part of the efforts to curtail the porosity within the Idealist School, the behaviourists emerged with emplaced emphasis on *human conduct* to determine the 'why' of certain human political behaviour (Riker, 1995). Deductively, the P5's resistance to the United Nations Security Council reform is a calculated and intentional act, and the African Group's call for inclusion is equally intentional. Even though, a growing number of scholars of international relations, security and strategy observe that idealism as a tool for unpacking international actors conduct in global politics is limited in interpreting the realpolitik (power politics) which, for example, makes the powerful nations exclude the weaker states in global affairs, it is always on some specific-felt human needs for power control. Actually, this is part of the cases with the current configuration of the Council. Behaviourists, settle that both pro and anti-reform crusaders are aware of their actions and inactions.

Relating the United Nations Security Council reform account to behaviourism, mindful of the exclusive character and configuration of the organ, it can be outlined that Britain, China, France, Russia, and especially, the United States, rejection of reform proposals and for example, the US's attendant suggestion of the Four Policemen are acts that lend credence to Africa's claim that the US likewise other permanent members in this instance, do not want Africa's development and progress but dependency. In the case of the United Nations Security Council reform, and the P5 resistance, the behaviourist would hold that African States insistence, following its 70% number of conflict cases, annually, is observable and is a sufficient reason to insist on reform actions in order to become part of the solution to its 70% conflict records (Eulau, 1963: 24). The behaviourist perspective is pertinent in unpacking the ideology that guides even the reform debates from all parties. This is true since it actually assists us in measuring and interpreting the politics of human conducts within the Council.

3.7. Society of State Approach

Although, advocates of the society of states approach acknowledge the existence of international anarchy, they maintain that various kinds of bonds — such as the UN Charter, the Rome Statute — and institutions (the United Nations, the African Union, the European Union) bind many individual states (Mitchell, 1991; Doty, 1993; Gill, 1996). These states regulate their relations through array of practices such as diplomacy and trade. The entire system (such as the United Nations) is sustained through a balance of power mechanism whose operation is aimed not at preventing war but rather to safeguard state sovereignty and independence (Deudney, 1995; Gordenker and Weiss1996; Golberg and Don2001). Proponents of the approach insist that members of the society of state understand that they may use force only for a specific purpose such as self-defence or to uphold the basic principles and characteristics of international state system (the United Nations) as well as its norms and laws which in turn, is sustained by virtue, "a mixture of self-restraint and norms of compromise, and by a skilled knowledge of procedures and mechanisms, both of which were objects of extensive educational effort" (United Nations,1983; Deudney, 1995: 214). In this approach, there exist operating rules aimed at establishing the proper conduct which shall govern the state behaviour. As such, states that refuse, substantially, to accept the guiding rules of the game are denied membership in the club. For example, China, Iraq, South Africa, have been ostracised and isolated — more or less — as punishment for bad behaviour and poor conduct (Holsti, 1995: 7; Hay and David, 2000). In essence, the society of states model — much like realism — regards state as the focal point of international politics. The principal problems faced by states revolve around the quest for security, order, and peace. This approach is critical to understanding the reform agitation within the Council, since the Charter is mindful of security of nations and Africa is in search for one.

The importance of security and respect to law validates the relevance of this approach as it pertains to both the African Group seeking inclusion on the permanent seat with a view to attain independence from the dictates of the P5 in managing global conflicts. And also, the P5's reference to the amendment of the Charter as a starting point for reform, tallies with, and confirms the School's observation of the various kinds of bonds especially the

Charter, the Rome Statute in terms of the Council reform. The relevance of this approach to this study is that, it provides grounds for the African states to agitate for inclusion and can equally argue that the entire African states is ostracised from the Security Council permanent seat — the unit where the global decision on security and peace are determined and most importantly without any offence.

3.7.1. Strengths of Society of State Approach

The society of state is specifically important to this study since it recognises roles of states in building international community. It equally pays respect to the instruments of law that should preserve the order upon which the community of nations must operate. Even though the African exclusion does not necessarily contravene the Charter, the Approach provides reasons to reform as reform according to Article 108 is part of the guiding rules and regulations of the Organisation. As such failing to reform or resisting such effort, in view of the Society of State violates the procedure since reform ultimately requires the blessings of the P5 as outlined in Article 23 of the Charter. In this way, the notion of society of state becomes relevant since it characteristically, questions African exclusion, viewing it as ostracise without any offence or provocation. And most importantly, it encourages the P5 to show respect to the Charter (bond) upon which the unity and assembly of the UN member states is built. This call is founded on the account that without the P5's consent, no change can occur. The society of State becomes important approach here, as it provides basis and ground upon which the P5 can reform, by accentuating the importance of the bond in a community of nations.

3.7.2. Weakness of the Society of States Approach

This approach, while it pointed to the constitution as essential element in maintaining order and peace in international organisation. It did not particularly address how powerful violators of its stipulations should be treated by the weaker states. The imposition of sanctions and ostracise is possible when US is against Burundi and not the other way round. This in part, exposes the faulty formulations of the article of the Charter which makes the P5 judges in their own case which in turn makes difficult to determine how the

P5 can be treated as their refusal to reform cripples every other attempt on reform. So, in order words, it provides for the perpetuation of stronger nations to determine the terms of relationship and interactions when dealing with weaker nations. This specifically shows that the inability to reform is a matter of stronger nation against weaker nations and as a result, does not necessarily speak to African inclusion but explained that expansion of the Council did not happen principally because it is a community of the strong against the weak.

3.8.   Dependency Theory Approach

Dependency theory is the notion that resources flow from a 'periphery' of poor and underdeveloped states to a 'core' of wealthy states, enriching the latter at the expense of the former. It is a central contention of dependency theory that poor states are impoverished and rich ones enriched by the way poor states are integrated into the world system. The theory arose as a reaction to modernisation theory — an earlier theory of development which held that all societies progress through similar stages of development, that today's underdeveloped areas are thus in a similar situation to that of today's developed areas at some time in the past, and that therefore the task in helping the underdeveloped areas out of poverty is to accelerate them along this supposed common path of development, by various means such as investment, technology transfers, and closer integration into the world market (Hay and Daniel, 1998; Held and Anthony, 1998; Hopgood, 2000; Alvin, 2011). Dependency theory rejected this view, arguing that underdeveloped countries are not merely primitive versions of developed countries, but has unique features and structures of their own; and, importantly, is in the situation of being the weaker members in a world market economy and that of global politics.

In principle, the idea of interdependence implies symbiosis between the mutually supporting parts of the whole (Keohane, 1988; Lipschutz, 1992; Keohane, 1995; Hopf, 1998; Keohane, 1998; Johnston, 2001). In order words, it suggests the existence of equality and symmetry in the relationships between units or actors (Mastanduno, 1989; Martin, and Beth1998; Malone, 2000). However, in many countries of the Global South (developing countries), there are no records of reciprocal dependence between developing countries and industrialised countries (Schweller, 2004). Instead of

interdependence, some actors from the Global South offer an alternative explanation to the underdevelopment of unindustrialised countries. Beginning in the 1960s, the *dependency theory,* which argued that despite the 'modern' attributes, the fundamental character of dependency outlook is hierarchical and unequal in which one develops at the expense of other. Snyder (1980) specifically recalled that "all states cannot develop simultaneously by definition, since the system [such as the United Nations Security Council] functions by virtue of having unequal core and peripheral regions" (Snyder, 1980: 753). It goes without saying that the European conquest of the Africa, Americas, and Asia was not done for the benefit of the local populations (Matunhu, 2011). In other words, why else were the commercial agents and slavers so important to the European imperial system? To be sure, they argue, the conquests were done for commercial profit through robbery, slavery, and monopolies (Snyder, 1980).

Surely, the conquest depends fundamentally on a highly unequal distribution of the benefits of power. The UN Security Council reproduces existing classes within the organ and presumes the continuing exploitation and marginalisation of the participants (Africa and Latin America) at the periphery. Various authors of dependency theory such as Snyder (1980) and Matunhu (2011) see a stratified international system in which some countries — the core (P5 members) — achieve autonomous self-sustaining growth while others — the periphery (African and Latin America Groups) — are so dependent on the growth of the core. These authors opine that security and development only reflects the state of economic activities at the core. From Snyder's point of view, the Council actually comprises core states and semi peripheral and peripheral areas, each of which fulfils a different role in the system (Snyder, 1980: 752). In essence, development, growth and security in periphery countries lack its own dynamic. Dependency Theorists such as Celso Furtado, Andre Gunder Frank, T. Dos Santos, F.H. Cardoso and Szentes cited in Heraldo Muñoz (1978) present a multi-pronged argument in this regard. They contend that the developing countries were incorporated deliberately into the capitalist-led UN system by the West under an imposed structure that only serves to facilitate the exploitation of those peripheral countries. This provides for the account that colonial administrative system was purposeful in shaping the important features of the colonial

states such as: the direction of economic development, their cultural development including language; national boundaries to better shape the framework of national economy; and their social and political institutions (Snyder, 1980). The theorists also claim that economic activities (trade relations) were thus, effectively skewed to reflect the demand and supply imperatives of the metropolitan countries. The system has been so effective that in the post-colonial era, international trade has been sufficient in maintaining the old order.

Also, the core-imposed structural constraints and prevent autonomous or self-sustaining economic growth patterns within the periphery. Beyond that, the capitalist international division of labour (which keeps the peripheral states at bay) and the changes within it distorted all of social, political and economic structure in the periphery in a way that concentrates power in the hands of small minority whose outward orientation serves to further entrench the countries in a dependent quagmire (Snyder, 1980). In political sense, this is also the real issue with the Security Council structure. Dependency outlook was deliberately facilitated by the P5 through exclusivist veto power which impresses the P5's overwhelming dominance and virulence to suppress or stifle African Group seeking to engage in global security activities. In the place, of such hostile marginalisation of Africa and Latin America, the P5 oversaw the establishment of permanent seat and veto power as appendages of Global North interest. A characteristic feature of the Council's arrangement is that the P5 nations have made the states at the periphery virtual dependent on the P5 to resolving the smallest of dependants' own state and human security problems (Anne Orford, 2011: 3). This is why so many developing countries are perpetually de-capitalised and are always in persistent conflicts. Dependency also explains why African nations' economies and actually their lives are dependent on policy decisions made in the metropolitan centres of the Global North through the agency of the United Nations Security Council permanent members.

The Council's governance and exploitation of the peripheral states is now held together in the form of assorted paternalistic leverages such as foreign aid, military grants and training, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding missions in Africa. The shared-common

denominator for these factors is that they are direct and indirect forms of control and influence over the target. The synergy between the Dependency theory and the Security Council reform in this fashion is anchored on the fact that the P5 which controls every decision of war and peace in the Security Council are actors of Global North. As implied by Snyder (1988), the subjugation of African countries at the table of global security has been the mode of relationship and activities in the Council. For its part, the dependency model views the world by examining the mechanisms of exploitation. The agitation for reform was informed by the notion that the Global North is in direct exploitation of the Global South (Africa being one of them) on global security matters. This approach proves useful in exploring the dilemmas of continued under development of Africa. Dependency theorists summarily argue that underdevelopment is a function of a nation-state's international predicament, especially, its position in the global division of power.

3.8.1. Strengths of Dependency Theory

Not only do dependency theorists present a conceptual framework for analysing Third World politics, they also suggest several "solutions" for the central problem of inequality. They argue that Third World countries can take steps to improve their situation. Bearing this in mind, it can be argued that the formation of common agenda which includes political and economic interests to overcome adversaries will put the Third World on a better footing. The idea is that Third World countries share many common economic, trading and indeed political problems in their relations with the industrialised core P5 nations. By joining together and presenting a common front to the core such as a representative P5 from the underdeveloped nation, the marginalised (Africa) will gain leverage, and be able to secure greater advantages from their interactions with world core countries. By forming groups or cartels the periphery nations will have more power than any individual Third World country has in its relations with the core.

Dependency theory provides the mindset for the leaders of marginalised group to think towards redemption. The need for acting in tandem with the ideas of this Dependency School by the dependent nations is predicated on the fact that the dependent nations are actually colonised. The dependency theory should not be of any significant importance if

109

the dependent nations decolonised because there is no common enemy to oppose. This is how it calls on African leaders in the United Nations to confront their country's condition of exclusion and dependency in the UN, and take voluntary steps to alter it. Thus leaders and elites in the UN l might be convinced to use some of their political power — wealth to invest in regional security projects or permanent seat programs, rather than importing luxury automobiles and standing divided in times of needed-unity. The goal is for the elites to suspend their selfish habits of conspicuous consumption, and to use their wealth for national development. The elites would be encouraged to invest in their home countries, rather than abroad.

Apart from Hans Singer and Raúl Prebisch who related Dependency theory through the lenses of imbalance terms of trade, the Guyanese Marxist historian, and a seemingly radical dependency theorists Walter Rodney, in his book *'How Europe Underdeveloped Africa'*claims that Africa had been consciously exploited by European imperialists, leading directly to the modern underdevelopment of most of the continent. His proffered solution, inherently calls for revolutionary elucidations. Rodney among others argues that it is unrealistic to expect those currently in positions of power to take voluntary actions which would be personally disadvantageous. Altruistic solutions are nice in the abstract, but are unlikely to be implemented in reality. The only realistic solution is revolutionary action to rid the country of those leaders who have betrayed it, and to institute sweeping revolutionary change to end inequality. It should be noted in conclusion that the dependency position is fundamentally anti-status quo. Dependency theorists argue that existing national and international economic and political systems are the cause of their unjust situations. They call for systemic change to solve the problems.

3.8.2. Weaknesses of Dependency Theory

Actually, Dependency Theory does not adequately account for the roles of the subservient African leaders who may side with the P5 to perpetuate exclusion. It may be argued that docile African leaders explain why African states to date have not presented a particular candidate to the United Nations Security Council as African candidate. The adverse effect of comprador bourgeoisie (subservient African leaders serving Western

interest) among African leaders goes to the extent that little attention is paid to the development of Africa but dependency seems to have covered all African states under one blanket as under developed and in-need of freedom. Essentially, no African state is rated as developed but not every African state is interested in the Security Council reform. But dependency would assume that all of them would be interested in the inclusion that can beget development and growth. Further, and most importantly, other weakness of some segments of the Dependency School as reflected is the assumption that the periphery is passive in its subordination.

3.9. Justification for the choice of theories

Realist Theory: Within the Realist tradition, three arguments are central. First, the international system is dominated by sovereign nation-states, each beholden to no higher authority than itself (Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry, 1989). It is, in other words, anarchic. Second, the relations between nation-states are fundamentally competitive, although this does not preclude the possibility of cooperation in the pursuit of national interests. Finally, with a system so constituted, nation-states behave purposively in the pursuit of power and material well-being.

While all of these arguments have connection with the position of the P5 in this study in one way or another, this study engages the Realist position specifically to highlight the functioning of the P5 and how they have preferred the preservation of their national interest to the reform of the global body of the Security Council. In this study, realism densely fleshes out the central argument that underpins the lack of reform and clearly placed the problem on the individual nations that constitute the P5 – Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States and the non-permanent members.

Realism was also utilised in this study since the study is international in character and realism arguably a prominent International relations theory that attempts to provide a conceptual framework upon which international actors behave and can be analysed. This is in part, crucial, since reflecting on the underlying strength of realism, it is safe to say,

that it is a theory, essentially about power and security, and the UN Security Council reform is one of such. The bottom line is that there is variegated interest that causes the absence of natural harmony of interest in the world which is why realism would impliedly insist that the P5 activities and refusal to reform the Council is calculated and intentional, aimed at disadvantaging the weaker nations at the periphery – Africa.

While realist paradigm is critically essential in this study, it has one major disadvantage, especially with the issue of reform to expand the Council and include an Africa state. Under realism the state represents domestic constituencies at the international level and this, may be said of potential African representation at the UNSC. This is one of the principal reasons why additional three theories (Bahaviourism, Society of State, Dependency Theory), are discussed to clearly address the specific issue-areas and specific-felt needs of the study.

Behaviourism: the Behaviorism makes a remarkable contribution to the framework of the study. Its suitability of usage in this theoretical unpacking of the Council attitude lay in the argument that enabled our understanding that the Security Council's inability to reform since 1945 is a human machination aimed at conditioning and controlling the behavior of those who receive (the peripheral actors). Behaviourism, notes that the seeming impossible reform of the Council is a mere manipulation of the global community by the operant P5 nations who refused reform based on the expectation to meet their considered outcomes, that is, how the excluded African nations must behave when the P5 act in certain way in the world. Given, that the P5 also make references to the common Charter of the UN as an element disturbing the reform, Behaviourism alone cannot account for the instrument and the utility of the Charter, hence, other approaches such as the society of state that concerns itself with matters of the national and international rules for international engagements.

Society of State approach: the Society of State Approach has a specific importance in the study since it highlighted the significance of the UN Charter in the overall reform effort. Society of State Approach stands out of the other theories in this study following

the commanding reference it makes to the bonds, the statutes, the constitutions, and indeed, the United Nations Charter. Understanding the role of the Charter in this study is prime and there is no other theory that is closest to its understanding than does the Society of state. Another salient justification for the utility of the Society of state approach to this study is that, it views all parties as non-bias actors but harbingers of law to maintain security and order. In this regard, the P5 and African Group are viewed as neutral actors, not biased, willing to respect the Charter and through their obedient to the Charter can work together to preserve the state and reform the Council. This theory is truly essential as it does not only give the benefit of doubt to the P5—that has been accused of interest protecting by the realist and the African Group that can be tagged overzealous. Extended usefulness of the Society of State to this study is its appreciation that the reform of the Council is within the law and that the two parties are encouraged to pursuing it through the invocation of the relevant provisions of the Charter to establish common ground for reform failing which, the offender of the law should be punished or ostracised. But, while the Society of State has seen both actors (the P5 and African Group) as neutral actors and believe that lack of reform was based on inadequate attention to the Charter, this theory shows more light on explain the seeming Global North-Global South divide, the dependency theorist claims is the issue reproduced in the Security Council.

Dependency Theory: Dependency theory campaigns for the Third World countries and calls for African states inclusion in the Security Council on the basis that neither developed (the P5) nor the Third World (African Group can exist in isolation. The theory reveals that the P5 and African Group can only be understood in the context of the world economic and political system. Political events in Africa are directly related to events in the P5 countries within the Council. However, relations between the P5 and Africans currently exist in the Security Council are asymmetrical. Dependency theory is critical to this study since it argues that the flow of power and control is from the First World (center or core or the P5) to the Third World (periphery or Africa). Through the lenses of Dependency theory, it is understood that political and economic (security and development) events in the First World have a huge impact on the politics and economics

of Third World countries, but Third World political and economic events usually have little impact on the First World. The exclusive Security Council is exemplary in this respect.

Within the world political and economic system dependency theory asserts that there is a tremendous amount of interaction among core countries and peoples, and between the core and the periphery. There is very little interaction or influence just among periphery countries. The consequences of this are great, resulting in an isolated and weak periphery country having an unequal relationship with the united and strong core – the P5. Suffice to say that politics and economics are related especially as being practiced in the Security Council where political decisions are made for economic reasons. As such they cannot be understood apart from each other. Dependency theory clearly fleshed out the P5 effort to maintain the status quo. It underpins that economic and political ties and relationships between core and periphery countries are particularly important. These are advantageous for the core, and disadvantageous for the periphery. Core-periphery trading patterns result in continuous growth of political and economic power for the core at the expense of the periphery. Core-periphery orientation and continued operation causes a widening of the gap between developed and developing countries, rather than a narrowing it, in this way makes difficult for instance for the Council reform to occur. Historically, dependency maintains that lower priced raw materials have been exchanged for higher priced finished goods and this condition is replicated in the Security Council.

Also, it necessarily follows from dependency theory argument that Africa's underdevelopment is not a natural state, but rather a condition that is caused by core political actors, the P5. The fact is that in the asymmetrical relations, the developed nations are actively under developing Third World countries as a result of the systems of interactions between them, through the agency of the United Nations Security Council exclusive politics. Put another way, the insecurity paradigm in Africa and its underdevelopment is directly related to, and makes possible, the development of the powerful countries of the industrialised core, the P5.

Premised on the outlook of Dependency theory and the real imbalance, status quo, and above all the Global North and Global South divide as currently obtained in the Security Council, this study adopted this framework as it fleshes out the real reasons for the Security Council. This theory actually highlighted pertinent issues such as the Global North at the centre/core maintaining the strangle hold on those of African countries at the periphery. This outlook shows us that the inability to reform the Council is because the P5 at the centre do not want the African Group at the periphery to join the class at the centre. In this regard, dependency theory records that the relationship between the North and South reproduces unequal relations and that the functioning of the UN reproduces inequalities between Global North and Global South. In our case, the P5 represents the Global North and Africa represents the global South.

3.10. Conclusion

Reflecting on these theories and models engaged above, this researcher understands and concluded at once that international politics of the UN Security Council reform does not holistically fit one specific model following its hydra-headed and variegated dimensions. While some approaches such as behaviourism and society of states are closely interpretative and explanatory enough to make them truly useful in unpacking the reform saga, others such as realism are good because they touched chord in deep ways on sort of systems theory through which international politics can be understood. Since states are organisations that participate in both international and domestic political arenas, it is not unforeseen that the pursuit of goals in one arena influence actions in the other. Surely, the P5 nations may both respond to international events through domestic motivations and attempt to solve domestic problems through international actions; this is the principle of realism.

The alternative frameworks to realism presented in this paper attempts to move beyond existing Realist theories. In assortment of ways society of state specifically places the state at the centre of the analysis and develops a range of strategies, across domestic and international arenas, available to state officials in pursuit of their objectives (for the African Group, it is inclusion and for the P5, it is exclusion of the African Group) both

laying claims to the Charter. By taking into account both the domestic and international constraints on the state, and by articulating both the domestic and international choices available to both P5 and the African Group, we are able to provide a more comprehensive, integrated approach to the analysis of state behaviour through the instrument of behaviourism.

Specifically, on the basis of choice of theory, the Realist Theory of International Relations frameworks is used to exactly underpin and critically analyse and gauge the fundamental divergent interests of the P5 actors in the Council reform which shape the African Group actions and options. This chapter is equally fleshed out through the apparatus of behaviourism. Behavioursim alongside realism summarise the overall effort in this chapter, to link lack of reform to power politics and actors' behaviours. More, the realists' integrated approach offers a versatile tool through which the examination of the multiple interests and behaviours of all actors in the Security Council reform saga, and how these have influenced the dialectics of the reform over the years are politically appraised. Assuredly, the African Group who competes for inclusion into the permanent category of the Council does so to protect its collective interest. It is also for the African Group a call meant for its survival in the anarchic international system. However, the P5's resistance is anchored on desired ability to lord it over Africa for as long as power can sustain. The important thing to bear in mind therefore is that this model and approach explain international political process and are valid instruments and clean lenses through which we have evaluated global political phenomena in the United Nations Security Council reform. From here, the study moves to Chapter four in which we respond to Question 1 (Q1), Objective 1 (O1), of the study. The discussion in chapter four is carried out under the main heading '*The African exclusion from the Council's veto power: weighing the nexus.*' It looks at various reasons for African exclusion from the UN permanent seat, mirroring the remote and immediate reasons of the seeming political marginalisation, finding ways to achieve reform.

CHAPTER FOUR

The African exclusion from the Council's veto power: weighing the nexus

4.1   Introduction

This chapter provides a descriptive presentation of the responses to the interview questions which were administered in the field. It focuses on the two major actors—the African Group and the United Nations Security Council Group. Whereas a number of top career diplomats of both the African Union origin and the United Nations decent are targeted for this interview, it was only possible to access some senior level representative of the AU whose interviews were held on 23 May 2015. The AU was represented by a very senior official in Ethiopia whose office is located in Addis Ababa. However, this interview was held on 23 May 2015 at the event of Africa Day Expo in South Africa. A renowned professor of International relations and conflict resolution from Bradford University was also interviewed on 25 May 2015 while the interview of a High-Ranking Nigerian official working for the United Nations was on 28 May 2015 and another of South African representative in the AU was on 30 May 2015. Also, we solicited the views of high-ranking UPEACE official who equally advised us on pertinent issues areas of this study. The response was received on September 2015.

This Chapter is developed and concluded from the feedbacks from the officials contacted in this study and corroborative literature evidence that interrogate the remote and immediate causes of African exclusion from the permanent seat of the United Nations Security Council permanent chamber. The presentation is made in terms of the themes covered in the interviews. The officials' acuities are presented not only from their own perspectives, but also from the collaborative perspective of the UN and AU official documents on the subject under study. The discussion then assesses the actors' interests and roles in the reform debates, juxtaposing these interests with those of other opposing actors. To further validate the findings of the interviews, the researcher employs the official and position papers on African inclusion and exclusion debates. To be sure, it is

very difficult to secure an appointment with the UN and AU officials. However, with a view to have reasonably balanced account on the pertinent exclusion saga within the Council, the researcher conducted further interviews with senior officers of the: United Nations mandated University for Peace (UPEACE), and the University professors with expert knowledge on the topic of UN Security Council reform debate. These senior directors assuredly, house some vast knowledge of African insecurities and the theatrics of global political affairs. For the purpose of presentation of the data all the respondents were grouped according to the questions they addressed. The AU/UN respondents and the non-AU/UN respondents were merged as the same set of questions was used in their separate interactions. This allowed for informed opinion of the possible causes of African exclusion from the permanent Chamber of the UN from 1945 to 2015. In this fashion, the roles of the P5 actors in shaping and sustaining the structurally imbalanced Council become clearer.

4.2   Respondents' perceptions on African exclusion

In a nutshell, this chapter presents the views and assessment of the AU official, Professor, UN Official, and UPEACE official on Africa's exclusion from the United Nations, Security Council (immediate and remote causes/reason). By extension, this chapter investigates Africa's interests in the Security Council reform and reasons why Africa has not been included in the permanent category of the Council since most African states joined the organisation in early 1960s.

4.2.1. Understanding African Exclusion from the permanent seat

Africa in the first place was excluded from the permanent Council due to the following reasons: (1) "in 1945 when the United Nations was born, no African country was free of colonial rule and dominance. The not-colonised Ethiopia and (Liberia) that can claim freedom from Western domination was on its knees at advent of both WWI and WWII begging for survival from drought and hunger, as such was not a global player; (2) Africa did not have significant interest in directing global hegemon and could not be a stake holder at that time, but has interest now following its efforts to control the array of the

natural deposit within its borders; (3) The concert of Europe and the League of Nations that were before the UN was not of any meaningful impact towards global peace and security and it was safe to assume that the UN could be a repetition of the League"[4]

The Officials identified Africa's interests in the permanent seat as aimed at continent's development and providing essential skills and ensuring internal security to help stabilise African states which has emerged from colonialism and been in conflict with itself and loggerhead with the Western powers that excluded it from holding a veto. These respondents specifically added that the West through the UN agency suspends Africa at the periphery while the West stays at the core for as long that is possible. The "*drive for Africa's permanent seat interests in the Council, which is includes Africa's political and economic securities and the campaign for its inclusion in the Security Council is genuine. In my view the behaviour of trying to repeat the West through some catch-up activities with the West by of African leaders is a problem. African actors must be aware that the some members of the P5 is furthering virtually every conflict the P5 has intervened either through direct military engagement or through the adoption of resolutions*"[5]. However, the usefulness of the catch-up games in the context of Council reform, for Africans the basis of the reform is to enable the continent control its own territory, conflicts, and resources by having hold on the permanent seat and veto power – the most relevant power leverages of the Council — through which the continent was relegated to the periphery for perpetual dependence on the powers at the core—the P5 in the current international system. "The dependency channels and the assortments of its adverse impacts on the dependent nations as discussed in Chapter three, actually fashioned by some of the powerful P5 nations through their behaviour and conditioning of the African Group. In the most important areas of global relevance, the political will and economic

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[4] The idea that African exclusion was processed through the colonial manicure of decoration of the seeming importance for the beauty of the project at hand, were advanced by the AU Official and the UPEACE official who responded to our question on African exclusion respectively. It is imperative to note here that the common denominator, in terms of thematic analysis of the causes of exclusion among the respondents is included in quotation marks. Interview with the AU Official occurred at Protea Hotel, Johannesburg South Africa - 23 May 2015.

[5] In an interview with the AU Official, the African exclusion in some instances was blamed on Africa's catch-up-game approach to reform the current status quo of the United Nations. The respondent is convinced that Africa can be included only when it charts its own way through the Council or dictates the modus of its involvement, Protea Hotel Johannesburg, South Africa - 23 May 2015.

options service only the spirit of dependency paradigm which originally was created by the Europeans emperors long before the dismantlement of African Land and Nations, cemented through the artificial construction of 1872 colonial Africa in a Berlin conference of 1884 – 1885"[6]. "Africa has been on a mission to regain itself from the shock of dependency on colonial masters; the dependency syndrome currently stretched beyond African leaders' control, especially over its regional security affairs"[7]. In pursuit of these security protections of human and natural endowments and development strategies, the AU has challenged the status quo and will sure continue to do so until the reform is met either in a short or long term designs. If none works there are also options for extremes such as becoming defiant and withdrawing support towards the UN activities.[8]The respondent continues press that Africa's aim towards the Council reforms also has focus on supporting regional efforts to find a practical solution to resolving conflicts in the continent without external intervention and assisting the stabilisation of Africa. This includes security support through the African Union and especially the veto mechanism of the United Nations Security Council.

4.3   In 1945 Africa was still under colonial rule

Ethiopia is one African state that was neither defeated in war nor colonised by imperial powers.[9] Of course, every other African state was at one point or the other under the colonial rule. However, the non-colonised Ethiopia by 1945 was plagued by poverty and hunger, such that the country has no influence whatsoever at the time to demand a permanent seat from the Council. It also was not a player in the World Wars I and II neither is any other African states who gained political independence in the 1960s.[10] The history of reform efforts geared towards making the Security Council more reflective of growing UN membership and of changing world politics since the organisation's

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[6] The United Nations Official I, this respondent linked Africa's exclusion to the asymmetrical encounter the continent had with Europe since the event of scramble for Africa at the programme of Berlin conference, Protea Hotel Johannesburg, South Africa - 25 May 2015.
[7] Interview with the African Union Official, Protea Hotel Johannesburg, South Africa - 23 May 2015.
[8] Interview with the African Union Official, Protea Hotel Johannesburg, South Africa - 23 May 2015
[9] Interview with Professor of International Relations 23 May 2015, at Saro-Maria Hotel, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The professor as well as the UPEACE official, note that Africa has no meaningful role in the world during the years 1940s as most part of the continent were still under colonial rule.
[10] Interview with the UPEACE Official, 10 September 2015. [E-interview].

establishment conveys the slim prospects for meaningful change(Weiss, 2003: 148). The UN founders deliberately divided member rights and roles by establishing a universal General Assembly with the most general functions and a restricted Security Council with executing authority for maintaining the peace — unanimity among the great powers was a prerequisite for action. This arrangement was designed to contrast with the Council of the League of Nations, in the areas of general executive committee of the organisation that failed miserably in its security operations. It failed because it required agreement from all states with the right to veto decisions of substance, an essential component of the original 1945 deal. In the original agenda of the institution of the UN was the chronicled sustenance of colonial empire and legacy.

According to Fanon (1963: 33), the colonial world is a compartmentalised world. It is obviously as superfluous to recall the existence of 'native' towns and European towns, of schools for 'natives' and schools for Europeans, as it is to recall apartheid in South Africa Fanon, 1963: 33). Yet, if we penetrate inside this compartmentalisation we shall at least bring to light some of its key aspects. By penetrating its geographical configuration and classification we shall be able to delineate the backbone on which the decolonised society is reorganised and will remain secluded from international political and economic engagements for years. This is why the Concert of Europe following upon the defeat of Napoleon in 1815 was probably the first attempt at setting up a practical international organisation to foster peace by means of Congresses among the European powers to secure the vested strategic interests in global environment (Fanon, 1963: 33). The membership of the Concert was strictly confined to the large Powers, and that any attempt to change the status quo by the secession of any ethnic group within the boundaries of the larger Powers should be vigorously resisted. This is the case with the United Nations.

Further, (Barkawi and Mark1999; Cammack, 2002; Verwij and Thompson, 2009) note that the heavy casualties caused by the World War I, seemed appropriate that men like Smuts and Woodrow Wilson, inspired by motives of lofty idealism of entrenching European superiority in all spheres of international endeavour, considered setting up an

international organisation, its double purpose was the maintenance of peace by means of collective action of all the members against a likely aggressor in any part of the world, and the prevention by peaceful means of another major struggle. The lessons of history hold that Africa was not part of this gathering. The mere threat of collective action was usually sufficient to deter small states from pursuing an aggressive policy or even more, trying to be exertive. The League of Nations can thus be said to have come into existence as a remedy against international anarchy. At the event of Versailles, Africa was not there. The League was established under the Treaty of Versailles, the peace treaty that formally ended World War I (Duffy, 1950: 168). The Treaty of Versailles was signed on 28 June 1919. Part I of the Versailles Treaty, that is, the Covenant of the League of Nations, was the constitutional document of the League. According to this constitution, the League's purpose was "to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security." Africa is part of the international community but was not part of Versailles convention even though Africa was bounded by the resolutions of the 1919 treaty, yet it had no contributions whatsoever towards the design and outlay of the League.

Likewise, at the San Francisco conference where the UN was formed and Charter drafted, delegates who were dissatisfied with a revival of a kind of nineteenth-century Concert of Europe—with more powerful states given special roles—but also did not wish to impede the effective creation of the new world body expected that a review conference for all UN member states would be convened relatively quickly to discuss changes in the Charter and organisational structures. Although the Charter Article 109 reserved the possibility of a General Conference for the purposes of "reviewing the present Charter," the P5 preferred setting the bar high for any changes (Carpenter, 1997; Weiss, 2003: 149; Cox, and Harold2005). They not only resisted efforts to convene such a conference but also clearly communicated their intention to safeguard their veto rights. The increasing polarisation of UN member countries during the Cold War in the 1950s prevented such a gathering then, and none has been convened since making it impossible for discussions and debate on such reform architecture let alone the low priority African inclusion (Deudney, 1995).

Between the UN's establishment in 1945 and the end of the first wave of decolonisation in 1963, the number of UN member states swelled from 51 to 114. Only six countries from Africa and Asia were UN members originally (Weiss, 2003) while two decades later, more than half of the UN's membership were from these two developing continents. As a result, these newly decolonised countries demanded a better reflection of their numbers and priorities in the Security Council and throughout the UN system. The chief agitation from the African wing has been the inclusion in the permanent hall of the Security Council.

Assuredly, no progress has been made on these numerical or procedural changes because absolutely no consensus exists about the exact shape of the Security Council or the riddance of the veto.[11] Surely, every P5 member knows what Africa wants, they also know that the Council does not reflect the actual distribution of twenty-first-century power, yet reform proposals have been dented by never addressing the true imbalance between seats at the table and actual military capacity outside of the Security Council chamber. The P5 specifically have sought to address, instead, the imbalance between the total number of countries in the world and Security Council membership as well as to guard the absolute veto right held by five countries. So, Africa will continue to work on long term prosperity of the continent. This is important since the current power-play in the UN does not favour Africa a lot.

To be sure, the only significant reform of the Security Council came to pass in 1965, after two-thirds of all UN member states ratified and all five permanent members of the Security Council approved Resolution 1990 (adopted by the General Assembly in December 1963) which proposed enlarging the Security Council from 11 to 15 members and the required majority from 7 to 9 votes (Weiss, 2010: 149). The veto power exclusively reserved for the P5 was left intact. The question of whether the Security Council should reflect the growing membership of the UN, let alone the lofty language of the UN Charter's Article 2, emphasising the principle of the sovereign equality of all its

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[11] Interview with African Union Official, 25 May 2015, at Protea Hotel, Johannesburg, South Africa.

Members, resurfaced in the 1990s, paradoxically, as a by-product of the initial successes of the Security Council in the early post—Cold War era (Doty, 1997; Weiss, 2003). The P5 countries, progressively on the same wavelength, reached unanimity privately on Security Council as a whole on a range of issues especially on inclusion of another partner to the veto power.

So the exclusion did not start in San Francisco. It actually was part if the Versailles congress and duplicated in 1945. Post San Francisco conference, a series of decisions about beefed-up and improved global security in areas that had formerly paralysed the council, including several flash points of former East-West tensions seemed to usher in the philosophy that guided exclusion and inclusion of states as actors. Excluded continents especially, African and Latin American countries wanted a part of the action, to defend their own viewpoints from the risk of being ignored by a new sort of P5 condominium but this did not happen because neither of the two, was a part of the conquerors of WWII. In essence, the inclusion and exclusion strategies were equally based on the decision of the winners of WWII.[12]

4.4 Africa's pre-independence and post-1945 conditions and interests

In 1945, Africa was not the master of its own destiny. Africans are not leaders in Africa, Africans are not in command of their natural resources, Africa did not control import and export trading agreement, Africans did not have a say in who will lead them, Africans are just people with life under the control of others—Britain, France, and Portugal.[13] However, since the wave of democracy in early 1960s, the African states and leaders have shown continued growth and became important global actors in both economic and political spheres. Currently, in terms of natural resources, Africa is the world's richest continent. It has "50% of the world's gold, most of the world's diamonds and chromium, 90% of the cobalt, 40% of the world's potential hydroelectric power, 65% of the manganese, millions of acres of untilled farmland, as well as other natural resources." Africa has natural resources which include: crude oil, hydroelectric power, diamonds,

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[12] Interview with African Union Official, 23 May 2015. Johannesburg, South Africa.
[13] Interview with the United Nations Official, 25 May 2015. Johannesburg South, Africa.

uranium, gold, cobalt, 70% of the world's Coltan and 34% of its cassiterite. Coltan and cassiterite are strategic in the production of cell phones, laptops, and other portable electronic products. Above all, Africa currently has 54 independent states and over 900 million people; "it is the second largest region at the United Nations, after a 55 Asian-Pacific region".[14] And these 54 states of Africa, account for over 70 percent of the annual conflicts treated by the Security Council. Mindful of this record, we believe that if the UN Security Council aims for genuine maintenance of global peace and security, it truly requires Africa's cooperation and support to achieve that goal.

So the AU makes no pretences concerning its interests in securing a permanent seat with veto power in the Council. This is important because, "Whatever is happening there [at the Security Council], has a clear and direct impact here [in Africa]"[15]. The AU defines its interests in terms of national security, recounting the wars and conflicts in the region that has attracted either the Security Council's direct military intervention or adoption of the Security Council resolution since 1960s from the DRC to Libya in 2011. The un-ending conflict in DRC that was soaked in the UN intervention since the 1960s and attendant assassination of Patrice Emery Lumumba (whom the Secretary General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld, told the Security Council of the United Nations that the UN did not know where Lumumba was at the time when he was taken prisoner by Mobutu's troops, so they could not help him), the removal of Laurent Gbagbo through the UNSC agencies, the trial of Liberian Charles Taylor that was orchestrated by the UNSC ambers, the dethronement of Muammar Gaddafi and extermination of his life through the UNSC Resolution 1973 in 2011, truly touches chord on some of the reasons why Africa has had increased interest in the quest for inclusion.[16]

For more than 50 years, there have been heinous deaths of prominent African leaders. These deaths from Thomas Sankara to Muammar Gaddafi may have linkages to the

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[14]Interview with African Union Official, 25 May 2015. Johannesburg, South Africa
[15]Interview with African Union Official, 25 May 2015. Johannesburg, South Africa
[16]Interview with African Union Official, 25 May 2015. Johannesburg, South Africa. The respondent is of the view that even though an African representative may not represent the interest of all African states at all times, it is securely better than Europeans standing in for Africans. The AU has methods of dealing with defiants and can apply one on African representative when act defiantly.

UNSC presence in Africa (Thomassankara.net, 2010). And, the UNSC presence and interventions have contributed to weakness and dysfunctionality in African states where the Council has mediated in conflict. This explains why the, AU defines its quest for permanent seat and veto power in the Council as partly motivated by the need to bring Africa back to real political independence in the continent and globally. While the remote causes of African exclusion may be located on the three major issues identified above, some of the immediate reasons for African exclusion lay in the maintenance of old order.[17] The AU is nervy of the status quo and works towards a Security Council that will be interest-free-intervention, friendly and open to address Africa's and other region's security concerns through a proportional inclusion and representation of members and interests especially at the permanent category.[18] Africa has supported the transformation of the periphery-core that characterised the dependency agenda being perpetuated the P5 since the 1945. Another immediate reason for the sustained exclusivity in the Council is that the African inclusion is likely to cause the removal of irredentist conflict and the escalation of intra-continent conflicts within Africa. This will wane the visibility of the Council in African conflicts and may as well diminish the relevance of the Council in as the most important organ of the UN. In this way, the record book of the Council that registers 70% of conflicts annually in Africa may have nothing to address in Africa and would have to scavenge for conflict elsewhere in order to write up her annual report.[19]

Further, the University Professor, while expressing doubts on the possibility of reform, corroborates the AU official that currently Africa has interest at stake in the Council which must be guarded. Professor[20] sees that besides the abundance of human and material resources which Africa has now as opposed to 1945, that its role in the Council is inevitable. He states that at least, African inclusion will speak to some extent to protect the African states from those cheap onslaughts of the West especially when Africa found unity and desires to oppose Western interventions, motivated by greed, as witnessed in

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[17] Interview with the Professor of International Relations, 23 May 2015 at Saro-Maria Hotel, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; and, Interview with UPEACE Official, 10 September 2015, [E-interview].
[18]Interview with African Union Official I, 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa.
[19]Interview with African Union Official, 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa
[20]Interview with the Professor of International Relations, 23 May 2015, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Libya.[21] He believes that an African presence in the Council would undercut the negative excesses the P5 would intend for Africa in a bid to achieve some economic gains or political advantages. Further, he claims that Africa is becoming a hot spot for terrorist group which is another platform to keep western presence in the continent until another insecurity architecture in manufactured to keep the interested P5 on African soil, and belonging to the permanent seat of the Council will allow for African voice in how to best address the security issues and also engender real commitment to fighting the insurgences such as *Boko Haram* and Al-Shabab.[22]

4.5   The League and the UN: failures and successes

Bearing in mind that some African states that were independent at the dawn of the UN, having seen the League crumbled settled that there may be no need to fight for permanent seat, as the UN will eventually collapse as did the League. This idea forms part of the remote reasons why the call for reform seems to have gathered more momentum now than in late 1940s. The League of Nations was formed after the World War I (WWI), specifically on the occasion of 10 January 1920 through a Paris Peace conference that ended the WWI. Surely, it was the first international organisation that sought to maintain global peace and security through collective security and disarmaments. It has its own security goals contained in the Covenant. Even though, it was conceived on laudable objectives, the League was weak and unable to resolve conflicts quick enough if at all. The inability is due to the differences among the League leaders and the difficulty involved in managing a global organisation with independent nations with independent national interests even in war zones. Thus, as indicated earlier, at the dawn of the UN, those problems the League encountered which led to its eventual collapse, was some reasonable grounds for Africa not to fight for post in the UN as it was anticipated that it will die a natural death as did the League. But "the for the United Nations, the Security Council organ eventually, unlike the League of Nations became attractive, its

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[21]Interview with the Professor of International Relations, 23 May 2015, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. At this instance, the professor argues that the 2011 Libyan intervention was not a democracy intervention but a hegemonic intervention through the veto mechanism.
[22]Interview with the Professor of International Relations, 23 May 2015, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

deliberations were more than talk, and resolutions were more than wishes".[23] Actually, Colum Gavan Duffy (1950) who corroborated the AU Official noted that diplomatic intrigue and rivalry behind the scenes of the League led to the abandonment of many global peace agendas that gradually became couched in such weak and vacillating terms that the League achieved nothing in practice (Duffy, 1950: 168; Murphy, 2000; Murphy, 2002; Moravcsik, 2004). To be sure, the League was nearly a care-free hall of actors where every actor is not bound by regulations to act in certain manner. For example, Duffy, (1950) relayed that Japan, Italy and Germany, as soon as they were criticised for committing acts of aggression against smaller states, immediately gave notice that they intended to withdraw from the League, in order to prevent the machinery of the Covenant from functioning effectively against them.

In light of that, many of the smaller states, who were not members, were deterred from joining an international body which did not really protect small countries from aggression by larger ones, and this was how the dream of a genuinely universal League gradually faded away (Duffy, 1950; Oneal, *et al,* 1996; Newman, 2001; Naraghi-Anderlin and El-Bushra, 2004). Indeed, under Article 3, the Assembly of the League was empowered to deal with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world. In theory it was open to any member of the League to have inserted on the agenda of the Assembly any matter which the Secretary-General considered to come within the terms of this Article, but in practice the wide scope of the Assembly was subject to the unofficial approval of the Council, which could arrange to defer discussion of any awkward matter. The Council, under Article 4, consisted, like the Security Council today, of both permanent and non-permanent members; its terms of reference were identical with those of the Assembly, but it had power to act when the Assembly was not in session, and also to summon the Assembly for special extraordinary Sessions, if the need arose (Duffy, 1950). But in the case of the UN, the organisation was prepared to act apart when the collective international and individual interests of the P5 states are at stake. As such the P5 members do not allow international institutions to limit actions that they deem necessary for either collective international or that of their national security.

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[23]Interview with African Union Official, 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa.

The protection of the national security of the P5 states is the principal plank upon which the survival and hegemonic relevance of the Council is anchored. The protection of the national interests of the P5 by whatever means serves part of the reasons why the organ cannot adhere to any reform that democratises or legitimises the organisation especially through a geographic representativity[24]

4.6   Perspectives on African exclusion from the Council

A professor of International Relations interviewed on the reasons of African exclusion, argued that "one important immediate reason why Africa is currently excluded from the permanent membership of the Security Council is because African states are still members of the United Nations".[25] He maintains that Africa's united movement either towards the UN or outward the UN will earn Africa a landmark voice in the organisation. To be sure, he declared that "the day the 54 African members of the UN pull out of the UN is the hour their voice is heard in every corner of the world".[26] So, he opines that the AU should mark as a primary task towards an independent and relevant Africa in the world, to unite the continent and move as one. Disunity and the old colonial tactics of divide and rule are some of the current forces that have utterly undermined the AU's ability to return to global power and have kept the AU floating aimlessly in the UN for about 70 years of its membership in the organisation.

Professor's argument followed on the resoles of Frantz Fanon's in his '*The Wretched of the Earth*'. Actually, Fanon (1963) remotely notes that independence from colonial masters [which includes Africa's current struggle for freedom from P5 imposition] and such activities as national reawakening, restoration of the nation to the people or Commonwealth, whatever the name used, whatever the latest expression, decolonisation, is always an event of sustained passion (Fanon, 1963: 1). The underpinning is that Africa

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[24] Interview with Professor of International Relations from the Bradford University United Kingdom, at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 23 May 2015
[25] Interview with Professor of International Relations from the Bradford University United Kingdom, at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 23 May 2015
[26] Interview with Professor of International Relations from the Bradford University United Kingdom, at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Here, he says he is a realist and prefers the position of realist. In his view, power cannot be ceded on the altar of request. In his words, if Africa wants the seat, they must be ready for war.

could go on to portray the rise of a new Africa, the establishment of new strengths and resources, the recognition of its diplomatic relations and its economic and political importance and orientation in the world. But instead, the AU that would lead this reawakening has never formed a common font since the African inclusion debates.[27]

In actual fact, steps towards success in the current debate for reform stay in the amount of pressure the AU was able to garner from its 54 members. The disunity conundrum will continue to make the AU not recognise its success as failure turned inside-out. The AU Official who responded to questions on this issue spotted that the Council reform is extraordinarily important because "it is desired, clamored for, and demanded by the majority of the legitimate members of the UN".[28] Further, professor[29] continued that the need for the Council reform and reasons why it is not happening exists in an underdone state of affairs in the economic and political conditions and lives of the colonised and marginalised African leaders, youth, women and children. While the professor locates the immediate reasons for Africa's exclusion as part of the ongoing neo-colonial tactics, Fanon (1963: 2) fundamentally narrates that decolonisation, independence, freedom as the case may be, therefore, implies the urgent need to thoroughly challenge the current colonial situation

4.7   The African Group and the P5 Group as they see each other

This unit reports on the responses of the actors regarding their perceptions of each other's interests and roles in the UNSC. The aim is to depict divergences and conceivable caginess between and among these actors with a view to understanding the conflicting interests within the Council and factors driving resistance, and the roles that sustains African exclusion from the permanent seat since 1945.

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[27]Interview with Professor of International Relations from the Bradford University United Kingdom, at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 23 May 2015.
[28] Interview with African Union Official, 25 May 2015.
[29] Interview with Professor of International Relations from the Bradford University United Kingdom, at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 23 May 2015.

4.7.1. The United States of America

According to a former US president Mr. Jimmy Carter, the "sole purpose for the US membership of the United Nations is for the UN to contribute to the making of the US the super power it can ever be in the world despite the possible destructions that may follow in the quest of America's superiority" (Jimmy Carter, 2015). The two interviewees, a Professor[30] and the AU Official[31] who actually corroborated Mr. Carter informed this researcher that "the US' interest in the Council is further anchored on safeguarding its national security and the security of its citizens against global terrorism and to permanently alleviate poverty among its population". While professor, for one, argues that "US's current resistance towards reform is part of its broader global agenda to keep Africa forever dependent and at the periphery, part of its strategies being to keep the African states out of permanent position in global leadership and global security activism so as to maintain the culture of America's supremacy in Africa". In this regard the US is also believed to be currently interested in African exclusion specifically to eliminate African threats from the global sphere of politics and engenders sustained insecurity in the region, as this would reduce the opportunity for Africa's ability to unite let alone oppose whatever order the US wanted for Africa, whether against or for, through the agency of the Council. A Professor maintains that the relevance of the Council is within its rights to maintain global peace, as such, "where over 70% of the Council's peace mission and activities occur is Africa, the continent in turn adds value to the Council and African inclusion will challenge not only the US powers on Africa but also US' unholy practices in African wars as the economic gains she made from the DRC wars".[32] "In as much as I would agree that the US has been giving aid to African poor states, the US has been instrumental to initiating those conflicts that they give aid to their victims".[33] This view is supported by other literature evidence which argue that, the US supplied munitions and enabled the cycles of violence and economic problems plaguing the

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[30]Interview with Professor of International Relations from the Bradford University United Kingdom, at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 23 May 2015
[31]Interview with African Union Official, 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa.
[32]Interview with Professor of International Relations from the Bradford University United Kingdom, at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 23 May 2015
[33]Interview with Professor of International Relations from the Bradford University United Kingdom, at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 23 May 2015

continent of Africa throughout the Cold War (1950-1989). Specifically, Mentan (2007) underscores that "the US delivered over $1.5 billion worth of weaponry to Africa. Many of the top US arms clients – Liberia, Somalia, the Sudan, and DRC have turned out to be the top basket cases of the 1990s and 2000s in terms of violence, instability, and economic collapse (Mentan, 2007: 89). To be sure, the Professor assert that "the US was part of the UN team that intervened in these countries; and as long as it [US] is part of the whole, these African nations will not recover fully from the conflict or to be safe, they may not know peace until the US arms trade is removed. Termination of trading in weaponry by the US is a major source of solution to most conflicts in Africa and elsewhere since weaponry sustained some major conflicts in Africa over the years".[34]

For his part, former President Jimmy Carter (2015) feels that the US is protecting its economic and political interest by shoving Africa out of the Council. He contends that the interest of the United States is far from the interests of African states. In his view, "Africa is one of US' biggest business partners and African representative's physical presence in the permanent Council will serve a disturbance to the US. According to Carter (2015), US-Africa partnership may collapse following tensions that the permanent membership of an African state may pose to the US leading role in its relations with Africa. Further, while he admits that African inclusion is not good for the US, he asserts that it is problematic to assume that African inclusion will better the living standards of Africans; neither will it remove from Africa, the internal squabbles among African actors. The view of Carter (2015) was supported by Kofi Annan (2015) who however, added that while, African inclusion may not necessarily change the world, it, will indeed, provide buffer for Africans in trying decision making and taking times. Specifically, Annan (2015) is convinced that "Nigeria, South Africa [from Africa] and Brazil [from Latin America] are emerging powers that cannot be left out of the Council" (Annan, 2015).

While admitting that the AU has not been as forceful to assert the necessary pressure to compel reform in the Council, Annan (2015) utters that the AU is doing the most

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[34]Interview with Professor of International Relations from the Bradford University United Kingdom, at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 23 May 2015

important, that is, raising the debate, bearing in mind that power is not relinquished on a platter of gold and mere wishes and desires. It may either take political might or economic might and based on these parameters, Africa is on the right track to become part of the permanent Council, "after all, Nigeria is potentially a global power in the continent, can fight wars and has natural resource, it is for the existing powers such as the US to facilitate the inclusion amicably" (Annan, 2015). A UN staff who responded to question in this regard, argues that the US will continue to fight against African inclusion in the Council since the US is currently testing the "African solutions to the US problems of terrorism".[35] To count, the UN Official maintains that US is interested in Al Shabbab, Boko Haram, and Islamic States of Iraq and Iran (ISIS) to mention a few. These three terror groups have stations in Africa: Cameroon, Kenya, Libya, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia. The UN Official further stated that while these terrorist wars are in the best interest of the US, "the US will continue to confront terrorism in Africa using Africans and never US personnel for all the odd jobs of fighting terrorism. The wider angle is that African inclusion could result in issues of fighting terrorist group in Africa receiving the decision of the Council to which Africa may have an opposing view with the US".[36] So, the bottom line is that the US sees a lot of potential in Africa and would not allow for the possibility of African challenge especially from the Security Council.

4.7.2. Russian Federation and permanent seat with veto

This UN Official[37] who discussed African exclusion and why Russia has not in recent years vote for African inclusion states that that Russia is a major actor in the Council. According to the UN Official, Russia's status in the Council and overall conflict resolution amounts to global security significance. However, Russia's interest in global security is motivated by the efforts to sustain its ideological reasoning, which includes the

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[35] Interview with the United Nations Official, 28 May 2015. Pretoria, South Africa.
[36] Interview with the United Nations Official, 28 May 2015. Pretoria, South Africa. The respondent believes that the terrorist presence in Africa has the backing of the US as oppose the notion of the US confrontation of the same. While the respondent cautioned that he is not seen as blaming the US alone, he is convinced that the US is involved in breeding terrorist groups, by equipping them as forces against the state.
[37].Interview with the United Nations Official, 28 May 2015. Pretoria, South Africa

"respect for the principle of sovereignty in international affairs, maintaining a geostrategic balance and international security, cultivating a favourable international image and status as a responsible member of the international community, and promoting its economic and political interests" (Paul, 1999: 218; Ferdinand, 2013: 15). It too prioritises dialogue over force to solve international conflicts (although it has shown itself more willing to pursue a muscular foreign policy). Russia too believes that UN peacekeeping operations should only be authorised when the consent of the host government has been obtained. It too places economic stability and development over respect for human rights. It too believes in the principle of upholding and strengthening the rule of law in international relations.

However, there is a key problem that Russia has with Council reform including African inclusion. Russia's particular attachment to its membership in the UNSC stems from the trajectory of variation in Russia's place in the world, Russia inherited its P5 seat from the Former Soviet Union (FSU), when it was accustomed to be treated as the superpower with net rivalry to the US (Ferdiand, 2013). Russia's skepticism about reform stems from two principal factors: "its needs to first rise from the seemingly declining Russia's status in the world, (even though this was also partly caused by the collapse of the Russian economy), and lack of trusted allies within the circle. Surely, most African states are colonised by Britain and France who also are permanent members and not the best friends of Russia, for Russia, if African state is included in the Council and the state allies with the West and US, Russia will suffer at the prime of democracy deficit within the Council and may become an overlooked power.[38] One of the prime concerns of Russia has been to restore its prestige and clout globally, and African inclusion may not necessarily mark the box for Russia. In this time of self-building, being a permanent member of the UNSC is a key element in that self-image. According to Orlov cited in Ferdinand (2013: 13) "for Russia today no world order is acceptable unless it can influence Russia's taking of strategic decisions within the Council." This particularly means that Russia is afraid that the entry of new veto-holding permanent member of the UNSC may tip the balance in the Council against Russia.

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[38]Interview with the United Nations Official, 28 May 2015. Pretoria, South Africa

So the P5 status remains tremendously valued by Russia because it embodies that wider vision the country should follow to achieve ends in the global politics. According to the UN Official, Russia requires every power it can muster to display global activism since Russia's capacity to influence the whole range of global issues is now diminished by comparison with the Soviet era. Russian economic resurgence does at least provide them with greater capacity to make a difference in selected parts of the world. And the current priority is to thicken Russia's relations with Asian states, especially China. So cooperation with China in the Security Council contributes both to the image and the substance of Russia as a global power. Russia's inability to determine where Africa's allegiance may fall in the Council is one reason why it will take another long period for Russia to endorse Africa's candidature to the permanent seat, let alone Nigeria that is in seeming good standing with the US.[39]

So far, China is the only reliable ally of Russia and the country has made many enemies from the European axis and somewhat has only the trust of its citizens, nuclear might and the veto power to rely on at the international gallery of politics. As such Russia, will not want any alteration or confusion within the established Council permanent order as it fears that additional member may side with the West. Behind Russia's resistance is the fear of depletion of its own power base. Russia, in this year [2015] banned 89 European Union (EU) politicians from entering the country which the European parliament president, Martin Schulz termed unacceptable, but Russia, sees same as a sign of its intention not to compromise its extra territorial power [veto power inclusive] without a suitable measure of war (Ferdinand, 2013).

4.7.3. The China and permanent seat with veto

Since 1945, China laid down that it should adopt a low profile in international affairs (Ferdinand, 2013: 17). Actually, China's strategy has been 'coldly observe, secure their own positions, cope calmly, conceal their positions and bide their time, keep a low

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[39]Interview with the UN Official I, 28 May 2015, Pretoria, South Africa.

profile, never take the lead, and make a contribution only when necessary (Ferdinand, 2013). China focuses exclusively upon its economic objectives and the veto power is an instrument for protecting it. One interpretation of the practice of Chinese attitude and diplomacy as the country gradually sought to integrate itself into international organisations was that its representatives observed cautiously the ways in which these organisations operated so that they could better fit in. Rather than challenge the existing international order, they sought to learn how to work in it and how to make it work for them (Ferdiand, 2013). They have been more concerned to reassure governments around the world that China's 'rise' is peaceful, and not a threat to anyone. This explains why Yang cited in Ferdinand (2013) has analysed Chinese diplomacy in the Security Council on issues concerning Iraq between 1991 and 2003 as friendly. This was opposed to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. She showed that throughout the preceding decade the People's Republic of China (PRC) increasingly practised multilateralism and balance of power, accommodating and hedging conflicts from potential allies (Ferdinand, 2013: 12). As she puts it, on balance, China did not tend to opt for obstructive behaviour in the Security Council.

Actually, observers have argued that China kept half a step behind and half inside the Council and letting Russia take the lead. According to Ferdinand (2013) Chinese officials were more nervous than Russians about antagonising the US within the Security Council system and around its reform debates. This forms part of the reasons why at the beginning of the decade-long confrontation between the West and the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, China was itself the target of Western sanctions in the aftermath of the massacres of protesters around Tiananmen Square in 1989. It might have been expected that China's leaders, who felt both threatened by and resentment about this isolation, might have responded with greater opposition to Western diplomacy, but this did not happen. Ferdinand (2013: 12) settles that in its decade-long involvement in "international diplomacy over Iraq, China tried to satisfy Western counterparts as well as appease domestic audiences."

Thus, Ferdinand (2013: 12) notes that the main priorities of Chinese engagement at the UN have four main objectives:

- protecting sovereignty, autonomy and its independence of decision-making there;
- maintaining geostrategic balance and national security;
- cultivating a favourable international image and status as a responsible member of the international community and a great power;
- Promoting China's economic and political interests.

In the above regard, a steadfast adherence to absolute sovereignty and the prioritisation of dialogue over the use of force to resolve conflicts, as the UN Charter, Chapter VII provides must reviewed to have the consent of governments against whom they are directed. Alternatively, except where UN agencies can show clear evidence of breaches of UN rules. China favours support for government efforts to promote social and economic development, with stability prioritised over human rights, and the upholding and strengthening of the rule of law in international relations are matter of interest to the Chinese as well.

Professor[40] and UN Official[41] have noted that there is a paradox about a recent emerging trend in China's attitude towards dealing with the challenges to international peace and security that constitute the criterion for Security Council intervention under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In their views, China does wish to see the role of the Security Council enhanced. Yet, Ferdinand (2013) opines that at the same time the Chinese government has edged towards involving regional organisations such as the African Union in decisions as to whether a particular situation really does represent a threat to international peace and security, or at least in legitimising them but not ceding the veto power to Africa (Ferdinand, 2015). For China, without a permanent seat and that corroboration, it is more reluctant to grant the Security Council powers to act except in circumstances where the threats are most blatant.

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[40] Interview with Professor of International Relations from the Bradford University, United Kingdom, at the Saro-Maria Hotel, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 23 May 2015.
[41] Interview with UN Official I, 25 May 2015, Pretoria, South Africa.

In other words, it has shown itself reluctant to concede sole adjudication of power to the Security Council, when the majority of the P5 members are still Western and developed, rather than from the developing world where most peace-keeping activity takes place. It implicitly accepts that assessments of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security may vary from one region of the world to another. Above the Security Council politics, China is developing itself using resources found in China, elsewhere and Africa. An African inclusion in the permanent seat means African empowerment. According to the AU Official[42] and the UN Official[43]the common denominator in their responses is that "China is not necessarily pushing for anti-African inclusion, if China had not been a permanent member since inception; it would have been difficult for China to manage its economic successes". In this view, the AU Official for one, registers that the account is true, because the US that does not want any competitor, would have drummed up support from UK and France to preach democracy in China and possibly instigate violence in that country. "If China has been infested with conflicts even in 1990s, it would have been like the Democratic Republic of Congo – a country of abundance or wealth and war."[44] Conflict of any sort cripples economic and political capabilities to organise oneself and move to the next advanced level. Incessant conflicts are why Africa is still crippled.

4.7.4. The France and permanent seat with veto

France is one of the five permanent members of the Council. According to the UN Official[45], French interest and reason why it will stand in the way of African inclusion is the fear of its own space in the Council room. France is not as powerful as it were when the WWII ended and if it leads the march for African inclusion, two things might happen to France. One, the US and Britain will sideline it in the permanent seat and it may not have any good marriage with Russia and China for their difference in policy and ideology. Two, US, UK, Russia and China may agree to open the debate on reform and vote to replace France with any emerging African state such as Nigeria, South Africa and

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[42]Interview with AU Official, 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa
[43]Interview with UN Official, 25 May 2015, Pretoria, South Africa
[44]Interview with UN Official, 25 May 2015, Pretoria, South Africa
[45]Interview with UN Official, 25 May 2015, Pretoria, South Africa

others. For this reason, France would not campaign vigorously for reform for it fears it might become the victim of the reform.[46] Its global power parity has waned since the end of WWII. The UN Official II[47] recalled that when the French Government encouraged the African region to stand up for its right to inclusion at the 566 extraordinary meeting of the AU at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, it was aimed at liberating the region. Former French President Nicolas Sarkozy said that "it was time for the world to make a place for Africa on the global stage to discuss international crises and reform, calling for the United Nations to be reformed and Africa to have a permanent member of the Security Council" (Reuters Africa, 2010: 1). At that instance, the US and Britain went behind the door saying that France is not deserving of a seat in the permanent chamber of the Council.[48]

Equally so, authors such as Yehuda Z. Blum (2005: 637) had already indicated that critics are raising doubts as to whether Britain and France especially the latter had really qualified for 'Great Power' status in the Council in the first place, even in 1945. Blum (2005) asserts that after all, France having surrendered to Nazi Germany in 1940 was not among the participants in the Dumbarton Oaks Conference of September 1944. He asserts that France was not one of the sponsoring powers of the San Francisco Conference of April-June 1945, which adopted the Charter and established the United Nations. In his view, France's inclusion in the P5 was apparently prompted by the nostalgia of Western statesmen more than by considerations of realpolitik. This sentiment, though, did not necessarily extend toward Charles de Gaulle, the leader of the 'Free French' during the war. But the 1960s critics quickly abandoned these arguments, realising that any prospect for constitutional change in the composition of the Council and the powers of its permanent members was out of the question, since it required the consent of those very members. The apex therefore, is that France is not certain of its permanent post should there be an agreement to reform the Council.

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[46]Interview with UN Official II, 1 November, 2015, Conrad Hotel, Seoul, South Korea.
[47]Interview with UN Official II, 1 November, 2015, Conrad Hotel, Seoul, South Korea
[48]Interview with UN Official II, 1 September, 2015, Conrad Hotel, Seoul, South Korea

4.7.5. United Kingdom and permanent seat with veto

To be sure, Britain was a colonial power. According to the AU Official[49] and the professor[50] who have consensus on the underpinning interest of Britain in the permanent seat and having Africa outside the chamber of permanency in the Council, the two respondents' agreed that Britain as a colonial master would not want to see its colonies at an equilibrium of power. The political reason for supporting African exclusion is to allow for the Britain to maintain the chauvinist view that lorded Britain over Anglophone African states including Nigeria. This goes without saying that Britain will not voluntarily cede power to Nigeria or South Africa or Zimbabwe, for the simple reason that they want these states to remain in perpetual dependent on the colonial master [Britain].[51]So, for Britain it is about dominating the colonised as the master in politics and economics. The two respondents see Britain as a master who wants to see African states serve as a messenger and not a mate of the UK for whatever reasons globally. Professor[52] for one argues that Anglophone African states are being used by the UK to accomplish its economic goals and will lose that edge when it becomes equal with a 'stubborn' African nation such as Nigeria that can challenge status quo and say "go away with your rotten aid."[53] In line with the above, the AU and the UPEACE officials[54] who corroborated professor added that besides lording itself over its colonies, another key reason why Britain will stand against Africa's inclusion as long as possible is to participate in maintaining the original Africa, Britain has created. "That is Africa without a global impact, controlled by outsiders."[55] He concluded that since early 1960s when most African states obtained political independence from Britain, that, Britain has been present in Africa pushing its own agenda through the divide and rule tactics that destroyed Sudan, Nigeria, South Africa, to name a few.

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[49]Interview with AU Official, 25 May, 2015, Pretoria South Africa.
[50]Interview with Professor, 23 May 2015, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
[51]Interview with Professor of International Relations, 23 May 2015, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
[52]Interview with Professor of International Relations, 23 May 2015, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
[53] Interview with Professor of International Relations, 23 May 2015, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
[54] Interviews with the AU Official and the UPEACE official resonate with the Professor's assertion that a stubborn African state will challenge the colonial Britain if granted a permanent seat with veto.
[55]Interviews with the AU Official, 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa.

4.8.   Sustaining the Status Quo: similar perspectives and examples

In spite of widespread complaints that the council's composition is unrepresentative and in spite of the seemingly endless maneuvering among member states on its reform, membership in the council is seen at the UN in the late 1990s as more of a prize than ever especially in the Latin American axis of the UN world. This view owes much to the increasingly active Council agenda since the end of the Cold War (Malone, 2000: 1). Many reasons have been advanced for why the Latin American Group was excluded from the Council as was African region. To start with, the UN was a product of WWII which the Latin American Group did not influence in any political and or economic way discernible (Lenin, 2005). As such, the sharing of the spoils of WWII took into account only important actors at the time. Currently, the P5 are dived over inclusion and reform because each actor has its own peculiar circumstances and environment that produce its survival strategy. Further, the motivation for reform and inclusion of the previously excluded and marginalised among the P5 members are variegated. Some are easily evident, while others are secreted. Bearing this in mind, the reason/s for the Latin American Group exclusion can consist of any of the following: (1) Opportunism by the executive core; (2) International dependency philosophy; (3) Realist ideology of might is right and the weak must suffer what they ought.

4.8.1. Opportunism by the executive core

An external state actor's involvement in internal conflict on the side of an insurgent group fighting a state is often an expression of aggression but an independent state begging to be seen and addressed as such is deprivation. While the reasons for why some P5 members are willing to spend billions of US dollar in sustaining violence in the Caribbean is for the simple reason of the push and pull effect of dependency and independency. The executive core, in the case of Latin America, especially Brazil, is often motivated by a number of factors including: the desire for the readily able P5 to intervene and overthrow any unfriendly government in the Latin America and Caribbean axis without the questioning of the tenacious Brazil; the US concerns around regional policy disputations and disagreements as it affects the US; and an opportunity to play one

state against the other in obtaining economic advantages with sheer impunity by the P5 member states.[56]

4.8.2. Entrenching the Dependency cleavages

What is the economic implication of "antagonism against the Security Council reform" in the 21st century world? The answer to this question has been partly provided in the Basle Manifesto. That "the resistant and wars are being fought by all the Great Powers for the purpose of plunder, carving up the world, acquiring markets, and enslaving nations" the entire Latin American population inclusive (Lenin, 2005). To the P5 it brings higher profits; to a calculated crust of marginalisation and aristocracy, and also to the best interests of the victors of World War II which impedes the global security assurances and economic developments, it promises at the inception in 1945 (Lenin, 2005). The economic basis of "political-chauvinism" (this term being more precise than the term political-patriotism, as the latter embellishes the and adores) and of opportunism of the P5 is the same, namely, an alliance between very few number of the UN member states at the permanent category of the Security Council, directed against the majority of the member nations, directed against the class that is marginalised by the P5. Political-chauvinism is a consummated opportunism and the P5 are adamant that the Latin American members of the UN will remain without permanent signature, in the global arena of governance.

Political-chauvinism and opportunism are the same in their partisan essence; the P5 collaborations (usually the Britain, France and US on one hand against the China and Russia on the other hand) avow dictatorship and rejection of transformative action, obeisance to the principles and spirit of the Charter. The legal and ethical poise of the Charter which prayed for greater freedom for all nations of the earth has lost confidence in the bourgeoisie-led Council. The exclusion of Latin American states is propelled by the circumstance that political ideas of the P5 who currently occupy the permanent seat are identical, and so is the political content of their exclusivist political tactics.

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[56]Interview with Professor of International Relations, 23 May 2015, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Political-chauvinism of Britain and US is a consummated opportunism in the Council. To be sure, the alliance of the duo is ideological and secret. What is public now, is that, none of the P5 members in essence wants South American Group in the permanent Chamber. While the US may want to remain unchallenged by South American states, it will remove every instrument that will bring South American powers to equal the North American state of US. The P5 draws its Latin American exclusion strength from nowhere else but the need to distance the two American continents apart with north as superior to the south in the global political radar (Lenin, 2005). This calculated resistance by the North America's state of US against the South Americans explains why it is a falsehood for any P5 member to say that the Latin American and Caribbean is not ripe for global power politics of veto power. The Latin Americans were never part of the P5 plan despite the roles of Brazil and Argentina's agitations especially in the 1990s towards the reformation of the Council (Padelford, 1960).

Having been seeking permanent position alongside Africa, Australasia for nearly seventy years without success in conditions of violence and peace, the P5 have matured in their exclusivist politics. The current P5 proved an open ally of the 'bourgeoisie'. Unity with opportunism means unity between the proletariat and its national bourgeoisie that is, submission to the latter, a split in the international revolutionary working class. We do not say that an immediate split with the opportunists in all countries is desirable, or even possible at present; we do say that such a split has come to a head, that it has become inevitable, is progressive in nature, and necessary to the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, and that history, having turned away from "peaceful" capitalism towards imperialism, has thereby turned towards such a split. *Volentem ducunt fata, nolentem trahunt* (faith lead the willing, but faith drag the unwilling).

The three principal powers haggled long and hard over the inclusion of additional permanent members. The United States lobbied hard for China and, initially, for Brazil, while France owes its place to the efforts of Britain. The Soviets were leery about the addition of any other powers. The United States believed Brazil belonged on the Security

Council due to its size, resources, and its contribution of troops to World War I combat. However, the British and Soviets pushed back on the idea (Cox, 2009). The United States did not press the issue for two reasons: First, a driving reason for Brazil's inclusion was equitable geographic representation, and the United States, after pushing so hard for the 'Four Policemen' idea, did not want to reopen the question of regionalism in general. Second, Brazil was simply far below the rank of 'Great Power' economically, politically, and militarily.

4.8.3. The realists turn in the Latin Americas

When seen in bold relief against the histories of other times and places, the story Thucydides tells us would help us better understand the sustained exclusion of the Latin American states through the realists lenses. According to Lenin (2015: 2) international politics is primarily about choices, not constraints; that self-interest is but one motivation among many, and not always the strongest; that people take their moral commitments seriously and sometimes act upon them, even when this conflicts with their self-interest narrowly understood; that state behaviour in crisis and war is at least as powerfully shaped by passion as by reason; and that national interests are constructed in historically contingent, seemingly arbitrary ways, not given by the structure of the system. I think we would come to see more clearly that, whether that interests and identities are negotiated and transformed through interaction; that anarchy is indeed 'what states make of it'; and that states have some choice as to what they do make of it." Claims have long been advanced by Brazil that the Latin American area should have a permanent seat on the Council and that Brazil's size and position entitle it to such a privilege.

4.9.   Conclusion

Indeed, this Chapter has explicitly and implicitly explained the reasons behind Africa's exclusion from the permanent seat. Principally, the remote reasons were partly due to colonial rule that had many African state under colony, the Chapter further explains that the fall of the League of Nations, was relied upon to settle for the assumption that the UN will equally fall. This makes for lack of motivation to compete for permanent seat at the

birth of the organisation, at least from the very few independent African states that were equally among the founding nations of the UN. The third important discourse in this Chapter was that the immediate reason why Africa is still excluded was for the P5 nations to have their own interest protected and Africa's interested not unprotected. The Chapter shows, that Africa with permanent seat will rival current status quo and this is not good for the P5 nations in varied degrees.

A growing number of major actors in the international community have rightly felt and have given the Council reform increasingly vocal expression that the current standing of the United Nations in general, and the Security Council in particular, does actually exacerbate the exclusion conundrum within the organisation. The Chapter underscores that African nations calling for reform points to their worsening security conditions which is evidenced in the 70% of the cases treated by the Council annually, being Africans. In the event of remote causes for African exclusion, it was understood that majority of African nations were not part of the UN in 1945. It was explained also that Africa was not a stakeholder at the time of the UN formation, the thoughts that the League was not a success story and that the UN may be a repeat does serve as a pillar a problem with African actors in the exclusion saga. However, the contemplations of continued exclusion, post 1960s, that is the immediate causes for African marginalisation hinges mainly on the United States of America's intentions to locka vulnerable Africa where the US can achieve maximum pecuniary profits. In short, the exclusion has processed both political and economic dislocations in Africa.The next chapter, Chapter Five, considers the capabilities of African states to serve in the Council using various conflicts and war record to bring the accounts to bear.

CHAPTER FIVE

Africa: the construal of regional and global peace and security

5.1. Introduction

The previous chapter examined the remote and immediate causes of African exclusion from the permanent seat which in part frames the epistemic contours of this study. It was noted that African exclusion was due to colonial perfidy and protection of contemporary interests of the privileged P5 members. The reasons for the formation of the Council capture the dialectics of realpolitik and prescribe mechanisms for sustaining the status quo – attributes that underscore Security Council's relevance to the world.

This chapter presents an overview conflicts and African actors presence in Africa. The Chapter locates the contemporary propensities in conflict and armed violence in Africa and elsewhere. It is noted that, it is a complex enterprise, especially, as it prevails on the United Nations Security Council profligacy. It however, excavated the economic, technological, military and political underpinnings that play roles to either encourage or inhibit global actors. As a measure to determine capabilities, it weighs top five African states securitisation competences and underscores that, while it is independently, daunting to gauge Africa's suitability to occupy a permanent seat, it is fashionable to include Africa in the permanent range.[57] Official documents such as the Human Security Report (HSR) (2013) was utilised to highlights that number of conflicts within states.

As agreed to in chapter two, this chapter recognises: Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa as the Big Five in African affairs. The analysis draws from the views of United Nations Official's response to our interview questions, the African Union representative's response to our interview questions, and various data providers – the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), the reports from the Global Burden of Armed Violence (GBAV), the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer, the Political Instability Task

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[57]Interviews with the UN Official, 25 May 2015, Pretoria, South Africa.

Force (PITF), the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) and the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).

Based on this premise, this chapter highlights the centrality of conflicts, wars, and capability to manage them. Specifically, it discusses the implications of Africa's conflict in Africa and the consequent rise of terrorist groups. The tortuousness of the war and conflicts in Africa derived from various sources are considered thinking whether the result would have been same if African state is a permanent member. Finally, using specific interventions, as example, this chapter, in its explication of the conflicts in Africa weighs Africa's fitness to take a leading role in providing security for Africa. In order to conceretise debate, sections 5.7, 5.7.1, 5.7.2, and 5.7.3 were used as specific sample of an African state's roles.

5.2. Violence and death in Africa: the implications of Security Council Permanent seat

As noted earlier, the Africa is plagued with serious conflict pathologies despite its being naturally endowed. According to Cillier (2014: 2), in at least 58 countries that exhibit violent death rates above 10.0 per 100 000, Africa, accounts for almost two-thirds of all violent deaths – or 285 000 individuals killed annually. About five years ago, particularly since 2009 and 2010, Africa has experienced increased in armed conflict within the continent. This is a period jaggedly overlapping with the prodigious global recession and the later years of the War on Terror, during which armed conflict has, in particular, spread to Africa. According to the UN Official[58] "the waning heights of interstate war and the fact that most armed conflicts today are fought within, rather than between states is a major cause of the declining levels of fatalities and causalities of war in the continent". This signaled that civil wars in Africa are seemingly sure to stay. The wars will in turn tear apart the affected population as did Libya since 2011. And the issue of security importance here is why there are no civil wars in the P5 states, and Africa is

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[58]Interviews with the UN Official which focusses on Africa's regional and global security roles, was conducted on 25 May 2015, JHB, South Africa. This respondent strongly recommended the works of Jackie Cilliers in the field area as relevant document to understanding the roles and/or intended roles which this researcher adhered to and utilised.

regularly at war with self. In order to verify this point, an interviewee raised the question: "why is it that civil conflict continues in Africa while other parts of the world are relatively peaceful?"[59] Questions such as this foreground the role of some of the P5 nations in the Africa's civil conflicts.

However, one of the interviewees[60] "underscores that the customary mode of governments' leadership and combating insurrectionaries has given way to a multifarious tapestry within which rebel movements rise and fight against the state. In stressing the point, it was said that the government in Africa may be weak in combating insurrections and terrorism but no permanent voice in the Security Council is partly responsible for it."[61] One way to determine this trend is to turn to the measurement of the number of armed groupings involved in conflicts, or so-called 'conflict dyads' as casted by Jakkie Cilliers of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). In her work, Africa's Conflict Burden in a Global Context combining data from two Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) datasets, and plotting the number of dyads against the number of armed conflicts globally and in Africa, she found that the number of dyads slowly outpaces the number of conflicts over time despite the restrictive UCDP requirement that one of the two conflicting parties must be the government of a state. To be sure, Somalia and South Sudan, for example, have substantial proportion of conflict actors with local, regional and opportunistic goals that may fall into the neighboring borders.

According to the AU Official[62] and Cilliers (2014) the number of armed conflicts experienced in Africa in 1960s when African population was about 285 million compared to 1,1 billion in 2013, was on the increase because Africa currently does not have a permanent security actor. Cilliers (2014) argues that the increase and its complexion have direct bearings to some of the P5 members. Impliedly, she counted that more recently; external involvement in Africa's internal conflicts by the P5 members is evidenced by

[59]Interviews with the UN Official which focusses on Africa's regional and global security roles, was conducted on 25 May 2015, JHB, South Africa.
[60]Interviews with the UN Official which focusses on Africa's regional and global security roles, was conducted on 25 May 2015, JHB, South Africa.
[61]Interviews with the UPEACE Official, 10 September 2015 [E-interview].
[62]Interview with the AU Official on Africa's regional and global security roles, was conducted on 25 May 2015, JHB, South Africa.

events in Côte d'Ivoire, Mali and the Central African Republic, during which French forces intervened (Cilliers, 2014: 8 – 9). This account can be married to that of combined efforts of Britain, France and US in Libya in 2011 through which Gaddafi can never be resurrected again (Ekwealor, 2013).

As was in Cote d'Ivoire and Libya, Africa's fatality levels from different types of armed conflicts including that of the later phase of Congo War, also known as the Great War of Africa, which began in 1998, directly involved nine African countries and at least 20 armed groups (Cilliers, 2015). Fatality statistics vary greatly between sources, but by 2008, the war and its aftermath had resulted in between 2.4 and 5.4 million deaths, mostly from disease and starvation. Further, the veteran Ugandan scholar, Professor Dan Wadada Nabudere famously described the Congo war as "Africa's First World War" (Ekwealor, 2013: 42). Baregu (2002:33) opines that the war was all "about high international politics as opposed to low domestic politics (democratisation, human rights, ethnicity, etc.)". He adds that it was first and foremost, an imperialist war and like all imperialist wars in modern history, it was about the distribution of wealth and power.

Both Amuwo (2009) and Baregu (2002) note that the United States of America, a permanent member of the Security Council is the main beneficiary of the conflict in the Congo based on the fact that its armaments industry was a foremost supplier to the country and warring factions including the militias involved in the war. While this account endorses the position of the UN Official that the P5 in its current form is not a safe net for Africa and that the reform is urgent to halt conflict in Africa, Baregu (2002:3) further observes that behind the pro-democracy pro-growth grandiloquence of the P5 states, the less publicised role of the US in Africa has been its steady supply of arms, ammunitions and military training – all stoking the fires of armed conflicts in the Congo and elsewhere on the continent. See table 5.1 below as adapted from Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIICR) at the Department of Political Science, University of Heidelberg Conflict Barometer, 2008.

Table 5.1 - Overview: UN Missions led or supported by Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) from 1948 till 2008

Mission Acronym	Name of Mission	Start	Country
Europe			
UNOMIG UN	Observer Mission in Georgia	1993	Georgia
UNFICYP UN	Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	1964	Cyprus
UNMIK UN	Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo	1999	Serbia
Sub-Saharan Africa			
BINUB UN	Integrated Office in Burundi	2007	Burundi
MONUC UN	Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	1999	Congo (Kinshasa)
UNMIS UN	Mission in the Sudan	2005	Sudan
UNAMIS AU/UN	Hybrid operation in Darfur	2007	Sudan
UNMEE UN	Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	2000	Ethiopia, Eritrea
UNOCI UN	Operation in Cote d'Ivoire	2004	Cote d'Ivoire
MINURCAT UN	Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad	2007	Chad
UNMIL UN	Mission in Liberia	2003	Liberia
UNIOSIL UN	Mission Integrated Office in Sierra Leone	2006	Sierra Leone
UNIPSIL UN	Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone	2008	Sierra Leone
AMISOM	African Union Mission to Somalia	2007	Somalia
The Americas			
MINUSTAH UN	Stabilization Mission in Haiti	2004	Haiti
Asia and Oceania			
UNMOGIP UN	Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan	1949	India, Pakistan
UNMIT UN	Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste	2006	Timor-Leste
Middle East & Maghreb			
UNIFIL UN	Interim Force in Lebanon	1978	Lebanon
UNAMA UN	Assistance Mission in Afghanistan	2002	Afghanistan
MINURSO UN	Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	1991	Morocco
UNTSO UN	Truce Supervision Organization	1948	Israel
UNDOF UN	Disengagement Observer Force	1974	Syria, Israel

Source: Adapted from the United Nations Intervention log book (http://www.un.org).

Having seen that twenty-two UN peace mission led or supported by the DPKO globally is enormous, twelve of those (that is, more than half) are on the soil of Africa (HIICR, 2008: 10). This observation also features prominently in narratives on the Africa's conflict dyad. For example, several chapters in Cilliers' (2014) compendium illustrate the

fact that each (PKO) had its own interest(s) or agenda(s) besides those advanced publicly or in official briefings. Thus, it is important therefore to note that the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, which recorded about 500 000 deaths, and the 1996 DRC conflict are instances of UN Security Council P5's business of interest. While the AU Official[63] corroborates Cilliers account, that, the sharp peaks in Africa in battle-related fatalities in 1989/1990 and again 1999/2000 are largely the result of the Ethiopian civil war, the AU Official is adamant that those wars are indicators of lack of 'real' authority — UN Security Council Permanent seat — in the continent. The AU Official confirms Cilliers account that the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea over the town of Badme was a war against dissident and armed opposition groups against each other which actually broadened the scale of human deaths as part of a proxy war within the axis of the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia is currently on upward step towards a status of important regional actor. And equipping Eritrea with munitions by the manufacturer of munitions from the P5 will make that journey very far and unyielding. Veto power to an African state can serve a deterrent to such trading arrangements that stoke conflict in Africa. This assertion is mindful of the possibility of an African state aligning itself with either Western or Eastern members of P5. But what is certain, is that whoever gets its alliance must lobby for it. Currently, no one lobbies for Africa's per se, Africa is told what actions to take.

Other peaks in battle-related deaths still on African soil is in Angola, the war between the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (1993) and the actions of the Cobra militias in the DRC in 1997, on top of sustained conflict in Sudan as the war between the government in Khartoum and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army escalated. This brawl saw the division of Sudan after the signing of the Naivasha peace agreement in 2005, followed by the secession referendum in South Sudan in 2011 and South Sudan's independence, only for war in South Sudan to resume in 2014 among externally funded opposing factions in the ruling party that both broke and dislocated the political compass of the South Sudan political determination.

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[63] The view of the African Union Official in this interview is that Africa as a region, needs to present the world with one candidate for the permanent seat, and "when this is done, Africa will determine the tone of whatever debate that may follow" 25 May 2015, JHB South Africa.

5.2.1. The scale and nature of conflicts in Africa

An important characteristic of armed conflict in Africa, which distinguishes it from other regions globally, is the consistent high levels of so-called non-state conflict and its associated fatalities (Cilliers, 2014). Reading and interpreting the works of Virgil Hawkins' *Measuring United Nations Security Action and Inaction in the 1990s: Lessons for Africa,* it is evident from the intensity of conflicts in Africa especially, from 1991 to 1993 and from 1998 to 2004 as also implied by Cilliers (2014) that Africa as a car needs mudguard for global conflict — the permanent seat with veto. While Cilliers holds that the most likely explanation for this particularly African phenomenon is the absence of effective state control over national territory, Hawkins (2003) and AU Official[64] were of the convictions that the political jockeying within the Council strata is the major militating force against Africa's peace and security.

The UN[65] and UPEACE[66] Officials and Cilliers (2014) argue that African exclusion from the Council per se, does not stop the region from the proprietorship of own and global securitisation scopes, the duo separately lay emphasis on weak governance and ineffective security agencies in Africa that are unable to ensure stability across the continent. Cilliers (2014) specifically, maintains that poor infrastructure and difficult politico cum economic terrains are the most likely explanations for Africa's invisible security roles regionally or globally. Also, the African leaders' inability to untie the colonial demarcated boundaries that do not necessarily correspond with forms of loyalties on the ground since independence is a significant factor driving Africa's muted security roles. When boundaries and loyalties are properly harnessed, the AU Official judged that "Nigeria for example, will be able to lead the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) into most at-risk-of-death African states such as

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[64]Interview with the AU Official on Africa's regional and global security roles, 25 May 2015, JHB, South Africa.
[65]Interview with the UN Official on Africa's regional and global security roles, 25 May 2015, JHB, South Africa.
[66]Interview with the UPEACE Official on Africa's regional and global security roles, 25 May 2015, JHB, South Africa.

Somalia, South Sudan and the DRC."[67] The AU Official is convinced that "Nigeria's experiences and success stories in Liberia and Sierra Leone respectively coupled with new Ethiopian enthusiasm in regional and global security operations with the backing of other African states can combat and defeat any insurgency and douse uprisings in the region through military might."[68]

5.2.2. The emergence and rise of terrorism in Africa: the next burden

Meanings of terrorism have continuously stayed contentious, particularly in Africa, where certain so-called terrorist movements later became anti-captivity crusaders. Africa has not had a hold on confiscating terrorist programmes and agenda in the continent neither has the global community. But the United Nations Security Council has ignored developing modalities on how to deal with terrorism in Africa as opposed to other terrorist attacked nations. According to the *Russia Today* (RT), terrorists such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in November/December 2015 attacked countries such as France, Lebanon, United Sates of America, Syria, Nigeria, to mention a few. But the Security Council convened to discuss only the Paris attack. Those that occurred in Nigeria and Lebanon did not receive any attention *per se.*

However, global interest as well as African entrapment within the fight against terrorism cannot be contained without halting the importation of military hardware. The halt in the sales of arms to terrorist groups is a statement that a permanent member can make. Africa's current mode of addressing the terrorist group such as the Boko Haram in founded in what the AU Official called "African solution to non-African problems."[69] In the view of the AU respondent, terrorism became global as well as African problems since it was rekindled by the 9/11 attacks in the US and the subsequent development of

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[67]Interview with the AU Official on Africa's regional and global security, is African exclusion from the permanent seat and veto power impeding its ability to command peace regionally and globally? 25 May 2015, JHB, South Africa.

[68]Interview with the AU Official, 25 May 2015, JHB, South Africa.

[69]Interview with the AU Official on Africa's regional and global security, is African exclusion from the permanent seat and veto power impeding its ability to command peace regionally and globally? 25 May 2015, JHB, South Africa.

what some consider a global jihadist movement composed of groups affiliated with or inspired by al-Qaeda (Cilliers, 2015). The AU Official recorded with concern that the current insurgency around the globe whether Al Shabaab or Boko Haram, sprang as the aftermath of the provocative combined invasion of Iraq by US and Britain. The respondent maintains that these terror groups have fixed interest as a common denominator. The respondent is adamant that even ISIS are to some extent, the byproduct of the undue incursion into Iraq. "They are spillover effect of undermining national governments and lack of respect to the will of others by the US and allies"[70]

According to Cilliers (2014) data, at the 11th Conference of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa in Kenya, which brought together African heads of intelligence and security services from 51 countries, the special representative of the chairperson of the African Union Commission for Counter-Terrorism Cooperation, Francisco Madeira, quoted in Cilliers, advises the politicians to create jobs, give counter narratives to these groups, share intelligence in time, create laws that can help and allocate enough resources to address the menace. Madeira noted that although al-Shabaab represented the greatest threat in East Africa and Boko Haram in West Africa, the entire continent was threatened by the increasing influence of al-Qaeda and other radical groups in Iraq and Syria. The challenge is that the War on Terror is exploited by governing elites and their security apparatuses to strengthen their coercive abilities, and that governments crack down on legitimate opposition by labelling them 'terrorists' (Cilliers, 2014: 12). It is important to note that accounts which do not represent act or terrorism are also labeled so by the P5 states to allow intervention and simultaneous exploitation of the invaded land. Libya was invaded in 2011 through the UN Security Council Resolution 1973, today, the North African economic and political power house, is a haven for all sorts of terrorist activities and as a state, it is very close to being declared a failed one. This account, indeed explains the claims that Africa's exclusion from the P5 has neutralise its ability to keep peace and order regionally and globally. The AU had a

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[70]Interview with the AU Official on Africa's regional and global security, is African exclusion from the permanent seat and veto power impeding its ability to command peace regionally and globally? 25 May 2015, JHB, South Africa.

collaborative plan on Libya, the only instrument that would have allowed its plan was a veto power.

Despite the 2011 Libya reality, the incidents of armed conflict in Cote d'Ivoire, the ongoing conflicts in Central African Republic, the South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, suggests that armed conflict in Africa follows the general pattern of voiceless African states and 'voiceful' P5 states on African soils. This is so, because in all of these conflicts, at least a permanent member is interested in the conflict, thereby sustaining it traditionally against the government and in favour of the 'opposition' or the rebel. The impact of the Cold War, to which Africa was no active role player, for example continued to disrupt peace pattern in the continent, leading to higher levels of armed violence than would have been expected from the 1970s and 1980s (Cilliers, 2014). Recent trends of politics of exclusion and inclusion point to another increase in armed violence from around 2010, potentially indicating that, conflict in Africa rose much faster than the global average prior to 1989. According to the AU Official, "the issue with African equipment with veto strength is that the levels of armed conflict in Africa are quite sensitive to global developments."[71] Cilliers who corroborated this view added that, this is possibly because of the marginal position that Africa occupies politically and economically globally, and also the possible multiplier effect that limited governance has in many African countries (Cilliers, 2014: 15).

When the UN Official was drawn to specifically untangle the disjuncture that exists in global conflict burden, the note is that "unlike other regions, Africa is burdened with a high level of so-called non-state conflict."[72] This type of conflict involves armed groups and factions that are fighting one another and not the state. Assuredly, Cilliers (2015) underscores that this is almost certainly due to weak, unconsolidated governance characteristic of many African countries. She continued that for several years, the War on

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[71]Interview with the AU Official on Africa's regional and global security, is African exclusion from the permanent seat and veto power impeding its ability to command peace regionally and globally? 25 May 2015, JHB, South Africa.
[72]Interview with the UN Official on Africa's regional and global security, is African exclusion from the permanent seat and veto power impeding its ability to command peace regionally and globally? 25 May 2015, JHB, South Africa.

Terror enabled the impression that international terrorism, largely aimed at the US and its allies, but mostly affecting Muslim societies, presented a threat to all countries, despite the limited nature of the attacks and generally small number of fatalities suffered.

There is a general view that the Middle East, and not Africa, is the region experiencing the fastest growth in terrorism. Cilliers informed that whether terrorism, intra-state war, or inter-state war, all precipitate conflict. Surely, once the dominant elite have established control in a given territory, and others recognise their legal right to rule, there are generally reduced levels of large-scale violence – although not always resulting in improvements in the livelihoods of the population is the view of Cilliers. However, in these variations, it becomes imperative to note, that the importance of African empowerment to combat own and global terrorism and other definitive conflicts is a step forward to genuinely addressing matters of international security. To be safe, the League of Nations and later the United Nations were established with a primary focus on reduction of wars between nations, the dominant type of instability at the time. The dominant trend of instability in Africa currently is an Africa with conflicts but does not play any significant role in ending conflicts within her own borders.

Since the formation of the UN in 1945, the nature of conflicts have both gradually and drastically changed and internal armed conflicts now dominate both pie and component bar chats of global conflicts. And Africa is actually at the centre. As noted by Cilliers (2014), since interstate war – characterised by high-intensity battles between formally organised armed forces – is generally more deadly than civil war, the decline in war between countries since the middle of the 20th century has also led to a sharp decline in so-called battle deaths. Today, armed political violence is still widespread, however. This manifests itself in various forms – from terrorism to efforts at violent secession and warlords fighting for control over tradable resources, such as coffee, cocoa, coltan and charcoal.

Increased competition for water, food, energy and land among Africa's rapidly increasing population will increase local conflict over livelihoods. Again, this trend will be accentuated and may escalate into more widespread interstate conflicts in the near future starting with countries such as Libya, South Africa that do not have sufficient naturally engineered water within their own borders (BBC News, 2015). What is clearer is that, when the conflicts erupt, the affected local communities might not be able to compartmentalise the insecurity, thereby, requiring the support of the international communities, especially the Security Council. This is another fundamental reason why Africa's exclusion from the Council is still a big thorn on Africa's blood system. In this forecasted time of trial, Africa needs a veto power to manage the anticipated undue incursion by the current P5 states during trying time. The question however, is who will stand in the permanent position for Africa? To this end, we will engage the views of UN Officials, the AU Officials, and the global data sets on Africa's top five actors as listed in chapter two.[73]

5.3. Top Five African states

In a milieu in which Africa both aspires and is expected to take on more responsibilities for expansion, peace and security on the continent and globally, the question of who will bail the cat is at the heart of post-colonial Africa. Save to say, Africa has been peripheral in all things and pusillanimity to international relations that have tended to focus on P5 or the other influential western states that spin the agenda wheel in the circle of global governance. While the AU Official is adamant that "Africa is reclaiming its rightful podium at the global altar of governance",[74] Cilliers et al (2015) can only agree that the more recent popular 'Africa rising' narrative is superficial, and so far only South Africa and, to a lesser extent, Nigeria and Egypt have attracted the attention of scholars and analysts as potential middle or emerging powers.

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[73] The idea here is to determine whether any of the states listed is eligible to stand in for Africa. The analysis is not aimed at comparing African states with a view to single out the best.
[74]Interview with the AU Official, 25 May 2015, JHB, South Africa.

The UN Official who narrates that Nigeria's stability can change Africa's course globally, hinted that, "withholding of permanent seat from Africa, will continue to exacerbate the instability in the region, Africa's potential trajectory, provides that a colonial legacies, post-independence politics and foreign interference that have combined to render the region perennially tempestuous will be regularly challenged."[75] Concurring with the UN representative, Cilliers et al (2015) affirm that "changes in the global distribution of power [especially within the Council], however, will influence Africa's ability to project power, and its capacity for informal and formal alliance building – both continentally and globally" (Cilliers et al, 2015: 1-2). They continued that the Big Five powerhouses of Africa – Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa (in alphabetical order) will unavoidably contour the future of the continent because of their demographic, economic and military size, as well as their historical role as regional leaderships. Jointly, these states account for "40% of Africa's population, 60% of the African economy and 58% of Africa's military expenditure" (Cilliers et al, 2015: 2).

5.3.1. Perceptions of clout among Africa's Big Five

Forecasting the distribution of relative national power across time requires a platform that formally represents variables from a wide range of key development systems and interactions. Despite the fact that a fundamental variable in comprehending nation's comportment, gauging its power, and determining its current state and future potentials are hugely contested, there are perceptions among scholars of economics and politics that Africa's Ethiopia and Nigeria are on the regional and global power rise. The contestations among academics and analysts concerns the components that should be used when calculating power capabilities and how those components can be totaled into a single measure of power (Cilliers et al, 2015). After World War II, the UN Official notes that the focus on determining global power parity was generally on quantifying the balance of power held among the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the US and various European states. More recently the focus has been the ongoing transition of power

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[75]Interview with the UN Official on Africa's [Nigeria's] candidacy to the United Nations Security Council permanent seat, 25 May 2015, JHB, South Africa.

between the US and China. Africa has in both regards, been at the margins of such debates.

However, early measures of self-styled 'hard power' notions which are near absent on the African soil tended to emphasise only three principal components of power capability, that is, economic, demographic and military forte (Cilliers et al, 2015). Many other components of power have, however, subsequently been considered in an effort to refine the original broad measures. These include measures of wealth, trade, aid and investment flows, measures of technological capabilities, government capacity and human capital. Efforts to measure and forecast state power rely on indicators of the general strength and ability of a country to exert influence rather than on any particular outcome of state action. Therefore, measures of power focus on potential, which is tied to a generalised understanding of outcomes. Using the Hillebrand-Herman-Moyer Index (HHMI), a modification and expansion of the Hillebrand-Herman Index (HHI), which was created by Evan Hillebrand and Paul Herman with support from Barry Hughes at the University of Denver, Cilliers et al (2015) weighed the top five African states.

Cilliers et al (2015) who conducted the study takes international flairs and diplomatic networks, and military spending into the analysis. In this fashion, the study relies extensively on the Base Case forecast in the International Futures forecasting system (IFs) to set out expected future developments with a time horizon of 2040 with a view to providing grounds for suggesting that, these top five African states is fit to become a permanent member of the Council with veto. IFs is a large-scale, long-term highly integrated modelling software system housed at the Frederick S Pardee Center for International Futures at the University of Denver. The measures referred to above is actually contextualised for Africa. On the continent, state formation and consolidation are ongoing processes. Many capabilities are inwardly focused and national processes for converting capabilities into power projection are constrained. This process of consolidating state capacity may be one helpful way to understand why African states' ability to express power externally may be limited by domestic instability and other governance deficits (Cilliers et al, 2015: 3).

5.3.2. The economy of Africa's top five

Accounts available on Africa's economic rooting as presented by Cilliers et al (2015) hold that in 2014 only six African countries had economies with a GDP larger than $100 billion (in real market exchange rates):

1.   Nigeria ($536 billion)
2.   South Africa ($454 billion)
3.   Egypt ($263 billion)
4.   Algeria ($233 billion)
5.   Angola ($126 billion)
6.   Morocco ($116 billion)

Even though, Ethiopia is among Africa's top five powers, it was the 11th largest economy in Africa, with a GDP of $43 billion. But, although Ethiopia's GDP was 12 times smaller than that of Nigeria in 2014, at the end of the forecast period in question it is estimated that Ethiopia will be the sixth largest economy in Africa and only eight times smaller than that of Nigeria. This reflects faster rates of convergence (Cilliers, et al, 2015).

Economic growth in Africa is driven by long-term investments in health, education, reductions in foreign-debt burdens, access to information-communication technology and improvements in governance. Although there have been general improvements in these variables and associated trends for the past 15 years, each of the Big Five has a unique economic-production profile.

According to the IFs Base Case forecasts for the period 2015 to 2040 Ethiopia is expected to achieve the highest average growth rate of the Big Five – on average, almost 2% faster than the 8.3% of Nigeria. Whereas Algeria, Egypt and South Africa are expected to grow below the African average rate of 6.3%, and roughly in line with the global average, Nigeria and Ethiopia are both expected to grow much faster. Nigeria, already the largest economy in Africa, and representing over 1.5% of the global economy, is forecast to represent nearly 3% of the global economy by 2040, close to the

economic output of Germany and greater than that of France in 2013 (Cilliers et al, 2015: 14).

5.3.3. International flairs and diplomatic engagements

Some of the ways to determine states international relevance and presence is through the arrays of its diplomatic interactions. Such indicators are: the number of embassies a country has in the world; the number of memberships of international organisations, weighted by importance of these organisations; and, the number of treaties held by the UN secretary-general signed or ratified by a country, weighted by treaty importance. In this regard, Egypt has traditionally dominated this category of foreign-policy power projection, followed more recently by South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, and Ethiopia (Cilliers et al, 2015). The increase in the level of South Africa's diplomatic engagement after the end of apartheid clearly illustrated the country's successful reintegration into international affairs over the last 20 years. In brief, Egypt is the African country with the most embassies abroad with 125 embassies in foreign countries in 2014. While we have underscored in chapter two that Egypt's strategic location, and its important role in Arab and African nationalism have ensured that this country is deeply connected internationally, it is not surprising that Egypt is therefore the African country with the most foreign embassies – and has remained so even after the surge in interest and activism by South Africa since the end of apartheid in 1994.

5.3.4. Military spending

The size and quality of a country's military force is a traditional indicator for measuring national power. The Big Five's military capabilities since 1960 as a percentage of total military expenditure in Africa and shows the forecast through to 2040. Bearing in mind that the UN Security Council's P5 are states with big spending on military projects it becomes imperative to weigh military expenditure among Africa's top five. While the study does not compare Africa against the P5 states, absolute military expenditures for Algeria and Nigeria have increased modestly in recent years, whereas for Egypt, Ethiopia and South Africa have remained relatively flat. Algeria and Egypt have had to contend

with the fallout of the Arab Spring in North Africa, which culminated in the overthrow of the dictatorial regime of Mubarak and the Muslim fundamentalist rule of Mohamed Morsy – only for the military to later reassert its influence with El-Sisi's appointment as president. After NATO's intervention in Libya and the death of Gaddafi in October 2011, the arms that flowed in and out of Libya have fuelled regional instability. North Africa has thus far only seen a stable, if tenuous, transition in one country – Tunisia – and instability affects Algeria's security along its eastern, southern and western borders.

At the same time that global oil and gas prices have fallen sharply, reducing its revenues, Nigeria has been caught in an intensifying five-year insurgency with Boko Haram in its north-east, which, by the end of 2014, had displaced 1.5 million and resulted in the deaths of more than 10 000 people in 2014 alone (Mark, 2015). Part of a regional challenge, Boko Haram is also active in Chad, Niger and Cameroon and has recently pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. For its part, and beyond its various internal challenges, Ethiopia has a frozen conflict with Eritrea, insurgency in Somalia and war in neighbouring Sudan/South Sudan to contend with in the region. Since the end of apartheid, South Africa is the only country in the group at peace with its region, which is reflected in the dramatic decline in defence expenditure since 1994. In 2013, the latest year for which the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute published data, Algeria accounted for 17% of Africa's total military expenditure and has, since 2008, had the largest military expenditure in Africa (Cilliers et al, 2015). Algeria's military expenditure has grown at 11% per annum since 1988.

In 2014 Nigeria's military budget increased substantially with an additional $1 billion allocated to the military in response to the growing threat of Boko Haram. This has pushed Nigeria into the same league as Egypt in terms of its annual military budget but it is still significantly below that of Algeria or Angola. Aside the account that suggests that an African top five, Nigeria, can saddle with the veto power of the Council for Africa, an ISS policy paper in South African Defence Review (Cilliers, 2014b) commented on the mismatch between ambition and capacity among Africa's top five, and noted that Africa remains reliant on European and US force enablers, such as strategic and tactical airlift to

function. In that study, the potential locomotives of Africa's development and stability –
countries such as Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, and Egypt – do not have commensurate
military capacity, to match their foreign-policy ambitions. The study relates that the need
for France, the UK, and to a lesser extent the US (and the UN) to militarily intervene in
Africa reflects the constrained conflict-management capacity available on the continent.
However, despite this record, the AU Official[76] is adamant that "Africa has been able to
return peace in certain trouble spots in Africa; and that the continent does not necessarily
need out-of-ordinary military expenditure to resolve conflicts in the region." The
respondent related that "Nigeria almost single-handedly returned Liberia and Sierra
Leone to peace even without big military expenditure; holding that Africa needs
commitments to any course including fighting against externally dominated
interventions."[77]

5.4.   The power panel of Africa's five states

Indeed, Nigeria is the country with the largest economic and power potential on the
continent. However, it faces different challenges like the other countries of the Big Five –
although it shares a common history with Ethiopia, Egypt and Algeria, having
experienced 33 years of military rule since independence in 1960. According to the AU
Official[78] and Cilliers et al (2015) the Nigerian economy is dominated by its hydrocarbon
sector, which suppresses the development of other economic sectors, manufacturing in
particular, by increasing the relative value of its currency, the naira. Despite the recent
diversification of the economy, with new sectors contributing to the country's GDP, 90%
of Nigeria's export revenue still comes from oil (Financial Times, 2014). To a large
extent, the increase in Africa's role globally will be driven by the future weight of
Nigeria. Politics in Nigeria are particularly complex with many ethnic, religious and
social fault lines across society. Also, a deeply entrenched low level of government
efficiency equally pulls Nigeria backwards against its bid to quickly emerge as a global
power. Even when it ranked the happiest nation on earth in 2011, Transparency

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[76] Interview with the AU Official 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa.
[77]Interview with the AU Official 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa.
[78]Interview with the AU Official 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa.

International's Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Nigeria lowest of the Big Five, at 136 out of 175 countries in the survey (Cilliers et al, 2015).

However, despite the shortcomings Cilliers et al (2015: 7) assert that "in terms of economic potential, no African country can compete with Nigeria." Further the interpretation of the International Futures (IFs) data and model in forecasting countries future powers, Nigeria's GDP is forecast to grow from slightly "over $525 billion in 2014 to slightly over $4.2 trillion by 2040" (Cilliers et al, 2015: 7). By 2040 the IFs Base Case forecast is that Nigeria will constitute slightly less than 2% of the global economy, up from 0.7% in 2014. To this end, the authors advised that "to a large extent, the increase in Africa's role globally will therefore be driven by the future weight of Nigeria – a country that by 2040 will have the fourth largest population in the world after India, China and the US" (Cilliers et al, 2015: 7). Despite these positive samplings, change in Nigeria's political culture of violence which former President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan has terminated by accepting defeat as an incumbent president in the 2015 presidential election in Nigeria must continue to influence political decision in Nigeria. This is a country that has been enmeshed in continual internal wars – the most recent against Boko Haram in the north-east. The change in political culture of Nigeria is necessary to effectively align and nurture its foreign policy, stand its preeminence in role it plays in West Africa, and more specifically ECOWAS, and that of the African Union and the United Nations.

Having seen that Nigeria is shortlisted to manifestly top the Big Five African states by 2040, it becomes important to warn Nigeria to embark on overall good governance. The UN Official[79] holds that Africa's overall success is tied to the success of Nigeria as a nation. In fact, a commissioned study by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in 2013 found that when Nigeria is liberated from colonial dependency Africa shall become an independent continent. The study also notes that Africa and the Middle East are likely to retain their unenviable position as the two regions with the highest conflict burden

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[79]Interview with the UN Official 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa.

164

globally for the foreseeable future. This does not only points to the continued need for Africa to wake from slumber but also to invest in conflict prevention, security-sector reform, the rule of law and regional forces, by not only striving towards becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council but also ensuring good governance in Nigeria. As noted in chapter two, currently, nine of the sixteen global peacekeeping operations are sited in Africa and it is reasonable to expect that the continent will remain the largest domain for international peace operations in both long and medium terms unless Africa says no, that, enough is enough (Cilliers et al, 2015). Traditionally, under the current configuration of the UN Security Council, Africa's interest is not protected, and it can only be catered for when it is able to seat as a veto power and negotiate bends with that power.

5.5.   Africa in the world: the cries or the actions?

The state-based configuration of the global arrangement has always been in fluidity with countries – and regions – gaining and losing power over time. Since the 1940s especially from the 1960s to the end of the Cold War on December 8, 1991, the world experienced a bipolar distribution of state power between two P5 states (Russia and US). The end of the Cold War brought about an ostensible unipolar moment that was devoid of Africa which may now be changing towards another bipolar moment because of the shifting power between West and East, and more specifically the importance of the US and China (Cilliers et al, 2015). As for Africa in the world, some scholars have focused only on the rise of China, whereas others have emphasised that the world is moving towards a greater degree of multipolarity before the mid-century, with potentially four great powers, China, India, the European Union and the US, and to a lesser extent Africa (with a combined resources) (Cilliers et al 2015).

The US National Intelligence Council's report 'Global trends 2030: Alternative worlds' notes that one of the four most important megatrends globally is the diffusion of power, which is happening both across states (from West to East, in particular), and from states to networks, non-state actors and other international regimes the United Nations being

165

one of them (Cilliers et al, 2015). The UN Official[80] indicated that global realignment of power is based on necessary might – political, economic and social. For example, China has risen and its economy was recently re-estimated to be larger than that of the US in purchasing-parity terms. In this regard, China is today a global power and is not missing in the global power mix. Nigeria is expected to rise, but it is not currently doing it greatly, the respondent observed.

Against this backdrop, and within this broader mix of global power redistribution, Africa remains fundamentally at the sidelines. Following a study conducted by Cilliers et al (2015), "the total size of the African economy is expected to increase by 29% from $5.3 trillion to $18 trillion, but by 2040 its share of the global economy will only increase from 5.1% to 7.2%" (Cilliers et al, 2015: 3). On the other hand, the study further shows that Africa's demographic share is growing rapidly. The authors continued that in 2014 the total African population was estimated at 1.1 billion people, or 15.6% of the global population. However, "by 2040 Africa is expected to have a population of 2.0 billion people, constituting 21.8% of the global population. To put this figure into perspective, by 2040 Africa's population will have increased by 820 million people" (Cilliers et al, 2015: 4). This is more than the total current population of the European Union (over 500 million people – a figure that will remain largely unchanged to 2040). In the absence of an agricultural revolution that could exploit the massive potential of the associated workforce, Africa will remain largely dependent on food imports to feed its developing population. While this view is untainted, there are other studies that actually suggest that Africa will also grow economically to support its growing population. For instance, the study conducted by the World Bank and appropriated by the Eritrean Economist, Africa, especially the Sub-Saharan African region will increase productivity with 4.5% in 2015, just below Asia and Australasia that has 5.7% and will be better than any other continent in the world. See figure 5.1 below for graphics.

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[80]Interview with the UN Official 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa.

Figure 5.1 - Forecast of Global Economic increase by 2015 - 2017

Source: Eritrea's 2015 – 2017 Economic Outlook, According to the World Bank data

Using military strength, economic abilities, and political and technological muscles, Cilliers et al, who have a different study on the Africa's possible power underscore that the global measure of power in 2015, particularly the combined power of Africa represents close to 9% of global power (Cilliers et al, 2015). This percentage compares with about 5% in 1962, when the process of decolonisation was in full swing (and many African states bath themselves in the pool of independence from colonial strangle-hold). To be sure, it is not very clear how the US will exceed its current mark in 2040, but China and Africa might continue to diversify and increase. Currently, China and the US represent about 12% and 18% of global power, respectively. Cilliers et al note that in 2015, the combined relative power of Africa is larger than that of Japan, Russia or India but less than that of the US, China or the European Union (EU). As for the future, the

167

total relative power of Africa is likely to surpass that of the declining EU and US by 2040 (Cilliers at al, 2015: 4). This is important indicator for developing modalities that will ensure and secure Africa's security features to be able to maintain the progress that could be achieved in 2040.

Although the combined capabilities of Africa's 54 countries total about 9% of global power today and are forecast to rise to over 11% by 2040, Africa is obviously neither a sovereign country (but composed of 54 sovereign countries) nor a union of states with any kind of supranational provisions as obtained within the EU political orbit. And even with a great expansion of regional and continental integration, the AU Official[81] relayed that "the expression of a unified African foreign policy is experimented to be highly unlikely, but major and key integrations can occur." This in part explains why Cilliers et al recorded in their study that, "with the potential exception of Nigeria, African countries will remain what have been termed 'minor powers' and this has implications on how Africa will influence issues of global governance, including the Security Council reform agenda" (Cilliers et al, 2015: 6).

Despite the findings by Cilliers et al, the UN Official[82] argues that African states will nevertheless continue to gain greater agency in terms of shaping their own future in a complex and interconnected world. Like other commentators in the field, the respondent notes that there exist mechanical limitations on African governments' bargaining power. The respondent argues that "it is pertinent that African countries in their individual and collective capacities become increasingly active, assertive and confident players on the world stage, influencing international negotiations in areas ranging from multilateral trade to climate change not only in the Security Council reform."[83]

While there are suggestions and implied cases for strong economic and political integration complemented by much more rapid and sustained economic growth in Africa to offset its limited role in shaping global governance, Africa must harness its resources

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[81]Interview with the AU Official 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa.
[82]Interview with the UN Official 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa.
[83]Interview with the UN Official 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa.

and secure its borders in order to be able to reap any of the forecasted projections. Surely, Africa is the next regional emerging market after India, and manufacturing and services are expected to expand rapidly in the continent – although much of this growth will initially be at the lower end of the value-add curve (albeit higher than the current value derived from commodity exports) (Cilliers et al, 2015). Manufacturing growth will continue to gravitate towards the free-trade region that has the lowest cost of labour and greatest domestic stability in the continent. This will however, increasingly include sub-Saharan Africa. The AU Official[84] believes that "one potentially major determinant of higher future growth rates will be the political and economic integration of current markets – the creation of regional economic communities with common currencies, freedom of movement of labour and capital across borders, and common import and export tariffs on African goods and services within Africa."

As noted in Chapter two, one of the strengths of Nigeria is the population evolution that could also act as an important driver of economic growth. Also, the works of Cilliers et al (2011) on African Futures 2050 – the next forty years, documented some demographic growth in West and East Africa, where population sizes will expand more rapidly than in northern and southern Africa. According to the Cilliers et al (2011) account, Central Africa will also experience large increases in population, but from a much lower base. It is expected that the populations of northern and southern Africa will have income levels that are three to four times higher per person than in East and central Africa over the forecast horizon, and that West Africa will slowly catch up with the two richer regions (Cilliers et al, 2011).

According to these authors (Cilliers et al 2015) who have been mapping Africa's progress through current and future possibilities, the HHMI reflects the shifting balance of power in Africa since the end of the Cold War, with "West Africa consolidating its position as the most powerful region in Africa (largely due to the presence of heavyweight Nigeria), followed, as from 2021, by East Africa and a fairly stagnant southern Africa" (Cilliers, 2015: 6). The relative decline of North Africa from its position as second most powerful

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[84]Interview with the AU Official 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa.

region in Africa until 2019 to last but one (ahead of Central Africa) by 2040 follows changes in relative population size and indeed, economic growth prospects, among others. In these estimations, and according to *Global Economic Outlook* (2015), Africa's Nigeria is identified to perform better than the US, UK, Germany, Iran, Russia, Venezuela, Brazil, and Japan and will be on or almost par with China and India that will be above 6% on economic performances respectively. Applicable to note that all four permanent members including France that is not among the state graphed are dwindling, with exception to China that is billed above 6%. See figure 5.3 for details.

Figure 5.2 – Global Gross Domestic Product of Top Eleven Countries from five continents of the World.

Source: 2015 Global Economic Outlook, Data provided by the International Monetary Fund, Graphic by Bloomberg BusinessWeek.

5.6.   The African Union Peace and Security Council: Measuring the fitness

The UN Official, who responded to our questions, was of the opinion that "Nigeria and South Africa are two African states that need to put their acts together to make important comments in the current global politics. Their importance is woven into the facts that even the powerful nations – the US and EU — need the collaboration of [Nigeria and South Africa] to gain inroad and be able to operate efficiently in the region."[85]

This view in part provided for Cilliers et al (2015) account that two potential ways of assessing influence in the foreign-policy domain in the African context may be, firstly, to look at a country's commitment to peacekeeping missions, and, secondly, its relevance and membership in the AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) in particular and Africa in general. Given the heavy conflict burden Africa is facing and resolving, which in fact serve a sufficient ground for qualifying African states for claims of share of global security prowess. The numerous interventions in Africa by African states equally shows individual country's commitment to contributing to peace and security as a regional or international public good as an important indicator of its leadership qualities, ambitions and influence.

Actually, the personnel contribution of the Big Five to UN peacekeeping operations over a period of 10 years on average, accounted for about 19% of the total number of UN peacekeepers in 2012, considerably more than in early 2007, when they only contributed 8% of total UN peacekeepers (Cilliers et al, 2015). Over the years, Nigeria was the leading contributor of troops to the UN peacekeeping mission but has been surpassed by Ethiopia since 2011 presumably following the Boko Haram terror in Nigeria.

Algeria, despite being the country with the largest military expenditure in Africa by a considerable margin, has never contributed more than 20 military observers per month and on average around six. At the end of 2011 when Ethiopia became the largest African contributor to UN missions after overtaking Nigeria, three years later, Ethiopia was

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[85]Interview with the UN Official 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa.

contributing on average more than 7 800 troops, observers and police officers to UN missions – more than the combined total of the other four members of the Big Five (Cilliers et al, 2015). In December 2014, Ethiopia was not only the largest African contributor to UN missions but also the fourth largest globally, while Nigeria fell to occupy rank eight.

With the exception of Algeria, which has always played a very limited role in UN peacekeeping, all the other Big Five countries rank above South Africa, which nevertheless is a consistent contributor to peacekeeping efforts. Egypt's contribution to peacekeeping took two significant dips from July 2011 onwards when it was providing 5 632 troops to UN missions. By August 2011 the number of Egyptian troops had fallen to 4 126, thereafter continuing its decline to 2 585 in October 2014 (Cilliers et al, 2015). In December 2014, Egypt was the 10th largest contributor to UN peacekeeping globally and the sixth largest in Africa as domestic security concerns appeared to take priority.

Further, in recent times, Nigeria has also witnessed a substantial decline in the number of troops deployed: from a high of 6 020 in August 2009 to 2 930 in December 2014. The quality of Nigeria's contribution to international peacekeeping efforts has always been linked to when Nigeria played an active role in managing two civil conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. However, Adebayo cited in Cilliers et al (2015: 22) notes that since then, "the quality of [Nigeria's] soldiers has been questioned; its military and police contingents have often not been equipped to UN standards; and many of the country's Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) have broken down in mission areas." This has resulted in frequent complaints from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, damaging the country's impressive peacekeeping record painstakingly built up over five decades.

According to the AU Official[86] the PSC was established at the heart of the AU's African Peace and Security Architecture. In this fashion, countries are voted onto the PSC for two or three year terms based on broad-based criteria. The original intention was that more

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[86]Interview with the AU Official 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa.

powerful countries would be re-elected on the three-year ticket, effectively remaining indefinitely on the council. One of the reasons advanced in the ISS report of 2015 for Nigeria's candidature to the UN Security Council is that, Nigeria has consistently served on the PSC since 2004 on behalf of Africa's most powerful region – West Africa – an indicator of the country's significant sub-regional and regional influence (Cilliers et al, 2015). In all other regions, members of the Big Five have rotated the baton of AU safe-keeping in the PSC in favour of regional contenders – itself a stimulating indicator of how the Big Five are each perceived in their respective regions within the parameters of security adventure. With its long history of destabilisation in the region, South Africa has therefore not served on the PSC in a similar consistent manner, whereas representation on behalf of North Africa, for example, has been shared among Algeria, Egypt and Libya.

Further, using the HHMI, the power of Nigeria as well as other nations of the Big Five, the states will gradually improve by 2040. In Cillier *et al* (2015), "the African country with the greatest capabilities is by far Nigeria, which accounts for 0.9% of global power today, forecast to rise to 1.6% of global power by 2040" (Cilliers et al, 2015: 10). According to the data set presented by the authors, Nigeria is followed by Egypt, South Africa, Algeria and Ethiopia, which all remain below 0.7% of global power over the time horizon. In the same study, the authors note that if one looks at the relative distribution of power only in Africa, where the combined power of the continent's 54 states comes to 100%, "then by 2040 Nigeria is forecast to account for nearly one-fifth of the continent's total capabilities followed by Angola with close to 10% (a country that is not among the top five)" (Cilliers et al, 2015: 13). In 2040, frontrunners Nigeria and Angola are followed by Egypt, South Africa and Algeria, which each represent around 6% of total African power. Ethiopia steadily increases its share from 3% in 2014 to 5% in 2040. Morocco, another outsider, catches up, reaching over 3% by 2040.

In all of these, some scholars of strategy such as Yang Li, Sun Guohui and Martin J. Eppler (2008) refer to the 'inevitability of instability' in Nigeria as a pull-back factor. The AU Official[87] noted with niceties that there is lack of strategic vision, including in

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[87]Interview with the AU Official 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa.

the foreign-policy domain, recently aggravated by the growing threat the Boko Haram. The Official[88] indicated that as long as Boko Haram operates in Nigeria, progress may remain in peace meal. In his view, without a solid native base, it is tough for Nigeria to formulate a coherent foreign policy and project power in the region or elsewhere. Therefore, while the evidence abound that Nigeria is a role player in Africa, it is at least debatable whether Nigerian leadership can keep up with the country's development in terms of capabilities to translate raw mass into power projection and shape African, and even global, governance (Cilliers et al, 2015: 24).

5.7.   African state's demonstrated abilities to maintain domestic peace and order

According to Kirk-Greene (1975: 1), Nigeria has Africa's first civil war (the Biafra War). Although, the war was located in a variety of different sources and levels, and may be explained in terms of political competition of inter-regional economic rivalry of elitist in-fighting. More arguably, it is of class and religious struggle, of military anomie and ambition; of personal, ethnic and regional conflict. In terms of social malaise and disenchantment with the golden age never materialised in the aftermath of colonialism; or of colonialism itself with the fifty years of British divide and rule. Apart from its internal conflicts and attendant security and peace initiatives, Titilope Ajayi (2011: 3-4) notes that, while Nigeria has not been immune to the conflicts, having itself brawled a devastating civil war, suffered bad and oppressive governance under successive military regimes for most of its post-independence history and fought civil war, battled with the Niger Delta insurgence in 2002, [and currently the Boko Haram insurgency], it has not wavered in its commitment to conflict prevention, resolution and management in Africa. A key factor to note is that through the war, Nigeria developed a self-correcting mechanism to resolving and transforming conflicts and ensuring peace both within and outside Nigeria (Ebegbulem, 2012: 19). Nigeria has been involved in global bilateral special training and security missions in the world since 1960s. In West African

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[88]Interview with the AU Official 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa.

countries, such as, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, and especially, in Liberia, and Sierra Leone, Nigeria invested enormous amount of human-military and financial-material resources that restored peace in those countries of ECOWAS origin.

When ECOWAS was formed on 28 May 1975 by the signing of treaty of Lagos with a primary mandate to improve regional economic integration in West Africa, the onset of civil war in Liberia and Sierra Leone tested Nigeria's aptitude to regional peace and security. According to Egbubelem (2012) Nigeria's commitment to ECOWAS ensured the political stability that led to successful economic integration that emplaced priority on economic to political urgencies as well as peace and security primacies. According to Ajayi (2011: 3) "Nigeria led both in military and economic might, the ECOWAS-deployed Economic Community of West African Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), (a Ceasefire Monitoring Group), in Liberia (1990-1998, 2003- 2006), Sierra Leone (1997-2000), Guinea Bissau (1999), Côte d'Ivoire (2003, 2011), and Mali (2012 - 2013)." The ECOMOG missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone occurred without prior UN authorisation due to strained relations between ECOWAS and the UN at the time. The UN Security Council held several informal consultations, some in response to ECOWAS' requests for assistance, but took no immediate action until Nigeria took the first step (Ajayi, 2011). The UN sent military observer missions to Liberia in 1993 (UNOMIL) and Sierra Leone in 1998 (UNOMSIL) as shown in figure 5.1 above to help the ECOWAS-inspired ECOMOG implement its mandates under the respective peace agreements (Ajayi, 2011; Egbubelem, 2013).

5.7.1. Regional peacebuilding for global harmony

Nigeria's effort at peacebuilding has been predicated principally on the pursuit of domestic security through the promotion of peaceful relations between itself and neighbours, and between neighbours themselves (Tope, 2011). Nigeria has been consistent with striving to put its neighbours at ease and attempts to stave off problems that could arise especially over inherited colonial boundaries by establishing bilateral agreements as the case of relations with Equatorial Guinea since 1988 demonstrate (Muhammad Juma Kuna, 2005). According to the AU Official, some of the "Nigeria's

leading roles include the mediation of the crises between Liberia and Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso and Mali, and Togo and Ghana, and these are some of the clearest indications of Nigeria's peacebuilding machinations in the region."[89]

The chief exertion to date however could effortlessly be seen in the case of the struggle with Cameroon over the Bakasi Peninsula (Cilliers and Hilding-Norberg, 2000). The extreme restraint that Nigeria has demonstrated and its acceptance of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling which ceded the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon is a supreme example of its pursuit for regional and global harmony.[90] This vow to the peaceful resolution of conflicts was one of the major catalysts for securing its overall objectives of regional economic integration through which, Nigeria-led ECOWAS maximally reduce the reliance of other West African countries on Western foreign powers for economic and military assistance which in turn marks the region as Africa's most powerful (Kuna, 2005). This is not to say that there have not remained problems, such as lingering Boko Haram terrorism and other border disputes, Cameroon, and Chad being two of them. But Nigeria's preference remains the peaceful resolution of such disputes (Barna, 2014).

5.7.2. Conflict Resolution for a peaceful world

As in peacebuilding, the role of Nigeria in the resolution of actual conflicts has been vigorous especially when supported with appropriate instruments (Kuna, 2005). In the specificities of conflict resolution, Nigeria inspired various protocols endorsed by Heads of State and Government which provided for an effective institutional framework for the resolution of disputes in the region and continent alike (Kuna, 2005). To be specific, in the early 1990s, Liberia slided into anarchy, with the refusal of the United Nations, the United States and the rest of the International Community to quickly intervene, it was left to "ECOWAS at the instance of Nigeria to quickly act to stem the threat to law and order not only in Liberia, but also throughout the Mano River Union, and possibly across West Africa" (Kuna, 2005: 7). Monetarily, "Nigeria contributed in excess of ten US$10

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[89]Interview with the AU Official 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa.
[90]Interview with the AU Official 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa.

billionin preserving its troops in Liberia and Sierra Leone alone and had 13,000 troops in the country which conducted both peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations" (Kuna, 2005: 7). Nigeria's approach occasioned the 1999 Lome, Togo, pact to end the crises, thus paving the way in 2000 for United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).

5.7.3. Peacekeeping mission for regional and global peace

The history of Nigeria's participation in UN peacekeeping operations dates back to 1960 in the Congo just few days after her independence in an account in which Nigeria contributed troops and also commanded the UNOC operation (Kuna, 2005; Omotere, 2011; Sule, 2013: 16;). Since then, as recorded by Kuna (2005: 8) and Omotere (2011: 24 -25), Nigeria has been involved in many peace initiatives in several parts of the world some of which are:

Congo (ONUC) 1960-1964, Battalion operations; New Guinea (UNSF) 1962-1963, Military Observers; Tanzania (Bilateral agreement) 1964, Battalion operations; India-Pakistan (UNIPOM) 1965-1966, Military Observers; Lebanon (UNIFIL) 1978-1983, Battalion operations and Staff Officers; Chad (Harmony I, bilateral agreement) 1981-1982, Battalion operations and Staff Officers; Chad (Harmony II, OAU) 1982- 1983, Brigade operations; Iran-Iraq (UNIIMOG) 1988-1991, Military Observers; Liberia (ECOMOG) 1990- Division (-) 25 operations; Iraq-Kuwait (UNIKOM) 1991, Military Observers; Angola (UNAVEM II) 1991-1992, Military Observers; Sierra Leone (NATAG) 1991, Training Team; Angola (UNAVEM III) 1992-1995, Detachment; Namibia (UNTAG) 1989-1990, Military Observers; Western Sahara (MINURSO) 1991, Military Observers; Cambodia (UNTAC) 1992- 1993, Military Observers; Somalia (UNOSOM) 1992-1994, Battalion operations and Staff Officers; Former Republic of Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) 1992, Battalion operations and Staff Officers; Mozambique (ONUMOZ) 1992 Military Observers; Rwanda (UNAMIR) 1993, Battalion operations; Gambia (NATAG) 1993, Training Team; Aouzo Strip (UNASOG) 1994, Military Observers; Israel (UNTSO) 1995, Military Observers; Liberia – ECOMOG; Sierra Leone – UNMIL; and Dafur peace initiative (Tope, 2011: 24 -25). "Bosnia Herzegovina, Iraq,

Kuwait, Western Sahara, Rwanda, Somalia, Mozambique, Cambodia, Lebanon, Angola, Beirut, India and Pakistan" (Kuna, 2005: 7). Nigerian troops are still serving in many UN missions in places like Kuwait, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone. By December 2000, Nigeria had 3404 troops serving under the UN; making her the second largest contributor to UN Peacekeeping missions in the world after Bangladesh with a total contribution of 6040.[91]

Nigeria's leadership both as Chair of the Security Council at various times, and member as well as in other areas in the UN System has given it the opportunity not only to build peace, but also to push for positions favourable to Africa. This long history of participation in peacebuilding, conflict resolution and peacekeeping operations has given Nigeria sufficient exposure and experience that is valuable not only to the country and the continent but also to the world community. This can be said of Egypt and South Africa that have concerned themselves with global peace through regional securities.

5.8.   The Challenges and prospects for African inclusion

There appears to have been something of a consensus that in the impending reorganisation of the UN, at least one permanent seat will be reserved for Africa in the expanded Security Council. Again, very consistently Egypt and South Africa have been touted as countries that may challenge Nigeria for the seat. To be sure, whether in terms of geopolitics, regional international politics and issues of stability and conflict, or size of population and culture, Egypt remains an important Arab and African state. It also shares with Iran, Israel and Turkey for many of the same reasons, the characterisation of being one of the four most important countries in the entire Middle East including North Africa. Egypt until 1991 was the key hegemonic state in the international relations of the Middle East. It is the self-identified chief peace-maker, and on occasions, chief war maker in the region as well. It was Egypt, for example, Cantori (2002) noted, crafted the unprecedented Arab alliance against Iraq in 1991. It is also militarily powerful in terms of

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[91]The account of Nigeria's troop contribution was before the scale of troop contribution was tilted in 2011.

size (300,000) and quality of armed forces as well as the size of its population, which at about 85 million contains practically one-half of all Arabs (Cantori, 2002: 229). It should also be mentioned that Egypt had a strong voice in the GAU (AU). It was Egypt, for example, that influenced the diplomatic isolation of Israel in Africa, following the 1973 Arab-Israel war (Adeniji, 2005: 7). So Egypt is an important force.

Further, South Africa's credentials are also quite impressive. First, it is undoubtedly the regional hegemonic power in the Southern African sub-region; and secondly, it has had an incredible economic performance relative to other African nations. It is only African state member of the G20 and that of BRICS. If the African permanent seat would not rotate and is given to one state exclusively, it is palpable that the other contending states would not sincerely support the expansion. Moreover, this enlargement neglects the Arab/Muslim world (Venter, 2003: 30).

In spite of the undoubtedly impressive records of Egypt and South Africa, supporters of the Nigerian bid also submitted that Nigeria's bid is unassailable. Without bearing any comparison among the three African states (Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa), the three nations under consideration can represent Africa at the Security Council, if not on the basis of capabilities, at least on the basis of interestedness to serve. It is true that, for example, Nigeria is currently the largest economy in Africa and indeed, the most representative of the black race (African race). But both South Africa and Egypt are also fending for Africa and attract non-African through the mix in their relevant countries. Nigeria has a breed unsullied black population of over 170 million people, "it gives Nigeria an advantage to be treated as the African people country, because, for every four black persons anywhere in the world, one of them is mathematically a Nigerian" (Adeniji, 2005: 8). While this statistics is very important in measuring the black race representation in the multi-racial global body it is worthy to note that Africa was not marginalised in the Security Council purely on the basis of race (Ikhariale, 2002:35).

Some of the concerns registered by some scholars against Africa's push for representation in the Council is laced with the type of candidates they support. For some,

although Egypt is on the African continent, it is more ideologically identified with the Arab World than with Africa they aver. And as for South Africa, it is contended that the country is not racially a pure African society since it is composed of blacks, white, Indians, and coloured - the so-called rainbow nation (Adiniji, 2005: 8). These critics noted also that, Nigeria is too corrupt to be trusted, even though it is deemed to have more experience in peace operations, following that it has been fully tested in the responsibility and effective discharge of international obligations in the key areas of peace-keeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding and peace-enforcement - the critical areas in which the Security Council had been very active, still it is dull in transparency and good governance. On the score of peace operations, even the UN records confirm that Nigeria has acquitted itself very well but it has more political and economic problems needing attention for the well-being of its population (Gambari, 1997: 9; Ikhariale, 2002: 36).).

Finally, it can be reasoned that if the UN Security Council is in search of candidate/s from Africa, the said three nations are available and willing to stand in for Africa. Whether Nigeria is considered the ideal African candidate for a permanent seat at the Security Council, by some scholars or South Africa or Egypt is considered suitable, our point is that at one juncture or the other, there are valid reasons why they were considered eligible. Save to say that the US and France do not possess the same amount of both economic and military powers let alone political powers. In addition to the points already highlighted, the three African countries are in respective ways strategically located in areas that will enhance their effectiveness in service to the continent. Yes, it was observed that Nigeria is almost at the middle of Africa; Egypt is too northerly, while South Africa too southerly, it is in our interest to note that it is also developed even if it is too southerly. From this abundantly strategic perspective therefore, all of these countries is considered to enjoy the near equidistance to the four corners of the African continent which Nigeria does (Ikhariale, 2002: 36).

Further, the enormous contributions of Nigeria to regional and sub-regional resolution of conflicts in Africa which cost the country billions of dollars and gallant men and women of the Nigerian Armed Forces (NAF) who paid the supreme sacrifice in the cause of

peace cannot be over emphasised. South Africa is also involved in DRC and Burundi working for peace and security as does Egypt in the Arab world. Within the West African sub-region, for example, Nigeria has made the promotion of peace and security its primary consideration under the framework of the ECOWAS. South Africa is doing same under the umbrella of SADC all in a run for Relative peace and democracy. Recorded presently in countries like Liberia, Sierra Leone, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, to mention a few examples, would not have been possible without the determined fight put up by Nigerian peacemakers at huge human and material costs under the framework of AU and ECOMOG (Starr, 1992; Adeniji, 2005: 7).

5.9. Conclusion

This chapter, devoted to the explication of conflicts in Africa and its capabilities has examined pertinent aspects of top five African countries capabilities in the context of the connections amidst security, politics and economy. In doing so, the chapter presented its discussion in three stages: conflict and war, Africa's top five, and some intervention records. This among others includes elaboration on the profiles of selected top five African states. As discussed, Africa's security and the United Nations Security Council exclusion featured prominently through the discussion. The chapter sought to determine whether permanent seat to Africa will tilt the balance of insecurity in the region and help contain terrorism. The documentations which investigated UN behaviour in terrorist attacked member found that the Council can be biased. In order for African states to have decreased conflicts and increase economic advancements it shall by virtue of commitment to global peace, strive to occupy a permanent seat with veto power.

The chapter demonstrated that there exist some substantial pressure to complicate plan through conflict by the P5, aimed at maintaining existing status quo, but a united Africa can wrestle permanent seat out of the current P5. In order to unpack the P5 behaviour in terms of its ambivalent manifestations, the chapter, maintains that lack of the permanent seat sometimes causes the P5 to withdrawn security support in conflict time and also makes African interveners powerless. ECOWAS led, and UN supported successful interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone endorsed that African inclusion in the security

affairs of the world through a permanent seat with veto is more likely to reduce insecurity in Africa and help keep the world at larger peace.

Actually, Hawkins measurement of the UN behavior in Africa endorsed that the high level of conflict in Africa compared to other regions of the world is built into voiceless Africa in the permanent seat. Exclusion from the permanent seat has also sustained the creeping and rise of terrorism in Africa. Africa's entrapment within the fight against terrorism — Al Shabbab and Boko Haram — which the AU Official called "African solution to non-African problem"[92] will pick relevance only when Africa has the political power to veto intervention decisions of the P5 nations. The US and UK invasion of Iraq contributed to the existing terrorism in the Middle East, including the present day ISIS and cousin terrorist groupings in Africa.

Surely, Africa has been the peripheral continent in the world. However, the analysis of Africa's top five nations shows that at least in one category or the other, all of the top five states of Africa are fit to serve as a permanent member of the Council. This bears in mind that the current P5 nations do not possess equal powers. Actually, in 2040, Nigeria will surpass France, tangibly in economic output and overcome US in population. The African nations have been underperforming since they were caught up in catch-up games with the current global powers. Africa can only find its feet in global politics by defying those global orders that keeps Africa woven in the net of dependency, conflicts, underdevelopment and especially insecurity paradigm. Following Africa's high-ranking status in the troop contribution graph, it is evident that Africa wants to play part in providing not only regional but also global security. And one sure way to achieve this end is for the 54 African states to endorse one candidate for the permanent seat, failing which to be accepted by the UN the 54 states as one will excuse themselves simultaneously from the UN until they are accorded a place of action at the permanent category of the Council. The question that merits attention is how does the researcher measures the Security Council's activities in Africa to determine the lessons for Africa? Chapter Six

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[92]Interview with the African Union Official, 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa.

addresses this question by discussing the Security Council's actions and inactions (interventions) in Africa's conflict carefully compared against conflicts outside Africa.

CHAPTER SIX

The United Nations Security Council's deeds: lessons for Africa

6.1   Introduction

The United Nations was created in an atmosphere of major power cooperation. Its architecture assumed that the leading global actors in world affairs in the period of 1940s will permanently be at the helms of world affairs, and with the introduction of veto power, they were even encouraged to believe so and act in tandem with their believe. However, from the very beginning of its practical operation in 1946, the Council came to operate in an entirely different atmosphere necessitated by the continued changes in the world. The slow but seemingly irrevocable drift into cold war went against the dictum of the Council, as such, had a paralysing effect on the organ. Further, major changes within the international systems such as liberation wars, decolonisation, and the increasing North-South divides may not have damaged the complexion of the Council but had indeed, impacted on the Council ability to stay true to its original mission. Since decolonisation (violent or peaceful), African states have registered presence in the global politics whether as a spectator or an actor, fact is, Africa has become part of the whole at the place of global politicking. Although Africa's narrative was laced to being the host to the vast majority (and the most deadly) of conflicts in the world, Hawkins (2003) noted that that there is a distinct lack of genuine interest in African affairs shown by the UN Security Council and its key members. This chapter shows the variegated scales of Council's activities particularly in conflict areas in Africa and the world and takes note of the stack lack of seriousness of the Council in dealing with conflicts in Africa as well as states of non-permanent status. In the presentations, the results show that Africa has been (and remains) marginalised in the Council work due to power politics.

6.2. The Council as an arena of Power Politics

The beginning of the end of the international security system had actually come slightly earlier, on September 12, 2002, when the former US President George W. Bush, to the surprise of many, brought his case against Iraq to the General Assembly and challenged the UN body to take action against Baghdad for failing to disarm. The US government under Bush declared that the US will work with the UN Security Council to generate the necessary resolutions that will tame Iraq, failing which, Bush continued that he would act alone if the UN failed to cooperate (Glennon, 2003). US' threat was reaffirmed a month later by Congress, when it gave Bush the authority to use force against Iraq without getting approval from the UN first. The American message seemed clearer and reassuring when the Bush's administration undersigned that, the US does not need the Security Council. Two weeks later, on October 25, the United States formally proposed a resolution that would have implicitly authorised war against Iraq. But according to the AU Official "the UN encouraged US to stay away from Iraq."[93] Nevertheless, President Bush again cautioned that he would not be deterred if the Security Council rejected the measure. In his words, Bush asserts that "if the United Nations does not have the will or the courage to disarm Saddam Hussein and if Saddam Hussein will not disarm, the United States will lead a coalition to disarm [him]" (Glennon, 2003). Following the US determination to beat up one of the smaller states, intensive behind-the-scenes haggling started among the Council group to save Iraq from US' wrath. Indeed, the Council responded to Bush's challenge on November 7 by unanimously adopting Resolution 1441, which found Iraq in material breach of prior resolutions, including "Resolution 687 (1991), in particular through Iraq's failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], and to complete the actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of Resolution 687 (1991)" (S/RES/1441, 2002). Thus, the Council set up a new inspections regime, and warned once again of serious consequences if Iraq again failed to disarm. The resolution did not explicitly authorise force, however, and US pledged to return to the Council for another discussion before resorting to arms. In a community of independent states, of what importance is the

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[93] Interview with the African Union Official, 25 May 2015, Johannesburg South Africa.

unproven Iraq's nuclear armament for the US has been the question among member nations?

Actually, the vote for Resolution 1441 was a huge personal victory for the then US Secretary of State Colin Powell, who had spent much political capital urging his government to go the UN route in the first place and had fought hard diplomatically to win international backing. Nonetheless, when doubts emerged concerning the effectiveness of the new inspections regime and the extent of Iraq's cooperation, on January 21, 2003, Powell himself declared that the inspections will not work, returned to the UN on February 5 and made the case that Iraqi was still hiding its weapons of mass destruction (WMD). France and Germany who responded by pressing for more time only activated tensions between the allies that were already high and divisions deepened when 18 European countries signed letters in support of the American position. In all of these, the UN Official,[94] is convinced that the EU was only playing the usual solidarity card, not because they were half sure that Iraq possessed any nuclear substance. Still in effort to satisfy the US, on February 14, the inspectors returned to the Security Council to report that, after weeks of investigation in Iraq, they had discovered no evidence of WMD. Ten days later on February 24, the United States, the United Kingdom and Spain introduced a resolution that would have had the Council simply declare, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,[95] that Iraq has botched the final opportunity afforded to it in Resolution 1441 (Glennon, 2003). In response to the US; France, Germany and Russia once more proposed giving Iraq still more time.

Further, "on February 28, the US announced that the American goal was no longer simply Iraq's disarmament but also regime change. Then, on March 5, France and Russia announced they would block any subsequent resolution authorising the use of force against Saddam" (Glennon, 2003: 25). These political macho by France, Russia and US, in the view of the UN Official[96] "is the dangerous tower in the Council". Accordingly, the next day, China declared that it was taking the same position with Russia and France

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[94] Interview with the United Nations Official I, 25 May 2015, Pretoria South Africa.
[95] The Section dealing with the cases and instances of threats to global peace and security.
[96] Interview with the United Nations Official I, 25 May 2015, Pretoria South Africa.

making it impossible for the US to secure the Security Council blessings to attack Iraq. Still, the United Kingdom floated a compromise proposal, but the Council's five permanent members did not agree. In the face of a serious disagreement among the P5 the Security Council fatally deadlocked.

Under the deadlock, on September 2002, the United States announced in its national security document that it would no longer be bound by the Charter's rules governing the use of force. According to the UN Official,[97] at the time of deadlock, the Charter and its provisions ceased to bear meaningful terms to the US as applied to the use of force. The US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, who corroborated the UN Official,[98] declared on October 20, that the US has the authority to intervene in Iraq … just as in Kosovo (Glennon, 2003). The claim was that there was no Security Council authorisation for the use of force by NATO against Yugoslavia. That action blatantly violated the UN Charter, which does not permit humanitarian intervention any more than it does preventive war. As such, the US claims to have all the authority needed to attack Iraq not because the Security Council authorised it, but because there was no international law forbidding it. Under such circumstance, it was therefore impossible to act unlawfully.

As surely as there are series of contested terrains regarding the Charter ranging from equality to freedom, oppression to expression, the legality of invasion of smaller states by bigger states as did the US in Iraq is a lesson of international importance, especially, under the watchful eyes of the Charter, the resolutions and veto mechanism. In a nutshell, the US invasion of Iraq, probes the legitimacy of the collective authority of the seemingly bias-hoisted Security Council.

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[97]Interview with the United Nations Official, 25 May 2015, Pretoria, South Africa.
[98]Interview with the United Nations Official, 25 May 2015, Pretoria, South Africa.

6.3. The collective authority of the Security Council and the rules

Theories such as the Society of the States analytical focus and broader explication is on the utility and implementation rules while engaging in any rule-governing activities. With the end of the Cold War, the most apparent ideological distinctions between East and West, political and economic, ended. As the 'First and Second' worlds merged, the Iraqi incursion into Kuwait swept the world up in an endeavor that breathed new life into a United Nations was hobbled by the East-West conflict (Caron, 1993). The difficulty in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was the strict application of the rules of the UN Charter. The Security Council acted in utterly unprecedented ways, collectively, ordering economic sanctions and, ultimately authorising the use of force — as provided in Charter VII — by Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait so as to implement the resolutions of the Council and restore international peace and security in the area. According to the UN Official,[99] "the vitality within the UN was activated by the imposition of economic sanctions against Libya, Serbia and, Haiti with a view to establishing the Council as that organ that can issue command and expect obedience". Following from the US attitude towards the Council on the issue on Iraq, the international community had sought a functioning UN Security Council with legitimacy that stems from its collective authority. However, at the dais of disunity among the P5 and the attendant show of might by the US after Resolution 1441, in view of the central role of the Security Council, the US actions went against the Charter and gave rise to discord among the P5 and non-P5 states.

Against this backdrop, Wallensten and Johansson, (2013) accounted that within the Council, in the years 1988 – 1990, there was a considerable peace-making activity showing that the US' outlandish strategy was met with disapproval. In the view of Wallensten and Johansson, and the AU Official[100] "cooperation among the P5 was lacking, even though cooperation was to be the norm on matters as varied as the conflicts between Iraq and Kuwait". It was observed that despite the perceived disunity among the

[99]Interview with the United Nations Official I, 25 May 2015, Pretoria, South Africa.
[100]Interview with the African Union Official I, 25 May 2015, Pretoria, South Africa.

P5 that hampers the Council's collective output, the UN Official[101] noted with disdain that "the relations between the most significant powers within the Council did not reinforce the UN's Charter position on resolution of disputes". The UN Official[102] asserts that "Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 02, 1990, and the immediate Council reaction to undo that breach of international peace and security was according to the Charter".

In pressing further Council's activities, during the Cold War some countries had managed to get away with occupation of neighbouring territories, as exemplified by Turkey (northern part of Cyprus), Indonesia (East Timor), and Israel (the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights), but none of these moves had been awarded international recognition (Wallensten and Johansson, 2013). Credibly, when Iraq, tried to annex Kuwait, it expected protection from at least on permanent member which did not actually happen and amounted to a monumental misreading of the global conditions. Since then, the conflicts and crises surrounding Iraq have continued to be a top priority on the Council's agenda. Specifically, from 1990 to 2002, Wallensten and Johansson, (2013) underscore that matters relating to Iraq resulted in sixty-three Council resolutions, of which fifty-eight were adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter. This was important because the Iraq's conduct was variously interpreted by the P5 states leaving rooms for reasons to engage the situation or not, which in part has been the dominant insecurity paradigm facing Africa from the Council.

6.4. Africa's conflict record in 1990s

Conflict in Africa was responsible for approximately 90% of the total number of war deaths in the 1990s. Nine of the 10 bloodiest conflicts of the decade were in Africa. Death tolls in some of these conflicts were literally one thousand times those of minor, yet high profile conflicts in Haiti, Kosovo and Israel (Hawkins, 2003). Assertions that the UN Security Council is seriously engaged in African affairs are often supported by claims that 70% of the Council's work is devoted to African affairs. According to the UN

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[101]Interview with the United Nations Official I, 25 May 2015, Pretoria, South Africa.
[102]Interview with the United Nations Official I, 25 May 2015, Pretoria, South Africa.

Official "70% of the Council's work may indeed on Africa, the overall output, of the Council's work in the 1990s exposes that, on the contrary, Africa was largely marginalised by the Council and its members"[103] To realistically put a rest to this issue, Hawkins (2003) maintains that some means of measuring and assessing the Council's response to conflict (including the plotting of radar graphs based on these indicators), demonstrate that, despite the immense needs of Africa in terms of conflict resolution, it has been the subject of disproportionately little attention in the Council. It is sufficient to note here that the most prominent factor is the lack of political will of its influential members, to function according to the stipulations of the Charter. This study is further corroborated by the Uppsala conflict data record, which pitched conflict and human death in Africa from 1980s to 2000s on the high. See Figure 1.1 on global conflict below.

Figure 6.1 – Global Armed Conflict – 1946 - 2014

Adapted from the Uppsala Data Conflict Programme, accessed June 2015

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[103]Interview with the United Nations Official I, 25 May 2015, Pretoria, South Africa.

Comparing levels of conflict and UNSC response in order to evaluate the performance of the Security Council in the 1990s, it is important to compare the level of conflict with the level of Council response. Ideally, the Council would respond to a threat to the peace, or conflict situation, in an escalatory modus. Bearing in mind the world's numerous conflicts and the physical inability of the Council to deal appropriately with all of them, the Council would ideally prioritise, devoting greater attention to the most serious conflicts. Hawkins' (2003) elementary examination of the Council's response to conflicts across the globe in 1990s reveals massive imbalances between the level of conflict and the level of response. Actually, "situations, where it was doubtful whether a threat to the peace ever existed, were met with a high level of Council response, while the Council largely (and in some cases completely) ignored large-scale wars resulting in massive casualties" (Hawkins, 2003: 63).

6.4.1. The resolutions and the actions: the response

Assuming that the Council does indeed spend much of its time discussing African conflicts, then it can also be said that there is a considerable gap between the amount of discussion and the actual output of the Council. The relatively low number of presidential statements and resolutions that the Council produces based on such discussion does not reflect such an apparently high level of engagement. To be sure, in the 1990s, 32% of resolutions (and 25% of presidential statements) adopted by the Council dealt with African affairs, with 26% of resolutions pertaining to European conflicts, and 17% to conflict in the Middle East (Hawkins, 2003). According to the UN Official,[104] examining the number of resolutions dealing with individual conflicts (excluding those conflicts that the Council failed to engage itself in), the responses of the Council appear disproportionate to the level of the various conflicts. For example, 19% of all the Council resolutions in the 1990s were adopted in response to a single conflict: 124 resolutions in relation to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. On the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, the Council adopted 52 resolutions. Angola was the subject of the most resolutions of any African conflict: 46, approximately half of which were essentially

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[104]Interview with the United Nations Official I, 25 May 2015, Pretoria, South Africa.

mandate extensions for missions in that country. The number of resolutions for some other major African conflicts are as follows: Rwanda, 29, Liberia, 17, Somalia, 17, Sierra Leone, 10, DRC, 6, Burundi, 4, and Ethiopia–Eritrea, 3 (Hawkins, 2003: 64).

The number of presidential statements and resolutions that the Council adopts in response to conflicts does provide, to some extent, an indication of how seriously the Council is engaged in dealing with a particular conflict. Such numbers, however, can be somewhat misleading. The Council sometimes abandons the Charter mandate to take necessary action. Instead, it utilises adoption of presidential statements or resolutions, as action towards a threat. It was observed that those resolutions are employed to provide the appearance that it is interested and engaged in the conflict. It is noted that such activities were for the Council to cover its lack of willingness to really get involved in finding a solution. In other cases the final version of statements or resolutions may have been watered down as a result of a compromise. Furthermore, many resolutions are adopted for the sole purpose of extending previously created mandates for peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions, and do not necessarily demonstrate serious Council engagement. Here, Angola is a case in point. In short, the content and strength of resolutions are not equal. Resolutions can range from a call for parties to a conflict to refrain from violence to the authorisation of full scale enforcement action as the latter was the case in Libya 2011.

In view of the UN Official,[105] the Council's response to conflict cannot, however, be judged entirely by the number of resolutions it adopts, or by whether or not it was able to find the existence of threat to the peace. The respondent outlined that in order to understand the pattern of the Council's response, it is necessary to examine, and compare, the overall level at which the Council dealt with individual conflicts throughout the 1990s. Hawkins (2003) records that the Council responded at a high level to certain select situations that were unrelated to actual armed conflict—for example, situations concerned with the possible involvement of certain governments in single acts of terrorism. In the cases of Libya, the Sudan and Afghanistan, the Council applied sanctions on the

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[105]Interview with the United Nations Official, 25 May 2015, Pretoria, South Africa.

leadership for their failure to hand over those who were allegedly involved in acts of terrorism. The Council was also quite responsive in a number of cases in which there was armed conflict, but on a relatively minor scale. It responded at low level in response to minor conflicts in Haiti, Albania, the Central African Republic, Kosovo, and East Timor — all with death tolls less than 3,000 (Hawkins, 2003).

On the other hand, all too often in the 1990s, the Council was unable — or unwilling — to respond to large-scale conflicts, and as a result, a large number of major conflicts, particularly those in Africa, were the object of a disproportionately low-level of engagement by the Council (Hawkins, 2003). One of the most glaring examples of this is the Council's handling (or mishandling) of the conflict in the Sudan. In the Hawkins (2003) range between levels 0 to 10 (low to high) the Council's response did not exceed level one, as attempts in procedural discussions to include the issue on the Council's agenda failed. The Council also responded at either level zero or level one to a number of other large-scale conflicts in Africa in the 1990s, including Algeria, and Ethiopia. In effect, the Council did not even discuss these conflicts. In response to conflict in the Republic of the Congo, the Council adopted two presidential statements (level four). For the other major African conflicts of the 1990s, the Council was at least able to adopt resolutions. The war in the DRC — probably the bloodiest war of the 1990s—raged over an area the size of Western Europe, drawing in the direct military involvement of as many as eight other African countries, and resulting in well over one million deaths in its first year alone. The Council handled it at level six: adopting a number of presidential statements, and finally a resolution (eight months after the outbreak of hostilities) (Hawkins, 2003). The Council recognised the existence of a threat to peace and security, but the demands it made — for a ceasefire, and the withdrawal of foreign forces, were not made under Chapter VII of the Charter. With the exception of the adoption of a presidential statement in June 1999, the Council took no further action until a peace agreement was signed in August, one year after the outbreak of hostilities. Throughout the war, the Council made it clear that it would not become involved until after peace had been achieved. Peacekeepers would not begin arriving in the DRC until 2001.

In a similar vein, the UN Official[106] notes that the Council's first resolution on Burundi, which had cost more than 200,000 lives, was in 1995 — almost two years after the conflict began. Hawkins (2003) continued that Council's response to the conflict did not exceed level six. Similarly, in response to the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Council adopted a total of three resolutions in the 1990s (none of which contained any measures under Chapter VII). The Council finally adopted a resolution, under Chapter VII, banning the sale or supply of arms to the two countries in May 2000, as the conflict was coming to a close. According to Hawkins (2003), even in conflicts in which the Council did eventually respond at a relatively high level, such as in Angola (level eight) and Rwanda (level nine), the timeliness of response and force level did not reflect any sense of urgency in their resolution, and actions were largely ineffective.

6.4.2. The Haiti conflict theatrics 1991–1995

Accounts available on the study conducted by Hawkins suggest that human deaths amount to 3,000; refugees (Internally Displaced Persons [IDPs]): 100,000 and another 300,000 under Humanitarian aid. According to the study, while the humanitarian situation in Haiti was problematic, the risk of a humanitarian crisis was not great. However, the Council authorised the forcible removal from power of the military junta in Haiti and adopted its first resolution more than one and a half years after the coup that brought the junta to power. This study also learnt from Hawkins (2003) calculations that one year later the Council authorised military intervention even after the junta has departed peacefully. This was followed by the contingent of a strong peace enforcement force as the UN operations saw the creation of numerous peace building projects, including the professionalisation of the Haitian police force

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[106]Interview with the United Nations Official, 25 May 2015, Pretoria, South Africa.

6.4.3. The conflict in Yugoslavia and the NATO bombing campaign (Kosovo), 1997–1999

Again, Hawkins (2003) reveals that 2,000 persons died in Kosovo conflict, 145, 000 persons became refugees and 315,000 were under the IDPs and humanitarian support. Although homes and means of livelihood were destroyed, the humanitarian situation was relatively stable. The majority of refugees were spread out across Europe, with approximately 30,000 in neighbouring Albania and Macedonia. The Council response was at level 9. After NATO's bombing operation the Council authorised a peace enforcement operation and a UN presence (S/RES/1244). The timeliness of Council intervention measured from the dawn of NATO's bombing which began almost two years after the outbreak of low intensity conflict, NATO's unilateral bombing, rather than a Council-sanctioned response was a strong peace enforcement operation. At the end, the UN created an interim administration and numerous peace-building programs in Kosovo.

6.4.4. The Sudan conflict from 1983–2003

Reading from the 1983 to 2003, the conflict in Sudan claimed 1,100,000 human lives, raised Refugees (IDPs): (10) 460,000 (4,000,000) (Hawkins, 2003). Humanitarian War-induced famine has been responsible for a large proportion of the war dead. Chronic food/water shortages and disease are also widespread among the displaced population. The conflict contributed to border conflicts between Sudan and Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea. The Sudan conflict that saw over one million death, attracted no response from the Council. In fact, the Council was at the zero (0) levels in all spheres it intervention strategies. For example, the Council scored at level 1 on response because it discussed the situation in Sudan, but scored zeros on timeliness, use of force, the most critical mechanism to return warring nations to peace.

6.4.5. Democratic Republic of the Congo conflict, 1998–2002

The DRC conflict was dubbed the Second World War by some scholars of security and strategy such as Professor Nabudere. The DRC conflict saw to the deaths of over 1,300,000, refugees (IDPs): 240,000 (960,000) (very conservative estimates). Conflict-related starvation and disease contributed to the deaths of over one million people in the first year of the conflict (and in excess of three million after more than three years of conflict) (Hawkins, 2003). The UN Official[107] relates that DRC conflict had drawn in as many as eight neighbouring countries that have directly participated in the conflict (for or against the government and against each other). However, the Council response was at level six, that is, the Council determined the existence of a threat to the peace (S/RES/1234), and established an observer mission (MONUC). In terms of timelines the Council did not adopt a resolution until approximately eight months after the outbreak of fighting. In 2000, MONUC was expanded into a peacekeeping operation (S/RES/1291), to be deployed in a post-conflict capacity as a force. The case of DRC should serve as a useful means of evaluating Council performance in the restoration and maintenance of international peace and security. This is pertinent bearing in mind that DRC is a resource rich African state. However, what we see from the DRC is a number of its citizens penciled down for, or under trial by the ICC for war crimes and its related.

6.5.   The International Criminal Court (ICC) indictees

The approach of enforcing the Rome Statute fmanaged by the ICC and sometime facilitated by the Council, has not also been consistently applied. In exploring the thematic concern of the chapter premised on the idea that in order to understand the activities of the Council it is necessary to situate the roles of bonds and actors in context. Under the United Nations Charter, the UN Security Council bears the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Security Council can take decisions in this regard that are binding on all UN Member States. The Charter empowers the Security Council to decide on a broad range of measures, including sanctions and the use of force that may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

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[107]Interview with the United Nations Official, 25 May 2015, Pretoria, South Africa.

The Council may take such decisions where it determines "the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" in accordance with Article 39. The Security Council thus has a key role to play in responding to acts of aggression. The Rome Statute, as amended in 2010, takes account of this key role and preserves the primary role of the Security Council in determining an act of aggression.

The ICC governed by Rome Statute is the first permanent treaty based the court established to end impunity for perpetrators of the most heinous crimes of international concern. ICC is supposedly, independent international organisation and it is not part of the United Nations per se but refers matters to the Security Council of the UN. After the end of Cold War the ICC was established on July 17 1998 and the Rome Statute (the pillars upon which the ICC is founded) entered into force in July 1, 2002 (ICC Official website). Since then, the institution started arraigning African leaders for various counts of crime against humanity. Below are the works of the ICC since inception. The question is since we learnt from the figure 6.1 that conflict and war obtain n various part of the world, why are the indictees all Africans? Please see, Appendix 9 for detailed list of the ICC indictees.

6.6. International Relations and Leadership lessons from the world for Africa

Discussion, academic or otherwise, on the performance of the UN Security Council, likewise global institution such as the ICC, a discourse on the P5, tends to focus solely on how effective it has been in what it sets out to accomplish, but ignores what it fails to attempt at all. In the 1990s, assessment of the Council appeared to be based largely on how effective it had been in handling conflicts in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda. The other major indicator used by those judging Council performance seemed to be its unwillingness to authorise the use of force in response to select minor conflicts (or non-conflict situations) that complicated major power interest and/or saturated media coverage — Kosovo being the leading example in this instance. This has been seized upon more also over the issue of Iraq — a high profile yet non-conflict situation and

197

essentially an artificial crisis — as those P5 nations pushing for war found themselves unable to attract the necessary support for authorisation in the Council.

Essentially, the Council's lack of support for the use of force against Yugoslavia over Kosovo seems quite understandable. Solitarily, massive aerial bombardment was scarcely a balanced response to such a conflict. Likewise in Iraq, the case for the US-led full-scale invasion of that country (both in terms of its justification and its consequences) remains decidedly dubious at best. The UN Official[108] is of the view that the Council did not approve the use of force in either case should not be interpreted as a sign of Council impotence or irrelevance, but rather as recognition, by the Council, that such massive force was inappropriate, and that diplomatic options remained available. The UN Official[109] continued that the Council traditionally treated the use of force as a last resort. Surely, the Security Council faces irrelevance not in Iraq, but in Africa. This is a glaring reality that has been all but ignored during discussions on the performance of the Council.

This notion of neglect provides part of the reasons why Hawkins (2003) records that the massive wars, resulting in the death of millions, rage unchecked, sometimes with little more than a mild expression of concern by the Council, and with next to no serious pressure by its members to bring a halt to the hostilities. In the few instances, he argues that where the Council did attempt intervention in the 1990s, the casualty tolerance of those contributing forces proved to be far too low for the operations to be seen through, and intervention in African conflicts was abandoned. In his study, there is a demonstrated awareness that the apparent resurgence of Council interest in Africa in the late 1990s — in Sierra Leone, the DRC and Ethiopia and Eritrea — is a sign of improvement. However, this can be seen, partly as a reaction to criticisms of 'selective indignation' following interventions in Kosovo and East Timor, and, more importantly, has been limited primarily to post-conflict peacekeeping. The willingness of the Council to fulfil

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[108]Interview with the United Nations Official, 25 May 2015, Pretoria, South Africa.
[109]Interview with the United Nations Official, 25 May 2015, Pretoria, South Africa.

its duty in the restoration of peace, rather than simply in the maintenance of peace, in Africa remains (and can be expected to remain) extremely low.

The UN Official[110] who agreed to Africa's marginalisation in global politics notes that the key issues lie in convincing the P5 states to be neutral and altruistic in their interventions. The Official is convinced that this is indeed in their interests, and in ensuring that the process is not derailed and converted into a 'usual-incapable-Africa', thereby deflating away from the more pressing need for African inclusion in the permanent seat of the Security Council. In the Official's[111] view the only basic challenge Africa is facing from the world bodies is garnering the support of the members who would support, and/or take some form of responsibility for Africa's failure when efforts to become free at once fails. In the final analysis, there is little doubt that the future of Africa's global relevance will be left almost entirely in African hands and that little support from the UN Security Council, or its powerful members can be expected in the near future. While diplomatic power does not have the same clout as economic or military power, it is inexpensive and, if used skilfully, can be quite effective (Hawkins, 2003). It is imperative that African leaders pool their diplomatic power together and shame the Council and its powerful members into lending more meaningful moves towards supporting the African efforts to democratise the Council.

As shown in table 6 above, since the birth of the ICC in 2002, there have been conflicts in various parts of the world that threatened the foundations of global peace and security. Israel, Palestine, Iraq-US, and DRC have had conflicts that browbeat humanity. But in all of these real accounts, there is no single citizen of any other continent other than Africa, who has been indicted. In areas, it is not clear whether those African conflicts and the so-called perpetrators of violence truly violated those codes of war they are accused of. For instance, Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir must be arrested and handed over to the ICC, but the former US President Bush has nothing to answer to The Hague following,

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[110]Interview with the United Nations Official, 25 May 2015, Pretoria, South Africa.
[111]Interview with the United Nations Official, 25 May 2015, Pretoria, South Africa.

leading his country to invade Iraq. During the invasion, the UN Official[112] argued that, it is not possible that there was no war crime, at least rape, committed.

Further when the North Korean attacks on South Korea were formally brought to the Security Council's attention, the council's resolution of July 7, 1950 adopted in the temporary absence of the Soviet Union called on member states to assist South Korea in resisting the North Korean aggression (Russett and Sutterlin, 1991). It recommended that all members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States. Thus, the Security Council requested one member state to lead a combined effort on behalf of the United Nations to resist aggression. Notwithstanding his designation as commander of UN forces in Korea, General Douglas MacArthur, the commander named by the United States, never reported directly to the Security Council (Routine, unclassified status reports were provided by the United States). Neither the Military Staff Committee a body composed of military representatives of the five permanent members intended to advise the council on military matters nor the Council itself, had any role in directing military operations of the unified command.

All of these disadvantages were intensified in the Korean case by the bitter disagreements that prevailed at the time between the Soviet Union and the United States. Under conditions of harmony among the permanent members of the Security Council, these various disadvantages could have considerably less force. In the Persian Gulf crisis the Security Council authorised, albeit in oblique language, the use of force for enforcement in another interstate conflict (Russett and Sutterlin, 1991). Actually, after imposing a comprehensive laid down in the resolution relating to economic sanctions, in Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990, the Security Council authorised member states cooperating with the government of Kuwait to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Security Council Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.

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[112]Interview with the United Nations Official, 25 May 2015, Pretoria, South Africa.

All states were requested to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken. This action, with specific reference to Chapter VII of the charter, constituted a new approach to implementation of the collective security concept. As in the earlier enforcement action in Korea, when there was no reference to Chapter VII, a basis for the council to mobilize a UN force for military enforcement action did not exist. Therefore the council again turned to member states to act in its behalf through such measures as might be necessary. But this time no unified command was established, and the use of the UN flag was not authorised.

According to the UN Official[113] the gulf action became possible because the permanent members of the Security Council cooperated on a matter of peace and security in the way originally foreseen when the United Nations was founded. The Official is akin to the narrative that the UN Charter is suffering from the interpretative abilities of the P5 nations. When drawn to comment on the Iraq-Kuwait, the UN[114] and UPEACE[115] Officials indicated that the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union have repeatedly suggested that such [collective] action is an important element in a new world order; that is, a world in which nations will be secure because of the capacity of the United Nations to guarantee their security through collective measures. This fundamental goal of the United Nations is unquestionably brought closer through the sustained cooperation and a notably increased commonality of interests among the major powers, evident not only in the Gulf War but also in other conflicts such as Cambodia and Angola.

In view of Russett and Sutterlin (1991) the credibility of UN action to repel aggression and restore international peace and security, as foreseen in the UN Charter, has been profoundly affected by the response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The Security Council showed itself capable of taking decisive action. Its ability to impose comprehensive sanctions and see them enforced was clearly demonstrated, even though the ultimate

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[113]Interview with the United Nations Official, 25 May 2015, Pretoria, South Africa.
[114]Interview with the UnitedNations Official, 25 May 2015, Pretoria, South Africa.
[115]Interview with the UPEACE Official, 10 September 2015, [E-interview].

effectiveness of the sanctions was not adequately tested. By authorising the use of military force, Russett and Sutterlin (1991) believe that the Council gained compliance with all of its relevant resolutions. The duo continued that the Security Council had shown that it has the capacity to initiate collective measures essential for the maintenance of peace in a new world order. This development can enhance the United Nations ability not just to restore the status quo as it existed prior to a breach of the peace, but also to change the parameters of the global order to something more favorable than existed under the prior status quo. In this it may even go beyond the vision of the UN founders. Furthermore knowledge that the United Nations has such a capability will also enhance its ability to deter breaches of the peace, and so make actual enforcement or later peacekeeping less necessary. Collective security may suppress incipient acts of aggression as well as defeat or punish those that do emerge but a collective effort cannot be attained by only a part of the whole, where some continents that bring the conflicts are not party to its solution.[116]

Similarly, the manner in which the gulf military action was executed by the United States and its coalition partners actually limited the willingness of Council members to follow a similar procedure in the future - a procedure that leaves Council members little control over the course of military operations and over the conclusion of hostilities. Neither the United States nor any other country will be ready to act under all circumstances to preserve or restore peace. Nor will other states always be ready to endorse unilateral actions anymore. Even though, a Security Council without African permanent seat means for Africans, a unilateral Council, some states may not wish to contribute to an operation, and the Council may not always wish to depend disproportionately on a particular state's contribution following the excesses shown by the US in the regard under review. This is so, because there were instances of the breach of the UN Charter.

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[116]Interview with the United Nations Official, 25 May 2015, Pretoria, South Africa.

6.7.   Constitutional and Charter crisis within the Council

Beginning with the Nuclear Tests cases, continuing through Nicaragua, and, most recently, in the jurisdictional phase of Nauru, the Court indicated that it was prepared to depart from the classical and strictly consensual basis for its operations and assert its jurisdiction over disputes on the basis of what would previously have been considered weak or even questionable grounds (Reisman, 1993). Common to these cases was a gross disparity in the power positions of the state parties, with the weaker party requesting judicial intervention. By this time, a generation of political leaders from the smaller states in the General Assembly had grown up operating in this changing environment (Hill, 2004). As a result, the membership of a much larger General Assembly came to feel itself entitled to far greater competence than the subordinate role to which the Assembly is consigned by the 1945 Charter. Some states aspired, individually to admission to the most exclusive club in the world; others (of which deceased Muammar Gaddafi of Libya was a leader), to limit or abolish the veto entirely or tear down the structures that support 'some are more equal than the others.'[117] Like a parliamentary matryoshka (doll), the Council contains ever-smaller mini-Councils, each meeting behind closed doors without keeping records, and each taking decisions secretly thereby, magnifying the disquiet that the fact that, as the Council has become more effective and powerful, it has become more secretive too (Reisman 1993). Apathy

According to Reisman (1993) who corroborates the UN Official[118] on the account of converting the Security Council Chamber into a secret Chamber, he notes that before the plenary Council meets in consultation, in a special room assigned to it near the Security Council, the P5 have met in consultation in a special room now assigned to them outside the Security Council; and before they meet, the P3, composed of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, have met in consultation in one of their missions in New York. The P2, consisting of China and Russia will also agree in secret. All of these meetings take place in camera and no common minutes are kept. After the fifteen

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[117]Interview with the African Union Official, 25 May 2015, Johannesburg South Africa. The official recalled how Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was killed, saying that the struggle for freedom from colonial dispiritedness was part of the reasons for Gaddafi's sponsored assassination.
[118]Interview with the United Nations Official, 25 May 2015, Johannesburg South Africa.

members of the Council have consulted and reached their decision, they adjourn to the Council's chamber, where they go through the formal motions of voting and announcing their decision. Decisions that appear to go further than at any time in the history of the United Nations are now ultimately being taken, it seems, by a small group of states separately meeting in secret. In areas it could be a matter on Africa but the African states has in fact, no say.

Yes, Libya's suit in the International Court against the United States and the United Kingdom for alleged violations of its rights under the 1971 Montreal Convention was widely viewed as the cynical ruse of a government implicated in state terrorism to evade condemnation and sanction by the Security Council. But claimants, no matter how despicable, sometimes raise important issues (Reisman 1993). In dealing with Libya's request for interim measures and the jurisdictional boundary between the International Court and the Security Council, the Court collided with world constitutional issues that had been taking shape over the previous five years. Specifically, in Resolution 731 (1992), the Council had asked Libya, in effect to surrender for trial, two Libyan officials who had been indicted in the United States and Scotland for causing the destruction of an American civilian airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland.

Relying on the Montreal Convention to which all the relevant states are party, Libya insisted on its treaty and customary right *aut dedere aut judicare* and indicated that it would try the officials itself if its investigating magistrate who, it averred, had begun to review the evidence-found sufficient grounds. As the Libyan Government purported to see it, three permanent members of the Council – the United States, the United Kingdom and France — were exploiting their powers under the Charter to deprive Libya of its rights under conventional and customary international law (Reisman 1993). Because the Montreal Convention incorporates the International Court's jurisdiction, Libya asked the Court to stop them. Though the Court's decision responds to a request for interim measures and could be reconsidered at a hypothetical merits phase, the majority, concurring and dissenting opinions provide a remarkable window on the Court's thinking about a critical constitutional problem.

To be sure, the nominal issue in Lockerbie was thus the sequencing, as between Council and Court, of the exercise of jurisdiction in part held concurrently by both of them. This is not an unusual phenomenon in advanced legal systems where different organs with different competences are created over time and often find themselves seized of all or different parts of the same dispute. The solution lies in the development of various codes for allocating and sequencing competences. Behind this nominal issue, however, lay a more difficult constitutional question that fused an apparently technical interpretation of the Charter about the boundary between the competences of Council and Court with an increasingly acute struggle over the most fundamental allocations of power in the United Nations system. In a nutshell, the P3 coaxed the Council to force Libya. The issue of lesson therefore, is that the P3 would not have dared, if Libya were to be a permanent member. If it were, it could have either joined forces with the P2 or challenge the P3 through the Council system.

6.8.   Conclusion

Chapter Six, drawing from the analysis in the preceding chapter, deals with the presentation and analysis of specific Council intervention data. This chapter presents discussion on the activities of the Council especially in resolution of disputes. Through the discussion of the P5 behaviours, lessons were drawn from the activities for Africa. The idea here is to explicate the accounts that exist in Council's behaviour. Chapter Six does this by framing the activities of Council in adopting resolution and intervening in the conflicts in Haiti, Yugoslavia, DRC and Sudan. Based on the perspectives from the discussion it was noted that high profile conflicts in Africa were ignored while low profile conflicts elsewhere attract the maximum attention of the P5 states. This observation is foregrounds the call for African inclusion for better practices.

Unavoidably, the Security Council, specifically, the permanent seat has become an arena of power politics, where might is right. More than anything else, however, it has been

still another under lying difference in attitude-over the need to comply with the UN'S rules on the use of force-that has proved most disabling to the UN system. Since 1945, so many states have used armed force on so many occasions, in flagrant violation of the charter that the regime can only be said to have collapsed. In framing the charter, the international community failed to anticipate accurately when force would be deemed unacceptable.

Further, given that the UN system is a voluntary system that depends on compliance of state consent, the act of unilateral actions in areas where collective authority is required, is short-sighted and can be fatal to the progress of the global body. This conclusion can be expressed a number of other different ways under the adoption of resolutions by the US as a means of intervention in less-interested territories to the P5. Indeed, massive violation of a treaty by the P5 states over a prolonged period can be seen as casting that treaty into desuetude -- that is, reducing it to a paper rule that is no longer binding, as Libya was bullied by the US and Britain on the account of Lockerbie trial as opposed to the international convention. In a global community such as the UN, the US and Britain serve as the principal forces that dismasted the Security Council making other weaker member states to snap in the gale. This was the accounts of Haiti, Yugoslavi (Kosovo), Sudan and the DRC conflicts where the US exerted influence without the proper required consultations with the stakeholders.

Granted, it was argued that Resolution 1441 and its acceptance by Iraq somehow represented a victory for the UN and a triumph of the rule of law. But it did not. Had the United States not threatened Iraq with the use of force, the Iraqis almost surely would have rejected the inspections regime. Yet such threats of force violate the Charter and seek to abrogate it by disuse. Actually, the Security Council never authorised the United States to announce a policy of regime change in Iraq or to take military steps in that direction but the US did with impunity.

It is a UN's failure that rules which must flow from the way states actually behave, not how they ought to behave is contradictorily correct. As the world prays for peace, even

though they preach war the old violence vocabulary should be cleared away so that decision-makers can focus pragmatically on what is really at stake and how to best compartmentalize every demeanour. Such vocabularies justify the search to continuously indict African citizens since the ICC despite evidence of violations in other parts of the world. While the forceful capturing of African citizens to be sautéed by the ICC some of them receiving jail terms of 14 years, the lesson for Africa is that the victims are looser of war.

In line with this study's hypothesis and Society of State Approach, this chapter underscored the idea that lack of consistent application of the rules entrench double standards. It also emphasised the point that an examination of such factors, as opposed to simplistic or reductionist explanations, engenders a holistic understanding of Council's behaviour. It is on this cautiously optimistic note that this chapter concludes its presentation and analysis of research findings on Council's behaviour in African conflicts and proceeds to providing summary of findings, conclusion and recommendations in Chapter Seven.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Summary of findings, conclusion and recommendations

7.1. Introduction and Overview

This study is interdisciplinary in nature. This assertion is predicated on the accounts that its contextual elements straddled the linked and mutually reinforcing disciplines of international relations and conflict transformation and peace studies. The study interrogated the connections of powerful nations who are prominent actors of the UN Security Council – that is the P5. Its primary unit of analysis from actors' perspectives is the P5 – powerful permanent states actors with veto power which Caron (1993) refers to as 'Club'. Its focal point of analysis in the domain of conflict analysis is conflict transformation and peace studies. Broadly speaking, this study has examined the intricate relationship between the Security Council formation and global conflict. Specifically, it investigated the roles of P5 nations and African states in Africa's conflict zones, measuring peace and security conundrums. In terms of methodology, the empirical nature of this study necessitated a combination of research methods and various approaches. Therefore, it adopted historical and qualitative approaches to the explication of the subject matter of the research.

Chapter One was a primer, an introduction to the study. Its presentation of the background to the study foregrounded, essentially, the research problem. It also identified the research task and outlined the study's hypothesis. The chapter presented the research objectives and corresponding research questions. Furthermore, Chapter One delineated the study's scope and limitations. It highlighted the significance of the study, followed by a brief statement of the research methodology and research design. The chapter also noted that an empirical study of this nature is bound to grapple with certain methodological and practical limitations, which the chapter identified. A section of Chapter One was devoted to the brief clarification and description of the seven chapters that underpinned the structure of the study.

Chapter Two – a review and comparison of relevant literature – interrogated the interface between permanent seat and veto power and conflict and insecurity. The analysis of the Security Council reform nexus was done with a view to advancing a nuanced understanding of the role of the P5 in conflicts paradigms. Furthermore, the discussion of the veto power link provided a context in which the connections between exclusion and marginalisation skirmishes could be located. Using the 'reform' thesis as the focal point of analysis, Chapter Two examined the debate about the interconnection between veto power and conflict. It was noted that although the literature contains narratives that either corroborate or disprove the 'reform' thesis, the relationship between security and peace is not linear and direct but complex and indirect. This is because lack of reform of the Council, *per se*, does not in itself engender war pathologies but may precipitate conflict.

Through a review and comparison of germane literature, Chapter Two evidenced the intervening variables in the security-conflict-peace link. Crucially, the chapter showed that a number of intervening variables associated with African exclusion from the permanent seat and veto power enjoyed the combined support of economic and political interests of the P5. It presents account that veto power precipitates, exacerbates and perpetuates conflicts especially against the veto-less states such as African nations. In other words, these variables intertwine with security and peace of nations as relates to conflict dynamics from the onset through its duration and specific intensity and perpetuation. In its explication of these variables, Chapter Two emphasised the need for a nuanced understanding of the link between veto power and security of nations including shielding friendly states and attacking non-friendly states. This chapter also provided the framework that elucidates the discussion on legitimacy, working methods, the new threats, and the composition and structure of the Council.

Chapter Three presented theoretical and analytical perspectives on the call for Security Council reform and why it has not happened, and is not happening. The chapter examined relevant paradigms (or schools of thought) and the theories and arguments (pertaining to the international politics of Security Council reform and the behaviour of the P5) associated with paradigmatic perspectives. The analysis of related sub-themes in the

chapter sought to provide a panoramic framework that lends itself to understanding of the P5 nations in the exclusive governance of the Security Council in general and conflict biases of conflict trends in Africa in particular. The chapter's interrogation of Realist theory on reform saga foregrounded the contending views vis-à-vis the impacts of status quo activities in the Security Council, especially in the face of Africa's agitation for inclusion. Realist views the activities within the Council as interest utilised in terms of power. It was noted that the structural and traditional schools advance different premises that lead to apparently incommensurate conclusions on the effect of real politik in the permanent category of the Council on the marginalised states. The traditional realists contend that *power is an end in itself* and therefore is important engine driving the P5's prosperity in making and taking major decisions of global security. By contrast, the structural realists maintain that, *power is a means to an end and the ultimate end is survival*. However, the chapter noted that the performance of P5 towards global peace and security underscore aspects of both traditional and structural arguments where power utility is demonstrated in reform resistance and, intervention in conflict zones further lends credence to facets of the structural and traditional schools' arguments. It therefore is evident that the two paradigms are not necessarily or inevitably incommensurate since neither provides a definitive world view. Rather, each represents an aspect of reality.

An examination of the structural and traditional realist paradigms provided a useful backdrop for the analysis of how 'interest' and 'power' are used instrumentally to achieve the sole objectives of the P5nations within the Council. As the discussion highlighted, the performance of the P5 exemplify an aspect of dominance. It was observed that, though the protection of national interests could possibly plague any other state drafted unto the P5 category, respect for the three 'Ss'[119] has remained resilient on the analytical and practical planes. Importantly, the P5 continue to profess commitment to global security but reform, and this probes the elementary essence of security.

Chapter Three combined lexicon of crucial other theories. This is not only dependent on the fact that realist paradigm does not address all concerns within the reform agenda, but

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[119] See Chapter Three.

also, that pertinent issues such as colonial and imperial standards processed through dependency paradigm could only be best unpacked through the dependency approach. Dependency theory as articulated in Chapter Three emphasised domination of one by another, and recognised the imbalance within the Council Structure and the operational modalities as asymmetry among the political actors. It argues that, in principle, the idea of interdependence implies symbiosis between the mutually supporting parts of the whole (Hopf, 1998). In order words, it suggests the existence of equality and symmetry in the relationships between units or actors of global security (Mastanduno, 1989). Chapter Three highlighted that there is unequal relations and asymmetrical interactions among the security actors of the Council. In essence, the utilisation of Dependency Theory in the study put into perspective the Global North – Global South divide that exist in the Security Council chambers serving as the compass that underscores that the developing countries were incorporated deliberately into the capitalist system (such as the UN) by the West under an imposed structure that only serves to facilitate the exploitation of those peripheral countries.

Chapter Three further engaged the Behaviourist Theory and gauged the behaviour and the conduct of the P5 and that of the permanent-seat-needing African states. While P5 behaviour shapes both reform debates within the global political arena and conflict dynamics in native countries, the P5 governance regime in native countries – among other factors – influences domestic government behaviour itself. In line with this realisation, Chapter Three analysed the dominance of the P5 governance regime and aligned the treatment of various actors by the P5 conduct to classical conditioning and operant bahaviours. The interrogation of thesesub-paradigms showed that the adoption of one or the other by a host government determines the extent to which P5 could be held accountable and/or responsible for their activities in the public sphere. It was noted that while the classical conditioning may explain how the African states were being conditioned to accept the status quo as the only option, a nuanced analysis of such observation indicated that 'the P5 actors' were accountable to no political stakeholders. And indeed, as highlighted, there is a twin phenomenon of 'learning and doing' within

the Behaviourist approach as presented between the classical conditioning and the operant behaviour.

Operant Response was utilised by Chapter Three to address the actions of the P5 towards the non-permanent African nations and provided the basis for determination of the claims implicitly made in the study that human behaviour controls the rate at which specific consequences occur. Behaviourist regard African states quest for inclusion as a response to the exclusion stimulus which is fraught with practical implications for P5 decisions. On one hand, a manipulation (classical conditioning) of African states behaviours for an expected outcome was viewed as undermining the legitimate claims/concerns of African states for inclusion, especially when the P5 actors determines the conditions of the African Group. On the other hand (operant response) the P5 activated a global political structures that allows the African nations to react only to actions but do not take the lead in deciding the activity within the organ.

Chapter Three further used Society of State Approach. This approach examined the theory of society of state. In the context of this study, Society of State recognise the importance the international treaties, rules, bonds, regulations in international political environment. It accentuates the usefulness of the United Nations Charter in resolving the reform debacle and calls on all parties to adhere to the rules of the Charter as concerns the Security Council reform. As noted, lack of heed to the rules of the Charter significantly influences the trajectory of conflicts that exist within the Council organ.

Chapter Four provided the analysis on the African exclusion from the Council's veto power while addressing the research O1 that necessarily follows from research Q1. Chapter Four provided the background and context for the examination of the interface of African exclusion from the permanent seat since 1945. In this chapter, the study undertook a detailed depiction of the reasons for exclusion, the AU's security roles, interests, and the roles of the individual P5 nations in the reform saga. It was noted that certain tangible attributes or elements of power underscore the Africa's mineral might has become an importance source of interest in global politics and a strategic relevance for

the region. These include its economy, strategic geographic location in the world and most importantly, immense natural resource endowment.

This enormous mineral wealth earned the region the appellation of geographic importance. As noted in the chapter, what gives the region strategic significance, however, is not the sheer number (or staggering amount) of natural resources but Africa's considerable hare of world's reserves and the high quality of the minerals which in turn is an element of power. This realist theory as presented in Chapter Three aptly speaks to 'instruments' as either means to an end or an end in itself. Struggle for mineral wealth in oil rich African states sometimes has been means an end in itself for some P5 nations, while war is means to that end. The discussion in Chapter Four showed that Africa (arguably occupies important political and economic space on earth in terms of natural resource endowment) possesses crucial tangible elements of power that potentially stimulate global socio economic development. Thus no phenomenon illustrates the African exclusion-inclusion discourse in the Security Council more profoundly than the imbrication of natural resources in the continent. Chapter Four emphasised that the variegated positions the P5 nations holds on African exclusion and since 1945 underlies economic incentives that they (the P5) obtains from Africa's conflict minerals which provided little or no incentive for Africa's inclusion which may signal the end of exploitation of Africa's mineral resources and instigation of conflicts that ushers in Africa's dependency on the P5 nations. In this way, Africa's resources have been a formidable factor in perpetuating a Security Council with a veto-less African state.

In Chapter Five, the study sought to respond to O2, Q2 of the thesis and provided broad explications of P5 and especially African Group roles in entrenching regional and global security roles. It examined the activities of African leaders and roles of some P5 nations in conflict environment and noted that some P5 states such as the US benefits from conflicts in Africa, and poor leadership among African leaders has allowed for the US incursions. The chapter presented the politics and profiles of conflicts that have binary indications to the incessancy of conflict in the regions (some pointing at the permanent seat as factor and others pointing at Africa's leadership style as the source).

The discussion in Chapter Five showed that state and non-state conflicts were facets of insecurity regime in the region. It revealed that African states have not been the sole owner of the conflicts within its borders. It tested the military might of top five African countries, their diplomatic clout to ascertain whether the agitation for inclusion is healthy, and confirms that, these African states can function well as the permanent member with veto in the Council. The chapter noted that lack of UN permanent seat with veto negatively affects Africa's securitisation. However; it recognised that some African countries intervention activities as did South Africa in Burundi and DRC and Nigeria in Liberia, Sierra Leone are indicators of potential and actual peacebuilding capabilities. In addition, it highlighted the point that since some of these African nations has been successful in various interventions and resolution of conflicts in Africa, it argues the point that their inclusion into the permanent category of the Council is equally in order. Importantly, drawing from empirical and literature evidences, the chapter argues that insurgencies such as Boko Haram and Al-Shabbab are prominent insecurity threats to Africa, which in turn, roll back Africa's regional security fronts and relegate peacebuilding in the region to an embryonic stage. This section combines the Society of State and Realist paradigm to sustain its argument. The Society of State highlights the importance of preserving the sovereign order of the nations through instruments of law which terrorism is tottering. As noted during the discussion, realism denotes capability which Nigeria demonstrated in the intervened states.

As discussed in Chapter Five, research findings indicate the saliency of Africa's inclusion agenda in the permanent seat of the Council. It was shown that inclusive permanent Council can achieve a peaceful and stable political environment. The chapter argued that although peace-enhancing initiatives by P5 (intervention in affected states) constitute a dimension of security obligations; they do not fall strictly within the purview of traditional notion of peacebuilding. In this sense, P5 peacebuilding is located in securitisation agenda.

Crucially, Chapter Five analysed the operational contexts that underpinned the contradictions of economic development and political progress in Africa. The chapter

undertook this analysis in light of the study's O2, Q2 and the hypothesis, which states that the interplay of Africa's security roles and capabilities and the operational context (that is, the local, national and international environments) underpin the strategic behaviour of the P5. As discussed, contextual factors and interactive clusters of actors (which this study refers to as the P5 and the African Group) at three levels of analysis – national, regional and international – influenced P5's activities in support of conflict or contribution towards positive transformative change. It was argued that understanding the context in which P5 operated was pivotal to unpacking African Group behaviour, especially in terms of its persistent call for reform.

Chapter Six undertook a combined empirical and literature presentation and analysis of data on Security Council's connections to conflicts and peacebuilding in Africa and some other selected non-African cases, locating the lessons for Africa. The chapter examined the specific roles of Security Council in the DRC's conflicts and peacebuilding process, thereby illuminating the broad explication of intervention behaviour and strategy. This was done through the presentation and analysis of the data obtained during fieldwork interviews and sourced literature accounts.

Discussions in Chapter Six typified Security Council's actions and inactions in transforming conflicts in resource rich and resource poor African states, compared to non-African states. The findings included the reckless abandonment of conflicts in resource poor states (such as Rwanda) and wedging war in the neighbouring resource rich DRC aimed at illicit exploitation of minerals, trading in conflict minerals and providing financial and logistical support for belligerents. From respondents' perspectives, these actions portrayed P5 as 'selective interveners' and elements stoking ongoing conflicts. Research findings as corroborated by Virgil Hawkins (2003) suggested that the involvement of some members of the P5 in the DRC's conflicts exacerbated and prolonged the conflicts, thereby having a significant impact on conflict dynamics. For instance, it was noted that there is a distinct lack of genuine interest in African affairs shown by the UN Security Council and its key members (the P5) and some P5 actors

reaped from conflicts underpinned conflict perpetuation which provided little or no incentive for every actors to seek peace.

Nonetheless, research findings indicated that Security Council was involved in activities that increased elements of conflict in selected cases where the organ had intervened in Africa. As noted in this study, the conflict behaviourism underscores provision of environment to maximise performance, either in achieving peace or degenerating into conflict through *conditioning* of the actor. In addition, it emphasises *operational* activities of the Council which included selective interventions as crucial act that undermines the integrity of the organ as a neutral arbiter. From the perspectives of interviewees and documented evidence, the involvement of any member of the P5 in activities aimed at halting conflict shown to have entrenched sustained conflict.

The chapter drew inferences from research findings and discussed emerging issues, highlighting the lessons learnt from this study on Security Council behaviour. Key issues that have significance for the research hypothesis and research questions included the nexus between reform and peacebuilding, the roles of the P5 in conflict zones, and the African Group in ending violence and building peace. Other issues discussed were the lack of inclusion that sustained the regional political economy of natural resource exploitation and trafficking, and the role of international actors in maintaining the status quo. Chapter Six also emphasised the point that the involvement of Security Council actors in the DRC's conflicts and their inability to implement a peacebuilding initiatives highlighted the dialectics of the P5 states behaviour. It was also noted that the complicity of P5s in conflicts undermined Africa's peacebuilding. In view of this, Chapter Six undertook a prognostication of P5 behaviour in Africa's DRC and Sudan, mapping out the lessons from the Council's engagements. Based on research findings and the operational contexts of the P5, the chapter observed with deductions that exclusion conundrums were intentional.

The chapter's analytical projection of Security Council's interventions and P5 resolution, drawing from historical and contemporary trends, suggested that a number of factors

potentially jeopardise P5 sdesire to intervene in African conflicts. It was pointed out that a conflicts in DRC, Sudan, Haiti and Yugoslavia offer considerable different faces of the Security Council. However, the chapter presented a caveat: the success of P5interventions and commitment towards security and peacebuilding in countries such as Haiti was aimed at facilitating reconstruction, peace and development in that state. It was observed however, that, generally, intervention depends largely on the extent to which the P5 address the substantive (that is, systemic and institutional) factors that potentially causes conflict and imperil effective post-conflict peacebuilding strategies. Drawing from the study's findings as outlined in the chapter, some of the key logical conclusions, which may provide the bedrock for future research into the P5conflict resolution nexus and Security Council behaviours in conflict zones is the abandonment or utility of the instructions of the Charter.

Predicated on the study's main objectives, it investigates the nexus between the United Nations Security Council reform and peacebuilding in Africa. In this effort, the study sought to address the following specific objectives: to determine the remote and immediate causes for African exclusion from the United Nations Security Council permanent seat; to determine whether Africa's exclusion from the permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council inhibits Africa's peace and security roles in the region and globally; and, to articulate what lessons can be learnt from the composition of the United Nations Security Council permanent seat, in terms of how to deal with African peacebuilding and security issues.

In light of that, the study was underpinned by a realist paradigm as propounded and guided by the Waltz, 1979, Morgenthau 1948: 5; Donnelly 2000, Keohane, 1986 and three other complementary theories/models, such as: the Behaviorism (Scientific Approach); Society of State Approach, and Dependency Theory. Realist paradigm enabled the use of qualitative approach which is centrally important in this study. The population of the study is not measured by the number of participants but by the category of respondents, namely the AU, UN and researchers and directors of peace and security institutes. Data for this study was collected through, semi-structured interviews and were

analysed using content analysis, tacitly combining it with thematic analysis. In areas where quantitative data were utilised, the study have employed the utility of data set from Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) which variously generated descriptive and inferential statistics for actualising the outlined objectives of the study.

The study has seven chapters. The first chapter anchors, in essence the background, the hypothesis, the study objectives to mention a few. In Chapter Two, the United Nations real reform debates past and present, pro and anti-reform crusaders views were recorded as they pertain to global security and peace. At Chapter Three, the study demonstrated with models that reform is under sabotage due to percuniary and political interests. The research questions of the study (section 1.7) and the objective (section 1.6) are used as the organising framework for chapters four, five, and six, and Chapter Seven presents the originality of the study, contributions of the study and suggested areas for future research.

7.2. Summary of findings

The Security Council reform and Africa's peacebuilding inhabit a distinctive posture in the discourse of worldwide safekeeping due to the weighty configurations they have set. The reform and the Africa's insecurity, indeed, have endured for seven decades. In the course of this thesis, the following findings were made under various chapters, from Chapters: Four, Five and Six. The findings under Chapter Four are discussed under article 7.2.1 to 7.2.3 with Q1 and O1 respectively. Chapter Five is discussed under article 7.3 with code Q2 and O2. And Chapter Six is discussed under article 7.4 with Q3 and O3. Generally, Chapter Four was dedicated to addressing objective One of the study – determining the remote and immediate causes of African exclusion from the Council, Chapter Five unpacked the Objective Two – determing whether African exclusion hinders Africa's security roles, regionally and globally, and Chapter Six addressed the lessons that can be learnt from African exclusion and overall UN Security Council operations with a view to understanding how to deal with Africa's security and peacebuilding jobs.

7.2.1. The remote and immediate causes of Africa's exclusion

In 1945 when the United Nations was born, not many African countries were free of colonial rule and dominance. The not-colonised Ethiopia that can claim freedom from Western domination was on its knees at the advent of both WWI and WWII begging for survival from drought and hunger, as such was not in any manner a global player. Thus, lack of freedom from colonialism was an important remote cause for Africa's captivity in and exclusion from the permanent seat. And the neo-colonial tactics played out through avenues of MNCs, aid donations, especially, the constitution of international organisations such as the UN is still responsible for Africa's immediate reasons for exclusion from the permanent seat of the Security Council.

It was recorded from some of the interviewees that Africa did not have significant interest in directing global hegemon and could not be a stake holder at that time when the UN was formed, but has interest now following its efforts to control the array of the natural deposit within its borders. This actually foregrounds the position of realism in this study. The study learnt that interests of parties in organisations determine the disposition and contestation among the same. The African exclusion from the Council is laced into the protection of global interest of the P5 nations of the UN. Also, Africa's persistent call for inclusion was born to defend her own interest within the global political system. So, while it appears, that the P5 states are heartless, both the P5 and African continent as well as the Latin American Group, know that it is a competition that requires one to force the other to accept the will of the stronger competitor for there to be a winner. The P5 may not in the near future carve out a permanent seat for Africa through dialogue. And the African nations may never become permanent members without agitation and competition. The UN is not the League.

The concert of Europe and the League of Nations that were before the UN were not of any meaningful impact towards global peace and security and it was safe to assume that the UN could be a repetition of the League. While one of the issue areas assumed to have sparked some care-free attitude towards the Council was that it may die a natural death as did the League, it was seen that the UN have learnt from the mistakes of the League and

have a different political arrangements from the League. One key difference between the League and the UN is the P5 operational modalities. As shown in Chapter Four, the League lacked the commanding voice that the UN found in the P5. A major challenge to the UN is within its lack of best practices, lack of democratisation and the dictatorial enforcement strategies that have clearly made Africa feel itself a victim of the P5.

The study found that resistance towards reform is not about African states not having the necessary ingredients required to serve in the Council's permanent seat, instead, it is part of the broader global agenda to keep Africa dependent and at the periphery. Part of which is to keep the African states out of permanent position in global leadership and global security activism. The membership of South Africa and Brazil to the BRICS group bears testament to the account that where Russia and China operates, that an African and Latin American minds can comprehend and participate meaningfully in execution of Group's purposes. Thus, the resistance is aimed at settling Africa at the periphery without powers to challenge decisions imposed on them, especially when the continent is being exploited.

The study learnt that the AU is not fully assertive as a unit of force at international arena. However, the AU has been consistent, through its document doing the most important with the UN, which is, raising the reform debates as witnessed in Ezulwini Consensus. While the common position paper of the AU did translate into granting the region even half of the AU's overall request, the study again found that the status quo remained because power, especially at international level of politics is not relinquished on mere wishes and desires or proficiency and articulation of position paper, but by hard politics of increase economic, military and political growth and might. This is the view of realism in this thesis.

7.2.2. What about Africa's regional and global securitisation?

Further, in Chapter five, the study found that lack of 'clout-leadership' – which is likened to driving a car without steering – which indeed is, seeking control of African affairs by African leaders in an international political environment without even a permanent voice in the Security Council is problem within the continent. Discussion on lack of clout-

leadership noted that Africa is aware of its deficiency and is now looking for more than Africa's development as articulated in Agenda 2063; they are seeking a complete experience with permanent power and secured continent. The study's Chapter Five specifically shows that the UN P5 simply does not have enough attractions from Africa. This observation was located in the interpretation of armed conflicts and loss of lives that have occurred in Africa. It was further deduced that Africa could not resolve conflicts within her region independently of the UN especially, when the P5 have stakes in the conflict. The AU is likely to increase its agitation for inclusion as a unit to the UN and it is not likely to stop calling for reform until at least a permanent seat is ceded to Africa.

In Chapter Five, the thesis learnt that war was aimed to be an African affair in particular and an integral part of global politics in general. For example DPKO records demonstrated that Africa has more than half of the global conflict. Even though, the UN has presence in the conflict, it has been at the peacekeeping levels. Peacekeeping, indeed, occurs after the conflict has occurred. Recalling the AU Official's narratives, numerous wars in Africa with external actors with vested interests, are indicators of lack of 'real' authority in the continent. Thus, the study found that while Africa has attracted more peacekeeping missions from the UN, it would not have had more wars if the African region is in control of conflicts within its territory.

This is important since the study also finds that veto power to an African state can serve a deterrent to unpopular resolutions that targets Africa and even illegal activities of war such as trading in military weaponry that cause and actually stoke conflict in Africa. In Chapter Five, we learnt that trading in military hardware is a source of income to some nations of the P5 such as the US that was the highest beneficiary of the conflict in Africa's DRC. So, any arrangements that will cut the US out of the selling of military hardware to the DRC and numerous African states with conflict will surely face the challenge of the US. So, DRC for instance, may continue to be in war since it is a source of revenue to a permanent state and it requires another permanent member to disentangle DRC from the strangle hold of the weapon dealers. That other permanent member must

be African as the P5 members do not step into one another's business, as a matter of mutual respect.

In Chapter Five, the study learnt that since the formation of the UN in 1945, the nature of conflicts have both gradually and drastically changed and internal armed conflicts now dominate both pie and component bar chats of global conflicts, and Africa is actually at the centre. It is understood that Africa is at the centre of world conflict and periphery of the world governance, so that development cannot take root. Further, in a milieu in which Africa both aspires and is expected to take on more responsibilities for expansion, peace and security on the continent and globally, the question of who will bail the cat is at the heart of post-colonial Africa. The question of who will bail the cat requires Africa to stand on as a candidate, push the candidate through to the permanent seat, and tasked the candidate with the duty of representing the continent. Egypt, South Africa, and Nigeria have been found capable of representing the continent in the permanent chamber of the Council.

The UN Official, who narrates that some African states is verily able to serve at the Council's permanent seat noted for instance that Nigeria's stability can change Africa's course globally. The Official, however, hinted that, "withholding of permanent seat from the region, exacerbate the instability within its circles." Following the insights from the UN Official, the study learnt that some African state's inability to punch up to, or even beyond its weight in international political arena is a problem to the continent as a whole. The study specifically finds that peace, security, development in Nigeria as well as any of the big five African states will bring peace, security, and development to the entire continent. In this regard, the study under Chapter Five records that Nigeria needs capable leaders at all spheres of governance with coherent policies to get out of its current arena of under-performance that negatively affects the continent.

In essence, it is an observation of the study that the Big Five powerhouses of Africa – Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa (in alphabetical order) will inevitably shape the future of the region for the reason that their demographic, economic and

military size, as well as their historical role as regional leaderships, and for the fact that they account for "40% of Africa's population, 60% of the African economy and 58% of Africa's military expenditure." While the study finds that Nigeria holds a lot of prospects for a prosperous Africa, the top five African nations, including Angola and Morocco need to be conscious of their role in the region as a well harnessed power from these countries will engineer the sense of security for Africa's people.

Further, recalling the interpretation of the ISS study, it is this study's judgment that economic growth in Africa is driven by long-term investments in education and indeed, reductions in foreign-debt burdens. Thus, it is our finding that lack of education and especially low or high foreign debts liability is a major factor silencing African leaders in the face of good governance to the African people.

There is prospect for Africa's growth and development. The study finds that Ethiopia is on the rise. According to the IFs Base Case forecasts for the period 2015 to 2040 Ethiopia is expected to achieve the highest average growth rate of the Big Five – on average, almost 2% faster than the 8.3% of Nigeria. Whereas Algeria, Egypt and South Africa are expected to grow below the African average rate of 6.3%, and roughly in line with the global average, Nigeria and Ethiopia are both expected to grow much faster. Nigeria, already the largest economy in Africa, and representing over 1.5% of the global economy, is forecast to represent nearly 3% of the global economy by 2040, close to the economic output of Germany and greater than that of France. Algeria accounted for 17% of Africa's total military expenditure and has, since 2008, had the largest military expenditure in Africa (Cilliers et al, 2015). Algeria's military expenditure has grown at 11% per annum since 1988.

When the forecast shows that Nigeria's GDP is forecast to grow from slightly "over $525 billion in 2014 to slightly over $4.2 trillion by 2040" the IFs Base Case forecast is that Nigeria will constitute slightly less than 2% of the global economy, up from 0.7% in 2014. To this end, lesson is that "to a large extent, the increase in Africa's role globally will therefore be driven by the future weight of Nigeria – a country that by 2040 will

have the fourth largest population in the world after India, China and the US. As indicated earlier, to a large extent, the increase in Africa's role globally will be driven by the future weight of Nigeria. Nigeria's current problem is dependency wrapped in bad-leadership clothing, a liberated Nigeria from neo-colonial dependency shall lead the road for Africa's independent and good name.

The study finds that global realignment of power is necessary. And Africa must cooperate and function as a unit to become heavier. The combined political, economic and social might of Africa, found in its total unit is impressive. Specifically, the total size of the African economy is expected to increase by 29% from $5.3 trillion to $18 trillion, and its share of the global economy will increase from 5.1% to 7.2% by 2040. Through the IFs forecast, the study finds that by 2040 Africa is expected to have a population of 2.0 billion people, constituting 21.8% of the global population. One other major determinant of higher future growth rates is the political and economic integration of current markets – the creation of regional economic communities with common currencies, freedom of movement of labour and capital across borders, and common import and export tariffs on African goods and services within Africa

In this respect, the study finds that Nigeria and South Africa are two African states that need to put their acts together to make important comments in the current global politics. Their importance is woven into the facts that even the powerful nations – the US and EU — needs the collaboration of [Nigeria and South Africa] to gain inroad into Africa and be able to operate efficiently in the region.

7.2.3. Summarising security and peace lessons for Africa

Under the Chapter Six of this thesis, the study finds that the United Nations was created in an atmosphere of major power cooperation. This was made evident when it was established that the UN architecture assumed that the leading global actors in world affairs in the period of 1940s will permanently be at the helms of world affairs, and with the introduction of veto power, they were even encouraged to believe so and act in tandem with their believe. Hence, the continued resistance towards reform to

accommodate the democratic principle upon which every government in the current dispensation is encouraged to appreciate. The P5 states (especially, US, France and Britain) who have advanced reasons why the Council must not democratise, have invaded countries like Libya on the altar of lack democracy. So, it is not about democracy and balance, it is about the maintenance of the interests of the concerned P5.

Africa is afraid to challenge the status quo and face the consequences. From the analysis of data in Chapter Six, it was observed that the only basic challenge Africa is facing from the world bodies is garnering the support of the members who would support, and/or take some form of responsibility for Africa's failure when efforts to become free at once fails. A lack of solidarity and disunity may keep Africa dependent and begging. Lack of unity and solidarity is the upshot of Africa's fear of the colonial powers. The study noted that Africa has the capacity but lacks the courage when dealing at the international gallery. Collective action can bring about collective security which may in turn suppress incipient acts of aggression from within the region and end imposition of external order on the region. Study finds that collective effort among African actors cannot be easily attained but it is very possible. As such it was observed that African region that owns the conflict does not participate in its solution and was further noted that the African continent that owns the conflicts should be part of the team, (the permanent members) that proffer solutions.

Africa lost more people to death in conflicts and wars than any other continent under the presence of the UN Security Council command. The study learns that conflict in Africa was responsible for approximately 90% of the total number of war deaths in the 1990s. Nine of the 10 bloodiest conflicts of the decade were in Africa. Death tolls in some of these conflicts were literally one thousand times those of minor, yet high profile conflicts in Haiti, Kosovo and Israel. Assertions that the UN Security Council is seriously engaged in African affairs are often supported by claims that 70% of the Council's work is devoted to African affairs. That 70% of the Council's work may indeed be on Africa, the overall output, of the Council's work in the 1990s exposes that, on the contrary Africa was largely marginalised by the Council and its members.

The study discovered that Council uses different 'canes to different persons' in that the responses of the Council appear disproportionate to the level of the various conflicts. This bears in mind that high profile or large scale conflicts in Africa (as was the DRC) received a very low response from the Security Council, while a supposedly low profile conflict outside Africa (as was in Haiti) received the full attention of the Council. In areas, it was found that the Council just adopts resolution or presidential statement on the matter without any determination to get practically involved in resolving the actual skirmish thereby stoking the conflicts.

Further, the study under Q3, O3, learnt that the ICC is an independent institution of justice, but it works hand in hand with the Security Council in dealing with indictees who are outside the bracket of the ICC. The study found that since 2002 when the ICC relevant documents were ratified, the body had indicted 37 persons for various accounts of war crimes, crime against humanity and genocide (See Appendix 10). As a matter of fact, the 37 indictees are all citizens of Africa. Some were tried by the Court, found guilty and convicted by the Court while others were set free on the basis of lack of sufficient evidence and others awaiting hearing and trial. It was noted that the Council play roles in referring and people deemed to have violated the rules, to the ICC.

7.3.   Conclusions

Save the UN works out the idea to reform the Council, it has to resign itself to the status quo. It was observed that status quo is a preference that is not particularly attractive when one considers the current United Nations Security Council structure and the future of world order. As a system – a framework of rules, based on checks and balances – meant to preserve the survival of the human race through, maintenance of global security and peace, needs to be supported by all actors. Co-operation and inclusion as the basis of genuine equality among all international actors in normative terms as contained in the UN Charter were noted. Also, it was suggested that, in practical terms, such actions as implementation of geographic representativity contained in several proposal at the permanent chambers of the Security Council be carried out.

The study has three principal questions and three pertinent objectives that stems necessarily from the three questions posed in the study. This study has at the Chapter Four responded to question one (Q1) and Objective one (O1) respectively. At the outset of Chapter Four the study made significant findings discussed under Summary of Findings and concludes that the remote and immediate causes of African exclusion from the United Nations Security Council permanent seat is in parts on one hand of African cause and on the other hand non-African cause. The exclusion, particularly on the remote cause, where it is claimed that African nations were not free of colonial rule may serves a genuine account that the exclusion is not a decision made by the African members.

However, on the other hand, when the African nations variously joined the UN during the post-independence in the 1960s, and having been members of the UN for that long, Africa's exclusion is not entirely the problem of the P5. Indeed, Africa was not free when the decision to create the UN to rule the world was made. Now that it is free, the pertinent question is what stops Africa from including itself unto the permanent category? The study draws from the data and document evidence that Africa contributes to its continued marginalisation by the UN Security Council through its own inactions.

Further, discussion on reasons for sustained African exclusion from the permanent seat, Q1 and O1, shows that the thoughts that the UN may function and collapsed naturally as did the League show lack of commitment from the African side. This is because, the lessons and factors that informed the collapse of the League appears to have been wrongly applied in the context of the Security Council. So, there is a wrong estimation and assessment of the UN at its departure by leaders of African descent.

The same argument applies to the account of Africa not being interested in the global body as it had no interest at stake at the period of 1945. One, it can be given that an Africa that is not free from colonial powers does not have the liberty of talking about permanent seat when it is not assured of non-permanent seat. Two, it is also important to note that an Africa that was under colonial oppression will be seeking ways only to get rid of colonial masters and may not have the vision for permanent seat. However, there is

a duty on Africans to have marked their attendance in the UN activities correctly. The continent recognised the time of entry but have no agenda of exit which left their bargaining power in powder —weak status.

In addressing Q2 and O2 which seeks to understand whether the permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council inspired Africa's conflict and inhibited Africa's active peace and security roles in the region and globally, it is evident that lack of permanent seat to Africa contributes to Africa's insecurity paradigm. Indeed, without any reform that includes Africa, the Security Council shall continue to relegate Africa to the periphery and may lose legitimacy among disgruntled African states. This is not only because other multilateral institutions such as BRICS may gain relevance in Africa and the Latin America that is also excluded from the permanent seat, to entrench dependency paradigm but also the decentralisation of international peace and security activities to all concerned touch base with the marginalised.

Following from the interrogation of Q2, O2 under Chapter Five, and the attendant outcomes, it can be deduced from the accounts that armed conflicts, and wars in Africa (the DRC, the Libya for example) sometimes are paid for by the external powers. The aim of the external powers is to become an actor in that conflict, either as a peacekeeper or weapon dealer. The latter is the case of the US and DRC in which the US is the highest beneficiary of the DRC conflict. Also, there seems to be some concerted effort in maintaining the cult of violence in Africa with a view to making the African region an arena notorious for violence, instability and under-developed to aid the interested P5 states in marking Africa as a continent in perpetual need of intervention and not one to offer help to itself or any other globally.

There have been voices from commentators and authors such as Brian Cox, that a permanent seat and veto power will not change Africa's political story in the world. However, there are compelling grounds to concede that one thing that will change Africa's political story in the world is the permanent seat with veto. For example, if the Resolution 1973 that authorised the attack on Libya and terminated Gaddafi's life was

matched with a veto vote from supposedly South Africa or Nigerian government, the once consolidated Libya that is in shambles today may have a different story. In fact, South Africa or Nigeria do not need to wait until veto stage, the mere public announcement that they will veto it would have at least changed the complexion of the intervention in that country, bearing in mind that the AU was still working out modalities for a process that when peacefully explored will ensure a stronger Libya. So, permanent seat with veto power would have been deterrence factor, and allow Africa some meaningful intervention in both regional and global security regimes.

Even though, there are some other pertinent activities such as growing Africa's economies that the continent can focus on to increase its relevance and abilities towards regional and global securities, it is imperative to underscore that these economies may not grow if the region is not equipped with permanent power. This is because, one of the destabilising factors of growth is the conflicts and some of the conflicts are stoked through the permanent voice. So Africa needs permanent seat and veto power in order to sustain any progress made in the direction of development and especially that of security and peace in the region. This is important since no meaningful economic development can be achieved in a conflict-ridden environment. Conflict is a crippling factor to Africa's growth and permanent seat and veto power are ingredients necessary to sustained Africa's growth in the current international system.

Suffice to say that Africa's dependency on external actors decision before engaging conflict is caused by its lack of political equipment of the veto and permanent seat, not the financial resources as have been suggested for decades. One of the major ways, Nigeria's poor governance is affecting the continent is that when it was punching at its weight, it nearly single-handedly restored both Liberia and Sierra Leone to peace before the UN was welcomed to those countries. Yes, the nature of conflicts have changed drastically, but any rebel group without the backing of such states as the US in terms of munitions will beg any government for peace within days of encounter. Further the AU intervention in 2003 at the instance of luncheon of the AUPSC, which was later taken

over by the UN was not due to lack of financial resources as the AU was made to believe, this study understood that, it was due to lack of strategy and determination to succeed.

More also, following from the political marginalisation that Africa has experienced in the hands of authors of the United Nations, it is inevitable that if the authors such as the US and Britain are true to the course of Africa's security, there must be a global rearrangement of power. Especially to entrench democracy in the Council through the geographic representation standards, this will incorporate Africa and Latin America into the whole, and allow all continents the opportunity to respond to matters of domestic interest before external actors. This account borders on the fact that insecurity paradigm is a global phenomenon and the powerful that intervene in weaker states also experience other forms of security threats. The policy of global war on terrorism was after the United States was attacked in September 2011.

While South Africa and Nigeria have dominantly been important actors in the region, the two must act properly and united in international activism with a view to keeping African states united. The Western countries destablise the continent of Africa through Nigeria and South Africa. The two nations are vehicles through which the external actors enter Africa. The two have not been acting in tandem with the supposedly African expectations due to hegemonic antagonism which led to the fate of Laurent Gbagbo and Muammar Gaddafi respectively.

Furthermore, critically appraising the Q3, O3, it is instructive to conclude that the United Nations was first and foremost a political institution created by the global powers for the global powers. It is operated by the powerful for the weak. The P5 (especially, US, Britain and France) that are front runners for the democratisation of the world and every gathering within it blatantly throw away any reform proposal brought to make the UN more inclusive and democratic. This in full, shows that the principle of democracy should exist only where it services the needs and interests of such states as the US, Britain and France in that order.

The issue with Africa's backwardness is linked to lack of courage and wealth of fear among African heads of states. This study concludes that in their individual capacities, African leaders cannot favourably compete against their oppressors, but as a united body of governors, the African actors will surely become an important force to reckon with in global political matters. The fear to challenge the status quo does not mean out of touch with what has to be done to, it all has to do with being on the bad books of US and other Western powers. The continent needs to unite in real terms bearing in mind that a well governed Nigeria will in 2040 supersedes the France and German governments respectively in terms of output. So, unity among the leaders will increase Africa's chances of taking care of business in the region and globally.

Yes, in 1990s Africa lost more men and women to wars and conflict than any other UN region in the world. This fact is chiefly due to the Council's tactics of ignoring major conflicts in Africa but responding adequately to minor conflicts elsewhere. The Council's attitude towards Africa was informed by the fact that, in areas where conflict exists, there also exist natural resources that are of interest to the interested Council interveners. So, the conflict receives band aid treatments which allow the interested interveners to continue tapping benefits from the conflicts, the DRC and Libya conflicts being some of them.

Another important lesson is that, when the ICC started arraigning people and incarcerating them, those conflicts that attracted high level response outside Africa, on the altar that they are high profile crises did not warrant the ICC to arrest any of the participants of those wars as in Haiti or in Kosovo. The issue is, it could be that the UN stopped the war crimes through its necessary intervention and takes credit for those, or it has failed to make necessary intervention and precipitate the violence and attendant crimes. In the latter, the Council shall be drawn to answer to the cases of war crimes in African areas and elsewhere where it did not use proportionate method in dealing with those conflicts; either way, it is necessary that the Council accounts for its victories and failures.

7.4. Recommendations

The study has discussed the United Nations Security Council reform and peacebuilding in Africa, reviewing the possibilities of African inclusion in the permanent seat. The recommendations presented below are based on the interpretations of each of the research questions, objectives and the pertinent findings that necessarily stems from them. Therefore, the recommendations are made in the areas of: Security Council reform, with specificities of African exclusion from the Security Council's permanent membership; intervention roles, with emphasis on Africa's ownership of interventions and peace missions; lessons for African states to unite and act as a unit force, with clear emphasis on integration and generating common denominator-factors among members.

Africa must drown dependency on external actors and fund own missions: while the chase for the permanent seat and veto power has been daunting, relying on external actors to resolving African crises makes the region vulnerable and susceptible to external interveners. Dependency allows the P5 nations to dictate for Africa in both political and other areas of African affairs. It was noted that African leaders through the AU should embark on independent funding system to back up the willingness to provide desired security for the region.

In view of the above, it is recommended that funding should be anchored firmly on good political and economic governance, with strong emphasis on Africa-led interventions. Good security and political governance consists of the promotion of independent ethos (including popular political participation). To be sure, respect for the rule of law and the sustenance of accountable, responsible and responsive effective national governments, and credible political leadership, all of which have been lacking in Africa. Good intervention strategy includes the implementation of credible and predictable transparent financial management, and effective anti-corruption mechanisms. These measures will curb corruption, which has contributed to the mismanagement of funds meant for peacekeeping as was sadly witnessed in Burundi 2003.

The continent should work collectively to secure collective regional peace through shared responsibilities among the 54 states that currently constitute African region. As noted, it was learnt that the region depended on external actors which had resulted in failed missions. So, for some practical steps to address some of the immediate intervention problems noted in the study, the AU member states should encourage both monetary and military contributions as a mandatory peace project. Currently, the greater burden is shared among, the top five African states as alluded to earlier in this study.

The Security Council should be made to reform through hard politics: during the study, we learnt that the Security Council is not reforming because of matters of power and not that of the will of the people. Since it is a subject of Realpolitik, the only amour the African axis of the UN has, which is truly effective is for the AU member nations to go through the hurdle of disunity, unite under and umbrella of the AU and exert influence within the parameters of a collective. Given, that the current status quo of the Council violates every spirit of democracy in the current era, the African group shall hold the US and allies (who are crusaders of democracy) to practice what they preach. This can be done in two practical ways: firstly, the African Group will stand together and present a candidate, who will represent Africa at the permanent chambers of the Council. In this vein, their resources and especially voice will be best heard. We have seen that Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt can serve efficiently in the Council, the African states will insists for example that they have voted that an African state must become a permanent actor in the UN Security Council activities failing which, they will withdraw their membership from the organ. If request is granted, then the second step is not necessary, but if not granted the second step must be taken.

Secondly, the second step, the African group will practically and collectively withdraw their membership of the UN on the grounds of marginalisation and that it is not democratic, but very exclusive. When this step is taken, bearing in mind that the reform has not happened because the US and allies are against it, the African Group, will collectively increase relations with other emerging and contending institutions such as BRICS. This will not only make the UN, especially the P3 actors call for dialogue, but

will actually compel them to cede at least a permanent seat to Africa, at least to avert entrenching Africa's relations with the competitors — the P2 — of the P5.

The African nations must aim at integration and peacebuilding, to attain unity: the integration of African states is more doable on paper than in practice. However, it is possible. Africa can integrate through ownership of common currency, open borders, common passports and become visa free routes to all Africans. In this regards, the first things that needs to be done is to create a common passport. This passport will have the AU logo and seal, other than any particular country but can be issued by the AU or any of the AU member states. When the common passport is introduced, any African holder of the AU-issued passport will move freely in the continent without visa within the countries of AU member states. In this regard, the border is open to members only while non-members are subjected to the due process of visa acquisition before entry into Africa, and should have visas for any of the member states to allow passage. When this is done, the AU should introduce a common currency. Or allows that South African Rand can be used to purchase items in Nigeria and Nigeria's Naira can be used in South Africa and same to apply to all member states. The AU should have African Union Banks that functions in all member states, these banks will see to free utility of African members' various currencies in all member states, through the members Principal Banks such as Reserve Bank for South Africa, Central Bank for Nigeria, etc. When this is done, the gap and stack reality that Africa is divided will be practically narrowed, and the continent strengthened through shared common denominators such as the AU passport, either common currency or recognised currency, AU Banks, etc.

Another strategy on Africa's integration is to use the AUPSC as a forum to create a unified 'made in Africa' intervention plan that can be pushed into and integrated with the national security projects of member states through the national constitution. This would give such African peace mission plan a considerable legitimacy among the member nations, and would make it difficult for the Council to invade territories as was witnessed in Libya, since such AUPSC intervention plan will not only prohibit external interventions but will propel the wing to act at the earliest. As we saw in Chapter Two,

that the AU Constitutive Act empowers the African states to take certain action under certain circumstances, this account was re-enforced in Chapter Five when the data reveals that armed conflicts are more within than between countries in the present time. The AUPSC integration of security arrangements into national constitutions of member states makes easy to regard such arrangement as national order and part of nation's constitution and treated as such under international law.

This will eliminate the challenge of having to regularly garner the support of the Council members who (as seen in Chapter Six) would take actions that suit the interveners and not the intervened. In the final analysis, there evidence from the data that the past African conflict resolution was left to Africans, and the future of Africa's conflict resolution has been left almost entirely in African hands, and that little support from the UN Security Council, or its powerful members cannot be practically and genuinely expected in the near future. At this juncture, the AU should assert itself through developed modalities to lead Africa's unity programme.

The United Nations Security Council should encourage its own reform through the P5: The UN Security Council should turn on a self-correct mode within the Council to reform it through democratisation and inclusive principles. This will appreciate, value, and recognise the presence of all members in the Council. How it will work, the P5 should adopt a resolution that speaks to current configuration of the Council, in consonance with the Charter and reform proposals, and call for the reform of the Council. Firstly, the P5 must advise that the Council is bias as currently configured – since it does not have the genuine representation of people from Africa and Latin America at the permanent level. Secondly, the Council must assert that geographic representativity tallies with the UN Charter that all are equal and must be treated equally. In this regard, the workings of the Council should be such that one permanent seat to one UN region or two permanent seats each to one UN region and equitably so. When this is done, the bias, the undemocratic, the legitimacy, the unrepresentative cases against the Council would have been addressed at once.

Alternatively, when Council refuses to reform, it will have more jobs trying to keep disgruntled members happy and make them remain members and lose relevance that would have been there if the P5 have bowed when the ovation was indeed high. While this study did not make any forecast on UN's future, it is imperative to note that with the emergent of alternative voices such as the BRICS, chances are there that the UN fame might wane in areas, as South Africa may be committed more to BRICS than the UN. It may as well happen that the Official's speculation that the UN may die naturally becomes true as the departure of the League was done through the emergence of the UN.

7.5. Contribution and originality of the study

Wassenaar (2006) cautioned that, for research to be of value, it should address issues that are important to a particular society or community within a society. The study through the interrogation of research questions and objectives as set out, has in fact, identified the gaps in the existing literature, extended the frontiers and horizons of existing knowledge within the UN Security Council, and the AU. Specifically, knowledge generated from the study are of significant value to the AU, the UN, policy-makers, researchers, scholars of security, conflict, and strategy, as a whole, and more particularly to those who are dealing with the UN Security Council reform and Africa's peacebuilding.

From a policy perspective: the findings have the potential to influence the policy formulation of African government towards relations within the continent as how to relate with one another for unity purposes and countries outside the region for regional unity too. Further, the findings discussed in the study provide policy direction to planners, policy makers towards the Council reform and implementation.

Improved Practice: the study indeed, contributes to the domain body of knowledge and literature, especially in the context of United Nations Security Council reform and peacebuilding in Africa. It also, has suggested improved ways reform the Council. While there are other studies in the field UN reform strategies, this study is the first comprehensive of its kind to explore the nexus between the reform and the peacebuilding in Africa. The study also proposes a model for peace missions in resolving Africa's

conflicts, which builds upon the weaknesses of the UN Security Council current practice of might, is right.

Finding the missing links and gaps: several studies made on the reform have agreed on reform for democratic principles and representativity, however, beyond the noted reasons, this thesis has pressed further the call based on weighed capabilities of African states. It further identified the politics of P3 against P2 as primary problems towards the reform. This determination was possible after interpreting the positions of both Razali Plan and the High Level Report which called for reform but did not get the support required for implementation due in part to the P3 – P2 divide.

7.6. Suggested areas for future research

The present study investigated the United Nations Security Council reform and peacebuilding in Africa. In this fashion, while the study took into account the reform strategies and Africa's peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding records, it did not give an in-depth analysis of the case of Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa or any other states of Africa's top five. Thus, the study was limited to top three out of five, and indeed out of 54 African states. Future research should be conducted in the specific abilities of the top five compared with the current P5 nations of the Council with a view to determine their relative strengths and how those can be translated into soft and hard power in addressing the Council reform plan.

Furthermore, since the present study was aimed at understanding the nexus between the United Nations Security Council reform and peacebuilding in Africa, minding the roles of the P5 in reforming the Council, future research could be conducted on the roles of the General Assembly of the UN to reconnoiter how a 194 states has been over powered by just five states among them since 1945 and to reposition the Assembly in a manner that the power of intervention rest on the Assembly.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Ethical Clearance

UNIVERSITY OF ™
KWAZULU-NATAL

INYUVESI
YAKWAZULU-NATALI

07 April 2015

Mr Chinedu Thomas Ekwealor 210556027
School of Social Sciences
Pietermaritzburg Campus

Dear Mr Ekwealor

Protocol reference number: HSS/1658/014D
Project title: The nexus between the United Nations Security Council reforms and peacebuilding in Africa: the case of Nigeria.

Expedited Approval

In response to your application dated 13 December 2014, the Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee has considered the abovementioned application and the protocol have been granted **FULL APPROVAL**.

Any alteration/s to the approved research protocol i.e. Questionnaire/Interview Schedule, Informed Consent Form, Title of the Project, Location of the Study, Research Approach and Methods must be reviewed and approved through the amendment/modification prior to its implementation. In case you have further queries, please quote the above reference number.

Please note: Research data should be securely stored in the discipline/department for a period of 5 years.

The ethical clearance certificate is only valid for a period of 3 years from the date of issue. Thereafter Recertification must be applied for on an annual basis.

I take this opportunity of wishing you everything of the best with your study.

Yours faithfully

Dr Shenuka Singh (Chair)

/px

cc Supervisor: Dr Khondlo Mtshali
cc Academic Leader Research: Professor Sabine Marschall
cc School Administrator: Ms Nancy Mudau

Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee
Dr Shenuka Singh (Chair)
Westville Campus, Govan Mbeki Building
Postal Address: Private Bag X54001, Durban 4000
Telephone: +27 (0) 31 260 3587/8350/4557 Facsimile: +27 (0) 31 260 4609 Email: ximbac@ukzn.ac.za / snymann@ukzn.ac.za / mohunp@ukzn.ac.za
Website: www.ukzn.ac.za

1910 - 2010
100 YEARS OF ACADEMIC EXCELLENCE
Founding Campuses: ■ Edgewood ■ Howard College ■ Medical School ■ Pietermaritzburg ■ Westville

Appendix 2: Informed Consent Letter

Informed Consent Document

Dear Interviewee:

I, EKWEALOR Chinedu Thomas, of the University of KwaZulu Natal, kindly invite you to participate in the research project entitled **The Nexus between the United Nations Security Council reform and peacebuilding in Africa.**

This research project is undertaken as part of the requirements of the PhD, which is carried out through the University of KwaZulu-Natal, School of Social sciences. The aim of this study is to engage in the United Nations Security Council reform and peacebuilding in Africa and determine whether African exclusion from the permanent seat without veto negatively impacts on Africa's overall peacebuilding agendas. Participation in this research project is voluntary.

You may refuse to participate or withdraw from the research project at any stage and for any reason without any form of disadvantage. There will be no monetary gain from participating in this research project. Confidentiality and anonymity of records identifying you as a participant will be maintained by the School of Social Sciences, at the University of KwaZulu-Natal.

If you have any questions or concerns about participating in this study, please feel free to contact myself, my supervisor, or the University Research Ethics office at the numbers indicated below.

The interview should take you about 15 minutes to complete.
Thank you for participating in this research project.

---------------------- --------------------
Signature   Date

I………………………………………………………………………….(full names of participant) hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project.

Additional consent

I hereby provide consent to:
Audio-record my interview

YES	NO

I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so desire.

Additional

Name: .... Date: .... Signature: ....

Supervisor's details
Supervisor: Dr Khondlo Mtshali
Institution: University of KwaZulu-Natal
Telephone number: +27 (0) 33 260 5895,
Email address: mtshalik@ukzn.ac.za

Research Office details
Contact: MsPhumeleleXimba
Humanities and Social Science Research Ethics Office
University of KwaZulu-Natal
Telephone Number: +27312603587
Email address: ximbap@ukzn.ac.za

Student's details
Researcher: EKWEALOR Chinedu Thomas
Institution; University of KwaZulu-Natal
Telephone number: +27734099690
Email address: 210556027@stu.ukzn.ac.za

Declaration

I……………………………………………………………………… *(full names of participant*) hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project.

I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so desire. I understand the intention of the research. I hereby agree to participate.

I consent / do not consent to have this interview recorded (if applicable)

Signature of Participant   Date

………………………………………………………………………

Appendix 3: Letter of Request to the African Union

College of Humanities
School of Science
Private Bag X01, Scottsville 3209
Pietermaritzburg, South Africa.
Cell phone: + 27 (0) 849 893 972
Email: 210556027@stu.ukzn.ac.za

To Whom It May Concern:

African Union Headquarters,
P.O.Box 3243,
Roosvelt Street, Old Airport Area,
W21K19, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,
15 May 2015

My name is EKWEALOR CHINEDU THOMAS (student number: 210556027). I am a PhD candidate studying Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies at the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN), South Africa. The title of my thesis is: ***The Nexus between the United Nations Security Council reform and peacebuilding in Africa***

The objective of this study is to:
1. To determine how has Africa contributed to its continued exclusion from obtaining a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council;
2. To determine how the United Nations Security Council inhibited Africa's permanent representation;
3. To articulate what lessons can be learnt from the composition of the United Nations Security Council permanent seat, in terms of how to deal with African peacebuilding and security issues.

As part of the requirement for the award of PhD degree I am expected to undertake original research on the subject under study. The UKZN ethical compliance regulations require me to provide proof that the relevant authority where the research is to be undertaken has given approval.

My supervisor is Dr Khondlo Mtshali of the School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus, South Africa. Available at: Mtshalik@ukzn.ac.zaTelephone: +27332605892. The Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee contact details are as follows: Ms Phumelele Ximba, University of KwaZulu-Natal Research Office. Email: ximbap@ukzn.ac.za, Telephone: +27312603587.

Thank you in anticipation for your contribution to this research.

Yours faithfully,

Ekwealor Chinedu Thomas

Appendix 4: Letter of Approval from the African Union

AFRICAN UNION

الاتحاد الأفريقي

UNION AFRICAINE

UNIÃO AFRICANA

Chinedu Thomas EKWEALOR – 210556027
College of Humanities,
School of Social Sciences,
University of KwaZulu-Natal
Pietermaritzburg, South Africa.

Dear Mr. Chinedu EKWEALOR,

Re: Request for permission to conduct interview with you on the African Union's position and perspective towards the United Nations Security Council reform and peace building in Africa

I have reflected on your letter and have approved your request for interview.

I will, within my parameters, give you whatever further support you may need for your study.

For further support, please contact me at: KpotsraH@africa-union.org or (251) 11 551 77 00, Ext: 2148. I am willing to assist.

Sincerely,

Hervé K. Kpotsra

Appendix 5: Interview Schedule for Nigerian UN permanent mission

College of Humanities
School of Science
Private Bag X01, Scottsville 3209
Pietermaritzburg, South Africa.
Cell phone: + 27 (0) 849 893 972
Email: 210556027@stu.ukzn.ac.za

To Whom It May Concern:

Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the United Nations
828 Second Avenue New York, NY 1007,
United States of America
Telephone: (212) – 953 – 9130
Email: permny@nigerianmission.org
05 May 2015

My name is EKWEALOR CHINEDU THOMAS (student number: 210556027). I am a PhD candidate studying Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies at the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN), South Africa. The title of my thesis is: ***The Nexus between the United Nations Security Council reform and peacebuilding in Africa***

The objective of this study is to:

1. To determine how has Africa contributed to its continued exclusion from obtaining a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council;
2. To determine how the United Nations Security Council inhibited Africa's permanent representation;
3. To articulate what lessons can be learnt from the composition of the United Nations Security Council permanent seat, in terms of how to deal with African peacebuilding and security issues.

As part of the requirement for the award of PhD degree I am expected to undertake original research on the subject under study. The UKZN ethical compliance regulations require me to

provide proof that the relevant authority where the research is to be undertaken has given approval.

My supervisor is Dr Khondlo Mtshali of the School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus, South Africa. Available at: Mtshalik@ukzn.ac.zaTelephone: +27332605892. The Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee contact details are as follows: Ms Phumelele Ximba, University of KwaZulu-Natal Research Office. Email: ximbap@ukzn.ac.za, Telephone: +27312603587.

Thank you in anticipation for your contribution to this research.

Yours faithfully,

Ekwealor Chinedu Thomas

Appendix 6: Letter of Request to the United Nations Security Council

College of Humanities
School of Science
Private Bag X01, Scottsville 3209
Pietermaritzburg, South Africa.
Cell phone: + 27 (0) 849 893 972
Email: 210556027@stu.ukzn.ac.za

To Whom It May Concern:

The United Nations Headquarters,
New York, NY 10017, United States,

15 May 2015

My name is EKWEALOR CHINEDU THOMAS (student number: 210556027). I am a PhD candidate studying Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies at the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN), South Africa. The title of my thesis is: ***The Nexus between the United Nations Security Council reform and peacebuilding in Africa***

The objective of this study is to:
1. To determine how has Africa contributed to its continued exclusion from obtaining a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council;
2. To determine how the United Nations Security Council inhibited Africa's permanent representation;
3. To articulate what lessons can be learnt from the composition of the United Nations Security Council permanent seat, in terms of how to deal with African peacebuilding and security issues.

As part of the requirement for the award of PhD degree I am expected to undertake original research on the subject under study. The UKZN ethical compliance regulations require me to provide proof that the relevant authority where the research is to be undertaken has given approval.

My supervisor is Dr Khondlo Mtshali of the School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus, South Africa. Available at: Mtshalik@ukzn.ac.zaTelephone: +27332605892. The Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee contact details are as follows: Ms Phumelele Ximba, University of KwaZulu-Natal Research Office. Email: ximbap@ukzn.ac.za, Telephone: +27312603587.

Thank you in anticipation for your contribution to this research.

Yours faithfully,

Ekwealor Chinedu Thomas

Appendix 7: Interview Schedule for Independent Researchers and Academic Observers

Questions on African exclusion from the permanent seat (Question 1 [Q1] – Objective 1 [O1]); Q2 – O2; and Q3 – O3.

1. As an independent observer, what do you think are the remote and immediate causes of African exclusion from the United Nations Security Council?--
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2. Do you think that the non-permanent seat to African states affects its peacebuilding roles in and security activities regionally and globally?---
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3. What do you think are the lessons for African from the exclusion to insecurity paradigm confronting the regions?--
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4. Do you think that Africa (particularly Nigeria) will make a successful bid to be included in the Security Council? Why and why not?--
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5. What would you recommend for African states as a practical strategy to walk itself into the permanent seat?---
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Appendix 8: Interview Schedule for the African Union Officials

Questions on causes of African exclusion and Security Council reform – Africa's interests (Question 1 [Q1] – Objective 1 [O1]); Q2 – O2; and Q3 – O3.

1. What are the factors responsible for the AU exclusion from the permanent seat, and what is the mission of the African Union in the Security Council?----------------------------------
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2. The AU has been excluded from the permanent seat and veto power of the Security Council since UN formation in 1945, how is the AU working towards its inclusion into the permanent seat as enunciated in the Ezulwini Consensus?----------------------------------
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3. Why is the African members of the UN politically marginalised in the permanent category of the Council, has the AU identified a single candidate and supported same for the permanent seat, if yes who? If not why?--
----

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4. What methods do you think the AU can adopt in order to be recognised and accorded a permanent seat?---
----

----

5. How would you describe Nigeria's ambition to occupy a permanent seat in the Council?--
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6. What would you recommend for the African members of the UN, with a view to achieving a secured continent peaceful and capable of resovling its own conflicts within the region---
----

Appendix 9: Interview Schedule for United Nations Officials

Questions on United Nations Security Council reform (Question 1 [Q1] – Objective 1 [O1]); Q2 – O2; and Q3 – O3.

1. What would you say is the importance of the United Nations Security Council to the world and Africa in particular?--- --- --- --

2. Why has it been difficult to reform itself since the UN commissioned relevant reports has recommended reform?--- --- --- ---

3. At what stage and under what circumstance do you think African inclusion debate will attract global attention?--- --- --- ---

4. What are the underlying immediate factors responsible for African exclusion?-------------- --- --- --- --

5. Bearing in mind that the P5 has resisted any reform that will affect their permanent seat and veto powers, what would you say about the tyranny of the minority by the P5---------- --- --- --

6. Do you think that the Council will be better equipped with veto powers decentralised according to the lines of the UN geographic centres, or are you pro-status quo, please explain-- --- --- --

7. What would you recommend as a best way forward towards reform and inclusion to make a more efficient and indeed democratic Security Council------------------------------- --- --- ---

8. In the face of these reform saga, do you think that there is any lessons for Africa, if yes, what are those?--- ---

Appendix 10 – The International Criminal Court Indictees (World Leaders)

Name of the ICC Indictee	Continent	Country	Year and status of case
Bahr Idriss Abu Garda	Africa	Sudan	On 7 May 2009, Abu Garda was indicted and summoned to appear before the Court on 18 May 2009 and on 23 April 2010 Pre-Trial Chamber I rejected the Prosecutor's application to appeal its decision, thus ending the proceedings in the case.
Mohammed Ali	Africa	Kenya	Mohammed Ali was indicted on 8 March 2011 and summoned to appear before the Court on 8 April 2011. Hearing was held from 21 September 2011 to 5 October 2011. On 23 January 2012, Pre-Trial Chamber II decided not to confirm the charges against Ali, thus ending the proceedings against him.
Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain	Africa	Sudan	Abdallah Banda was indicted on 27 August 2009 and the Court on 17 June 2010 confirmed charges and hearing was held on 8 December 2010. On 7 March 2011 Pre-Trial Chamber I confirmed all the charges against him. And on 11 September 2014, Trial Chamber IV replaced the summons to appear with an arrest warrant and suspended the case until Banda appears in court.
Walter Osapiri Barasa	Africa	Kenya	Walter Barasa was indicted on 2 August 2013. The warrant of arrest against Barasa was unsealed on 2 October 2013. Barasa is currently in Kenya, where the government initiated extraditions proceedings against him. In January 2014, the High Court of Kenya ruled that he can be extradited, but he is currently appealing the ruling.
Omar al-Bashir	Africa	Sudan	Omar al-Bashir was indicted on 4 March 2009. On 26 March 2013, Pre-Trial Chamber II referred the Al-Bashir to the Security Council. Since then, Al-Bashir has traveled to Chad, Kenya, Djibouti, Nigeria, Malawi, and South Africa, without arrest.
Jean-Pierre Bemba	Africa	Congo	Jean-Pierre Bemba of the Congo was indicted on 23 May 2008. On 10 June 2008, the arrest warrant was amended and Bemba was arrested in Belgium on 24 May 2008, transferred to the Court's custody on 3 July 2008. The confirmation of charges hearing was held from 12 to 15 January 2009, and on 15 June 2009 Pre-Trial Chamber II partially confirmed the charges against Bemba. The trial against Bemba began on 22 November 2010 and is ongoing.

Charles Blé Goudé	Africa	DRC	Charles Blé Goudé was indicted on 21 December 2011 and arrested on 17 January 2013 in Ghana, and extradited to Côte d'Ivoire. On 22 March 2014, the Ivorian government transferred him to the Court's custody in The Hague on 23 March. The confirmation of charges hearing was held from 29 September to 2 October 2014, and on 11 December 2014, the Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed all the charges against him and committed him to trial.
Muammar Gaddafi	Africa	Libya	Muammar Gaddafi (assassinated Libyan leader) was indicted on 27 June 2011. Gaddafi was killed in the Libyan city of Sirte on 20 October 2011 and the Court terminated proceedings against him on 22 November 2011.
Saif al-Islam Gaddafi			Saif al-Islam Gaddafi was indicted on 27 June 2011. In 2012, Libyan authorities stated their intention to try Gaddafi in Libya. However, on 10 December 2014 the Pre-Trial Chamber found Libya in non-compliance with several of its orders, including an order to transfer Gaddafi to its custody, and accordingly it referred Libya to the Security Council
Laurent Gbagbo	Africa	Cote d'Ivoire	Laurent Gbagbo was (the former president of Cote d'Ivoire) indicted on 23 November 2011. On 29 November 2011, Gbagbo was transferred to the Court. On 5 December 2011 he made his first appearance before the Court and the confirmation of charges hearing took place from 19 to 28 February 2013 before the pre-trial chamber and on 12 June 2014 it confirmed all the charges against him. Trail is ongoing.
Simone Gbagbo	Africa	Cote d'Ivoire	Simone Gbagbo was indicted on 29 February 2012. On 22 November 2012 the warrant of arrest was unsealed. On 11 December 2014, the Pre-Trial Chamber dismissed Côte d'Ivoire's challenge to the admissibility of the case. However, the domestic prosecution of Simone Gbagbo continued and on 10 March 2015 a court sentenced her to 20 years' imprisonment.
Ahmad Muhammad Harun (Ahmad Harun)	Africa	Sudan	Ahmad Muhammad Harun was indicted on 27 April 2007. Since his indictment, Harun has continued to play an active role in the Sudanese government, which has refused to cooperate with the Court. He served as Sudan's Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs until May 2009 when he was appointed Governor of South Kordofan.
Abdel Rahim Muhammad Hussein	Africa	Sudan	Abdel Rahim Hussein indicted on 1 March 2012.

			Hussein continues to play an active role in the Sudanese government (which has refused to cooperate with the Court) and he is currently serving as Minister of Defense.
Saleh Jerbo	Africa	Sudan	Saleh Jerbo was indicted on 27 August 2009. Jerbo was summoned to appear before the Court on 17 June 2010 and the confirmation of charges hearing was held on 8 December 2010. On 22 April 2013 Radio Dabanga reported that Jerbo had been killed on 19 April. On 4 October 2013, the Court terminated the proceedings to resume upon prove that is alive.
Germain Katanga	Africa	DRC	Germain Katanga was indicted on 2 July 2007. After the Court issued a warrant for his arrest, Katanga was transferred to the Court on 17 October 2007. His trial began on 24 November 2009. The Trial Chamber delivered the judgment in the case on 7 March 2014 finding Katanga guilty of four counts of war crimes and one count of crime against humanity. On 23 May 2014, Katanga was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment. He is currently at the Court's Detention Centre in The Hague pending transfer to a state where he will serve the remainder of his sentence
Uhuru Kenyatta	Africa	Kenya	Uhuru Kenyatta is the current President of the Republic of Kenya was indicted on 8 March 2011. Kenyatta was summoned to appear before the Court on 8 April 2011 and the confirmation of charges hearing was held from 21 September 2011 to 5 October 2011. All the charges against Kenyatta were confirmed by Pre-Trial Chamber II on 23 January 2012. However, before the trial began, the Prosecutor announced on 3 December 2014 that she was withdrawing all of the charges. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber terminated the proceedings against Mr. Kenyatta on 13 March 2015
Joseph Kony	Africa	Uganda	Joseph Kony of Uganda was indicted on 8 July 2005. Kony is currently at large and his whereabouts are unknown, although he is suspected to be in either the Central African Republic or a neighboring country.
Henry Kosgey	Africa	Kenya	Henry Kosgey was indicted on 8 March 2011. Kosgey first appeared before the Court, voluntarily, on 7 April 2011. On 23 January 2012, Pre-Trial Chamber II decided not to confirm the charges against Kosgey therefore ending his proceedings before the Court.
Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (Ali Kushayb)	Africa	Sudan	Ali Kushayb was indicted on 27 April 2007. On October 2008 it was reported that Kushayb was arrested by Sudanese officials in connection to war

			crimes allegedly committed in Darfur. Despite the arrest, no evidence of any further proceedings has emerged. It is also not clear if Kushayb is in detention and his whereabouts are not publicly known.
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo	Africa	DRC	Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was indicted on 10 February 2006. Lubanga Dyilo was arrested on 19 March 2005 by Congolese authorities and transferred to the Court's custody on 16 March 2006. His trial began on 26 January 2009 and ended with his conviction of all three counts on 14 March 2012. On 10 July 2012 he was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment.
Raska Lukwiya	Africa	Uganda	Raska Lukwiya was indicted on 8 July 2005. On 12 August 2006 the Ugandan military killed Lukwiya in a battle with LRA forces. Following the confirmation of his death, the Court terminated proceedings against Lukwiya on 11 July 2007.
Callixte Mbarushimana	Africa	DRC	Callixte Mbarushimana was indicted on 28 September 2010. Mbarushimana was arrested in France on 11 October 2010 and transferred to the Court on 25 January 2011. On 16 December 2011, Pre-Trial Chamber I ruled to decline to confirm the charges against him and ordered his release. The Prosecutor's appeal against the decision was rejected, and on 23 December 2011, Mbarushimana became the first person to be detained by the ICC and then set free; at his request, he was released in France.
Sylvestre Mudacumura	Africa	DRC	Sylvestre Mudacumura was indicted on 13 July 2012. Mudacumura continues to lead the FDLR in the eastern DRC and is at large as a fugitive.
Francis Muthaura	Africa	Kenya	Francis Muthaura was indicted on 8 March 2011. Muthaura was summoned to appear before the Court on 8 April 2011 and the confirmation of charges hearing was held from 21 September 2011 to 5 October 2011. On 11 March 2013, the Prosecutor announced that her office would withdraw all charges against Muthaura, citing a lack of cooperation from the Kenyan government, the death and killing of witnesses, and the recantation of testimony by a key witness who was bribed by agents of the accused. On 18 March 2013, the Trial Chamber granted the Prosecutor permission to withdraw the charges and terminated all proceedings against Muthaura
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui	Africa	DRC	Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui was indicted on 6 July 2007.

			After the Court issued an arrest warrant, Ngudjolo Chui was detained on 6 February 2008 by Congolese authorities, transferred to the Court the next day, and made he his first appeared before the Court on 11 February 2008. The confirmation of charges hearing was held from 27 June 2008 to 18 July 2008 and on 26 September 2008 the Pre-Trial Chamber confirms all but three charges against Ngudjolo Chui. His trial began on 24 November 2009 and on 18 December 2012; Trial Chamber II delivered the judgment acquitting Ngudjolo Chui. The Prosecutor appealed the judgment, but the Appeals Chamber upheld the acquittal on 27 February 2015.
Bosco Ntaganda	Africa	DRC	Bosco Ntaganda was indicted on 22 August 2006. The Congolese government refused to arrest him and in 2009 Ntaganda became a general in the armed forces in the city of Goma in North Kivu province. In April 2012 he and his troops defected from the military and left Goma to form the March 23 Movement, an armed group that began attacking villages and towns around Goma. On 18 March 2013, following reports of clashes between factions of the March 23 Movement, Ntaganda fled to Rwanda and entered the Embassy of the United States in Kigali. He requested that the United States facilitate his surrender the Court. On 22 March, the ICC took custody of Ntaganda and transferred him to The Hague. His first appearance before the Court took place on 26 March 2013. The confirmation of charges hearing occurred from 10 to 14 February 2014 and on 9 June 2014 all the charges against Ntaganda were confirmed by the pre-trial chamber.
Okot Odhiambo	Africa	Uganda	Okot Odhiambo of Uganda was indicted on 8 July 2005. In 2014, an LRA defector claimed that the Ugandan military wounded Odhiambo in October 2013 during an ambush in the Central African Republic and that he later died from his injuries. In February 2015, Ugandan officials announced that they had exhumed a grave believed to contain Odhiambo's remains and are conducting DNA testing on the remains to verify if Odhiambo is deceased. However, since his death has not been confirmed, Odhiambo is still considered to be at large as a fugitive by the Court.
Dominic Ongwen	Africa	Uganda	Dominic Ongwen was indicted on 8 July 2005. Ongwen surrendered to United States military advisors

			assisting Ugandan forces on 6 January 2014 in the Central African Republic. The Court took custody of Ongwen on 17 January 2015 and he was transferred to the Court's detention center on 21 January. He made his first appearance before the Court on 26 January.
Vincent Otti	Africa	Uganda	Vincent Otti was indicted on 8 July 2005. In December 2007, BBC News reported that on 2 October 2007 Otti had been executed on orders from Joseph Kony, the commander-in-chief of the LRA. Kony later confirmed that Otti was dead to Riek Machar, a mediator between the Ugandan government and the LRA. Because Otti's death has not been independently verified, the Court still considers him to be at large as a fugitive and proceedings against him are ongoing.
William Samoei Ruto	Africa	Kenya	William Ruto (the current Deputy President of the Republic of Kenya) was indicted on 8 March 2011. Ruto first appeared before the Court, voluntarily, on 7 April 2011. All the charges against Ruto were confirmed by Pre-Trial Chamber II on 23 January; Ruto's trial began on 10 September 2013, and is ongoing.
Joshua Arap Sang	Africa	Kenya	Joshua Sang was indicted on 8 March 2011. Sang first appeared before the Court, voluntarily, on 7 April 2011 and through the confirmation of charges hearing, all the charges against Sang were confirmed by Pre-Trial Chamber II on 23 January 2012 Sang's trial began on 10 September 2013, and is ongoing.
Abdullah Senussi	Africa	Libya	Abdullah Senussi was indicted on 27 June 2011. Senussi was arrested on 17 March 2012 at Nouakchott International Airport in Mauritania after he arrived on a flight from Casablanca, Morocco with a fake Malian passport. On 5 September 2012 he was extradited to Libya. On 11 October 2013, Pre-Trial Chamber I ruled that the case against Senussi was inadmissible before the ICC because of ongoing proceedings against him in Libya. On 24 July 2014, the Appeals Chamber confirmed the decision.
Aimé Kilolo Musamba	Africa	DRC	Aimé Kilolo Musamba Current situation: Interim release. Arrest warrant was issued under seal on 20 November 2013, made public on 28 November 2013 Transfer to the ICC on 25 November 2013. He made initial appearance on 27 November 2013 and confirmation of charges on 11 November 2014. Scheduled opening of the trial is 29 September 2015.
Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo	Africa	DRC	Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo's current situation is

			interim release. Arrest warrant was issued under seal on 20 November 2013, made public on 28 November 2013. He was transferred to the ICC on 4 December 2013 and made initial appearance on 5 December 2013. Decision on the Confirmation of charges was on 11 November 2014. Scheduled opening of the trial is 29 September 2015.
Fidèle Babala Wandu	Africa	DRC	Fidèle Babala Wandu's current situation is interim release. His arrest warrant was issued under seal on 20 November 2013 and made public on 28 November 2013. He was transferred to the ICC on 25 November 2013 and his initial appearance was on 27 November 2013. Decision on the Confirmation of charges was on 11 November 2014 and scheduled opening of the trial is 29 September 2015.
Narcisse Arido	Africa	CAR	Narcisse Arido's current situation is interim release. Arrest warrant was issued under seal on 20 November 2013, made public on 28 November 2013 and he was transferred to the ICC on 18 March 2014. Initial appearance was on 20 March 2014. Decision on the confirmation of charges was on 11 November 2014. Scheduled opening of the trial is on 29 September 2015.
Bahar Idriss Abu Garda	Africa	Sudan	Bahar Idriss Abu Garda's summons to appear was issued under seal on 7 May 2009 and unseald on 17 May 2009. First appearance was on 18 May 2009. Confirmation Hearing was on 19-29 October 2009. On 8 February 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber I refused to confirm the charges against Mr Abu Garda. On 23 April, 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber I issued a decision rejecting the Prosecutor's application to appeal the decision declining to confirm the charges.

Source: Data worked out from the ICC official website, 2015