Analyzing Accountability in Street-Level Bureaucracy: Managing the Implementation of National Curriculum Statements in the uMgungundlovu District in South Africa

Sybert Muterekono

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Policy and Development Studies), in the College of Humanities at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa.

Supervisor: Professor Ralph Lawrence

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DECLARATION

I, Sybert Mutereko, declare that

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2. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.

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Student Name: Sybert Mutereko

Signature: ________________

Date: ________________

Dr Anne Stanton

Signature: _____________

pp Professor Ralph Lawrence (Supervisor)

Date: ________________
ABSTRACT

It has become generally accepted among public policy stakeholders, practitioners and scholars that street – level bureaucrats play a vital role in policy implementation. Because of that, street – level bureaucrats are attracting considerable interest due to their ability to influence policy outcomes through the exercise of their professional discretion and autonomy. On the other hand, there is an immense body of literature covering different techniques public managers can use to hold street – level bureaucrats accountable. Although many studies have been done to investigate the role of management in holding street – level bureaucrats accountable, there are very few such studies in done in South Africa.

Our knowledge of the role of management in holding street – level bureaucrats accountable to organisational goals in the education sector of South Africa is largely based on very limited data. The aim of the research was therefore to analyse accountability mechanisms used in managing the implementation of National Curriculum Statements in the education street - level bureaucracy of South Africa. The specific geographical unit of the study was uMgungundlovu District in KwaZulu-Natal Province. The study had five key objectives, each of which is suggestive of a type of accountability: political accountability, performance accountability, hierarchical accountability, legal accountability and professional accountability.

In order to understand the different types of accountability used in the implementation of National Curriculum Statements, a comprehensive review of documents was done. This was followed by interviews with six high school principals and surveys with 100 high school educators. The data were analysed quantitatively and qualitatively.

The results from documentary review show that the government was exercising political accountability in education through various policies as well as financing education. However, not many respondents were satisfied with its level of political accountability. The results further show that in line with performance accountability, the government was using performance measures to in order to hold educators accountable among other reasons. With various levels of effectiveness, the government is using different forms of hierarchical, legal and professional accountability mechanisms to hold educators accountable.

The findings of this study have shown that there are various forms of accountability used in the implementation of National Curriculum Statements. Each type of accountability has its strengths and weaknesses; therefore, they are not mutually exclusive. The present findings have important implications for our understanding of the role played by management in managing policy implementation in street – level bureaucracies.
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Finally, I wish to express my gratitude and love to my wife, Pamela, my son Kaelan and my beloved daughters, Kuda and Mufaro for their support and strength. They are the reason I did this; they are the reason I thrive to be better. Their pride for me is my main goal in life.
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my parents, James and Media Mutereko for their endless love and support.
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<td>ABET</td>
<td>Adult Basic Education and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACE SL&amp;M</td>
<td>Advanced Certificate in School Leadership and Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Annual National Assessments</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>Bed</td>
<td>Bachelor of Education</td>
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<td>C2005</td>
<td>Curriculum 2005</td>
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<td>CAPS</td>
<td>Curriculum Assessment Policy Statements</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEM</td>
<td>Council of Education Ministers</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEPD</td>
<td>Centre for Education Policy Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIAS</td>
<td>Council of Internationally Accredited Schools</td>
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<tr>
<td>COSATU</td>
<td>Congress of South African Trade Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>CUMSA</td>
<td>Curriculum Model for South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Developmental Appraisal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DBE &amp; DoHET</td>
<td>Department of Basic Education and the Department of Higher Education and Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>DBE</td>
<td>Department of Basic Education</td>
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<td>DNE</td>
<td>Department of National Education</td>
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<td>DoE</td>
<td>Department of Education</td>
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<td>ELRC</td>
<td>Education Labour Relation Council</td>
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<td>ELT</td>
<td>Ethical and Legal Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMIS</td>
<td>Education Management Information System</td>
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<td>ERS</td>
<td>Education Renewal Strategy</td>
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<td>EVE</td>
<td>Ethics and Values in Education</td>
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<td>FET</td>
<td>Further Education and Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>HEDCOM</td>
<td>Heads of Education Departments Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>HoD</td>
<td>head of department</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Computer Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPET</td>
<td>Implementation Plans for Education and Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>IQMS</td>
<td>Integrated Quality Management System</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCS</td>
<td>National Curriculum Statements</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEEDU</td>
<td>National Education Evaluation and Development Unit</td>
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<td>NEPA</td>
<td>National Education Policy</td>
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<td>NEPI</td>
<td>National Education Investigation Policy</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Senior Certificate</td>
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<td>NSNP</td>
<td>National School Nutrition Programme</td>
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<td>OBE</td>
<td>Outcome Based Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PGCE</td>
<td>Post Graduate Certificate in Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Performance Measurement</td>
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<td>PPN</td>
<td>Post Provisioning Norm</td>
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<tr>
<td>REQV</td>
<td>Relative Education Qualification Value</td>
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<tr>
<td>RNCS</td>
<td>Revised National Curriculum Statement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACE</td>
<td>South African Council of Educators</td>
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<td>SASA</td>
<td>South African Schools Act</td>
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<td>SGB</td>
<td>School Governing Body</td>
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<td>SMT</td>
<td>School Management Teams</td>
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<td>WSE</td>
<td>Whole School Evaluation</td>
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

A question that has been of a source of public debate in public administration, public management, and public policy literatures is whether management makes a difference to the operations and performance of government organisations (Ricucci, 2005:1). On the one hand, there is an immense body of literature which highlights the importance of management techniques and leadership in the efficient operation of public organisations. On the other hand, there is considerable academic research which suggests that the influence of management and management techniques on the behaviours of the street-level bureaucrats is minimal (Lipsky, 1980:159). By definition, street-level bureaucrats are “public service workers who interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs, and who have substantial discretion in the execution of their work” (Lipsky, 1980:3). In this sense, teachers are viewed as street-level bureaucrats. Some scholars portray a very pessimistic view of the ability of public managers to secure accountability among street-level bureaucrats and improve the efficiency of public organisations. They argue that “bureaucratic systems make it extraordinarily difficult for management to change the direction, nature, or culture of their organisations” (Ricucci, 2005:1). These scholars contend that street-level workers are difficult to control because they possess a great deal of discretionary powers especially where their jobs involve qualitative aspects (Ricucci, 2005:1; Lipsky, 1980:159).

A further area of research shows that mechanisms of accountability can hinder managers from attaining their organisational objectives. Ebrahim (2005:57) notes that certain accountability requirements can hinder organisational learning, and it is thus important to differentiate among factors that enable and impede efficiency. A number of the studies show the existence of side effects such as ‘window dressing’ and other types of ‘gaming’ (Wolf and Janssens, 2007:2).

Notwithstanding this, public managers are pressured to secure or improve workers’ accountability through manipulation of incentives and other aspects of the job structure available to them (Lipsky, 1980:159). The need for accountability in policy implementation is heightened by the principles of democracy. Lipsky (1980:160) argues that there is a strong link between bureaucracy and democracy. Lipsky explains that modern democracy depends on the accountability of bureaucracies to carry out declared policies. In this respect, accountability
means more than answering to a superior or to account for one’s action; the issue here is the relationship between what superiors seek and what subordinates do (Lipsky, 1980:160).

Because street-level bureaucracies are major recipients of public expenditure and represent a significant portion of public activities at local level (Lipsky, 1980: xvi), they are expected to be accountable. For example, the education and health sectors in South Africa receive a total of 30% of government expenditure (The Presidency, 2009:5). Some 60% of this money is spent on salaries (The Presidency, 2009:7).

For this reason and others, education is the most ‘public’ of all public policies. As a result there is great deal of literature on accountability pertaining to education policy, but there very little on South African education.

1.2 The context of the study

The context of this thesis is the implementation of educational policy in South Africa. It examines mechanisms employed by government, public managers and other organisations in trying to achieve accountability in the implementation the National Curriculum Statement (NCS). The main aims of the NCS policy are, among other things, to:

- Equip learners, irrespective of their socio-economic background, race, gender, physical ability or intellectual ability, with the knowledge, skills and values necessary for self-fulfilment, and meaningful participation in society as citizens of a free country;
- Provide access to higher education;
- Facilitate the transition of learners from education institutions to the workplace; and
- Provide employers with a sufficient profile of a learner’s competences. (Department of Education, 2002b:1)

The demands of the NCS on both educators and learners have been debated by scholars, practitioners, and policy makers. Because of this, the policy has been amended several times. It has a number of features which seek a radical change in the behaviour of educators in order to be relevant in the democratic dispensation. For instance, the NSC envisions teachers who are qualified, competent, dedicated and caring and who will be able to fulfil the various roles outlined in the Norms and Standards for Educators of 2000 (Department of Education, 2002a:9). Some of the norms and standards view teachers as mediators of learning, interpreters and
designers of learning programmes and materials, leaders, administrators and managers, scholars, researchers and lifelong learners, community members, citizens and pastors, assessors and learning area/phase specialists (Government Gazette No 20844). This places a huge responsibility on education managers at all levels to make sure that that behaviour of educators is in accordance with policy expectations.

The role of management in street-level bureaucrats’ implementation of NSC policy and teachers’ perceptions of the effect of different accountability mechanisms on educators are the focal point of my thesis. The term ‘street-level bureaucrats’ in this study refers to teachers (educators) who work at the frontline in the actual implementation of curricula, while management denotes heads of departments (HoDs), deputy school principals, school principals, subject advisers as well other management personnel at district as well provincial offices in South Africa.

The implementation of the NCS has not been smooth. Due to several challenges faced during its implementation successive ministers of education in South Africa instituted commissions to investigate such challenges. President Jacob Zuma, in his 2009 State of the Nation Address as well as in his 2010 Freedom Day celebration address, seemed to apportion part of the problem to the teachers. He pointed out that:

> Our plan is to improve the output and the pass rates through increasing efficiency and accountability in our schools. That is why we say our teachers should be in school, in class, on time, teaching for at least six and half hours a day. If they do that, the results will speak for themselves (The Presidency, 2010).

It is implicit in this assertion that once the educators do implement the NCS policy as it intended poor educational outcomes will become a thing of the past. The question is why do teachers apparently behave in ways that are contrary to their expected roles? What can be done to make them accountable in delivering NCS policy?

While the factors that hinder policy implementation are varied and may include the nature of the NCS policy, the focus of this study is on how to make schools and teachers accountable. The government at different levels has a number of mechanisms that are meant to keep the teachers’ level of accountability at optimum levels. In 2009 The Presidency produced a discussion document entitled *Improving Government Performance: Our Approach*. This document, among other things, emphasises the need for institutional mechanisms for outcomes performance management. “The purpose of the outcome performance system is not limited to measuring
outcomes and outputs. It serves as a mechanism to guide the direction of policy implementation – to ensure that we are doing what matters most” (The Presidency, 2009:8).

While all these control mechanisms and many others are in place at provincial, district and school level, the problem of poor performance seems to persist. The teachers still have a considerable level of discretion in the course of their duties (Mutereko, 2009: iii). The individual decisions made by each teacher (street-level bureaucrat), the routines they establish, and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the education policy they carry out (Lipsky, 1980: xii).

Nevertheless, if the educational outcomes are to improve there is a need to find ways of controlling the teachers’ discretion and enhancing accountability. The central theme of this study is to explore ways and means by which street-level workers can be held accountable to their organisation objectives. For various reasons, the methods used by the Department of Education have not been effective as evidenced by “widespread learner underperformance in both international and local assessment” (DBE, 2009:1). Some of these mechanisms include performance evaluation, training and recruitment (professional development), sanctions, time limits, the use of authority and centralizing certain functions (Lipsky, 1980, Riccucci, 2005).

Despite the unsatisfactory educational outcomes in South Africa, there has been very little research on educational accountability. Most studies on National Curriculum Statements (NCS) simply mention educational outcomes in OBE as a mechanism for accountability (Jansen, 2001:242, Chisholm, 2004:1). One study is Mapesela and Strydom’s (2003) research on performance management and accountability in South African higher education. Most of the studies on educational accountability and performance management have been carried out in North America (Horsley, 2009; Frink and Klimoski, 2004; Frink and Ferris, 1998; Webb, 2005; Bush, 2007) and Europe (Taylor, 2007; Huse, 2005; Epstein, 1993; Maupin, 1993).

1.3 Research problems and objectives

In policy implementation there is an increasing need to understand why policies do not achieve the desired results. Studies have shown that street-level bureaucrats, who are the final implementers of policy, have discretion, autonomy and coping mechanisms which they exercise to produce the final policy which might not resemble the written policy (Mutereko, 2009:4). On one hand, Lipsky (2010) boldly asserts that “bureaucratic accountability is virtually impossible to achieve among street-level bureaucrats who exercise a high degree of
discretion at least where qualitative aspects of the work is involved”. On the other he observes the high expectation placed on public managers to secure or at least improve accountability through manipulation of incentives and other aspects of job structure available to them (Lipsky, 2010:159). Broadly speaking, this study explores the different strategies employed by departments, organisations and government at large to secure accountability among street-level bureaucrats in South Africa in the implementation of government policies on education in schools.

In view of the poor performance by government departments which was reported by The Presidency (2009:3), the question is, what are the government departments doing to enforce accountability among the street-level bureaucrats? What kind of accountability mechanisms are they using? How do these accountability mechanisms affect the behaviour of street-level bureaucrats? Answering these questions is significant in a number of ways if government performance is to be improved through enhanced accountability. Understanding the effect of accountability mechanisms on street-level workers in policy implementation is important for public managers, policy makers and scholars alike.

The purpose of this study was to investigate how government and management responsible for secondary schools in uMgungundlovu District in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, attempts to secure and improve accountability in the implementation of the National Curriculum Statements. Furthermore, the study seeks to understand how the educators perceive the different accountability mechanisms the government and the secondary schools employ to hold them accountable.

In order to explore the research problem, this study has five key objectives, each of which is indicative of a type of accountability. The perceptions of teachers and principals are investigated in order to understand: firstly, government’s responsiveness to the educational needs of South Africa (political accountability); secondly, the implementation of performance evaluation by the Department of Basic Education (DBE) (performance accountability); thirdly, the bureaucratic processes which are used to make teachers accountable (hierarchical accountability); fourthly, the legal framework for the work of teachers (legal accountability); and fifthly’ professional accountability of teachers in relation to implementing NCS.
In the next sections that follow, how these key objectives will be investigated will be explained by outlining the theoretical framework of the study and then indicating the context of the research itself, and the methods used.

1.4 Theoretical framework

This study seeks to bridge the gap between the literature on public policy implementation and on organisational management, which are informed by different theoretical frameworks. This investigation is underpinned by two main theories: (1) street-level bureaucracy as propounded by Lipsky (1980) in his celebrated book titled *Street-Level Bureaucrats: dilemmas of individuals in public serves*, and (2) organisational influences on workers as postulated by Simon in his works, starting with his seminal article in 1944, titled *Decision-Making and Administrative Organisation*, and his classical book, * Administrative Organisation* (second and fourth editions in 1952 and 1997 respectively).

Organisations use different mechanisms to influence the behaviour of their workers in making them accountable to their organisation or clients (Lipsky, 1980:162-171; Simon, 1944:21; 1952:102; 1997:277). In order to achieve accountability, organisations can use authority, performance evaluation, advice and information, training and the criterion of efficiency (Simon, 1944:21-25). Lipsky’s (1980:164-166) main performance prescriptions for accountability are goal clarification and performance measures. Lipsky also includes training and professional development as solutions to public service dilemmas (1980:202). In many respects, these writers agree on the need to hold street-level workers accountable to realising organisational objectives, although they differ in terms of their approaches. For instance, Simon (1944:24; 1952:103; 1997:13) emphasizes the importance of pre-training and in-service training as a means of achieving accountability from the inside out. Lipsky’s (1980) position is not known since he is silent about the training issue. On the other hand, Simon (1944; 1952; 1997) does not discuss the need for performance evaluation as a means of influencing the street-level worker’s behaviour. It is, however, important to note that although these authors may not be explicit about certain accountability mechanisms, a review of their works shows that by implication they all believe in the importance of training (Simon, 1944:24; Simon, 1997:13; Lipsky, 1980:200-201).

Lipsky proposes accountability mechanisms that are related to what he perceives to be the cause of the lack of accountability (Lipsky, 1980:164). For instance, Lipsky notes that lack of accountability among street-level workers is caused by the ambiguity and multiplicity of
organisation. It is easier to manage a department if you are sure of what is supposed to be done. In the United States of America, public service areas such as education in recent years have all been subject to efforts to increase accountability through goal clarification (Lipsky, 1980:165). Lipsky explains that:

Schools attempt to instruct, but they also inculcate social behaviour and citizenship. They do this not because educators are fuzzy but because both these objectives are favoured by parents (and because there is no convincing case that they are mutually incompatible) (Lipsky, 1980:165).

The problem of goal ambiguity has contributed to discrediting institutions that provide social services. For example, educators may not be sure of their aim: providing citizenship education or teaching to produce high pass rates? Observers can discredit an education system if there is such uncertainty.

Another important accountability mechanism presented by Lipsky is performance evaluation. The development of performance measures is critical to a bureaucratic accountability policy (Lipsky, 1980:165). He notes that the purpose of these measures is to control employees’ behaviour. Lipsky explains the purpose of performance evaluation as follows:

There is no doubt that public services can be enhanced through the development of valid performance measures. In such cases, public service workers can be held accountable for producing results in the same way machine operators can be charged with producing a certain volume of output in a given time (Lipsky, 1980:166).

This may imply the Taylorist scientific management style of 1911 which was deemed effective in increasing the productivity of pig-iron handlers at Bethlehem Steel Company. The application of these strategies in human service organisations dealing with professionals might be questionable. Furthermore, Lipsky notes that public service workers must also be assessed for quality control since producing a volume of items may be meaningless (Lipsky, 1980:166). To Lipsky these are some mechanisms that can be executed in order make street-level bureaucracies and bureaucrats accountable.

Simon proposes several modes of organisational influences on the behaviour of street-level workers (operatives) (1944:21-25; 1997:9-14). Some of the modes are similar to Lipsky’s ones (1980). First, the use of authority as a mode of influence on street-level workers’ behaviour is discussed by Simon. The importance of authority as an accountability mechanism is that it can
permit a decision to be made and carried out even when agreement cannot be reached (Simon, 1997:10). However, it is important to note that subordinates can only carry out authoritative orders if they are within their ‘zone of acceptance’, which is the limit beyond which workers are unwilling to take orders (Simon, 1997:10). The zone of acceptance depends on the sanctions which the authority has to enforce its commands. Simon notes that these sanctions could be physical or economic sanctions (1997:10). The critical question is how can authority be used to secure accountability in educational bureaucrats?

The second accountability mechanism which Simon (1997:10; 1944:21) proposes is *organisational loyalty*. It is a prevalent characteristic of human behaviour that members of an organised group tend to identify with that group (Simon, 1997:10). In making decisions, individual members are influenced by their organisational loyalty. There are a number of psychological elements on which an organisational loyalty mechanism is based. First, personal success often depends on organisational success – the administrator who builds up his or her unit expects (with good reason) promotion and salary increases. Second, loyalty seems partly to transfer to the field of public management the spirit of competition which characterizes private enterprise (Simon, 1997:11). Third, Simon avers that *advice and information* can be used to influence the behaviour of street-level workers (Simon, 1997:12; 1944: 23). Unlike the overt and formal accountability mechanisms already discussed, Simon says that advice and information may be viewed as internal public relations for there is no guarantee that advice rendered will be used (1997:12). He adds that information and advice may be used as alternatives to the exercise of authority (Simon, 1944:23).

Fourth, Simon believes that *training*, like institutional loyalties and other overt accountability mechanisms, influences decisions “from the inside out” (Simon, 1997:13; Simon, 1944:24). Because of this, many bureaucracies require people to undergo some form of training. Training can be pre-service or in-service. Lipsky (1980:200) concurs with Simon (1997:13) and adds that “on the job training is likely to be more effective than classroom learning experiences because the training is provided in the context of actual problem solving situations”. New members to an organisation are trained in what is appropriate and acceptable in a way that will guide their future decisions in their organisations.

In summary, the accountability mechanisms which are employed in educational policy implementation include the elements which are listed in Table 1.1. They can be grouped into internal and external mechanisms.
Table 1.1 Street-level accountability mechanisms in schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External mechanisms</th>
<th>Internal mechanisms</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Authority</td>
<td>• Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Performance evaluation</td>
<td>• Oversight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Assessment and mandated curriculum</td>
<td>• Class visits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Training and Professional development</td>
<td>• Staff development</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>• Leadership styles</td>
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Internal mechanisms of accountability are those which teachers as street – level bureaucrats experience at school, whereas external mechanisms emanate from outside sources, for instance, government department or a professional association. This typology is taken a step further in the conceptual framework below.

The conceptual framework in Figure 1.1 depicts the impact of public authorities in education and school principals on street-level bureaucrats. In this model, managers in government bureaucracies affect the front-line management in local offices as well as schools and thereby influence the final organisational outputs. The model also illustrates the importance of street-level bureaucrats’ beliefs about the policy goals and the needs of individual learners. It also shows that the day-to-day activities of teachers, such as the time of coming to work, lesson planning and lesson delivery influence the educational outputs of the schools. The arrows indicate that the impacts of elements of front-line management on the behaviour of street-level bureaucrats are expected to be tenuous due to coping mechanisms employed by teachers.
Figure 1.1 A conceptual model of accountability and performance of street-level bureaucrats

Elements of state management systems and policies (external mechanisms)
- Explicit goals supporting work
- Program and policy features
- Earnings
- Sanctions
- Time limits
- Work requirements
- Employment and training staff-development
- Performance evaluation
- Clients’ expectations (parents, learners)
- Institutional roles (uMalusi, South African Council for Educators, non-profit, for profit)
- Accountability; incentives for performance
- Assessments and mandated curricular
- Publication of results

(Adapted from Riccucci, 2005:8)

Elements of front-line management (internal mechanisms)
- Local statement of policy (district and school)
- Human resources practices (implementation of state policy, staffing, training staff development, reward structure, monitoring and evaluation; class and school visits, book inspection)
- Management practices (Communication and leadership styles and oversight)

Elements of front-line beliefs and behaviour
- Street-level behaviour and practices (Observable characteristics of service delivery, delivery including day today activities of frontline workers (educators))
- Street-level bureaucrats’ discretion, beliefs about the NCS mission and goals, worker roles, and learner obligation

Organisational outcomes
- Organisational outputs
  - Ensured specific organisational qualities considered to be critical to effectiveness are reflected in their schools or district
  - Meeting standards of professional knowledge and skill
  - Meeting standards of moral behaviour
  - Performance of best professional practices or specified duties
- Organisational efficiency
- Access to higher education,
- Transition from high school to work place
- Sufficient profile of learner competence

Unwanted outcomes
- Teachers leaving due to excessive need for accountability
- Window dressing
- Creaming (preventing weaker learners from progressing to matric)
- Falsification of information
- Entry tests of new students to screen weak students
This theoretical framework is appropriate in providing answers to the research questions raised in this thesis in two significant ways. First, it will be used to identify and explain the different mechanisms (formal and informal) that are used to achieve accountability in the street-level workers (teachers). Simon, for example, in all his writings in the 1940s until the late 1990s believed that it is possible to control the street-level bureaucrats through the prescriptions that he outlines. The DBE has, in a number of ways, used some of these mechanisms. Second, the theoretical framework shows how the attainment of accountability among the street-level workers may be an elusive pursuit. For instance, Lipsky’s (1980) theory presents a very pessimistic picture about the ability of the mechanisms to attain accountability among street-level bureaucrats. Proper application of this framework should enable the research questions to be addressed comprehensively.

1.5 Research: context and methods

The research focuses on secondary schools in uMgungundlovu District in KwaZulu-Natal. This is a District with poor and rich schools. It also has a mix of public and private schools. Above all, it has both schools which have enjoyed successive outstanding Matriculation pass rates (Grade 12) as well as those that continue be far less successful. This makes this District a suitable case study.

This study took a mixed methodology approach which focused on qualitative as well as quantitative methods.

**Qualitative methodology**

Qualitative research methodology is relevant for this study for three major reasons. First, qualitative research is deemed to be much more fluid and flexible than quantitative research in that it emphasizes discovering novel or unanticipated findings and the possibility of altering research plans in response to such serendipitous occurrences (Bryman, 1984:78). This is very important since there have been very few studies on accountability in basic education in South Africa. Second, qualitative research generates results and theories that are understandable and experientially credible, both to educators, principals and other people (Bickman and Rog, 1998:76). Third, Bickman and Rog (1998:76) argue that qualitative research is appropriate for studies that intended to improve existing practice rather than to determine the outcomes of the programme.
Quantitative methodology

Quantitative techniques were used in coding interview data with a view to constructing a dataset which can be analysed using appropriate statistical programme (Burton, 2000:217). To this end, questions in the interview schedule were designed in a way that made responses easier to code (See the Appendices). Quantitative data were linked to qualitative data in order to: (a) enable confirmation and corroboration of each other via triangulation; (b) to elaborate and develop analysis, providing richer detail; and (c) to initiate new lines of thinking through attention to surprises or paradoxes (Miles and Huberman, 1994:41).

Sample

For the purpose of this study, non-probability sampling was used, both the convenient and purposive forms. Based on the researcher’s previous findings (Mutereko, 2009), the sample comprised six school principals and 100 teachers. The sample size for this study was determined by three different factors. First, the size was determined by the techniques of analysis to be used which are mainly qualitative. Secondly, the number of units of analysis from which usable data were collected was anticipated to be smaller than the number originally drawn since some people might have refused to participate in the research (Welman et al, 2007:72). Thirdly, the size was also influenced by the resources that were available for undertaking this study.

Data collection and analysis

Apart from the data collected from interviews, extensive use was made of reviewing official documents, from government and other educational organisations. This covered the laws and policies that have been promulgated to guide the management of schools. For example:

- Draft Policy on the Minimum Requirements in Education 2009
- Human Resources Management Guideline for Schools 2010
- Human Resources Management Guideline for Districts and Provinces
- An Integrated Performance Management and Development System for Use in the Public Service (Department of Public Service and Administration, 2009).
- National Education Policy (1996)
- The National Policy Framework for Teacher Education and Development in
So


These documents allowed the researcher to track what happened, when it happened and who was involved (Bickman and Rog, 1998:19). These documents were also important in corroborating and augmenting evidence from other sources (Bickman and Rog, 1998:19). The review of documents before fieldwork also provided the basis for interviews.

The main form of data analysis was content analysis. Data recorded and coded from interviews were transcribed before analysis. Thematic content analysis was then used to analyse responses to the open ended comments in the interview schedule. The analyses of the transcribed data were based on pattern matching logic, which “compares an empirically-based pattern with a predicted one” (Yin, 2003:116). The ‘predicted pattern’ comprised findings from the previous studies, together with the theoretical framework (Bergen and While, 2005:4). Put another way, findings from other studies at times were used to compare results.

The responses from the closed questions in the interview schedule for the educators were analyzed quantitatively, using IBM SPSS Statistics 21. Frequency tables and bar graphs were developed to present summary statistics. The Chi-Square tests were deployed to test the effect of accountability mechanisms and the level of accountability. Cross tabulation was used to explore relationships in the data.

To ensure validity the researcher used multiple sources of evidence (triangulation) during the data collection stage. The researcher gave some participants draft reports for verification (Bickman and Rog, 1998:243). The study did pattern and explanation building during the data analysis stage to ensure internal validity. External validity was enhanced through the use of theories outlined in the theoretical framework (Bickman and Rog, 1998: xiii)

The researcher made sure that the findings of the study are reliable. Reliability is concerned with the findings of the research as it relates to credibility of the findings (Welman, 2007:145). To achieve this, the researcher used the case study protocol and by ensuring that the data collection instruments yielded consistent information.

Ethical consideration
In order “to protect the welfare and rights of research participants” (Terre-Blanche and Durrheim, 2002:65) the researcher had to follow research ethics protocols. The researcher observed the ethics that pertain to the conduct of research under the auspices of the UKZN. To that end, the study was carried out in accordance with UKZN policy on ethical issues relating to research activities. Right at the proposal stage the researcher sought clearance from the Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee which was granted. The researcher got permission to conduct the study in the uMgungundlovu District (See Appendix Four). Before conducting interviews and giving questionnaires to respondents the researcher obtained informed consent from the participants. The researcher explained everything the participants needed in order to make informed decisions before participation.

The researcher identified himself as well as the institution that he was affiliated to. He gave the participants his supervisor’s contact details in case there was a problem. He explained the aims of the study as well as the methods to be used. Furthermore, the researcher assured the participants of anonymity, privacy and confidentiality. The right to privacy can be viewed as “the right to decide when, where, to whom, and to what extent his or her attitudes, beliefs and behaviour will be revealed” (Singleton et al., 1988:454). The researcher explained to the participants that no one in their schools or the Department of Basic Education would know how they would have answered. They did not give their names or any person’s name in their answers. He assured them that their responses were going to remain confidential. All information the participants provided was considered confidential and grouped with responses from other participants. Furthermore, no participant was identified by name in this thesis or in any report or publication resulting from this study. Pseudonyms were used in place of respondents names (e.g. Tr. 1 for teacher 1, Pl. 1 for principal 1 and SA 1 for subject advisor 1). It was also important for the researcher to emphasise to the participants that their participation was voluntary. He explained to them that they were not going to be penalised they chose not to participate or to withdraw from the study at any time. Lastly, the researcher assured the participants that this study had been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Office of Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee at UKZN and, both their schools and the Department of Basic Education had approved this study but the final decision about participation was theirs.

1.6 Structure of the thesis

The argument of the thesis will be structured as follows:
Chapter Two considers the subject of policy implementation by focusing attention on the three generations of implementation research, followed by a presentation of models and approaches to policy implementation. The chapter ends with an analysis of the role of street-level bureaucrats in policy implementation. The third chapter characterises accountability and then examines five types of accountability, namely, political accountability, performance accountability, hierarchical accountability, legal accountability and professional accountability. The chapter closes by offering an analytic framework for educational accountability. Chapter Four arrives at an analytic framework for ensuring accountability in schools and among teachers by drawing on various types of accountability.

In order to place the whole thesis in context, Chapter Five chronicles the evolution of the South African education policy from the period before the dawn of democracy in 1994 until 2012. Chapter Six will concentrate on a comprehensive review of documents pertaining to the implementation of NCS in terms of different types of accountability.

The seventh chapter describes the study site and gives a profile of uMgungundlovu District. This will include data about educators and information on schools. The next several chapters will consist of findings from surveys and interviews in accordance with types of accountability developed in the theoretical framework. Chapter Eight will examine political accountability; Chapter Nine will examine performance accountability; Chapter Ten will consider hierarchical accountability; and Chapter Eleven will analyse professional accountability.

The final chapter will be divided into two: conclusions and implications. First, conclusions will be derived from qualitative and quantitative findings on the research problems. The contribution of this research to the body of knowledge will be clearly developed.
CHAPTER TWO
PUBLIC POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Many bureaucracies and other organisations have formulated superb policies that are aimed at delivering services and improving the quality of life of their people. There are many approaches that governments use to implement policies. Depending on various factors, top-down, and bottom-up approaches can be used. Policy networks are increasingly becoming common where public and private partnerships are forged in implementing public policies. However, although many of these policies are premised on sound theoretical foundations, in many cases they fail to achieve the desired outcomes. The reasons for policy failure are many. They include but are not limited to non-implementation or partial implementation, inadequate political commitment at the top, lack of capacity by street-level bureaucrats and poor oversight at local level. Whatever the reason for policy failure, it may lead to a change of government through electoral processes while in others, especially in authoritarian states, this may lead to public protest and despondency. In areas where it is assumed that the problem of policy implementation lies in the street-level bureaucrats, governments and their departments have used different accountability mechanisms.

The purpose of this chapter is to trace the history of policy implementation in the context of this study. This will focus on the three generations of policy implementation. These are: Generation 1: a cog in the administrative machine; Generation 2: implementation is complex, ‘nothing works’; and Generation 3: the search for a fully-fledged theory. Then the chapter will outline the top-down and the bottom-up models of implementation. After that the chapter will explain the principal theory upon which the study is based. Then the chapter will end with a section on the role of street-level bureaucrats in policy implementation. In analysing the complex process of policy implementation, this chapter attempts to unravel the complexity of policy and ultimately understand the managerial mechanisms of securing accountability.

2.1 Policy implementation

The systematic study of public policy implementation started in the 1970s (Hill and Hupe, 2002:41). As such, most influential definitions of policy implementation used in policy analysis are those developed at that time. Drawing on these definitions and others developed later, this section attempts to define policy implementation. Implementation is viewed as “the
ability to forge subsequent links in the causal chain so as to obtain the desired result” (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973: xv). For Rein and Rabinovitz (1978: 308), implementation is “the point at which intent gets translated into action”. Some conceive implementation as “those events and activities that occur after the issuing of authoritative public policy directives, which include both the effort to administer and the substantive impacts on people and events” (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983:4). To Goggin, Bowman, Lester, and O’Toole (1990:34) implementation is a “process, a series of ... decisions and actions directed toward putting an already decided ... mandate into effect”. All these definitions have implicit points of convergence. Common among these definitions is the desire to produce change or desired outcomes through directed actions by groups of people or individuals.

The last definition to be considered in this section is that of Bardach (1977). Bardach (1977:56) defines implementation as “the playing out of a number of loosely interrelated games.” Bardach defends his games metaphor of implementation by arguing that:

It [implementation] directs us to look at the players, what they regard as the stakes, their strategies and tactics, their resources for playing, the rules of play (which stipulate the conditions for winning), the rules of ‘fair’ play (which stipulate the boundaries beyond which lie fraud or illegitimacy), the nature of the communications (or lack of them) among the players, and the degree of uncertainty surrounding possible outcomes. The game metaphor also directs our attention to who is not willing to play and for what reasons, and to who insists on changes in some of the game’s parameters as a condition for playing. (Bardach, 1977:56)

This definition is of great interest to policy implementation scholarship due to its unique approach to implementation and, by extension, to accountability. It highlights the unwillingness of some players to play, the rules of play and the conditions for winning or how the success of implementation can be measured. In figurative language, this definition contains most of the ideas in all other definitions of policy implementation. Furthermore, it also goes on to show how the outputs of the process are to be measured. This is very close to Jenkins’s (1978) view of implementation. Jenkins argues that:

A study of implementation is a study of change: how change occurs, possibly how it may be induced. It is a study of the micro-structure of political life; outside and inside of political system how actors conduct their affairs and interact with one
another; what motivates them to act the way they do, what motivates them to act differently. (Jenkins, 1978:203)

Implicitly, Jenkins’s (1978:203) and Bardach’s (1977:56) definitions of implementation agree on the role of different players in the organisations and their motivations. In Bardach’s language it could be asked, what motivates players to ‘win their games?’ Importantly, Jenkins raised the importance of different levels of implementation to include micro-structures and organisations which could be termed micro-implementation.

2.2 The three generations of implementation research

The problem of trying to match public policies and outcomes in the form of improved public services is not new. Many scholars and analysts have devoted a lot of time and effort to learn and understand the dynamics of policy implementation. “The first generation of implementation analysts discovered the problem of policy implementation – the uncertain relationship between policies and implemented programs- and sketched its broad parameters” (McLaughlin, 1989:9). The second generation began to unpack implementation processes and to zero in on relations between policy and practice of implementers at local level (1989:9). The third generation focused on understanding policy implementation through organising frameworks and theories. These generations can be summarised as follows:

- Generation 1: A cog in the administrative machine
- Generation 2: Implementation is complex and “nothing works”

These three generations of scholarly thinking on implementation are very critical for this study since they also imply different accountability mechanisms used in policy implementation. The next three subsections will briefly explore each generation.

2.2.1 Generation 1: A cog in the administrative machine

“The first (‘classical’) generation of thinking on the subject of implementation began with the assumption that implementation will happen automatically once the policies are authoritatively proclaimed” (Cloete and Wissink, 2000:166). The antecedents of the “classical” view of administration can be traced to early constitutionalists (Najam, 1995:8). The political methodology of this phase could be “labelled [a] single-authority, top-down’
approach to political organisation and, thereby, to policy implementation (Cloete and Wissink, 2000:166). Cloete and Wissink (2000:166) point out that the law was dominant in policy implementation. They argue that:

So great is the force of laws and of particular forms of government, and so little dependence have they on the humours and tempers of men, that consequences almost as general and certain may sometimes be deduced from them as any which the mathematical sciences afford us” (Cloete and Wissink, 2000:167).

It is because of this that administration was conceived as being “scientific”, “rational”, “predictable” and, ultimately, “machine-like” (Najam, 1995:8). The classical model of administration (implementation) is based on three basic concepts which helped to foster the view that implementation was an automatic cog within a rationalised administrative machine (Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980:8). The three concepts are based on the work of Max Weber, Woodrow Wilson and Fredrick Taylor. First, the Weberian framework of the ideal bureaucracy is a firmly ordered “system” with highly rationalized, legalistic, authoritarian, and hierarchical structures, where a small group of decision makers at the top create policy and subordinates at the bottom dutifully carry it out (Najam, 1995:9; Cloete and Wissink, 2000:167).

The second concept upon which the classical view is based is Woodrow Wilson’s work. In an influential 1887 paper on the subject, Woodrow forwarded the thesis that policy formulation and policy implementation are - and should be - two separate and distinct activities; with the later being neutral, professionalized, and non-political (Najam, 1995:9; Cloete and Wissink, 2000:167). The third and last basic concept upon which the classical model of implementation is based is Frederick Taylor’s influential work, _The Principle of Scientific Management in 1912_. This theory provided the rationale for adopting efficiency as the basic criterion for evaluating administrative performance (Najam, 1995:9; Cloete and Wissink, 2000:167). It is precisely for these reasons that the significance of implementation was minimised. Although these theories might seem antiquated, their influence on accountability mechanisms in the contemporary world is still very significant. As Smith (1973) [cited in Najam, 1995:9] points out the assumption was that “once [an ‘efficient’] policy has been ‘made’ by a government, the policy will be implemented and the desired results of the policy will be near those expected by the policymakers”. In that sense, the implementation process is
assumed to be a series of decisions and interactions which did not attract the attention of scholars and politicians (Najam, 1995:9).

2.2.2 Generation 2: Implementation is complex and “nothing works”

Many scholars agree that the limitations of the classical model of implementation began to emerge after World War II (Najam, 1995:9; Cloete and Wissink, 2000:167) as it became apparent that public policy worked less as an efficient and orderly machine and more as a process of “muddling through” (Najam, 1995:9). A number of case studies in the 1970s showed that “the grand policies of the 1960s were not working the way they were ‘supposed’ to under the classical model” (Najam, 1995:10). At the same time, scholarship in public administration and organisational behaviour revealed that administration and implementation were far more complex and political than the classical assumptions had suggested them to be (Cloete and Wissink, 2000:168).

The second generation of scholars set out to record the magnitude of the complexity of implementation through detailed empirical studies. Scholars of this generation meticulously documented specific case studies and showed how complex implementation really was and why it was folly to assume that just because a policy had been proclaimed it would be implemented (Najam, 1995:10). In short, the second generation of scholars set out to challenge the classical model and to demonstrate that was a complex process which requires due attention. Bardach (1977:3) highlights the importance of implementation and concludes that:

> It is hard enough to design public policies and programs that look good on paper. It is harder still to formulate them in words and slogans that resonate pleasingly in the ears of political leaders and the constituencies to which they are responsive. And it is excruciatingly hard to implement them in a way that pleases anyone at all, including the supposed beneficiaries or clients.

Although the second generation of scholars is criticized for being overly pessimistic, Goggin et al (1990:13-14) list the major contributions of this generation of scholars. These include:

a) it shifted the focus from how a bill becomes a law to how a law becomes a program;

b) it demonstrated the complex and dynamic nature of implementation;
c) it emphasized the importance of policy subsystems;

 d) it identified a number of factors that seemed to account for programmatic results, especially failure;

 e) it diagnosed several treatable pathologies that periodically plague implementing actors (Goggin et al, 1990:13-14).

2.2.3 Generation 3: The search for fully-fledged implementation theory

The third (“analytic”) generation, by contrast, has been less specific with implementation failure and focuses more on understanding how implementation works in general and how its prospects may be improved (Cloete and Wissink, 2000:167). This generation of scholars realises that the battle for implementation to be recognised had been won but there was no organising framework to allow comparisons of studies (Najam, 1995:11). It was the absence of sound conceptual models of policy implementation that led to the development of the third generation of thinking on implementation (Najam, 1995:11). Most importantly, researchers on implementation do not agree on the outlines of a theory of implementation or even on the variables crucial to successful implementation (Cloete and Wissink, 2000:168).

2.3 Models and approaches to implementation

The third generation of implementation research mourn the lack of an analytic framework and explanatory ‘models’ of implementation. The contribution of the third generation scholars “yielded a number of increasingly more refined analytic models of the implementation process, an extended list of potential explanatory variables, and at least two major theoretical streams of thought” (Najam, 1995:11). The prominent models produced by these scholars are the top-down approach as well as the bottom-up approach which will be discussed in the next two subsections.

2.3.1 Top-down rational system approaches

The earliest model on the scene was the top-down approach. The classical top-down writers are Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky who are believed to be the founding fathers (Hill and Hupe, 2002:44; Parsons, 1995:463). Other scholars associated with this model are Donald Van Meter, Carl Van Horn and Eugene Bardarch (Hill and Hupe, 2002:44). The top-down approach begins with the central decision - maker and the authoritative policy statement and proceeds downwards through the hierarchical administrative structure to
examine the extent to which a policy’s legally mandated objectives were achieved and procedures followed (Najam, 1995:12).

In their book, *Implementation: How Great Expectations Are Dashed in Oakland*, Pressman and Wildavsky became interested in the efforts by Oakland Economic Development Administration (EDA) in California to implement a programme for city development. As they explored the programme they became aware that implementation problems were rarely analysed (Parsons, 1995:464). They observed that implementation involves efforts to forge links in a causal chain so as to put policy into effect. They argue that for successful implementation to occur “the goals have to be clearly defined and understood, resources made available, the chain of command be capable of assembling and controlling resources, and the system be able to communicate effectively and control the individuals and organisations involved in the performance tasks” (Parsons, 1995:464).

After an analysis of the EDA and experiences of Oakland, Pressman and Wildavsky prescribed that “implementation requires a top-down system control and communications, and resources for the job” (Parsons, 1995:464). Pressman and Wildavsky note that capacity to co-ordinate and control was sadly lacking in the Oakland case study (Parsons, 1995:465). An illustration of a classical top-down model is depicted in Figure 2.1. The idea of top-down model has much in common with Weber’s construction of an ideal type of bureaucracy.

**Figure 2.1 Classical model of the public policy implementation process**

(Source: Riccucci, 2005:5)
Hood (1976) [cited in Parsons, 1995:465] cited the five conditions that are needed for perfect policy implementation. Hood argues that:

- ideal implementation is a product of a unitary ‘army like’ organisation, with clear lines of authority;
- norms will be enforced and objectives given;
- people would do what they are told and asked;
- there should be perfect communication in and between units of organisation;
- there will be no pressure of time (Parsons, 1995:465).

It is important to note that the top-down model is a prescriptive theory which may be found in Taylorism and scientific management theory (Parsons, 1995:467) and in that sense it may be subjected to similar criticisms. Furthermore, Parsons (1995: 467) criticises the top-down model for “too much emphasis on the definition of goals at the top”. Another criticism is its perception of policy implementation as “a process in which x follows y in a chain of causation” (Parsons, 1995:467). Public programmes are not well defined and cannot be subjected to quantitative evaluation.

### 2.3.2 The bottom-up models

The top-down model has been criticised for not taking into account the role played by other actors and levels in the implementation process (Parsons, 1995:467). Parsons notes that a major source of this criticism pre-dates the top-down model. In an article published in 1971, Michael Lipsky argued that “students of public policy had to take into account the interactions of bureaucrats with their clients at ‘street-level’” (Parsons, 1995:467).

Because of his work (1971; 1977; 1978; 1980), Michael Lipsky is the founding father of the bottom-up perspective (Hill and Hupe, 2002:51). Lipsky’s analysis of the behaviour of front-line staff in policy delivery agencies, whom he calls ‘street-level bureaucrats’, has had a profound effect upon implementation studies. “The decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressure become the public policies they implement” (Lipsky, 1980:12). After Lipsky’s 1977 study of institutional innovation in implementing special education reform, it was discovered how the rational top-down model was not effective in practice although it is convincing in
theory (Parsons, 1995:468). It was clear that the implementation of public policy depended on changing the attitudes and practices of micro-implementers (Hill and Hupe, 2002:53).

Lipsky (1978) [cited in Najam, 1995:20] called for “standing the study of public policy implementation on its head”. Lipsky questioned the assumption of hierarchy and proposed that in many cases “the latitude of those charged with carrying out policy is so substantial that ... policy is effectively ‘made’ by the people who implement it” (Najam, 1995:20).

In essence, Lipsky’s (1980) study shows that control over people was not the best way forward for effective policy implementation. People cannot be regarded as chains in the line of command; policy makers should realise that policy is implemented by “backward mapping” (Elmore, 1979) [cited in Parsons, 1995:469]. Street-level workers may develop ways of implementing government policy which actually result in outcomes which are quite different from those intended or desired by policy makers (Parsons, 1995:469).

Other scholars of bottom-up implementation, such Porter (1981) and Hjern and Hull (1982), argue that a more realistic understanding of policy implementation can be gained by looking at policy from the perspective of the target population and service deliverers (Matland, 1995:148). What is peculiar to this view is the inclusion of the target population in policy implementation. At macro-implementation level, policy makers design government programmes which are implemented at micro-implementation level by local organisations and individuals (Matland, 1995:148). At this level “contextual factors within an implementing environment completely dominate rules created at the top implementing pyramid, and policy designers will be unable to control the process” (Matland, 1995:148).

In sum, the “bottom-up approach was, largely, a reaction to this model: based on identifying weaknesses in it and suggesting alternatives to address those weaknesses” (Najam, 1995:13). Workers will always have a degree of discretion in the process of policy implementation. Kaufman (1973) [cited in Najam 1995:13] declares that:

Subordinate compliance does not automatically follow upon the issuance of orders and instructions... when managers die and go to heaven, they may find themselves in charge of organisations in which subordinates invariably, cheerfully, and fully do as they are bid. Not here on earth. (Najam 1995:13)

It is important to note that both approaches to the study of policy implementation are powerful heuristic as well as analytic tools in policy implementation scholarship. It is not the
aim of this study to join the debate between bottom-up and top-down scholars of implementation. It suffices here note Matland’s conclusion that:

Under certain conditions it is most appropriate to hold either a top-down or bottom-up perspective ... [and] to recognize that both schools contain kernels of truth relevant to policy implementation situations. For example, central authorities inevitably influence policy implementation through decisions on funding and jurisdiction, even when policies are vague and conflict is low. It is also clear that policies are not self-executing. (Matland, 1995:171)

This understanding is very important since different policies require different approaches to implementation. Central implementation is important in order to provide a monitoring and evaluation framework. Without such structures it is disastrous to wait until the end of the programme. Some authors prefer to apply the different models at different stages of the policy cycle (Matland, 1995:152). For instance, Dunsire (1978) [cited in Matland (1995:152)] argues that the two perspectives should apply at different times in the implementation process. The top-down approach is more appropriate in the early planning stages; the bottom-up view is more appropriate in later evaluation stages.

In sum, the role of street-level bureaucrats in policy implementation has been accentuated by most scholars of bottom-up approaches. It is generally agreed that policy is made during implementation. The original policy may, for some reason, be ignored by implementers at the front line. This scenario raises serious issues about public accountability. To this end, the concept of street-level bureaucrats is explored in greater detail in the next section.

So far the analysis of scholarly literature reveals the contentious nature of policy discourses at theoretical level. In reality, policy processes such as those in education are not linear. The processes are iterative in nature. Education policies processes have no clear stages such depicted in the frameworks analysed here. The fluid character of policy dynamics in education and elsewhere makes them difficult to implement and monitor which raise the issues of accountability. The next section explores the role of front line workers in the policy processes.

2.4 The role of street-level bureaucrats in policy implementation

The concept of street-level bureaucracy as propounded by Michael Lipsky (1980) stresses the relative autonomy of professionals working in public service. The autonomy of street-level
workers poses a problem of control for those at the ‘top’ and justifies the need for more direct forms of accountability to the ‘street’ (Hupe and Hill, 2007:279). In this section the concept of street-level bureaucracy is explored. The discussion will cover issues which give street-level bureaucrats autonomy and discretion in their work.

By definition, street-level bureaucrats are “public service workers who interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs, and who have substantial discretion in the execution of their work” (Lipsky, 1980:3). This definition includes people like teachers, social workers, lawyers, judges, health workers and police officers. Street-level bureaucracies are organisations that “employ a significant number of street-level bureaucrats in proportion to their workforce” (Lipsky, 1980:3). Organisations like schools, police and welfare departments, lower courts, legal services offices and hospitals are, in Lipsky’s language, street-level bureaucracies.

This theory of Lipsky is a total departure from the classical model of public policy implementation process which suggests a top-down, hierarchical approach (Riccucci, 2005:4). Riccucci argues that this “somewhat static view of policy implementation may illustrate the broad elements of the policy process, but it does not account for the important role of street-level bureaucrats” (Riccucci, 2005:4). “Although they are normally regarded as low-level employees, the actions of most public service employees constitute the services delivered by government” (Riccucci, 2005:3). Such a view rejects the notion of policy implementation depicted in Figure 2.1. Thus public policy is not best understood as made in legislatures or top floor suits of high ranking administrators, “because in important ways it is actually made in crowded offices and daily encounters with street-level workers” (Lipsky, 1980: xii). Lipsky argues that “the decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures effectively become the public policy they carry out (Lipsky, 1980: xii).

This theory makes the efforts to link policy demands and the actions at street-level elusive due to a number of practical as well as abstract assumptions. In a comprehensive article on ‘Street-Level Bureaucracy and Public Accountability’ Hupe and Hill (2007:280-286) present a number of statements as grounding axioms for the theoretical and empirical study of the scholarly theme of street-level bureaucracy. The statements are presented here and will be discussed in relation to other literature on street-level bureaucracy and policy implementation.
Statement 1: *street-level bureaucrats have discretion and are forced to use it* (Hupe and Hill, 2007:280; Lipsky, 1980:13). Unlike other lower-level workers in most organisations, street-level bureaucrats have considerable discretion in determining the nature, amount, and quality of benefits and sanctions provided by their organisation (Lipsky, 1980:13). However, Lipsky warns that “this is not to say street-level bureaucrats are not unrestrained by rules, regulations, and directives from above or by norms and practices of their occupational group” (1980:14). In reality, discretion and rules are interrelated: as rules specify the duties of officials, discretion allows freedom of action (Hupe and Hill, 2007:281). Hupe and Hill argue that, for example, a public officer has discretion wherever effective limits on his or her power leave him or her free to make a choice among possible courses of action or inaction (2007:281).

Discretion is not always desirable. Lipsky acknowledges that many problems associated with street-level bureaucrats in implementation would theoretically disappear if workers’ discretion is eliminated (1980:15). The elimination of such discretion is difficult to severely reduce for three main reasons. First, “street-level bureaucrats often work in situations too complicated to reduce to programmatic formats” (Lipsky, 1980:15). It would be difficult to give instructions to police on how they should apprehend suspects in all situations. Likewise, contemporary educational philosophies militate against giving detailed instructions to teachers since they are expected to cater for individual differences among students.

The second reason pertains to the work situations of street-level bureaucrats. They work in situations that often require responses to human dimensions (Lipsky, 1980:15). In these situations sensitive observation and judgement are required and cannot be reduced to programmatic formats. Teachers should be sensitive to individual learners and respond appropriately. Similarly, judges are not expected by society and superiors to give similar judgements for all cases that look similar before their context is considered. The third reason discretion is not likely to be eliminated bears more on the function of the lower-level workers who interact with citizens than with the nature of the tasks (Lipsky, 1980:15). Discretion promotes workers’ self-regard and encourages clients to believe that workers hold the key to their well-being. This is, arguably, illustrated by the faith the students have in their teachers and patients in their nurses and doctors.

Statement 2: *street-level bureaucrats seek ways to manage their work* (Hupe and Hill, 2007:282). Managers seek to restrict workers’ discretion in order to secure certain results, but
Street-level bureaucrats often regard such efforts as illegitimate and to some degree resist them successfully (Lipsky, 1980:19). This is because public officials engaged in street-level work have specific characteristics and certain situations are handled in a way similar to how corresponding situations have been handled regardless of rule from the ‘top’. In other words, there are standard operating procedures at street-level.

**Statement 3:** *street-level bureaucrats see themselves as professionals* (Hupe and Hill, 2007; Lipsky, 1980:147). As such, they are regularly deferred to in their specialized area of work and are relatively free from supervision by superiors or from scrutiny by clients. Their professional ideology provides a framework in terms of which disparate information is stored, comprehended, and retrieved (Lipsky, 1980:147). However, the problem is compounded by the fact that “public service employees who do not have claim to professional status exercise considerable discretion” (Lipsky, 1980:14). These include workers such as clerks in welfare and public housing departments. In defining professions, a distinction is made between, on the one hand, the characteristics of a specific kind of occupation and, on the other hand, the way in which society approaches the persons exercising that occupation (Hupe and Hill, 2007:282). In this context, teachers, police officers and medical doctors are viewed as professionals. Schools as street-level bureaucracies and teachers as street-level bureaucrats clearly reflect Lipsky’s perspective. Teachers, like other professionals, have their own self-policing processes and are subject to relatively little managerial control (Taylor, 2007:558). The school system limits its controls on teachers “for fear of generating opposition to management policies and diminishing accountability still further” (Lipsky, 1980: 168).

**Statement 4:** *in their interaction with individual citizens in different roles, street-level bureaucrats are public officials* (Hupe and Hill, 2007:283). “The essence of street-level bureaucracies is that they require people to make decisions about other people. Street-level bureaucrats have discretion because the nature of service provision calls for human judgement that cannot be programmed and for which machines cannot substitute” (Lipsky 1980:161). Furthermore, street-level bureaucrats must be accountable to the client and must give an appropriate response to a client’s situation and circumstances. These considerations cannot be translated into authoritative agency guidelines, although it is on behalf of their agencies that these street-level bureaucrats are accountable to the clients (Lipsky, 1980:162).
**Statement 5:** street-level bureaucrats have relative autonomy from organisational authority (Lipsky, 1980:16). It is misleading to take for granted that the work of lower-level workers is to conform to what is expected of them. In agreement with this, Brinkerhoff (2001:3) posits that “in all of these realms, public officials, by virtue of the authority accorded the roles and positions they occupy, exercise varying degrees of power as they carry out their functions”. Furthermore, organisational theorists recognise that there will always be some slippage between orders and the carrying out of orders (Lipsky, 1980:16). This may be as a result of workers who do not share the objectives, or the means of attaining such objectives, with their superiors. At times this may happen due to the recruitment of workers who do not have an affinity with an organisation’s goals. This can be prevalent due to unemployment. Workers can withhold co-operation from their organisations through absenteeism, quitting, aggression towards the organisation (cheating, deliberate wasting) and negative attitudes with implications for work (alienation and apathy) (Lipsky, 1980:17). Furthermore, workers can collectively resist the authority of their organisation. Lipsky states that:

> Workers may take advantage of collective resources to act non-cooperatively by forming trade unions or by exercising rights under collective bargaining or civil service regulations. These collective strategies for noncooperation contribute to workers’ willingness to display a lack of motivation and to perform at minimal levels (Lipsky, 1980:17).

These acts of noncooperation reduce the capacity of an organisation to achieve its objectives. Management is left with a challenge of how to balance an organisation’s goals and meet the personal, material as well as psychological gratification of workers (Lipsky, 1980:17).

**Statement 6:** “lower level workers always possess relatively resources with which they can resist management” (Lipsky, 1980:23). Some of these resources include the costs of firing and demoting workers which are high under civil service regulations. This results in mediocre standards of public service performance. This does not mean that management does not control workers (a subject to be dealt with in greater detail in the later chapters). Lipsky points out that management can manipulate perquisites they control such as recommendations for advancement or transfer (1980:24).

The arguments in the preceding section led Lipsky to conclude that “accountability is virtually impossible to achieve among street-level bureaucrats who exercise high degrees of discretion, where qualitative aspects of their work are involved” (Lipsky, 1980:159).
Regarding educational accountability, Winkler, (2004:1) declares that creating accountability in public education is extraordinarily complex. Nonetheless, public managers are pressured to secure and improve accountability since lack of it may lead to poor service delivery. To this end, public administration and public policy scholars have devoted an enormous amount of attention to the importance of public management in public bureaucracies (Riccucci, 2005: xiii). Although a large volume of literature demonstrates that management impacts directly on the efficacy of organisations, there is very little research focusing on the effects of public management on street-level behaviour (Riccucci, 2005: xiii). This study analyses the types of accountability available to public managers to make street-level bureaucrats (in this case, teachers) accountable for their implementation of public policies (in this case, the National Curriculum Statements). Accountability, which Lipsky argues, is inherently difficult to enforce among street-level bureaucrats because of the six statements discussed above. Contributing to such research is the core of this thesis.

**Conclusion**

In order to put accountability into perspective in relation to public policy implementation, this chapter has reviewed academic research on public policy implementation itself. In the light of persistent failure in policy implementation, the chapter has traced the history of policy implementation as a field of study. The three generations of policy implementation were discussed. The first generation assumed that implementation would happen automatically once policies are formulated. The second generation, which came after World War 2, responded to the realisation that policy implementation worked less efficiently and less orderly as postulated by the first generation. The chapter pointed out that the first two generations did not yield conceptual models or organising frameworks, which then ushered in the third generation which focused more on how policy implementation works.

The chapter went on to discuss the models of policy implementation starting with the top-down model which is considered classical and then the bottom-up approach. Regardless of efforts to understand policy implementation, the process remains a big challenge for bureaucracies seeking to deliver services. Many reasons for policy implementation failure have been put forward. To that end, the chapter has outlined the theory of street-level bureaucracy. The chapter ended with the role of street-level bureaucrats in policy implementation. It was highlighted that because of the nature of their work, it can be difficult to hold street-level bureaucrats accountable to organisational goals. The role of street-level
bureaucracy managers is critical for the success of policy implementation. The issue of street-level bureaucrats’ accountability is a key to the success of policy implementation. Accordingly, accountability is the theme of the next chapter.
CHAPTER THREE
CONCEPTUALISING ACCOUNTABILITY

Accountability is the hallmark of modern democratic governance (Bovens, 2005:1). In agreement with this, Lipsky argues that modern democracy depends on the accountability of bureaucracies to carry out declared policy (1980:160). For democracy to be a reality those in power should be held accountable by the public for their acts and omissions, for their decisions, their policies, and their expenditures (Bovens, 2005:1). The need for accountability in the public sector has been necessitated by two main reasons. Firstly, “the size and scope of the administrative state in modern economies is large, according governments’ broad and significant power to intervene in people’s lives” (Brinkerhoff, 2001:3). Secondly, “democracy has emerged as the pre-eminent and most aspired-to form of governance system” (Brinkerhoff, 2001:3). Furthermore, politicians and other activists have used accountability to patch up a rambling argument, to evoke an image of transparency, responsiveness, trustworthiness, fidelity, and justice, or to hold critics at bay because of its attractiveness (Bovens, 2005:1; Brinkerhoff, 2001:3). Because of this, it is apparent that the term accountability is evocative and can be likened to ‘transparency’, ‘responsibility’, ‘learning’, ‘integrity’ and ‘solidarity’: nobody can be against it. However, the term accountability is too complex to be construed comprehensively.

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss accountability. Using different views of academic scholars, this chapter will commence by defining accountability. After considering various views of accountability the chapter will devise different types of accountability that are considered important for this study; namely professional accountability, political accountability, legal accountability, hierarchical accountability and performance accountability. This will then form the basis for an analytical framework for educational accountability, which will be discussed in the final section of the chapter.

3.1 Defining accountability

Accountability is a difficult term to define. Citing Schedler (1999), Brinkerhoff (2001:3; 2003:4) notes that “accountability represents an underexplored concept whose meaning remains evasive, whose boundaries are fuzzy, and whose internal structure is confusing.” He then concludes that “accountability is a complex and chameleon-like term” (Brinkerhoff (2001:3).
The need for accountability in public bureaucracies has drawn the attention of scholars. In the process, the term accountability is construed and used differently by different people. The general insistence on increased accountability is plagued by the fact that it is not always clear precisely what is being advocated. The term ‘accountability’ has come to mean different things to different people. For example, in education it has ranged from improving the quality of education to ‘scape-goating the teachers’ (Smithson, 1987:4). Because of this some researchers have tried to distinguish different types of accountability. Since accountability is one of the pillars of the thesis, a range of literature on accountability is discussed here. Although the definitions of accountability presented here are generic, the analysis will focus on educational accountability since this thesis focuses on street-level bureaucrats in the context of educational policy implementation.

Accountability is a relational term. It means that “A is accountable to B” and also implies that A is held accountable and that B is holding A accountable (Fenstermacher, 1979:330). Brinkerhoff (2001:16) asks the question “who is accountable?” This implies: which actors in the street-level bureaucracy are held accountable for their actions? Brinkerhoff (2001:16) introduces the notion of power relations by observing that to whom street-level bureaucrats are accountable lie power, authority and the right to ask for answers and explanations. Generally, there are three broad categories of actors that are “held accountable for policy and program decisions, actions, and outcomes: politicians and politically appointed leaders, public officials, and non-governmental actors” (Brinkerhoff, 2001:16). One important attempt to synthesise different views on accountability was made by Brinkerhoff (2001:6). Although these dimensions and definitions may not exhaustively cover the concept of accountability several critical elements are indicated in Table 3.1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accountability Dimension</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Links to other dimensions of accountability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Democratic/political           | Oversight of public officials and agencies in terms of their responsiveness to political leaders and to citizens, and of fulfilment of the public trust. | To financial: officials and agencies budget and spend resources to discharge their public mandates, dialogue and deliberation on budgets are a core feature of democratic discourse and policy-making.  
To performance: delivering services and results is a concrete manifestation of responsiveness to citizens’ interests and societal needs. Judgments about performance influence voter behaviour. |
| Financial [Legal]              | Examination of compliance of officials and agencies with laws, regulations, and procedures for the transparent allocation, expenditure, and reporting of financial resources. | To democratic/political: financial accountability assures that resources are used for agreed upon public purposes.  
Transparency in financial accountability enhances citizens’ ability to participate in oversight.  
To performance: goods and services cannot be produced without financial resources. Many accountability systems join financial and performance accountability. |
| Performance                    | Scrutiny of the actions of officials and agencies related to the production of outputs, delivery of services, accomplishment of objectives, and/or achievement of results and impacts. | To democratic/political: politicians and citizens look at performance to determine whether government is responsive, trustworthy, effective, and democratic. These determinations can affect citizen satisfaction with government and the outcome of elections. To financial: performance links allocation and spending of financial resources to achieving desired results. |

Source: Brinkerhoff (2001:6)

Firstly, “in a democracy, politicians are accountable first and foremost to the citizens who elect them, though often the links are tenuous” (Brinkerhoff, 2001:14). This is because “accountability is the link between bureaucracy and democracy” (Lipsky, 1980:160). Lipsky notes that “modern democracy depends on the accountability of bureaucracies to carry out declared policy” (1980:160). The mechanism for this accountability is an election. However, “elections can be a rather distant and limited accountability mechanism” (Brinkerhoff, 2001:14). Secondly, Brinkerhoff points out that “politicians elected under systems where citizens vote for party lists rather than individual representatives [for example, the South
African system] tend to be accountable first to their party leadership, and only secondarily to citizens. Furthermore, most senior bureaucrats are appointed by political leadership. Brinkerhoff posits that “officials appointed to [such] leadership positions by the government in power may feel they owe their allegiance to political decision-makers, with only a distant or diffuse sense of accountability to citizens” (2001:14).

The second group of actors is composed of public officials and agencies or departments. This large group of players is the major object of public accountability (Brinkerhoff, 2001:14). Street-level bureaucrats are caught up in a dichotomous accountability situation. Brinkerhoff notes that “[t]hey [are] ultimately upwardly accountable to politically appointed leaders and downwardly accountable to citizens via responsive and transparent policy implementation and service delivery” (2001:15). The main problem in this situation is that “some constituencies are more powerful than others in influencing officials and their agencies to respond to their needs and desires; this reduces accountability to disadvantaged and marginalized groups, with negative impacts on equity” (Brinkerhoff, 2001:14). Powerful politicians and senior bureaucrats are almost always at an advantage.

Another feature of the concept of accountability is that the relation holds with regard to some standard of performance. “Person B does not hold A accountable. Rather, A is held accountable for specific performances that meet stated or implicit standards” (Fenstermacher, 1979:330). Like Fenstermacher (1979:330), Bardach and Lesser (1996:201) note that street-level bureaucrats are “accountable for results”. Bardach and Lesser posit that “‘holding Agency X accountable for results generally appears to mean that the agency should take pains to measure and report its results and that its managers should expect to be berated, if not dismissed, if they fall short” (1996:201). For instance, taxpayers hold public officials accountable for the proper and judicious expenditure of tax revenues on quality public services. The issue of punishment gives ‘teeth’ to accountability (Brinkerhoff, 2001:2). Brinkerhoff notes that “answerability without sanctions is generally regarded to be weak accountability” (2001:2). This may include requirements, standards, and penalties embodied in laws, statutes, and regulations. However, “the main value of an accountability system is not to produce punishment; it is to motivate better performance than would otherwise occur” (Bardach and Lesser, 1996:201).

The third feature of accountability pointed by Fenstermacher (1979) is that of information sharing. Brinkerhoff (2001:2) says accountability implies answerability; “being accountable
means having the obligation to answer questions regarding decisions and/or actions”. In agreement with this, Fenstermacher says that:

The parties to an accountability relation are obliged to provide or receive information. The obligation to provide is incurred by A, the person held accountable; the obligation to receive is incurred by B. This obligation operates somewhat ambiguously, as is shown by the difference between the expressions, A gave an account to B, and A was called to account by B. (Fenstermacher, 1979:331)

However, a critical feature of the information regarding accountability is that it is asymmetrical: a manager simply informs street-level workers, usually in a manner that is regular and routine, while street-level workers are expected to justify their performance. Similar to this definition is Kappan’s (1972:636) view of the relationship in accountability. Kappan notes that “an accountable relationship between seller and buyer involves three elements [contractual – implicit and explicit]: 1) disclosure concerning the product or service being sold; 2) product or performances testing; 3) redress in the event of false disclosure or poor performance” (1972:636).

Levin’s concept of information in accountability is common to many authors. Levin points out that “the most straightforward interpretation of the accountability concept appears to be that of performance reporting, a periodic report of the attainments of schools and other educational units” (Levin, 1974:364). Under Levin’s interpretation accountability usually includes the development of state-wide testing programs in the United States as well as the provision of other information such as the racial and socioeconomic distributions of pupils which is useful in interpreting test results among school districts (1974:364). The presumption underlying the performance reporting interpretation is that information on policy outcomes is necessary in order to enable constituents to appraise the public service workers.

Accountability can also be seen as the extent to which one must answer to a higher authority, legal or organisational, for one’s actions in society at large or within one’s organisation (Kearns, 1998:145). Kearns views accountability as an “obligation for keeping accurate records of property, documents, or funds” which will help the agents to provide answers to questions from principals (Kearns, 1998:145). Furthermore, Starling (1986:123) asserts that a good synonym for accountability is answerability. To Kogan (1986:26), accountability is a synonym of responsibility. Hunt summarizes accountability as:
...the capacity and the willingness to give explanations for conduct, stating how one has discharged one’s responsibilities. Accountability, therefore, involves both an explanation of conduct in a credible story of what happened, and a calculation and balancing of competitive obligations. (Hunt, 2006:45)

Scholars of accountability generally agree with the concepts of “answerability for performance” (Romzek 2000:22) and “the obligation to report to others, to explain, to justify, to answer questions about how resources have been used, and to what effect” (Trow, 1996:310). However, the underlying principle is that those whose capital is used to finance an undertaking should be able to judge the performance of those who act on their behalf and should be able to exercise sanctions when necessary (Smith, 1990:54).

A common feature among these definitions, though not explicit, is a hierarchical form of accountability where street-level workers are expected to be answerable, responsible and keep organisational information for some higher authority. Implicit in these definitions is the view that workers (agents) should account for all their actions in the organisation. They must collect information and document their activities for their principals.

Some authors, although they agree with most of definitions mentioned, believe that accountability is a form of performance evaluation. One such writer is Paul (1991:2) who maintains that accountability is “holding individuals and organisations responsible for performance measured as objectively as possible”. Although the inclusion of some performance measurement (evaluation) as an element of accountability is echoed by some writers (Huisman and Currie, 2004:530; Levin, 1974:363), other authors believe that this is a misconception of accountability. For instance, Kogan (1986:32-33) believes that many people mistakenly think that accountability and evaluation are identical. The notion of accountability carries with it the overtones of sanctions while responsibility simply refers to the feeling that the workers may have towards those who are affected by their work.

These definitions are clear, simple to understand and embody the core elements of accountability, but they are narrow. Kearns (1998:144) identifies the core elements of narrow definitions of accountability. They include “(a) a higher authority vested with the power of oversight, (b) an explicit reporting mechanism for conveying information to the higher authority, and (c) a measure or criterion used by the higher authority to assess compliance by subordinate institutions” (Kearns, 1998:144). Kearns argues that
accountability includes much more than following rules and formal reporting upward through a chain of command (1998:145).

In explaining the broader meaning of accountability, Kearns (1998:145) notes that accountability is achieved when organisations assume responsibility for responding to the needs of society. For instance, if the education system does not respond to the needs of the society its accountability becomes questionable. In the same vein, Kearns further argues that accountability can be extended to include the desire by stakeholders to have street-level bureaucracies and bureaucrats be held accountable to their wishes, their personal definitions of a problem and the best way to solve it (1998:145).

Another author who views accountability in broader terms is Mansfield (1982). Mansfield declares that the notion of “accountability reaches beyond obeying instructions faithfully to include a responsibility for behaviour and actions that are judged by standards (national and international examinations) of competency, integrity, judgment, prudence, vision, courage, and other like qualities” (Mansfield, 1982:61). These broader definitions extend far beyond bureaucratic control and “blur some important semantic and conceptual distinctions between the related, but distinct, notions of accountability, responsibility, obligation, and ethics” (Cooper, 1990:60). Although it may be technically correct to differentiate between these concepts, there are only rare cases in the literature on accountability where these distinctions are made. However, the focus of this study is limited to accountability within the bureaucracy.

Bovens views accountability as a social relationship in which an actor feels an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct to some significant other (Bovens, 2005:4). In this relatively simply definition of a relationship there are a number of variables. The actor, or accountor, can be either an individual or an organisation. The significant other, which Bovens (2005:4) calls the accountability forum or the accountee, can be a specific person or organisation. For public managers this could be the general public. The accounting relationship usually consists of three stages. The first stage is that “the actor must feel obliged to inform the forum about his or her conduct, by providing various sorts of data about the performance of tasks, about outcomes, or about procedures. This usually happens in the case of failures or incidents; this also involves the provision of justifications” (Bovens, 2005:4). The obligation that is felt by the accountor can be formal and informal. Bovens argues that
“public managers often will be under a formal obligation to give accounts on a regular basis to specific forums, such as their superiors, supervisory agencies, or auditors (2005:4).

Secondly, such information can prompt the forum to interrogate the actor and to question the adequacy of the information or the legitimacy of the conduct (Bovens, 2005:5). This reveals the connection between ‘accountability’ and ‘answerability’. The third and final stage of the accounting relationship is that the forum usually passes judgement on the conduct of the actor. This may include implicit sanctions on the actor such as the very fact of having to give an account in front of television cameras, or of having one’s public image or career severely damaged by the negative publicity that results from the process (Bovens, 2005:5). Here accountability involves a reactive response to the outcome of an organisation in relation to the expected outputs.

3.2 **Forms and types of accountability**

The different views of the concept of accountability can yield different forms of accountability. Brinkerhoff suggests that “these definitional elements of accountability can be combined into a matrix that helps to bring some order to the concept and adds clarity in terms of where various kinds of accountability mechanisms fit within the schema” (2001:4). Illustrations of these matrixes are shown in Table 3.2 (Brinkerhoff, 2001:5) and Table 3.3 (Romzek, B., & Dubnick, 1987:229).
Table 3.2 Typology of accountability with illustrative examples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Accountability within government (horizontal)</th>
<th>Accountability outside government (vertical)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| High enforcement/sanctions capacity | • Audit institutions  
• Courts supreme  
• Comptrollers general  
• Law enforcement agencies  
• Parliamentary hearings  
• Legislative committees  
• Administrative review councils  
• Anti-corruption agencies | • Elections  
• Professional codes of conduct  
• National/international standard-setting bodies  
• Accreditation agencies  
• Referenda  
• Public interest law |
| Low enforcement/sanctions capacity | • Advisory boards  
• Intermisterial committees  
• Ombudsman offices  
• Blue ribbon panels  
• Citizens’ charters  
• ‘Sunshine laws’  
• Freedom of information laws | • Citizen oversight committees  
• Service delivery surveys  
• Civil society watchdog organisations  
• Policy research (e.g., by think tanks or universities)  
• Investigative journalism (media) |

Source: Brinkerhoff (2001:5)

Table 3.3 Types of accountability.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Agency Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Degree of Control Over Agency Actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Degree of Control Over Agency Actions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Romzek and Dubnick (1987:229)

Although these matrixes are not exhaustive, a close look at them reveals remarkable features. Firstly it is clear that accountability has both internal and external orientations. Both matrixes show that legal and bureaucratic forms of accountability have a high degree of control over agency actions. However the scholars seem to disagree on the level of enforcement or degree of control of political and professional accountability. Brinkerhoff seems to suggest that political accountability [denoted by elections] has a high level of enforcement (2001:5) while
Romzek and Dubnick (1987:229) rate political accountability as having a low degree of control over agency action. It is, however, not necessary for this study to resolve these differences.

Some authors group accountability into several types depending on the purposes of their analyses. Some of the groups are professional accountability, political accountability (Huisman and Currie, 2004:530), upward and downward accountability, inward or outward accountability (Burke, 2005:3), legal and hierarchical accountability (Radin and Romzek, 1996:61), public accountability, public-administrative accountability, participatory accountability (Hupe and Hill, 2007:288-290). Some scholars state that “in the daily life of modern public managers operating in a democratic system, there are at least five different sorts of forums that they may have to face up to, and therefore also at least five major types of potential accountability relationships” (Bovens, 2005:7). These are: organisational accountability – superiors; political accountability - elected representatives and political parties; legal accountability – courts; administrative - auditors, inspectors; and controllers and professional accountability - professional peers (Bovens, 2005:5-9). Table 3.4 shows some of the types of accountability as classified by Hupe and Hill (2007:289). The next sections will focus on five common types of accountability which have been chosen due to their relevance to this study; that is political, performance, hierarchical, legal and professional.

Table 3.4 Forms of accountability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action scale</th>
<th>Public-administrative accountability</th>
<th>Professional accountability</th>
<th>Participatory accountability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SYSTEM</td>
<td>Representative organs</td>
<td>Vocational associations</td>
<td>National associations of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td></td>
<td>Patients/parents/clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister/Cabinet</td>
<td></td>
<td>Communication media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inspectorates</td>
<td></td>
<td>National interest groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auditors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORGANIZATION</td>
<td>Representative organs</td>
<td>Peers**</td>
<td>Local associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institutions for appeal</td>
<td></td>
<td>Local news media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local officials</td>
<td></td>
<td>Client councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Executives</td>
<td></td>
<td>Citizen’s initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTROLLERS</td>
<td>Controllers</td>
<td>Colleagues</td>
<td>Citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chiefs</td>
<td></td>
<td>Association members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Collaborators</td>
<td></td>
<td>Voters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subjects of law</td>
<td></td>
<td>Parentis/residents/etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIVIDUAL</td>
<td>Patients/pupils/clients</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** peers within both the profession in question and related professions.

(Source: Hupe and Hill, 2007:289).
3.2.1 Political accountability

Political accountability “relates to building trust among citizens that government acts in accordance with agreed-upon standards of probity, ethics, integrity, and professional responsibility” (Brinkerhoff, 2003:8). In terms of the accountability matrix (Table 3.1), political accountability is an external mechanism. Many scholars believe that political accountability is an important type of accountability for street-level bureaucrats (Timar, 2003:178; Boven, 2005:7). Also referred to as democratic accountability (Brinkerhoff, 2001:8), “political accountability relationships afford managers the discretion or choice to be responsive to the concerns of key interest groups, such as elected officials, clientele groups, and the general public (Huisman and Currie, 2004:531; Bovens, 2005:7). These stakeholders may come from formal institutions (such as chief executives or legislative bodies) or constituent groups. These relationships derive from external sources but involve low degrees of direct control. They are manifested in a high degree of discretion for the individual organisation or individual to choose whether to respond to the expectations of some key external stakeholder and to face the consequences of a decision made (Radin and Romzek, 1996:62). This is because the relationship is based on an expectation of responsiveness to these stakeholders. Hupe and Hill assert that political accountability implies an orientation towards a top, demanding that functionaries are accountable to it (Hupe and Hill, 2007:286). However, the political model of accountability can lead to intrusive regulations and it requires consensus or at least majority consent (Burke, 2005:10).

Political accountability usually causes conflicts between politicians and professionals due to their different perspectives. Public managers, especially “those with a professional or legal background, often find political accountability difficult to handle, if not threatening, because of the fluid, contingent, and ambiguous character of political agendas and political norms” (Bovens, 2005:7). This is because the criteria for political judgment are often contestable and contested and may depend on media coverage, blaming, coalition building, and political opportunity to get into power or stay in power.

The main avenues for political accountability are the political process and elections (Brinkerhoff, 2001:9). While this form of accountability is decisive in determining the government’s continuation in power, in reality, and especially in developing countries, political accountability is weak and blunt. Brinkerhoff (2001) gives three major reasons for this. Firstly, “elections are periodic, thus attenuating the link between government’s actions
and the expression of citizen approval or dissatisfaction” (Brinkerhoff, 2001:9). Secondly, it seems that most voters choose their leaders based on the election manifestos. Brinkerhoff notes that “it can be unclear to those in power whether votes are taken on the basis of retrospective voter assessment of past government performance or of prospective appreciation of promises made for the future” (2001:9). Thirdly, the “political process in developing and transitioning countries constrains democratic/political accountability” (Brinkerhoff, 2001:9). In most developing countries elections are rarely free and fair, or even if they are, their outcomes are rarely respected by those in power. Because of this Brinkerhoff argues that “the effectiveness of electoral accountability tends to further diminish” (2001:9). This is in stark contrast with the purpose of political accountability which Brinkerhoff says “has to do with the institutions, procedures, and mechanisms that seek to ensure that government delivers on electoral promises, fulfils the public trust, aggregates and represents citizens’ interests, and responds to ongoing and emerging societal needs and concerns” (2003:7).

### 3.2.2 Performance accountability

Also termed managerial accountability, performance accountability refers to demonstrating and accounting for performance in light of agreed-upon performance targets (Brinkerhoff, 2001:10; 2003:21). Performance is both internal and external in this form of accountability: internal to internal supervisors and external to the public. The main focus of performance accountability is on outputs of public bureaucracies. Performance accountability also denotes the notions of efficiency, effectiveness, productivity, quality (‘hard accountability’) and satisfaction, trust and equity (‘soft accountability’) (Fard and Rostamy, 2007:342). It has a strong link with political accountability in that the decisive factors “for performance are responsiveness to citizens and achievement of service delivery targets that meet their needs and demands” (Brinkerhoff, 2001:10). Furthermore, performance accountability is related to financial accountability in as far as financial resources intended to produce goods, services, and benefits for citizens are to be accounted for (Lipsky, 1980:16; Brinkerhoff, 2003:7). However, performance accountability involves complex processes of setting credible goals and objectives against which performance is judged. The main problem with this is the measurability of public bureaucracies’ goods. By definition, street-level bureaucracies are large organisations whose outputs are difficult to measure objectively (Lipsky, 1980). In agreement with this assertion, Brinkerhoff points out that:
On the surface, performance accountability appears deceptively simple: public officials should be accountable for outputs, results, and impacts. However, a number of methodological issues arise in thinking about performance accountability and governance reform. (Brinkerhoff, 2001:11)

Moreover, critical questions concerning the link between performance and other types of accountability emerge. Because of this, some analysts believe that the emphasis on performance accountability has led to the introduction of business management concepts and market based accountability in public sector administration and management (Brinkerhoff, 2001:11). The main problem with this is that “treating citizens as consumers downplays the democratic aspects of accountability; the risk is that governments become accountable only to those citizen-consumers who ‘vote’ with their dollars” (Brinkerhoff, 2001:12). Brinkerhoff laments the issues of equity if citizens without resources do not have a voice and compliance with standards and regulations if accountability favours responsiveness to citizen-consumers (2001:12).

All the accountability forums discussed here can fall into two broad groups: internal and external accountability. Internal accountability relationships are based on the assumptions that organisations have conceptions of accountability embedded in their patterns of day-to-day operations, and that an organisation’s conception of accountability significantly influences how it delivers its services (Carnoy, Elmore and Siskin, 2003:3). For street-level bureaucracies to function they need to solve problems of accountability. In specific reference to schools, Carnoy, Elmore and Siskin posit that “the way they solve these problems is reflected in the ways teachers, administrators, students and parents talk about fundamental issues of schooling” (2003:3). Some analysts view capacity building (to be discussed later) as an effort to strengthen internal accountability (Gunzenhauser and Hyde, 2007:501). However, it is important to note that internal accountability exists in the context of external accountability pressures (from parents, media and the public at large) which seek to promote improved student learning. Because of the strengths of internal accountability mechanisms, a number of countries, for example, Scotland, emphasise systems of self-evaluation (internal accountability) as a means of quality control (Swift 2008:4). Using a sense-making perspective, Karen, Febey and Schroeder (2005) examined teachers’ responses to accountability and report that teachers “viewed their long-term emphasis on school improvement planning and internal accountability as having contributed to their success, and
they were angry that their path-breaking work on quality improvement had not been acknowledged” (2005:185).

With specific reference to education, external accountability can be viewed as “the constraints and demands placed upon schools and school districts” (Gunzenhauser and Hyde, 2007:501). These can include state-mandated assessments, performance evaluation and time limits. There are mixed views on the effectiveness of external forms of accountability on street-level behaviour. There is some evidence that better performing schools have greater capacity to respond to external accountability pressures (Carnoy and Loeb, 2002:320). However, as will be discussed in later sections, external accountability alone will not ensure that a school will have adequate organisational capacity to improve, and that highly prescriptive consequences mandated by external authorities deny school staff the necessary ownership of the change process to make it effective (Ahearn, 2000:10).

Securing compliance through any or all of the forms of accountability discussed to date in this chapter is important if street-level bureaucracies and bureaucrats are to deliver quality public goods. Public managers can attempt to increase accountability through administrative controls to increase the congruence between worker behaviour and the policies of their organisations (Lipsky, 1980:160). Lipsky notes that recent efforts have also focused on improving accountability to public consumers by creating market conditions and by decentralising (1980:160). Depending on the approach to policy implementation discussed earlier, accountability mechanisms can be either top-down or bottom-up, and have internal or external forms of accountability.

3.2.3 Hierarchical accountability.

Also termed bureaucratic accountability (Smithson, 1987:6), hierarchical accountability is an internal mechanism with a high enforcement capacity (see accountability matrix: Table 3.1). The principle of hierarchical accountability is characteristic of Weber’s ideal-type of bureaucracy (Pesch, 2008:338). Pesch notes that, in order to deal with the complexities of bureaucracies, Weber calls on both political leaders and civil servants to behave according to their ascribed roles (2008:8). As with legal accountability, in hierarchical accountability relationships are defined internally and exhibit a high degree of control (Radin and Romzek, 1996:62). In both legal and hierarchical accountability relationships, there is little choice about whether to respond to the relevant expectations. “The high degree of control and scrutiny leaves little room for discretion; in contrast, both professional and political

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accountability relationships allow a high degree of discretion as to how to respond to expectations for performance” (Radin and Romzek, 1996:62). In hierarchical accountability, relationships are manifested in organisational roles, supervisory relationships, rules, standard operating procedures, and close, detailed scrutiny of employee or agency performance and are based on an expectation of obedience to organisational directives (Radin and Romzek, 1996:62). Heinrich adds that hierarchical accountability includes inputs such as administrative rules which guide routine tasks and budgetary allocations (2002:712). Some authors substitute the term “hierarchical” accountability for “bureaucratic” accountability (Radin and Romzek, 1996:62).

Hierarchical accountability is similar in many respects to what Bovens (2005:7) calls organisational accountability. He notes that public managers will regularly, sometimes on a formal basis, such as with annual performance reviews, but more often in daily informal meetings, ask street-level bureaucrats to account for their assignments. This involves a strong hierarchical relationship and such accounting may be based on strict directives and standard operating procedures, but this is not a constitutive element (Bovens, 2005:7).

### 3.2.4 Legal accountability

Legal accountability is an external mechanism which entails a high degree of control over agency actions (see Tables 3.2 and 3.3). Legal accountability is based on specific responsibilities which are formally or legally awarded to authorities (Boven, 2005:8). Relationships in legal accountability derive from external sources that exercise a high degree of control and scrutiny (Radin and Romzek, 1996:62). They are manifested in oversight and monitoring activities (for example, audits, site visits, and other monitoring tasks). This also involves appraisals of government performance and adapting techniques from the larger field of management science (Heinrich, 2002:712). These accountability relationships have an orientation to the ‘top’. Radin and Romzek point out that “some actor (individual or organisation) external to the office or agency has an independent basis for scrutinizing performance, such as an auditor, a legislative oversight hearing, or a court review of administrative practices” (1996:61). Hupe and Hill (2007:286) add that public- administrative and legal forms of accountability have in common a vertical orientation. They argue that political and legal accountability may be in conflict even for street-level bureaucrats who may see themselves as, first, bound by law and, secondly, are restrained hierarchically (Hupe and Hill, 2007:286). However, a study by Fard and Rostamy (2007:340) in Iran shows that
legal accountability was ranked as the most effective form of accountability in terms of degree of control over workers. This is because “legal accountability is the most unambiguous type of accountability as the legal scrutiny will be based on detailed legal standards, prescribed by civil, penal, or administrative statutes, or precedent” (Boven, 2005:8).

3.2.5 Professional accountability

Street-level bureaucrats are often held accountable by their peers (Hupe and Hill, 2007:289; Smithson, 1987:6; Huisman and Currie, 2004:530). “Professional accountability systems are reflected in work arrangements that afford high degrees of autonomy to individuals who base their decision-making on internalized norms of appropriate practice” (Romzek, 2000:26). According to Tables 3.2 and Table 3.3 (accountability matrixes) professional accountability falls in both the internal and external accountability mechanisms. It is external in as far as professional bodies are concerned and internal when considered in relation to internal peers. Professional accountability relationships derive from internal sources but involve low degrees of control and high degrees of discretion to the individual or agency being held to answer for performance (Radin and Romzek, 1996:62). Radin and Romzek argue that peers practice collective self-management on various scales (1996:62). It seems as though this approach preserves the traditional domination of certain professions such as medicine and law. The relationships in professional accountability are based on a high opinion of the expertise of workers. In terms of professional accountability street-level bureaucrats are expected to exercise discretion in a manner consistent with the norms of professional practice relevant to the area of expertise as stipulated by their code of ethics. This source of control emanates from within the organisation as internalized professional norms and standards (Radin and Romzek, 1996:62). The implicit bargain between professions and society is that in exchange for self-regulation professions will act in a client’s interest without regard for personal gain and without compromising their advocacy (Lipsky, 1980:189). Jaafar and Anderson share the same view and state that the standards of practice set benchmarks that in principle serve as a point of reference by which educators can self-reflect and measure their own thinking and practice (2007:211). In explaining the importance of professional accountability from public management perspectives, Bovens says that:

Professional bodies lay down codes with standards for acceptable practice which are binding for all members. These standards are monitored and enforced by
professional bodies of oversight on the basis of peer review. This type of accountability relation will be particularly relevant for public managers that work in professional organisations, such as hospitals, schools, psychiatric clinics, police departments, or fire brigades. (Bovens, 2005:9)

However, Lipsky points out that “this is not to say street-level bureaucrats do not also confront organisational demands” (1980:190). Furthermore, professions are not necessarily unified groups. There may be divisions within them (for example, within medicine, between primary and secondary care practitioners, between physicians and surgeons, between medical specialities, and so on) (Hupe and Hill, 2007:289). Moreover, street-level bureaucrats of a given profession may often cooperate, externally induced or not, with other professionals (doctors with social workers; teachers with educational psychologists, and so on). Hupe and Hill thus distinguish between ‘inter’ and ‘intra’ dimensions of professional accountability (2007:290).

3.3 Analytic framework for educational accountability

Using the five types of accountability discussed in the preceding subsection as analytic lenses, this section attempts to devise a framework for educational accountability. It can be discerned that the five classes of accountability outlined here are dependent on the purpose of accountability. For instance, some purposes of accountability can include adherence to professional ethics, legal requirements, bureaucratic procedures and processes, responsiveness to societal needs and making sure that schools are performing at the highest level so as to attain the agreed upon outcomes or results. In light of this, different views on educational accountability will be discussed based on the types of accountability presented above. Like the notion of accountability, educational accountability is a difficult term to define. With specific reference to Australia, Smithson (1987:4) states that “today’s general insistence on increased educational accountability is plagued by the fact that it is not always clear precisely what is being advocated, for there is little doubt that in Australia, as elsewhere, ‘the term ‘accountability’ has come to mean different things to different people”.

Political accountability

Political accountability manifests itself in educational institutions’ responsiveness to expectations that emerge from external stakeholders such as legislative bodies, parents and society at large (Radin and Romzek, 1998:77). However, it is generally agreed that
Accountability in education involves not only reactive responses to the requirements of different constituencies, but also requires efforts by different stakeholders to meet the needs of the public and to make sure that the public trust is served. This view matches the political form of accountability. Accountability in educational policy implementation also entails “the guarantee that all students, without respect to race, income, or social class, will acquire the minimum school skills necessary to take full advantage of the choices that accrue upon successful completion of public schooling” (Fenstermacher, 1979:333). In agreement with this, Elmore (1996) [cited in Linn, 2000:12] states that educational accountability should focus schools’ attention less on compliance with rules [legal accountability] and more on increasing learning for students. However, this does not eliminate the need to comply with regulations. Political accountability relies on periodic elections as political actors promise their supporters better and effective educational systems. Furthermore, Smithson argues that if:

publicly funded state schools should be under some form of democratic control, ... presumably we could expect citizens in a democracy to hold those responsible for making curriculum policy decision, democratically accountable for their policies - to the extent that should citizens disapprove of policies and policy-makers, they could rid themselves of both, and the electoral system is the traditional means of accomplishing this. (1987:7)

A study carried out by Fard and Rostamy reveals that political accountability, public trust and citizens’ are interrelated (2007:331). Political accountability allows government to demonstrate, at least symbolically, that it is being attentive and responsive to all constituent interests in education (Jaafar and Anderson, 2007:220). In the event of problems in areas of jurisdiction, public managers or senior bureaucrats in the education sector may be required to appear before parliamentary committees on education (Bovens, 2005:8). Furthermore, Bovens notes that public managers can find themselves in the United States in “informal and discrete, but not to be disregarded accountability relationships with party bosses” to protect their jobs (2007:8). Bovens also argues that street-level bureaucrats and public managers in education alike have to be constantly alert to the media, because the agenda of the media determines in large part the agenda of their political principals (2007:25). This is because political accountability implies an orientation towards a top, demanding that street-level
bureaucrats and public managers and educational institutions are accountable to it (Hupe and Hill, 2007:286).

**Performance accountability**

In using performance accountability as an analytic tool, Leithwood, Edge and Jantzi’s (1999) conception of educational accountability is relevant here. They assert that an educational system must account for the welfare of individual students (1999:18). By ‘welfare’, these scholars imply the pre-eminence of academic achievement. They argue that “such achievement is a necessary if not sufficient part of the meaning of student welfare in the context of schooling” (Leithwood *et al.*, 1999:18). A distinguishing feature of this view is ‘academic achievement’ without which an educational institution may not be said to be accountable. In current policy and practice, argue Leithwood *et al* (1999:18), educators are often held accountable, as well, for the nature of the organisation and the practices of those who it is believed contribute more or less directly to students’ welfare. Under this regime the most straightforward way of understanding educational accountability seems to be that of “performance reporting, a periodic report of attainments of schools and other educational units” (Levin, 1974:364). To attain this, in the United States, state-wide mandated curricular and testing procedures which provide information and ways of analysing the information on the basis of other variables such as geography and other socio-economic variables have been used.

There are different purposes of performance reporting in education. For instance, in Singapore performance reporting coupled with rewards is used for the following reasons:

- as a tool of accountability tool for Ministry of Education to identify good practices that can be used to improve an education system.
- as a benchmarking tool for schools to measure their performance against that of other schools as a part of continual improvement.
- as a source of information to allow parents and students to make informed choices when choosing schools. (Ministry of Education, 2006:2)

It is clear that educational accountability is consonant with the variety of accountability types outlined earlier. In as far as teachers are accountable to “their employers, their school principals, their staff colleagues, the parents of their pupils, their pupils, the teaching profession, and they are also responsible to themselves” (Smithson, 1987:4), the notions of
bureaucratic accountability (to the principals), and professional accountability (to staff and colleagues) are evident. However, educational accountability has been regarded as very poor in developing countries. Winkler (2004:3) points out that “in traditional public education, accountability is weak, especially in most developing countries because of weak voice, poor management, insufficient information, confusing roles, and weak incentives”. These challenges can be grouped into external and internal factors. Some external challenges to educational accountability listed by Winkler are:

- Citizens lack experience with popular democracy. Their resultant passive behaviour reduces the voice of parents and citizens in education.
- Weak management practices pervade the public sector, making it difficult for the management of the education sector to improve.
- Poor public budgeting and spending practices produce unpredictable education funding. (Winkler, 2004:6)

The internal challenges are:

- Public schools rarely welcome parental involvement, except for their financial contributions.
- Reliable information on academic performance at the school level is almost never available.
- Schools lack an evaluation culture: neither teachers nor schools are evaluated. (Winkler, 2004:6)

Thus, although educational accountability has reached advanced stages in the developed world, in Africa, as in many developing countries, educational accountability remains a daunting challenge. This is compounded by the dearth of scholarship on educational accountability in the developing world.

**Hierarchical accountability**

In the education sector the hierarchical form of accountability is defined by the dimensions of the subordinate/supervisor relationships within a hierarchical organisation (Radin and Romzek, 1996:74). These can include relationships, as in South Africa, between teachers, heads of department, principals, circuit managers, district education managers, provincial education directors, the director generals and political masters (for instance, the Minister of
Basic Education). Hierarchical accountability denotes the answerability of street-level bureaucrats to superiors. As Kearns (1998:145) points out, “accountability is the obligation of educational institutions to acknowledge a higher authority, the public trust, which ultimately is the source of their mandate, their authority, and their credibility”. Kerns’ view of educational accountability is that bureaucratic accountability and hierarchical accountability are synonymous. Depending on the accountability actors in question, educators are obliged to acknowledge their principals as higher authorities while at the same time senior bureaucrats in education are also obliged to acknowledge their political masters as the source of their credibility and mandate.

**Legal accountability**

Legal accountability is another important aspect of educational accountability. Many standards of accountability are codified in laws and regulations. Educational institutions are expected to comply with explicit standards of performance, operational procedures, output measures, or reporting requirements (Kerns, 1998:147). The compliance requirements are often formally codified and carry the force of law (Kerns, 1998:147). In another way, schools are legally accountable to parents of pupils stemming from the *in loco parentis* principle (Smithson, 1987:6). Furthermore, legal accountability provides for processes such as audits, school visits, and other monitoring tasks (Heinrich, 2002:712). However, effective legal accountability requires proper execution of law and regulations, and providing citizens with required information about laws and regulations at the expected time. (Fard and Rostamy, 2007:336). An example of legal accountability in education is the ‘No Child is Left Behind’ law in the United States which stipulates that states adopt a comprehensive accountability system for identifying and improving underperforming schools. This law aims to have all students performing at proficient levels in selected learning areas by 2014. Furthermore, it prohibits any national testing or federally controlled curriculum. In England the ‘Every Child Matters’ (2003) law provides for inspecting children’s services which include schools.

Within a legal accountability framework laws and regulations can be passed to constrain the screws on teachers and educational institutions. For example, California created an ‘accountability law’ through the passage of the Stull Act (Lenin, 1974:366). One section of that Act calls for the assessment of teacher competence. It stipulates that the governing board of school districts should develop and adopt evaluation and assessment guidelines which include the following elements:
• The establishment of standards of expected student progress in each area of study and of techniques for the assessment of that progress.

• Assessment of certificated personnel competence as it relates to the established standards.

• Assessment of other duties normally required to be performed by certificated employees as an adjunct to their regular assignments.

• The establishment of procedures and techniques for ascertaining that the certificated employee is maintaining proper control and is preserving a suitable learning environment. (Levin, 1974:366)

Fenstermacher argues that the Stull Act involves the continuous willingness to evaluate education, to explain and interpret the results with all candour and to divulge the results to the public or constituencies that need to know them (1979:333). Martin [cited in Fenstermacher (1979:333)] views accountability as “a system for rewarding teachers according to their pupils’ performance on some standardized measures of learning”.

**Professional accountability**

In terms of professional accountability, schools and educators are held accountable by their peers (by professional bodies like the South African Council for Educators). Professional accountability relies on a distinction between experts and laypeople. Teachers regard themselves as professionals whose work can be understood better by their peers. That is, in addition to being held accountable for organisational features that enhance student welfare (performance accountability), teachers are held accountable for student welfare directly by their peers. Educators in some contexts are held accountable for:

- ensuring that specific organisational qualities considered to be critical to effectiveness are reflected in their schools or districts;
- organisational efficiency;
- meeting standards of professional knowledge and skill;
- meeting standards of moral behaviour;
- performance of best professional practices or specified duties;
–skilfully using organisational processes believed to contribute to the successful introduction of change (such as strategic planning, school improvement planning and the carrying out of quality reviews). (Leithwood et al, 1999:19)

Conclusion

In this chapter a definition of accountability was offered. It was shown that although accountability is important for all organisations and is a hallmark of democracy, the term is not easy to define. It was noted that accountability may be interpreted as transparency, responsiveness, trustworthiness, and fidelity and justice. The need for accountability in bureaucracies has attracted the attention of scholars. As result, there have been concerted efforts to understand the term. This has given rise to different types of accountability that were discussed in this chapter, particularly political accountability, performance accountability, hierarchical accountability, legal accountability and professional accountability.

Political accountability is based on public trust in elected officials (when they are elected) in terms of their responsiveness to fulfilling their promises. It is usually judged on the ability of governments to deliver services which can influence voter behaviour. Then performance accountability, which is also known as managerial accountability, was discussed. This type of accountability refers to the demonstration of performance in view of agreed-upon outcomes. The third type of accountability presented was hierarchical accountability which is also known as bureaucratic accountability. This type of accountability requires high degrees of control and leaves very little room for discretion. A further type of accountability which was discussed is legal accountability which is reflected in the compliance of public officials with regulations and laws. This form of accountability is related to political accountability. Finally, professional accountability takes place when street-level bureaucrats hold each other accountable in terms of norms and standards as well as according to a code of ethics of the profession. Professional accountability has low degrees of control as well as high degrees of discretion and professional autonomy. It is important to note that all these forms of accountability are related to one another and that most of them emanate from legislative requirements in many contexts.

The chapter ended by examining educational accountability in terms of the above types of accountability. Academic research which deals with the application of different forms of accountability to education was reviewed. In both the United States and Western Europe
different forms of accountability have been used to make education bureaucracies accountable. There is a dearth of academic scholarship on educational accountability in South Africa and in Africa as a whole. The next chapter will focus on a framework for investigating accountability in education.
CHAPTER FOUR
A FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINING ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE EDUCATION SECTOR

Managing public policy invariably requires the ability to hold role payers accountable at all the echelons of government bureaucracy and every stage of policy cycle. Despite the challenges to educational accountability in the developing world, the demand for accountability the management of educational policy is increasing. Furthermore, tax payers the donor community as well as bilateral and multilateral organisations have made accountability an indispensable virtue. The need for accountability in the public sector cannot be over emphasised. To do this, public managers who are involved in managing public policy in government departments have to find ways of making their organisations and street-level workers more accountable. Lipsky posits that:

Despite the dual focus of accountability inherent in street-level bureaucrats’ roles, public managers are drawn to make street-level bureaucrats more accountable by reducing their discretion and constraining their alternatives. They write manuals to cover contingencies. They audit performance of workers to provide retrospective sanctions in anticipation of which it is hoped future behaviour will be modified (Lipsky, 1980:162).

There is a large volume of scholarly literature on different modes of achieving accountability and their effects among street-level bureaucrats. Some include performance management and legal and bureaucratic accountability. Other methods that are used to improve accountability in education entail mandated curricular and external examinations. This study will focus on both internal (bureaucratic and professional) and external (legal and political) modes. This chapter will explore different accountability mechanisms employed in managing the implementation of educational policy. Methods such as performance evaluation, student assessment, school inspection or whole school evaluation, accreditation and professional development will be discussed. As noted in the previous chapter, the different types of generic accountability are somewhat arbitrary. The boundaries of each mode of accountability are not crystal clear. Semantic confusion has resulted in an unending list of accountability types which are often applied to education. It is, however, apparent that no single type of accountability stands on its own. For instance professional accountability in education is supported by legal accountability through the promulgation of legislations such
as the South African Council of Educators Act of 2000 in South Africa. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to further develop and apply the accountability framework developed in Chapter 3 to the management of educational policy implementation.

Accordingly, the chapter will be organised in line with the accountability framework developed in the previous chapters. It will commence with political accountability followed by performance accountability, third will be bureaucratic/hierarchical accountability which will be followed by legal accountability, and then professional accountability. As far as possible these connections will be highlighted. Even within each type of accountability, the methods used are interrelated. For example, sanctions and rewards as a strategy which may be used may also be based on the results of student assessments. The type of accountability which is applied may have a bearing on the strategy which is used to increase accountability.

4.1 Political accountability

The faith and hope that families, communities and society have on education makes education one of the ‘most public’ of all the public policies. Managing the implementation of education becomes one of the most controversial tasks for public managers. Examples of such controversial policies include the ‘No Child left Behind’ in United States and the Curriculum, 2005 (outcomes based education) in South Africa. Using the hierarchy presented earlier, each level at the top places pressure at the levels beneath it to perform and produce outcomes. As conceptualised in Chapter 3, among other relationships, political accountability represents the relationship between elected officials and the voters. This relationship can exist at least at two levels, school level and national level. At school level it is manifested in school governing bodies (SGBs) that are elected to oversee the running of the school (Manchanda, 2013). At national level it is revealed in national politics where elected officials are expected to formulate sound educational policies and enact them in the most prudent ways. Although these two dimensions of political accountability do not pose any meaningful direct contact with street-level bureaucrats in classes, their position in management of educational policy merits a brief analysis.

At school level in South Africa composition and functions of SGBs are sanctioned by the South African Schools Act 84 of 1996 [a clear link with legal accountability]. DBE (2009:6) notes that SGBGs are democratically elected to:

- improve quality of education;
- ensure good governance;
• ensure that schools serve the interests of the community and meet expectations of parents;
• assist in spreading the cost of education across users and society as a whole and to combat racism, sexism and all other forms of unfair discrimination and intolerance.

The electoral process of SGB members is comprehensive systematic. These processes are guided by Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; National Education Policy Act, 1996 (Act 27 of 1996); South African Schools Act, 1996 (Act 84 of 1996); and failure to deliver on their mandates would result in members losing their position in the SGBs. However, the extent to which these governing bodies are accountable is unclear. Considering the number of schools in the rural communities, with huge number of parents who are illiterate, it may be difficult to ascertain the capacity of such bodies to be accountable. Although an analysis of their mandated duties seems to show that holding street-level bureaucrats accountable is not within their jurisdiction, they are still held accountable for the functioning of the school ((Manchanda, 2013). It may, however, be inferred that the attitudes of parents towards the schools may have an effect on how teachers perceive their duties and accountability devices that are placed on them to secure accountability among them in the schools.

At national level, formulation and implementation of education by governing parties is often a critical issue of accountability. Both ruling and opposition political parties place attractive and at times radical education policies in their election manifesto in order to attract voters in electoral processes. Often, these policies are purportedly informed by their constitution.

In 2007 Britain’s Labour Party demonstrated its willingness to exercise political accountability in education and set out the following objectives:

• Secure the wellbeing and health of children and young people
• Safeguard the young and vulnerable
• Achieve world class standards in education
• Close the gap in educational achievement for children from disadvantaged backgrounds
• Ensure young people are participating and achieving their potential to 18 and beyond
• Keep children and young people on the path to success (Lupton and Obolenskaya, 2013:7).
In New Zealand the Labour Party promises its people “a world-class education for all” (New Zealand Labour Party, 2013: 32).

These promises often remain wish lists if the implementation of such polices is not well managed. If the political accountability devices are not effective ruling parties may do as they wish. In the Western countries electoral processes are an effective means to make governments account for their action or inaction. For instance, the Conservative Party of Canada state that the principles of its education policy are guided by the Constitution of Canada (Conservative Party of Canada, 2011). This policy document emphasises the importance of government accountability. It states:

A fundamental component of parliamentary government is ministerial accountability to Parliament. The Conservative Party is determined to enforce parliamentary principles of government [political] accountability. We believe that ministers should continue to have authority and be accountable for the policies [including education policy] they implement and the administrative actions of their departments. (Conservative Party of Canada, 2011:9)

The ANC, the governing party, aims to strength its position and exercise political accountability in education improving through:

- Strengthening the culture of performance management within the education system;
- Simplifying and aligning the evaluation instruments that measure performance standards for educators;
- Strengthening monitoring and support for educators; and
- Strengthening reporting at all levels. (ANC, 2012:13)

What has been made clear in this is that governing parties exercise political accountability in education to maintain the trust and significance before the voters while opposition parties present alternatives as they attempt to gain the win voters to their side. While it has been shown that in the Western World political accountability is an effective means of keeping government accountable evidence reveal that this is not so in Africa and other developing countries (Brinkerhoff, 2001). Although political accountability may not have a direct link to what takes in in classrooms, it foregrounds the different mechanisms that are employed to make teachers accountable. It is to such mechanism that the next section will, in greater detail, turn to.
4.2 Performance accountability

As discussed previously, performance accountability is based on the demonstration of performance in the light of agreed upon performance targets. The method that is used to secure and improve accountability in performance accountability is performance evaluation. This method can be either an internal or an external mode of accountability. Performance accountability can have links with political accountability as politicians seek to determine whether their educational policies are being effective or not, as this could influence the behaviour of voters.

Performance accountability involves complex processes of setting credible educational goals and objectives against which performance is judged. The main problem with the use of performance accountability for street-level bureaucrats is the measurability of educational bureaucracies’ goods.

Measures of performance evaluation are premised on performance as a type of accountability, as was discussed earlier. Educational institutions and their workers are expected to perform according to acceptable performance targets. The operational framework for performance evaluation is guided by work plans and objectives of the entire educational bureaucracy at regional level as well as at district and institutional level (depending on the organisation of the education system). At national level a government may have targets such as improving access to education through increased enrolment, improving student retention and reducing dropout rates. These may cascade downwards to form targets for schools. Here, the development of performance measures is critical to a performance accountability policy (Lipsky, 1980:165).

To this end, administrators make great efforts to develop performance measures in order to control employees’ behaviour. Lipsky believes that “if appropriate performance measures were available street-level bureaucrats could be made accountable for their behaviour” (1980:199). Performance measures can be viewed as a method of evaluating an organisation or a street-level bureaucrat’s performance, which involves tracking, evaluating and giving feedback on actual performance based on key behaviours or competencies which are established in terms of the goals that support the achievement of the overall organisational mission (Davi Ngo, hrvinet.com). Student performance can be a measure of how effective school districts are in improving the academic performance of its students by relying on standardized exams. The federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 in the United States of
America explicitly requires that all states develop accountability systems based on assessment tests (Imazeki and Reschovsky, 2004:5). The “most straightforward interpretation of the accountability concept appears to be that of performance reporting, a periodic report of the attainments of schools and other educational units” (Levin, 1974:363).

Smith (1990:53) notes that performance indicators have become ubiquitous in the public sector. Street-level bureaucracies do this for many reasons and in the same way they use different measures for each purpose. For example, some believe that “the current focus on performance measurement at all levels of government and in non-profit organisations reflects citizen demands for evidence of program effectiveness that have been made around the world” (Behn, 2003:586). Wholey and Newcomer add that “performance measurement may be done annually to improve public accountability and policy decision-making or done more frequently to improve management and program effectiveness” (1997:98). As an accountability system, managers use performance for various purposes.

While performance evaluation is seen by many scholars (Behn, 2003:586-606; Smith, 1995:189-205) as a means of reducing the discretion of street-level bureaucrats and improvising performance in public bureaucracy, Lipsky (1980) is pessimistic about the efficacy of these mechanisms because “bureaucracy itself may be defined in part as a large organisation whose output cannot be evaluated through market transactions” (Lipsky, 1980:48). One of the reasons for this is that there are too many variables to take into account to make the evaluation realistic. As explained earlier, educational outcomes are not determined by what happens in class alone. For instance, one of the examples of educational outcomes given by the South African Presidency (2009:7) is to “improve the quality of basic education”. A realistic evaluation of such an outcome is complicated by several factors. Educational outcomes are the product of a multiplicity of stakeholders. Furthermore, street-level bureaucrats tend to work in jobs that are freer from supervisory scrutiny than most organisational jobs (Lipsky, 1980:50). In this regard, teachers work in their classes with minimal supervision since they are regarded as professionals. Some of the purposes of performance evaluation in general, as well as in education are discussed below.

**To evaluate**

Arguably, the main purpose of performance measurement in education is to evaluate. As an accountability mechanism bureaucracies usually want to know how they are performing or how well they are meeting societal needs and receiving public trust. Behn notes that people
rarely state that their dominant rationale for measuring performance is to evaluate performance, let alone acknowledge there may be other purposes (Behn, 2003:588). Performance measurement of programme outputs and outcomes provides important, if not vital, information on current programme status and how much progress is being made toward important programme goals (NAPA, 1994:2). This assertion implicitly invokes the importance of performance evaluation. Performance measures are usually centred on programme outcomes (for example, the pass rates) rather than on inputs (for example, the number of students taught). In order to evaluate, a public manager needs to know what a department or ministry needs to accomplish. To evaluate the performance of a public organisation, a public manager needs to know what is supposed to be accomplished and should then formulate a clear, coherent mission, strategy, and then objectives, and structure the programme as a prelude to measurement (Behn, 2003:588). To this end, Lipsky lists four conditions that are necessary for accountability:

1. Agencies must know what they want their workers to do. Where the objectives are multiple and conflicting, agencies must be able to rank their preferences.

2. Agencies must know how to measure workers’ outputs.

3. Agencies must be able to compare workers to one another to establish standards of judgement.

4. Agencies must have incentives and sanctions which would serve to discipline workers. (Lipsky, 1980:161)

**To control**

Public managers also use performance measures as a proactive accountability mechanism. In order to ensure that schools and teachers are implementing a policy as it is intended, public managers measure their outputs and processes. Behn points out that in measuring performance, systems try to control the behaviour of street-level bureaucrats (Behn, 2003:390). However, Behn is not optimistic about the effectiveness of these measures. He notes that:

Yes. Frederick Winslow Taylor is dead. Today, no manager believes the best way to influence the behaviour of subordinates is to establish the one best way for them to do their prescribed tasks and then measure their compliance with this
particular way. In the twenty-first century, all managers are into empowerment. (Behn, 2003:589)

Behn further says that it is disingenuous to assert (or believe) that people no longer seek to control the behaviour of public agencies and street-level bureaucrats, let alone seek to use performance measurement to help them do so (2003:589).

Executive branch superiors do establish performance standards, for instance, specific curriculum standards for teachers, and then measure performance to see whether individuals have complied with these mandates. In terms of the general principal-agent model, the principals seek to control the behaviour of agents. However, the introduction of multi-principals in the model can create problems for agents (teachers). Some principals of schools measure outcomes through pass rates while others measure the same outcomes through the quality of those passes. As already said, Lipsky (1980:162) agrees that “they (managers) audit the performance of workers to provide retrospective sanctions in anticipation of which it is hoped future behaviour will be modified”. In fact, management control depends on measurement (Behn, 2003:589). That is, if the measured performance indicators are associated with sanctions, workers maintain or modify their behaviour. For example, Kentucky’s accountability system in the United States focuses on rewarding and sanctioning schools for compliance with state standards and goals (Carnoy, Elmore and Siskin, 2003:65). Specifically, Carnoy et al report that principals of non-performing schools can be replaced by distinguished educators who are given administrative authority over the schools (2003:65). For example, in England, schools are judged on a four point scale. If the school’s overall effectiveness is judged as causing concern, the school can be placed on special measures or issued with a notice to improve (Matters, 2003)

To motivate

In addition, performance measures are used to motivate schools and teachers. In order to motivate workers to work harder or smarter, almost real time measures of outputs are needed in order to compare with production targets (Behn, 2003:594). Following good results a school may receive awards while poor performers may face sanctions. For example, in Singapore, awards were introduced in 1998 in order to recognise success and sustained
achievement in both educational processes and educational outcomes (based on examinations). Furthermore, schools were rewarded with increased funding and flexibility. On the other hand, sanctions are used to discourage poor performance. In the United States, schools which fail to meet Adequate Yearly Progress face sanctions (Gunzenhauser, 2007:493). Sanctions and rewards are common features of the accountability processes in countries such as the United States, England and Scotland. California’s Public Schools Accountability Act 1999 provides for award programmes, both monetary and non-monetary, for schools that meet the Academic Performance Index (Timar, 2003:180).

However, it is important to note that organisations like schools do not produce outcomes but outputs (Behn, 2003:594). It will be difficult, if not impossible, to measure educational outcomes such “to develop responsible and respectful citizens”. School outputs such as an improvement of a pass rate from 30% to 60% can be measured. In that sense, in order to motivate an organisation to improve its performance, managers have to motivate street-level bureaucrats accordingly (Behn, 2003:594). Moreover, to motivate street-level bureaucrats, managers have to collect and distribute the output data quickly enough to provide useable feedback so that they can continue productive behaviour or discontinue and change ineffective strategies. This also explains why society attempts to motivate schools and teachers with test scores (outputs). The real outcome that citizens want from public schools is children who would grow up to become productive employees and responsible citizens. This is because of the lengthy time lag between teaching and the observable outcomes of learners. Concerning that, Behn states that:

The lag between when the schools and teachers do their work and when these outcomes can be measured is not just months or years, but decades. Thus, we never could feed these outcome measures back to the schools and teachers in time for them to make any adjustments. Consequently, as a society we must resort to motivating schools and teachers with outputs - with test scores that (presumably) measure how much a child has learned. (Behn, 2003:595)

The issues discussed here may have implications for the use of performance accountability as a means of holding street-level bureaucrats accountable to their organisational objectives. The next section will examine some of the issues that pertain to the issue of measuring the performance of street-level bureaucrats.
4.3 Issues in measuring the performance of street-level bureaucrats

Academic research suggests that the development of valid performance measures can lead to more accountable street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980:166). In such cases, Lipsky argues that street-level bureaucrats can be held accountable for producing results in the same way that machine operators can be charged with producing a certain volume of output in a given period (1980:166). He, however, laments that such calls on street-level bureaucrats can interfere with the quality of public services. This is due to a number of reasons, including the fact that quantitative measures of performance in street-level bureaucracies are usually unreliable and controversial.

One of main reasons why performance measures cannot be perfect is that street-level bureaucrats will concentrate on activities that are measured (Lipsky, 1980:166). Lipsky argues that, “by virtue of simply putting attention on some tasks over others street-level bureaucrats can improve their performance on most quantitative measures that managers introduce” (1980:166). For example, if street-level bureaucrats are assessed according to the proportion of their students who pass end of year examinations, more teachers will “teach the test” (Lipsky, 1980:166). This is what Behn calls “what gets measured gets done, and people responding to the explicit or implicit incentives of the measurement will do what people are measuring, not what these people actually want done” (Behn, 2003:599). One might say ‘if performance measures improve the performance then what it is the problem?’ The problem is that what people measure often is not precisely what they want done (Behn, 2003:599).

Another problem is that a measured aspect of the job can induce workers to reduce attention on other aspects where there are no controls on the quality of work produced. Because of the multi-purpose nature of performance appraisals discussed earlier, no optimal performance measure can be used for all of the purposes.

If only certain areas of their work are measured, the problem is that street-level bureaucrats will make choices and exercise discretion by directing their activities in ways that will improve their performance scores (Lipsky, 1980:166). Workers will select into their programmes clients who are likely to do well in them, in order to improve appearance of success, a situation which Lipsky calls “creaming” (1980:166). This can result in interviews (test) to determine entry to some ‘elite’ government schools and minimum points being required for admission to university education. This can be in direct conflict with the goal of ‘education for all’.

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Another problem with performance measures in street-level bureaucracies is resistance by workers. For example, teachers resist being measured by the progress of their pupils unless adequate provision is made to control for their students’ previous levels of achievement and their capacity to learn (Lipsky, 1980:169). This also can be controversial.

Recent attention has also focused on using surveys of client satisfaction to obtain information on workers’ performance (Lipsky, 1980:169). This has also faced resistance by some due to professional scepticism that performance that pleases clients may not be related to high class practice: the popular teacher may not be the best instructor (Lipsky, 1980:169). This problem is compounded by the fact that street-level bureaucrats’ work tends to take place in private or beyond the scrutiny of supervisors. Teaching is done in classrooms where principals and supervisors do not normally enter; if they do, they often provide advance notice so that the teaching, like a performance, may be prepared accordingly (Lipsky, 1980:169).

The issues discussed here provide a formidable barrier to effective performance measurement. In most cases, public managers in the education sector do not observe the street-level bureaucrats at work but rely on reports. The reliability of these reports, which are written by street-level bureaucrats themselves, can be questionable (Lipsky, 1980:169). It seems the only form of accountability that Lipsky is optimistic about in the United States is professional accountability. He notes that “it might be possible for street-level bureaucrats to scrutinise each other’s’ work and provide assessment of quality” (Lipsky, 1980:169).

4.4 Hierarchical accountability

Hierarchical accountability is related to the other forms of accountability discussed earlier. It is related to legal accountability in the sense that the roles and relationships of stakeholders in education can be codified in policy documents and laws. It is also related to performance accountability in terms of who measures performance and to whom an account of performance is reported. The use of hierarchical or bureaucratic accountability in holding street-level bureaucrats accountable seems to be the most important mechanism. In education, hierarchical accountability ensures a high degree of control with very little room for discretion as there are always rules and regulations that guide routine tasks. As discussed earlier, senior bureaucrats in central offices usually seek answers from provinces, districts, schools and teachers (street-level bureaucrats). The purpose of hierarchical or bureaucratic accountability is to remove autonomy and discretion from street-level bureaucrats.
The significance of hierarchical accountability in education is the view that teachers are not expected to be experts in making judgements about their clients but rather implement an externally mandated curriculum in conjunction with prescribed textbooks. Crucial to hierarchical accountability is the use of universal mandated assessments.

This section will discuss, in depth, the use of assessments as a form of an hierarchical accountability mechanism. Somewhat related to performance measures, student assessment has been used widely as an accountability mechanism in education. The use of student assessment meets the requirements of political as well as performance accountability. Usually, examination results are the only way that all stakeholders can measure what is happening in schools and be able to seek answers from the street-level bureaucrats. In that light, political and democratic accountability are exercised by society at large.

Linn notes that assessment and accountability have played prominent roles in many of the educational reform efforts in the United States (2000:4). In identifying the role of tests in hierarchical accountability, Linn (2000:4) remarks that tests and assessments come in many different forms and may be used in a variety of ways in accountability systems which intend to improve education. Angelo (1999:30) notes that “most of us think assessment should be first and foremost about improving student learning and secondarily about determining accountability for the quality of learning produced”. The purpose of assessment is to improve accountability. Accountability for students’ performance, coupled with standards and assessment, directed at students, teachers, or schools is growing not only in the United States, but the world over (Carnoy, Elmore and Siskin, 2003:129). Carnoy, Elmore and Siskin argue that in most cases assessments are critically important for students, where promotion and graduation from high school are tied to students passing measures set by public authorities (2003:129). Elmore, et al conclude that the presumption is that “educational accountability should focus schools’ attention less on compliance with rules and more on increasing learning for students” (1996:65). However, in the end, assessment as an accountability mechanism depends on the co-operation of the students, a feature which causes resentment among teachers and schools, an issue which will be discussed further in later sections. Other issues pertain to the validity and reliability of such tests.

There is no agreement among scholars on the purpose of assessments. At a general level, the main purpose is to improve instruction and student learning (Linn, 2003:2). Linn argues that
tests and assessments are designed to provide information about student achievement which will be helpful to teachers, schools and parents, although it is seldom specified how this is so (2003:2). However, it might be obvious that teachers have a great deal of information about students’ performance through their day-to-day interactions as well as from assessing tests which are devised by teachers. State tests in a public system provide an important accountability mechanism as well as an external check against which teacher judgements can be compared (Linn, 2003:3). Britain’s National Curriculum aimed at introducing a system of measuring and reporting on the achievement of children, and by implication their teachers, through a combination of Teacher Assessment (TA) and Standard Assessment Tasks (SATs) (Abbott et al., 1994:155). Some analysts argue that if assessments are used as an accountability mechanism in order to measure teacher performance, the teachers’ professionalism will be reduced and “teaching to the test” would also occur (Seashore, Febey and Schroeder, 2005:177).

Assessments “throughout most of the United States today are designed to rank-order schools and students for the purposes of accountability” (Guskey, 2003:6). In addition to providing information to educators, parents, and students, most state mandated assessments have some type of stakes attached to the results (Linn, 2001:6). Even though the stakes may not be formally specified, the consequence of reporting results to the school boards and the public can be very high. Newspaper reports of results by schools create pressure on principals and teachers to improve scores (Linn, 2001:4).

Assessment results may have other consequences as well. Linn reports that at school level these may involve requirements for accreditation or the assignments of rewards and sanctions (2001:4). Linn notes that:

For teachers they may involve monetary rewards in the form of bonuses or, in some instances, be the bases for pay-for-performance schemes. Negative consequences for teachers most commonly are informal ones, such as pressure from principals, but may include more formal actions such as being singled out for some kind of assistance programme. For individual students, accountability may involve placement in remedial programmes, mandatory attendance of summer school, grade to grade promotion, or requirements for certificates of mastery, high school graduation, or level of endorsement on high school diploma (Linn, 2001:4).
Although student accountability (where students are responsible and answerable for their outcomes) is not the focus of this thesis, it is of great importance since it illustrates the environment in which the street-level bureaucrats operate and the expectations of their clients. In their study, Carnoy, Elmore and Siskin (2003:13) found that the number of states that mandated student accountability has increased dramatically and also discovered that twenty-four states in the United States (almost 50%) attached stakes to their tests in the form of student recognition, or graduation; forty states (80%) used test scores for accountability (Carnoy, Elmore and Siskin, 2003:13-14).

Furthermore, feedback provided to parents and students based on assessments will, by extension, make teachers more accountable. Linn points out that results from external assessments are a useful benchmark against which reports of teacher performance can be compared (2001:3). The argument is that parents and students could use such information to demand improved education from the school and teachers if the results are not as expected. Additionally, Linn suggests that in the same way tests can serve to motivate students to greater efforts to learn, they can also motivate teachers to put more effort into their work (Linn, 2001:3). Most “accountability programs took a variety of forms, but shared the common characteristic that they increased real or perceived stakes of results for teachers and educational administrators” (Linn, 2000:6). However, as already mentioned earlier, this may lead to cheating, teaching the test and teaching to test (Linn, 2001:3).

It is clear from this discussion that forms of assessment have a long history in educational accountability. The motivations for assessment vary and depend on different perspectives of the education stakeholders. Angelo concludes that when academics ‘do assessment’, personal and professional values motivate them and the strongest of intrinsic motivators is the desire to improve student learning (1999:30).

It is apparent that assessment is a mechanism of binding street-level bureaucrats to organisational goals; it can also be argued that the use of government mandated assessment may result in unwanted consequences. The next section discusses the effects of using assessments as an hierarchical accountability mechanism.

4.5 Issues with the use of assessments as an accountability mechanism

“A fundamental premise of high-stakes accountability systems is that instruction and student learning will be improved by holding teachers and/or learners accountable for results” (Linn,
However, a number of empirical studies have produced mixed results (Linn, 2001:4; Angelo, 1999:30). Angelo is pessimistic about the improvement of learning through assessment and he states that “we still don’t have much solid evidence of learning improvement” (1999:30). On the other hand, Linn (2001:4) indicates that there is “a good deal of evidence that test scores generally increase during the first few years after a new assessment and accountability system is introduced”, a phenomenon he calls the “Lake Wobegon effect” (Linn, 2000:7). Furthermore, it is generally agreed that high-stakes assessments result in a number of unintended consequences (Linn, 2001:4; Linn, 2000:12; Stiggins, 2004:24). This section examines some questions raised in the use of assessments as accountability mechanisms for street-level bureaucrats in the education sector.

The first issue to consider when using state mandated assessments as an accountability mechanism for street-level bureaucrats is whether a student’s socioeconomic background should be taken into account. “It is well known that socioeconomic background is substantially related to student achievement” (Linn, 2001:12). In his later work, Linn observes that “when teacher or school value-added results are reported it is assumed that it is the teacher or the school that is having an effect rather than some other factor such as students’ families, student background, or student peers in the school” (2006:19). However, Linn believes that “schools can fairly be held accountable only for factors that they can control, and therefore performance accountability systems should control for or equalize student socioeconomic status before they dispense rewards or penalties”, a factor which he believes might a cause for lower expectations from low-achieving schools (2001:12). It is well-established that academic achievement is influenced “by two main factors: quality of educational services provided and socioeconomic backgrounds of students themselves” (Linn, 2001: 12). Most accountability and incentive schemes prejudge or ignore this fundamental issue (Hanushek and Raymond, 2001:14).

Because of the obvious effect of a student’s background, some states in the United States take socioeconomic factors into account when comparing assessment results from different schools. Linn (2001:12) reports that “Pennsylvania uses a number of community type socioeconomic status variables to identify similar schools and then reports the inter quartile range for reading and mathematics scores for the set of similar schools called ‘Similar Schools Band’”. However, as already mentioned earlier, the use of the socioeconomic status of students as the primary basis for accountability can lead “to institutionalisation of different
Another issue pertains to the use of students’ prior achievement in assessment and accountability systems. “Accountability systems that emphasise change in performance over time rather than current status provide a means of taking into account characteristics of students attending the school without resorting to measures of socioeconomic status of students” (Linn, 2001:13). Echoing Myers’s (2000) sentiments, Linn says that the current educational accountability systems “are contaminated by factors other than school performance, in particular, the average level of achievement prior to entering first grade, [and the] effects of student, family, and community characteristics on student achievement growth from first grade through the grade in which students are tested” (Linn, 2006:18). Linn discovered that accountability systems in states like California and Kentucky compare achievement of students at selected grades in a given year or biennium with that of cohorts from previous years at the same grade in the same school which provides a means of recognising that schools serve students who start at different places (2001:13). Linn questions this comparison since it is based on the implicit assumption that students’ initial achievement levels are relatively stable from year to year (2001:13). Linn went on to recommend that a better way of tracking students’ prior achievement should “track changes in student achievement from one grade to the next” (2001:13).

The use of prior achievement of students as a predictive factor in an accountability system has many advantages over systems that rely on socioeconomic status (SES) as factors to adjust scores or to produce comparative bands of schools (Linn, 2001:15). The use of prior achievement as a predictor of subsequent achievement does not establish different gains for students from different backgrounds (Linn, 2001:15-16) since the only basis for comparison is academic background of students. The assumption is that teachers will be held accountable for any deterioration in students’ achievement compared to what was expected of them.

Another problem that arises from the use of assessment results as an accountability mechanism relates to “focusing only on the percentage of students who score at the proficient level or above” (Linn, 2006:15). Linn went show how the mechanism “does not give credit for moving students from the lowest performance levels to higher levels of achievement that fall short of the minimum score required to be categorized as proficient” (2006:15). Akin to what Lipsky calls “creaming” (1980:166) some analysts fear that:
this encourages teachers to focus their attention on ‘bubble students,’ that is, students who are performing near the proficient level, at the expense of more needy students who are performing so far below the proficient cut that there is little hope of raising their achievement enough to surpass the proficient cut score and at the expense of high achieving students for whom there is little doubt that they will score at the proficient level or above (Linn, 2006:15).

Many scholars agree with this assertion. For example, Shepard points out that “because of the pressure to achieve high test scores, more hard-to-teach children are rejected by the system” (1991:234). He went on to say that “there is a direct correspondence between the extent of pressures regarding accountability and the number of children who are denied entry to kindergarten, who are assigned to two-year kindergarten programs, who are referred to special education, who are made to repeat a grade, or who drop out of school” (1991:234). It is, therefore, important to recognise any improvement in the results of learners regardless of whether they have reached the minimum score required to be categorized as proficient. In the United States, “Massachusetts defined six levels of performance called advanced, proficient, needs improvement-high, needs improvement-low, warning/failing-high, and warning/failing low (Linn, 2006:17). This was intended to motivate teachers in low performing schools by then knowing that the impact they make would be recognised. In the same way teachers in performing schools would be discouraged from aiming at the minimum score required to be categorized as proficient.

The use of nationwide assessments as an accountability mechanism in education can also lead to narrowing the curriculum. One of the major criticisms of this mechanism is that “high-stakes tests narrow the curriculum: tested content tends to be taught to the exclusion of non-tested content” (Shepard, 1991:232). Another analyst who agrees with this assertion is Ladd who contends “that the emphasis on test scores will narrow the curriculum, induce teachers to teach narrowly to the test, and promote a shallow approach to learning” (Ladd, 2002:385). Even within subjects that are favoured such as mathematics and reading, and language mechanics, instruction is focused only on skills covered by the test (Shepard, 1991:232). Shepard also reports that studies have shown that “because of external tests, elementary teachers had given up on reading real books, writing, and undertaking long-term projects and were filling all available time with word recognition; recognition of errors in spelling, language usage, and punctuation; and arithmetic operations” (Shepard, 1991:232). Shepard
also lists two disturbing patterns in the use of state mandated assessments as accountability mechanism. He explains that:

The degree to which testing distorts curriculum can be predicted from 1) the extent of political pressure (that is, the higher the perceived stakes of test results, the greater the narrowing of curriculum) and 2) the socioeconomic level of the school or district (that is, the poorer the school or district, the more time devoted to teaching to tests) (Shepard, 1991:232).

In some cases the nature of sanctions and rewards can lead to cheating and falsification by both street-level bureaucrats and students. This depends on the level of stakes and the severity of sanctions. In relation to the narrowing of curricula, the use of state mandated assessments “misdirects instruction even for the basic skills” (Shepard, 1991:233). Shepard points out that a test-driven curriculum encourages the teaching of skills in isolation, and different cognitive processes are elicited when a teacher concentrates on materials with a test-like format instead of addressing intended learning goals directly (1991:233). Furthermore, “the kind of drill-and-practice instruction that tests reinforce is based on outmoded learning theory” (Shepard, 1991:234). While the primary focus of accountability mechanisms is improving teaching and learning, “this approach actually denies students opportunities to develop thinking and problem-solving skills” (Shepard, 1991:234).

Another criticism in the use of state mandated assessment as an accountability mechanism is that it reduces professionalism in teachers. The dictates of externally mandated tests reduce both the professional knowledge and the status of teachers (Shepard, 1991:234). Reporting on the results of a study conducted by Amos Hatch and Evelyn Freeman, Shepard says that “teachers were themselves victims of instructional decisions dictated by accountability pressures” (Shepard, 1991:234). State mandated assessment is a typical example of bureaucratic accountability as these assessments emphasise administrative hierarchy. Echoing Linda Darling-Hammond’s sentiments, Shepard observes that:

The very conception of bureaucratic accountability is intended to remove control from the judgments of individual teachers - hence such notions as ‘teacher-proof curricula’. Teachers are not expected to be experts in pedagogy or child development; rather, they are supposed to implement externally mandated curricula, text books, tests, and promotional standards as specified. Bureaucratic accountability begets exactly what it assumes - less skilled professionals (1991:235).
Runté adds that the “centralized testing threatens teachers’ professional control in four ways: (1) by deskilling the ‘testing’ portion of the evaluation function, (2) by enforcing a centralized curriculum, (3) by removing the teachers’ right to evaluate the outcome of their own activity, and (4) by introducing new (and possibly inappropriate) measures of teacher productivity” (1998:166). Runté explains that teachers lose the responsibility of evaluating the product of their labour and managers could “enforce labour discipline by linking salary negotiations to achievement results, threatening dismissal for those whose graduates fail to meet provincial norms, and so on” (1998:166). Consequently, Runté concludes that “the external accountability provided by centralized testing indirectly undermines teachers’ professional autonomy and status, because professionalism assumes the absence of direct managerial oversight” (1998:168).

The form and purpose of state mandated assessment may differ from context to context but the primary goal is often the same: to improve student learning. In terms of types of accountability, as already explained, it can be argued that nationwide assessment can serve as bureaucratic accountability, which is associated with administrative hierarchy as well as public and political accountability, given that the results tend to be published for all to see. In terms of implementation, hierarchical accountability conforms to the top-down model. Another prominent feature of the mechanism discussed here is that assessments are imposed from the top and are mostly external forms of accountability. This discussion, although not exhaustive, has explored some of the effects of using state mandated assessment as an accountability mechanism for teachers.

4.6 Legal accountability

Legal accountability is a critical element of increasing accountability in educational bureaucracies and by street-level bureaucrats. As indicated previously, legal accountability is an external mechanism. Legal accountability requires officials and government departments to comply with laws, regulations and procedures for delivering services. In many ways it is related to other types of accountability. It is related to political accountability in that it requires politician to deliver and to give an account of issues that fall within their government departments. In some situations, citizens may be allowed to go to court to demand educational services. As mentioned in Chapter Two, legal accountability is based on specific responsibilities which are formally or legally awarded to authorities (Boven, 2005:8). To that end, government may enact laws that give authority to statutory bodies that are involved in
ensuring accountability in education. Some of their roles include school evaluation and accreditation and registration. Examples of such laws in South Africa are the General and Further Education and Training Quality Assurance Act, 2001 (for the establishment of uMalusi) and the South African Council for Educators Act, 2000 (for the establishment of South African Council for Educators).

Accreditation is an example of strategies used to increase accountability (Brinkerhoff, 2003:24; Timar, 2003:181). School accreditation is a “system of voluntary self-regulation” (McCormick, 1982:142). Decisions concerning accreditation are based on the degree to which a school meets threshold standards that have been set as preconditions for all schools. In the United States accreditation has played a central role in promoting accountability and quality education (Wolf, 2005:78). Wolf notes that the power and influence of accreditation arises from its distinctive characteristic:

- It uses a peer review process that is well adapted to the academic culture;
- Unlike other external review approaches, it includes other practitioners and schools;
- It focuses heavily on institutional development and improvement (2005:78).

Evaluation involves a relentless and continuous quest for school quality (McCormick, 1982:142). McCormick explains that evaluation is a “self-study and visiting team process that a school undertakes for the purposes of reviewing its present purposes, goals, and activities, for planning future activities that will enable the school to improve the quality of its service to its clientele” (1982:142). “To ensure accountability in education, evaluation policy of the schools has been carried out throughout [South Korea] since 1997” (Jin, 2001). The evaluation teams are composed of educational administrators, principals, school teachers, university lecturers, and parental representatives. In Australia, evaluation in the accountability processes is linked to registration renewal (accreditation) for private schools. However, the primary purpose of the requirement of a visiting team and the preparation of a visiting team school report is to improve the quality of schools and not to gather information that pertains to making any decision concerning continued accreditation (McCormick, 1982:142). In Australia “a number of states now allow external accreditations to be undertaken by organisations such as the Council of Internationally Accredited Schools (CIAS)” (2006). Some studies in the United States have that shown school accreditation is
used to market schools (Adams and Hill, 2006:228). This is a very effective mechanism of accountability, especially for independent or private schools.

Over and above the roles of statutory bodies in ensuring accountability among street-level bureaucrats, legal accountability also regulates the relationships between street-level bureaucrats and their clients (learners), their peers, their supervisors and the community at large. It is clear from this discussion that legal accountability is important in trying to ensure accountability by street-level bureaucrats.

4.7 Professional accountability

As just recounted, street-level bureaucrats are often held accountable by their peers (Hupe and Hill, 2007:289). This is reflected in work arrangements that allow street-level bureaucrats a high degree of professional autonomy. This is based on the presumption that street-level bureaucrats have undergone professional training and continue to undertake staff development. Performance accountability is evident in that street-level bureaucrats in education are held accountable by their colleagues in their organisation (internal accountability) or by professional bodies (external accountability) which have been legally mandated to monitor the work of teachers (legal accountability). In education, street-level bureaucrats are given room for discretion but they are bound by professional ethics. In the context of this study the two main ways of furthering professional accountability are professional development and the registration of street-level bureaucrats.

In view of the analytic framework of education accountability discussed earlier, professional development may be seen as a means of increasing professional accountability as well as a way of responding to external accountability demands. In terms of external accountability, schools respond in various ways to meet new demands. In their book *The New Accountability; High Schools and High-Stakes Testing*, Carnoy, Elmore and Siskin (2003:195) explain that policy makers mistakenly think that schools were ‘not accountable’ before the new wave of accountability policies. This is because “all schools, consciously or unconsciously, have well worked out ideas of accountability, and, most importantly, that they respond to new accountability policies by adjusting their existing ideas of accountability to external influences introduced by new policies” (Carnoy, Elmore and Siskin 2003:195-196).

The nature and form of internal accountability determine how the schools respond to external accountability mechanisms. Such mechanisms mobilise the capability of schools in particular ways. The knowledge, values, skills and commitment of street-level bureaucrats determine
how their schools will respond to external accountability mechanisms (Carnoy, Elmore and Siskin 2003:196). Carnoy, Elmore and Siskin argue that it is possible for schools to act in accordance with basic requirements of accountability mechanisms without any significant improvement in student learning, a phenomenon which they call “compliance without capacity” (2003:200). Thus securing internal accountability requires knowledge and expertise on the part of street-level bureaucrats and a motivation to focus that knowledge on a common goal (Carnoy, Elmore and Siskin, 2003:200). To achieve this, Carnoy, Elmore and Siskin (2003:84) point out that most school principals put pressure on street-level bureaucrats “to improve through school wide professional development sessions”. To this end, this section will focus on training, pre-service and in-service used by schools and education agencies in order to meet accountability requirements.

Public organisations seek to improve accountability and control of their street-level bureaucrats through training and professional development (Simon, 1997:13; 1944:24; Lint, 1988:283). Training constitutes a tacit mechanism of controlling workers and attaining accountability. According to Simon in his seminal article titled ‘Decision-Making and Administrative Organisation’, training influences decisions “from the inside out” (Simon, 1944:24). Although training does not force a worker to make any decision, it provides the premises on which to make a decision. Training prepares a member of an organisation to reach a satisfactory decision himself, without the need for constant authority and advice (Simon, 1944:24). In line with this view, Lint, in his study entitled Regulating Autonomy: police discretion as a problem for training, shows how training can be a significant tool in restraining discretion and securing accountability in street-level bureaucrats (Lint, 1998:277). A good example of this is found in Finland’s education system. In contrast with general trends, Finland consistently performs at the highest level in international tests but its national inspection system was discontinued in 1991 (2004:78). De Grauwe notes that “decision-makers felt that the benefits from external inspection and advice services were minimal, in view of the high level of training and professionalism of teachers” (2004:78). Although its accountability systems are relatively weak, Finland’s initial selection process for students applying for the teacher education program is very rigorous. All teachers graduate with a Master’s degree.

Like Lint (1998), Lipsky also values the importance of training for street-level bureaucrats. He points out that “the professionalization of street-level bureaucrats is commended by some
analysts because standardised training in universities, seeking training to get credentials over occupational entry, is already far advanced in teaching, nursing, social work, and other street-level occupations” (Lipsky, 1980:201). The most important aspect of dealing with street-level bureaucrats is the in-take process (Ricucci, 2005:33) in which careful selection is done on the basis of qualifications. Some researchers contend that professional development will lead to restricted professionalism (Hardy and Lingard, 2008:66).

Professional development may perhaps not have realised its potential but it is still seen as the best means for changing classroom instruction, because other methods, such as policies and programmes that standardize teacher behaviour, have fared no better (Supovitz and Turner, 2000: 964). Supovitz and Turner report that street-level bureaucrats often restructure or overlook policies that are proposed to manipulate their daily classroom routines (2000: 964).

A focus on professional development has been emphasised due to studies that show that teachers prove to have a greater impact on student performance than other accountability mechanisms (Supovitz and Turner, 200: 964). Like Guskey (1986:6), Supovitz and Turner, (2000:964) say that the reason for focusing on professional development as a way of improving student attainment is that high class professional development will generate superior schooling in classrooms, which will, in turn, result in higher levels of success by learners. Guskey points out that “the three major outcomes of staff development are change in the classroom practices of teachers, change in their beliefs and attitudes, and change in the learning outcomes of students (1986:6). The logic behind such staff development is illustrated in Figure 4.1.

**Figure 4.1 A model of the process of teacher change**

![Diagram of the process of teacher change](image)

Source: Guskey (1986:6)

Many scholars agree that professional development is a way in which schools respond to external accountability mechanisms and accordingly they list their critical components or
elements (Supovitz and Turner, 2000:964; Borko, 2004:3). Supovitz and Turner (2000:964) posit that professional development is effective if it includes four vital components. The first one of these is that “high quality professional development must immerse participants in inquiry, questioning, and experimentation and therefore model inquiry forms of teaching” (2000:294). This view is also echoed by Berne who says that professional development must “include training, practice, and feedback; opportunities for individual reflection and group inquiry into practice; and coaching or other follow-up procedures” (1999:175).

The second component of professional development is that it must be both intensive and sustained (Supovitz and Turner, 2000:964; Kinnucan-Welsch et al, 2006:423; Knap, 2003:121). In agreement with this assertion Berne contends that professional development must be “conducted often enough and long enough to ensure progressive gains in knowledge, skill, and confidence” (1999:175). Some studies have shown relationships between “professional development and contact time and student learning, although the association appeared to hold more in science than mathematics” (Supovitz and Turner, 2000:964). Again, time span and contact hours have a substantial positive influence on opportunities for active learning (Garet et al, 2001:933). Garet et al also add that length of time and contact hours have a reasonable influence given the emphasis on content knowledge (2001:933). Desimone et al also observed that the duration of professional development programmes, “including the total number of contact hours that participants spend in the activity, as well as the span of time over which the activity takes place; and the degree to which the activity emphasizes the collective participation of groups of teachers from the same school, department, or grade level, as opposed to the participation of individual teachers from many schools” produces desirable effects on the teachers (2002:83). The duration of professional development is important in two ways. One, “longer activities are more likely to provide an opportunity for in-depth discussion of content, student conceptions and misconceptions, and pedagogical strategies” (Garet et al, 2001:921). Second, “activities that extend over time are more likely to allow teachers to try out new practices in the classroom and obtain feedback on their teaching” (Garet et al, 2001:922).

Thirdly, Supovitz and Turner (2000:964) and Kinnucan-Welsch et al (2006:423) aver that staff development of street-level bureaucrats should incorporate their everyday experiences with students. Berne (1999) echoes the same sentiments. He says that professional development should focus on critical problems of curriculum and instruction, be based and
embedded in teacher work and be rooted in the knowledge base for teaching and, most importantly, be situated in classroom practice (1999:175-176). Desimone et al also point out that professional development should provide “opportunities for teachers to become actively engaged in the meaningful analysis of teaching and learning” and should integrate “experiences that are consistent with teachers’ goals, align with state standards and assessments, and encourage continuing professional communication among teachers” (2002:83). Furthermore, Garet et al add that teachers must be actively engaged in meaningful discussion, planning, and practice of professional development (2001:925). Empirical studies have shown that professional development which is undertaken in isolation from teachers’ ongoing classroom duties seldom have much impact on teaching practices or student achievement (Supovitz and Turner, 2000:964).

Fourthly, professional development must focus on subject-matter knowledge and deepen teachers’ content skills (Supovitz and Turner, 2000:964; Knap, 2003:122). This is because some teachers might not have the capacity to meet the accountability requirements. Most researchers believe that professional development must have a content focus and should aim at improving and deepening teachers’ content knowledge (Desimone et al 2002:83). There is a great deal of evidence which suggests that “teaching a subject requires content knowledge that goes substantially beyond what is typically taught and learned in college and university classes” (Goldschmidt and Phelps, 2010:433). They call this form of knowledge ‘pedagogical content’ (2010:433). For example, studies on “mathematics teaching and learning conducted for the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics, calls attention to the importance of high standards, content focus, and in-depth learning opportunities for teachers” (Garet et al 2001:917). Some scholars argue that professional development should “take a more authentic, more substantive form in an effort to provide teachers with the knowledge they need to teach students” (Wilson and Berne, 1999:201). Goldschmidt and Phelps report that “professional development can affect changes in the knowledge teachers use in elementary reading instruction, but that knowledge gains generally erode after teachers return to the classroom and these gains are unlikely to significantly impact the uneven distribution” (2010:433). In sum, there are numerous studies that show that “programs that focus on subject matter knowledge and on student learning of particular subject matter are likely to have larger positive effects on student learning than programs that focus on teaching behaviours” (Supovitz and Turner, 2000:964).
There are many studies that record the success of professional development (Desimone et al 2002:99; Supovitz and Turner, 2000:974). However, some authors are a bit pessimistic about the reported impacts of professional development on the behaviour of teachers (Hill 2009:472). In view of this, it is important to review the academic research on the importance of these mechanisms in securing accountability and improving educational outcomes.

Ngidi’s (2005) study, which sought the perceptions of teachers who underwent a professional development programme, found that the capacity of teachers improved. Using a longitudinal study to examine the effects of professional development on mathematics and science teachers’ instruction, Desimone et al (2002:81) report that professional development which focused on specific instructional practices increased teachers’ use of those practices in the classroom. Furthermore, they found that specific features, such as active learning opportunities, increase the effect of professional development on a teacher’s instruction. Nonetheless, while the use of longitudinal methods by Desmone et al (2002) has strengths, it is affected by complicating factors such as maturation. Thus, the changes in teacher behaviour may not be entirely attributed to professional development but may result from experience that the teachers acquire over a period of time.

A longitudinal study by Supovitz and Turner on the effects of professional development in science on teaching practices and classroom culture shows that results vary according to focus and duration of such development (2000:974). For example, they discovered that change in teacher behaviour was related to the duration of a development programme (as shown in Figure 4.2). Increasing amounts of “professional development were strongly linked with increasing teacher use of inquiry-based practice and investigative classroom culture” (Supovitz and Turner, 2000:974). They also note that “teachers with minimal exposure to professional development had below average inquiry oriented classroom cultures, and it was only after [plus or minus] 40 h [ours] that teachers’ investigative classroom culture was above that of the average teacher” (2000:973). Other factors that they investigated were gender, attitudes towards the curriculum and teaching experience. Concerning teaching experience, they report that it was “negatively associated with investigative culture, but was not related to inquiry-based teaching practices” (Supovitz and Turner, 2000:974).
Figure 4.2 The relationship between hours of professional development and classroom practice

Source: Supovitz and Turner (2000:974)

In another study, Desmone et al found that there are increased benefits of “professional development when there is collective participation of teachers from the same school, department, or grade level” (2002:101). Furthermore, their results also show that professional development is more effective if teachers are closely engaged in the activities rather than being passive recipients of information from the facilitators. They conclude that besides focusing on content, five critical qualities of professional development are useful in enhancing teaching practice: “three structural features (characteristics of the structure of the activity) - reform type, duration, and collective participation - and two core features (characteristics of the substance of the activity) - active learning and coherence” (2002:102).

A different study using a matched-comparison design, which was carried out in elementary schools in Jerusalem by Angrist and Lavy, also indicated that training in schools led to an improvement in student test scores (2001:343). In yet another study, which focused on the duration of behaviour change after a short professional development workshop, Leach and Conto found that the teaching practices of teachers greatly improved. However, “after initial increases, there was a downward trend during the post-workshop period” (1999:459). They noted that benefits from workshops were short-lived. One of the reasons why professional development fails is that “it is usually implemented in ways that violate key conditions for teacher learning” (Newmann, 2000:259). The factors that lead to effective professional development in changing teacher behaviour are summarised in Figure 4.3.
Some scholars are not very optimistic about the effectiveness of professional development. Hill points out that there is much scholarship trumpeting “phenomenal improvements in teacher knowledge and skills” as a result of professional development (2009:471). But there is also evidence to the contrary. For example, “teachers apparently have little use for their learning experiences” and some simply engage in professional development in compliance with professional requirements (Hill, 2009: 471). Another astounding finding is that “teachers themselves are lukewarm about their professional development experiences” (Hill, 2009:472). In a study in which teachers were asked about the effectiveness of professional development experiences in the previous three years, “more than a quarter, on average, reported that professional development affected their instruction” (Hill, 2009:472). In that study most teachers even reported that in-service training “reinforced their existing practices
and a minority reported no effect at all” (2009:472). This revelation raises questions about the use of professional development to meet accountability requirements.

It is important to point out that the purpose of professional development and training is to influence the practices of the street-level bureaucrats from the inside out. After receiving training the street-level bureaucrats still have discretion whether to use or not use what they learnt. Nonetheless, it is clear that professional development forms one of the important pillars of professional accountability outlined in the theoretical framework for this study.

Another mechanism of increasing professional accountability is licensing teachers or registration which is based on acquiring appropriate qualifications. This allows professionally qualified street-level bureaucrats to be given the room to exercise professional discretion with minimal supervision. Licensing of novice teachers is becoming a global phenomenon. Teacher licensing in some countries is based on having appropriate qualifications as well as a clean criminal record. Timar (2003:180) notes that in the United States teacher licensing screens out people with criminal records. The licensing bodies usually control the “certification of those who can teach in the schools, and attempt to assure that teachers are socialized in such a way as to reflect the ethos of education” (Levin, 1974:382). In some cases, licensing is connected to continuous professional development. This process is codified in laws which can reflect legal accountability. This is also a form of external accountability. In South Africa, as will be discussed later, there is registration but no licensing.

**Conclusion**

Using the theoretical framework developed in the previous chapters, this chapter outlined a framework for increasing accountability in education. Although the types of accountability were discussed separately, they are related to one another. In considering performance accountability in education it was seen that bureaucracies try to measure the performance of street-level bureaucrats. However, it was highlighted that the measurement of street-level bureaucrats is not an easy task since their outputs are difficult to quantify.

In terms of hierarchical accountability, it was revealed that educational bureaucracies often use a mandated curriculum which is developed at the centre or top for all schools to implement. This is supported by assessments that are also set centrally for all students to write. It was discussed that hierarchical accountability can undermine the professional
autonomy of street-level bureaucrats since they are always regulated by guidelines, procedures and work schedule. Furthermore, hierarchical accountability is closely related to political as well as legal accountability.

It was explained how the work of street-level bureaucracies and bureaucrats is regulated by laws and regulations in the form of legal accountability. This includes accreditation processes and school evaluation. Legal accountability entails a high degree of enforcement since it leaves no room for discretion. It was pointed out that officials and elected politicians have to comply with the laws and regulations to deliver basic education to all. Legal accountability is also a form of external accountability.

The chapter ended with a discussion of professional accountability which involves street-level bureaucrats holding each other accountable. It is often enforced by statutory bodies which have been given legal mandate to do so. Street-level bureaucrats are expected to observe a code of professional ethics. One major way of increasing this accountability is through professional development. The academic scholarship which was reviewed showed that professional development can be a very effective tool of improving classroom instruction. Professional accountability is also enforced through licensing and registering new teachers. In order to be licensed street-level bureaucrats are normally required to have appropriate qualification and a clean criminal record to enter the profession. The licensing of street-level bureaucrats is codified in law in some countries.

The next chapter will explore the history of education policy in South Africa in order to put the study into context. To that end, the chapter will begin with a brief discussion on South African education policy before 1994. Then it will discuss the evolution of Curriculum 2005, NCS and Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statements (CAPS).
CHAPTER FIVE
THE CONTEXT: THE SOUTH AFRICAN EDUCATION SYSTEM

The demise of apartheid in 1994 in South Africa marked a critical defining moment for democracy and human rights. This historic moment offered an opportunity to rebuild the highly fragmented and discriminatory institutions and construct unified national institutions which are underpinned by equity and transparency. In all these endeavours, the education sector was central. Considering the role played by education in establishing the foundation of apartheid, it was important for the new government to effectively restructure the education bureaucracy in terms of the new dispensation of democracy and in line with international trends. The mission statement of the Department of Education illustrates explicitly the goals of education in a new South Africa. It states that: “Our vision [is] of a South Africa in which all our people have equal access to lifelong education and training opportunities, which will contribute towards their quality of life and build a peaceful, prosperous and democratic society” (DoE, 2001:3). This led to the promulgation of several legislative acts and regulations geared to achieve these goals. The crucial legislation and policies of the early phase of democratic South Africa include: The South African Constitution (1996) which requires the education system to be transformed and democratised in accordance with the values of human dignity, equality, human rights and freedom, non-racism and non-sexism; The National Education Policy (NEPA) (1996); The South African Schools Act (SASA) (1996); Employment of Educators Act (1998); The Further Education and Training Act (1998); and the Curriculum 2005 (C2005) (DoE, 2001:4-5).

To understand this and to put the whole discussion into perspective it is important to discuss the background to these policies and what they sought to address. To that end, this chapter will discuss, in brief, the state of education policy before 1994. Then it will explore the evolution of Curriculum 2005, the National Curriculum Statements and Curriculum and Assessments Policy Statements (CAPS) and the Schooling 2025 policies in South Africa. It will present the major components of the policies and the way in which accountability was sought among the street-level bureaucrats. Then, it will discuss tenets of the outcome based education system (OBE) as a philosophy for educational policy reform. Thereafter, current issues in the implementation of the NCS in South Africa and the official abandonment of OBE in 2010 will be discussed.
5.1 Education policy before 1994

Admittedly, a comprehensive discussion of education policy in South Africa before 1994 is beyond the scope of this study but a brief analysis will help to illustrate the kind of hope and expectations that the people had after the demise of apartheid. Although the policies that pertain to education in South Africa can be traced back to the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 through The Union of South Africa Act (1909) the discussion in this section will focus on those policies that were prominent in shaping the more recent educational landscape of the country. The issues that arose following the creation of the Union of South Africa culminated in the enactment of the National Education Policy Act of 1967 (NEPA, 1967) (Behr, 1984:20). It is important to note that this policy addressed the issues of education for whites. This policy provided for various aspects of education that included attendance, funding, administration, inspection and the training of teachers. For instance, the policy stipulated that “the training of white persons as teachers for secondary schools may be provided at a university only” (NEPA, 1967 section 1A). In terms of funding and other resources, the policy stated that “education (including books and stationery) shall be provided free of charge in schools maintained, managed and controlled by a department of state” (NEPA, 1967 section 2e). The Act also provided for input in the form of recommendations and suggestions from officially recognised teachers’ associations and specified the uniform conditions of service and the salary scales of teachers (Behr, 1984:39). To promote professionalism among teachers the South African Teachers’ Council for Whites Act, 1976 was enacted. Behr notes that the operation of this policy in 1977 signified the accomplishment of a long cherished ideal of an organised profession (1984:39).

Alongside the NEPA 1967, the Black Education Act of 1953 was in operation. This Act addressed issues in Black education. On most of the issues discussed earlier (NEPA, 1967), the Black Education Act was either silent or did not address them. In terms of funding, the Black Education Act subsection section 6.1(a) and (b) and subsection 6.2 stipulated that:

6. (1) ... The Minister may ... out of the moneys appropriated or set aside by parliament for Black education –

(a) subsidize any school established or maintained by a Black authority...

(b) assist the establishment or maintenance of any such a school ...
6. (2) The Minister may, in his discretion, at any time suspend, reduce or withdraw any subsidy or assistance granted to any such school under this section.

In respect of the financing of Black Education, Dr H. F. Verwoerd, the then Minister of Native Affairs, argued that “it was sound educational policy to create among Blacks a sense of responsibility by allowing them to bear sufficient financial responsibility to make them accept that their development is their own concern and in this way to guarantee its continuity” (Behr, 1984:184). A high teacher-pupil ratio common in Black schools. Teacher training courses (Primary Teachers’ Certificate and Junior Secondary Teachers’ Certificate) were offered at the institutions for Black teachers. Fort Hare, the North and Zululand universities trained secondary school teachers but they could not cope with the demand.

It is believed that the state of schools was one of the major causes of the Soweto riots in 1976. The Cillié Commission found that “besides the objection to Afrikaans, there was dissatisfaction with the standard of education, the quality of teaching, the school buildings and equipment” (Behr, 1984:197). The Black Education Act, 1953 was subjected to severe criticism during the 1976 Black students’ riots. Partly as a result, it was replaced by the Education and Training Act, 1979. The principles of this Act followed the pattern of NEPA, 1967 but excluded aspects like conditions of service and uniform salaries. Another important feature of educational policy during this phase was the multiplicity of departments of education based on race and geography. Added to these problems, in the late 1980s and early 1990s there was considerable global economic adjustment as a consequence of slower economic growth (Fleisch, 2002:2). This resulted in high levels of unemployment and declining state expenditure on social services, including education. Fleisch notes that “between 1990 and 1995 South Africa experienced a surge of militancy among the working class and the poor, with teacher unionism becoming a major force on the educational landscape” (2002:2). During this phase most organisations became sophisticated in their strategies to advance their agendas.

The last policy efforts to modernise the apartheid education system and “to minimise local and international protest and contestation” were made in 1989 when National Department of Education (DNE) devised new curriculum polices (Cross et al, 2002:173). To this end, the Curriculum Model for South Africa (CUMSA) was introduced in 1991. Cross et al note that the aim of this policy initiative was to “make education more relevant, rationalise the curriculum, eliminate unnecessary overlapping of subject content and redress other
shortcomings” of the previous policies (2002:173). This was followed by the Education Renewal Strategy (ERS). The purpose of this policy was “to renew and restructure the South African education system in order to improve existing deficiencies, make education more affordable and create education and training opportunities for an ever-growing population” (Department of National Education, 1992:5). However, ERS was overshadowed by the publication of National Education Investigation Policy (NEPI) reports in 1992. This was as a result of the liberation movements’ request to develop an agenda and position papers on education (Cross et al, 2002:174). The main idea was to generate policy alternatives for a future education dispensation in a new and democratic South Africa. The central themes which informed these early proposals were non-racism, non-sexism, democracy, equity and redress (Cross, et al, 2002:174).

After national political negotiations, when the agreement on the Interim Constitution was struck and the 1994 elections were looming, the African National Congress (ANC) began its preparation to govern (Fleisch, 2002:12). Cross et al report that:

[T]he ANC’s Head of Education constituted an independent policy-research agency, the Centre for Education Policy Development (CEPD) in 1993. Drawing on some NEPI specialists, the CEPD developed the ANC’s ‘Policy Framework’, and undertook the subsequent ‘Implementation Plans for Education and Training’ (IPET) project. (2002:174)

Another problem that beset the government in waiting was the need to transform the bureaucracy and reorganise the old departments while building alliances with progressive teachers (Fleisch, 2002:20). A means was sought of bringing the bureaucrats on board through informal networking, consensus building and popular mobilisation. To that end, by April 1994 the ANC Task Team had opened dialogue with apartheid bureaucrats (Fleisch, 2002:20). Another important feature of this phase was that the policy-making approach was top-down and was shrouded in secrecy and authoritarianism (Cross et al, 2002:172).

This brief analysis of the educational policy in South Africa before 1994 has shown the disparities in education resources available to people were based on race. The inequalities were a result of policies enacted by the apartheid government. This resulted in protests from some of the sectors of society. Amendments to the educational policies and the promulgation of new ones prior to 1994 did not have a significant impact on the majority of the people in South Africa.
5.2 Educational policy reform in the post-apartheid South Africa

When Sibusiso Bengu assumed the position of the Minister of Education in a new South Africa in 1994 the education system was complex and had collapsed (Chisholm, 2003:268). Chisholm notes that the problems included high levels of adult illiteracy, dysfunctional schools and universities, discredited curricula and illegitimate structures of governance (2003:268). Since the ANC education manifesto promised to open the doors of learning and culture to all, the new democratic government undertook four important initiatives (Fleisch, 2002:41). The first one was to close down the racially segregated education departments and replace them with a single non-racial administration. Secondly, the ANC started to equalise per capita school funding. Thirdly, the new government promised to open up new opportunities for adult basic education and training and early childhood education. Lastly, the new government committed itself to “transforming the bureaucratic and the authoritarian culture of the former education systems” (Fleisch, 2002:41). The Department of Education (2001:3) grouped these objectives into three interrelated tasks. These were dismantling apartheid structures and creating a unified education system; creating a more equitable system of financing in the context of huge demands on limited financial resources; and devising a policy framework which gave expression to the values that underpinned the new state (DoE, 2001:3). This section explores some of the initiatives that were undertaken after the dismantling of the apartheid education, their implementation and the issues that arose. However, a comprehensive discussion of these policies will be limited to Curriculum 2005 (C2005), NCS, and now CAPS due to their relevance to this study.

First was the South African Constitution (1996) which required that education be transformed and democratised in accordance with the values of human dignity, equality, human rights and freedom, non-racism and non-sexism (DoE, 2001:4). The South African Constitution guarantees access to a basic education for all. The Constitution explicitly states that everyone has the right to:

- a basic education, including adult basic education; and
- further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must make progressively available and accessible (South African Constitution, 1996:8).

The vision of education expressed in the Constitution was based on the 1994 education policy framework of the African National Congress (DoE, 2001:4).
A more specific important policy in education was the National Education Policy Act (NEPA) (1996). This policy was established to embody “the principle of co-operative governance, elaborated in Schedule Three of the Constitution” (DoE, 2001:4). NEPA (1996) outlined the monitoring responsibilities of the Minister of Education and specified the relations between national and provincial departments of education. As a result it established the Council of Education Ministers (CEM) and Heads of Education Departments Committee (HEDCOM) as inter-governmental forums to collaborate in building the new system, and provide for the determination of national policies on, among other matters, curriculum, assessment, language policy and quality assurance. In terms of monitoring and evaluation, NEPA (1996) specified that “the Minister shall direct that the standards of education provision, delivery and performance throughout the Republic be monitored and evaluated by the Department annually or at other specified intervals, with the object of assessing progress in complying with the provisions of the Constitution and with national education policy” [NEPA, 1996 section 8(1)]. Another important objective of NEPA (1996) was to provide for the publication and implementation of national education policy. Furthermore, the policy addresses the ratio between teachers and students as well as education for the profession and accreditation of educators.

To promote access, quality and democratic governance in the schooling system the South African Schools Act (SASA) (1996) was enacted (DoE, 2001:4). Its aim is to provide for a uniform system for the organisation, governance and funding of schools and to amend and repeal certain laws relating to schools. SASA seeks to ensure that all learners have the right of access to quality education without discrimination, and makes schooling compulsory for children aged 7 to 14 years (SASA, 1996). Specifically, the policy states that “every parent must cause every learner for whom he or she is responsible to attend a school from the first school day of the year in which such learner reaches the age of seven years until the last school day of the year in which such learner reaches the age of fifteen years or the ninth grade” (SASA, 1996). SASA (1996) provides for two types of schools, that is, public schools and independent schools. The Act also promotes democratic school governance through school governing bodies and representative councils of learners. In terms of funding, SASA prioritises redress and targets poverty in providing funding to schools.

In 1998 the Employment of Educators Act was enacted to regulate the professional, moral and ethical responsibilities and competencies of teachers (DoE, 2001:4). This Act addresses
the historically divided teaching profession and states that the teaching force shall be governed by one Act of Parliament. The Act also provides for the formation of one professional council, that is, the South African Council of Educators (SACE). SACE established a code of professional ethics for educators which applies to all educators who are registered or provisionally registered with the Council and advises the Minister on any relevant aspect (South African Council of Educators ACT No. 31 of 2000).

5.3 The evolution and nature of curriculum 2005

Of all the educational policies formulated and implemented in South Africa since the mid-1990s, Curriculum 2005 (C2005) has occasioned considerable controversy. Because of its centrality in education and its significance for this study, this policy merits detailed and comprehensive discussion. The name Curriculum 2005 was given to reflect “the year when its first learners would finish school” (Marneweck, 2010:1). C2005 “envisaged for general education a move away from a racist, apartheid, rote learning model of learning and teaching to a liberating, nation-building and learner centred outcomes-based one” (DoE, 2001:5). The DoE says that the reformulation of the curriculum was “intended to allow greater mobility between different levels and institutional sites, and the integration of knowledge and skills through ‘learning pathways’” (2001:5). Furthermore, the C2005’s assessment, qualifications, competency, and skills-based framework encouraged the development of curriculum models aligned to the National Qualifications Framework (NQF) in theory and practice. Because of its holistic nature, C2005 was significant because of the enormity of the practical and symbolic legacy that it aimed to “address as well as the weight that is attached to what it can achieve” (Chisholm, 2003:268).

Curriculum 2005 and Outcomes Based Education (OBE) were the culmination of developments that took place in the country and elsewhere. It was “part of a flow of ideas that through globalisation processes have gained echo in different contexts and express converging trends in educational systems throughout the world”, such as the centralisation/decentralisation debates, debates on the effectiveness of schools and recently approaches to school improvement (Cross et al, 2002:176). Cross et al note that the OBE approach in South Africa can viewed as a policy ‘hybrid’ since “there are both local and global roots to [it] that had different impacts at different times” (2002:176). Spreen also says that “activists outside the traditional education establishment (with strong international ties) were instrumental in establishing the new educational agenda in South Africa” (2001:5). The
labour movement was also involved in this. Regarding Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) involvement in the OBE, Sreen asserts that:

The COSATU Education Desk began to strive for recognition from the education community for what workers knew and were able to do. In many ways, these early concerns are what brought about an interest in OBE. Increased recognition of the skills workers obtained on the job and in other settings outside of the formal education system would give them better credentials that would bring more pay and greater mobility. (2001:130)

However, the actual work of putting together a curriculum framework began in 1995 with the appointment of the Consultative Forum on Curriculum although much of the work was done by learning areas committees in 1996 (Fleisch, 2002:122). The final version of the curriculum was unveiled in 1997 in an official booklet entitled ‘Curriculum 2005: Lifelong for the 21st Century’. A cause for prolonged debate among all stakeholders in education was its departure from content-based teaching and learning to an outcomes based education (Fleisch, 2002:122; Cross et al, 2002:178). Cross et al noted that this curriculum demanded a “departure from ‘fundamental pedagogics’ (a racially-based prescribed set of learning objectives) to progressive pedagogy and learner-centred teaching and learning strategies” (2002:179). The main aims of curriculum 2005 were to:

(i) align school work with workplace, social and political goals;

(ii) emphasise experiential and cooperative learning;

(iii) pursue the value of diversity in the areas of race, gender and culture;

(iv) develop citizens who are imaginative and critical problem-solvers (Cross et al, 2002:178).

To that end, Curriculum 2005 identified eight learning areas which are regarded as a means of “breaking away from strict boundaries between traditional school subjects and to ensure integration within and across the different disciplines as well as developing and organising the core curriculum” (Cross et al, 2002:178). Nevertheless, the traditional subjects were retained and accommodated within eight learning areas: Arts and Culture; Language, Literacy and Communication; Economic and Management Sciences; Human and Social Sciences; Life Orientation; Mathematical Literacy, Mathematics and Mathematical Sciences; Physical and Natural Sciences; and Technology (DoE, 2002b:18; Cross et al, 2002:178).
Another key feature of the C2005 was its emphasis on critical and developmental outcomes which are derived from the Constitution and are contained in the South African Qualifications Act (1995) (DoE, 2002:10; Cross et al, 2002:178). These outcomes describe the kind of a citizen the education system aims to create at the end of the period of instruction. The critical outcomes are to create learners who will be able to:

- Identify and solve problems and make decisions using critical and creative thinking.
- Work effectively with others as members of a team, group, organisation and community.
- Organise and manage themselves and their activities responsibly and effectively.
- Collect, analyse, organise and critically evaluate information.
- Communicate effectively using visual, symbolic and/or language skills in various modes.
- Use science and technology effectively and critically showing responsibility towards the environment and the health of others.
- Demonstrate an understanding of the world as a set of related systems by recognising that problem-solving contexts do not exist in isolation. (DoE, 2002b:10; Cross et al, 2002:178)

The developmental outcomes aimed at creating learners are able to:

- Reflect on and explore a variety of strategies to learn more effectively.
- Participate as responsible citizens in the life of local, national, and global communities.
- Be culturally and aesthetically sensitive across a range of social contexts.
- Explore education and career opportunities.
- Develop entrepreneurial opportunities. (DoE, 2002b:10)

There seems to be a divergence of views on what really constitutes OBE. Another issue is the distinction between OBE and content based education. Chisholm notes that OBE as a philosophy has been defined and re-defined differently by many people. She concludes that OBE is a ‘floating signifier’ meaning different things to different people (Chisholm, 2003:271).
Spady argues that OBE rejects the “notion that students of differing aptitudes or abilities should be given different curricula and learning opportunities, and thereby leaving some permanently behind and others permanently ahead” (1994:14). For this to happen, schools will have to change how they have been operating. These arguments resonated well with a new democratic government which came to power in 1994 promising equality among citizens. It was a total departure from apartheid’s educational policies. Mention has already been made of teachers who relied on teaching methods that did not engage learners in active learning. Many of them were also preoccupied with the imperative to complete the syllabus in preparation for examinations (DoE, 2003a:4). These issues gave the new government an impetus to adopt the new OBE system.

Nonetheless, some scholars do not see OBE as a viable education system. For example, Jansen (1998) points out that:

> At first glance, there appear to be sound reasons for a curriculum policy modelled on OBE. Outcomes would displace an emphasis on content coverage. Outcomes make explicit what learners should attend to. Outcomes direct assessment towards specified goals. Outcomes signal what is worth learning in a content-heavy curriculum. Outcomes can be a measure of accountability, i.e. a means of evaluating the quality and impact of teaching in a specific school. (1998:2)

However, he quickly queries the efficacy of the OBE in the delivery of educational services. Jansen (1998:2) asks: “Do outcomes in fact deliver what they claim? How do outcomes play out in a resource-poor context? Can outcomes survive their psychological roots in behaviourism? Do outcomes in different contexts mean the same thing, e.g. are outcomes specified for education equivalent to those identified for training?” These questions are critical for the front-line workers who dispense the packaged policy. For street-level bureaucrats, issues of resources and the psychological behaviour of both clients and themselves are very important. It is therefore critical for these issues to be addressed in order to accomplish the principal aims of OBE and to make the education system accountable to society. Soon after the initial implementation of C2005 a growing number of scholars, practitioners and other stakeholders began to criticise it. Some of the issues and the criticisms made are discussed in the next section.
Chisholm points out that when C2005 was launched in 1997 it gave hope to the majority of citizens as it included commitments to human resource development, learner-centredness, relevance, integration, differentiation, and learner support, nation-building and non-discrimination (2003:273). On the surface there appeared to be sound reasons for advocating a curriculum policy which was modelled on outcomes-based education (Jansen, 1999:146). To many people OBE was good in the sense that outcomes would displace an emphasis on content coverage.

Among other issues, Jansen doubted the relevance of OBE in a resource-poor country (1999:146). He went on to outline ten ‘principal criticisms of OBE’. In brief, these are: (i) the language of innovation associated with OBE; (ii) assumptions about the relationship between curriculum and society; (iii) flawed assumption about what happens inside schools, how classrooms are organised and the kind of street-level bureaucrats that exist in the school; (iv) desirability of specifying outcomes in advance in a democratic society that is undemocratic; (v) the focus on ends as final outcomes is questionable considering that much of educational and political struggle of the 1980s valued the process of learning and teaching; (vi) OBE side-steps the issue of values in the curriculum with its focus on instrumentalism; (vii) the management of OBE increases burdens placed on teachers; (viii) OBE trivialises curriculum content as it claims to be a leverage away from content coverage; (ix) the minimum requirements for OBE to succeed cannot be met since there is neither the fiscal base nor the political will to intervene in the education system at this level of intensity; and lastly (x) OBE requires a radical revision of the most potent mechanism in schools militating against curriculum innovation, namely the system of assessment (Jansen, 1999:146-153).

Cross et al discuss the criticism of OBE according to six main dimensions: “(i) its origins and conceptual basis; (ii) its policy nature; (iii) its knowledge and pedagogical features; (iv) process issues such as the management of its formulation, adoption and implementation; (v) design issues; and (vi), its position in the context of schooling” (Cross et al, 2002:180). Some saw OBE as an imposition of the Western world or as another manifestation of cultural imperialism (Nekhweva, 1999:491; Cross et al, 2002:180). Nevertheless, some scholars argue that it is misleading and too simplistic to perceive “global influences simply as impositions on local contexts, since this would overlook the agency of local actors as well as the different forms that adaptation” [Christie cited in Cross et al, 2002:181].
The nature of C2005 has been questioned. It has been argued that this policy was driven by political imperatives more than by policy imperatives. This curriculum initiative was not meant to be implemented but was just a “part of state policy symbolism and political expediency to give the impression that change was taking place and the expectations of the disadvantaged groups were being addressed” (Jansen, 2002: 210).

Furthermore, criticisms were focused on the policy process. The major concern was that the administration of the “curriculum process from its conceptualisation, formulation, adoption and implementation was not aligned with curriculum development, teacher development, selection and supply of learning materials” (Cross et al, 2002:182).

Some critics argued that in C2005 the degree of state intervention in the curriculum process was too much. Cross et al point out that C2005 represented an example of a bureaucratic-driven [top-down] process of curriculum reform (2002:182). They argue that this problem resulted in the following deficiencies:

1. Too much alignment to socio-economic concerns at the expense of knowledge and pedagogical concerns.


3. Over-specification of outcomes (seven critical outcomes and 66 specific outcomes) which de-skills street-level bureaucrats by leaving little space for their discretion and creativity.

4. Under-specification of content and knowledge basis, which diminishes its value as a framework and limits the pedagogical authority of the teacher.

5. Limited teacher participation in the conceptualisation and design of the curriculum; and


In terms of design, the policy has been criticised for focusing too much on outcomes and neglecting issues of content that were left to individual educators to formulate. The policy makers did not anticipate the effects of confounding factors such as “poor training of teachers and lack of resources, as well as the toll that apartheid had inflicted on the education system. The majority of teachers found it difficult to know what to teach and tended to act as mere technicians without the necessary conceptual and content tools” (Cross et al, 2002:182). In
other words, even if educators wanted to comply with the new policy requirements it was difficult for them because they lacked capacity.

Policy makers often overlook crucial aspects of policy implementation such as capacity and the competence of implementers or street-level bureaucrats. Berlach and O’Neill (2008:50) point out that “when Spady’s principles first surfaced, they appeared to be such common sense and so compelling that many education authorities wholeheartedly embraced Spady’s (1988) challenge of “organising for results”. They did this, often doing so naively, believing that matters such as content, assessment and implementation would, by and large, take care of themselves as schools interpreted and implemented OBE in their local context (Berlach and O’Neill 2008:51). These criticisms precipitated pessimism among stakeholders. These reactions have had a direct impact on the outcomes of the policy. Botha points out that:

Negative reactions and pessimism from the South African communities, educationists, teachers and the press against certain elements of the model can already be observed. Such reactions can contribute towards denying the OBE model a chance, which could result in its early demise. The misunderstandings of the theoretical bases and tensions among philosophical underpinnings can be viewed as possible reasons for concern in the South African scenario. (Botha, 2002:363)

These reactions have persisted. Teachers, politicians, academics and labour movements have queried the effectiveness of the policy to address the problem of the quality of education.

The government insisted that the policy is effective but that the street-level bureaucrats were not implementing it correctly, although finally it was admitted that the OBE model was flawed (DBE, 2009c:1). Rogan (2007) is of the view that C2005 might be good but little emphasis had been placed on implementation. Citing Verspoor (1989: 133), in his analysis of 21 World Bank-supported educational change programmes, he points out that:

Large-scale programmes tend to emphasize adoption and neglect implementation. In nearly all instances low outcomes resulted from poor implementation of what was essentially a good idea. In South Africa, this lack of foresight was particularly unfortunate. The high ideals of C2005 were to be implemented in a system that was already under considerable stress. (Rogan, 2007:98)

It can be discerned from this quotation that many policy makers put their effort into policy formulation and adoption phases and ignore the implementation phase but wait for good
results. They omit to take into consideration the context within which the policy is being implemented. Unlike in other countries where OBE was implemented, the South African environment was under considerable stress. It seems that the government made simple assumptions that when the policy is in place everything would flow naturally. One of the assumptions underlying this nationally directed educational reform process was that street-level bureaucrats would be both willing and able to adapt their teaching and assessment practices accordingly. Yet, there is considerable evidence to suggest that this is not so (Vandeyar, 2005:461). In reality, many street-level bureaucrats have not been so willing to adapt due to a number of factors, which may include their capacity to interpret the policy (Mutereko, 2009:59).

Most of the issues that affect South Africa education policy implementation are akin to other developing countries. Issues to do with financial resources, human resources, political will, physical resources, attitudes and beliefs of street-level bureaucrats can all combine to affect policy implementation. Of all these factors, attitudes and values are very critical (Mutereko, 2009:59). Botha points out that “the attitudes and values of most of the adult South Africans of this decade were formed in the apartheid era” (2002:363). This is very significant since attitudes tend to change slowly. It is important to note that the majority of these street-level bureaucrats were socialised under apartheid.

Cross et al (2002) summarise the issues that arose from the implementation of C2005:

As in many other developing countries, curriculum reform in South Africa has resulted in several structural and policy tensions within the system. These tensions include: the vision vis-à-vis the country's realities; symbolism vis-à-vis mass expectations; the curriculum framework vis-à-vis applicability, conditions of implementation and actual practice in schools; expected outcomes vis-à-vis the capacity of street-level bureaucrats to translate them into reality; and budget concerns vis-à-vis commitment to values such as equity, redress and massification, and so on. (Cross et al, 2002:172)

The issues which are critical for street level-bureaucrats’ accountability are the applicability of the policy, conditions of implementation and actual practice in schools. It can be inferred that the actual practice of C2005 in schools might not reflect what was intended, either because of discretion exercised by the street-level bureaucrats or because of the different accountability mechanisms employed. Of great importance is the capacity of street-level
bureaucrats to translate the outcomes into reality. But as explained earlier, the majority of the teachers were trained to teach black learners who then received inferior education. Consequently, the implementation of C005 required retraining teachers.

There seems to be a general problem with teacher training. As Botha (2002:368) laments: “in South Africa there is a lack of responsibility [accountability], dedication and commitment on the part of many teachers and learners”. Botha observes that “achieving the required knowledge, skills and habits of mind to promote a prosperous and democratic country with a quality education system will take some very hard work from a number of key players such as teachers and learners” (2002:368). The implication of this assertion is twofold. Firstly, it can imply that street-level bureaucrat autonomy, discretion by school management and government accountability mechanisms may hamper policy implementation and may need to be reduced or controlled. Secondly, although it is beyond the scope of this current study, Botha mentions the importance of learners’ (clients) commitment in ensuring improved outputs of the policy. Botha asserts that “learners will have to take greater responsibility for their learning” (2002:368). In response to all these kinds of issues, the then Minister of Education, Professor Kader Asmal, appointed a committee to review C2005.

5.5 The Review Committee on Curriculum 2005 and the Revised National Curriculum Statement

Amongst other purposes, a policy review can serve as an accountability mechanism (Cross et al, 2002:183). Depending on who appoints a review committee and the purpose of the review, its outcomes could be used with reference to all the types of accountability discussed earlier. The task of the review committee was “to investigate the structure and design of the curriculum, the level of understanding of the curriculum, how the curriculum could be strengthened, and what needs to be done to about implementation envisaged for 2001” (Chisholm, 2003:277). Cross et al added that the committee was to investigate the “[s]teps to be taken in respect of the implementation of the new curriculum in Grades 4 and 8 in 2001” (2002:183). Broadly, the review committee reaffirmed the social justice, equity and development goals of the curriculum. In this regard, the committee placed “the values of society striving for social justice, equity and development through the development of creative, critical and problem-solving individuals” at the core of the curriculum (Chisholm, 2003:278). Chisholm states that the review committee also discovered that there was overwhelming support for the principles of OBE as well as for C2005. After all, the Review
Committee was “not expected to do away with Curriculum 2005 or to question its approach (i.e. OBE) and basic assumptions, though these have been an object of contestation” (Cross et al, 2002:183). According to DoE (2001) and Cross et al (2002) some of the problems and challenges of the C2005 implementations were the following:

i. Although there was support for the curriculum changes (especially its underlying principles), the levels of understanding of the policy and its implications were highly varied;

ii. A skewed curriculum structure and design, for instance, the language was often complex and confusing (including the use of unnecessary jargon);

iii. Integration, a leading design feature (seen as placing emphasis on progression and not on conceptual mastery);

iv. Policy overload and limited transfer of learning into classrooms;

v. Lack of alignment between curriculum and assessment policy (too much assessment-oral, written, individual, group, etc. - ad hoc and fragmented - each of the 66 specific outcomes has three to four assessment criteria);

vi. Inadequate orientation, training and development of teachers and follow-up support unavailable;

vii. Too much emphasis on the outcomes without stating what should go into the system (inputs) for the outcomes to be achieved;

viii. Learning support materials were variable in quality, and often unavailable;

ix. Shortages of personnel and resources to implement and support Curriculum 2005;

x. Inadequate recognition of curriculum as the core business of education departments; and

xi. Timeframes for implementation were unmanageable and unrealistic – the policy was released before the system was ready, with timeframes that were too rushed. (Cross et al, 2002:184; DoE, 2001:27)

In response to the findings, the Review Committee outlined a number of proposals to strengthen the implementation of C2005 [for a detailed list of the proposals see Cross et al, 2002:185]. These proposals culminated in the drafting of the Revised National Curriculum

In tandem with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, the goals of RNCS are “to create a new South African identity that encompasses critical consciousness, to transform South African society, to promote democracy and to magnify learner involvement in education” (Msil, 2007:151). Furthermore, the RNCS envisaged educators and learners who were to assume new roles. On the one hand, the RNCS states that street-level bureaucrats at all levels are regarded as key contributors to the transformation of education in South Africa and as such that they are expected to be qualified, competent, dedicated as outlined in the Norms and Standards for Educators of 2000 (Government Gazette No 20844) (DoE,2002b:9). The DoE states that teachers are seen “as mediators of learning, interpreters and designers of Learning Programmes and materials, leaders, administrators and managers, scholars, researchers and lifelong learners, community members, citizens and pastors, assessors and learning area/phase specialists” (2002:9). On the other hand, the RNCS envisaged a learner who “will be imbued with the values and act in the interests of a society based on respect for democracy, equality, human dignity, life and social justice” (DoE, 2002b:8). The DoE states that:

The curriculum aims to develop the full potential of each learner as a citizen of a democratic South Africa. It seeks to create a lifelong learner who is confident and independent, literate, numerate and multi-skilled, compassionate, with a respect for the environment and the ability to participate in society as a critical and active citizen. (DoE, 2002b:8)

Assessment remained a cornerstone of RNCS as it aligns the curriculum with Assessment Policy (Government Gazette No 19640 of 1998). Each Learning Area Statement includes a detailed section on assessment. In line with outcomes-based principles, “the most suitable assessment methods that accommodate divergent contextual factors are used” (DoE, 2002b:18). The RNCS stipulates that “assessment should provide indications of learner achievement in the most effective and efficient manner, and ensure that learners integrate and apply knowledge and skills (DoE, 2002b:18). Furthermore, assessment should help learners to make informed judgements about their own performance.
However, the implementation of NCS was not without problems. Many challenges that haunted the implementation of C2005 have persisted with the implementation of NCS. In response to this, the Minister of Basic Education, Minister Motshekga, appointed a panel of experts to investigate the nature of these challenges and to develop a set of recommendations designed to address them (DBE, 2009a:5). After obtaining information over several years from a range of stakeholders such as teachers, parents, teacher unions, school management and academics, the Minister of Education realised that there were serious problems and challenges relating to the implementation of the National Curriculum Statement. Despite the fact that several minor interventions have been made to attend to some of the challenges of implementing the NCS, these changes had not had the desired effect. The panel of experts presented their findings and recommendations in July 2009. Then The Minister of Education, Angie Motshekga announced that:

I have been aware of the wide-ranging comments on the implementation of the National Curriculum Statement. While there has been positive support for the new curriculum, there has also been considerable criticism. This has included criticism of teacher overload, confusion and stress. Most worryingly, there is consistent evidence of widespread learner underperformance in both international and local assessments. (DBE, 2009b:2)

The next section discusses the major findings from the panel of experts who were appointed to review the implementation of the NCS. It then explores the introduction of Curriculum Assessment Policy Statement, Schooling 2025 and the Action Plan to 2014.

5.6 The evolution of Curriculum Assessment Policy Statements (CAPS)

The panel found that there was no clear, widely communicated plan for the implementation and support of the National Curriculum Statement (DBE, 2009b:7). As a consequence, many stakeholders complained that they had no broad vision in terms of what the curriculum sets out to achieve, specifically with regard to learners. Together with the poor performance of learners, this has caused distrust in the education system. The panel was of the view that “a coherent, clear, simple Five Year Plan to Improve Teaching and Learning across the schooling system needed to be developed and adhered to; it must be clearly and widely communicated to the nation” (DBE, 2009b:7). This led to the development of the Action Plan to 2014. This is a part of a vision which is called Schooling 2025. The Action Plan sets out the goals that the national education system will be working towards as well as the actions to
achieve these goals, by 2014 (DBE, 2010a:4). These are the first steps towards realising the bigger, more long-term vision of quality education in schools by 2025. “Schooling 2025 is a long term plan for the basic education sector which will allow for the monitoring of progress against a set of measurable indicators covering all aspects of basic education, including amongst others, enrolments and retention of learners, teachers, infrastructure, school funding, learner well-being and school safety, mass literacy and educational quality” (DBE, 2011a). Additionally, the panel recommended the use of accountability mechanisms to monitor the implementation of the plan, such as regular external monitoring to assess whether the plan has the desired effect on learner and teacher performance.

The panel also discovered that there was “a plethora of policies, guidelines and interpretations of policies and guidelines at all levels of the education system, from the DoE down to provincial, district and subject advisor level” (DBE, 2009b:7). The panel recommended that the NCS documents be streamlined into a set of single, coherent documents per subject or learning area for each phase from Grade R to Grade 12. This resulted in the development of a Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statement for every learning area and subject (by phase) for implementation by January 2012. However, this was postponed until January 2013 to give the book publishers ample time to prepare learning materials. Currently (2013) the only grades that are implementing CAPS are Grades R - 6 in primary school and Grades 10 and 11 in high school.

It important to stress that CAPS did not replace NCS. The CAPS replaced the Subject Statements, Learning Programme and Guidelines and Subject Assessment Guidelines with:

a) Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statements (CAPS) for all approved subjects listed in this document;
b) National policy pertaining to the programme and promotion requirements of the National Curriculum Statement Grades R-12; and
c) National Protocol for Assessment Grades R-12.

With respect to the types of accountability discussed in the theoretical framework, CAPS typifies hierarchical accountability in the sense that it prescribes what needs to be taught and the time prescribed for teaching elements of curricula.

Another challenge which was identified pertains to the role of subject advisors. The role of subject advisor differs from province to province and street-level bureaucrats see the role as
demanding unnecessary administrative tasks and ‘box ticking’ (DBE, 2009b:8). There were also too few subject advisors nationwide; moreover, many of them did not have sufficient knowledge and skills to offer street-level bureaucrats the support they require to improve learner performance (DBE, 2009b:8). This is because they did not receive special training for their jobs which might have contributed to the confusion and led to a proliferation of documents and paperwork. The panel recommended that the DBE should “clarify Subject Advisor roles nationally and specify the exact nature of in-classroom and school support they should provide to teachers” (DBE, 2009b:8). This issue is in line with criteria of professional accountability which was discussed in the previous chapters.

The implementation of NCS was also hindered by the nature of teacher training. The panel found that the “current teacher development policies to support the curriculum were often too generic and superficial and did not provide the needed support to teachers” (DBE, 2009b:10). This was compounded by the sense that most tertiary institutions did not cover the National Curriculum Statement thoroughly enough in curricula for qualifications and as a result many newly trained street-level bureaucrats were not competent to teach what is required. The panel recommended that as from September 2010 onwards “the training of teachers to support curriculum implementation should be subject specific and targeted only where needed; and all support staff, including school management, subject advisors and district officers, should also undergo training on the Curriculum and Assessment Policy” (DBE, 2009b:10).

In brief, these are some of the findings and recommendations of the panel of experts appointed by the Minister of Education, Angelina Motshekga. These findings led her to sign the ‘Death Certificate’ of OBE in the South African education system. In her address to the parliament on the 6th of November 2009, the Minister of Education said that:

The question on everyone’s lips is why we do not ... declare the death certificate of outcomes-based education, OBE? I must say that we have, to all intents and purposes, done so. So if anybody asks us if we are going to continue with OBE, we say that there is no longer OBE. We have completely done away with it. (DBE, 2009a:2)

This marked an important turning point with regard to the application of the principles of outcomes based education in South Africa. The use of textbooks which was de-emphasised in OBE has since resumed a central role. Work books were distributed by the DBE, starting in
2011. The assessment of learners from Grade 1-9 which was carried out internally by schools has been replaced by Annual National Assessment at Grades 3, 6 and 9. However, these assessments are marked by schools themselves. As will be discussed, these assessments act as bureaucratic accountability mechanisms for street-level bureaucrats.

**Conclusion**

In an attempt to put the entire study into perspective, this chapter explored the South African education system. It commenced with exploring the different education policies that have been used to shape the education landscape. Apartheid education policies which sought to deliver education along racial lines were discussed. The apartheid policies still have a significant bearing on the current problems which are faced in education. Their impact on the contemporary South Africa is still evident. The dawn of a democratic South Africa and the demise of apartheid brought in a new dispensation in the education system of South Africa. It brought new hopes and aspirations. The new educational policies and curriculum frameworks in the democratic South Africa include Curriculum 2005 which was underpinned by the OBE philosophies. It seems that people expected too much from the educational policies that sought to redress the past injustices.

However, the implementation of such policies was marred by challenges which led to its review in 1999 and the adoption of the Revised National Curriculum Statement in 2000. The Revised National Curriculum Statement was still informed by the principles of OBE. Difficulties in implementation persisted and the Minister of Basic Education appointed another Review Committee which led to the abandonment of OBE and the phasing in of the Curriculum Assessment Policy Statements, Action Plan 2014 and Schooling 2025.

Admittedly, the educational policies that have been in operation South Africa may be flawed, but accountability in the implementation of these policies requires attention. With the knowledge that street-level bureaucrats may pose challenges for management, all forms of accountability will now be explored to see how effective they are in holding street-level bureaucrats accountable to organisation goals. The next chapter will explore the different types of accountability which were discussed in preceding chapters in the context of South African educational policy implementation, that is, political, performance, hierarchical, legal as well as professional accountability.
CHAPTER SIX
TYPES OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN SOUTH AFRICAN EDUCATION

Accountability in the South African education system will be presented according to the types of accountability discussed in the previous chapter. Using a comprehensive review of policy documents this chapter will commence with a discussion of political accountability in South African education, which will focus on issues such as how government has been politically accountable in financing the education system and supporting the less privileged schools and learners. This will then be followed by discussing the application of performance accountability to South African education. The third type to be investigated will be bureaucratic or hierarchical accountability. In terms of hierarchical accountability, use of examinations as an accountability mechanism will be discussed. The fourth type of accountability to be considered is legal accountability. Different policies and regulations that govern the work of street-level bureaucrats will be explicated. The last type is professional accountability. Here professional bodies and peer review are used as ways of making accountable street-level bureaucrats who are implementing the NCS. There are many overlaps and similarities between these types of accountability as will be revealed in the course of the argument which follows.

6.1 Political accountability

In as far as political accountability is concerned, the South African government, as Brinkerhoff (2003:7) says, established institutions, procedures, and mechanisms that seek to ensure that government delivers on electoral promises, fulfils public trust, aggregates and represents citizens’ interests, and responds to ongoing and emerging societal needs and concerns. As explained previously, political accountability is a cornerstone of democracy whereby those elected are accountable to the citizens. However, in political accountability the performance and outcomes expected of the elected officials are variable and hard to specify. In the case of education, this might entail policies relating to the “curriculum taught, the level of spending on education, or special treatment for a constituent’s children” and the provision of infrastructure (Education Encyclopaedia, online). In a democracy, elected officials will be inclined to act in a manner that favours their re-election.

Financing and access
Most education policies enacted after the demise of apartheid in South Africa were aimed at fulfilling the promises that were made and gaining the trust of citizens. In the context of high unemployment, coupled with a widely recognised shortfall in skills, reducing poverty is to a large extent a matter of giving South Africans a better educational start in life. For that reason, basic education featured strongly on the 2008 election manifesto of the ruling party (African National Congress), and it is why access to quality education has been a priority amongst democratic South Africans for decades, as reflected in, for instance, the 1955 Freedom Charter (DBE, 2010e:6). In light of this, government’s contribution at national level to public education remains its single largest investment, as that is seen as key to reducing poverty and accelerating long-term economic growth. As enshrined in the South African Constitution, the government strives to make sure that everyone has the right to a basic education, including adult basic education and further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must progressively make available and accessible.

The Department of Basic Education, in terms of the South African Schools Act of 1996, made attendance in school compulsory for all children aged seven to 15 (or the completion of Grade 9) (South African Schools Act of 1996, section 3.1). In order to achieve this without disadvantaging learners from poor communities, the same Act allows for learners from poor families to be exempted from paying school fees. Furthermore, government introduced the No Fee Schools policy which abolishes school fees in the poorest 40% of schools nationally for learners from Grade R to Grade 9 and in 2009 this was extended to 60% of learners nationally (South African Government Information, 2011: available online). Consequently, spending on education is the largest allocation in the national budget (see Figure 6.1), totalling R165 billion (19%) in 2010/11.
Figure 6.1 Public spending on education in South Africa; percentage of government expenditure.

Figure 6.1 shows that the amount allocated to education has not been static. Over the years it has fluctuated depending on other variables. In 1996 education was allocated over 21% of the national budget (which coincided with the introduction of C2005) with 2002 showing the highest percentage (over 22%) ever allocated. In 1995 and between 1997 and 1999 education was allocated below 16% of the budget.

**Government’s top priority**

Education is a top priority for the current government. This is reflected in the Delivery Agreement which is a negotiated charter reflecting the commitment of the key partners involved in the direct delivery process. It stipulates the activities to be undertaken to produce the mutually agreed-upon outputs (DBE, 2011a:4). In the Delivery Agreement “Improved quality of basic education” is the first ranked of twelve general priorities which were identified by government. The Delivery Agreement should be read in conjunction with the *Action Plan to 2014: Towards the realisation of Schooling 2025* (published as Government Notice 752 of 2010), referred to as the Action Plan (DBE, 2010a:6).

**Political accountability at local level**

Another component of political accountability is the need to involve parents in the affairs of the education of their children. The South African Schools Act No. 84 of 1996 stipulates the
establishment of school governing bodies (SGBs), comprising parents, educators and non-educator members of staff (Van Wyk, 2009:132). This is a critical component of political accountability at local level since it involves parents who are elected to govern the affairs of a school. Van Wyk (2009:132) argues that parents are placed in a powerful position and are able to influence the school budget, language policy, discipline and the appointment and promotion of street-level bureaucrats and administrative staff since they form the majority on SGBs. This is because the South African Schools Act No. 84 of 1996 states that parents must form the majority of members on a school governing body. Their number in any school governing body must be at least half plus one of the total combined number of members with voting rights.

**Assistance to less privileged schools and learners**

A review of official documents suggests that government, in this case the provincial Department of Education in KwaZulu – Natal and the uMgungundlovu District, has been trying to help the less privileged learners. In its performance plan for 2011/2012 it expanded the National School Nutrition Programme (NSNP) which caters for underprivileged learners (KZN DoE, 2011:40). It notes that “the School Nutrition Programme targets learners from poor socioeconomic backgrounds, primarily those in rural, farm schools and schools in informal settlements, i.e. quintile one, two and three schools” (NSNP provides learners with nutritious snacks for every school day. To this end, secondary schools have been provided with catering equipment and a few schools will receive mobile kitchens for storage and preparation of food (KZN DoE, 2011:40)).

Furthermore, learners who are in both fee paying and non fee paying schools are said to benefit from the No Fee2 paying policy. In order to help the deserving learners, the KZN DoE points out that there are many No Fee paying schools and the No Fee paying policy was expected to be extended to cover all the schools in quintile three (KZN DoE, 2011:40). This would mean that all learners attending school in quintiles one to two would not pay fees. Furthermore, the KZN DoE has re-imbursed fees to learners who have been exempted from them.

With regard to learners who live far from schools, the KZN DoE has made available transport facilities for them. In its performance plans for 2011/2012, the KZN DoE notes that “up to this

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1 The schools in uMgungundlovu District are ranked into five economic classes known as quintiles. These quintiles determine the poverty level of a school with quintile one being the lowest with the poorest schools, and quintile five being the least poor.

2 The criterion for determining whether a school should be a ‘fee paying’ or ‘no fee paying’ school is determined by the socio-economic conditions of the geographical area within which the school is found.
point 2,838 learners are benefiting from the provision of learner transport and plans are afoot to increase this number to 9,000 in the financial year 2010/11” (KZN DoE, 2011:34).

All these provisions suggest that the government has been and is still doing a great deal in order to maintain the trust of the citizens who elected them. The money allocated to education each year has remained significantly high. The government, it seems, has been making concerted efforts to make sure that everyone has access to education and that support - financial subsidy, nutrition, transport – in principle is made available to those who need it.

Political accountability in the implementation of NCS is very critical. As a form of external accountability mechanism citizens are expected to hold elected officials accountable and require them to deliver the services they promise. As citizens put their faith in government, street-level bureaucrats come under indirect pressure to perform appropriately since their failure may mean government failure. The extent to which this form of accountability is effective in South Africa is difficult to determine.

6.2 Performance accountability

Performance accountability is an external form of accountability which involves the “scrutiny of the actions of officials and agencies related to the production of outputs, delivery of services, accomplishment of objectives, and/or achievement of results and impacts” (Brinkerhoff, 2001:6). In South African education the performance of street-level bureaucrats is scrutinised in terms of their outputs (for example, the pass rate in Grade 12 (matriculation) and numeracy skills in various grades) and the objectives of DBE. However, the performance and outputs of education bureaucracies is not the same for all the different stakeholders in education. While some stakeholders measure the achievement of schools through pass rates, others measure it in terms of the quality of such passes or the ability of school leavers to cope with university education and find placement in jobs. This has given rise to different ways of measuring performance as well as indicating various means of making street-level bureaucrats accountable.

Performance measurement

One such method of holding street-level bureaucrats accountable through their performance is the Annual National Assessments (ANA). The states that “ANA, the Action Plan to 2014, Schooling 2025 and the Delivery Agreement are key elements of a new approach to make schooling more accountable” (2011a:10). The main purpose of this is to make sure that neither
poor nor outstanding performance will go unnoticed. In explaining the importance of performance accountability the DBE argues that:

It is necessary to know where underperformance occurs and the underlying reasons for this so that timely and well-targeted interventions can occur. At the same time, outstanding performance should be acknowledged and replicated through the system. It is especially important to promote good management and accountability within the 82 district offices in the country and amongst the school principals of approximately 25,900 public schools. (DBE, 2010d: 11)

To be able to achieve performance accountability, the DBE uses Human Resources Management tools such as the Integrated Quality Management System (IQMS) (Weber, 2005:65). Weber notes that the use of IQMS was agreed on by the Department of Education and teacher organisations in the Collective Agreement 8 of 2003: Integrated Quality Management System (2005:64). The IQMS has several devices, which include Developmental Appraisal (DA), Performance Measurement (PM) and Whole School Evaluation (WSE) (mentioned here as a component of IQMS).

The purpose of DA is to assess individual educators in a transparent manner with a view to determining areas of strength and weakness and to draw up programmes for individual development (Weber, 2005:65).

The DBE uses Performance Measurement (PM) to secure accountability among teachers. This mechanism mimics the traits of ‘carrot and stick’ device. PM is a rewards and incentives tool which is used to evaluate individual teachers for purposes of salaries and promotion, as well as affirmation of appointments. PM has ten Performance Standards. Some of the Performance Standards for class based educators are:

- **Performance Standard 1: Creation of a positive learning environment.** The educator is expected to create a positive learning environment that enables the learners to participate actively and to achieve success in the learning process.

- **Performance Standard 2: Knowledge of curriculum and learning programmes.** The educator is expected to possess appropriate knowledge of curriculum content which is demonstrated in the creation of meaningful learning experiences.
• Performance Standard 3: *Lesson planning preparation and presentation*. The educator must demonstrate competence in planning, preparation, presentation and management of learning programmes.

• Performance Standard 4: *Learner Assessment/Achievement*. The teacher should demonstrate competence in monitoring and assessing learner progress and achievement.

• Performance Standard 5: *Professional development in field of work/career and participation in professional bodies*. The educator must engage in professional development activities which demonstrate his/her willingness to acquire new knowledge and additional skill (DBE, 2010d:52-80).

Figure 6.2 Composite score sheet for use in performance measurement for pay progression and grade progression for level 1 educator

![Composite score sheet](image)

Figure 6.2 shows that the performance of street-level bureaucrats is measured for different aspects of their job. These aspects include creation of a positive learning environment, lesson
planning and learner assessment. The measures are aggregated, thus arriving at a final score which indicates the level of overall performance by a street – level bureaucrat.

**Purpose of Integrated Quality Management System**

Although it cannot be used for punitive and judgmental purposes, IQMS can be used for incentives. For instance, with reference to the operation of IQMS as a performance management tool in the South African education system, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) notes that IQMS is:

> An incentive scheme which operates where evaluation of a teacher’s performance is linked to salary progression. The evaluations are categorised as ‘good’, ‘satisfactory’ and ‘unsatisfactory’. Those evaluated as good go up two notches on the salary scale at three yearly intervals; those with a satisfactory grade go up one notch, while those regarded as unsatisfactory receive no advancement. (2008:303)

Thus IQMS can be used in the promotion and salary progression of street-level bureaucrats. However, it has been noted that IQMS has not been as effective as expected because many street-level bureaucrats are given a score of ‘good’ regardless of their performance (OECD, 2008:303). Because of this, external moderators have been introduced in the South African system but they have been turned away from some schools by labour unions (DBE, 2013:9). The DBE (2009:28) outlines the process of “monitoring of educator performance using the IQMS”. KZN DoE (2011:32) and underscores the importance of performance by stating that “there will be [for the 2011/2012 performance plan] focussed attention on teacher accountability through the monitored implementation of the IQMS”.

**National Policy on Whole School Evaluation**

The National Policy on Whole School Evaluation (WSE) has been designed to ensure that school evaluation is carried out according to an agreed national model (DoE, 2002:8; DoE, 2001b). The purpose of WSE is to evaluate the overall effectiveness of a school – including the support provided by the District, school management, infrastructure and learning resources – as well as the quality of teaching and learning (Education Labour Relation Council (ELRC), 2003:33). The aims of WSE are varied but focus on improving performance accountability and
helping struggling schools and their individual teachers. The Department of Education (DoE) (2002:10) says that the aims of WSE are to:

a) Moderate externally, on a sampling basis, the results of self-evaluation carried out by schools.

b) Evaluate the effectiveness of a school in terms of the national goals, using national criteria.

c) Increase the level of accountability within the education system. [with increased emphasis on individual street-level bureaucrats]

d) Strengthen the support given to schools by district professional support services.

e) Provide feedback to all stakeholders as a means of achieving continuous school improvement.

f) Identify aspects of excellence within the system which will serve as models of good practice.

g) Identify the key elements of effective schools and improve the general understanding of what factors create effective schools.

**Use of examinations in measuring performance**

In many cases, the performance of schools and individual street-level bureaucrats is measured through the educational achievement of the learners in state mandated examinations. The use of assessments in South African education can be traced back in the history of education in this country. The use of examinations as a means of assessment began with the first formal examination which was conducted in South Africa by the University of the Cape of Good Hope in 1858 (DBE, 2010d:8). A new feature of assessment is its use as an accountability mechanism in the implementation of national and mandated curricula. Previously provincial departments used to set their own assessments. Motivated by the need to establish national standards across provinces, the national Department of Education took control over the national examination papers of Grade 12 in 2001 (DBE, 2011b:9). In the Assessment Policy³ in General and Education Training the DoE notes: “assessment has a direct influence on teaching and learning, and this power can be harnessed and directed to achieve positive impact” (DoE, 1998: online).

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³The Assessment Policy was used to guide assessments before it was incorporated into the CAPS documents in 2012.
Although examinations serve various purposes for different stakeholders in education, their effect as an accountability mechanism cannot be overemphasised. The National Senior Certificate (NSC) examination results in Grade 12 in South Africa have always attracted media attention since they are a significant means of demonstrating the accountability of the education system. The current Minister of Basic Education, Angie Motshekga, believes that NSC examination results sum up schooling over the twelve years and thus serve as a yardstick of performance of the education system as a whole (DBE, 2011b:7). Managers in the education sector at all levels always respond to these results in one way or another. The publication of NSC results exposes under-performers to public scrutiny. At national level provinces are ranked according to their performance, as illustrated in Figure 6.3.

**Figure 6.3 Ranking of 2013 NSC examination results percentage of schools with 100% in South Africa according to province**

![Bar chart showing ranking of provinces](image)

(Adapted from DBE, 2014:42)

At school level the NSC results bring pride to teachers whose learners performed well and shame to those whose learners under-performed. In KZN a number of teachers whose learners performed below certain benchmarks in the NSC examination are called to learning workshops over some weekends. Winter schools have also been introduced for under-performing schools (DBE, 2011b:34). For independent schools, the publication of results has a direct impact on their enrolments and by extension has financial implications. As a result such schools have these means of ensuring performance accountability among their street-level bureaucrats.
However, the problem of using examinations as a prime performance accountability mechanism was that the quality of education has not been sufficiently measured before Grade 12. The DBE notes that “a key problem in the past has been that there has been insufficient measurement of the quality of teaching and learning below Grade 12” (2011a:12). It is against this background that the DoE introduced the Annual National Assessments (ANA) in 2009. This prescribes universal and standardised testing in Grades 3, 6 and 9. The DBE has set targets that are based on performance in relation to international testing programmes. ANAs, in line with the Action Plan 2014, Schooling 2025 and the Delivery Agreement outcome 1 are key elements of a new approach to make schooling more accountable (DBE, 2011a:13). While ANAs are aimed at improving the quality of teaching and learning, their real purpose might be to ensure accountability. Hence the DBE’s argument is that “if people know there is monitoring, for instance through regular assessments of educational quality, a sense of accountability is strengthened” (2011a:7).

It was seen that performance accountability is an external form of accountability which ensures that street-level bureaucrats in schools are made to account for their performance. However, measuring their performance is problematic. This has led to the use of surrogate measures such as the performance of learners in assessments and other elements such as those used in the IQMS as a means of promoting and testing performance accountability.

6.3 Hierarchical accountability

This section focuses on hierarchical accountability, which is also known as bureaucratic accountability, in the implementation of NCS in South Africa. Hierarchical accountability is multifarious. In the implementation of NCS, hierarchical accountability involves the teachers (street-level bureaucrats) who are accountable to a head of department (HoD) in their school and school principals, or what is commonly called a school management team. Teachers are accountable for teaching, planning and assessment of learners. The mechanisms for this include: conformity to standards and procedures; peer review; as well as tests and examination, as with performance accountability. In hierarchical accountability the most important feature is the subordinate/supervisor relationship. Roles are clearly defined for street-level bureaucrats, indicating to whom they should account in the hierarchy. Figure 6.4 illustrates a simplified structure of the South African education hierarchy.
Figure 6.4 shows a simplified hierarchy of accountability in South African education. In the hierarchy of the South African education bureaucracy there are stipulated reporting procedures. From the street – level bureaucrat (teacher / educator) up to the Minister of Basic Education, there are levels of the subordinate/supervisor relationship within the education sector. These can include relationships between teachers and heads of departments; principals and circuit managers; district education managers, provincial education directors, the director - generals and political heads (Minister of Basic Education). Both teachers and schools are held accountable through hierarchical structures for various issues which pertain to their responsibilities. At school level, teachers are held accountable by the school principals for the performance of their classes and other issues relating to classes: principals/schools and their governing bodies are accountable to their cluster, circuit and districts. Districts are accountable
to provincial leadership. And education authorities in a province are then accountable to the Minister of Basic Education.

Finally, the performance and implementation of NCS and the functioning of the DBE at national level is subject to the scrutiny of the Portfolio Committee on Basic Education (parliamentary committee) in the National Assembly of South Africa’s Parliament.

Information flows upwards from the teachers and principals to senior bureaucrats in the DBE through monthly, quarterly, and annual reports: quarterly reports are on student performance, staffing issues, expenditure and any other information which is required. Schools are subject to DBE’s demands for additional information on an ad hoc basis.

Furthermore, the senior street-level bureaucrats have a duty to evaluate the performance of their street-level bureaucrats and the schools in their jurisdiction. Consequently, there are various mechanisms to ensure hierarchical accountability among the street-level bureaucrats. Some of the tools are similar to those discussed in the previous section on performance accountability. These include performance evaluation of individual street-level bureaucrats, WSE and staff development. WSE in this context is a tool which is used by supervisors to make their subordinates accountable in terms of hierarchical or bureaucratic accountability.

In order to strengthen educational accountability through evaluation, the former Minister of Education, Grace Pandor, appointed in September 2008 a Ministerial Committee to consider establishing a National Education Evaluation and Development Unit (NEEDU). The review team reported that the planned NEEDU could serve a very useful purpose, if sufficiently well staffed (OECD 2008:319). The OECD asserts that the NEEDU “might also be a useful agency in dealing with chronically ineffective teachers. Furthermore, it would be a help in ensuring that teachers are present – and on time – at school, and that the main focus of their work is on teaching and learning” (OECD 2008:319). Eventually, NEEDU was established and its first report (The State of Literacy Teaching and Learning in the Foundation Phase) was presented to the Minister of Education in April 2013 (NEEDU, 2013).

6.4 Legal accountability

In South Africa educators are held accountable through legislative requirements and administrative regulations. Many legislative acts and regulations have been put in place to guide the processes of street-level bureaucrats in education. These regulations provide
directives in terms of how educators are employed and how they should conduct their duties. Some of the Acts intended to regulate the educators are found in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1 Some legislation for legal accountability in South African education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACT/POLICY DOCUMENT</th>
<th>FUNCTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Education Policy Act, No. 27 of 1996</td>
<td>Provides for the determination of policy on salaries and conditions of employment of educators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South African Schools Act No. 84, of 1996</td>
<td>The employment and promotion of teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment of Educators Act No. 76 of 1998</td>
<td>Appointments, promotions and transfers, Termination of services, Discharge of educators, Incapacity and misconduct, South African Council for Educators, Performance of other work by educators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South African Council for Educators Act, No. 31 of 2000</td>
<td>Defines and promotes the ethical conduct of an educator as one who upholds the view of human rights embodied in the Constitution, Compulsory registration of educators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General And Further Education And Training Quality Assurance Act, No. 58 of 2001 (Umalusi)</td>
<td>Monitor the suitability and adequacy of standards and qualifications, Ensure that providers adopt quality management systems for learner achievement, Assure the quality of learner assessment at exit points, Promote quality improvement among providers; and monitor and report to the Minister on the performance of departments (General and Further Education and Training Quality Assurance Act of 2001).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first Act is the National Education Policy Act No 27 of 1996 (NEPA), which empowers the Minister of Education to determine national policy according to the following:

- The ratio between educators and students [this has a direct impact on the work load of street-level bureaucrats]
- Professional education and accreditation of educators
- Training educators
- The salaries and conditions of employment of educators.

Most of the policies listed in Table 6.1 were determined in terms of the legislative framework of NEPA in order to regulate the work of street-level bureaucrats (NEPA, 1996).
The South African Schools Act no. 84, of 1996 provides for the employment and promotion of teachers. Subject to the Employment of Educators Act, the South African Schools Act empowers a school governing body to recommend to the head of department in the DBE the appointment of teachers at a school.

In fostering legal accountability the Employment of Educators Act No. 76 of 1998 determines how appointments, promotions, transfers, misconduct and discharge of educators should be handled. Together with other policies, this policy also guides the evaluation of performance of work carried out by street-level bureaucrats. For instance, it states that a teacher shall be guilty of misconduct if he or she is absent from office or duty without leave or a valid reason.

In accordance with NEPA, the South African Council for Educators Act of 2000 was enacted. This led to the establishment of South African Council for Educators (SACE). This provides a strong pillar of legal accountability in the sense that it determines who enters the teaching profession by registering and accrediting them. Besides, SACE also advances the professional and ethical conduct of teachers. Subject to the Employment of Educators Act No. 76 of 1998, “a person may not be appointed as an educator unless such person is registered or provisionally registered with the South African Council for Educators” (DoE, 1998:13). An applicant may not be registered if he or she does not meet the minimum requirements set by SACE. However, in exceptional cases SACE may provide provisional registration to people who do not meet the minimum requirements if:

- the Council has approved that the person be appointed to a teaching post on the grounds that there are no other suitably qualified teachers available;
- the Council is of the opinion that the person will obtain the required qualification within a reasonable time; or
- the Council is of the opinion that it is in the interests of learners at an educational institution (SACE: online).

The General and Further Education and Training Quality Assurance Act, No 58 2001 realised the establishment, composition and functioning of the General and Further Education and Training Quality Assurance Council (‘Umalusi’ meaning ‘shepherd’), to provide for quality assurance in general and further education and training, and to exercise control over norms and standards of curriculum and assessment. Among other statutory duties, Umalusi monitors the suitability and adequacy of standards and qualifications; and ensures that providers adopt
quality management systems for learner achievement and assures the quality of learner assessment at exit points. The DBE, in the Delivery Agreement for Outcome 1: Improved Quality of Basic Education, indicates that Umalusi has a crucial role to play in ensuring that ANA becomes a world class assessment programme (DBE, 2011a: 17).

In order to maintain the quality of qualifications for prospective teachers, the institutions offering the qualifications must themselves be accredited. As defined in the General and Further Education and Training Quality Assurance Act, 2001 accreditation means “the certification of a person, a body or an institution as having the capacity to fulfil a particular function in the quality assurance system set up by the South African Qualifications Authority in terms of the South African Qualifications Authority Act, 1995 (Act No. 58 of 1995)”. Umalusi has been accredited by the South African Qualifications Authority, in terms of section 5(l) (b) (i) of the South African Qualifications Authority Act, 1995 (Act No. 58 of 1995), as the body responsible for establishing education and training standards or qualifications for general and further education and training at education institutions.

6.5 Professional accountability

SACE is specifically charged with regulating the teaching profession (Jansen, 2005:5; SACE ACT, 2000). The majority of the Council members are teachers (18 of the 30 members). However, the chairperson and five members are appointed by the Minister of Education. The Council has legislative powers to determine criteria for entry into the profession through the process of registration of educators (Jansen, 2005:5). Its main functions are “the registration and professional development of educators and the setting, maintenance and protection of ethical and professional standards” (OECD, 2008:87).

In South African education, street-level bureaucrats are often held accountable by their peers as well as by their professional body, SACE. Professional accountability systems in South African education system are reflected in the nature of the work that affords street-level bureaucrats a high degree of autonomy which is circumscribed by the decision-making norms and standards which are prescribed by SACE’s code of ethics. Therefore, professional accountability in the South African education system has both an internal form (as practised by peers in schools and their cluster groups), and an external form (as exercised by SACE).

The internal form of professional accountability relationships in the South African education system derives from internal sources that involve low degrees of control and high degrees of discretion when the street-level bureaucrat in his or her classroom makes professional
judgements with little or no close supervision. The relationships in professional accountability are based on a high opinion of the expertise of teachers who are regarded as professionals.

The professional body, SACE, is critical to the external form of professional accountability in South Africa as it lays down codes with standards for acceptable practice that are binding for all street-level bureaucrats. SACE has the authority to register teachers. For a teacher to be registered he or she he must have a minimum of a three year qualification after matriculating [M+3 or Relative Education Qualification Value (REQV) 13]. Alternatively, he or she must have a two-year certificate in teacher education for the pre-primary phase (M+2 or REQV12 (SACE, 2011b: online). However, unlike other professional councils for engineering, accounting or medicine, SACE “does not regulate and quality assure the development of higher education qualifications for professional employment” (Parker and Adler, 2005:64). In addition to accreditation requirements, a teacher’s educational qualifications also have to be submitted to the DBE for evaluation for employment in education (DBE, 2010d: 19). This has to be accompanied by a certified copy of a SACE registration certificate (DBE, 2010d: 26). The assumption is that if a street-level bureaucrat has appropriate professional qualifications then he or she has the requisite expertise and can exercise discretion as a professional, without the need for constant supervision.

Over and above the professional qualification requirements, an applicant for registration must satisfy the ethical standards contained in the Code of Professional Ethics for Educators (SACE, 2011b: online). A part of the Code of Professional Ethics for Educators states that educators who are registered or provisionally registered with the South African Council for Educators must:

- acknowledge the noble calling of their profession to educate and train the learners of our country;
- acknowledge that the attitude, dedication, self-discipline, ideals, training and conduct of the teaching profession determine the quality of education in this country;
- acknowledge, uphold and promote basic human rights, as embodied in the Constitution of South Africa;
- commit themselves therefore to do all within their power, in the exercising of their professional duties, to act in accordance with the ideals of their profession, as expressed in this Code; and
• act in a proper and becoming way such that their behaviour does not bring the teaching profession into disrepute (SACE, online).

In general, SACE’s main focus is on professionalism among educators, on the sensitivity to unequal power relations that exist between educators, as well as between educators learners and on a commitment to the ideals of human rights and democracy (Jansen, 2005:5). The DBE views SACE as important in enforcing professional accountability and calls on teachers to conform to the SACE Code of Professional Ethics and promise to:

• teach, to advance the education and the development of learners as individuals;
• develop loyalty and respect for the profession;
• be punctual, enthusiastic, well prepared for lessons, and of sober mind and body;
• improve their own knowledge and skills base to be more effective;
• provide regular information to parents on their children’s progress;
• eliminate unprofessional behaviour such as teacher-pupil relationships, drunkenness, drug use, assault, sexual harassment and others (DBE, 2010e:39-40)

It is clear that SACE has been given an important role in promoting professional accountability in South African education. Its role as an accreditation agency is critical for professional accountability.

One of the activities SACE has been involved in is the Ethical and Legal Training (ELT) Project. This project provides “training and development workshops for educators to make them aware of both the ethical and legal issues that are significant for the implementation of the SACE Code of Professional Ethics in schools, and various educational institutions and centres” (SACE, online). It also has training material that can be used by schools to familiarise educators with the legal and ethical obligations of the profession. SACE also initiated the Ethics and Values in Education (EVE) Project. This project produced the SACE Handbook on the Code of Professional Ethics which can sharpen teachers’ understanding of ethical issues and can enhance their ability to act ethically by provoking debate, thinking and discussion about ethical issues in education.

With the aim of improving professionalism in the implementation of NCS in 2011, the Department of Basic Education and the Department of Higher Education and Training (DBE & DoHET) marked an important milestone in South Africa with regards to the professional
development of educators when they published the Integrated Strategic Planning Framework for Teacher Education and Development in South Africa, 2011–2025. This came after the realisation that the accountability mechanisms on their own will not yield quality education in an environment where the teachers’ subject matter knowledge and pedagogical knowledge of curriculum content are poor. The main aim of the framework is to “improve the quality of teacher education and development in order to improve the quality of teachers and teaching” (DBE & DoHET, 2011:4).

The Integrated Strategic Planning Framework for Teacher Education and Development in South Africa, 2011–2025 is a 42 page document which offers a comprehensive plan on how to improve the quality of teaching and learning. It explains the processes of identifying and addressing the development needs of individual teachers. The plan involves self-evaluation by educators at all levels and identifies the interventions necessary. The interventions include discovering and addressing the immediate to medium-term systemic needs for teacher development. (DBE & DoHET, 2011: 9-10). A system for identifying and addressing the development needs of teachers is shown in Figure 6.5.
Figure 6.5 A system for identifying and addressing teachers’ development needs in South Africa

1. Teachers are at the centre of the system. Teachers take responsibility for their own professional development. The key goals of teacher development must be enhanced classroom practice and improved learning outcomes.

2. Teachers recognise a personal need for professional development on the basis of their learners’ performance and put themselves forward for a series of diagnostic self-assessments, which have been designed for the teacher’s particular subject or learning area. These self-assessments can be taken in online and/or in paper-based form, and they provide immediate, confidential feedback to the teacher on curriculum areas that need to be developed.

3. The self-assessment results are used to direct the teacher to specific pedagogically sound, content-rich SACE-endorsed CPD courses or activities which, once engaged with, will lead to development in the identified area(s) of need. The teacher will also be directed to SACE-approved providers of the appropriate course through which to address learning opportunities. The teacher is able to apply for funding to register for the identified course(s).

4. A variety of modes of study and support are available to the teacher at localised sites, like PTDIs and DTDCs, to engage effectively with the course content, including independent, materials-based or online study, participation in formal or informal programmes and learning with colleagues and peers in PLCs.

5. Success measures are:
   1. Improved classroom practice and learner performance;
   2. Improved performance on diagnostic self-assessments; and
   3. Increased collaborative activity through PLCs.

(Source: DBE & DoHET, 2011:8)
With reference to improving formal qualifications, the DBE & DoHET will offer a practice-based Advanced Certificate in School Leadership and Management (ACE SL&M), which is designed specifically for the South African context for selected principals, deputy principals and heads of department in schools. A Bachelor of Education (BEd) (Honours) and Master’s degrees, which are designed to enhance the subject advisors’ knowledge of teaching and learning in their specialist area, as well as their ability to provide support to practising teachers and leadership to other advisors in the system, are also indicated. It is envisaged that competent teachers and subject advisors will be used to induct new teachers, to catalyse the development of professional learning communities at the school and local cluster levels in their specialisations (DBE & DoHET, 2011:10-11). Unqualified graduate teachers will be identified and supported so that they can complete the Post Graduate Certificate in Education (PGCE) part-time over two years (in the future, this will become an Advanced Diploma in Teaching), while unqualified teachers will be identified and supported to complete BEd degree programmes (either full-time or part-time) (DBE & DoHET, 2011:10-11).

Professional accountability is a critical mechanism of ensuring accountability without the need for constant close monitoring and supervision. SACE is an important statutory body which is involved in promoting professionalism among street-level bureaucrats through registration and enacting professional codes of conduct for teachers. The DBE and DoHET places an emphasis on professionalism and on the importance of staff development as a way establishing some control over teachers.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has explored the accountability systems used in education in terms of the analytic framework developed in the previous chapters. Political accountability in education is largely associated with government itself. It was shown that education has been allocated a significant proportion of South Africa’s national budget. Out of the twelve priorities identified by government, education is at the top. Performance accountability has taken the form of performance evaluation as a mechanism of ensuring conformity in the implementation of NCS. Examinations and mandated curricula are instruments of hierarchical accountability. A comprehensive review of different legislation in South Africa has revealed that legal accountability is another means of controlling street-level bureaucrats. Finally, professional accountability could be seen as a softer but effective means of controlling the work of street-level bureaucrats in South Africa’s education system.
After presenting in the next chapter a profile of the uMgungundlovu District and outlining the research methods used, the chapters thereafter will investigate political, performance, hierarchical and professional accountability in relation to street – level bureaucrats in the District. Legal accountability was omitted from the case study because its salient features are abstract and were found to have been incorporated in considerations of the other types of accountability.
CHAPTER SEVEN
UMGUNGUNDLOVU DISTRICT: PROFILE AND RESEARCH METHODS

The purpose of this study is to explore the accountability mechanisms employed by government and education management to secure and improve accountability among street-level bureaucrats who are involved in the implementation of the National Curriculum Statements. The government in general, and national and provincial departments of education in particular, and other statutory bodies, as well as the schools themselves, employ a variety of accountability mechanisms to this end. The research now turns to detailed investigation of these accountability mechanisms in uMgungundlovu District. But before doing so, the specific context and research methods need to be outlined.

7.1 Study site

uMgungundlovu District is found in Kwazulu-Natal province (KZN) in the eastern part of South Africa (see Figure 7.1). It includes the provincial capital city of KZN, Pietermaritzburg, which is the second largest city in the province and the fifth largest in South Africa.

uMgungundlovu District has 547 schools. About 179 (both public and independent schools) of these are secondary schools which are also known as high schools. There are approximately 7458 teachers (for both primary and high schools) and 225 081 learners in 502 public schools and 1108 teachers and 14 679 learners in 45 independent schools (KZN DoE, 2011:2). uMgungundlovu District has a total of 239 760 learners (8.44% of the provincial total), 8 566 teachers (9.12% of the province) and 547 primary and secondary schools (8.85% of the provincial total) (KZN DoE, 2011:3). The average teacher / learner ratio in the district is 1:29 which is slightly below the provincial average of 1:29.7. uMgungundlovu District has the highest number of public schools (84) with less than 100 learners.
Figure 7.1 Map of uMgungundlovu District in context

(a) South Africa
(b) KwaZulu-Natal
(c) uMgungundlovu District

(Source: Ingonyama Trust Board, online)
The pass rate in the National Senior Certificate in uMgungundlovu District has improved slowly since 2009. In 2009 the pass rate was 66.68%, followed by 75.86% in 2010 and then 72.27% in 2011. The District was ranked third in the province in terms of the pass rate in 2011. The District has a few schools which are among the best performers in the country, but there are many that continue to have poor pass rates. The average performance of schools in uMgungundlovu District in 2011 was 71%, with the lowest performing schools obtaining a pass rate of 11.8% among their learners, while the best achieved 100%.

7.2 Population, sampling, data collection methods and analysis

This study used data from multiple sources, that is, from documents, interviews, questionnaires and observation as well as secondary sources. The official documents used in this study include those from government, DBE, Umalusi and SACE.

The total population for this study was all the practising high school teachers and school principals in uMgungundlovu Education District. According to the EMIS 2010 there were approximately 3240 high school teachers in the District. For feasibility purposes, the researcher chose a sample of 100 teachers which was based on non-probability purposive sampling which is also known as ‘judgment sampling’ (Abrahams, 2011:538). Although the purposive sample was deemed perfect for this study, “it does not pretend to represent the wider population” (Cohen, Manion and Morison, 2005:104). This limitation hinders the generalisation of the findings to the whole population. A total of 15 schools were conveniently selected. Three were from former Mode C schools, 3 from independent schools and 9 from public townships schools. Although this was not accurately proportion the numbers were determined by the need to be so. After a pilot test, a questionnaire was distributed to teachers in order to obtain information and gain their perceptions of various accountability mechanisms (see the questionnaire in Appendix). Face-to-face semi-structured interviews were conducted with the six principals of the schools where the teachers who participated in the questionnaire were located. The interviews lasted forty-five minutes to one hour. The interviews served two main purposes. Firstly, the interviews sought to understand the mechanisms of accountability associated with the implementation of the NCS. Secondly, the interviews also elicited the views of school principals on the effectiveness of the mechanisms employed by the government in securing
accountability among street-level bureaucrats (see Appendix Two). The researcher took notes, and recorded the interviews when permission was granted.

In order to augment the other methods, observation and was also used in the course of attending several cluster workshops and seminars which had been organised by the KZN DoE and uMalusi between March 2011 and December 2012. Detailed notes of issues pertaining to accountability were taken.

The main form of data analysis was content analysis. Data recorded and coded from interviews will be transcribed before analysis. Thematic content analysis was used to analyse responses to the open ended comments in the interview schedule. The analysis of this transcribed data was based on pattern matching logic, which ‘compares an empirically-based pattern with a predicted one’ (Yin, 2003:116). The ‘predicted pattern’ comprised findings from the previous studies, together with the theoretical framework (Bergen and While, 2005:4). Put another way, findings from other studies at times were used to compare results.

The responses from the closed questions in the interview schedule for the educators were analysed quantitatively, using SPSS Windows. Frequency tables and bar graphs were used to present summary statistics. The Chi-Square tests were used to test the effect of accountability mechanisms and the level of accountability. Cross tabulation were used to explore relationships in the data.

To ensure construct validity the researcher used multiple sources of evidence (triangulation) during the data collection stage. The researcher gave some participants draft reports for verification. The study used pattern and explanation building during the data analysis stage to ensure internal validity. External validity was enhanced through the use of theories outlined in the theoretical framework (Bickman and Rog, 1998: xiii)

7.3 uMgungundlovu education district in context

This section presents information on the educators, followed by a description of the schools in which they teach.

7.3.1 Biographical data of the educators in uMgungundlovu District.

Data for a total 3 250 high school educators (ordinary public and independent schools) in 2010 was collected on uMgungundlovu District by the researcher from the Education Management Information System (EMIS). These educators are located in 21 wards. Figure 7.2 shows the
racial composition of the educators in uMgungundlovu District. About 60.4% (1930) of the educators are female.

**Figure 7.2 Racial composition of high school teachers in uMgungundlovu District**

![Racial composition chart]

(Source: based on uMgungundlovu EMIS 2010)

The majority (74%) of teachers in uMgungundlovu District are African while Coloured and Indian educators are 9% each. The White teachers constitute 8% of the teachers in the District. Although Africans are present in all the wards, the same cannot be said about the other races. A majority of Indian educators (51%) are found in the ward of Cumberwood while Africans constitute 19.4%. Cumberwood, Msunduzi South, Midlands East and Midlands North wards have 89.3% of all the white teachers. These wards are predominantly areas that were reserved for Whites under apartheid.

The average age of all the street-level bureaucrats is 40.9 years with a standard deviation of 10 years. The lower age quartile is 33 while the topmost quartile is 48 years. The oldest educator was 71 years old (EMIS 2010).

In terms of teaching experience the average was 14.5 years with a standard deviation of 9.9 years. Figure 7.3 shows teaching experience according to race.
This data seem to suggest that the average teaching experience of the African teachers is around 14 years less than any other race. However, there are a few outliers who have more than 40 years of teaching experience. Whites, on the other hand, seem to have the highest average number of years (20) of teaching experience.

Most of the street-level bureaucrats (83.4%) are employed by the provincial Department of Education. The school governing boards (SGBs) as a whole employ 14.2%, while 0.7% of the educators were voluntary. The majority of the street-level bureaucrats (80.5%) are employed on a permanent basis, 16.4% full-time on a temporary basis and 1.5% are part-time. There was information missing on 1.7% of teachers. The majority of street-level bureaucrats (92.4%) who are employed by the SGBs are in the independent schools. Over and above the teachers who are employed by government, the public school governing bodies may employ additional teachers whom they pay themselves from school fees levied. This is common for relatively wealth schools. Also, independent schools pay their teachers from their own resources.
Furthermore, the schools in which these educators teach are generally identified in terms of public township schools, public former Model C schools and independent schools. Township schools which are found in residential areas outside the Central Business District were a product of racial segregation. They are often under-resourced in terms of infrastructure and human resources. They mostly cater for learners from low income families. Some of them are No Fee schools, where as explained before, learners do not pay fees in order to attend them. Other schools in township charge relatively low fees. The teachers’ salaries are paid by the KZN DoE.

The former Model C schools are previously schools for white learners which are often found in the suburbs (Bloch, 2009:141). They often cater for learners from middle income families and charge fees accordingly. They are also known as Section 21 schools. They have better facilities and physical infrastructure compared to township schools. Bloch notes that these schools are “well - organised, focused and able to draw on experienced teachers” (2009:141). Their teachers’ salaries are paid by KZN DoE. They also employ their own teachers over and above those paid by the government whose salaries are paid by a school’s governing body.

Independent schools are not reliant on government in order to run their school business although they do receive state subsidy. Some of them have been established for profit while others are faith based. Some of these schools are well resourced as compared to the public township schools. However, others have few resources.

**Characteristics of teachers**

In terms of human resources, most secondary schools depend on the teachers allocated by the Post Provisioning Norm (PPN) [this determines the maximum number of educators a public school can have] which is based on the teacher/learner ratio (1:30). All such teachers are employed by the KZN DoE. EMIS data for 2010 indicates that all the schools in quintile five employ more teachers than those provided for by PPN, who are hired by the SGBs. Most schools in quintiles three to five had more teachers than those determined by PPN.

There is some racial disparity between educators in uMgungundlovu District in terms of their level of education. Figure 7.4 indicates this. In Figure 7.4 zero represents no qualification; one – Certificate; two – Diploma; three – Bachelor’s Degree; and four – graduate qualification.

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4 These are schools that are permitted to raise funds and manage their own finances.
Most of the African teachers are at level one. Their White counterparts are at higher levels. Most Indian and Coloured teachers are at level two in terms of qualifications. This shows that most African teachers are the least qualified of all the teachers. The qualification level of street-level bureaucrats is important in determining potential for professional discretion that can be exercised by street-level bureaucrats in implementing NCS.

About 63.1% of all educators use Information and Computer Technology (ICT). Table 7.1 which is based on EMIS data in 2010 shows ICT usage by race in uMgungundlovu District.
Table 7.1 ICT usage by educators in uMgungundlovu District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>ICT usage</th>
<th>N = 3193</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>1328</td>
<td>1018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56.6%</td>
<td>43.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>65.9%</td>
<td>86.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>82.2%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>82.8%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>78.7%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>1177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>63.1%</td>
<td>36.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: based on EMIS 2010)

Table 7.1 shows that 65.9% of African teachers use ICT, compared to 78.75 of the Coloureds, 82.2% of Indians and 82.2% of the Whites. But the disparity is even wider in absolute terms in the schools, since Africans constitute 73.5% of all the teachers in the District.

7.3.2 Information about the schools in uMgungundlovu District

Data for all 178 (147 public and 31 independent) high schools in uMgungundlovu District in 2010 were collected by the researcher. These included 34 combined schools\(^5\) which enrol learners from Grade R to Grade 12. About 80.9% of the schools are secondary only while 19.1% are combined. Most (64.7%) of the combined schools are public. The rural areas have 44.1% of the combined schools while the remaining schools are in the urban areas. The majority of schools in both urban (79.3%) and rural (83.1%) areas serve high school learners only. Only 38.7% of the independent schools are for both primary and secondary learners. The majority (82%) of the schools are public schools while the remainder 17.4% are independent.

Table 7.2 shows the distribution of secondary schools in uMgungundlovu District according to type, and whether they are located in an urban or a rural area.

\(^5\) Combined schools which cater for both primary and secondary school learners.
Table 7.2 uMgungundlovu District: Urban / rural distribution of public and independent secondary schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban/Rural</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent schools</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>90.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public schools</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>86</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>58.5%</td>
<td>41.5%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>96.6%</td>
<td>68.5%</td>
<td>82.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>89</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: based on EMIS 2010)

A substantial majority (90.3%) of independent schools is found in the urban areas while 9.7% is in the rural areas. A very small proportion (3.4%) of the rural schools is independent while 96.6% are public schools. In urban areas independent schools constitute 31.5% while 68.5% are public. Table 7.2 shows that the number of secondary schools in the rural areas and urban area is equal, that is 89 in each area.

As mentioned earlier, schools are ranked into five economic classes known as quintiles. These quintiles determine the poverty level of a school with quintile one being the poorest and quintile five being the least poor. The socio – economic status of a community where a school is located is used to determine its quintile. Figure 7.5 shows the distribution of schools in uMgungundlovu District according to quintiles. Data for 31 schools were missing.
Figure 7.5 uMgungundlovu District: distribution of schools according to quintile

![Graph showing distribution of schools by quintile](image)

(Source: based on EMIS 2010)

Of the 147 schools, 5.6% were in quintile one while 11.2% of the schools were in quintile five. The majority (46%) of the schools were in quintile three. Almost all (90%) of the schools in quintile one are in the rural areas. About 32% of the schools are in quintile five and all of them are in the urban areas.

The majority of the schools (72.8%) are beneficiaries of the National School Nutrition Programme (NSNP). 2010 EMIS data indicate that most of the schools receiving nutrition programmes are those in the lower quintiles. Because of such poverty the provincial Department of Education plans to declare most of these schools as No fee schools, which is meant to enable even poor children to attend school.

**Facilities for learning in the schools**

The learning facilities in the schools are not uniformly distributed. For instance, only 57% of all the schools have at least one media centre. One school has five media centres and five schools have two media centres each. About 65.7% of all the schools with a media centre are in the urban areas and most (79.4%) of the schools with media centres are public.

A large proportion (44.4%) of schools does not have computer rooms. Rural schools which constitute 50% of all the high schools in uMgungundlovu comprise 36.4% of schools with computer rooms. About 7.3% of schools have at least two computer rooms while one school

139
has more than five computer rooms. Independent schools which constitute 17.4% of all the high schools make up 19.2% of all the schools with computer rooms.

Laboratories are also nonexistent in about 47.8% of the secondary schools in uMgungundlovu District. Rural schools make up 31.2% of the schools with laboratories. There are a few schools (2.4%) with at least 10 laboratories each while one school has 19. Although independent schools constitute 17.4% of all the secondary schools, they have 20.4% of the laboratories. Quintile five schools which make up 20% of the high schools have 25.7% of all the laboratories.

The data seem to indicate that most schools (81.5%) have staff rooms while 7.9% of the schools have more than one staff room. Most (57.1%) of the schools without staff rooms are in quintile two and most (57.9%) are in rural areas.

This brief portrait of uMgungundlovu District indicates that the legacy of apartheid is still very evident which is characterised by racial inequality, especially in rural areas.

**Profile of learners**

According to EMIS 2010, uMgungundlovu District had about 97 000 learners in Grades 8 – 12 in all schools. Of these, about 20 000 were in Grade 8, 20 000 in Grade 9, 22 900 in Grade 10, 19 900 in Grade 11, and 14 000 in Grade 12. About 51% of all these learners are in schools that are classified as rural. 92.6% are in public schools and 7.4% in independent schools.

**Conclusion**

uMgungundlovu District is heterogeneous in that it has some of the best performing schools as well as some of the worst performing ones. Its secondary schools are in both urban and rural areas. There are many ways of looking at these schools. They could be classified as urban or rural. They can also be classified into township schools, public Model C schools and independent schools. Townships schools often have fewer resources and facilities than Model C schools. A majority of such schools are in lower quintiles which reflect their low socio-economic status. Model C schools are found mainly in the suburbs. As beneficiaries of the education system under apartheid, they remain well resourced in terms of learning facilities and physical infrastructure. As Section 21 schools, they are also allowed to raise and manage their funds. Independent schools, on the other hand, are privately owned and depend on fees they levy on learners as their main source of revenue. They cater for a wide range of learners from different socio-economic backgrounds.
Teachers from former Model C schools tend to be more experienced and better qualified than those from other types of schools. A majority of these are White teachers. Most teachers in township schools are African. Many are less qualified than their White, Coloured and Indian counterparts. Most teachers in uMgungundlovu District are African; most are located in schools in rural areas.

Fifteen years or so since the universal right to education and basic equality were enshrined in the South African Constitution and enacted in subsequent legislation, the legacy of educational apartheid is still experienced by learners, teachers and schools in uMgungundlovu District. The following chapters will reveal how this has consequences for accountability in implementing the NCS.
CHAPTER EIGHT
UMGUNGUNDLOVU DISTRICT: POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN IMPLEMENTING EDUCATIONAL POLICY

The following four chapters investigate the accountability mechanisms pertaining to street level bureaucrats in education in uMgungundlovu District. This chapter will focus on political accountability in implementing the NCS which is based on the data collected from the questionnaires and interviews. It will investigate the respondents’ perceptions of political accountability in financing education, in supporting the less privileged schools and learners, in policy formulation and in implementation. The responses from teachers and principals will be coded in order to preserve their anonymity. Thus Tr2 indicates teacher 2, Prl4 is principal 4 and so on.

8.1 Political accountability: financing education

The street-level bureaucrats were asked to rate the effectiveness of government in financing education. Financing education is a broad term. It includes financing all aspects of education. Some respondents expressed satisfaction in terms of the money allocated for education but bemoaned how it has been used. The following are some of the respondents’ views on the effectiveness of the government in financing education.

*We hear there is a lot of money for education but it’s not coming. Not in terms of finance, there is a great need to increase financial support (Tr43).*

*No. There is little money coming. In my school we don’t have computer rooms. Our learners pass matric without the knowledge of using a computer. I wonder how they cope in tertiary institutions (Tr31).*

*Some schools still do not have the necessary infrastructure like toilets and classrooms. Only No Fee schools get the government attention, they focus mostly on what they term ‘under-performing’ schools. There is no help for parents who can’t afford school fees. In No Fee paying schools text books always arrive late so quality learning is delayed (Tr71).*

It is apparent that some respondents acknowledge that the government is allocating large sums of money to education but they are not receiving it. For instance, Tr43 points out that substantial money is given to education each year but there is very little to show for this in the schools. Tr31 and Tr71 do not believe that the government is doing enough in terms of
supplying the schools with necessary facilities and equipment needed for teaching and learning.

Educators in all types of schools, former Model C schools, public schools in townships, urban and rural schools, complained about the resources they receive in order to run their schools. As a result, most respondents said that the government was not effective in financing education. Figure 8.1 shows the perceptions of educators on the effectiveness of government to finance education.

**Figure 8.1 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of teachers of government’s effectiveness in financing education**

Figure 8.1 shows that a very small proportion of respondents in uMgungundlovu District (15%) think that the government is effective in financing education. Only 5% of the respondents said the government was very effective in financing this. On the other hand 25% of the respondents indicated that the government was ‘not effective at all’ while 27% said that it was ‘not effective’. Further analysis indicates that the perceptions of respondents may be based on the type of school where they taught, which is shown in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of teachers of government’s effectiveness in financing education, according to type of school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Financing education</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not effective at all</td>
<td>Not effective</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>Very effective</td>
<td>No opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in Type of school</td>
<td>12.00%</td>
<td>16.00%</td>
<td>32.00%</td>
<td>40.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public: former Model C</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in Type of school</td>
<td>31.30%</td>
<td>33.30%</td>
<td>18.80%</td>
<td>8.30%</td>
<td>6.30%</td>
<td>2.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public: township</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in Type of school</td>
<td>25.90%</td>
<td>25.90%</td>
<td>37.00%</td>
<td>3.70%</td>
<td>7.40%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in Financing education</td>
<td>60.00%</td>
<td>59.30%</td>
<td>33.30%</td>
<td>26.70%</td>
<td>60.00%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in Financing education</td>
<td>60.00%</td>
<td>59.30%</td>
<td>33.30%</td>
<td>26.70%</td>
<td>60.00%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.1 indicates that 40% of respondents in independent schools in uMgungundlovu District said that the government was ‘effective’ in financing education although they obtain most of their revenue from fees paid by the learners. Respondents from independent schools constitute 66.7% of those who said the government was effective. Perhaps this is due to the fact that they are not as reliant on substantial support from government.

A majority in the former Model C schools expressed dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of the government in financing education. They also constitute the highest percentage (60%) of those who indicated that government was ‘not effective at all’ and 59.3% of those who suggested the government was ‘not effective’. The views of former Model C schools respondents were also echoed by those in ordinary public schools in townships.

About 25.9% of the respondents from public schools in the townships said that government was ‘not effective at all’ while another 25.9% said that the government was ‘not effective’ in financing education.
Data on financial support at district level could not be found. The purpose of showing how government is allocating financial resources on education is to suggest how the government attempts to be politically responsive to the needs of the citizens.

The KZN Department of Education’s expenditure on different sectors of education is shown in Figure 8.2. Public ordinary school education received the biggest share (85%) of the amount allocated for education. Early Childhood Development, Special Functions, Adult Basic Education and Training (ABET) and independent schools received a small portion (5%) of the budget.

**Figure 8.2 KwaZulu – Natal: financial allocation for different education sectors 2011/2012**

Source: Adapted from KZN DoE, 2011:47

Figure 8.3 reveals how the money allocated to public ordinary school education is divided into different sectors. Most of the money was allocated to public primary schools (55.7%) with 39.33% for public secondary schools. It can be assumed that the differences in allocation to primary and secondary schools are a result of the distribution of learners and by extension the number of schools at each level. The National Nutrition Programme received 3.32% of all the finances allocated to the public ordinary school education.
The KZN provincial government is attempting to fulfil its mandate as well as trying to gain the trust of the citizens through financing education. It is allocating large sums of money to education. Although appreciating the money allocated to education, the street – level bureaucrats who are implementing the NCS feel that the government is not effective enough in financing education.

8.2 Political accountability: supporting less privileged schools

The government has introduced a range of policies that are meant to support the less privileged schools. Figure 8.4 shows the respondents’ perception of the level of political accountability of government in supporting these.
Figure 8.4 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of educators of government’s effectiveness in supporting the less privileged schools

Figure 8.4 shows that 32% of the respondents believed that the government had not been effective in supporting the less privileged schools, whereas 24% indicated that it had been ‘not effective at all’. A small proportion (12%) of the respondents said that the government was ‘effective’ while a tiny fraction (3%) said the government was ‘very effective’. Some 28% could not say whether the government had been effective or not.

Further analysis of the perceptions of respondents of government’ support for less privileged schools revealed that their responses differ according to the type of school. Table 8.2 shows the respondents’ perceptions according to the type of school in which they taught.
Table 8.2 uMgungundlovu District: government’s support for less privileged schools, according to respondent’s type of school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Supporting less privileged schools</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not effective at all</td>
<td>Not effective</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>Very effective</td>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public: former model C</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public: township</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
<td>40.7%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.2 indicates that while 28% of teachers in independent schools said that government had been ‘effective’ in addressing the needs of the less privileged schools, they were in the majority (58.3%) of all educators who took such a view. The largest proportion (36%) of the respondents in independent schools said the government had not been ‘effective’ while 8% said it had ‘not been effective at all’.

The majority of respondents in former Model C schools did not believe that the government was doing enough in supporting the less privileged schools. About 31.3% said it was ‘not effective at all’ while another 31.3% said it was ‘not effective’. The respondents from former Model C formed the majority (62.5%) of those who thought that the government was ‘not effective at all’ in supporting the less privileged schools. All the respondents (6.3%) who said the government had been ‘very effective’ were from former model C schools.

A small majority (40.7%) of those in ordinary public schools in townships noted that government’s effectiveness was ‘neutral’ [average]. However, many [a total of 55.5%] of them did not think the government was effective in supporting less privileged schools. 25.9% of the respondents from the public township schools indicated that the government had ‘not been effective at all’. They make up 29.2% of those who said the government was not effective at all.
Further analysis shows that there was no relationship between the type of school and the respondents’ perception of government’s support for the less privileged schools. An insignificant chi-square test (p = 0.053) showed that the association is a result of chance as shown in Table 8.4.

### Table 8.3 Chi-square test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18.139</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.053</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 8.3 Political accountability: supporting less privileged learners

The respondents were asked to rate the government in terms of supporting less privileged learners. This question was more complex than the previous one about ‘less privileged schools’, because in some cases, less privileged learners in the fee paying schools may find it difficult to pay the fees, to have decent meals or to have transport to and from school.

Table 8.4 uMgungundlovu District: respondents’ perceptions of government’s effectiveness in supporting the less privileged learners, according to type of school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Supporting less privileged learners</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not effective at all</td>
<td>Not effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public: former model C</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public: township</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.4 shows that 21% of all the respondents believed that the government is ‘not effective at all’ in supporting the less privileged learners while 35% said that the government was ‘not effective’. A total of 16% [13% and 3%] was satisfied with the support given to less privileged learners. Further analysis shows that 29.2% of all former Model C school respondents said that
the government was ‘not effective at all’ in supporting less privileged learners. At the same time, the respondents from former Model C schools constituted 66.7% of all those who said the government was ‘not effective at all’ in supporting the less privileged learners.

The majority (48.1%) of respondents in the ordinary public schools in townships thought that the government was ‘not effective’ in supporting less privileged learners. They also constituted 37.1% of those who believed that the government was ‘not effective’ and 19% of those who said the government was ‘not effective at all’ in supporting less privileged learners.

36% of respondents from independent schools indicated that the government was ‘effective’ in supporting the less privileged learners. Furthermore, the majority (69.2%) of all the respondents who noted that the government was ‘effective’ in supporting the less privileged learners were from independent schools.

The information given in Table 8.4 is also supported by data collected from the interviews. Some teachers commented as follows:

*No. The government is not effective. Povertystricken learners are still suffering!* (Tr32).

*Government is not doing enough for the less privileged. The poor will remain poor* (Tr28).

*There is no help for parents who can’t afford school fees. In No Fee paying schools textbooks always arrive late so quality learning is delayed* (Tr71).

*I don’t think they are supporting the less privileged learners. The government is giving more money to basic education - where is that money going? I don’t know. They are cutting down on subsidies; they are cutting down all over* (Prl1).

*On paper it’s happening. In practice it is not happening, because there are a lot of poor people who are denied access to schools because they can’t pay the fees. It’s a good theoretical thing but there are a lot of people who are unable to pay fees. Even in No Fee paying schools very often the quality of education is very poor. Although these schools do not charge fees, they start charging for other things* (Prl1).

*There are some schools which are fee paying schools but because of the structures of the government people can join the school and then basically ask for full reduction of the fees and they qualify for it. I feel that nobody should qualify for it. If they choose to come to this school, which is a fee paying school, they should pay something but the government doesn’t have that*
philosophy. The government does not subsidise non fee paying learners. This leaves the school in financial problems (PrI3).

The differences in perception in terms of all type of schools is statistically significant as confirmed by a chi-square test (p = 0.005). This shows that the variation cannot be attributed to a chance occurrence. Table 8.5 shows that the relationship between the type of school where a respondent taught and the perception of government’s political accountability in supporting the less privileged learners is statistically significant.

Table 8.5 Chi-square test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Degree of freedom</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-Square</td>
<td>25.373</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is apparent that the government is helping the less privileged learners and schools. A substantial number of schools has been classified as No Fee. However, the quality of education in these schools may not be good, as principal 1 said. Furthermore, as principal 1 pointed out, even though the No Fee schools do not levy fees, they charge learners for other things. As a result the less privileged learner may remain deprived.

In terms of supporting the less privileged learners, the government introduced a nutrition programme, as was reported earlier. Table 8.6 which is based on data from EMIS 2010 shows that the majority (60.1%) of the high schools in uMngungundlovu District are served by the nutrition programme.

Table 8.6 Nutrition programme in uMngungundlovu District high schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rural / Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No nutrition programme</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>91.5%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>73.0%</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A nutrition programme</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>77.6%</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>93.3%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>60.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on EMIS 2010
Schools that are classified as rural are the major beneficiaries of the nutrition programme. They constitute 77.6% of all the schools on the nutrition programme. The majority (93.3%) of rural schools have a nutrition programme. Schools that are classified as urban constitute a mere 22.4% of all the schools that are benefiting from the nutrition programme. Furthermore, 91.5% of the schools that have not received the nutrition programme are classified as urban. It can be argued that, by serving 61.1% of secondary schools in UMgungundlovu District, the government has tried to accommodate the less privileged learners.

Another area in which the government is assisting the less privileged learners is transport. Because of the geographical distribution of high schools in UMgungundlovu District, not all learners have a high school nearby. In that regard, there are plans to assist such learners. In its performance plans 2011/2012, the KZN DoE “has been providing learner transport to certain areas where children experience difficulties in getting to nearby schools” in the province which include UMgungundlovu District (KZN DoE, 2011:34). However, the actual number of learners benefiting from the learner transport programme for UMgungundlovu could not be ascertained.

The government has exercised political accountability by supporting the less privileged learners and schools, as well as by introducing a nutrition programme for those in need as well as planning to introduce transport. Such measures are evident in UMgungundlovu District, but the overall sense from teachers and principals is that such efforts to date have not been adequate. The next section investigates the perception of respondents in UMgungundlovu District of government’s effectiveness in formulating educational policy.

8.4 Political accountability: policy formulation

In order to gain and maintain the trust of citizens governments formulate policies that are aimed at delivering services such as education. Respondents were asked to give their views on the effectiveness of the government in formulating relevant educational policies for South Africa. The results are presented in Figure 8.5.
About 28% of respondents said that the government was ‘not effective’ and another percentage 14% indicated that the government was ‘not effective at all’ in formulating educational policies. About 34.7% were neutral. 19% of the respondents noted that the government was ‘effective’ while 2% believed that the government was very effective in formulating educational policies. As indicated earlier, some respondents pointed out that such policies were ‘good on paper’ which may also be taken to mean that the policies are well formulated. Some teachers had the following to say about educational policy in South Africa.

*I think government is trying. They are definitely spending a lot of money on education but the education system they are using is not right for our context* (Pr15).

*No. The policies are not good. With the advent of OBE and its rigidity as a system ... teachers felt disempowered and often lost confidence in themselves. The administration was onerous and time consuming leaving less time for more important activities like lesson preparation.* (Tr36)

*No, some policies are not working in SA.* (Tr22).

*The government is forever changing goal posts, we are never consulted* (Tr24).

*It is not enough. The government must stop changing the curriculum now and then* (Tr17).

*I think the department needs to make up their minds and stick to it. Changes cause stress and confusion to teachers* (Tr16).
Yes, the government is doing well but they must stop giving new policies every day. They should make sure that all schools have learning materials and facilities (Tr54).

The issues raised by respondents included policy stability, policy effectiveness and policy relevance. Most of these respondents were dissatisfied with the educational policies themselves, especially the pace of change. Table 8.7 shows the perceptions of respondents based on their race.

**Table 8.7 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of respondents of government’s effectiveness in formulating of educational policies according to race**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Not effective at all</th>
<th>Not effective</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Effective</th>
<th>Very effective</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.50%</td>
<td>29.10%</td>
<td>38.20%</td>
<td>25.50%</td>
<td>1.80%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21.40%</td>
<td>59.30%</td>
<td>61.80%</td>
<td>73.70%</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>56.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30.00%</td>
<td>30.00%</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
<td>10.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42.90%</td>
<td>22.20%</td>
<td>14.70%</td>
<td>10.50%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
<td>20.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26.30%</td>
<td>21.10%</td>
<td>31.60%</td>
<td>10.50%</td>
<td>5.30%</td>
<td>5.30%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35.70%</td>
<td>14.80%</td>
<td>17.60%</td>
<td>10.50%</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
<td>19.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>3.70%</td>
<td>5.90%</td>
<td>5.30%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>4.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14.30%</td>
<td>27.60%</td>
<td>34.70%</td>
<td>19.40%</td>
<td>2.00%</td>
<td>2.00%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.7 indicates that a large percentage (42.9%) of those who said the government was ‘not effective at all’ in formulating educational policies were White respondents. On the other hand, 73.7% of those who indicated that the government was ‘effective’ were African respondents. About 26.3% of the Indian respondents believed that the government was ‘not effective at all’ in formulating educational policies while 50% of the coloured respondents thought that the effectiveness of government in formulating educational policy was neutral [average]. The responses given here seem to suggest that the racial background of street-level bureaucrats is related to their perception of government’s effectiveness in educational policy.
formulation but a chi-square test ($p = 0.279$) shows that the association is not statistically significant.

### 8.5 Political accountability: implementing educational policies

How effective has government been in implementing policies on education, as opposed to formulating them? The results appear in Figure 8.6.

**Figure 8.6 uMgungundlovu District: the perceptions of respondents of government effectiveness in implementing educational policies**

The results indicate that the government has not been very effective in implementing educational policies. A small percentage (15%) of the respondents asserted that the government has ‘not [been] effective at all’ in implementing educational policies. 26% of the respondents said the government is just ‘not effective’ while 27% said the government has been neutral in the area of educational policy. Only a small percentage (7%) of respondents thought that the government was very effective in implementing the policy, but 23% indicated that it had been effective.

One teacher said that: **on paper it works but lacks implementation at cluster and school level** (Tr18).

With regard to implementation, other teachers asserted that:

*The government is trying, however, more needs to be done in terms of implementing education policies* (Tr54).
The government is not effective at all because there many things which are insufficient in our school but government does nothing (Tr38).

No. Too much under SADTU [South African Democratic Teachers’ Union] and implementation is hampered by cadre deployment (Tr34).

Policies are all in place but there is a no implementation thereof. There is not enough accountability in some schools and in the Department of Education. Some schools do not have telephones and it is difficult to communicate. There is a shortage of qualified teachers in many schools (Tr71).

A largely negative response arose from the interviews on matters of policy implementation. Yet the findings from the questionnaire were mixed, with 4% overall expressing some dissatisfaction, while 27% had a neutral view, and 30% thought that government had been effective to some degree. In order to analyse this further, the perceptions of the respondents was calculated according to their educational qualification.

Table 8.8 uMgungundlovu District: respondents’ perception of government’s effectiveness in policy implementation according to educational qualification

| Respondent’s level of qualification | Not effective at all | Not effective | Neutral | Effective | Very effective | No opinion | Total |
|------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------|---------|-----------|---------------|-----------|
| National Senior Certificate        | N 0                 | 0             | 3       | 0         | 0             | 0         | 3     |
| %                                  | 0.0%                | 0.0%          | 11.1%   | 0.0%      | 0.0%          | 0.0%      | 3.0%  |
| Teacher Certificate                | N 0                 | 0             | 1       | 1         | 0             | 0         | 2     |
| %                                  | 0.0%                | 0.0%          | 3.7%    | 4.3%      | 0.0%          | 0.0%      | 2.0%  |
| Diploma                            | N 4                 | 9             | 4       | 5         | 2             | 0         | 24    |
| %                                  | 26.7%               | 34.6%         | 14.8%   | 21.7%     | 28.6%         | 0.0%      | 24.0% |
| Bachelor Degree                    | N 11                | 8             | 10      | 9         | 4             | 2         | 44    |
| %                                  | 73.3%               | 30.8%         | 37.0%   | 39.1%     | 57.1%         | 100.0%    | 44.0% |
| Honours’ Degree                    | N 0                 | 7             | 8       | 8         | 1             | 0         | 24    |
| %                                  | 0.0%                | 26.9%         | 29.6%   | 34.8%     | 14.3%         | 0.0%      | 24.0% |
| Masters’ Degree                    | N 0                 | 2             | 1       | 0         | 0             | 0         | 3     |
| %                                  | 0.0%                | 7.7%          | 3.7%    | 0.0%      | 0.0%          | 0.0%      | 3.0%  |
| Total                              | N 15                | 26            | 27      | 23        | 7             | 2         | 100   |
| %                                  | 100.0%              | 100.0%        | 100.0%  | 100.0%    | 100.0%        | 100.0%    | 100.0%|

Table 8.8 shows that 73.3% of those who said the government was ‘not effective at all’ in implementing educational policies hold a Bachelor’s degree as their highest qualification. Respondents with a Master’s degree constituted 7.7% of those who said the government was
not effective. Those who hold a teacher certificate comprised 4.3% of those who said that government was effective in implementing educational policy. It seems as though the degree of satisfaction with government’s performance in policy implementation depended on the level of qualification of respondents. The higher the qualification the respondent has, the lower the level of contentment. However, a chi-square test ($p = 0.269$) seems to suggest that this is a chance occurrence.

**Conclusion**

The chapter has offered a comprehensive presentation and analysis of the views of street-level bureaucrats’ on government’s political accountability in implementing the educational policies in uMgungundlovu District by examining government’s financing of education, how government supports less privileged learners and schools, as well as the formulation and implementation of policies in education.

On financing education, the government has allocated a large portion of the national budget to education but the respondents in uMgungundlovu District expressed dissatisfaction with the resources they have received in the schools. The sentiments were generally similar across different types of schools.

The exercise of political accountability by government in terms of supporting the less privileged learners in schools in uMgungundlovu District was evident. The government classified some schools as No Fee schools and introduced nutrition programmes in most of the schools in the lower quintiles. There are also plans to introduce transport programmes for all learners who reside in areas that are far from schools. However, the respondents in uMgungundlovu District indicated that the government was still not doing enough to support the less privileged schools and learners.

In exercising political accountability, the government formulated educational policies to be implemented in all districts. Some respondents in uMgungundlovu District indicated that the policies were good and that the government had been effective in designing them. But other respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the manner in which the policies are made and the pace at which they are changed. There were differences in the views of respondents from different racial and educational backgrounds on the effectiveness of government in formulating educational policies. However, these differences were not statistically significant.
Very few respondents in uMgungundlovu District affirmed the effectiveness of government in implementing educational policies. Most respondents, especially those who were interviewed, said that the policies themselves were inadequate, nor had government been effective in implementing them.

The next chapter will investigate the second type of accountability, that is, performance accountability.
CHAPTER NINE
UMGUNGUNDLOVU DISTRICT: PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY IN IMPLEMENTING THE NCS

The second objective of the study is to survey the external accountability mechanisms used by the government through the Department of Basic Education (DBE) to secure accountability among the street-level bureaucrats (teachers) and to improve performance in the implementation of NCS policy. It was found that the Department uses a number of strategies to make schools and educators accountable. Performance accountability in uMgungundlovu District involves scrutinising the actions of street-level bureaucrats who are implementing the NCS in relation to the outputs and accomplishment of objectives.

This chapter will investigate performance evaluation as a principal method of ensuring performance accountability. The main tool used in measuring and evaluating the performance of street-level bureaucrats in uMgungundlovu District, namely, IQMS, will be discussed with respect to various items that are listed on the composite score sheet for performance evaluation. Performance Agreements (PA) must be signed by educators at the beginning of the year and be reviewed quarterly until evaluation is completed. Quarterly reports must be kept in an individual’s file and be made available whenever they are required. The chapter will end with a discussion on the perceived effects of performance evaluation in ensuring performance accountability by teachers in implementing the NCS.

9.1 uMgungundlovu District: the perceived importance of different aspects of the performance evaluation score sheet

The respondents were asked to rate the different items listed on the composite score sheet of performance evaluation in terms of their significance when evaluating the performance of a street-level bureaucrat in implementing NCS. These items are: learner assessment and achievement; teacher attendance and punctuality; planning, administration and lesson delivery; co-curricular activities; human relations and contribution to school development; creation of a positive learning environment; and knowledge of curriculum content; and professional development. The respondents were asked to rank the importance of each item. The ratings were 1 (not important at all), 2 (slightly important), 3 (somewhat important), 4 (important) and 5 (very important). The next sub-section will focus on all these items, discussing each item in turn.
9.1.1 uMgungundlovu District: perceived importance of learner achievement for performance evaluation

One of the most important aspects of performance evaluation is learner achievement in assessments. Figure 9.1 shows the perceptions of respondents in relation to this.

**Figure 9.1 uMgungundlovu District: perceived importance of learner achievement in assessments**

![Figure 9.1 uMgungundlovu District: perceived importance of learner achievement in assessments](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importance of learner achievement in assessments</th>
<th>Percentage of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all important</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slightly important</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat important</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>55.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9.1 shows that about 23% of respondents indicated that performance evaluation based on learner achievement in assessments is ‘important’. The majority (55%) indicated that this means of assessment is ‘very important’ in performance evaluation. A very small group (4%) said performance evaluation is ‘not important at all’ and a fairly large proportion (15%) said learner achievement in assessment is ‘somewhat’ important. The information in Table 9.1 indicates that most of the respondents affirm that learner achievement in assessments is a significant component of performance evaluation. Table 9.1 analyses the respondents’ perceptions according to the type of school in which they taught.
Table 9.1 uMgungundlovu District: perceived importance of learner achievement in assessments for performance evaluation, according to type of school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Not important at all</th>
<th>Slightly important</th>
<th>Somewhat important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Very important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>44.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former Model C School</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
<td>39.1%</td>
<td>50.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>59.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>55.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.1 indicates that 44% of respondents in independent schools said that learner achievement in assessments is very important for performance evaluation; 28% rated this as ‘important’ and 20% believed this to be ‘somewhat important’. A very small minority (4%) thought that this consideration is either ‘slightly important’ or ‘not important at all’. Note, though, that those who rated assessment as ‘very important’ constituted 20% of the total of number of teachers in all types of schools.

The majority (58.3%) of respondents in public former Model C schools said that learner achievement is ‘very important’ in performance evaluation; they were also the majority (50.9%) of all respondents who took such a standpoint. About 18.8% of the respondents in former Model C schools indicated that learner achievement in assessment is ‘important’ in performance evaluation and they constituted 39.1% of all respondents who held such a view. A small proportion (14.6%) in former Model C schools believed that learner achievement in assessments is ‘somewhat important’ in performance evaluation. They were a large proportion (46.7%) of all the respondents who took that position. In the ‘not important at all’ and ‘slightly important’ categories there was 4.2% in each.

The highest proportion (59.3%) of those who believed that learner achievement in assessment is ‘very important’ in performance evaluation was from the respondents in public township schools, although they comprise a small proportion (29.1%) of all the respondents who took
such a view. Furthermore, 25.9% of all the respondents in public township schools believed that learner achievement in assessments is ‘important’. Another 11% of such respondents rated this as ‘somewhat important’ in performance evaluation, which was 20% of all respondents who made the same judgement. Only one respondent (3.7%) in a public township school believed that learner achievement for performance evaluation is ‘not important at all’.

The information in Table 9.2 seems to suggest that there is little variation in the perceptions of respondents according to type of school. This is confirmed by a chi-square test which shows that the variations are not statistically significant ($p = 0.914$) as shown in Table 9.2. It is therefore clear that the type of school had no influence on the perception of street-level bureaucrats on the importance of learner assessment in performance evaluation.

### Table 9.2 Chi-square test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Degree of freedom</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.300*</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.914</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9.1.2 uMgungundlovu District: Attendance of teachers and punctuality

Teacher attendance and punctuality are the second item of performance evaluation of street-level bureaucrats implementing NCS in uMgungundlovu District. Figure 9.2 shows the perceptions of respondents on the importance of this.
Figure 9.2 uMgungundlovu District: perceived importance of teacher attendance and punctuality as a means of performance evaluation

Figure 9.2 shows that the majority (51%) of all the respondents believed that teacher attendance and punctuality are ‘very important’ while 23% of the respondents said they are ‘important’. It suggests that 74% of the respondents affirmed that the punctuality and attendance of teachers are crucial in performance evaluation of street-level bureaucrats. About 16% of the respondents said that teacher attendance and punctuality are ‘somewhat important’, while 7% and 3% of the respondents believed that teacher attendance and punctuality are ‘slightly important’ and ‘not important at all’ respectively. Generally, one can say that most respondents acknowledged the importance of teacher punctuality and attendance in performance evaluation.

Further analysis shows that the perceptions of respondents from different schools are not the same as Table 9.3 reveals.
Table 9.3 uMgungundlovu District: perceived importance of teacher attendance and punctuality in performance evaluation as a means of performance evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Not important at all</th>
<th>Slightly important</th>
<th>Somewhat important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>56.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former model C</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>51.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.3 shows that the majority (56%) of respondents in independent schools believed that teacher attendance and punctuality are ‘very important’ in performance evaluation. They constituted a small proportion (27.5%) of all respondents who believed as much. 20% of all the respondents in independent schools believed that teacher attendance and punctuality are ‘important’ in performance evaluation, 21.7% of all the respondents who made the same rating. 18% of those suggested that teacher attendance and punctuality are ‘somewhat important’ in performance evaluation, 12% of the total who indicated as such. Although only 12% of respondents in independent schools indicated that teacher attendance and punctuality are ‘slightly important’, they were a large percentage (42.9%) of all the respondents who took such a view.

A significant proportion (45.8%) of all the respondents in former Model C schools who believed that teacher attendance and punctuality for performance evaluation are ‘very important’, were a large proportion (43.1%) of those who held such an opinion. The biggest proportion (52.2%) rated teacher attendance and punctuality as ‘important’ but they were a small fraction (25%) of all the respondents from such schools. About 14.6% of all the respondents from former Model C schools indicated that teacher punctuality and attendance are ‘somewhat important’ in performance evaluation, a small percentage (8.3%) of all respondents who thought so. Although only 6.3% of all the respondents in former Model C schools said
that teacher attendance and punctuality is ‘not important at all’ in performance evaluation, they constituted 100% of all respondents who believed as much.

A substantial majority (55.6%) of respondents in public schools in townships indicated that teacher attendance and punctuality are ‘very important’ in performance evaluation but they constituted a small fraction (29.4%) of all respondents who indicated this. 22.2% of all the respondents in public schools in townships believed that teacher attendance and punctuality are ‘important’ in performance evaluation, 26.1% of all respondents who took such a position. It can be inferred that all the respondents from public schools in townships affirmed that teacher punctuality and attendance are significant factors in performance evaluation.

Table 9.3 seems to suggest that the perceptions of street-level bureaucrats are associated with the type of school in which they teach. However, statistical analysis dispels this view, given the results of chi-square test (p = 0.454). This means that any such association is based on chance.

Table 9.4 Chi-square test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pearson Chi-Square</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Degree of freedom</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.790</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.454</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9.1.3 The importance of planning administration and lesson delivery in performance evaluation

The third item of performance evaluation of educators in uMgungundlovu district is planning, administration and lesson delivery. Figure 9.3 shows the perceptions of respondents in relation to this.
A substantial majority (56%) of all the respondents believed that planning, administration and lesson delivery are ‘very important’ in performance evaluation, about 22% of all the respondents rated this as ‘important’ and 18% as ‘somewhat important’. Only 3% of all the respondents rated this item as ‘slightly important’ while 1% believed it is ‘not important at all’.

Generally, Figure 9.3 shows that most respondents confirmed the significance of planning, administration and lesson delivery in the performance evaluation of street-level bureaucrats’ work.

In order to see any association between such perceptions of respondents and the type of school in which they teach the two variables were cross tabulated. Table 9.5 shows the results.
Table 9.5 uMgungundlovu District: perceived importance of planning, administration as a means of performance evaluation, according to type of school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Not important at all</th>
<th>Slightly important</th>
<th>Somewhat important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>52.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model C</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>56.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.5 shows that the majority (52%) of respondents in independent schools said that planning, administration and lesson delivery are ‘very important’ in performance evaluation and they constituted a small percentage (23.2%) of all the respondents who took such a position. 31.8% from independent schools indicated that this item is ‘important’ in performance evaluation, 28% of all respondents from such schools, 12% rated this as ‘somewhat important’ in performance evaluation; 4% indicated that it is either ‘slightly important’ or ‘not all important’.

About 58.3% of all the respondents in public former Model C schools (50% of all such respondents) indicated that planning, administration and lesson delivery are ‘very important’ in performance evaluation. 20.8% believed that this item is ‘important’, (45.5% of all respondents who took such a view), 18.8% regarded it as ‘somewhat important’ (50% of the entire sample), whereas only 2.1% (only one teacher) viewed this as ‘slightly important’.

Table 9.5 shows that the majority (55.6%) of respondents from public schools in townships constituted a small proportion (26.8%) of all the respondents who indicated that planning, administration and lesson delivery are ‘very important’ for performance evaluation. 18.5% of respondents in public schools in townships rated this as ‘important’ (22.7% of the sample) and 22% viewed the item as ‘slightly important’ (33% of all such respondents).

No one thought that planning, administration and lesson delivery are not important for performance evaluation. The responses seem to be fairly similar across all types of schools.
This is confirmed by a chi-square test \((p = 0.784)\). It is generally apparent that planning, administration and lesson delivery were regarded as crucial elements of performance evaluation of street-level bureaucrats implementing NCS in uMgungundlovu District.

**9.1.4 The importance of co-curricular activities in performance evaluation**

Involvement in co-curricular activities is considered to be an important part of a teacher’s job description. To this end, it is also listed on the composite score sheet of performance evaluation in uMgungundlovu District. What are the perceptions of street-level bureaucrats of the importance of co-curricular activities in performance evaluation? Figure 9.4 presents the responses.

**Figure 9.4 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the importance of co-curricular activities in the performance evaluation**

![Bar chart showing responses to the importance of co-curricular activities.]

Figure 9.4 shows that a small majority (35%) of respondents said that co-curricular activities are ‘very important’ in performance evaluation, 26% said they are ‘important’, while 25% said they are ‘somewhat important’. A small proportion (11%) indicated that they are ‘slightly important’. Only 3% of all the respondents thought that co-curricular activities are ‘not important at all’. As compared to other items of the composite score sheet discussed earlier, it seems as though less value is attached to co-curricular activities for purposes of performance evaluation as shown by the relatively small proportion (35%) of respondents who thought that contributing to co-curricular activities are ‘very important’ for evaluating their performance.
The findings seemed to suggest that there was an association between perceptions of respondents on the importance of curricular activities and the type of schools in which they taught. See Table 9.6.

Table 9.6 uMgungundlovu District: perceived importance of co-curricular activities as means of performance evaluation, according to type of school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Not important at all</th>
<th>Slightly important</th>
<th>Somewhat important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former Model C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>47.9%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.6 shows that 20% of respondents from independent schools (14.3% of all such respondents), indicated that co-curricular activities are ‘very important’ in performance evaluation, 24% that they are ‘important’ (23.1% of all such respondents), and 32% that they are ‘somewhat important’ (45.5% of all such respondents). Only 4% (33.3% of all respondents) of respondents from independent schools thought that co-curricular activities are ‘not important at all’ in their performance evaluation.

The highest proportion (47.9%) of respondents who indicated that co-curricular activities were ‘very important’ in performance evaluation was in the former Model C public schools and they also constituted 65.7% of all respondents who took such a viewpoint. 27.1% in these schools rated this item as ‘important’ (50% of the sample who did so), whereas a small fraction (8.3%) thought that co-curricular activities are ‘slightly important’ for performance evaluation (18.2% of all respondents who had the same view).

The proportion of respondents from former public schools in townships who felt that co-curricular activities were ‘very important’ for performance evaluation was 25.9%, which was the lowest of all types of schools. Another 25.9% indicated that this criterion is ‘important’ for
performance evaluation and 37% that it is ‘somewhat important’ (40% of all the respondents who held such a view).

The information in Table 9.6 seems to suggest that there is an association between the perceptions of teachers about the importance of co-curricular activities in performance evaluation and the type of schools in which they are located. Respondents from former Model C schools seemed to place greater value on co-curricular activities than respondents from public township schools. However, a chi-square test showed that this was not statistically significant (p = 0.177).

9.1.5 The importance of human relations and contribution to school development in performance evaluation

Street-level bureaucrats in uMgungundlovu District are expected to maintain good human relations and contribute to the development of the schools in which they teach. This is a fifth item on the composite score sheet of performance evaluation. Respondents were asked to rank the importance of this item for their performance evaluation. The findings are presented in Figure 9.5.

Figure 9.5 uMgungundlovu District: perceived importance of human relations and contributing to school as a means of performance evaluation

Figure 9.5 shows that a small majority (40%) of all the respondents said that human relations and contributing to the development of their school is ‘very important’ in assessing their
performance while 27% said it is ‘important’. About 22% suggested that this item is ‘somewhat important’, 8% that it is ‘slightly important’ while 2% believed it is ‘not important at all’. The perceptions were then analysed according to the type of school where a teacher was based. The results appear in Table 9.7.

**Table 9.7 uMgungundlovu District: perceived importance of human relations and contribution to school development as a means of performance evaluation, according to type of school**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Not important at all</th>
<th>Slightly important</th>
<th>Somewhat important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former model C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>47.9%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.7 shows that 20% of all the respondents from independent schools said that human relations and contributing to school development were ‘very important’ in performance evaluation (a small proportion (20%) of all respondents who took such a view), 24% indicated that this is ‘important’ (23.1% of all such respondents) and 20% that this is ‘slightly important’ (45.5% of all such respondents).

Table 9.7 shows that respondents from former Model C schools seem to give more value to human relations and to contributing to school development than any other type of school, with 47.9% of their respondents constituting 65.7% of all the respondents who suggested that this is ‘very important’. Furthermore, 27.1% of their respondents were 50% of all respondents who felt that this criterion is ‘important’. About 14.6% indicated that it is ‘somewhat important’ (28% of who took such a view). Only one teacher dismissed the importance of this item altogether.
Table 9.7 shows that 25.9% of respondents in public township schools constituted 20% of all respondents who believed that human relations and contributing to school development were ‘very important’ in their performance evaluation. A further 25.9% rated this item as ‘important’ (26.9% overall), and 37% as ‘somewhat important’ (40% of all such respondents). Three teachers took a lesser view of the significance of such criteria for their performance evaluation.

It is clear that teachers in all types of school attach at least some importance to human relations and to contributing to school development as a means of performance evaluation. Although respondents from former Model C schools seem to attach more value to this than any type of school, a chi-square showed that the association was not statistically significant (p = 0.177).

9.1.6 The importance creation of a positive learning environment for performance evaluation

Street-level bureaucrats are not only expected to make learning happen in their classes, but they were also expected to create a positive learning environment in them. They were given scores on the composite score sheet for performance evaluation according to how they do so. Figure 9.6 shows the perception of respondents of this item for their performance evaluation.

Figure 9.6 uMgungundlovu District: perceived importance of creating of a positive learning environment as a means of performance evaluation
Figure 9.6 shows that a small majority (47%) of the respondents said that creation of a positive learning environment is ‘very important’ in the performance evaluation of street-level bureaucrats while 25% indicated that it is ‘important’. 20% that it is ‘somewhat important’ and 6% that it is ‘slightly important’. It can be inferred that 72% of the respondents highlighted the importance of the creation of a positive learning environment in performance evaluation. Did these views depend on the types of schools concerned? Table 9.8 presents these findings.

**Table 9.8 uMgungundlovu District: perceived importance of creating a positive learning environment as a means of performance evaluation, according to type of school**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Not important at all</th>
<th>Slightly important</th>
<th>Somewhat important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former model C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>52.0%</td>
<td>51.1%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>47.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.8 shows that 32% of the respondents in independent schools (17% of all such respondents) indicated that the creation of a positive learning environment is ‘very important’ in evaluating the performance of street-level bureaucrats who are implementing NCS. 24% believed that this is ‘important’ (24% as well of all such responses). Thus 56% rated this item as at least important. 28% of respondents from independent schools formed 35% of all the respondents who thought that the creation of a positive learning environment is ‘somewhat important’ in performance evaluation. Only 16% believed it is ‘slightly important’, which was 66.7% of all respondents who had such a view.

The majority (50%) of respondents from former Model C schools also formed the majority (51%) of all respondents who believed that creating a positive learning environment is ‘very important’ in the performance evaluation of street-level bureaucrats. A small percentage (21.7%) of respondents from these schools constituted a majority (52%) of all respondents who
thought that this factor is ‘important’. This means that a total of 77.1% of respondents from former Model C schools identified the importance of creating a positive learning environment. 16.7% of respondents in former model C schools noted that this is ‘somewhat important’ with only one teacher suggesting that it is ‘slightly important’ and another that it is unimportant.

Table 9.8 shows that the majority (55.6%) of respondents in public schools in townships indicated that the creation of a positive learning environment is ‘very important’ for performance evaluation while 22.2% suggested that it is ‘important’. Thus 77.8% rated the importance of this item. 18.5% of respondents from public schools in townships (25% of all such respondents) felt that the creation of a positive learning environment is ‘somewhat important’.

The creation of a learning environment was found to be important in all types of schools with 47% of the total indicating that it is ‘very important’ and 25% that it is ‘important’. Table 9.6 shows that there is no big variation in perceptions between types of school, although schools in the townships had the highest proportion of respondents in the ‘very important’ category.

9.1.7 The perceived importance of knowledge of curriculum content in performance evaluation

On the composite score sheet for the performance evaluation of street-level bureaucrats knowledge of the curriculum content is listed as a further (sixth) item where street-level bureaucrats can score points. Knowledge of curriculum content describes the street-level bureaucrat’s knowledge and mastery of the subject(s) he or she teaches. Figure 9.7 shows the perceptions of respondents of the importance of knowledge of curriculum content for their performance evaluation.
Figure 9.7 uMgungundlovu District: perceived importance of knowledge of curriculum content for performance evaluation

Figure 9.7 shows that the majority (56%) of respondents indicated that knowledge of curriculum content is a ‘very important’ component of performance evaluation. About 20% and 18% of the respondents said it is ‘important’ and ‘somewhat important’ respectively. A very small proportion of respondents rated this lower with 3% saying it is ‘not important at all’ and 2% that it is ‘slightly important’.

The type of schools where respondents taught seemed to have an influence on their perceptions about the importance of knowledge of curriculum content for performance evaluation. Table 9.9 portrays these results.
Table 9.9 uMgungundlovu District: perceived importance of knowledge of curriculum content in performance evaluation, according to type of school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Not important at all</th>
<th>Slightly important</th>
<th>Somewhat important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>52.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former model C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>56.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.9 reveals that 52% of respondents from the independent schools (23% of all such respondents) indicated that knowledge of curriculum content is ‘very important’ in their performance. 12% thought that it is ‘important’ (15% of all respondents who took such a standpoint). This means that 67% of respondents from independent schools identified the significant importance of knowledge of curriculum content in performance evaluation. Only 12% thought that this is ‘somewhat important’ while 24% believed that it was ‘slightly important’.

58.3% of all respondents from former Model C schools constituted the biggest proportion (50%) of respondents who felt that knowledge of curriculum content is ‘very important’ in performance evaluation. 20.8% thought that this is ‘important’. Only one respondent (2.1%) believed this item is ‘not important at all’ for performance evaluation.

Table 9.9 shows that 55.6% of the respondents from public schools in townships constituted 26.8% of all respondents who said knowledge of curriculum content is ‘very important’ in their performance evaluation. 25.9% in these schools (35% of all such respondents) rated this as ‘important’, 14.8% as ‘somewhat important’, while 3.7% indicated that it is ‘not important at all’.

A chi-square test showed that there was no significant difference between respondents from different type of schools (p = 0.490). However, this test revealed that there was an association
between respondents’ perception of the importance of knowledge of curriculum content relation to their highest educational qualification (p = 0.009) (see Table 9.10).

Table 9.10 Chi-square test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pearson Chi-Square</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>degree of freedom</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44.874</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>.009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9.1.8 The perceived importance of professional development in performance evaluation

The number and type of exercises in professional development that a street-level bureaucrat attends in a year are the final item for performance evaluation. Respondents were asked to rank the importance of this for their performance evaluation. This is indicated in Figure 9.8.

Figure 9.8 uMngundlovu District: perceived importance of professional development for performance evaluation.

A small majority (45%) of respondents said that they considered professional development to be a ‘very important’ component of performance evaluation, 27% indicated that it is ‘important’, while 22% thought that it is ‘somewhat important’, and 4% that it is ‘slightly important’. only 2% felt that it is ‘not important at all’.

An analysis of the responses according to type of school where teachers were located revealed no significant differences. See Table 9.11.

177
Table 9.11 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the importance professional development for performance evaluation, according to type of school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Not important at all</th>
<th>Slightly important</th>
<th>Somewhat important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former Model C</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>52.1%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
<td>40.7%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>45.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

36% of the respondents from independent schools (20% of all such respondents) rated professional development as ‘very important’ for their performance evaluation. 28% (25.9% of all such respondents) regarded this factor as ‘important’. Thus 64% of the respondents in independent schools suggested the significant importance of professional development in their performance evaluation of educators. Only 8% of the respondents from independent schools indicated that professional development is ‘slightly important’ while 4% that it is ‘not important at all’.

Former Model C schools had the highest proportion (52.1%) of respondents who believed that professional development is ‘very important’ which also constituted the majority (55.6%) of all respondents who took such a viewpoint. 25% of respondents in these schools (44.4% of all such respondents) regarded professional development as ‘important’ in performance evaluation, 18.8% that it is ‘somewhat important’ and 4.2% that it is ‘slightly important’. In sum 77.1% of these teachers indicated that professional development is at least an important consideration in their performance evaluation.

Table 9.11 shows that 40.7% of respondents from public schools in townships (24.4% of all such respondents) suggested that professional development is ‘very important’ for performance evaluation, and 29.6% that it is ‘important’ (29.6% of respondents who took such a view). This brought to 70.3% the total proportion of respondents who identified the importance of
professional development for performance evaluation. 25.9% of these respondents rated professional development as ‘slightly important’ for performance evaluation.

The information in Table 9.11 shows that there is no association between the perceptions of respondents of the importance of professional development and the type of school where they teach. This is confirmed by a chi-square test (p = 0.67) which shows that any such association is insignificant.

This section has outlined the perceptions of respondents of the importance of different items on the composite score sheet which is used to evaluate the performance of street-level bureaucrats implementing the NCS in uMgungundlovu District. An attempt was made to compare the perceptions of respondents according to different types of schools. Generally, no statistically significant variation emerged. The next section will focus on the purposes of performance evaluation as perceived by street-level bureaucrats.

9.2 uMgungundlovu District: Purpose of performance evaluation

What is the purpose of performance evaluation? Some educators in uMgungundlovu District argue that its main purpose is to evaluate best teaching practice while others see it as a way of learning. Some view performance evaluation as a means of rewarding high performers and punishing the street – level bureaucrats who do not perform to expected standards. This section will investigate the perceptions of educators relating to the purpose of performance evaluation.

9.2.1 Evaluation as the main purpose of performance evaluation

Many street – level bureaucrats in schools believe that the main purpose of performance evaluation is to evaluate their work. Figure 9.9 shows their opinions.
Most (54%) of the respondents suggested that the main purpose of performance evaluation is to evaluate their performance ‘all the time’. 19% thought this is so ‘sometimes’ while 23% rated this as ‘almost never’. Only a small fraction (4%) said that the purpose of performance evaluation is ‘never’ to evaluate their work. In order to analyse this further, the perceptions of respondents were calculated according to the types of schools in which they taught.

Table 9.12 uMgungundlovu District: perception of performance evaluation as a means of evaluation, according to type of school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>To evaluate</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Almost never</td>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>Almost all the time</td>
<td>All the time</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>44.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former Model C</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>52.1%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>52.2%</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
<td>46.3%</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>54.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9.12 shows that 44% of all the respondents from independent schools indicated that the purpose of performance evaluation is to evaluate their performance ‘all the time’. However, they comprise a small proportion (20.4%) of all the respondents who took such a view. 16% in independent schools believed that evaluation ‘almost all the time’ measures their performance and 32% indicated that this is sometimes the case. Only 8% of respondents from independent schools suggested that that the main purpose of performance evaluation is ‘almost never’ to evaluate (the majority (50%) of all respondents).

A majority (52.1%) of respondents from former Model C schools thought that performance evaluation is aimed at evaluating street – level bureaucrats (46.3% of all such respondents), 25% that this is so ‘sometimes’ (52.2% of all such respondents) and 4.2% that it is ‘almost never’.

A large proportion (66.7%) of respondents from township schools said that the purpose of performance evaluation is to evaluate their work ‘all the time’ (33.3% of all such respondents). A further 22.2% thought that this is the case ‘almost all the time’ (31.6% of all such responses), and 11.1% that this is so ‘sometimes’ (13% of who held such a view).

In some cases, after an evaluation, lessons are learnt and methods are improved. The next section investigates learning as the main purpose of performance evaluation.

9.2.2 Learning as the main purpose of performance evaluation

In order to make a comprehensive analysis, the perceptions of respondents were calculated according to the types of schools in which they teach, as shown in Table 9.13.
Table 9.13 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of learning as the purpose of performance evaluation, according to type of school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>To learn</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Almost never</td>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>Almost all the time</td>
<td>All the time</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former Model C</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>40.7%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (overall results)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is apparent that that a small majority (45%) of all the respondents affirmed that the main purpose of performance evaluation ‘all the time’ is to learn, that this is so ‘almost all the time’ for 21.%, and ‘sometimes’ for 27%. 4% thought that learning is ‘almost never’ the purpose of performance evaluation and 3% that it ‘never’ is.

Independent schools had the smallest proportion (13.3%) of all the respondents who said the purpose of performance evaluation ‘all the time’ is to learn. 12% of respondents from these schools formed a substantial majority (75%) of those who said it is ‘almost never’ the case that the main purpose of performance evaluation is to learn. The 12% of respondents from independent schools formed 100% of all who indicated that the purpose of performance evaluation is ‘never’ to learn.

A majority (58.3%) of respondents from former Model C schools were a substantial majority of all respondents (62.2%) who believed that the purpose of performance evaluation ‘all the time’ is to learn. About 12.5% of respondents from former Model C schools said that ‘almost all the time’ the purpose of performance evaluation is to learn (28.6% of all the respondents who took such a view), and 27.1% that it is so ‘sometimes’. Only 2.1% of respondents from former Model C schools thought that learning is ‘almost never’ the purpose of performance evaluation, although this constituted 25% of all such respondents.
A small majority (40.7%) of all the respondents from public township schools said that the purpose of performance evaluation ‘all the time’ is to learn, but they constituted a small fraction (24.4%) of all the respondents who took such a view. For 25.9% learning as the purpose of performance evaluation is the purpose ‘almost all the time’ and ‘sometimes’ for 33.3%. There was no one from these schools who indicated that the purpose of performance evaluation is ‘almost never’ or ‘never’ to learn.

The findings suggest that there is a close association between the respondents’ perceptions of learning as the main purpose of performance evaluation and the type of school in which they teach. It seems as though most respondents from independent schools did not see improving their teaching as the main purpose of performance evaluation. This association is confirmed by a chi – square test (p = 0.003) which shows that this is not a chance variation.

### Table 9.14 Chi-Square Tests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-Square</td>
<td>23.235</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 9.2.3 Rewarding high performers as main purpose of performance evaluation

Table 9.15 illustrates the opinions of teachers on rewarding high performers as the main purpose of performance evaluation.
Table 9.1 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of rewarding high performers as the purpose of performance evaluation, according to type of school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Almost never</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Almost all the time</th>
<th>All the time</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former Model C</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>40.7%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.15 shows that a small majority (33%) of respondents indicated that the main purpose of performance evaluation in uMgungundlovu District ‘all the time’ is in order to reward high performers, this is so ‘sometimes’ for 24% and that for a significantly high proportion 19% performance evaluation is ‘never’ used to reward high performers. In order to gain a deeper understanding, the perceptions of the respondents were calculated according to the types of schools in which they teach.

A small majority (36%) of respondents from independent schools who said that performance evaluation is ‘never’ used in order to reward high performers also constituted the largest percentage (47.4%) of all the respondents who indicated as much. Another fairly large proportion (32%) from independent schools comprised 53.3% of all the respondents who suggested that performance evaluation is ‘almost never’ used to reward high performers. Only 16% of the respondents from independent schools said that ‘all the time’ performance evaluation is used to reward high performers. On the other hand, 12% in these schools believed that performance evaluation is a means of rewarding achievers ‘sometimes’, 4% ‘almost all the time’ and 16% ‘all the time’.

Unlike in independent schools, a small majority (37.5%) of respondents from former Model C schools who said that performance evaluation is used ‘all the time’ to reward high performers also constituted the majority (54.5%) of all such respondents. Furthermore, 8.3% from former
Model C schools (44.4% of all such respondents) thought that ‘almost all the time’ performance evaluation is used to reward high performers 29.2%, ‘sometimes’, but 10.4% ‘almost never’ and 14.6% ‘never’.

A large proportion (40.7%) of respondents from township public schools indicated that performance evaluation is used ‘all the time ‘to reward high performers, while another 14.8% said that this is so ‘almost all the time’ (44.4% of all such respondents) and 29.2% that this happens ‘sometimes’. For 7.4% performance evaluation ‘almost never’ serves this purpose, and ‘never’ for 11.1%.

The findings reveal that perceptions of the purpose of performance evaluation are dependent on the type of schools in which teaching happens. Most respondents from independent schools did not affirm the use of performance evaluation in rewarding street – level bureaucrats who perform well. A chi – square test (p = 0.018) confirms this.

**Table 9.16 Chi-Square Tests**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-Square</td>
<td>18.489</td>
<td></td>
<td>.018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 9.2.4 Punishing low performers as main purpose of performance evaluation

Table 9.17 portrays the perceptions of punishing teachers who do not perform in terms of expected outcomes.
Table 9.17 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of punishing low performers as the purpose of performance evaluation, according to type of school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>To punish low performers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model C</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>52.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (overall</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>results)</td>
<td>46.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.17 shows that a small majority (46.5%) of all respondents said that performance evaluation are ‘never’ used to punish low performers. Another 18.2% said that it is ‘almost never’ used to punish low performers. Only 10.1% of all the respondents said that performance evaluation is used ‘all the time’ to punish street-level bureaucrats who do not perform well. The perceptions of respondents were calculated according to the type of schools in which they teach in order to gain an insight into the distribution of their responses. This is presented in Table 9.17.

Independent schools formed 23.9% all respondents who indicated that performance evaluation is ‘never’ used to punish low performers, 38.9% said ‘almost never’, 26.3% ‘sometimes’, 20% ‘almost all the time’ and 10% ‘all the time’. In general, most independent school respondents did not regard performance evaluation as a means used to punish low performers.

The majority (50%) of respondents from former Model C schools who indicated that performance evaluation is ‘never’ used to punish low performers were also in the majority (52.2%) of all respondents who held such a position. Furthermore, 16.7% of all the former Model C respondents who believed that performance evaluation is ‘almost never’ used to punish low performers made a significant fraction (44.4%) of all respondents who assumed such a view. Although a small percentage (6.3%) of respondents from these schools thought that performance evaluation is used ‘almost all the time’ to punish low performers, it formed
the majority of all respondents who took such a point of view. The findings suggest that most of the street – level bureaucrats in the former Model C schools did not view performance evaluation as a mechanism of punishing low performers.

42.3% of respondents from townships public schools said that performance evaluation is ‘never’ used to punish low performers although they constituted a small percentage (23.9%) of all respondents who held such a view. 11.5% of the respondents from such schools noted that performance evaluation is ‘almost never’ used to punish low performers. 19.2% indicated that performance evaluation is ‘sometimes’ used for this purpose, 3.8% that this is so ‘almost all the time’ and 23.1% that this is so ‘all the time’ (a majority (60%) of all the respondents who assumed such a position). Generally most respondents from public township schools in uMgungundlovu District did not see performance evaluation as a way of punishing low performers.

There is a general consensus among teachers from all types of schools that the purpose of performance evaluation is not to punish street –level bureaucrats who do not meet the required standards of performance. Furthermore, most respondents tended agree there are no financial benefits attached to performance evaluation. As result most street – level bureaucrats view performance evaluation as a routine exercise.

As a mechanism of ensuring performance accountability, performance evaluation is feared by some street – level bureaucrats in uMgungundlovu District because they do not understand its main purpose. It is viewed as a way of evaluating learning processes and methods but such evaluation has also been seen in relation to rewarding high performers and punishing low ones. Teachers’ perceptions of performance evaluation may result in both desired and unintended effects. The next section investigates some of these effects.

9.3 uMgungundlovu District: Perceived effects of performance evaluation

Respondents were asked whether performance evaluation improved their performance; caused false behaviour by teachers; led to falsification of information; caused teachers to focus on measured output; added more clerical work (administration); or improved accountability. This section will focus on these effects on street – level bureaucrats. In order to gain a deeper understanding of the perceived effects of performance evaluation the perceptions of the respondents were calculated according to the type of school in which they were located.
9.3.1 Performance evaluation improves performance of the teachers

Has performance evaluation helped to improve the actual performance of teachers? Views on this are portrayed in Table 9.18.

Table 9.18 uMngundlovu District: performance evaluation improves performance, according to type of school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Improves my performance</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former Model C</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In general, a small majority (46%) of respondents ‘agreed’ that performance evaluation improved their performance while 33% ‘strongly agreed’ that it did so. A significantly small percentage (6%) ‘disagreed’ while 4% ‘strongly disagreed’ that performance evaluation was effective in improving their performance. This would suggest that performance evaluation as an effective mechanism of performance accountability is viewed positively by respondents (a total of 79%).

Independent schools had the highest proportion (56%) of their respondents who ‘agreed’ that performance evaluation was effective in improving their performance. About 24% of respondents from independent schools who ‘strongly agreed’ that performance evaluation improved their performance formed 18.2% of all such respondents. Although a very small percentage (8%) of respondents ‘strongly disagreed’ that performance evaluation improved their performance, they were 50% of all respondents who took a similar view. The responses from independent schools were largely positive.

The responses from former Model C schools were also generally positive with a small majority (39.6% of respondents) who ‘agreed’ that performance evaluation improved their performance.
and 33.3% who ‘strongly agreed’. However, respondents from these schools were the most (63.6%) of all respondents who were ‘uncertain’ about the effects of performance evaluation. Furthermore, their respondents constituted 50% of all respondents who ‘strongly disagreed’ and 66.7% of all respondents who ‘disagreed’.

About 33.3% of all respondents who ‘strongly agreed’ that performance evaluation improved their performance were from public township schools. Respondents from these schools also formed 28.3% of all respondents who ‘agreed’ that performance evaluation improved their performance. About 7.4% of their respondents formed 18.2% of all respondents who were ‘uncertain’ about the effects of performance evaluation. Only 3.7% of respondents from public township schools ‘disagreed’ that performance evaluation improved their performance.

The responses from all types of schools were largely positive which suggests that performance evaluation as a mechanism of performance accountability was effective in improving the performance of street – level bureaucrats.

9.3.2 Performance evaluation caused false behaviour by teachers

Teachers were asked if performance evaluation caused them to perform better when they were being observed for performance evaluation than when they not. Their responses are shown in Table 9.19.

**Table 9.19 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of performance evaluation causing false behaviour by teachers, according to type of school**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Causes false behaviour</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former Model C</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A very small majority (30%) of all respondents ‘agreed’ that teachers may behave differently when they were being observed. However, a small but significant percentage (25%) of all respondents ‘disagreed’, while 12% ‘strongly disagreed’, that educators may teach better when they are being observed than when they are not. A very small proportion (7%) of all the respondents ‘strongly agreed’ that performance evaluation may lead to false behaviour in the classroom. The total number of respondents of those who affirmed false behaviour and those who denied it is almost the same (30% vs. 25%), while 24% were uncertain.

The proportion of respondents from independent schools who ‘disagreed’, were ‘uncertain’ and those who ‘agreed’ about performance evaluation causing false behaviour was similar (28%). A small percentage (8%) from these schools who ‘strongly disagreed’ formed 16.7% of all respondents who took such a view. Their opinion as to whether or not performance evaluation led to false behaviour by teachers was inconclusive.

A small majority (37.5%) of respondents from former Model C schools in uMgungundlovu District were the majority (60%) of all respondents who ‘agreed’ that performance evaluation causes false behaviour. Furthermore, 10.4% of respondents from these schools comprised 71.4% of all those who ‘strongly agreed’ that teachers would teach differently when they are being observed. A small percentage (8.3%) from former Model C schools was 33.3% of all respondents who ‘strongly disagreed’ that performance evaluation leads to ‘window dressing’. The findings are also inconclusive.

About 22.2% of respondents from township public schools made up the majority (50%) of all respondents who ‘strongly disagreed’ that performance evaluation leads to false behaviour. A large proportion (29.6%) of respondents from these schools formed 32% of those who ‘disagreed’. A significantly large fraction (29.6%) of respondents was ‘uncertain’ while 18.5% ‘agreed’ that performance evaluation leads to false behaviour. A largely negative response came from public township schools which suggests that many of these respondents did not think that performance evaluation leads to behaviour modification when they are being observed.

Responses from the interviews largely indicated that performance evaluation may lead to false behaviour, as is shown in the following comments.
Because it is done once [per term], it is not a true reflection. If it is done continuously it can empower teachers for better performance (Tr23).

It is not a true reflection of everyday activities (Tr62).

It not a true reflection of everyday activities as evaluation occurs on limited occasions (Tr59).

The other thing is that when IQMS happens the teacher can put on a show for one lesson when observation is done and then for the rest of the year (Prl2).

I do think that evaluation can lead to "window dressing", one often feels - you told me you were coming so now I must give my best and more / not what is normal (Tr66).

These responses as well as observation by the researcher seem to suggest that performance evaluation as a mechanism of performance accountability may lead to behaviour modification by teachers in uMgungundlovu District. In some cases, behaviour modification may be accompanied by falsification of information. This is the focus of the next section.

9.3.3 Performance evaluation caused falsification of information

Respondents were asked if performance evaluation may cause teachers to falsify information about their job. Their responses are displayed in Table 9.20.

Table 9.20 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of performance evaluation causing falsification of information by teachers, according to type of school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Leads to falsification of information</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Uncertain</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former Model C</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>47.1%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
<td>59.1%</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>29.4%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A small majority (28.3%) could neither agree nor disagree with the assertion that teachers may falsify information due to performance evaluation. A fairly significant proportion (22.2%) of all respondents ‘agreed’ while 7.1% ‘strongly agreed’ that falsification of information may be caused by performance evaluation. About 17.2% ‘strongly disagreed’ while 25% ‘disagreed’ that performance evaluation may cause teachers to falsify information.

A further analysis of the perceptions of respondents according to their schools showed that 28.6% of all respondents who ‘strongly agreed’ and 18.2% of all respondents who ‘agreed’ were from independent schools. A small majority (32%) of respondents from independent schools was ‘uncertain’. However, a significantly large percentage (28%) of all respondents who ‘disagreed’ was from independent schools. About 16% of respondents from independent schools who ‘strongly disagreed’ formed 23.5% of all the respondents who took such a view.

Respondents from former Model C schools constituted 71.4% of all respondents who ‘strongly agreed’ and 59.1% of all respondents who ‘agreed’ that performance evaluation may lead to the falsification of information by teachers. About 17% of respondents from former model C schools ‘strongly disagreed’, while 23.4% ‘disagreed’, that teachers may falsify information due to performance evaluation. This shows that some of the unintended consequences of performance evaluation are falsification of information. This may suggest that teacher’s performance evaluation as an accountability mechanism on its own is not enough to hold street-level bureaucrats accountable.

A small majority (33.3%) of all respondents from public schools in township were ‘uncertain’ as to whether performance evaluation may cause teachers to falsify information about their work. About 18.5% of respondents from these schools constituted 29.4% of all respondents who ‘strongly disagreed’ that performance evaluation may lead to such falsification. Only 18.5% of respondents from township public schools ‘agreed’ that teachers may falsify information due to performance evaluation.

One teacher said that it is difficult to falsify information due to the constant supervision of heads of departments.

*Because we have constant checking up and moderation by our HoDs, we cannot falsify information, but we can always strive to develop and grow for the good of our school, learners and ourselves (Tr76).*
The findings suggest that the use of performance evaluation as a mechanism of performance accountability may lead to falsification of information but effective and constant supervision by heads of departments might help to reduce this. The next section will investigate the assertion that teachers may focus on the measured output which might be used as a coping mechanism to deal with performance evaluation.

### 9.3.4 Performance evaluation causes teachers to focus on measured outputs

Respondents were asked if performance evaluation caused them to focus on the tasks that are and measured. Their responses are shown in Table 9.21.

**Table 9.21 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of performance evaluation causing teachers to focus on measured outputs, according to type of school**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Teacher focuses on measured output</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Uncertain</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
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<td>36.0%</td>
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<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
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<td>12.5%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
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<td>42.9%</td>
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<td>45.5%</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>0.0%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
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<td>18.5%</td>
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<td>0.0%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
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<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A small majority of all the respondents (33%) ‘agreed’ while 15% ‘strongly agreed’ that performance evaluation may lead teachers to focus on measured outputs. About 31% percent were ‘uncertain’, 14% ‘disagreed’ and 6% ‘strongly disagreed’ that teachers would focus on measured outputs due to performance evaluation. Table 9.21 seems to suggest that most (48%) of the respondents affirmed that performance evaluation may lead to the neglect of tasks that are not measured in performance evaluation.

Further analysis shows that 24.2% of all respondents who ‘agreed’ and 20% of all those who ‘strongly agreed’ were from independent schools. A small majority (36%) of respondents from these schools formed 29% of all respondents who were ‘uncertain’. About 16% of all
respondents from independent schools constituted 28.6% of all respondents who ‘disagreed’ that performance evaluation may cause teachers to focus on measured outputs.

A small majority (46.7%) of all respondents who ‘strongly agreed’ that performance evaluation may cause teachers to focus on measured outputs came from 14.6% of respondents from former Model C schools. About 31.3% of respondents from these schools ‘agreed’, while 29.2% was ‘uncertain’. Only 10.4% of respondents from Former Model C schools were in the majority (83.3%) of all the respondents who ‘strongly disagreed’ that performance evaluation may cause teachers to focus on measured outputs. However, the findings suggest that most (45%) of respondents from former model C schools acknowledged that performance evaluation may lead to the neglect of tasks that are not measured in the performance evaluation.

A majority (37%) of respondents from township schools ‘agreed’ while 18.5% ‘strongly agreed’ that performance evaluation may lead teachers to focus on the measured output. However, 29.6% of respondents from these schools were ‘uncertain’ while 14.8% ‘disagreed’. However, most respondents from these schools acknowledged that performance evaluation as a mechanism of performance accountability may cause teachers to focus on the measured outputs.

The views of teachers from different types of schools did not vary significantly. However, there were more respondents from township schools who believed that teachers may focus on the measured outputs due to performance evaluation.

9.3.5 Performance evaluation causes more clerical work for teachers

Findings from observation showed that teachers often complained about the additional clerical work due to performance evaluation. Respondents were asked about this. Their responses are shown in Table 9.2, which is based on the type of school in which a teacher is situated.
A small majority (37%) of all respondents ‘strongly agreed’ while 24% ‘agreed’ that performance evaluation has led to more clerical work for educators. About 21% said ‘sometimes’ this was so. A very small proportion (13%) disagreed while only 5% ‘strongly disagreed’. Generally, the biggest proportion of all respondents acknowledged that performance evaluation has caused more clerical work.

Further analysis based on the types of schools where the respondents are showed that a majority (48%) from independent schools ‘strongly agreed’ while 16% ‘agreed’ that performance evaluation did add clerical work to their teaching load. Only 8% of respondents from these schools ‘disagreed’, while a small majority (40%) of the sample who ‘strongly disagreed’ were from these schools. It can be inferred that most (64%) of all respondents from independent schools confirmed that performance evaluation as a mechanism of performance accountability has added more clerical work to the load of teachers.

A majority (56.8%) of all respondents who ‘strongly agreed’ that performance evaluation caused more clerical work for teachers were from former Model C schools. Respondents from these schools also constituted a majority (58.3%) of all those ‘agreed’ that performance evaluation increased clerical work. Although only 14.6% of respondents from former Model C schools ‘disagreed’, they were in the majority of all respondents who took such a view. Only
4% percent of all respondents from these schools ‘strongly disagreed’ that performance evaluation added more clerical work. Taken as a whole, most of the respondents from former Model C schools acknowledged that performance evaluation has caused more clerical work.

A majority (44.4%) of respondents from township schools were integral to the majority (57.1%) of all respondents who said ‘sometimes’ performance evaluation added more clerical work to educators. About 22.2% of respondents from these schools ‘agreed’ while 14.8% ‘strongly agreed’. A small percentage (3.7%) of respondents from township schools formed 20% of all those who ‘strongly disagreed’.

In the main, the perceptions of respondents from township schools in uMgungundlovu District were different from perceptions of teachers in other types of schools. Although the latter acknowledged that performance evaluation has caused more clerical work, most of the respondents from township schools said it ‘sometimes’ does. This was confirmed by a chi – square test (p = 0.02) which shows that this variation was not a result of chance.

9.3.6 Performance evaluation improves performance accountability among teachers

Respondents were asked if performance evaluation improved their performance accountability. Their responses are shown in Table 9.23.
Table 9.2 shows that a small majority of all respondents ‘agreed’, while 26% ‘strongly agreed’, that performance evaluation improved their performance accountability. About 23% of all respondents said that ‘sometimes’ performance evaluation improved their performance accountability. Only 6% ‘strongly disagreed’ while another 6% ‘disagreed’. The findings suggest that a large proportion of all respondents acknowledged that performance evaluation improved their performance accountability.

Analysing the perceptions of respondents according to the types of schools in which they teach revealed that respondents from independent schools who constituted 25% of all respondents formed 34.6% of all respondents who ‘strongly agreed’, and 17.9% of those who ‘agreed’. About 28% of respondents from independent schools thought that ‘sometimes’ performance evaluation improved their performance evaluation while 8% ‘strongly disagreed’. In the main, most respondents from these schools confirmed that performance evaluation improved the performance accountability of teachers.

A majority (61.5%) of all respondents who ‘agreed’ that performance evaluation improved performance accountability were from former Model C schools. About 14.6% of respondents from these schools formed 26.9% of all respondents who ‘strongly agreed’ that performance evaluation improved their performance accountability. About 8.3% of respondents of former Model C schools ‘strongly disagreed’ while another 8.3% ‘disagreed’. It is apparent that most

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Performance evaluation improves performance accountability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former Model C</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of the respondents from these schools affirmed the effectiveness of performance evaluation in improving performance accountability in uMgungundlovu District.

A small majority (37%) of respondents from township public schools ‘strongly agreed’ while 29.6% ‘agreed’ that performance evaluation improved performance accountability among teachers. About 25.9% of the respondents said that ‘sometimes’ performance evaluation improved accountability. A small fraction (7.4%) of respondents from these schools formed 33.3% of all respondents who ‘disagreed’. For the most part, respondents from these schools confirmed that performance evaluation improved performance accountability.

The perceptions of respondents from all types of school discussed here are fairly uniform. Most of the respondents in uMgungundlovu District acknowledged that performance evaluation improved performance accountability among teachers. However, one commented that:

*Committed and dedicated teachers are accountable all the time. You do not need an instrument to ensure accountability* (Tr53).

**Conclusion**

This chapter explored the performance accountability of teachers in uMgungundlovu District. The first section of the chapter investigated the perceived importance of different aspects of the performance evaluation score sheet that are used when rating the performance of a street – level bureaucrats for purposes of performance accountability. The items were: learner achievement in assessments; attendance of teachers and punctuality; planning, administration and lesson delivery; involvement in co – curricular activities; human relations and contribution to school development; and content knowledge. Their significance was reported.

The second section concentrated on the main purpose of performance evaluation in relation to teachers as street – level bureaucrats. There were different views about the main purpose of performance evaluation. Some of the main purposes explored in this chapter were: evaluation; learning; rewarding high performers; and punishing low performers. Many respondents did not believe that the purpose of performance evaluation was to draw lesson from the evaluation. They viewed the evaluation as ways of limiting their autonomous spaces and reduce their professional discretion. This may imply that teachers do not look forward to improved practice after observing what works and what does not work through performance evaluation. Most
respondents acknowledged the impact of these factors but viewed performance evaluation as a means of punishing the low performers.

The last section of the chapter surveyed the effects of performance evaluation as a mechanism of performance accountability among teachers as street – level bureaucrats in uMgungundlovu District. The main effects that were discussed are: improvement in the performance of teachers; false behaviour; falsification of information; focusing on measured outputs; increased clerical load; and improved performance accountability among teachers. Respondents from all types of schools acknowledged most of these effects although a significant proportion did not affirm the falsification of information by teachers.

It was apparent that education authorities in uMgungundlovu District are exercising performance accountability, which is an external form of accountability to secure compliance among teachers as street – level bureaucrats. The findings suggest that the measures to secure compliance were seen as being quite effective, although this assessment will be explored more thoroughly in the final chapter. The next chapter will investigate hierarchical accountability in uMgungundlovu District.
CHAPTER TEN
UMGUNGUNDLOVU DISTRICT: HIERARCHICAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN IMPLEMENTING THE NCS

In uMgungundlovu District hierarchical accountability, which is also known as bureaucratic or organisational accountability, is manifested in the roles of supervisors and street – level bureaucrats. There are rules and operating procedures for tasks which are the responsibility of educators. Their performance is closely monitored by education authorities at various levels. As explained in earlier chapters, hierarchical accountability involves teachers who are responsible for teaching, planning and assessment of learners. The main mechanisms for this in uMgungundlovu District include conformity to standards that are set at provincial or national level as well as assessment of learners.

Firstly, the chapter will begin by exploring the perceptions of teachers of the purpose of assessments. Then it will investigate the perceived effects of using assessments and examination as a mechanism of hierarchical accountability. Thirdly, the chapter will explore the role played by the school management teams (SMT). Different accountability tools used by members of SMT will be considered. Finally, the chapter will end with a discussion on the role played by subject clusters and subject advisors. Here moderation of school based assessments at cluster level will be explored.

10.1 uMgungundlovu District: The use of assessments as a mechanism of hierarchical accountability

As discussed in earlier chapters, the DBE has used assessments as a means to secure accountability among street – level bureaucrats. Most of the assessments are done in the exit bands: Grades 3, 6, 9 and 12. Assessments in schools are divided into two, school - based assessments and common tests. The DBE spells out the number and type of assessments for each subject and grade. For instance, in Geography learners are expected to carry out eight tasks in an academic year. Out of the eight tasks, three are examinations (mid-year, trials and end of year examination), two are tests, and the other three are any tasks that could include drawing and labelling sketch maps, research and analysing information from sources. For most schools, the mid-year and trial examinations are common examinations while they set and administer the other tasks. The first seven tasks are known as school-based assessments (because they are usually set and marked at school level). In terms of weighting, they comprise 25% of the final mark.
The DBE introduced Annual National Assessments (ANA) which were piloted in 2010. These assessments test Grades 1 – 6 and Grade 9 in numeracy and literacy, which are administered and marked by teachers. The scores are sent to the provincial and national education departments. These assessments are said to serve two purposes; assessment for learning and assessment of learning (NEEDU, 2013:52). It is argued that when teachers administer and mark such assessments they will be in a better position to ascertain the weaknesses of their learners and therefore seek to improve their performance. Thus assessment of learning leads to assessment for learning. In so doing, schools are also made accountable for their results. How have these purposes of assessment been interpreted by teachers as street – level bureaucrats?

10.1.1 uMgungundlovu District: assessment of learners as a mechanism of hierarchical accountability for teachers.

Do educators in uMgungundlovu District view learner assessments as a mechanism of bureaucratic accountability? Their responses are displayed in Table 10.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>To make educators accountable</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Almost never</td>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>Almost always</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>44.0%</td>
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<td>16.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>42.3%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former Model C</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>46</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>41.3%</td>
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<td>100.0%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>76.9%</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
<td>46.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3.7%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>40.7%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>21.4%</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

About 21.4% of all the respondents indicated that ‘almost always’ the purpose of assessments is to make street – level bureaucrats accountable while a slightly larger percentage (38.8%) indicated that this is ‘sometimes’. 26.5% of all the respondents believed that learner
assessments are ‘almost never’ used as an accountability mechanism while to 13.3% of the respondents it was an outright ‘never’.

Further analysis revealed that while 16% of those from independent schools believed that assessments are ‘almost always’ used as an hierarchical accountability mechanism, 22% thought that it is so ‘sometimes’, while 44% indicated that this is ‘almost never’ the case, and 8% that this is ‘never’ so. The stronger negative reaction proved to be characteristic of the independent schools.

A majority (76.9%) of all respondents who indicated that assessments are ‘never’ used as a hierarchical accountability mechanism were from former Model C schools. Furthermore, 41.3% of these respondents were also in the majority (50%) of all those who indicated that ‘sometimes’ education authorities use assessments as a mechanism of accountability. Only 17.4% of respondents from these schools suggested that assessments are used ‘almost always’ for accountability purposes.

A small majority (40.7%) of respondents from township public schools said that ‘sometimes’ assessments are a mechanism of hierarchical accountability. Furthermore, 33.3% of respondents from these schools were the majority of all those who indicated that learner assessments are ‘almost always’ used as an accountability mechanism for educators. Only 3.7% of respondents who were surveyed in township public schools believed that assessments are ‘never’ used for accountability purposes and they were also in the minority of all those who took such a view. Respondents from township public schools mainly affirmed that assessments were used as an accountability mechanism in uMgungundlovu District in the implementation of NCS.

On the whole, although responses from the types of schools differed, they all confirmed that assessments are used as a mechanism of hierarchical accountability by education authorities.

10.1.2 uMgungundlovu District: using assessments to make schools accountable

Schools, as street – level bureaucracies which implement NCS in uMgungundlovu District, are sometimes themselves subject to accountability mechanisms. This stems from their position in the hierarchy of the DBE. Table 10.2 illustrates the perceptions of respondents of how assessments are used to make schools accountable.
Table 10.2 uMgungundlovu District: perception of assessment as a bureaucratic accountability mechanism for schools, according to type of school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of schools</th>
<th>To make schools accountable</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Almost never</td>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>Almost always</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former Model C</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>51.9%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The largest proportion (39.4%) of respondents indicated that assessments are ‘almost always’ meant to make schools accountable. Another proportion (38.4%) simply believed that ‘sometimes’ assessments are used for this purpose. Those who said that assessments are ‘never’ used to make schools accountable were in the minority (6.1%) while another 16.2% said they are ‘almost never’ used for this.

Analysing the responses according to type of school revealed that a majority (50%) of all respondents who said that assessments were ‘almost never’ used to make schools accountable were from independent schools. Respondents from these schools also constituted 33.3% of all those who indicated that assessments were ‘never’ used to make schools accountable. However, about 32% of respondents from these schools pointed out that assessments are ‘almost always’ used for school accountability intentions. Generally most respondents from independent schools seemed to suggest that assessments in uMgungundlovu District are aimed at making schools accountable in implementing NCS.

A majority of respondents from former Model C schools (40.4%) indicated that ‘sometimes’ assessments are used to make schools accountable while 36.2% said they are used ‘almost always’ for such a purpose. Although only 6.1% of all the respondents thought that assessments are ‘never’ used to make schools accountable, respondents from former Model C schools were in the majority (66.7%) of all those who took such a view. Most respondents
from these schools affirmed the use of assessments as an hierarchical accountability mechanism which is directed at schools.

Turning to township public schools, a majority (51.9%) of respondents indicated that ‘almost always’ the purpose of assessments is to make schools accountable while 44.4% believed that they are ‘sometimes’ used for this. There were very few (3.7%) respondents from these schools who indicated that assessments are ‘almost never’ used as hierarchical accountability mechanisms in the implementation of NCS. Generally, the majority of respondents confirmed that in uMgungundlovu District assessments are used to render schools accountable.

One principal commented that:

*The Annual National Assessments are used to measure the performance of the school. The schools are judged on the results of these national assessments. But it is hard to measure all the outcomes of education thorough assessments. So [this] is an unfair accountability method (Prl2).*

It is apparent that most of the respondents, regardless of the type of schools where they taught, believed that assessments are used as hierarchical accountability devices for schools. However, teachers from township public schools felt the strongest about this.

**10.1.3 uMgungundlovu District: using assessments to make learners accountable for their education**

In trying to elicit the perspective of street – level bureaucrats on the purposes of assessment, respondents were asked to give their opinion on assessments as an accountability mechanism for learners. Their responses are displayed in Table 10.3.
Table 10.3 uMngundlovu District: perceptions of assessment as a bureaucratic accountability mechanism for learners, according to type of school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>To make learners accountable for their education</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Almost never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public former Model C</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public township</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A majority (54.5%) of all respondents suggested that assessments ‘almost always’ aimed at making learners accountable for their learning while 23.2% believed that sometimes they are used for such a purpose. 18.2% said they are ‘almost never’ used to make learners accountable for their learning while only 4% felt that this is ‘never’ so.

About 32% of respondents from independent schools constituted 14.8% of all the respondents who said that ‘almost always’ assessments are used to make learners accountable for their learning. 28% of the respondents from these schools indicated that ‘sometimes’ assessments are aimed at making learners accountable for their education. The respondents from independent schools, who constituted 25.3% of all the respondents, were in the majority (50%) of all those who suggested that assessments are ‘almost never’ used to make learners accountable for their education. Only 4% of the respondents from these school pointed out that assessments are never used to make learners accountable.

With regard to Model C schools, a majority (70.2%) of their respondents indicated that assessments are ‘almost always’ aimed at making learners accountable for their education. They also comprised the majority (61.1%) of all respondents who took such a view. About 19.1% of respondents from these schools indicated that ‘sometimes’ assessments are used for such purposes while 6.4% thought that this is ‘almost never’. Although a mere 4.3% of
respondents from these schools said that assessments ‘never’ make learners accountable for their learning, they were in the majority (50%) of those who took such a position.

In township public schools 48.1% of their respondents confirmed that ‘almost always’ assessments are used as an accountability mechanism for learners while 25.9% said they are ‘sometimes’ used for such purposes. Only 3.7% of their respondents rejected this assertion while 22.2% said it was ‘almost never’ so. In general, the respondents from these schools agreed that assessments are used as an accountability mechanism for learners.

Most respondents from all types of schools acknowledged that assessments are an instrument used to make learners accountable. As one educator commented:

_The purpose of education and assessment is not assessing the teachers; it is to distribute the limited resources. If there were no assessments and tests how were we going to determine who gets the scholarships, who goes to which university, who pursues which degree and who does which job? In a way, learners need to be accountable if they don’t want to be deprived of what they want and desire. One of my matric [Grade 12] learners is crying now because she was not taken into medical school because she does not have enough ‘As’. Isn’t that depriving? (Tr14)._

Respondents from former Model C schools seem to have the biggest proportion of those who regarded assessment as an hierarchical accountability mechanism which made learners accountable. This was confirmed by a chi – square test; the results (p = 0.03) suggest that this was not a chance variation.

In conclusion, it is apparent that assessments are multipurpose instruments of bureaucratic accountability. Whether they are used to make schools, teachers or learners accountable, it generally agreed that they remain a crucial hierarchical accountability mechanism in the implementation of NCS in uMgungundlovu District. The next section will consider the effects of using assessments as accountability mechanisms.

### 10.2 uMgungundlovu District: The effects of using assessments as hierarchical accountability mechanisms

As discussed earlier, the use of any accountability mechanism may produce both intended and unintended consequences. This is true for the use of assessments as an hierarchical accountability mechanism. This section will focus on some of these consequences that pertain to the work of street – level bureaucrats in implementing NCS in uMgungundlovu District. To that end, assessment will be discussed in relation to: encouraging accountability among
teachers; improving instruction and classroom practices; manipulating test records and results; emphasising subject areas that are covered in examination; encouraging a ‘finish the syllabus syndrome’; and promoting an emphasis on past examination questions.

10.2.1 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effectiveness of assessments in encouraging accountability among teachers

As noted earlier, it is apparent that many respondents acknowledged the use of assessments as an hierarchical accountability mechanism. In order to investigate the effectiveness of this mechanism, the perceptions of street – level bureaucrats were cross tabulated with the types of schools in which they taught. The results are illustrated in Table 10.4.

Table 10.4 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effect of assessments in encouraging accountability in schools, according to type of school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Encourages accountability in teachers</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former Model C</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the data it is clear that the majority (53.7%) of all respondents ‘agreed’ that assessments were effective in making street – level bureaucrats accountable while 22.1% ‘strongly agreed’. A very small proportion (7.4%) of all respondents ‘disagreed’ and another 1.1% ‘strongly disagreed’. It is clear that most respondents in the study confirmed the effectiveness of assessments as an hierarchical accountability mechanism.

Analysing the data according to type of school showed that although a majority (60.9%) of respondents from independent schools ‘agreed’, they comprised 27.5% of all respondents who
‘agreed’ that assessments were effective in making teachers accountable. 17.4% of all respondents from these schools ‘strongly agreed’ with this assertion. Only 4.3% of respondents from independent schools who ‘strongly disagreed’ comprised 100% of all the respondents who took such a view.

The respondents from former Model C were the highest proportion (57.1%) of all those who ‘strongly agreed’ that assessments were an effective tool of bureaucratic accountability. A majority (52.2%) of respondents from these schools ‘agreed’. The 6.5% of respondents from former Model C schools who ‘disagreed’ constituted the largest percentage (42.9%) of all those who took a similar position. In general, respondents from these schools responded positively to the assertion that assessments are effective in making teachers accountable.

The largest proportion (57.1%) of all those who ‘disagreed’ that assessments were effective in making teachers accountable was 15.4% of respondents from township public schools. However, a majority (50%) of such respondents ‘agreed’ while another 19.2% ‘strongly agreed’ with the assertion. On the whole, respondents from township public schools confirmed the effectiveness of assessments in making street – level bureaucrats accountable.

Respondents from all types of schools affirmed the role which is played by assessments in making educators accountable. The variations between them were not statistically significant.

10.2.2 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effectiveness of assessments in improving instruction and classroom practices

It would be expected that the improvement in bureaucratic accountability which was reported earlier would be accompanied by improvements in classroom instruction and practice. Respondents were asked if this is so. Their perceptions are shown in Table 10.5.
Table 10.5 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effect of assessments in improving classroom instruction in schools, according to type of school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Improves instruction and classroom practice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former Model C</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results obtained showed that a small majority (37.2%) of all the respondents ‘agreed’ that assessments lead to an improvement in classroom instruction and practice whilst 28.7% ‘strongly agreed’. Put together, this means that most of the respondents responded positively. Only 6.4% of the respondents did not agree while 6.4% ‘strongly disagreed’ that assessments result in improved classroom instruction.

Further analysis revealed that although 43.5% of respondents from independent schools ‘agreed’ that assessments lead to improvement in classroom instruction, this comprised 28.6% of all respondents who took such a viewpoint. About 21.7% of all the respondents in these schools ‘strongly agreed’ with the assertion. The 4.3% of all the respondents from independent schools who ‘strongly disagreed’ comprised 100% of all those who took such a position. In short, most respondents from independent schools were largely positive about the effects of assessment in the improvement of classroom instruction.

Turning to former Model C schools, about 33.3% of respondents from these schools were a majority (55.6%) of those who ‘strongly agreed’ that assessments had a positive effect on classroom instruction and practice. About 37.8% of respondents from such schools comprised 48.6% of all the respondents who ‘agreed’, whereas a small percentage (6.7%) of the respondents ‘disagreed’ (50% of all the respondents who held such a view). Again, it is
apparent that most respondents from former Model C schools acknowledged the positive effect of assessments on classroom instruction and practice.

A small majority (30.8%) of all the respondents from township public schools ‘agreed’ that assessments lead to the improvement of classroom instruction and practice, 26.9% ‘strongly agreed’ while 7.7% (33.3% of all such respondents) ‘disagreed’.

Generally, respondents from township public schools had a higher proportion of those who disagreed that assessments had a positive effect on the classroom instruction and practice, although in general respondents in various types of schools responded positively. This observation may suggest the ineffectiveness of assessments as an accountability mechanism among the township educators.

10.2.3 uMgungundlovu District: assessments cause teachers to manipulate test scores

The perceptions of street – level bureaucrats were sought regarding the negative effects of assessments as an hierarchical accountability mechanism. Table 10.6 shows the outcome.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Leads to manipulation of test records and result</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former Model C</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The biggest percentage (31.7%) of those surveyed was ‘uncertain’ when asked if the use of assessments as an accountability device causes teachers to manipulate test scores. A small but significant proportion (27.7%) of all the respondents ‘agreed’ that the use of assessments as an hierarchical accountability device causes street – level bureaucrats to manipulate test scores.
while 6.5% strongly ‘agreed’. Only 9.6% of all the respondents ‘strongly disagreed’, while 23.4% ‘disagreed’. The data show that the proportion of the respondents who did and did not support the assertion that the use of assessments as accountability may cause teachers to manipulate test scores is almost equal.

Further analysis shows that about 34.8% of respondents from independent schools ‘agreed’ that the use of assessments may cause teachers to manipulate test scores while another 34.8% was ‘uncertain’. 8.7% of respondents from these schools comprised 22.2% of all the respondents who ‘strongly disagreed’ with the assertion. Another 21.7% of respondents from independent schools ‘disagreed’. Although a bigger proportion of respondents ‘agreed’, the proportion which was ‘uncertain’ was significant.

As far as former Model C schools are concerned, 11.1% of respondents from these schools comprised 83.3% of those who ‘strongly agreed’ with the assertion that the use of assessments may cause street – level bureaucrats to manipulate test scores. Furthermore, 28.9% of respondents from these schools were in the majority (50.3%) of those who ‘agreed’. However, 26.7% of the respondents from these schools were ‘uncertain’ while 22.2% ‘disagreed’. Although only 8.9% of the respondents from former Model C schools ‘strongly disagreed’, they were 44.4% of all the respondents who took such a view.

Although 27.7% of all the respondents were from township public schools, they constituted only 16% of all those who ‘strongly agreed’ that the use of assessments may cause teachers to manipulate test scores. About 19.2% of all respondents from these schools also amounted to 19.2% of all those who ‘agreed’ with the assertion. The majority (38.5%) were ‘uncertain’, the highest percentage of those who took such a view. Again, although 11.5% of their respondents ‘strongly disagreed’ with the assertion that the use of assessments as a hierarchical accountability device may cause teachers to manipulate test scores, it was the biggest proportion compared to other types of schools.

In all types of schools there was a large proportion of respondents who were ‘uncertain’ about the effect of the use of assessments as a bureaucratic accountability mechanism. The reason for this is not clear, but it may have something to do with the cautiousness of respondents and the sensitivity of the subject. As one respondent commented:

*Under some circumstances I think it can be fair to ‘adjust marks’ (manipulation - sounds dishonest) but I see no problem with that* (Tr19).
However, it is apparent that most respondents acknowledged that the use of assessments for purposes of accountability may have caused them to manipulate test scores.

10.2.4 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of assessments in causing teachers to focus on areas covered in examination

It has been argued the use of assessments as a bureaucratic accountability device may lead teachers to focus on areas that are often covered in an examination, that is, to ‘teach to the test’. Respondents were asked the degree to which they agreed with this assertion. Their responses are shown in Table 10.7.

Table 10.7 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effect of assessments in causing teachers to focus on examined areas, according to type of school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Teacher put emphasis on subject areas that are covered in exams</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>No opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>47.8%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former Model C</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>41.3%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75.0%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
<td>58.8%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Preliminary analysis showed that only 17.9% of all the respondents indicated that they ‘strongly agreed’ while 42.1% ‘agreed’. A small but significant percentage was ‘uncertain’. Very few of the respondents did not confirm the effect of assessments in causing teachers to focus on content that they believe would be covered in examinations. About 9.5% ‘disagreed’, while 4.2% ‘strongly disagreed’, that the use of assessments as hierarchical accountability devices caused teachers to focus on areas that are likely to be examined at the expense of those that they believe would not be covered. Generally, most respondents acknowledged the effect of assessments in directing the attention of street – level bureaucrats to subject matter that they believe will be examined.
Further analysis of the data showed that although respondents from independent schools comprised 24% of all the respondents, they made up 29.4% of all the respondents who ‘strongly agreed’ that the use of assessments as an accountability mechanism may divert teachers’ attention to those areas that they believe are ‘important’ for examiners. A majority (47.8%) of respondents from these schools ‘agreed’ while 21.7% was ‘uncertain’, while only 8.7% of respondents (22.2% of all such respondents) ‘disagreed’ with the assertion.

On the other hand, the respondents from former Model C schools were in the majority (58.8%) of all those who ‘strongly agreed’ that the use of assessments as a bureaucratic accountability mechanism causes educators to teach according to what is likely to be examined. 4.1% of respondents from these schools ‘agreed’, 21.7% was ‘uncertain’ while 6.5% ‘disagreed’. Although a small proportion of respondents from former Model C schools ‘strongly disagreed’ (6.5%), they were in the majority (75%) of all those who took such a view. By and large, most respondents from these schools confirmed this particular effect of using assessments as a bureaucratic accountability mechanism.

What stood out most from the respondents from township public schools is that although they comprised 27.4% of all the respondents, they were in the majority (44.4%) of all those who ‘disagreed’ that the use of assessments may prompt teachers to teach in anticipation of what is often examined. A small majority (38.5%) of respondents from these schools ‘agreed’ while 7.7% ‘strongly disagreed’. A significant proportion (34.6%) of respondents from these schools was ‘uncertain’. Overall, this question elicited mixed reaction.

The phenomenon under review here, that the effect of assessment leads to educators teaching accordingly, arose in the interviews as well. One educator commented that:

*It [using assessments as accountability mechanisms] stifles creativity and spontaneity. Learners can’t learn at their own pace. We teach to assess. General skills and knowledge can’t be taught. There is not enough time to fulfil all the other roles of an educator (Tr39).*

Furthermore, observation by the researcher also confirms this impression. A good example is in Geography, where learners are expected to go on some field trips to reinforce concepts learned in class and to write research projects, but most teachers tend to ignore these aspects since they do not feature in the National Senior Certificate examinations. To some teachers these activities are viewed as a waste of valuable ‘learning’ time.
This syndrome is often connected to the need to finish the syllabus in time without paying attention to learners’ needs. This is explored in the next section.

10.2.5 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of using assessments as an accountability mechanism causes a ‘finish the syllabus syndrome’

Respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they agree that the use of assessments as an hierarchical accountability mechanism entrenched in them the need to finish, above anything else, teaching the syllabus on time. The responses are shown in Table 10.8.

Table 10.8 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effect of assessments in causing finish syllabus syndrome’, according to type of school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Promotes ‘finish the syllabus syndrome’</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|                              | 0.0%                    | 4.3%     | 26.1%    | 43.5% | 26.1%         | 100.0%
|                              | 0.0%                    | 7.1%     | 24.0%    | 32.3% | 27.3%         | 24.2%
| Public former Model C        |                         |         |          |       |               | 46    |
|                              | 6.5%                    | 19.6%    | 19.6%    | 23.9% | 30.4%         | 100.0%
|                              | 100.0%                  | 64.3%    | 36.0%    | 35.5% | 63.6%         | 48.4%
| Public township              |                         |         |          |       |               | 26    |
|                              | 0.0%                    | 15.4%    | 38.5%    | 38.5% | 7.7%          | 100.0%
|                              | 0.0%                    | 28.6%    | 40.0%    | 32.3% | 9.1%          | 27.4%
| Total                        |                         |         |          |       |               | 95    |
|                              | 3.2%                    | 14.7%    | 26.3%    | 32.6% | 23.2%         | 100.0%
|                              | 100.0%                  | 100.0%   | 100.0%   | 100.0%| 100.0%        | 100.0%

A general overview of the data shows that a significant proportion (23.2%) of respondents ‘strongly agreed’ while 32.6% ‘agreed’ that the use of assessments as a bureaucratic accountability mechanism forces them to focus on finishing the syllabus on time for examinations. Another significant percentage (26.3%) was ‘uncertain’ while 14.7% ‘disagreed’.

Analysing these perceptions of respondents according to type of school indicates that a small majority (43.5%) of respondents from independent schools ‘agreed’ that the use of assessments as a bureaucratic accountability device forces them to focus on finishing the syllabus in time. About 26.1% of respondents from independent schools comprised 27.3% of those who
‘strongly agreed’. A significant proportion (24%) of all those who were ‘uncertain’ were from independent schools. It is apparent that most of the respondents from independent schools attested that the use of assessments can force teachers to focus mainly on finishing the syllabus in time.

Further analysis revealed that a majority (63.6%) of all the respondents who ‘strongly agreed’ that use of assessments as an accountability mechanism for street – level bureaucrats causes them to focus on finishing the syllabus in time were 30.4% of those from former Model C schools. About 23.9% of respondents from these schools ‘agreed’ while 19.6% ‘disagreed’. A majority (64.3) of all the respondents who ‘disagreed’ with the assertion are also from former Model C schools. It is clear that most respondents from former Model C schools indicated that assessments may cause teachers to focus on finishing the syllabus more than anything else.

Turning to township public schools, although respondents from these schools comprised 27.4% of all the schools they were in the majority (40%) of all those who were ‘uncertain’. About 38.5% of their respondents ‘agreed’ while 7.7% ‘strongly agreed’. Only 15.4% of their respondents ‘disagreed’ with the assertion that the use of assessments may cause teachers to pay most attention to finishing the syllabus rather than making sure that learners understand the material. It is apparent that many respondents from these schools did not feel the effect of assessments to cause teachers to focus more on finishing the syllabus than on other aspects.

Although most respondents from all the schools acknowledged that an effect of using assessments as an hierarchical accountability mechanisms compels teachers to organise their work schedules to finish the syllabus on time, fewer in township public schools took such a view. The general syndrome, though, seems to be very evident. As one educator commented:

*The need to finish the syllabus for the exam leads to ‘pushed’ and rushed lessons to make time for revision* (Tr69).

To conclude, the use of assessment as a bureaucratic accountability mechanism can be applauded for improving accountability among street – level bureaucrats, as well as enhancing classroom practice and instruction. This is reflected in the data that has been presented here. However, it should be noted that respondents did highlight that assessments might have also led to educators manipulating test scores, as well as narrowing the lessons to what teachers thought examiners would include in the final examinations. Furthermore, such use of
assessments as an accountability mechanism was seen by many as responsible in forcing educators to teach at a pace in order to finish the syllabus in time. But assessment by itself may not be the only bureaucratic accountability which has helped to secure accountability. The next section will consider other bureaucratic accountability mechanisms.

10.3 uMgungundlovu District: other bureaucratic accountability mechanisms used to ensure accountability among teachers

This section will investigate the role played by school management teams (SMTs), as well as by subject advisors and cluster co-ordinators, in uMgungundlovu District in the implementation of NCS.

10.3.1 uMgungundlovu District: The role of School Management Teams (SMTs)

This section will look at how different schools are enforcing various accountability mechanisms as they seek to control educators. Observation showed that in a school the SMTs are responsible for making sure that the national policies are implemented properly in the classrooms on a day to day basis. The SMTs include the school HoDs, subject heads, deputy principals, as well as the school principal. District officials have much faith in the internal accountability mechanisms implemented by SMTs. Although subject advisors are not part of a school’s internal accountability structures they will be included in this section because often the management of a particular subject goes beyond school boundaries to the subject advisors. In terms of policy requirements of a particular subject some teachers communicate directly with the subject advisors. Also, cluster coordinators will be discussed here for the same reason. Table 6.17 shows perceptions of the role of SMTs by respondents based on the type of school where each teaches.
Table 10.9 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of SMTs who supervise the respondents’ work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Who supervises</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HOD</td>
<td>Principal</td>
<td>Cluster co-ordinator</td>
<td>Subject advisor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>83.30%</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
<td>41.70%</td>
<td>29.20%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former Model C</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>83.00%</td>
<td>44.70%</td>
<td>53.20%</td>
<td>31.90%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public location</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>77.80%</td>
<td>37.00%</td>
<td>33.30%</td>
<td>25.90%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This information indicates that in all types of schools the SMT members who supervise most of the respondents are HoDs. This does not mean that those who were supervised by the HoDs were not supervised by the principals, cluster co-ordinators or subject advisors. What it shows is that teachers were supervised most closely by their HoDs. Observations made by the researcher revealed that some, but not all, teachers will attend cluster meetings in order to meet the cluster co-ordinators and subject advisors. This was the case where more than one teacher taught a subject at a school. In many cases only one teacher, usually the HoD or subject head, would attend cluster meetings, which results in fewer numbers of teachers being supervised directly by a subject advisor. Another reason why fewer teachers might be advised by subject advisors and cluster co-ordinators is if the respondents taught Grades 8 and 9 [and at times Grade 10 and 11, and other subjects such as Religion Studies] whose subjects are not moderated at cluster level.

83.3% of the respondents from the independent schools were supervised by the HoDs while principals supervised 50%. Only 29.2% of these respondents were also supervised by subject advisors. The trend was generally the same for respondents from former Model C Schools where 83% of the respondents were supervised by HoDs while 31.9% were supervised by subject advisors.

When respondents were asked to say how HoDs supervise their work, they gave the following brief statements:
HoDs check the records, and advise on the interpretation of the policy. They conduct workshops and class visits every term. They also ensure consistency, accountability and success in tasks done (Tr13).

They do constant checking of records, student books etc. They encourage an educator to excel in his/her work during classroom visits (Tr43).

The HOD or principal will intervene if need be or asked. ‘Timetabling’ is done by the principal. Who teaches who is decided by the management. The problem is no subject expert is guiding us. If we keep a low profile we are left to do pretty much as we please (Tr60).

They are administrative driven – there is more ‘admin’ work and less time to interact with the learners. They are too prescriptive and emphasise much on policy requirements. They want 100% accuracy. At times they check who is late to lessons or who is absent through check in-check out registers. The principal can’t see everything (Tr27).

I find HoDs in this school to be very supportive and this has motivated me in terms of my passion and enthusiasm for teaching (Tr33).

We check the prep [lesson plans] coming in to see if they are following what they should be doing in class visits. HoDs should be coming in checking books where we look at learners’ results. We also to try and see what’s going on - it’s very difficult to see what happens in the classroom because when we go into classroom we see that everything is perfect. But what happens when we are not around is difficult to measure. That’s why at one stage we had a very detailed performance evaluation thing. On paper people would say everything is happening but you know in reality that it doesn’t happen all the time but according to your ... you can’t actually prove that there is something wrong because everything on paper was ok. That is why we are trying to change, to walk around the class to see what’s going on, talk to children, we look at their work, and we look at their work when it comes for moderation (Pr1).

Most respondents said that HoDs are key supervisors in their daily work, although teachers can go a long time without seeing higher level supervisors. HoDs are involved in inspecting learners’ books, checking class records and lesson plans. They moderate the tasks before they are given to learners as well as moderate assessments. In some cases respondents said that HoDs organise a meeting for a subject on a monthly basis. It was also the HoDs who were
involved in checking learner performance. It was interesting to notice that some respondents referred to their HoDs as mentors and supporters.

It is clear that school-based HoDs carry a great responsibility in relation to the implementation process at classroom level (street-level). The researcher, who is also a school-based HoD, observed that this role is very critical. A HoD is expected to have all the policy documents for all the subjects in his or her department and to have an in-depth knowledge of each document to ensure effective implementation. As mentioned by respondents, HoDS play a crucial role in giving new teachers induction and mentoring them. At the same time they are expected to play an oversight role, organising internal staff development with teachers in their department, conducting class visits and inspecting learners’ books. They are the first line of management to see that teachers are being accountable.

Observation by the researcher revealed that HoDs tend to be more thorough than any other management level above them. If teachers are doing their work according to policy requirements it is the HoD who has to give an account to either the school principal or the subject advisor. It can be assumed that HoDs tend to be thorough in their supervision because of this. In most cases, HoDs tend to be supportive of the teachers since they always work together, unlike the principal and the subject advisors. However, the management of teachers is not left to HoDs alone. Deputy principals and principals are also involved in ensuring accountability at school level.

Supervising educators is not an easy task. Pr1 has pointed out that it is difficult to monitor what goes on in a class even for principals and HoDs. Walking around now and then and even talking to children about what is happening in class are some of the strategies employed by principals. Principals noted that teachers are professionals: as such principals could not go to teachers’ classes daily since they assume that educators know what they should do.
Table 10.11 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effectiveness of internal accountability mechanisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N = 99</th>
<th>Not effective at all</th>
<th>Not effective</th>
<th>Effective</th>
<th>Very Effective</th>
<th>Extremely effective</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lesson observation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.00%</td>
<td>18.20%</td>
<td>49.50%</td>
<td>19.20%</td>
<td>8.10%</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student book inspection</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.00%</td>
<td>11.10%</td>
<td>46.50%</td>
<td>29.30%</td>
<td>9.10%</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff clock in registers (attendance)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.10%</td>
<td>12.10%</td>
<td>42.40%</td>
<td>24.20%</td>
<td>13.10%</td>
<td>2.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher records (plans and progress)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.00%</td>
<td>10.10%</td>
<td>35.40%</td>
<td>33.30%</td>
<td>20.20%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Lesson observation**

Table 10.11 shows that a small majority of all respondents (49.5%) indicated that lesson observation by members of SMT was ‘effective’ in enforcing accountability among teachers while another 19.2% suggested that it was ‘very effective’ and only 8.1% that was ‘extremely effective’ as a mechanism of bureaucratic accountability. A small fraction of respondents did not affirm the effectiveness of this mechanism, with 18.2% indicating that it was ‘not effective’, while 4% believed that it was ‘not effective at all’. Generally most of the respondents acknowledged that lesson observation is an effective tool of hierarchical accountability.

**Inspecting of learners’ books**

With regards to inspecting learners’ books as a bureaucratic accountability tool, a total of 46.5% confirmed that it is an ‘effective’ tool, while 29.3% indicated that it was ‘very effective’ and another 9.1% believed that it was ‘extremely effective’. Observation by the researcher, as a SMT member, confirmed that learners’ books, in many respects, epitomise what happens in a classroom. It is often a clear record of what happens in class as it reflects a teachers’ work. However, checking Creative Arts (formerly Arts and Culture) using this method is not very effective since some of their activities such as drama and songs are not recorded. To that end, about 3% said inspecting learners’ books was ‘not effective all’ in ensuring hierarchical accountability.
Staff attendance registers

Schools often have attendance registers for all staff members, including teachers. This register shows the time of arrival and departure from school. Some schools are too big for anyone simply to see who is present and who is absent. A register is a bureaucratic means of measuring compliance, of recording whether teachers are present when they should be. 42.4% of all the respondents indicated that this is an ‘effective’ mechanism of bureaucratic accountability while 24.2% suggested that it was ‘very effective’ and another 13.1% expressed that it was ‘extremely effective’. Only 12% of the respondents indicated that it was ‘not effective’ while 6.1% said it was ‘not effective at all’. In general, most respondents acknowledged that a school register was an effective tool of bureaucratic accountability.

Teacher records (plans and progress)

A small majority (35.4%) of all the respondents indicated that inspection of teacher records was an ‘effective’ mechanism of ensuring bureaucratic accountability, while 33.3% suggested that it was ‘very effective’ and another 20.2% that it was ‘extremely effective’. However, 10.1% of the respondents indicated that the inspection of the records of teachers was ‘not effective’ and another 1% suggested it was ‘not effective at all’. Most respondents thought that the inspection of teacher’ records was an important means of ensuring bureaucratic accountability.

What can be gleaned from this section is the crucial role played by SMTs in ensuring bureaucratic accountability. HoDs were seen to be the key members of SMT since they are the front line managers in educational policy implementation. In order to make them effective, they were given a manual (KZN DoE, undated). The next section will focus on the role of cluster co-ordinators and subject advisors in ensuring hierarchical accountability.

10.3.2 uMgungundlovu District: the role of clusters and subject advisors

Schools in uMgungundlovu District are grouped into clusters. These clusters are not organised according to schools but are based on subjects. Thus different subjects taught at a school belong to different clusters. Subject advisors work closely with the clusters through an elected cluster co-ordinator. Cluster and subject advisors are regarded as key components of bureaucratic accountability. The accountability role played by clusters and subject advisors is external to the schools. These advisors work as moderators, overseeing the work of their peers
from different schools. This is neither a top-down nor a bottom-up accountability system since the educators here are all at the same level with the exception of the subject advisor.

At the beginning of each year subject teachers and their subject advisors meet in what are termed orientation workshops in uMgungundlovu District, which is a requirement according to Annexure 3 of the Guidelines on the Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities of Education Districts (DBE, 2011b:41). They are grouped into clusters. Each cluster chooses a co-ordinator to be a link between the cluster and a subject advisor. A cluster co-ordinator is not chosen on the basis of knowledge, experience or competence. Subject advisors monitor the assessments of their subjects in each cluster. The researcher observed that in these clusters meetings nothing much happens except for token moderation and signing school based assessment forms. The subject advisor’s role is not well specified. This was confirmed by many respondents who said that the purpose of a subject advisor is to co-ordinate orientation workshops at the beginning of the year and to sign the NSC school-based continuous assessment mark sheets at the end of a year. Respondents commented as follows.

The cluster co-ordinator checks that all assignments are correctly done every term before the subject advisor can check them. They explain clearly what needs to be done. However, they sometimes don’t know what they want (Tr92).

Sometimes you are supervised by somebody who does not know the subject (Tr4).

Cluster co-ordinator and moderation - a waste of time, but my subject advisors and I work very closely together to give support and material to schools in the district (Tr24).

My subject advisor knows less than I do, I mean my subject ... [subject is named]. He is there because they could not find an advisor for that subject; he is a ... [subject named] person. I don’t think they are doing anything to make schools and teachers accountable. I think they tried to introduce policies of going to visit what they call under - performing schools. But their definition of under - performing school is not right. I would say any school that is performing below 90% pass rate should be considered to be an under - performing school and they must be visited, monitored, encouraged and trained to some extent (Tr15).

The comments made by these respondents confirm what the researcher observed in some cluster meetings. Many times teachers complain about the inability of subject advisors to help them. In most cases, the few subject advisors try to visit what they call under - performing schools. Schools that are doing well are often left alone. In one workshop attended by the
researcher, the subject advisor invited a resource person to help teachers in some special topics in a subject [subject is known to the researcher] that he was not well versed with. Respondents indicated that even during workshops subject advisors are dependent on teachers from former Model C School to help teachers from the under-performing schools. Observation by the researcher revealed that subject are doing far less than they are expected of in the Annexure 3 of the Guidelines on the Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities of Education Districts (DBE, 2011b). It can be assumed that ensuring accountability when the supervisor does not know much could be a challenge. Some cluster co-ordinators on the other hand do not offer any better alternative.

However, it should be noted that subject advisors play an important role in ensuring bureaucratic accountability, as noted by Tr24. In some cases they disseminate information to schools and teachers about change to policies pertaining to specific subjects.

To conclude, it is clear that the bureaucratic accountability role played by clusters and subject advisors is important, but the respondents in this study were not convinced that it is so. Respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the competence of some subject advisors who are expected to be key drivers of accountability.

**Conclusion**

Hierarchical accountability in uMgungundlovu District was seen to be enforced by various means. The first mechanism discussed in this chapter was assessment of learners through examinations. Respondents expressed that assessments may be viewed as an accountability mechanism not only for educators but also for schools and for the learners. The use of assessment as an hierarchical accountability mechanism has been effective in making street-level bureaucrats accountable and in improving classroom instruction and practice.

However, it was reported that the use of assessments as a bureaucratic accountability device in uMgungundlovu District has influenced educators to manipulate test scores as well as to tailor their teaching to the likely requirements of final examinations. Furthermore, many respondents acknowledged the need to teach in such a manner so as to ensure that the syllabus is completed prior to examinations.

The role played by SMTs in ensuring bureaucratic accountability was highlighted. Members of SMTs are involved in daily issues of policy implementation as front line managers. They visit
classrooms; inspect books; inspect teachers’ records; as well as keep attendance registers for teachers. These were viewed as critical components of bureaucratic accountability.

The last section explored the role played by clusters and subject advisors. Although clusters and subject advisors are expected to function as key components of bureaucratic accountability, most respondents did not think they were operating properly. Some respondents lamented subject advisors’ lack of subject knowledge. This concern about professionalism is explored at length in the next chapter, which focuses on the final accountability mechanism, namely, professional accountability.
The accountability mechanisms which have been discussed so far have not been seen to be ideal since teachers as street – level bureaucrats will always have resources to cope with the increased demands of their work and exercise discretion. In some cases, teachers may fail to comply with the accountability demands out of incompetence, as pointed out by respondents in the preceding chapter. Education authorities expect teachers to exercise professional accountability which is guided by professional ethics. Professional accountability is based on the assumption that teachers are professionals and they should act as such. Therefore, teachers are held accountable by their peers and professional bodies such as SACE. However, in some cases teachers are unable to exercise their professional duties due to lack of capacity.

It is against this backdrop that this chapter will examine how professional accountability is exercised in uMgungundlovu District. It will commence by exploring the perceptions of educators of SACE as a professional body. The last section of the chapter will investigate professional development as a way of addressing street – level bureaucrats’ professional capacity challenges. The final stage of analysis will consider the effectiveness of professional development in promoting professional accountability among educators.

11.1 uMgungundlovu District: the role played by SACE in promoting professionalism

The mandate of SACE is to promote the teaching profession by using different strategies, as was described in Chapter Five. These include registration, inculcating the Code of Ethics and managing professional development. To what extent is SACE fulfilling this mandate in uMgungundlovu District?

**Registration**

Out of all the teachers in the 179 high schools in uMgungundlovu District, only 63.4% were registered with SACE. In the study sample the percentage of registered teachers was slightly higher (87%). Considering the requirements for registration that were mentioned earlier (professionally qualified teachers), it was found that 29% of all the respondents could not qualify for registration because they do not have the requisite qualification. However, some of these teachers could be provisionally registered, especially those who were studying towards a professional teaching qualification. In order to investigate the effectiveness of SACE in making
sure that only registered professionally qualified educators are teaching in uMgungundlovu District, the registered and unregistered teachers were tabulated according to the type of school that they were teaching in. Table 11.1 reveals the results.

Table 11.1 uMgungundlovu District: professional qualifications of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Registered with SACE</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>68.0%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former Model C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>93.8%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>92.6%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>87.0%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data indicate that 68% of respondents from independent schools were registered with SACE (19% of such respondents) while 32% of their unregistered number were the majority (61.5%) of such respondents. The biggest proportion (93.8%) of respondents who were registered were from former Model C schools and were the majority (51.7%) of such respondents. Only 7.4% of respondents from public township schools were not registered with SACE; the 92.6% who were registered respondents comprised 28.7% of such respondents.

On the whole, most respondents who were not registered were from independent schools. In order to determine the association between registration of teachers by SACE and the type of schools in which respondents taught a chi – square test was used. The results (p = 0.005) show that the association was statistically significant.

Inculcating the Code of Ethics

SACE is expected to promote teaching as a profession and to inculcate professional ethics through the Code of Ethics. In this regard, teachers are expected to be intrinsically driven rather than responding only to external accountability requirements in their jobs. To what
extent do teachers do their work through the influence of professional ethics? Table 11.2 portrays what influences their work.

Table 11.2 uMgungundlovu District: what influences respondents’ work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Almost never</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Almost always</th>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional ethics influences</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>my work</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>34.0%</td>
<td>55.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do my work as a moral</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>obligation</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>53.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect the views of my peers</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
<td>54.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACE influences the way I</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>work</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data indicate that a majority (55%) of respondents are influenced ‘almost always’ by professional ethics in their daily tasks, and to 34% this is so ‘sometimes’, while for 10% it is ‘almost never’ and for 1% it is ‘never’ the case. Moral obligation influences 53% of the respondents in their work ‘almost always’, 37% ‘sometimes’, 6% ‘almost never’ and to 4% it is ‘never’ the case. In terms of holding peers accountable, a majority (54%) of respondents reported that they respect the views of their peers while 39% reported they do so ‘sometimes’ and 7% ‘almost never’. 32% of the respondents indicated that they are ‘never’ influenced by SACE in their work and to 21% it was ‘almost never’, 28% ‘sometimes’ and 19% it was ‘almost always’ the case. SACE received a largely negative reaction from respondents. It is apparent that respondents identified the factors listed as crucial in their daily work with the exception of the influence of SACE which received a negative response.

How are these responses influenced by the type of schools where respondents are located? The next section investigates this further.

11.1.1 uMgungundlovu District: whether professional ethics influences the work of teachers

Further analysis was carried out to investigate perceptions of respondents of the effect of professional ethics according to the type of school in which they were located. Table 11.3 displays the results.
Table 11.3 uMgungundlovu District: perception of respondents of the influence of professional ethics in their daily work, according to type of school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Professional ethics influences my work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former Model C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11.3 indicates that 48% of respondents in independent schools said that professional ethics ‘almost always’ influenced their daily work; 44% rated this as ‘sometimes’ and 8% (20% of all such respondents) believed this to be ‘almost never’. A very small minority thought that professional ethical considerations ‘almost never’ influenced their work. Note, though, that those who rated the influence of professional ethics as ‘almost always’ constituted 21.8% of teachers in all types of schools.

Turning to former Model C schools, 68.8% of respondents (60% of all such respondents) indicated that professional ethics influenced their work ‘almost always’ while 27.1% suggested that it was so ‘sometimes’ (38.2% of all such respondents). A minority (4.2%) from these schools rated the influence of professional ethics in their daily work as ‘almost never’ (20% of all such respondents). Most respondents from these schools identified professional ethics as crucial in their work.

As far as public township schools are concerned, only 37% of respondents rated the influence of professional ethics in their daily work as either ‘almost always’ or ‘sometimes’. Furthermore, they were also in the minority who rated this factor as such. On the other hand, 22.2% of their respondents were the majority (60%) of all respondents who indicated that professional ethics ‘almost never’ influenced their work. Only one respondent from these
schools indicated that it was never the case. A largely negative response concerning the influence of professional ethics came from these schools.

On the whole, although most respondents from all types of schools identified professional ethics as crucial in their daily work, that was not the case with public township schools. They had the biggest percentage of respondents who did not identify this as important. A chi-square test result \((p = 0.03)\) indicated that this was statically significant. Although the cause of such apparent disparities with regard to professional ethics among teachers is not well established, its effects may be reflected in other aspect of their jobs such as commitment to work and professionalism in general.

### 11.1.2 uMgungundlovu District: the influence of moral obligation on the daily work of teachers

In order to investigate the perceptions of respondents of the effect of moral obligation in their daily work according to the type of school in which they were located the two variables were cross-tabulated. Table 11.3 portrays the results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Do my work as moral obligation</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Almost never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former Model C</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75.0%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most (56%) of respondents in independent schools indicated that they viewed their work as a moral obligation ‘almost always’ and 36% that this is ‘sometimes’ so. Only 4% rated moral obligation as either ‘almost never’ or ‘never’ a factor. Note, though, that 25% of all
respondents who rated moral obligation as ‘never’ and 16.7% who said ‘almost never’ were from independent schools.

A majority (60.4%) of respondents in former Model C schools (54.7% of all such respondents) indicated that moral obligation influences their work ‘almost always’ and 25% that it was so ‘sometimes’. 8.3% of respondents from these schools comprised 66.7% of all respondents who indicated that moral obligation ‘almost never’ influenced their daily work. The 75% who suggested that moral obligation ‘never’ influenced the way they work were from 6.3% of respondents from former Model C schools.

Turning to public township schools, a majority (59.3%) indicated that moral obligation only influences their work ‘sometimes’ (43.2% of all who held such a view) and 37% that this is so ‘almost always’ (a minority (18.9%) of all who took such a viewpoint). Only 3.7% (one respondent) indicated that moral obligation ‘almost never’ influenced his or her daily work.

Most respondents identified the crucial influence of moral obligation in their daily work although there were slight insignificant variations between respondents from different type of schools.

11.1.3 uMgungundlovu District: the influences of peers on the work of teachers

In order to explore how respondents in different types of schools perceive the role of peers on their work the two variables were calculated and the results are displayed in Table 11.5.
Table 11.5 uMgungundlovu District: perception of respondents of the influence of peers in their daily work, according to type of school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Respect the views of my peers</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Almost never</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Almost always</td>
<td>52.0%</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former Model C</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The majority (52%) of respondents from independent schools (24.1% of all such respondents) indicated that ‘almost always’ they respected the views of their peers concerning their work and 40% suggested that it was so ‘sometimes’. Only 8% said this was ‘almost never’ the case although they were 28.6% of all the respondents who took such a view. It is apparent that most of the respondents from these schools identified the influence of peers as crucial in their work.

With regard to former Model C schools, 60.4% of their respondents were the majority (53.7) of all respondents who indicated that they respected the influence of their peers on their work. Furthermore, 33.3% of respondents from these schools were also the majority (41%) of all respondents who rated their influence of peers as ‘sometimes’ while only 6.3% said it was ‘almost never’ so. Generally, most responses from these schools were largely positive.

Turning to public township schools, the majority (48.1%) indicated that ‘sometimes’ peers influenced their work (33.3% of all who took such a view). Another relatively large proportion (44.4%) suggested that it was so ‘almost always’. Only 7.4% felt that peers ‘almost never’ influenced their work. Most respondents were generally positive about the influence of their peers in their work.
In general, respondents from different types of schools identified the importance of the role played by their peers in their work. This may be taken to mean that teachers tend to hold each other accountable in the form of professional accountability. Having considered this, what is the role of SACE as a professional organisation in promoting these values among teachers in uMgungundlovu District? The next section explores this further.

11.1.4 uMgungundlovu District: the role of SACE in promoting the teaching profession

Bearing in mind the mandate given to SACE - to promote the teaching profession - respondents were asked whether it was living up to this. The results are presented in Table 11.6 according to the type of school in which the respondents were located.

Table 11.6 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of respondents of the promotion of the teaching profession by SACE, according to type of school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>SACE promotes the teaching profession</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Almost never</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Almost always</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>36.0%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28.1%</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former Model C</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>39.6%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>59.4%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A small majority (36%) of respondents from independent schools felt that SACE ‘never’ promoted the teaching profession (28.1% of all such respondents) and 32% indicated that this was ‘almost never’ (38.1% of all respondents who took such a view). Only 20% said ‘sometimes’ SACE promoted the teaching profession and another small percentage (12%) said ‘almost always’ SACE was doing so (15.8% of all such respondents). Most of the respondents from the independent schools expressed dissatisfaction with the activities of SACE.

A majority (59.4%) of all the respondents who said SACE was ‘never’ involved in the promotion of the teaching profession were from former Model C schools (39.6% of respondents from
such schools). Only 12.5% from these schools indicated that it was ‘almost never’ the case and 29.2% that it was ‘sometimes’ so (50% of all such respondents). 47.4% of those who indicated that ‘almost always’ SACE was involved in promotion of the teaching profession was from former Model C schools. A largely negative response about the role of SACE came from respondents in these schools.

Although respondents from township public schools were 27% of all the respondents, they comprised 36.8% of the respondents who indicated that SACE was ‘almost always’ working to promote the teaching profession. 33.3% indicated that this was so ‘sometimes’, 25.9% that it was ‘almost never’ so and 14.8% that it was ‘never’ the case. Again, responses from these schools were also largely negative.

In order to present a detailed perspective of respondents about SACE, some of their comments are noted here.

*When it comes to professional ethics it depends on individuals involved - some say why bother, they actually pull each other down. I think SACE holds educators accountable in terms of making sure that they get qualified. They also send out guidelines on how teachers should conduct themselves. But in the same breath, I can also say that they are not very useful, In fact, I don’t even know if we should call SACE a professional body. All they are doing is making sure that educators get qualified. They make sure that they do not register them until they are qualified or they have proof that they are studying towards an educational qualification. However, there are many unregistered teachers in both government and private schools (Pr1).*

*SACE is meaningless, it’s useless. It’s just there to take your R10 [per month]. There are some SACE registered teachers who don’t go to school on Fridays and Mondays and when they do so they are drunk. So SACE registration is meaningless. You can have a degree and still don’t teach and but you be paid. You never see a SACE official visiting a school (Tr27).*

*At the moment the only prominent activities of SACE is misconduct – if a teacher is having affairs with learners then that case is reported and investigated. If he is found guilty that teacher is struck off the register. Other than that I haven’t seen anything done by SACE. I haven’t seen SACE supporting educators in any way. I haven’t seen any workshop organised by SACE. I haven’t seen any developmental programme organised by SACE. I only hear of SACE when there is misconduct. Every teacher subscribes to SACE (Pr5).*
All the respondents confirmed that they pay a monthly subscription towards SACE. This has led some respondents to believe that the role of SACE was to collect money. Many respondents indicated that they had never seen a SACE official visiting their schools. However, some respondents confirmed that they knew SACE became involved in cases of misconduct and the deregistration of teachers for this. Some respondents suggested that registration does not make educators accountable since there are many registered teachers who were unable to deliver lessons and some who do not go to work on some days.

What can be gleaned from this section is that professional accountability is an internal accountability mechanism (in terms of schools and the individual teachers themselves). Professional ethics, moral obligation and peer accountability form the basis of professional accountability in schools. On the other hand, professional accountability may take an external form (in terms of the involvement of the professional body, SACE, in ensuring accountability among teachers. However, the discussion has shown that SACE was not effective in performing this role in uMgungundlovu District.

The discussion has indicated that most teachers do their work not as a response to various accountability devices which are administered to them but through personal motivation such as moral obligation and professional ethics. What would happen if a street – level bureaucrat would like to comply with all accountability directives but lacks the professional competence to be effective in executing tasks? The next section investigates this issue further.

11.2 uMgungundlovu District: Professional development as a means of enhancing professional accountability

In order to respond to external accountability demands the DBE has been using professional development and training as a way of making teachers accountable. Professional development may take the form of pre-service training and in-service training. To what extent can professional development be related to professional accountability? This question was raised in interviews and the findings are presented here.

*Professional development and accountability are different sides of the same coin - this is why Umalusi and other departments are insisting that teachers should not end with an academic degree but there is a need to have a professional qualification and continuous development. I think it still important that teachers do professional development and keep up to date. I mean teachers who did their training 25 to 30 years ago and have not been prepared to keep up to date with what is going on. So they should make it compulsory thing to keep your registration*
with it. To a certain extent it’s good but I think what they are doing is going overboard because they are expecting too much with the SACE point system. Someone can be excellent in doing courses but delivery is different (Pr1).

I think the government is strengthening itself in teacher development because there are sub-directorates dealing with teacher development and there are posts being advertised [in uMgungundlovu District]. So in about one or two years we are going to see a sub-directorate on teacher development (Prl2).

If the department was doing proper training and the development of teachers – I mean if I get trained to function properly I can be held accountable to function properly. But if I am not trained properly and come along you ask me why I am not doing this like it should be done. I just tell you that I don’t know how to. If the department was doing proper training not what they are doing now, then they come back to the teachers and say, ‘look we trained you in these things but your learners have done badly’. It can’t be all learners; there must be a teacher role there. In another way, I don’t think the department should hold the teachers entirely responsible. It is the department that has not done its job properly in terms of professional development and training (Pr3).

Accountability and training are linked. Training of educators should most definitely involve the adoption or internalisation of ethical standards, responsibility and accountability (Prl4).

With learning comes accountability because you know something then you do it, but if you don’t know it, then you don’t do it (Prl5).

Professional development is linked to accountability. If you say an unqualified person can be a teacher you are lowering the standards of a teacher. But if you make them highly qualified both theoretically and practically the quality of education is determined by the quality of a teacher (Prl6).

It was quite clear from these interviews that professional development was seen as linked to professional accountability. All the respondents acknowledged the crucial role of staff development in professional accountability. Prl1 highlighted the importance of continuous staff development well after teachers have attained their professional qualifications. This data also revealed that the DBE is instituting a sub-directorate for teacher development. The data has also shown the belief that educated and qualified teachers are likely to perform effectively
because of the acquired professional competence. The next section will consider the role of professional development in uMgungundlovu District.

11.2.1 uMgungundlovu District: attendance at professional development workshops

In order to investigate the value of professional development as means of enhancing professional accountability in uMgungundlovu District, respondents were asked if they had attended workshops on some key aspects of their jobs. The results presented in Table 11.7 are listed according to the aspects of the workshops that were attended by most respondents.

**Table 11.7 uMgungundlovu District: workshops attended by respondents in 2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subject knowledge</td>
<td>72.0%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum knowledge</td>
<td>72.0%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment and keeping records</td>
<td>64.9%</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of children and learning</td>
<td>58.0%</td>
<td>42.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class management</td>
<td>55.2%</td>
<td>44.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>55.1%</td>
<td>44.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classroom methodology</td>
<td>52.1%</td>
<td>47.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is apparent that the most attended professional development workshops were those which covered subject knowledge and curriculum knowledge, with 72% each, followed by assessment and keeping records (64.9%). The workshops that were attended by the least number of respondents were: knowledge of children and learning (58%), class management (55.2%) leadership (55.1%) and classroom methodology (52.1%). It was not clear why many did not attend workshops on class management, leadership and classroom methodology. Do teachers, though, implement what they learn from such professional development workshops?

11.2.2 uMgungundlovu District: use in the classroom of knowledge learned from professional development

*Formal professional development workshops*

Observation showed that at times teachers did not attend the formal professional development workshops out of the desire to learn but rather as a duty. Because of this, some teachers did not apply what they learnt from such workshops. Teachers were asked about this with specific reference to formal workshops and the results are presented in Table 11.8.
Table 11.8 uMngundlovu District: use of knowledge acquired from formal professional development workshops by teachers, according to type of school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Formal (workshops and training)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Almost never</td>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>Almost always</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former Model C</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>39.6%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>57.6%</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
<td>46.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A small majority (33.3%) of all the respondents indicated that they ‘almost never’ used what they learned from formal professional development workshops, and 32.3% that they did so ‘sometimes’. 28.3% rated this as ‘almost always’ the case while a small proportion (6.1%) thought that they ‘never’ used knowledge acquired from formal professional development workshops. Although the number of negative response was considerable, most teachers indicated that they did apply in the classroom what they learn from workshops.

Further analysis indicated that 25% of respondents from independent schools indicated that they ‘almost always’ used knowledge learnt from the professional development workshops, 33% suggested that they did so ‘sometimes’ while another 33.3% felt this was ‘almost never’. 8.3% of respondents from these schools were 33.3% of all respondents who indicated that they ‘never’ use what they learn from the workshops.

Turning to respondents from former Model C schools, 27.1% felt that they used what they learn from workshops ‘almost always’ (46.4% of all such respondents), 29.2% rated this as ‘sometimes’ 39.6% said they ‘almost never’ did so (57.6% of all respondents who held such a view). Only 4.2% said they ‘never’ use what they learn from formal professional development workshops. The response from former Model C schools was largely negative. This is despite
the fact that some of the workshops are facilitated by teachers from such schools [noted during observation].

With regard to respondents from public township schools, 33.3% indicated that they used what they learn from formal professional development workshops ‘almost always’ and a small majority (37%) that they did so ‘sometimes’ while to 22.2% it was ‘almost never’ the case. 7.4% believed that they ‘never’ use anything they learn from formal professional development workshops. In general, the response from these schools was positive.

It is apparent that most respondents apply what they learn from formal professional development workshops. However, the proportion of teachers who did not use what they learnt from formal professional development workshops was significantly high, bearing in mind the value and resources spent on them. How different is this from informal learning and training that happens in schools between teachers, their peers, mentors and HoDs?

**Informal training in schools**

It has been argued that teachers tend to use the knowledge they acquire informally in schools where they teach. Respondents were asked about this and the results are displayed in Table. 11.9.

**Table 11.9 uMngungundlovu District: use of knowledge acquired informally by teachers, according to type of school**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Informal (on the job training)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Almost never</td>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>Almost always</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former Model C</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>34.0%</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>41.4%</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27.6% of respondents indicated that they used what they learnt informally in schools in which they were located ‘almost always’, 31.6% that they use this ‘sometimes’ and 29.6% that it was
‘almost never’ the case. To 11.2% of the respondents, it was an outright ‘never’ the case. Most respondents identified the importance of what they learn from their peers and HoDs in informal ways.

Further analysis revealed that 25.9% of all respondents who said they used what they informally learnt from colleagues ‘almost always’ were from independent schools. 33.3% of respondents from these schools indicated that that they did so ‘sometimes’ and 25% said it was ‘almost never’ the case (20.7% of all such respondents). 12.5% said it was ‘never’ the case (27.3% of all respondents who held such a view). However, the response from these schools was largely positive.

In the former Model C schools, 31.9% of the respondents were in the majority (55.6%) of all those who indicated that they used what they learn from informal meetings in schools ‘almost always’. 34% thought that they did so ‘sometimes’ (51.6% of all the respondents who took such a view) and 23.4% said it was ‘almost never’ the case, while 10.5% rated this as ‘never’ so (45.5% of all such respondents). It was apparent that these respondents identified informal learning and training as a crucial factor in professional accountability.

What was evident from respondents in the public schools in townships was that a small majority (44.4%) indicated that they ‘almost never’ used what they learnt from informal interactions in the school (they were also 44.4% of all respondents who took such a standpoint). 11.1% believed that they ‘never’ did so, while 25.9% indicated that it was ‘sometimes’ the case and 18.5% rated this factor as ‘almost always’. A largely negative response emerged from respondents from these schools.

Although responses from public schools in townships seemed to deviate from the trend in other types of schools generally, most respondents pointed out that they used information from informal training in schools. Altogether, respondents from all types of schools showed that they use information gained from both formal and informal means of professional development.

Although a large proportion of respondents reported that they used what they learnt from professional development workshops, it was difficult to ascertain the effectiveness of such workshops. The next section explores this further.
11.3 uMgungundlovu District: perceived effectiveness of professional development workshops

The respondents were asked about the effectiveness of different professional development workshops in enhancing professional accountability among teachers. Professional development workshops were classified according to the areas, knowledge or skills they intended to develop among teachers. As a result, the section will consider the perceived effectiveness of professional development aimed at: subject knowledge; curriculum knowledge; assessment and recording; knowledge of children and learning; class management; leadership; and classroom methodology according to the type of schools the respondents were located.

11.3.1 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effectiveness of professional development that focused on subject content knowledge

Respondents were asked about the effectiveness of professional development workshops that aimed at enhancing their knowledge of subject content in enhancing professional accountability. Only 78% of the sample [those who attended such workshops] responded to this question. The results are displayed in Table 11.10.

Table 11.10 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effectiveness of professional development on knowledge of subject content, according to type of school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Not effective at all</th>
<th>Slightly effective</th>
<th>Effective</th>
<th>Very effective</th>
<th>Extremely effective</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former Model C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Findings showed that a small majority (37.2%) of all respondents indicated that professional development aimed at subject content knowledge was ‘effective’ in promoting professional accountability, 32.1% that it was ‘very effective’ and 15.4% that it was ‘extremely effective’. A small proportion (7.7%) rated this as ‘slightly effective’ and 1.3% (one respondent) believed that it was ‘not effective at all’. Generally, this factor received a positive response from all respondents.

Further investigation revealed that 46.7% of respondents from independent schools suggested that professional development aimed at subject content knowledge was ‘very effective’ (28% of all respondent who took such a view), 20% that it was ‘extremely effective’ (25% of all such respondents) and 20% that it was effective (10.3% of all those who held such a position). Only 6.7% rated this as ‘slightly effective’. On the whole, respondents from these schools gave a positive response to this question.

A small majority (39%) of those who were surveyed in the former Model C schools rated the professional development workshops based on subject knowledge as simply ‘effective’ (55.2% of such respondents), 24.4% as ‘very effective’ and 17.1% as ‘extremely effective’ (58.3% of all respondents who held such a view). 7.3% believed that it was ‘slightly effective’ and 2.4% that it was ‘not effective at all’ (100% of all such respondents). Most respondents from these schools identified professional development that focused on subject content knowledge as beneficial in enhancing professional accountability.

Turning to the public township schools, a small majority (45.5%) of respondents indicated that professional development aimed at subject content knowledge was ‘effective’, 36.4% rated this as ‘very effective’ and 9.1% as ‘extremely effective’ (16.7% of all such respondents). Only 9.1% from these schools felt that it was ‘slightly effective’. Like respondents from other types of schools, respondents from these schools also identified subject content knowledge as crucial in enhancing professional accountability.

It is apparent that regardless of the type of school in which the respondents were situated, they all indentified professional development that was subject based as effective in enhancing professional accountability. However, those from independent schools rated the effectiveness more highly than those from other types of schools.
11.3.2 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effectiveness of professional development that focused on curriculum knowledge

Those surveyed were asked about the effectiveness of professional development workshops that were aimed at enhancing their curriculum knowledge in promoting professional accountability. 79% of the sample responded to this question and the results are portrayed in Table 11.11 according to the types of schools they were located.

Table 11.11 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effectiveness of professional development on curriculum knowledge, according to type of school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Not effective at all</th>
<th>Slightly effective</th>
<th>Effective</th>
<th>Very effective</th>
<th>Extremely effective</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>56.3%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former Model C</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>41.5%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>56.7%</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
<td>61.5%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>51.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>38.0%</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Preliminary analysis showed that 16.5% of those who responded indicated that professional development workshops that were based on curriculum knowledge were ‘extremely effective’ in enhancing professional accountability among teachers, 27.8% rated this as ‘very effective’ and 38% felt that it was ‘effective’. A small percentage (10.1%) believed that it was slightly ‘effective’ and 3.8% suggested that it was ‘not effective at all’. Generally, most respondents identified this as a crucial component of professional accountability.

Further analysis revealed that 20% of all who responded to this question were from independent schools. A majority (56.3%) from these schools indicated that professional development for curriculum knowledge was ‘very effective’ in enhancing professional accountability (40.9% of all such respondents). Another 12.5% rated this as ‘extremely effective’ and 18.8% believed it was simply ‘effective’. A small minority (12.5%) felt that it
was ‘slightly effective’ (25% of all who held such a view). It is clear that this question received a positive response from respondents in independent schools.

Turning to respondents in the former Model C schools, 19.5% indicated that professional development for curriculum knowledge was ‘extremely effective’ in promoting professional accountability (61.5% of all such respondents). 17.1% rated this as ‘very effective’ and 41.3% as simply ‘effective’. A very small minority (7.3%) rated this as either ‘slightly effective’ or ‘not effective at all’. Although respondents from these schools comprised 100% of those who said ‘not effective all’, most of them were positive about the effectiveness of professional development for curriculum knowledge.

With regards to respondents in the public township schools, a small majority (45.5%) rated the effectiveness of professional development for curriculum knowledge as ‘effective’ (33.3% of all such respondents), 27.3% as ‘very effective’ and 13.6% as ‘extremely effective’. A very small proportion (13.6%) felt that it was ‘slightly effective’ (37.5% of all respondents who held such a view). Again, a largely positive response came from the respondents in the public township schools.

Overall, it is clear that most respondents, regardless of the schools in which they were teaching, identified professional development for curriculum knowledge as a key aspect of professional accountability.

11.3.3 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effectiveness of professional development that focused on assessment and keeping records

Respondents were asked about the effectiveness of professional development workshops that were aimed at enhancing their knowledge of assessments and keeping records. 74% of the sample responded to this question. The results portrayed in Table 11.12 are according to the type of school where the respondents were located.
Table 11.12 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effectiveness of professional development on assessment and recording, according to type of school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Assessment and recording</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not effective at all</td>
<td>Slightly effective</td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>Very effective</td>
<td>Extremely effective</td>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>56.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>56.3%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former Model C</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>44.0%</td>
<td>64.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>52.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>57.9%</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>55.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>25.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A small majority (33.8%) of those surveyed indicated that professional development for assessment and keeping records was ‘very effective’, 18.9% rated this as ‘extremely effective’ and 27% as ‘effective’ in enhancing professional accountability among teachers. A minority (2.7%) felt that it was ‘not effective at all’ and 6.8% that it was ‘slightly effective’. A significant proportion (10.8%) who had ‘no opinion’ on this question emanated from those who had not attended such professional development workshops. Generally, most respondents were positive about the effectiveness of such professional development workshops.

Analysis done according to the type of school in which the respondents were located indicated that a majority (56.3%) of respondents from independent schools felt that professional development for assessment and record keeping was ‘very effective’ and 18.8% that it was either ‘extremely effective’ or simply ‘effective’ in enhancing professional accountability. A small percentage (6.3%) of those surveyed indicated that it was ‘slightly effective’ (20% of all respondents who held such a view). On the whole, respondents from these schools were positive about the effectiveness of such professional development.

Further analysis revealed that a very small majority (28.2%) of respondents from former Model C schools rated the effectiveness of professional development on assessment and recording as ‘very effective’ (44.% of all such respondents), 23.1% as ‘extremely effective’ (64.3%) of all respondents who took such a standpoint) and 15.4% as ‘effective’. A small proportion (7.7%)
felt that such professional development was ‘slightly effective’ and 5.1% that it was ‘not effective all’. However, it is clear that the majority identified professional development on assessment and keeping records as an important key to enhancing professional accountability.

Turning to the respondents in public township schools, a majority (57.9%) indicated that professional development on assessment and record keeping was simply ‘effective’, (55% of all respondents who took such a view), 26.3% that it was ‘very effective’ (20% of all such respondents) and 10.5% that it was ‘extremely effective’ in promoting professional accountability. Only 5.3% felt that such professional development was ‘slightly effective’. On the whole, respondents from these schools were positive about the effectiveness of such professional development.

It is clear that a largely positive response came from the respondents from all types of schools, although those in former Model C schools tended to have more respondents with negative perceptions about professional development for assessment and record keeping as a means of enhancing professional accountability.

11.3.4 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effectiveness of professional development that focused on knowledge of children and learning

77% of the sample responded to the question about the effectiveness of professional development workshops in enhancing knowledge of children and learning in promoting professional accountability among teachers. The results portrayed in Table 11.13 according to the type of school in which the educators were located.
Table 11.13 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effectiveness of professional development on knowledge of children and learning, according to type of school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Knowledge of children and learning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not effective at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former Model C</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results from preliminary analysis revealed that a small majority (31.2%) of those surveyed were of the opinion that professional development on knowledge of children and learning was ‘very effective’ in enhancing professional accountability. 29.9% indicated that it was ‘effective’, 9.1% that it was ‘extremely effective’ and 7.8% had ‘no opinion’. A small but significant percentage (19.5%) felt that such professional development was ‘slightly effective’ and 2.6% that it was ‘not effective at all’. However, it was clear that most identified professional development as important for professional accountability.

Additional analysis revealed that a majority (52.9%) of respondents from the independent schools felt that professional development on knowledge of children and learning was ‘very effective’ (37.5% of such respondents) and 23.5% that it was ‘effective’ (17.4% of all respondents who took such a position). Another 17.6% from these schools suggested that it was ‘slightly effective’ (20% of all such respondents). A largely positive response came from these respondents.

Turning to respondents in the former Model C schools, 29.3% indicated that professional development on knowledge of children and learning was ‘effective’ (52.2% of all such respondents), 24.4% that it was ‘very effective’ (41.7% of all those who took a similar position) and 9.8% that it was ‘extremely effective’ (57.1% of all such respondents). 19.5%
indicated that such professional development was ‘slightly effective’ and 4.9% that it was ‘not effective all’. A large proportion (83.3%) of all those who had ‘no opinion’ on this question were from former Model C schools which suggests that these schools had the highest number of all those who had not attended such professional development workshops.

With regard to respondents from public township schools, a small majority (36.8%) indicated that professional development on knowledge of children and learning was ‘effective’ in enhancing professional accountability among teachers (30.4% of all those who took such a position). 26.3% suggested that it was ‘very effective’ (20.8% of all such respondents) and 15.85% that it was ‘extremely effective’ (42.9% of all those who took such a view). A small but significant proportion (21%) felt that such professional development was ‘slightly effective’. It is, however, clear that most respondents from these schools identified such professional development as effective in promoting professional accountability among teachers.

What is apparent from these findings is that most educators from all types of schools identified professional development on knowledge of children and learning as a critical component of professional accountability. Note, though, that a small but significant proportion of respondents from former Model C schools did not have an opinion because they might not have attended such professional development workshops.

11.3.5 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effectiveness of professional development that focused on classroom management

Respondents were asked to give their opinion about the effectiveness of professional development workshops on class management as means of promoting professional accountability among teachers. The results which are based on 71% of the sample are portrayed in Table 11.14 according to the type of school in which respondents were located.
Table 11.14 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effectiveness of professional development on class management, according to type of school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Classroom management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not effective at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former Model C</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Preliminary analysis revealed that a very small majority (32.4%) of the respondents felt that the professional development that focused on classroom management was ‘effective’, 25.4% that it was ‘very effective’ and 19.7% that it was extremely effective’. 8.5% had either ‘no opinion’ or suggested that it was ‘slightly effective’ and 5.6% believed that it was ‘not effective at all’. Generally, most respondents identified such professional development as important for professional accountability.

Further examination showed that 20% of the respondents from independent schools rated professional development that focused on classroom management as ‘extremely effective’ (21% of all such respondents), 40% as ‘very effective’ (33.3% of all the respondents who took such a view) and 20% as simply ‘effective’ (13% of all such respondents). 20% of the respondents from these schools who felt that such professional development was ‘slightly effective’ were the majority of all respondents who held such a view. Responses from these schools were essentially positive.

What stood out most for responses from former Model C schools is that they had the largest proportion (15%) of all respondents who had ‘no opinion’ (100% all the respondents who took such a view). This may suggest that these schools had the largest proportion of teachers who had not attended such workshops. 20% indicated that such professional development was
‘extremely effective’ (57.1% of all such respondents), 17.9% that it was ‘very effective’ (38.9% of all those who took a similar view) and 33.3% that it was ‘effective’. A small percentage (5.1%) rated such professional development as ‘slightly effective’ and 7.7% as ‘not effective at all’ (75% of all those who held the same view). It is, however, apparent that most respondents from these schools rated such professional development as crucial for the promotion of professional accountability.

Turning to the respondents from the public township schools, a small majority (41.2%) rated professional development that focused on classroom management as ‘effective’ in enhancing professional accountability. 29.4% rated such professional development as ‘very effective’ (27.8% of all such respondents) and 17.6% as ‘extremely effective’ (21.4% of all those who took such a view). A minority (5.9%) rated this kind of professional development as either ‘slightly effective’ or ‘not effective at all’. Again, it is clear that respondents from these schools identified such professional development as crucial for professional accountability.

Most respondents indicated that professional development that focused on classroom management was a key to the promotion of professional accountability. However, it was also clear that a significant proportion (29%) of all the respondents had not attended such professional development workshops.

### 11.3.6 uMngundlovu District: perceptions of the effectiveness of professional development that focused on leadership skills

About 69% of the all the respondents attended leadership professional development workshops. They were asked to give their opinion about the effectiveness of such professional development as a means of promoting professional accountability among teachers. The results are portrayed in Table 11.15 according to the type of school in which they were located.
Table 11.15 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of the effectiveness of professional development on leadership, according to type of school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of school</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not effective at all</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slightly effective</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very effective</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extremely effective</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public former Model C</td>
<td>Not effective at all</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slightly effective</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very effective</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>45.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extremely effective</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>45.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public township</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Not effective at all</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slightly effective</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The findings revealed that a small majority (31.9%) indicated that professional development that focused on leadership was ‘very effective’ in promoting professional accountability among educators, 17.4% that it was ‘extremely effective’ and 26.1% that it was simply ‘effective’. A very small proportion (7.2%) rated the effectiveness of such professional development as ‘slightly effective’ and 2.9% (two respondents) as ‘not effective at all’. It is apparent that most respondents felt that such professional development was important for enhancing professional accountability.

An analysis of the findings according to the type of school revealed that a small majority (38.5%) of the respondents from the independent schools rated the effectiveness of professional development that focused on leadership as ‘very effective’ (22.7% of all such respondents), 15.4% as ‘extremely effective’ (16.7% of all the respondents who held such a view), 23.1% as ‘effective’ and another 15.4% had ‘no opinion’. A very small percentage (7.7%) felt that such professional development was ‘slightly effective’. Overall, most respondents from these schools identified professional development that focused on leadership as critical for the promotion of professional accountability.

With regard to respondents from former Model C schools, 22.2% had no opinion (80% of all such respondents), another 22.2% suggested that the effectiveness of such professional
development was ‘extremely effective’, (66.7% of all those who held a similar view), 27.8% that it was ‘very effective’ (45.5% of all the respondents who took such a view) and 16.7% that it was ‘effective’. A small percentage (8.3%) rated this kind of professional development as ‘slightly effective’ and 2.8% as ‘not effective at all’ (50% of all such respondents). It is evident that most respondents from these types of schools felt that such professional development was important in enhancing professional accountability among teachers.

As for the respondents from public township schools, a small majority (45%) indicated that professional development that focused on leadership skills was ‘effective’ (50% of all such respondents), 35% that it was ‘very effective’ (31.8% of all the respondents who took such a position) and 10% that it was ‘extremely effective’ (16.7% of those who took a similar view). Only 5% rated the effectiveness of such professional development as either ‘slightly effective’ or ‘not effective at all’. This clearly shows that most of the respondents from these schools recognised the importance of professional development that focused on leadership as crucial for professional accountability.

Professional development workshops that focus on leadership skills was seen as important for the promotion of professional accountability among educators. However, the findings have shown that 39% of all the respondents had not attended any such workshops. This could be attributed to the fact that such professional development was often given to educators who were in leadership positions.

**General perceptions about professional development workshops**

Respondents gave general comments about professional development workshops which were not specific to those considered in the preceding sections. Some of their comments are listed here.

*Professional development workshops are very important. However, it is up to the educator to familiarise herself with curriculum content and assessment strategies and not to wait for workshops (Tr60).*

*A recent workshop in Hilton was very effective in promoting new ways to understand poetry for example (Tr39).*

*Professional development workshops with subject advisors are done once a year. They are very useful and practical (Tr89).*
Education department puts workshops on once a year. Some education workshops are terrible. I learn more from the Thutong [website] and Western Cape Website. District Workshops are terrible. Provincial ones are better (Tr16).

NCS and OBE workshops were not effective and unclearly presented. No professional development workshop can adequately prepare you for all classroom variables. It is always a short amount of time with a lot of work (Tr69).

Somehow they should be done over a long period rather than the plus or minus three days (weekends) (Tr73).

Some are good; others are means of giving money to the facilitators who tell us what we know better. They do book reading (Tr91).

They do good work on subject content knowledge. The professional development workshop I attended was very effective and I learnt a great deal (Tr23).

The workshops were educative and helpful and made teaching and learning much easier and successful (Tr3).

What can be gleaned from these comments is that professional development workshops were identified as very important in professional accountability processes. Furthermore, these respondents raised a number of issues. First, such professional development workshops were too short in terms of duration. To that end respondents proposed that teachers had to exercise their initiative to learn rather than to wait for such workshops. Another issue raised by respondents was the frequency of such professional development workshops which they said often took place once a year. This was further compounded by poor organisation. The last issue was the incompetence of professional development workshop facilitators. Respondents pointed out that such facilitators simply read from the workshop manuals without any further interpretation or explanation of what they read.

Conclusion

Professional accountability can be viewed as a softer way of holding street – level bureaucrats accountable to the objectives of an organisation. This chapter has shown that SACE, as a professional organisation, was playing a critical role in enforcing such a form of accountability in uMngungundlovu District. Through the use of the Code of Ethics, SACE promotes professionalism among the educators. In order to make sure that teaching was carried out by
professionals, educators who were not registered as professionally qualified teachers were not permitted to teach in the schools. Furthermore, findings have shown that educators who breached the Code of Ethics were deregistered by SACE. However, the registration of teachers had not been effective as evidenced by a significant proportion of educators in uMgungundlovu District who were not registered. Although many educators indicated that SACE did not play a significant role in their daily work, they confirmed that professional ethics influenced far more the way in which they approached their work. Furthermore, they pointed out that they regarded their work as a moral obligation. Like other professions, teachers in uMgungundlovu District emphasised the importance of peer accountability among colleagues.

Professional accountability emanates from professionalism among the educators. In order to promote such professionalism, teachers were often targets of professional development programmes. Respondents pointed out that this was very important in order to make sure that educators had the competence needed to comply with accountability demands. Most respondents revealed that such professional development workshops were very important in promoting professional accountability. However, a significant number of respondents noted that they rarely use or apply what they learn from such workshops. A majority of respondents who apply what they learn from work such professional development workshops highlighted the effectiveness of such professional development. Most of them indicated that professional development workshops that were aimed at: subject content knowledge; curriculum knowledge; assessment and recording; knowledge of children and learning; classroom management; and leadership skills were very crucial in promoting professional accountability among educators.

The importance of professional development in professional accountability stems from the ability of training and education to influence the decisions of street – level bureaucrats from the inside out. To put it another way, professional development can influence the decision-making processes of educators. This issue will be considered further in the next chapter which will focus on a final, overall analysis.
CHAPTER TWELVE
FINAL ANALYSIS OF THE STUDY

One of the underlying premises of this study is that if the educational outcomes are to improve, there is a need for public managers to find ways of controlling street-level bureaucrats' (in this case, teachers') discretion and enhancing accountability. This study confirms that teachers have a vital role to play in the implementation of the National Curriculum Statements, and their use of discretion impacts on whether the NCSs stated goals and objectives can be met. The primary research question guiding this study was by what means teachers could be held more accountable in the implementation of NCS policy? This chapter reflects on the findings of this study in this respect.

It is apparent that different stakeholders play various roles to ensure accountability in the education bureaucracy in uMgungundlovu District. The documents, surveys and interviews have shown that different accountability mechanisms are employed in order to hold street-bureaucrats accountable to the educational goals. The purpose of this chapter is to conduct a final analysis of the thesis through the lens of the theoretical framework presented in the earlier chapters of the study. To that end, this chapter will discuss the findings in the context of the research objectives as well as in terms of the theoretical framework. The chapter will begin by focusing on the theory of street-level bureaucracy in the light of the findings of this study. The second part will explore the five accountability mechanisms which are: political accountability; performance accountability; hierarchical accountability; legal accountability; and professional accountability in order to draw conclusions about the research questions. Finally, the chapter will end with some implications of the study.

12.1 uMgungundlovu District’s street – level bureaucrats in perspective

The nature of the work of educators in uMgungundlovu District epitomises the professional attributes of street-level bureaucrats as characterised by Lipsky. This section will consider the salient issues of street-level bureaucrats outlined in the theoretical framework following the findings of this study. These are: discretion; differences between street-level bureaucrats and managers; and resources for resistance. The section will end with a note on the role of management in holding street-level bureaucrats accountable to the DBE.

Discretion
As mentioned earlier, teachers exercise considerable discretion in their classes as they implement the NCS. Findings showed that teachers can focus on certain aspects of their jobs and ignore others in order to cope with the pressures of performance evaluation. Furthermore, teachers in uMgungundlovu District exercised considerable discretion with regards to the choice of subject content to teach in order to prepare their learners for examinations. In the process they used such discretion to ignore certain topics and activities which they believed would not help the learners in preparation for their examinations.

It is clear from the research undertaken that teachers exercised a considerable amount of discretion in decisions they made when implementing NCS. Most of the decisions they made were beyond the scrutiny of HoDs and school principals. As Lipsky (1080:14) points out: “street – level bureaucrats are professionals, the assertion that they exercise considerable discretion is fairly obvious”. This is so because as professionals, teachers are expected to make discretionary decisions about their work and clients. Lipsky also notes that the discretion of street – level bureaucrats stems from the fact that they work in situations that are too complicated to be reduced to programmatic schedules (1980:15). This resonates with what respondents said about how it was difficult to follow the work schedules as outlined in the work plans since other variables, like the need to finish the syllabus and the speed at which individual learners understood concepts, also needed to be considered. In such cases, educators had to exercise their professional discretion.

**Differences between street – level bureaucrats and managers**

What could be gleaned from the findings is that the way in which the SMTs and the teachers perceived their roles was different. The general perspective of the school principals and HoDs was on the effectiveness and productivity of the educators in terms of pass rates per subject and compliance with the rules of the schools. On the other hand, teachers were interested in making their job easier in such things as clerical or administrative work and focusing on only what they believed was critical for examinations or important for performance evaluation. With regard to this matter, Lipsky argues: “at the very least, workers have an interest in minimising the danger and discomfort of the job and maximising income and personal gratification” (1980:19). This was revealed in the findings where teachers had to create shortcuts and simplify their tasks as a way of coping with the pressure of work. As a result, street - level bureaucrats process work that is consistent with their own preferences and tasks that are backed up by sanctions (Lipsky, 1980:19). Because of this, most respondents pointed out that they tend to focus on aspects of
their job that may expose them to the scrutiny of the management which is often result oriented.

Another difference between management and street – level bureaucrats stems from the desire of the latter to maintain and expand their professional autonomy. Findings revealed that although teachers regard the classroom as their domain, the SMTs in uMgungundlovu District devised several mechanisms to limit such discretion (see later sections). In some cases most respondents felt that some of these devices were unfair or illegitimate. However, Lipsky points out that although professionals like teachers have “some claim of professional status, they also have bureaucratic status that requires compliance with superiors’ directives” (1980:19). On the whole, the main differences between the two were reflected in the desires of the teachers to maximise their satisfaction and lessen their workload while management, through the SMTs, sought to secure compliance among teachers and maximising productivity. What do street – level bureaucrats have to do in order to advance their desires?

**Resources for resistance**

Results indicated that in some cases educators did not comply with policy requirements to some degree in the implementation of NCS in uMgungundlovu District. A number of cases of such noncompliance became apparent, which included teachers focusing on areas that they believed would be covered in the examinations, and on those areas that were considered important for performance evaluation and thus teaching to the test. Lipsky notes that “workers can punish supervisors who do not behave properly toward them, by doing only minimal work” (1980:24). This kind of behaviour is sometimes supported or protected by membership of teacher unions. For instance, external evaluators of IQMS were turned away from some schools by teachers who belong to powerful teacher unions. With regards to this, Lipsky notes that “public service workers currently enjoy the benefits of collective resources that strengthen their position” (1980:23).

Another resource for resistance available to the educators in uMgungundlovu District is their level of expertise. It was seen that a majority of all the teachers in this District are qualified, meaning that they are considered to be professionals. Because of this, Lipsky suggests that, “managers are highly dependent upon subordinates without being able to intervene extensively in the way work is performed” (1980:24). This is in line with what principals said about their teachers, that they had faith in them.
This section has reviewed the nature of educators as street – level bureaucrats in accordance with the theoretical framework. Most importantly, what has emerged is that educators in this study have relative autonomy from bureaucratic control. It may seem that managers have no means of holding street – level bureaucrats accountable to the objectives of the DBE in uMgungundlovu District. Lipsky (1980:24) points out that street – level bureaucrats are constrained “by rules, regulations, and directives from above, or by norms and practices of their occupational group”, such as those presented in this thesis. The previous chapters have demonstrated that various accountability mechanisms are being implemented to secure such accountability among the educators in the District. The next sections will return to consider these mechanisms which are: political accountability; performance accountability; hierarchical accountability; legal accountability; and professional accountability.

12.2 uMgungundlovu District: political accountability

As presented in the theoretical framework, political accountability entails building trust among citizens and the elected officials in government. Its main avenues are regular elections which are decisive in determining the continuation of a government in power (Brinkerhoff, 2001:9). The elected officials are expected to deliver on their promises, otherwise they could be voted out of power. Political accountability gives managers the discretion to respond to key issues from their clients, as well as to elected officials and the general public (Huisman and Currie, 2004:531).

This thesis has shown that the performance and outcomes of elected officials are not easy to specify in education. The outcomes of elected officials may consist of educational policies, levels of spending on education, and special treatment for a category of children. The perception of street – level bureaucrats on this variable may influence their response to different accountability mechanisms. To that end the study undertook an extensive review of government documents to elicit what the government has been doing in exercising political accountability. This was followed by an exploration of respondents’ perceptions of the level of government’s political accountability regarding issues like: financing education; supporting less privileged schools; supporting less privileged learners; policy formulation; and implementing educational policies. These issues were considered to be critical for street – level bureaucrats’ accountability in the sense that when they are satisfied they are more likely to be motivated in their work. The next section will review findings from the documents and then from the surveys.

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Documentary review: political accountability

Documentary evidence indicates that the government of South Africa has exercised political accountability in various ways. Most education policies enacted after the demise of apartheid have sought to fulfil political accountability. The issue of education has featured on different election manifestos of the ruling party (African National Congress). Furthermore, the thesis has noted that quality of education has been a priority amongst democratic South Africans for decades, as reflected the 1955 Freedom Charter (DBE, 2010:6). In exercising political accountability, the South African government strives to make sure that everyone has the right to a basic education in accordance with the South African Constitution. To that end, the study has shown that spending on public education has become South Africa’s largest item in national budgets.

Furthermore, the South African government has made education its top priority. In the Delivery Agreement which could be read in conjunction with the Action Plan to 2014: Towards the Realisation of Schooling 2025, which was discussed in earlier chapters, the desire to achieve improved quality education is ranked first out of twelve other priorities of government. In addition to this, the government has policies to help less privileged learners in form of nutrition programmes, a No Fee policy for certain schools, as well as transport programmes in order to make sure that all learners have access to basic education.

What does this mean in terms of the political accountability framework? In exercising political accountability, the South African government has “established the institutions, procedures, and mechanisms that seek to ensure that government delivers on electoral promises, fulfils the public trust, aggregates and represents citizens’ interests, and responds to ongoing and emerging societal needs and concerns” (Brinkerhoff, 2003:7). But how do the respondents perceive such actions in terms of effectiveness and adequacy?

Surveys: political accountability

The thesis has demonstrated that government exercises political accountability in education in various ways. First, Table 12.1 shows the summary of the issues that political accountability in education often focuses on, and then Table 12.2 portrays the perceptions of respondents of government’s effectiveness in exercising political accountability in such areas. As mentioned earlier, the government’s political accountability is often measured in terms of the items listed in Table 12.1, but Bovens (2005:7) points out that this might be contestable since it is often
based on media coverage, blaming, coalition building, and political opportunity to get into power or stay in power.

Table 12.1 uMgungundlovu District: summary of political accountability focus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accountability type</th>
<th>Focus of accountability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political accountability</td>
<td>• Financing education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Supporting less privileged schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Supporting less privileged learners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Policy formulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Implementing educational policies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12.2 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of respondents of government’s effectiveness in exercising political accountability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accountability focus</th>
<th>Not effective at all</th>
<th>Not effective</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Effective</th>
<th>Very effective</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financing education</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting less privileged learners</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting less privileged schools</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enacting education policies</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing the education policies</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With regard to financing education, the thesis has shown that a majority of respondents were largely negative about the effectiveness of government. 25% and 27% suggested that it was ‘not effective all’ and ‘not effective’ respectively. This meant that 52% of the respondents were not satisfied with the funding given to education. This may be difficult to understand since documentary evidence suggested that the government was giving the largest portion of its budget to education and had placed it at the top of its priority list. The answer to this paradox may lie in the distribution of such funding in the DBE’s different sectors such as those discussed in the thesis. These include: administration; public special education; further education and training; early childhood education; independent schools; and spending on public ordinary schools which is further divided into: public primary schools; public secondary schools; professional services; human resources development; school sports and culture; a nutrition programme; and HIV/AIDS. Considering such distribution, it might be difficult to

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6 Table 12.2 is a summary based on the data presented in Chapter Eight.
assume that each sector was getting adequate funding. Respondents from some schools pointed out that the government was actually cutting funding.

However, after analysing the responses according to the type of school in which respondents were located, it was determined that a majority (40%) of respondents from independent schools were in the majority (66%) of those who felt that the government was effective in financing education. Perhaps this could be because these schools charge fees and are less dependent on government support.

In accordance with the South African Constitution, the government is expected to exercise political accountability by making sure that every learner has access to basic education. To that end, it has a responsibility to support the less privileged learners. Documentary evidence suggested that the government has a number of strategies to help such learners. For instance, learners who lived far away from schools were provided with transport. Learners whose parents could prove that they were unable to pay fees were also exempted from paying school fees. As was explained, learners who attended schools in quintiles one to three were given nutritional snacks every school day. However, a majority of respondents were generally negative about the government support for the less privileged learners. Some respondents pointed out that although some learners were charged school fees, they are also charged for other things such as sports and excursions which they cannot afford.

According to the research carried out, schools in public townships had the largest proportion of respondents who were negative about government’s support for such learners. Because of the effects of apartheid, these areas tend to have more learners who are less privileged than any other types of schools. Since these respondents are exposed to such learners more than any other respondents, they may have a better understanding of the needs of such learners. Again, by contrast, independent schools had the highest proportion of respondents who felt that the government was ‘effective’ in supporting the less privileged.

The study has shown that schools in uMgungundlovu District are not at the same level in terms of resources. Some schools are more privileged than others. For instance, there are some schools with more than three laboratories while others do not have even one. To that end, a largely negative response came from all the respondents about the government support for the less privileged schools, as presented in Table 12.2. Lack of support for such schools raises serious questions about the government’s political accountability to education since it can lead
to what is commonly called the ‘silent exclusion’ of learners in such schools. This is a situation whereby learners attend schools which are not properly equipped to teach effectively.

The theoretical framework has shown that another way of measuring government political accountability is through policy formulation. A significant proportion of respondents were largely negative about the government’s effectiveness in this area. 14% suggested that it was ‘not effective at all’ and 28% that it was ‘not effective’. A positive or negative perception of street – level bureaucrats about policy formulation is critical for policy implementation. A negative perception might engender a negative attitude in teachers who are implementing the policy.

Turning to government’s effectiveness in implementing education policy, a large proportion of respondents were negative. Although most respondents said the educational policies were good on paper they pointed out that government was ineffective in implementing them. When the data were analysed according to the level of education of respondents, it was seen that those with higher qualifications were in the majority of those who expressed dissatisfaction in policy implementation. Some respondents blamed cadre deployment as one hindrance in policy implementation while others blamed strong teacher unions for blocking implementation and yet others blamed the dearth of qualified educators. Whatever the reasons, documentary evidence seemed to corroborate these perceptions of respondents since it has become apparent that educational policy implementation has been the main challenge facing education in South Africa, as suggested by the number of review committees established by successive ministers of education. However, a small but significant proportion (30%) of respondents was positive about the implementation of education policy; most of these respondents were among the least qualified.

In sum, this thesis has revealed that in exercising political accountability, the South African government introduced transport and nutrition programmes for less privileged learners. This is consistent with what Jaafar and Anderson (2007:220) say about political accountability, that it “allows the government to demonstrate, at least symbolically, that it is being attentive and responsive to all constituent interests in education”. This is further corroborated by Radin and Romzek’s assertion: “political accountability manifests itself in educational institutions’ responsiveness to expectations that emerge from external stakeholders such as legislative bodies and parents and the society at large” (1998:77). In line with this, Fenstermacher (1979:333) says that political accountability guarantees “that all students, without respect to
race, income, or social class, will acquire the minimum school skills necessary to take full advantage of the choices that accrue upon successful completion of public schooling”.

This thesis has revealed that in order to gain the trust of the citizens, the South African government is exercising political accountability in financing education, supporting less privileged schools, supporting less privileged learners, in policy formulation and in implementing educational policies. With a few exceptions, most respondents are not satisfied with government’s effectiveness in all these areas. When governments fail to exercise their political accountability, Smithson argues, political accountability allows “citizens in a democracy to hold those responsible for making curriculum policy decisions, democratically accountable for their policies - to the extent that should citizens disapprove of policies and policy-makers, they could rid themselves of both, and the electoral system is the traditional means of accomplishing this” (1987:7). Although the mechanisms of checking political accountability are political processes and regular elections, this thesis has not shown why these have not been effective. Many respondents indicated that political accountability does not work in South Africa because the government was not evaluated on the basis of service delivery but on the basis of bringing apartheid to an end. Some of them said that freedom was more important than services. This implied that removing the government is equivalent to bringing apartheid back. This is hardly distinguishable from Brinkerhoff’s (2001:9) view that political accountability does not work well in “developing and transitioning countries”. As stated earlier, the manner in which street – level bureaucrats perceive the commitment of leaders of their organisations and political leaders at large to the goals of education may affect their reaction to the accountability mechanisms they employ. The next sections consider the different accountability mechanisms of ensuring compliance by street – level bureaucrats, starting with performance accountability.

12.3 uMgungundlovu District: performance accountability

In order to bring about compliance among street – level bureaucrats Lipsky argues for the “development of performance measures” (1980:165). This falls under performance accountability mechanisms. This thesis has shown that performance evaluation is a critical component of accountability in uMgungundlovu District. Table 12.3 displays a summary of performance accountability issues which have been explored in this thesis.
Table 12.3 uMgungundlovu District: summary of performance accountability issues

| Aspects of performance evaluation | • learner achievement for performance evaluation  
| • attendance of teachers and punctuality  
| • planning administration and lesson delivery in performance evaluation  
| • co-curricular activities  
| • human relations and contribution to school development  
| • creation of a positive learning environment  
| • knowledge of curriculum content  
| • professional development |
| Purpose of performance evaluation | • evaluation  
| • learning  
| • rewarding high performers  
| • punishing low performers |
| Perceived effects of performance evaluation | • evaluation improved performance of the teachers  
| • evaluation caused false behaviour by teachers  
| • caused falsification of information  
| • caused teachers to focus on measured outputs  
| • caused more clerical work for teachers  
| • improved performance accountability among teachers |

12.3.1 Aspects of performance evaluation

Lipsky notes that bureaucracies and their managers need to know what they want their workers to do and to be able to rank their preferences and know how to measure the output (1980:161). It is against this background that this thesis revealed that it is critical to identify crucial aspects of the job of street – level bureaucrats in order to measure their performance. Table 12.3 displays key aspects (key result areas) of uMgungundlovu District educators who are subject to performance evaluation. Table 12.4 displays a summary of perception of respondents of the importance of these aspects in the order of the value that was attached to each item.
Table 12.4 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of respondents of the importance of different items of performance evaluation.\(^7\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance Evaluation Item</th>
<th>Not at all important</th>
<th>Slightly important</th>
<th>Somewhat important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planning and administration and lesson delivery</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of curriculum and programmes</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learner assessment/ achievement</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher attendance/ punctuality</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of a positive learning environment</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional development</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human relations and Contribution to school development</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-curricular activities</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The thesis has revealed that performance evaluation, planning, administration and lesson delivery are considered to be ‘very important’ by 56% of all respondents surveyed and by 22% to be ‘important’. This perception was generally uniform across different types of schools. This suggests that planning, administration and lesson delivery were critical for educators as well as members of SMTs. The next most important item was knowledge of curriculum and programmes which was also considered to be ‘very important’ by 56% of the respondents and ‘important’ by 20%. However, in practice, this item may be difficult to measure. Methods of evaluating the knowledge of a teacher are not easy to find and become well accepted. Learner assessment was ranked third in Table 12.4 with 55% who felt that this measure of performance was ‘very important’ and by 23% that it was ‘important’. In fourth position was the punctuality and attendance of teachers which was viewed as ‘very important’ by 51% and ‘important’ by 23%. This shows that the SMTs valued teachers’ attendance at school on time as the prime consideration before they could evaluate other items. In fifth position was the creation of a positive learning environment which was judged to be ‘very important’ by 47% and ‘important’ by 25%. Since a learning environment is not confined to the classroom, this item may be difficult to evaluate. A few observations of lessons by SMTs cannot evaluate this comprehensively. Concerning this, Lipsky notes that “teaching is done in the classrooms that principals and supervisors do not normally enter; if they do, they provide a notice so that the teaching, like performance may be changed by the presence of audience” (Lipsky, 1980:169).

The sixth position was professional development which was considered to be ‘very important’ by 45% and important by 27%. Again the measurement of this item was based on the number

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\(^7\)Table 12.4 is summary based on the data from Chapter Nine.
of professional development workshops attended by a teacher as opposed to what was learnt (content) and how much the teacher understood. To put it another way, it was purely based on attendance. Seventh position was the ‘human relations and contribution to school development’ which was considered ‘very important’ by 40% and ‘important’ by 22%, and the last position in the ranking was co-curricular activities which was considered ‘very important’ by 35%, many of whom were from former Model C schools, and ‘important’ by 25%.

It can be concluded that although there are several measures of performance evaluation in uMgungundlovu District, the most critical ones in the eyes of respondents are: planning and administration and lesson delivery; knowledge of curriculum and programmes; and learner assessment/ achievement. Furthermore, it may seem that some of the items are difficult to measure in an objective manner. Even those that can be (such as professional development) may not reveal behavioural change by educators. This may raise serious questions as to the purpose of performance evaluation. The next subsection explores this issue further.

12.3 2 Purpose of performance evaluation

Those who administer performance evaluation often have a purpose that may not be explicit. This thesis has revealed that there are several purposes for performance evaluation other than to ensure compliance among teachers. Some of them are listed Table 12.5 according to the order of importance.

Table 12.5 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of respondents of the importance of different items of performance evaluation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Almost never</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Almost all the time</th>
<th>All the time</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To evaluate</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To improve efficiency</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To learn</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To reward high performers</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To punish low performers</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A review of literature earlier in this thesis revealed that often the purpose of performance measures is to evaluate (Behn, 2003:588). Bureaucracies want to know how well their workers are performing, although they rarely state this. Behn asserts: “evaluation is the usual reason for measuring performance” (2003:588). This study received mixed responses concerning this...
assertion from respondents, although a majority (54%) felt that it was so ‘all the time’ and 19% that it was so ‘almost all the time’. Such a perception is likely to influence other purposes of performance evaluation. As shown in Table 12.5, evaluation is perceived to be the main purpose of performance evaluation.

The second most important purpose of performance evaluation according to the respondents surveyed is to improve efficiency. In line with this view, Behn points out that in order “to ratchet up performance, public managers need to understand how they can influence the behaviour of the people inside their organisations who produce their outputs and how they can influence the conduct of citizens who convert these outputs into outcomes” (2003:597). 54% of those who were surveyed indicated that performance evaluation in uMgungundlovu District was aimed at improving efficiency ‘all the time’ and 22% felt that it was so ‘almost all the time’. It can be suggested that such a perception of performance evaluation is positive. Educators are more likely to take part in such evaluation if they have such a positive attitude.

Third on the list of purpose of performance evaluation was learning. 45% indicated that ‘all the time’ the purpose of performance evaluation was learning and 21% felt it was so ‘almost all the time’. As reported by Behn (2003:596), public managers need to use performance evaluation to answer these questions: what is my organisation doing well? What is my organisation not doing well? What does my organisation need to do differently to improve what it is not doing well? Answers to these questions would result in learning. The proportion of respondents who indicated that performance evaluation is aimed at learning was generally high. Again, this is a positive attitude which ensured the support of educators for such performance evaluation.

This study sought to find out if performance evaluations were used to reward high performers. The findings from this study were inconclusive. 33% indicated that performance evaluation was used for such a purpose ‘all the time’, 9% that it was so ‘almost all the time’ and 24% that it was so ‘sometimes’. A significant proportion (19%) felt that performance evaluation was ‘never’ used for such a purpose and 15% that it was ‘almost never the case’. These results were not expected since a review of documents revealed that performance evaluation was attached to potential annual increases in salary. However, probably the reason for this is that most respondents reported that all teachers are entitled to such an increase whether they perform well or not. The thesis has also shown that this was so because there was a tendency among SMTs to award every educator with a ‘good’ performance in the IQMS. Rewarding high performers was related to the last item on the list of purposes of performance evaluation.
Hardly any respondents (10%) indicated that performance evaluation was used to punish low performers: most of these respondents were from independent schools. On the other hand, a majority of respondents rejected the assertion that performance evaluations were meant to punish low performers. 46% indicated that it was ‘never’ used for such purposes and 18% that it was ‘almost never’ the case.

This thesis has revealed that IQMS had seemingly conflicting goals between performance evaluation (which focused on measuring performance) and development appraisal (for staff development – focusing on areas of weaknesses). It may be obvious that street-level bureaucrats might try to hide any information that they believed might reveal their weaknesses, especially if such weaknesses attracted negative sanctions. Consequently, any information that could be used to help the teachers in terms of professional development was hidden. The findings have revealed that in some cases it had become common for supervisors to classify all performance as ‘good’. To that end, external moderators were appointed but they were turned away from some schools by teachers belonging to ‘powerful’ teacher unions.

What can be gleaned from this is that, generally, the perceptions of respondents of the purpose of performance evaluation were positive. Most respondents regarded performance evaluation as a way of either to evaluate, to improve efficiency, or to learn. This means that the use of performance evaluation as an accountability mechanism is likely to be effective since educators view it in a good light. The fact that respondents did not view performance evaluation as a way of rewarding or punishing them would limit the chances of falsification of information in order to avoid punishment or gain rewards. If performance evaluation were designed to achieve what has been outlined here, to what extent is this successful? What are the other effects of performance evaluation on educators? The next subsection focuses on these issues.

12.3.3 Perceived effects of performance evaluation

The thesis has revealed that performance evaluation was used as an accountability mechanism in uMgungundlovu District. However, this has produced both intended and unintended consequences. Table 12.6 portrays a summary of the effects of performance evaluation starting with those that most respondents strongly agreed with.
Table 12.6 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of respondents of the effects of performance evaluation.9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Uncertain</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adds more clerical work (admin)</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improves my performance</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>46.0%</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance evaluation improves accountability</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher focuses on measured output</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causes teacher burnout</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>34.0%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leads to falsification of information</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of all the effects investigated, most respondents felt that performance evaluation created more administrative or clerical work for educators (37% ‘strongly agreed’ and 24% ‘agreed’). Very few (13%) respondents disagreed and 5% ‘strongly disagreed’. Most educators complained that the process of performance evaluation involved a lot of paperwork which they felt was taking a lot of their teaching and preparation time. This was one unintended effect of performance evaluation.

Second on the list was improvement in teachers’ performance, which received a largely positive response. A majority of respondents indicated that performance evaluation led to the improvement of their performance (33% ‘strongly agreed’ and 46% agreed’). This is in tandem with Lipsky’s (1980:166) assertion: “by virtue of simply putting attention on some tasks over others street-level bureaucrats can improve their performance on most quantitative measures managers introduce”. Because educators knew that their performance was going to be measured at the end of a learning term this induced them to work diligently in the areas concerned and consequently resulted in improvements. However, some respondents complained about how their performance was measured, which was often through learners’ achievement in assessments. Related to this was the third item on the list: improvement in accountability. 26% ‘strongly agreed’ and 39% ‘agreed’ that performance evaluation improved their accountability to the goals of the DBE. This epitomises what Brinkerhoff (2001:10) says, that performance accountability ensures that workers in organisations should demonstrate and account for performance in the light of agreed-upon targets.

9 Table 12.6 is a summary based on the data from Chapter Nine.
The last three items on the list identified largely negative effects of performance evaluation which are: increased focus on measured outputs; causing teacher burnout; and falsification of information by education. This thesis has shown that performance evaluation led educators to focus on activities that were measured. Lipsky points out that “street-level bureaucrats will concentrate on the activities measured” (1980:166). The findings revealed that 33% ‘agreed’ and 15% ‘strongly agreed’ that performance evaluation caused educators to concentrate on the measured outputs. This implies that organisations that are able to identify the right outcomes to be measured would cause an improvement of the outcomes that are measured. In the end, educators used their discretion to focus on the measured outcomes at the expense of those that were given little attention.

Apparently, this thesis could not find any link between teacher burnout and performance evaluation. Only 12% ‘strongly agreed’ and 17% ‘agreed’ that teacher burnout was caused by performance evaluation. This was low compared to 25% who ‘disagreed’ and 12% who ‘strongly disagreed’. Lastly, the study could not fully prove that performance evaluation led to falsification of information by street-level bureaucrats. The findings, however, show that a small but significant proportion 22.2% ‘agreed’ and 7.1% ‘strongly agreed’ that falsification of information could take place if supplying the correct information would result in punitive actions or caused incentives to be withheld or withdrawn. Concerning this issue, Lipsky (1980:167) asserts that “fraud and deception can also intrude into performance measurement”. However most respondents in this study disagreed (25.3%) and strongly disagreed’ (17.2%) with such a view.

This section discussed how the effects of performance evaluation were both positive and negative. As a mechanism of performance accountability, performance evaluation was reported to be effective in improving the performance and accountability of teachers. However, performance evaluation was also blamed for increasing the workload of teachers, causing them to focus on measured outputs, and perhaps resulting at times in teacher burnout and falsification of information by educators. These problems do not outweigh the benefits of performance evaluation, as they are what Lipsky (198:50) calls “difficulties that skilled management experts can overcome”. To that end, this thesis revealed that a number of mechanisms were employed to ensure compliance by educators. One such mechanism is hierarchical accountability which will be explored in the next section.
12.4 uMgungundlovu District: hierarchical accountability

The three main areas of hierarchical accountability explored in this thesis are summarised in Table 12.7.

**Table 12.7 uMgungundlovu District: summary of hierarchical accountability mechanism**

| Assessments as a mechanism of hierarchical accountability | • assessment of learners as a mechanism of hierarchical accountability for teachers  
• using assessments to make schools accountable  
• using assessments to make learners accountable for their education |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| The effects of using assessments as hierarchical accountability mechanisms | • the effectiveness of assessments in encouraging accountability among teachers  
• the effectiveness of assessments in improving instruction and classroom practices  
• assessments cause teachers to manipulate test scores  
• assessments causing teachers to focus on areas covered in examination  
• using assessments as an accountability mechanism causes a ‘finish the syllabus syndrome’ |
| Other bureaucratic accountability mechanisms used to ensure accountability among teachers | • The role of School Management Teams (SMTs)  
• The role of clusters and subject advisors |

12.4.1 Assessments as a mechanism of hierarchical accountability

This thesis has shown that the DBE has been using assessments as an accountability mechanism, including Annual National Assessments, (NEEDU, 2013:12). This mechanism targeted the different stakeholders of education, as summarised in Table 12.8.

**Table 12.8 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of respondents of the purpose of assessments.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose of Assessments</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Almost never</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Almost always</th>
<th>Always</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To help learners</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To assess the performance of the school</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>38.4%</td>
<td>39.4%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To evaluate teacher performance</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>38.8%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most respondents felt that assessments were aimed at learners. 54% indicated that ‘almost always’ assessments were meant to make learners accountable and 23% said it was so

---

10 Table 12.8 is based on the data from Chapter Ten.
‘sometimes’. 39% indicated that almost always assessments were meant to make schools accountable and 38.4% felt that this was the case ‘sometimes’. Compared to the first two assertions mentioned here, fewer respondents (21%) felt that assessments were meant to make teachers accountable and 38.8% felt that this was so ‘sometimes’. In essence, this implies that most respondents did not see assessments as a way of making them accountable. They saw assessments, instead, as a way of helping learners to see their strengths and weaknesses. Also, most of the respondents felt that assessments were meant to check the performance of schools. The DoE noted that the “purpose of assessment is not only to guide teaching and learning, but also to provide summary statements of learners’ achievements, for purposes of reporting and accountability” (DoE, 2001:25).

In order to implement fair and uniform assessments, the thesis has shown that the DBE had to introduce a mandatory curriculum for all the schools. This is not unique to South Africa. Linn notes that assessment and accountability have played prominent roles in many of the educational reform efforts in the United States (2000:4). Another scholar, Angelo (1999:30) asserts: “assessment should be used for student learning and secondarily to determine accountability for the quality of learning produced”. The use of assessment is growing in many countries. For instance, some scholars note that “accountability for students’ performance, coupled with standards and assessment, directed at students, teachers, or schools is growing not only in the United States, but the world over” (Carnoy, Elmore and Siskin, 2003:129). The reason for this is based on the presumption that “educational accountability should focus schools’ attention less on compliance with rules and more on increasing learning for students” (1996:65). Thus, Linn (2001:4) suggests that “a fundamental premise of high-stakes accountability systems is that instruction and student learning will be improved by holding teachers and or learners accountable for results”.

The findings of this study suggest that the respondents perceived the evaluation of teachers to be one of the purposes of assessment while some thought they served to evaluate the performance of schools and others believed that assessment served to help the learners. The evaluation of teachers through assessment was based on the conjecture that if schools and teachers became aware of their performance through assessment they would change their behaviour in order to improve their teaching. The same applies for assessment as a means of helping the learners. It can be assumed that assessments will help the teachers to know the areas in which their learners are performing well or poorly. This is usually termed diagnostic
analysis where teachers analyse the results of assessments by perusing each answer script to discover where learners performed badly and to propose remedial measures. This is consistent with Linn’s (2003:2) argument that “tests and assessments are designed to provide information about student achievement which will be helpful to teachers, schools and parents, although it is seldom specified in what way”. However, this is only applicable to internal assessments and not to the final NSC examinations which are not marked at school level. Schools, on the other hand, place a high premium on NSC examination results, especially considering that the results are published in the media for all to see. However, the issue of using assessments as an accountability mechanism leads to serious questions. To what extent is the use of assessment producing the desired outcomes? What are the undesired consequences of using assessments as a hierarchical accountability mechanism?

12.4.2 The perceived effects of using assessments as an hierarchical accountability mechanism

The perceptions of respondents of the purpose of assessments which were discussed in the preceding paragraphs are vital for the use of such an accountability mechanism. This may have a bearing on the effects of assessment on teachers’ behaviour. To that end, the thesis revealed that assessments seem to have had various effects on the behaviour of teachers in uMgungundlovu District. A summary of such effects is displayed in Table 12.9.

Table 12.9 uMgungundlovu District: perceptions of respondents of the effects of performance evaluation.\(^\text{11}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Uncertain</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Encourage accountability among teachers</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>53.7%</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve instruction and classroom practices</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leads to manipulation of test records and result</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher put emphasis on subject areas that are covered in exams</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotes ‘finish syllabus syndrome’</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotes emphasis on past exams</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{11}\) Table 12.9 is a summary based on the data from Chapter Ten.
This thesis has revealed that assessments were effective mechanisms of hierarchical accountability in uMgungundlovu District as the majority of respondents reported that such assessments led to accountability among educators (53.7% ‘agreed’ and 22.1% ‘strongly agreed’) and improved instruction and classroom practice (37.2% ‘agreed’ and 28.7% ‘strongly agreed’). Furthermore, the thesis revealed that the use of assessments as an hierarchical accountability mechanism was positive in improving classroom instruction and practices. 37.2% ‘agreed’ and 28.7% ‘strongly agreed’ that the use of assessments as an accountability mechanism led to such improvement. The argument for the use of assessments is based on shifting the focus of educational accountability from compliance with rules to paying more attention to student learning which is assessed through examinations. By extension, it is believed that this would lead to improvements in accountability and in classroom instruction and practices. In concurrence with these findings, Linn, (2001:4) acknowledges that “a fundamental premise of high-stakes [examination] accountability systems is that instruction and student learning will be improved by holding teachers and or learners accountable for results”. The findings of this thesis lend support to this argument as the majority of respondents reported that assessments encouraged accountability in schools and improved instruction and classroom practice.

However, this thesis has also revealed that the use of assessments as an accountability mechanism has led to unintended consequences, such as the manipulation of test records and results (27.7% ‘agreed’ and 6.4% strongly agreed’); the ‘finish syllabus syndrome’ (32.6% ‘agreed’ and 23.2% ‘strongly agreed’); and an emphasis on subject areas that are covered in examinations (42.1% ‘agreed’ and 17.9% ‘strongly agreed’); and an emphasis on past examination papers (31.3% ‘agreed’ and 23.2% ‘strongly agreed’). These findings are hardly distinguishable from Lipsky’s (1980:166) assertion that “if teachers are assessed or even remotely evaluated on the proportion of their charges who pass end-of year examinations, more will pass as teachers ‘teach to the test’”. This happens when teachers put the emphasis more on past examination papers rather than focusing on the curriculum. With regards to the manipulation of test records and examination marks, Lipsky calls this the intrusion of fraud and deception into the processes of hierarchical accountability (1980:167).

The emphasis on subject areas that are covered in assessments as reported in this thesis confirm previous research by Shepard (1991:232) who noted that teachers focused only on skills covered by tests in subjects like Mathematics and reading and language mechanics. Shepard
commented that long projects and reading real books was replaced with “word recognition; recognition of errors in spelling, language usage, and punctuation; and arithmetic operations” (1991:232).

Although there was overwhelming evidence in this thesis to support that teachers use their discretion and professional autonomy in class to rush their teaching in order to finish the syllabus and spend more time revising past examination papers, there was scarcely any such evidence reported in the scholarly literature.

To sum up, the use of assessments as an hierarchical accountability mechanism was seen to have had both positive and negative effects. The improvement of classroom instruction and accountability are important educational virtues that cannot be ignored. On the other hand, the downside of using assessments as an accountability mechanism is too substantial to ignore. An important question is: what can be done to harness the positive aspects of using assessments as accountability mechanisms while minimising its negative areas? The next part of this section explores this question.

12.4.3 Other bureaucratic accountability mechanisms used to ensure accountability among teachers

The role of School Management Teams (SMTs)

Evidence from this study shows that SMTs, led by the school principals, are the most effective means of ensuring accountability in the implementation of NCS. The uMgungundlovu District has faith in the effectiveness of SMTs. To ensure that they do their job properly and effectively, the KZN DBE prepared a manual for them. The use of manuals in bureaucracies is considered to be very critical by Simon (1997:213), who points out that the “function of manuals is to communicate those organisation practices which are intended to have permanent application”. In the absence of manuals, policies will remain in the minds of organisation members who make them. Manuals serve to determine whether members of an organisation have a common understanding of their organisation’s structure and policies (Simon, 1997:213). This is especially the case of the range of schools managed by SMTs where educators have different values, educational qualifications and experience. The use of manuals ensures uniformity, although it may be blamed for limiting the discretion of individual school principals. Lipsky (1980:162) explains that manuals reduce street-level bureaucrats’ discretion and constrains their alternatives whenever regulations are introduced to cover contingencies.
The members of SMTs often visit classrooms and observe lessons, scrutinise teachers’ records, and inspect learners’ books and exercise other managerial oversight at school level. These tasks are usually done by HoDs. Visiting classrooms and witnessing lessons are said to be very common for the purposes of IQMS. Concerning lesson observation, this study has shown that most of the respondents (49.5%) indicated that this was ‘effective’; 19.2% that it was ‘very effective’; and 8.1% that it was ‘extremely effective’. However, it must be noted that some respondents felt that, for purposes of accountability, educators could stage manage a lesson in order to please anyone observing it. In order to gain a balanced view, Pr1 indicated that at times they talk to learners about what is going on in their classes. Observing lessons is used in many countries as an internal accountability mechanism. Tailor (2007:569) notes that in the United States “increased monitoring of teachers’ plans and books and increased lesson observation has had a significant impact on discretion”.

In a comparative study of policy and practice in Finland and England, Webb et al (1998:551) comment that lesson observation were also used effectively by teachers and HoD where this would be followed by a discussions of the strengths and areas for improvement. However, some teachers seem to dislike class visits since these are perceived to undermine their professional discretion. Teachers, as street-level bureaucrats, view themselves as masters of their classes. Even in uMgungundlovu District, teachers “often view such visits with suspicion and dislike them since they are associated with reducing their discretion” (Muterekoko, 2009:21). In another case study in the Netherlands, class visits which focused on aspects of instructional behaviour were carried out by the school management at least three times a year (Hendriks, Doolaad and Bosker, 2001:515). The main purpose of observing lessons in all the different context mentioned here was to exercise accountability, although its overt use is to enhance learning.

Turning to the inspection of students’ books by SMTs, this thesis revealed that most respondents felt that this was an effective tool since it was considered to be a true record of what takes places in a classroom in the absence of supervisors. A total of 84.7% acknowledged this.

Attendance registers for teachers were acknowledged as an effective means of bureaucratic accountability by many respondents (79.7%). This finding was unexpected in another sense considering that all schools in uMgungundlovu District use such registers for monitoring attendance, but there are often complaints about teacher absenteeism. The reason for this
rather contradictory result is still not clear, but perhaps it could be explained by the improper and ineffective use of such registers by SMTs.

This study showed that a total of 88.9% of those surveyed felt that the inspection of teacher records was an effective tool of bureaucratic accountability. However, those who took an exception to this pointed out that it was likely that a teacher could prepare excellent records to please the SMTs but still fail to deliver effective lessons in class.

It is clear that the SMT is the most effective and critical level of hierarchical accountability in uMgungundlovu District. These management teams oversee the daily activities of educational policy implementation at school level. They work with subject advisors in ensuring compliance with educational policy.

**The role of subject advisors and clusters**

This study has indicated that subject advisors were expected to play a very critical role in the implementation of NCS. Although there were respondents who identified the effectiveness of subject advisors, a significant proportion of respondents did not agree. This was also confirmed by the subject advisors themselves who said that there were too few of them to cover all the schools. Another area of concern was the content knowledge of the subject advisors which was said to be inadequate. A study carried out by Dilotsothle, Smit and Vreken (2001) in North West Province (South Africa) had indicated some of these issues. For instance, they discovered that the majority of the subject advisors had not received a job description on appointment, their roles had not been clearly spelt out, they had not undergone any training or induction and that they were inexperienced as subject advisors (Dilotsothle, Smit and Vreken 2001:308). They also found that:

- There is no legislation governing the functioning of subject advisors.
- There is a shortage of experienced subject advisors as a result of the small supply of experienced science teachers.
- There is no formal evaluation of subject advisors by seniors or teachers. This is due to the Labour Relations Act.
- There is evidence that subject advisors are involved in management at the expense of other roles. (Dilotsothle, Smit and Vreken 2001:308)
Since Dilotsothle, Smit and Vreken’s study, there have been improvements in guiding and directing subject advisors’ work. For instance, Annexure 3 of the Guidelines on the Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities of Education Districts (DBE, 2011b) provides a detailed and unambiguous description of a subject advisor’s roles and responsibilities. Notwithstanding this, this study has revealed that subject advisors in uMgungundlovu District were doing far less than they was expected of them, as reflected in the findings presented in Chapter Ten. At times teachers did not understand whether subject advisors were playing a supportive role or the role of an inspectorate. As a result, the effectiveness of subject advisors in enforcing accountability among teachers is difficult to determine.

On the positive side, subject advisors in uMgungundlovu District play a critical role in working with subject clusters, HoD and cluster co-ordinators. They play an important role in moderating school based assessment (SBA) for Grades 10, 11 and 12. Their role in the lower grades is almost nonexistent (at least in uMgungundlovu District). Again, their work with clusters could be an important accountability mechanism if it were used properly. However, as reported in earlier chapters, sometimes the moderation by clusters was just a formality.

Taken together, it is clear that hierarchical accountability is exercised in uMgungundlovu District where SMTs, subject advisors and cluster co-ordinators are playing pivotal roles in implementing NCS. The exercise of hierarchical accountability and other forms of accountability in education are informed by legal accountability. This is the topic of the next section.

12.5 uMgungundlovu District: legal accountability

A review of government documents revealed that legal accountability is a critical element of increasing accountability in educational bureaucracies and of street-level bureaucrats. This thesis has shown that the work of teachers in uMgungundlovu District is regulated by legislation. This includes: (1) the National Education Policy Act, No. 27 of 1996 which provides for the determination of policy on salaries and conditions of employment of educators; (2) South African Schools Act No. 84, of 1996 which outlines the conditions for the employment and promotion of educators; (3) Employment of Educators Act No. 76 of 1998 which, among other things, addresses the appointment, promotion and transfer, and performance of other work by educators; (5) South African Council for Educators Act, No. 31 of 2000 which provides for the compulsory registration of educators, which also defines and promotes the ethical conduct of an educator as one who upholds the view of human rights.
embodied in the Constitution of South Africa; and General and Further Education And Training Quality Assurance Act, No. 58 of 2001 (Umalusi) which ensures that educational institutions adopt quality management systems for the achievement of learners and assure the quality of learner assessment at exit points.

In some cases, legal accountability also regulates the relationships of teachers and their clients (learners), their peers, their supervisors and the community at large. Legal accountability is important in ensuring accountability by street-level bureaucrats. The South African government is also bound by legislation to provide quality education for all. For instance, the KwaZulu-Natal Joint Liaison Committee (a committee of independent schools) took the KZN DoE to court over unpaid subsidies (The Witness 23 November 2012). The independent schools won the case. Other cases of legal accountability include the mandatory registration of teachers with SACE. However, evidence from this study revealed that although registration with SACE was a legal requirement, a significant number of teachers was not registered.

The types of accountability presented so far are largely external. Another form of accountability which this study explored is professional accountability which is the subject of the next section.

12.6 uMgungundlovu District: professional accountability

The study has revealed that professional accountability in which street-level bureaucrats often hold each other accountable constitutes a soft form of accountability processes in uMgungundlovu District. The need for professional accountability is highlighted by Harley et al (2000:298) who point out that there has been “increasing managerialism, bureaucratic accountability regimes as opposed to professional accountability regimes”. In uMgungundlovu District professional accountability was reflected in the work arrangements that allowed educators a high degree of professional autonomy. SACE was mandated with promoting professionalism among educators. In order to achieve this, SACE has a legal responsibility to register and deregister all teachers. Furthermore, SACE is required to carry out professional development with educators. This study considered these three main areas: the role played by SACE in promoting professionalism among teachers; the use of professional development to promote professional accountability; and the effectiveness of professional development workshops in promoting professional accountability. These areas are summarised in Table 12.10.
Table 12.10 uMgungundlovu District: summary of issues of professional accountability that were investigated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role played by SACE in promoting professionalism</th>
<th>Professional development as a means of enhancing professional accountability</th>
<th>Perceived effectiveness of professional development workshops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• professional ethics influences the work of teachers</td>
<td>• attendance to professional development workshop</td>
<td>• effectiveness of professional development that focused on leadership skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• moral obligation influences the work of teachers</td>
<td>• classroom use of knowledge learned from professional development</td>
<td>• effectiveness of professional development that focused on classroom management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• the influences of peers on the work of teachers</td>
<td></td>
<td>• effectiveness of professional development that focused on knowledge of children and learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• the role of SACE in promoting the teaching profession</td>
<td></td>
<td>• effectiveness of professional development that focused on assessment and recording</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12.6.1 uMgungundlovu District: role played by SACE in promoting professionalism

It has been reported that SACE has a legal mandate to “enhance the status of the teaching profession through appropriate registration, management of professional development and inculcation of a Code of Ethics for all educators” (SACE, online). This study revealed that only 87% of all the educators were registered with SACE, leaving 13% unregistered. Independent schools had the highest number of unregistered educators. Besides a monthly subscriptions paid to SACE, educators were not aware of any activities which had been organised or undertaken by SACE in the District. However, the OECD (2008:298) reports that SACE has contributed significantly to the teaching profession and has the potential to achieve more. Such potential is shown by the results of this study, especially considering the number of respondents who are not aware of SACE’s other roles. One area that was regarded as being key in promoting professional accountability was staff development and training.

12.6.2 Staff development and training

This thesis has shown that the DBE has been using training and staff development as a tacit way of securing accountability among street-level bureaucrats in uMgungundlovu District. All respondents reported that they had attended various workshops and seminars relating to staff development. According to Simon, “the behaviour of a rational person can be controlled if the
value and factual premises upon which he bases his decisions are specified for him” (1997:308). To that end, Simon argues that “influence is exercised through control over the premises of decision-making” (1997:308). This may also be revealed in the minimum qualification for entry into teaching (Lipsky, 1980:201).

Staff development and training were used in uMgungundlovu District to equip educators with the requisite skills, knowledge and competence to meet external accountability demands. This is a clear sign that training is an important component of accountability, as noted by Simon (1944:24; 1997:13) who avers that training influences decisions “from the inside out”. Simon further asserts: “training prepares the organisation member to reach satisfactory decisions himself, without the need for constant authority or advice” (1944:24). Put another way, training is an alternative to the use of authority as a means of controlling street-level bureaucrats. Another reason put forward by Riccucci (2005:87) is that “by setting up workshops with managers and staff to discuss the consequences of various behaviours, professional stuff are able to see the broader picture of the actual services delivered by their organisation”.

Simon (1997:13) says: “when persons with particular educational qualifications are recruited for certain jobs, the organisation is depending upon this pre-training as principle means of assuring correct decisions in their work”. When it comes to in-service training, street-level bureaucrats may be given this (such as that carried out in uMgungundlovu District) during school holidays or weekends to enable teachers to perform their task with less supervision. In essence, training provides the street-level bureaucrats with a “frame of reference for thinking” (Simon, 1997:13). This is hardly distinguishable from the minimum qualifications demanded by SACE for a teacher to register as a professionally qualified educator, as discussed earlier.

Riccucci (2005:51) also emphases the importance of training for street – level bureaucrats, especially whenever there is a policy change. In line with this, this study has revealed that most respondents had attended the new CAPS orientation workshops. Some of the professional development areas that the DBE focused on are: knowledge of children and learning; subject knowledge; curriculum knowledge; curriculum interpretation; knowledge of teacher’s role; subject application; assessment and recording; leadership; classroom methodology and classroom management. But how effective are these staff development workshops?
12.6.3 The effectiveness of training and professional development

The interesting finding in this study was that, generally, most respondents said that the workshops and training were very effective in making them more capable teachers in the different professional development areas listed earlier (see Chapter 11.3). This was not surprising since such findings have been recorded elsewhere. For example, a study of in-service training in Jerusalem’s secular elementary schools revealed that children’s achievement in reading and mathematics improved significantly (Angrist and Lavy, 2001:365). This is also in line with Ngidi’s findings on an evaluation of Post Graduate Certificate in Education in South Africa (NPDE) in which 70% of the respondents reported a considerable improvement in the effectiveness of their development, which, moreover, was not related to the school or level of qualification of recipients (Ngidi, 2005:37).

Generally, there was a small proportion of respondents in this thesis who reported that staff development was not effective at all (see Chapter 11.3). Those who were negative about the effectiveness of workshops also complained about the competence of workshop facilitators and/or the timing of such workshops. These findings are consistent with Ngidi’s (2005) findings which also reported that about 30% of the respondents did not find the in-service training effective. Even in Jerusalem’s religious schools, the in-service training was reported to be ineffective, albeit for other reasons that were not related to religion and the main one being the duration of training (Angrist and Lavy, 2001:365). Angrist and Lavy concluded that “that teacher training may provide a less costly means of increasing test scores than reducing class size or adding school hours” (2001:365).

To sum up, professional accountability in uMgungundlovu District was both internal and external. Based on their professional training, teachers were expected to make independent judgements about learning in their classes. The SMTs accorded them professional autonomy. Externally, SACE was seen a professional body that was meant to ensure professional accountability through registering teachers and inculcating professional ethics among the educators. However, most respondents noted that SACE was not effective in carrying out its mandate. This suggests that professional accountability like any other type of accountability could not work in isolation from the others.

What this study concluded is that holding street – level bureaucrats accountable to the goals of the DBE was not an easy task. It required various actors and different mechanisms of
accountability in a combined effort. The commitment made at national level by politicians may have a direct impact on how street – level bureaucrats react to the type of accountability to which they are subjected. Performance accountability where the performance of educators was measured was to some extent effective in holding educators accountable. Hierarchical accountability which was administered by the SMTs at school level was seen a crucial component of accountability. This was supported by different legislative requirement (hierarchical accountability). It was seen that these forms of accountability were viewed as key drivers of compliance. However, it was also seen at times that educators did not have the requisite skills to comply. To address this challenge, professional accountability played a key role in influencing educators’ decisions without resorting to the use of authority through professional development. How do all these conclusions which emerge from the findings answer the research questions and objectives posed at the outset of the study? The next section addresses this question.

12.7 Conclusions about the research objectives
The whole enquiry sought to gain an understanding of how the DBE in uMgungundlovu District secures accountability among the educators who are implementing the NCS. To accomplish this, the thesis explored the perceptions of street – level bureaucrats of different accountability mechanisms to which they are subjected. The key objectives and conclusions reached are presented here according to the various forms of accountability that were indentified in the theoretical framework.

12.7.1 Political accountability
To explore the perceptions of teachers and principals of the government’s responsiveness to the educational needs of South Africa.

With regards to this objective, the following conclusions are drawn from the findings:

a) In terms of financing education, the evidence from this study suggests that most respondents were satisfied with the amount of money allocated to education in the national budget but they lament that such funding was not reaching the schools.

b) Most respondents felt that the South African government had not been adequately exercising political accountability in supporting less privileged schools. This was despite the fact that the South African government had policies in place to support such schools.
c) Respondents were not satisfied with the exercise of political accountability in supporting the less privileged learners, although the South African government had such policies for a nutrition programme, transport programmes and a No Fee policy for the benefit of such learners.

d) With regards to formulating educational policies, the findings from this study indicate that respondents were not satisfied. However, it was recognised that after the demise of apartheid the South African government formulated progressive policies which had no racial bias.

e) Evidence from this study indicates that the South African government had been not effective in implementing education policy. This view was also supported by the evidence of numerous commissions established by successive ministers of education to investigate the implementation of educational policy.

12.7.2 Performance accountability

*To survey the implementation of performance evaluation used by the Department of Basic Education (DBE) to secure accountability and improve the performance of the street-level bureaucrats (teachers) in the implementation of NCS policy in uMgungundlovu District.*

Concerning performance accountability, the conclusions are as follows:

a) Most respondents felt that the main purpose of performance evaluation was to evaluate, improve efficiency and to learn best professional practices that could be used in the classroom.

b) Improvement in the performance of educators was an upshot of performance evaluation implemented through IQMS.

c) Compliance with the policies, rules and regulation of the DBE was an outcome of performance evaluation.

d) The unintended consequences of performance evaluation were an increased administrative work load for teachers and a narrowed focus on measured outputs.

e) Whilst this study did not confirm that performance evaluation caused teacher burnout and caused teachers to falsify information about their work, it did partially substantiate that such cases did occur.
12.7.3 Hierarchical accountability

To explore the bureaucratic processes used by the DBE in order to improve the compliance with policies and accountability of the street-level bureaucrats (teachers) who are implementing NCS.

a) Using the evidence from this research it can be concluded that assessment of learners’ work through examination forms a major component of hierarchical accountability. The main purposes of such assessment were to help the learners and to evaluate the performance of the teachers.

b) In general, the use of assessments as hierarchical measures of accountability led to improved accountability and enhanced classroom instruction as teachers attempted to improve the pass rates of their learners.

c) The findings from this study indicate that: manipulation of test records; a narrowed emphasis of teaching subject matter that was covered in examinations; an emphasis on past examination papers; and rushed teaching in order to finish the syllabus are a consequence of the use of assessments as a hierarchical accountability mechanism.

d) The study concludes that the SMTs played a critical role in ensuring that teachers in schools adhered to policies, rules and regulations of the DBE.

e) The indications are that subject advisors were expected to play a pivotal role in the implementation of NCS but they had not been equal to the task. The reasons for this included a lack of capacity and that there were too many schools to be covered by a single subject advisor.

12.7.4 Legal accountability

To explore the legal framework which governs the work of the street-level bureaucrats (teachers) and ensure accountability and compliance with policies and rules in the implementing the NCS.

a) The Constitution of South Africa makes basic education a right of all citizens. Through it, the South African government is held responsible for the provision of basic education.

b) Documentary evidence revealed that there is a range of legislation which governs the work of educators in South Africa. For instance, there is a legal requirement for
teachers to be registered with SACE. Other legislation provided for conditions of employment, termination of service, appointments, promotion and transfers of teachers and some relate to the quality assurance of learner assessment at exit points.

12.7.5 Professional accountability

To investigate how professional accountability improves accountability of the street-level bureaucrats (teachers) and ensures their compliance with policies, rules and regulations in implementing NCS in uMgungundlovu District.

a) Taken together, the findings of this thesis indicate that SACE was the main professional body that was mandated with promoting professionalism among teachers (by extension, this task involves promoting professional accountability).

b) In order to achieve this, SACE was legally required to register all professionally qualified teachers. Unregistered teachers are not permitted to teach in South African schools. However, this study revealed that such a requirement was too ambitious to attain since almost all the schools surveyed had a proportion of their educators who were unregistered.

c) The findings from this study indicate that one way of influencing the educators without the use of authority was to improve their professionalism through training and staff development. This method was reported to be very effective by respondents.

12.8 Implications of this study

This study has identified an analytic tool which assists our understanding of the role of street-level bureaucrats in implementing policies, not only in education but with regard to all public policies in which workers exercise some degree of professional discretion and autonomy. The study further explored methods of limiting such discretion and holding street-level bureaucrats accountable to organisational goals. The evidence collated in this thesis adds to our understanding of the role of management, law and professional bodies in holding street-level bureaucrats accountable.

It is apparent that The Principle of Scientific Management propounded by Frederick Taylor in 1912 is still relevant both as a theoretical tool for analysing organisational performance as well as a practical means of managing workers’ performance in public organisations. The evidence accumulated in this thesis implies that performance evaluation is an effective and useful tool in managing the behaviour of workers. However, a further implication is that
management should know important aspects of the job (key results areas) that they intend to measure since street-level bureaucrats have a tendency to focus their attention and energies on such tasks that are measured.

Several noteworthy implications for our understanding of bureaucratic accountability devices used in implementing educational policy flow from this research. First, the use of assessments was seen as pivotal in making teachers accountable for the learning of students. Although these assessments are rarely aimed at measuring the performance of educators, often teachers indirectly view their performance in terms of the proportion of their learners who pass such assessments. The data from this study suggest that the use of assessments as bureaucratic accountability devices could be exploited in order to secure accountability among educators, but necessary efforts must be taken to mitigate the unwanted consequences such as falsification of test records and teaching to the test which are likely upshots of using such mechanisms.

This thesis has demonstrated that school management teams are critical key drivers of accountability in educational policy implementation since they oversee the actual implementation of such policy. Empowering these front-line managers with the proper skills and knowledge would enhance their effectiveness. Furthermore, preparing detailed manuals might help the SMTs to do their daily work. The study further indicates that the implementation of NCS in uMgungundlovu District has the potential to benefit from adequate, effective, competent and well-informed subject advisors. This may require furthering the training of the current subject advisors and employing more in order to reduce the number of schools and teachers who are assisted by a single subject advisor.

With regards to legal accountability, the fact that not all teachers in uMgungundlovu District are registered with SACE implies that either the law is not being observed, or that it is not feasible to do so. For instance, for some schools it is difficult to find professional qualified teachers who can teach cultural subjects like Music, Art and Dance, or others like Computers Studies and Physical Education. This suggests that perhaps the law should make provisions for such cases.

The findings of this study might have important implications for strengthening professional accountability as a means of securing compliance among educators without resorting to the exercise of authority. The evidence indicates that if educators undergo development this could foster an intrinsic motivation for them to realise a moral and professional obligation to
accomplish their tasks because they would then have the competence to do so. Further implications relate to the role of SACE as a professional body: it has the potential to be more visible and accessible to educators over and above the collection of monthly subscriptions.

Taken together, these findings suggest that no mechanism is perfect to hold accountable street-level bureaucrats who are working in environments that allow them a high degree of autonomy and discretion. The mechanisms of accountability which have been discussed in this thesis are not mutually exclusive. Instead, it was demonstrated that they complement one another.

This study has gone some way towards enhancing our understanding of the nature of street-level bureaucrats in schools in the South African context and revealing how they are managed in the course of policy implementation. However, the findings of this study represent an initial step towards a complete understanding of managing policy implementation in such street-level bureaucracies. Our knowledge could be enhanced by enlarging the sample of the study as well as by covering a larger geographical area. Another possibility would be to focus on one type of accountability mechanism and then undertake a comprehensive analysis of how it is being used in implementing a specific public policy. This could be carried out as a cross-national study embracing all the provinces in South Africa. More broadly, research is also needed to determine how respondents perceive various types of accountability according to areas of location, educational qualifications, as well as their position in their educational organisation. In short, an extended application of Lipsky’s formulation of street-level bureaucrats could lend further insight into the management of education policy in South Africa.
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Davi Ngo, hrvinet.com.


APPENDIX ONE: LETTER OF CONSENT

Letter of Consent


My name is Sybert Mutereko. I am a PhD student under the direction of Professor Ralph Lawrence (e-mail: lawrencer@ukzn.ac.za) in the School of Sociology & Social Studies at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in Pietermaritzburg. I am conducting a research study which focuses on accountability mechanisms used in the implementation of National Curriculum Statements in the Umugungundlovu District.

The main purpose of my study is to find out how the Department of Basic Education and schools seek to secure and improve accountability in the implementation of National Curriculum Statements in Umugungundlovu District. Furthermore, the study seeks to understand how the school principals and educators perceive the different accountability mechanisms the government and the secondary schools employ to hold them accountable.

I appreciate your cooperation in this interview. No one in your school or the Department of Basic Education will know how you have answered. You do not have to give your name or any person’s name in your answers. Your responses will remain confidential. There are no right or wrong answers to the questions in this interview. This study only seeks honest and thoughtful judgements about accountability mechanisms used by government as well as your schools. Your opinion, perceptions and judgements are very valuable to this study. I hope you will find this very interesting.

Your participation in this study is voluntary. If you choose not to participate or to withdraw from the study at any time, there will be no penalty. The results of the research study may be published, but your name will not be used. All information you provide will be considered confidential and grouped with responses from other participants. Further, you will not be identified by name in my thesis or in any report or publication resulting from this study. During the course of interviews a tape recorder may be used but before that, your permission will be sought. Should you not agree to this, the researcher will write down answers to the questions? If you agree to the use of tape recorder, the researcher will insure that all information recorded is kept safely and deleted immediately after the use. The data collected through this study will be kept in a safe place for five years (according to the UKZN Research Ethics) in School of Sociology And Social Studies.

The research is expected to be completed in November 2011, and the research results will be shared with the Department of Education, academics and policy makers thereafter.
I would like to assure you that this study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Office of Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee at UKZN. However, the final decision about participation is yours. Should you have comments or concerns resulting from your participation in this study, please contact Professor Ralph Lawrence (e-mail: lawrencer@ukzn.ac.za) or myself at 208522821@ukzn.ac.za

I have read the above information, and I have decided of my own free will to participate in this research.

Name: .................................................................

Signature: ...........................................
APPENDIX TWO: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR PRINCIPALS

1. Type of school........................................................................................................................................
2. How does the Department of Basic Education ensures that:
   (a) The schools are accountable to the goals of the department?
   (b) The educators are accountable to the goals of the department?
3. What are the mechanisms used by Department of Basic Education in securing accountability among:
   (a) Schools?
   (b) Teachers?
4. How often do you use the following do you use the following accountability mechanisms for your teachers?
   (a) Performance evaluation
   (b) Student assessments
   (c) Professional development
   (d) Book inspection
   (e) Lesson observation
5. What are the effects (intended and unintended) of these accountability mechanisms on the teachers?
   (a) Performance evaluation
   (b) Centralized student assessments
   (c) Professional development
   (d) Book inspection
   (e) Lesson observation
6. What are the effects (intended and unintended effects) of the accountability mechanisms in Question 5 (a), (b) and (c) on schools:
   (a) Schools
   (b) Teachers
7. Which organisations are involved in the implementation of the National Curriculum Statement (NCS)?
8. What roles do the organisations like Umalusi, SACE and others play in the implementation of NCS and in ensuring accountability among:
   (a) Schools?
   (b) Teachers?
9. How effective are these organisations in securing accountability among teachers?
10. What role do subject advisors play in securing accountability among your teachers?
    Thank you for your participation.
APPENDIX THREE: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR TEACHERS

Section A: Biographical and Professional Information

1. School code………………
2. Type school…………………………………………………
3. Respondent number………..
4. Gender  male …..  female …….
5. Race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Indian</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colored</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. SACE registration  YES…..   NO……
7. What is the highest level of education that you have completed?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Senior Certificate</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certificate</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>diploma</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelors’ Degree</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honors’ Degree</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masters’ Degree</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctoral Degree</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. Subject/s taught

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject/s taught</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Languages (Fundamental)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts and Culture</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human and Social Studies and Languages</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical, Mathematical, Computer, Life and Agricultural Sciences</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business, Commerce, Management and Service Studies</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing, Engineering and Technology</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Teaching experience in years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>&lt;6</th>
<th>6-10</th>
<th>11-15</th>
<th>16-20</th>
<th>21-25</th>
<th>&gt;25</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Section B: Performance Evaluation/appraisal**

1. Are there any performance evaluations your school? Yes…… No……
2. How important are the following items important in performance evaluation? Circle the appropriate number.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Slightly important</th>
<th>Somewhat important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Learner Performance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punctuality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

306
3. Comment on any of the items in question 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning and administration</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co-curricular activities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesson delivery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. What are the purposes of performance evaluation in your organisation? Circle the appropriate number.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To evaluate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To motivate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To promote</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To celebrate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To learn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To improve efficiency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To reward high performers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To punish low performers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


To evaluate

To motivate

To promote

To celebrate

To learn
To improve efficiency

To reward high performers

To punish low performers


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Uncertain</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved teacher performance….</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved learner performance….</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Burnout……………………</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Window dressing……………………</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inhibits innovation………………..</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falsification……………………………</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on measured output</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. Do you agree that the use of performance evaluation systems improves your accountability? Circle the appropriate number.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree fully</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Uncertain</th>
<th>Do not agree</th>
<th>Do not agree at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Comment on the effects of performance evaluation mentioned in question 6. And any other effects that you know.

…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………

Section B: training and professional development

1. In the past two years have you ever received training on the items listed below? If your answer is yes please indicate the training was formal (workshops or classroom training) or informal (training by principal, HOD or peers).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge of children and learning</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Formal</th>
<th>Informal</th>
<th>Both</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. If you have received, how effective were these training and professional programs in improving your competence in your job? Circle the appropriate number.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Uncertain</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of children and learning</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject knowledge</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum knowledge</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum interpretation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of teacher’s role</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject application</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment and recording</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. How often do you apply what you learnt from formal training as well as informal training in day to day duties?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Almost never</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Almost always</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formal (workshops and classroom training)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal (on the job training by principal)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Comment on any the workshops/training that you have received.

........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................

Section C: Student Assessment as accountability mechanism

1. How many formal assessments do give learners in the subject that you teach per year? ..........  
2. Who set the assessments?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of assessments set at school</th>
<th>Number of assessments set at cluster</th>
<th>Number of assessments set at district</th>
<th>Number of assessments set at province</th>
<th>Number of assessments at national level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Who moderate the assessment?
Number of assessments moderated at school | Number of assessments moderated at cluster | Number of assessments moderated at district | Number of assessments moderated at province | Number of assessments moderated at national level
---|---|---|---|---

4. Learner assessments are used as an accountability mechanism? Circle the appropriate number.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Almost never</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Almost always</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To evaluate teacher performance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To assess the performance of the school</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To help the learners</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Who should be accountable for learners’ success in assessments? Circle the appropriate number.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Almost never</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Almost always</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The school</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The parents</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The learners</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Who should be accountable for learners’ failure in assessments? Circle the appropriate number.
7. How does the use of student assessments as an accountability mechanism for the teachers affect you? Circle the appropriate number.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Almost never</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Almost always</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The school</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The parents</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The learners</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Uncertain</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Academic improvement in all subject categories</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encouraged accountability in schools</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved instruction and classroom practices</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced preparatory curriculum for higher education and vocational training</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipulated test records and result</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispossession of students who fail to meet the desired performance levels</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher emphasis on subject areas that are covered in exams</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set a false idea of the aims and purposes of education</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotes ‘finish syllabus syndrome’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotes emphasis on past exams</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Add or comment on any of the items listed in question 7.

………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

Section D: Supervision and Inspection

1. Who supervises the work that you do?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HOD</th>
<th>Principal</th>
<th>Subject adviser</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Describe the roles played by any of supervisors in question 1.

………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

3. What are the positive and negative effects of supervision provided by supervisors?

………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
4. How effective are the following mechanisms of accountability? Circle the appropriate number.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Not effective</th>
<th>Not effective</th>
<th>Effective</th>
<th>Very effective</th>
<th>Extremely effective</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lesson observation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student book inspection</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clock in registers (attendance)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher records (plans inspection)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thank you for your participation.
APPENDIX FOUR: PERMISSION TO CONDUCT INTERVIEWS

SYBERT MUTEREKO
21 STOTT STREET
PRESTBURY
PIETERMARITZBURG
3201

Enquiries: Sibonelo Ahmar
Date: 11 March 2011
Reference: 0015/2011

PERMISSION TO INTERVIEW LEARNERS, EDUCATORS AND DEPARMENTAL OFFICIALS

The above matter refers.

Permission is hereby granted to interview Departmental Officials, learners and educators in selected schools of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal subject to the following conditions:

1. You make all the arrangements concerning your interviews.
2. Educators’ programmes are not interrupted.
3. Interviews are not conducted during the time of writing examinations in schools.
4. Learners, educators and schools are not identifiable in any way from the results of the interviews.
5. Your interviews are limited only to targeted schools.
6. A brief summary of the interview content, findings and recommendations is provided to my office.
7. A copy of this letter is submitted to District Managers and principals of schools where the intended interviews are to be conducted.

The KZN Department of education fully supports your commitment to research:


It is hoped that you will find the above in order.

Best Wishes,

Dr SZ Mbokazi
Acting Superintendent-General

...dedicated to service and performance beyond the call of duty.