

Semantics and Race: A Response to Appiah's Racial Eliminativism

Mutshidzi Maraganedzha

**This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Social Science in Philosophy, in the School of Religion, Philosophy and Classics.**

College of Humanities, Development and Social Sciences,

University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg

November 2013

Declaration of originality

The research for this dissertation was carried out through the School of Religion, Philosophy and Classics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg from February to November 2013.

The author hereby declares that the content of this dissertation is his work, unless specifically indicated to the contrary, and that the thesis has not been submitted in any form for any degree or diploma to any other University. All citations, references and borrowed ideas have been duly acknowledged.

Sign.....

Date.....

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank my supervisor, Dr Bernard Matolino, for his professional guidance and unfailing support.

I owe my deepest gratitude to my mother, Ndishavhelafhi Alphosinah Mphaya, and to my brother and sister, Dakalo and Phathutshedzo Maraganedzha, for their support and encouragement.

My special thanks are extended to my friends, Gbola Olasina and Elsie Adwo Essien for editing this project and for their insightful comments.

Table of Contents:

Declaration of originality iii

Acknowledgements iv

Introduction..... 1

Chapter One 6

1. Racial Skepticism 6

1.1 Introduction..... 6

1.2 Appiah’s Criticism of Du Bois’ Notion of Race..... 7

1.3 Biological Notion of Race 11

1.4 Appiah’s Account as a Denial of the Existence of Race 12

1.5 A Critique of Appiah’s Account of Race..... 13

1.6 Conclusion 15

Chapter Two..... 16

2. Topology of Race: A Response to Appiah’s Racial Eliminativism..... 16

2.1 Introduction..... 16

2.2 Essentialism and Race..... 17

2.3 Racial Constructionism: A Response to Appiah’s Racial Eliminativism..... 20

2.4 Conclusion 27

Chapter Three 28

3. Semantics and Race 28

3.1 Introduction..... 28

3.2 The Analysis of Racialism 28

3.3 Meaning and Race..... 31

3.4 A critique of Mallon’s view on the Role of Semantics in the Debate of Race 36

3.5 Conclusion 38

| | |
|--------------------------------------|----|
| Chapter Four | 39 |
| 4. Metaphysics and Race | 39 |
| 4.1 Introduction..... | 39 |
| 4.2 Metaphysics | 39 |
| 4.3 Racial Ontology | 43 |
| 4.4 Conclusion | 45 |
| Conclusion | 46 |
| Bibliography | 48 |

Introduction

Some people of certain races have encountered ill treatment arising from physical differences that are visible to the naked eye. Lucius Outlaw (2001: 58) claims that “for most of us, that there are different races of people is one of the most obvious features of our social life”. The concept of race has a rich history dating from the previous two centuries or even earlier, depending on which position one takes when discussing how race came to be. To assign the formation of the concept of race to a specific time period is an anachronism that Andrew Valls claims to be dangerous (Valls, 2005: 58). Valls argues that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the concept of race was not well developed but that it was just an idea (Valls, 2005). This thesis seeks to investigate the debate about the status of race. The researcher specifically seeks to analyze whether the concept of race exists.

There are various questions asked about the concepts of race and racism. The two concepts are highly contested in the scholarly work. Philosophers like Lucius Outlaw, Andrew Valls, Paul C. Taylor, Charles W. Mills, Bernard Boxill and Kwame Anthony Appiah all debate the question of the existence or reality of race. According to Mallon (2006: 525), there are three perspectives on race. The first perspective on race, racial scepticism, claims that races do not exist at all. This view or perspective is defended by proponents like Kwame Anthony Appiah and Naomi Zack. The second perspective is racial constructionism which claims that races are socially constructed. This view is defended by proponents like Charles W. Mills, Bernard Boxill and Paul C. Taylor. The third perspective is population naturalism which holds that “...the view that races may exist as biologically salient populations although ones that do not have the biologically determined social significance once imputed to them...” (Mallon, 2006: 525). This view is defended by Robin O. Andreasen. These are three views dominating the debate on the existence of race. The researcher will focus on the first two of these contending views. The researcher will focus on the view that argues that races exist. The researcher will also look at the view that argues racism is a false doctrine because it depends on the existence

of race, which is said to be nonexistent. The researcher proposes that these two views have a different conclusion in the inquiry of reality of the concept of race and are at both in the different ends of the spectrum in this debate.

The problem is that racism cannot be what it is without race and its connotations. The constructionists argue that race is a concept which cannot be easily thrown away or abandoned. For them the concept of race exists. The proponents of this view are Bernard Boxill (2001), Charles W. Mills (1998), Paul C. Taylor (2004), and Lucius Outlaw (1996). Boxill, Taylor, and Mills believe that race cannot be explained from the biological point of view. From this stand point race loses its status. There is a growing racial position of eliminativism¹ led by Kwame Anthony Appiah and Naomi Zack. Nonetheless, the proponents of racial constructionism argue that there is no need for eliminating the concepts of race, given the fact that it exists and there are real effects that people experience in the social world. This thesis shall argue that the concept of race exists, in contrast, to what the proponents who argue for eliminating the concept of race.

Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze (2001), argues that the idea that race does not exist is just a pretension. He further argues that modern philosophy of cross cultural values has amounted to nothing much, than just pretension (Eze, 2001: x). Here, the proponents who argue that race is not important run into trouble by endorsing a position that is controversial. This is because this position does not account for the prejudices, separation, and preference that people practice in the social world based on racial distinctions among different groups of people. The questions that philosophers are attempting to answer are: What is the concept of race? What criteria are used to separate people into racial groups? Does race really exist? Can race be metaphysical? Does race matter? Can race, as a concept, be meaningful without the 'theory of reference'? The metaphysical questions of the existence of race are at the center of philosophy of race. By

¹ Throughout, I use the terms 'racial eliminativism' and 'racial scepticism' interchangeably.

racial philosophy, I mean the debate that is conducted by philosophers when analyzing the nature of race or the race talk as Ron Mallon (2006) puts it.

In his book, *In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture* (1992), Appiah relies on semantic externalism² to rubbish the concept of race. Appiah argues that there is nothing in the world to which race refers, and he concludes that, given this, race does not exist. He further argues that the doctrine of racialism is wrong to separate people into racial groups. Appiah is motivated by what he sees to be problems that these concepts race and racism have brought. He claims that "...there are no races and there is nothing out there in the world that can do all we ask race to do for us..." (Appiah, 1992: 45). It is therefore clear from the foregoing that the philosophical debate on race and racism is clearly divided into irreconcilable camps.

In chapter one I summarize Kwame Anthony Appiah's theory of racial eliminativism. I look at the two notions of race, the one proposed by W.E.B Du Bois and the other based on contemporary biological notions of race; I then discuss their impact and implications for Appiah's position on race. Appiah argues that distinctions which are said to exist among people are artificial (1992: 18). In rejecting the concept of race, Appiah starts by a doctrine that plays a major role in the debate of race: racialism. His rejection of the doctrine of racialism lies in his assumption that the concept of race does not exist. Appiah focuses on Du Bois and biological notions of race. He seeks to show that Du Bois fails in his attempt to develop a definition of the notion of race that transcends the biological definition. Furthermore, Appiah supports the contemporary biological notion of race that claims that human variation is genetically determined.

In chapter two I focus on the objections which some philosophers (like Lucius outlaw, Charles W. Mills, and Paul C. Taylor) have risen against Appiah's racial eliminativism.

² Semantic externalism is a view that claims that meaning is equivalent to those things which are out there in the world (Alston, 1964:12).

One crucial move that Appiah's racial eliminativism makes is his claim that, in spite of popular belief that race is important and crucial, there are no races. Appiah does this because he wants to probe a meaning of race that goes beyond skin difference. His view of race challenges our intuition about the concept of race. Zack and Appiah as proponents of racial eliminativism argue that race is not important. They contend that any interpretation that perceives race as important in nature supports views that are racist in nature. Appiah argues that any person who is a racial essentialist is a racist. According to Appiah there are two types of racism "extrinsic and intrinsic" (1992: 13). Extrinsic racism is when people make moral distinctions between members of different races because they hold a view that the racial essence entails certain morally relevant qualities.

This view discriminates people on the basis that different races differ in respects that warrant differential treatment—respect, honesty and intelligence (Appiah, 1992: 13). Intrinsic racism is when people who differentiate morally between members of different races, because they believe that each race has a different moral status, quite independent of moral characteristics entailed by its racial essence (Appiah, 1992: 14).

Another philosopher who holds the same position as Appiah is Naomi Zack. Zack (1993) argues that black and white distinctions are in themselves racist because the concept race does not have an adequate scientific foundation. Appiah and Zack contend that race cannot refer to anything in the world. If there is nothing in the world to which it refers, then there is no proof that it exists. The debate about the concept of race, it is highly centered on these three main themes the nature, reality and the definition; and this debate is very broad. My main aim is to focus on the works of philosophers like Lucius Outlaw, Andrew Valls, Paul C. Taylor, Charles W. Mills and Bernard Boxill who argue that Appiah's position on race is fundamentally flawed and controversial.

In chapter three I argue that Appiah's objections to the concept of race is not convincing. To achieve this I will consider the doctrine of racialism at the outset. I argue that Appiah's rejection of the doctrine of racialism was based on his misconception of the

doctrine. I argue that this doctrine has two aspects, that need to be correlated and that work hand in hand, but are separate. In this chapter my aim is to show the relationship between our language (meaning concepts, words and sentences) and our world. I also argue against Ron Mallon's (2006) proposition that semantics do not play an important role on the debate of race is false. I conclude by claiming that the concept of race exists. The position that I argue for is racial constructionism.

In chapter four I consider metaphysics and ontology and suggest that this might provide a solution to the problem of the nature and reality of race. I will assess the merits of Appiah's racial eliminativism regarding his view on the existence of race. Finally, I argue that Appiah's view on race is incompatible with our intuitive understanding of race.

Chapter One

1. Racial Skepticism

1.1 Introduction

The problem of how human beings are distinguished or separated into particular small groups of races has been a worrisome issue in philosophical discussions for some time. In his work entitled *In My Father's House: African in the Philosophy of Culture* (1992), Appiah's main argument is to show that the concepts of race and racism are fallacious, because they—were informed by the fallacious belief that people are separated into racial groups. Robin O. Andreasen (2005: 94) claims that “a belief of separating people went sometime unchallenged and was held by many people”. She proceeds to claim that the traits typically used to individuate races vary independently. It is a general consensus among academics that this idea or a belief of individuating human beings into races based on their visible appearance is biologically unreal. It is clear in Appiah's work that his purpose and the main objective that he seeks to achieve affirm this idea that race is biologically unreal.

Appiah is motivated by what he sees to be the problems (like slavery and so on) that these concepts race and racism have caused. In his project Appiah seeks to show that there are similarities among different races. He claims that “there are no races and there is nothing out there in the world that can do all we ask race to do for us...” (Appiah, 1992: 45). My main aim in this chapter is to clearly examine and critique Appiah's racial skepticism; it is of course important to understand his theory before critiquing it. I shall outline the criticisms that Appiah has of W.E.B Du Bois' notion of race, and the biological argument that Appiah brought forward to rubbish the concept of race. In reaching a conclusion, I shall argue that the “dialectical thesis”³ which Appiah argues for, denies race distinctions and endorses similarities among human beings.

³ According to the *Cambridge International Dictionary* (2012), “Dialectic thesis” is said to be a disputation which is intended to resolve the differences between two competing views rather than to

1.2 Appiah's Criticism of Du Bois' Notion of Race

As a point of entrance to his racial skepticism, Appiah critically examines W.E.B Du Bois' notion of race. Du Bois was active in founding fathers of Pan-Africanism and was among the three intellectuals who articulated the ideology of the Pan-Africanism as a movement of liberation (Appiah, 1992), the other two intellectuals were Alexander Crummell and Edward Wilmot Blyden. Crummell was said to be one of the founding fathers of the Pan-Africanism movement whose aim was to fight for liberation; he was African-American by birth and a Liberian priest by adoption (Appiah, 1992: 3). Meanwhile, Blyden was a "native of the New World and a Liberian by adoption; like Crummell, he was a priest and a founder of the tradition of Pan- Africanism; for a while, they were friends and fellow workers in the beginnings of Liberia's modern system of education" (Appiah, 1992: 21). According to Appiah (1992), Du Bois is the person who provides us with an insight into the race ideology which was the backbone and archaeology of Pan-Africanism.

In his paper, *The Conservation of Races*, Du Bois claims that American Negroes have been "led to... minimize race distinctions"⁴ because the discussion of race with which they were familiar held assumptions about their full potential, abilities, political, intellectual and moral status, which they felt were wrong (Appiah, 1992). Even though Negroes were led to minimize race distinctions, Du Bois claims that "...in their private and calmer moments they must acknowledge that human beings are divided into races ..." (Du Bois, 1897: 6). He argues that:

All these physical characteristics are patent enough, and if they agreed with each other it would be very easy to classify mankind. Unfortunately for scientists, however, these criteria of race are most exasperatingly intermingled. Color does not agree with texture of hair, for many of the

establish one to be true. However, in a philosophical sense this term is used to describe the process by which thinkers investigate and seek the truth by exchanging different opposing arguments.

⁴ Du Bois, W.E.B. 1897. *The Conservation of Races*. P- 6.

dark races have straight hair; nor does color agree with the breadth of the head, for the yellow Tartar has a broader head than the German; nor, again, has the science of language as yet succeeded in clearing up the relative authority of these various and contradictory criteria (Du Bois, 1887: 7).

The criteria by which individuals were allocated to a particular categorical group were grosser physical differences of color, hair and bone. However, as for Du Bois there are other factors that play a role in differentiating and allocating human beings into particular groups. He claims that “Although the wonderful developments of human history teach that the grosser physical differences of color, hair and bone go but a short way toward explaining the different roles which groups of men have played in Human Progress, yet there are differences—subtle, delicate and elusive, though they may be—which have silently but definitely separated men into groups” (Du Bois, 1897: 75). These subtle forces that separate human beings

...[h]ave generally followed the natural cleavage of common blood, descent and physical peculiarities..., at all times, however, they have divided human beings into races, which, while they perhaps transcend scientific definition, nevertheless, are clearly defined to the eye of the Historian and Sociologist. If this be true, then the history of the world is the history, not of individuals, but of groups, not of nations, but of races, and he who ignores or seeks to override the race idea in human history ignores and overrides the central thought of all history (Du Bois, 1897: 75).

From this it can be deduced that Du Bois makes a clear move from the scientific notion of race to his notion of race which is informed by both sociology and history. However, the question at hand is whether this approach to the notion of race intelligible? Du Bois’ intentions were to come up with a definition of race that transcends the scientific notion. In his quest for the definition that transcends the scientific notion of race, Du Bois

proposed that there are several criteria that differentiate human beings. He claims that “those criteria of race differences have in the past been proposed, as color, hair, cranial measurements and language. And manifestly, in each of these respects, human beings differ widely” (Du Bois, 1897: 7).

However, Appiah does not agree with Du Bois’ suggestions that there are other factors that contribute to the differentiation and allocation of human beings into smaller groups. Appiah shows that as much as Du Bois was eager to articulate a definition of the notion of race which transcended the late nineteenth century’s final word on race, his attempt does not actually differ from the scientific notion of race. In his effort to provide a definition of race influenced by sociological and historical perspectives, his theory of race actually relied on the scientific notion of race. Du Bois’ dialectical thesis endorses difference among races and simultaneously acknowledges that there are similarities.

Du Bois believes that there are other characteristics like the spiritual and the psychological which play a greater role for the continuity of these races. From the look of things Du Bois’ understanding of race is one which seems wrong. I do not see why these criteria or characteristics like the spiritual and the psychological are of importance to the notion of race.

The essential question that is at hand is what then is race? Du Bois claims that race is:

....a vast family of human beings, generally of common blood and language, always of common history, traditions and impulses, who are both voluntarily and involuntarily striving together for the accomplishment of certain more or less vividly conceived ideals of life (Du Bois, 1897: 76).

From how Du Bois answers the question what is race, Appiah sets out to show that there is a problem with Du Bois’ technical answers to the question, “What, then, is a race?”

Firstly, race is not based on a common language because a particular race may speak numerous languages. Consequently, this idea of particular races speaking a common language does not really demonstrate what constitutes race. Secondly, race is said to be based on people who share a common history. According to Du Bois, in order for one to belong to a particular racial category that person has to have the same common history with other people who belong to that group. For example, African-Americans are associated with Africans because of their history. However, the criterion of common history does not accomplish what Du Bois wants to achieve (Appiah, 1992: 33).

In his analysis so far, Appiah has rejected and stripped away “common history and traditions” from Du Bois’ notion of race, consequently, what is left is common descent and common impulses. From Du Bois’ view this characteristics are both voluntary and involuntary (1897). Appiah further claims that the definition of common descent is a characteristic that flow from parts of the scientific definition of race. This leads us to the last two characteristics within Du Bois’ definition of the notion of race. Appiah (1992: 31) notes that “there is a problem with Du Bois’ last two characteristics of defining race, what Du Bois mean by common impulse? Impulse is some instinct which a person can act on. Does his mode of thought mean that a person will make a selection or associate himself with a particular race group based on impulses?”

However even this very common impulses, Du Bois’ one remaining criterion left to define race, are informed by historical, common experiences and common history, and these criteria were rejected earlier in Appiah’s argument (Appiah, 1992). It is clear that this criterion also does not work, because it relies on criteria that were earlier proven to be false, namely common history and common experience.

I suggest that any definition which relies on those two modes of thought (sociological and historical) is unhelpful in understanding race, because at the end of Du Bois’ attempt to define race, we are left with a definition that is not convincing and has no solid characteristic. Appiah has demonstrated that Du Bois’ definition of race is fallible.

Appiah probed the biological notion of race as an attempt of showing that race is not important, however, the truth is that it is an illusion.

1.3 Biological Notion of Race

In contemporary biological literature it is not clear whether there are any human races. Most biologists seem to have reached “consensus on the underlying genetics” (Appiah, 1992:35) to accept that human beings’ genetics are not that far apart. However, most cultures believe that there are racial differences among people, and that these differences are significant. But from the biologists’ literature this seems not to be the case (Appiah, 1992). Appiah argues “what most people in most cultures ordinarily believe about the significance of racial difference is quite remote from what the biologists are agreed on, and, in particular, it is not consistent with the doctrine of racialism” (Appiah, 1992: 35). According to Appiah (1992:13), racialism is the view “that there are heritable characteristics possessed by members of our species which allow us to divide them into a small set of races, in such a way that all the members of these races share certain traits and tendencies with each other that they do not share with members of any other race”.

Appiah goes on to say that “genetic variability among those populations is... 9-11%” (Appiah, 1992:35). In his attempt at finding a deeper meaning of the concept of race, Appiah moves to analyzing genetic literature. His main motive is to show that there is not much difference among human beings. If we study the genetic difference among human beings, there is less difference between Africans and Asians, and even Europeans. Appiah claims that human characteristics are genetically determined.

Some loci are occupied in different members of a population by different genes, each of which is called an *allele*; and a locus is said to be *polymorphic* in a population if there is at least a pair of alleles for it. Many loci have not just two alleles but several, and each has a frequency in the population. If you consider two members of a population chosen at random and look at the same locus on one chromosome of each of them,

the probability that they will have the same allele at that locus is just the probability that they will both have the first allele (x_1^2), plus the probability that they will both have the second (x_2^2)...plus the probability that they will both have the n^{th} (x_n^2) (Appiah, 1992: 35-36).

In his assessment and analysis of loci to see how human populations are different or similar, Appiah uses the analysis of the loci to show that, if we can search for the allele within the loci, we are most likely to find similarities or matching allele. The biologist claims that the estimated loci percentage of two people taken at random from the human population will have the same characteristic at a random locus are about 85.2 percent, while the chances for two (white) people taken from the population of England are about 85.7 percent (Appiah, 1992: 36). These figures of loci between these examples seem to be quite small to be considered different from each other. Consequently, there are no clear differences among the human population according to the analysis of loci. As the evidence stands the notion of race is unimportant in explaining the biological differences among human kind.

1.4 Appiah's Account as a Denial of the Existence of Race

Kwame Anthony Appiah's racial skepticism is informed by theory of meaning. He acknowledges that his argument connects the idea that if there are no racial essences then to claim that race does not refer requires an account of what it is for it to refer. According to Ron Mallon (2006: 530), Appiah, in questioning the reality and existence of race, combined the three traditional theories of meaning. These theories of meaning are comprehensively described by Alston, in his book: *Philosophy of Language* (1964). Traditionally these theories are known as "referential⁵, ideational⁶ and descriptive⁷ theory

⁵ Referential theory identifies meaning through an expression to which it refers or with referential to the connection (Alston, 1964).

⁶ Ideational theory claims that meaning is associated to ideas that are mental or is semantics of internalism (Alston, 1964).

⁷ Descriptive theory of meaning is a theory of meaning which hold that meaning of names, terms and objects are associated to the descriptions of the speaker, while the referent are determined by the objects that satisfies the descriptions of the objects (Alston, 1964).

of meaning” (Alston, 1964:11). Appiah’s strategy of deny the concept of race is to argue that from either tradition of these three theories the term and concept of race fails to refer. This approach seems to be problematic I suspect that Appiah is asking a wrong question here, the question is what are the properties in the world that can be used for this concept to refer.

Appiah’s concern is whether this concept of race exists in reality. He probes for a deeper and fundamental explanation of this concept. He begins his argument with the failure of the doctrine of racialism and turns to Du Bois’ distorted notion of race, and to the biological notion of race. His preceding assumption was that race is an illusion and it does not exist. He proceeds to argue that there is nothing to which race refers in the world. The issue that Appiah is avoiding is a tendency to accept or believe things tentatively without any solid evidence. In support of this he further argues that biologists do not agree that there are human races.

1.5 A Critique of Appiah’s Account of Race

Appiah argues that “The truth is that there are no races: there is nothing in the world that can do all we ask race to do for us” (Appiah, 1992:45). This is a strong statement that is dismissive of race. But this statement raises some problems for which Appiah has to account. In this section I would like to demonstrate some of the problems that arise out of his assumption. I shall also critique Appiah’s assumption that race does not exist.

Appiah believes that ‘race’ does not exist because it surpasses our scientific understanding; and there is nothing in the world which can represent it (Appiah, 1992). I find Appiah’s argument to be problematic. One of the problems lies in his usage of the new biological definition as a way of strengthening his argument and dismissing the concept of race. My aim in this project is to argue against Appiah’s claim that race is an illusion. I do not consider this assertion to be cogent. The purpose of the new biological definition of race was simply to falsify and to show the invalidity of the findings of nineteenth century science’s final word on race. Informed by these values, liberal

intellectuals claim that race does not exist in order to discredit the notion of racism (Boxill, 2001).

In his racial eliminativism argument, Appiah seems to be asking the wrong question. He starts his analysis, by rejecting the doctrine of racialism, and claims that it is a false doctrine. But the question is which aspect of this doctrine is false? The concern which I believe he has in mind is the suffering which this doctrine has caused human kind in the past. He goes on to claim that racism is informed by racialism; race (and its connotations) is an error that human beings have brought upon themselves (Appiah, 1992). However, if we dismiss race or stop understanding race as a concept that describes differences among people, how, then, can we account for racism that people still experience in the present?

In the third chapter I will argue that the doctrine of racialism has two aspects. I shall separate these aspects so as not to be misunderstood. The first aspect has to do with dividing people by traits and tendencies. This aspect of racialism has been mainly responsible for the stigma and hatred that most races experienced in the past century. The second aspect has to do with what I call the simple classification of people by physical appearance. We can classify people using this aspect of racialism without any stigma. I suggest that it is the first aspect of racialism that philosophers like Appiah and Zack have rejected as false. Since there are no traits and tendencies that are peculiar to particular races, it is likely that people of different races act in a similar manner. Does the view that people share the same behaviour imply that they are of the same race? I do not think that this is the case. Appiah claims that we have much in common as human beings. As the evidence stands, Appiah's dialectical thesis denies difference and accepts similarities among human beings.

It seems that Appiah does not comprehend that racialism is formed by two intertwined aspects, and then Appiah's rejection of the notion of racialism is incorrect. If we consider that a simple aspect of racialism exists and is still in use even today, then his argument that is keen to eliminate the concept of race fails and it is not persuasive. Furthermore, does the claim that race does not refer entail that race does not exist? If we consider the

evidence as I have presented it, Appiah misses the point in his argument against race. Therefore, Appiah's argument for eliminating the concept of race loses its strength.

1.6 Conclusion

In this chapter I have discussed Appiah's position on the notion of race. As demonstrated, Appiah's account of race is dismissive of the concept of race. In his dismissal of race he examined two different texts that both discussed the concept of race: one by Du Bois and the contemporary biological notion of race. Of course, other philosophers find Appiah's theory of race to be objectionable. The objection that I shall look at is that Appiah's theory of race is controversial. This objection is outlined in my next chapter.

Chapter Two

2. Topology of Race: A Response to Appiah's Racial Eliminativism

2.1 Introduction

Appiah's intentions were to discard or get rid of the concept of race in his essays "The Invention of Africa" and "Illusion of Race" of *In My Father's House: African in the Philosophy of Culture*. Appiah's quest to rubbish race was to show that racialism, race and racism are not significant. Lucius Outlaw, however, takes a different direction to Appiah's conclusion about the notion of race. He claims that "For most of us that there are different races of people is one of the most obvious features of our social worlds"⁸ (Outlaw, 2001: 58). He proceeds to claim that "the term race is a vehicle for notions deploy in the organization if these worlds in our encounters with persons who are significantly different from us" (ibid.). In essence, lines have been drawn between scholars who advocate for the existence of race and those who claim it does not exist. While these debates have some sense of merit, the controversy persists among philosophers on what is the meaning of race.

In this chapter I seek to argue that Appiah's position on the notion of race is controversial and not cogent. In the first section, I shall discuss philosophers who hold different views from Appiah's racial skepticism or racial eliminativism. In the second section I shall sketch out race essentialism as a philosophical concern, and I shall demonstrate the faults of *racial eliminativism*⁹. In reaching my conclusion, I argue that race is essential to account for vicious problems such as racism that are connected to race.

⁸ This approach to the notion or concept of race is one which is not only particular to Outlaw. There are philosophers like Mills, Boxill and Taylor agree with Outlaw that race does exist. See, Boxill (2001), Mill (1998), and Taylor (2004).

⁹ Glasgow defines racial eliminativism as a camp that argues that there is no race and that all claims that rely on a racial basis are false (Glasgow, 2009).

2.2 Essentialism and Race

Essentialism is a view that says that to any entity (like animal, a group of people, a physical object and concept) there is some attributes or properties that are necessary to its identify and function. In his paper, *Evolution, Population Thinking and Essentialism*, Elliott Sober argues that:

Both Typologists and Populationists seek to transcend the blooming, buzzing confusion of individual variation. Like all scientists, they do this by trying to identify properties of systems which remain constant in spite of the system's changes. For the typologist, the search for invariances takes the form of a search for natural tendencies. The typologist formulates a causal hypothesis about the forces at work on each individual within a population. The invariance underlying this diversity is the possession of a particular natural tendency by each individual organism. The populationists, on the other hand, try to identify invariances by ascending to a different level of organization (Sober, 1980: 176).

To my mind, Sober highlights an important point here; he argues that scientists search for the consistent and remaining aspect or property that can be used to identify a system. This view implies that for a particular entity to be identified there has to be some properties that are unique to this entity. In addition, this property plays a major to constitute what the notion of race is.

In this section I wish to explore the idea that there is some property, or properties, that naturally differentiate people into racial groups. This idea is used biologically to differentiate objects or species. By biological species, I mean a categorical form that most biologists use as a tool to differentiate objects according to their visible features (Tobias, 1961).

It seems that there is a property that can be used to function as the concept of race. Like any other concept or physical object, there are some characteristics or attributes that form a necessary part to identify the function of that particular concept or object. This is a view which most modern philosophers, including classical philosophers, hold about existing concepts and all things which are known¹⁰.

The question at hand is whether races are natural. Most philosophers are tempted to argue that races are not natural phenomena. Consequently, those racial eliminativist philosophers argue that race as a concept cannot exist since it is not supported by scientific knowledge. Andreasen states that:

The idea that race is biologically real has played a central role in scientific discussions of race, and in common sense as well, for some time. Some philosophers argue that scientific and folk conceptions of race developed hand in hand around the late eighteenth to nineteenth century. While, a number of biological definitions have been proposed, many share the assumption that it is possible to divide humans into races such that the members of each share certain heritable characteristics, such as overt physical traits..., which they do not share with members of other races (2005: 94).

According to Andreasen (2005: 94), this assumption went largely unquestioned for some time. People were individuated or separated by traits. Most of the traits that were used to individuate people into groups were different races. Recent biological research, however, has brought a challenge to this view because it has indicated that there is very little genetic variation among the three major races. This has motivated some scholars who

¹⁰ See, Aune. (1985) and Shalkowski in Le Poidevin. (ed) (2008), These philosophers believed that for any entity to be what it is in existence there has to be a particular property unique to that entity to constitute what that entity is.

argue for an eliminativist view to claim that there is not much difference among the human groups.

Despite the arguments put forward by Appiah and Zack to support their claim that race is not important biologically, race as a concept does matter, and it is possible that there may be characteristics and attributes to which race can refer. Those proponents who argue that there is no race seem to ignore the fact that race does not involve anything which is particularly pernicious. Those proponents, who hold that race exists, could tentatively argue that racial groups are defined by physical appearances that are visible to our naked eyes. This is an obvious reality in our social worlds as Outlaw will affirm. From the foregoing, it is clear that race exists. The concept of race is useful as a system to categorise human beings and to account for social problems like racism. In other words, it is useful because it is not possible to talk about race and race related issues without this concept or the term itself.

Appiah might argue that there is no difference between this position and the nineteenth century definition of race. My response to this objection is that there is a difference between this position and the nineteenth century definition of race, which perpetuated false and immoral ideas about other races. I argue that the view that I take on the concept of race does not alienate itself far apart from the nineteenth century definition of race, but it looks and tracks down what has succeeded or persisted to be the property that is still in use even today when we talk about race. This is not insidious since it only suggests that human beings have what we call difference, which is visible to the naked eye.

The substance or property that I have been talking about is essential for one to be a member of certain race, in other words an individual cannot belong to a particular race without this property. This property cited above is one that constitutes race and what it is. It is the only mode of reality about race which has survived from the seventeenth century usage of the concept through the nineteenth century and which is currently still in use. Another problem which race as a concept faces is that of being an illusion. Appiah argues that race is nothing but an illusion. To my mind, Appiah's thoughts are informed

by the ideas that human categories are worth nothing due to the fact that systems of categorizing humankind into small groups perpetuates discrimination and other evils arising from it. It seems as if what sceptical philosophers like Appiah and Zack believe about the substance or property which makes up race what it is may not be true.

2.3 Racial Constructionism: A Response to Appiah's Racial Eliminativism

In this section I shall discuss philosophers who disagree with Appiah's conclusion that "the truth is that there are no races: there is nothing in the world that can do all we ask 'race' to do for us"¹¹ (Appiah, 1992: 45). This claim has intrigued most intellectuals, philosophers included. In contrast, Boxill (2001) argues that the view that the concept of race is not biological and scientific relevant does not entail that there are no races. Audrey Smedley and Brian D. Smedley (2005) will agree with Boxill at this point. Smedley and Smedley argue that biological race is fictional, and racism as a social problem is real (2005: 16).

In his book *A Short History of African Philosophy* (2002), Barry Hallen acknowledges that Appiah's book, *In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture* (1992), is a text which discusses "different themes and those which are sensitive in diverse disciplines" (Hallen, 2002: 46). He further argues that some of Appiah's discussion and methodology generate considerable controversy (Hallen, 2002). Jayne Chong-Soon Lee argues that Appiah "addresses the construction and mapping of race, in his usual comprehensive and controversial manner" (1994: 752-753). Both Hallen (2002) and Lee (1994) agree that Appiah's account of race is controversial in nature and it raises a lot of questions.

¹¹ According to Boxill (2001), the debate was initiated by Appiah, K.A. (1985). The Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois and the Illusion of Race, *Critical Inquiry*, Autumn, p-35. This position was further pushed in his book *In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture* (1992).

In his book *Blackness Visible: Essays on the Philosophy of Race* (1998), Mills claims that race exists. He based his argument on practical common sense knowledge which we have about its practice within our societies. Although Appiah and Zack reject race due to their liberal mind-sets, they argue that race is not important. However, this does not erase its reality. The notion of race is real enough for most people as it is well immersed in the mental consciousness of most people (Mills, 1998).

Mills writes that:

....The most illuminating framework for defending this claim is, literally, a global one: the thesis that European expansionism in its various forms—expropriation, slavery, colonialism, settlement—brings race into existence as a global social reality, with the single most conceptual division historically being that between ‘whites’ and ‘nonwhites’. Those termed white have generally had a civil, moral, and juridical standing that has lifted them above the other ‘race’. They have been the expropriators; others have been the expropriated. They have been the slave owners; others have been slaves. So one gets a formal ontological partitioning in the population of the planet, signified by “race” (Mills, 1998: xiv).

From this, Mills notes that it was in the nineteenth century that the concept of race developed. During this period many wrong and ill-conceived ideas were perpetuated among people. For instance, perceptions about the black people were nothing more than mere condescension. In Eze’s book “Race and the Enlightenment”, Immanuel Kant wrote, “...this fellow was quite black from head to foot, a clear proof that what he said was stupid” (Eze, 1997:38). The fact that the person is black does not mean that he is incapable of thinking. My argument is based on my assumptions that human beings are equally gifted in intellectual ability.

As seen from above, several philosophers believe that the concept of race exists despite others being sceptical about this concept. Boxill argues that “the concept of race has been used for categorizing common perceived objects” (2001: 1). This view is commonly shared among philosophers who accept that race as a concept exists. These proponents acknowledge that racism is a problem which people experience their lives. How then can we account for this problem which is mainly caused by visible differences in appearance among human beings if we eliminate the concept of race that to mind sustain this doctrine of racism?

Although philosophers, like Appiah, believes that they are doing human beings a favour by making the revolutionary claim that race does not exist, many people are still suffering from the problems of racism in their day to day lives. I still believe that, although Appiah has proposed that the concept of race is an illusion, there have been no changes in the social world that he is writing about. I suggest that it is better for us to understand what remains of this concept and why it persists, rather than to dismiss it. Dismissing the concept of race will be a futile exercise because this doctrine is deeply immersed in people’s mindsets. The persistence of social struggle within most societies across the globe—race is mostly the key factor that perpetuate this struggle— this basically entails that this concept still has some significance in the social world. Outlaw argues that “still, the persistence of struggle around matters involving race requires that those of us who continue to be informed by leftist traditions of critical thought and practice confront, on the one hand, unresolved problems. On the other, by way of critical review of our own traditions, we must determine the extent to which those traditions have failed to account appropriately for race...” (Outlaw, 2001: 59).

Boxill points out that “...if races as commonly understood do not exist, it follows that races as commonly understood are not biological races, but it does not follow that there are no races...” (2001:38). The above quotation implies that there are races despite that fact that biology is appealed to by Appiah as supportive evidence to the non-existence of race. My suspicion here is that Appiah takes the same route when he argues that the concept of race is irrelevant and we have to stop using it in our societies.

As I mentioned earlier, the use of race was a system put in place to categorize people in accordance with their physical features visible to the naked eye. This system is clearly similar to the way in which biologists separate inanimate and animate things into groups. Tobias, a biologist, argues that the term, “race”¹² originated from biology. Moreover, the new biological definition of race was offered to discredit the nineteenth century definition of race. The new biological definition of race concluded that there are no races (Boxill, 2001).

The next point is the controversy of Appiah’s methodology. Jayne Chong-Soon Lee claims that Appiah’s methodology is controversial; Appiah’s persistent deconstruction of race addresses clear theoretical and political concerns (Lee, 1994: 759). She goes on to say that Appiah:

.... first recognizes the need to dissect the legacy of nineteenth century scientific racism: the institutionalized equation of biological difference with racial inferiority and the use of this biological inferiority to justify racial discrimination and exclusion. Second, Appiah seeks to dismantle the naturalization of racial difference...Third, he seeks to expose the processes through which subjects become racialized beings, allowing us to examine how racial differences emerge...Fourth, Appiah challenges entrenched understandings of racial difference, racial identity and racial hierarchy in society (Lee, 1994: 759).

¹² The first usage of this term is one that did not have all the connotations that the nineteenth century definition of the concept of race possessed. When people bring race or racism into their discussions, what comes to mind is the negative impact these two concepts have had in the global community as a whole. However, race was originally used as a tool or system for distinguishing people or objects into different small groups. See Tobias (1961), Lee (1994) Hardimon (2003) and Bernasconi & Lee Lott, (2000).

Thus Lee seems to suggest that Appiah's take on race exhibits an urge or desire to undermine race as a natural factor and the existence of racism. Lee proceeds to say that she believes Appiah has:

[A]nother reason for probing the divergences of racial categories from physical traits. Too often, the fact of physical differences leads inexorably to the conclusion that distinct races exist. Rather than examining how these specific physical differences came to be regarded as racial ones, differences in skin, hair, and bone are viewed as permanent features of our racial landscape. However, to assume that certain physical traits automatically dictate certain racial categories is to overlook the process of interpretation through which these traits are construed (Lee, 1994: 760-761).

However, to assume that certain physical features are important in determining racial categories is overlooked by Appiah in his second chapter of *In My Father's House*. Appiah argues that:

To say that biological races existed because it was possible to classify people into a small number of classes according to their gross morphology would be to save racialism in the letter but lose it in the substance. The notion of race that was recovered would be of no biological interest—the interesting biological generalizations are about genotypes, phenotypes, and their distribution in geographical populations. We could just as well classify people according to whether or not they were redheaded, or redheaded and freckled, or redheaded, freckled, and broad-nosed too, but nobody claims that this sort of classification is central to human biology (Appiah, 1992: 37).

I would like to pose this question to Appiah; does the example that he gives serve to demonstrate that there is no importance attached to certain physical features in human

biology in determining racial categories? I believe that physical features that differentiate people are important. Racial eliminativists contend that there is nothing in the world that race could refer to. Thus they:

...reject the view that races might be reproductively isolated human groups, because they are skeptical that there are contemporary groups that have the requisite reproductive isolation. Eliminativists suggest that many biologists and anthropologists are skeptical of the concept of race as a useful scientific tool because no racial population, past or present, has ever been completely isolated from other races in terms of breeding (Mallon, 2006: 532).

In other words, no human groups are, or have been, completely isolated from all other groups when it comes to reproduction. This point is quite legitimate, but I still do not believe this question is relevant to the issue of the reality of race or racial naturalism. I believe the critical question should have been what can make this concept natural or not natural. Appiah and Zack both suggest that the concept of race is not a scientific concept. The contemporary new biological notion of race was set to discredit racism. Outlaw argues that “What, then, after this extended review of the science of race, are we left with by way of understanding? With the decisive conclusion, certainly, that race is not wholly and completely determined by biology, but is only partially so. Even then biology does not determine ‘race’, but in complex interplay with environment, cultural, and social factors provides certain boundary conditions and possibilities that affect riation and development of geographical race” (Outlaw, 2001: 70). As the evidence stands from a sceptical view, race is irrelevant scientifically. This is important as Appiah and Zack perceived. It might be the case that race is not scientifically important; however, as Outlaw (2001) notes, this concept is not fully scientific. The only episode of it being scientific is when we are making distinctions of things according to their appearance.

The most fundamental and normative question that we have here is, should we eliminate the concept of race or racial thought? To my view the concept of race is valuable in three respects as a moral issue, political and to account for the issues like social injustices. For instances, Glasgow (2009: 3) argues that if we want to identify someone in a particular racial way, we have in some sense a moral obligation—this obligation is one that can be overridden in other contexts, to be sure—to identify them in this way. Without any doubts to most people’s mind, racial identity forms a key factor of other people’s self conception and it also informs who they are. On the other hand, getting rid of the concept of race within our societies can create more confusion to the societies; it seems to be a premature thought to eliminate this concept. For this following reason, as I have argued, race forms part of other people’s self-conception—and if this concept is abandoned—and stopped to be used within societies, people might fall in trouble of losing one aspect that form their identities as human beings.

Those proponents, who argue that to be an eliminativist is a route to take, are in favour of some common things that people of different races share among them. However, Graves (2001, 199) argues that the idea of eliminating the concept of race is a benefit to human beings, because, when race is eliminated human beings will erase the difference among them and this will foster economic growth. These are some of the benefits that intellectuals put in mind when they advocate for elimination of this concept. Glasgow proposes that there are several types of eliminativism; Public and global. Glasgow (2009: 2) argues that the broad form of eliminativism is what he called a public version. By, Public eliminativism, in this type of eliminativism people are encourage to get rid of “race-thinking” in both public life and political spheres. This leads to an uncertainty whether people are suppose to persist to regards each other as races. The last form is global eliminativism. Glasgow claims that “the goal of this view is for us to eventually get rid of race-thinking not only in the political or even public world, but altogether” (Glasgow, 2009: 2). It is precisely, the desire of pursuing the some benefits when eliminativists argue that this concept is not relevant to our societies today. In the same time, they argue for elimination of the concept of race because the elimination of this

concept shall bring some rectification to racial injustices that were brought by the concept of race in the past.

2.4 Conclusion

In summary, I have outlined my argument against Appiah's racial eliminativism. I conclude that Appiah's notion of race is controversial both in methodology and in practice. In addition, I have indicated that Appiah's goal of erasing the concept of race within societies is problematic given that the notion of race is deeply embedded in the minds of people. I have asserted that race, as a concept, is important to explain the vicious and problematic issues of racism which affect people on a daily basis. Finally, from the evidence presented it is clear that Appiah's racial eliminativism is not persuasive.

Chapter Three

3. Semantics and Race

3.1 Introduction

It would not be an exaggeration to claim that there is a controversy about the best and most suitable definition and meaning of race. It seems the meaning of the concept of race is not solely in its content. In some instances philosophers acknowledge that race might have a meaning that can be traced to the actual natural world. In this chapter I seek to make two philosophical moves to advance the debate about race and racism. My main aim in this chapter is to show the relationship between our language (meaning concepts, words and sentences) and our world. I shall be concerned with Appiah's conclusion that race does not exist, but my way to this point shall rather be a winding path. I wish to take an indirect approach to respond to Appiah argument of racial eliminativism. Firstly, I seek to sketch the possibility of particular properties in the natural world that can be used as a reference to race, by analysing the doctrine of racialism. I shall employ the framework of semantics to achieve my intentions. I shall argue that the concept of race exists.

3.2 The Analysis of Racialism

As a prelude to the pre- and post-modern debate of race and its main tool, racial classification, I have noted that philosophers assume that human beings have habitually categorized each other as members of particular races. However, other philosophers have contended that race is a modern concept or a concept which has developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Valls, 2005). In his book *Race: The History of an Idea in the West*, Ivan Hannaford contends that "this idea of race is modern and it was invented in the modern era" (Hannaford, 1996:4) starting from the 18th and developing further in the 19th century, following the scientific definition of race which claimed that there were three major races, although Du Bois argued for a greater number of races, I

shall show clearly what racialism means and how it is used within the debate on race. I propose to treat racialism as a *substantive element*¹³ in our lives.

As an entrance to the issue of racism Appiah begins by acknowledging that there are three crucial doctrines which are competing for the term racism (Appiah, 1992: 13). Those three doctrines according to Appiah are racialism, extrinsic racism and intrinsic racism (Appiah 1992). The last two are said to be the aspects of racism, while the first doctrine forms part and parcel of racism. This is because it completely defines race and serves as its antecedent and necessary premise, as Jayne Chong-Soon Lee neatly puts it, in her paper “Navigating the Topology of Race” (1994: 766). All of these three doctrines have some significance for Appiah’s project. He uses the last two doctrines to assign individuals to particular types of racism. According to Appiah (1992), the views of any person who still discriminates against others on the basis of their race and moral qualities are informed by notions of racialism.

Racialism has informed many of the racist ideas and practices in the previous two centuries. Many people have suffered a great deal at the hands of those who adhere to this doctrine. On the other hand, intrinsic racism is a form of racism that Appiah describes as a mild form of racism. “Intrinsic racism” is when an individual of a certain race prefers people of the same race (1992: 14-15). This seems not to be an extreme form of racism. According to Appiah (1992), there are cases where an individual can be both an extrinsic and an intrinsic racist. To demonstrate this Appiah uses Du Bois as an example. He claims that Du Bois exhibits hateful racism in his writings; hateful racism is extrinsic racism, according to Appiah’s assessment. Simultaneously, Du Bois advocates and exhibits some sense of solidarity among blacks: this shows his intrinsic racism.

Several provocative questions have been asked concerning racialism. According to Appiah, racialism is “...heritable characteristics, possessed by members of our species, which allow most of us to divide them into a small groups called races, in such a way that...members of these races share some certain traits and tendencies....that they don’t

¹³ By substantive element, here, I mean that racialism is in fact genuinely true, important, or self-sufficient.

share with other members of another race” (Appiah, 1992: 13). When philosophers talk about physical traits that are peculiarly shared by a member of a group of a race which distinguish a member of one racial group from the other they are referring to “skin, color and facial features” (ibid).

However, Appiah claims that this account considers more things than just visible characteristics. If we closely examine the definition, I presume that the doctrine of racialism is formed by two aspects. These two aspects played a greater role in the separation of people into different racial groups during the nineteenth century.

- 1) The first aspect deals with biobehavioral essences¹⁴ underlying natural properties that are heritable, biological features, and are shared by all and only by the members of a race, and as a result of which, are said to behave in the same way.
- 2) The second aspect has to do with physical appearance which was a tool with which people were separated into racial groups based on their appearances (Appiah, 1992).

According to Andreasen (2005), the doctrine of racialism went unquestioned for a long time. It assumes that people of the same race share the same tendencies, including the idea that there is some form of hierarchical standing in races, with whites being at the top of the hierarchy and other races coming after them. Two classical philosophers (Immanuel Kant and David Hume) held a view that the appearance of person or race has a relation to that person’s mental ability (Eze, 1997: 38). The first aspect of the doctrine is one that most philosophers have rejected. Ron Mallon (2006) claims that the rejection of racialism is almost universal among academic racial theorists. However, I find Mallon’s claim to be problematic and to raise questions. The question is to which aspect of the doctrine of racialism are intellectuals objecting? It seems that philosophers are only

¹⁴ I owe this understanding to Professor Ron Mallon from Washington University in St. Louis. In his paper, *Race: Normative, Not Metaphysical or Semantics*, he defines *biobehavioral* essences as underlying natural (and perhaps genetic) properties that (1) are heritable, biological features, (2) are shared by all and only by the members of a race ...cultural predispositions of individual persons and racial groups” (2006, 528–529).

worried about one half of this doctrine. The first aspect of this doctrine is more vicious than the second part of the doctrine, the second half still persists and it is not harmful like the first. To my mind, philosophers are highly worried about the first aspect by virtue of the ill ideas that it has perpetuated about other races.

The second aspect of racialism only claims that people are different. I believe that what motivated philosophers like Appiah and Zack to reject the doctrine of racialism, was that the suffering this doctrine has brought in the past. This doctrine has brought injustices and pains to mankind in the previous centuries, and it has left wounds that shall surely take time to heal.

In addition, as I have argued above, physical appearance shared by members of the same race do give us the ability to separate people into racial groups. The first aspect of racialism has been questioned, and proven wrong by intellectuals; those ideas are nothing more than ill-informed prejudices. If my suggestion is right that philosophers are mostly worried by first aspect of racialism, then there is one half that remains that ensure the possibility of the concept of race and account for the problem of racism.

3.3 Meaning and Race

Any satisfactory theory of meaning has to encompass the truthfulness and reliability concerning the meaning of a particular subject and meaning cannot change at any given time. This is the consensual view from the philosophy of language and semantics (Alston, 1964). Meaning has to be in relation to particular subjects, objects or an entity that can be brought forward to validate the claims being made about it (ibid.).

However, mode of meaning does not rely on the actual existing objects or subjects in order for the mode of meaning to be meaningful to people. People are more likely to use phrases that cannot be traced to the actual external world to prove their meaning or reliability (Alston, 1964: 7).

William P. Alston in his book *Philosophy of Language* notes that there are other phrases that can carry an important and vital meaning in our daily conversations. For example he states that, “if a person can talk about the fountain of youth” (ibid.), this sentence surely does have some sense or meaning, though it is not actually referring to anything that we can find if we can search for in the world. But does this disqualify the traditional understanding of meaning and how it works? I presume that mostly people understand meaning in a simpler manner. They do understand that for any particular phrase, word, or sentence to possess meaning, it is supposed to refer to something in the actual world.

My concern is to highlight that there is a connection between race and the properties which I have established to be a property of racialism or what it stands for. I shall look at the descriptive and referential theories of meaning. Both of these theories of meaning play a greater and significant role in investigating and determining the interrelation between the description and the actual object that it refers to or signifies.

Ron Mallon (2006) argues that Appiah claims that there are dominant philosophical traditions in theoretical meaning. Appiah also holds that there are three theories of meaning that are dominant in the philosophical traditions of meaning; however, he claims that race does not refer to anything in the world. The fact that there are no races, according to Appiah, entails that the concept cannot have any substance to which it refers in the world. I have argued above that the rejection of racialism does not totally show which part of racialism is wrong. I have shown that there is one aspect of racialism that is still in use. Mallon notes that Appiah in his argument groups referential, ideational, and descriptive theories of meaning together. From this, he argues the concept of race fails to refer. Mallon writes that Appiah’s descriptivist view holds that:

A1: A term or concept is associated with a description: a proposition or set of propositions about the properties of the referent.

A2: The term or concept refers to the unique thing that satisfies (or best satisfies) the elements of the description.

A3: If no unique thing satisfies the elements of the description, the term or concept does not refer (Mallon, 2006: 530).¹⁵

The descriptive theory of meaning finds the meaning of any object or subject from the description which is given. If there is any object or subject in the world which fits these descriptions, such an object or subject is meaningful according to the descriptive theory. Take, for example, a square: a square is said to be the only subject with four corners and with four equal sides (Aune, 1985). If we search for a particular subject that fits this description, such a subject is fit to be called a square. Appiah uses that same methodology of meaning to show that race does not exist. His rejection of the existence of race depends of his assumption that, if racialism which forms a part of the concept race is false, then race is also false, because the doctrine which it relies on to constitute it, is false and it does not have anything to which it refers in the world. But the assumption, that the failure of racialism means that race does not exist, seems to be problematic. To demonstrate this problem I shall look at the referential theory, and attempt to show where Appiah is wrong in this matter.

The second traditional theory of meaning is referential. It is a theory of meaning that is concerned with the relationship between properties and subject. This theory claims that meaning is through an expression to which it refers or with referential to the connection. Mallon writes that:

B1: A kind term is introduced to pick out some unified kind of thing.

B2: If the term successfully picks out a kind when introduced, it continues to pick out that same kind as the term is passed on to others (regardless of whether or not the thing satisfies the description associated with the term).

B3: If there is no single kind of thing successfully picked out by the term, the term does not refer (2006: 531).

¹⁵ I owe this understanding to Professor Ron Mallon from Washington University in St. Louis. In his paper *Race: Normative, Not Metaphysical or Semantics*, he argues that race is not a metaphysical question or worry but just a normative aspect. By normative, he means; how, when, where we talk about what is in the world. However, I argue that race is a question of semantics.

I now turn to the doctrine, racialism, which Appiah has argued is false. Earlier, I argued that the rejection of racialism by philosophers and other intellectuals seems to be a rejection of only a single part of racialism which, according to my assessment, has caused the ill treatment of other human beings. The other aspect of racialism is not harmful in nature. What is left of racialism, according to my observation, is a diluted version of the doctrine whereby people are separated according to their visible appearance, without any stereotypical connotations being attached to this separation: the doctrine merely acknowledges that we are different.

So far, I have discussed the doctrine of racialism with the aim of securing a property that to which the concept of race will refer. My motive in exploring this domain of philosophy was to show the convergence of our language and our world. Our usual language conveys the meaning of particular subject matter in two ways (referential and descriptive). Both of these do play a role in our search for the actual subject matter at hand. If, and only if, there is a subject matter which fits that particular description and refers to it logically, we can claim that we have established the meaning of the subject matter. I believe this is how both language and our world connect. Therefore, I presume that racialism does possess some properties that demonstrate the convergence between the language and our world. The property that I have in mind is what I have proposed to be a persisting property of racialism that constitutes the difference between different races. If this is the case, then race does have properties to which it refers. If race has a property that it refers, it can be said to exist. If race does have such a property to which it refers, then Appiah's claim that race does not exist is invalid.

It seems apt that the concept of race cannot easily be abandoned. It does account for most injustice that occurs within societies in which this concept is the main factor. It will be doing injustice if we can eliminate and abandon this concept, because most aspects of our daily dealings with one another would have lost their meaning. I have proposed that there is an aspect that still persists that can be used to secure this concept. Outlaw (2001: 82) argues that "elimination I think unlikely—and unnecessary". My view of race aligns

itself with racial constructionism—that argues that the concept of race cannot easily be abandoned—and this concept exists— because it is socially constructed.

Yet, Mills argue that “ a room has to be made for race as both real and unreal: that race can be ontological without being biological, shaping one’s being without being in one’s shaping” (Mills, 1998: xiv). Thus, in his book: *Blackness Visible: Essays on Philosophy and Race* (1998), Mills is mainly concerned with arguing that the concept of race is important because it still moves people. He further argues that the social structures are mostly organized by race, and “race is not ‘metaphysic’ in the deep sense of being eternal, part of the basic furniture of the universe” (1998: 48). However, the reality of our social world are highly informed by this concept, people are still regarding and taking each other with accord to their races. It seems that this concept of race cannot alienate itself from the social world, where its practices take place.

It should be clear by now, that my view is sympathetic towards the social constructionism position. Although my position corresponds with the views of the constructivist, it does not take the more radical views of this position. It only accepts that race has functioned as a maker and social category, where others were privileged and others oppressed. In addition, it also accepts that there are visible different among races that is what we call race.

My approach to racialism does account for the problem of racism which people experience in their lives. Racism is a doctrine which Appiah has also shown to be the moral error that humankind has made in our time (Appiah, 1992). I do not think that anybody can contend with the point that racism is a moral error. People still continue to be victims of this doctrine, which is based on the concept of race and its connotations. Appiah in his book set out to get rid of the concept of race. As a consequence of rejecting racialism, he claimed that race fails to refer. However, as I have argued above, race does refer to the second aspect of racialism. Therefore there is a connection between race and racism. The connection between race and racism is that racism cannot be what it is without the concept of race and its connotations.

3.4 A critique of Mallon's view on the Role of Semantics in the Debate of Race

Mallon argues that “once we realize the possibility of such a gap, then semantic considerations seem less important, for it is not clear that they are of sufficient importance to outweigh other normative arguments to alternative conclusions” (2006: 549). The reasons why he takes this position are firstly, he claims that:

The semantic strategy makes discussions over the correct account of race hostage to issues in the philosophy of language and metaphysics about which there is little agreement. Nor is it clear that a resolution will ever be forthcoming. Accounts of reference are justified by reference to semantic intuitions that vary from person to person and from culture to culture. All these reasons suggest that approaching the metaphysics of race via finding a determinative theory of reference for racial terms or concepts is unlikely to be fruitful (Mallon, 2006: 548-549).

Mallon's proposes that there is no certainty and consensus over the correct account of reference theory. He further claims that when one thought semantics offers a platform to settle disputes among three different camps of racial theorists' sceptics, constructionists and naturalists, it totally achieve the contrary (Mallon, 2006). So far, it seems to be clear that Mallon does not believe that the tradition of semantics or theories of meaning can answer the question of reality and meaning of the concept of race. However, this tradition does bring some promise to this debate of the concept of race, if employed in the right way. The promise route that I have in mind, is align with the relationship between our language (things like concepts, words and sentences) and worldly facts about those entities like concepts, words and sentences. This converges has traditionally brought answers to most question with relation to most concepts and likely things that we are familiar with like sentences. In addition, it seems that most philosophical inquiries of the nature or meaning of concepts and even words, what is at the center focus of philosophical inquiry is the relationship between the concepts and the fact in the world.

On the other hand, for Mallon the application of reference theory to racial terms seems to lead to a lack of clarity, and to an ineffective and unfruitful resolution of the disputes. He further claims that:

Finally, even supposing we overcame all these problems and arrived at a correct account of the reference of racial terms (or an account of the reference of such terms based on a converging set of accounts) yielding a definitive account of what (if anything) race is, it is not clear that the semantically correct account of ‘race’ talk ought to dictate our use (Mallon, 2006: 549).

It is clear that Mallon’s argument attempts to show that a semantic approach in the debate of race does not yield fruit at the end. However Mallon seems to be asking the wrong question here. What we need to be asking ourselves is not which is the correct reference theory of meaning to resolve the disputes about racial terms and concepts. The question that should concern us is what are the properties that are natural in the world to which race shall refer. Mallon concludes his argument by claiming that the debate on race is nothing but normative. Normative, as he neatly puts it, is not “what is in the world but how, when and where we decide to talk about things which are in the world” (Mallon, 2006: 550). His position on the concept of race is that race cannot be traced back to the world or there is no relationship between the concept of race and our world or what is in the world. There seems to be a contradiction in Mallon’s conclusion about the concept of race. He claims that race is normative. By normative, he does not mean what is in the world, but how, when and where we decide to talk about what is in the world. Mallon’s conclusion is not convincing

However, this seems not be the case because for any term or concept to be used meaningfully in any context it has to carry a meaning and meaning seems to be in relation to the world according to traditional theories of meaning. I would like to pose this question, is it possible that racialism cannot have any relation to the worldly things or

features? It seems to be true that racialism has properties to which it refers. Therefore the allegation that semantics is not relevant cannot be completely true. Of course, I do not agree with Mallon that semantics does not have a role which it plays in race talk. In this section, I have shown that Mallon seems to be asking a wrong question and, lastly, I have shown how semantics plays a role in racial terms and concept.

3.5 Conclusion

The objections Appiah launches against the doctrine of racialism are not convincing. The charge is based on a wrong assessment and interpretation of the doctrine of racialism. More importantly, Appiah's argument against racialism falls apart if we consider my proposed view of racialism. I have proposed that there are two possible aspects of racialism. The first aspect deals with underlying natural properties that are heritable, biological features, and are shared by all and only by the members of a race, as a result of which, are said to behave in the same way. The second aspect has to do with facial appearance on the basis of which people are separated into racial groups. I argued that Mallon's proposition that semantics does not play an important role on the debate of race is false. The second aspect still persists even today. Therefore, Appiah's argument that race does not have anything to which it refers, is not convincing. The next chapter shall consider ontology as a solution to this debate of exists of race and to the question of "what exists".

Chapter Four

4. Metaphysics and Race

4.1 Introduction

Despite Appiah's racial eliminativism theory, important questions arise about that view with regard to the existence of race. Is Appiah's analytical approach correct? This chapter assesses the performance of Appiah's racial eliminativism theory, in particular, his challenge to the existence of race. Even though there is a controversy about whether there is a definitive concept of race, it seems that Appiah's racial eliminativism is incompatible with our intuitive notion of the concept of race. Appiah suggests that we need to move away from our intuitive understanding of race.

My aim in this chapter is to search for a plausible ontological thesis that is suited to answer the question of the existence of race. Finally, I will employ the plausible ontological theory in attempting to answer the question of the existence of race.

4.2 Metaphysics

Bruce Aune in his book *Metaphysics: The Elements* (1985: 10), defines metaphysics as a study of the nature of being, or reality. It is divided into two mainstream metaphysics; general and special (Aune, 1985). According to Aune, metaphysics is a study that is devoted to the questions of existence (or being) of things, concepts and entities that belong to the different fundamental categories called ontology (1985: 11). Here I seek to propose the ontological thesis that I am committed to, it seems important to bring resolution to the fundamental question of the existence or reality of the concept of race. My view is in contrast to the solution that Appiah has proposed to the issue of the definition, existence and reality of race.

To paraphrase Peter van Inwagen (1983: 67), ontology is said to be a branch of metaphysics. Ontology is a study that is concerned with attempting to answer the question, what is there? (1983: 67). According to Van Inwagen (*ibid.*), this study is

famously associated with names like Heidegger and Quine. For the purposes of this study, I will focus on Quine's ontology, as suggested by Van Inwagen. Quine's ontology can be separated into two distinct parts: "those that belong to the proper and those that belong to the meta-ontology" (Van Inwagen, 1983: 67). By proper ontology, Van Inwagen means the quest to answer the question, "What is there?" However, this is not the question with which Van Inwagen was concerned in Quine's ontology. He was concerned with the second part of Quine's ontology which is the meta-ontology. By meta-ontology, Van Inwagen means the "...discussion of what it is to ask what there is and the theses of how to approach this question..." (ibid.). According to Van Inwagen (1983: 67), these theses are a product of intensive efforts to think clearly about these questions. This will liberate our understanding from some of the old and very strong illusions about being and existence.

Van Inwagen claims that Quine's meta-ontology can be viewed as having four comprising propositions or distinct parts. Those four propositions are as follows:

- (a) Being is the same as existence
- (b) Being is univocal
- (c) He claims that the third component of Quine's meta-ontology is difficult to state. I take it as "being through existential quantifier"¹⁶.
- (d) The fourth component of Quine's meta-ontology gives a general view of answering the question, "What is there?" (Van Inwagen, 1983: 68-69).

Before I delve into the selection of a plausible ontological thesis that can answer the question of the existence of race, it is important to explain these four propositions of Quine's meta-ontology. I shall explain these propositions in line with Van Inwagen's assessment of Quine's meta-ontology.

¹⁶ This is a theory of proving existence that was introduced by Frege and Russell. They claim for any entity to exist they have to be a unique features or its predicate to quantify its existence. See Frege(1892) and Russell (1919)

The first proposition which Van Inwagen suggests is “Being is the same as existence”. He claims here things of certain sorts exist and to say that there are things of a certain sort is one and the same thing as to say that it is (or it exists). To emphasize his point he provides some examples:

To say that horses exist is to say that there are horses, and to say that there was such a person as Homer is to say that Homer existed (Van Inwagen, 1983: 68).

It might seem obvious that there are horses. As much as we can conceive of being as the same as existence, in other cases it is not as obvious as our intuitive understanding of the notion ontology might be; there has to be a clear validating of propositions for it to be true. In other words, evidence has to be brought forward to validate the proposition that there is such a thing. If such an entity is fabricated or is a fictional figure, and if it does not exist or it cannot be realized in reality, then using the words “there is” might be problematic in other cases were that entity does not exist. However, when we utter words that “there is” it is surely the case that those entities exist. Van Inwagen claims that whether or not it is obvious, and it is true.

In sum, there are no things that do not exist. I cannot argue for this thesis at length and the issues it raises. I will say only this: if you think there are things that do not exist, give me an example of one. The right response to your example will be either, that does exist or there is no such thing as that (Van Inwagen, 1983: 68).

Van Inwagen claims that being is univocal which means that since existence is the same as being or one and the same thing, existence is univocal (1983: 68).

Many philosophers have thought that “there is” and “exist” mean one thing when they are applied to material objects, another when they are applied to.....supernatural beings, and when applied to abstract things

like numbers or possibilities. This view is defended by both Frege and Russell. This is evidently an extremely attractive position (Van Inwagen, 1983: 68).

Though attractive, this theory that believes that “exist” and “there is” mean one thing is false. To prove this Van Inwagen provides an analogy of numbers. He says the fact is that “six” or “forty-three” mean different things when applied or used in counting different objects. Let us take thirteen as focal point of this point. “You have thirteen epics and I own thirteen cats, then the number of your epics is the number of my cats. But existence is closely tied to numbers” (Van Inwagen, 1983: 68).

According to Van Inwagen, the third component, Quine’s meta-ontology is difficult to state. According to the researcher view, the third component is being through existential quantifier.

There is, in standard contemporary logic, the logic we have from Frege and Russell, a symbol called existential quantifier, often written as a reversed sans-serif capital E and pronounced “there exists a”. Thus, “ $\exists x$ x is a dog” is read “There is an x such that is a dog”. This symbol is one of a systematically interrelated family of symbols that collectively form an instrument of great beauty and utility for representing the logical structure of statements and for examining the logical relations between statements (ibid: 69).

From the look of things the existential quantifier or the symbol is doing much of the work in this theory of ontology. In this theory of ontology, when it is proposed that a particular entity exists, for this to be true such an entity has to exist in the world. Let us take the example given above of a dog: when an individual claims that “there is a dog” for this statement to be legitimately true there is supposed to be such an entity that fits the description of a dog for it to be true (Van Inwagen, 1983: 69). So the key here is that

there is supposed to be some features out there in the world that are unique to a particular subject or object that can be used as a predicate for its own existence.

The last component of Quine's meta-ontology, as suggested by Van Inwagen, is one which deals with the general ways of approaching the question, "What is there?" Or the metaphysical question of existence that most philosophers do engage in when they are probing about the truth and the nature of our reality in the world.

So far, I have been discussing Quine's meta-ontology, as illustrated by Van Inwagen. My purpose was to find a theory of ontology which I shall employ to answer the question of the existence of race. My quest here was to find an ontological theory to answer the question "there is".

4.3 Racial Ontology

From my assessment of Quine's meta-ontology, it seems that there is one plausible theory of ontology that has the potential to answer the question of the existence of the concept of race. In this section I shall employ the theory of existential quantifier in attempting to answer the question of existence of race.

The theory of ontology that seems able to resolve this misunderstanding about the existence of race is, I think, the third theory. In my quest to find a theory that shall bring answers to this problem of the concept of race. This quest of find a theory that is acceptable to this debate, it does not seem to be enough by itself to resolve this debate. In my third chapter, I argued that the doctrine of racialism that Appiah suggested was at the heart of race and racism has two aspects. The second aspect still persists today, and has to do with separating people in relation to their features that are visible to the naked eye.

When one claims that there are races, this is what he or she is saying from this theory of meta-ontology. The statement is formulated in this way “ $\exists x$ x is a race”, is read “There is an x such that it is a race”. However, the skeptics might ask, “What do you mean by saying that races exist?” Skeptics will require more than just utterances or just a statement with a word “there is”; this on its own cannot validate the existence of any entity or even an object. The question is how we validate the existence of things or entities that fit in with our intuitive understanding of epistemology. For anyone to validate the existence of any entity that he claims to be in existence, the entity has to be realized in reality. So far, I have attempted to show that the theory of the existential quantifier is plausible to answer the question of the existence of race. I have shown that when a person claims that race exists according to the existential quantifier, that person is making a claim that can be formulated in this way “there is an x such that they are races”. According to Peter Van Inwagen (1983), when a person claims that such and such exists, there is supposed to be properties that are in the world that fit the unique description of the entity, for that entity to exist. For the case we have at hand, for race to exist according to this principle, there is supposed to be a clear description in the world that can be used for this concept to exist.

The proponents of racial eliminativism have argued that race is not important. But wholly rejecting the concept of race seems to be a premature move. In the previous chapter I proposed that if we interrogate Appiah’s racial eliminativism, we find that most of the claims that he proposed about the concept of race go against our intuition about the concept. Further, they are controversial, because racial eliminativism does not account for problems like racism. Mallon (2006: 530) argues that “Appiah recognizes that his argument connecting the absence of racial essences to the claim that ‘race’ does not refer requires an account of what it is for a term or concept to refer”. However, Monahan argues that “the issue is not one of whether there are essential characteristics that effectively dictate the way our species can be divided, but rather is one [regarding] the ways, means, and ends we employ to draw the distinctions that we take to be *significant*. It is not about a strictly descriptive account of a mind-independent reality but rather about the meaning and significance of that reality” (Monahan, 2011: 103). My suspicion is that

Monahan accepts that the concept of race exists, because he claims that the problem, or the question, is not with the essential characteristics, but with the criteria we use to draw the distinctions that we consider to be important.

From my view, Monahan argues that it is important to find an underlining means to identify valuable characteristics that we can employ to draw these distinctions that we take to be significant, rather than just dismissing the concept of racialism in a simplistic manner. However, this concept is well established in the minds of people across the globe. Earlier I argued that there is a persisting characteristic which is still in use even today, by which people differentiate between the races. That characteristic I proposed to be the difference among human beings that is visible to our naked eyes I believe that this by itself can serve as a significant means to account for these distinctions that we take to be significant, as Monahan argues.

4.4 Conclusion

In this chapter I have probed for a plausible ontological theory to employ in the quest to argue for the existence of race. I established that the existential quantifier seems to provide a plausible answer to the question of the existence of race. Finally, I have re-emphasized the arguments for the existence of race.

Conclusion

From the beginning I have shown that the aim of this thesis is to respond to Appiah's racial eliminativism. The thesis has also examined the criticisms that Appiah levelled against both Du Bois and proponents of the biological notion of race, as a way of strengthening his argument to banish the concept of race. In the first chapter, I discussed Appiah's account of race in detail and further attempted to show that Appiah's objections against Du Bois are wrong, since Du Bois' position on race is not entirely incorrect. I also argued against Appiah's assertion that "the truth is that there are no races" (Appiah, 1992: 30).

The second chapter showed that Appiah's intentions were to discard the concept of race. His theory of race is controversial both in methodology and in practice. In addition, it has been shown that Appiah's goal of erasing the concept of race within societies is problematic, given that race is deeply embedded in the minds of people. I have argued that Appiah's notion of race is controversial and it is not cogent because it does not account or explain the vicious and problematic issues of racism which affect people on a daily basis.

The third chapter and the second half of the fourth chapter present arguments that attempt to sketch the plausibility of a racial theory arguing for the existence of race and arguing against Appiah's view of eliminativism. I argue that Appiah's account of race fails to recognise that there are two aspects of racialism. The reason Appiah and other philosophers reject this doctrine of racialism is, I believe, because of the past experience of human beings. Appiah says that racism, which is informed by racialism, is an erroneous doctrine (Appiah, 1992). Racialism is at the centre of Appiah's argument. He claimed that, if and only if, racialism is false, then even race is false. In this chapter I also reveal the failures in Appiah's account of race, and argue that Appiah's account of race goes against our intuitive understanding of the concept of race.

In the first half of the fourth chapter, motivated by Appiah's talk of metaphysics, I considered metaphysics. I also tried to find an ontological theory to answer the question of the existence of race.

Finally, after considering and analyzing the issues centred on race, I conclude that it is a fact that there are races. My purpose in this thesis was to bring some enlightenment to the debate centred on race. In reaching the conclusion, I made claims to support the existence of race. My reason for this is that, racism cannot be what it is without race and its racial connotations. Race and racism work hand in hand. Moreover, I suggest that those proponents, who argue that race exists, are correct, since the second aspect of racialism that is concerned with separating people according to their physical appearance, still persists. This is evidence in itself that race and its practices are still important in people's daily life.

Bibliography

Alston, W. P. (1964). *Philosophy of Language*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.

Andreasen, R. O. (2005). The Meaning of 'Race': Folk Conceptions and the New Biology of Race. *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 102 (2), pp 94-106.

Aune, B. (1985). *Metaphysics: The Elements*. Minnesota: University Press.

Appiah, K. A. (1992). *In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture*. New York: Oxford University Press.

———. (2001). African Identities, in Boxill, B. (ed) *Race and Racism*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp 371-382.

Bernasconi, R. and Lee Lott, T. (2000). *The Idea of Race*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.

Boxill, B. (2001). Introduction, in Boxill, B. (ed) *Race and Racism*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp 1-42.

Du Bois, W.E.B. (1897). *The Conservation of Races*. A Penn State Electronic Classical Series Publication.

Eze, E.C. (1997). *Race and the Enlightenment: A Reader*. Malden: Blackwell.

———. (2001). *Achieving our Humanity*. New York: Routledge.

Glasgow, J. (2009). *A Theory of Race*. New York: Routledge.

Graves, J.L. (2001). *The Emperor's New Clothes: Biological Theories of Race at the Millennium*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Hallen, B. (2002). *A Short History of African Philosophy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Hannaford, I. (1996). *Race: The History of an Idea in the West*. Washington D.C: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press.

Hardimon, M. O. (2003). The Ordinary Concept of Race. *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol 100 (9), p 437-455.

Lee, J.C. (1994). Navigating the Topology of Race. *Journal of Stanford Law Review*, Vol 46 (3), pp 747- 480.

Mallon, R. (2006). Race: Normative, Not Metaphysical or Semantic. *Journal of Ethics*, Vol 116(3), pp 525-551.

Mills, C. W. (1998). *Blackness Visible: Essays on Philosophy and Race*. New York: Cornell University Press.

Monahan, M. (2011). *The Creolizing Subject: Race, Reason, and the Politics of Purity*. New York: Fordham University Press.

Outlaw, L. (2001). Toward a Critical Theory of Race, in Boxill, B. (ed) *Race and Racism*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp 58-82.

Smedley, A, and Smedley, B. D. (2005). Race as Biology Is Fiction, Racism as a Social Problem Is Real. *Journal of American Psychologist*, Vol 60 (1), pp 16-26.

Shalkowski, S.A. (2008). Essence and Being, in Le Poidevin, R. (ed) *Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics*. Cambridge: University Press.

Sober, E. (1980). *Evolution, Population Thinking, and Essentialism, Philosophy of Science*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Taylor, P.C. (2004). *Race: A Philosophical Introduction*. New York: Blackwell Publishing.

Tobias, P.V. (1961). The Meaning of Race, in Baxter, P. and Sansom, B. (ed) *Race and Social Difference*. Penguin Books: Middlesex, Pp 19-43.

Valls, Andrew. (2005). *Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy*. New York: Cornell University Press.

Van Inwagen, P. (1983). Fiction and Metaphysics. *Journal of Philosophy and Literature*, Vol 7 (1), pp 67-77.

Zack, N. (1993). *Race and Mixed Race*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Dictionary

Cambridge International Dictionary of English. (2012). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.