

**The Theory and Application of Consociational Democracy in South Africa: A  
Case Study of KwaZulu-Natal**

By

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Rejoice in the Lord always. I will say it again: Rejoice! Let your gentleness be evident to all. The Lord is near. Do not be anxious about anything, but in everything, by prayer and petition, with thanksgiving, present your requests to God. And the peace of God, which transcends all understanding, will guard your hearts and your minds in Christ Jesus. Finally, brothers, whatever is true, whatever is noble, whatever is right, whatever is pure, whatever is lovely, whatever is admirable-if anything is excellent or praiseworthy-think about such things. **Philippians 4:4-8**

## DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I.....declare that

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## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this thesis to God Almighty, the architecture of the universe and the manager of all times, who kept me in spite of my consistent inconsistencies

And

To my Parents, Mr Harrison Mjubi Dlamini and Mrs Martha Ntombiyedwa Dlamini.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

I reserve all glory and honour to the Most High for seeing me through this research despite all difficulties. May your Name be glorified and may I ever be your student.

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The following individuals are notable amongst many and their contribution cannot be underestimated, Mr. N. Mngoma, Mr. MI Shongwe, Mr. S. Kheswa, Mr. M. Sibanda, DR. S. Idoniboye-obu, Mr. M. Ngwenya, Mr. Z. Sibisi, Ms Z. Maphanga, Miss N.E Zwane, Rev S Mthethwa, Dr. A. Jones, Ms C.K Ngubo, Ms N. Mudau, Dr. A. Whetho, Mrs N.E Ndlovu, Mr. L. Dladla. Mr. S.A.E Zondo. Mr. F Brookes, Prof. Ufo Uzodike Okeke, Mr S. Tembe, Thank you.

I am hugely indebted to my family for their support, love and understanding. I am also eager to express my indebtedness to Artemisa Aminata Soares Lima for her love, encouragement and push for tenacity. To my daughter Tenhle Temahlubi Dlamini and my son Harriston Jorge Dlamini, I could not have always been there for you as I would have wished. Thank you for your love and ability to keep both my feet on the ground. This is for you.

## **ABSTRACT**

Liberal democracy has failed to address issues of development, especially in plural societies such as South Africa, where different segments of society and government representation coexist. Its focus on individualism rather than collectivism; its competitive nature and lack of participation, injects an uncommon practice to the African political culture. Liberal democracy has been perceived by scholars and more generally, political commentary as an appropriate political system to address issues of development. This in part may be the result of not drawing focus on the relationship of development to other systems of government, more especially consociational democracy. And thus, due to the weaknesses and assumptions inherent in both new and classical liberal democracy, the study explored the consociational model in a search for a development model appropriate for South Africa. In essence, the study specifically seeks to provide an alternative paradigm of development by drawing on the consociational theory as advocated by Claude Ake.

The study argued that the importance of achieving development through coalition and participation by different segments of society deserves much attention. The conflict perpetrated by power struggles amongst elites is a significant obstacle in the path of development. In filling in the gap between liberalism and development, the study employed the consociational theory in examining the extent to which coalition between different segments of KwaZulu-Natal can work collaboratively towards achieving development. The theory based on Ake's paradigm of development is used to narrow down the research into a developmental paradigm that will specifically be in reference to KwaZulu-Natal's three districts, eThekweni, uMzinyathi and uMgungundlovu. Such a paradigm essentially focuses on cooperation and is characterized by a

people driven development agenda. The study argues that Claude Ake's paradigm of development with both its inclusive nature of the individual and emphasis on collective representation appears more feasible and capable of bringing about an African paradigm of development than the dominant liberal approach.

The study uses a qualitative research method. As research instruments, interviews and a questionnaire are used to get more detailed information out of participants. Using structured interviews and open interview schedules, interviewees consists of focus groups and elites in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. These interviewees are; councilors at district and local municipalities, traditional leaders, non-governmental organizations, politicians from different political parties, senior government officials, and the unemployed.

The study found out that it is abundantly clear that Africa in the 21<sup>st</sup> century requires a paradigm shift in shaping and conducting its democratic practices and its development agenda. There is a need to adopt a clear paradigm of development that is human centred and characterised by the inclusion of various segments of society. This paradigm should embrace the spirit of inclusiveness, cooperation, participation and recognition of people's capabilities and freedoms to value. While the study acknowledges the conscious attempts made by South Africa to ensure the participation of the citizenry in development issues, a greater emphasis on cooperation and unity in decision making is necessary in ensuring a smooth process of development, particularly in South Africa's most deprived communities.

**Key words:** Liberalism, Consociationalism, Development, Power Sharing, Majoritarianism, Liberal democracy, Consociational democracy, Classical Liberalism, New Liberalism.

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AfAP	African Alliance for Peace
ANC	African National Congress
CBOs	Community Based Organizations
Cllr	Councillor
CODESA	Convention for a Democratic South Africa
COGTA	Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Union
DA	Democratic Alliance
DIF	District Intergovernmental Forums
DM	District Municipality
DORA	Division of Revenue Act
DP	Democratic Party
DTT	District Task Team
EXCO	Executive Committee
ESID	Economic Sectors and Infrastructure Development Cluster
EU	European Union
FFC	Financial and Fiscal Commission
FPTP	First past the Post
G & A	Governance and Administration
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNU	Government of National Unity
GNP	Gross National Product
GPU	Government of Provincial Unity
HOD	Head of Department
ID	Independent Democrats
IDP	Integrated Development Plan
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
IGR	Intergovernmental Relations
IRFA	Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act

JCPS	Justice Crime Protection and Security
KZN	KwaZulu-Natal
LPC	Local Peace Committee
LTT	Local Task Team
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MEC	Member of the Executive Council
MF	Minority Front
MK	Umkhonto weSizwe
MM	Municipal Manager
MMPs	Members of the Provincial Parliament
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPLs	Members of Parliament
MPNP	Multiparty Negotiating Process
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
MWRRU	Maurice Webb Race Relation Unit
NCOP	National Council of Provinces
NDP	National Development Plan
NNP	New National Party
NPI-Africa	Nairobi Peace Initiative – Africa
NPA	National Peace Accord
NPC	National Peace Committee
NPOs	Non-Profit Organizations
NPS	National Peace Secretariat
OSS	Operation Sukuma Sakhe
OTP	Office of the Premier
PAC	Pan-African Congress
PPC	Provincial Planning Commission
PCF	Premier Coordinating Forum
PGDP	Provincial Growth Development Plan
PR	Proportional Representation
PTT	Provincial Task Team

RPC	Regional Peace Committee
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SALGA	South African Local Government Association
SONA	State of the Nation Address
SPCHD	Social Protection Community and Human Development
TPCF	Technical Premier's Coordinating Forum
UDF	United Democratic Front
UDM	United Democratic Movement
UMG	UMgungundlovu
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UWUSA	United Workers Union of South Africa
WANEP	West Africa Network for Peace

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
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
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## MAP OF SOUTH AFRICA



**Source:** Gijsbertsen, B. (2009). Department of Geography. University of KwaZulu-Natal.

**MAPS OF THE PROVINCE OF KWAZULU-NATAL, DISTRICTS, TOWNS AND LOCAL MUNICIPALITIES**



Source: KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Government – the Nerve Centre, 2015



## KwaZulu-Natal Towns



### Legend

 Towns

 District Municipalities

Requested By: Sipheto Dlamini

Department: Cabinet Cluster

Drawn By: Varsha Sewraj

Date: 15/09/2015

Drawing Number: OTP\_CC\_0003

Source: KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Government – the Nerve Centre, 2015



# KwaZulu-Natal Local Municipalities



## Legend

- Local Municipalities
- District Municipalities

Requested By:	Siphetho Dlamini
Department:	Cabinet Cluster
Drawn By:	Varsha Sewraj
Date:	15/09/2015
Drawing Number:	OTP_CC_0002

Source: KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Government – the Nerve Centre, 2015

# CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND


## 1.1 Introduction

This chapter begins with a brief historical overview KwaZulu-Natal, followed by a problem statement, research question, the conceptual framework and the research methodology. The Province of KwaZulu-Natal is one of the nine provinces of South Africa and is located in the southeast of the country, it borders three other provinces (Mpumalanga, Eastern Cape and Free State Province) and the countries of Swaziland, Mozambique, and Lesotho, along with a long shoreline on the Indian Ocean. KwaZulu-Natal is regarded as one of the countries' most populated province after Gauteng. According to Stats SA (2010) the population of KwaZulu-Natal was 10.65 million people in 2010<sup>1</sup>. KwaZulu-Natal has 10 Districts and 1 metropolitan. According to the National Census of 2010 KwaZulu-Natal is home to about 21.3% of South Africa's population. EThekweni Metro and UMgungundlovu district have the largest population in KwaZulu-Natal, making approximately a quarter of the Province's total population. Figure 1.1 shows the distribution of KZN's population by districts.

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<sup>1</sup> Approximately 11, 19 million people (22, 4%) live in Gauteng. KwaZulu-Natal is the province with the second largest population, with 10, 65 million people (21, 3%) living in this province. With a population of approximately 1, 10 million people (2, 2%), Northern Cape remains the province with the smallest share of the South African population. (StatSA 2010)

**Figure 1.1 Census 2011: KZN Population per District**



**Source:** KZN Provincial Government Review of the MTSF (2009-2013) – modified by the Researcher

According to Stats SA labour Force Survey (2011) KwaZulu-Natal was second only to Gauteng in the total jobs created; 90 000 in the formal sector and 66 000 in the informal sectors. Taking

into account job losses during the same year, a total 123 000 jobs were created<sup>2</sup>. Although the province of KwaZulu-Natal is relatively economically stable, the province still experiences high levels of poverty in some of her districts. “Six of the country’s 10 most deprived districts are in KwaZulu-Natal, with UMzinyathi and uMkhanyakude being the poorest districts in the country” (Cullinan 2012).

Out of a population of over 10 million people, just over 5 million people are living in poverty<sup>3</sup>. This constitutes a poverty level of approximately 50 %. Poverty and unemployment in South Africa are often rural phenomena, and given that many of the rural communities are linked to agricultural activities. Unemployed youth and adults who have work experience account for 60.7% and 39.3% respectively in KZN and unemployed youth and adults without work experience account for 92.7% and 7.3% respectively<sup>4</sup>. According to Stats SA (2014:7), “The unemployment rate was higher among black African youth and adults than among other population groups over the period 2008–2014”. These rates are higher in rural areas of uMkhanyakude, Zululand and uThukela.

## **1.2 Historical Overview**

The province of KwaZulu-Natal has been forged out of the former Province of Natal and the so-called homelands of KwaZulu. According to Beall et al (2012: 1), “the Province has had a difficult history and was born of political conflict during the twilight years of apartheid that assumed the

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<sup>2</sup> Dr Zweli Mkhize –Premier of KwaZulu-Natal (6 May 2009 – 1 September 2013) ‘State of the Province Address’ (2012)

<sup>3</sup> Poverty is a multifaceted reality consisting of, inter alia, lack of power, income and resources to make choices and take advantage of opportunities. - see Davids, I, 2009 – Poverty in South Africa: A development management perspective.

<sup>4</sup> See. StatsSA, National and Provincial labor market: Youth Q1: 2008 – Q1: 2014, 05 June 2014, also available online<<http://beta2.statssa.gov.za/publications/P02114.2/P02114.22014.pdf>> accessed: 4 July 2015

proportions of a civil war”. This civil war claimed approximately 20 000 lives since 1984. The three-month period preceding the first democratic elections in April 1994 was especially tense; during this period around 1,000 people were killed. Since 1994, around 2, 000 people have been killed in political violence in KZN<sup>5</sup>. (*A detailed account of political violence in KZN will be discussed in chapter 5*).

Nevertheless, today the province appears to have transformed itself from “the epicentre of violent conflict and civic breakdown in South Africa to one where accord and coexistence prevail” (Beall et al 2004: 2). This apparent transformation has been assisted by what Taylor calls “a politics of denial” about “a war that no one wants to admit or recognize” (Taylor 2002:504). KwaZulu-Natal has been marked by political differences, a divided system mainly between the ANC and the IFP. The ANC’s view was that there should be cooperation and reconciliation in order to avoid further conflict. After the 1999 elections, a coalition government between the IFP and the ANC was formed at provincial level.

The number of political compromises by national government that holds particular resonance at provincial and local level has also facilitated the transformation in the province. The first compromise took place when the ANC gave a cabinet post in the first government of national unity to Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the former Chief Minister of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and the leader of the rival Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). The second compromise was when South Africa’s traditional leadership was formally accommodated in the governance of the country.

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<sup>5</sup> SAIRR, *South Africa Survey 2000/2001* (South African Institute of Race Relations)

[SAIRR], Johannesburg), p. 89.

### **1.3 Background and Research Problem**

Due to the weaknesses, assumptions and irrelevance of liberal democracy in Africa, Liberal democracy has potentially failed to address issues of development, especially in cases such as KwaZulu-Natal where traditional authority and elected government representation co-exist, the study explores the relationship between consociationalism, liberal democracy and development with specific reference to South Africa's Kwa-Zulu Natal province. The study focuses on three districts namely; eThekweni metro, uMzinyathi and uMgungundlovu district. KwaZulu-Natal appears to be an interesting case study given that amongst other provinces, it is also a province with mixed government where both traditional and elected government representatives coexist in pursuing a development agenda. Even though KwaZulu-Natal is not the only province with mixed government, what makes it unique is the long history of the existence of the monarchy and how it still receives much recognition amongst its people.

KwaZulu-Natal's rigid and historic traditional leadership structures together with its modern democratic approach of governing make it worthwhile to explore. It is however important to note that the political challenge to the persistence of the hierarchical and the patriarchal nature of traditional institutions has received criticism from the Human Rights Commission and the Commission for Gender Equality. One of the key problems facing South Africa is that chieftaincy in Africa operates on principles that are antithetical to democratic ideals. Selection for the office of chief is not by popular vote, but is usually hereditary and for life. It is a hierarchical and patriarchal system that has largely excluded women from office and it supports customary laws

that are exclusionary and oppressive towards women, particularly in relation to property rights<sup>6</sup>. The problem has further been catalysed by the so called Traditional Courts Bill, which among other things has problems of exclusion and bias against women<sup>7</sup>.

Different scholars have different views on the existence of traditional authorities in democracies. According to Ntsebeza (2005:24), there are those who argue that “dismantling the institution of traditional leadership, especially viewed from its role in the colonial period, is a pre-condition for democratic transformation in Africa”... there are those who argue that the institution has a role in a multi-party democracy. This position argues that traditional leadership and multi-party democracy can co-exist. On the other hand, Mamdani (2001, 1996), proposes “nothing less than dismantling “the “bifurcated state”, which will entail “an endeavour to link the urban and the rural – and thereby a series of related binary opposites such as rights and customs, representation and participation, centralization and decentralization, civil society and community – in a way that have yet to be done” (Mamdani 1996). On the other hand, a scholar such as Sklar (1994:2) argues for what he terms “mixed government”. Sklar describes mixed government as “one that conserves traditional authority as a political resource without diminishing the authority of the sovereign state” (1994:2).

Ismail on the other hand, uses the integrated approach model to attack the argument in favour of coexistence and argues for the “incorporation of traditional leaders in local government” (Ismail 1999. Ismail recommends that “‘indigenous governance’ has its ‘democratic elements’ that can strengthen rather than weaken current efforts to build a democratic culture among the African

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<sup>6</sup> There are a few women chiefs or regents in KZN.

<sup>7</sup> Women are particularly vulnerable under the traditional system, in which they have curtailed rights and no access to communal resources outside their relationship with their father or husband.

people” Ismail (1999) quoted in (Ntsebeza 2004:61). In one way, such a political makeup may be beneficial to South Africa’s system of government. This calls for strategic cooperation in government in order to achieve development without any hindrances. Such hindrances may take the form of divisions leading to ideological conflict within the province and may also be a contributing factor towards the slow developmental pace and gender mainstreaming<sup>8</sup> in some of the districts within the province.

Given that Liberal democracy in South Africa has potentially failed to deliver on development and that more inclusion of different segments of society including traditional leadership / authority and its structures may facilitate development and democratic participation, might it not be that consociational democracy provides a more viable alternative for political stability and holistic development? Development is holistic when each area is dependent on the other to ensure that a community develops to its full potential.

#### **1.4 Research Questions**

The central question of this study is: can the application of consociationalism as espoused by Ake enhance development in South Africa, especially in KwaZulu-Natal? From this question, the following working questions have been formulated.

This research poses the following general questions:

- Can consociationalism address the defects of liberal democracy?
- What kind of consociationalism is relevant to Africa?

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<sup>8</sup> The term ‘gender mainstreaming’ is used in the context of the United Nation’s Report of the Economic and Social Council for 1997 (A/52, 18 September 1997) where ‘Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality’. See Chapter iv on Gender Mainstreaming ‘Extract from report of the economic and social council for 1997(a/52/3, 18 September 1997) available [online] < <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/GMS.PDF>>

- What is the relationship between consociationalism and development?

These general questions provide the background and a wider framework within which the following specific questions are addressed:

- To what extent is South Africa's system of government consociational?
- Are provinces an outcome of South Africa's consociational dispensation?
- Which elements of consociationalism are incorporated in the provinces and districts?
- To what extent are the KwaZulu-Natal's provincial and local government consociational?
- What are the segments that are present in the three districts to be researched?
- Can the three districts to be researched benefit from an application of the power-sharing components of consociationalism?

## **1.5 Research Objectives**

- To explore the relevance of liberal democracy in Africa in general, and in South Africa in particular.
- To examine the extent to which South Africa's system of government is consociational.
- To evaluate the nature of a consociational model that was incorporated into the South African constitution.
- To examine the relationship between consociationalism and development in South Africa.
- To evaluate the ways in which KwaZulu-Natal's poor districts have responded to issues of underdevelopment in their districts in order to improve the status quo.
- To explore the possible benefits and problems of incorporating power-sharing at the provincial and district level.

## **1.6 Methodology and Research Design**

### **1.6.1 Data Collection**

The present study was conducted in South Africa's KwaZulu-Natal province. It proceeded by collecting data in order to assess how the province responds to issues of underdevelopment with particular reference to three districts. The study used a qualitative research method. A qualitative approach is one in "which the inquirer often makes knowledge claims based primarily on constructivist perspectives (i.e. The multiple meanings of individual experiences, meanings socially and historically constructed, with an intent of developing a theory or pattern) or advocacy/participatory perspectives (i.e. political, issue-oriented, collaborative or change oriented) or both" (Creswell 2003:18). With this research methodology, tools such as survey methods and experiments may be used. According to (Denzin & Lincoln 2000:3), "qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them".

Data was collected from both secondary and primary sources. Secondary data do not only provide broad context and bibliographic information, it supports the primary source and hence illuminates the essence of the study. There are numerous secondary sources available on consociational theory, and there is an adequate basis in the literature from which to draw an analysis of the theory's application to conflict and democratic stability in Africa, South Africa and elsewhere. These sources include, internet, books, media, journal articles, reports, empirical data on the economic profile of the 3 districts chosen, policy documents, legislation, is used. Primarily, data for this study is sourced from the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, where three (3) districts out of the 11 districts (10 + 1 metro) in KwaZulu-Natal are surveyed using the interview instrument. Additional secondary sources of data are used to support available primary data. Other sources of

primary data include development index, the sought opinions of renowned scholars and other such individuals (men and women) who have done research on related subjects in this region.

As a research instrument, interviews and a questionnaire were used and assisted in getting more detailed information out of respondents. Interviewees consist of elites in the province of KwaZulu-Natal such as councillors at district and local municipalities, traditional leaders, non – governmental organizations, politicians from different political parties, senior government officials from relevant department such as CoGTA and the office of the Premier. Other ordinary people, including the unemployed are interviewed using structured interview and open interview schedules. A structured interview is one “that uses a data collection instrument to get data, either by telephone or face to face, it is one in which the interviewers ask the same questions of numerous individuals or individuals representing numerous organization in a precise manner, offering each interviewee the same set of possible responses”(Grosshans 1991:10). On the other hand, open interview schedules are “unstructured and contain many open-ended questions, which are not asked in a structured, precise manner. Different evaluators interpret questions and often offer different explanations when respondents ask for clarification” (Grosshans 1991:10).

Derived data is analysed using detailed content analysis of secondary and primary data. Small numbers of samples are selected randomly to represent large populations (cases) in each region and data is collected from these samples according to a conceptual framework that is commonly applied based on the research questions above. Then, within each region, the cases are classified according to similarities and differences found in the central variable in the study. Finally, the cases are compared across regions to assess the degree to which they confirm the research hypothesis.

## **1.6.2 Research setting and sample population**

The study was conducted in three (3) districts of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal. Namely, eThekweni District sometimes referred to as Durban Metro; uMgungundlovu and uMzinyathi. Preliminary research was conducted on the different levels of development within these districts. EThekweni Metro as the richest District in terms of development is compared with two other districts in the Province, uMgungundlovu and uMzinyathi<sup>9</sup>. The main determining factors for the district development are; socioeconomic, service delivery, health, unemployment, access to water and electricity and level of education.

## **1.6.3 Participants and Sample**

From each districts, 4 participants per group of interviewees are interviewed, and overall 12 participants<sup>10</sup> from each district were interviewed and include: traditional leaders and politician from different political parties. Senior<sup>11</sup> government officials at provincial<sup>12</sup> were also interviewed. These officials provided information about policies and their implementation; traditional leaders play a huge role towards the research as they provided information on how they view development in their communities and whether or not they feel included in bringing about development in their areas. The data collected also include interviews using focus groups. By definition, “focus groups

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<sup>10</sup> I have been fortunate to have served in the Office of the Premier (KZN) since 2010; I did not find much difficulty in getting hold of government officials to be interviewed. This also applies to councillors, mayors, religiously leaders. The Intergovernmental Relations Unit in the Premier’s Office has also be of great assistance in this regard.

<sup>11</sup> For the purposes of this research, senior government officials refers to, deputy managers, managers, senior managers, directors, chiefs of staff and anyone above the mentioned ranks. For example; Director Generals (DGs) and Deputy Director Generals (DDGs).

<sup>12</sup> Senior government officials were only interviewed at provincial level because relevant head offices of departments are at the provincial level and such departments are responsible for the different districts in the Province, hence they provided comprehensive information based on their specific areas of work.

are organized discussions or interviews, with a selected small group of individuals” (Blackburn, 2000 and Gibbs, 1997), “discussing a specific, predefined and limited topic under the guidance of a facilitator or moderator” (Blackburn, 2000, Robinson, 1999). According to Merton and Kendall (1946 as cited in Gibbs 1997), “a focus group is made up of individuals with specific experience in the topic of interest, which is explored during the focus group session”. Patton (1990), as cited in (Robinson 1999), states that the focus group has the following purposes: “basic research where it contributes to fundamental theory and knowledge, applied research to determine programme effectiveness, formative evaluation for programme improvement, and action research for problem solving”.

#### **1.6.4 Sample size and composition**

In this study, the focus group technique was used for basic research and formative evaluation with the goal of contributing to the fundamental theory of consociationalism and knowledge of important factors for the improvement of development in KwaZulu-Natal. Each district is comprised of 1 focus group and each focus group is made up of 3-4 participants, (the unemployed, faith based person, community development worker (CDW) in some instances). The appropriate sampling method consist both of snowballing and purposive sampling. *Purposive sampling* is when groups of informants are determined before being chosen (William 2006). For example, it is used to choose geographic areas, church leaders, politicians and the gender of participants. *Snowball sampling* is used when “it is impossible or difficult to identify beforehand all the people who fall into the categories needed. The researcher starts with few people available and gets them to refer him/her to others they think fall into these categories and that may be approached” (Hall & Hall 1996). One of the weaknesses of snowballing is that the research might end up with a pool

of interviewees who think alike, however, in dealing with that, the interviewees include the political elite from different organizations that are represented in the selected districts and senior government officials from departments that have immediate relevancy for local government.

### **1.6.5 Data Collection Process**

Individual interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were conducted in English. For those who were not able or did not prefer the English language, a Zulu translated questionnaire was used. All the information was tape-recorded with the permission of the participants. Handwritten notes were also taken as a backup to the tape recorded information for both individual interviews and FGDs.

## **1.7 Overview of the study**

This thesis is made up of seven chapters, chapter one is an introduction to the research project. It gives a general historical overview of the case study - KwaZulu-Natal. The chapter also provides a general background of the historic political changes that the Province of KwaZulu-Natal has undergone since the beginning of the civil war that claimed the lives of 20000 people in 1984. The chapter includes a background and research problem, research objectives of the study, research questions, methodology and research design, research setting and sample populations, participants and sample and the sample size and composition. Lastly, the chapter briefly looks at the relevant literature on consociationalism, development, in general and in South Africa in particular.

Chapter two reviews literature that deals with liberal democracy and its associated concept of development. The chapter will focus on the assumptions of liberal democracy and distinguish

between old liberalism and new liberalism. The chapter also reviews the literature on the value of democracy with specific reference to its intrinsic, instrumental and constructive value and finally a critique of liberal democracy is drawn, especially its applicability to the African context. The idea is to explore an alternative model (consociationalism) whose essence lies in cooperation or consensus and which is characterized by a people's driven developmental agenda.

In chapter three, the focus is on the rejection of liberal democracy as a political mechanism acclaimed to bring about development in Africa. While making a distinction between classical liberalism and new liberalism, the chapter teases out an argument by examining the connection between liberal democracy and development. It contends that the weaknesses and assumptions of liberal democracy (both classical and new liberalism) cannot bring about a suitable paradigm for Africa's development. The chapter links consociationalism and development as an identified gap in the literature. It further compares and contrasts liberal democracy and consociationalism, using Claude Ake's approach to development which takes into account the inclusive nature of the individual and an emphasis on collective representation. The chapter argues that development is likely to succeed in a consociational setting than in a liberal one, hence consociationalism is much more capable of addressing the weaknesses of liberal democracy.

Chapter four is an analysis of the consociational model of democracy in South Africa, it highlights some of the consociational elements that appear to be present in South Africa's democratic society. The chapter gives attention to the degree in which coalition building and power sharing (as important facets of consociationalism) played an important role in the promotion of consociationalism. Drawing reference back to the mediation efforts towards power-sharing in South Africa, the chapter focuses on the transition period and the negotiation that eventually led

to power –sharing, the idea is to show that despite some debates in academic literature and societal circles, South Africa still retains consociational features which may be more capable of bringing about a relevant developmental paradigm than the dominant liberal democratic approach.

Chapter five draws reference to the Province of KwaZulu-Natal as a case study. The chapter argues that the province of KwaZulu-Natal is a consociational outcome of South Africa's democratic dispensation because its governments are consociational in nature and the districts of KZN can benefit from an application of power-sharing component of consociationalism. The chapter gives a detail account of the historical and political overview of the Province. Moreover, as a unique case where traditional leadership or authority and elected government representation coexist, the chapter explores the role of the Province, Districts and Local government and how these spheres of government features in the consociational model. This will be done through an exploration of the role of cooperative governance in the Province of KZN. The reason for this approach is that KZN recognizes traditional authority and the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) is responsible for supporting traditional leadership in the Province, hence the existence of the Institution of Traditional leadership. Lastly, the chapter examines an integrated approach Operation Sukuma Sakhe (OSS) towards service delivery in the Province of KZN, the intention is to evaluate the inclusion of various segments of society which are important in the analysis of the consociational model.

Chapter six is a critical assessment and analysis of empirical data collected in the study. The chapter lays out the method and methodology that is used. This is done through a discussion of the researcher's qualitative method of inquiry, such discussion also includes data collection and the process, participants and sample, data setting, research design and sampling methods. The study

draws specific attention on finding meaning to the data collected in order to assess how the province responds to issues of underdevelopment with particular reference to the identified districts, eThekweni, uMgungundlovu and uMzinyathi.

Chapter seven is a summary and conclusion of the study. The study also makes further recommendations on how collective efforts can be made taking into account the different sectors of society in KwaZulu-Natal in bringing about holistic development in the Province and in South Africa in general. The chapter summarizes the overall chapters of the dissertation by a brief outline of the purposes that the chapters serve in the study. The chapter also provides a summary of the study by using the study's objectives as a guide. Lastly, the chapter makes recommendation, offers the reader possible areas for further research and concludes with the researcher's final thoughts.

### **1.8 Summary of Chapter**

This chapter has provided a background of the study. It has discussed the nature of liberal democracy potentially failing to address issues of development, especially in KwaZulu-Natal where traditional authority and elected government representation co-exist. The chapter also highlighted the research problem, objectives and questions. It also briefly reviewed literature and stated the significance of the study specifically focusing on the elites as key role players in bringing about development in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal. These elites could be potential contributors towards development as they have direct power over existing subcultures in society. The next chapter introduces a linkage between liberalism and development as key concepts.

## CHAPTER TWO: LIBERALISM AND DEVELOPMENT

“We are so accustomed to hearing the bad news about the third world that we seldom hear – or listen to – the good news, news that is important because it tell us what is already being achieved and what more could be achieved” (*Arnold Tom et al , October 2006*)

### 2.1 Introduction

Most countries find themselves concerned with certain aspects of their well-being. Such aspects may include their domestic and foreign policies and their diplomatic and economic relations with other countries. The bases of such concerns cannot be divorced from ensuring good political stability, a system of government that brings about peace, equality, harmony and justice; an economy that grows and brings about development. In ensuring that development is achieved in these countries, democracy<sup>13</sup>, especially the well-being of citizens has been taken into serious account. Having democracy as one of the core principle and value of the United Nation (UN), the UN states that “Democratic governance feeds into economic and social policies that are responsive to people’s needs and aspirations, that aim at eradicating poverty and expanding the choices that people have in their lives, and that respect the needs of future generations” (United Nation, n.d).

This research will argue therefore, that a number of countries have and still are linking democracy to development. As development appears to be one of the main missions for countries’ agendas, and liberal democracy a system that is commonly thought of as bringing about development, it

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<sup>13</sup> Democracy is conceived as a political system that has structures permitting the rule of the people. Its key elements are free and repeated elections, political competition and participation, rule of law, political and civil liberties.


becomes increasingly important to interrogate the relationship between liberal democracy and development. This chapter will argue that the weaknesses inherent in liberal democracy and its development paradigm are to be taken into serious consideration as they have not only been detrimental to Africa's development but have also proved their irrelevance as liberal democracy and its development paradigm are irrelevant for Africa. Liberal democracy's focus on individualism rather than collectivism; its competitive nature and lack of participation, injects an uncommon feature in the African value system and cannot bring about development in Africa, rather it has the potential of increasing underdevelopment and fostering perpetual social, economic and political problems.

This chapter begins by examining liberal democracy as a system of governance while also linking its features to development. It is partly a literature review chapter, that is, it reviews literature on liberal democracy and development. The chapter then draws attention to the development paradigm that is associated with liberal democracy. The chapter then brings an account of liberal democracy and development by Amartya Sen. The objective is not to create a new theoretical framework from the various works currently available on liberal democracy. Instead, the aim is to bring an understanding of the kind of development that is implied in the dominant liberal democracy model. Finally, this chapter provides a critique of liberal democracy and a critique of the development paradigm that is implied by the dominant paradigm of liberal democracy.

## 2.2 Liberal Democracy and Development

Liberal democracy is defined as “a form of democracy that incorporates both limited government and a system of regular and competitive elections” (Heywood 2002:425). A liberal democracy is strictly speaking a form of representative democracy, where the political power of the government is moderated by a constitution which protects the rights and freedom of individuals and minorities. According to Lumumba Kasongo (2005:10), “liberal democracy is the system of governance that, in principle, protects citizens’ rights and privately-owned instruments of production (land machinery, factory buildings, natural resources and the like)”. Figure 2.1 is an illustration of liberal democracy in general.

**Figure 2.1 Illustration of Liberal Democracy**



**Source:** Compiled by the researcher.

It is important to note that liberalism is a much contested term. As Leon states, “It has application to a wide range of political propositions, from the libertarianism of laissez-faire economics to the

democratic and *dirigiste* egalitarianism of the welfare state” (Loen 2010:5). The following section will critically discuss the assumptions of liberal democracy.

### **2.2.1 Assumptions of Liberal Democracy**

It is important to, firstly, note the Western origins of liberal democracy. Lumumba-Kasongo states that “liberal democracy is primarily the product of western political thought and the evolution of western societies through the bourgeois and technological revolution in England, France and the United States” (2005:7). This makes liberal democracy to be firmly rooted in Western history. The liberal school of thought emerged as a challenge to conventional views that emphasized political authority as justified on the basis of ‘noble blood’. This was mainly the belief that power was ordained by God to those who held political power and challenging such claims was closely associated with blasphemy. It was the challenge of such views that later on inspired both the French and America Revolution and eventually gave rise to ideology of liberalism. Such western societies believed that the existence of government must be solely to serve the people and not that people exist to serve governments and that everyone, including those who govern should not be above the law. As a result, much emphasis was put on individualism as a commitment to several core values within liberalism<sup>14</sup>.

Individualism is a central feature in the liberal school of thought. There are many reasons why individualism is regarded as important in liberal democracies. According to Gould (1988:93),

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<sup>14</sup> Such several core values include: the supreme importance of the individual; individual freedom and liberty; belief in the rational human being, equality of individual and toleration. See ( Heywood, A, 2007; Political ideologies: An introduction)

Liberal individualism takes all individuals as equal in their basic liberties and rights. Further, these individuals are taken to exist independently of each other and to be related to each other only in external ways. That is, each individual is understood as an independent ego, seeking to satisfy its own interests or to pursue its happiness.

Emphasizing the importance of the individual in liberal democracy, specifically in the market place, Rostow asserts that

...One must be more explicit; for the exercise of political power through government touches the individual, in fact or potentially, at many more points – and more sensitive points. It is not merely his income that may be at stake in the exercise of political sovereignty, but his life and property, his freedom and his status in the society... (Rostow 1971:8).

The wide support of the individualistic assumptions of liberal democracy is “often justified on the grounds that people are generally the best judges of their own interest, equal citizenship rights are necessary to protect those interests and people tend to be satisfied when they are equally able to pursue their own interests” (Goodin & Pettit 2002:411). The importance of persons is therefore much grounded in the idea or philosophy of individualism.

The individualistic assumptions of liberalism entail an emphasis on individual human rights. Thus, liberal democracy denies that popular rule is the ultimate political value; instead “they qualify the value of popular rule by recognizing a set of basic liberties that take priority over popular rule and its conclusions” (Goodin & Pettit 2001: 413). By denying popular rule, liberal democrats deny the idea of the people ruling themselves as free and equal beings, instead they subscribe to being ruled by an external power or by a self-selected minority amongst themselves. “Liberal democrats wonder why populist place so much value on popular rule when in practice each of us has so little chance of affecting the outcome of any decision”(Goodin & Pettit 2001: 415). Thus, for liberalism,

“Individualism is the belief in the supreme importance of the human individual rather than of any social group or collective body” (Heywood 2002: 424).

Equality is another critical element in liberal democracy. Not only is equality reflected in the constitution but it also reflects a commitment to individualism. The meaning of equality is very important in understanding the different facets in which liberal democracy views it. Most basically, liberal democracy subscribes to ‘foundational equality’. Foundational equality can be described as the belief that all humans are born equal<sup>15</sup> and that their lives are of equal moral worth.

Other critical areas in which equality can be viewed as a liberal democratic element are equality before the law and political equality. Equality before the law simply means that no one is above the law irrespective of status. This further means that the rule of law<sup>16</sup> regulates government power and the application of procedural and formal justice. Political equality “refers to the extent to which citizens have an equal voice over governmental decisions” (Verba 2001:2). This equal voice refers to universal suffrage – one person one vote. Verba (2001:3) notes that “The ability to express one’s political views is constitutive of membership in the polity. It confers a sense of selfhood, of agency, of belonging”. Elaborating, Verba states that “In this sense, political voice represents a general capacity to achieve many goals” (Verba 2001:4). Verba further state that; “This instrumental aspect of political equality -- the ability to inform the government of one’s needs and preferences and to pressure the government to pay attention -- is the key to that equal consideration” (Verba

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<sup>15</sup> See Harrison & Boyd, 2003:103 – ‘Understanding Political Ideas and Movements’

<sup>16</sup> It is also important that one distinguishes between the ‘rule of law’ and the ‘rule by law’ with regards to liberal democracies. Under the rule by law, the government is above the law and the law is the instrument of the government.

2001:4).The expression of one's political voice enables one to contribute towards government's decision making.

Liberal democracy is also characterized by voting as a form of participation in government decisions. Even though it can be noted as (Verba 2001:3) states;

There are some who denigrate the importance of voting, since voting rights and voting participation, when achieved, (as among blacks in the American South or in South Africa) does not bring with it the solution to all or even most problems. But those who denigrate the importance of the vote are almost certainly people who already have the right to vote.

Voting rights and voting participation may not necessarily bring solutions for all or most problems, however, voting becomes a crucial element in guaranteeing people the equality of opportunity hence the endorsement of equality of opportunity in liberal democracy.

There is also a greater emphasis on the primacy of property relations in liberal democracy. The rights to property is closely linked to the rights of persons, in fact as Upham (1998) states “property and persons are the two great subjects on which Governments are to act; and that the right of persons, and the right of property, are the objects, for the protection of which government was instituted”. Liberal democracy therefore considers the right to property as one of the significant traits of the system. Even though there are debates on whether or not such rights can be regarded as less important than others, the constitution in liberal democracies has been put in order to protect these rights.

There are a number of reasons why property rights are viewed as primary in liberal democracy. One of the reasons is that the property rights on themselves serve as a practical guarantee for other

rights. Drawing reference to the American experience, Upham (1998) states that “In effect, not only were property rights the most vulnerable, they were also the first line of defense for the other rights...[P]roperty was not only a right in itself, but also a means to the preservation of other rights”<sup>17</sup>. Not only does liberal democracy draw emphasis to property rights as a line of defense for other rights, but property rights are also closely related to exercising one’s independent vote. Gouverneur Morris in Upham (1998) stated that “Give the votes to people who have no property, and they will sell them to the rich, who will be able to buy them....”. Morris meant that those with property were thought to be independent compared to those without property. The ones without property will be dependent on those with it; hence they will not be able to exercise their independent vote.

It is worth noting that liberal democracy is linked with the concept of development. The concept of democracy generally sees value in the recognition of human beings living within a particular space, it puts emphasis in bringing about an organized society for the benefit of the people living in it. In understanding the different needs and qualities of the polity, liberal democracy attempts to organize a society by ensuring representation so that people can achieve their talents, goals and generally enhance their self-development by ensuring that all have equal opportunity and are equal before the law. As Rostow (1971:268) asserts, “the democratic concept recognizes from the beginning that the talents, tastes, and interests of citizens are not identical; governments can provide only equality of opportunity and equality before the law”. In this way citizens are able to make decisions through democratic processes characterized by majoritarian rule and representation.

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<sup>17</sup> See: Upham David in Foundation for Economic Education < <http://fee.org/articles/the-primacy-of-property-rights-and-the-american-founding/>

One of the key features of liberalism is the constitution. In a liberal democracy the constitution plays a huge role in placing constraints on the extent to which the will of the majority can be exercised. It is worth noting that with specific regards to liberal democracies, the constitution as a broader guide of a state's functionality is still an important element to be taken into account. In a liberal democracy, the constitution ensures that government's power is limited and no official may violate these legal and constitutional limits, moreover, the courts are independent in structure and formally power is separated and dispersed among multiple, independent branches and institutions. Referring to the conditions of a successful democracy, (Rostow 1971: 271) asserts that, "The second condition is constitutional and limits the power of the majority: it is to guarantee to the minority that their basic rights will be protected as well as their ability to continue to express freely and effectively their dissident views, within the law, as part of a living political process". The constitution also protects the rights of citizens by limiting executive power; such power is constrained and scrutinized by an independent legislature, judiciary and other institutions. As Leon (2010:18) states, "The constitution also provides for a series of checks and balances against presidential and executive overreach, including term limits and separation of powers".

Both liberalism and democracy might be founded on more ultimate values of freedom and equality (Cohen 2002). A liberal democracy is thus "a rather indirect form of majority rule, the liberal aspect refers to a set of traditional values, drawn from the basic stock of civil rights and natural rights which are seen as central to the political culture and may indeed be enshrined in a constitution and protected by the courts" (Robertson 2004: 281). The constitution therefore plays a huge role in bringing about development. By protecting the rights and liberties of citizens, the

constitution enables citizens to freely carry out their societal duties without the fear of much government intervention. Rights and liberties entrenched in the constitution also enable the individual to exercise freedoms that may bring about a conducive environment for development. Most importantly, the constitution provides elements that can be tied to development. For example, old liberalism<sup>18</sup> and its emphasis on private property, individual rights promotes development in that the citizenry is given individual liberty in the accumulation of material things such as property<sup>19</sup>, land etc. It is such freedom and liberty that enables the person to go beyond and develop not only himself but also that which is around him. As Polin (1987:16) asserts; “Freedom is the specifically human ability to go beyond and to exist beyond nature and the environmentally given. It is the capacity to transcend oneself and all the elements constituting the present”.

The constitution being the highest law of the land ensures that no one is above the law and that all citizens are treated equally and fairly. As Freud quoted in Rostow (2004: 12) states, “the end result would be a State of law to which all that is, all who are capable of uniting have contributed by making some sacrifices of their own desires, and which leaves none – again with the same exception – at the mercy of brute force”. Therefore, having the constitution as an element of liberalism creates conducive conditions for the citizenry to freedom and protection by the government which in turn enables them to achieve their own desires through a developmental agenda.

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<sup>18</sup> Old liberalism will be further discussed later in the chapter.

<sup>19</sup> Property can be land, or ‘estate’, to use Locke’s term, as well as furniture, paper, machinery, or other physical items. Property can also include poetry, computer programs, musical arrangements, painting, and works of fiction, reports, designs, roles and so forth. ...Property is anything tradable or exchangeable that may be of value to persons. But it is not itself a person, since property, as a belonging, is a distinct relation in which ‘person’ is one of the pair of related items. To regard a person, therefore as property is a metaphysical and categorical mistake, as well as an injustice towards the person involved. See Machan (1989) on *Individual and their Rights*

Today the Bill of Rights would be seen as central to the protection of individual liberties. The constitution therefore open a particular space for social forces to operate, that is, it creates a wide range of opportunities for both individuals and groups. It is important to note though that such individuals and groups may end up not using these possibilities or opportunities for different reasons. This is unlike an unconstitutional guided space, where the citizenry are confined and can also be forced through limitation to pursue developmental agenda suitable for their well-being.

The conception of liberal equality is grounded on a strong moral ideal of individual freedom. Equality therefore creates individuals that are free from interference by government and such person are able to think in a way that enhances their capacity to judge for themselves. In the same line of thought a free environment that creates developmental opportunities and gender mainstreaming is formed. People are able to think and act independently on what development is and mean to them. Even the government does not feel morally obliged to empower individuals to be free by supplying them with relevant goods and amenities. Instead individuals are able to develop and bring development themselves in a distributive scheme to which Flikschuh (2007:117) asserts to be “one which does respect individuals’ capacity for personal autonomy – should be designed as to allow individuals themselves to decide what sort of resources best further their own particular conception of the good life”.

Liberal democracy has a principled room for separation of power and checks and balances. This is to ensure that self-interest does not bring about anarchy and conflict. Madebo (2008) points out that “the fundamental liberal claim of universal self-interest is the basic assumption behind the vital liberal political theory of separation of power, checks and balances, and limited

government...” (Madebo: 2008). Therefore, without proper separation of powers and checks and balances, there is often some space for politicians to abuse power and use it to their own advantage. In most cases this is done at the expense of others. The assurance on checks and balances and separation of powers is reflected in a network of internal and external restraints on government that are designed to guarantee liberty and afford citizen protection against the State.

Development cannot be fully achieved if those affected by it are not fully exercising their rights to private property, neither will development be possible if restrictions are imposed and power is still vested much on an authority that defines its own developmental terms. Self-development is a prerequisite for a possibility of achieving a holistic development agenda. Such self-development can only be attained if some basic human goals and accomplishments rests with the individuals themselves. While the existence of the individual within the social context cannot be underestimated, it is within such a social context that the concept of a right to private property “presupposes a moral standpoint that suggests a justification for the individual’s authority...to decide on the disposition of a certain range of valued items that qualify as private” (Machan 1989:141).

The link between liberalism and its emphasis on individualism and right to private property to development can thus be found on the underlying principle of individuals rationally planning their lives. As Machan (1989:157) succinctly puts it, “ if individuals can rationally plan their lives, so can societies, and it is as vital to do this in the case of societies as it is in the case of individuals”. Likewise, if individuals can rationally plan their self-development, so can holistic societal development be achieved.

One other factor in understanding liberal democracy is that there is further a greater emphasis on public opinion. Referring to the role of government, Rostow states that, “the action of government should be subjected to regular scrutiny, criticism, and debate by the people, their representatives, and by an unmonopolized press” (Rostow 1971: 269). The idea of public opinion is closely linked to voting or political competition. Although this can be argued by many political theorists and political thinkers, however, it still remains a major claim that liberal democracies should mainly include public participation in decision making. Public opinion is an important element because it is through such opinions that the state gets the general feeling of its citizens with regard to major national concerns.

Linked to voting is the fact that in theory, everyone can get into power through elections in liberal democracies. As a government responsibility, Rostow asserts that “Government can take their shape legitimately only from some effective expression of the combined will and judgment of individuals, and the basis of one-man one –vote” (Rostow 1971:268). The purpose of elections is to ensure that there is order and fairness when getting into power. Elections are also intended to avoid riots and ensure equal representation of human beings since voting acts as a voice in selecting those to be in power. “Elections represent a way of making a choice that is fair to all – one that leaves each member of the electorate with the reasonable hope of having his alternative elected, an election is therefore an empirical demonstration of a citizen’s liberty and political choice” (Odukoya 2007: 12).

### **2.2.2 Old Liberalism and New Liberalism**

Liberalism is not homogeneous, but is divided to, at least, two kinds namely; old liberalism, which is also referred to as ‘classical liberalism’ and new liberalism. This section will focus on the

following differences between these two schools of liberalism: the nature of individual, freedom, common good<sup>20</sup>, private property and development.

The classical liberal position originates from those whom Goga (2008:17) refers to as ‘enlightenment-inspired theorist’ “in which liberal values such as freedom of association, freedom of religion and freedom of speech and other ‘natural rights’ are deemed necessary for the functioning of an ideal ‘liberal’ and free society” (Goga 2008:17). Classical liberalism focusses on the inherent rights of an individual. John Locke is amongst the main advocates of classical liberalism. Locke is known for having reasoned that people have a natural right to protect their property, liberty and life and that a social contract should be established so that a government that will protect such natural rights could be created. If such government does not protect the rights of its citizens, it may be dissolved and citizens may establish a new government. Even though the government may have the rights to protect such natural rights, however, John Locke also argued that such government should have limited powers in protecting this rights. He asserts that,

But though men, when they enter into society, give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature, into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative, as the good of the society shall require; yet it being only with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself his liberty and property; ... the power of the society or legislative constituted by them can never be supposed to extend farther than the common good; but is obliged to secure every one’s property by providing those three defects above mentioned that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy (Locke 1965:398).

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<sup>20</sup> It is worth noting that the concept of ‘common good’ differs between Old Liberals and New Liberal – the distinction shall be elucidated later on the chapter – see under the critique of liberal Democracy

The classical liberal school of thought insists that private property<sup>21</sup> and liberty are interrelated. Classical liberals have insisted that people could live their lives as they see fit as a result of an economic system which is based on private property being consistent with individual liberty. In short classical liberalism advocates for the limitation of government power, and it puts much emphasis on ensuring individual freedoms, rights, national liberties, equality and justices. John Stuart Mill, a nineteenth century social thinker and English Philosopher criticized governments as insufficient in upholding such individual liberty.

Not only is the emphasis drawn towards limiting government power but also other powerful entities such as the market, corporations and business people are viewed as beneficial towards individual freedoms, rights, equality, national liberties and justice. Robbin (1961:104) asserts “A market order based on property is thus seen as an embodiment of freedom”. It is therefore such freedom that enables people to make contract, gain private property and enjoy liberty. According to Gaus et al (2011) “unless people are free to make contracts and to sell their labor, or unless they are free to save their income and then invest them as they see fit, or unless they are free to run enterprises when they have obtained the capital, they are not really free”<sup>22</sup>.

Another argument by classical liberals is that it is not only that property gives people liberty but also that such private property is the only effective means for the defense of liberty. Here the idea is that people needs to have the means of controlling their property in order to feel and enjoy freedom. Hayek (1978:149) argues that “There can be no freedom of press if the instruments of

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<sup>21</sup> Private property refers to any valuable item or service which may be separated off from the public or state, for individuals to manage or control. The concept of a right to private property presupposes a moral standpoint that suggests a justification for the individual’s authority, within a social context, to decide on the disposition of a certain range of valued items that qualify as ‘private’. See (Machan T.R 1989 – individuals and their rights)

<sup>22</sup> See - <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/>

printing are under governmental control, no freedom of assembly if the needed rooms are so controlled, no freedom of movement if the means of transport are a government monopoly”.

Classical liberalism also emphasizes negative freedom. This also includes economic liberties and the recognition of civil liberties. Brennan & Tomasi (2001: 1) states that Negative liberty is “the absence of obstacles, barriers or constraints...and it is usually attributed to individual agents” (Lan 2012). One example of negative liberty is when an individual has free speech only when no one stops her from speaking her mind. Referring to negative liberty, Machan (2011) states that “this liberty is dubbed “negative” because it requires that everyone abstain from acting aggressively, that they refrain from invasive or intrusive conduct”. The main primary checks on negative freedom is the law and physical constraints. Negative freedom discourages government intervention and restrictions that allow choice and privacy. The government is only encouraged to intervene in instances where it will only prevent harm to others. Some examples of negative freedoms may include; civil liberties such as freedom of speech, freedom of movement and freedom of religions worship.

Common good is a critical element of in classical liberalism. According to Cohen 1989 quoted in Bohman (1998:410), “the principle of the common good means that a policy must at the very least advance the interests of all”. Locke and other political philosophers such as Jeremy Benthan perceived the concept of common good as one that is simply an aggregate of all voters. Even though a single voter does not determine the outcome of an election however Holcombe (2013:26) suggests that “there are mechanisms within a democracy that aggregate everyone’s vote such that when voters vote based on their narrow interests, the common good is the aggregate result”. He

further asserts that “Political institutions, like market institutions, channel individuals’ self-interested behaviour so that the aggregate outcome is in the common interest” (2013:26).

There is therefore a strong emphasis on the idea of common good in classical liberalism. Classical liberalism also argue that all persons are able or capable to freely pursue their own economic interests without much government influence thus serving the common good. Government is thus seem more as an enemy to liberty in classical liberalism. The emphasis of common good in classical liberalism demonstrates the need to pursue collectivity through participation. In fact, Bohman (1998: 409), asserts that “...as a self-rule of free and equal citizens, each with equal access to political influence as a shared interest in the common good”. Even though there are many views on what constitute a common good, in a developed liberal democracy “plural conceptions of the common good contend, but within a range of ideals related by family resemblance and tending to converge on basic practical issues” (Mackie 2004:6). The common good in classical liberalism was viewed more as a way of promoting peace and the achievement of free trade. Brennan and Tomasi (2001:1) states that “Classical liberals interpret economic liberty as having the same wide scope accorded to the civil liberties. Just recognizing religious liberty requires the general protection of independent activity in the religious realm, economic liberty requires the general protection of independent activity in economic matters.”

In its view on development, classical liberalism saw development along the West European and North American lines. For example, Rostow treated development as equivalent to the model of Western capitalist society. This approach has a unilateral interpretation of traditional societies as

‘non-modern’ because of their (mis) interpretation of ‘lower ‘or ‘other’ forms of development” (Mallick 2005:12).

Political development involved political parties and electoral institutions. The concept of political development has also been seen as closely linked to the idea of modernization because of its Eurocentric inception. Defining political development Huntington (1965:386-387) states that “political development is identified as one aspect of, or as intimately connected with, the broader process of modernization in society as a whole, Modernization affects all segments of society; its political aspects constitute political development”. Moreover, one approach in the analysis of political development as a concept recognizes the importance of electoral institution as significant in achieving political development. Political development has to be characterized by democratization, pluralism, equal distribution of power. Coleman quoted in Huntington (1965:388) states that “Competitiveness is an essential aspect of political modernity... [T]he Anglo-American polities most closely approximate the model of a modern political system”. Referring to the American Intellectual circles, Frey also quoted in Huntington (1965:388) argues that, “the most common notion of political development in intellectual American circles is that of movement towards democracy”. According to Huntington, Frey “finds this a congenial notion and offers his own definition of political development as “changes in the direction of greater distribution and reciprocity of power...” (Huntington 1965:388).

It is for this reason that for classical liberals, economic development was seen as an accumulation of wealth by individuals in a society. As from a classical liberal standpoint development is measured by indices such as GDP per capita. Scholars such as Rostow have been advocates of the classical liberal view of economic development. Rostow’s theory assumes that the state is neutral and that because of its neutral nature it will then get the support of everyone. Not only does

Rostow's theory assume that, it also advocates for the creation of such a state. Lastly his theory advocates that the State should lead issues of development this is closely linked to the basis of his theory which also dwells on individualistic self-interest in the form of income per capita.

New liberalism arose in the early twentieth century, an era in which the ability of free market to sustain equality was probed. The argument was mainly around the instable nature of a private property based market. This led new liberals to doubt that a private property based market was able to adequately create a stable and free society. Another factor that gave rise to new liberalism was that, although they questioned the market as capable of creating equilibrium and social justice, they however began to gain much faith in governments as capable institutions in supervising the economic life of individuals. Even though insisting on guaranteeing individual freedom, new liberalism not only gained faith in government but it also believed that such governments should be responsible and are a solution to many societal and social problems.

Another factor underlying the progress of new liberalism was that property rights generated an unjust inequality of power which resulted to a less-than-equal liberty for the working class. According to Gaus et al (2011), " This theme is central to what is usually called 'liberalism' in American politics, combining a strong endorsement of civil and personal liberties with, at best, an indifference, and often enough an antipathy, to private ownership. New liberalism became focused on developing a social theory of justice.

Succinctly highlighting the historical conceptualization of new liberalism, Gray (1994:719) asserts;

The new liberalism was an outlook, or a framework of categories, more than it was a doctrine, or a substantive philosophical position. Central among these categories were the notion of the person, conceived as the bearer of rights and the originator of plans of life and conceptions of the good; the idea of justice as the supreme regulative ideal for the assessment of political and social institutions; the conception of political philosophy as having a jurisprudential or legalist character, in that its agenda was the specification of the constitutional structure of political life with its attendant basic liberties; and so on.

Common good is another critical area underlying the new liberal thought. The understanding of common good within the new liberal perspective is challenging the principle that government may legitimately “be employed only in the service of common good” (Raeder 1998:520). Amartya Sen also take the new liberal approach to common good. For Sen the main characteristic of development is seeing the expansion of freedoms to individuals, enabling them to choose and value. Accordingly, “Development is a matter of giving more opportunities for each individual to live a life of his or her choice” (Deneulin and Townsend 2006:20). The idea of common good in Sen’s terms is not only restricted to individual wellbeing, instead it also take into account other common goods such as family relationships. What this also means according to Deneulin and Townsend (2006:20) is that “no teleological account of the good that societies ought to promote beyond (individual) freedom is offered”. Even though Sen focuses much on the individual’s wellbeing as the end of development in his capability approach, the common good tradition leads “to a conception of human freedom as oriented towards a *telos* which includes both the good of individuals and the good of the communities in which individuals live” (Deneulin and Townsend 2006:20).

New liberals also take note of the importance of positive rights<sup>23</sup>. Positive rights<sup>24</sup> are those rights that do not necessarily require action of another person or group. On the other hand, positive liberty “is the possibility of acting – or the fact of acting – in such a way as to take control of one’s life and realize one’s fundamental purposes” (Lan 2012)/ Unlike negative liberty, positive liberty is more concern with individuals that are considered to be primarily members of a collectives or collectives themselves. According to Velasquez et al (2014) “positive rights are "positive" in the sense that they claim for each person the positive assistance of others in fulfilling basic constituents of human well-being like health and education”<sup>25</sup>. Rights that falls under positive rights may include, civil and political rights such as the right to counsel and the right to police protection of persons and property. Positive rights can also be economic, social and cultural, for example rights falling under this category could include, health care, national security, education, employment, housing and/ access to food.

New liberals regard positive rights as important for various reasons. One of the reasons for the affirmation of positive rights by the new liberals is that positive rights have an obligatory elements of helping others in fulfilling their most important needs. Since new liberals gained faith in government as a sole institution that can be responsible and be a solution to societal problem, positive rights are therefore a vehicle towards ensuring that the most basic and important needs for

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<sup>23</sup> The distinguishing between negative and positive rights is worth noting. While positive rights do not necessarily requires action from a person or group, negative rights on the other hand, often oblige inaction, for example, freedom of speech, freedom of worship or fair trial can be categorized other negative rights.

<sup>24</sup> It is worth noting that the idea of ‘positive rights’ can also be “known as the ‘doctrine of entitlements’; that is, some people are said to be entitled to that which is earned by other people” (see TIBOR R. MACHAN on the Perils of Positive Rights, <http://fee.org/freeman/detail/the-perils-of-positive-rights>)

<sup>25</sup> See - <https://www.scu.edu/ethics/ethics-resources/ethical-decision-making/rights/>

people are met. For example, the right to education, housing, employment and health care are essential in ensuring the good livelihood of the community.

Positive rights are not only important in meeting the importance needs of others, but also can contribute towards building an equal society. Gewirth (1996:32) succinctly puts it;

They [positive rights] entail mutual obligation to help persons to fulfil their essential agency-needs and thereby move closer to equality. As a result, a human society based on positive human rights requires not only that person refrain from coercing or harming one another but also that they help one another. This requirement for help is not, however, indiscriminate or open-ended; it is concerned rather to enable all persons equally to become and to function as productive agents who can provide for their own needs, while also making effective contribution to the fulfilment of other person's needs and desires on a basis of mutual respect and cooperation. Thus positive rights serve to relate persons to one another through mutual awareness of important needs and, as a consequence, affirmative ties of equality and mutual aid.

Positive rights are also important for the new liberal in that they enable persons the freedom to be who they want to be. According to Machan (2001), the new liberalism includes a sub-clause stipulating that people may at least enjoy the sexual and other non-economic freedom distinctive to one's chosen "lifestyle". The stipulation of such a sub-clause is closely linked or associated with the idea of expanding the real freedoms of individuals. As such the broader concept of new liberalism is tied to a different notion of development that is demonstrated by Sen's approach.

The link between new liberalism and Sen's approach is visible in that Sen's "analysis of development treats the freedoms of individuals as the basic blocks" (Sen 1999:18). In this regard Sen focuses "particularly on the expansion of capabilities of person to lead the kind of lives they

value and reason to value” (Sen 1999:18). Sen’s approach also relates to new liberal which also draws emphasis on the importance of choosing one’s lifestyle and enjoying one’s freedoms.

In his 1999 publication, *Development as Freedom*, Sen argues that “development can be viewed as expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy” (Sen 1999:3). By this Sen means that human freedom is a critical aspect when viewing the broader concept of development. For example, development should not be narrowly viewed by focusing on gross national product (GDP) or with the rise of individual income, technological advancement, industrialization or with social modernization. He nonetheless asserts that

Growth of GDP or of individual income can, of course, be very important as means to expanding freedoms enjoyed by the members of the society. But freedoms depend also on other determinants, such as social, economic arrangements (for example, facilities for education and health care) as well as political and civil rights (for example, the liberty to participate in public discussion and scrutiny). Similarly, industrialization or technological progress or social modernization can substantially contribute to expanding human freedom, but freedom depends on other influences as well (Sen 1999:3).

Sen therefore argues that if indeed freedom is what development advances, then there is a good argument for concentrating on that overarching objective, “rather than on some particular means or some specially chosen list of instruments” (Sen 1999:3). Therefore economic development should be viewed more as mean than an end. It is specifically the expansion of substantive freedoms that directs the importance of freedom as the end rather than the means that plays an important role in the process.

While it is the case that human freedom should be viewed as an end to development, it is further important to note that to achieve such development, major sources of unfreedoms should also be

removed in the process. Such major sources of unfreedoms may include: poverty as well as tyranny, neglect of public entities as well as intolerance or over activity of repressive states, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation. Emphasizing this, Sen states that “ Sometimes the lack of substantive freedoms relates directly to economic poverty, which robs people of the freedom to satisfy hunger, or to achieve sufficient nutrition, or to obtain remedies for treatable illnesses, or the opportunity to be adequately clothed or sheltered, or to enjoy clean water or sanitary facilities” (Sen 1999:4). Moreover, the denial of civil liberty and political liberties may also be the cause of the violation of freedom. Such denial of political and civil liberty is mainly the result of authoritarian regimes and “from imposed restrictions on the freedom to participate in the social, political and economic life of the community” Sen 1999:4).

While there is a need to see development as freedom as Sen believes, Sen also regards democracy as an important aspect in ensuring holistic development, including the provision of political freedoms (both civil and political liberties). Sen views democracy as being more than just free and fair elections or majority rule. In *Development as Freedom*, Sen defines ‘democracy’ in this terms.

Democracy has complex demands, which certainly include voting and respect for human rights, but also ... the protection of liberties and freedoms, respect for legal entitlements, and the guaranteeing of free discussion and uncensored distribution of news and fair comment. Even elections can be deeply defective if they occur without the different sides getting an adequate opportunity to present their respective cases, or without the electorate enjoying the freedom to obtain news and to consider the views of the competing protagonists. (Sen 1999a: 9-10)

In sum, it is critical that the lives of the people are positively enhanced. Certain practices need to be taken into account when the lives of people are to be enriched. Just as Sen points out that “the merits of democracy and its claims as a universal value can be related to certain distinct virtues

that go with its unfettered practice” (Sen 1999:6). Key amongst such practices is political freedom which according to Sen is part of human freedom in general and helps in exercising political rights and civil rights and which in turn forms part of the good lives of individuals as social being. Such rights are also fundamental in bringing about developmental requirements and human needs, but more to that, they also empower people and communities.

In emphasizing the importance of democracy, and the need to ensure public participation while guaranteeing political freedoms, Sen mentions three different ways in which democracy can be valued. Namely; the intrinsic value, the instrumental value and the constructive value. Below is a detailed account of what each of these values entails.

## **2.3 The Value of Liberal Democracy**

### **2.3.1 Intrinsic Value of Democracy**

Democracy can be of intrinsic value in and of itself as long as it allows citizens to shape their own lives and communities. It is this freedom that is crucial and can be regarded as part of human dignity. Democracy and political freedoms such as civil and political rights can therefore have direct significance on how human lives. Referring to one of the considerations that takes us to the direction of a general pre-eminence of basic political liberties and civil rights Sen (1999:148) asserts it is “their direct importance in human living associated with basic capabilities (including that of political and social participation).

Democracy therefore enables people to be agents. The prevention of one from political participation or involvement can mean that one does not have control over resolution that affects their lives. The liberty to determine one's own purpose is according to Dreze and Sen (2002) quoted in Deneulin and Crocker (2006: 2) "one of the elementary freedoms that people have reason to value, [...] even among people who lead very deprived lives in material terms". Another critical aspect that makes democracy attain its intrinsic value is that it supports equality. Democracy through its universal suffrage assumes that all adult members of the society are equal in worth and dignity. Deneulin and Crocker (2006:2) states that "Apart from whatever constructive consequences it may have, democracy is intrinsically important because it treats members of the group as *equals*".

Classical liberalism does not fully account for intrinsic value of democracy as an important facet for wellbeing of human lives and communities. This is because of its lack of emphasis on the community as a whole and individualistic idea of justice rather than collective. As Norton (1998:24) states

The classical liberal idea of justice is individual rather than collective. Rewards and punishments should, under this conception of justice, have more to do with an individual's own behaviour than with his or her membership of a group. We see here again the emphasis on process rather than outcomes. If you emphasise individual justice, whether a person deserves his or her benefit matters more than whether or not the benefits produce a more equal end-state distribution of income. Using individualist ideas, a welfare system which neglects personal circumstances produces unjust results.

On the other hand, it can be argued that classical liberalism's commitment to individual freedom makes it hold the intrinsic value of democracy. According to Norton (1998:24), "One idea here,

an idea that finds support in the psychological literature, is that wellbeing is associated with a sense of being in control of one's own life. Being coerced to do something, even if it is something you would do anyway if given a choice, is bad for your well-being". Norton also brings the emphasis on dignity as "another related line of thinking about freedom as an intrinsic value in classical liberalism" (Norton 1998: 24). In this sense classical liberalism holds that democracy has an intrinsic value in that the sense of self-worth and self-respect plays an important role in ones knowledge of oneself. The freedom to be able to shape ones live is crucial as a freedom that can be viewed as part of human dignity, and democracy has been thought of as having intrinsic value if such human dignity is taken in to account as an important factor that enables one to have freedom on how to live and value. Norton states that "If your understanding of who you are or what is good for you is being officially rejected and smothered by the state this constitutes a loss of well-being. And this can be so even if, on a reasonable assessment, you are mistaken about what is good for you".

### **2.3.2 The Instrumental Role of Democracy**

Democracy can be instrumental in that it can be used as a means to achieve something else. One way in which democracy can be instrumental is that it can act as a control mechanism through repeated election that helps in reducing corrupt behaviour. Vollmer & Ziegler (2009:10), states that, democracy "is also instrumental and protective because control mechanisms like free and repeated, competitive elections and the compliance with the rule of law principle reduce discretionary and corrupt behaviour of those representatives who hold political power".

Democracy can be instrumental in that democracies tend not to combat against one another. Democracies according to Dreze and Sen (2002) quoted in Deneulin and Crocker (2006:2) "...tend to be more responsive than alternatives to the importance of protecting human agency (voice) and well-being". Making an example to illustrate the point on the importance of democracies protecting human agency, Deneulin and Crocker (2006:2) states that,

Although a benevolent dictator may listen to "his" people and respond compassionately to their needs, he is likely to insulate himself from popular demands. Narrow or shallow democracies may also exclude the voices of the poor and relegate them to voting, distributive justice is more likely to occur in even these conditions than in an undemocratic state.

According to Sen (1999:7) "Democracy has an important *instrumental value* in enhancing the consideration that people get in expressing and supporting their claims to political attention (including claims of economic needs)". This according to Sen also includes claim on economic needs, such economic needs in turn bring about development since much of which is decided on is based on the participation of the citizenry through voicing out their concerns. This (as stated earlier on the chapter) is crucial in any democratic society and good trait of a liberal democracy. As Sen (1999:152) states, "Informed and unregimented formation of our values require openness of communication and arguments, and political freedom and civil rights can be central for this process. Furthermore, to express publicly what we value and to demand that attention be paid to it, we need free speech and democratic choice".

Moreover, democracy also plays the role of ensuring political incentives and also ensuring that governments are responsible and accountable. In achieving this important instrumental value, it is important that there are institutions in place that will bring about organization and stability. Where

democracy and its electoral institution exist conflict is avoided or has little chances of taking place. This is often the case when there is crisis and there is a lack of free communication. As Deneulin and Crocker (2002:2) asserts,

Democracy is especially valuable in times of crisis. A free press, for example, may identify a pressing human problem such as an immanent famine and, before it becomes a reality, demand appropriate public action. A citizen's freedom not to starve, frequently benefits from the protective power of democracy.

The important point here is that in issues regarding rights there is always greater respect given. "In principle, liberal democracy can comprehend all conceptions of rights or at any rate provide a framework in which they can fruitfully contend...it is unlikely that democracy would fail because of differences between parties or movements over fundamental rights issues" (Austin 1995: 140). As it will be discussed later in this chapter, it is however important to note that while electoral systems can prevent conflict by offering potential combatants the opportunity to compete for power or express grievances peacefully, these multiparty elections can have some downfalls, [this shall be well elucidated later in the chapter].

There are many other justifications on how liberal democracy is supposed to reduce conflict. For example, collective decision making in liberal democracy is a pivotal element as many democratic theorist argue that "democracy is instrumental in human development in so far as it encourages people to take responsibility for their own lives" (Goodin & Pettit 2002:412). The meeting of parliamentarians to discuss critical matters of pivotal political, social and economic importance is a manifestation of the existence of collective decision making in liberal democracy. Even though there can be disagreements within a particular issue but there is a proper consideration of

negotiations. This is a good trait in liberal democracies and it plays a huge role in conflict management.

Liberal democracy is also supposed to reduce conflict because decisions are not imposed to citizenry but rather the citizenry contributes towards decision making. Within the process of decision making, there is also a lot of negotiation taking place. This means that, at least formally, everybody has a say directly or indirectly when it comes to the creation of government policies or any other issues of great national concern. Even though there may be possibilities of verbal friction but in some instances significant points of convergence are reached in liberal democracies during negotiations.

The emphasis on human rights in a liberal democracy is another way of reducing conflict. This is usually done so as to ensure that every citizen is represented and respected for their own values, the importance of human rights is more prevalent in cosmopolitan states, where citizens have different beliefs and customs. If human rights are violated, then chances are, conflict will prevail, and people will protest because they will feel like their recognition in society has declined as a result of such violation. The highest ambition of the human beings is to live lives where they can enjoy freedom of speech, freedom of belief and have no fear of dominance. Disregard for human rights has resulted in ferocious acts which have outraged the conscience of humankind. With much emphasis and recognition of these human rights it is believed that conflict in a liberal state can be reduced if human rights are recognized.

The merit of liberal democracies as a ‘democratic institution builder’ has also been seen having a positive impact on economic development. Even though it can be argued that there have been other authoritarian systems that have had a positive economic growth compared to liberal democracies, it is however not convincing since much can also be drawn from democratic countries. With respect to the quantitative as well as the qualitative dimension of redistribution and goods provision, Vollmer and Zeigler (2009:4) has argued that “democracy performs better than an otherwise equal autocracy”.

Not only does democracy play an instrumental role for the new liberal, democracy has also been thought of as having its commitment to individual freedom which recognizes freedom as an instrumental value for the classical liberal. This value according to Norton (1998: 25) “leads to well-being even if it does not of itself provide it”. This argument specifically refers to institutions especially the market which according to (Norton 1998:25) are “a device which coordinates action by facilitating voluntary interaction. [And] has enormous power to enhance wellbeing”. Norton further asserts that “The market has informational and incentive advantages that in most circumstances make it a coordination mechanism superior to its available rivals” (1998:25). The market also ensure well-being by satisfying the different preferences that people actually have. Norton elaborates as follows;

If we accept that well-being is in large part subjective, that it depends on satisfying the preferences people actually have, then the market has obvious merits. In most cases, the person who has best knowledge of the preferences someone actually has will be that person himself. Even if some other person knows a preference of another, he or she is less likely to know—given that not all preferences can be satisfied in a world of inevitable scarcity—how that person would trade off one preference against another. And even if such information was knowable by the other person, there does not seem to be any point

incurring the costs in finding out. Just let the first person make his or her own decisions in the market (1998:25).

Another instrumental value of democracy within the classical liberal school of thought lies on its emphasis to private property. Private property being consisted with individual liberty is crucial in seeing people living their lives as they see fit in a democracy. “Classical liberals are justly proud of their role in re-legitimizing the case for economic liberty, in clarifying the critical roles played by contract and private property in making liberty a reality” (Smith 2003:21). The attainment of private property as a right adds instrumental value on its own as such property because a result of something achieved thus contributing positively to the well-being.

### **2.3.3 The Constructive Value of Democracy**

Finally Sen argues that democracy is constructively good in so far as it provides information, institutions and processes. Through such institutions and process, people are be able to “learn from each other and “construct” or decide on the values and priorities of the society in a way that is influenced by the diverse values and needs of different groups and people” (Deneulin and Crocker 2002: 2-3). Value information is a critical democratic activity as is the usage of social values in bringing about public policy and social response. The constructive value of democracy is thus founded on the belief in the formation of values and the understanding of the force and feasibility of claims of needs, rights and duties. This also includes helping citizens to learn about their values and way of life. Sen (1999a:10) states that “The practice of democracy gives citizens an opportunity to learn from one another”.

Sen also include the idea of “need”, including the understanding of economic needs as something that needs public discussion and “exchange of information, views, and analyses” (Sen 1999:7). It is in this sense that democracy finds its constructive importance. In essence, the merits of liberal democracy and its developmental paradigm can be are intrinsically linked to the broader human development paradigm which insists on the well-being of the people. Such a human development paradigm favors the improvement of people’s lives through taking into account the range of things that people can do or be. This is necessary in a liberal democracy as it has the potential of eliminating obstacles such as illiteracy, ill health, lack of access to resources, political freedoms such as political and civil rights.

#### **2.4 The Critique of Liberal Democracy**

Inasmuch as the traits of liberal democracy have the potential of reducing conflict as highlighted in the previous chapter, liberal democracies actually experience the opposite. Critics have gone further to criticize liberal democracy as being unpractical. As Lumumba-Kasongo (2005:13) states, “a critique of liberal democracy can be made by examining the nature of the relationship between what they ought to do in society and what they actually do. The contradiction between theory and practice of liberal democracy can also reveal much about the substantive issue of this democracy”.

One critique of liberal democracy arises from the difference between classical liberalism as a dominant paradigm and new liberalism. Since both classical liberalism and new liberalism have different views on how individuals should be treated in a society, both classical and new liberalism makes assumption worth criticizing. For example, classical liberalism assumes that individuals, as voters are equal. It does not take into account the different conditions of individuals constructed

by social stratification and capabilities. In other words, classical liberalism ignores the differences in income and education. Such differences are crucial as they determine one's political participation in a state. As stated earlier on in the chapter, only the privileged, and educated are likely to make use of their civil liberties, on the contrary, the uneducated and poor will tend to be manipulated in the political process hence they are less likely to make use of their civil liberties. Moreover such an assumption makes classical liberals to perceive human beings as capable of managing their own activities. Classical liberals therefore ignore the intellectual and mental difference that human beings uphold. Some human beings can prove incapable of achieving their goals despite the existence of their civil liberties. The idea of human incapacity is one crucial element that the classical liberal does not efficiently attempt to address.

New liberalism on the other hand can be criticized for taking away individual and personal liberties. This is because new liberalism does not agree with formal equality<sup>26</sup> as the classical liberal does, instead new liberalism affirms that there is substantive inequality<sup>27</sup> amongst individuals. As Brennan and Tomasi (2011:3) states; "High liberals are committed to substantive equality, substantive liberty, and social justice; classical liberals care only about formal equality and negative freedom". This means that there is a need to recognize opportunities, access and rights that are not equally distributed in a society. New liberalism encourages the state to intervene and support those whose autonomy is compromised by poverty and illiteracy which in turn creates

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<sup>26</sup> "Formal equality promotes individual justice as the basis for a moral claim to virtue and is reliant upon the proposition that fairness (the Moral virtue) requires consistent or equal treatment" (see Wesson, Murray. "equality and social rights: an exploration of the South African Constitution", Public Law, 2007, p 751.)

<sup>27</sup> The proponents of 'substantive' equality stress out the incoherence between an ideal theoretical model and the real-life situations. The discriminatory practices against certain social or racial groups are undeniable and have continuing effects, because they have created a status quo that still exists. Justice, therefore, needs an asymmetric vision that will take into account the existing inequalities in the allocation of resources and will aim to change them. In simple terms, a noninterventionist symmetrical approach will lead to the perpetuation of this status quo, which is based on an unfair distribution of wealth, and will legitimize this unfairness by securing the existing stratification of society. See (Panagiotis Kapotas, nd) "Gender Equality and Positive Measures for Women in Greece" available [online] <[http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/2nd\\_Symposium/Panagiotis\\_Kapotas\\_paper.pdf](http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/2nd_Symposium/Panagiotis_Kapotas_paper.pdf)>

inequality in a society claimed to be surrounded by equal citizens (as per the advocacy of classical liberalism on formal equality). Even though the state may support those whose autonomy is compromised by poverty and illiteracy, it is still rendered unequal treatment when those who are capable, intelligent and rich do not receive such support from the state. . There is less sensitivity in analyzing the extent to which such holders of power in government could be rendered as bias and discriminatory towards the provision of those who are also capable, intelligent and rich. Even though the new liberal can defend the government as genuinely serving the needs of the citizenry; it can however be argued on the contrary .The law of liberty tends to abolish the reign of race over race, of faith over faith, of class over class”. Therefore, not only does the new liberal undermines people’s different capabilities, it also demoralize men as being incapable of taking care of his own affairs while simultaneously discriminating the citizenry based on their affordability and well-being. It is in this sense that the new liberal does not seem to give a plausible account of its rejection of formal equality, hence its criticism.

Another critique of liberal democracy can be made by analyzing the constitution and the nature of the relationship between what it ought to do in society and what it actually does. Basically, the constitution aims at formalizing institutions through institutional and often legal restrictions upon government officials and bodies. Much if not all is about the democratic mechanism which includes how the state should function in liberal democracy is in the constitution. In a liberal context, the constitution does not only act as a guideline towards governance but it also meant to protect the rights of minorities within a democratic setting. Even though the constitution does provide for a series of checks and balances against presidential and executive overreach including term limits and separation of powers, a dominant party in a liberal democracy has greater chances

of influencing change and proposing new constitutional amendments. Such a party may also introduce new Bills that may be in favor of its own political party. Although there is a greater emphasis on the protection of minority rights and individual liberties such as freedom of speech and assembly, freedom of religion and the right of property as well as equality before the law, the constitution does not in practical terms protect such minority rights.

Other scholars, such as Claude Ake, argue that the failure of liberal democracy is tied to its Eurocentric assumptions. Amongst such Eurocentric assumption are the political arrangement that liberal democracy makes which do not match Africa's social set up. For example, liberal democracy assumes that the idea of political participation within the Eurocentric context is the same as the Africa context. Ake (2001:243) asserts that "Liberal democracy offers a form of political participation which is markedly different from and arguably inferior to the African concept of participation. For African, especially the rural dwellers, participation is linked to communality. Africans do not generally see themselves as self-regarding atomized beings in essentially competitive and potentially conflicting interaction with others". Unlike in a Eurocentric context, the idea of participation includes taking into account the importance of sharing and carrying out the challenges of the entire community as a whole.

With specific reference to representation in liberal democracy, as a result of the dominance of a certain elite, Fayemi highlights the implications on the rights of the minority in meaningful participation towards decision making. He asserts that "In this system, the minority representatives' votes are overridden by the votes of the majority. The implication of this is that

the right of the minority representatives and their constituencies to meaningfully participate in the actual making of decisions is rendered nugatory” (Fayemi 2009:115).

Another critique of liberal democracy is that it presupposes individualism. The individualistic emphasis of liberal democracy makes it difficult to become an integral part of a commonly perceived African political culture. Liberal democracy advocates for individual rights and values as vital requirements for citizens. Gould (1998:94) argues that liberalism “disregards the concrete social difference among individual, without reference to which their actions cannot be adequately explained or their social institution understood”. The individualist assumptions of liberal democracy has also received criticism from African scholars. Ake (2000) argues that “Liberal democracy presupposes individualism but there is little individualism in the communal societies of rural Africa; it assumes the abstract universalism of legal subjects, but that applies mainly in the urban enclaves”. Therefore the idea of individualism appears to be contradictory to the dominant African beliefs characterized by collectivism, solidarity and unity in the African context. As Lumumba-Kasongo (2005:16) concurs;

Although African societies are culturally, geographically and historically diverse, and colonial and neocolonial experiences have added new political and educational elements to their complexity, the metaphysics of African societies are characterized more by the principle of collective existence than that of individualism.

Given the historical cultural African setup, individualism appears to be a foreign concept directly or indirectly intended to pursue a different agenda from that which is commonly perceived as

African communitarianism<sup>28</sup>. It is the emphasis on collectivism in African societies that will require a different political system suitable for Africa than that practiced in liberal societies. As Ake points out;

The political party system of liberal societies makes little sense in societies where the development of associational life is rudimentary and interest groups remain essentially primary groups. In the light of such difference, it will be very misleading to think of democratization in Africa as multi party competition (Ake 2000:31).

It is however important to note that ‘individual consciousness’ is not altogether absent in modern Africa. Even though “individual consciousness is emerging because of economic imperatives; however it has not found a solid social base” (Lumumba-Kasongo 2005:16). The notion of brotherhood and sisterhood is still a common phenomenon in the African value system; it finds its playground normally in reference to African social-relation and productive systems. Therefore, it is precisely for this reason that liberal democracy has received much criticism and challenges in Africa when it continues to advocate for individual rights as opposed to collective rights which finds its solid foundation on the African value system.

Another critique of liberal democracy closely linked to individualism and self-interest is that primacy of property relations. The linkage is mainly because (property rights) on themselves served as a practical guarantee for other rights. While other rights such as freedom of speech are recognized in a liberal constitution, such rights get infringed and in turn affects the primacy of

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<sup>28</sup> Communitarianism can generally be thought of as the theoretical perspective or philosophy that emphasizes the connection between the individual as a member of a community and the community. See also Odirachukwa Stephen Mwimnobi – *A critical Exposition of Kwame Gyekye’s Communitarianism* who sees communitarianism as deriving its principles from the idea that a person, when born, finds himself or herself, not in isolation but, among other individuals and thus establishing the relational nature of a person.

property relation in liberal democracies<sup>29</sup>. Likewise, the idea on the primacy of property relation is not entirely beneficial to all citizens; there is a close link between who get what and money is used to influence that. It is the importance of human dignity that needs to be taken into account in liberal democracy, and money should only be used to benefit everyone in an effort of guaranteeing citizens basic welfare. As Appiah states

In a world where land has all been parceled out (so that no one can simply acquire land to work by moving into uncharted territory); a world where money is essential for adequate nutrition and proper shelter; where a job (or so much money you don't need one) is increasingly a condition for minimal social respect; guaranteeing that everybody has access to a place to live, food to eat, and a form of work, is simply making sure that everyone has access to the possibility of a dignified existence (1997:47).

Even though Appiah's quote is a defense for liberalism, it brings about a non-realistic phenomenon of how such money can be undistributed in a society thus creating inequality through self-interested individuals who may want to accumulate more. This is not to say that liberalism does not completely supports the influence of money in politics, however it does mean that the power of government should be limited as it may use money to influence or limit human freedom. It is therefore the political processes that interferes with the primacy of private property for the citizen which raises concerns in liberalism. Taking into account individual rights as the most distinctive feature of a liberal state, there is a need to limit governments' intervention and what the state may require of its citizens.

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<sup>29</sup> It is worth noting that not all countries can be generally thought of as not putting limits on the power of property rights, countries such as India and South Africa for example put some limits on eh power of property.

Although a multiparty system can be advantageous in the sense that it promotes power egalitarianism. On the contrary it can also be the main source of competition and conflict in some liberal democracies. Lumumba-Kasongo (2005:16) argues that “Competition over human and material resources implies that only clever or more ‘intelligent’ well-informed people, more aggressive or persuasive individuals with greater political clout, are more likely to have such resources”. Hence uneducated, ill, undernourished, or destitute persons cannot properly make use of their constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties. Politicians can rig elections, manipulate government policies and resort to corruption through bribes and nepotism. This also includes the political processes which in many instances remain in the hands of few elite. As a result, abuse of state power continues to go largely unchecked. Therefore, it is likely that competition in liberal democracies will eventually produce greed, which in the African context discourages collectivism and unity.

In an African setting, African, especially those in rural areas do not really see themselves as competitive beings but rather their participation is mainly influenced by their sense of communalism. African are mainly driven by what Ake calls “one’s station and duty in life, not to assert one’s interest and claim rights over others” (Ake 1993:243). In liberal a democracy political parties are assumed to be representative in nature hence accommodating those that can hardly voice out their concerns. This kind of thinking is however foreign in an African value system. With Africans, even the general concept of ‘participation’, whether for the purpose of representation or not mainly “rest not on the assumption of individualism and conflicting interests, but on the social nature of human beings” (Ake 1993:243). Ake goes further to states that;

Related to this, the African concept of participation is as much a matter of taking part as of sharing the rewards and burdens of community membership. In addition, in the traditional African sense participation is quite unlike the Western notion of the occasional opportunity

to choose, affirm or dissent, it is rather the active involvement in a process, that of setting goals and making decisions. More often than not, it is the involvement in the process rather than the acceptability of the end decision, which satisfies the need to participate (Ake 1993:243).

Ake believes that it is dubious to assume that political parties are the suitable mechanisms for political competition conditions where interests groups remain essentially primary groups. He states that “Single member constituencies are hardly suitable for societies that are still federations of ethnic groups and nationalities” (Ake 1993:243).

Issues regarding majoritarianism also have a huge impact on the lives of people in a liberal democracy. One criticism about liberal democracy is the fear that it will become a "tyranny of the majority." This fear has many negative consequences in the lives of people, especially those who are members of minority parties. Some of these fears may include; lack of full representation, abuse of resources by those who hold power, unfair application of justice which may favor the majority and undermine its independence. In short the focus may shifted from the application of democratic values to competition, power struggles and the survival of the fittest. As stated earlier on, liberal democracies have a tendency of producing undesirable outcomes characterized by violence and protests. As Zakaria (2003:18-19) states, “Governments produced by elections may be inefficient, corrupt, short-sighted, irresponsible, dominated by special interests”. For Ake, the problem of elections is that the electorate is not educated, and is sometimes coerced to vote for particular individuals or groups. As a result democracy tends to be exclusionary and only benefits the privileged elites. As Omotola (2009) states, “Democracy is also both an exclusionary and elitist phenomenon, which marginalizes, may excludes the masses especially at the economic realm”.

Liberal democracy can also be criticized for its assumption of common good. As an essential element of liberal democracy, the common good itself is not entirely a different phenomenon in liberal democracies; it is closely linked to individual interest. Liberal democracy, necessarily assumes a sense of shared values in the demos (otherwise political legitimacy will fail). In other words, it assumes that the demo is in fact a unit. By assuming a sense of share values, liberal democracy presupposes that a common good can therefore be easily attainable. In a diverse society, where the populace is characterized by different ethnic groups and nationalities, achieving a common good is hardly practical. Therefore, the assumption of common good in a liberal democracy can have negative effects in a society, especially that which is plural in nature.

Ethnic diversity in liberal democracies may not only result to conflict, but it also has the potential of disrupting the electoral results in that different ethnic groups do not vote for their leaders based on merit but they vote based on the particular ethnic group that leaders comes from<sup>30</sup>. This has a huge negative impact on the general running of the government and in achieving common good since some leaders may fail to render proper service to citizens as they are put into power on ethnic bases. It then turns out that from this lack of proper service delivery people experience social and economic impediment thus resulting in strikes, violence, conflict and a disorganized society.

The criticism of common good is applicable to its understanding on both classical liberalism and new liberalisms. In the classical liberal school of thought, the concept of common good “was traditionally implicated in the justification of privilege, hierarchy, and deference” (Holmes

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<sup>30</sup> This kind of voting is also referred to as ‘identity politics’ where according to Kimenyi and Romero 2008: 4, ‘implies that voting is not the outcome of a careful evaluation of policy positions or the performance of leaders, instead, it is identity that matters.

1989:240). It also carried with it “various dangerous or oppressive sentiments – religious intolerance, nationalism, militarism and the like” (Raeder 1998:520). Moreover there is much reliance on free market in the classical political liberal school of thought, ruled by a minimal State to achieve social goals and self-interest. Argondona (2011: 6) states that;

The common good or general interest is determined in a consensual way as the sum of the private goods chosen by the citizens according to the utility functions; in a utilitarian spirit, it is the greatest good for the greatest number. And the role of the State is to promote the well-being of citizens and protect their freedom.

The assumption by liberal democracy that common good could be easily achieved, especially in a utilitarian spirit (as the classical liberal believes) is misleading and impractical. The advancement of interests takes into account a number of factors that contributes towards advancing the interest of all. For example, people needs to have their value of equality protected, they need an equal level of participation and political decision making. Liberal democracy with problems such as competition is less likely to achieve a common good that will bring about the advancement of the interest of all.

In fact scholars such as Schumpeter have denied the existence of common will or common good in democracy. According to Mackie (2004:3),

Schumpeter criticizes what he calls the classical doctrine of democracy, that the people through their common will elect representatives to realize the common good. He says there is usually no will of the people nor common good, and when there is then autocracy often better realizes both. There is no unique and unanimously endorsed common good, he objects. Nor is there a will of the people

Such a criticism by Schumpeter draws its fundamental point on democracy being just a method which is “neither valuable in itself nor tending to right action or good ends” (Mackie 2004:3). In this regard Schumpeter concerns himself with the will of the people which he perceives as not

being genuine but rather one that is influenced by the leaders. According to him, the people only follow and accept what is being said by their leaders. This is mainly because “the judgment of a qualified leader is generally superior to that of parliaments and publics” (Mackie 2004:3).

Likewise, the criticism of common good can also be applicable to new liberalism. The new liberal school of thought views common good from its general terms as the good for all, however the application of common good should also consider the rights of individuals (and not only be viewed in general terms to be a ‘good for all’. This is because what can be good to person A and B may not be good to person A and C. There is greater emphasis in ensuring that people have their own right to choose their own good in the application of common good in liberal theory. The idea of common good in this context is also linked to how Sen discusses the value of democracy. In his discussion, Sen talks about the constructive value of democracy in which people are able to learn from each other and construct on the values and priorities of the society collectively. In the constructive sense, what is good is what people construct. Common good within the new liberal perspective also entails the opportunity of using democracy to achieve something else (instrumental). Specifically the control mechanism through repeated elections can be regarded as common good for all. The political incentives also gives the citizenry the platform to voice out their concerns thus ensuring political participation. The rulers then have the responsibility to attend to the concerns of the people. According to Sen, “The rulers have the incentive to listen to what people want if they have to face their criticism and seek their support in elections” (1999:152).

Lastly the idea of common good within the new liberal school of thought also entails the application of political freedoms such as civil and political rights in order to ensure that people are able to control their own lives. These political freedoms plays an intrinsic value in the citizenry. A according to Sen (1999:153), “Political and civil rights, especially those related to the guaranteeing of open discussion, debate, criticism, and dissent , are central to the process of generating informed and reflected choices”. In a nutshell, the new liberal perception of the common good will incorporate all three aspects of the value of democracy, as alluded by Sen in *Development as Freedom*, and not only be viewed in general lame terms as the ‘good for all’.

A paradigm of development that does not take into account popular participation cannot therefore be appropriate in Africa, liberal democracy with its promising features has proven to be unsuitable as social and political problem still continues in the continent. Lumumba Kasango states “While Africa is promoting liberal democracy as the most promising formula for unleashing individual energy and generating political participation, African social and economic conditions are worsening” (Lumumba-Kasango 2005:5). Therefore a developmental paradigm suitable for Africa needs to be participative in nature; it should be characterized by popular enthusiasm and developmental driven. The absence of democracy in Africa is the foundation for the crisis of underdevelopment. In emphasizing the importance of a good human centered development that through participation ensures the well-being of the people, The African Charter for popular participation argued that;

We therefore have no doubt that at the heart of Africa’s development objectives must lie the ultimate and overriding good human-centered development that ensures the overall well-being of the people through sustained improvement in their living standard and the

full and effective participation of the people in charting their development policies, programme and processes and contributing to their realization (UNECA, pp 17-18).

Thus said, liberal democracy does not seem to produce the relevant paradigm of development because as Ake contends;

...the development paradigm marginalized Africans, it takes hardly any interests in Africa and its culture. In so far as it takes any interests in them, it is to underline their dysfunctionality and the need to transcend them. For the most part African people, especially the rural population, and their culture are written off as being purely negative in the quest for development (Ake 1996:21).

This is because the paradigm itself does not take into account that what is relevant for Africans should be initiated by Africa, the African have been relegated, they have been marginalized “because the development paradigm take an uncompromisingly negative view of the people and their culture, it cannot accept them on their own terms. Its interests in Africa on the possibility of Africa becoming what it is not and probably can never be” (Ake 1996: 21).

## **2.5 Conclusion**

Thus, the focus of this chapter was a literature review of the key concepts - liberal democracy and development. The chapter critically reviewed literature on these two concepts. It also focused on the assumptions of liberal democracy and distinguished between old liberalism and new liberalism. The chapter also focused on reviewing the literature on the value of democracy with specific reference to the intrinsic, instrumental and constructive value of democracy. A critique of liberal democracy was then drawn especially its applicability to the African context.

Due to the weaknesses inherent in liberal democracy, the next chapter introduces a political mechanism (Consociationalism) whose essence mainly is cooperation or consensus and characterized by a people's driven developmental agenda. The emphasis is also put on elite cooperation. The consociational model "is premised on processes of elite cooperation and assumes that the centrifugal forces found in divided places can be offset by such policies of collaboration among the representatives of the different segments within the polity" (Lijphart 1968:1). The following chapter therefore will explore in detail the consociational model as proposed by Arend Lijphart and the relevance of its applicability in Africa.

## **CHAPTER THREE: CONSOCIATIONALISM AND DEVELOPMENT**

These enormous social and human costs of historically aborted development pose critical threats, both nationally and globally, to stability, peace and survival, particularly in the era of neoliberal globalization that has turned the picture before us grimmer. Dooming circumstances of beleaguered societies, without any perspective for stability, peace or development, urge both social science and politics in contemporary world to promptly formulate a feasible alternative for the future. (Sankatsing 2004:1)

### **3.1 Introduction**

The preceding chapter examined the relationship between liberal democracy and development. While making a distinction between classical and new liberalism, it was noted that the weaknesses and assumptions of liberalism (both classical and new liberalism) cannot bring about a suitable paradigm for Africa's development. Thus, the analysis in chapter two demonstrates the need to further interrogate the link between the democracy and development. In light of the weaknesses of liberalism identified in the previous chapter, this chapter introduces Lijphart's consociationalism. The point is to interrogate the ability of Lijphart's consociationalism to address the weaknesses of liberalism. It is worth noting that not all elements of consociationalism are relevant in dealing with the weaknesses of liberalism. This chapter, therefore, investigates the link between consociationalism and democracy. It also calls for the rejection of liberal democracy as a political mechanism suitable for bringing about development in Africa.

In support of the above argument, the chapter utilizes Ake's approach in laying down the kind of democracy Africa needs. The chapter thus contends that Africa can bring about effective holistic

development through the application of consociational approaches<sup>31</sup> as espoused by Ake. Firstly, the chapter argues that an appropriate developmental model for Africa places as much emphasis on collective rights (new liberal approach) as it does on individual rights. In pursuing this line of argument, the chapter addresses the origins of consociational theory and consociationalism as a school of thought. Secondly, the chapter provides an examination of both the merits and demerits of consociational democracy in an attempt to analyze its relevance for the African context. Thirdly, while analytically distinguishing between new liberalism and old liberalism, the chapter compares and contrast liberal democracy and consociationalism. The objective of this section is to argue that development is more likely to succeed in a consociational setting than in a liberal one. Fourthly, the chapter highlights that the links between consociationalism and development have been neglected in the literature to date. Finally, a conclusion is drawn using Ake's approach to development. It is argued that the consociational approach appears to be a reasonable and preferable alternative to the liberal approach. A consociational political system is much more capable of bringing about an African paradigm of development given both its emphasis on the inclusive nature of the individual and its emphasis on collective representation, whereas the dominant liberal political system lacks this combination of inclusivity and collectivity.

## **3.2 Origins of Consociational Theory**

### **3.2.1 A Historical Overview**

In its origins, the consociational model was intended as an alternative to majoritarian models of democracy. It came about as a result of the failures of liberal democracy which is unable to

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<sup>31</sup> Later on in the dissertation, there is a focus on the Provincial Level, specifically the Province of KwaZulu-Natal.

incorporate minorities into government. In an effort to facilitate the development of democracy in divided societies, consociationalism advocated for a kind of government based on the principle of elite accommodation. The model is intended for implementation in polities which typically possess the following ingredients: instability, ideologically antagonistic subcultures, a lack of social and political consensus as well as cross cutting cleavages. It is the objective of the consociational model to address, from the outset, the challenges to stability for which the majoritarian model fails to cater.

Even though consociational theory is well known to be associated with Arend Lijphart, (regarded as the ‘father of consociationalism’), the term ‘consociation’ has its own deep historical origin. Johannes Althusius first used the term ‘consociatio’ in 1603. His usage of the term was specifically to refer to a political union. It was in the 1960s that the term received its current meaning when according to Clarke & Foweraker (2001: 92), it “was utilised by scholars concerned with a number of small democracies that challenged predominant plural and social determinist accounts of the relationship between political cleavages and democratic stability”.

As noted in chapter two consociationalism in Africa emerged as a critic of liberalism in the new post-colonial states of Africa. Both as a conflict resolution and a political mechanism for plural and instable societies. The African roots of consociationalism can be traced back to an analysis of conflict-ridden African countries often characterised by racial, ideological, ethnic and / or even at times religious lines. According to Taylor (1992:1), “Since its initial formulation in the late-1960s consociationalism has led to a highly influential school of studies and consociational engineering has been marketed, particularly by Lijphart, as a genuinely attractive option to address the

seemingly intractable ethnic divisions of South Africa”. (Lijphart; 1970, 1985, 1989, 1998: Rubert Taylor – *South Africa: A Consociational Path to Peace*). In South Africa, consociationalism was particularly initiated by the Central Committee of Inkatha which resulted in the proposal for a single provincial sphere of administration on a consociational model for KwaZulu-Natal. Taking into account the major changes of the then government structures of the Natal-KwaZulu, the consociational option was not to be applied purely as advocated by Lijphart, instead the unique case of the region was taken into consideration. For example, the Buthelezi Commission (1982:77) stated, “The first choice that has to be made when a new consociational democracy is being established is whether to lay down the various consociational rules in formal documents or to rely in informal and unwritten agreement and understanding among the leaders of the different segments of the population”. Despite the Inkatha’s initial efforts of the consociational option, such proposals were rejected by the NP government and the ANC (both in exile and inside Natal)<sup>32</sup>.

The theory has also received application in other parts of Africa such as Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC – (Lemarchand 2006 - *Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo*). Other scholars have analysed the theory of consociationalism with specific reference to development in Africa. These scholars amongst others includes Fayemi (2009), Claude Ake (1967, 1991, 1993, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 2000 1996). The theory of consociationalism has been advocated for as a potential mechanism to bring about development in Africa, more especially in plural society where different of segments exist.

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<sup>32</sup> It is worth noting that given the changes brought about by South Africa’s transition to democracy and its focus on a developmental state, the Buthelezi Commission proposal may not directly offer much to the current discussion on consociationalism, however certain aspects of the proposals maybe important reference points for the application of consociationalism in contemporary South Africa.

### **3.2.2 Arend Lijphart's consociational approach**

Lijphart's works "focused on the fourfold typology of democracy which was based on two major factors. Namely, their political cultures are homogeneous or fragmented and secondly, their elite behaviour is competitive" (Dlamini 2010:19). Lijphart therefore used the term 'consociational' to refer to those democracies "where fragmented political culture co-exists with accommodative elite behaviour, which builds a metaphorical bridge (or 'arch') over the gulf separating the subcultures (or 'pillars') and this ensures democratic stability" (Clarke & Foweraker 2001:92). It is important to note that only in systems where the leaders of subcultures realize the dangers of not cooperating is consociational democracy viable. As Clarke & Foweraker (2001:92) note,

... [c]onsociational democracy is only viable if subcultural leaders have the ability to recognize the dangers inherent in fragmentation; commitment to system maintenance; the ability to transcend subcultural cleavage at the elite level and the ability to forge appropriate solutions for subcultural demands.

In achieving this, leaders should at least feel the need to maintain unity as well as a commitment to democratic principles. "By retaining and maintaining the support and loyalty of their followers<sup>33</sup>, the leaders must at the same time put forward the spirit of working together and compromise with leaders of other segments" (Dlamini 2010: 20).

### **3.3 Majoritarian, Consociational, power-sharing and / Consensus**

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<sup>33</sup> The term 'followers' refers more specifically to the middle-level group that can be described as sub elite political activist. See Lijphart 1977: 53.

The term ‘consociational’ is closely associated with power-sharing and consensus democracy. This is because consociational ‘power-sharing’ and consensus democracy are frequently regarded as acceptable alternatives to the adversarial politics and the majoritarianism of the Westminster model. However, Jastad takes exception to the notion that ‘power sharing’ and ‘consociationalism’ are conterminous, and points out that separate strands of research have used the term ‘power-sharing’ in different ways: Firstly, power sharing in terms of democracy, secondly, power-sharing in terms of conflict management<sup>34</sup>. As a result, consociational theory is frequently prescribed for countries with acute subcultural diversity such as Lebanon and Northern Ireland. In his analysis, Lijphart shows that only in homogenous countries can the majoritarian model of democracy be stable and this is because destructive competition is prevented when full power is allocated to the majority party. On the other hand, consociational democracy is suitable in heterogeneous countries where societies are divided along religious<sup>35</sup>; ideological, linguistic, cultural, ethnic or racial lines. Lijphart also argues that “social homogeneity and political consensus are regarded as prerequisites for, or factors strongly conducive to stable democracy. Conversely, the deep social divisions and political differences within plural societies are held responsible for instability and breakdown in democracies”. (Lijphart 1977: 1) It is important to note that for scholars such as Lijphart, a plural society and a political consensus can be regarded as seminal prerequisites for a strong and stable democracy to exist.

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<sup>34</sup> Conceptual confusion has hampered research on power sharing. Two, actually separate strands of research use the term ‘power sharing’, often without recognising the difference in terms of democracy and conflict management. However, power sharing stipulated in part of the conflict management literature differs from power sharing in accordance with democratic theory. Because of different definitions, there is little overlap between the characteristics, the cases and the mechanisms of these two concepts of power sharing. . . See Jastad 2006:14

<sup>35</sup> The term ‘confessionalism’ is sometimes used to refer to the distribution of political power and institutional power to religious communities.

There is a significant relationship between Lijphart's consociationalism and development, more especially with regards to the representation and overall organization of the society. While both liberalism and consociationalism sees value in the recognition of human beings and seeks to organize society for the benefit of the people living in it, however, the way in which society is organized by these two systems differs hence the outcome of development in the areas governed by either the two systems. For example, liberalism attempts to organize society by ensuring representation through democratic processes characterized by majoritarian rule and representation. Consociationalism on the other hand organizes such society through democratic processes characterized by proportional representation and consensus. In a consociational democracy, development cannot only be perceived as a responsibility and project of a 'majority represented society' but rather it also takes into account the needs of the minorities who are respectively represented by their leaders through a proportional representation principle. Thus, in consociational democracy the focus of development is with the community or the collective citizenry rather than the individual who is encouraged to enhance self-development through the provision of equal opportunity as advocated by the liberal school.

Moreover, since there is a greater emphasis on the elite in consociational democracies. As Lijphart (1977:25) states that "The primary characteristic of consociational democracy is that the political leaders of all segments of the plural society cooperate in a grand coalition to govern the country". This mean that the responsibility of bringing about development on behalf of the different segments within the country lies with the elite. In other words this could be translated into a 'top-down' approach to development. It is in this approach that people are not the center and dictators of development but more like recipients of development. "Top down development is characterised

by usually a small number of people recruited or elected to develop a ‘strategy’ that will lead to progress”<sup>36</sup>. Therefore the link between Lijphart’s consociationalism and development can thus be traced from the basic principle of Lijphart’s consociational theory advocates. That is, the main elements of the consociational theory.

Thus far in the chapter, a definition of consociationalism has been provided, prior to an account of its crucial connection with development. It is also important to note that the theory of consociationalism is broad: hence the need to understand the term in a broader context as a school of thought.

### **3.4 Consociational Democracy as a School Of Thought**

Consociationalism can be understood in two interconnected ways; Firstly, as a democratic political system and secondly, as a political mechanism for conflict resolution in divided societies.

#### **3.4.1 Consociationalism as a Democratic System (Elements of Consociationalism)**

Consociationalism as a democratic system has four main elements, namely: executive power-sharing, mutual or minority veto, proportional representation and autonomy. In consociational democracy, executive power is shared both by the majority parties and the opposition. This is done through elite cooperation and coalition cabinet. Mutual or minority veto is regarded as the minority’s ultimate weapon which helps them to protect their vital interests. According to Lemarchand, “this works best when it is not used too often and only with regard to issues of fundamental importance” (Lemarchand 2006:3). The third element of consociationalism is

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<sup>36</sup> <http://realiseddevelopment.net/2013/01/top-down-bottom-up/>

Proportional Representation (PR), which Lemarchand defines as the basic standard of political representation, public service appointments and allocation of public funds. According to Dlamini (2010:22), “It (proportional representation) serves as a guarantee for the fair representation of ethnic minorities”.

The last condition of consociationalism is segmented or group autonomy. This means that “while on issues of common interest, decisions are made jointly by all members of the coalition cabinet, on all other issues autonomy is the rule, with each community free to attend to its own affairs as it wishes” (Lemarchand 2006: 3). With this condition, minority groups are given the right to protect their own interests. As Eisenberg (2002: 8) puts it, “Segmental autonomy or limited forms of self-government provides each minority with the security it needs to ensure that its distinctive interests are protected and minimizes the degree to which it must coordinate, compromise and negotiate with other minorities”.

The full application of the above elements is believed to ensure the equality of citizens so as to avoid potential disputes arising from inequalities. Democracies seek to manage conflicts of interest by allowing competition among people according to agreed-upon rules which are mediated by institutions. Equality and involvement, especially in decision making, is fundamental to consociationalism.

Hence, consociationalism in this sense focuses on the accommodation of different segments of society. Since no political system of government is perfect, even the hegemonic ‘liberal democracy’ has manifest drawbacks” (Dlamini 2010:23). Consociational democracy seeks to address these problems through devices of accommodation. Therefore, the emphasis on collective representation endows the democratic consociational model with a better chance of enhancing

participation and bringing about an African developmental paradigm than the democratic liberal approach.

### **3.4.2 Consociationalism as Conflict Resolution**

One way of understanding consociational theory is by viewing it in terms of conflict management. “Power - sharing serves as the mechanism that offers this protection by guaranteeing all groups a share of state power” (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003:319). The aim of consociationalism as a conflict resolution mechanism is to instil and emphasize the importance of incorporation. It is also “...to bring about a major restructuring of power relations through a more inclusive participation in policy making, accompanied by corresponding spheres of autonomy for the groups concerned. Incorporation than exclusion is seen as key to conflict resolution” (Lemarchand 2006:2). As a conflict resolution mechanism, Lijphart believes that there are certain favourable conditions that will facilitate the success of consociationalism. . Lijphart adds that “these factors are helpful but neither indispensable nor sufficient in and of themselves to account for the success of consociational democracy” (Lijphart 1977: 54). These conditions are: a balance of power; multiparty systems; smaller rather than larger countries; cross-cutting cleavages; a tradition of elite accommodation; homogenous, isolated pillars not internally divided and scattered and over-arching loyalties. Each of these favourable conditions is briefly explained below.

### **3.4.3 Conditions favorable to Consociationalism**

#### **3.4.3.1 A balance of power**

A balance of power among the segments of multiple societies works better for consociational democracy than a society where there are two major segments. This, according to Lijphart, is because “if one segment has a clear majority its leaders may attempt to dominate rather than cooperate with the rival minority. And in a society with two segments of approximately equal size, the leaders of both segments may hope to win a majority and to achieve their aims by dominating instead of cooperation” (Lijphart 1977:55). Furthermore, two elements form part of the notion of ‘multiple balance of power’. Firstly, there is a need for a balance of power among the different segments of society, and secondly, a need that at least three different segments of society are present for the proper application of the consociational model<sup>37</sup>.

#### **3.4.3.2 Multiparty System**

The second condition favorable to consociationalism is a multiparty system. According to Lijphart (1977:61), “In plural societies with free elections, the salient social cleavage tend to be translated into party system cleavages; the political parties are likely to be the organized political manifestation of the segments”. Segments of political parties are favorable because political representatives can be responsible for the representation of each of their segments and “they provide a good method of selecting the segmental leaders who will participate in grand coalition” (Lijphart 1977:61-62). It is worth noting that this function cannot only be performed by parties, however, state governments or representatives in the national legislature and executive can also

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<sup>37</sup> These elements are crucial because an area with relatively few segments constitutes a much more favourable base than a highly fractionalized society. The reason, according to Lijphart, is that “cooperation among groups becomes more difficult as the number participating in negotiations increases” (1977: 56).

execute this function, more especially, “in plural societies with regionally concentrated segments and a federal constitution”. (Lijphart 1977:62).

### **3.4.3.3 Smaller rather than larger countries**

Thirdly, consociational democracy works better in smaller countries than in larger ones and a greater number of smaller states have become consociational democracies than larger ones. This is because “Small size has both direct and indirect effects on the probability that consociational democracy will be established and will be successful; it directly enhances a spirit of cooperativeness and accommodation” (Lijphart 1977:65). One reason for this is that burdens of decision making are reduced and a smaller country is easier to govern than a larger one, hence increasing the chances of consociational democracy. Secondly, leaders of various segments in smaller countries have an advantage of meeting and interacting often. As Stenier quoted in Lijphart 1971:65) states, “In smaller states the political elite is, compared to bigger states, relatively small. Hence the probability is greater that the members of the political elite will interact relatively frequent”. This, according to Lijphart, is likely “to lead to a relatively high level of mutual goodwill, which in turn makes the political leaders prefer not to perceive politics as zero-sum game, in which a strategy of ‘all or nothing’ is applied”. (Lijphart 1977:66)

### **3.4.3.4 Cross cutting cleavages**

Fourthly, cross-cutting cleavages is another important favourable condition for consociational democracy. Giving an example of the significance of cross-cutting cleavages as a favourable factor of consociationalism, Dlamini (2010:29) states “if for instance, a political cleavage and a social

cleavage crosscut to a high degree, there will develop a feeling of equality among the political groups, but if the two cleavages tend to coincide one of the groups is more likely to feel relegated and unjustly represented". The presence of cross cutting cleavages is not the main explanation of the political stability of plural societies, but rather "crosscutting divisions of equal or unequal intensities are a factor of subsidiary importance, and they may or may not be favourable to consociationalism" (Lijphart 1977:81). Lipset has argued that "the chances for stable democracy are enhanced to the extent that groups and individuals have a number of crosscutting, politically relevant affiliations" (Lipset 1960:88-89)<sup>38</sup>. The examination of how two or more cleavages relate to each other is crucial in understanding the successes and failures of consociational democracies. Lijphart gives two reason for the importance of crosscutting cleavages. He notes "In the first place, the way in which cleavages cut across each other affects the chances for consociational democracy because it affects the numbers and relative size of the segments and thus the balance of power among them. Secondly, crosscutting can have important consequences for the intensity of feelings generated by the cleavages" (Lijphart 1977:75)

#### **3.4.3.5 Tradition of elite accommodation**

Fifthly, the traditions of elite accommodation is another favourable factor of the consociational theory. If political leaders engage in coalescent rather than adversarial decision making, plural societies are likely to enjoy democratic stability in their government. "An alternative or additional factor predisposing political leaders to be moderate and cooperative is the prior existence of a

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<sup>38</sup> In Lijphart's theory the concept of cross-cutting cleavages is important because, if such cross-cutting is missing, political instability is the prospect for a plural society" See also Schendelen, R.1985. Consociational Democracy: The Views of Arend Lijphart and Collected Criticisms. *Political Science Reviewer*. Pp. 141-183.

tradition of elite accommodation” (Lijphart 1977: 100). Even though Lijphart includes the tradition of elite-accommodation on the list of favourable factors, he nonetheless argues that it is not a key prerequisite for consociational democracy. Lijphart’s assertion does not necessarily mean that the tradition of elite accommodation has insignificant value in consociational democracy. On the contrary, this favourable factor still plays a role in maintaining a consociational democracy.<sup>39</sup>

#### **3.4.3.6 Segmental isolation and Federalism**

The sixth favourable factor of consociationalism is segmental isolation and federalism. The phenomena of segmental isolation and federalism are often used to refer to the geographical separation of opponent societies. The idea is that a clear distinction of the boundaries of different societies may contribute positively towards sustainable democracy in plural societies. Accordingly the physical separation of societies “will avert latent aggressions from evolving into conflict, and segmental autonomy can have a stable basis by means of federalism and regionalisation” (Lijphart 1977:88). This is because danger may arise if these groups are in close contact. “...clear boundaries between the segments of plural society have the advantage of limiting mutual contacts and consequently of limiting the chances of ever-present potential antagonism to erupt into actual hostility” (Lijphart 1977:88).

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<sup>39</sup> “The genetic factors, including a tradition of elite accommodation, intensive communication between elites and the absence of a majority group, however, are equally helpful in maintaining consociational democracy”.- see Bogaards (1998:484)

### 3.4.3.7 Over-arching loyalties

The last favourable condition for consociational democracy is based on ‘over-arching loyalties’. “The conflict potential of cleavages also depends on the degree to which their inherent intensities are moderated by overarching loyalties” (Lijphart 1977:81). This means that even though there may be certain cleavages in a society that divides it, “over-arching loyalties may operate simultaneously, and the conflict potential of cleavages depends on the combined effect of the two forces” (Lijphart 1977:81). Over-arching loyalties also have the potential to bring about cohesion for the whole society or even a segment of that society<sup>40</sup>. Elites can also play an important role towards filling the cross cutting gap and strengthening overarching loyalties in divided societies. They can, through representation of the masses, ensure that certain factors that create unity rather than divide a society are given priority<sup>41</sup>.

It is worth noting that consociationalism is not always successful. For example, the application of consociationalism proved to have failed in countries such as Cyprus and Nigeria, and “Uruguay abandoned its Swiss-style consociational system” (Lijphart 1969:216). Even though consociationalism is not always guaranteed to succeed, the role of elites is regarded as an important aspect in the success of consociationalism<sup>42</sup>. Therefore, consociational democracies, whether

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<sup>40</sup> Certain cohesive forces that can be identified in bringing about cohesion in a society. For example -“Nationalism is potentially such a cohesive force. Not only its strength is important, but also the question of whether it truly unites the society or instead acts as an additional cleavage by providing a loyalty to nation that is not coterminous with the state” see -Lijphart 1977:82.

<sup>41</sup> Elites representing the masses can have a tremendous influence on society: hence their standpoint on issues affecting the community becomes important. “Overarching cooperation at the elite level can be a substitute for cross-cutting affiliations at the mass level” – see (Lijphart 1968: 200).

<sup>42</sup> Lijphart (1969) identifies four requirements for successful consociational democracies:

a) That elites have the ability to accommodate the divergent interests and demands of the subcultures; b) This requires that they have the ability to transcend cleavages and to join in a common effort with the elites of rival subcultures. c) This in turn depends on their commitment to the maintenance of the system and to the improvement of its cohesion and stability. d) Finally, all of the above requirements are based on the assumption that the elites understand the perils of political fragmentation (Lijphart 1969:216).

understood as conflict management or political system needs to take into account the role played by elites for its success.

Having explained consociationalism as a school of thought, the chapter moves on to highlight some of the merits of consociationalism, both as a democratic system and a conflict resolution mechanism. The intention is to argue that consociationalism stands a better chance than majoritarianism of enhancing participation due to its emphasis on collective representation and the general representation of the minority.

### **3.5 The Merits of Consociational Democracy**

#### **3.5.1 Minority representation**

Despite criticisms of the consociational theory, consociational democracy is applauded for its minority representation and as such ensuring the contribution and participation of the minority towards development. According to the UNDP (2010:4), “Encouraging the inclusion and participation of minorities and their organisations in human development efforts and governance contributes to more cohesive, peaceful and stronger societies”. This means the lack of full representation and or the exclusion of the minorities has high chances of causing conflict, divisions and tension in societies. Such instability and lack of participation affects the minorities and only allows the majority to participate and dictate what development is and mean to the minorities. Communities are not only comprised of the majority but include the minority. This means that it is both the majority and minority that need to define what development is hence making them agents, means and ends of development at all levels. As Ake contends, “ If the people are the agents of development –that is , those with the responsibility to decide what development is, what

values it is to maxima , and the methods of realising it, they must also have the prerogative of making public policy at all levels” (1996:126). Specifically referring to majoritarian democracies, Zuhair (2008:49) states, “In reality, traditional majoritarian democracies propel a winner-takes-all system and ethnic minorities are usually excluded from political power. This exclusion creates division and hinders development through a ‘majority centered approach’ to development. As a result, conflicts involving minorities are easily channeled into extra-parliamentary and violent forms”. James Madison (quoted in Guinier, 1994:3) warned, “If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure”. Therefore, the inclusion of minority groups in consociational democracy is an important merit and one of the main advantages of a consociational democracy given that all groups, including minorities, are represented and development becomes a phenomenon not only owned by the majority but also by the minority. The minority is thus able to get representation at political, social and economic arenas and as such becomes both the contributors and beneficiaries of development.

Development in a consociational democracy becomes the product of a power-sharing electoral system (proportional representation) which has the potential to reduce divisions and promote accommodation among different groups in the society. Lijphart has also claimed that proportional representation allows minorities’ equal representation in society and “incites party proliferation, providing the basis for minority compromise through the necessary formation of coalitions” (Erm 2013). There has been statistically convincing evidence by scholars such as Pippa Norris that indicates how proportional representation electoral systems have created more democratic governments than majoritarian systems. Erm states that: “In comparing homogenous and heterogeneous societies through multivariate analyses and the Freedom House Democratic

indicator, majoritarian elections produced higher democracy in homogenous societies and PR elections produced higher democracy in divided societies” (Erm 2013). The inclusion of minorities in consociational arrangement therefore cannot be underestimated given that minority inclusion makes societies more democratic, hence bringing about a developmental process that benefits all. Without full recognition of minorities, a political system may not be fully democratic and development will only benefit a few. “In an ideal democracy, the people would rule, but the minorities would also be protected against the power of majorities.” (Guinier 1994:4). Consociationalism therefore intends taking into account the importance of minorities and their role in government.

### **3.5.2 Consociationalism provides autonomy for communities**

Another positive aspect of consociationalism is that it seeks to provide autonomy for those divided communities, and this can have a positive impact on the development of these communities. In this case, each segment of society with its unique features such as education<sup>43</sup>, language, culture and religious beliefs is able to autonomously perform its practices without any interventions from different communities. Moreover, minority communities are able to take a more active role in the development of their language, education and provide a wider range of their language educational services. (Aunger 199) The provision of autonomy for communities does not mean that all issues of common concern are made independently by communities. However, it does mean that all other

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<sup>43</sup> “Education is almost inevitably an issue of particular concern to ethnic minorities, not the least because of its intrinsic links to such crucial areas as language, culture and religion” – see Augner 1995 - Dispersed Minorities and Segmental Autonomy: French-Language School Boards in Canada. Or <http://www.ualberta.ca/~eaunger/pubs/dispersed1996.htm>

matters relevant that directly affects the community such as culture and other important rites of passage should be the sole responsibility of those individual communities

This is an important aspect of consociationalism as it not only take into account the differences within the plural society but also pursues efforts in respecting them through the advocacy of segmental autonomy. It is mainly the segmental autonomy of communities that enable workable shared intercommunity cooperation, and communities cannot merely bring about development without cooperation of the community. It is also important to note that democratic opposition is not eliminated in consociational democracies, but rather their existence (both division and oppositions) enables them to grow independently in conditions of generalized security. Furthermore, segmental autonomy creates strengthened organizations and sense of belonging within communities which in turn contributes positively towards communal development that is characterized by shared attributes and responsibilities.

### **3.5.3 Conflict Management and peace sustainability**

As stated earlier in the chapter, consociational democracy can act as a good conflict management tool. A society with a better conflict resolution mechanism easily achieve development than one that is conflict-ridden. The management of conflict through consociational efforts happens both in post conflict societies and in plural societies that have not experienced conflict. The application of consociationalism does not have to be as a result of conflict per se, however consociational democracy may be applicable in any plural society where lack of cooperation is apparent. According to Lijphart (1969:211-212), “The leaders of the rival subcultures may engage in competitive behavior and thus further aggravate mutual tensions and political instability, but they

may also make deliberate efforts to counteract the immobilizing and unstabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation”. Therefore, there is also a high degree of conflict management and peace sustainability in a consociational democracy which create and paves way for development. The overarching cooperation at the elite level may as Claude Ake (1967:113) states, “achieve a degree of political stability quite out of proportion to its social homogeneity”.

There is a strong interconnection between conflict and development. For instance “current links between development and conflict theory stress the provision of aid in cases of violent conflict, peace building intervention after violent conflict address the same concerns as development interventions” (Barnbanti 2004). Consociational democracy also has a better capacity to handle post conflict disputes and division in plural societies. The avoidance of conflict in plural societies is crucial: democracy, especially liberal democracy, is much more prone to conflict than a consociational arrangement. Disputes arising from elections have in many countries, especially in Africa, been a worrying trend. It comes not as a surprise therefore, that Africa is haunted by a slow developmental pace characterized by poverty, escalating inequality and unemployment. For example, election-related violent conflict has been seen in countries such as Kenya (2007-2008 elections), the 2003 Federal and States elections in Nigeria and during the August 2007 run-off elections in Sierra Leone. According to Lijphart, it is exactly this competitive political process that should be avoided in plural societies. “Political contests in severely fragmented societies are indeed not likely to be “good games”” (Lijphart1969:215). Lijphart further argues that “...the anxieties and hostilities attending the political process may be countered by removing its competitive features as much as possible” (Lijphart 1969: 216). Hence, one of the merits of consociational democracy is that it is the political system which has the highest probability of

instituting durable peace which may in turn bring about development both in post conflict societies and in societies that have not experience conflict.

### **3.6 Criticisms of Consociational Democracy**

#### **3.6.1 Consociationalism is anti-democratic**

One of the common criticisms of consociational democracy is its anti-democratic nature. Consociationalism does not fully embrace democracy because if the existence of a strong opposition is a crucial ingredient of democracy, then consociational democracy is in essence less democratic than the liberal model. Lijphart admits that “grand coalition government necessarily entails either a relatively small and weak opposition or the absence of any formal opposition in the legislature” (Lijphart 1977:47). Prominent critics of consociationalism’s undemocratic nature including Courtney Jung and Ian Shapiro have argued that “a healthy democracy requires opposition, and power-sharing arrangements simply do not allow for this” (Jung and Shapiro 1995:273). Consociational democracy therefore does not seek to bring about a strong opposition which strengthens democratic values. As a result of a less democratic state with a weak opposition, a state may experience hindrances in achieving development. This is because less democratic states may also affect the level of participation towards community needs. The lack of participation in turn is likely to contribute negatively towards the relationship between the government and the people. Such a relationship is important since it determines the way in which development would be perceived by the community. Theron 2009 in Davids et al (2009: 109) states that “the nature of the relationship between the change agent and the beneficiary of development remains the crux of the matter regarding the outcomes of development”. The link between a strong democratic government, participation and development can therefore not be overlooked. While Courtney Jung

and Ian Sharipo (1995) have supported the notion that the anti-democratic nature of consociationalism does not necessarily account for the underdevelopment of states, however it is worth noting that society should be the initiators, owners and contributors of development. While that may be the case in some countries, however most African countries have suffered severe poverty and inequality as a result of democratic deficit and lack of full participation of the citizenry in decision making. Development should take into account those that are supposed to benefit from it, it should, especially be driven by both individuals and groups in a society. Burkey (1993:48) notes that “Development involves changes in the awareness, motivation and behaviour of individuals and in the relation between individuals as well as between groups within society. These changes must come from within the individuals and groups, and cannot be imposed from the outside”. Thus, Lijphart’s consociational theory, does not seem to fully embrace democracy and emphasize the importance of individual participation, particularly in supporting advocating for a strong opposition as a crucial ingredient of democracy. Therefore such a critique of consociationalism underestimates and undermines the argument on the importance of democracy, particularly the representation aspect of the concept.

### **3.6.2 Consociationalism solidifies underlying conflict cleavages**

Consociationalism emphasizes the cooperation and compromise of representatives from each community and that “decision-making power in the legislature should be formally shared between the competing community groups” (Garry 2009: 458). Competing groups are therefore likely to compromise not only on political issues and their differences but also on issues pertaining to the development of their various segments. Critics have noted that since such an institutional arrangement is strictly based on conflict division and the accommodation of competing groups,

“this conflict division is re-enforced and rendered all important. The institutional arrangements effectively, and very unfortunately, solidify the underlying conflict cleavage and prohibit the emergence of other political cleavages” (Garry 2009: 458). In such instances, critics have therefore argued that ‘ethnic outbidding’ is likely to be the result of such party competitions in each community. In such communities, there will be a high likelihood of relatively “extreme parties who will seek to maintain and electorally benefit from, uncompromising hardline positions” (ibid). As a result, the contest between moderate and militant parties will be mainly characterized by conflict cleavages. In the future this could mean conflict could be entirely the result of ethnic power struggles and less about other plural society cleavage such as ideology, religion or class.

### **3.6.3 Consociationalism is elitist**

Consociationalism has also been criticized for its elitist nature. Critics argue that Lijphart has left open the possibility that political parties are responsible for the recruitment of contenders for an election. In such cases, the connection between the electors and the elected is not visible and nor do elite opinions necessarily represent the people’s needs. This criticism cannot be divorced from development. Despite elites having a disproportionate impact on development outcome, the relationship between elites and development cannot be underestimated. The role of elites in consociational democracy focuses on ensuring cooperation of different segments and representing the different segments of society in an effort to enhance the live hoods of the community. As stated earlier on the chapter, cooperation paves way for development since an unstable society cannot effectively deliver development outcomes. Lijphart’s emphasis on the elite does not always translate to practical cooperation and the success of development. It is worth nothing though, that certain assumption can be draw about elite capacity and their role towards development. Mainly,

the argument assumes that elites by their very nature do not represent the people's needs because of the perceived invisible connection between the elected and the electors. As a result, the argument assumes that elites cannot play a significant role towards development.

Consociational democracy has also been thought of as elitist because different leaders are responsible for representing their segments in a plural society. Kieve argues that Lijphart's concept of consociationalism lacks a fundamental element, hence it is basically flawed. According to Kieve (quoted in Mackova 2009:19), "the first and final variable determining segmental divisions, elite behavior, political stability and their mutual influence is the society's class structure". Kieve's view addresses the elite challenges from a Marxist point of view<sup>44</sup>. He seems to see no difference between elite bargaining in a consociational system and elite competition in a majoritarian system: "what it is all about anyway for elite – is exchanging (bargaining) or winning power and retaining a leadership position. Only a consociational system tends to maintain segmental division which secures their ruling position" (Kieve quoted in Mackova 2009: 18).

Other scholars such as Rudy Andeweg and Horowitz, have "pointed to the fact that elites themselves are rather talented in fostering and encouraging tensions between groups, which they then exploit to mobilize the population for political or other purposes" (Mackova 2009: 19). As a result, Lijphart has been criticized for failing to recognize that such elites may in fact fuel tensions and "motivation for violence may be stronger than any incentive for moderation" (Mackova 2009:19). Horowitz has referred to the consociational model as a 'myth' because it expects elites to cooperate without giving them the incentive to do so. Elites are also not motivated to construct

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<sup>44</sup> See Keive (1981), *Pillars of Sand: A Marxist Critique of Consociational Democracy in the Netherlands (1981)*.

strong majority parties; instead, the conditions in consociational democracies allow for further division: hence society or the political arena becomes more fragmented. Horowitz, therefore, believes that elites in a consociational democracy are more likely to slow down political processes “and lead to deadlock rather than solutions” (Mackova 2009:19).

### **3.7 Consociational Discourses in Africa**

Prior to the 1990s, experts in African politics and consociational democratization scholars expected African countries to be continuously under one party state, military or authoritarian rule. However, for the past 15 years, power sharing<sup>45</sup> institutions have attracted a number of countries in Africa, specifically “to deal with division at large, and enable opposing parties to share political power along with the economic and military oppositions that stem from such oppositions” (Remond 2015). This was motivated by the idea that simply cooperating through power sharing mechanism is better an option than the costs attached to wars and national disputes. Cooperation between different segments therefore has contributed to the improvement of development in countries that have been constantly haunted by national disputes, wars and political violence. Likewise, the cost of not cooperating negatively contributes towards the underdevelopment of countries causing them to spend millions of dollars in reconstructions. Even though in some cases the costs of cooperating are costly themselves, African countries still prefer to share power in the name of unity. As Rothchild (2005:9) states “African governments have found that signalling a willingness to collaborate with insurgents in national reconciliation governments is costly but

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<sup>45</sup> Timothy Sisk defines power-sharing as “a set of principles that, when carried out through practices and institutions, provide every significant identity group or segment in a society representation and decision-making abilities on common issues and a degree of autonomy over issues of importance to the group”. See Sisk (1996), p.5.

acceptable in order to maintain their country as a single entity”. The application of consociationalism in some parts of Africa has not always yielded positive results. However, in instances where the institutions have been established to fight against the possibility of majority tyranny, consociationalism has been the foundation of democracy and respect for human rights and it has in turn provided firm grounds for the success of development.

South Africa is an example of a country which yielded positive results in its application of consociationalism (power-sharing). Despite efforts in infrastructural investment in South Africa (post -1994), South Africa did not have to specifically develop much of her infrastructure as a result of a physically damaged landscape during the violence in early 90s. “Clearly, development is at the core of post-conflict interventions, where the physical and social landscape has been damaged. In such cases, development assistance is provided” (Barbanti 2004). The pluralistic nature of South Africa created a platform for minority representation through segmental autonomy and proportional representation. The leadership and cooperation of the two leaders, (Mandela and FW de Klerk) was also helpful in setting out a stage for development in South Africa. As Welsh (2004:7) states, “South Africa was fortunate to have people of the calibre of Nelson Mandela and F.W de Klerk in pivotal roles during the tempestuous time of transition”. Referring to Mandela and de Klerk, Welsh further notes that “Despite ferocious disagreements at regular intervals, never lost sight of their mutual interdependence as leaders of the only organization that could take the country into a settlement. Equally important, especially in the de Klerk’s case, was their ability to keep their constituencies in line” (Welsh 2004:7). As a result 1994 saw the new South Africa, led by the African National Congress (ANC), resorting to a constitution which implicitly contained elements of consociationalism.

As stated earlier, the successes and failures of consociationalism vary from one country to another. In some states, consociational democracy does not last for a long period of time, in others it becomes vague in nature while in other countries it is sustained for much longer periods. Despite these dependent instances, consociationalism creates a conducive environment for development to take place. Unstable societies engulfed by violence and internal divisions cannot bring about legitimate systems that will pave way for development. Consociationalism therefore, “can help put an end to violence and provide a stable ground for the building of a legitimate system that accounts for identity and prevents it from becoming a source of conflict or be capitalized upon for greedy ends”(Remond 2015). Referring to Rwanda and South Africa for example, Traniello (2008) highlights some of the different factors that may have contributed towards the difference in experiences during both countries’ political transition. Traniello (2008:29) states that, “South Africa has been deemed the miracle transition and a possible model, from which other divided societies can learn, Rwanda on the other hand, represented the opposite extreme: a tragedy we must learn to prevent”. Traniello (2008:38) further contends that, “If South Africa is the ideal model possessing all the necessary conditions for power-sharing to thrive, then Rwanda represent the worst case scenario that played into almost every criticism for the concept”. Traniello focusses on the lack of certain factors that may have contributed to the failure of the Arusha accord in Rwanda. He states that, “the power-sharing settlement, the Arusha Accords, failed to mitigate violence because it lacked such necessary factors as an able and committed leadership, shared destiny and the will to accommodate”. (Traniello 2008:38)

Uzodike points out that “after 40 years of political independence; African states continue to grapple with many problems, not least political conflict”. Emphasising that Africa is “the world’s

most conflict-ridden region” (Uzodike 2004:297), he makes a convincing case for consociational democracy as distinct from majoritarian democracy. He asserts that:

Given the context of African political processes and organizations as well as the severe structural segmentation of many of its countries, it seems reasonable to work towards fashioning an instrument of governance that has the right ingredients for cushioning cultural cleavages while creating an enabling environment within which political and economic development can occur (Uzodike 2004:288).

Uzodike’s idea is that the consociational model or power-sharing can act as a useful formula for addressing Africa’s societal segmentation and the challenges that hinder development. It is no doubt that Uzodike’s assertion links power-sharing to development. African countries have been constantly rampaged by conflict, corruption and general societal and political challenges. As a result development has been difficult to achieve. The application of consociationalism in such conflict ridden countries enable segments to leave in harmony as they are able to respect the cultures and traditions of one another. As a result, an enabling environment for development is created.

Rene Lemarchand, a well-known Africanist, draws concrete examples from consociational experiments in strife-ridden African countries. While Lemarchand concedes that power-sharing agreements have generally failed in Africa, he nonetheless contends that the failure of power-sharing in Africa does not necessarily mean that there is no more space for the application of consociationalism. Lemarchand (2006:2) states: “Although power-sharing experiments in Africa have generally failed, this does not necessarily invalidate the case for consociationalism. What it does is to bring to light the obstacles involved in the passage from theory to practice”. Likewise,

the success of development in Africa will be purely be determined by the willingness of the elite's cooperation.

Lemarchand uses the terms 'consociationalism' and 'power-sharing' inter-changeably for the purposes of his discussion. He regards Burundi's case as a unique one that offers a more fruitful understanding of an ideal consociational polity. "Neither Rwanda nor the DRC comes anywhere near a comparable achievement. Whatever moves were made in the direction of power-sharing can best be seen as efforts at co-optation, dictated by expediency" (Lemarchand 2006: 4). One of the main reasons for Lemarchand's claim that power-sharing agreement or consociationalism has failed in Africa is that he believes that instead of bringing genuine peace between rivals in Africa, it has instead perpetrated violence. However, explaining Burundi's success as an exception, Lemarchand explains as follows; "Burundi explicitly recognises ethnic differences as a necessary condition to reconcile minority rights with the claims of the majority. The aim is to strike an appropriate balance between Hutu and Tutsi in the executive and legislature organs of government and in the communal councils." (Lemarchand 2006:7). As such, this is an important step towards setting a stage for development. A divided society cannot be conducive in efforts made towards the application of development. Despite Burundi being one of the poor countries in Africa, the country was able to take advantage of the consociational approach in crawling towards development. According to Lemarchand (2006:7), "This is as close as any African state has come to implementing Lijphart's consociational formula".

In Rwanda and DRC, on the other hand, a fatal flaw is apparent, namely that, "Where opportunism is the main reason for sharing power and amounts to a mere tactical retreat from the battle, the chances of success are virtually nil" (Lemarchand 2006:19). In Rwanda alone, "The two ethnic

groups are actually very similar - they speak the same language, inhabit the same areas and follow the same traditions...” (BBC, 2008). What further perpetrated the division was that the colonial powers classified the “Rwandans into one of the two ethnic identities and obligating them to carry out ethnic identity cards” (Traniello 2008:37). Taking into account the extent of the violence that took place in Rwanda (Rwandan Genocide), one is predisposed to regard Rwanda as a worst case scenario in regard to its power-sharing application. According to the BBC (2008), in 1959, “resentment among the Hutus gradually built up, culminating in a series of riots. More than 20,000 Tutsis were killed, and many more fled to the neighboring countries of Burundi, Tanzania and Uganda”.

### **3.8 Liberal Democracy and Consociational Democracy Compared**

In drawing a comparison between the two models of democracy, it is necessary to take into account some of the core elements of liberal democracy – individual rights and liberties. While comparing the two types of democracies, a distinction will be made between classical liberalism and new liberalism in comparison. The idea is to show that there are weaknesses inherent in liberal democracy, especially within the classical liberal school when compared to consociationalism. After all, the link between the two systems lies mainly on the representation or incorporation of minority segments of society in the political process. Welsh (2004:6) notes, “The debate about improving the quality of liberal democracies extends to the difficult question of how racial/ethnic minorities in divided societies can be incorporated in such a way that their rights are respected and they are not marginalized in the political process”.

### **3.8.1 on human freedom, individualism and collectivism.**

Some scholars have argued that consociationalism does not deal with issues of human freedom. For example, McGarry (2001:47) has argued that “consociationalism fails to see society as an active subject, it does not fully confront the question of human freedom and action. Consociationalism limits understanding and the potential for people to create their own future...” One would argue, therefore, that freedom is more visible when both the individual and the collective are taken into account, unlike in classical liberalism where the emphasis is entirely on personal liberty without recognition of the ‘collective’. It is therefore deducible that liberal democracy, especially classical liberalism, does not take into account the existence of community based issues of common concern or issues that may affect the whole community rather than just an individual. Its claim that real freedom should be based on freedom from coercion (government) and thus it shuns the idea of seeing the individual as belonging to a communal setting. Likewise, New Liberalism places little emphasis on the collective. Therefore, consociationalism appears to play an accommodative role with regard to both the freedom of the individual and the collective society at large. In this way, collective participation and the recognition of the individual improves the chances of bringing about development to a greater extent than does an emphasis on liberty and individualism.

### **3.8.2 On equality**

The notion of equality is another arena of contrast between liberal democracy and consociationalism. In liberal democracy, equality exists more in theory than in practice. Dahl (2000) in his book *On Democracy* questions the idea of viewing equality as an obvious and realistic

phenomenon. He advocates viewing equality rather from a moral standpoint than viewing it as a self-evident phenomenon. Specifically referring to political equality, Dahl (2000:64-65) contends that: “To understand why it is reasonable to commit ourselves to political equality among citizens of a democratic state, we need to recognize that sometimes when we talk about equality we do not mean to express a factual judgment”.

With specific reference to classical liberalism, there is little emphasis on the importance of equality. For example, classical liberalism’s belief that an economic system must be based on private property is problematic with regard to the attainment of equality in a society. The new liberals, on the other hand, believes that private property will ultimately lead to inequality of power which will in turn create an unstable society. Lichtman (1969) has affirmed that: “Liberal democratic theory is the ideological expression of capitalism. Its paramount function is to justify the distribution of property and power which permits a minority of men to exploit and dominate the lives of the majority”. In light of its close ties to capitalism, the challenges encountered by liberal democracy in laying out a convincing case for equality are scarcely surprising. One can note, however, that new liberalism’s approach to equality is an improvement on classical liberalism’s weak if not non- existent approach.

Consociationalism, on the other hand, appears to have a plausible approach to equality, as indicated by the conceptual definition of the term ‘consociation’. As noted earlier in this chapter, consociationalism has been criticized for falling short of the democratic trinity of liberty, equality and fraternity<sup>46</sup> and of not being able to achieve democratic equality. However, Lijphart disputes

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<sup>46</sup> Quoted from Arend Lijphart (Democracy in Plural Societies) pg. 48

the claim that both segmental isolation and autonomy can be obstacles to equality<sup>47</sup>. “On the other hand, segmental separateness is not at all incompatible with segmental equality” (Lijphart 1977:49)<sup>48</sup>. Given that consociationalism intends to implement a system of cooperation in divided societies, whilst also addressing the importance of accommodation for a stable society, it can be deduced that consociationalism perceives equality as an important trait that contributes not only to political stability but also to development as a whole.

Another justification for the consociational approach to equality is founded on two other core elements of consociationalism, namely, grand coalition and proportionality. Firstly, grand coalition bring about equality in that those involved in leadership share executive power among representatives of all major groups. According to Lijphart (1977:36) “participation in a grand coalition offers important political protection for minority segments”. Secondly, by ensuring that important institutions, public offices and significant resources are shared through proportionality, different communities and individuals are likely to feel equally represented. The element of proportionality also ensures that neutrality, in its capacity as a crucial element of equality, is achieved. As Lijphart puts it, “Proportionality, as neutral and impartial standard of allocation, removes a large number of potentially divisive problems from the decision-making process and this lightens the burdens of consociational governments” (Lijphart 1977:40).

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<sup>47</sup> : As elucidated by Cameron and Hofferbert (1974), who according to Lijphart have stated that “Regional inequalities tend to be greater in federally organized democracies than in unitary ones,, and among sovereign states than within federal ones”. Such a claim emanates from the argument that both segmental isolation and autonomy can be hindrances in attaining equality in a society.

<sup>48</sup> Lijphart makes an example that the Catholics, Calvinist, and Socialist subcultures and their organizations in the Netherlands are often described as emancipation movements, and they have by and large achieved their goals of a full and equal role in Dutch national life within the framework of consociational democracy. Separation may tend toward, but does not inherently lead to inequality. (see Lijphart 1977:49)

### 3.8.3 Electoral system and autonomy

Powell cites two constitutional features that determine whether a democracy can be regarded as majoritarian (liberal) or proportional (consociational), namely, the electoral system and the legislative. Firstly, with regard to the electoral system, proportional democracy promotes multipartism, particularly a “proportional electoral system with large district magnitudes” (Mainwaring 2001:173). In a majoritarian model, on the other hand, the opposite is true. A low district magnitude is preferable as it increases the possibility of single party winning a majority in the legislature. Secondly, the legislature give the parliamentary majority more- or- less unfettered capacity to implement its policies in majoritarian democracies. By contrast, in proportional democracy the rules of the legislative “favors the dispensation of power and enhance the opposition’s influence” (Mainwaring 2001:173).

Moreover, majoritarian democracies often have the first past the post electoral (FPTP) system whereby the government is centralized and unitary<sup>49</sup>, there are only two major political parties, there is a single party cabinet and the legislative. For example, the United Kingdom falls under majoritarian democracies, whereas countries such as Switzerland and Belgium may be referred to as consociational democracies. According to Mainwaring (2001:170) “such countries are characterized by most or all of the following: proportional electoral system with multimember districts, more than two major parties, coalition cabinets, bicameralism, and decentralized or federal political systems”.

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<sup>49</sup> The understanding of centralized and unitary system is in accordance with Lijphart who noted that these unitary and centralised system means that there are no clearly designated geographical and function areas from which the parliamentary majority and the cabinet are barred. – see Lijphart 1984, *Democracies: patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-Once Countries*. Pg 8

In this way power is proportionally divided through coalition cabinets. There is also a greater sense of autonomy in various districts which grants citizens a level of independence and self-reliance. Not only does such independence and self-reliance grant communities the right to practice their culture, language and religious autonomy (as issues of common concern) but it also enables them to independently elect their own leadership which is responsible for the welfare of citizens. Moreover, because consociational democracy works better in smaller countries than in larger ones, communities in the regions are likely to receive much attention from government. This is not unlike the new liberal approach which regards government intervention as a necessary aspect of a free and stable society. By contrast, classical liberalism advocates minimal government intervention and also opposes a welfare state. Even though the government may intervene only on issues involving liberty and property rights in classical liberalism, consociational democracy is a more plausible vehicle for development than liberal democracy (of both the classical and the new varieties), not only because of its decentralization elements or its federal features but also because of its full representation of various groups in the society which enhances opportunities for development.

#### **3.8.4 Power decentralization and representation**

As noted earlier, one of the core differences between liberal democracy and consociational democracy is that liberal democracy places greater emphasis on majority rule. Additionally, liberal democracy is mainly based on a concentration of power. As a result, it is likely that liberal democracy will create sharp divisions between those who hold power and those who do not. Consociational democracy, on the other hand, emphasizes democracy as a system that needs to represent as many citizens as possible. It advocates the distribution of power in a way which

ensures that the majority does not govern autonomously despite the presence of a central government. Consequently, the distribution of power in consociational democracies enables cooperation and collective decision making, thus reducing the likelihood of sharp divisions between rulers and ruled. Further, there is a surety on checks and balances which limits power invested in the central government and simultaneously provides full representation of all parties involved. A collective decision making process enables citizens to collectively bring about a single paradigm of development based on direct participation of the citizenry.

### **3.8.5 Participation and policy influence.**

The collective decision making exercise through participation is closely linked to elections as an instrument of democracy. Elections and voter turnout are also good indicators of democratic equality. Lijphart believes that there are two reasons why voter turnout is an excellent indicator of democratic quality. Firstly, “it shows the extent to which citizens are actually interested in being represented” (Lijphart 1999:284). Secondly, a low turnout means unequal participation and therefore more inequality while high turnout means greater political equality as a result of more equal participation. Therefore, the extent to which citizens participate in a particular model of democracy is crucial in analyzing the quality of that democracy. According to the majoritarian model, citizens choose between two identifiable parties or coalitions; the winner then gets more or less unencumbered power to rule. According to Mainwaring (2001:173), “Responsibility for government policy is clear, and citizens influence policy by choosing between two distinct options”.

On the other hand, advocates of ‘consensus democracy’<sup>50</sup> believe that not only the majority should influence policy; but rather, all citizens should influence policy. The preferences of the minority should be taken into account and the majority should be subjected to greater checks and balances. Challenging the majoritarian rule, Sir Arthur Lewis, a Nobel Prize-winning economist (quoted in Lijphart 1984:21) argues that “majority rule and the government-versus-opposition pattern of government...[m]ay be interpreted as undemocratic because they are principles of exclusion”. Lewis states that the primary meaning of democracy is that “all who are affected by a decision should have the chance to participate in making that decision, either directly or through chosen representatives”. The inclusion of the minority in influencing policy creates a recognition of freedoms for all, especially political freedoms where not only the majority influences policy but also the minority as well.

### **3.9 Development And Consociationalism - Claude Ake’s Approach**

Using Claude Ake development approach, this section draws a link between consociationalism and development. It specifically deals with the weaknesses found in Lijphart’s version of consociationalism in order to propose a better hybrid consociational approach. Despite Lijphart’s consociational approach being closer to an African driven development paradigm than the liberal approach, it has some weaknesses worth addressing. Since neither the liberal approach nor Lijphart’s consociational approach have fully been able to bring about a paradigm that effectively addresses challenges of development, there is a need for a paradigm shift with regard to an appropriate paradigm of development relevant for Africa’s.

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<sup>50</sup> Mainwaring (2001) also refers to consensus democracy as ‘proportional conception of democracy’.

The link between democracy and development is not new amongst thinkers and scholars of democracy and development. As Nyong'o highlights, there is a strong link between democracy and development in Africa.

[Q]uestions of development and problems of economic crises cannot therefore be meaningfully discussed without discussing problems regarding the nature of state power, the form of popular participation in the processes of government and the question therefore, of democracy (Nyong'o 1990, 360).

Claude Ake is among the scholars who devoted much of his research to investigating linkages between democracy and development (Ake 1993a, 1993b, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2001). According to Ake (quoted in Obi 2008:14), "Development therefore was a political project, but more fundamentally, it was a democratic project." Ake refers to the process of linking development and democracy as the "democratization of development and the development of democracy" (Ake 2000: 87-88). Among the key factors in the success of this kind of development are the direct participation of people, and a system designed in such a way that it is inclusive in nature. Ake's view highlights the importance of people as the agents of social development in Africa; consequently, he advocates a democracy that is relevant for the African people. Accordingly it should "emphasize the decentralization of power, local autonomy and a consociational arrangement in which government would be *a coalition of the* authentic leaders of social groups" (Ake 2000:184-192; 2001:132. Emphasis added).

Evidently, Ake's view of an Africa-relevant democracy is much closer to the consociational model than it is to the dominant liberal model. Even though Lijphart's consociational approach draws less emphasis on a people-driven kind of democracy, Ake on the other hand addresses this

weakness by the emphasizing a people driven kind of democracy. This kind of democracy, he argues, will empower people since “everyone would participate as part of an interconnected whole in promoting the common good” (Ake 2000: 184). Ake’s thesis is in line with the bottom-up “grass roots” approach to development, whereby people are uplifted from poverty and are helped to help themselves. This kind of approach to development is contrary to Lijphart’s, which reflects more of a top-down approach to development, since the elites are perceived to be representing the people, with less direct participation from the people themselves. To this extent, his the bottom-up approach is congruent with new liberalism’s assertion that government’s intervention is necessary for a free and stable society, especially with regard to social policy measures, economic oversight and welfare legislation. As Ake emphasizes, a democracy which concerns itself with the improvement of people’s overall well-being and standards of living should be characterized by the effective participation of the people in developmental policies.

We therefore have no doubt that at the heart of Africa’s development objectives must lie the ultimate and overriding good of human centered development that ensures the overall well-being of the people through sustained improvement in their living standards and the full and effective participation of the people in charting their development policies. (Ake 1996:136)

The consequentiality of ascertaining a better life through development has withal received much attention from Amartya Sen (1988) whose cerebrating is akin to Ake’s. Sen’s focus is mainly on the importance of taking into account the well-being of and a better life for the people. Sen did not believe that assessing the success of development can be “a matter only of quantification of the means of that achievement” (Sen 1988:15). Rather, the actual achievements themselves are the measure of development. Sen (1988:15) states that “the assessment of development has to go well beyond GNP information, even when the other difficulties...(such as distributional variation,

presence of externalities and non-marketability, imperfect mechanism, etc.) were somehow overcome”. Sen further states that “insofar as development is concerned with the achievement of a better life, the focus of development analysis has to include the nature of the life that people succeed in living” (Sen 1988:15). Paramount amongst the indicators of development should be the freedom to choose. For some developmental capabilities, the main input will be financial resources and economic production. On the other hand, for others it can also be political practices, such as the effective guaranteeing and protection of freedom of thought, religion or political participation; or social and cultural practices, social structures, social institutions, public goods, social norms, traditions and habits. For Sen as well as for Ake, the developmental endeavors are further strengthened by political participation which enables people to define their own development.

### **3.9.1 Liberal democracy and the challenges of development in Africa.**

Given its universalizing tendencies, Liberal democracy, does not seek to provide a solid base for an appropriate African paradigm of development that takes into consideration socially grounded norms. Moreover, given its market-oriented policies, liberal democracy has privatized the state. According to Ake, “being privatized, the so called state is not able to rise above the struggles and conflicts of contending social groups. It becomes a contested terrain where contending parties vie for the appropriation of resources, including the power of the state” (Ake 1996:129). As a result of the struggle for power, the state is characterized by political competition, self-aggrandizement, and a detour from a development agenda that considers those who most need to benefit from it. Self-seeking individuals find themselves in intense political competition, “in which the stakes are so high that the situation is essentially lawless; politics is basically warfare, or at best anarchy of dedicated self-seeking” (Ake 1996:129). In light of Ake’s analysis of Africa’s political defects, a

liberal democracy which ignores crucial factors such as a full participation of citizens, and which fails to see the people not only as the end of development but also the agents and the means, does not seem to be a suitable developmental paradigm. If the people's participation is not taken into account, then liberal democracy only seeks to dictate what the people need instead of allowing people to exercise their capabilities and choose their own wants and needs.

Another aspect of Ake's criticism is that democracy has been relegated to "a crude simplicity of multiparty elections to the benefit of some of the world's most notorious autocrats..." (Ake 1996:30). Sankatsing (2004: 6) states, "'electorate' is not the equivalent of 'people', and does not even represent any meaningful social force or social group. The electorate is an amorphous aggregate of individuals, delinked from social ties, social contexts and social networks, which lacks any meaningful existence outside the ballot". Hence a democracy primarily characterized by multiparty elections does not offer much to Africa and does not bring about emancipation. Even though people are guaranteed rights to exercise, the extent to which they can fully exercise their rights is questionable. As Ake (1996:5-6) succinctly puts it: "This type of democracy is not in the least emancipatory especially in African conditions because it offers the people rights they cannot exercise, voting that never amounts to choosing, freedom which is patently spurious, and political equality which disguises highly unequal power relations".

The North's interest in economic policy reform rather than democracy has also been identified as a hindrance to Africa's development. The North appears to show genuine care for the African continent when in actual fact "it is promoting structural adjustment in ways that tends to reinforce political authoritarianism" (Ake 1996:131). Moreover: "Insofar as the North is interested in

democracy, it promotes a kind of democracy whose relevance to Africa is problematic at best and at worst prone to engender contradictions that tend to derail or trivialize democratization “(Ake 1996:131). Underdevelopment therefore can be said to be a result of political or economic intentions pursued by the North that do not seek to directly address Africa’s various developmental needs.

### **3.10 Ake’s Development Approach for Africa**

In laying out his development paradigm for Africa, Ake problematizes the way in which scholars and agents of development have attempted to solve problems of development in Africa. Such scholars and agents are often tempted to provide ideologically derived answers to already unclear problems of development. In addressing this conundrum, Ake explains what the problem is and what it is not; he goes on to give an understanding of what the problem entails.

- Development is not economic growth even though economic growth in large measure determines its possibility. A development paradigm cannot therefore be judged merely by its conduciveness to economic growth, although its criterion of judgment is not irrelevant to its validity.
- Development is not a project but a process
- Development is the process by which people create and recreate themselves and their life circumstances to realize higher levels of civilization in accordance with their own choices and values.
- Development is something that people must do for themselves, although it can be facilitated by the help of others. If people are the end of development, as is the case, they are also necessarily its agent and its means.
- Africa and the global environment are to be taken as they are and not as they ought to be. What the paradigm contributes is some idea of what they can be (Ake 1996:125).

Ake believes that it is in the context of democratic politics that an African development paradigm can develop. The dominant liberal paradigm of development only focuses on the people as (nominally) the end of development whereas Ake argues that people need to be the sole drivers of the developmental machinery, that is, they need to be the agents and the means of development and not only the end. The people's decision making power is an important aspect to take into account for an appropriate paradigm of development in Africa. Only when people are the agents, means and end of development will their well-being be the supreme law of development. This means only when people have some decision making power that their well-being will be the supreme law of development. As Ake puts it "the only one way to ensure that social transformation is not dissociated from the well-being of the people is to institute democracy" (Ake 1996:127).

Elaborating one of the assumptions of an African development paradigm, Ake points out that there is a growing tendency to conflate development and economic growth. People often refer to authoritarian countries such as South Korea as impressive achievers of development. Referring to the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) in Asia, Ake believes that adhering to certain democratic principles has been one of the main contributing factors in the development of these countries. He refers to such factors as those that are "usually associated with democratic polity but that may also occur in a more rudimentary form in nondemocratic polities" (Ake 1996:128).

Ake therefore suggests that it is pointless to compare African experiences with the experiences of other countries, especially East Asian countries. This, according to Nnaemeka, is because "In most of sub-Saharan Africa, unlike East Asia, the state is not only very rudimentary, if it can be said to exist at all, but was also displaced by colonialism" (Nnaemeka 2009:43). In explaining how this

came about, Ake (1996:129) states that, “in the course of its violent assault on indigenous society directed loyalties to primary groups, and also by the state-building project of the post-independence era, which was almost as coercive as the colonial state-building project and had roughly the same effect”. It unleashes powerful centrifugal forces that render the polity incoherent and unable to establish a common purpose, including a development project, and to pursue it effectively”.

In highlighting Ake’s paradigm of Africa’s development, and having discussed the unsuitability of the liberal democratic paradigm and the weaknesses inherent in Lijphart’s consociationalism, this study argues in favour of adopting Ake’s four characteristics of a relevant democratic-developmental model for African countries.

1. A democracy in which people have some real decision-making power over and above the formal consent of electoral choice.<sup>51</sup> (Ake 1996:132).
2. A social democracy that places emphasis on concrete political, social and economic rights, as opposed to liberal democracy that emphasizes abstract political rights. It will be a social democracy that invests heavily in the improvement of people’s health, education, and capacity so they can participate effectively (Ake 1996:132).
3. A democracy that puts as much emphasis on collective rights as it does on individual rights. It will have to recognize nationalities, sub nationalities, ethnic groups, and communities as social formations that express freedom and self-realization and will have to grant them rights to cultural expression and political and economic participation.<sup>52</sup>(Ake 1996:132).

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<sup>51</sup>This will entail, among other things, a powerful legislature, decentralization of power to local democratic formation, and considerable emphasis on the development of institutions for the aggregation and articulation of interests (Ake 1996:132).

<sup>52</sup> This could mean for instance, a second legislative chamber, a “ chamber of nationalities, “ with considerable power in which all nationalities irrespective of their numeric strength are equal. It could mean a consociational arrangement, not only at the national level but even at regional and community levels. It will also entail such arrangements as PR and an electoral –spread formula like the one used in Nigeria, by which a party must secure a stipulated minimum percentage of votes over a large part of the country to win (Ake 1996:132).

4. A democracy of incorporation. To be as inclusive as possible, the legislative bodies should in addition to nationality groups have special representation of mass organizations, especially youth, the labor movement, and women's group, which are usually marginalized but without whose active participation there is unlikely to be democracy or development (Ake 1996:132).

In achieving the above principles, there is a need to adopt four key values in the pursuit of development. These values as advocated by Ake are: a popular development strategy; self-reliance; empowerment and confidence and self-realization rather than alienation. By *A popular development strategy* Ake means that there is a need to ensure that the people are the agents, the means and the ends of development<sup>53</sup>. *Self-reliance* on the other hand means that development needs to be experienced as participation in the process of bringing it about instead of receiving it. It is only when self-reliance is embraced that a real developmental revolution will be seen<sup>54</sup>. Linked to self-reliance is the value of *empowerment and confidence*. Self-reliance requires confidence. In order to be able to pursue development as Africans, "the development strategy for Africa will also have to be a strategy for incremental improvement of capabilities and self-esteem at all levels of society" (Ake 1996:141). It is therefore important that Africans are empowered in order to facilitate a successful African development agenda. Lastly, Ake believes that for a proper development strategy to be a success, *self-realization rather than alienation* is a necessity. He argues that "if the people possess their own development, the development process will not turn into an exercise in alienation, as has been the case in much of Africa" (Ake 1996:141). The current situation in Africa is that a strategy has been designed to specifically appropriate the people's

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<sup>53</sup> It is worth noting that this principle is the underpinning of all development policies; their mechanisms of implementation and the distribution of the benefits of development are fairly obvious – see Ake 1996:140.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid - Such self-reliance should be visible at all levels including the level of national policies and the relation between states, and must also spread to the levels of region, federal units where communities and households exists.

rights to develop themselves; this means that the objective primarily is to develop the people instead of empowering the people to develop themselves.

### **3.11 Conclusion**

In conclusion, the chapter has focused on arguing against liberal democracy as a suitable political mechanism for a relevant paradigm of development in Africa. Specifically, the chapter endeavored to address the weaknesses of liberal democracy using Lijphart's consociational formula. It has argued that Africa is unable to unleash its potential for bringing about development through the dominant liberal approach. The chapter has argued that consociational democracy stands a much better chance for a successes and relevant paradigm of development, not only at a national, provincial and local level but also at continental level at large. The chapter firstly considers Lijphart's theory of consociationalism in addressing the weaknesses of liberal democracy. In doing so, the chapter then noted the weaknesses in Lijphart's theory to which it proposed could be addressed or filled by Ake's approach to development. Using Ake's approach on development, the chapter has emphasized the importance of looking at development as a phenomenon that is based on social transformation rather than economic growth one that is people driven in which there is great emphasis on both the collective and individual recognition of different segments of society. Having compared and contrasted liberal democracy and consociationalism, the chapter has adopted a hybrid consociational approach for Africa's development as espoused by Ake, and advocated for a development strategy that takes people as they are and not as they ought to be. The chapter that follows refers specifically to South Africa as a case study. It discusses and analyses the already existing consociational elements in the country in an effort to demonstrate the applicability of consociational theory within the South African context.

## **CHAPTER FOUR: POWER-SHARING AGREEMENT & CONSOCIATIONALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA**

South Africa's current institutional design is in part similar to Lijphart's perception of consociationalism and is certainly closer to consociationalism than majoritarian democracy. Given South Africa's current demographic and paucity of democratic values, consociationalism is essential (Hooper 2008:7)

### **4.1 Introduction**

The chapter provides an analysis of the consociational model of democracy in South Africa. In an attempt to analyse the consociational elements in the South African polity, the chapter seeks to highlight some of the consociational elements that appear to be present in South Africa's democratic society. Despite the debate on whether South Africa is or was a consociational democracy after apartheid, it is important to pay attention to the degree in which coalition building and power sharing (as important facets of consociationalism) played an influential role in the promotion of consociational democracy. Drawing from the mediation efforts towards power-sharing in South Africa, the chapter focuses on the transition period and the negotiations that eventually led to power-sharing in South Africa. The idea is to highlight a historical view that eventually led to a transition from apartheid to a truly multiracial democratic South Africa. The chapter attempts to shed light on the existing consociational elements in South Africa in an effort to show that despite the debates in scholarly literature and, more generally, political commentary, it can be argued that South Africa still retains consociational features which may be more capable of bringing about a relevant development paradigm than the dominant liberal democratic approach.

## **4.2 Literature on Consociationalism in South Africa (The Transition Periods)**

South Africa's transition from apartheid rule to a democratic society took an unprecedented form. A transition characterised both by fields of violence and negotiation tables within different ethnic groupings. In forging a stable, democratic society, the consociational model was applied as a possible mechanism to avoid further political violence. In fact, "since its initial formulation in the late – 1960s consociationalism has led to a highly influential school of studies and consociational engineering has been marketed, particularly by Lijphart, as a genuine attractive option to address the seemingly intractable ethnic divisions of South Africa" (Taylor 1992:1).

There were a number of factors that played a role during the transition period in South Africa. The transition was an unprecedented event that saw many South Africans celebrate a new democratic dispensation after a long struggle under the oppression of white minority rule. Inman (2013:1) states that "South Africa's transition from apartheid to a truly multi-racial democracy stands as one of the significant events of the last century". Even though there were different stages of the political transition in South Africa, for example, the initial phase of the transition (1978-1989); the crucial phase of transition (1989-1991) and the maturity phase of the transition (1991-1994), the chapter focuses more on the crucial phase and the maturity phase. The motivation behind focusing on the final two phases of the transition is to trace the most recent elements of consociationalism (as they can mainly be traced in those phases) that may have contributed towards a power-sharing deal between the apartheid regime and black majority led by the African National Congress (ANC). Table 4.1 gives a brief summary of the framework for analysis of South Africa's transition to democracy.

**Table 4.1 Framework for the Analysis of South Africa's transition to Democracy**

<b>Initial phase of transition (1978-1989)</b>	<b>Crucial phase of transition (1989-1991)</b>	<b>Maturity phase of transition (1991-1994)</b>
<u>Macro-structural Factors</u> <b>Push, pull and status quo effect of:</b> Societal structures, cleavages and demography Political culture Economic development and crisis International context	<u>Macro-structural Factors</u> <b>Push, pull and status quo effect of:</b> Societal structures, cleavages and demography Political culture Economic development and crisis International context	<u>Macro-structural Factors</u> <b>Push, pull and status quo effect of:</b> Societal structures, cleavages and demography Political culture Economic development and crisis International context
<u>Actors</u> <b>Power, actions and decisions of main actors within and between the domains of:</b> State Political Society Civil Society	<u>Actors</u> <b>Power, actions and decisions of main actors within and between the domains of:</b> State Political Society Civil Society	<u>Actors</u> <b>Power, actions and decisions of main actors within and between the domains of:</b> State Political Society Civil Society
<u>Outcomes</u> Attempts at transition from above liberalization measures Rise of civil society mutual hurting stalemate	<u>Outcomes</u> Levelling of playing field Cross of threshold of democracy Pre-negotiating for negotiation Advent of multi-party negotiation	<u>Outcomes</u> Multi-party negotiations Negotiated outcomes and transition Process of democratization Choices for new institutions

Source: Sang-Hyun, Seo (2008:96)

#### 4.2.1 Crucial phase of transition (1989-1991)

In 1989 PW Botha resigned as president of South Africa. He was succeeded by Mr FW de Klerk whose leadership created possibilities for new initiatives and new processes of political change. It was during this period that South Africa's road to secret negotiations was paved. In his speech during the opening of parliament on 2 February 1990, Mr de Klerk stated that

I hope that this new Parliament will play a constructive part in both the prelude to negotiations and the negotiating process itself. I wish to ask all of you who identify yourselves with the broad aim of a new South Africa, and that is the overwhelming majority: Let us put petty politics aside when we discuss the future during this session. Help us build a broad consensus about the fundamentals of a new, realistic and democratic dispensation. Let us work together on a plan that will rid our country of suspicion and steer it away from domination and radicalism of any kind<sup>55</sup>.

It was during this phase that the National Peace Accord was implemented in September 1991. The introduction of the peace accord was preceded by pre-negotiations which facilitated the institutionalization of the commitment to peaceful talks which could see a cooperative change in the new rule structures amongst ruling elites. The commitment of the leaders to peace talks was an important trait of consociational and it contributed positively towards the eventual signing of the NPA. This is because for cooperation to be a success between segmental leaders, leaders must "feel at least some commitment to the maintenance of the unity of the country as well as a commitment to democratic practices. They must also have a basic willingness to engage in cooperative efforts with the leaders of other segments in a spirit of moderation and compromise"

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<sup>55</sup> See: <http://v1.sahistory.org.za/pages/governance-projects/constitution/doc16-fw-deklerk01.htm>

(Lijphart 1977:53). This is one of the favourable factors of which Lijphart refers to as “traditions of elite accommodation”.

Being a highly diverse society, South Africa was able to move from a conflict ridden society into a reasonably cooperative one. As Sisk (1995:15) points out: “South Africa’s experience illustrates that the politics of divided societies may be reoriented from the anarchic arena of conflict to the conflict-regulating institutions of democratic state”. However, it is important to note that even though there was a slow but steady movement towards the Accord, the process and progress towards peaceful talks were not smooth. According to Sang-Hyun (2008:276), “Through gains, setbacks, breakdowns, unprecedented levels of violence, mutual recrimination and blame, there was slow progress beyond the preliminaries”. As a result of these political catastrophes, all concerned parties eventually saw the need to reach significant points of convergence. It was further realized that negotiations were desirable, if not necessary. This phase contributed toward the initiation of pre-negotiations which were to pave the way towards political compromise.

#### **4.2.2 The Pre-negotiations**

The pre-negotiations<sup>56</sup> were an important aspect of the transition to democracy in South Africa. The process of negotiations is sometimes referred to as ‘negotiation about negotiations’, ‘bargaining about bargaining’ or ‘talks about talks’<sup>57</sup>. According to Sang-Hyun (2008: 276), “A process of pre-negotiation can be important in bringing about a re-assessment of a conflict and,

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<sup>56</sup> Pre-negotiation begins with changes in at least one of the parties’ perception of the conflict where negotiation is considered as an option and an alternative to the unilateral track. Parties subsequently convey the messages of their intentions to each other. The pre-negotiation stage ends when parties agree to begin negotiating a formula for the resolution of their conflict, or when one party abandons this option altogether, (see Jolobe 2014:14).

<sup>57</sup> See Du Toit and Gagiano, 1988

particularly, a conflict that has become deadlocked as was the case in South Africa”. Pre-negotiation is useful because this is where the participant parties get to learn about themselves. According to Sisk (1995:85), “pre-negotiations facilitates a re-imagining of the opponent as a party that is to some extent reasonable and trustworthy, that is the actors learn about themselves and about each other and thus facilitate nascent elite co-operation”. This stage often involves a commitment to a negotiated settlement, an understanding of the nature of the problem and a strict commitment to substantive negotiations (see Zartman, 1989; Saunders, 1985, Sisk, 1995:75, 82, 85-87). Additionally, alliances are often regarded as important players during this stage: there are various alliances that position themselves to cooperate in order to reach an agreement, and furthermore the pre-negotiation stage is where participation, agendas, rules and tactics for discussions are negotiated.

Below are some of the factors regarded as crucial for a successful outcome of the negotiations, and which may also need much attention during the pre-negotiations

- A clear understanding of what issue/issues is/are to be negotiated;
- An intention by all parties to achieve a settlement;
- A willingness to reconsider a stated position;
- Resources of power which are sufficient to persuade, but insufficient to force a particular Standpoint on the others;
- A clear mandate from a coherent constituency;
- Mutual recognition or accreditation as negotiating partners;
- Agreement on and adherence to the rules of the game;

- Acknowledgment of both the legitimacy of differences, and the existence of common ground in the relationship - i.e. interdependence among the different parties must be established;
- A belief that the negotiation is the best option available for the purpose of resolving differences and
- Sufficient resources to allow outcomes that do not discredit the use of the negotiation process or those parties seeking to use it (Sang-Hyun, 2008: 278).

The pre-negotiation process phase in South Africa is summarized by (Sisk cited in Sang-Hyun, 2008; Gastrow cited in Sang-Hyun, 2008) as follows;

- Increasing, rather than decreasing political violence. It was often alleged that political violence was fomented in a bid to enhance bargaining power prior to the onset of the actual negotiation process.
- Gradual compliance by the government with the preconditions set by the ANC in particular, such as the unbanning of banned organizations, the release of political prisoners, the return of exiles, and the ending of the state of emergency.
- The further repeal of apartheid laws by the government (with the exception of the 1983-Constitution) with the aim of manoeuvring for competition in the new political game.
- The intervention of domestic and foreign mediators, such as church and business groups, as well as the OAU and other international actors. This was to resolve various deadlocks in bringing the various parties to the negotiation table and to eventually facilitate the conclusion and signing of the Accord.

- Intensive debates and planning over the central questions of institutional choice such as that new political rules should replace the old ones.

It is worth noting that the balance of power or segments of roughly equal size (as an important favourable factor of consociationalism) contributed in catalyzing and creating a platform for the pre-negotiations in South Africa. For effective negotiation to take place, none of the emerging segments is “expected to have a numeral strength of more than 20 percent” (Steiner 1987:362). For a proper application of the consociational model, there needs to be at least three different segments represented. Even though South Africa had a fairly larger number of segments, however these segments were manageable. South Africa had as Lijphart (1985:123) puts it “a considerably larger but by no mean unmanageable number of segments”. This favourable factor contributed positively towards the success of the negotiations in South Africa.

It was thus the formalization of pre-negotiation as a first step in the process of negotiation that characterized the initial stage of De Klerk’s presidency. It is also important to highlight key processes that contributed to the pre-negotiations era, in particular, the signing of the National Peace Accord and the collaborative efforts of various parties in pursuing a politically stable South Africa environment.

#### **4.2.3 The National Peace Accord – A consociational exercise**

The National Peace Accord (NPA) was one of the major factors that eventually contributed to South Africa’s transition to a multi-racial society. Even though the transition was mostly regarded as peaceful, especially by the outside world, South Africa’s transition was punctuated by instances of violence and armed struggle. As Spies (2002:20) emphasizes:

...[s]ome embarked on an armed struggle to force the government to abandon its policies, which was in turn met with violence by the state security structures. In the absence of resources and mechanisms to manage conflict at all levels of society, competition and mistrust within and between communities often flared into violence.

The violence mostly occurred during the initial phase of the official negotiations in the early 90s. One way of intervening and responding to these instances of violence was the negotiation of the 1991 National Peace Accord (NPA). The NPA, according to Spies, “created an unprecedented country- wide network of structures to implement the agreement by addressing the behavior of political parties and the security forces, issues related to justice, and conflict management through participatory process of localized mediation and monitoring coordinated at the regional and national level” (2002:20). The main aim of the NPA was to end the conflict and initiate discussions. According to Spies, its principles and structures “provided an important safety net for national negotiation” (2002:20).

The NPA also provided a platform for different stakeholders to work collaboratively in containing the violence and stabilizing the situation. Collaboration was a signifier of intentions to win the game through consensus or power-sharing. The differences, both ideological and political, were set aside and practical methods were implemented to reach an agreement. This era was also very significant because it saw for the first time good working relations between various groups. A 13- person committee comprising church leaders and the business community played a crucial role in bringing all different types of group to the negotiating table. According to Spies (2002:21)


The committee initiated the process with a low-key preparatory meeting in late June. It attracted almost 120 appointed representatives from all the political groupings except three

white right-wing parties. It was the first time that the NP, ANC, and IFP met to discuss the violence and was the first time that the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) agreed to participate in negotiations involving the government.

In an effort to reach an agreement, the committee focused mainly on five topics, namely: the code of conduct for political parties, the code of conduct for security forces, socio-economic development, implementation and monitoring as well as processes regarding secretariat and media. Overarching loyalties – an important favourable factor of the consociational theory helped the 13-person committee to negotiate and eventually sign the NPA. There is need for parties to collectively feel a sense of belonging in order for an agreement to be a success (nationalism is often a cohesive force and will create a shared identity between parties). According to Lijphart, “it is obviously helpful for consociationalism if the divisions among the segments are counterbalanced to some extent by an overarching sense of belonging together” (Lijphart 1985:124). Thus, the 14<sup>th</sup> September 1991 saw, the committee holding a Convention which eventually came up with a final draft of what would become the National Peace Accord. For South Africa’s National Peace Accord structures, see Figure 4.1

**Figure 4.1 South Africa's National Peace Accord Structures**

**South Africa's National Peace Accord structures**



**Source:** Spies 2002:23

The figure above is an illustration of South Africa's National Peace Accord Structures. It is noteworthy that the NPA included all three structures of government, the national, regional (now referred to as provincial) and the local structures. It further worth noting that inclusion of all three structures signifies the importance of participation in a democracy and how decisions need to be reached collectively – in other words, a consociational approach. The different structures in the NPA worked together and reached agreements by consensus. What contributed to the possibility of the negotiations and the Peace Accord during this era was the presence of the traditions of elite

accommodation – an important favourable factor of consociationalism. According to Lijphart (1985: 126), “it is helpful to a consociation if it is supported by long-standing traditions of setting disagreements by consensus and compromise”. The Africa traditions of consensual decision making is seen by Lijphart as a positive and hopeful sign. Attesting to this claim is Lijphart’s citation of Chief Mangosutho Buthelezi who criticised “the competitive Westminster system as being incompatible with African traditions” (Lijphart 1985:126). There were a number of instances that showed that different structures worked together and reached agreement by consensus in South Africa. For instance, “the Department of Home Affairs’ Directorate of Internal Peace Institutions provided the NPS’s infrastructural support. Both the National Peace Committee (NPC) and National Peace Secretariat (NPS) operated by consensus” (Spies 2002:22). Again, there was much collaboration at the regional level as well. Decisions had to be taken by consensus, and the participation and consensual agreements were not only limited to the NPS and NPC but they were also inclusive of religious organizations, businesses, and unions. At the regional level, 11 Regional Peace Committees (RPCs) were established; the exception was only in “four independent homeland territories that were not NPA signatories” (Spies 2002:23). Spies elaborates as follows;

Each RPC comprised representatives of political and religious organizations, unions, business and industry groups, local authorities, security forces and other relevant organizations. In some regions, the process of forming the RPC replicated the conflict dynamics of the country and called on all the NPS’s mediation skills before they could be constituted. They were charged with preventing violence in their region by using a number of approaches, including mediation, monitoring, and facilitating preventive action. They reported to the national structures on the causes of violence, coordinated activities in the region and established networks of local committees. They made decisions by consensus (2002:23).

Among other efforts to implement the pre-negotiation stage, the activities of the NPA were seminal in creating a stable political climate in South Africa. Hampered by political turmoil and resource limitation, the NPA did not necessarily end the violence or put an end to various conflicts. However: “The peace committees helped to open channels of communication; legitimize the concept of negotiations; create a safe space to raise issues that could not be addressed in other forums; strengthen accountability; equalise the power balance; and reduce the incidence of violence” (Spies 2002:23).

#### **4.2.4 Mediation efforts towards democratization**

As stated above, South Africa’s political history features a number of mediation efforts. These mediation efforts have been some of the strategies used or employed towards a peaceful resolution between contending parties. For example, Geldenhuys, (quoted Seo in 2008:174) notes that “likewise the Commonwealth appointed a Group of Eminent Persons to impose mediation from outside. The unilateral nature of these attempts made them largely ineffective. Mediation, however increasingly became important and especially towards the later stages of democratisation”. Mediation efforts cannot be underestimated in their capacity as contributors to the maturity phase of the transition which eventually led to South Africa’s democratization.

#### **4.3 The Maturity Phase of the Transition.**

South Africa’s maturity phase can be characterized by the multiparty negotiations and the inauguration of President Nelson Mandela as South Africans’ first democratically elected President. This era of the transition also led to the interim constitution which underlined a non-

racial, non-sexist democracy with universal adult suffrage, a national common voter's roll, regular elections and a multiparty government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness in South Africa<sup>58</sup>. The transition also signified acceptance by the ruling white minority of the necessity to hand over power to the previously oppressed South African majority.

What can be described as the 'stepping stone for the negotiations' was known as the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). The Convention took place between 1991<sup>59</sup> and 1992 and was attended by various groups including different political parties, religious leaders and a delegation from the government. "The year 1991 was a precarious period during which the two major players, namely the NP-government and the ANC sized each other up against a background of continuing unrest. (Sao 2008: 344) (See **Appendix 1** for the negotiation chronology that eventually led to CODESA 1 & 2).

It is worth noting that compromise within the negotiations were not easy. This was because of allegations of hidden agendas, lack of trust and continuing violence. Some of the issues that could not be easily resolved included the issues of political prisoners, exiles and the future of the uMkhonto weSizwe (MK), and the future and defence of the homelands such as Ciskei and Transkei<sup>60</sup>. According to (Francis 2011: 53-54),

"The focal point in Southern Natal of the late 1970s and early 1980s became the re-establishment of ANC groups in the townships by people involved in the ANC of the 105s. Isolomuzi (Eye of the Township) was based upon the M-Plan. In Southern Natal, KwaMara

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<sup>58</sup> See the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, chapter one on founding provisions. The founding provision also emphasises human dignity and the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.

<sup>59</sup> The first plenary session of CODESA took place on 20 and 21 December 1991 and was chaired by Justices Ismail Mohamed and Piet Schabert.

<sup>60</sup> It is however worth noting that the discussion during this phase of the negotiations were not only about the MK but also included military wings of other organizations, it also focused, the role of the public broadcaster, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC)

(Kwamashu Resident's Association) and Umra (Umlazi Resident's Association) as well as associations in Lamontville and Chesterville became these focal points, and from the release of two MK Regional High Commanders Curnick Ndlovu in 1981 and Billy Nair in 1980 the building of structures through the fusion of civics and MK took on new momentum.

Thus as Seo (2008:376), states that "Personalities also played an important role and there was often a deadlock between the ANC and government delegates". CODESA, however, played an important role in resolving the conflict in South Africa, "The first plenary of CODESA was the first multiparty session of negotiations towards the settlement of the South African conflict" (Goldstone quoted in Jolobe, 2014: 3). Jolobe asserts that: "CODESA signalled the end of the pre-negotiation stage of the negotiation process, where parties established whether negotiations were worthwhile, and the beginning of the formula stage, where parties began to negotiate the basic principles of a negotiated settlement." (2014: 3).

Despite some of the challenges experienced during the CODESA talks, a package of agreements and consensus emerged, including an interim constitution through the Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP). The role of the constitution would not only be the basis of fundamental values and principle but it would also "govern the country during the period covering the first democratic elections and during the negotiations leading up to the adoption of the so-called final Constitution" (Henrard 2002:22). According to Seo (2008:346) "The interim constitution that was produced at a plenary session of the Negotiating Council on 17 November 1993 was formally adopted by Parliament as the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No. 200 of 1993."<sup>61</sup> The adoption of the new interim constitution sketched out wider parameters of a new democracy.

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<sup>61</sup> It is worth noting that section 71 (1) and (2) of the interim Constitution stated that that the 'final constitution will only come into effect when the Constitutional Court has certified that it complied with these Constitutional Principles.

Firstly, the interim constitution highlighted electoral rules according to which the President would be elected in the National Assembly; it also detailed “rules crucial to assure the increasingly impatient black majority that they would have an equal voice in a truly democratic new South Africa” (Inman & Rubinfeld 2013: 2). Secondly, the interim constitution created the nine provincial governments in which each autonomously had its own legislature and Premier. The boundaries of these provinces “were explicitly negotiated to assure the white (NP) and black (IFP) political minorities control over public resources and policies in at least one province”. (Inman & Rubinfeld 2013: 2)

The final constitution took two full years of negotiation to be finalized and on the 11 October 1996, the constitution was presented to the National Assembly. According to Inman & Rubinfeld: “The final constitution established three important principles for the governance of the new federal democracy” (2013:2). The acceptance of the nine provinces as the geographical boundaries and their envisaged sovereign control was the first principle. Secondly, Inman & Rubinfeld state that “provinces were given responsibility for the provision of fundamental services – K-12 education, health services, and housing – and for the administration of transfers to the poor and the elderly” (2013: 2-3). Lastly, there was an expectation from the National Government to share national revenues with the Provincial Governments so that they [Provinces] could be in a position to render provincial services.

Thus both constitutions contributed greatly towards a well negotiated and settled democratic South Africa. The creation of a calm political platform by both these constitutional processes enabled a significant era of cooperation between conflicting parties. South Africa would have had a difficult

experience if the transition was not mainly characterized by the willingness to share power, political consensus and clear negotiation processes that eventually led to the approval of both constitutions.

#### **4.4 Elements of Consociationalism in South Africa**

##### **4.4.1 Grand Coalition**

Power sharing mechanisms have been used by a number of countries, especially around the African continent, where instances of power struggle have been prevalent. Power sharing agreements have been the order of the day in a number of African countries, and have been used to restore stability which has been disrupted by the widely divergent views of different parties. (See **Appendix 2** for countries that have in the past signed power-sharing agreements.) One visible consociational feature in South Africa was the principle of executive power sharing which was “developed through the Government of National Unity (GNU)” (Henrard 2005). Rothschild has noted that: “Power –sharing agreements can set the foundation for democracy and for governmental respect for human rights. Where the best-case scenario prevails, as occurred in South Africa, problems of credible commitment may ease and civility and respect for difference may become expected practice” (2005:9).

Given the challenges encountered by South Africa in the early stages of its transition, power sharing appeared to be the most suitable approach to preparing the ground for a smooth democratic transition. According to Kurume (2003:3),

One of the main features that the political system inherited under consensual democracy was the principle of executive power-sharing which was observed through the establishment of the Government of National Unity (GNU). Through the GNU, power sharing in South Africa's transitional democracy was seen as the only viable and acceptable system to all sides.

Amongst the reason for the establishment of the GNU was the fear that the African National Congress (led by the late former President Mandela as the leader of the party) would discriminate against the previous oppressor (the white minority) and potentially other smaller parties as well, and resort to tyranny rather than power-sharing, as had been agreed. The GNU therefore came as part of the exchange of political power between the ANC and the NP (National Party)<sup>62</sup>. According to Hopper (2008:1), "The GNU established multi-party governance in South Africa by enabling minority parties who obtained 5% of the national vote a position in the cabinet, as well as pursuing a non-partisan public service and introducing proportional representation into South Africa's national assembly and provincial legislature". Amongst other efforts and initiatives for a power-sharing deal also include the Joe Slovo's sunset proposal written in the African Communist, 1992. Francis (2011:61) states that,

The Record of Understanding emerged out of a bilateral series of ANC-NP negotiations initiated by an article written by Joe Slovo in the African Communist. Slovo advocated a sunset period whereby the ANC agreed to a period of quasi power-sharing in a government of national unity for a limited term and that constitutional principles established ahead of an election would be written into a final constitutions.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Not only did the NP felt secure in participating in government, other smaller parties such as the IFP also participated in the GNU – see Traniello (2008) – entering into negotiations, the National Party and other minority parties such as Inkatha Freedom Party were greatly outnumbered. However, each party chose to participate because the structure of the institution and power-sharing made concessions to their insecurities.

<sup>63</sup> See appendix A for *South Africa in Transition, 1989-1993: A Negotiation Chronology: October 1992* (SACP leader Joe Slovo publishes "Negations: A Strategic Perspective," proposing power-sharing).

Moreover, the power-sharing aspect of consociationalism became more visible in the political compromise between the ANC and the NP and surely it played a significant role towards peaceful political transition. As Lijphart (1998:144) states, referring to consociationalism, “it was also the optimal and most logical compromise between the two principal antagonists, the African national Congress (ANC) and the National Party (NP) who originally favoured straightforward majority rule and continued white minority respectively”.

#### **4.4.1.1 The 1994 interim constitution of South Africa**

Scholars such as Micheal Kelly Connors – *The Eclipse of Consociationalism in South Africa’s Democratic Transition* (1996) have argued against the existence of wholesale consociational features in South Africa’s interim constitution. Whilst acknowledging some of the elements of consociationalism in South African’s interim constitution, Connors nonetheless rejects the idea of a completely consociational interim constitution in South Africa. He asserts that “... only semi or quasi-consociational elements, such as proportional Cabinet representation, were evident in the interim constitution and even these were subsequently dropped in the drafting of the new permanent constitution. In fact the consociational bridge has largely been ignored.” (Connors 1996:420). Connors’ assertion notwithstanding, grand coalition appeared to be an evident consociational feature in the interim constitution of 1994. According to Bogaards (2005:166), “the 1993 constitution provided for a Government of National Unity in which all parties with a minimum of 5 per cent of the seats in the National Assembly could participate”. This arrangement, according to Lijphart, “is a clear instance of government by grand coalition” (Lijphart 1998:146).

Connors' account of a quasi-consociational interim constitution is not convincing. This is because by its very definition, consociational democracy is understood in term of four main elements: grand coalition, proportional representation, group autonomy and minority veto power, all of which take into account issues of vital importance for the minorities. Thus, all elements of consociationalism were embodied in the 1994 interim constitution. The government was by grand coalition, group autonomy was visible, especially by means of decentralization and federalism (territorial and / or non-territorial), proportionality was also evident in the form of political representation<sup>64</sup> and lastly Minority or Mutual Veto demonstrated consideration for and accommodation of minority groups, especially the white minority. Even though not directly visible, however, the minority or mutual veto "appeared in the form of the two third majority requirement for amending the constitution and for adopting the permanent constitutional text by the Constitutional Assembly" (Bogaards 2005:166). The 1994 constitution, therefore, cannot be regarded simply as quasi-consociational as all key elements of consociationalism were present<sup>65</sup>. Indeed Lijphart also concurs that "The 1994 interim constitution embodied all of these basic principles and should therefore be regarded as a perfectly consociational constitution instead of a 'quasi-consociational' document" (Lijphart 1998:146).

Furthermore, in an effort to justify the consociational nature of the 1994 constitution and specifically its power sharing feature, Lijphart makes a clear distinction between the presidential

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<sup>64</sup> Section 40 (1) of CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, ACT 200 OF 1993 on Composition of National Assembly States that "The National Assembly shall consist of 400 members elected in accordance with the system of proportional representation of voters as provided for in Schedule 2 and the Electoral Act, 1993". And Section 48 (2) (2) with respect to the composition of Senate "Each party represented in a provincial legislature shall be entitled to nominate a senator or senators for the relevant province in accordance with the principle of proportional representation as determined by the following formula:"

<sup>65</sup> Traniello (2008) has also alluded that "it is no secret that the interim government and the 1993 Interim Constitution Pact were constructed on consociational elements".p 36

system and the parliamentary system. Regarding the 1994 constitutional design as "an optimal power-sharing system for South Africa", and as an advantage of the parliamentary system, Lijphart argues that "its cabinets are collegial decision-making bodies in which grand coalitions can flourish, in contrast with presidential cabinets which typically consist of mere advisors to a pre-eminent president" (1998:146). In this regard, power sharing can also be practical even with a winner-take-all electoral system. Lijphart makes a convincing case with reference to the Malaysian experience. He asserts that "in Malaysia..[t]he partners in the grand coalition have manipulated the nomination in the single-member constituencies in such a way as to achieve nearly proportional results" (Lijphart 1998:146).

#### **4.4.1.2 The 1996 Final Constitution of South Africa.**

Some theorists have argued that the political transformation in the second democratic elections in South Africa demonstrated a major shift from pure consociationalism. Theorists such as Connors have further insisted that South Africa is becoming more of a majoritarian system than a consociational one<sup>66</sup>. While it is true that the permanent constitution of 1996 no longer made power-sharing arrangements a permanent and compulsory feature, there was an emergence of voluntary coalitions. Notably, the ANC continued to voluntarily embrace power-sharing cabinets. "Majorities take decisions; minorities receive the opportunity to win the majority to their side and, in the meantime, enjoy constitutional protection". (Macdonald quoted in Karume, 2003:3). Despite the final constitution not encouraging the construction of grand coalition, Dusing predicted

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<sup>66</sup> See, Connors (1996), "The Eclipse of Consociationalism in South Africa's Democratic Transition".

that “it is likely that the ANC will push its suggestion for majority rule, tempered by a form of ‘voluntary –power-sharing’ (Dusing 2002:149).

This means that there was an establishment of political coalitions as a necessary feature of the newly transformed South Africa. Moreover, “...simultaneously existing political institutions were organized and new ones recommended intended to promote and enshrine the practices of voluntary coalitions and the associated principles of participatory democracy” (Karume 2003:3). Lijphart does not refer to the establishment of political coalition as a necessary principle of consociationalism. However, according to Hooper (2008:2) “he [Lijphart] prefers the much looser term used by Ralf Dahrendorf of a cartel of elites [...] as informal rules generally work better because they are more flexible...[and] they reflect a higher level of trust among groups and group leaders” (Lijphart quoted in Hopper, 2008:2).

#### **4.4.2 Proportional Representation**

Another element of consociationalism that can be found in South Africa’s system of governance is Proportional representation (PR). Proportional representation, according to Lijphart, (1977:38) “also represents a significant deviation from majority rule and, like the mutual veto, is closely interconnected with the grand coalition principle”. Since the proportional model also includes the participation of the majority through grand coalition, it becomes easier to reach decisions, thus decreasing the potential for disagreements on issues. As Lijphart (1977:39) states: “Proportionality, as a neutral and impartial standard of allocation, removes a large number of potentially divisive problems from the decision-making process and thus lightens the burden of consociational governments”. In South Africa, the principle of PR can be traced mainly to South

Africa's electoral system. Not only was the composition of the GNU based on proportionality, members of both the National Assembly and the Provincial legislatures were elected according to a PR system. According to (Sisk, 1995:140) there was a need for "a bicameral legislature in which the first house would be elected on a proportional basis and the second house would be composed of representatives from parties in the regional legislatures". Referring to the South African case Lijphart states that "proportionality was the leading principle of election and representation" (Lijphart 1998:146).

In the South African context, the benefits of the application of the PR principle could not be overlooked. PR gave parties the opportunity to participate in governance without the fear of losing or wasting votes and thus forfeiting representation. As Traniello (2008:41) puts it: "In terms of institutional design South Africa, with features such as proportional representation systems, was able to turn the interim Government into a positive-sum scenario where parties recognized that it was better to cooperate and be included rather than boycott the process and undermine it". It is worth recalling (as discussed earlier in the chapter) the role of the GNU in the establishment of the PR system. All major parties would be included in a proportional system as a result of the GNU. For example, a proportion of seats in the 27-person cabinet would be given to parties that wins more than five percent of the vote<sup>67</sup>. Traniello further gives a positive account of South Africa's constitutional design and its PR feature.

Choosing such a system greatly enhanced the stability and legitimacy of the 1994 elections. This simple form of PR provided incentives for "spoilers" to join the elections. The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) jumped onto the ballots at the last moment. Even if they would be a

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<sup>67</sup> during the proportioning exercise decision making would be consensus-based without legal constraints – see Traniello (2008) .p.36

minority, they would have a chance for representation and thus some influence in the ruling of South Africa in the Government of National Unity. (Traniello 2008:36)

During the early negotiating process, De Klerk emphasized the importance of proportional representation as the “only acceptable voting system, given that the white presence in parliament would disappear if there were no arithmetic connection between votes and seats” (Seo 2008:300). De Klerk announced that: “I want to say here and now that this government will not be frightened or threatened into making any concessions on principle with regard to these fundamental matters” (Herbst quoted in Seo 2008: 300).

In looking at the proportional principle in South Africa’s democratic transition, it is instructive to note that proportional representation played an important role in the electoral process as well. As Olaleye (2003:7) argues: “

Electoral system and coalition politics are different sides of the same coin: both are inseparable from each other. Coalition politics are influenced by what politicians must do to get elected and electoral politics by what politicians do after they have been elected into public offices

The electoral system is one aspect of politics and governance that brings about stability in unstable countries and often the success of a country’s democratic transition will often depend on the kind of electoral system used. Giovanni Sartori (1968:273) has aptly called electoral systems ‘the most specific manipulative instrument of politics’ (quoted in Lijphart 1991:91). Referring to divided societies, Lijphart asserts that: “The electoral system is by far the most powerful lever of constitutional engineering” (1994:91). As stated in the previous chapter, Lijphart distinguishes between the two types of electoral systems, namely, First-Past-the-Post (EPTP) and other

majoritarian election methods as distinct from proportional representation<sup>68</sup>. South Africa as a plural society fits the second option for an electoral system. This is because, even South Africa's constitutional engineering as Lijphart asserts;

Concerns the relationship between the executive and the legislature as well as the types of executive. Here the main alternative are presidential government (in which executive power is concentrated in one person who is elected, directly or indirectly, by popular vote for a fixed term of office) and parliamentary government (characterized by a collegial executive, the cabinet, which is selected by and dependent on the confidence of the legislature) (Lijphart 1991:91).

In South Africa, PR has made it possible for minorities to be justly represented and it has also been responsible for the advancement of a multiparty system “in which coalition governments, based on compromises among the minorities, have to be formed” (Lijphart 1991:92).

Even though South Africa's political system gradually shifted to a type of majoritarian democracy instead of a consociational one, for example, the permanent constitution no longer included the GNU and that the NP eventually left the grand coalition. While it may be tempting to believe that these events replaced power-sharing with majoritarianism, the contrary can also be argued. Firstly, even when the NP left the GNU, the IFP on the other hand remained a cabinet partner. Therefore, as Lijphart puts it, “the cabinet, while no longer a grand coalition, was still a very broad and – in the parlance of coalition theory – ‘oversized’ coalition instead of a ‘minimal winning’ (that is, bare majority) one –party cabinet that is typical of majoritarian democracy” (Lijphart 1998:147). Secondly, the removal of the grand coalition is not surprising, since this kind of feature is in any

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<sup>68</sup> FPTP is also often called the plurality, relative majority, or winner-takes-all method – is also often called the plurality, relative election districts (constituencies), and it means that the candidate with the largest number of voters wins, even if that number is less than an absolute majority. PR exists in many forms all of which share the principle that political parties win roughly the same percentage of seats as the percentage of the votes they receive. – See Lijphart (1991)

case rare among consociational democracies: examples can be found in Belgium, Colombia and Lebanon. In such countries, grand coalitions are more based on casual agreements than on formal procedures. By the same token, South Africa under the leadership of President Nelson Mandela was able, in March 1996, to offer cabinet posts (without any formal obligation) to smaller parties that did not win the minimum of five percent of the seats.

The third factor is that the ANC is a party with strong multi-racial and multi-ethnic features and that its membership is demographically representative: it draws from most if not all racial and ethnic groups in South Africa. Fourthly, even if (from an alternative interpretation) the ANC can be viewed as representing the black South African majority and the DA representing the white minority, the dominance of the ANC and the exclusion of the DA in Cabinet will still not signify the end of consociationalism in South Africa. Interestingly, the DA has lately been perceived not only as representing the white minority and black membership in the DA has increased over the years<sup>69</sup>. Finally, any interpretation of the ANC's nature, whether it is majority cabinet or 'black representation perception' will not justify the claim that South Africa has shifted from consociationalism to pure majoritarianism. According to Lijphart: "South Africa's shift away from pure consociationalism does not mean that it has become or is becoming a majoritarian system, on the continuum between pure power-sharing and pure majority rule, it is still much closer to the consociational than to the majoritarian end of the scale" (1994:149).

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<sup>69</sup> Maimane National DA spokesman stated that "DA rallies are almost always attended by a majority of black supporters. At our Federal Congress last year, most attendees were black (each branch sends representatives based on their size to Federal Congress to vote on congress resolutions and new leadership). Hence, a diverse Federal Congress implies that we are a diverse party" (see Africa check [online] <<http://africacheck.org/reports/is-the-das-membership-mostly-black-the-claim-is-unproven/>>)

#### 4.4.3 Segmental Autonomy and Federalism

Inasmuch as segmental autonomy and federalism are linked, it is important to note the difference between these two concepts. While segmental autonomy creates a sense of independence and permits for diverse culturally-based communal laws in plural societies, segmental autonomy is regarded as a special form of federalism and does not really have to be applied specifically to plural societies. According to Lijphart (1977:42), “as a theory, federalism has a few significant parallels with consociational theory: not only the granting of autonomy to constituents parts of the states, which is its most important feature , but also the overrepresentation of the smaller subdivisions in the ‘federal’ chamber”. This element also stresses deviation from the majoritarian system and it is also linked to the grand coalition principle. This is because all matters that concerns the community should be made by all segments of society through a proportional representation principle. “On all other matters, however, the decisions and their execution can be left to the separate segments” (Lijphart 1977:41).

In South Africa, the element of segmental autonomy was first visible in the 1994 constitution. Even though there were debates about formal entrenchment of autonomy by various political parties, the idea of segmental autonomy was not formally ingrained in the constitution. For example, “the IFP boycotted much of the constitutional negotiations owing to its concern that provincial power would not be entrenched” (Pottie & Hassin, 2003:78). The proposed constitution was referred by IFP leader Buthelezi as an “advanced death certificate of pluralism, federalism and freedom of a country which, constitutionally speaking, is committing suicide by installments” (Reagan 1996 quoted in Pottie & Hassin, 2003:78). No specific ethnic minorities were established and no provincial government received much in the way of legislative powers. However, as

Lijphart highlights, autonomy was guaranteed in the “vital realm of education” (Lijphart 1998:146). According to Kridge (1995:85): “Under the new Constitution of South Africa the administration of school-level education will constitute a provincial responsibility although curriculum and standards will be determined at a national level”. The interim Constitution of 1993, section 32 stated that:

Every person shall have the right-

- (a) “To basic education and to equal access to educational institutions;
- (b) To instruction in the language of his or her choice where this is reasonably practicable; and
- (c) To establish, where practicable, educational institutions based on a common culture, language or religion, provided that there shall be no discrimination on the ground of race”.(South African Constitution, Act 108, section 32)

The Final constitution eventually incorporated the consociational principle of segmental autonomy. Nonetheless, segmental autonomy has been perceived as absent in South Africa. According to Hopper (2008:6), “the perceived lack of this principle came from the exception of a highly decentralized state”. It thus has to be conceded that South Africa is not as decentralized as it would have been if autonomous communities had possessed full control over their own affairs. This, however, does not mean that South Africa’s segments do not have a fairly significant amount of autonomy. In short, this chapter argues that the principle of segmental autonomy is still visible in South Africa.

Likewise, federalism as a special form of segmental autonomy cannot be overlooked in the South African political setup<sup>70</sup>. This feature came about as an eventuality of “the supposed political

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<sup>70</sup> Federalism or a federal state is one kind of a political system and is usually compared oppositely with a unitary state which according to Du Pisanie and Kritzingner “presumes that there must be some single, ultimate center of authority in any society – the central government... which holds

benefits of a multi-centered political dispensation in ethnically divided societies. Dividing executive authority between central and regional government would give minorities, defined in different ways, a stake in the system” (Lodge quoted in Pottie, 2000: 37). South Africa’s federal features are discernible in the following political arrangement: three spheres of government, national, provincial and local. All these spheres are connected and interlinked. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa states that “In the Republic, government is constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of government which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated”(Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). Each of these spheres have their powers assigned to them and are independently elected. All spheres of government are protected both by the constitution and the constitutional courts. Thus, South Africa can be regarded as a rather highly centralized form of federalism<sup>71</sup>.

It is important to note that although the principle of federalism could not be traced in the 34 constitutional principles that contributed to the groundwork for the constitution of 1993 (interim), “it was nevertheless implied in the least ten of the principles and in the division of concurrent and exclusive powers for national and provincial government” (Davenport 1998:64). The 1996 Constitution also featured some themes of federalism, even though the design was more cooperative than competitive. According to Bottie and Hassin (2003:81), “the model of cooperative government was adopted to promote coordinated governance instead of allowing the provinces to compete with each other and the national government for power and resources”.

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the final legislative and executive power” (1985:443-444). The main qualities of a unitary state are the absence of subsidiary sovereign bodies and the supremacy of the central parliament.

<sup>71</sup> It is worth noting that South Africa also has visible elements of ‘fiscal federalism’ where the central government control all major revenue resources. The national government is also responsible for transferring more than 90% of revenues to provinces and where the finance and fiscal commission advices on these shares.

#### 4.4.4 Minority veto

South Africa's constitution indirectly contains a minority veto. This is because the provision for a minority veto cannot be regarded as fully effective in light of the requirement that minorities cannot exercise a veto unless two thirds of the parliamentarians concur. According to Lijphart (1998:146),

minority veto appeared in the form of the two-thirds majority requirement for amending the constitution and for adopting the permanent constitutional text by the Constitutional Assembly; moreover, a number of fundamental principles, like proportional representation and 'collective rights of self-determination in forming, joining, and maintaining organs of civil society, including linguistic, cultural and religious associations', could not be infringed even by two-thirds majorities.

Even though a minority veto cannot be traced in the South African constitution, the two third requirement previously made the minority veto impossible. For example, the 2004 general election, where the ANC got 69.69% of the national vote literacy meant that the ANC could change the constitution unilaterally through its two-thirds majority. However, the 2014 general election made the ANC to attain 62.15%. The ANC's 62.15%<sup>72</sup> of the national vote makes minority veto in South Africa essentially effective and possible. This is because the party may not alter the constitution of the country since it no longer makes two-thirds of the nation votes.

Lijphart's view, however, is that what could immobilize decision making in South Africa could be strengthening mutual veto and as such this could also increase the stability of the country (Lijphart 1980). It is worth noting that there are some fundamental principles that cannot be infringed even

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<sup>72</sup> See: <http://www.elections.org.za/content/NPEPublicReports/291/Results%20Report/National.pdf>

by a two thirds majority. For example, freedom to associate or worship, proportional representation and collective rights of self-determination. Moreover, South Africa's voluntary coalition enables minorities to express themselves and get represented to some degree in the executive even though the ANC's domination can easily subordinate the interests of the minorities. The application of an active minority veto in South Africa would give full political protection to all segments of society, however, "the dangers of the minority veto is that it will lead to minority tyranny, which may strain the cooperation in a grand coalition as much as the outvoting minorities"(Lijphart 1977:37).

#### **4.5 Conclusion**

The chapter has examined key elements of South Africa's interim constitution of 1993 and of the 1996 constitution. In an attempt to trace consociational elements in the South African polity, the chapter has discussed the transition period and the negotiations which eventually led to power-sharing in South Africa. Visible features of consociationalism in South Africa include the following: the principle of power-sharing through the GNU: even though such an arrangement was not made permanent, voluntary coalitions by some parties is still allowed. Proportional representation is also traceable through South Africa's electoral system and racial representation even within political parties such as the ANC and the DA. A high degree of autonomy and federalism is also visible in South Africa. Through the federalist system, provinces enjoy a certain degree of autonomy as they have independent legislative autonomy to create their own elected establishments even though provinces receive the authority of such autonomy from national government and as such, national government can intervene on specific cases. Even though less

effective in nature, minority veto is also a visible consociational feature in South Africa despite the requirement of two third of the parliamentarians concurring in opposition to exercise a veto.

Given the existence of these elements, specific reference has been made to the possibility of a relevant developmental paradigm. It has been argued that such a paradigm will be consociational in nature and will contain both a collective and individual recognition of different segments of society and how their participation necessitates holistic development. The next chapter focuses on the Province of KwaZulu-Natal's politics and institutional arrangement as a case study.

## **CHAPTER FIVE: THE PROVINCE OF KWAZULU-NATAL: POLITICS & INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT**

### **5.1 Introduction**

The previous chapter focused on the broader application of consociationalism in South Africa. This chapter specifically draws reference to the Province of KwaZulu-Natal as a case study. The chapter argues that South Africa's provinces, such as KwaZulu-Natal, are an outcome of South Africa's consociational dispensation. This chapter will therefore critically analyse the consociational nature of KZN's provincial and local governments.

The chapter begins with a historical and political overview of the Province of KZN. The intention is to show the rise of cleavages and different segments in KZN. This chapter will also show how negotiations and consultations moved South Africa and KZN toward a consociational arrangement. Moreover, as a unique case where traditional leadership or authority and elected government representation coexist, the chapter explores the role of the Provincial and local government and how these spheres of government features in the consociational model. This will be done through an exploration of the role of cooperative governance in the Province of KZN. The reason for this approach is that KZN recognises traditional authority and the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) is responsible for supporting traditional leadership in the Province, hence the existence of the Institution of Traditional leadership. Lastly, the chapter examines an integrated service delivery approach Operation Sukuma Sakhe (OSS) in the Province of KZN, the intention is to evaluate the inclusion of various segments of society which are important in the analysis of the application of the consociational model in the province.

## 5.2 History of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal

### 5.2.1 The Pre – 1994 Period

What initially formed the Zulu state was the policy of “separate development – Apartheid”. It was then through the creation of KwaZulu that the foundation of this policy was laid and the territory KwaZulu was granted legislative powers. “Despite pressure from the South African government, the Chief Minister of KwaZulu, Mangosutho Buthelezi refused to accept total independence” (Maninger 1994:62). A formation of both the Province of Natal and the so called homelands of KwaZulu, the Province of KwaZulu-Natal experienced a difficult history characterised by conflict and violence before 1994. In 1977, the homeland of KwaZulu was granted self-government under the apartheid government. “According to the apartheid social planner’s ideal ‘separate development’, it was intended to be the home of the Zulu people. Although it was relatively large, it was segmented and spread over a large area in what is now the Province of KwaZulu-Natal”<sup>73</sup>.

The Chief Minister of KwaZulu, established good working relations with the then ruling National Party. “He also distanced himself from the African National Congress, with whom he had a close relationship”<sup>74</sup>. It was during this period that the IFP was able to consolidate much of its support. More especially from the rural dwellers of KwaZulu. Even though the ANC and IFP were very close as they both supported each other in the anti-apartheid struggle, however, The 1980s saw the rise of tension between these two organizations. Amongst other causes of such tension was the IFP’s dependency on the South African state and economy. Buthelezi was regarded more by the

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<sup>73</sup> <http://www.sahistory.org.za/places/kwazulu-natal>

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

anti-apartheid leaders as a government puppet given that most anti-apartheid leaders living in and outside South Africa demanded sanctions. “His tribal loyalties and focus on ethnic interests over national unity were also criticised as contributing to the divisive programme of the IFP. This led to a virtual civil war between Zulu loyalist supporters and ANC members in KwaZulu-Natal”<sup>75</sup>.

It is worth noting that one of the challenges faced by the IFP was the rise in urbanization in the 1980s. Most black people moved from the rural part of the region to the urban areas. “Between 1985 and 1989 the functional urbanization rate in KwaZulu (primarily in those parts bordering the main urban area) rose to 5, 7% representing the highest percentage increase for any area in South Africa, except KwaNdebele” (Ntuli 2006:101). The cases of urbanization were however not planned or provided for, hence this resulted in the mushrooming of informal settlements outside the city centres. According to Ntuli (2006:101), “the majority of these informal settlements were without services, e.g. no water, electricity, sewerage, roads, clinics, schools or recreational services. Most of the dwellings were small, one or two roomed homes, constructed from scraps of metal, wood or plastic”. The lack of such services resulted in tension between local council in the township and the various community organizations. As Johnston (1994:188-189) notes; “the violence became diffused through other conflicts that made it incoherent”. These conflicts included “conflicts over the regulation of , and access to , resources and services (such as minibus taxi rivalries and access to basic services such as water supplies through standpipes), clan or tribal conflicts over succession rights, vendetta type local rivalries, crime and intergeneration conflict” (Francis 2011: 55). These conflicts took place in townships such as Lamontville – south of Durban where resident opposed rent increased and incorporation by forming the Lamontville Rent Action Committee. Other townships that fell under the KwaZulu administration included KwaMashu and

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<sup>75</sup> ibid

uMlazi. It was therefore within these townships that civil organization protested in an effort to address local issues.

Van der Merwe (1999) states that “Civic organizations played a central role in these protests against local councils and in response to local issues (housing, rent, services, consumer concerns, etc.) Civics were locally organized structures that were (supposedly) not politically aligned (but generally were linked to the ANC)”. This era saw the formation of distinct segments formed along racial lines<sup>76</sup>. According to van der Merwe (1999) “local councils remained racially based with separate structures established for whites, "coloureds", Indians and Africans. The fiscal resources to provide services to the different racially segregated neighbourhoods were kept separate”<sup>77</sup>.

Another area of conflict was based on the opposition to the established political structures by the apartheid government for blacks. As Van der Merwe (1999) states;

Black Local Authorities were established in the early 1980s to give blacks (the pretense of) representation in local community affairs. Elections for these authorities were characterized by very low turnouts largely due to a strong boycott campaign. The local black councils were seen as an attempt at co-optation and an attempt to legitimize racial division of political structures and racial inequality of municipal services. Blacks who participated in these councils (and their families) were particularly targeted by the liberation movements, as were police who resided in black communities. A number of councillors and police were killed, and many were forced to flee their homes and move to other areas.

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<sup>76</sup> It is worth noting the proposed and partly implemented KwaZulu-Natal Option which runs parallel with the consociational proposal for KwaZulu and the Natal. For example, The Joint Executive Authority for KwaZulu-Natal Act [Act no. 80 of 1986] was an exercise in power-sharing comprising members of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and Natal Provincial Legislature after the Provincial Government Act [Act No.69 of 1986]

<sup>77</sup> See – The Centre for Study of Violence and Reconstruction at :<http://www.csvr.org.za/wits/papers/paphd6.htm>

The period prior to 1994 played a significant role not only in the history of KwaZulu-Natal, but in the history of South Africa at large. This period is important because of certain significant events that took place. For example, the formation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the release of Dr Nelson Mandela who had been imprisoned for twenty-seven years.

### **5.2.1.1 ANC and NP Negotiations**

What was also significant in the history of KwaZulu-Natal was the political violence and vigilant activities that gained momentum in the region. Pre 1985 violence could be traced in the region, however, its impact is incomparable to the events of post 1985. This was mainly because of political negotiation between the then banned ANC with the National Party (NP). Seeing the spread of violence, the NP continued to negotiate with Mandela, stating that he will be released on condition that Mandela lives in Transkei and unconditionally renounces violence. P.W. Botha quoted in Evans (2014:87) declared that, "It is therefore not the government of South Africa which now stands in the way of Mr Mandela," "It is he himself". During this time Mandela was advised by the National Government to unconditionally reject violence to which Mandela reacted intransigently towards. These negotiations being secret in nature created tensions around the people of KwaZulu-Natal. Despite such tension and internal ANC conflict between national and provincial elites, a future for political compromise through consensus was bright. What also paved way for the smooth negotiations was that later on (May 1992) both parties agreed on the application of regionalism – an important consociational feature that defines the politics of KwaZulu-Natal. According to Pottie and Hassin (2003:81), "Regional politics were acknowledged as well as in the

adoptions of a federalist form of government (a key compromise between the ANC and the opposition parties)<sup>78</sup>.

### **5.2.1.2 ANC, UDF and IFP Tensions**

Political party tensions in KwaZulu-Natal were not only between the NP and the ANC, but it also manifested itself between the IFP<sup>79</sup>, ANC and the United Democratic Front (UDF) which was regarded as the internal wing of the ANC. According to Times, 11 April, 1994 quoted in Maninger (1994:62) “The long conflict between Inkatha and the ANC has many roots. At its core is a power struggle between the Congress, an organization Buthelezi sees as Marxist and dangerously revolutionary, and Inkatha, which the ANC depicts as a right-wing, ethnic party led by an autocrat”. The UDF has posed threats to the IFP since 1983 when it was founded. As a result of the UDF’s affiliation to the ANC, the ANC was regarded as a serious challenge to the IFPs hegemony, especially with regards to the running of affairs in the region.

### **5.2.1.3 COSATU and UDF Affiliation**

What further created violence in the region of KwaZulu was the affiliation of COSATU with UDF during its inception in 1985. The IFP is perceived to have reacted to a speech made by the first president of COSATU who referred to IFP as ‘puppets of apartheid’. According to Jeffery (1997:140),

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<sup>78</sup> Despite the deadlock, both the NP and the ANC were confident that the first phase of the interim government could be in place by August 1992. On 13 May agreement was reached on the question of regionalism and a two-chambered interim legislature cum constitution-making body – see also (<http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/chapter-7-defining-process>)

<sup>79</sup> The party was formed in 1975, initially called Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement and became known as the IFP in 1990.

Chief Buthelezi told the commission that the events...[R] represented an attempt to undermine his credibility as a political leader. His reputation as a leader rested inter alia on his being an opponent of apartheid and the popular leader of the largest in South Africa – the Zulus. Opponents thus sought to portray him as a ‘sell-out’ and a ‘puppet of Pretoria’, and to demonstrate that he could not enter the Ngoye Campus, in the heartlands of KwaZulu, without ‘causing a riot’<sup>80</sup>.

Although it is believed that the first president of COSATU’s remarks sparked violence in the region, on the contrary, Haysom (1989) states that “Undoubtedly, the central catalyst for the violence is the conflict over political support or superiority in the region - Inkatha blames an 'attempt to render the areas ungovernable' and UDF/COSATU allege that it is the result of Inkatha's determination to root out any alternative political presence in its own back door”<sup>81</sup>. This conflict between COSATU, IFP and UDF also resulted in the victimization of workers (mainly members of COSATU)). Having seen the threat posed by COSATU and UDF, the IFP launched its own workers union called the United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA). This created violence between the parties and major gatherings were attacked by Impis in reaction to major events organized by COSATU or the UDF. Tension grew even wider between the two unions to such an extent that “everyone said Inkatha impi was responsible for the attack” (Jeffery 1997:53). There are other interpretation of political violence and conflict in KwaZulu-Natal. The most common explanations is that “the legacy of apartheid is to blame, producing high unemployment, contributing to brutal and deprived conditions of existence in rapidly expanding informal settlements and hostels and dehumanising black males and leaving them powerless” (Francis 2011:55), see also (Morris & Hindson 1992a:43-59 and Morris & Hindison 1992b: 152-170).

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<sup>80</sup> See Anthea Jeffery (1997), *The Natal Story: 16 years of conflict*.

<sup>81</sup> See, Centre for the study of violence and reconciliation - <http://www.csvr.org.za/wits/papers/paphaysm.htm>

Another explanation of the political violence and conflict is that “a third force of renegade security force elements was responsible for stoking conflict within IFP and ANC black communities by attacking one side or another until re-tributary violence took on a momentum of its own”( Francis 2011:55), see also (Bennun 1995: 2061 and Ajulu 1992: 67-83). The last explanation also referred to ‘the most common’ is that violence came about as a “product of turf rivalries between the ANC and the IFP” (Francis 2011:55). The close relationship between the ANC and UDF in this explanation is important to consider. This is because it does also contribute to the reasoning behind the tension between the IFP and the UDF/ ANC. According to Jeffery (1997:78), “The UDF also expressed its fear that Inkatha was mobilising for an offensive, due to begin on 19 January. Residents of townships on the outskirts of Pietermaritzburg said that Inkatha was ‘preparing an invasion force to crush anti-Buthelezi elements once and for all’”.

#### **5.2.1.4 ANC – COSATU Alliance and Mandela’s Release**

Notwithstanding other numerous events that happened in KwaZulu in the mid and towards the end of the 80s, 1991 saw the signing of the National Peace Accord after the unbanning of the ANC and (other political parties) which also paved way for negotiations between the government and the ANC-COSATU alliance. The signing of the National Peace Accord also demonstrated a power-sharing feature in KwaZulu-Natal. This is because the aim of the National Peace Accord was to “bring about peaceful power-sharing in a multi-party democracy and to assist in social and economic reconstruction”<sup>82</sup>. Moreover, “The NPA recognised as fundamental rights the freedoms

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<sup>82</sup> <https://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv03275/05lv03294/06lv03321.htm#>

of conscience and belief, speech and expression, association, movement, peaceful assembly and peaceful political activity. It was premised on fundamental democratic principles of good governance, mutual responsibility and accountability”<sup>83</sup>. This was after President de Klerk appointed Judge Goldstone to chair a commission that will bring about a solution to the political violence in KwaZulu-Natal. Even though the unbanning of political parties brought much joy to South Africans, in KwaZulu-Natal such an era brought more killings and disaster. This was mainly due to insecurities within the region and within the legislature itself<sup>84</sup>. When Nelson Mandela was released on 11 February 1990, further violence grew between the IFP and the ANC.

#### **5.2.1.5 The Inkathagate Scandal**

What can be characterized as a ‘disguise path to political compromise’ was the 1991 Inkathagate scandal<sup>85</sup>. This is because even though the Inkathagate scandal perpetrated violence and uncertainty in resolving the conflict in KwaZulu-Natal. On the other hand it also created a platform that enabled the government to collide with the IFP and vigilantes. The IFP had initially denied having sent their members to Caprivi for military training; this however was not true as the government admitted to having sent IFP members (150) to undergo military training to strengthen the security measures in the region. The challenge began when there were contrary views on why the 150 IFP members were sent. While the government stated that the 150 IFP members were ‘trained as bodyguards for KwaZulu-Natal leaders<sup>86</sup>’, on the contrary, “members of the group alleged that they were trained in offensive guerrilla warfare in Caprivi. They also revealed that

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<sup>83</sup> *ibid*

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid*. “Buthelezi regarded himself as a true fighter of democracy and a leader whom the people dearly loved. However, with the release of Mandela, most of these aspects changed. It became imminent when Buthelezi was accused of having established an anti-Mandela campaign to thwart or destabilize the popularity of Mandela in the KwaZulu-Natal region”.

<sup>85</sup> The Inkathagate can be described as the military training of some of the members of Inkatha in Caprivi –Namibia.

<sup>86</sup> See - <http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/chapter-1-introduction-0>

another similar camp was in existence in KwaZulu-Natal”<sup>87</sup>. These contradictions exposed the failures of De Klerk’s government and were interpreted as a perpetration of violence in the struggle for peace in KwaZulu-Natal.

#### **5.2.1.6 Settling the Dispute**

Despite all the violence in KwaZulu-Natal and the different causes and events that led to the killing of thousands of people towards the dawn of democracy, Mandela and Buthelezi were eventually able to settle the dispute through negotiations. Even though initially Buthelezi was adamant that he and his party will not take part in the first democratic elections. Eventually he was convinced through persuasive efforts of the international community<sup>88</sup>. It is worth noting that the election did not stop the violence in KwaZulu-Natal; however the election created a ground base for a peaceful regional settlement in the future. What also contributed to the dispute was idea of regional politics (federalism) by both the IFP and the NP, these two parties according to Pottie and Hassin (2003:81) “were the strongest proponents of strong regional government and a federal state structure for South Africa”. This common sentiment created a strong promotion for decentralized state power, hence “the prospect of gaining regional office was therefore a strong draw card for parties that could not hope to achieve political power at national level”(Pottie and Hassin 2003:81). As a result of such a stance, the ANC was more predisposed to settle the dispute peacefully through talks and negotiations. Thus the segments created pre 1994, the African Rural population (comprised mainly of the black majority from the IFP), the urban ANC segment, and the urban segments formed along

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<sup>87</sup> *ibid*

<sup>88</sup> “It is generally believed that international attention has a mitigating effect on conflict. So far, most quantitative research has included controls for peace keeping, but there are of course also other international dimensions such as aid, diplomatic support, and diaspora engagement, that could be important with regard to international influence on conflict dynamics”. See (Jastad 2010:63)

racial lines, especially between the whites, Indians and coloured community could for the first time share a common sentiment of attaining regional power as a result of the decentralized state power.

## **5.2.2 Post – 1994**

In the early dawn of democracy, the politics of compromised were entered into by both the IFP and the ANC. This period was marked by the negotiation phase where “Buthelezi supported the demands of the former ruling NP for a federalist system of government” (Beall 2008: 5). Even though the attempt of a federal system failed, Buthelezi was still adamant in retaining power in the Province, mainly through the strengthening of traditional authorities which were an important element of his political party base. During the 1994 election, the “IFP won a narrow majority in the new provincial legislature and KZN became one of only two provinces falling outside the control of the ANC<sup>89</sup>” (Beall 2008: 5). On the other hand, the ANC came second in the overall provincial election result. Thus, it was clear that the IFP had taken control of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal.


### **5.2.2.1 The High Profile Cases of violence**

Despite the decline in political violence after 1994, violence continued to erupt in some parts of the province. Mainly in areas such as Richmond in the Midlands, Nongoma in the North of the province and Shobashobane in the South Coast of the province. See map below.

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<sup>89</sup> The other was Western Cape Province. In 1994 nine provinces were created out of the four provinces of so-called ‘white South Africa’ and the ten former ethnically defined ‘homelands’ or ‘bantustans’ created under the bantu Authorities Act of 1951 and the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act in 1959. (See Beall 2008)

**Figure 5.1 High Profile Areas of Violence in KwaZulu-Natal**



**Sources:** (Rupert Taylor 2002)

The map above shows some of the areas affected by violence in KwaZulu-Natal. It is important to note that there are other areas in KZN that experienced violence besides the above, however, these areas are regarded as high profile cases<sup>90</sup> and violence in these areas reached an unprecedented scale. For example, Taylor (2002) states that “The Shobashobane massacre was by no means the first massacre in the area. The broader region had been locked into a vicious round of attacks and counterattacks for well over a decade”. As a high profile case, Shobashobane for example, saw the massacre of 19 ANC members by a group of Inkatha supporters on the 25th December 1995<sup>91</sup>.

<sup>90</sup> It is worth noting that there were other causes of the violence other than the political ones. For example, causes were socio-economic, deprivation, conflict between traditional and modern form of governance, urban – rural conflict.

<sup>91</sup> The Shobashobane massacre is often labels as the ‘Christmas Day massacre’.

On the other hand, the Richmond massacres to which Taylor regards as “a case that would defy the imagination of the most creative of fiction writers” (Taylor 2002), saw a number of killings (approximately 150 pre 1994). The tension between the UDF, IFP and ANC did not soften after 1994, instead more cases of violence erupted and this included the assassination of two newly elected Richmond ANC Councillors and three other ANC members following the local government by elections of 22 July 1997. Moreover, fifty more ANC and UDF members were killed following the release of Sifiso Nkabinde<sup>92</sup>, a strong ANC supporter who also assisted the ANC in taking much control of the areas in 1993. The assassination of Nkabinde fuelled the violence in Richmond as eleven members of the ANC were also murdered on the same day Nkabinde was assassinated.

Lastly, the Nongoma assassination, according to Taylor “illustrates that even in areas of hegemonic IFP control political violence can continue to spiral out of control” (2002). Political violence in Nongoma has seen more than twenty IFP and ANC officials being killed. Even though the violence in Nongoma was not as intense as the Shobashobane massacres and Richmond, however they also made national headlines on several occasions. Moreover, unlike Richmond, the main tensions in Nongoma “have been between IFP local leaders –with the names of a small number of individuals recurring constantly” (Taylor 2002). According to Johnston 1994 quoted in Jastad (2010:65), “There were also generational conflicts between radical youth and traditional elders, disputes over chiefship succession, crime, economic rivalry (as in the so-called ‘taxi’ wars) and cycles of vendetta-like clan conflict”. What brought about political tension and eventually violence in the areas was the 1994 national and 1996 local elections. The ANC only received two percent of the

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<sup>92</sup> Sifiso Nkabinde was assassinated on 23 January 1999 and on the same day eleven ANC members were also murdered.

vote according to the 1994 elections despite Nongoma being regarded as a ‘no-go’ area for the ANC. Even though Nongoma experienced little political conflict between the IFP and the ANC, there were traces of violence linked to the ANC and IFP tension in other areas, for example, “nine of the people who were killed by the ANC in front of the Shell House [in Johannesburg, just prior to the April 1994 election] were from Nongoma. Others were maimed during the incident” (Taylor 2002). Other killings included the assassination of Joseph J.B Sikhonde, a once IFP leader and at some point a Mayor of the town Nongoma. Sikhonde’s assassination was followed by a series of other killings of IFP and ANC politicians in a space of a year.

#### **5.2.2.2 Towards a Negotiated Settlement – the 1996-1999 election.**

The 1994 and 1999 KZN Provincial Elections show a similar trend in terms of voting pattern and the re-alignments of political party segments in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal. More especially between the four main political parties, namely, the IFP, ANC, DP and the National Party (NP) which later pulled out of the Government of National Unity with the ANC became the New National Party (NNP) in 1999. See table 5.1 and 5.2 below for the 1994 and 1999 Provincial elections respectively.

**Table 5.1 1994 KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Election Results**

<b>KWAZULU-NATAL</b>	<b>VOTES</b>	<b>SEATS</b>
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania	26,601	1
Vryheidsfront/Freedom Front	18,625	
Workers' Inrernational to Rebuild the Fourth International (SA)	4,626	
African Christian Democratic Party	24,690	1
African Democratic Movement	8,092	
Africa Muslim Party	17,931	
African National Congress	1,181,118	26
Democratic Party	78,910	2
Minority Front	48,951	1
National Party	410,710	9
Inkatha Freedom Party	1,844,070	41
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>81</b>

Source: Independent Electoral Commission<sup>93</sup>

**Table 5.2 June 2, 1999 General Election Results - KwaZulu-Natal: Provincial Legislature**

<b>Party</b>	<b>Votes</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Seats</b>
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	1,241,522	41.9	34
African National Congress (ANC)	1,167,094	39.4	32
Democratic Party (DP)	241,779	8.2	7
New National Party (NNP)	97,077	3.3	3
Minority Front (MF)	86,770	2.9	2
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	53,745	1.8	1
United Democratic Movement (UDM)	34,586	1.2	1
Federal Alliance (FA)	9,762	0.3	
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC)	7,654	0.3	
Vryheidsfront / Freedom Front (VF/FF)	6,804	0.2	
Afrikaner EenheidsBeweging (AEB)	5,801	0.2	
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	5,052	0.2	
The Socialist Party of Azania (SOPA)	3,451	0.1	
Mass United Movement (MUM)	2,261	0.1	

Source: <http://electionresources.org/za/provinces.php?election=1999&province=NL> (modified by the researcher)

<sup>93</sup> See: <http://www.elections.org.za/content/uploadedfiles/NPE%201994.pdf>

In the post-apartheid era, the Province of KwaZulu-Natal has been marked by a divided system of governance or political authority. During this era provincial power was mainly based between the IFP and national power with the ANC. According to Taylor (2002), “A top level peace process was instituted, and by mid-1996 political leaders declared the political conflict over”. The ANC proposed a much more diplomatic approach towards the conflict. Instead of a rather confrontation approach, the IFP moved towards a more inclusive politics characterised by reconciliation and co-operation. In 1999, after the general election, the IFP and the ANC were able to form a coalition government at provincial level and thus “as a sign of some progress on the path to peace in the province, KZN Peace Process Code of Conduct was signed by the IFP and the ANC in May 1999” (Pottie and Hassin 2003:84). The formation of the coalition government meant that no party won a clear majority between the ANC and the IFP. The results of the 1999 election were also characterized by floor-crossing in the legislature, which eventually favoured the ANC in securing a two seats majority “so that for the first time the political dominance of the IFP in KZN was dislodged, unleashing a backlash from the Party involving accusation of bribery and corruption against those of defected to the ANC” (Beall 2008:5).

### **5.2.2.3 The 2004 election**

The 2004 election took a different angle altogether, with the ANC winning a narrow majority of (46.8%) over the IFP which won (36.82%). This translated into 38 seats for the ANC, 30 seats for the IFP, 7 seats for the DA, 2 seats for ACDP, 2 for the MF and 1 seat for UDM. See table below for a comprehensive 14 April 2004 Provincial election results.

**Table 5.3 14 April 2004 KZN Provincial Elections**

Party	Abbrev.	Results	%	Seats
AFRICAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY	ACDP	48 892	1.78 %	2
<b>AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS</b>	<b>ANC</b>	<b>1 287 823</b>	<b>46.98 %</b>	<b>38</b>
AZANIAN PEOPLE'S ORGANISATION	AZAPO	7 061	0.26 %	
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY	CDP	4 980	0.18 %	
DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE/DEMOKRATIESE ALLIANSIE	DA	228 857	8.35 %	7
INDEPENDENT AFRICAN MOVEMENT	IAM	1 546	0.06 %	
INDEPENDENT DEMOCRATS	ID	13 556	0.49 %	
INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY	IFP	1 009 267	36.82 %	30
IZWI LETHU PARTY	ILP	4 858	0.18 %	
MINORITY FRONT	MF	71 540	2.61 %	2
NUWE NASIONALE PARTY/NEW NATIONAL PARTY	NNP	14 218	0.52 %	
PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS OF AZANIA	PAC	5 118	0.19 %	
PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY	PDP	3 154	0.12 %	
UNITED CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY	UCDP	3 921	0.14 %	
UNITED DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT	UDM	20 546	0.75 %	1
ROYAL LOYAL PROGRESS	RLP	3 141	0.11 %	
THE SOCIALIST PARTY OF AZANIA	SOPA	5 023	0.18 %	
VRYHEIDFRONT PLUS	VF Plus	7 764	0.28 %	
<b>Total Valid Votes</b>		<b>2 741 265</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>80</b>
<b>Total Number of Spoilt Votes</b>				<b>41 300</b>
<b>Percentage Poll</b>				<b>72.84%</b>
<b>Total Votes Cast</b>				<b>2 782 565</b>
<b>Total Number of Special Votes</b>				

Source: <http://www.anc.org.za/elections/2004/results/prov-kzn.html>

There are a number of factors that led to the ANC's victory in the 2004 elections. These factors are rather explained by the ANC's majoritarian strategies than power sharing efforts in attaining a victory in the Province. For example, its campaign's focus to the Indian community contributed towards attaining better numbers for the party. According to Letsholo (2005:10), "the ANC began to treat the Indian community as 'citizens rather than as a group'. In its Indian stronghold of Reservoir Hill and environs, the ANC improved its position, winning 15 of 18 districts, while in the nearby Newlands it captured all eight districts". There was also a focus on the Muslim

community, including Mbeki's attendance at the Tamil's New Year's celebration early in the year. Strong support of the ANC also came from a proportion of whites in the province. According to *The Witness* dated 18 April 2004 quoted in Letsholo (2005:10), "there was also another source of new ANC supporters in the form of largely white voters in Pietermaritzburg who switched from the DA to the ANC as a protest at the DA's support for Ulundi as the region's capital". Thus the IFP's support drastically declined in the 2004 election, even in the IFP stronghold in Nongoma which lasted a decade after 1994, the ANC was able to penetrate the areas leaving the IFP with a lousy percentage of its supporters.

Referring to the 2004 election outcome, the then ANC Provincial Secretary, Mr Senzo Mchunu stated that, "We knew that if we wanted to grow our support we had to look north," we consolidated our traditional support bases but we realised that if we were serious about winning KwaZulu-Natal with an outright majority we had to look to the north of the province all the way up to the Mozambique border" (Toulouse 2009). Likewise, on ANC's stronghold in Ndaleni (Richmond) "proportions of ANC vote remain constantly high at about 96%, while the IFP has only been able to secure little more than 1% since 1999" (Schuld 2013: 117). The ANC had initially become an exclusively urban party in KwaZulu-Natal and the IFP retaining its stronghold in the rural part of the province, however, the ANC's focus on the North (predominantly rural communities) during the 2004 election shows that political party representation in KwaZulu-Natal is characterised by the urban rural division. Thus the above shows racial segmentation and urban – rural division at a provincial level in KwaZulu-Natal.

Even though the ANC's victory could be explained through its majoritarian strategies, the above table depicts that cleavages and their importance are shown by party representation. For instance, Francis (2011:74) notes that "...[S]ocial background is a good indicator of the points of fusion or alliance among segments of the elite. Certainly political elite in KwaZulu-Natal does not constitute a homogenous group". These segments or cleavages are however not static but rather changing or evolving<sup>94</sup>. These cleavages entails both ethnic<sup>95</sup> segmentation and urban-rural divide (between the ANC and the IFP). It is however worth noting that the IFP "has been the most diverse of the parties in its racial makeup, with more Asian and white members than any of the others and the IFP has accounted for more white MPPs than both the DP<sup>96</sup> and the NNP together" (Francis 2011:76). On the other hand, the DA being a predominantly white party received 7 seats in the 2004 election. The DA managed to get most of their votes from the urban areas which have a large number of white people. As noted by Francis (2011:76), "among the smaller parties, the DP (now DA) shows similar levels of diversity to the two dominant parties, but with representation skewed heavily to whites". On the other hand the Minority Front (MF) which claims to represent all minorities of South Africa but has its members formed mainly by the Indian community, especially in the city of Durban won only 2 seats in parliament. Both UDM and Independent Democrats (ID) have their stronghold in other provinces outside KwaZulu-Natal. For example, the UDM targeted Xhosa speaking people who are mostly in the Easter Cape Province and the ID's party's strongholds were in the Northern and Western Cape. The UDM won 1 seat and 0 seats for the ID.

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<sup>94</sup> See: Suzanne Francis 2011, institutionalizing elites, chapter 3.

<sup>95</sup> In this case, the definition of 'ethnicity' is adopted from Piper 1998, in which he refers to ethnicity as a sense of people-hood, or community by virtue of perceived common descent, as indicated by shared cultural endowments- see Piper, L., 1993. *The Contemporary Identity of Ethnicity Or 'new Wine in Old Bottles'*. Thus ethnicity in this context is viewed in terms of different components of a particular racial grouping. And thus shared cultural endowments for Afrikaners, white) English speaking South Africa etc., makes them to be perceived as different ethnics groupings. Race on the other hand refers more to the categorization of different people according to their genetic traits or physical characteristics.

<sup>96</sup> See Francis (2011:76) In Mid-2000 the Democratic Alliance was formed out of the Democratic Party, the New National Party and the Federal Alliance to contest the December 2000 Local Elections. Francis notes that "Because of the anti-defection clause in the 1996 Constitution, parties could not legally merge between elections. As a consequence, in the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Legislature, the DP and NNP remained separate parties and received separate allocation, but operated as one entity in terms of voting together and attending one caucus".

The Vryheidsfront Plus which was founded by members of the Afrikaner community did not win any seat in the 2004 election, the VF Plus mainly targets protecting the interest of white South Africans , (especially Afrikaner speaking) and coloured people, who are a minority in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal. The results attained by these parties is explained by the racial factor or cleavage which puts them at a disadvantage in the predominately dominated Zulu speaking people of KwaZulu-Natal. Thus the racial cleavage in party representation cannot be underestimated in KwaZulu-Natal Politics. While this may be the case, one needs to bear in mind that elite composition is represented by a much more diverse grouping that just race. As Francis notes that “There is not one typical profile of the political elite in KwaZulu-Natal” (2011:75)<sup>97</sup>. Instead, while race is an important category in the politics elite of KwaZulu-Natal, “the political elite in KwaZulu-Natal reveal clusters of elites that share specific characteristics. These clusters are not always specific to a political party” (Francis 2011:75).

The above table also shows that both the votes of the IFP and the DA added would still not be enough to side-line the ANC. The ANC was able to attain a majority after ten years and five elections. This translates to three national /provincial and two local government elections. Despite the 2004 election being declared free and fair, the IFP laid a complaint stating that 367 000 votes were tempered with during election process. The 2004 election saw the inauguration of Thabo Mbeki as president of South Africa, Jacob Zuma as Deputy President and Sibusiso Ndebele as the Premier of KwaZulu-Natal. “A day before the inauguration of Mbeki, the IFP withdrew its vote rigging allegations on the grounds of ‘interests of national unity’” (Letsholo 2005:10).

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<sup>97</sup> Besides race, there are other social characteristics such as gender, age, regional identification, family and lineage ties, religious affiliation, education, and occupational background and community activities.

The 2004 elections in KwaZulu-Natal were not spared from election related violence. Cases of attacks and intimidation between the IFP and ANC were also visible on party members and supporters. The 2004 election were mainly characterised by disruptions intended to prevent free electioneering. According Mottiar (n.d), “The ANC, for example, alleged that IFP supporters blocked access to areas, tore down ANC posters and assaulted ANC supporters. The IFP in turn blamed ANC supporters for setting up road blocks, stoning cars and attacking an IFP councillor”<sup>98</sup>.

#### **5.2.2.4 The 2009 election**

The extent of violence during the 2009 election in the Province appeared to have taken a major decline. According to Zulu et al (2009:29) “relative to the situation in the province just over 14 years ago when violence and intimidation were rife and presented a genuine barrier to election campaigning and freedom of the electoral process, the KwaZulu-Natal’s political culture markedly improved in levels of tolerance”. There were however concerns on the possibility of violence and intimidation before the elections of 2009. Zulu et al (2009:6) states, “These concerns, together with a broad sense that the general elections of 2009 would be a milestone in South Africa’s current political history, drew greater attention to the question of violence and intimidation in KwaZulu-Natal”.

There were a number of observers that took part in ensuring a peaceful election. One of them was the Observer mission known as the African Alliance for Peace (AfAP). Together with its ACCORD partners, the West African Network for Peace (WANEP) and the Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa

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<sup>98</sup> <http://www.electionupdate.org.za/2014eu3kzn.htm>

(NPI-Africa) played a crucial role in creating a stable climate for peaceful, free and fair election during this period<sup>99</sup>. Former President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo was the head of the AfAP during the observer mission.

There were seventeen political parties that took part in the 2009 election; the election eventually went with very few incidences of political violence despite positive signs of electoral proceedings. “The presence of security forces did much to minimise the potential damage this could have caused on the elections” (Zulu 2009:29). There are different observations that explain the political outcome of few incidences of political violence and success of the 2009 election during this era. Notable amongst others are a decline in the Presence of weapons including traditional weapons and Specific incidents of violence and intimidation.

As an result of the 2009 election, twenty-five parties ran for the election, however, only six (6) parties were able to attain seats in the legislature. The top two parties were the ANC and the IFP, with each party winning 51 seats and 18 seats respectively. The ANC showed much improvement compared to previous elections. According to Bruce (2009:6), “Compared to 2004 the ANC improved its provincial position by 16 percentage points, winning 63 per cent of the vote in the province. The IFP lost more than 14 percentage points, ending with 22 per cent of the vote”. See table below for 2009 provincial election results.

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<sup>99</sup> The role of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) is not to be taken lightly during elections, the IEC is a statutory body which manages and controls South Africa elections. It was first created in advance of the national democratic elections in 1994 and its purpose is to ensure free and fair election.

**Table 5.4 22 April 2009 - General Election Results - KZN: Provincial Legislature**

<b>PARTY</b>	<b>VALID VOTES</b>	<b>SEATS</b>	<b>% VOTES</b>
ANC	2 192 516	51	62.95%
IFP	780 027	18	22.40%
DA	318 559	7	9.15%
MF	71 507	2	2.05%
COPE	44 890	1	1.29%
ACDP	23 537	1	0.68%
UDM	7 953	0	0.23%
AL J	7 612	0	0.22%
ID	6 853	0	0.20%
NADECO	6 881	0	0.20%
VF Plus	5 760	0	0.17%
ACP	5 087	0	0.15%
SADECO	3 883	0	0.11%
PAC	2 578	0	0.07%
UCDP	1 798	0	0.05%
WF	1 816	0	0.05%
GKSA	1 730	0	0.05%

**Source:** Compiled by the Researcher

Even though there has been a decline in political violence in the Province, it could still be a precarious assumption to envisage less violent elections in the future. Two reasons can be noted from these claim, firstly, there is still a continuous and vibrant optimism and participation of different political parties in South Africa's political culture and secondly, (as seen in table 5.1 and 5.2 above) , the existence of cleavages and segments on party representation is still to a great extent visible. Most political parties, especially the small ones are still voting along ethnic and racial

lines. For example, the electoral trends between the ANC, DA and other smaller parties such as MF, ID, Vryheidfront Plus and Christian Democratic Party and the IFP attests to this claim (compare 2004 election pattern to 2009). These election trends shows the consistency in political party behavior as characterized by identity voting and ethnic cleavage as shown by party representation in the Province.

However, power-sharing could still bring about a difference in curbing violence in the province, not only election related violence but violence that may also be perpetrated by social, economic and political problems. Jastad (2010:62) puts it, "...power-sharing includes any type of institution dividing or sharing political, economic, territorial and military power. ... [T]he more power-sharing provisions in an agreement, the higher the like hood that peace will endure". Therefore employing preventative measures to potential violence in KZN should take into account, cooperation, consensus and participation of different segments of society - A consociational approach that is. According to Mdletshe (2014:1) "we owe it to the people of KwaZulu-Natal to exercise leadership, work towards stability and peaceful coexistence with our political colleagues". Such an approach will have to be in line with the already existing cooperative government structures. This is because cooperative governance in the Province has however created an enabling environment for consociationalism to be put in place.

### **5.3 Cooperative Governance in KZN & Intergovernmental Relations.**

#### **5.3.1 Consociational elements in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal**

KwaZulu-Natal's institutional arrangement reflects more of Arend Lijphart's consociationalism. This is because of the four visible elements of consociationalism that appears in KZN's political makeup. Firstly, one visible consociational feature in the Province is the principle of power-sharing, more especially between government and traditional authority. This is a unique feature given that the Province of KwaZulu-Natal adopted the KwaZulu-Natal Traditional Leadership and Governance Act No.5 of 2005 which amongst other things provides for the; Recognition of traditional communities; Establishment and recognition of traditional councils; Recognition of traditional leaders, their roles and functions and the Recognition of Isilo as the Monarch of the Province<sup>100</sup>. Moreover "A formal agreement was reached that chapters seven and 12 of the constitution would be amended to ensure that the powers and functions of traditional leaders would not be obliterated by the implementation of the Municipal Structures Act and other legislation" (Gwala 2015).

Secondly, the principle of segmental autonomy is also visible in the province, "One of the major innovations of the 1996 Constitution was the elevation of local government to a sphere of government, firmly establishing local government's autonomy. A municipality now had the right to govern, on its own initiative, the local government affairs of its community"<sup>101</sup>. This means that national and provincial government may not encroach the institutional integrity of local government despite the powers invested in them to supervise local government. This also means that local government or districts have the right to exercise their autonomy on cultural activities that specifically apply to their communities. Moreover, the Province of KwaZulu-Natal also

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<sup>100</sup> The Act also provides for the removal of a traditional leader from office, provide for Houses of Traditional Leaders, provide for a Code of Conduct for traditional leaders, provide for the repeal of certain laws and to provide for incidental matters. See: KWAZULU-NATAL TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE ACT, 2005 (Act No. 5 of 2005)

<sup>101</sup> <http://www.salga.org.za/pages/Municipalities/About-Municipalities>

comply with the principle of segmental autonomy in the field of education, language, religion, customary law and traditional leadership. With specific reference to education, South Africa's education autonomy like India's, is fully supported by the central government where "the crucial feature of education autonomy is not just the minorities' right to set up and run their own school by the ability to make this right effective through full government financial support of these schools" (Lijphart 1996:260).

Provinces also adheres to the South African Constitution which states the freedom of her citizens in choosing ones language, education and religion and being able to live by their choice<sup>102</sup>. With specific reference to languages, the Province is also working towards the promotion of multilingualism and the use of indigenous languages. The MEC for Arts, Culture, Sports and Recreation, Ms Sibhidla-Saphetha reported that "the KwaZulu-Natal Languages Bill is at its final stages of consideration by the Department. The Bill will be referred to the Legislature by the end of June and we envisage implementing it before the end of the current financial year" (Sibhidla-Saphetha 2015)<sup>103</sup>.

South Africa's consociational setup also shares certain features to that of India particularity with reference to the representation and promotion of local government (referred to as local democracy in India). The most notable difference between India and South Africa with regards to segmental autonomy is that India's segments unlike South Africa's are more defined by religion and

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<sup>102</sup> South African Constitution – see articles 6, 15, 20, 30 and 31 among others.

<sup>103</sup> The Provincial language Bill intends to empower the public to use languages of their choice in order to access government services, knowledge and information and to promote parity of esteem and equitable treatment of all provincial languages among other objectives.

language, thus India has some of her states represented specifically by religious and linguistic segments. According to Lijphart (1996:260-261);

Cultural autonomy for religions and linguistic groups has taken three main forms in power-sharing democracies: (1) federal arrangements in which state and linguistic boundaries largely coincide, thus providing a high degree of linguistic autonomy, as in Switzerland, Belgium, and Czecho-Slovakia; (2) the right of religious and linguistic minorities to establish and administer their own autonomous schools...; and (3) separate “personal laws” – concerning marriage, divorce, custody and adoption of children, and inheritance-for religious minorities, as in Lebanon and Cyprus. India democracy has had all these three forms, the last two from the very beginning and linguistic federalism since the 1950s.

Even though there are slight differences, especially in terms of segmental representation between India and South Africa, however, what is common between the two countries is that the power-sharing principle could not be traced at a state level. Hence, only an emphasis on local democracy is made in bringing about representation and participation of segments in local government. As Dreze and Sen (2002:14) notes that “Indeed, local democracy represents one means of participation in the larger democratic system, which is relatively accessible to the disadvantaged and can be potentially a stepping-stone towards other forms of democratic participation”.

Thirdly, the principle of proportional representation is also visible in KZN’s political setup. This is because, South Africa in general uses the PR system which has been “described as ultimately democratic because no votes are ‘wasted’ and the low threshold ensures that even the smallest of parties is represented in parliament, thus facilitating nation building and political stability” (Mottiar 2005:2). It is worth noting that both the national and provincial electoral systems differ from the local government’s electoral system. For example, in both metropolitan councils and local councils, “half the councillors represent wards and half are chosen from party lists in the order in

which their names appear on the lists. Electoral representation is, therefore, through the mixed member representative system which combines the accountability of direct personal representation with the equity of proportional representation” (Mottiar 2005:3). The inclusion of traditional leaders may also be considered in the municipal council’s proceedings, however, such traditional leaders “may not exceed 20 % of elected councillors and traditional leaders sit on councils *ex officio* – they do not have voting rights” (Mottiar 2005:3).

South Africa’s transition to a peaceful political climate (both at a national and provincial level) can be similarly compared to the Belgian case. Even though “the pillars in Belgium have been built on a combination of religions and economic cleavages” (Deschouwer 2006:897), however, certain similarities can be noted between Belgium and South Africa (KZN), mainly was the willingness of the elites and political parties to negotiate. Similarly to South Africa, in Belgium “the political parties play a major role in negotiating the way out of political crises. Every party has a number of individuals – sometimes not centre stage – with this crucial capacity of finding compromises when needed” (Deschouwer 2006:897). Moreover, both countries seem to have used consociationalism during the escalation of the crisis, which made the elites were able to recognise the dangers of not cooperating. In the case of Belgium for instance, Deschouwer (2006:898) notes, “When the crisis deepens, the elites finally decided to opt for the consociational devices: power-sharing and thus mutual veto, proportional distribution and – in the case of the school question – segmental autonomy”. Likewise, South Africa saw the need to compromise upon the escalation of political violence which claimed the lives of many people. According to (Hamber 1998)

To a great extent, the negotiated settlement did result in political stability and bring an end to large-scale political violence. It also provided a powerful lesson in the mutual

dependency of former enemies who, within a context of continual crisis management and high levels of violence, were forced to accept compromise.

Lastly, minority veto is present in KwaZulu-Natal's political landscape, even though the minority veto is not formally announced. For instance the Country's constitution, the legislature at a provincial level requires two-thirds majority to make a decision before the legislature. For instance, in a situation where there is a wish to adopt a provincial constitution, two thirds of the Members needs to vote in favour of the Bill. In the KZN general elections of 2014, the ANC attained 64.5% of the provincial votes, this means that the ANC as a ruling party cannot account for two-thirds of the Provincial Legislature, hence it cannot be change the constitution unilaterally. On the other hand, this makes the minority veto possible in cases where minority segments are able to make two-thirds of the provincial legislature in opposition of a particular Bill.

### **5.3.2 Constitutional Mandate**

The Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) provides that the government is constituted of three spheres, namely national, provincial and local government. The Constitution enjoins the spheres of government to work together in the spirit of cooperation rather than competition. This implies that each sphere is in charge of planning for its own activities, but at the same time those activities and the corresponding plans by which they are guided, have to be aligned with what is happening in other spheres. Co-operative governance is given statutory and institutional expression through Intergovernmental Relations (IGR). These spheres are distinctive, inter-dependant and interrelated. These concepts reflect the different components of a decentralized South African state.

In 2005, the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (13 of 2005) was passed to make sure that the principles in Chapter Three of the Constitution on cooperative government are implemented. The Act seeks to set up mechanisms to coordinate the work of all spheres of government in providing services, alleviating poverty and promoting development. The Act also establishes a line of communication that goes from municipalities to the provinces and directly to the Presidency.

The different spheres of government depend on each other for support in project implementation, thus regular communication among different spheres is essential. For example, when a municipality proposes the development of a new township in its Integrated Development Plan (IDP), health and education services have to be provided. “An important consideration is that an IDP is more than just a theoretical document. It must be implementable – it must become “everyone’s IDP” (Theron 2009:146).

#### **5.4 Landscape and Terrain of Governance in the Province**

The Province of KwaZulu-Natal has a complex institutional arrangement, more especially because of the government’s adoption of Operation Sukuma Sakhe (OSS), an integrated program to service delivery. As part of this program, all government departments are supposed to work collaboratively by visiting the most deprived households in the Province. The idea is to ensure that communities receive service delivery in areas such as welfare and health. “OSS encompasses: the “One Home One Garden Program”; ensure that families are assisted to register for birth certificates and identity Documents: promotes education, skills development and youth development and emphasizes the delivery of services and infrastructure development”<sup>104</sup> The Provincial Government is constituted

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<sup>104</sup> See - [http://kzntopbusiness.co.za/site/public-sector/view/5811/687/2012/07/09/OPERATION\\_SUKUMA\\_SAKHE/print/](http://kzntopbusiness.co.za/site/public-sector/view/5811/687/2012/07/09/OPERATION_SUKUMA_SAKHE/print/)


of sixteen Departments, including the Department of the Royal Household. Each of the department is expected to develop and facilitate implementation of plans to develop all areas of KwaZulu-Natal, and to work collaboratively with other spheres of Government and relevant agencies in their respective sectors in pursuit of this objective. The work of these departments is coordinated mainly through the Executive Council Cluster system. The role of the Executive Council clusters is to “provide a forum for more detailed consideration and discussion of issues before referral to the Executive Council. As a principle, matters for decision by the Executive Council should be considered first by one or more Executive Council Clusters” (KZN Cabinet Manual 2011:39). It is also worth noting that “Executive Council Clusters derive their powers from the Executive Council and can only make recommendations which are ratified by the Executive Council. Members of the Executive and Departments must not act on the Executive Council Cluster decisions unless they have been confirmed (or amended) by the Executive Council” (KZN Cabinet Manual 2011:39).

There are four Clusters into which the departments are arranged, namely

- (i) Governance and Administration Cluster (G&A);
- (ii) Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster (JCPS) ;( informally constituted and functioning under (G&A)
- (iii) Economic Sectors and Infrastructure Development Cluster (ESID); and
- (iii) Social Protection, Human and Community Development Cluster (SPCHD).

Figure 5.2 illustrates the functions of the different clusters in the Executive Council.

**Figure 5.2 Clusters in the Executive Council**



**Source:** Province of KwaZulu-Natal Presentation on PGDP, 2014

The figure above shows the four clusters that work collaboratively with non-governmental stakeholder group in the Cabinet Office (now called the Executive Council Office). Non-governmental stakeholders cannot be listed on themselves, given their size in numbers, however Non-governmental stakeholders can be categorized into sectors. The main sectors in which such non-governmental stakeholders can be categorized are; the labour sector, which is often referred to as the ‘union sector’, faith based sector or religious groups sector, Business Sector which also has many organizations operating under it. NGOs/NPSs sector sometimes referred to as ‘interest groups’ and are usually at community level – others are also called CBOs but they call under the umbrella name called NGOs. It is also worth noting that there are some Non-governmental

structures that have formed themselves into forums and are operating outside government, for example. Youth forums, and vulnerable grouping including, children, women and people with disability.

The labour sector plays an important role in eliminating labour inequalities in the province and generally improving the working conditions of all South Africans. There are pieces of legislation that aims to ensure that the labour market is strengthened. For example; the South Africa's labour market transformed since 1994, with an emphasis on strategies that eliminate labour inequalities of the past and improve general working conditions for all South Africans. The Labour Relations Act (LRA); the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA); the Employment Equity Act (EEA); and the Skills Development Act (SDA). In KwaZulu-Natal, the labour sector is aligned with Goal one of the PGDP on 'Job Creation'. According to the PDGP (2014:26) "Government led job creation programmes yield income and prepare participants for entry into the labour market". In ensuring that there is public participation in this sector, Trade Unions<sup>105</sup> play a significant role in the Province's labour relation. All three federations form part of the labour constituency which is called the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC). "NEDLAC was launched in 1995 with the aim of building consensus between the State and its partners on social and economic issues. The stated priority for NEDLAC was public participation". (Theron 2009:121) NEDLAC has been noted as having contributed significantly to both economic reform and promoting dialogue in the labour sector. According to Webster & Joynt (2014),

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<sup>105</sup> South Africa has three (3) major union Federations. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the Federation of Trade Unions of South Africa (FEDUSA) and the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU).

The South African experience shows that NEDLAC has had an important impact on the content, pace and sequence of economic reform in three broad areas: the restructuring of the labour market, trade liberalisation and competition policy, as well as privatisation. Peak-level social dialogue improved the quality of the decisions through the input of business and labor and built political bases of support for economic reform.

Faith based organisations (FBOs) also play a major role in the provision of community services. FBOs have been responsible for the provision of education, water, food, health, spiritual upliftment and other important community needs of the poor and vulnerable groups. With specific reference to health, Moyo & Ying-Ling Keir (2014:346) observes;

This central role of FBOs in health service provision in Sub-Saharan Africa can not only be explained by their long histories in this continent and the generous funding they continue to receive from western donors. They possess unique features, functions and capabilities that government departments, national and international development agencies do not have.

FBOs have shown their importance in the provision of education through the provision of scholarships for the most vulnerable. This also includes the provision of food for AIDS orphans through both spiritual support and the provision of basic needs such as shelter and clothing. For example, Moyo & Ying-Ling Keir (2014: 346) states that “Long before the first feature story on AIDS in Africa appeared in USA Today in 1999 and brought the global epidemic to American consciousness, the Salvation Army in South Africa was already caring for dozens of AIDS orphans”. In KwaZulu-Natal, there have been a number of Faith Based organization that have contributed positively towards the lives of the vulnerable. For example, the Tzu Chi Buddhist Compassion Relief Organization has been diligent in providing home-based care projects and winter distribution in KwaZulu-Natal’s Ladysmith and Newcastle. Moreover, Tzu Chi volunteers also “conduct regular presentations focusing on safe sex practices, abstinence and HIV

transmission channels in communities that include Umbumbulu, Addington and Isipingo” (Moyo & Ying-Ling Keir: 2014:348).

Thus in enhancing the health and community of citizens it is important that government creates partnerships with FBOs. The KwaZulu-Natal PGDP (2014:73) has noted that;

...[P]artnerships between community health practitioners, the rationalisation of health care facilities, as well as nutritional, physical and spiritual wellness programmes all contribute to the health of communities. These elements entail partnerships with traditional healers, faith-based organisations, sports development practitioners and recreation as well as health care facilities.

One of the purposes of the KwaZulu-Natal PDGP is to “Guide the activities and resource allocation of provincial government and other spheres of government, business sectors, organised labour and other role players from civil society that can contribute to development in the province” (PGDP 2014:9). The role of the business sector as one of the non-governmental stakeholders become important in not only supporting government’s strategic projects, but also in strengthening partnership between civil society and business in the Province. Not only does the business sector focus on the business aspect of developing communities, it also contributes towards the criminal justice system by reducing and preventing crime. Thus the idea of community partnerships “require individuals, communities, businesses, non-government organisations and government to work together in a coordinated way to implement effective strategies to prevent and reduce crime” (PGDP 2014:84).

Despite the presence of these different non-government stakeholders in the province, the extent of their impact and level of participation deserves further attention and investigation. This is because

to a great extent, non-government stakeholders in KwaZulu-Natal do not have a statutory platform to influence and shape policy while also reviewing the impact of policies in communities. As a result, this lack of participation has negative impact on the application of development, especially at a local level. Theron (2009:132), states;

Reality has shown that development often fails because there are methodological and process differences between authentic public participation processes on the one hand and informing, consulting, involving and engagement processes masquerading as public participation on the other. ...South African applications are unfortunately not often focused on authentic public participation. This means that the building blocks of development are not yet accommodated, which calls for an urgent reassessment of public participation principles, strategies and policies in South Africa.

As a result, non-governmental stakeholders do not to have much of an impact even within the Executive Council. The nature of South Africa's political system encourages the promotion of public participation through the creation of platforms for civil society engagements. Thus the existence of such non-governmental stakeholders act more as a facade for the government's constant emphasis on public participation through civil society engagements. The role of non-governmental stakeholders in a democratic society should be to participate in government programs and representing their different sector interests. There is also a need for civil society organizations to be formally recognized, in order to measure the extent to which they participate and contribute towards communities. As noted by the National Development Agency (2014:32), "Given the diversity and scale of CSOs participation it would be essential for civil society to be organised under an umbrella body which must be representative of all civil society voices and must ensure accountability". Government should be responsible in ensuring that civil society organization are well resourced if they are to contribute towards public participation in the

province of KwaZulu-Natal. This will allow wider and flexible participation in the development process, one that is able to create its own strategies and inputs in the development process. As Theron (2009:121) notes “It should be stressed that participants in the development process should be allowed to define and/or create their own view of their social, political, economic and other environments and the strategies that should be used to address the problems of such environments”. By doing so, the government will be strengthening the consociational elements through catering from these different segments, currently this is not the case, hence a weakness of consociationalism in KwaZulu-Natal. Despite the Provincial Planning Commission (PPC) resembling a coordinating structure for civil society coordination, not all stakeholders are involved in the PPC. The actual responsibility of ensuring a formal coordination and participation of non-governmental stakeholders lie with the Office of the Premier’s Stakeholder Coordination Unit.

The (PPC) is established by resolution of the KwaZulu-Natal Executive Council (cabinet). In terms of cabinet resolution no 229 of 28 July 2010. The role of the PPC is to undertake planning and make recommendations that will assist the provincial government in dealing with;

- A long term strategic development perspective and vision of the province;
- Ensuring coherence in policy development and planning across the provincial government; and
- Strengthening performance monitoring and evaluation to assess the pace required to deliver on the desired outcomes<sup>106</sup>

Even though all departments are meant to work together in the delivery of services through OSS, specific departments are meant to play important roles in catering for different segments of society.

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<sup>106</sup> See <http://www.kznppc.gov.za/AboutUs.aspx>

For example, the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs is tasked with ensuring there is a good working relationship between traditional leadership and local government (councillors), this also entails assisting local government in the implementation of government service delivery. Within the department of cooperative governance and traditional affairs, a specific focus is drawn to assisting Amakhosi (traditional leaders) in playing their role as an important segment of the Province. In summary COGTA receives its mandate from the constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Accordingly;

The mandate of the Department of Traditional Affairs is derived from:

- **Sections 211 and 212** of the Constitution, which stipulates that:
  - “The institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to customary law, are recognized, subject to the Constitution”;
  - “National legislation may provide for a role for traditional leadership as an institution at local level on matters affecting local communities”.<sup>107</sup>
- **Section 30** of the Constitution, on *Language and Culture*: “everyone has the right to use the language and participate in the cultural life of their choice, but no-one exercising these rights may do so in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.”<sup>108</sup>
- **Section 31** of the Constitution on Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities: “persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right, with other members of that community to enjoy their culture, practice their religion and use their language; to form; join or maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other organs of civil society.”<sup>109</sup>

Despite the mandate of the Constitution as highlighted above, the Department of Cooperative Governance has faced certain challenges in ensuring that all segments of society are catered for.

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<sup>107</sup> The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.

<sup>108</sup> *ibid*

<sup>109</sup> *ibid*

One of the challenges encountered by the department is the growing frustration of some Amakhosi at the “apparent lack of recognition traditional leaders received from the new dispensation” (Meer & Campbell 2007:7). This problem is linked to the participation of Traditional leaders in Municipal Councils. Accordingly, Traditional leaders have no voting powers and are not members of Council. “Traditional Leaders are representatives of their communities in Council but are not members thereof. They can only participate in debates on matters that affect their traditional communities” (Salga 2012). In this regard traditional leaders do not find themselves working effectively with government. This then becomes the weakness of the consociational arrangement in KwaZulu-Natal as consociationalism requires that there is recognition of different segments of society.

On the other hand, the Department of Social Development is supposed to play an important role of the following core functions.

- (i) Management and oversight over social security, encompassing social assistance and social insurance policies that aim to prevent and alleviate poverty in the event of life cycle risks such as loss of income due to unemployment, disability, old age or death occurring<sup>110</sup>.
- (ii) Developmental social welfare services that provide support to reduce poverty, vulnerability and the impact of HIV and AIDS through sustainable development programmes in partnership with implementing agents such as State-funded institutions, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) and Faith-Based Organisations (FBOs)<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>110</sup>[http://www.dsd.gov.za/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=54](http://www.dsd.gov.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=54)

<sup>111</sup> *ibid*

The core functions of the department of social development, what the department ought to do and what is actually does could explain the rates of poverty in the different districts and the extent to which NGOs or CBOs participate in political decision making in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. This to a great extent affects public participation negatively and limits the relationship between government and the people. Moreover, the effective participation of NGOs is constrained by a number of factors which makes it difficult for them to contribute effectively towards community development. As Banks, Hulmes and Edwards (2015:711) assert, “The ability of NGOs to promote democracy is dependent on processes that begin with and gain strength from grassroots mobilization and associationalization. These processes hinge on participation from, and accountability to, members”. While Section 152 (1) of the constitution states that “local government must encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in matters of local government”<sup>112</sup>, NGOs and civil society are still not effectively involved in key political decision making. The participation of such NGOs and civil society is important as they also form part of the different segments of society. The state, therefore plays a major role in restricting the full participation of NGOs in communities. “Alongside weak links with the grassroots where they lack a strong membership base, NGOs are also constrained by state control of the regulatory environment” (Banks et al 2015:711). Thus “Participation can only constitute political action when it attempts to change the underlying structures and processes underlying limited and unequal access”. (Banks et al 2015:711)

In KwaZulu-Natal where there are districts with high rates of poverty, the role of NGOs and civil society cannot be overlooked, their participation in political decision making will strengthen their

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<sup>112</sup> The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996

ongoing efforts<sup>113</sup> in poverty eradication both in rural areas and in urban areas. The contrary is also true, especially where state regulation exist and where government equate NGOs with opposition “and create regulations to dampen or repress civil society, NGOs face severe limitations on their ability to act as agents of progressive social change” (Bank et al 2015:711-712). Therefore, as Buccus notes, “it needs to be said that the efforts on the parts of CBOs and NGOs in their struggle against poverty can only be enhanced through public participation” (2004:9). One NPO that has contributed to the wellbeing of the vulnerable in KwaZulu-Natal has been the Al-Imdaad foundation. The foundation has been proactive in working together with the government of KwaZulu-Natal in the provision of services such as orphans and child welfare, housing and shelter, food and nutrition and education and skills development. “The Al-Imdaad Foundation has thus, for a number of years now, been part of the institutional partnerships envisioned by Operation Sukuma Sakhe to actively address the social and developmental issues faced by poor South Africans”<sup>114</sup>.

The principle of Proportional representation is therefore not met if NGOs are not active in the participation of political decision making. In other words, their participation is important to account for proportional representation as a requisite for consociationalism in KwaZulu-Natal. The National NPO summit 14-17 August 2012 acknowledged and made recommendation on some of the challenges faced by CBOs and NPOs in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal. Amongst such recommendations were that;

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<sup>113</sup> In most legislative frameworks in the country CBOs and NGOs have been described and considered as “social partners” in the building of a better, more humane society, especially in relation to their developmental efforts, which are closely aligned with the eradication of poverty. See- Buccus, pg11

<sup>114</sup> <http://www.alimdaad.com/html/Public/ProjectDetails.aspx?id=261>

- The role of Local Government and traditional leadership in the development and transformation of the NPO sector features quite prominently.
- The formation of district or local based NPO Forums to act as a collective voice for the sector comes out strongly.
- The transformation of the welfare services to support the National Democratic Development agenda in line with the notion of a developmental state is key.
- The funding models and regime need to support the transformational path.
- The transformation of the NPO sector needs to be anchored by clearly defined capacity building strategy. (Thusi 2012).

The above recommendations attest that there is still a need to rejuvenate the work of NPOs and CBOs in creating a workable partnership with government. There is a further need to give much attention to NPOs in rural areas. Thusi (2012) acknowledged that “NPOs in rural areas are being ignored by DSD – no spatial considerations”. Therefore CBOs, NPOs and NGOs need to be fully embraced in government decision making, instead of them being faced in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal.

## **5.5 Poverty analysis in KwaZulu-Natal**

KwaZulu Natal is the third province most afflicted by poverty (after Limpopo and the Eastern Cape) see Figure 5.4 While declining over time poverty in the province remains above the country average. The poor are mostly found in the rural areas and there is a close relation between incidences of poverty and unemployment and under-employment. The labour market remains crucial in addressing the growing levels of poverty and inequality. This is because a growing labour market through employment guarantees access to income that eases the burden of poverty and potentially reduce inequality. At the same time, a depressed labour market may be the cause of

social and political instability due to growing frustrations from unemployment. The table below shows the percentages of people living in poverty<sup>115</sup> per district in 2004, 2009 and 2013.

**Table 5.5 Percentage of People Living in Poverty per KZN - District**

	2004	2009	2013
KwaZulu-Natal	54.80%	51.20%	49.10%
eThekweni	39.50%	39.10%	38.70%
uGu	61.80%	55.60%	53.20%
uMgungundlovu	49.10%	45.50%	43.20%
uThukela	65.20%	60.80%	58.20%
UMzinyathi	70.00%	63.10%	58.90%
Amajuba	61.00%	57.20%	55.40%
Zululand	68.70%	63.40%	60.50%
uMkhanyakude	70.90%	66.40%	62.90%
uThungulu	59.20%	55.10%	52.40%
ILembe	59.10%	52.70%	49.10%
SiSonke	68.30%	61.30%	58.60%


**Source:** Global insight 2014 – cited in Nhleka (table redrawn by the researcher)

Ranking the districts according to the percentage of people living in poverty shows that UMkhanyakude, UMzinyathi, Zululand and Sisonke have the highest poverty levels whilst

<sup>115</sup> Here poverty is viewed according to the OSS approach and takes into account the state of multiple deprivations, i.e. a deficiency in an individual's socio-economic capabilities. Its manifestations include poverty in income, lack of access to basic services, health, education and access to assets, the extent of social networks or social capital among the poor. See: KZN Integrated Poverty Package Presentation - 2013

eThekwini and uMgungundlovu have the least percentage of people living in poverty. (These findings are in line with the objectives of the thesis, which is focusing on a comparison between one of the poorest districts (uMzinyathi) and uMgungundlovu and eThekwini as better economically stable districts). This is further illustrated by the Average Income per District Municipality (DM) in the figure (5.3)

**Figure 5.3 Average Income Level per DM per Annum**



**Source:** Office of the Premier presentation, 1 February 2012


Figure 5.3 shows that uMzinyathi and uMkhanyakude are the lowest districts in term of average income levels. This poverty perspective is referred to as the income perspective and takes into account welfare payments, wage levels, poverty datum lines, and GNP as income indicators<sup>116</sup>. On the other hand uMgungundlovu and eThekwini shows a positive outlook compared to the other district of the Province. The link between poverty and lack of participation, especially in local

<sup>116</sup> See: Davids, I. 2009- Poverty in South Africa: A Development Management Perspective.

government cannot be underestimated. This link can be traced mainly from two identified perspectives of poverty, sustainable livelihoods perspective and the human development perspective. Firstly, the sustainable livelihoods perspectives “stresses the participation of individuals and communities in defining and solving their own poverty” (Davids 2009:40). Moreover, Davids elaborates that “by focusing on vulnerability or the inability to cope with hardship rather than on poverty per se, the issues that emerge may not be the lack of an income or even unemployment, but rather factors such as the breakdown of the family or social problems like alcoholism” (2009:40).

Secondly, the human development perspective “emphasizes a holistic understanding of poverty in terms of which anti-poverty actions enlarge people’s life choices. This refers to enabling individuals to lead a long and healthy life, in which they are educated and have access to a decent standard of living” (Davids 2009:40). It is worth nothing that upholding human rights and securing social freedoms are part of this notion of poverty alleviation. In making the alleviation of poverty a reality in this perspective, it is therefore important that “In this regard public participation strategies should be introduced as strategies and policy consideration” (Davids 2009:40). As such “It is not an either / or situation – both the local government and “its public” (the beneficiaries of development) stand to gain through this planning partnership” (Theron 2009:136). The above data is important because it points out to the substantive participation or the lack of substantive participation of people living in the identified districts. Thus, as a result, the like hood is that people from the very poor districts do not have much of a say in the affairs of the communities than the better developed districts. KwaZulu-Natal’s percentage of people in poverty is compared to other provinces in figure 5.4 below.

**Figure 5.4 Percentage of People in Poverty - KwaZulu-Natal Compared**



Source: Global Insight (2014)

Figure 5.4 shows the depth of poverty in KwaZulu-Natal as compared to other provinces in South Africa. KwaZulu-Natal is the third highest with 49% after Eastern Cape and Limpopo. On the other hand, the Western Cape Province, Gauteng and Northern Cape are amongst the top three provinces that have the lowest percentages of people living below the poverty line.

## 5.6 The Role and Consociational Features of Provincial and Local Government

### 5.6.1 Legislative and Executive Autonomy of Provinces.

The Provincial government has both legislative and executive powers. This is because of the pre-election negotiations that proposed an autonomous setup of provinces, hence “the current makeup of provincial government is a result of the pre-election negotiation over the form of the post-apartheid state” (Pottie and Hassin 2003:81). The constitution of the Republic of South Africa Section 104 (1) states that “The legislative authority of a province is vested in its provincial legislature, and confers on the provincial legislature the power to-

- (a) To pass a constitution for its province or to amend any constitution passed by it in terms of section 142<sup>117</sup> and 143<sup>118</sup>.

The legislative authority of provinces is reflected in Section 114 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. On the other hand, provinces also have executive authority<sup>119</sup>.

The legislative and executive authority of provinces features in as an important element of consociationalism. This is because of the independent nature of provinces which enables them to function autonomously. Even though provinces are not purely federal in nature, since “Provinces have executive authority only to the extent that they have the necessary administrative capacity and national government may, under some circumstances, take over functions that a provincial government may not properly perform” (Constitutions of RSA, 1996), however, its legislative and executive autonomy in carrying out provincial needs does to a great extent compliment a consociational arrangement.

### **5.6.2 Fiscal Autonomy of Provincial and Local Government.**

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<sup>117</sup> Section, 142. A provincial legislature may pass a constitution for the province or, where applicable, amend its constitution, if at least two thirds of its members vote in favour of the Bill.

<sup>118</sup> Section 143 details the content of the Provincial constitution

<sup>119</sup> See: Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Section 125

Constitutionally provinces have limited powers when it comes to their revenue-generation ability. Both provinces and local government receive their transfers from national government through conditional grants, and equitable share<sup>120</sup>. The local government is represented in the National Council of the Provinces and in other important institutions like the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC). The FFC is an independent body that is set up under the Constitution to advise government on the portion of revenue that should go to provincial and local government to subsidise services for poor people (equitable share).

The Division of Revenue Act (DORA) lays down how the total government income (revenue) should be divided and allocated among the spheres of government, and within government. The local government is also represented on the Budget Council, where the Minister of Finance discusses the proposed budget with provincial and local government.

Despite limitations from National Government, provinces enjoy to a certain degree a high level of fiscal autonomy. The autonomy of provinces in this area is an important consociational feature to take into account. This is because consociationalism creates a sense of independence and permits provinces to have culturally based community rules. This is because, despite the occasional interference of central government, provincial and local government have the liberty to use allocated budget on specific issues relating to their constituencies. For example; Provinces play a critical role in the delivery of social services. Education, Health and social welfare are the largest areas that receive budgets for the delivery of social services in the Provinces. As noted in the National Treasury Budget Review (2015:73) “Provincial governments are responsible for

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<sup>120</sup> The equitable shares are determined by formulas that take into account demographic and developmental factors. Conditional grants are designed to achieve specific objectives, and provinces and municipalities must meet certain criteria to receive grants and fulfil conditions when spending them. See – national Treasury Budget Review, <http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2015/review/FullReview.pdf>.

implementing national policies for education, health, social development, agriculture, roads and human settlements. They are also responsible for their own governance and administration, including being answerable to the legislature and coordinating service delivery with local government”.

In KwaZulu-Natal, the provincial departments are responsible for carrying out a government mandate in delivering services through the Provincial Growth and Development Plan (PGDP). The provinces also play a critical role in laying out the foundations for faster economic growth. Moreover, they [provinces] also have a constitutional role to support municipalities in carrying out their responsibilities. Even though the constitution sets out the limits of provincial government in intervening in Municipal affairs, however, Section 139 (1) lays out exceptions and specific conditions in which the Province can intervene in municipal affairs.

Local government in KZN plays a critical role in the implementation of government service delivery. “Local governments are responsible for providing basic services such as water and sanitation, electricity reticulation, refuse removal, storm water management, municipal transport and roads, community services (such as parks, sport and recreation) and street lighting. They also provide free or subsidized basic services to poor households”<sup>121</sup>. The South African Local Government Association (SALGA) is the official representative of local government. Local municipalities join SALGA at provincial level. Executive elections and decisions on policies and programs happen at provincial or national general meetings. SALGA is also an employers' organisation for all municipal workers, and sits as the employer in the South African Local

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<sup>121</sup> See – national Treasury Budget Review 2015, pg. 73, or <http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2015/review/FullReview.pdf>.

Government Bargaining Council. SALGA's main source of funding is membership fees payable by municipalities.

Since municipalities have both the executive and legislative authority assigned to it by national or provincial government, local government has the right to manage the local government matters listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B of Schedule 5; and any other matter given to it by national or provincial legislation (Section 156 (1)). The coverage and independence of the local government sphere of government is stated in Section 151. Subsection (3) states that, a municipality has the right to govern, on its own initiative, the local government affairs of its community...". Local government also has authority to make and administer by-laws for the effective administration of matters assigned to it. The provincial government has the power to intervene in municipal affairs only in extreme circumstances. Municipalities have a constitutional right to impose rates on property and surcharges on fees for services they provide. Any other tax, levy or duty can only be imposed in terms of an Act of Parliament.<sup>122</sup>

Local government's largest budget is self-funded and their revenues are their major source of income. The degree to which municipalities are self-funded varies between municipalities in two ways.

First, only local and metropolitan municipalities levy property rates. Generally, only local and metropolitan municipalities impose surcharges on fees for services as they normally provide those functions. District municipalities, therefore, do not have a significant ownership revenue basis, but depend largely on intergovernmental allocations. Second, metropolitan municipalities and urban municipalities raise significantly more of their own revenue than rural municipalities, who depend largely on intergovernmental allocations<sup>123</sup>.

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<sup>122</sup> See - Departmental of Provincial and Local government – Practitioner's guide to Intergovernmental Relations in South Africa.

<sup>123</sup> *ibid*

Even though local government may not necessarily have full fiscal autonomy, however, they have powers that enable them to run their municipalities without much intervention from Provincial and national government, especially on their own initiatives. Moreover, their fiscal status is sufficient to account as a consociational feature of segmental autonomy and in any case, even in highly consociational democracies, the fiscal autonomy of regions is not a core prerequisite for consociationalism.


### **5.6.3 Legislative mandate to support local government.**

The Department of CoGTA is the custodian of municipal support. Chapter seven of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, in particular, section 154 (1) states that, “The national government and provincial governments, by legislative and other measures, must support and strengthen the capacity of municipalities to manage their own affairs, to exercise their powers and to perform their functions”. With regards to Provinces, The Local Government Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998, S 88 (3) states; “The MEC for local government in a province must assist a district municipality to provide support services to a local municipality”. The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (IRFA) 13 of 2005, Section 24 also states that “There is a district intergovernmental forum to promote and facilitate intergovernmental relations between the district municipality and the local municipalities in the district”. It is however worth noting that, the executive and legislative powers of local government lie with the municipal council<sup>124</sup>. Therefore, in the bid to strengthen co-operative governance through IGR, CoGTA, utilizes the established IGR structures to channel support services to municipalities. See figure 5.5 below.

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<sup>124</sup> See the Constitution of the republic of South Africa, section 43, C

Figure 5.5 KZN-COGTA's IGR Model for Municipal Support



Source: COGTA presentation 11 March 2014

The above CoGTA's model ensures that IGR does not only have to comply with legislation but also it add value to municipalities. In addition, the model seeks to: accelerate CoGTA's distribution of municipal support while the IRFA (2005) provides space for flexibility and negotiations within broad parameters. IGR forums do not make executive decisions, but they may take resolutions or make recommendations in order to promote and facilitate co-operative decision making (*governance*). IGR forums also provide a place for discussion and consultation on areas that require co-operation among the family of municipalities. IGR seeks to resolve disputes without resorting to judicial proceedings (reasonable effort). Ensure the smooth flow of information within the three spheres of government with a view of improving the implementation of policy and programs. Moreover, there are other legislations that govern or organize the IGR

system. These legislations formalize the roles and responsibilities of the different spheres with regard to their functions and their consultative structures<sup>125</sup>.

## **5.7 Operation Sukuma Sakhe (Oss) – An Integrated Approach to Service Delivery**


### **5.7.1 Origin of Operation Sukuma Sakhe**

On the 8<sup>th</sup> February 2008: Former President, Mr Thabo Mbeki, in his State of the Nation Address (SONA) announced the *National War on Poverty Campaign*. In 2008 the Province of KZN launched the War on Poverty in uMsinga. This was succeeded by a launch of *KZN Flagship Programme* at (eQhudeneni-Nkandla) in July 2009. The war on poverty approach focused on addressing social ill in the province such as, food security, fighting diseases such as TB, HIV and AIDS and Poverty, Empowerment of Women and Youth, to name but a few. The flagship programme commenced in uMzinyathi, eThekwini and uThungulu and subsequently to the whole Province. Provincial Task Teams (PTTs), District Task Teams (DTT) and Local Task Teams (LTTs) were established in all districts. Households were profiled and immediate service was provided. On March 2011 former Premier, Dr Zweli Mkhize (ANC Treasury General at the time of writing) re-launched the Flagship Program at the uMgungundlovu District as Operation Sukuma Sakhe (OSS). As a development strategy, OSS intends to benefit all sectors of society in communities. The participation of these stakeholders and beneficiaries is an important aspect of the integration process towards development. Such beneficiaries include, children, the elderly, the sick, people with disabilities, the youth, the working poor, the jobless, women and the unskilled and illiterate. The figure 5.6 below shows in summary the evolution of Operation Sukuma Sakhe since 1994-2011.

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<sup>125</sup> Other legislation include; the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act (1997), Municipal Structures Act (1998), The Municipal Systems Act (2000).

**Figure 5.6 Evolution of Operation Sukuma Sakhe**



**Source:** Operation Sukuma Sakhe 5 Year Review (2009-2013) Report

### 5.7.2 Legislative framework guiding OSS in KwaZulu-Natal

OSS is guided by the South Africa Constitution, Batho Pele Principles<sup>126</sup>, KZN Citizen's Charter<sup>127</sup>, Millennium Development Goals, 5 Priorities of Government<sup>128</sup> and the 12 National Outcome<sup>129</sup>. The Office of the Premier (OTP) is to provide the leadership and co-ordination needed to ensure that government acts in a strategic, integrated and co-ordinated manner in addressing the agenda of government. OTP also focuses on the outcome 12 (An efficient, effective, and development oriented public service and an empowered, fair and inclusive citizenship). This

<sup>126</sup> The Batho Pele Principles are based on putting people first before one considers his or her own needs. This is done through the identification of important things that can assist in improving the quality of people's lives. These principles include, consultation, service standards, access, courtesy, information, openness and transparency, redress, value for money, encouraging innovation and reward excellence, customer impact, leadership and strategic direction.


<sup>127</sup> The Charter emanates from the Bill of Rights as provided for in Chapter 2, section 7 to 39 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. The chapter paves way to protect the rights of the citizens through the government's commitment to ensure that service standards are not compromised.

<sup>128</sup> Governments 5 priorities are: Improving education, Improving healthcare, creating decent work, Fighting crime and corruption, Rural development and land reform.

<sup>129</sup> The government identified 12 outcomes that needs to be achieved by 2014/2015, amongst other include, quality basic education, a long and healthy life for all South Africans, creating a better South Africa, a better Africa and a better World to name but a few.

outcome is also regarded as the governance of OSS. Figure 5.7 shows the overall OSS structure and its institutional arrangement.

**Figure 5.7 Overall Structures and Institutional Arrangement**



**Source:** Office of the Premier presentation, 1 February 2012

The figure above shows the different stakeholders responsible for the implementation of OSS in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal. OSS also signifies power-sharing in government structures, OSS emphasizes the importance of an active citizenry ‘community partnership’. Both government and the community play an active role in the integration of government services in addressing issues such as Local Economic Development, Environmental care and behavioural change campaigns to addressing social ills.


It is worth noting that the intention is to create a channel of communication that will involve all the spheres of government from the Provincial level to the Local level in order to effectively carry

out service delivery using an integrated approach. This is in line with the OSS mission “To provide comprehensive, integrated and transversal services to communities through effective and efficient partnerships”. The idea around OSS is to eradicate poverty and empower the ordinary person through an integrated fashion. Poverty, especially at a local level has been the major cause of social ill despite much effort applied by government. “Municipalities have been confronted by a series of problems. Institutional incapacity and widespread poverty have undermined the sustainability of the local government project, leading in some instances to a catastrophic breakdown in services” (CoGTA 2014:5).

### **5.7.3 OSS institutionalization in communities**

In an effort to ensure participation of other segments of society and closing the gap between government and the community, OSS ensures that there are responses on the ground that is at ward / municipal level. All ward Mayors and councillors participate as champion leaders of OSS at ward level. This also includes all municipalities participating in the OSS coordinating structures. COGTA plays a huge role in the coordinating and strengthening participation of ward committees and traditional leadership into ward rooms. The role of field workers and community volunteers is to report to the war room as an integrated community fieldwork force. Figure 5.8 illustrates the institutionalization of OSS into local government and the community structure explaining their roles and responsibilities.

**Figure 5.8 OSS Institutionalization into local government & community structures.**



**Source:** Office of the Premier presentation, 1 February 2012

## 5.8 Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter has focused on the Province of KZN as a case study. Drawing reference of the politics in the province and its institutional arrangement, the chapter has argued that the province of KZN is an outcome of the South African consociational dispensations. Both the KZN Provincial and local government still contain visible consociational elements that can be used as a significant base in bringing about holistic development in the Province. The chapter has given a historical and political overview of the province to show that such consociational elements have

historical roots, and past cases of both election and political related violence are a critical area of focus in examining the extent to which consociational means were applied as a conflict resolution mechanism.

As a constitutional mandate, Cooperative government and the Intergovernmental relations Framework Act (2005) in the province has contributed tremendously towards bringing about development and moreover, its institutional arrangement has common features congruent to the consociational model and as such cannot be detached in the analysis of the Provincial developmental needs. Moreover, having drawn focus on the poverty analysis through an examination of the landscape and terrain of governance in the Province, the chapter has also given a detailed account of Operation Sukuma Sakhe (OSS) as an important integrated approach towards service delivery in the Province. Likewise, OSS share certain aspects of the consociational approach towards enhancing the lives of the people through the inclusion of the Province's various sectors of society. It is worth noting that these segments are stable in nature and they comprise more of party ideology and class than ethnicity and race. While class cleavages can impact less in the implementation of development and service delivery, ideological cleavages on the other hand have the potential of hampering development more through slow implementation of service delivery goals. The next chapter focuses on the survey and critical assessment of data collected in the three districts to which the focus of the study was drawn.

## **CHAPTER SIX: SURVEY AND CRITICAL ASSESSMENT**

### **6.1 Introduction**

This chapter focuses on the empirical component of the study. The methods of inquiry are qualitative. “Qualitative inquiries study how people and groups construct meaning. In so doing, qualitative methodology devotes considerable attention to how qualitative analysts determine what is meaningful” (Patton 2015:6). The chapter firstly deals with the methods of data collection and data analysis. Secondly, the chapter explains the ethical issues with respect to the research. Thirdly, I focus on an argument explaining and supporting the choices of the four main distinct groups of participants (Councillors – politicians, traditional leadership, senior government officials and focus group discussions). Lastly the chapter deals with the presentation and interpretation of the research findings.

### **6.2 Research Methodology**

Purposive sampling and snowball sampling were used as an approach of collecting data in this qualitative study. This is because I had the privilege of working in the Office of the Premier under the intergovernmental relations unit, hence attaining information and contacts of participants was not to a certain extent a difficult task. I am grateful to the intergovernmental relations staff for their cooperation and assistance. The nature of the environment also enabled me to seek assistance from others in getting hold of other contacts.

Purposive sampling in this case is appropriate because, “it select cases with a specific purpose in mind” (Neuman 1997:206). Lisa Given explains,

Embedded in this is the idea that who a person is and where that person is located within a group is important, unlike other forms of research where people are viewed as essentially interchangeable. Research participants are not always created equal – one well-placed articulate informant will often advance your research far better than any randomly chosen sample of fifty – and the way we sample needs to take that into account (Given 2008:697).

*Snowball sampling* is also appropriate because sometimes “it is impossible or difficult to identify beforehand all the people who fall into the categories needed. The researcher starts with few people available and gets them to refer him/her to others they think fall into these categories and that may be approached” (Hall & Hall 1996:113). Using the snowball sampling, Given (2008:125) also explains that “Participants are sampled as information-rich cases where each subsequent interview is designed to pursue areas of agreement or disagreement on what the priority issues are for the phenomenon under study”. One of the weaknesses of this sampling method is that the research might have a pool of participants who shares the same ideas, however in dealing with that, the participants include categories of participants from different organizations that are represented in the selected districts, for example, councillors (politicians), traditional leaders, and senior government officials.

Given the nature of the research being explanatory, the aim is to suggest practical ways of applying elements of consociationalism to development in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal and therefore purposefully selecting few cases that will contribute relevant information with a view of attaining a deeper understanding of people’s views on issues of cooperation and development. As a result, a small sample size has been opted for in order to avoid the generalization of generated opinions from a wider population and to ensure that insightful opinion contribute towards understating the

application of the theory of consociationalism to development in contemporary KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa and the larger global environment.

The insights produced may even assist in influencing future research into the applicability of consociationalism to other areas of interest concerning scholarly debates on democracy and development. This is because issues of development are a subject of great importance to humanity as a whole. Therefore, the identified participants were chosen because of their ability to comprehend issues of cooperation and democracy in relation to development.

Since the method of research is qualitative, a majority of the participants were interviewed face to face (telephonically in some instances). These included focus groups who were interviewed live. Out of a target of 12 individuals and 3 focus groups (each comprised of 3-6 participants – eThekweni had 3 participants, uMgungundlovu 4 participants and uMzinyathi had 6 participants), all individual participants and focus groups were interviewed. Individual participants were interviewed on individual bases as the main technique. Open-ended interviews were formulated to obtain the views of people regarding the objectives of the study. The interview questions were structured in a way that enables interrogation of the study's theoretical framework. In other words the interviewee had the opportunity of giving a detailed account of his or her views rather than only being asked closed questions that are fixed or have predetermined options. The aim of the open-ended questions was to allow the participants to freely express their feelings, knowledge and experiences on the subject. Unlike closed question that restricts the participants, "open-ended questions allow the informant to express an opinion without being influenced by the researcher (Foddy 1993:127).

The aim of the qualitative method of data collection is to explore people's experiences and understanding the concept of 'consensus' or 'cooperation' in relation to development. It is also part of the study to explore the extent to which different sectors of society perceive the level of cooperation within the different spheres of government in relation to the province of KwaZulu-Natal, particularly in relations to the selected districts chosen for the study.

The quality of qualitative research has not been immune from criticism, in large part qualitative research has been criticized for not serving "evidence-based practice well" (Hammersley 2007: 287). The evidence-based practice movement according to Hammersley ( 2005:86) "argues that policymaking and practice should be based on research evidence presented in the form of systematic reviews, in other words syntheses of the findings from all relevant studies meeting some threshold of methodological rigour". The above critique does not seem to carry much weight however, especially given that not all questions are best addressed through quantitative methods, in some instances other research questions are best addressed qualitatively. Even though the investigation procedures is not necessary through systematic application of scientific methods, "this does not mean that the knowledge or information gained cannot provide insights and solutions to problems that confront society" (Devine 1995:140). On the same vein, the nature of qualitative research as Hancock et al (2009:6) notes "focuses on reports of experience or on data which cannot be adequately expressed numerically".

### 6.3 Data Collection

Data collection was carried out from 17<sup>th</sup> January 2014<sup>130</sup> – August 2015. Interviews involving individual participants were conducted both telephonically and face to face. Individual interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were conducted in English. For those who were not able or did not prefer the English language, a Zulu translated questionnaire was used. Appointments to conduct such interviews were made both telephonically and electronically. Willing participants were given a brief synopsis of the study and upon indicating their willingness to participate, an appointment would be made and in some instances an interview will be conducted immediately. Through this process, 22 participants from the three districts, eThekweni, uMgungundlovu and uMzinyathi and 1 focus group was identified from each district. Specifically, eThekweni comprise of 2 traditional leaders, 4 political councillors, uMgungundlovu comprised of 2 traditional leaders, 4 political councillors and uMzinyathi comprised of 4 political councillors, 2 traditional leaders. All 4 senior government officials were identified in the Provincial Government in uMgungundlovu district. A mobile phone and a smart pen device were used to record the responses of participants captured in the data. The recording device assisted in ensuring the capturing of accurate information as a result of separating data gathering from data transcribing, moreover the recording device also offered unfiltered information on what took place thus contributing to quality of information gained. Handwritten notes were also taken as a backup to the recorded information for both individual interviews and FGDs. After each interview the information was transcribed

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<sup>130</sup> Humanities and Social Science Research Ethics Committee grants full approval for the researcher for data collection – protocol reference no: HSS/0935/013D

accurately by the interviewer and stored in the computer. The electronic versions of the recorded interviews were kept safely for cross referencing purposes.

#### **6.4 Data analysis**

The study uses inductive data analysis, whereby relevant data is first collected based on the topic of interest. “The primary purpose of the inductive approach is to allow research findings to emerge from the frequent, dominant or significant themes inherent in raw data, without the restraints imposed by structured methodologies” (Thomas 2003:2). This enables the researcher to make a connection between the gaps identified in the literature. One of the purposes of inductive data analysis is “to establish clear links between the research objectives and the summary findings derived from the raw data and to ensure these links are both transparent (able to be demonstrated to others) and defensible (justifiable given the objectives of the research)” (Thomas 2003:3). In clarifying the basis of inferences made and substantiating interpretations, quotations from transcripts have been included. This also includes highlighting the diverse points of views in cases where differences appear.

#### **6.5 Researcher integrity: ethical issues.**

It is not practicing good ethics of social research to force or coerce anyone to participate in your research, all participants should do so voluntarily. According to Neuman (2003:124), “It is not enough to get permission from subjects; they need to know what they are being asked to participate in so that they can make an informed decision”. It is on this basic principle of social research that before I conducted my interviews with potential participants, I firstly explained the nature of the

study and the importance of getting permission from the participants. In some instances questionnaires were emailed to participants in order to give them an idea of what the study's objectives entailed.

Before the interview could commence, participants were requested to give their consent and willingness to participate in the study. Participants were also asked if their names could be cited or to remain anonymous. This exercise was specifically done to ensure that if the participant's ideas were used, then such ideas would be appropriately cited and quoted. In short the study guaranteed privacy and anonymity of participants from individual interviews and the availability of interviewees was respected hence both the interviewee and the interviewer (in agreement) were responsible for securing a place that would be suitable for the interview to be conducted.

The participants were also assured that only the researcher and the doctoral research supervisor will have access to the information and all individual information will remain confidential and will be destroyed within three months after the submission of the thesis. For the purposes of compliance to academic social science research ethics and cross – referencing, all relevant data collection documents are superimposed in the appendixes of the thesis, these include the consent letter, the consent form, interview guides of various categories. Lastly, the Humanities and Social Science Research Ethics Committee gave full approval for the research component of the study. (See section on appendix).

## **6.6 Argument explaining and supporting the choice of four distinct groups of participants**

Groups identified were groups closely affected by issues of development and who were also willing to participate. These groups were identified not only because they have the ability to relate better to issues of development within their respective areas of location but also because they have practical and theoretical knowledge of the subject. The identified groups consist of participants who are councillors (politicians), traditional leadership, and senior government officials. A focus group consisting of an NGO person, an unemployed person and Community Development Worker (CDW) also formed part of the identified groups to be researched.

### **6.6.1 Councilors**

Councillors play a significant role in the overall development of communities. According to Paradza (2010:11)

The work of councillors is guided by the framework set out in the White Paper on Local Government (1998) that proposes a developmental model of local government. Developmental local government espouses the philosophy of sustainable ways to meet the socio-economic needs of residents and improve the quality of life...

The responsibility laid upon councillors in KwaZulu-Natal and South Africa at large takes into account the importance of ensuring that development is prioritized in communities, hence improving the lives of the citizenry. Councillors therefore are the engines of local government, not only do they have the responsibility to enhance the marginalized and poor members of societies, they also “have the responsibility to make important decisions by voting in Council on issues such as resolutions of Council, policy changes, the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) and the annual

budget” (Paradza 2010:13). Despite councillors being acclaimed for possessing ground knowledge on the socio-economic status of their communities, they have on the contrary been criticised for their practices. For example, councillors have been criticised for being bias when rendering service delivery to communities. As Mhlanga (2012), notes, “There is allegation by the community members and traditional leaders that ward councillors are bias in delivering services, preference is given to the group that belongs to their party of interest”. This is surely an unacceptable practice from councillors, more especially because the Municipal Systems Act No.32 of 2005 stipulates the rights and duties of the municipal council, to which amongst others is to “Exercise their powers and use their resources in the best interests of the local community...”. Therefore, the functioning of councillors under local government enables them to work cooperatively with provincial government and other segments of society such as, CDWs NGOs, NPOs, CBOs and business personnel. Thus councillors should be responsible for the development of municipalities and specifically in relation to the development of the well-being of all citizens living in those communities. According to the White Paper on Local Government (1998);

The powers and functions of local government should be exercised in a way that has a maximum impact on the social development of communities - in particular meeting the basic needs of the poor - and on the growth of the local economy. Through its traditional responsibilities (service delivery and regulation), local government exerts a great influence over the social and economic well-being of local communities.

All interviews with councillors were done in the three identified districts, namely, uMgungundlovu, eThekweni and uMzinyathi district. Linked to the above criticism, one of the challenges encountered during interviews was the bias nature of responses gathered from the councillors. Even though not all responses carried a biasness, however it was arduous to ascertain whether such responses were influenced by their political party affiliation or not. These councillors

are expected to work collaboratively despite their political differences. It is paramount to note that this is not always the case on the ground as political differences often obstruct cooperation amongst councillors. In dealing with this weakness of getting biased responses from councillors, data collected also included a focus group which comprised of NGOs, CBOs, unemployed person and CDWs (in some instances). The idea was to increase the comparability of responses from a wider range of participants. Moreover, Community Development workers, work closely with councillors and they played a significant role in bridging the partiality of councillors. As Mhlanga 2012:26 notes, “Ward Councillors work hand in hand with Community Development Workers (CDW) because they CDW has a role to help bridge the gap between service provision by government and access to these services by communities. Duties of CDW are more similar to the ward councillors”.

Moreover, councillors through their Local municipalities are also challenged to fulfil the vision of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal which is to be “A prosperous Province, with healthy secure and skilled people, acting as a gateway to Africa and the World”<sup>131</sup>. Despite the challenges faced by municipalities in providing efficient service delivery, The Premier of KwaZulu-Natal assured the province that;

2015 marks the 15th year of the new dispensation of local government and we unfortunately have to acknowledge that we are still faced with a range of challenges in this sphere of governance. It is for this reason that we also fully support Operation Back to Basics, which is aimed at strengthening local government by focussing on issues such as: Putting people first, let’s listen and communicate; Adequate and community-oriented service provision; Good governance and transparent administration; Sound financial management and accounting; and Robust institutions with skilled and capable staff (Senzo Mchunu – State of the Province Address February 2015).

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<sup>131</sup> See -Foreword by the Honorable Premier of KwaZulu-Natal, Mr. Senzo Mchunu for the Provincial Growth and Development Plan 2011-2030. 14 August 2014. [www.kznppc.gov/Portals/0/documents/13-09-11%20PGDP%20version%2029%203.pdf](http://www.kznppc.gov/Portals/0/documents/13-09-11%20PGDP%20version%2029%203.pdf).

Councillors are not only responsible for the development of their communities but they also act as a link between the municipality and the people on the ground. This is an important role because citizens are then able to communicate through councillors who have a cognate relationship with municipalities. By doing so, there is smooth flow of information from grass roots affected individuals to local government. In sum, despite the weaknesses and criticism directed towards councillors as participants in the study, the reason for choosing councillors as participants is that they have a better understanding of what happens in their local municipalities, specifically in their wards. In that way the identification of rudimental needs and other developmental issues is more facile thus enabling the government's intervention in delivering service.

### **6.6.2 Traditional leaders**

Traditional leaders play a significant role as custodians of customs and traditions in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. Traditional leadership has also been often referred to as “special intermediaries between government and the community” (Dusing 2002:242). Their presence especially in KZN has been strengthened by the recognition of the King of the Zulu people, whom plays a significant role in the affairs of the traditional aspect of the Province. The role of traditional leaders can therefore not be separated from other aspects of development. This is partly because, “the traditional leadership institution has always been seen as the main governing system closest to and accepted by rural communities” (Ndlela 2008:44). The government has also played a supporting role in local government and traditional leadership, their position has been noted both at a social and political level. According to Khan et al (2006:86),

In the era of democratic governance traditional leaders no longer enjoy remuneration or emoluments from their tribes, but are paid by the state in terms of laws passed by central

government on a uniform basis, without distinction on the size of the tribe. Yet they still enjoy a social and political importance that cannot be ignored.

While the importance of traditional leadership has been noted, especially in rural settings, traditional leadership have been criticised and accused for contributing to the underdevelopment of communities. One of the contributing factors towards the underdevelopment of such communities has been the power struggles between traditional leaders and political leaders. In a study conducted by Mafokane and Gray in 2007, it was observed that power issues between traditional and political leaders brought divisions in communities and as such power issues were referred to as the ‘most fundamental problem’ of societal divisions (Mafokane and Gray 2007:205). According to (Mafokane and Gray 2007:205) “The participants mentioned that most of the communities were in a dilemma as some felt that they owed their allegiance to traditional leaders, while others viewed them as old, conservative and resistant to change, and blamed them for impeding development in their communities”.

Another critic of traditional leadership has been founded on their resistance to change. This in turn has contributed towards the escalation of poverty, especially in rural communities. The resistance to change has also been perceived to be the main cause of the vulnerability of women in the new democratic dispensation. Traditional authority has been accused on relegating women and providing less opportunities compared to men. This has been the result of culturally practiced norms that perceives men as more superior than women. The introduction of the Traditional Courts Bill also contributed the criticism of traditional leadership. According to (Kompi and Twala 2014:987)“The Bill was not only viewed as patriarchal, but as clearly in conflict with the country’s constitutional values because according to it women are not guaranteed participation in traditional courts, but may be represented by male counterparts”. As a result the vulnerability of women in

communities not only contributes towards underdevelopment in communities but it also deepens their social, political and economic exclusion on community matters.

Despite the criticisms labelled against traditional leadership, the White Paper on Local Government also emphasises the need for cooperation between the different structures of government in rural areas. With specific reference to development of the local government and community, traditional leadership has a responsibility of

Making recommendations on land allocation and the settling of land disputes; Lobbying government and other agencies for the development of their areas; Ensuring that the traditional community participates in decisions on development and contributes to development costs. Considering and making recommendations to authorities on trading licences in their areas in accordance with law (White Paper on Local Government, March 1998).

Despite the accusation directed to traditional leaders, in this respect, it is important that some of our views are sourced from traditional leaders as significant contributors to development in local level. I choose to interview traditional leaders not only because of their knowledge on developmental needs in communities and as authorities of a wider population to look after, but also because as (Teffo-Menziwa & Mullick 2010:1) states, “Traditional Leaders reach thousands of people in their communities through “imbizos/lekgotlas” or community dialogues; they advise government on traditional affairs and influence policy making that affects the lives of millions of people in mostly rural populations”. Similarly, Kompi and Twala (2014:987) have noted that “In South Africa, over 14 million people reside in rural areas and are still subject to the command of traditional leadership. These rural inhabitants are loyal to the institution, and they believe that traditional leadership is vital in ensuring the development of their areas”. The aim of interviewing traditional leaders therefore, was to discover their understanding of development, their role and

inclusion in development and the level to which there is cooperation between them and local government.

### **6.6.3 Senior Government Officials**

The Premier of KwaZulu-Natal, Mr Senzo Mchunu stated, “All Heads of Departments and senior government officials must always report about service delivery in various war rooms across the district. You must hold them accountable for the lack of service delivery because this is your government” (Mchunu 2014). The above statement underpins the critical role played by senior government officials in contributing towards service delivery in the Province. This is not to underestimate the role played by middle management and junior government officials, however, senior managers (as overseers of government administration at all level of government) have a responsibility to ensure that there is smooth reporting processes on efforts made to drive the development agenda. Their accountability means that they are answerable or responsible to those they serve. Senior government officials also play a coordinating role as they are responsible for conducting meetings of various stakeholders and ensuring a follow through on recommendations and resolutions made from those meetings.

Senior government officials also have a duty of ensuring a successful integrated approach to service delivery, (OSS) – see chapter five. This responsibility is crucial in bringing about development. The various government departments headed by Head of Departments (HODs) need to work together in dealing with social ills and carrying out the Province’s vision of seeing KZN as a prosperous Province with a healthy, secure and skilled population, acting as a gateway to Africa and the world by 2030. In carrying out this vision, the Provincial government needs a

vibrant and passionate team, comprised of senior government officials as facilitators of government administration.

It is against this background that I choose senior government officials as another source of knowledge in the pursuit of the study's objectives. I purposively choose senior government officials from relevant departments who are familiar with certain aspects of the research, for example, the integration approach to service delivery, and the cooperative aspect of government in bringing development. These officials will provide information about policies and their implementation and they include senior government officials from the CoGTA and the Office of the Premier (OTP).

#### **6.6.4 Focus Groups (NGOs, unemployed, CDWs)**

A focus group consisting of an unemployed person, NGO person and Community Development Worker (CDW) also formed part of the identified groups to be researched. I choose focus groups because a focus group can be a great source of data in bringing about diverse opinions on a subject. According to Komanisi (2014:1850-1851) "The main advantage of focus groups is that they provide an opportunity to observe a large amount of interaction on a topic in a limited period of time based on the researchers' ability to assemble and direct focus groups". Moreover, as Morgan (1997:10) states, "Group discussion provide direct evidence about similarities and differences in the participants' opinion and experiences as opposed to reaching such conclusions from post hoc analyses of separate statements from each interviewee". Morgan further notes, "In an era when issues of consensus and diversity are of intense interests to social scientists, the discussions in focus groups can provide direct data on these exact issues" (1997:15).

I purposely choose to interview this group of persons because they were knowledgeable about the different community needs that have to be provided in their respective areas. CDW<sup>132</sup>s on one hand are responsible for verification of projects in municipalities. CDWs are a great source of knowledge because they are located in the communities, hence they have first-hand information on developmental issues in local government. According to the Presidency (2008:17) “Not only do these service delivery mediators aim to resolve service delivery blockages across the province, but they also perform a monitoring role. Over time, they could play a valuable evaluation role as well, given their grassroots contact with communities”.

On the other hand, NGOs are also a relevant category in the development of communities. Even though the role played by CDWs is slightly similar to that of NGOs, however NGOs are unique mainly because most of them are not the initiative of government<sup>133</sup> like CDWs and they do not receive much support from government even though government can be a sponsor from time to time. The work of NGOs has rapidly been increased towards focusing on capacity development in communities. Ulleberg (2009:7) has stated, “As the development discourse leans towards developing skills and tools for strengthening society, NGOs have reacted accordingly”. Even though NGO personnel were part of each focus group, I specifically drew focus to one individual interview with a leader of an NGO (Sakhumnotho) in Pietermaritzburg; the reason is that their main focus involves a wider range of activities which include, development and housing, training vocational counselling and guidance, employment. Sakhumnotho specifically empowers those who

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<sup>132</sup> In some provinces such as Easter Cape, CDWs are referred to as “service delivery mediators”.

<sup>133</sup> It is worth noting that some NGOs and NPOs, especially those registered under the Department of Social Development are depended on the state for financial support.

are underprivileged. I found their contribution invaluable, especially in understanding the role that government has played towards supporting their goals. Sakhumnotho has also been working closely with the Office of the Premier (Operation Sukuma Sakhe), an integrated approach to service delivery.

## **6.7 Presentation of findings**

The research questions are formulated in such a way that they explore the extent to which the concept of development is understood and also the extent to which different segments of society understand the link between consociationalism and development. In an effort to get further information from participants, the questions are designed to allow for the interrogation of the dissertation's main ideas. This includes the role of different participants or segments in development. In doing this, I organize the findings of the presentation and interpretation and note the general and specific themes. Although the questions are generally expected to be standard, however, the questions are slightly altered in such a way that they suit the relevant participant. All questions are correctly numbered and comments or responses are also noted. Interview interjections are also noted in bold and italics<sup>134</sup>. I also broadly report on the detailed views of participants, my aim is to create a broader understanding of the link between consociationalism and development and the extent to which different segments of society collaborate in achieving

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<sup>134</sup> During the analysis of the results, the researcher used abbreviation to refer to different categories of participants, for example "Cllr" referring to Councillors, "TRL" referring to Traditional Leader, "SGO" referring to senior government official and "FGD" referring to focus group discussion. The researcher further coded the three different districts with numbers to show the location of each participant, for example, eThekweni is coded 1, uMgungundlovu 2 and uMzinyathi 3. I use alphabetical symbols (A, B, C etc.) to refer to the sequence of each participant in a category, this means that Councillors in eThekweni and uMgungundlovu will be referred to as Cllr A-1 and Cllr A-2 respectively and Traditional Leader in uMzinyathi will be referred to as "Ink A-3" and so on. This applies to other groups of participants as well.

their developmental goals. After putting the different perception of participants into context, I then use those perceptions to draw a conclusion and suggestion that can contribute to further research.

### **6.7.1 General themes**

Questions that apply to all targeted participants include the examination of general themes such as the concept of consociationalism and development. These concepts are explained first to the participants, thereafter their responses are analysed appropriately under the correct thematic headings.

### **6.7.2 Specific themes**

Within each questionnaire were questions that specifically targeted themes to address major thematic content and arguments proposed by the thesis. These questions were structured in such a way that they target the specific group of participants in the three identified districts. For example, traditional leaders, councillors (politicians), senior government officials, and focus groups. For instances, questions such as what role do traditional leaders play in development or what is the role of KwaZulu-Natal's traditional leadership and how relevant are they in achieving development? Other questions to other groups included, whether or not cooperation has facilitated the failures or successes of achieving development. The same kinds of questions were applicable to other groups of participants. Focus groups on the other hand were asked questions such as what the things they value in life are and whether they are aware of their municipality's goals and the extent to which they participated in formulating those goals. These questions were formulated within the context of consociationalism and development, which is the crux of the thesis. The data was also analysed according to the three districts identified in the study.

## 6.8 General themes - uMgungundlovu and eThekweni

The uMgungundlovu District is located in the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands and is one of the 10 + 1 districts of the province of KwaZulu-Natal<sup>135</sup>. The district also locates the Capital City of KwaZulu-Natal, (Pietermaritzburg) under uMsunduzi local municipality<sup>136</sup>. “The District covers about 8500-square kilometres, it has a population of 1,017,763 (one million, 17 thousand, seven hundred and sixty three) according to Census 2011” (IDP draft review 2014/2015)<sup>137</sup>. Black African cover a large percentage of the population group approximately (85%), followed by the Indian or Asian and white population at approximately 7 % and 6% respectively. The smallest population group is the colored community which comprises of only 2 % of the total population. The linguistic grouping of the districts mainly dominated by Zulu (76.39%) and English speakers (15.32%) and the remaining being ‘other’.

eThekweni on the other hand has the largest population in the province - over 3 442 398 people (as per 2011 Census). This population consist of individuals from different racial backgrounds. “The majority of the population come from the African community (73.8%) followed by the Indian community (16.7%), White community (6.6%), Coloured community (2.5%) and other (0.4%).(Census 2011) “eThekweni is the largest City in this province and the third largest city in the country...[I]t is known as the home of Africa's best-managed, busiest port and is also a major

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<sup>135</sup> “Pietermaritzburg is an amalgamation of the names of Voortrekker leaders; Piet Retief and Gert Maritz, who laid out the town and declared it the capital of the Republic of Natal in 1883 and IsiZulu speakers know the city as “uMgungundlovu” (the place of the elephant), which translates to the place of the head of the kraal of the Zulu king, Dingaan –see (Ndaba and Landman 2014) or [http://researchspace.csir.co.za/dspace/bitstream/10204/7918/1/Ndaba\\_2014.pdf](http://researchspace.csir.co.za/dspace/bitstream/10204/7918/1/Ndaba_2014.pdf), accessed: 25 November 2015.

<sup>136</sup> Other local municipalities in the district includes, Impendle, uMgeni, Mpofana, uMshwati, Mkhambathi, Richmond and Highmoor/Kamberg Park local municipality

<sup>137</sup> See: <http://mfma.treasury.gov.za/Documents/01.%20Integrated%20Development%20Plans/2014-15/03.%20Districts/DC22%20UMgungundlovu/DC22%20uMgungundlovu%20DRAFT%20IDP%202014-2015.pdf>, accessed: 25 November 2015.

center of tourism because of the city's warm subtropical climate and extensive beaches”<sup>138</sup>. eThekweni covers land area of about 2,297 square km.

Both uMgungundlovu and eThekweni are home to a many civil society organizations (including NGOs/NPOs and CBOs), moreover, both traditional leadership and government representation (political leadership) coexist in the districts<sup>139</sup>. The ANC is the dominant political party in both uMgungundlovu and eThekweni and the DA and IFP have become the main opposition parties on both districts. The districts, takes pride in their economy, agriculture, and tourism and has great potential for investors, uMgungundlovu with its planned development of a road corridor linking N2 and N3 will bring additional potential to further promote economic development in the region while eThekweni “is known as the home of Africa's best-managed, busiest port and is also a major centre of tourism because of the city's warm subtropical climate and extensive beaches”<sup>140</sup>.

### **6.8.1 Understanding development and the values of life**

An explanation of what the concept of development is takes into account enhancing the lives of human beings and what is of value to them. Development (as stated earlier on the study) does not only focus on the economic aspect but rather recognizes the different social needs and capabilities of the individuals and collectives. One characteristic of development is seeing the expansion of freedoms to individuals, enabling them to choose and do what they value. The question asked here is: what is your understanding of development and what are the things that you value in life? Responses to this question were more aligned to what the participants needed in their communities

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<sup>138</sup> [http://www.durban.gov.za/Discover\\_Durban/Pages/AboutEM.aspx](http://www.durban.gov.za/Discover_Durban/Pages/AboutEM.aspx)

<sup>139</sup> These segments are predominant in the province given that they continue to influence both the social and political life of their communities.

<sup>140</sup> [http://www.durban.gov.za/Discover\\_Durban/Pages/AboutEM.aspx](http://www.durban.gov.za/Discover_Durban/Pages/AboutEM.aspx)

specifically highlighting their social needs as both means and ends of development. In fact most of the participants presented the most basic needs as important attributes to development. This is because to most participants, development is perceived as linked to enhancing the wellbeing of both the community and the people. For example, one participant states, “development is development of the community, developing the people”<sup>141</sup>. This means that the well-being of the people needs to be enhanced simultaneously with the community itself. One traditional leader alluded that “Traditional leadership can take part in developing people as well as developing the community by having the basic needs”<sup>142</sup>

The provision of basic needs such as shelter is of critical concern to a number of people seeking to realize development. “Development is when the country has people, the people of that country should develop over time and not be citizens who will continue to stay in the bushes like wild animals with their minds also behaving like animals”.<sup>143</sup> The participant in uMgungundlovu further stated that “they can take part in developing people through the programme of giving them the basic needs relating to their welfare...they [people] need water, houses and shops, we already have electricity but we still need shops to improve the people’s lives”<sup>144</sup>. Another traditional leader commented similarly when he observed that “When we talk about development we are talking about roads, we are talking about sanitation, installation of water, electricity, sports fields, houses as well as other things such community halls which enable people to go inside when there are events instead of having meetings under trees”<sup>145</sup>.

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<sup>141</sup> Interview with participant – TRL A-2, 10 November 2014.

<sup>142</sup> Interview with participant – TRL A-2, 10 November 2014.

<sup>143</sup> Interview with participant – TRL B-2, 7 July 2014.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid.

<sup>145</sup> Interview with participant – TRL B-2, 7 July 2014.

Both in eThekweni and uMgungundlovu Districts, one interesting observation was specifically with regards to shelter as the missing basic human need. Most participants acknowledged the work done to achieve development in these districts, however, concerns were raised regarding the lack of commitment by some government departments in delivering service to the people, particularly by the Provincial Department of Human Settlement (DHS). One Councillor notes, “we do have problems with the Department of Human Settlement, help does not come as fast as we need, for instance, where I am there are houses which have cracks, from a long time even before I became a Councillor the houses had cracks but we fall under a province”<sup>146</sup>. One participant from an NGO highlighted the lack of houses as a challenge mainly affecting the orphaned, she stated that;

...when you go back to the grannies who are left with kids because of the death of their parents, the grannies are left in two rooms, these children who are left in these houses grow and the granny can't sleep with a boy that is grown up and his dad passed away and he didn't get the money to further his studies”<sup>147</sup>.

Mr Nzimande<sup>148</sup> also concurs with the above participant, and states that “the houses really are too small as they say because they are only two rooms. ... [s]ometimes you find that there are 5 or 10 people in one house and they will sleep in this two rooms and sometimes they will be boys and girls, so if we can be helped when it comes to houses”<sup>149</sup>. The challenges attributed to the lack of housing is not only a result of government not building enough houses but also that there is lack of space in which some of these houses can be built, a number of settlements in eThekweni and uMgungundlovu are still informal. This was also alluded by one government official who admitted that “eThekweni being a metro does not mean it is operating as a fully functional metro. There are

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<sup>146</sup> Interview with participant – Cllr A - 1, 10 November 2014.

<sup>147</sup> Interview with participant – FGD -1, 24 April 2015.

<sup>148</sup> Not real name.

<sup>149</sup> Interview with participant FGD -1, 24 April 2015

still areas that do not have access to water, sanitation and housing for its people”<sup>150</sup>. Thus, the existing informal settlements are clustered and there is no space for further infrastructural development such as roads. One unemployed participant suggests; “What is needed here is relocation because once people move to other places there will be open space and then they can build roads and put sewer pipes”<sup>151</sup>.

The above assertion shows that development cannot only be brought about by the building of houses for the people, however, there are other important enablers that paves way for development, such as roads as stated by the previous participant. This also shows that there is a need for government departments to integrate their service delivery programmes in the provision of community needs. For example, the Department of Human Settlements needs to work collaboratively with the Department of Public Works. Emphasizing the lack of space and need for road construction, the participants further notes;

Another brother was asking why government does not help us with the roads? For example this lady’s house got burnt and it was difficult for the fire fighters to get in to fight the fire because she stays far from the main road and also when someone is sick or when in labour it means you need to go to the main road which makes it unsafe to wait for an ambulance. . . . [I]t is better if the government can give us more places to enable other people to move which will create room for development<sup>152</sup>.

Certainly, most participants understood development specifically in terms of needs, both basic and other features that enables persons to exercise their capabilities freely. Participants also show a great value for the well-being of their people in the communities. One traditional leader however

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<sup>150</sup> Interview with participant – SGO - 1, 28 February 2014.

<sup>151</sup> Interview with participant FGD -1, 24 April 2015

<sup>152</sup> Interview with participant FGD -1, 24 April 2015

pointed out that development could be more possible if the government can take the budget and give it to “kings in the traditional council, local house and provincial house”<sup>153</sup>, this is because, “government doesn’t get to the people in time and even seeing what are the people’s needs but kings knows exactly what the people’s needs are, Even councillors who are elected they don’t have the same sympathy as the kings when it comes to the community”<sup>154</sup>. This observation was not necessarily aimed to divert from the initially posed question, but rather it assist in pointing out that to a great extent, there is a concern around the lack of participation by some segments (especially traditional leaders) would could play a role in driving development in their communities. For instance, the same participant asserted that “it is your birth right to be a king or chief or a leader and look after the people’s needs in their communities as well as people of other communities. When the people are in trouble assist them and develop them to avoid them becoming poor”<sup>155</sup>. Despite the above assertion, it was also interesting to note that the participant also acknowledged the relationship between development and democracy, a gap in which consociationalism can bridge in plural societies. For example, one participant stated “democracy came where everybody was required to be closer to development and support it when it comes”<sup>156</sup>. What was also interesting to note was that the participant appeared to have admitted the gradual shift of development being the sole responsibility of government to also involve other important segments of society such as NGOs in communities. He reflected as follows; “There are people who say they are bringing development such as NGO’s, we receive it sometimes”<sup>157</sup>.

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<sup>153</sup> *ibid*

<sup>154</sup> Interview with participant – TRL B-2, 7 July 2014.

<sup>155</sup> *ibid*.

<sup>156</sup> *ibid*

<sup>157</sup> *ibid*

In light of the above observations, it is undisputable that such reflections are insightful, as they highlight the main elements on how development is perceived and what is of value in people's lives. These reflections are insightful particularly if development is to be viewed as social necessity that allows people to exercise their capabilities and freedom through an improvement of their standards of living and their overall well-being and interests thus creating an enabling environment where people are able to help themselves. Development "should balance the interests of different groups of people, within the same generation and among generations, and do so simultaneously in three major interrelated areas –economic, social, and environmental"<sup>158</sup>.

There are a number of findings that can be deduced from these observations. Most participants (traditional leaders, councillors, and the unemployed) reflect on the concept of development and are able to identify what is of value to them. Most of the participants in these specific districts also identified the challenge of human settlements as the main basic need for communities. This is not to say that this challenge is not linked to other challenges, however, such a challenge is also related to, unemployment, health, safety and security and education. With specific reference to eThekweni, one government official noted that eThekweni "still have informal settlements. If you go to eThekweni and passing Newlands, Spring field park area, it's an informal settlements"<sup>159</sup>. Most of the participants also reflected on the importance of firstly identifying specific 'enablers' that will allow them to freely exercise 'self-development', i.e., allowing them to choose what is of value to them and eventually improving their standards of living and their well-being. Such enablers can be translated to be the means of development other than just the ends. For example, there was a concern from a number of participants about the challenges they face from attaining

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<sup>158</sup> [http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/english/beyond/beyondco/beg\\_01.pdf](http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/english/beyond/beyondco/beg_01.pdf)

<sup>159</sup> Interview with participant SGO – 1: 28 February 2014.

identification document for orphaned children from the Department of Home Affairs. These challenges are problematic because they also translate to hindering the children from getting proper education and employment, and as a result they end up staying with their parents in smaller houses.

As one participant stated;

At schools we are having a problem as we speak, these children are orphans. For example, Siphon<sup>160</sup> died and left Mbongeni<sup>161</sup> who was born at the Mchunu family and he has no birth certificate because his grandmother had also passed away so she also didn't have a birth certificate. When you come here at Home Affairs bringing in a granny they end up being provided for by the government and even Department of Social Development (DSD) give them for three months only and say try yourself as well. Social workers are such a problem they don't know how to advise the grannies when the granny has come here bringing a child, they can't advise the granny what to do when bringing these children that are orphans.<sup>162</sup>

Emphasizing the challenges faced on the issue of Home Affairs, the participant also provided insightful response and is quoted at length;

[H]ome Affairs want a lot of things but if they could understand that here is Mr X, we had an affair that didn't last but I had a child with him, Home Affairs should give the child a certificate because the mother is South African. Maybe the problem will be solved if ask our government not to make things so difficult for us because it's hard for these kids. Secondly, sex is nature that was created by God these kids look from their parents since they live in the same room then they go out and have sex instead of focusing on education. So we sit down and look at these things because they happen before us and it's the things we see but you can't hit they child all the time. Yesterday I was hitting a child from the other household who was kissing another child from the shop behind the house and they

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<sup>160</sup> Not real name

<sup>161</sup> Not real name

<sup>162</sup> Interview with participant FGD – 1: 24 April 2015

go to the same school. This makes it hard for teachers because these children will go and do these kissing things when they are supposed to be at school<sup>163</sup>.

The above response does not only reflect a genuine concern on activating the important elements of bringing about development but it also reflects a need to empower people so that they can be both the means and ends of development.

In summary, participants showed competing and conflicting views on their understanding of development and what they value. For instance, traditional leaders from both eThekweni and uMgungundlovu reflected on the provision of basic needs as an important aspect of development. Thus, the views expressed by these participants reflected more of a top-down approach to development which has been negatively perceived to reduce “the incentives of local people to save and be innovative” (Pham 2011:3). This is because in a nutshell, the top-down approach overlooks the importance of self-help in development which in turn enable people to be the owners and users of their resources. Not only did such conflicting views emerged from contributions made by traditional leaders but also from some members of the focus group in both districts. In the same vein the concept of development was viewed more towards an expectation of government deliver service to and for the people rather than the people taking part as agents, means and ends of development. It is worth noting that the participants showed so much value for their families, especially of their communities. Thus the provision of government services could assist in eventually meeting the needs of the community thus creating a productive and healthy citizenry. As Streeten (1994: 232) puts it, “Human beings are both ends in themselves and means of

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<sup>163</sup> Ibid

production.... A well-nourished, healthy, educated, skilled, alert labour force is the most important productive asset”.

### **6.8.2 Consociationalism – collective and individual recognition of different segments and their participation in bringing about development.**

A wide range of interesting responses were gathered from the participants regarding their perception on their relation to other segments of society, more especially the extent to which their participation and cooperation facilitated the achievement or failures of their goals in bringing about development. This question was specifically asked because an appropriate paradigm of development (as proposed by the study) will have to be consociational in nature, it has to emphasize both the collective rights (new liberal approach) as it does on individual rights, and the participation and cooperation of these different segments is a pre-requisite for a successful and appropriate paradigm of development in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal.

One of the participants referred to the back to basics programme that has been initiated by government. The programme is meant to allow municipalities to perform basic service delivery. These municipalities are meant to then report on their service delivery plans to the wards. The participant showed concerns around the effectiveness of this programme in enabling municipalities to reach their goals. He notes;

But at the moment there is this thing called back to basics. When you still have this programme they will put another one and at the moment we are told to do back to basics where we identify the potholes, we look at the leaks of taps, check if the street lights are all working. We are told to prevent protests and we are told to focus only on this programme and hold on to the others. While we are busy with back to basics something else will come.

I have this in my mind that there is this thing that is a combination but in the end it doesn't work and it affects development<sup>164</sup>

Indirectly supporting the above participant, another member of the focus group raised a concern about the difficulty of being part of the development process if one does not belong to any political organization. He was quoted as follows; "There are people who wants development but who are not interested in politics, you find that for that person to reach development that person need to involve him/herself in politics even though he is not interested"<sup>165</sup>.

Thus, one of the challenges faced by the community as alluded by the participant is that of the political activists who influences the ward leader. The participant stated that, "basically it is the political activists who are closer to the ward leader at the time and this puts them in the position of influence"<sup>166</sup>. He continued with his position on how political activists tarnish development,

So far we do not have leaders from local, municipal, province or even in national level who will know how to position the struggle of politics versus development. Even the people who are driving it as I see from my position here in the community, it is still not going together because some things can only happen because something else has happened of which in true sense it shouldn't be like that. So in the community political activists are the one tarnishing the integrity of development<sup>167</sup>.

In supporting his position on how councillors do not seem to consult with the people with regards to their needs, he asserts that;

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<sup>164</sup> Interview with participant FGD -2, 17 July 2015

<sup>165</sup> *ibid*

<sup>166</sup> *ibid*

<sup>167</sup> *ibid*

The drafting of the NDP is done in the presence of people who do proposals for ward councillors as ward councillors are seen as the people who relate a lot with the community as they are the people who are leading the community. When you look closely there is nothing that shows that the councillor has called the people to ask them what they need before he/she goes to do submissions that will be included in the NDP, there is nothing that forces them to do this thing, there is no punishment for not doing it<sup>168</sup>.

Another participant sharing the same sentiments also offered an equally detailed and insightful response, he is quoted as length:

At times even when you can have five projects, for example in our ward we have a project which is still continuing of sewer reticulation and which takes a big portion of the ward, we have a big housing project which will go to the area that never had houses, we also have another project from housing where we will demolish the houses that were built with wire, we have a project to fix the road, we have a project to maintain the road and the sides of the road and ensuring that it is serviced. What I can say is that we have five projects that are running concurrently at our ward but when you walk in the ward you can hear that there is dissatisfaction and their lack of trust to the current administration. This tell you that the administration can tell themselves they have delivered to the people with these projects which we do need. But even when you do these five projects this tells you that the reason there are people who are complaining is because it is not yet the things that is touching directly to the needs of the people from the people but we are bringing what is common to all and we are telling ourselves that we would have achieved this and that of which it is not what the people wish for<sup>169</sup>.

One participant was rather more concern about the way in which the municipality prioritizes their goals vice versa those directly affecting the communities. He said that

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<sup>168</sup> *ibid*

<sup>169</sup> Interview with participant FGD -2, 17 July 2015

You see the municipality will bring their goals and we also will bring our priorities saying if IDP can do these five. When they are sitting there at the municipality, when the councillors are meeting there, there will be priorities from the municipality which will mean that the communities priorities now belong outside of the municipalities prioritise<sup>170</sup>.

The participant elaborated on how they as a community are not included in decision making and how councillors go about prioritising their own goals, he asserts;

When they vote, the councillors meet outside or they meet also at a caucus and they will say ‘you know I don’t need the road, please vote for me when it is the road and then I will vote for you when you want a school’. If your caucus is not strong these five of yours doesn’t come to your community and it won’t come until your term comes to an end because they prioritise and they are voting, they will say let’s vote for so and so and then he will get the road and if you have a weak caucus you won’t get anything<sup>171</sup>.

One of the challenges that limits the participation of community members in decision making was pointed out by another participant, who urged strongly against the implementation of the Secrecy Bill, he pointed out that “not all of us understand this thing of the Secrecy Bill and when and how it is implemented, everything within the municipality they say it is confidential to the municipality and it is the municipality that decides what is going to be discussed by people”<sup>172</sup>. The participant provided an example to demonstrate his view,

For example if the municipality will pass a certain Bill we have a local paper newspapers which is Edendale Echo, Edendale Eyethu and so on but when there is a need for community participation this thing is pasted only at the City Hall (in town) inviting the community to bring their views regarding the transport system. More than 90% of the commuters around the Msunduzi Municipality cannot come where the issue of transport is

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<sup>170</sup> Interview with participant FGD -2, 17 July 2015

<sup>171</sup> *ibid*

<sup>172</sup> *ibid*

being discussed because there are people who are privileged by receiving this information”<sup>173</sup>.

The participant went on to state that, “then this thing goes against the needs of the people because they do this things to cover themselves on paper because of the 10 or 20 people who will add their views even though it should have gone directly to the community”<sup>174</sup>. Therefore to a great extent there seems to be a lack of participation and cooperation between local government and members of the community because, as the participant argues, “There is no such thing that says that the community is hands on, on the programmes of the municipality”<sup>175</sup>.

The finding of this section suggest that the collective and individual recognition of different segments and their participation in bringing about development still needs to be improved in both eThekweni and uMgungundlovu. Even though there are some programmes that are meant to involve community members in bringing about development in their communities, these programmes often have not demonstrated to be an effective way of bringing development. Hence the way in which they are implemented undermines the collective participation of the members of the community. It should be borne in mind that in consociational democracy, participation ensures that there is a proportional representation of segments of society. Bächtiger, Spörndli, & Steiner (2000:5) affirms that, “...[t]he principle of proportionality in consociational democracies provides for the equal representation and participation of all segmental groups and thus fulfils a basic precondition of deliberative politics,...”. Moreover Kubanda (2014:6) also alludes that “African state can achieve effective consociation democracy through having equal representation and participation of the majority and minority as well as the varying segments of the population as

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<sup>173</sup> Interview with participant FGD -2, 17 July 2015

<sup>174</sup> Ibid

<sup>175</sup> Interview with participant FGD -2, 17 July 2015

evidenced in Botswana”. The participation and recognition of some segments is also a challenge to those who do to belong to any political organization, these group of people are not privileged and cannot effectively participate in the development agenda than those are politically active. As a result efforts made towards development are often contrary to the needs of the people, and moreover, the needs of the community are not given priority than those of the politicians. “After all development should be a product of people – rather than something delivered by “uninterested” state technocrats – and is instead propelled by a situation in which the state and citizens co-produce common goods, services and values of mutual benefit to all” (Edigheji 2007:11) The lack of access to information and knowledge on information such as Secrecy Bill also contribute towards the lack of participation and recognition of the members of the community.

## **6.9 Specific themes**

### **6.9.1 Relationship between segments of leaders**

Lijphart observes that “in a consociational democracy, the centrifugal tendencies inherent in a plural society are counteracted by the cooperative attitudes and behaviour of the leaders of the different segments of the population” (1977:1). In the same vein, Ake notes that “the crisis of underdevelopment in Africa is presented essentially as a political one, with African leaders lacking any real commitment to development and democracy” (Ake 2000:36-37). Thus to summarize both Lijphart and Ake, the cooperation of various segments of society together with their attitudes is an important element in ensuring that development becomes a realizable phenomenon. It follows that the purpose of the data collected is not only to analyse the extent to which such cooperation can

pave way for development but also to focus on the conditions that facilitate the failures and achievements of development. Therefore the question asked here is: How would you characterize the relationship of your district to KwaZulu-Natal Provincial government?

Most of the participants contributed positively on how they characterized their relationship to provincial government, however few concerns were raised. One participant from the DA referred to the relationship as ‘cordial’ however he also stated that;

The Provincial Government is clumsy and overstaffed employing people rather on the basis of their affiliation to the ruling party than their ability to perform the functions for which they are employed. ...[t]his then would be the most serious impediment to forging a good relationship with the Provincial Government<sup>176</sup>.

The above participant felt that there is a need to ensure that people are employed on condition that they have the ability to perform their duties and functions. The above response is in concurrence with (Obi 2008:6) whom when referring to leaders affirms that “they reward loyalty and obedience, rather than efficiency and creativity, not seldom leading to sacrifices in terms of productivity and resource growth”. Another participant (a senior government official) also shares similar sentiments;

The structure established in the Office of the Premier to manage that relationship is predominantly the Technical Premier’s Coordinating Forum (TPCF) and the Premier’s Coordinating Forum (PCF) at a political level and I really am sorry to say that over the last three - four years that structure is been very inefficient in managing that relationship, so therefore the conclusion must be that the relationship is not what I think is should be<sup>177</sup>.

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<sup>176</sup> Interview with participant – Cllr B-15 April 2014.

<sup>177</sup> Interview with participant – SGO 3: 26 March 2014

The above participants are critical in addressing the challenges of a good working relationship between provincial governments and local government. However as stated earlier on, most participants showed a positive outlook in their perception to the above question. In fact in some instances, local municipalities have a much better relationship with provincial government than their district municipalities. For example; one councillor from uMgungundlovu notes; “If for example we have issues in the ward, as a ward we go straight to the MPLS (Members of Parliament) or the Province. Therefore our relationship with the Province is pretty smooth, that’s why we have little reasons to go to the District than the Province”<sup>178</sup>. Drawing specific reference to the relationship between the Provincial government and uMgungundlovu district, another councillor also shared similar sentiments;

By and large, the relationship that is cordial. We do work together because if you look at our programmes, they speak to each other. For example if you have a programme which is rolled out at a provincial level we are able to channel it down to a district level particularly here at uMgungundlovu district. In my understanding there is a collegial relationship. Sometimes there are intergovernmental programmes that we run concurrently, for example, the Mandela Marathon<sup>179</sup>.

Interesting observation were also noted from two senior government officials (provincial government). These officials answered the question from a cooperative governance perspective stating that “in terms of our relationship with uMgungundlovu District, it is very good”<sup>180</sup>. One participant alludes, “I think sometimes we do not follow the formal processes when we require certain information because through these structures which are currently in place we are able to

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<sup>178</sup> Interview with participant – Cllr A-2. DA: 30 January 2014

<sup>179</sup> Interview with participant – Cllr B-2: 10 November 2014

<sup>180</sup> Interview with participant – SGO 1: 28 February 2014.

pick up the phone and exchange information. So that's the kind of relationship we have developed with the 8 municipality in UGM"<sup>181</sup>. Another senior government official also shared similar comments with regard to the good relationship as demonstrated by the smooth exchange of information. He states that "We actually have a good relationship and a high level of cooperation, for example when you request information they respond and they also respond when we call meetings. There is a live level of cooperation even though it can always be improved"<sup>182</sup>.

The finding of the above participants indicate that there is a generally good relationship between segments of leaders between uMgungundlovu and eThekweni district and the Provincial government. This cordial relationship could, at least partially, be an explanation why the two districts are performing well in their development agenda as compared to other districts the Province. This is also explained by the good working relationship between the different leaders despite their different political affiliations. Despite the need for improvement in some areas such as the Office of the Premier's TPCFs, and cooperative governance between the provincial and local government (municipalities). The findings also suggest that good working relation between leaders and other segments does bring about cooperation and development. As alluded by another participant, "So the fact that we have such a great relationship with the district and its locals makes cooperation lot easier"<sup>183</sup>.

## **6.9.2 Cooperation among different segments in enhancing or compromising the achievement of development.**

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<sup>181</sup> Ibid.

<sup>182</sup> Interview with participant – SGO 2: 28 February 2014.

<sup>183</sup> Interview with participant – SGO 1: 28 February 2014.

As noted in chapter 5, The Constitution enjoins the spheres of government to work together in the spirit of cooperation rather than competition. Moreover, as observed in chapter 2, consociationalism is a political mechanism that seeks to bring about stability in a plural society. The pluralist nature of the society is characterised divisions along ideological, ethnic, linguistic and even religion lines. The cooperation of different segments of society in KwaZulu-Natal is a critical feature in achieving development in the Province. The contrary is also true, the lack of cooperation by various sectors or segments of society is more likely to hinder development. Thus, in an effort to see the enhancement of development in KwaZulu-Natal, the question asked here was; what is your or your party's relations to other parties and/ or how would you characterize your relationship to other parties?

Despite the divergent views and opinions to this question, a majority of the responses positively contributed to the question asked. What was more interesting though was the ability of participants to give reasons to support their views on the questions asked. For example, one participant who is a member of the ANC stated that "To be honest we are working very well with our colleagues across the bench if I may say so, our brothers across the river, because where we are there are many rivers but yes we seems to be working well"<sup>184</sup>. Emphasising the importance of tolerance as an important trait in forging good working relations despite the presence of ideological differences, he further stated that "we have a relationship because all you need is this important thing called tolerance and maybe because KZN was on the spotlight in the 80s/90s. Having a different idea does not necessarily mean we can't work together"<sup>185</sup>.

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<sup>184</sup> Interview with participant – Cllr B-2: 10 November 2014.

<sup>185</sup> Ibid

The above participant acknowledged that democracy can still be possible in a plural society since what is important is the recognition of different groups, especially divided along ideological lines and ensuring a level of tolerance instead of centrifugal tendencies. Another participant from the same political party (ANC) shared a similar view and alluded to the good working relation between his party and other parties, however, the participant raised concerns about the DA as an official opposition. Accordingly, he asserts;

We do work together with other parties such as the National Freedom Party (NFP), Minority Front (MF), and sometimes IFP gives us constructive criticism but when it comes to DA as an official opposition party, sometimes the party has doubts over the budget and does not agree to the budget so even some things such as charities it will say these charities are too big or too small<sup>186</sup>

The above views shows that despite the good working relations between his party and other parties there is still a lack of consensus with other minority/ opposition parties when it comes to decision making. This is because the participant acknowledged that “as majority we push for things to happen even though there are oppositions”<sup>187</sup>. This was also confirmed by a member of an opposition party (DA) who stated that, “Sadly however the ruling party because of its overwhelming majority will often force through issues which are fundamentally wrong and they are quite aware of this, yet forge ahead simply because they can”<sup>188</sup>. The participant also asserted to the contrary about the relationship her party has with other parties, even though she acknowledged having a fairly harmonious relationship with other party members, she noted that “...[w]ithin the political arena it is a totally different scenario. In simple terms we “hate each other’s guts” and make no effort to modify our dislike for each other. The reasons for this are

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<sup>186</sup> Interview with participant – Cllr C-1: 17 December 2014.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid.

<sup>188</sup> Interview with participant – Cllr B-1: 15 April 2015.

manifest but to narrow down the temperament each party has a set of viewpoints and will vigorously defend them”<sup>189</sup>.

The participant’s response indicates that the level of cooperation between different political parties still needs to be improved. This is important because even though the relationship between the different parties can be fairly good, it is within the political meetings that its true conduct will be tested. The conduct of parties outside a political space is different from one that is not within a political space such as the legislature. On the same note, referring to a political space (chamber) another participant stated that “another person levels an argument which you can see that this argument is not necessarily informed by facts but this person is just trying to put his party forward”<sup>190</sup>. The participant shows that there is often less efforts made towards cooperation on specific areas that needs decision making, instead party members will tend to support their members in order to pursue their parties’ agenda rather than considering other opposition parties and finding ways of reaching consensus on important matters. This is further confirmed by one participant from the ANC who pointed out that; “at the end of the day when you propose a project all ANC councillors support you because we are from one family and then we pass that project. But on the other hand it is like homes in the wards where different things are happening, we only meet at the municipality when we are going approve projects”<sup>191</sup>.

In an attempt to bring forth the application of consociationalism as an important aspect towards enhancing development in the province. It can be argued as a summary that to a large degree

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<sup>189</sup> Ibid.

<sup>190</sup> Interview with participant – Cllr B-2: 10 November 2014.

<sup>191</sup> Interview with participant – Cllr C-1: 17 December 2014.

cooperation and good working relations between various sectors of society is critical in bringing about holistic development in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. Challenges such as personal issues, egos and pushing political party agendas will not contribute positively towards efforts made in ensuring that development takes place. Instead personal issues and petty politics characterised by sabotage and undermining minority views will not only hinder development but will also slow down efforts made towards service delivery in the province. As one senior government official stated, “sometimes you do find different personalities and egos that make it difficult to implement service delivery. It’s not a matter of not knowing but rather it’s a matter of not wanting”<sup>192</sup>.

The findings suggests that most participants agree that there is generally a good working relationship between leaders of different segments and political parties. This is especially with the two main political parties in eThekweni and uMgungundlovu, mainly the ANC and the DA. This good working relationship however does not mean that there is consensus in all issues that involve the delivery of service in the province. This is because as stated earlier political disagreements happen often within the political space which is where much decisions are taken. Even though there are differences between the different political parties, such differences do not hold much ground to hinder development in the two districts. What these responses also show is that there is a need for much more improved approach by the Office of the Premier in terms of coordinating and aligning government programmes to fast track development. This is because the Office of the Premier plays a critical role in the coordination of government stakeholders like municipalities and their councillors. The extent and level of cooperation and integration by various sectors needs to be pioneered by the office of the premier. As stated by one senior government official, “the Office of the Premier has a direct coordinating responsibility and it does so specifically together with

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<sup>192</sup> Interview with participant – SGO 2: 28 February 2014

provincial treasury who has a finance coordination and as far as policy planning coordination all other fields of coordination the Office of the Premier is supposed to put it together”<sup>193</sup>. The participant further admitted that, “the Office of the Premier is starting now to give a very clear direction of where the province is moving to”<sup>194</sup>. With specific reference to local government the participant concluded that “I must emphasise that we cannot as Office of the Premier engage the local sphere of the government without involving COGTA, it is COGTA’s primary responsibility to engage local government”<sup>195</sup>.

## **6.10 General themes – UMzinyathi District**

UMzinyathi district is located on the northern part of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal. Bordered by Amajuba Municipality in the West, uThukela in the South-West, iLembe in the South East, uThungulu in the East and uMgungundlovu in the South-West, the district is comprised of four local municipalities: namely, Endumeni, Nquthu, Msinga and Umvoti. Substantial commercial and agricultural activities happen in the strong regional centres of Dundee and Grey town, these are also the more developed areas of the district. The total population is 510 838<sup>196</sup> with most of the population living in the rural areas of the district. 93% of the population speaks isiZulu the language. While the topography of the district may be complex with “(rolling hills and mountains) across large sections of the district has an aesthetic appeal and holds considerable tourism development potential” (District Growth and Development Plan 2015:98). It does however also “increase the cost of infrastructure provision, especially in the case of roads. This can contribute to geographic isolation or at least a significant increase in travel friction and increased

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<sup>193</sup> Interview with participant – SGO 3: 26 March 2014

<sup>194</sup> Ibid.

<sup>195</sup> Ibid.

<sup>196</sup> According to - <http://www.localgovernment.co.za/districts/view/22/uMzinyathi-District-Municipality#demographic>

transportation cost” (District Growth and Development Plan 2015:98). UMzinyathi is one of the poorest districts in South Africa, according to the (District Growth and Development Plan 2015:40) “The low affordability levels in the district in terms of 2011, indicates that 41.1% of the population age between 15 - 65 years does not have any form of income. In addition, 36% of the population earn less than R400.00 per month. Although these statistics reflect on a situation of extreme poverty, there have been signs of improvement”.

Much of uMzinyathi district is rural with the traditional leadership and councillors being major segments with a synergistic partnership in the district. The district is also characterised by a number of NGOs and political parties that makes up the different segments of the district. More than 90% of the population is Black Africa, followed by approximately 2% White and 1% Asian and 0.5% coloured. The district faces high levels of unemployment despite role played by the manufacturing sector towards economic production and output in the district. “The proportion of the unemployed population older than 20 years of age regarded as illiterate is significantly higher in the Msinga and Umvoti local municipalities (25.4% and 16.4% respectively)” (District Growth and Development Plan 2015:26). Overall, only 4.90% of the population has higher education and 21.60% has matric<sup>197</sup>., “most of the population aged 20 and above with no formal education are in Msinga Municipality, and it is a bit high that the provincial rate which is 10.8%.” (District Growth and Development Plan 2015:40).

### **6.10.1 Understanding development and the values of life**

The question asked here is: what is your understanding of development and what are the things that you value in life? The responses to this question had a similar trend to those of

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<sup>197</sup> See 2011 – uMzinyathi demographics - <http://www.localgovernment.co.za/districts/view/22/uMzinyathi-District-Municipality#demographic>

uMgungundlovu and eThekweni. Participants expressed their understanding of the concept of ‘development’ in relation to their community needs; moreover, their understanding of development entailed the change needed in people’s lives. For example, one participant noted that “development means developing the community or to change people’s lives which can either be getting a job opportunity which will help a person to develop themselves”<sup>198</sup>. Hence development is strongly linked to the people that need to benefit from it. This means that development cannot take place by its own; instead it needs to take into account the people in the community and their needs. In understanding development, one traditional leader noted that “We look at the way in which government provides for the needs where the community resides”<sup>199</sup>.

The participant further noted that; “Basically, as people staying in the rural areas, roads are important and they are a sign that development is implemented, water and pipes, electricity and big roads that will enable people to travel to town and so forth”<sup>200</sup>. While noting the importance development as an aspect that changes people’s lives, one participant made an interesting point and explained the concept of development in relation to scarcity. He stated that “development is when we talk about the change of life in the community...things that were scares are no longer scares”<sup>201</sup>. The participant further made an elaborative example when he noted that;

Before we needed to wake up early in the morning to get water from the river and now when we talk about development you will find that the water has been brought to the yard. We needed to go and get fire wood in the forest which is far. Ladies needed to put fire wood on their heads, so when the government has brought things like electricity there is no need to go to the forest and put your life in danger where you can get hurt or get bitten by

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<sup>198</sup> Interview with participant – FGD – 3: 25 July 2015

<sup>199</sup> Interview with participant – TRL B-3, 21 August 2015

<sup>200</sup> Interview with participant - TRL A-3: 17 August 2015

<sup>201</sup> *ibid*

snake and walk long distance to get the basic needs. Things like that are the ones that change the people's life and make it better than what it was before<sup>202</sup>.

In order to ensure that people sustain their lives in the communities, youth development plays an important part not only as means of development but also the ends. Most participants alluded to the importance of youth development as a critical element in bringing about development in their communities. One participant states that “another thing that needs to be done is to develop our youth so that they can leave a lot of things that are a problem as there are not a lot of programmes organized for the youth”<sup>203</sup>. The participant further notes that; “if there isn't a place/sports where young people are involved on a daily basis, we won't be able to have a country that we can be proud of, so we have that problem that there are lots of young people but there are no sports activities which makes the youth to be involved in bad activities”<sup>204</sup>. The importance of youth programme came to many as a response to what they value in their communities. The challenge of youth development is closely linked to the lack of job opportunities and lack of information. “You find that even as these kids work hard and study hard but there are no jobs, some of them have been to tertiary but there are no jobs. There are not even people who come and help them in their different departments or even take those in matric to guide or advise them on what else they can do”<sup>205</sup>. Thus jobs and access to information are an important aspect of development, not only because they enable people to sustain themselves and live better lives but also because they are able to support their families and even pay for their children's education. Despite government's

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<sup>202</sup> *ibid*

<sup>203</sup> Interview with participant – FGD – 3: 25 July 2015

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>205</sup> *Ibid.*

efforts in in uMzinyathi, some communities still suffer the lack of job opportunities which result in more social ills such as HIV/AIDS, robberies and drug abuse. Another participants comments;

The government can help us because there are children who have good matric results and they wish to go to the University. Even though we are lucky that our municipality does help with giving the children money for registration at tertiary level but they don't have enough money which can results in these youth getting involved in drugs, they drink and get involved in robberies<sup>206</sup>.

What these findings indicate is that there is still a lot that needs to be done in terms of creating job opportunities in uMzinyathi District. A careful study of the responses shows that participants place so much value on their youth in the district and that education can play a significant role not only as a mean to develop the youth but also as means of the district's overall attainment of a developed populace. The lack of jobs especially for the youth turns out to promote social ills such as drug abuse, robbery and teenage pregnancy. These findings also show that unemployment, especially amongst the black youth is closely linked to the lack of proper education in the districts. Dias and Posel (2007:3) have noted that;

Among prospective employees, human capital may directly increase productivity making individuals with greater human capital more valuable. An employer, therefore, would rather hire someone with more, than less, education. Even where higher formal education does not directly increase an individual's productivity, employers with imperfect information about prospective employees may use education as a "sorting device" to help evaluate the future worth of an employee.

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<sup>206</sup> Ibid.

The high rate of unemployment in the district is not only related to the lack of proper education. There is also a strong link between unemployment and the market. UMzinyathi, unlike other districts such as eThekweni or UMgungundlovu does not have a strong labour market. A growing labour market provides access to income and reduces poverty and inequality, it also avoid social and political instability. Employment is therefore important to human dignity, sustainable economic development and social cohesion. As Dias and Posel notes, “We would expect the relationship between education and unemployment also to be influenced by market forces: in labour markets where the demand for skilled labour increases, for example; the relative benefits of higher education should rise” (2007:3). UMzinyathi district, with its high level of poverty and lack of a positive vibrant market force could therefore be an explanation for the high rate of unemployment especially amongst the youth. Therefore the above findings reflect a need to empower people as an effort of eradicating poverty in the district. People should not only be economically empowered but they also need to be provided with the basic needs that will enable them to effectively carry out responsibilities of what is of value to them. As the UNDP (2013:41) reminds us, “Many of the tragedies that we witness today are due to the poor capacity that some governments have to provide basic needs to the citizens, which, if increased and accomplished, have the power to protect the democratic values that these nations espouse”. One senior government’s official adds;

You find a different school of thought if you talk specifically to most of your civil society partners, which is a very strong social perspective and for them it is not really as much interest in what the economy does but it is whether we have got schools, clinics, sanitation and water, it is about our daily lives that the emphasis falls on which is obviously very important.<sup>207</sup>

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<sup>207</sup> Interview with participant – SGO 3: 26 March 2014

In summary, similarly to both eThekweni and uMgungundlovu, competing views regarding participant's understanding of development and what they value were gathered from uMzinyathi district. Participants viewed development as that which needs to be provided by the government including the provision of basic needs such as roads, electricity and water. Thus the conception of development from uMzinyathi participants reflects more of a top-down approach as similarly noted in both uMgungundlovu and eThekweni Districts. Given the rate of unemployment in the district and the extent to which social ills have manifested themselves in the districts, most responses depicts that participants places value on both their youth families. Accordingly, the youth of the district needs to be preoccupied with activities such as sports in order to refrain from drugs, crimes and other related social ills. Moreover, participants also noted the importance of youth programmes that will assist in the unemployed youth of the district, hence the link between youth development and unemployment.

#### **6.10.2 Consociationalism – collective and individual recognition of different segments and their participation in bringing about development.**

A number of interesting responses were gathered from the participant's perceptions regarding their collective and individual recognition of their different segments and their participation in bringing about development in their communities. Participants shared different sentiments on the collective and individual recognition as different segments of society. This also applied to their level of participation in bringing about development. One of the Community Development Worker (CDW) stated that “when we do IDP (Integrated Development Plan) and budget, we go to the people, we call people in all wards of Msinga. We present the budget and the IDP as well but we start with

the IDP and then the budget follows because the budget comes from the IDP”<sup>208</sup>. Not only does local government recognize the community development workers but also the people on the grass-roots are also consulted and given a platform to participate on issues that affects the community.

He further notes that;

The municipality of Msinga has a programme that goes to the wards every Thursday. The whole of Msinga municipality does this and goes around the wards.... They go and talk to people and listen to what the people have to say and explain things to people. To participate, the municipality has created ward committees to be in the community to get information working together with the Councillor and pass on the information to the municipality”<sup>209</sup>.

Addressing the extent to which there is participation and recognition of the community and other different segments in the community, another participant who also forms part of the ward committee notes; “we don’t think what people want but we depend on what people are asking for because if we tell ourselves we will deal with this but it may be something that the people do not want”<sup>210</sup>. Elaborating on this point the participant further notes that “The ward committee collects the information from the people and then it goes to the councillor and from the councillor to the municipalities”<sup>211</sup>. This was an interesting observation given that an element of the bottom up approach to development can be identified in the above quotation. Moreover, the participants’ words show that there is to an extent a level of people’s participation in the process of community development. This is because the inclusion of society is a crucial component of the process of development.

It was interesting to note that most of the traditional leaders were not impressed by the extent to which government recognizes traditional leadership in the district. One participant noted that “we

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<sup>208</sup> Interview with participant – FGD – 3: 25 July 2015

<sup>209</sup> Ibid.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid

<sup>211</sup> Interview with participant – FGD – 3: 25 July 2015

do not have a problem, especially when invited to events, but we are not really impressed, especially because there isn't any communication on issues that concerns Amakhosi. COGTA is not consulted by the Office of the Premier on such things. There isn't any consultation at all"<sup>212</sup>.

Emphasising the lack of recognition of traditional leaders, another participant states;

Indeed these are very important issues. As Amakhosi we cannot even make S & T claims (subsistence and travelling), especially if we need to attend the Premier's events. That also implies when travelling to Enyokeni. When the King calls Amakhosi he expects them to take a message and return with it back to the people... [T]here is no recognition of Amakhosi in Provincial Government. It really has to be the small things like petrol that needs to be taken into account.<sup>213</sup>

The lack of recognition as expressed by the above participants does not only hamper the participation of traditional leaders in developmental issues but it also restricts their participation altogether thus undermining their authority as leaders of communities especially in the rural areas. This concern was shared by one traditional leader who complained that "when you are invited to events, they tell you that we don't know you. Even when it comes to other celebrations, we only get to know about these events on radio because we are not consulted. When there are events we don't prepare to go there, instead we prepare a court interdict to stop the event"<sup>214</sup>.

There were also concerns raised about the district municipally not working collaboratively with local municipalities in the areas of uMsinga. These concerns were regarded as contributors to the slow development pace in the area. According to one participant, "the local municipality does have its vision and mission. In the district we have a problem because there are no programmes since

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<sup>212</sup> Interview with participant - TRL A-3: 17 August 2015

<sup>213</sup> Interview with participant - TRL B-3: 29 August 2015

<sup>214</sup> Interview with participant - TRL A-3: 17 August 2015

2011 and they (district municipality) never came to this ward to explain their programmes”<sup>215</sup>. The recognition of local municipalities by the district becomes important in ensuring that there is a smooth flow of information between local government, the district and the provincial government. This also creates a smooth integrated approach to social ills and enables either the district or the provincial government to intervene in instances where the local government is unable to. As one participant notes;

If there are other problems the district should come in and assist and then if there is more it should go to the province and go to the national government if needed. We have a problem with a district because we don’t know their programmes. They don’t come and when they present their budget there is always fights, we come out divided<sup>216</sup>.

On the other hand, participants felt content with the extent to which local municipality consults people and allows them to be part of decision making. For example, one participant notes;

The local government does have its goals and we know them because at the time when they go around going to people. All their things are transparent and when they come to people they come to present something they have done before they present something that is going to happen. They even tell us that we must talk if there is a problem and then we get told who is in charge of what<sup>217</sup>.

The participant provides an example to elaborate on his position.

For example in education we have a lot of children if we can give you a record, the children are going every year to tertiary institution with the help of the municipality, others do come back and thanks us when they have completed. In the district we have a big problem. For

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<sup>215</sup> Interview with participant - FGD – 3: 25 July 2015

<sup>216</sup> Ibid

<sup>217</sup> Interview with participant - FGD – 3: 25 July 2015

example they don't come to the people at all. We do take our problems to them but at the end of the day nothing comes back and there is no help coming forward.<sup>218</sup>

Thus, the above findings suggest that while the collective and individual recognition of different segments and their participation is visible in bringing about development in uMzinyathi, traditional leadership in the district feel that provincial government is not doing enough to ensure that traditional leadership is recognized and participates in decision making. This is manifested by some of the challenges raised which amongst others include the provision of incentives for traditional authorities, such as subsistence and travelling allowances. Whilst the Department of COGTA can be commended for its efforts in ensuring that such traditional authorities are recognized, the findings suggests that much still needs to be done to enable traditional leaders to feel accommodated in decision making, especially decisions that effects development in their areas. It must be borne in mind that for an appropriate paradigm of development to take place in the province, there is a need for a collective and individual recognition of these important segments of society. Consociationalism and development is more likely to be successful if major segments of society will not feel segregated in the government's pursuit for development. In addition, there is a need for a strong working relation and recognition of local municipalities that forms part of a district in order to realize a smooth integrated service delivery model. Development cannot be pursued if there are tensions between the district municipality and the local municipalities. The success of development in uMzinyathi district can be realized by dismantling divisions and cleavages in communities and creating an enabling environment where all sectors of the district are free to participate while also recognised as a collective and individual contributors to their community's development.

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<sup>218</sup> Interview with participant - GD – 3: 25 July 2015

## **6.11 Specific themes**

### **6.11.1 Relationship between segments of leaders**

Again the question asked under this specific theme is: How would you characterize the relationship of your district to KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Government. It is worth noting that depending on the background of the participant, some of the questions were specifically intended to analyse the relationship of the provincial government to the district of the Province. This is mainly in instances where interviewees work in the provincial government. In such instances, the question would be phrased as follows; how would you characterize the relationship between your office and the Provincial Cabinet Cluster's? Or how would you characterize the relationship of the Office of the Premier with district municipalities in a broader scale?

The responses to the above question stimulated a wide range of views and solutions. One participant, a Councillor reflected on the relationship between Provincial Government and other Councillors, he notes that "it is hard, it is something that I don't even know how to explain and it is not even easy to say that all is well because I know that all is not well"<sup>219</sup>. The problem he notes "is in the area of management, all is not well at all the levels of management and it is both politically and officially if I may put it that way"<sup>220</sup>. One of the challenges highlighted by the

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<sup>219</sup> Interview with participant - Cllr A-3: 10 November 2014.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid.

participant was in relation to unqualified personnel who hold important positions in the municipality. He notes;

Yes among other things maybe to ensure that always if there are officials employed they are employed only on the basis of their skills and ensuring that they really have the qualifications that they say they have. This vetting thing is very important because problems are mostly created by officials not knowing what their roles are, I think if at all levels of management they can ensure that an official that is employed is going through a proper vetting system and they are properly qualified. There are people who are in key position and it is very important that they are properly qualified.<sup>221</sup>

The problems faced by the relationship between segments in the districts are often driven by changing or involving political differences – as seen in the previous chapter. This was frankly admitted by one IFP Councillor regarding the non-existence of a proper relationship between the ruling party ANC and the IFP, he says “I can say that the relationship doesn’t seem that bad because there are no bad feelings between the ruling party and my party, you can only say what you see. There is no relation at all but there is development”<sup>222</sup>. This lack of cooperation and tensions by the different segments of political parties in the district are not foreign to Provincial Government. Unfortunately this lack of working relations also escalates to individual and hampers development in the district. One of the officials from Provincial Government is quoted at length;

In uMzinyathi the challenge is of a political nature which impacts on the administration. For example, uMvoti had an issue with the Mayor, the Speaker and Council itself. The MM was suspended, half the council was in agreement with the suspension, and the other half was not in agreement. Within uMvoti we actually had two council seating concurrently, two Mayors sitting concurrently. One appointed officially, one appointed himself and then the two councils fought and it’s also because of the political parties, so that’s the challenge,

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<sup>221</sup> Interview with participant - Cllr-A: 3. 10 November 2014

<sup>222</sup> Interview with participant - Cllr B-4: 10 November 2014.

and the challenge of council impacted on the administration, where the council that was of a different political party did not recognize the MM as the administrative head and subsequently he was suspended and those that were in support still regarded him as MM, if he sent a notification for a meeting, it was not honoured because he was considered to be suspended by one half, and the other half was still fine. Issues of speakers became a problem in the district and that impact on the administration and it has an effect on the district as a totality because the district has functions such as water, sanitation, electricity, and these are the effects that it has within the locals because of the disjunction within the council at the local level<sup>223</sup>.

The above response shows not only the difficulty of bringing about development in a highly politically fragmented environment but it also shows the difficulties that the District face towards bringing about solutions to the problem. This is because (as stated above), the nature of the problem in UMzinyathi is more political, hence different political parties do not easily reach consensus on matters that effect the community. Moreover, the impact of the political tensions on the administration also hampers the way in which IGR is supposed to function in the district. As a result the senior officials in the local municipalities are “unable to provide information or support to the district and the district is unable to do that as well. So these are the challenges we have had that impacted in terms of IGR”<sup>224</sup>.

Another councillor took a positive position on the working relation between the segments, he asserted that “it’s only internal politics, each and every political party has its own mandate. We do work together at all times”<sup>225</sup>. Despite such good working relations, the participant however noted that some of the challenges faced by local municipalities are closely related to the lack of resources which hinders the progress of development. He notes;

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<sup>223</sup> Interview with participant - SGO -1: 28 February 2014

<sup>224</sup> Ibid.

<sup>225</sup> Interview with participant - Cllr – C: 3. 17 December 2014.

The municipality does not have resources such as money, we get money from the government which means the community depends on the Municipality because they have elected councillors and they think that councillors have money but councillors don't have enough money they depend on the provincial government<sup>226</sup>.

To illustrate his position, the participant states;

The problem is that when we are in politics it depends on who is in charge in that province. For example, in KwaZulu-Natal there are many Political parties so what happens sometimes when we look is that even though the municipality have those resources but not getting a lot of them even the one that arrives whoever is in charge distribute in different ways and each ward get what is allocated and the shares are not the same between all the wards in the municipality as compared to the same ward<sup>227</sup>

The above quotation is particularly useful because indisputably, the lack of sufficient resources have a negative impact on the implementation of development. Moreover, the IDP speaks to the importance of resources to better the lives of the people through development. Accordingly, to improve the quality of lives, the IDP should take into account the resources available for development in communities.

The above finding here suggest that political differences hinders development in uMzinyathi district, unlike eThekweni and uMgungundlovu where the ruling party is most dominant in most parts of the districts, uMzinyathi on the other hand has the IFP, NFP and the ANC as the main competing political parties. As one Senior Government Official noted, "uMgungundlovu easily runs all 8 local municipalities, however, the challenge with uMzinyathi is the existence of

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<sup>226</sup> Interview with participant - Cllr: B-3, 10 November 2014.

<sup>227</sup> Interview with participant - Cllr: B-3, 10 November 2014.

difference political parties which hampers the process of development”<sup>228</sup>. This also results in the dysfunction of IGR as an important mechanism to promote and facilitate IGR in the district. IGR tends not to function well as a result of these bad working relations between segments of leaders. Moreover, even though, there are IGR structures (even though not fully functional), the challenge is that “the IGR act is a framework (a guiding document), there is no legislation that binds them to say you have to do these things. It is not a binding document in terms of preparation for a performance report at the end of your financial year”<sup>229</sup>. The participant further noted that “people don’t look at IGR as a tool for actually working together; they look at it as an ‘add on function’ that they have to do and this creates some gaps in its functionality”<sup>230</sup>.

The challenges in uMzinyathi district are not only limited to the political difference between segments of leaders, there are also factions within political parties – intra party differences that hinder development in the district. Even though both intra and interparty differences are not only unique to political parties in uMzinyathi district, as one participant notes, “all political parties has this, there are different interest groups within a political party and that sometimes just as devastating as differences between political parties, intra political party differences can be just as devastating as inter political party differences”<sup>231</sup>, however, the extent to which these intra and inter-party differences manifest themselves in uMzinyathi are more noticeable than in other districts. The lack of resources in the district could also be related to both intra and inter political differences which hinders development in the district. This is because development is often hindered or delayed as a result of the lack of cooperation towards decision making, more especially

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<sup>228</sup> Interview with participant - SGO -1: 28 February 2014

<sup>229</sup> Interview with participant – SGO -1: 28 February 2014

<sup>230</sup> *ibid*

<sup>231</sup> Interview with participant – SGO -3: 26 March 2014

on issues that directly affects the provision of resources in the district. With the district depending mainly on central fiscal (provincial government), the availability of resources to sustain the district is not as available as in the other districts such as eThekweni and uMgungundlovu. This was also reflected by one participant who stated that; “UMzinyathi is a rural district with very low economic activities so in the pure economic terms it would be classified as a ‘drain to the system’ because you have more people demanding from the central fiscal in that district than people contributing to that fiscal”<sup>232</sup>.

### **6.11.2 Cooperation among different segments in enhancing or compromising the achievement of Development.**

As noted in chapter two, The consociational model “is premised on processes of elite cooperation and assumes that the centrifugal forces found in divided places can be offset by such policies of collaboration among the representatives of the different segments within the polity” (Lijphart 1968:1). Cooperation of different segments becomes important in achieving development, likewise, the lack of cooperation can strain the process of development. Again the question asked here is; are there instances in the past when lack of cooperation among different parties compromised or facilitated the achievement of your goals. Depending on which segments the interviewee came from, the question would be phrased according to that segments, for example, focus groups, councillors, and politicians would be asked in relations to their municipal goals. Likewise, senior government officials in Provincial government would be asked in accordance with their provincial goals.

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<sup>232</sup> Interview with participant – SGO- 4: 13 August 2015

Participants showed different sentiments when it comes to the extent of cooperation between segments in enhancing development in uMzinyathi. One participant stated that “from 2011-2015 we have not been working together, we don’t even know the programmes of the district. What should happen is that if there are projects that needs to be carried out, they should be implemented via the people and the elected leaders should be responsible for that, but these leaders do not do that”<sup>233</sup>. Another participant shared similar sentiments when he stated that “There is lack of unity because when we need to take decisions, because two parties will vote for what they see than to what we see. For anything we say, they will say that needs to be researched first and what they agree on will be what the council will do”<sup>234</sup>. The participant further made an example with Nquthu municipality stating that, “there are many arguments which makes things bad at times in the local municipality”<sup>235</sup>. This lack of cooperation in some instances creates delays in the implementation of municipalities’ goals, thus hampering development in local government. One government official noted that “in other instances you find other political promises which are made without the ability to follow through on implementation. Non-cooperation hampers development and yes sometimes it is within political parties or different grouping within political parties”<sup>236</sup>.

The district municipality has also been blamed for not cooperating with local municipalities. As a result the lack of cooperation has compromised development in the district, resulting in the district not delivering services such as sanitation and water. One participant stated that

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<sup>233</sup> Interview with participant - FGD – 3: 25 July 2015

<sup>234</sup> Interview with participant - Cllr – C: 3. 17 December 2014.

<sup>235</sup> Ibid.

<sup>236</sup> Interview with participant - SGO -3: 26 March 2014

Since 2011 there is nothing that you can show in this ward alone that the district has done to the extent that even this community does not know uMzinyathi as a district as they have never come here even to introduce themselves that they are district and this is what we do. As we have been complaining about water, the district has a function of water and sanitation as well as electricity but it does not happen, that is why you hear that we have crises of water because the local government makes it clear that they are not given a budget for water and toilets in the community<sup>237</sup>

Despite the lack of cooperation by the district municipality, the participant suggests that there are traces of development in the local area and that local municipality is helping the community by delivering basic community needs. He notes that;

Locally we can see development because you can see the houses, even though they are not finished yet, there is another programme that will start for houses on the other side. This hall that we are occupying is a hall that was built by the local municipality, and it is not the only one, we have many, we have crèche at this community which was built by the local municipality for the kids and we also have schools that were built by the local municipality<sup>238</sup>.

Another participant concurs and that stated that:

If you go around Msinga and you see buildings with the green and white colours you should know that it is the municipality buildings. We have schools, crèche, halls, roads, electricity and our youth do go to Universities, and the local municipality makes it clear in the meetings that they don't want a 10 year old child who is not going to school. Even if the parents do not have enough money. We don't want children to start working after matric, we want them to go to tertiary institutions, but the local municipality does give them temporary jobs to work in the roads and even clean our small town<sup>239</sup>.

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<sup>237</sup> Interview with participant - FGD - 3: 25 July 2015

<sup>238</sup> ibid

<sup>239</sup> ibid

Another participant acknowledged the good working relations between the different segments, however drew specific focus to the challenge being with the people on the ground. He notes that “the truth is that uMsinga has since been under the ruling of the same party since 1996 (IFP) and they had their programmes like that. But about working together of the different segments, I will say that they do work together but the problem is us followers on the ground”<sup>240</sup>. Even though the participant did not elaborate on how they as followers impact on the working relation, however he did acknowledge that most wards in the area are under one political party (IFP) hence, “the programmes go well because nobody opposes what the people are asking to be done for them”<sup>241</sup>. On the other hand, another participant with a contrary view stated that “those who are a majority can change things to suit themselves including the date and time of when things happen”<sup>242</sup>. Thus having a single political party in charge of many wards does not always translate to cooperation, other parties, especially those with minority representation may not always feel included in decision making. The participant explains that “we have not achieved the municipality’s goals through unity and this is because sometimes we will argue about something which ends up the idea being changed, which even happened when the IDP arrived”<sup>243</sup>.

Thus far, what could hinder the progress of development in the district is more than just the lack of cooperation. Slow service delivery challenges are also linked to the power struggles between the district municipality and the local municipality. The government has given more powers to the district municipality than the local municipalities, hence often times there will be political frictions

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<sup>240</sup> Ibid.

<sup>241</sup> Ibid.

<sup>242</sup> Interview with participant - Cllr - C: 3. 17 December 2014

<sup>243</sup> Ibid.

solely based on power struggles between the two municipalities. One Councillor from a local municipality noted that “What can give us strength to work properly is being consulted in advance by the district municipality when there is something happening. We don’t have a problem at the moment but what we want is power as a local municipality which will make us work well like we have before”<sup>244</sup>. Therefore the power struggles between the local and district municipalities have played a significant role in hindering development and the general delivery of service. Interestingly this was also noted by the then Deputy Minister for Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, Mr Yunus Carrim who noted that; “We didn’t anticipate the extent to which power struggles within municipalities would paralyse service delivery, and power struggles between local and District municipalities would undermine the two-tier model”(Carrim 2009).

Thus far, the above findings suggests that the lack of cooperation by political party differences has contributed tremendously towards a slow paced development process in uMzinyathi district. This is explained by the lack of cooperation by the district municipality which has an ANC majority as members of the council, whereas most local municipalities are comprised of other political parties, for example uMsinga local municipality led by the IFP. The struggle for power is not only within different political parties in the district but also between the local and district municipality have proven to a hinder service delivery and development in general. Cooperation therefore becomes a critical area of focus should holistic development be realized, “if there is cooperation amongst all stakeholders, development will benefit everyone equally. Cooperation is very important”<sup>245</sup>. Another senior government official succinctly provides a summary at length;

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<sup>244</sup> Interview with participant – Cllr – C: 3, 17 December 2013

<sup>245</sup> Interview with participant – TRL A:3, 17 August 2014

Then you find a different school of thought if you talk specifically to most of your civil society partners which has a very strong social perspective, for them it is not really as much interest in what the economy does but it is whether we have got schools, clinics, sanitation and water. It is about our daily lives that the emphasis falls on which is obviously very important. Then you have another group that will come forward and say ‘it is all about the environment, we look at sustainability, stay green you can’t do this you can’t do that’. Eventually as I say it’s about tolerance and balance because you’ve got to find that golden thread that runs through all of it because it is not just about the economy, it’s not just about the social, and it is not just about the environment, but it is about how we can bring all of them together and get them in a harmonious and synergistic relationship to be able to achieve the objectives. What we are trying to manage is those divides that we have and by the way your study is very relevant today and I would like to predict that your study will still be very relevant 100 years from now.<sup>246</sup>

## **6.12 Conclusion**

Principally, the chapter aimed at presenting the findings of the qualitative research. In light of the above responses and comments, the concept of development is viewed in relation to meeting the basic needs of the community, in all three districts, eThekweni, uMgungundlovu and uMzinyathi. A common conception of development also entails developing the community and its people. This include, the provision of basic needs such as water, shelter and electricity. Given the high population of eThekweni and uMgungundlovu, the issue of human settlements came to the fore as compared to uMzinyathi district. What is even of more importance in all districts, is that the provision of such basic needs is translated as enablers of development. This is manifested by the

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<sup>246</sup> Interview with participant - SGO -3: 26 March 2014

appraisal of most participants who have proven to suggest that besides lack of jobs, their youth and families are of value in their lives.

In the KwaZulu-Natal province, where different segments co-exist with government, cooperation and the general recognition of these segments are good catalyst to a smooth development process. An inclusive paradigm of development characterised by the collective participation of the community and an emphasis on the community's well-being cannot be overemphasised. There are still areas of improvement in both eThekweni and uMgungundlovu with regards to the collective and recognition of segments and their participation in development, more especially the inclusion of traditional leaders as intermediaries between government and the community. On the other hand, uMzinyathi's development appears to be highly dependent on the creation a conducive environment for good working relations between the leaders of different segments. A good relationship between both the district municipality and the local municipality working collaboratively with provincial government through effective and well enhanced IGR structures can positively contribute towards development in uMzinyathi. I argue, therefore that, the transcribed responses indicate an increasing realization that for KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa and Africa to offer a holistic development approach, it will have to ensure that such an approach contains both a collective and individual recognition of different segment of society, it also should not be economically based, but rather it should focus more on the social well-being of the community in an effort to make the citizen live the lives they value.

## CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Our future will be forged in the ferment happening outside of liberal institutions and norms. It is imperative that this space, this radically diverse space, is engaged on the basis of evidence and reason. Those who simply shriek against what they imagine to be the barbarians at the gate are doing us all a major disservice (Pithouse 2015).

### 7.1 Introduction

The study was set out to explore the extent to which the theory and application of consociationalism as espoused by Ake can possibly enhance development in South Africa - KwaZulu-Natal. The study was further set out to explore the reasons, understanding and motivation for an appropriate paradigm of development and the extent to which different segments of society participate in the development process in improving the well-being of their communities. Moreover, the study has also sought to understand the level of cooperation among different segments in enhancing development and the relationship between the different segments of leaders KwaZulu-Natal. The general theoretical literature on the subject of consociationalism and development has received less attention and thus a critical inquiry on the discourse had to be done. Therefore, the study sought to answer three main questions:

- Can consociationalism address the defects of liberal democracy?
- What kind of consociationalism is relevant to Africa?
- What is the relationship between consociationalism and development?

In this section, I would like to summarize the chapters of the thesis by a brief outline of the purpose that the chapters served in the study. Chapter one outlined the introduction of the research project and gave an overview of the case study - KwaZulu-Natal. In achieving this, the chapter firstly explored the general background of the historical and political changes in the Province. Secondly, the chapter dealt with the background and research problem, research objectives of the study, research questions, methodology and research design, research setting and sample populations, participants and sample and the sample size and composition was done. Lastly the chapter briefly surveyed the literature relevant to consociationalism in South Africa. This literature included unpacking concepts such as development, liberalism and consociationalism.

Chapter two focused on the literature review of the key concepts, - liberal democracy and development. The study devoted the chapter to discussing the assumptions of liberal democracy and making a distinction between old liberalism and new liberalism. The chapter also reviewed literature on the value of democracy with specific reference to its intrinsic, instrumental and constructive value and finally a critique of liberal democracy with specific reference to its applicability to the African context was drawn. There are a number of reasons why liberal democracy is not suitable for Africa, and these have been presented. Amongst others are its individualistic nature and lack of emphasis on collective participation. The chapter then introduced and delved an alternative model (consociationalism) whose essence mainly lies in cooperation or consensus and which advocates for the recognition of minorities and other segments of society in an effort to bring about stability and conflict resolution heterogeneous societies.

Chapter three focused on arguing against liberal democracy as a suitable political mechanism for a relevant paradigm of development in Africa. While addressing the weaknesses of liberal democracy (both classical and new liberal) using Lijphart's consociational formula, it argued that Africa is unable to unleash its potential for bringing about development through the dominant liberal approach. The chapter argued that consociational democracy stands a much better chance for a successful and relevant paradigm of development, not only at a national, provincial and local level but also at continental level at large. The chapter firstly considers Lijphart's theory of consociationalism in addressing the weaknesses of liberal democracy. In doing so, the chapter then noted the weaknesses in Lijphart's theory to which it proposed could be addressed or filled by Ake's approach to development. Using Ake's approach on development, an emphasis on the importance of looking at development as a phenomenon that is based on social transformation rather than economic growth one was done. It advocated for a rather people driven kind of development where the emphasis on both the collective and individual recognition of different segments of society. Having compared and contrasted liberal democracy and consociationalism, the chapter adopted a hybrid consociational approach for Africa's development as espoused by Ake, and advocated for a development strategy that takes people as they are and not as they ought to be.

Chapter four analysed the consociational model of democracy in South Africa. It highlighted some of the consociational elements that are present in South Africa's democratic society. Using the term 'consociationalism' conterminously with 'power-sharing', the chapter gave specific attention to the degree in which coalition building and power sharing (as important facets of

consociationalism) played an important role in South Africa's democratic dispensation. The chapter then drew reference back to the mediation efforts towards power-sharing in South Africa and also examined the transition period and the negotiation that eventually led to power-sharing. The idea was to show that despite some debates in scholarly literature and more generally political commentary, South Africa still retains consociational features more capable of bringing about a relevant developmental paradigm than the dominant liberal democratic approach.

Chapter five focused on the case study - Province of KwaZulu-Natal. The chapter argued that KwaZulu-Natal is a consociational outcome of South Africa's democratic dispensation; this is because of the elements of consociationalism reflected in the province such as proportional representation, segmental autonomy (to a certain extent) and power-sharing. KZN can thus benefit from an application of the power-sharing component of consociationalism. The chapter gave a detailed account of the historical and political overview of the Province. Moreover, as a unique case where traditional authority and elected government representation coexist, the chapter explored the role of the Provincial and Local government and how these spheres of government features in the consociational model. The reason for this approach was that KZN recognizes traditional authority and the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) is responsible for supporting traditional leadership in the Province, hence the existence of the Institution of Traditional leadership. Lastly, the chapter examined the integrated approach to service delivery in the Province, Operation Sukuma Sakhe (OSS), the idea was to evaluate the inclusion of various segments of society which are important in the analysis of the consociational model.

Chapter six was a comprehensive analysis of the research findings. Informed by the qualitative element of this study, the aim was to uncover the views and perceptions of participants regarding their understanding of development and what is of value to them; the level of cooperation between the different segments of society and the extent to which they (participants) have participated towards the facilitation of development in their respective districts. The contributions of different participants with regards to the above matters were noted and so were the challenges faced. It was important to include both the positive attributes of consociationalism and its application in KwaZulu-Natal and the challenges that consociationalism would encounter in search of a new paradigm of development for the Province. This is because the proposed development paradigm cannot be immune to challenges and theoretical upheavals. I attempted to defend the challenges likely to be encountered and having examined and discussed the relevant paradigm of development as espoused by Ake, I believe that the province of KwaZulu-Natal has a creative and groundbreaking contribution to offer South Africa and the rest of the world in our quest for Africa's development, and it is through a paradigm of development that takes into account both the collective and individual recognition of different segments of society, one that puts emphasis on participation and social transformation rather than economic growth, and one that empowers people to freely choose what is of value for their well-being.

## **7.2 Summary**

The study was set out to provide an investigation of the theory and application of consociational democracy in South Africa, the Province of KwaZulu-Natal was used as a case study in achieving this task. Its main objective was to examine and evaluate the extent in which consociationalism as espoused by Ake can enhance development in South Africa, especially in KwaZulu-Natal. The

findings of the study are chapter specific and were summarized according to the respective chapters. The study focused on six objectives for investigation and they are as follows:

- To explore the relevance of liberal democracy in Africa in general, and in South Africa in particular.
- To examine the relationship between consociationalism and development in South Africa.
- To evaluate the nature of a consociational model that was incorporated into the South African constitution.
- To examine the extent to which South Africa's system of government is consociational.
- To explore the possible benefits and problems of incorporating power-sharing at the provincial and district level.
- To evaluate the ways in which KwaZulu-Natal's poor districts have responded to issues of underdevelopment in their districts in order to improve the status quo.

This section provides a summary of the study using the above noted objectives as a guide.

### **7.2.1 The Relevance of Liberal Democracy in Africa and South Africa in particular**

The first research objective of the study was to explore the relevance of liberal democracy in Africa in general. The basic research problem was that Liberal democracy in Africa has potentially failed to deliver on development. This research objective was answered in chapter two, where it was argued that liberal democracy does not seem to produce a relevant paradigm of development given its weaknesses, assumptions and irrelevance for Africa and therefore, a more inclusive approach of various segments may facilitate development and democratic participation, hence

consociational democracy provides a more viable alternative for political stability and holistic development.

Following from many assumptions on the benefits of democracy in bringing about development and good governance (Taylor 1992; Diamond 1999; Adejumobi 2000), Chapter two, undertook to assess the role and relevance of liberal democracy in Africa, and South Africa in particular. From literature and primary data collected through the course of this study, it was noted that the weaknesses inherent in liberal democracy and its development paradigm are to be taken into serious consideration as they have not only been detrimental to Africa's development, but have also proven irrelevant (Murray & Simeon, 2007; Kabanda, 2012; Pazhyanur, 2015). While in the 1980s, using Structural Adjustment Programme (SAPs) packages, the Bretton Woods institutions and the Washington Consensus 'advised' those interested in developing their countries were to adopt a set of '*good policies*' (macroeconomic policies of liberal markets) and '*good institutions*' (democratic institutions)' (Haynes 2008:32-33), the end of the 1990s saw an Africa that was progressively worse than what it had been in the 1970s (Adejumobi, 2000). This was an indication that some of the liberal systems had to be reviewed as they were not good for the African context.

Apart from the empirical evidence that shows some decline in African prospects, the study has argued, based on many sources (Appiah, 1997; Gould, 1998; Fayemi, 2009; Dlamini, 2010), that the adoption of liberalism has not sufficiently served Africa, especially given its lack of an inclusive approach, which does not directly permits consensus and participation of various segments of society in political decision making. While liberal democracy has emphasised values such as constitutionalism, rule of law and equality, which have been well appropriated in many

African countries, the study has argued that this still falls short of the ideal due to lack of recognition of resource differentials and political cleavages in the African context. As such, some of the principles of liberal democracy such as equality have been compromised through a majoritarian application of rules and systems.

While South Africa has been heralded for its ‘democratic transition’ and the embrace of many values of liberalism (Taylor 1992); two decades of post-apartheid governance has seen a decline in these prospects. This has been noted by scholars such as Pithouse (2015), who has observed that “the liberal consensus on which the post-apartheid order was founded has been burnt away like morning mist giving way to the heat of the rising sun”. Other scholars have noted that, instead South African institutional setting has been drifting towards a consociational arrangement ever since 1994 (Hooper, 2008). The *Twenty Year Review* (2014) prepared by the Presidency, while acknowledging the many positive aspects of the democratic dispensation since 1994 in the areas of socioeconomic transformation, governance and administration, infrastructure and education, has also lamented challenges in the areas of safety and security, social cohesion, poverty and inequality. The participants in this study have also noted the challenges of democracy in recent political upheavals manifested by protests, poverty, a declining domestic market and rising unemployment. It is therefore argued that, while South Africa has had some apparent gains from liberal dispensation, the challenges not only outweigh the positive, but also threatens the sustainability of these positive effects should liberal democracy continue to subtend.

In an unprecedented move, this study has challenged the relevance of liberalism in Africa, and South Africa, based on analysing the relationship between classical and new liberalism in a bid to assess what liberalism ought to do and what it actually does. Supported by many scholars (Appiah, 1997; Omotola, 2009; Lumumba-Kasongo, 2005), the study has argued that while liberal democracy looks good on paper, many African contexts have been unable to either implement or sustain it. As a result, some have acknowledged the existence of missing links between liberal democracy and development (economic growth), especially within African contexts (Adejumobi, 2000).

While liberal democracy has been supported as suitable in setting out a suitable development agenda, not only in Africa but in other parts of the world, little has been done to distinguish between classical liberalism and new liberalism. For example, classical liberalism assumes that individuals, as voters are equal. As stated in chapter two, classical liberalism does not take into account the different conditions of individuals constructed by social stratification and capabilities. In other words, classical liberals ignore the differences in income and education which can be important in determining one's participation in a state (Brennan & Tomasi, 2011). Thus, liberal democracy is not sensitive to the different classes of society and the unequal nature of their participation. Moreover, classical liberals perceive human beings as capable of managing their own activities. However, in reality, not all human beings are capable of achieving their goals despite the existence of their civil liberties. Thus the classical liberal does not efficiently attempt to address the idea of human incapacity

New liberalism on the other hand, does not agree with formal equality, thus it takes away individual and personal liberties. New liberalism affirms that there is substantive inequality amongst individuals. Thus, the unequal distribution of opportunity, access and rights in a society is central to the new liberal. Therefore the state is encouraged to intervene and support those whose autonomy is compromised by poverty and illiteracy. This in turn creates inequality in a society claimed to be comprised of equal citizenry. Due to this realisation, this study concludes that, while others have argued against the relevance of democracy based on its implementation deficit, its philosophical and theoretical assumptions also render it irrelevant in the context under study.

In addition, the Eurocentric assumptions tied up to liberal democracy, its majoritarian inclinations, and ignorance of African realities of communitarianism and cultural diversity renders this ideology bankrupt in engendering development in Africa, and South Africa in particular. In her assessment of *Twenty Years of South Africa Democracy* (2014), Susan Booysen has noted a withering trend of popular hopes on the prospects of democracy. Corroborating the findings of this study, Booysen (2014) has discovered a lot of disgruntlement in the way human rights have been protected in South Africa. A note has been made on uneven realisation of democratic promises, alienation and marginalisation of minority groups, new race-class inequalities – in which a growing class of black elite have benefited more than the rest through cronyism and *tenderpreneurism*. As a result, this study has argued for the need to transcend liberal democracy, to a more inclusive form of democracy, in a bid to extend the gains of democracy from a few to the whole.

While many studies have critiqued the suitability of liberal democracy in non-Western contexts like Africa, very few have based their argument on the conceptual merits of liberal democracy.

Many have argued based on its implementation deficit; what it states in theory is not what is done on the ground. This study has gone further and argued that even if liberal democracy were to be implemented efficiently, it would still fall short of alleviating developmental challenges in Africa. As shown above, this study has based its argument on the assumptions of classical and new liberal theories. As noted earlier, these have proven to contain assumptions that are foreign to the institutionalised values of most African societies.

### **7.2.2 The Relationship between consociationalism and Development in South Africa**

The second research objective was to examine the relationship between consociationalism and development in South Africa. This question was answered in chapter three of the study where the elements of consociational democracy as acknowledged by Lijphart (1969, 1971, 1991, and 1996) and Ake (1993a, 1993b, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2001) were unpacked and assessed in the context of South Africa. The four elements of consociationalism discussed are; (1) a grand coalition of representatives of all significant sections of a society, (2) mutual veto rule, (3) the principle of proportionality and, (4) self-rule or autonomy of each segment.

With these elements implemented, it was argued that challenges of liberal democracy can be mitigated by consociationalism, in its inbuilt accommodative mechanism (Lemarchand 2006; Dlamini, 2010). Africa is a highly fragmented society, with some countries having more than five hundred distinct segments, fragment along ethnic, religious, race, cultural, and ideological lines (Ake, 1996). In essence, consociational democracy as a political system that accommodates these internal cleavages has the ability to institute stability in the region, and ultimately bring about

development (Ake, 2000). While most separations in Africa can be labelled superficial, due to their being put in place by colonialism (ethnic, tribal, religious, class), these have proven to be enduring in such a way that they need to be accommodated in all forums of institutional development in Africa (Chinwokwu, 2013; Kendhammer, 2015). Consociational, and not liberal, democracy is the tool to achieve this (Orlovic, 2015). This is because, consociational democracy allows for participation and integration, and takes into account one's capability in a community (Parry & Moran 1994).

In this line of thought, people are seen as agents of social development – and this is in line with African thinking. Ake (2000) therefore advocates for a democracy that is relevant for the African people, one that is developmental along the democratization of the state. Accordingly, it should “emphasize the decentralization of power and local autonomy and a consociational arrangement, in which government would be a coalition of the authentic leaders of social group” (Ake 2000:184-192; 2001:132). This bottom-up collaborative public engagement is relevant in the developmental aspirations of Africa in two ways: garnering synergy between different communities towards common national objectives, and; getting to deal with genuine popular developmental objectives derived from the people, and not some foreign economic experts (Ake 2000:184).

Ake's conception of a bottom-up, basic needs approach, to development is well suited with consociational arrangements, in which different segments are given autonomy and are proportionally represented in all decision-making structures of national governments (McGarry & O'Leary 2006:43-44). With all relevant segments having a buy-in into the national development project, as well as allowed, through their own segmental autonomy, to pursue their own initiatives,

this can have positive developmental spin-offs; both at a national (GDP) and communal level (human development). Ake (1996), therefore, accepts new liberalism, in which the only legitimate government intervention to ensure a free and stable society.

In this consociational democratic position, the government supports social policy measures, economic oversight and welfare legislation, in a proportional manner; taking into cognizance all relevant societal strata. As such, people are supported in taking a step further away from poverty, thus being able to help themselves. This kind of democracy seeks to see the improvement of people's overall well-being and ensure that people's standards of living are characterized by effective participation in projecting their developmental policies (Orlovic, 2015).

Thus, the success of consociationalism in bringing about development is further strengthened by political participation, which enables the people to define their own development. Since the major challenges of liberal democracy, besides its theoretical inability to appreciate societal segmentation in Africa, has been its implementation. We have argued here that this apathy has been partly led by the feeling of alienation caused by the majoritarian politics. As such, while in liberal democracy, political competition is high since the winner takes it all, in consociational democracy co-operation is endemic due to the mutually inclusive arrangements of governance (grand-coalition and proportional representation) and self-governance (Orlovic, 2015). With every segment guaranteed of their own space in the political economy – it is in everyone's self-interest to see to it that the system is stable and productive.

This study, therefore aims to make an original contribution to literature based on the above argument for the relationship of consociational democracy, as proposed by Ake, and development

in plural society. Inasmuch as many have argued on the shortfalls of democracy in ethnically diverse societies, like many African countries, and South Africa in particular, still very few studies have evaluated the assumptions of liberal democracy in instituting a new development paradigm for these areas.

### **7.2.3 The Incorporation of Consociationalism in SA's Constitutions**

The third and fourth research objective was to evaluate the nature of consociational model that was incorporated into the South African constitution, the second corresponding research objective examined the extent to which the South African system of government is consociational. This research objective was addressed in chapter four of the study.

The study noted the elements of consociationalism pervading in the South African institutional context for the past two decades. Several elements of consociationalism predate the 1996 Constitution, even though they were later institutionalised through it. For example, while the CODESA negotiations had only recognised two political groups (NP and ANC); the unrest in KwaZulu Natal and Gauteng, which was associated with IFP, necessitated the inclusion of the IFP. This multi-party balance of power is one of the first consociational elements recognised in South Africa. This was achieved through the signing of the National Peace Accord.

The Grand Coalition, signified by the Government of National Unity was also another significant element, which carried the transitional period. Through this period, the IFP ensured that the traditional leaders are not ignored; hence The Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA) as a national representative of traditional leaders was also included in the constitutional debates. However, while the provision for the government of national unity, was

explicitly given in the transitional constitution of 1993, the 1996 Constitution had less emphasis on that line.

Drawing a specific focus to the 1996 final constitution of the Republic of South Africa, consociational elements presented themselves in a number of areas. Despite critics insisting that the 1996 constitution no longer made power-sharing agreements permanent and compulsory, however, I argue the fact that the ANC voluntarily embraced power-sharing cabinet is not to be taken lightly. Despite political coalition not being a strictly necessary principle for consociationalism. The ANC's voluntary and informal establishment of power-sharing gave consociationalism a settling stage in its application.

The first elements of consociationalism in South Africa can be traced in the country's electoral system. In South Africa, the elected members of both the National Assembly and the Provincial legislature are done solely on the application of the proportional representation principle. This principle recognizes political diversity and averts minority rule while also allowing active government representation (Lijphart 1977). As a result, most political parties occupy seats in parliament. It should be borne in mind that the idea of consociationalism is to ensure a representation of different segments of society, especially those segments defined along ethnic and racial lines. The ANC has strong multi-racial, multi-ethnic and a demographically represented membership. This means the ANC draws its membership from all racial groups in South Africa. This is a visible feature of the proportional representation in South Africa, most notably because; often political instability in most African countries is manifested through divisions caused by either the ethnic card or ideological differences.

The principle of segmental autonomy cannot be counted out in South Africa political setup. In fact, I argue that South Africa's segments have a fair amount of autonomy. Despite South Africa not being a fully decentralised state as the National government still retains more political power than Provinces, it cannot be ruled out that to a certain extent communities (provinces in this case) still retains a fair amount of independence and often take full control of their own affairs. Moreover, much of South Africa's community is categorized according to ethnic and racial lines. For example, the Province of KwaZulu-Natal has Zulu's as a majority in the province, Limpopo – Northern Sotho and Tsonga people, Mpumalanga the Swazi people and the Western cape is still predominately dominated by South African Coloured community. I argue that instead of completely ruling out South Africa as federal or having principle of segmental autonomy, South African could rather be regarded as having a highly centralized form of federalism.

From this institutional background, the study contends that the elements of consociational democracy are eminent in the South African systems; and due to its mixed context, this can be taken advantage of to yield positive developmental paradigm.

#### **7.2.4 Towards cooperation and power sharing in KwaZulu-Natal.**

The fifth research objective was answered in chapter five of the study and it explored the possible benefits and problems of incorporating power-sharing at the provincial and district level. Here, the study argues that not only is the Province of KwaZulu-Natal an outcome of the South Africa's consociational dispensation but also that the Province itself contains visible elements of consociationalism and that these elements can play a significant role as a foundation for the application of an appropriate paradigm of development as advocated by Claude Ake. More

especially, the power-sharing component of consociationalism can effectively trigger both provincial and local government to pursue a human centred approach to development in the Province.

There are several areas of possible consociational arrangement revealed during the course of this study. Firstly, the Province of KwaZulu-Natal is one of the counties with a visible coexistence of traditional leadership and elected government representation. This enables the province to embrace and enhance cooperation and general participation of various segments in decision making. The cooperation of traditional leadership and elected government representation signifies a desire to collectively work towards a more inclusive kind of development. When the coexistence of traditional and elected representatives is concerned, there is another element of consociationalism that obtains; balance of power. Given the role played by elected government representatives and traditional representatives in the context of development and governance in the Province, the study note that there is no clear winner. Even though others would want to look it in terms of “The King Rules, The Premier Governs” dictum; there is still clear power context in many localities. This situation then can only be beneficial if both parties are interested in a paradigm of development that puts emphasis on both collective and individual recognition of different segment of society.

Orlovic (2015:31) acknowledges this point, by arguing that, for co-operation to work, “political elites must first believe that consociational arrangement is absolutely desirable and feasible and they also must have knowledge and motives to implement them.” The tradition which focuses on reconciliation, mutual adjustment and compromise is also desirable (Orlovic 2015:31). Thus, taking note of the already existence of such cooperation, I argue that the Provinces stands better a

chance to bring about holistic development through a rather consociational approach, more especially in its most deprived communities and or districts.

Another element conducive for consociationalism is the existence of a multi-party system. In spite of the dominance of the ANC since 2004, the Provincial Government has several parties, according to their proportional electoral successes. The study noted the prevalence of five main political parties, roughly representing different consociations; ANC, IFP, NFP, DA and MF. As such, consociationalism in KwaZulu-Natal also manifests itself through ethnic cleavages in party representation. Quoting Lijphart, Orlovic (2015:41), states that “no power-sharing arrangement is complete if ethnic communities are not broadly represented at the level of the government”. In KwaZulu-Natal, I argue that these ethnic cleavages are shown by party representation as indicated in chapter five.

As noted in chapter five, the ANC and the IFP in the Province represent both ethnic segmentation and urban-rural divide. Likewise other parties, especially those claiming to represent the minorities are formed mainly along ethnic and racial lines. Other important elements that attest to the consociational nature of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal is that it has both legislative and executive autonomy, which enables the province to carry out service delivery without much reliance from the national government. Moreover, this autonomy enables the provinces to exercise its own independence, thus also exercising its own culturally based community rules.

The Provinces integration strategy towards service delivery OSS also signifies a power-sharing element in the Province. This is largely because of its emphasis on community partnership where both the government and the community play a role in addressing social ills. It is therefore no

surprise why the Province is working diligently towards enhancing and achieving social cohesion. It is also worth noting that the idea of social cohesion attests to the presence of a desire from elites to cooperate, hence ensuring an inclusive approach towards development.

Another noble aspect is the growth of social cohesion consciousness, not only in the Province, but also in the national context. Cloete, Kotze and Groenewald (2009), in their Concept Paper on Social Cohesion, argue for social cohesion as an inclusive concept in the preparation of integrated development plans (IDPs). Arguing that South Africa can learn significantly from experiences of the UK with regards to social cohesion, this paper prepared for the Department of Social Development argue that the preparation of IDPs in municipalities offer a rare opportunity for South Africa to call for inclusivity across racial, ethnic and gender divides (Cloete, Kotze & Groenewald, 2009). While they argue that dismantling divisive structures (policies, programmes, systems) and changing ways of thinking can realise this dream; others proponents argue that the promotion of equitable economic growth (Cokayne, 2013), building a culture of mutual acceptance and encouraging inter-group dialogue (Barolsky, 2013), whilst regulating the activities of political parties, media, religious institutions, education institutions and community organisations (MISTRA, 2014) can help build a sustainable culture of social cohesion in South Africa. Moreover, Van Donk et al (2008) quoted in Theron (2009:146), notes that, “participatory processes have been structured via stringent legalized formalities focused on the technocratic dimension of physical delivery at the expense of the more subtle social processes of building a democratic culture of negotiations, expression and social cohesion”.

The Province of KwaZulu-Natal has also shown interest in building this culture of social cohesion in the province following a quarter of century violence between different segments in the province (Bonnin, 2004; Injobo Nebandla, 2005). It is important to note that the call for social cohesion in the province has been catalysed by the Mazibuye African Forum (MAF) and Imbumba Business empowerment which according to Maqhina (2014:1) wanted “Indians to be excluded from affirmative action and black economic empowerment, and Imbumba wants previously disadvantage small business to be considered in the economy by the government”. Led by the Office of the Premier, KZN has made tremendous strides in designing programmes and policies aimed to promote social cohesion in the province. In March 2014 by-elections, the MEC of Community Safety and Liaison, Mr Willies Mchunu, called for ‘tolerance and peaceful political co-existence’, arguing that this was key to sustainable development and ensuring investment (DCSL, 2014). The Premier, Mr Senzo Mchunu, reiterated this perception, in his State of The Province Address in February 2015, argued for the importance of partnerships in service delivery as well as the growth and development of the province (SOPA KZN, 2015). This study argues therefore that the province of KwaZulu-Natal, working together with communities and different segments of its society, could bring about a holistic, people centred kind of development and one that will specifically emphasis the participation of these segments while simultaneously creating an enabling environment for the people to be the agents, means and ends of development.

### **7.2.5 Towards an improved development response in KZN’s poor district**

This section contains three main objectives from the empirical findings of the study and was answered in chapter six of the study. The first objective is to show that a bad relationship between

segments of leaders has a negative effect towards the implementation of development in KwaZulu-Natal, likewise a good relationship contributes positively towards the enhancement of development in the Province. The views and recommendations provided explore the possibility of enrolling an appropriate paradigm of development as one that can be characterised by the recognition of both the collective and the individual. I discuss how the practical application of consociationalism or elements of consociational can contribute towards development in KwaZulu-Natal. The proposals provided are a result of the empirical findings of the study and the theoretical discussions gathered thereof.

The second objective of the empirical findings concerned itself with suggesting how cooperation among the different segments of society have facilitated the achievements of development in KwaZulu-Natal. The third objective focuses on making recommendations for a more inclusive and relevant developmental paradigm that will be consociational in nature and will carry both a collective and individual recognition of different segments of society and be a proponent of people's participation as a necessity for holistic development. The aim is to discuss the benefits of such a paradigm and how a consociational approach stands much better chances of bringing about development than the dominant liberal approach. Despite the recommendation being context specific in nature, the thoughts offered can deliver a worthwhile reflection point for policy makers and proponents of the development and democracy debate in governments of the continent and around the globe. Upon discussing the objectives of the study, suggestion on possible areas of further research are made. The idea is to reflect on the gaps that have been identified in the study. I finally conclude both the chapter and the full study by presenting my thoughts on the valuable input that the proposed paradigm can make in enhancing development in KwaZulu-Natal.

The participants in this study showed a very distinct understanding of development and mooted the structural arrangements needed to attain this. For one, many participants understood development as a processes realised through collective engagement. While many participants mentioned many tangible aspects, such as access to housing, water, and other necessary infrastructures, the major theme that emerged was the understanding of development in terms of community upliftment, instead of an individualised improvement. This confirms the argument that African development is always viewed in communitarian terms and not in atomised, individualistic terms proposed by liberal democracy.

Based on the feedback from the participants, the study drew the conclusion that, in spite of ideological differences between political groupings and civil society in the province, many segments of the society are willing to work together to enhance development in the province. Based from other studies done in the province, the study also noted that different segments of the province have similar identification of the problem, which include poverty, high proportion of child-headed households, high prevalence of HIV/AIDS, and political violence (see also HSRC, 2014). Many see the resolution of these developmental challenges as the consolidation of democracy in their plural society; enabling the embrace of diverse cultures, races and ideologies. Hence, the study contends that the context of instituting consociational democracy in the Province is ripe.

### **7.3 Recommendations**

Issues of democracy and development are multidimensional and highly complex. This study only explores the extent to which consociational democracy can enhance development in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. More studies are required to bring about solutions and appropriate paradigms

of development in plural societies, particularly in less developed provinces of South Africa. With this study, it would be possible to offer a meaningful, thorough and coherent set of recommendations that will assist in bringing knowledge and applicability to a wider scope, not only in South Africa but to the Africa continent and the rest of the world. This is crucial because the link between democracy and development affect almost all countries, more especially plural ones. The study recommends the following in an effort to bring about development through consociational approaches involving, the participation and cooperation of different segments of society.

- A recognition of people's capabilities rather than political affiliation in order to help them lead the kind of lives they value and have reason to value.
- Greater participation of various segments of society in provincial government structures and in political decision making generally.
- Greater institutional autonomy and formalization of various segments of society to enforce checks and balances.
- The right to vote to be given to traditional leadership in municipal council to ensure participation and collective decision making.
- Enforce the participation of traditional leaders in municipal council meetings in KwaZulu-Natal as it is done in other parts of the country.

The above recommendations are not entirely meant to change South Africa's political landscape, nor are they intended to disregard efforts made by the South African government since the birth of democracy, rather they are intended to provide a better alternative and direction on improving what has already been done in efforts made to achieve development. After all, development is not a project but rather a process.

#### **7.4 Possible areas for further research**

The empirical aspect of the study had also intended to include religious leaders as another critical segment that needs to be considered when dealing with issues of development. Owing to the nature of the research and generally the contextual understanding of consociationalism as a mechanism for stabilizing a divided society, religion was omitted because it does not account for a major segment in KwaZulu-Natal. Moreover, as stated earlier on the thesis, the organization of consociationalism along religion confessional lines is also known as ‘confessionalism’ and thus the aspect of confessionalism does not necessarily fit the political landscape of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal. However, this does not make religion a less salient category in the politics of development, instead, this gap creates room for further research in terms of the specific role of religious leaders in contributing towards development, especially in heterogeneous societies.

#### **7.5 Final thoughts**

It is abundantly clear that Africa in the 21<sup>st</sup> century requires a paradigm shift in shaping and conducting its democratic practices and its development agenda. There is a need to adopt a clear paradigm of development that is human centred and characterised by the inclusion of various segments of society, it should embrace the spirit of inclusiveness and participation and recognition of people’s capabilities and freedoms to value. This is precisely the reason why an alternative consociational approach to holistic development was applied specifically in heterogeneous societies, where various segments of society divided along ideological, racial and ethnical lines co-exist. As cited earlier on the study, KwaZulu-Natal appears to be an interesting case study given that amongst other provinces, it is also a province with mixed government where both traditional and elected government representatives coexist in pursuing a development agenda. The Province’s

long history of the existence of the monarchy and how it still receives much recognition amongst its people was worthwhile to explore. From amongst the three districts chosen, uMzinyathi deserve much attention as one of the poorest districts not only in KwaZulu-Natal but also in the country.

The finding of the study shows that cooperation is an important aspect of a development process and cooperation serves as a key measure of participation in decision making. This is strongly acknowledged in the experimental section of the study whereby key participants from different districts noted that unity is an important aspect in decision making if development is to be achieved in any way.

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix 1: South Africa in Transition, 1989-1993: A Negotiation Chronology

March 1989	Nelson Mandela sends thirteen-point memorandum suggesting ANC-government talks to president P.W Botha
5 July 1989	Botha, president, meets Nelson Mandela, prisoner.
14 August 1989	Botha resigns and is succeeded by F.W. de Klerk.
21 August 1989	Harare Declaration is adopted.
13 December 1989	De Klerk confers with Nelson Mandela to discuss preconditions for negotiations.
2 February 1989	President F.W de Klerk lifts bans on the ANC, PAC, and SACP, announces release of Mandela and calls for negotiation.
9 February 1989	De Klerk again meets with Mandela.
11 February 1990	Nelson Mandela is released after twenty-seven years in prison.
16 February 1990	The ANC agrees to direct talks with de Klerk's government.
April 1990	ANC, SACP and COSATU announce formal alliance.
2-4 May 1990	ANC and government conclude the first pact, the Groote Schuur Minute.
July 1990	The National party and Inkatha separately declare membership in their parties open to all races; violence in the townships and Natal soars.
6-7 August 1990	A second round of formal ANC-government talks results in the Pretoria minute.

September 1990	Conflict between IFP and ANC supporters further spreads from Natal to townships near Johannesburg.
8 January 1991	ANC calls for an All-Party Congress
31 January 1991	Joint ANC-IFP delegation meet in Durban: IFP leader Buthelezi and Mandela meet for the first time in twenty-eight years.
15 February 1991	The Government and ANC conclude the D.F. Malan Minute.
March 1991	ANC releases “Constitutional Principles and Structures for a Democratic South Africa”.
6 April 1991	ANC “ultimatum” links talks to diminution of violence”.
30 April 1991	Pretoria Minute deadline lapses.
18 May 1991	ANC withdraws from negotiation.
17 June 1991	Population Registration Act repealed.
22 June 1991	Church and business leaders plan national peace conference.
2-7 July 1991	The ANC’s 48th National Conference is held.
19 July 1991	The Weekly Mail publishes reports detailing police funding of IFP rallies.
8 September 1991	Just prior to the National Peace Convention, 18 are killed and 14 wounded in violence near Johannesburg; by week’s end, some 121 die and 550 are wounded in factional violence.
14 September 1991	National Peace Accord signed.
27 September 1991	The ANC, PAC, and seventy other parties from short-lived Patriotic Front.
20 December 1991	CODESA, the first formal constitution negotiation is convened.

17 February 1992	NP loses a key by-election.
17 March 1992	White vote overwhelmingly (67.8 percent) to back de Klerk's reforms, amid widespread violence in townships.
April 1992	Working Groups set up by CODESA negotiate transition path.
15-16 May 1992	CODESA 11 results in deadlock.
17 June 1992	Boipatong massacre leaves forty-nine dead; ANC withdraws from negotiation.
15 July 1992	UN Security Council debate on South Africa.
23 July 1992	Mandela relates talks withdrawals to CODESA 11
August 1992	Following secret talks with the government, the PAC agrees to attend relaunched multiparty talks; following a split, the CP too agrees to talks.
3 August 1992	COSATU spearheads a three-day general strike.
7 September 1992	ANC protesters march on Ciskei's capital, Bisho; twenty-eight are killed by Ciskei security forces, after which "urgent" government-ANC bilateral resume.
26 September 1992	Government, ANC agree to the Record of Understanding, which charts the basic path of further transition.
October 1992	SACP leader Joe Slovo publishes "Negations: A Strategic Perspective," proposing power-sharing.
6 October 1992	Buthelezi, some homelands leaders, and white right-wing groups form a rejectionist front, the Concerned South Africans Group (COSAG)

12 February 1993	The Government and ANC conclude a wide-ranging agreement that reflects the formula outlined in “Negotiation: A strategic Perspective”.
17 February 1993	Government-IFP negotiations fail to win IFP backing of power-sharing deal.
5 March 1993	Multiparty Negotiating Process (MPNP) planned.
1 April 1993	MPNP’s first plenary session launched at the World Trade Center in Johannesburg.
10 April 1993	Chris Hani, SAPC leader, assassinated.
3 June 1993	MPNP Negotiating Council “tentatively” agrees on 27 April 1994 election date; the IFP and its COSAG allies object.
25 June 1993	Armed right wingers invade the MPNP forum
2 July 1993	Nineteen of twenty-six parties at the MPNP affirm the 27 April 1994 election date; over July, some six hundred die in political violence.
18 July 1993	The IFP withdraws from the MPNP over election date.
25 July 1993	Five gunmen attack churchgoers in Cape Town, killing 12 wounding 147.
26 July 1993	MPNP negotiators present first draft of an interim constitution.
8 September 1993	Negotiating Council agrees on transitional structures.
16 September 1993	Government negotiators fail to woo the IFP back to talks.
24 September 1993	Parliament adopts the transitional executive council legislation, and Mandela calls for the lifting of most remaining sanctions.
7 October 1993	Black and white right-wing rejectionist groups from the Freedom Alliance.

15 October 1993	De Klerk and Mandela win the Nobel Peace Prize.
16 November 1993	De Klerk and Mandela conclude final power sharing agreements.
18 November 1993	Interim constitution adopted by the Negotiating Council of the Multiparty Negotiating Process.

## Appendix 2: Levels of Power-Sharing in Sub-Saharan Africa After 1990

<b>Less than 2,000 total conflict-related deaths</b>	<b>Power Sharing Arrangement</b>
Mali	<p>Transitional government but no explicit power-sharing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1992 Bamako Peace Pact</li> <li>• 1991 Agreement between Gov. of Mali and Popular Front for the Liberation of Azawad</li> </ul>
Congo (Brazzaville)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1999 Accords de cessation des hostilités en République du Congo</li> </ul>
Nigeria	Implicit power-sharing through federal system
Kenya	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2008 National Accord and Reconciliation Act</li> </ul>
Djibouti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2000 Agreement Between Government of Djibouti and breakaway faction of FRUD</li> <li>• 1994 Agreement Between Government and FRUD</li> </ul>
Guinea-Bissau	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1998 Agreement between the Gov. and the self-proclaimed military junta</li> </ul>
Lesotho	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1998 Agreement Between LCD and opposition parties</li> </ul>
Niger	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1997 Agreement between Gov. and UFRA and FARS</li> <li>• 1994 Ouagadougou Agreement Between</li> </ul>
Senegal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2004 Ziguinchor Peace Agreement Between Gov. and MFDC</li> <li>• 2001 Agreement Between Gov. and MFDC</li> <li>• 1991 Agreement Between Gov. and MFDC</li> </ul>
Togo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2006 Ouagadougou Agreement calling for a transitional unity government to organize parliamentary elections</li> </ul>
Zimbabwe	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2008 Global Political Agreement</li> </ul>
<b>More than 2,000 total conflict-related deaths</b>	<b>Power Sharing Arrangement</b>
Sierra Leone	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2001 RUF and Civil Defense Forces Peace Agreement</li> <li>• 1991 RUF and Gov. Peace Agreement</li> <li>• 1996 RUF and Gov. Peace Agreement</li> </ul>
Cote D'Ivoire	<p>Creation of Government of national reconciliation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Agreement</li> </ul>
Somalia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1993 Addis Ababa Agreement</li> <li>• 1994 Nairobi Declaration on National Reconciliation</li> <li>• 1997 Cairo Declaration on Somalia</li> </ul>
Angola	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2002 Ceasefire Agreement, Gov. of Angola and UNITA</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1999 Angola Agreement with UNITA-Renovada</li> <li>• 1996 Gov. of Angola and FLEC</li> <li>• 1994 Lusaka Protocol</li> <li>• 1991 Angola Peace Accords</li> <li>• 1991 Bicesse Agreement</li> <li>• 2002 Memorandum of Understanding</li> </ul>
Chad	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2003 Gov. of Chad and MDJT</li> <li>• 2002 Gov. of Chad and MDJT</li> <li>• 2000 Gov. of Chad and RAFAD</li> <li>• 1997 Gov. of Chad and Fronlinat-FAP</li> <li>• 1997 Agreement Between Gov. and Frolinat-FAP</li> <li>• 1997 Agreement Between Gov. and FARF</li> <li>• 1996 Agreement Between Gov. of Chad and the Action for Unity and Development</li> <li>• 1995 Agreement Between Gov. and MDD</li> <li>• 1992 Agreement Between Gov. and MDD and CSNPD</li> </ul>
DRC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2003 Inter-Congolese National Dialogue Agreement</li> <li>• 1999 Ceasefire Agreement</li> </ul>
Liberia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2003 Gov. of Liberia, LURD, MODEL and political parties peace agreement</li> <li>• 1994 Akosombo Agreement</li> <li>• 1993 (Cotonou) Agreement</li> <li>• 1991 Yamoussoukro IV Accord</li> </ul>
Burundi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2003 Pretoria Protocol on Political, defense, and Security Power Sharing</li> <li>• 2001 Power-sharing Agreement, President Buyoya and Hutu Parties</li> <li>• 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement</li> </ul>
Rwanda	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1993 Arusha Accord, Gov. and RPF</li> <li>• 1994 Broad Based Government of National Unity</li> </ul>
Sudan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement</li> <li>• 2004 Humanitarian Ceasefire on Darfur</li> <li>• 2004 Nairobi Declaration on Peace in Sudan</li> <li>• 2004 Protocol of SPLM on power-sharing</li> <li>• 2004 Framework on Wealth Sharing Between Gov. and SPLM/A</li> <li>• 2002 Machakas Protocol</li> <li>• 1997 Agreement Between Gov. and UDSF</li> <li>• 1996 Agreement Between Gov. and SSIM and SPLA</li> <li>• 1996 Political Charter</li> <li>• 1995 Political Charter between Gov. and SPLA</li> </ul>
Uganda	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2002 Agreement Between Gov. and UNRF</li> </ul>

Mozambique	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• 1992 General Peace Agreement for Mozambique (October</li><li>• 1992 Joint declaration</li><li>• 1990 Joint communiqué</li><li>• 1990 Agreement on a Partial Ceasefire</li></ul>
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**Source:** Carl LeVan (2011:33-35)

### Appendix 3: Letter of approval - Humanities and Social Science Research Ethics Committee for data collection.



17 January 2014

Mr Sphetho Dlamini (204506403)  
School of Social Sciences  
Pietermaritzburg Campus

Protocol reference number: HSS/0995/0130

Project title: The Theory and Application of Consociational Democracy in South Africa: A case study of KwaZulu-Natal

Dear Mr Dlamini,

**Full Approval – Expedited**

With regards to your response to our letter dated 17 December 2013, the Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee has considered the abovementioned application and the protocol have been granted **FULL APPROVAL**.

Any alteration/s to the approved research protocol i.e. Questionnaire/Interview Schedule, Informed Consent Form, Title of the Project, Location of the Study, Research Approach and Methods must be reviewed and approved through the amendment/modification prior to its implementation. In case you have further queries, please quote the above reference number.

Please note: Research data should be securely stored in the discipline/department for a period of 5 years.

I take this opportunity of wishing you everything of the best with your study.

Yours faithfully

Dr Sheenuka Singh (Chair)

/ms

cc Supervisor: Dr Khondlo Mtshali  
cc Academic Leader Research: Professor Sabine Marschall  
cc School Administrator: Ms Nancy Mudau

Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee

Dr Sheenuka Singh (Chair)

Westville Campus, Govan Mbeki Building

Postal Address: Private Bag X5400, Durban 4000

Telephone: +27 (0) 31 230 9507/03504557, Fax: +27 (0) 31 280 4600 Email: [ethics@ukn.ac.za](mailto:ethics@ukn.ac.za), [ethics@ukn.ac.za](mailto:ethics@ukn.ac.za), [ethics@ukn.ac.za](mailto:ethics@ukn.ac.za)

Website: [www.ukn.ac.za](http://www.ukn.ac.za)



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## Appendix 4: Gate keeping letters from The Office of the Premier



premier

Office Of The Premier  
PROVINCE OF KWAZULU-NATAL

DIRECTORATE:

Private Bag X9037, PIETERMARITZBURG, 3200

Room 404, 4<sup>th</sup> Floor, Moses Mabhida Building, 300 Langalibalele Street, Pietermaritzburg, 3200

Tel: 033 341 3363 Fax: 033 394 0434 E-mail: tesslyn.aiyer@kznpremier.gov.za

INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

Dr. S Singh  
**Chair:** Humanities & Social Research Ethics Committee  
University of KwaZulu-Natal  
Govan Mbeki Building  
Westville Campus

Dear Madam/ Sir

**Re: Granting permission for Mr. Siphetho Bonginkosi Dlamini to collect data on this study titled; The Theory and Application of Consociational Democracy in South Africa. A Case study of KwaZulu-Natal. - Protocol Reference number HSS/0935/013D**

1. The above matter bears the reference
2. This letter serves to support the above mentioned study.
3. Mr Dlamini has approached the Office of the Premier requesting the permission to conduct interviews with government Officials from different District in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal.
4. The Districts to which the research will be conducted are as follows:
  - uMgungundlovu District Municipality
  - uMzinyathi District Municipality
  - eThekweni Metro
5. In essence, as the center of Governance for the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, the Office of the Premier plays a coordinating and oversight role with respect to all Provincial Department.
6. Your cooperation will be highly appreciated.

Regards

**Ms N.E Ndlovu**

Manager: Intergovernmental Relations & Government Protocol


Signature: 

Date: 8/01/14

1

Working Together For Growth, Development And A Better Future For All

## Appendix 5: Gate-keeper's letter from the Department of Social Development



---

FAX	: 0865965343	
Telephone/ Ucingo /Telefoon	: (033) 264 2178	208 Hoosen Haffejee, Private Bag X9144
Enquiries / Imibuzo / Navrae	: Ms. Nolwazi Dlamini	Pietermaritzburg
E-mail	: nolwazi.dlamini@kznsocdev.gov.za	3200

---

06/01/2014

Dr. S Singh  
**Chair:** Humanities & Social Research Ethics Committee  
University of KwaZulu-Natal  
Govan Mbeki Building  
Westville Campus

Dear Sir/Madam

**Re:** Granting permission for Mr. Siphetho Bonginkosi Dlamini to collect data on this study titled: The Theory and Application of Consociational Democracy in South Africa. A Case study of KwaZulu-Natal. - Protocol Reference number HSS/0935/013D

1. The above matter bears the reference
2. This letter serves to support the above mentioned study.
3. Mr Dlamini has approached the Department of Social Development requesting the permission to conduct the interviews with NPO/NGOs.
4. The Districts are as follows:
  - uMngungundlovu
  - uMzinyathi
  - eThekwini
5. In a summery, Department Social Development has the authority to oversee and work with NGOs/NPOs in the Province.
6. Your cooperation will be highly appreciated.

Yours Faithfully

  
Nolwazi Dlamini

Population Unit: Research Manager

Date: 06/01/2014

## Appendix 6: Gate-keeper's letter from COGTA

		<b>cogta</b>	
		Department: Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs <b>PROVINCE OF KWAZULU-NATAL</b>	
		<b>MUNICIPAL PLANNING</b>	
Enquiries:	My Reference:	Research &	Date:
Imibuzo: Thulani Bhengu	Inkomba Yami:	Development	Usuku: 06 January 2014
Navrae:	My Verwysing:	Programme	Datum:
		<a href="mailto:thulani.bhenqu@kzncogta.gov.za">thulani.bhenqu@kzncogta.gov.za</a>	


Dr. S Singh  
Chair: Humanities & Social Research Ethics Committee  
University of KwaZulu-Natal  
Govan Mbeki Building  
Westville Campus

Dear Sir/Madam

**Re: Granting permission for Mr. Siphetho Bonginkosi Dlamini to collect data on this study titled; The Theory and Application of Consociational Democracy in South Africa. A Case study of KwaZulu-Natal. - Protocol Reference number HSS/0935/013D**

1. The above matter bears the reference
2. This letter serves to support the above mentioned study.
3. Mr Dlamini has approached the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs requesting the permission to conduct the interviews with Councilors and Traditional leadership in the Province.
4. The District to which the research will be undertaken are as follows:
  - uMgungundlovu
  - uMzinyathi
  - eThekweni
5. In essence, The Department is responsible for performing oversight and support to 61 municipalities and 294 Traditional Leaders and their institutions in the Province.
6. Your cooperation will be highly appreciated.

Kind Regards

<b>Submitted By</b>  <b>Mr T.A Bhengu</b> <b>General Manager: Municipal Planning</b> <b>Date:</b>
--

## Appendix 7 Consent from

I hereby agree to participate in the research on “*The Theory and Application of Consociational Democracy in South Africa: A Case Study of Kwazulu-Natal*”.

I understand that I am participating freely and without being forced in any way to do so. I also understand that I can stop this interview at any point should I not want to continue and that this decision will not in any way affect me negatively. The purpose of the study has been explained to me, and I understand what is expected of my participation. I also understand that the interview may be recorded and that I may or not give permission to the interviewer to have the interview recorded.

I know **the person to contact should** I need to speak to someone about any issues that may arise in this interview.

I understand that this consent form will not be linked to the questionnaire, and that my answers will remain confidential, unless I specifically give permission to use my name.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Name of participant

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature of participant

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Name of Interviewer

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature of Interviewer

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

### Details of the Researcher

Sphetfo N.B Dlamini  
School of Social Sciences; University of KwaZulu Natal  
P.O.Box 3209 Pietermaritzburg; South Africa  
Tel. 084 500 6695; E-mail: [sphetfo@hotmail.com](mailto:sphetfo@hotmail.com) or [204506403@stu.ukzn.ac.za](mailto:204506403@stu.ukzn.ac.za)

### Details of the Project Supervisor

Dr K. Mtshali  
College of Humanities: University of KwaZulu-Natal  
Private BagX01; Scottsville; 3209; Pietermaritzburg; South Africa  
Tel: (w); 033 260 5892 (h); E-mail: [MtshaliK@ukzn.ac.za](mailto:MtshaliK@ukzn.ac.za)

### Details of Project co-supervisors

Professor C. Isike  
Department of Political Science and Public Administration: University of Zululand  
Private bag X1001 KwaDlangezwa 3886  
Tel: (w): 035 902 6572 (c) 082 749 1155, E-mail [sykeman3@yahoo.co.uk](mailto:sykeman3@yahoo.co.uk)

## Appendix 8: Sample questions for interviews traditional Leaders (English Version)

<b>Traditional Leaders (English Version)</b>
1. Who are the traditional leaders?
2. What is your understanding of development?
3. What role do traditional leaders play in development? (Please elaborate with examples).
4. What is the role of KwaZulu-Natal's traditional leadership and how relevant are they in achieving development?
5. How can government better enhance development in KwaZulu-Natal's districts? Namely; uMgungundlovu and uMzinyathi.
6. Should all political parties come and work together in enabling development in these districts or it should be left to the party in power only?
7. To what extent do different political parties play a role in affecting development in KwaZulu-Natal, specifically uMgungundlovu, eThekweni and uMzinyathi?

## Appendix 9: Sample interview questions for traditional Leaders (Zulu Version)

<b>Traditional Leaders (Zulu Version)</b>
1. Obani abaholi bendabuko?
2. Yini oyiqondayo ngentuthuko?
3. Iliphi iqhaza elibanjwa abaholi bendabuko ezinhlelweni zentuthuko? (chaza kabanzi bese unikeza nezibonelo)
4. Iliphi iqhaza elidlalwa ubuholi bendabuko bakwaZulu-Natal futhi bubaluleke ngani ekufezekiseni izinhlelo zentuthuko?
5. Yini uhulumeni angayenza ukuphucula izinga lezinhlelo zentuthuko ezifundeni zaKwaZulu-Natal njengaseMgungundlovu, eThekwini kanye noMzinyathi
6. Ngabe kufanele onke amaqembu asebenzisane ndawonye ukuze kube lula ukuqhuba izinhlelo zentuthuko kulezi zifunda noma kufanele kube sezandleni zeqembu elibusayo kuphela?
7. Ngabe ukwehlukahluka kwamaqembu kunamthelela muni ezinhlelweni zentuthuko KwaZulu-Natal, kakhulukazi eMgungundlovu, eThekwini naseMzinyathi?

## Appendix 10: Sample interviews question for politicians/ councilors (English Version)

<b>Politicians / councillors – English Version</b>
1. How would you characterize the relationship of your political party to KwaZulu-Natal Provincial government?
2. Have your political party been able to achieve its goals in the past?
3. What are the conditions that facilitated the achievement or the failure to achieve your political party's goals?
4. How is the current performance of your Political party in relation to its goals?
5. What is your, or your parties relation to other parties
6. Which of the two arrangements would you say contribute to the well-being of your constituent? When one party has a majority in the council? Or when no party has a majority in the council, and the parties have to cooperate to make decision? Please elaborate.
7. Are there instances in the past when lack of cooperation among different parties compromised the achievement of Provincial goals?
8. Are the instances in past when cooperation facilitated the achievement of Provincial goals?
9. Is there anything that you think is important for the well-being of your Political party?

## Appendix 11: Sample interview questions for politicians/ councilors (Zulu Version)

<b>Politicians / councillors – Zulu Version</b>
1. Ungabuchaza kanjani ubudlelwane obuphakathi kwesifunda sakho kanye nohulumeni wesifundazwe saKwaZulu-Natal?
2. Ngabe iqembu lakho luke waphumelela ukufezekisa izinhloso zalo kulesi sikhathi esedlule?
3. Iziphi izimo ezenze kwabanzima noma kwabalula ukufezekisa izinhloso zeqembu lakho?
4. lisebenza kanjani iqembu lakho uma kubukwa izinhloso alibekelwe zona?
5. Iqembu lakho ngabe lisebenzisana kanjani namanye amaqembu?
6. Iziphi izindlela kulezi ezimbili ocabanga ukuthi zinganomthelela omuhle ekusebenzeni kweqembu lakho? Uma kuneqembu elilodwa elinamakhansela amaningi? Noma uma kungenaqembu elinamakhansela amaningi okokwenza ukuthi onke amaqembu asebenzisane uma efuna ukuthatha isinqumo? Chaza kabanzi.
7. Zikhona yini izimo ezenzeka esikhathini esingaphambili lapho amaqembu ahluleka ukufika esivumelwaneni kwaze kwaphazamisa ukufezekisa izinhloso zikamasipala?
8. Zikhona yini izikhathi lapho kwabanokubambisana phakathi kwamaqembu kwase kufezekiswa izinhloso zikamasipala?
9. Ikhona yini into ocabanga ukuthi ibalulekile ukuze iqembu lakho lisebenze ngendlela?

## Appendix 12: Sample interview questions for NGOs

<b>Non-Governmental Organization (NGOs)</b>
1. How would you characterize the relationship of your NGO to KwaZulu-Natal Provincial government?
2. Have your NGO been able to achieve its goals in the past?
3. What are the conditions that facilitated the achievement or the failure to achieve your NGOs goals?
4. How is the current performance of your NGO in relation to its goals?
5. What is your, or your parties relation to other parties
6. How would you characterize your relationship to other NGOs?
7. Which of the two arrangements would you say contribute to the well-being of your municipality? When one party has a majority in the council? Or when no party has a majority in the council, and the parties have to cooperate to make decision? Please elaborate.
8. Are there instances in the past when lack of cooperation among different parties compromised the achievement of your NGOs goals?
9. Are the instances in past when cooperation facilitated the achievement of NGOs goals?
10. Is there anything that you think is important for the well-being of your NGO?

### Appendix 13: Sample interview questions for Focus Group Discussions

<b>Focus Group</b>
1. What are the things that you value in life?
2. With regards to the values you have just mentioned, have they been influenced by your religion?
3. What are the goals of your municipality? And to what extent have you participated in the formulation of these goals.
4. Do you participate in your municipalities' decision-making? Please elaborate.
5. Are there things that hinder you or other members of the community from participating in decision making?
6. Please tell me a little bit about the organizations and leadership in your municipality? Which organizations, who are the leaders? Do this organizations and leaders cooperate in their activities?
7. Has your municipality been able to achieve any of its goals?
8. What accounts for your municipality's success or failure?
9. Which of the two arrangements would you say contributes to the well-being of your municipality? When one party has a majority in the council? Or when no party has a majority in the council, and the parties have to cooperate to make decision? Please elaborate.
10. Does cooperation among different organizations enhance or compromise the achievement of municipality's goals?
11. Are there any other conditions/ organizations that facilitate the achievement of your goals?

## Appendix 14: Sample interview questions for Senior Government Officials

Senior Government Officials	
1. How would you characterize the relationship of your District Municipalities to CoGTA or Office of the Premier	Interview
2. Have your District municipality been able to achieve its goals in the past?	Interview
3. What are the conditions that facilitated the achievement or the failure to achieve your municipalities' or department's goals?	Interview
4. How the current performance of your municipality or department in relation to its goals?	Interview
5. How would you characterize your Department's relations to other municipalities?	Interview
6. Which of the two arrangements would you say contribute to the well-being of your Province? When one party has a majority in the Provincial? Or when no party has a majority in the Provincial, and the parties have to cooperate to make decision? Please elaborate.	Interview
7. Are there instances in the past when lack of cooperation among different parties compromised the achievement of department's goal?	Interview
8. Are the instances in past when cooperation facilitated the achievement of Department's goals?	Interview
9. Is there anything that you think is important for the well-being of your Department?	Interview