The causes of wars debate in Africa, and its implications for African military expenditures

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Declaration

I, Owusu – Sekyere, Bernard Nyarko, hereby declare that this thesis, unless specified in the text, is my original work. I also declare that I have not submitted this research project for any other purpose at any other institution or university.

[Signature]

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Date: 30/6/07

As supervisor, I agree to the submission of this thesis:

[Signature]

Professor Geoff Harris

Date: 30/6/07
Dedication

To the voluntary staff and the students who had the opportunity to be part of the CRPS programme at UKZN for initiating and participating in a programme Africa needs so urgently. May the labour invested and the yield result in emerging hope for positive and much needed peace for the African region, and wherever peace have been ruffled on our globe.
Abstract

The dissertation reviewed “the causes of war debate in Africa, and its implications for African military expenditures” by levelling the argument of greed hypothesis as inconsistent with the pragmatic ground situation in Africa that can properly inform optimal decision-making. The arguments raised support the debunking of greed claim that opportunity to pillage state resources, supersedes issues of grievance as cause of civil war. This work discussed the major civil wars in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1990, the study raised concerns that, by taking stance with greed has the tendency to make traditional state security the utmost policy concern. That also provides cost benefit excuse for state actors to give milex priority over other social sectors in budget prioritizing. It is argued that greed does not offer the platform for durable peace pursuit. The dissertation then showed that grievance is consistent with causes of civil war in Africa due to its multifarious outlook of conflicts. Grievance hypothesis, is supported because it offers practically approach to pursue endurable conflict, and problem solving approach to conflict analysis in Africa. Grievance encourages a policy of milex reduction and encourages peacebuilding effort. The study concluded by saying that none of the debate grievance and that of greed’s validity justify the heinous carnage and destruction involved in African civil wars. Therefore what compels leaders to find solution with violence as a result of opportunity not based on resource per se, but it also involves misplaced priority to find lasting solution to grievance issues. It also involves the opportunity to heroism based on distorted perception of power and lack of social education on appropriate means to conflict resolution, and lack of appropriate early warning mechanism and trivialization of conflict warnings as happened in ECOWAS, East-Central Africa. Nine recommendations suggested in the dissertation centres on the causes of new civil wars debates and policy; the study of cases of new civil wars in SSA; and on the influence of new civil wars debate on milex.
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I have the pleasure to express my joy over this second master’s work that has been achieved through hard work. The admiration of the achievement does preclude moment of sadness in the course of the study over the turbulent political climate and issues of violence that have characterized not only the region of Africa with wars, but history and current global events appear to make violence an intractable prevailing paradigm. The study of wars can be unappetizing if I have not had the good support of my hardworking and veteran supervisor. My acknowledgment and thanks goes to Professor Geoff Harris who has been helpful with tedious work of supervision. This gratitude also extends to the period of the coursework when his guidance enabled me to explore and cover numerous resource materials that have contributed to the completion of this dissertation. My gratitude also go to Professor Ufo Okeke Uzodike for the opportunity offered me in the International Relations and International Political Economy modules which broadened my perspectives over issues pertaining to the international political platform which formed the core of my research. I also acknowledge the opportunity offered to me in tutoring International Relations - 102 during 2006 Second Semester Session for the experience. I want to further acknowledge the enormous help I received from the University Graduate Award and cheerfully appreciate my nomination in 2007 for the grant. I also acknowledge the various sources of information and data on the internet that provided free valuable materials, e.g. Journal of Conflict resolution, International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, Human Security Report, SIPRI, PRIO, WMEAT, UN Security Council, ISS, HSRC, TRC Sierra Leone, UNDP, UNAIDS, etc. I owe it as an obligation to express my general appreciation to all and sundry who supported me in one or other way that made the completion of this dissertation possible.
List of Abbreviation

AIDS  Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
APRM  African Peer Review Mechanism
APC   All People Congress
AU    African Union
BET   Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti
CGE   Central Government Expenditure
DRC   Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOMOG ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS Economic Community of West Africa States
EU    European Union
FARF  Forces Armées pour la République Fédérale
FPI   Ivoirian Popular Front
FUCD  United Front for Democratic Change (Front Unique pour le Changement Démocratique)
GDP   Gross Domestic Product
HIV   Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IISS  International Institute for Security Studies
LCD   Less Developed Countries
LRA   Lord’s Resistant Army
MDJT  Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad
Milex Military expenditure
MJP   Movement for Justice and Peace
MPIGO Popular Ivorian Movement for the Great West
MPLA  Popular Movement for Liberation of Angola
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEPAD New Partnership of Africa Development
NGOs  Non-Governmental Organizations
NIF   National Islamic Front
NPFL  National Patriotic Front of Liberia
OAU  Organisation of Africa Union
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PRIO  Peace Research Institute of Oslo
RUF  Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone
SADC  Southern Africa Development Community
SAP  Structural Adjustment Programme
SPLMA  Sudan people’s Liberation Movement/Army
SIPRI  Swedish Institute for Peace Research Institute
TSZ  Temporary Security Zone
TRC  Truth and Reconciliation Council
TWP  True Whig Party
UN  United Nations
UNAIDS  United Nations
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNITA  National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
USA  United States of America
WMEAT  World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers
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Chapter One

Introduction

1.1. Background and Issues

The study and debate surrounding the causes of wars date back to the period of Thucydides. Howard (2001: 29) say war is “a phenomenon which, if we fail to abolish it, might well abolish us”. The debate surrounding the causes of wars has become an academic discipline known as International Relations (IR) and is the subject of research. International Relations is concerned with ‘relations between supply and demand in the global market. It further deals with the international and domestics of individual states so that you can learn where the best opportunities are’ and most, pertinent to this study, it ‘can also inform you of the prospects for war and peace around the globe’ and provide the framework or parameters or organising device to conduct review, assessment and analysis of issues within this context (Duncan 2002: 2, 3; Holsti 1995: 4, 5). However, IR failed to prevent World War II (WW-II) from taking place. The debate on the causes of wars has also become one of the key subjects of interest in Peace Studies as discipline. In peace studies, human security research is fundamental for achieving peace.

The peace and conflict studies pertaining to wars can divided into three main periods. The credit is due firstly to the early research pioneers whose interest in the studies about conflict and wars surfaced before WW-II. Academically, from late the 1920s and into the 1930s, researchers like Sorokin, Richardson from England, and Wright an American conducted studies on war as they sought to find solution to wide scale war such as the two World Wars (WWs). Initial ideas on conflict, early warning and prevention originated with them. Quincy’s work on variety of empirical synthesis factors has influenced war prevention concepts (Centre for Conflict Resolution 2002: Unit 2). Within this period Gandhi had also been compiling his satyagraha (‘struggle for truth’) concept which began in South Africa and was further developed on his return to India. Gandhi’s non-violent action (ahimsa) was the key method of struggle against British imperialist colonial rule and eventual independence of India in 1947 (King, Mary 1999: 13, 15, 29, 30, 31, 73).
The median stage started in the 1950s after WW-II had ended. Conflict studies gained more importance as experts sought to understand the dynamics of conflict as a result of the devastation after WW-II. Nader and Grande (2002: 574f) purport that the conceptualization of conflict resolution focused on providing understanding from many disciplines such as social organization, religion, economic interdependence, international relations, national politics, industrial relations, communities, families or between individuals. Further studies in the late 1960s by Dahrendorf posit that conflict is unavoidable and normal in human society. There have been other subsequent pioneering contributors such as Boulding due who proposed scientific analysis of wars as solution to IR incompetence after WW-II. He hypothesized that war is an aspect of a sovereign state, therefore by reforming international organizations and increasing research in the area war could be prevented. Burton date is credited with his Needs Theory and involvement in the ‘protracted social conflict concept’. He shared the same intrinsic hypothesis as Dahrendorf. Furthermore other scholars have to continue with where the pioneers left off. For instance, Kelman had influenced areas in conflict resolution by negotiation, and is credited with the origin of the Journal of Conflict Resolution in 1957, and the Centre for Conflict Research in 1959. Curle date researched African conflicts using the Biafra war in Nigeria as a case study and noted issues of society and development as factors involved in intra-state wars (Source: Centre for Conflict Resolution 2002 - Unit 2).

The third stage of development of war research began in the 1970s when emerging colonized countries coming out from liberation wars were plunged into internal state conflicts. Within this period the most influential researchers included Galtung whose concept on peace being distinguished into two conceptual streams, namely, positive and negative peace emerged (Source: Centre for Conflict Resolution 2002 - Unit 2). His works, in 1975, showed conceptual distinctions between peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding. Boutrous-Ghali’s 1992 report entitled “Agenda for Peace”, made peacebuilding an urgent and critical conceptual issue for the UN considering the nature and level of intra-state wars in the developing world, especially Sub-Saharan Africa (UN (A/47/277-S/24111) 1992: Section VI). This outlook of the peacebuilding concept has led to the formation, in 2005 of the Peace-Building Commission (PBC) by Kofi Annan as an advisory intergovernmental body at the UN (Scott and Wyeth 2006: 3, 4). The PBC functions are first to bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources...
and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peace-building and recovery. Secondly it aims to focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery, bridging the gap between the immediate post-conflict phase and sustainable development. Thirdly it is to provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the UN. This means that the international community is poised to pursue peace-building as a critical item on the agenda, not only for peace but also for development which has been elusive because of wars in developing countries (Cockell 2003: 26). In 2005 UN Report indicated Africa had fallen behind its targets and was struggling with its development agenda. Now, out of the projected number of 353 million people living in poverty in the world by 2015, about 53% will be in SSA, indicating an increase by 29% (UNDP 2005).

The debate on the causes of war increased in 1990's as major world organisations such as the UN and international Financiers in particular seeks to find better policy approaches to prevent the recurrence of wars in the developing world. War is described as the nature of armed violence where more than one thousand deaths result per year (Bloomfield et al 1998:10; Human Security Centre 2005: 18). Wars are a state of carnage that results from military aggression or counter-aggression between two states alternatively. War can be armed rebellion within a state where a rebel group and government forces engage each other without adequate protection for civilian population who are unarmed. The origin of war is itself a debate as whether it is innate with human or acquired. Hobbes (1904: 119, 120, 131) idea of the leviathan signified the elected leader of the state and his influence on the citizens. The citizen is though free, but is subject to the power of the prince. The idea enabled Hobbes to explain his belief in human as political creature who organise together with others to compete to survive. It has its foundation with the Aristotelian political model, ‘man is by nature a political animal’ (Hall 1973: 23). This perception carries the idea that politics means to organise and compete for power to acquire needs, scarce resources or economic resources, e.g. land, mineral and natural resource and distribute them within a particular state context (Mayer 2000: 66). The resources within a state context need to be protected from external threats. This perception made it necessary to have a state with central authority or leadership for the purpose of defence against external aggression and to maintain internal security. The collective trust has been essential with liberals’ belief for security for private property.
This underlies the importance of the state taking over the function of protection and creation of enabling environment for citizens to generate wealth (Mbaku 1999: 300, 317). In the view of Hobbes this makes it relevant for the need of political authority, thus, the “preservation of political authority will prevent aggression of all against all” (Hall 1973: 34). This belief also underlies the realist one-sided view of realpolitiks where “[p]eace is not about justice; rather it is about effecting security” (Freedman 2001: 311), whereby the state and its authority generally view instrumental security as military, economic, and political as relevant means to wield power and to pursue security.

The doctrine of Hobbes views the state as relevant albeit an ‘indispensable devil and unwanted angel’. This means that while the state has its own problems it offers its blessings to bestow upon those who are citizens. Hobbes and Rousseau considered the state as ‘.... a response to the “inconveniences”, “inadequacies” or downright “anarchy” of the state of nature, i.e. the condition that preceded the state’ (Hoffman 1988: 30). In Africa the formation of states has carried such “inconveniences”, “inadequacies” and “anarchy” (a reversal to Hobbes and Rousseau cherished idea of protective state). For instance, tyranny is the worst form of authority citizens may expect from state authority. The state is relevant for the collective galvanisation of societal authority, achieving formidable defence and organised form of order and balance of power among individuals (Hoffman 1988: 16). This has not materialised practically in Africa in over fifty years of independence. Indeed Africans have become excessively dependant on the state. That is not functionally conducive in contemporary political practice for both security and citizen welfare as security itself takes extended meaning and new relevance. The statism system has also evolved various kinds of political models from liberal democracy to communism. The evolution of political modelling has also taken its toll on the post-colonial African society, with the continuation of various political unrest and wars carried over from liberation struggle conflicts and the Cold War political ideological divide period.

It is argued here that the background to the problems preventing peace is often attributed to the African colonial background and the post-independence political quagmire. Indeed, these are usually cited as the reason for conflict that leads to new wars on the continent. These backgrounds prepared unstable ground for conflicts that
could have been prevented by appropriate state policies after the post-colonial era (Brand-Jacobsen and Jacobsen 2000: 54; Gwartney and Lawson 2005: 29; Abdallah 2001: 162; Harris and Lewis 1999: 32, 34). In Africa and Asia in particular, conflicts that trigger wars are known to be embedded in multifarious ethnic identities and political grievances that centres on both a lack of political power-sharing and economic distribution issues (Bloomfield et al 1998: 9). However, current debate on the causes of wars theorizes that identity issues in the ‘grievance hypothesis’ are a cover up for opportunity to plunder state resources through militant means (Collier 2001: 143, 144).

What is the significance of this and how valid is this debate in particularly for Africa? This study argues that there have been numerous efforts to control recurrence of wars by both international and regional organisations effort such as the UN, European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Africa Union (AU) (which was formerly Organisation of Africa Union (OAU)). These have taken place in the form of peacekeeping interventions, political diplomacy and recent efforts at peacebuilding with some preventive diplomacy initiatives in conflict ridden countries. These efforts seem to be having a positive effect on the number and intensity of wars in Africa (Human Security Report 2005), but these effects will not be sustained if the underlying causes of war are not addressed politically and economically.

Politically, democracy in practice differs from the ancient Greek origin of the idea which says democracy is the gathering of all qualified citizens of Athens for assembly, demos (Blackwell 2003: 3-6; Dunn 1993: 16, 17). Democracy in the modern era generally takes the form of representation, where segments of society are represented by an elected person. This is termed by Rousseau (1999) as “social contract” and varied institutional arrangements and multiple stakeholders as “polyarchy” by Dahl (1998: 94). Critics see the current representation and majoritarian democratic model as elitism. The critics argue the representative system of democracy is essentially a closed and elitist arrangement. Two interests compete, one being the government’s interest, and other being the opposition. This facilitates the plurality of stakeholders in the political decision-making as advantage, but has tendency of creating political tension where government appears intolerant. In this case, effective democracy should have conflict resolution component at various social and institutional levels to ensure peace. These are some of the key conceptual concerns the dissertation explores in discussion of the new war debates. The rationale and objectives of this study are now presented.
1.2. Rationale and Objectives

There are many theories of causes of civil wars in Africa. The on-going debate centres mostly on the validity of the hypothesis in the current global political system. The concern here is to re-examine how these theories practically link military expenditure (milex), and the impact on conflict prevention policy over the years under review. The hypothesis is that the tension between the greed and grievance theories as key debate focus should rather be complimentary because using conventional analytical framework three-level-analysis for testing theories, the two trajectories of war theories builds upon the strength of each other (Levy 2001). Both theories combine demand policy measures which have both national and international implications to reduce or stop armed conflicts. The intellectual benefit of harnessing the tension between the two theories to enhance optimal decision-making on conflict resolution policy with emphasis on milex reduction towards peacebuilding, a holistic and sustainable approach to conflict resolution, is explored here.

The critical theoretical goals the research explored are the following, firstly, to examine the debate concerning the causes of war with particular reference to ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’; second, to review the major civil wars which have occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1990, with particular reference to their underlying causes; and finally, to assesses the implications of the underlying causes of war for African military expenditure in Sub-Saharan Africa.

1.3. Preliminary Literature Review

1.3.1. Literature review on causes of war

"The Causes of War" by Howard (2001) draws on the history of war presented by authors such as Thucydides to Vattel, Jomini, Wright, Brodie to Blaiey to show that wars are not contingent phenomena but crafted by statesmen with calculated intention to achieve good. In as much as war to others may seem animalistic due to the level number of human casualties, Howard says wars such as civil wars are state politics based on civilized principles. It the same time he concedes that actors in war’s attitudes and perceptions pertaining to power and the state’s security is bound up with underlying
factors of war (p. 32). His key examples are taken from European wars and former Soviet Union conflicts. He draws his concluding thoughts from the basis that war reflects previous “underlying instability” (p. 36) He believes the issue of suspicion as typified in the cold war by Russia for Western hegemony and pursued state of balance, conversely made Russia a threat to Western interest. Suspicion legitimizes the consequence of war as the best policy option even though the cost involved may appear irrational from the perspective of idealist. Suspicion also legitimizes the arms race and military build-up as a deterrent to potential war. Howard focuses much on the interstate war of the West. The underlying principles of his argument such as rationalization of armed conflict, suspicion, policy positions, political actors’ perception, and impact on arms race will assist in drawing conclusion for the state of conflict in Africa. Though Howard espouses ideals of realism where peace does not necessary mean devoid of armed belligerence, he tries to ward off the demonization of realist perception and position over war.

In the “Theories of interstate and intrastate war: A levels-of-analysis approach”, Levy (2001) shows the daunting task of reassessing some theories on causes of war based on the three levels-of-analysis framework. He modified the three levels-of-analysis by Waltz to test the validity of variables in causes of war theories. Levy’s view is that good theories should be capable of multiple explanatory powers and be able to forecast war tendencies at both international and domestic levels. His reason based on his review of some of the theories is that they offer no definitive conclusions based on explanatory variable(s). The theories validity, Levy claims, do not match with particular analytical framework for systemic and domestic range. He provided another three level-of-analysis models that take cognisance of the traditional systemic range, the societal range, and individual range.

In the “Origin of war in Africa”, Tshitereke (2003) acknowledges various underlying factors that trigger war in Africa. In drawing conclusions from globalization cum neoliberalism and the imported political systems that are in their infancy on the continent of Africa, he cites “identity, ethnicity and inequality”, “natural resource endowment”, and “on greed and grievance” as the main sources of violent conflicts. They are also fuelled by criminality for economic gain. The agents of this criminality he labelled international criminal enterprise. From this perspective Tshitereke points out that the wars in Africa
creates "parallel economy" where criminal agents take advantage to reap economic gain. On the reverse side are those who bear the brunt of criminal brutality and trauma of the war (pp. 81 - 82). It can be seen that the author tries not to elevate any particular factor as the key element, and this enable him to arrive at a conclusion that causes of African wars can be multifarious, but these factors are nonetheless exploited for criminal economic gains by combined actors of local and international origin. Tshitekere perspective holds much value for analysts of African wars because there are diverse sources of war but "inseparable" from crime as fuelling factor. The implication is that when conflict reaches fatigue level where conflict is bound to end naturally due to resource exhaustion, the interests of international criminal enterprise provide the outlet of supply which sustains the conflict and its economic exploitation. Tshitekere perspective shall contribute to the examination of the two main debates on the causes of African wars, particularized as greed and grievance.

The article "Economic Cause of Civil Conflicts and Their Implications for Policy" by Collier (2001) sets the theory that civil wars in Africa have their source in "greed" and not "grievance" as most articles assert. Collier, an economist, develops his argument from the perspective that the underlying cause of war in Africa is criminality-to plunder state resources through rebellion by private individuals. The position of this theory debunks grievance theory that wars in Africa are caused by political and ethnic-religious issues which cause marginalized and minority groups to resort to violence to seek redress or solution. According to Collier, it is unlikely for grievance to be the underlying factor but he does not reject grievance as triggering factors. The author draws a clear distinction between triggering factors and underlying factor with the latter determined as the root source. With this distinction Collier categorizes the factors and situates greed more as an underlying rather than triggering factor. The implication, as the theory posits is that for a good conflict prevention policy to be effective, there is the need to recognize this distinction and formulate conflict prevention policy that captures greed as the key issue to deal with in the foremost. Collier's greed theory has become one of the key foci for testing this work given that a significant number of contemporary articles are influenced by his theory. The potential problem with greed theory is that it neglects to consider some civil wars as being caused by structural factors.

The article "What do we know about natural resources and civil war?" (2004a) reviews
fourteen recent cross-national econometric studies, and many qualitative studies, which
attempts to offer clarification on the ongoing debate on the causes of war and the
relationship between natural resources and civil war. Ross (2004a: 351) argues that the
trend of the debate in many of the recent studies is “ambiguous or contradictory”
offering appropriate policy recommendations or contradictions. The reason, Ross argues,
is that the causes of conflict can be complex and requires scholarly cooperation. Thus,
sharing data, speaking common conceptual language, and drawing together the findings
of research projects, contribute to better understanding the determinants of civil war.
The article is critical of scholars not testing their ideas empirically. This argument
identifies the strength of Ross argument that there cannot be a reason behind the causes
of civil war without consideration of valid practical issues.

1.3.2. Milex literature review

The article by Suzuki (2007) “Major arms imports and the onset of civil and Ethnic
wars in the postcolonial world, 1956–1998: A preliminary reassessment”, studies the
effects of states’ major arms imports from major powers on the likelihood of civil and
ethnic wars in the postcolonial world. Suzuki (2007) states that statistically major arms
imported from major world states into developing states cannot be significantly linked
to triggering civil war or ethnic war. However, the author has not debunked the fact that
it invariably has degree of negative impact on causal issues of such wars (pp. 101, 106).
Suzuki suspects that small arms and light weapons proliferation can have some causal
link which was not the subject of this article by stating that, “[h]owever, these results
reveal only one aspect of the links between arms imports and internal armed conflict”
(pp. 108, 109). The usefulness of this article is that Suzuki has reviewed major literature
on arms import and impact on internal conflict. He clarifies the distinction between civil
war and ethnic war and employs models that take into consideration the systemic issues,
state and individual actors involved in policy. The article supports that armament is
significant for civil war deterrence. Suzuki did not assess the overriding strength of the
state by arms build-up in Africa, which are used to sabotage constitutional authority. It
ignores the morale of the army which evidences show, when degenerated can cause
internal instability.

The article by Harris (2004) “The case for demilitarisation in Sub-Saharan Africa”
pursues the rationale to reduce milex in discussing the need for demilitarisation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Harris’ argument is that demilitarisation is concurrent with reducing military spending by reducing the size of the army, and redefining the role of military for more cost effective and social benefits and reduction in force personnel (p.3). Harris therefore defines demilitarisation as “a process of working towards a society which emphasizes the non-violent resolution of conflicts and personal social justice”. The author considers the levels of militarization since 1990s, and also determines potential benefits of militarization. This enables him to propose seven reasons for demilitarisation by taking into consideration these factors. These include the changed nature of warfare, the meaning of security that has changed, military expenditure retards economic growth and development, the negative effect of military on human rights, the ineffectiveness of the military in resolving conflict, among others. The end point as put forth by Harris is that “military can be transformed” by transforming the military by non-offensive defence, civilianising military functions, and social defence; secondly, reducing the incidence of disputes by befriending the neighbours, promoting democracy, and promoting development; and thirdly, building dispute-resolution capacity by educating in conflict resolution and management, and establishing conflict resolution institutions (p. 12). Harris argues finally for aid, investment and lending conditions that encourage demilitarization and substantive cutting on milex by states.

In “Does military spending matter? Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1989 - 1999”, Smaldone’s (2004) analyses the patterns of war, peace and military spending from the 1990s across forty-two countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The gist of the literature critically examines whether military expenditure (ME), military burden (ME/CGE), military capability (ME/AF), and a composite military effort index (MEI) has something to do with the incidences of major armed conflicts and their durations. His findings showed that tendency to war is not influenced by military expenditure (ME), military capability (ME/AF), and a composite military effort index (MEI). Rather the states with significant military burden (ME/CGE) are those that have major armed conflict. The military burden (ME/CGE) exposes states to the tendency towards high milex. Therefore the implication is that low military spending also exposes a state to threat of war. This couples with other factors to trigger conflict. The relevance of the findings is that it did acknowledge other factors as necessary to combine with low spending to trigger wars and this will help in identifying the other factors. The overall policy impact
is development regression.

In “Military expenditure and conflict in Africa”, Omitoogun (2001), raises the inevitable limitations of military expenditure data. She states “to use military expenditure to measure phenomena other than the economic burden constituted by high defence spending is fraught with a lot of weaknesses”. The author considers military expenditure as inadequate to assess the phenomena of armed conflicts. He however emphasise “economic hardship” which implies grievance as the causal basis for civil rebellion that leads to armed conflict. In justifying the argument of the weakness of military expenditure as a key issue, the author cites factors like lack of data, deficiency due to unreliability of available data as a result of various kinds of manipulation, poor accounting systems and verification problems, and the problem of conversion of data into dollars currency from local one has its own limitations. The significance, as raised by the author, is that it makes the military expenditure records available difficult for use to predict its conclusive roles in conflict making. Hence, indirect role cannot be ruled out but argues that military spending in terms of wages can be interpreted as reducing unemployment. But with regard to it crowding out other social services like education, health and others which could serve as triggering factors in social rebellion, is inconclusive. The explanation is that other factors have to combine with high military expenditure to trigger social uprising. The relevance of this literature is that it exposes the weaknesses which arguments based on milex in Africa need to consider and cautions against over emphasis on them in debates on causes of wars in Africa.

In “Data issues in the study of conflict”, Collier and Hoeffler (2001), review and discuss issues concerning data on civil wars. The authors state that definition of war determines what data to collect. Therefore the narrow scope of a definition certainly affects the findings of research due to scope of data used. Collier and Hoeffler argue that some definitions explicate the underlying issues of conflict but are not based on the severity of violence, for example, the Kosimo databank. They recommend the need to conform to data categorisation that is of broader scope and offers varied forms of definitions of war at the choice of the user of such data. The authors believe that the best definition should consider the level of violence as a measuring scale rather than other factors. This argument is based on the fact that definitions that emphasise factors other than level of violence only serve the interest of rebels and their goals.
In examining the correlation between military expenditure and economic growth in less developed countries (LCD), Deger and Smith (1983), gathered empirical facts, cross-sectional in a macro-statistical framework. They stated that analysis should not be complex but could use a simple model framework. What is useful in this literature is that the arena of milex influence is categorised into four areas. Firstly, resource allocation and mobilisation, secondly, organisation of production, thirdly, socio-political structure, and lastly, external relations. This simplifies any analysis and makes assessing the impact of milex both easier and more common sensical.

Looney (1988) attempted to examine the extent of military expenditure impact on the poverty condition that has started worsening in Africa in the 1970s into 1980s. Looney claims, importantly for this study, that high military spending at that time had less impact on education and health but could have affected economic services and roads. To be more specific Looney’s view could imply that non-conflict states milex has less impact on their development budget; whilst major conflict states has serious impact with milex on their development budget because they do not have external sources for grants and loans. The donor sources do not provide funds in conflict period or high tendency. The article provides a good background to the impact of the debate on the causes of wars in Africa since 1990s. It provides a background to the current debate which centres on war, economics and social welfare with clear distinction between non-conflict countries and major conflict ones in Africa.

1.4. Research Approach

1.4.1. Definition of analytical framework

Finding an appropriate framework for causes of wars analysis is difficult due to their complexity. This has generated debates and models that particularize analysis, taking a reductionist approach. The reductionist approach limits the analysis to the impact of pattern of structures rather than behaviour of actors (Waltz 1979: 18, 19, 36). The nature of new Sub-Saharan African wars in particular makes it even more difficult to locate model of analysis. Waltz formulated the system approach after critiquing the traditional IR reductionist approach which disaggregates national structure into its units such as political, economic, socio-cultural organization and ethnicity. Waltz describes the
reductionist framework as incapable of assessing behaviour, but rather impact of organizational structure not the effect of activities by actors. He critiques its inability to capture the effects of state interaction with the international (systemic) role. Waltz formulated the system approach which composed of both national and systemic structures which analyze the relational interaction of actors in the two spheres as a system. The model’s two structures are inadequate to analyze the complex scope and nature of new civil wars in Africa.

Levy (2001: 4ff) adapted the system model of Waltz by introducing what he describes as the levels-of-analysis framework. This model adds an additional level to Waltz’ two system structure. Levy’s concern is that knowing the ‘how’ of the levels (or structures) of interacting factors in a system requires ability to assess individual actor’s behaviour and perceptions. Whilst it will be too much additional task in this work to use psychology tools to conduct individual actors assessment, creating structures helps to identify individuals and their behaviour in one or more structures and it political consequence. Apart from the individual actor as dependent variable, there are two other structures in levels-of-analysis framework. The national level has governmental variables as domestic political system structure, policymaking process, political culture and ideology, societal and economic structures, among others. The systemic level also has variables as global anarchic structure, the major powers involved in the global system, military distribution, pattern of military alliances and international trade.

To understand the phases of Levy’s framework requires better understanding of the term ‘structure’. The word has scientific origins implying the interaction between levels of systems to deliver consistent output. The adoption of structure in the social science arena has given it broader usage. Its implication in general connotes the levelling of outcomes within interaction of systems. In this case, it could be accepted that the interaction within a particular unit alone is not suffice in justifying the validity of a theory unless all other systems that fit into configuration are considered. A system is therefore a “set of interacting units” (Waltz 1979: 40, 80). This makes Levy’s levels-of-analysis model suitable framework to review the grievance and greed theories.

The levels-of-analysis model shall also be adapted here by inserting the “regional” structure from Brown (2001: 213) to form integrative-analysis-system framework. The
regional structure as independent variable captures the essential role and "motivation" of key background political actors within a region in making civil wars in other states happens. As Brown also perceives wars as deliberate rational human activity, the integrative-analysis-system will enable the study of the theories under consideration for their validity in integrative and comprehensive manner. A theory is describes as a logical explanation born out of hypothesis or an idea (Waltz 1979: 5). It is therefore scientific, because it depends on empirical evidence or data; and genius creativity as art, because it requires imagination to invent out of what is seen or observed. A hypothesis is just imagination and once empirically confirmed, it becomes a theory (Waltz 1979: 7, 8). There are strong and weak theories and for this reason a theory must be tested over time to justify their validity. In this case theories are transient, or as Waltz (1979: 5) describes, and do not constitute "edifice of truth" neither "reproduction of reality". So from a new observation of existing phenomenon a better theory can emerge to phase out existing one. But the laws that theories seek to explain are permanent and do not have qualitative value but quantitative.

With this perspective, Levy’s model can help in assessing the impact of diverse actors’ behaviours and structural influences over Sub-Saharan African countries new wars. The Levy’s model will also enable reviewing the grievance and greed hypothesis impact on milex in Africa and the effect on state political stability and peace. In Levy’s application the focus was more on testing the causal factors theory of inter-state wars. But he stated that the model can be applied to intra-state wars. To make it effective for the task in this study, levy’s model is slightly modified to enhance its capacity on gauging behaviour variation of different entities such as international, state, and non-state political actors. As an integrative system, it is versatile to examine multiple issues and actors involved in intra-state war in particular. It is useful adapting the levels-of-analysis model into integrative-analysis-system in this instance, because the African civil wars have diverse and complicated causal factors. The regional context inserted has prominent role in current dynamics of conflict in Africa as will emerge in the study.
1.4.2. Methodology

The research is mainly quantitative which implies that non-numerical data or nominal scales and to some extent numerical data shall be used to determine behavioural patterns. The research derived its data from non-empirical literature sources of journals, articles, books and dissertations mainly in the domain of peace studies, conflict resolution, and international relations.

The constraint posed by literature review research is that there was no access to primary data. However, the risk is minimal because of the reliable nature of sources such as Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) which identifies each individual exporter and importer, and converts arms transfers figure into millions of constant 1990 U.S. dollars since 1950 (Suzuki 2007: 109); World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfer (WMEAT) which contains all arms transfers (major weapons and small and light weapons) from major powers as well as minor ones to individual states (Suzuki 2007: 107); and Human Security Reports which presents annual human security data that describes the complex of interrelated threats associated with civil war, genocide and the displacement of populations (Human Security Report 2005: VIII).

With the milex data it is an acceptable fact by scholars that the data available from many states especially those from the developing countries may not reflect the needed accuracy due to high secrecy in some of milex dealings (Harris 2004: 205). However, available data was used to present the best possible picture of military spending pattern. Any limitation imposed by this nature of milex records inevitably affected the analysis but within generally acceptable norm with the use of milex data. I also acknowledge that there are some literature used that were without page numbering. In such instance the reference only quoted the author and the year of the article in this dissertation.

The entire dissertation follow this outline starting with Chapter one which introduced the dissertation with regard to background issues, aim and objectives. It also provided sample literature review of causes of new civil wars and military expenditure (milex). It spelled the analytical framework and provided procedure to accomplish the research study, and also an outline of chapters. Chapter two reviewed the trend of military expenditure in SSA since 1990. It set out with introduction, a glance over pre-colonial SSA conflict context, and reviewed the recent trend of global wars and SSA milex data.
The chapter discussed the influences on milex decisions, the effect of milex, and it explored alternative to reliance on military defence, reviewed the new trend in security approach, and a summary.

Chapter three discussed the "grievance" or "greed and grievance" debate as the causes of wars in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1990. The discussion began with and introduction. It set out the discussion with grievance debate from political perspective and considers subjects as immature democratic process, fragmentation of nation-state in globalisation, constitution tampering, the greed discourse, and a summary. Chapter four reviewed the major intra-state wars in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1990 and underlying issues with introduction and continues to examine civil wars in SSA from Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) conflicts, Central and East Africa (Great Lake Region) and Southern Africa sub-regions, and a summary.

Chapter five provided an evaluation and policy implications of the causes of war debates and impact on military spending in SSA. With an introduction the chapter evaluate SSA conflicts profile, it continue to evaluate the "greed and grievance" and implications for military priority, grievance and impact on human development, and ends with summary. The final chapter six provided a summary of central ideas of the chapters, a concluding reflection and suggest some recommendations as policy guide. The dissertation ends with a section on literature resource reference and appendices.
Chapter Two

Military expenditure in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1990

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) defines milex as “an input measure: they measure the amount of resources used for military purposes. They are therefore best used as an indicator of the economic burden imposed by military activities” (Omitoogun 2001). Pérez-López (1996: 125) defines milex as “all the material and human resources devoted by a state to its defence, and intended to, (i) guarantee its national independence, the integrity of its territory and, where appropriate, the respect of the international treaties binding the country to foreign states; and (ii) maintain internal security and public order”. Collier and Hoeffler (2001: 10) describe milex as “Military expenditures [which] measure the cost of maintaining a military establishment in war and peace... Military expenditures are an input measure, the aggregation of payments for military personnel and equipment. In this dissertation the sources of milex data are SIPRI, UPPSALA University of the Netherlands, International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), and the U.S. Department of State world Military Exports and Transfers (WMEAT) (see appendix item 6) series. These sources are well known and reliable for operational and maintenance defence cost. They acknowledge the scanty information on procurement, especially, during the period of conflict in warring states. This dissertation therefore, in the use of such data, has limitations for the scope of the data used. In this chapter a review of the recent trends of global wars is offered. It continues with an examination of the Sub-Saharan Africa milex data, a review influences on milex decisions, a look at the effect of milex, a new trend in security approaches, alternatives to reliance on military defence are considered, and finally a summary of the issues is offered.

2.1.Recent trend of global wars

The trend of world wide wars shows that the civilian casualties and victims in armed conflicts have increased since the First World War, from five percent to fifty percent, during the Second World War, to eighty percent in the 1990s (Bloomfield et al 1998: 14).
The vast majority of these, according to the Human Security Report (2005: 127 - 140), were the result of war-related famine and disruption to the provision of health services. Beside human casualties, the consequence of wars since the World Wars has shown significant devastation of property and infrastructure. This reality of war makes it an activity that is grossly inimical to human development. Wars cause massive damage to the ecology due to the sophisticated nature of weapons used (Human Security Centre 2005: 30). There are cases of deliberate destruction of the ecological diversities where, fighting forces and refugees hiding in the bush are compelled to depend on wild animals for survival (Brauer 2000: 32).

Other negative effects of wars are felt in the health sector where breakdown of activities, especially provision of health services causes fatal disease outbreaks such as cholera and dysentery. Also, there occur disruption of disease eradication programmes such as those fighting Polio and Guinea Worm. Currently, the massive gathering of refugees without work has given way to women prostituting themselves for survival. This has been reported to have increased the spread of HIV in many conflict areas and where refugees tend to concentrate. Post-conflict control of disease spread such as HIV/AIDS has not been easy in places like Liberia where government focus is centred on stability and security issues (UNAIDS 2007; Human Security Centre 2006: 130).

During war time, there normally results cessation of economic activities which deprive the state and the active citizen of the means to generate income and revenue collection (Tshitereke 2003: 83, 84). Since the state depends on revenues the longer a war lasts, it becomes detrimental to the economy of the state and local business. As a result of 15 years of civil war in Liberia, unemployment is estimated at eighty to eighty-five percent of the population with same figure living under the poverty line due to little or minimal economic activity even after the new democratic government of Johnson-Sirleaf (FAO/WEP 2000; McIntosh 2006: 1, 11).

Socio-culturally, wars present social cohesion and families become fractured. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), for example, is a well resourced country but due to unceasing armed conflict many communities cannot organize themselves for development. Burundi and Rwanda still have many refuges scattered in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) region. Most of the skilled labour that could
contribute enormously to Rwanda’s reconstruction are living as refuges in neighbouring countries. Indeed Africa requires a significant reduction of the incidents of wars to accelerate development and economic growth (Human Security Centre 2005: 130).

Politically, there is also the idea that particular political models are the root cause of civil/intra-state conflict. The evidence from the International Relations discipline on conflict and peace shows that in most places, early stages of democratization has in fact caused conflict and related destabilization activities. This is contrary to the expectation of stability and peace (Mansfield and Snyder 2001: 113). There is also the evidence that post-war political system if properly handled could provide stability by adopting a more inclusive political system, a rule of law, and transparency in governance. This is the stage in which many African countries currently situated. Thus a reduction in inter-state and intra-state wars is apparent. Many Sub-Saharan African states need for dire external aid have realign their governance system towards transparency and participatory reforms. For instance, the African initiative with the introduction of African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) through the New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD), is also contributing to proper ‘conflict reducing’ governance in few countries that are signatory.

The sudden upsurge in the incidence of conflict, especially in Africa has been attributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ‘thawing’ of the Cold War. The Cold War era (which followed the Second World War), was the belligerent tension between USA and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies and the Soviet and Eastern Bloc states. The accumulating uneasy calmness resulted in the incidence of more inter-state conflicts. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its disintegration into nation-states began another turn of recurrent conflicts in breakaway former Soviet states and the already polarized SSA. The period after 1990 saw Africa also going through a period of armed intra-state wars in for example Liberia, Sierra-Leone, Uganda, Somalia, Sudan, DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Chad, Algeria and Morocco and Western Sahara region. In Asia, Cambodia, Indonesia and East Timor; and across to Central America, Peru, Columbia had also been in conflict (See appendix for graph). In Africa though there was an observed fall in the number of conflicts from 1991 to 1996. After this period there was another upwards rise from three in 1996 to eleven by 1999 (Sollenberg and Wallensteen 2001: 53). However, a decline was again experienced from 2002 through
In 2003, despite the reported world-wide decline, the level of political violence experienced in Africa and Asia remained comparatively high even though Africa’s level showed twenty percent decrease with Asia showing a four percent increase. In the sample of figures below, there is a general reduction by five inter-state wars in 2003 from 2002 was experienced; and only one reduction in intra-state wars. The last figures are high in Africa, keeping the region at the top of the table in terms of armed conflicts. Asia had two increases in inter-state but reduction in intra-state conflicts by three remained second to Africa as a conflict prone zone. The Middle-East showed increase in inter-state wars based conflict but did not experience any intra-state conflict.

### Table 1. Regional distribution, number and types of major armed conflicts: 1990–2000

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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
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G = government and T = territory, the two types of incompatibility Project.

### Table 2. Cases of armed conflict and one-sided violence: 2002 – 2003

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<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
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Beyond and within the period of 2002 to 2003, Africa has experienced higher migration of professionals and skilled labour to the West and the Middle-East. The high rate of loss
of health care staff indicates a deterioration of general health care. Education sector, too, has not shown any remarkable improvement in enrolment in schools. Food production has not improved generally with famine cases experienced within all the sub-regions in Africa, e.g., Niger, Ethiopia, Kenya, Zimbabwe, DR Congo, Sudan, Somalia. Salaries in many African countries cannot adequately meet daily needs. Research has shown that much of the human suffering is due to failure of the state as a result of improper policies that create debt, prevent government service delivery and promote other internal conflict issues like ethnic and identity issues (Abdallah 2001: 157; Tshitereke 2003: 85).

2.2. Sub-Saharan Africa milex data

The available information on Sub-Saharan African milex is considered by many researchers as barely representative. In many African states milex comes foremost in consideration of national budget. According to Collier and Hoeffler (2006: 8) SSA level of milex is,

\[\text{In response to the high risk of civil war, African governments increase their military spending. Spending is particularly high in post-conflict situations, partly because risks of further conflict are very high, but also because of inertia from the inherited high spending during war. African military spending is also increased by emulation and rivalry among neighbours, and by aid: around 11 per cent of development aid inadvertently leaks into military spending so that in Africa around 40 per cent of spending is financed by aid. African governments respond to a high risk of coups in the same way as to a high risk of rebellion: military spending is increased.}\]

This picture reflects much of the increase pattern of African milex since 1990. Available data estimates indicate that pre-1990 Africa spent less on milex which took comparatively small portion of GDP (Landau 1993: 2). Some factors such as low level conflicts and generally weak economies have contributed to less milex in most African states. Many of the African states already have high outstanding debts due to the 1970s Crude Oil high cost shock. And Landau (1993: 12) has also indicated that results from regions other than Africa shows the effect of milex on growth depend on the allocation within GDP of between four percent and nine percent. It is evident in data presented below that after 1990, with new conflicts era in Africa increasing milex and economic growth has shown considerable decline. Sköns (2000) confirms that seventy-one percent
of forty African countries indicate a link between high milex and the occurrence of war. The period after the Cold War collapse and the new wars in Africa has resulted in consistent progression of milex. WMEAT records confirm that of the twenty-five top military spenders in Africa, with the exception of Botswana and Tunisia, the rest of the states are directly or indirectly involved in conflict. WMEAT data of 1999 – 2000 show DRC has a defence budget of 14.4% whilst in 2003 – 2004 defence spending rose to 21.7% of GDP. The sharp rise can be explained as the security consolidation by the then new military government under Kabila. Eritrea, a small country with small economy accounted for defence spending of 27.4% by 2000. This declined to sixteen percent by 2004. Eritrea had clashed with Ethiopia from 1998 to 2000, over a border dispute. A settlement for cease-fire was reached and agreement on Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) with Ethiopia in Algiers in 2000. This explained the cut down in milex after that period. The hostility however resumed in 2005. Angola estimates defence spending of 21.2% of the GDP by 2000, due largely to a breakdown of the Lusaka Peace Accord in 1998 which sent UNITA and government back to war (Human Rights Watch 2003b; also appendix item 5). In 2003 the milex declined to 8.5% because of the relative stability experienced in 2003 (Porto 2004: 3; also appendix item 4). Human Rights Watch revealed the government suppressed data on arms purchases from 1998 as funds were diverted from social and development support budgets.

Table 3. World and regional military expenditure estimates 1996 – 2005 (Africa portion of data)

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<td>3.9</td>
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<td>4.4</td>
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<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>5.0</td>
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<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
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<td>6.9</td>
<td>(7.0)</td>
<td>(7.2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>World</td>
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<td>7.56</td>
<td>7.48</td>
<td>7.57</td>
<td>7.84</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>8.51</td>
<td>9.14</td>
<td>9.69</td>
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<td>+34</td>
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Change(%) 1.3 -1.1 1.2 3.6 2.0 6.4 7.5 5.9 3.4

Figures are in US$ b., at constant (2003) prices and exchange rates. Figures in italics are percentages. Figures do not always add up to totals because of the convention of rounding.

( ) = Total based on country data accounting for less than 90% the regional total;
.. = Available data account for less than 60% of the regional total.

Some countries are excluded because of lack of data or consistent time series data. Africa excludes Angola, Benin, Equitorial Guinea and Somalia. (See appendix item 2 for full table)

Several other factors influence high milex such as political leadership, state record of war or armed violence, donor condition and regional neighbourhood or circumstance. These factors will be discussed in the next section but we shall consider here the issue of defence policy and milex. Omitoogun (2002: 12 - 14) discusses the problem with “absence of a defence policy to guide the budgeting and planning” therefore create “distortions” in the general economic policy. This is attributed to either a lack of expertise or proper administrative environment, or sometimes both. This makes it difficult to determine what is being spent, by whom and on what. Ghana and Nigeria are cited by Omitoogun as examples where a lack of political coordination between the defense and other public sectors exists. This makes it even difficult for the defence budget to fall under legislative monitoring. Omitoogun further explains that many of the countries in Africa lack policy expertise who understands military spending. Whilst there is no convincing explanation for a lack of rational policy on defence as a policy issue by many African states, South Africa is a notable exception as one of the few key countries on the continent with well laid out defense policy. The importance of a defence policy is to provide a framework for military spending capable of preventing excesses of spending and promote accountability. This also contributes to a better administration of the defence budget.

### 2.3. Influences on milex decisions

By far the most important influences are the presence or threat of wars and ability to

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**Table 4. The largest military spenders in Africa**

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Source: WMEAT 2002
afford milex. On an international level, milex in Sub-Saharan Africa benefits certain actors in particular. The key factor is profit through arms trade into the African region. In the wake of a civil war the international community is not exempted from the cost of refugees’ influx and the associated problems, as well as involvement in state reconstruction from the devastation of war. The United Nations and Western countries appear to be fatigued by constant resource provision involved in peace-keeping and demobilization. However, arms trade through proper formal channels, informal and conflict entrepreneurs (underhand dealers) derive greater benefits from prolonged supply of ammunition (Francis 2004: 64). Tambudzai’s (2005: 8) economic study confirmed that,

In some cases, the level of gains has resulted in corrupt practices among state officials and arms manufacturing companies. For instance, in South Africa a government arms procurement probe with alleged high state officials and foreign companies in EU is the source of on-going investigations in South Africa and Germany. Some EU states have policies that protect arms companies and encourage the use of bribery to win procurement bids overseas (Roeber 2005: 9 – 13; Godbaw and Richards 1998: 230, 238). So at the international level we find that arms trade to Africa is generating huge profit which sometimes involves a barter with natural resources. According to Omitoogun (2001: 295), Angola’s own internal and involvement in neighbouring DRC conflicts accrued “an external debt burden of $11 billion and depressed world oil prices from 1998, in 1999 the country resorted to mortgaging its future oil sales to pay for military equipment”. In this case Angola has to depend on external loans which are likely to frustrate its development efforts and, again, possibly create political instability (Masiga, Nakimbugwe, and Rwakabaale, 2005: 3).

The persistence of political insecurity demands more spending on arms, than providing good health care and good schools (UNDP 1997; See also appendix item 6 for data).
The international system and structure with distrust of US hegemony also compels even smaller states to spend on armament. Cuba and states in Latin America with socialist orientation all resort to rely on strengthening their military capability as deterrent of any Western imperialism. According to Jorge F. Pérez-López (1996), Cuba's milex were “784 million pesos (8.6 percent of central government expenditure (CGE)) in 1978; they peaked at 1471 million pesos (3 percent percent of CGE) in 1985, and reached 1380 million pesos (9.6 percent of CGE) in 1990”. In the 1990s milex took five percent of the GNP of Cuba. Smaldone (2004) argues that military capability or strength do not constitute genuine ability to control internal security, or external aggression. Developing countries tend to look to maximize their military capability as a deterrent to internal insurrection and external aggression. Because of the over dependence on military security system “arms suppliers can influence governments to purchase military weapons well in excess of need” (Tambudzai 2005: 8). Uzodike (1996: 75) indicate that between 1991 and 1995 the American government alone supplied $311 million small-weapons to forty-two states in Africa. Within the same period African debt stood at $300 billion (Ihonvbere 1999: 48). What the two authors clearly point out is that arms suppliers exert pressure on African government which is against the optimal interest of the state. Excessive spending on defence leads to significant external debt. This indicates the role of the international system in developing countries’ milex which has the potential to encourage a violation of human rights due to the over-confidence of some African leaders in increasing military arsenal. Mugabe’s government in the wake of social discontent due to degenerating social and economic conditions resorted to further new arms importation between 2003 and 2005 from China (Tambudzai 2005: 6).

2.4. The effects of milex

Much literature on milex in Africa does not recognize the link of high or low milex as direct source of armed conflict in states. However, some are of the view that milex (either high or low) has some impact on social expenditure by the state. If this is negative in the sense that it can cause reduction of the budget allocation to the social sector, it could indirectly serve as a trigger for violent conflict due to the disproportionate allocation of resources in the state that could violate the security of opposition and vulnerable groups (Smaldone 2004). For example, in Ghana soldiers from disgruntled ethnic groups such as Ewes and Northerners tend to participate
actively in military coups (Brown 1983: 439, 442, 443). In this instance, state defence resources were used to overthrow constitutional governments from Nkrumah to Busia, and junior rank insurrection that brought Rawlings to power in Ghana for almost two decades. In Uganda, Amin overthrew the Obote government and instead of dealing with the development of the country, used the Army to terrorize his own country people. Amin focused on the security of his terrorist rule which served to pauperise Uganda and prepare Uganda for subsequent conflicts. According to Omitoogun (2001),

In many African countries where there is an acute shortage of resources, devoting a proportionate share of state resources to defence may have a crowding out effect on social spending which may in turn adversely affect the well being of the citizens. This may trigger a reaction from the populace that could result in armed rebellion against the state.

In this assertion, Omitoogun emphasizes that certainly other incendiary factors also contribute to the volatile situation created by economic marginalization and pressures thereof (See also Ali and Galbraith 2003: 14, 15). But in these assertions what is made obvious is that most African countries do not reveal data of their arm imports. The data available primarily pertain to military personnel and maintenance expenditure. However, valid milex data should determine the various segments that budget is used. Many such details pertaining to hardware are unavailable. But this does not negate the need for countries to increase their arsenal capability in case of a possible threat of internal or external insecurity. Smaldone (2004) noted that this has been the case for Africa since the 1990s. It was this period that many African countries were experiencing economic turmoil due to economic failures caused by what many believed to be inappropriate programmes such as Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). This dissertation assumes that milex has a key role to play in conflicts in African wars (those either on-going or ended). What therefore is important is why milex becomes an issue of security in SSA and what the sources of influence are? This will be assessed further within at the regional, national, and individual political level.

At the African regional and sub-regional level, increased milex does not provide positive results in the political and social environment but rather that of suspicion of military threat among states, as security dilemma (Holsti 1995: 5). A case example is
Liberia’s threat through Charles Taylor in the ECOWAS sub-region by exporting rebels and weapons into neighbouring states (Human Right Watch 2003: 11, 29). Omitoogun (2001) mentioned that an increase in a state milex poses suspicion of military threat in the regional or sub-regional security. In Sub-Sahara Africa there is considerable confidentiality over milex, however an observed increase in budget allocation in that sector has the tendency to promote regional suspicion and insecurity. Harris (2004: 7) argues that high milex can be a disincentive to investors who will suspect the likelihood of military coup d’état, which is common in Africa. But others also argue increased milex as sign of investors’ confidence. Looney (1988: 322 - 325) has argued that states in a conflict period may not benefit from increasing military burden as it impact other social sectors; ironically, non-conflict states milex burden is not likely to impact the social sector. The empirical evidence shows that milex providing a sense of stability reduces economic growth in the long-term (Harris 2004: 7).

At the national or state level the consequence of high milex budget cannot be overemphasized. Statistically, it is difficult to determine the level of procurement figures due to the secrecy of that part of defence spending. There is, however evidence that giving military procurement, operational and maintenance defence takes a greater portion of the CGE which creates a military burden for many developing countries, whether in conflict or not. This creates unsustainable external debt. The level of milex allocation can affect the overall state commitment to provision of its portion of development funds (Omitoogun 2003; Smaldone 2004). The visible part of milex budget, which is the operation cost in salaries to soldiers, is itself burdensome for developing countries. The recent preliminary studies by Suzuki (2007: 107 – 109) confirms possible “negative” impact of high milex, though it is statistically insignificant. Suzuki agrees that small arms and light weapons have a link to inception of civil wars but this is statistically unquantifiable and lacks empirical evidence. The secrecy over military procurements has contributed to the accuracy in using figures to estimate milex impact in relation to development regression. Practically, military investment does not yield direct dividend and so are a drain on developing states’ economy. Harris (2004: 7) emphasizes that there is no direct return in such investment in military personnel. If a portion of the milex budget is invested in education and other productive areas of the economy, it will yield a dividend that has a direct impact on the general economy of the state. Excessive milex in pre-conflict, conflict period or post-conflict period will impact
on the level of government commitment to social service delivery (Agbese 1999: 232). The question then is does white elephant defence sector merit the cost involved that continue to over burden poor citizens?

Mbaku (1999: 317) has stated that a "[p]rotective state is one, which provides society with an enabling environment for the creation of the wealth needed to effectively confront poverty and deprivation". Conversely, a state’s diversion of state agenda from optimal wellbeing of its citizens is inimical to political stability. In South Africa the post-apartheid policy resulting in a cut in milex resulted in the release of funds for other sectors in urgent need of funding. Batchelor, Dunne, and Lamb (2002: 346) indicate that,

It is evident... that the main beneficiaries of the decline in defence spending since 1989/90 have been social services (e.g. education, health, social security and welfare) and public order and safety (police, justice and correctional services). The increases in education, health and social security and welfare reflect the prioritization of social spending, particularly since 1994 when the ANC came to power.

The key note of concern is the emphasis placed on how the government determined its priorities over maintaining the level of milex that preceded the ANC, though the defence budget had already declined by that time, due to the collapse of Soviet Union, which reduced the level of ideological threat and security in the SADC zone. The new South African government saw earlier on the need to reshuffle its priorities away from defence. But that would have been critical considering the nature of the transitional period which could have threatened political stability. Uzoigwe (1975: 472) contends that militarism, irrespective of historical placement (pre or post-colonial), has "repercussions on political, social, and economic relations". Therefore why do African states continue to consider the pattern of prioritizing high milex above other security issues in state expenditure?

2.5. New trends in security provision

The slow pace of development and growth still creates internal security dilemma in many African states. The internal stability is worsened with the development of private security, where mercenaries can be imported. The new private security enterprise,
according to Sköns (2000: 14), “provide a variety of services, ranging from guarding installations, protecting convoys, supporting humanitarian assistance operations to performing reconnaissance and intelligence services, providing logistical and transport support, military training, strategic planning, and engaging in combat”. They have become a buffer to less efficient and effective state armies for emergency actions to counteract rebels’ incursion. Harris (2004: 34) argues that these new enterprises are operating without any legal limitation at the international and regional levels. Hellinger (2004: 213) argues that the UN has no plan to outlaw private securities but provide regulation of their activities, for example restricting their use of firearms. Their staff constitute ex-service men and new recruits who could be ex-combatants. Because they are a profit oriented business, they are prone to being contracted into participating in destabilizing activities. Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, DRC and Angola have government, business interest groups, and regional organization such as ECOWAS engaging the services of such enterprises (Human Security Centre 2005: 37, 38). In 2005, a South African security company was implicated in providing fighters to participate in a coup in Equatorial Guinea. Some of the recruits involved having been arrested in Zimbabwe during a stopover (Hellinger 2004: 204). They have been released to be tried in South Africa as citizens by the anti-terrorist law (BBC News 13 January 2005). The dilemma of the new security enterprise will become a new challenge to rising milex unless an alternative non-violent approach to resisting rebellion or state pogrom is established.

2.6. Alternatives to reliance on military defence

Harris (2004b: 37ff) offers alternative suggestions for contemporary substitutes to military security in which the army is becoming less effective with the cost and nature of civilianized warfare. Currently, the key functions of the military are deterrence of external aggression against the sovereignty of the state and internal security in line with “territorial integrity” of the state. The challenges faced by post-modern states have compromised the army in non-traditional function as follows: internal security operations against opponents of the government; internal security operations, often together with the police services, against crime and as domestic peacekeepers; guarding land and sea borders against illegal immigrants and smuggling; protection of marine and other resources against poaching by locals and foreigners; civil defence during natural disasters and rescue work; international peacekeeping, and development tasks e.g. building infrastructure.
These added functions give credence to the essential service the army has been tasked to do. Harris (2004; 37 - 40) argues that these functions can be provided efficiently and effectively by civilians. Military peacekeeping has been found to prolong the duration of conflict the method results in its own conflicts (Luttwak 2001: 272). The arrogation of such tasks by the military makes it imperative for the defence sector to demand increased budget allocations. But such task would not necessarily inflate the budget. The problem of excessive expenditure goes with the confidential expenditure on arms in particular. In some countries the issue of increasing military personnel is a drain on the overall budget. South Africa, with high unemployment, is considering militarization as potential solution (Roux 2007). The creation of farming cadres and other income generative options would contribute effectively to the GDP growth of South Africa. The weakened states in Africa also find the military a costly burden. The idea of drastic cuts in military personnel has been argued by others as a poor solution with already high unemployment in Sub-Saharan Africa (Omitoogun 2001: 8). The post-war situation normally results in absorbing ex-combatants into the states regular army. There is the problem of “macro-insecurity” and “micro-security” where many of demobilized soldiers or ex-combatants link up with mercenary organizations, internal instability results, and local criminal activities increase. That makes demobilization and reintegration of state forces a difficult rational choice (Lewis, Harris and Santos 1999: 144). Already some post-war states face the challenges of Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) with ex-combatants. Sierra Leone’s planned reduction in the size of the army from 14,500 to 10,500 required funding to resettle volunteers (International Crisis Group 2003: 8). Kingma (2004: 158-159) view demobilisation as “…central component[s] of peace and development policy after violent conflict”, it becomes a “security sector reform” policy to “downsizing” the government army and resettling ex-combatants for a productive post-war life. The expectation of demobilisation is to reduce military spending so it can be redirected to other developmental purposes after the war. This is followed by reintegration where ex-combatants can rejoin the society without and be productive.

The critical problem for the demobilisation and reintegration programme is funding. This has been experienced from Central America through to Africa and Asia where conflicts have occurred and ceased (Spencer 1997: 23, 42; Colletta, Korstner and Wielderhofer 1996: 11-13; Rossi1 and Guistozzi 2006: 4-5). This is the dilemma faced with some demobilisation and reintegration activities so far in spite of its relevance in post-conflict
reconstruction and peace-building. But in the long run post-conflict peace, as Harris (1999: 42) puts it, is “incremental” requiring gradual adjustment as a programme. This depends on the perception and perspective of peace as either a state peace or human security or both. What then should be the best way to deal with rising defence costs caused by paying an unproductive army?

Ibáñez and Moya (2006) say, “[u]nderstanding the consequence of war is critical to craft policy programs aimed to mitigate the short and the long-term costs of conflict. In particular, the long term consequences of internal conflicts may hinder economic development on a significant basis by reducing human capital investments, destroying assets, and creating pockets of the population trapped in poverty vicious cycles”. The solution to mitigate the burden imposed by the military through high milex can be argued from a policy perspective on three main factors (Harris 2004: 200, 201).

The first consideration is the preference for essential effectiveness of a military option that should justify the enormous input as optimal choice. Normally, it is not the case. For instance after months of convincing the world that a military option best suited deposing the Hussein regime in Iraq, the enormous cost in human life and trauma among other factors makes it “unreasonably” essential. The effectiveness is nullified by the increasing cost that will reach estimates of between $750 billion to $1.2 trillion by 2011 (Bilmes and Stiglitz 2006: 5). As Harris argued the new task of the defence sector can be better and more cheaply done by the civilian society. Agbese (1999: 233) claims the presence of technical incompetence of the soldiers relative to other segments of society. A mobilised civilian revolt, as argued by Sharp (2003) could have overthrown the Hussein autocratic regime. The Gueï military regime in Cote d’Ivoire was forced by civil disobedience to abandon the attempted continuation of a leader after a controversial electoral outcome (Human Rights Watch 2003: 8).

The second consideration is the essential efficiency in application of military choice. Efficiency counts on the resource input and the time used to achieve objectives at a lesser cost by considering alternatives (Harris 2004: 190, 191). In West Africa, military reaction to rebel activities has been counterproductive and created unimaginable protracted conflicts that lasted almost decade. The decision to rely on military defence was miscalculated and bound to fail. A similar uprising in Cote d’Ivoire, with the rebel
occupation of the northern sector, drew almost half the country. Gbagbos’ refusal to heed to ECOWAS counsel to refrain from a military solution has cost much than would have been by earlier peaceful negotiation (see page. 56f). A military solution does not offer efficient solution by considering the proportionate cost in human and material resources destroyed. There is a need for integrated-early-warning mechanisms to detect potential conflicts and the engagement of preventive diplomacy and peace-building (Lederach 2002: 80, 81, 89).

Scott and Wyeth (2006) distinguish peace-building as the gap between peace-keeping and development. Peace-building and development have a common focus on promoting well-being but two separate conceptual origins. In a similar post-conflict circumstance, the reconstruction after the two World Wars focused on “creative peace”. The Marshall Plan was based on European integration by “integrated economic and political order” under a supra-national institution as proposed by Paul Porter and colleagues (Hogan 1987: 36, 37). Development does not necessarily originate from post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction because development programmes, in many places, begin before any conflict. Peacebuilding bases its significance on dealing with the chaotic arena of conflict, where reconciliation and reconstruction are critical; it is an investment rather in development (General Assembly Security Council 2001: 2). It is displacing war as the only means of survival from the realist defence point of view (Francis 2004: 64).

The third consideration is the essential consensuality over the military option to resolve intra-state conflicts or other conflicts. The legitimacy of the military option is still a problem because it is confined to the cabinet. The lopsided democracy that ends after electoral process limiting public choice in critical policy agenda such as decision to war is problem even with major democratic states in advanced countries, nevertheless developing countries. The political paradigm of realpolitiks in African politics undermines democracy in defence and makes transparency in that sector impossible. The emerged new wars which are intra-state requires rational political choices as well as civil society inputs on defence security preference or to what extent should military decisions be subject to public participation? Generally the evidence of relative high milex and decision to war (as would be found in Chapter Three) indicates lack of consensuality and democratization of state security decisions in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The democratization of state security decisions in Sub-Saharan Africa will depend on influencing factors that shape the social construct of in society. In many countries the military symbolizes national pride and honour (Francis 2004: 64). The political realist school claims war is a natural human tendency which is strongly disputed by idealist and neo-liberalist schools as an erroneous tendency that can be corrected. Neoliberalists argue that "violence and selfishness are not part of human condition but are the result of flawed institutions" (Holsti 1995: 2; Duncan 2002: 20, 21, 26, 27, 33). It will not be automatic that with certain distorted religious and political indoctrinations the majority of society will denounce war preparation and indeed the war option. For example, currently, Iran has the full support of its citizens to spend much money to develop nuclear bombs and the desire for war option is at its peak level (Lynch 28th August 2006, USATODAY). The increasing military spending in developed countries, the prevailing culture of violence that is characterized in media and entertainment, and the current Bush Europe Missile Shield Project which has angered Russia to consider withdrawing from the previous Cold War Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, entrenches militarism (Eshel - Accessed June 2007).

We see therefore the need for reorientation of the general societal idea of security which underlies militarization and armament as the popular paradigm for attaining peace. Dower (1995: 18 - 23) explicates security in relation to a "value system" which is a "good" which is guarded by sustainable confidence and pride. Security therefore centres around three main concerns: a personal attitude to coping with confidence irrespective of relative issues; secondly is a form of uncertainty which perceive complete security as impossible therefore it becomes a goal to pursue; and thirdly, is protective focus and guard over what is valued and perceived to be vulnerable. The last two perceptions of security tend to shape the trend of international relations and local politics, especially with multiparty democracy. Security becomes the concern of opposition and those whose choice of voting did not materialize. The pursuit of security has become a burden in relation to what it cost to achieve it politically. The security takes the form of parties, identities, land and resources in particular area, as well as economic security, among others. The party in power and its supporters are those who feel secured by the occupation of state authority. Generally, in multiparty democracy, entrenchment of one party becomes a preoccupation and a value others die to sustain as it becomes one-sided nationalism (Pettman 1995: 24, 25). Security has its moral implication as a good. Dower says that the pursuit of a person
(or a state’s) security should not undermine another person’s or a state’s security in terms of value. Harris (2004: 6) supports this saying that security is no longer “territorial” protection which gives much significance to the military. Dower then argues that the pursuit of security using conventional systems and institutions like the military cannot conform to that moral principle with regard to upholding the security of others. The reason is that “peace” is the object of “security interest” and by undermining others security impinges on their peace. Therefore “whatever leads to peace provides security”. Thus homes, community, and nation with peace signify the freedom and security that abound.

Peace is not guaranteed by the wish for it. Individuals and society work and ensures peace through the manner and approach conflict issues and difference and wrongs are handled and resolved. Conflict resolution concisely is “to turn opposed positions – the claim and its rejection – into a single outcome” (Ury, Brett and Goldberg 1988: 4). This can be done by reconciling the basic concerns among parties, identifying the party that is right by legitimate standards, and/or identifying the most powerful which has much influence upon the outcome. In this case power should give way to rights and interest as prior areas in reconciliation (Ury et al 1988: 5, 7, 8, 19). Total security therefore should be equivalent to the wellbeing of a state and its citizens, and even its ecology.

2.7. Summary

This chapter began with review of the trend of wars since 1990. The last quarter of the 1990s could be described as the epitome of intra-state conflict in Africa since the period of liberation struggles in the twentieth century. Nevertheless, the period into the twenty-first century has seen some level of reduction in intra-state or new wars in Africa. The decline however still placed Africa on top as a conflict prone area which requires much study to identify the key factors causing new wars or intra-state wars. This led to a review of the trends of milex and found that African states with conflict history or on-going conflict and those in a security dilemma generally resort to high milex as state security or conflict deterrence. This has been observed to affect human security or development spending where milex per GDP exceeds the five percent range. The recourse to high milex by Sub-Saharan African countries is also attributed to influential factors from the international system, based on Western foreign policy, and market for arms manufacturing.
companies. Therefore effect has three main impacts: firstly, non-transparency on new arms procurement causes regional insecurity and proliferation of small-light weapons. Secondly, internal security dilemma relate to state failure and insoluble debt due to non-budgeted arms procurement than budgeted approach, maintenance of large number of non-productive military personnel. Thirdly, at the individual leadership level, the international influence which combines with the personal perception and the ideology of a leader, determines the type of security choice either state or human security. The issue of privatization of military functions raised the concern for demilitarization, peaceful alternative to non-military conflict resolution, and early warning mechanisms. The essence of this has been supported by the new perception and meaning given to security which centres not on state territorial protection per se but on general human welfare, wellbeing, as human security.
Chapter Three

Grievance or greed as main underlying causes of wars in Africa

Many factors have been cited as cause of civil wars. However scholars and conflict analysts remain divided on specific root problems that trigger armed conflicts. The prominent post-1990s civil war or new wars discourse has focused on grievance issues as the underlying reason for armed conflicts. These include: ethnicity, religious intolerance, state failure to secure emerging democracy, fragmentation of state, amongst others. As scholars grapple with the reasons these factors incite devastation beyond reasonable levels, another school of thought championed by Collier and Hoeffler posit the greed hypothesis. The greed and grievance discourse implies the need of "motive" and "opportunity" to incite armed rebellion in a state (Collier 2006: 7). The motive is linked to the non-measurable but observable behaviour as greed which is identified as looting or plundering of illegal resources of state through rebel activity. Opportunity is also linked to the prevailing political and socio-economic conditions that offer room to raise issues of injustice that warrant violent change as the only avenue. Whilst the two schools of thought have similar basis, the premise of interpretation and analysis has created rivalry between them rather than causing them to be complimentary. Grievance takes a positivist perspective on critical empirical evidence. The neo-liberal economist perspective of greed is post-positivist and therefore espouses its argument on non-empirical behavioural tendency of rebels alone. The new wars debate is another arena of Peace Studies and International Relations discourse seeking reasonable explanations for the emerging new civil wars and their nature. This section will review both the grievance and greed debates with the aim of highlighting merits and demerits in their discourse for military policy implications.

3.1 The grievance discourse

The grievance proponents from a social and political perspective do not specifically focus on one reason as the cause of war but have broad range of factors as possible causes and contributors, as acknowledged by Collier and Hoeffler (2002: 9). Some of
the causes of civil war by the grievance school of thought are empirical in nature, and lend themselves to easier scientific measurement and observation. For example political and non-state actors’ mismanagement of civil positions and commitment, and human rights violations can be composed into data from economic growth impact, social service structure and delivery assessment, and social relations between ethnic groups. As a structural mechanism, grievance implies direct and indirect use of systems and institutional arrangements to violate the basic rights of those who deserve to be protected by the state. The violation of human rights is a critical issue that can polarize society into antagonism and eventually violence. In Lukes (1974: 24) grievance has political implications and is defined as, “...an articulated demand, based on political knowledge, an undirected complaint arising out of everyday experience, a vague feeling of unease or sense of deprivation” As a political issue, political systems and issues and actors’ behaviour have been cited as avenues through which root causes of civil wars are located when basic life issues are infringed upon. Three main political processes and practices that can be used to violate human rights, the basis of grievance theory, are presented below.

3.1.1. Immature democratic process

Immature democratic process is the condition of democratization where the learning process of political actors and other stakeholders can be fragile to the point of inciting conflict. Mansfield and Snyder (2001: 120-124) argue that immature democratization crisis causes war. Competition for popular support by certain elites in the democratization process can result a power struggle to secure their mass support (Brown 2001: 221). In Africa, such instances have prevailed in the way individuals have chosen to use violence if they cannot, by the ballot box, secure the power to rule.

Ayoob (2001: 127-129) has indicated that formation of states in Europe followed a pattern of internal political struggle towards achieving nationhood. Such characterization is described as “primitive central state power accumulation” which has three distinctive aspects: (i) territorial expansion and consolidation under political authority, (ii) policing of the state to keep order, and (iii) the use of taxation and resource extraction to generate income to honour regime’s national political agenda. Scholars have observed that the power accumulation, which resulted in the taxation and
resource extraction processes, is reversed when states decide to become democratic. So when sharing political power becomes inevitable this can lead to possible frustration for the state authority. The problem is connected to what Kaldor (2004: 168–169) describes as “patrimonial leaders [using] tribal networks as a way of rationing out scarce governmental resources” which is prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Sometimes the state, according to Mansfield et al (2001), shows its prowess by utilizing diversionary tactics into external aggression, a way to calm internal discontent. Sudan’s quasi-democratization with its prevailing internal racial and religious problems was bordering fragmentation due to oppression of southern Sudan black citizens with politics of exclusion. Sudan’s export of its internal problems through aiding insurgents’ activities crosses territorial frontiers into Uganda, Eritrea-Ethiopia war and recently Chad incurs similar reprisal (International Crisis Group 2005 and 2006). The breakdown of non-interference with regard to sovereignty in Africa is also attributed to legacies from modernity imposed through European colonization created nation-state system which constructs state around militarism (Melander et al 2006: 7). The enormous cost involved has varying consequence for poor economies if the state fails to deliver on its commitment to citizens. The resulting regional-wise conflict becomes inevitable.

### 3.1.2. Fragmentation of nation-state in globalisation

The fragmentation of the nation-state has become a factor that can frustrate early democratization processes. The nation-state is the galvanisation of the prior organised state and nationalism into composite units under a single authority. Biswas (2001: 182) has described the capacity and success of the nation-state as its ability to protect national identity and aspirations. This manifests both in economic prosperity and cultural unity. For example, Sudan, at the edge of fragmentation, was attributed the lack of “core identity” of the state (Sisk 2001: 794). The advent of globalisation, economic and cultural hegemony induces destabilization in, especially, third world nation-states currently adopting democracy (Melander et al 2006: 8). Kaldor (2004: 169) supports the fact that “globalisation breaks down the homogeneity of the nation-state. Globalisation involves diversity as well as uniformity, the local as well as the global”. But the reality of social and national identity is superimposed by the activities of supranational ideals through Western cultural hegemony. The imbalance in the global economic system
which comes with Western values has contributed to emerging African democratic states trapped in debt. The heavily indebted condition ruffles the internal stability of economically and politically weak African countries with rippling effects occurring within the sub-regional enclave (Uzodike 1996, 1999; Economic Commission for Africa 2005: 141). In the instance of a failing economy, patriarchal leadership tend to look to the survival of their stronghold of supporters. The excessive manner Zaire under Mobuto conducted his patronage politics plunged the state into political turmoil (Busumtwi-Sam 2002: 95).

Democracy according the literature is capable of ensuring peace (Bloomfield et al 1998: 16 – 20). But formal democracy (legislature, political parties, elections, etc) without some contextualisation can be counterproductive and disintegrate the state (Busumtwi-Sam 2002: 107). The imposition of mere majoritarian democracy in post-war can undermine peace-making efforts or conflict management as evidences show across Africa with ethnic based conflicts (Sisk 2001: 793). The majority choices are imposed on the minority when it may not be just. As Gwartney, Lawson and Gartzke (2005: 29) note:

Democracy is desirable for many reasons but policies that encourage, or even seek to impose, representative government are unlikely to contribute directly to international peace.

Gwartney et al, defend democracy as not the cause of violence, but the economic model of a free-market which generates economic problems and creates the propensity for intra-state violence. In this case, a good democratic structure that guarantees power sharing and participation of the minority who may never become the majority, can also be involved in critical decision-making is essential (Abdallah 2001: 162; Mbaku 1999: 300 - 301). A good power sharing democracy will expose policies to policy-dialogue where both the winners and losers can reach consensus and ineffectiveness due to incompetence can be minimized (Uzodike 2001: 299, 303, 310). This is a key factor for sustaining a stable political system and enhanced decision-making for effective impact. It means divergent parties in the state can have their wishes carried out, and this is the basis for a good approach to development. Development fails when the needs of some
national sub-cultural or minority group(s) are trivialized. The Ogoni Niger Delta area in Nigeria has been marginalised in terms of development despite the region being the primary source of Nigeria’s wealth (Mazumdar and Daniel 2005). The resultant grievance can degenerate into large scale destruction if politicians continue to take the local people for granted. In addition Kaldor (2004: 176) says, “[v]iolence unfortunately squeezes the space for reason and deliberation”. These issues confirm conflict theory that social differences can be politicized into ethnicity and nationalism (Avruch 2003). Mismanaged democracy ends up in economic marginalization and ethno-religious discriminations as structural violence (Kent 1995: 382-383; Bloomfield et. al. 1998: 35-36). Many SSA states evince democracy that politicise ethnicity, economic opportunity, and religious differences.

3.1.3. Constitution tampering

Compulsive constitution amendment by the majority without proper consideration of minority interest can engender internal destabilization which also can extend beyond the territorial boundaries (Uzodike 2004: 300, 306). Some serious changes that seek to extend a particular occupation of power by one party and group can spell fatal consequences. The Ugandan constitution was amended to extend the expiring two-term presidential mandate of Musevini (Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006). This made it impossible for the opposition side to have any hope of acceding to political authority too. The Chadian constitution was amended to extend the reign of Idriss Déby whose mandate of two terms was about to expire (BBC News 2006). Gueï made constitutional changes that triggered the Cote d’Ivoire conflict later. According to Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (2001) “Gueï made several substantive changes to the text, including inserting controversial language regarding the eligibility requirements of a president, before submitting the draft constitution to a referendum” in Cote d’Ivoire. Clearly, constitutional changes are good when they seek genuinely to improve the workings of a document created by citizens. However, when those changes are used by some segments of the population to extend their stay in office, it points to an internal struggle for power. Necessarily, such manoeuvres serve to trigger counter-manoeuvres and resistance from segments that may stand to lose with the changes or who otherwise foresee bigger problems with the proposed changes. This can be a highly charged and dangerous political environment unless the tensions are managed
very carefully.

The grievance theory provides broad-spectrum of causal factors when analysis civil war. It is potentially an appropriate model that captures varying political and socio-economic variables and other qualitative issues such as the greed which was supposed to have triggered civil wars in Africa since 1990.

3.2. The greed discourse

The contention of greed theory is that rebellion is large-scale predation of productive economic activities. Collier and Hoeffler (2006: 2) argue that,

> grievances are often interpreted as one of the main causes of conflict. However, there are very few measures of objective grievances available. In our work ... we found no evidence that neither income nor land inequality have an effect on the risk of conflict.

Collier and Hoeffler, and others contend that the motive for civil wars cannot be attributed to altruistic grievance but opportunistic greed which preys on available incentives. They insist that greed is more important to predict rebellion than grievance (Collier 2000: 339-340). The greed proponents believe strongly that no amount of grievance can lead people to armed conflicts that normally continue over years. The only plausible factor is opportunistic rational aggression to pillage a weak state of resources such as diamonds and crude oil. Collier and Hoeffler (2006: 3) argue that,

> interpretation of conflict is obviously not shared by rebel organizations or by the people who honestly support them: the justice of the struggle seems central to success. By contrast, the economic theory of conflict argues that the motivation of conflict is unimportant; what matters is whether the organization can sustain itself financially. It is this, rather than any objective grounds for grievance which determine whether a country will experience civil war.

Therefore, based on economic rationality, armed “rebellions” are nothing less than individuals desire to ransack the state for private material gains. Typical examples of such ulterior motives in greed assumption cite armed rebellion in mineral resource countries
such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Chad, Uganda, the Niger Delta basin conflict in Nigeria and other places in the African region. The Sierra-Leone war enabled Sankoh and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) to pillage the country's diamond mines. That became the life-line for the survival and operation of the RUF, self-created "personal army", according to Collier (2006). The eventual aftermath of peace agreement for cessation of conflicts saw rebel leaders demanding ministerial positions over mineral resources. Can greed alone be the single reason for mineral resource plundering of significant scale and brutal devastation of a whole country? Will such desire lead to years of protracted war? The assertion depends on the type of mineral wealth being plundered. Indeed since diamonds are not a "lootable" resource, they could potentially prolong a war but appear not to be the cause (Ross 2004: 340)

In the DRC, external interest in the massive mineral rich country contributes to the difficulty of achieving lasting peace agreement. The reason is also attributed to the rebel factions as instruments promoting violence under which mineral resources are exploited cheaply or stolen. The issue of external "conflict entrepreneurs" is raised, in this instance, where they collaborate with the rebel groups who cause extensive chaos as a result of the resources they have looked. Collier (2006: 1) then asserts that,

Economic analysis sees rebellion as more like a form of organized crime, or more radically, as something that is better understood from the distinctive circumstances in which it is feasible, rather than worrying about what might motivate its participants. Either economists are being excessively cynical, or popular perceptions are badly misled.

By equating rebellion to "criminal" activity, it has been suggested that all rebel leaders are criminals. In reality, genuine rebellion due to genuine grievance and causes does exist. Conflicts over ideology which are normally personality and individual centred cannot be categorised as an ulterior criminal act. Such conflicts begin as contestation for political authority but eventually result in armed confrontation due to intolerant government and the uncompromising nature of non-state actors involved. How then do we distinguish genuine rebellion from criminal one within greed theory? This is difficult to answer using by the greed hypothesis which alludes to observable behaviour alone.
The greed position is simplistic and makes it difficult to determine if there is any conflict that is not greed oriented because civil wars are economized in commodity terms and not in moral or political ways (Mack 2002). Wars, which ever way societies wage it, cannot be said to be sane with its destructive impact that embarrasses the sanity of rational humans. In most wars, pillaging, extortion and the use of torture, force and destructive ways to amass plundering resources has always existed. The false perception of violence as the natural tendency of humans is itself problematic. Human destructiveness, such as war, is learnt and such tendency can be transformed, “people can learn to think and act brutally, so they can learn to think and act with care and respect” (Francis 2004: 67).

According to Hinde and Rotblat (2003: 108), some terrible wars have been waged under a religious guise, justifying the butchery of other people for either religious or ethnic differences (sometimes both) across the globe. The Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan, and the Jewish and Palestinian conflicts, e.g., have become excessively prolonged in modern times due to religious and ethnic colouration of the two conflicts (Habibullah 2004: 5, 14; ). Brown (2001: 210-211) notes that “language and religion are especially powerful ethnic makers” and ethnic conflict surrounds varied issues such as political, economic, social, cultural or territorial matters. This why Melander et al (2006; also Duncan 2002: 26), argue that the motive of new wars cannot be dissociated from historical and ancient origins of what causes humans to take up arms and wage war. Therefore, Melander et al affirm, in quoting Clausewitz’s On War, that “…modern warfare is a conflict between organized armies on the battlefield and is a continuation of politics by other means, the logic of which tends toward extremes in warfare”. This tells us that the mode of old and new wars might be different, but the motive remains a puzzle and the reason for ongoing debate and research. The point is if scholars in framing models try to dissociate “structures” and “actors and behaviour” they eliminate account of strategies, motives and behaviour of local stakeholders in conflict (Mehler 2005: 31; Ross 2003: 21, 22). In benign manner greed proponents postulate that, the theory may have a symbiotic relationship in rebellion: to get started, rebellion needs grievance, whereas to be sustained, it needs greed (Collier 2000: 852). Again there is the ‘chicken and the egg’ (which came first) debate by arguing that greed takes advantage of “conflict traps” (Collier et al 2003: 79). It is then difficult to explain which actually causes the other.
Recent articles have raised doubt over the greed theory claiming that new wars especially from the 1990s are based mostly on greed and therefore all warlords are categorised criminals. Collier (2000: 851) tries to persist in his position by saying “...it is hard to see the crime-to-rebellion story as a general phenomenon” by other school of thought in the debate. Collier noted that if his rationality card be implausible, empirical data can vindicate greed as a valid motive for a rebel leader. But for instance, International Alert and Powell and Yahya (2006) Report on diamond mining in Mano River Basin in West Africa does not indicate resources as basic causal factor of conflicts in West Africa. The evidences in the document indicate that they are contributing factors and serve to fuel conflict rather than starting them:

Diamonds helped fuel the civil wars of Sierra Leone and Liberia during the 1990s, prompting the UN Security Council to ban diamond exports by Sierra Leone between 2000 and 2003 and impose a diamond embargo on Liberia that is still in place (Powell and Yahya 2006: 5).

There is a distinction between fuelling elements and causal or provocative factors. In the case of the Cote d’Ivoire separatist conflict, the document disproved that diamonds for instance are a major source of income for the rebels. Other exportable commodities such as cocoa, coffee, timber and cotton revenue are also used by the rebels. The evidence available shows that the rebels actually use the revenues for their survival and replenishing the weaponry. The motive then for their rebellion is not a question of resource plunder alone but perspective. What has been rebels’ perception of state resource? In the words of New Forces leader Guillaume Soro, “how can we tell these people to stop mining for diamonds? It would be like ordering a peasant to stop cultivating his land” (Powell and Yahya 2006: 5). This does not rule out the evidence of some war crimes committed by fighting forces and some level of exploitation. The Powell and Yahya report noted that,

The New Forces military commanders responsible for security in Seguela and Tortiya, appeared to be enriching themselves personally themselves from diamond mining. They noted that some of these men had recently acquired brand new four-wheel drive vehicles and had begun to show other signs of newfound wealth (Powell and Yahya 2006: 22).
Despite the case of some level of plunder by certain individuals, such particular behaviour cannot constitute the very root factor for the cause of the Cote d'Ivoire conflict. They exemplify normal warring men's behaviour with booty, as is evident in history. Non-state warriors do not have access to state military resources but in a sense have an obligation to acquire resources for defence and to achieve their objectives. Ross (2004: 349) argues Angola rebels resorted to looting after the end of Cold War due to the diminishment of their external funding.

Rebels will not resort to full-scale war in order to plunder natural resources knowing that they shall be controlled by government forces. This may sound plausible if there is a systemic level of aid and motivation. The engagement in plundering has been argued as not the motive but means to survive and continue their war efforts (Ross 2004: 342). The greed model which only provided a reductionist framework to predict the occurrence of war due to the measure of natural resources therefore deliberately ignored the critical role of state actors and structural issues involved in the conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Mehler 2005: 13, 31; Fjede 2006; Waltz 1974: 18, 19, 36). The armed insurrection against certain military juntas' persistent human right violations cannot be equated to greed. The rebellion against the Menghisto regime in Ethiopia, where the country is not rich in natural resources is an example. The model is structurally sensible with qualitative based assumptions, but may fail to determine how the actual motive behind warring parties' key actors began. There is also a limitation to model variables as greed did not test non-fuel minerals, as argued by Ross (2004: 349), and it is systemically limited in its analysis.

There is also the contention of greed that "surprising empirical regularities is that societies which are diverse in terms of both ethnicity and religion seem to be significantly safer than societies which are homogenous" (Collier and Hoeffler 2006: 11). This evidence does not support the critical religious tension in northern Nigeria with recurrent violence between Muslims and Christians. The conflict in Cote d'Ivoire, Sudan, Somalia and Chad cannot be isolated from the context of plurality of religions, ethnicity and race. Recent research finds that Somalia cannot be a homogenous society thirteen living languages and six clans (Human Sciences Research Council, 2006: 6). The research indicates that,
...contributing factors for the Somali conflict are; competition for power among the clans, especially between the Daroud and Hawiye clans, the destruction of the Heer, Somalia's traditional conflict resolution mechanism by colonialism, especially in the south, economic decline, rising inequality, and availability of large quantities of weapons in the country.

Therefore attributing Somali conflict to Ayeed is contrary to proper consideration of the context of political history even from the time of Italian occupation (Collier and Hoeffler 2006: 13). The legacy of non-contextualised democracy made it easy for entrenching military rule which perpetuated the colonial use of force and "divide and rule" (Uzodike 2004: 299 - 300). In trying to validate the theory, Collier and Hoeffler (2006: 13) argue further that,

[when such conflicts [civil wars] are viewed during or after the event, the observer sees ethnic hatred. The parties to the conflict have used the discourse of group hatred in order to build fighting organizations. It is natural for observers to interpret such conflicts as being caused by ethnic hatred. Instead, the conflicts have caused the inter-group hatred....

Several writers have alluded pre-independent method of 'divide-and-rule' as a nascent factor in recent intractable conflicts. The divisions in Rwanda and Burundi, and Sudan (where even the southern citizens were excluded from writing the constitution), and in Cote d'Ivoire where the French policy of elite education discriminated against the northern citizens are good examples. The French supported a government who had planned serious pogrom and refrained from protecting the Tutsis and moderate Hutus (Peterson 2000: 280-284). The continuous method of 'divided-and-rule' by post-colonial independent governments with patronage politics that favours party supporters and particular identity groups need not be overemphasized in Africa. Such practices have wedged a rift in African societies, both in economy and resource distribution before 1990. Such example of Africa's post-colonial leadership has left a reality of instability through greediness manifested in the misappropriation of state resources. In the Sierra Leone case, the evidence by the Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC) did not exonerate other non-state parties and the successive governments from looting and human rights violations. According to the TRC Report (Vol I: 5),
Sierra Leone was systematically plundered and looted by all factions in the conflict. The Commission found the RUF to have been responsible for the largest number of human rights violations in the conflict.

Further arguments show that patronage-politics, as practiced in Sierra Leone, with license from external governmental actors, led to misappropriation of state funds than for citizens' wellbeing (Reno 2003: 45 - 47).

The data basis of the greed and grievance discourse as single dominant causal variable has been problematic in spite of the level at which the theory originates. The Collier and Hoefller model ignores the systemic predatory economic impact on the African economy and the weaknesses caused by exploitation (Uvin 2001: 19). Challenged by the empirical research of Ross (2004: 337) which indicates that fourteen field research evidence least prove that greed is the viable basis for civil war. However, Ross considers greed as one of the various factors that need to be considered depending on the analysis of the conflict cause but not the single causal variable as espoused by Collier and Hoefller. Humphreys (2005: 533-534) says the theory “suffers from severe problem of data, model specification, and in particular a sensitivity of coefficient estimates to variations in model specification. This weakness is confirmed in Rosser (2006: 18, 19) is that “[t]he problem with this approach is that it tells us nothing about the structural characteristics of societies – that is whether, groups are defined primarily in class, ethnic or religious terms and what the relationship between different social elements is”.

Moreover, the greed hypothesis posits that intra-state conflicts are excessively prolonged due to their origin with resources. Humphreys (2005: 514) disagrees on the ground that “natural resource conflicts are more likely to end quickly and are more likely to end with military victory for one side rather than with a negotiated settlement”. What Humphreys draws attention to is that greed alone does not guarantee total loyalty. His conclusion further indicates his affirmation of grievance as a viable model to help explain the pattern of civil wars in Africa than “booty futures and state capture hypotheses” (Humphreys 2005: 534). This is supported by Ross (2004) and Rosser (2006) alike in that the looting (plundering) hypothesis is not tenable though greed plays a substantial role in some case such as DRC. The case of Zimbabwe lends some tenable
evidence to greed as lack of lootable primary commodities might have stalled civil war with African regional political actors' interest as happened in DRC in 1998. Arms to rebel groups or opposition militia will have to be supplied through a neighbouring state if the external interest at stake is worth the risk. The greed hypothesis therefore undergirds intensive militarization as the state's safeguard to resist and prevent rebellion (Mack 2001: 521). Indeed Busumtwi-Sam (2002: 94) says that "...the main issue is not the ability to predict a crisis but to learn as much as possible about the underlying pattern of such crises...". The frowning over the undercurrent in intra-state conflicts by greed hypothesis is the missing link and point of departure between greed and grievance.

3.3. Summary

In reviewing the debates, the research found grievance linking new civil wars in Sub-Saharan Africa to political, socio-cultural and economic issues that violate human rights in particular. They are mainly political and social issues such as immature democracy, fragmentation of the nation state in globalisation in Africa, and constitutional tampering. The hypothesis, without limiting itself to particular variable, provides a model conducive for intra-state conflict causes analysis. On the side of greed hypothesis, the motive is not the issue but economic opportunity. Motive is just a means to initiate violence for state capture and plundering of mineral resources. Though it has some validity, it's claim appears to be one-sided with elements of biasness. It also lacks in-depth substantive form from assumptions based on inadequate variables such as distinctions of resources and ethnicity categories. Both theories present valid viewpoints but speak from divergent paradigms and perspectives. This position tallies with Ross' (2004) view that,

The major quantitative studies of civil war have produced different findings about the role of natural resources; these differences were presumably caused by differences in the underlying data bases, models of civil war, estimation procedures, and techniques for handling missing data. Reconciling these findings – and identifying the factors that have produced the differences in the findings – would help us identify which of the resource conflict relationships are truly robust.

The absence of complimenting the various models creates policy discrepancies which
normally affect government budget priorities. In the absence of complimenting the various discourses, resolution to conflicts may be difficult and therefore the tendency for political actors to depend excessively on the military to provide security. The Chapter Two showed that such state security based on the military is illusive and a lack of human security results in disloyalty of both military and society which can trigger conflict and violent consequences with human rights violations. The next chapter will review some cases of major new wars or civil wars since 1990 in SSA and examine the key triggering issues.
Chapter Four

Intra-state wars in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1990

This chapter, review the incidence of major civil wars in the regions of Sub-Saharan Africa. The previous discourses in Chapter Two and Three have provided perspective for profiling conflicts and key actors across Africa. These perceptions will be linked to the integrative framework that assesses issues from systemic, regional, national, and individual structures that make civil wars likely. This will help to identify factors in the structures that work together to trigger conflict. The profiling will adopt aspects of Bloomfield and Reilly (1998) argument in identifying the actor, the issues, and the underlying factors. The notion is to justify whether actors' initial motive are directly linked with greed. The key patterns of mimetic greediness in rebel leaders need to be identified by correlating the manner and timing of looting; also identify whether there are circumstantial issues that are critical and highly provocative to incite armed violence. How does the pre-colonial historical warfare context inform current intra-state conflicts? Africa had its major wars (mostly intra-state which involved government and rebel militia forces) between 1990 and 2006. The subsequent years have registered decline (see table 1). Which of the identified factors can be attributed to the upsurge in the 1990s and the decline beyond 2000? Is greed an adequate answer? Do other reasons, as root factors in African new wars exist?

4.1. Pre-colonial society and militarism in Africa

Before reviewing new wars it is necessary to review the pre-colonization scenario of militarism in Sub-Saharan Africa. Generally, pre-colonial African wars took place with divergent motives and patterns. Those that took place in kingdoms were secessionist motivated by “desire for power and prestige” and often left a bloody trail. Expansion by annexation to ensure security and avenues for survival by taxation and tribute payment were major motivational factors (Uzoigwe 1975: 480; Becker 1966: 23f). There were others of religious nature, aimed at purification, as occurred with the Sokoto Caliphate expansionism in Nigeria; and also territorial establishment and revenge among others.
The formation of the Zulu kingdom by King Shaka happened after the defeat of the Dingiswayo of Mthethwa Empire, also occurred through various campaigns. The escape of Shaka’s key adversary, Zwide of Ndwandane resulted in his conquest of tribes of Nyasaland and the formation of the Shangana Empire (Becker 1966: 32). Yoruba Alafin of Oyo engaged in annual wars as “deliberate” exercises of manhood (Smith 1988: 104). The Massais of East Africa were known as “warriors” whose passion was “cattle and warfare” (Muriuki 1974: 83, 84). Cattle raiding, slave capturing, and attainment of manhood are common rationales for the inter-ethnic and intra-tribal conflicts.

Becker (1966: 23) describes most of the wars as lacking “organized warfare” and “disorderly assemblage of cattle raiders”. He ascribed the victories of Dingiswayo to his ability in transforming traditional males’ initiation guild into military barracks, though that did not constitute a standing army. He also conscripted males of defeated clans into military units. Similarly the Sokoto Caliphate and Oyo chief had limited armies made of mostly from captured slaves (Roberts 1980: 397; Smith 1988: 99). Normally, trained slaves retained their routine role as limited militia for rapid action in most dominant groups. But many ethnic groups did not have such luxury. Generally, male citizens in the kingdom or the clans offered compulsory warfare service. The social structures provided military training through adulthood male initiation rites. After the requisite puberty rite which took place when a teenager, the initiate qualifies to contribute to defence or the raiding service. Because militarism was an aspect of the integrated social system, it took its ethics from traditional religious values (Muriuki 1974: 124). That obliged the warrior to conform to a level of respect for innocent lives. Sotho warriors, for instance, took women and children captives as they frighten men away or in the course of resistance (Lye 1969: 47). Kikuyus forbid wanton killing of women and children, and it was “taboo” for a warrior to rape or seduce females during war (Muriuki 1974: 125). Yorubas and Zulus generally refrained from sheer massacre unless they experienced resistance. Nevertheless, the records of most historical conquests contained significant bloodshed.

The encounters with guns by the arrival of European traders changed the pattern of one-sided internecine conquest in most places in Africa. Benin or Dahomeans in 1840 were able to repel their perennial Yorubas subduers by being the first to use firearms.
According to Uzoigwe (1975: 474) the massive supply of guns and powder to coastal kings by European traders began another larger predation to capture more slaves from the Savannah hinterland groups. It resulted in the commercialization of wars for its lucrative benefit in human trade. Therefore the importance of African traditional warfare has been its capability of annexation, cheap slave labour and slave exchange for economic (material) gains. Jihad kingdoms turned captured slaves into a buffer for defence, and excess slaves constituted purchasing power in terms of accessing European goods and firearms. The commodification of people for both local and export purposes warranted the proliferation of firearms along the coastal belts of Africa and into the interior (Roberts 1980: 400). Smith (1988: 105) says, “Warriors were coming increasingly to prefer taking captives in battle, as slaves material, rather than to kill or maim their enemies”. Therefore, trade in slaves and its material and economic benefits determined the pace and occurrence of wars before formal colonization. It was therefore a period during which neighbours got enriched by enslaving their neighbours for labour or exchanged them for some other value.

4.2. Economic community of West Africa (ECOWAS) conflicts

West Africa is one of the Africa sub-regions with prolonged major and minor conflicts. This occurred mainly in five countries Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria where sporadic religious conflict between Muslims and Christians caused destruction of property and death.

With exception of Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone are endowed with natural and mineral resources that, if well administered, are capable of alleviating acute endemic poverty in these countries. Cote d’Ivoire has its northern sector seriously underdeveloped due to lack of government concern for that area because most of the inhabitants are claimed by government as not being full citizens of Cote d’Ivoire (Human Rights Watch 2003: 6 – 8). Liberia consists of indigenes and non-indigenous group of former freed slaves from America. Liberia became independent in 1847 and had been one party state ruled by the True Whig Party (TWP) dominated by America-Liberian blacks. Tolbert, the last leader of TWP, was overthrown in a bloody coup and murdered by Samuel Doe in October 1980 (Ellis 1995: 175). Doe comes from the Krahns (indigenous) group who are less educated, and mostly illiterate, without interest
in political involvement. Stephen Ellis (1995: 116) has noted that, "[t]here was already a history of enmity between Doe's own Krahn, on the one hand, and the Gio and Mano on the other, resulting from the politics of the military after the 1980 coup, which had already led to bloodshed in 1985". That event's human rights violations was enough of a sign of eminent bloodshed should the Gio and Manos get the opportunity for power again, according to a US Human Rights group report in 1986. However, prior to Doe's coup there was coexistence between various ethnic and religious groups.

Doe political incompetence, desire to entrench his rule, and atrocities in killing former head of state Tolbert had attracted displeasure by neighbouring states' leaders such as Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire, and Compaore of Burkina Faso (Ellis 1995: 174; Sierra Leone TRC Report 2002 - 2007 Volume 3, item 35, 39). Charles Taylor, an ex-convict and prison escapee from an American jail, is American-Liberian descent organized rebellion with support from Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Libya in particular. Libya had trained young militia men and ex-soldiers from that part of West Africa for revolutionary purpose. Libya had become another post-modern major destabilizing, and minor hegemon in Africa due to her anti-American sentiment. In 1990 Taylor and his recruited forces began horrible carnage after government forces launched an offensive attack. The ensuing war lasted a decade with human cost around two-hundred thousand. The clear intension of Taylor was shown to be his aspiration to Head of State by removing Doe. There was also the ultimate desire to avenge the Krahn people by Taylor. This required massive resources which had underscored his involvement in procurement scandal as head of government procurement. According to Ellis (1995: 169, 180) America could have prevented the ten year blood bath, but President Bush was more interested in salvaging Kuwait from Hussein. Those who supported Taylor expected a simple coup. The poorly resourced ECOMOG intervention force, mostly from Nigeria and Ghana could not prevent the arrest and assassination of Doe.

Taylor's militia later split into two opposing factions with the other controlled by Prince Yomi Johnson also trained in Libya. The two groups fought each other concurrently whilst maintaining their advances against the Krahn dominated people. The heavy armament of the rebel forces made it difficult for the ECOMOG intervention forces. Taylor took over the diamond areas and lumbered timber for export in exchange for arms and cash. The imposition of the UN embargo in 1998 and 2000 did little to control
the illegal extraction and sale of resource from Liberia and Sierra Leone. Taylor eventual accession to Presidency through a post cease-fire election did little to change his grip on state resource income. Underground agents from Europe and America in particular had become buyers of what become known as blood diamonds from conflict zones. Taylor’s was compelled to accept exile into Nigeria after revolt by insurgents from the Krahn felled his government. Taylor personal income from illicit exports had earned him over five times that of the state income per annum. Indeed Taylor had involved himself in both the Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire civil wars by targeting the mineral resource field for support to rebels rather than the government.

The Sierra Leone civil war was preceded by a series of military coups. Sankoh master-minded and organized a civil-military revolution to salvage Sierra Leone from internal plundering of the state by politicians and senior military officials. Sankoh is an ex-convict of an abortive coup in 1981. His conviction was based on his knowledge of the plot because he was the camera man for the coup plotters. Sankoh had also met Taylor in Libya during his training under Qaddafi and had contributed as conspirator in Taylors’ activities in Liberia. Sankor used the situation in Liberia to plan and mobilize forces from Sierra Leone citizens captured in Liberia by NPFL. Sankoh was compelled by Taylor, in 1991, to advance his attack on Sierra Leone ahead of his own schedule. This request was based on the strategic consideration to prevent the consolidation of ECOMOG forces, intended to make it impossible for NPFL to capture Monrovia. The Sierra Leone TRC Report (Volume 3 item 55 - 65) indicates that Sankoh’s motive was basically undertaking a revolution in a political and economically abused state; and also to seeks vengeance for his imprisonment in 1981, by the government. Sankoh had prevented the execution of captured Sierra Leonean citizen in Taylor’s camp. A confession from an ex-combatant in the TRC report (Vol. 3 item 121) quotes Sankoh stating,

"[t]he explanation had been made to us so many times by the Leader himself that the old dictatorial regime of the APC is the only tyrant… Our targets would not be against civilians; nor even against armed men who surrendered. It was just rather unfortunate that the war started with a certain group of people who were not exposed to that type of ideology. Had it been a warfare started by people trained with that understanding, it would not have badly affected civilians in that initial phase."
According to Uzoigwe (1975: 474) the massive supply of guns and powder to coastal kings by European traders began another larger predation to capture more slaves from the Savannah hinterland groups. It resulted in the commercialization of wars for its lucrative benefit in human trade. Therefore the importance of African traditional warfare has been its capability of annexation, cheap slave labour and slave exchange for economic (material) gains. Jihad kingdoms turned captured slaves into a buffer for defence, and excess slaves constituted purchasing power in terms of accessing European goods and firearms. The commodification of people for both local and export purposes warranted the proliferation of firearms along the coastal belts of Africa and into the interior (Roberts 1980: 400). Smith (1988: 105) says, “Warriors were coming increasingly to prefer taking captives in battle, as slaves material, rather than to kill or maim their enemies”. Therefore, trade in slaves and its material and economic benefits determined the pace and occurrence of wars before formal colonisation. It was therefore a period during which neighbours got enriched by enslaving their neighbours for labour or exchanged them for some other value.

4.2. Economic community of West Africa (ECOWAS) conflicts

West Africa is one of the Africa sub-regions with prolonged major and minor conflicts. This occurred mainly in five countries Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria where sporadic religious conflict between Muslims and Christians caused destruction of property and death.

With exception of Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone are endowed with natural and mineral resources that, if well administered, are capable of alleviating acute endemic poverty in these countries. Cote d’Ivoire has its northern sector seriously underdeveloped due to lack of government concern for that area because most of the inhabitants are claimed by government as not being full citizens of Cote d’Ivoire (Human Rights Watch 2003: 6 – 8). Liberia consists of indigenes and non-indigenous group of former freed slaves from America. Liberia became independent in 1847 and had been one party state ruled by the True Whig Party (TWP) dominated by America-Liberian blacks. Tolbert, the last leader of TWP, was overthrown in a bloody coup and murdered by Samuel Doe in October 1980 (Eliis 1995: 175). Doe comes from the Krahs (indigenous) group who are less educated, and mostly illiterate, without interest
The later massacre of civilians began with Taylor’s faction, the Special Forces, that were assigned to enter Sierra Leone alongside RUF to secure Taylor’s interest. This, according to the TRC Report alerted Sankoh to the consequence he could not prevent by stopping Taylor’s combat men involvement in Sierra Leone. There were however some of the RUF rebels who, due to the two front attack approach, made monitoring difficult for Sankoh and resorted to serious human rights violations. Therefore the TRC Report bore credence to the RUF’s initial motive as not being greed, but rather concern to use peaceful military revolution to salvage a failed state. The TRC report, therefore, affirmed that without diamonds the war was inevitable. It is also argued by William Reno’s (2003: 47; see also UNDP 2005: 34) analysis that,

...denying resources to armed groups is a necessary but insufficient requirement for ensuring that Sierra Leone remains at peace. This task also requires addressing grievances that are at the root of popular experiences of personalist rule and state collapse.

The deplorable condition, under which the people lived, indicated that the vast diamond resources were in fact lining the pocket of few political-majesties. Indeed civilian and military administrations could not have prevented a serious revolt. With ECOMOG and the larger international communities’ efforts a peaceful deal was reached and RUF transformed into a legitimate political party in 1999. However, two intra-state conflicts began at this time in Guinea Bissau and Cote d’Ivoire.

In 1999, General Ansoumane Mane attempted to overthrow Vieira of Guinea Bissau a war which lasted one year, 2000. The underlying factor was attributed to a failing state that could not pay its own army well. General Mane handed over to civilian administration after a year’s control. During this time, the stalemate around the disqualification of Ouattara, former Prime Minister under Houphouet-Boigny, resulted in enmity between the southern dominated ruling party and the Northerner Ivorian. The Ivorian government is identified as strongly ethnocentric, with Baoule and Bete ethnic groups (Pitman 2005), with strong emphasis on what is popularly known as ‘Ivorite’ or ‘pure Ivorian-ness’ (Gberie 2004). The Gbagbo government of the Ivoirian Popular Front (FPI) was elected through a controversial election (Crisis Group 2000). The
Gbagbo government fanned anti-North sentiment in the south which resulted in the attack and killing of some Northerners living in the south. The reprisal resulted in a coup attempt which resulted in the murder of former military leaders Gueï from the Western Cote d'Ivoire. Immediately a rebel group, named the Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix (MJP) (Movement for Justice and Peace) occupied the Northern sector and another rebel group, the Mouvement Populaire du Grand Quest (MPIGO) (Popular Ivorian Movement for the Great West) occupied the Western sector of Cote d'Ivoire. The factors underlying the conflict manifested themselves as political, ethnic, and religious. It was becoming increasingly difficult for the southern elite to allow the Northerners, who they claimed originated from Burkina Faso and were predominantly Muslims, to accede to Presidency. The animosity turned into serious conflict by government actors and the military (and the southern citizens, in some cases) led to a violent Northern revolt in 2002. During this period of conflicts a number of civilians lost their lives during both government and rebels’ attacks. Also, natural resource fields such as diamond mines and export commodities such as cocoa, were taken over by rebels. Gbagbo was viewed as nuisance to France and has been politically isolated with new favour directed towards Ouattara, the northerner ex-Vice President under Houphouet-Boigny regime. Gbagbo has, due to his socialist inclinations been opening the door to China and also for US favours (Diop 2005). This irated the former colonial lord and strained the existing relationship between the two states. Attempted resettlement negotiations through ECOWAS, AU and UN failed with the inevitable postponement of the October 2006 scheduled multiparty election, due to Gbagbo’s insistence on citizen voter registration issues until a recent arrangement, through the mediation of Banny, the interim Prime Minister.

In 1999, Mané attempted overthrow of Vieira of Guinea-Bissau which turned into a war lasting one year. The underlying factor was that the “political rivalry” and “general discontent” of failing state (Chabal 2002: 56). Mané handed power over to civilian administration after a year of control. Currently, there is an on-going impasse between The Gambia and Senegal over intra-state destabilization issues. Gambia accused Senegal Wadi of harbouring political fugitives accused of attempted coup plots. The Gambian government raised on international outcry that the Senegal Head of state, Wadi, was behind the plot to oust him from leadership. Again, Jammeh, accused Wadi of interference in Guinea-Bissau with same intension to oust the government there. Whilst
Jammeh trace Wadi's intention back two years ago, the claim is that Senegal is also being supported by French and the US. There are two considerations that either this issue is taken up as significant early warning to avert another complex stalemate conflict in the Senegambian enclave; or Gambia shall be compelled to resort to arming to the teeth to counteract suspected insurgents from Senegal. Jammeh therefore has resorted to revive the Cassamance rebellion to cause unrest to Senegal government (Freedom Newspaper June 11, 2007).

4.3. The Great Lakes Region

After quasi-independence from France in 1960, Chad had its first civil war in 1965 due to insurgency from the North to overthrow a non-democratic southern authority. The Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET) region had raised many rebel activities led by the Zaghawa people. The imposition of higher tax, which sparked riots in villages of Mangalmé, had resulted in a widespread revolt in most part of the North. There have been power struggle, that is intermingled with North (mainly Muslims) and South (mainly Christians and Traditional) enmity over ethnic and religious differences. This period also saw the external interference of Libya in particular and then France and American interventions due to territorial issues, such as the Libyan purchase of the Aousou strip. In 1975, Chad fell into a state of anarchy between military rivals after the overthrowing of Tombalbaye. The military leaders Gen. Malloum, Goukouni and Habré wrestled until eventually Habré became Head of State. In 1990 Habré was replaced by Déby a Northerner with the help of Qaddafi. This was made possible because according to Fearon and Laitin (2006: 21),

...French withdrew their support for Habré because of his closeness to the Americans in general and in particular, because he granted oil concessions to American companies.

The French had allowed Qaddafi favouritism over their effort to normalize the relationship with Libya for oil advantage. At this stage Chad’s oil prospects were not that promising. Unfortunately, the American government under Bush was involved in another oil field salvation mission in Kuwait. This made it easy for Qaddafi to enthrone
Déby (and Humphreys (2005: 509) and garner other support from Elf Petroleum in France). But several insurgency groups continued to be formed such as Forces Armées pour la République Fédérale (FARF) in 1994, Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad (MDJT) was formed in 1998. Déby instituted democratic system which Fearon and Laitin (2006: 18) described as a sham to forestall the consequence of a weakened state. John Prendergast (2007: 1) agreed with the former authors that the Chad democracy failed because the “governments came to power militarily, pay lip-service to democracy, and fail to provide basic services to their citizens”. Now Déby’s determination to entrench his reign also attracts more rebellion from,

rebels groups included dissidents from the inner circles of power and Déby’s Zaghawa people who seek to distance themselves from Déby’s costly failures and to maintain their prominence in the country’s leadership, the FUCD appears determined to remove Zaghawa influence in Chad altogether (Prendergast 2007: 4).

The Chadian conflict therefore does not reflect the greediness of internal rebels but the complex situations of the weak state and the politics of patronage together with strained ethnic relationships and state failure which is also beset with foreign interests such as Libya, Sudan and America. According to Reno (2002: 13),

Chad’s extremely weak state institutions and fragmented patronage network have generated a plethora of temporary political alliances of opponents, rebels groups, and ambitious local strongmen.

The situation in Chad will therefore continue without crude oil because the root of the conflict was created by the colonial ineffectiveness to unite the country. The manner of personality politics then worsened the political quagmire rather than galvanising nationalism and uniting Chad. Such a condition is required for peaceful resolution of their differences and a suitable political system. Chad requires a democracy that guarantees power sharing rather than the current majoritarian environment that it is easily hijacked by the leader and supporters.

Sudan’s internal conflict started before the discovery of crude oil in the southern part of the country. After independence in 1956, racial and religious conflict existed between
the northern Afro-Arab community around (39% of the population) and the black community in the south. Scott Peterson (2000: 178) has criticized the colonial ‘divide and rule’ policy as a source of racial conflict in Sudan:

Following the time-honored practice of divide and rule, Britain encouraged north and south differences and legally enforced them to prevent any rise of nationalism.

The colonial endorsed segregation based on race led to the exclusion of the south from contributing to the first Sudan constitution since independence. The racial and religious superiority felt by the Afro-Arab community has lead to the enforcement of ‘Arabization’ of the blacks as a formal state policy. This policy enables the Arabs, who are minority to “control state power, provides the majority of the political elite, dominates the armed forces, the bureaucracy, commerce, banking, trade, and the judiciary” as a means to subdue other cultures and beliefs (Uzodike 2004: 297; Reno 2002: 14, 16, 22 - 24; International Crisis Group 2006: 4).

The Bashir government’s religious extremism as the National Islamic Fronts (NIF) imposition of Sharia without a national referendum was an affront to the majority non-Muslim citizens in the south. This resulted in armed conflict from 1983 until 2005. The government between 1989 and 1994, replaced about 73,000 professionals with religious extremist supporters of the party. Furthermore the effort of the government to re-demarcate the southern boundaries to secure the oil and mineral lands was unacceptable. These issues, coupled with the excessive development marginalization where Southern Sudan received only 23.6% of the allocated development fund, resulted in starvation. The new policy was resisted through violence by the formation of SPLMA led by Garang. The Sudan conflict therefore cannot be qualified as a greed, though its has crude oil as a later contributing factor (Reno 2002, Lado (undated), International Crisis Group 2006, Seymour 2002: 18-19).

Between Chad, Sudan and Somalia, the upsurge in intra-state conflict from the issues involved can be attributed to unresolved local critical issues. They form mainly political and diversity (ethnic, racial, and religious) issues. Dealing with these problems requires
both national and international support to adequately determine a balanced and satisfactory resolution. It is evident that at the national level individual leaders in both Chad and Sudan, by their own idiosyncrasy, have become obstacles to resolving critical issues such as ethnic and religious differences. The systemic and regional actors tend to express an interest in the economic implications of national issues. The external actors took advantage of political and non-political cleavages to pursue interest in Chad and Sudan. In fact, the Anglo-Franco policy of ‘divide and rule’ for economic exploitation, has proven to be an effective time-bomb for social disintegration. If the grievance issues had been resolved earlier with the encouragement of the international and regional organizations, the conflicts would have possible ceased. The development of animosity together with other issues, have complicated the state of both Chad and Sudan wars as well as that of Somalia. The answer to the Chad, Sudan, and Somalia conflicts rest with the reduction of external parties interests, which also amounts to greed after economic resources. Systemic greed is serious obstacle to any local effort to resolve internal conflict.

The Great Lakes region has experienced pre-1990 violent political conflicts. However the DRC conflict has the extra-dimension valuable resource unlike Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. The politics of patronage by the Seseko regime from the early independent period ran Zaire into context of official ‘rent-seeking’ and economic mismanagement. America and Russia contested furiously the control of the zone with oil and diamond wealth. Places like Rwanda and Burundi though without massive resources, experienced conflict due to colonial ‘divide and rule’ policy, sowing seeds of enmity for today’s turmoil among the few ethnic indigenes. Uganda was the first to experience significant human rights violations targeted at political opponents people from their ethnic groups. That political instability, with its related human rights abuses reached its peak with Amin’s military regime in the 1970s. From Amins’ period to Obote saw the massacre of around 600, 000 people, including foreigners. The ethnic and political complexities that have resulted in the past politically motivated carnage, have been attributed to the nature of British rule and the legacy left. A diplomatic report states that,

Colonial development exploited these differences, bringing people from the centre and west into commerce and employment in the administration and using people from the north and east mainly as labour and in the army. This laid down
a pattern of inequality between a poorer north and a richer centre that persists today, aggravated by unresolved internal and external conflicts (Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006).

It appears colonial political legacies have laid the foundation for armed violence to aid in facilitating unjust economic exploitation, and this is ignored by the greed theorists. The emerging leaders did not change the rule of force and brutality in governance with Obote regime (Busumtwi-Sam 2002: 95). But Busumtwi-Sam argues Obote’s regime attempts to hold post-independence leaders culpable, but the evidence goes beyond the behaviour of those personalities. Similar policies have also characterized the Somali conflict where the imposed democracy by Italy has served to divide the clans and the struggle to practice western form of democracy has left Somalia in an unending bloody fiasco (Uzodike 2004: 294, 295). Nader and Grande (2002: 587) confirm that the imposition of imported ruling (legal) systems created a conflict of interest and continues to sustain such confusion of anarchy in places like Somalia.

The history of the Great Lakes region had served as the foundation of subsequent post-1990s armed conflicts that have engulfed the zone. The protracted armed rebellion by the Lord’s Resistant Army (LRA) led by Kony and Otti whose mission had been to overthrow the Museveni government for overthrowing the Acholi-led military government in 1986. There had been the other factor of LRA seeking to install a theocratic state in Uganda which turns away from murder of civilians and abduction of children, using girls as sex slaves and the indiscriminate damage to property. The post-modern world has witnessed massive genocide in Rwanda due to political and ethnic insecurity. Stein (2001: 190, 191, 192) describes the behaviour as “enemy image”, a stereotype complex of contextual factors such as group belief which entrenches negative perceptions that estrange groups to each other or by a group upon another. ‘Enemy image’ can be transformed politically through positive leadership. Stein cited the case of Sadat who whose effort turned Israel from having an enemy status which impacted on Egyptian policy on Israel after Sadat’s assassination. The assassination of Habyarimana in April 1994, unleashed a “holocaust” with almost a million people killed within three months in Rwanda. Petterson implicated the colonial method of ‘divide and rule’ as significant factor that continued to force a wedge between the two main ethnic groups. Therefore at the onset of the civil attacks on Tutsis, “French interest went far beyond
keeping up its reputation as African adventurers ...proved to be the main bulwark of the Hutu regime” (Peterson 2000: 280, 281). Frances’ alignments with the Hutus compelled Museveni to give his “blessings” to Tutsis in the Ugandan army who reorganized to defend their neighbouring-kins in Rwanda.

This was extended to Burundi as the same two ethnic groups, Hutus and Tutsis turned arms upon each other over political issues. This conflict was not limited to Rwanda and Burundi with cross-border insurgencies of rebels who shared the same ethnicity as people in the DRC (Kigali for example). The concurrent conflicts within the states in the Great Lakes enclave resulted in a serious spill over from Rwanda into Burundi, DRC and Uganda for example, due to geographic convenience. Rebels easily found homes in next neighbouring states intensifying the political distrust. Also the sense of destabilization in the same area, by political leaders, influenced some to secretly extend military favours to a particular side (Stein 2001: 195). The conflicts of DRC and Angola included major sub-regional parties embroiled in what is described as internationalized conflict, due to the nature of spill over and interests (Human Security Centre 2005: 20). South Africa, Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Namibia on one side and Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi on the other eastern frontiers of DRC. In Angola, South Africa and Namibia played an active role in fighting alongside UNITA and the government forces respectively (Batchelor et al 2002: 341, 342). The involvement of most of the economically struggling SADC neighbours had resulted in an increase in military expenditure in that period (see p. 19). This was due to the economic and political sense of the conflict, and the role of crude oil and mineral resources. Human Sciences Research Council (2006: 6) report has confirmed this by identifying foremost, politics, economic and ideology as underlying issues.

Angola and the DRC civil wars had its roots in the Cold War, American-Russian economic and ideological expansionism. The reason for a conflict starting and for it continuing can be different (Collier et al partly alluded to this by distinguishing between trigger causes and underlying causes). The superpower expansionist interest in Africa has had much to do with resource endowment. Therefore the clash of America and Russia over Angola and DRC was inevitable given the two states natural resources and the need for early effective intervention in Rwanda. According to Tshitereke (2003: 86), rebels such as Mobuto and Jonas Savimbi had received massive support from America
and its allies in the West to overthrow constitutional governments. Whilst the DRC was successful in removing constitutional government it served as an initial foundation for subsequent political instability. Eduardo Dos Santos' support from the former Soviet Union and Cuba served as formidable resistance against the Western motivated rebellion of Savimbi's Popular Movement for Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Tshitereke again says, "President Ronald Reagan invited him [Savimbi] to the White House and hailed him as a freedom fighter...". Today the same "freedom fighters" with the same level of looting and devastation are unfortunately branded as "criminals" and motivated by "greed". This does not forgive the atrocities that characterized many of African civil wars. However the issue to be raised is that systemic greed explains the complex nature of civil wars in Sub-Saharan Africa (Møller 2004: 19; Agbese 1999: 225). The post-Cold War era from 1990s, only changed the focus of the struggle from ideological to "economic interests" and "motivated by greed"-often more devastating to citizens. This also speaks to the opportunity war opens for elites and rebel leaders alike to establish themselves economically on a global scene through irregular trade market with destinations in the West (Tshitereke 2003: 87; Willet 2004: 109, 111).

The late Mobuto's demoralised government by promoting patronage and the wholesale promotion of rent services in state institutions, coupled with a mismanaged economy which pauperized the majority of Zairian citizens. The ineffectiveness of the Zairian government resulted in a collapse of the state and a lack of development, despite the high level of resources. The military intervention in the late 1990s Mobuto's exile under the leadership of the late Kabila is noted to have had external influence and support. The later days of Mobuto saw him estranged from his friends in the West. The involvement of external interests had resulted in Kabila receiving £30 million from a South African consortium, Namibian businesses, and the Namibian government (Willet 2004: 111). Kabila, confronted with fierce opposition by other rebel forces despite Mobuto's exit, is an example of the economic centre of the conflict. His assassination and replacement by his son, Kabila has not changed the conflictual nature of the DRC because of the high level external systemic influences. These external actors derive higher gains from an unregulated market in the conflictual state of the DRC. The issues surrounding the DRC and Angolan civil wars intensified because of the post-Cold War change from ideological struggle into a purely economic one. The systemic greed that was evident had two dimensions: acquiring cheaper resources from these conflict-ridden states, and
the arms trade (Agbese 1999: 229). Internally, the DRC and Angolan warring parties refused to cooperate because of the economic factors. The decline in intensity, for example the Angolan war, indicates the conflict-fatigue period when Savimbi began to negotiate a power-sharing deal. The post-democratic election in DRC in 2006 has not offered a thorough peace, with the opposition leader in exile after fatal post-election clashes and a number of rebel factions hiding in the bush. The local warlords' greed factor over diamonds and other resources received external motivation by conflict entrepreneurs on a systemic level.

4.4. Summary

This review of the intra-state conflicts indicates that the majority originated from grievance complaints. Pre-colonial raiding of people and property in Africa exhibit greedy symptoms but have no link to the current manner of new wars with its unprincipled destruction of civilian lives. Colonization modernized weaponry and made local wars economically lucrative. With the new conflicts, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, and Guinea Bissau cannot be part of the greed perspective irrespective of the incidences of resources plundered. The role of natural resources has been a critical means to finance the conflict. Natural resource in a state where conflict ensues creates disorder for plundering. In the Chadian and Sudanese conflicts the precedents of the internal conflicts makes it difficult to use the greed barometer. However, the presence of resources has intensified the struggle between the government and rebel factions in Chad. The DRC and Angolan civil wars involve strong elements of greed. The nature of the greed extends beyond individual agendas but is influenced systemically from external actors. The Cold War era territorial struggle underlies these two major conflicts in that sub-region. Therefore, it is not an anomaly to describe the majority of intra-state conflicts as an outright continuation of politics, but from a non-professional military force. Therefore in quoting Møller (2004: 11), "most wars can have a host of different motives, they may be said to be military actions for the creation of public goods. Whether they deserve this label also depends on whether they succeed in actually mitigating the humanitarian problems in question, and whether the costs of doing so (e.g. measured in terms of human lives) compare favourably with the gains".
It is difficult at this stage to credit any of the civil wars in West Africa, Central Africa, Great Lakes Region and Southern Africa, as contributing to public good. They have undermined the development of the Africa region and created problems such as the destruction of families, refugees, spread of diseases, famine, environmental degradation, destruction of infrastructure, and economic decline in states. In the long-run the parties had to rely on negotiation for settlement. It appears that if it was not for greed, the parties would have relied on negotiation from the beginning. In the same manner once promptings for negotiation failed, most aggrieved parties resorted to violent struggle and eventually a war.
Chapter Five

5. The implications of the causes of war debates for milex

This chapter, pulls together the issues and the implications of the parts raised in the previous chapters. The policy implications of the grievance and greed debate for conflict resolution and prevention are discussed. The strengths and weaknesses of the two discourses and the impact on defence decision-making will be explored. The impact of the debates on economic and social development as human security will be evaluated.

5.1. Evaluation of SSA conflicts

The lack of an appropriate theory to explain the phenomena of wars, generally, has contributed to the recurring incidences and ineffective armed conflict resolution mechanisms. The ineffectiveness of weak theory has been attributed to the lack of valid data and testing. Therefore the work of Sorokin, Richardson, Quincy, Boulding, Burton, Kelman, Galtung among others, in creating scientific data mechanisms for conflict research contributed to providing the systematic basis to predict wars and take the necessary steps to prevent a recurrence. As the evidence shows, new African civil wars have defied previous models used in predicting interstate conflicts and Western models of wars, due to differences in underlying factors and contextual issues of the two worlds. Democratic models that have been effective in preventing civil wars in Europe have proven to have an opposite tracked record in Africa. The fast-track (track one) mediation methods of conflict resolution has been effective in the West, but has failed to prevent recurrence of new wars in emerging states Africa (Brand-Jacobsen and Jacobsen 2000). It has not been capable of unifying the differences but enforcement of agreement that hardly resolve the conflict (Ury et al 1988). We have found that most of the theoretical literature that has been produced repeats the same trend of expanding weak theories due to weak data mostly based on assumption. The relevance of appropriate and valid data underscores the soundness of a theory (Ross 2004; Rosser 2006). Waltz effort in creating appropriate framework for restoring confidence in International Relations,
centres on how best to formulate a sound theory based on accurate data and validity testing of variables. A weak untested hypothesis lends itself not only as inappropriate, but also as misinforming decision-making. There is the need for high profile researchers to seek valid empirical evidence and improved familiarization with African context issues.

Pre-colonial local wars showed no link in principles with regard to new civil wars in Africa. However, slavery and its material and economic benefits determined the pace and occurrence of wars before formal colonization. It became a period during which neighbours became enriched by enslavement of their neighbours, which resulted in distrust. The possible contribution made to new intra-state conflicts could be an entrenched enemy stereotype which has caused a wedged between ethnic groups and weaker clans and visibly influenced the pattern of ethnic and racial dominance of democratization in Africa. Another significant factor is the role of firearms which intensified the level of raiding and resistance. Whilst the suppliers benefited enormously, the increasing weapon proliferation by European traders impacted negatively on the politics and economic production in Sub-Saharan Africa (Lovejoy 2000: 161; Manning 1994: 156; Owusu – Sekyere 2005: 56 – 59).

The profile of the West African conflicts revealed preferences, perception and attitudes of individual leaders, state failure, regional and systemic biases and interests, all contributing and shaping issues towards provocation and violence. The systemic and regional interest had numerous implications for the beginning and prolonging of the Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d’Ivoire conflicts. In the case of Liberia, America is said to have offered Doe’s regime more financial aid than any other country in the region that time (Agbese 1999: 227, 228). Why then did America allow its ‘favourite’ African state to plunge into such intractable civil war? We also find without the support of Qaddaffi, Campoare, and Houphouet-Boigny, it would have been difficult for Taylor to rule on Liberia. Just as other leaders in the ECOWAS sub-region perceive the threat of Taylor to regional stability, Libya, Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso would not have fallen back on violent means of removing Doe. Those who offered the full support therefore cannot be dissociated from what happened in the destabilized countries. The individual political and non-political actor alone is incapability to wage war without
external factors contributing enormously. What the Sierra Leone TRC Report (Vol III item 6) revealed against the greed theory is that,

…the civil war in Sierra Leone was not simply a struggle for mineral resources. There were other factors that laid the grounds for the war which would have taken place even without the existence of diamonds in the country.

Therefore conclusions can be drawn which may be problematic for the idea that warlords cause civil war. The use of excessive force meant a huge increase in arms costs (Mack 2002: 523). The report added that the presence of the mineral resources served only to "fuel" the conflict by providing a source of funding, but this was not the core issue. Similarly, the Kosovo genocide attempted ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Serbs and Croat Muslims and is evident of the level identity and political insecurity which could trigger intra-state armed violence and war based on the ‘enemy image’ crisis. There is the evidence of the intolerance of diversities and animosity building out of the failing state. Such intolerance can be an explosive rebellion against political institutions, dominant ethnic groups, religious superiority, and racial groups (Stein 2001: 190, 192, 193).

In Cote d'Ivoire, Gueï's death invoked a vindictive sentiment in the Western region of the country bordering Liberia. In that area the evidence showed that Taylor supported to MPIGO to overthrow the party that has supported him previously through its former late leader (Human Rights Watch 2005: 11, 29). Here Taylor's attraction to mineral resources is clearly manifested in how the attraction overrides other crucial common-sense political considerations. The nature of the MPIGO campaign and the destructive nature of their campaign is more than a vindictive display. The indication is that the involvement of ex-Taylor supporters and former RUF militias is evident. They looted resources and were involved in rape. This evidence amounts to gross human rights violation and war crimes. However, in the Cote d'Ivoire conflict, three main factors are the basis of their behaviour that culminated in an upsurge of rebel activities. The controversial issue of identity of authentic Cote d'Ivoire citizen, which focused on the exclusion of northerners demanded fierce resistance; (not necessarily violence as happened by the manner of government violent response to the northern occupation by rebels). The revenge of Gueï's death would satisfy the Western rebels; and French
lassie-faire with Gbagbo’s administration constituted the isolation of Gbagbo’s government (Washington Post 2004).

The patterns of conflicts in the analysis lead to the assertion that individual warlord’s greed *per se* could not have plunged the states involved into such protracted civil wars. Other scholarly arguments indicate disloyalty among rebels, which could have caused the eventual dispersal and weakening of the rebel force. There were indisputable grievance issues based on political failure, structural issues that lead to ethnic marginalization and discrimination, and also the economic pillaging by the elite in some cases. Whilst Taylor’s overt excess amounted to greediness this alone could not have enabled him to attack Liberia and subsequently Sierra Leone. The underlying factors go beyond local grievance to regional grievance that invokes the support of other states and systemic apathy by America. We need to admit the general complexity of what actually underlies civil wars. Currently, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal fracas over internal revolts show the complex nature of the causal dynamics that start with all kinds of counter accusations by internal and external parties.

The greed theory makes is made more difficult to identify when developing states conflicts viewed as fundamentally criminal. In as much as greed theory has gained influence and categorized new wars as pure criminality, this rational assumption, backed by the examples cited, still make it difficult with other recently documented reports. For instance, the Powell and Yahya (2006) report does not indicate resources as a basic causal reason of conflicts in West Africa. The evidence in the document also indicates that resources are contributing factors and serve to fuel conflict rather than starting them. In the case of the Cote d’Ivoire conflict, the document disproved that diamonds, for instance, are a major source of income for the rebels. Other exportable commodities such as cocoa, coffee, timber and cotton revenues are used by the rebels. The evidence available shows that the rebels actually use the revenues for their survival and replenishing needed weaponry, the motive for their rebellion could then simply be the criminal onslaught on the general citizens. Nevertheless, war cannot be sensible given its manner of destruction, especially where there is ethical disconnection which has been evident with many non-professional rebels, mostly poor uneducated young boys.

Between Chad, Sudan and Somalia, the upsurge in intra-state conflict resulting from the
issues involved can be attributed to unresolved critical local issues. They were mainly political and diversity issues (ethnic, racial, and religious). Dealing with some of these problems requires both national and international support to adequately work on a balanced and satisfactory resolution. It is evident that at the national level, individual leaders in both Chad and Sudan, by their own idiosyncrasy, have become obstacles to resolving these critical issues. The systemic and regional actors tend to express an interest in the economic implications of national issues and have taken advantage of the cleavages to pursue their interest. The Anglo-Franco policy of 'divide and rule' for economic exploitation, has proven to be an effective time-bomb for social disintegration. If the grievance issues had been resolved earlier, with the encouragement and support of the international and regional organizations, the conflicts could have ceased. The development of animosity complicated the states of Chad and Sudan as well as that of Somalia. The answer to the Chadian, Sudanese, and Somali conflicts, rest with the reduction of international actors' interests, which also amount to greed over economic resources. The systemic greed is a serious obstacle to any local effort to resolve internal conflict (Roeber 2005: 21, 22; Mack 2002: 522).

With Southern African conflicts, the issues surrounding the DRC and Angola civil wars intensified because of the post-Cold War demise of the political ideological struggle into purely economic struggle. The systemic greed had two ways of acquiring cheaper resources from these conflict-ridden states, and indeed the arms trade was vital to the Western arms industry (Agbese 1999: 229). Internally, DRC and Angolan warring parties refused to cooperate because of these economic factors. The decline in intensity of for example, the Angola war, indicates the conflict-fatigue period when Savimbi began to negotiate a power-sharing deal. The post-democratic election in DRC in 2006 has not offered sustainable peace, with the opposition leader in exile after post-election clashes. Indeed the local greedy warlords get external motivation by conflict entrepreneurs within the international arena and developed countries.

The conflicts of the DRC and Angola brought major sub-regional parties embroiled in what is described as internationalized conflict, due to the nature of mixed interests (Human Security Centre 2005: 20). South Africa, Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Namibia on one side and Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi on the other eastern frontiers of DRC. In Angola, South Africa and Namibia had played an active role in fighting alongside
UNITA and the government forces respectively (Batchelor et al 2002: 341, 342). The involvement of most of the economically struggling SADC neighbours had incurred an increase in military expenditure during that period (see figure 4). This was due to the economic political nature of the conflict, and the role of crude oil and mineral resource. It could be inferred that the Zimbabwean political stalemate has not erupted into armed conflict because the SADC neighbours have learnt their lesson in DRC. None of the SADC states have dared to contribute arms or allowed arms passage through their territory. Therefore the importance of external actors is required to make civil war possible. Human Sciences Research Council Report (2006: 6) identifies foremost, politics, economy and ideological interests as underlying issues in SADC conflicts. The Zimbabwean opposition, without military aid from any regional party cannot mobilize an armed response to Mugabe’s tyranny. The lack of any SADC members’ intervention has prevented an armed alternative to topple Mugabe’s entrenched regime. As neither war nor pressure resistance provides a short-cut to a resolution, the later eliminates excessive cost of post war reconstruction.

5.2. The greed hypothesis and implications for milex

a) On the international policy platform

The greed hypothesis’ strength as espousing greed as the only causal factor to rebel wars lies in its ability to raise concern about the possible negative human behaviour during rebellion. It also helps policy-makers, avoid trivializing the availability of primary commodities as potential source of peace, but rather as potential for armed conflict in the state, if there is over dependence on such resources. It draws the international community’s awareness to external illegal market that provides an avenue for the illegal exploitation of mineral resources in conflict states. The hypothesis has an influence on the various impositions of an embargo on “blood diamond” as diamonds from conflict zones with the Kimberly Certification Process Scheme (KCPS), and other natural resources such as timber from countries such as Sierra Leone and Liberia to starve rebel forces of income (Ursino and Kamaludeen 2005: 10). It also raises the need of more aid to conflict prone states to help the governments meet their commitments, thus increasing their defence spending and aid to ultimately pressure rebels to abandon the war. At this juncture some of the significant weakness with greed model will be
considered. The following raises some of the main weakness of the greed econometric hypothesis which gives the wrong signal to security preferences based on intense military security:

i. The argument with grievance carries much of Western perceptions and misconceptions of political attitudes, behaviour and social idiosyncrasies in SSA which can hastily trigger violence such as religious and ethnic oppression.

ii. Putting blame for wars on rebels and labelling them criminals shift focus from human security to absolute state security as the main guarantee of stability.

iii. The need for donor countries to consider military security conditionality with financial aid to African states becomes crucial (Mack 2002: 522).

iv. Arms importation is given priority in the executive agenda to: i) safeguard government protection, ii) symbol to attract investment, iii) guarantee protection to existing state and foreign investment, and iv) policy of resistance of non-cooperation by governments in the event of conflict due to presence of military.

v. It also intensifies the arms trade whereby bribery of African government officials becomes inevitable as arms manufacturers take advantage of conflicts.

vi. The policy of arms companies' bribery protection is also justified as economic interest concerns. The bribery induces excessive weapons procurement and expense on military personnel that affect other social sectors. This has the enormous potential to open the way for "global instability" which normally happens in the developing world, such as Africa (Roeber 2005: 21).

vii. Greed proponents frown at economic dependency through globalization policies of unfair trade balance of current international economy. That has resulted in the economic non-performance of African states. The crisis that evolves and explodes into violence is totally attributed to rebellion. Stewart (2001: 2, 3, 17, 18, 19, 32, 33) shows that inequality, nevertheless, causes critical social imbalances that can lead to political violence.

b) Resources can generate war: Regional policy impact

Greed hypothesis has a negative influence at the level of regional spheres of Africa - especially with emphasis on resources as the only security threat:
1. Such a resource scare could lead to a regional security dilemma by increasing armament, which contributes to regional distrust and destabilization.

ii. The involvement of regional parties in promoting and supporting rebellion is attributed only to rebels. That makes conflict resolution elusive for the entire region.

iii. With the intensification of regional militarization, the proliferation of small arms and criminal activities increases.

c) State

The greed hypothesis acknowledging resource induced patronage by state actors however the greed hypothesis:

i. Trivializing the critical issue of degeneration of human security and the resultant human rights violation that in itself undermines state security through revolt.

ii. The acute abuses of human rights by state actors are treated as potential root factor to violent uprisings in African states (Thoms and Ron 2006: 46, 47). State failure is not the only institutional shortfall, but the inability to provide protection to citizens with divergent policy views is, in itself, anarchy according to Hobbes and Rousseau.

iii. The loci of policy priority is misdirected and wrongly focused on state assets security requires intensive militarization rather than human security (Harris 2004). Such a misguided policy will serve to intensify the conflict or promotes its reoccurrence if human rights issues remain secondary on agenda. This also leads to state actors reinforcing structural mechanisms, such as voting structures, which make the state the absolute provider with excessive statism dependency. Once this is materially and economically difficult, it leads to policy failure.

iv. The patronage governments, without any purported grievance, may use the full strength of the military and state funds without any need for properly account to conduct “raiding” and “terror” by state forces upon its own citizens in e.g. Ethiopia, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Rwanda and Zimbabwe among others (Azam and Hoeffler 2002: 482; Agbese 1999: 233; Human Rights Watch 2005: 14 - 23).

v. The greed hypothesis with its ‘economist’ perspective, therefore, validates the existence of the state without counting how some state leaders mismanage their economies and violate human rights (Fjelde 2006: 6). That happens to push
forward state actors’ parochial interest which can be either ethnic interest or religious, as it is happening in Uganda, Sudan and Somalia (Brown 2001: 219 – 220). The Sierra Leone government, running the state aground, have not been accused of criminality which leads to other emerging forms of armed violence and retaliation by non-state actors.

vi. Greed perception could lead to biased analytical basis which according to Mehler (2005: 13) “could lead to short-sighted and contradictory policies by national governmental and international organizations”.

d) Individual

The radical indiscriminate categorization of all rebel leaders as criminals lends serious weakness to the theory by making them all “greedy predators”:

i. This instils in the government an adversarial (enemy image) stance. Despite greed hypothesis claim there are no means provided by the theory to assess motives.

ii. The sense of bias against non-state actors exonerates governing leaders’ motives and their impact on the political landscape, sometimes resulting in human rights violations and that does not measure up to criminality of the state. These are questions greed proponents do not answer because of their perception that the causes of new conflicts are a commodity than policy issue.

5.3. The implication for human development of the grievance hypothesis

The strength of the grievance hypothesis, generally, is its diverse scope of combining various factors rather than limiting its analysis to a single issue:

i. The grievance hypothesis is significant for its multi-perspective analytical approach to conflict analysis. It therefore helps to dissect a conflict from broad-range of factors from the international to individual and social structures to institutions. It therefore helps in quicker prediction of conflict. The grievance model facilitates easily recognizable signals as integrated-early-warning to avert full-blown conflict. Urvin (2001: 16, 17) explain early-warning as observable
attitudes and patterns of changes. Gambia currently shows early signals of possible revolt possibly with external support. Making it a rebel issue will imply recourse to arms alert but the Jammeh government needs to consider its entrenchment.

ii. Grievance helps in taking the necessary early response through the preventive diplomatic process. The latter is essential to avert the enormous cost of international humanitarian aid, peace-keeping, and protracted resolution procedures which demand lot of funds, so too do cost of post-conflict reconstruction after massive destructions of infrastructure (Mack 2002: 522, 523).

iii. There is the evidence that many grievance proponents advocate for increased cuts in milex and recommend political reform, better power-sharing democratic practice, and discourage extensive incumbency of elected leaders.

a) Regional systems and grievance

Grievance at the regional level has similar significance for security as the global level. The theory:

i. Enhances integrated-early-warning and post-conflict DDR to avert full-blown conflict and its recurrence (Urvin 2001: 16, 17; Møller 2004: 17; Lederach 2002: 80, 81). With the exception of the conflicts that have historical antecedents, most of the new civil wars could have been averted if the early signals have been recognized.

ii. Considering the grievance hypothesis, some of Africa’s sub-regions are erecting mechanisms based on grievance issues to signal a potential conflict in states. In West Africa, an early response intervention base has been set in Sierra Leone, whilst the civil society and grassroots are being educated on the detection of early warning conflict symptoms. These initiatives can help in managing, mitigating and preventing violent conflict in Africa region.

b) Grievance and the state

At the national or state level the grievance position on the causes of new wars informs policy-makers of micro-issues that have relevance for political stability.
Grievance informs policy-makers to consider a protective state, which is cardinal to peace-building and confidence inspiring. Indeed, the pursuit of a military arsenal and maintenance of a large army is for peace and stability which can be achieved at a less a cost by meeting provisions for human and environmental well-being. Such structural preventive measures can forestall operation prevention which can be too late (Møller 2004: 21).

The factors of democracy being the cause of war conform to Levy’s system (broader factors) approach. At the national level of state formation and transition failure, fragmentation of the nation-state in globalization, elements of economic exploitation draws on systemic support in the form of military aid.

The theory is cautious of across-the-board criminalization of non-state actors in civil war, and this makes it a very conducive premise to initiate proactive, preemptive and integrated approaches to conflict prevention and peace-building. The theory recognizes the legitimacy of both actors embroiled in civil war, and that facilitates the use of dialogue and integrative or multi-track negotiation. Peace-building focus achieving consensus among all parties makes it an optimal policy choice. Francis (2004: 62) agrees that it is decision type which places humans as the agent that shape the future which is not fixed. The strategic nature of peace-building as positive-peace with a long-term view of conflict, makes it a better policy informant for new wars conflict resolution.

c) Leadership critical focus of grievance

The grievance hypothesis is concerned with state actors’ behaviour and perceptions:

The grievance theory does not exonerate greedy warlords, but from its balanced perspective to pursue peace, creates the platform to promote multi-track approach negotiation to offer warring parties a genuine chance for peace and stability.

The benefit is that it enables non-state war actors the chance to find their niche in governance or in some cases, where greed is the motive, actors have been exposed Charles Taylor’s as an example. Collier and Hoeffler (2006: 3) acknowledge that even altruistic rebel leaders, certainly in recruiting, shall compose both “altruistic” and “criminal” elements. This results in intensification of criminal activities in the course of fighting government forces. In Sierra
Leone, Sankor tried hard to avert plundering but in such circumstance of chaos, naturally, as Collier acknowledges, control of forces is critical issue and the worst may happen.

5.4. The implication of war debates for policy prioritization

If basing policy approaches on grievance, the implication is to move resources away from the milex to peacemaking by various stakeholders for international peace, through negotiation mediation and possibly to regional courts like the International and Regional Courts of Justice (Peck 2001: 577). If on the other side, greed becomes policy focus given that the military is not very effective in actually resolving conflicts, then two things could be done:

i. War has to be made more costly. For example, weapons should be more difficult to obtain, and tax should be imposed on arms manufacturers to compensate the excessive harm by their usage as it is done with tobacco products. There is the need to impose sanctions such as an embargo on arms supply as in Cote d’Ivoire. The intervention with UN/AU peacekeepers as a matter of course should cost the particular state at war, afterwards.

ii. Peace can be made more profitable by the use of aid to finance demilitarization i.e. to reward countries which adopt a less militarized stance. Normally post war aids have involved further armament under the guise of making the military more capable to deter sudden offensive. For instance, the Security Council mission to Sierra Leone in 2004 found that country has been disappointed by aid promises which could undermine the peace-building process (Parry et al 2004: item 35).

Mehler (2005: 19, 20) contends that in spite of firm plans for conflict intervention in Africa, there is no “analytical backbone” influencing the prioritization of the many strategies proposed between Africa and EU partners, for example, as found in the Evian Summit (France) in 2003:

....to train African peace support forces, including through the development of regional centres of excellence to train military and civilian personnel in conflict prevention and peace support, and to better coordinate peacekeeping training initiatives. Special foci were put on reducing the number of small arms
circulating in Africa, helping African countries rid themselves of anti-personnel mines, getting close scrutiny of the link between conflict and pillage of natural resources, ending illicit trafficking of weapons and outlawing mercenary activities (Mehler 2005: 19, 20).

Real social rebuilding support is relegated elsewhere as is happening in Sierra Leone due to uncertainty surrounding the causal factors which is made more difficult by theories like greed. The difficulty with intervention and preventive strategies cannot be oversimplified as espoused by the greed hypothesis and therefore poses misplaced prioritization and concentration of aid on military concerns in the peace pursuit processes.

5.5. Summary

The greed theory therefore does not help with peace-building as it demonizes non-state actors in conflict with the state. Pro peace-building theories and conflict analysis model should recognize the non-state adversary and accord warring parties equal courtesy that helps in mooting the steps for peaceful and sustainable resolution of conflict. It rather promotes the track one approach to conflict resolution where rebels are compelled to acquiesce to a peace deal. The state, recognizing the implication, uses that as excuse to increase military spending without paper accounting. In the absence of accountability some defence deals in Africa have been involved in massive bribery and corruption. This nevertheless affects other sectors of state spending which Omitoogun (2003) and Smaldone (2004) claim plunges the state into debt.

With grievance the analysis indicates that its broad outlook and considerations of varying factors meet the nature of complexity with the new wars. Therefore the grievance discourse has much relevance for conflict prevention and conflict resolution that can last longer. This is due to its capability to promote the recognition of warring parties and build bridges to link them. Grievance therefore facilitates in creating a platform that is conducive for peace-building and restoring hope of trust by working to prevent “enemy image” syndrome. Grievance, therefore, discourages unnecessary arms build-up that has the tendency to trigger conflict. It advocates state focus on human security as the optimal means of achieving stability and lasting peace in post war states.
Chapter Six

6. Conclusion and recommendations

The dissertation began by highlighting some background issues pertaining to the origin of wars generally, context issues and sequel of wars in SSA. It also captured the brief historical overview of war studies and peace research initiators, definitional review of peacebuilding, the state and democracy concepts. It stated the goal and objectives of the study namely as (i) to examine the debate concerning the causes of war, with emphasis on grievance and greed; (ii) to review the major civil wars which have occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1990, with particular reference to their underlying causes; and (iii) to assesses the implications of the underlying causes of war for African military expenditure in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The dissertation has reviewed the milex trend in Africa from the 1990s and observed that high milex has an impact on human security and the general development in African states. It was argued that factors that caused high milex originate from the systemic, regional, national and the perception of state actors. In considering the issue of privatization of military functions, concern for demilitarization and a peaceful alternative to non-military conflict resolution, and early warning mechanisms, was raised. The chapter provides definitional review of security as a concept. It also showed that state security based on the military is elusive and a lack of human security results in disloyalty of both military and society, which can trigger conflict and violent consequences with human rights violations.

Then in an effort to ascertain whatever causes new civil wars, the two main debates about the causes of Africa civil wars, grievance and greed hypothesis were reviewed. It was observed that whilst the grievance hypothesis is conducive for employing peace-building approach due to its broad outlook of conflict; greed is not pro-peace-building and rather tend to augur for military security than human security. The absence of complimenting the various models creates a policy discrepancy which normally affects government budget priorities. Thus, the absence of complimenting the various
discourses, resolution to conflicts may be difficult and therefore the tendency for political actors to depend excessively on military to provide security.

An overview of cases of major conflicts across Africa with a brief review of nature of pre-colonial African warfare is then presented. The majority of the new wars originated from revolutionary motives due to various factors which are mainly political failures. The issue of resources was found to be an aspect that helps mostly in the duration of the wars as a source of revenue to sustain major actors involved in the civil wars. However given the level of destruction, none of these is enough reason for rational humans to wage destruction and carnage beyond those acceptable in war. None of the reasons is convincing and justifies the proportion of loss of life and resources.

Thus an evaluation which assessed the level of the two debates grievance and greed on the state policy implications of the causes of war debates and impact on military spending in Africa was performed. Whilst greed hypothesis is conducive for a distributive type of conflict resolution based on an adversarial outlook which argues from an econometric perception and commoditized conflict issues; it is thus not pro peace-building theory and the conflict analysis model should recognize the non-state adversary and accord warring parties equal courtesy that helps in mooting the steps for peaceful and sustainable resolution of conflict. Grievance is noted to create the platform that is conducive for peace-building and restoring hope of trust by working to prevent “enemy image” syndrome. Grievance therefore discourages unnecessary arms build-up that has a tendency to trigger conflict. It advocates state focus on human security as the optimal means of achieving stability and lasting peace in post war states.

6.1. Reflection on SSA war debates and milex

The study on causes of wars debate in Sub-Saharan Africa and its implication for milex showed a lack of effective systematic means of assessing new conflicts in Africa for durable resolution, effective preventive measures, and early warning detection. This is due to unnecessary conflicting causal hypothesis that does not help in effective decision-making and efficient internal and external resource utilization by stakeholders involved in African conflicts. The dissertation ends by saying that the issues raised
based on grievance and that of greed do not justify the level of carnage and destruction involved in African wars. Therefore what compels leaders to find solutions with violence is as a result of opportunity not based on primary commodities per se. It also involves the opportunity to heroism based on distorted perception of power and lack of social education on appropriate means for conflict resolution, lack of appropriate early warning mechanisms and trivialization of conflict warnings as happened in ECOWAS, East-Central Africa. The understanding, that is lacking at the systemic, regional, levels in the states and with political and non-political actors together with entire communities is the sense of security. We cannot provide any meaningful answer to the causes of war, if our sense of security is warped and distorted. Basically “human security, in the sense that your security is my security” underlies human practice of religion and institutions such as politics and military (Brown 2001). Indeed, the distortion of security from strong realist, patriarchal and warped masculinity perspective makes society hail violence as heroic, therefore violent revolutionary attempt is acclaimed as great. It espouses the negativity in the saying that the end justifies the means as new wars philosophical outlook.

Some religious perspectives from Buddha to Jesus, Mohammed, Gandhi, and Luther King discouraged violence in pursuit of social, economic and political security. They taught love, peace, tolerance, non-aggression that should characterize true culture of human race. Unfortunately, the perspective of security still carried with it the symbolism of violence which is attributed to the distorted perception of power as exhibition and application of force and compulsion. This time it takes the form of the survival of the fittest, the strongest and the most powerful in terms of military might. That has also had cultural implications where masculinity connotes the ability to use force and military might (Francis 2004: 64f). So where there is threat to security the most obvious solution has been violence or war to decide the winner. Islamic Jihads and Christians’ crusades have been represented as employment of violence, compulsion to obedience by resistant opponents in both political and religious spheres with contradicting ideology and perceptions which underlies conflicts generally. Gandhi led the entire Indian nation through his concept of Satyagraha based on the Hindu concept of peace and struggle to overthrow British colonialism. In spite of the availability of religious and philosophical basis for non-violence, conflict resolution in human history has generally been violent due to the perspective of the prevailing paradigm of power security and manhood as the
ability to use force and inflict violence. Today the major conflicts beyond Africa are of politico-religious nature such as new terrorism and Bush’s “axis of evil” crusade, Zionism and Jihadism. At the end of the twentieth century, which holds the record of the two world wars and the beginning of new civil wars in Africa, there have been some hopes for a change for reduction of armed violence in the new twenty-first century. In a statement by Blair which captured this view,

My father fought in the last great European war. I was born in 1953, a child of the Cold War era, raised amid the constant fear of a conflict with the potential to destroy all of humanity. Whatever other dangers may exist, no such fear exists today. Mine is the first generation able to contemplate the possibility that we may live our entire lives without going to war or sending our children to war. That is a prize beyond value and this agreement is a great contribution to it (Blair in Paris May 1997).

But unfortunately and contrary to Blair’s words, he was involved with US and together led the Iraq invasion as part of the axis of evil crusade. This was a contradiction to the aspiration of civil society and the UN Security Council for other peaceful alternatives such as tightening sanctions (Møller 2004: 22; Oudraat 2001: 340-343). Bush and Blair’s intelligence which led to recourse to war was found to be baseless concerning Hussein’s “weapons of mass destruction” programme. Similarly, the carnage in most African conflicts has been found to be above the cost of purported basis being addressed by armed violence. At the level of the international community, there are policies that encourage arming Africa to the teeth to protect their economic interest, and not necessarily the welfare of such weak states. The issue of arming Africa in the interest of ideological and state security has been influential as a crucial factor in the causing of new civil wars. France, US, UK, Russia, for example, have provided resources for African states militarization, and in other cases, arming opposition groups to resort to arm struggle when politically aggrieved. Antecedent to the new civil wars are the foundations laid by such policies which has enormous influence to motivate recourse to armed insurrection rather than an individual’s greed.

Therefore, grievance actually has more justification as a key underlying factor leading to armed conflict in most Sub-Saharan Africa conflicts. Greed, from the perspective of this research, may not be the critical element to provoke issues that leads to violence.
and wars in Africa. The study finds greed, as the meaning implies, to be parasitic advantage taken when there is violent conflict. Greed is found to be individual excesses by both rebel and state forces (sometimes involved) to use available natural resources to support the conflict. There is evidence of pre-colonial antecedent ‘greed’ in African tribal wars where massive cattle looting were a motivating factor but not the only independent variable. Greed can generate grievance, if greed is exhibited in the state political actors’ structure. That normally leads to serious corruption and resultant state failure, as happened in Sierra Leone and DRC. Thus, after a review of ECOWAS, East-Central Africa, to Southern Africa conflicts show a pattern that does not indicate greed as the causal link to civil wars but political structural issues which are transformed into ethnic, cultural, religious, and ideological bickering most of the time resulting in acute human rights violations that trigger violent up-risings. This comes about because the institutional mechanism for justice also denies justice or is not accessible to some minority parties or part of grieving society. In addition there have been foundations set already to trigger conflicts through incorrect colonial policies of ‘divide-and-rule’ politics. The dissertation has identified that greed is, most of the time, opportunistic that only helps to prolong conflict but is not the cause, in most cases of SSA conflicts. The study also identified that it is not only private rebel leaders who have such a tendency, but greedy governments that are biased and oppressive against a section of society and fails to implement conducive policy that promote social and economic justice. This is capable of inflaming of social protest, which if excessive military force is used by the state against its own citizens can result in civil war. This trend is also evident in most of the conflicts on other regions such as Asia and South America.

The study concurs that the greed hypothesis shows misunderstanding of the African context issues which are attitudinal and peculiar ethnic mindset issues. Indeed some rebel leaders may be “sleeping dogs” with ulterior motives and a peculiar idiosyncrasy that is capable of wreaking havoc for personal gains at extreme cost. Such actors have the opportunity to use violence when there is the least opportunity, not caused by resource abundance but rather by external and internal support abundance. The resource factor is just one item of many. It is the issue that creates the opportunity that matters most. This normally lies with the political policy and system that, though assumed as democratic, denies its very essence in dialogue and open forum for majority and minority to discuss issues. Democracy is said to promote peace, but theoretically, the
pursuit of peace appears idealistic from the point of view of the perception that human nature is innately violent. It is negated by Burns’ (1990: 73 – 75) argument that humans cannot be passive to the achievement of peace but directly “responsible” for making it happen. This is ignored by emerging political policies in Africa which resort instead to militarization alone as the most appropriate security without enhancing institutions for resolving conflicts, such effective judiciary and accountable civil service. And as peace is relevant for general human and social development and economic growth, such peace cannot be spelt by military might (Dower 1995: 18). According to Toh and Floresco-Tawagas (1987: 27) peace is not unattainable in the way it is perceived without militarization. In some African countries, militarization has been a critical drain on the economy and is incapable of effective defence in the complexity of new civil wars. Whilst many African states do not reveal the amount involved in military (hardware which should be a staggering figure), the routine maintenance and personnel expenditure is a tremendous burden for the overall GDP (Harris 2004: 205). This nevertheless portrays the drain of milex on state resources at the sacrifice of essential general wellbeing of citizens by the provision of cheaper social services and agriculture development for food production. Whilst health is declining, with many African states being incapable of providing Anti-Retro Viral (ARV) drugs for HIV/AIDS, incapable of producing enough food and deteriorating educational standards, milex is still very high despite critical local level development needs in many SSA states.

6.2. Suggestions for policy considerations

Upon issues the study has raised with regard to the debates on the causes of new civil wars in SSA and its correlation with milex as conventional security measure, the following suggestions have been proposed for policy consideration:

a) On the causes of new civil wars debates and policy:

i. The greed theory espouses intensive militarization as the state’s safeguard to resist and prevent rebellion. The discussion on milex in SSA has shown that such state security based on the military is elusive. There is the need to address the underlying issues of conflict where a lack of proper human security results in the disloyalty of both military and society to the state, which triggers rebellion when human rights and
basic-survival needs are violated. There has been ample evidence of data problems with greed as a single causal variable which makes it inadequate and unreliable as the optimal decision guide in the context of SSA.

ii. *Grievance discourse is noted as having much relevance for sustainable conflict prevention and conflict resolution.* The dissertation notes that grievance, therefore, facilitates the creation of a platform that is conducive for peacebuilding and restoring hope and trust by working to prevent enemy image syndrome. Grievance is noted to discourage unnecessary arms build-up that has the tendency to trigger conflict. The grievance discourse advocates state focus on human security as the optimal means of achieving stability and lasting peace in post war states. Grievance’s multiple factors approach can help decision-makers consider various alternatives to the provision of security other than the over dependence on militarization and resultant excessive mil ex. It also provides a basis for the review and restructuring of social structures and power relations that is non-violent.

b) On the study of cases of new civil wars in SSA the dissertation recommends that:

i. *None of the the two main hypothesis grievance or greed is enough reason for people to wage destruction and carnage beyond 'reasonable' ethically guided war.* None of the reasons is convincing and justifies the proportion of loss of life and resources as an expression of selfish greed and grievance over human rights violation. The nature of the greed identified extends beyond the individual’s agenda and has far reaching state actors’ and systemic influence from external actors which should not be trivialized in the SSA context with its peculiarities in ethnic and religious diversities.

ii. *In the review of new cases of new civil wars, the greed hypothesis instead promotes the track one approach to conflict resolution where rebels are compelled to acquiesce to peace deals without consideration of the*
underlying issues. That has provided only short-term or temporary measures of peace which ends with a relapse into conflict by aggrieved parties. The dissertation advises the need to a long-term resolution of conflicts by peace-building based on a broader outlook of new civil war causes, rather than just a narrow single individual factor.

iii. The study supports the call for cooperation and convergence of research finding activities on new wars in SSA to provide appropriate systematic and effective framework for SSA conflict analysis and resolution. The lack of empirical evidence in most of the literature reduces the validity of the hypothesis and the consequence of misinformation can be incalculable. Only a few researchers attempt to organize their work by pulling the causal factors together. Currently, the new war causal factors are isolated and scattered across numerous works. This is indicative of an effective organized explanation of the causal issues evident in the level of recurrence and awakening of further military interventions in Equatorial Guinea and diplomatic conflict between The Gambia and Senegal. There are still rebel activities in Kivu of DRC and armed crisis in Lesotho, for example.

c) On the influence of new civil wars debate on milex, the dissertation recommends that:

i. The issue of privatization of military functions raised the concern for demilitarization and peaceful alternative to non-military (civilianization) conflict resolution. The new approach posed by private military comes with complex tactics which current SSA armies are incapable, to some extent, to handle. Therefore the cost of maintaining a large army should be reformed (Harris 2004: 205, 206). What is required first then, is cutting down the size of the army and its expenditure by carefully planned DDR; and second, adopting a democratic model that poses less of a threat to governments by provision of majority-minority power-sharing structures (Møller 2004: 22). Currently most of the defence decisions are confined to the ruling governments which tend to serve its interest and perpetuate a
form of power abuse and political entrenchment with the military support. Power-sharing between majority and minorities should encourage democratization of defence decision-making.

ii. The issue of social conscience on violence and wars remains critical to defence reform. The emerged new wars which are intra-state require rational political choices as well as the input of civil society on preferential defence security alternatives. Indeed, to what extent should military decisions be subject to public participation? Uniformed society certainly cannot make meaningful contribution in an area of which they have little understanding. The dissertation posits that the traditional perception of security itself is distorted. Therefore, an effective effort to democratize defence decision requires some level of perception transformation which comprehends security not as force and domination, but rather human security, in the sense that ‘your security is my security’. Generally the need for appropriate social education on peace, security and violence is necessary in Africa where the last two decades have been governed by violence in terms of wars and high levels of organized crime due to the proliferation of small-light weapons (Maxwell 2004: 123, 132, 133). The need to demilitarize social conscience is imperative for new security perspective (Harris 2004: 206). The state needs to propose such policies of social education and get civil society organizations and entire communities to take it up as national security task.

iii. The dissertation therefore suggests that militarization is not an effective optimal choice for defence in Sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed neither is militarization efficient to defence counting on the resource input and the time used to achieve objectives at lesser cost by considering alternatives (Harris 2004: 199, 200). Military solutions do not offer efficient solutions by considering the proportionate cost in human and material resources destroyed. ECOWAS, East to Central Africa and Southern African conflicts bear evidence of military solution to demand political change or arrest rebellion against governments as ineffective and inefficient. The need for setting up peace constituencies in communities and state level
supervision can help prevent conflicts reaching violent stages (Lederach 2002: 94). Such organization can serve as part of early warning mechanisms.

iv. *It would be expedient if multinational aids are directed to support services and capacity building at the local levels.* Allowing aid to refurbish the state military only exacerbates the neglected role and irresponsible statism that entrench rent patronage, corruption, exclusion politics and executive plundering of state resources. Governments of post-war states should provide a strategic plan of action on the use of aids and should be open to external monitoring and evaluation.

v. *Finally, external factors that contribute to rearmament and makes DDR difficult include arms manufacturers and dealers.* The imposition of high tax and rewarding post-war governments with further aid based on reduced milex and effective DDR could help in redirecting resources to nation building. It would be effective if post-war states that recourse to excessive rearmament are not encouraged with strict conditional loan and grant facilities. Strictly conditional aid can be diverted to activities that have less priority for reconstruction and peacebuilding (Harris 2004: 208f). The onus is on the international stakeholders for Africa’s peace to recognize the role proliferation of light-weapons having contributed to the insecurity in the region. This also requires commitment to arms and light-weapons conventions signed by African governments within their respective sub-regional organizations and its enforcement.
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Appendix

Item 1.

Regional distribution and total number of major armed conflicts, 1990–2000

![Graph showing regional distribution and total number of major armed conflicts, 1990–2000.]

Item 2.

The burden of military expenditure: military expenditure as a share of GDP in ten countries with the highest milex: GDP ratio in Africa 1991-1999.

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### Item 3.

**World and regional military expenditure estimates 1996 – 2005**

Figures are in US$ b., at constant (2003) prices and exchange rates. Figures in italics are percentages. Figures do not always add up to totals because of the convention of rounding.

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( ) = Total based on country data accounting for less than 90% the regional total; .. = Available data account for less than 60% of the regional total.

Some countries are excluded because of lack of data or consistent time series data. Africa excludes Angola, Benin, Equitorial Guinea and Somalia; America excludes Cuba, Haiti and Trinidad and Tobago; Asia excludes Myanmar and Viet Nam; and Middle-East excludes Iraq and Qatar.

World totals exclude all these countries.

Source: SIPRI, Appendix 8A, tables 8A.1 and 8A.3.
Item 4.
Item 5.

Defense expenditure as a percentage of GDP top 25 countries - 1999

Source: WMEAT
Item 6.

The column on Military Expenditure as percentage of combined education and health expenditure shows that some countries spend much more on military expenditure than on the social sectors. The following 7 countries show highest military expenditure for the period 1990-91 as a percentage of combined education and health expenditure.

- Angola is top with 208%
- Ethiopia 190%
- Mozambique 121%
- Tanzania 77%
- Morocco 72%
- Zimbabwe 66%
- Zambia 63%

As noted above, Angola and Mozambique are heavy military spenders and poor spenders in the social sectors. In Angola in 1995, the female literacy rate was 29% against 56% for men. During the period 1985-95, only 30% of the population had access to health services while 32% had access to safe water. During 1990 to 1996, only 15% of the births were attended by trained health personnel. At the same time the maternal mortality rate stood at 1500 per 100000 live births! The infant mortality rate at 170 per 1000 live births, and 191 per 1000 for Under-5 Mortality Rate(U5MR). It would therefore seem correct to say that high military spending coupled with a heavy debt burden take investment away from the social sectors and women and children suffer a great deal from poor health and unnecessary deaths. Notably, such countries as Nigeria, Egypt, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Niger, Sudan and Tunisia indicate significant reduction in military spending relative to health and education expenditure.

**Item 7.**

**World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT)**

The U.S. State Department Bureau of Arms Control’s World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) report, most recently published on February 6, 2003, provides figures for the ten-year period from 1989 to 1999. WMEAT uses the World Bank’s average 1999 market exchange rates in order to calculate military expenditures for most countries. In cases where no appropriate exchange rate is available, WMEAT uses PPP estimates.

For NATO members, WMEAT measures military expenditures according to a common definition that includes military retired pay and military-type expenditures of defense ministries. In this definition, a) civilian-related expenditures of defense ministries are excluded and military-related expenditures of other ministries are included; b) grant military assistance is included in the expenditures of the donor country; c) purchases of military equipment for credit are included at the time the debt is incurred, not at the time of payment.

For most other countries, figures represent the expenditures of the ministry of defense. When these are known to include the costs of internal security, an attempt is made to remove such expenditures. A wide variety of data sources is used for these countries, including the publications and data resources of other U.S.

Item 8.

Source: ©MAGELLAN Geographix Santa Barbara, CA (800) 929-4MAP - 1999